Position Limits for Derivatives, 3236-3493 [2020-25332]
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 9 / Thursday, January 14, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 1, 15, 17, 19, 40, 140, 150
and 151
RIN 3038–AD99
Position Limits for Derivatives
Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or
‘‘CFTC’’) is adopting amendments in
this final rule (‘‘Final Rule’’) to conform
regulations concerning speculative
position limits to the relevant Wall
Street Transparency and Accountability
Act of 2010 (‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’)
amendments to the Commodity
Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’). Among other
regulatory amendments, the
Commission is adopting: New and
amended Federal spot-month limits for
25 physical commodity derivatives;
amended single month and all-monthscombined limits for most of the
agricultural contracts currently subject
to Federal position limits; new and
amended definitions for use throughout
the position limits regulations,
including a revised definition of ‘‘bona
fide hedging transaction or position’’
and a new definition of ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps’’; amended rules
governing exchange-set limit levels and
grants of exemptions therefrom; a new
streamlined process for bona fide
hedging recognitions for purposes of
Federal position limits; new enumerated
bona fide hedges; and amendments to
certain regulatory provisions that would
eliminate Form 204 while also enabling
the Commission to leverage and receive
cash-market reporting submitted
directly to the exchanges by market
participants.
SUMMARY:
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DATES:
Effective date: This Final Rule will
become effective on March 15, 2021.
Compliance date: Compliance dates
for this Final Rule shall be as follows:
• January 1, 2022 in connection with
the Federal speculative position limits
for the 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts subject to Federal
position limits for the first time under
this Final Rule. This compliance date
also applies to any associated referenced
contracts other than economically
equivalent swaps. Such swaps are
subject to a separate compliance date
noted below.
• January 1, 2022 in connection with
an exchange’s requirements under
§ 150.5, as adopted in this Final Rule.
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• January 1, 2023 in connection with
Federal speculative position limits for
economically equivalent swaps, as
defined under this Final Rule.
• January 1, 2023 in connection with
the elimination of previously-granted
risk management exemptions described
in § 150.3(c), as adopted in this Final
Rule.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dorothy DeWitt, Director, (202) 418–
6057, ddewitt@cftc.gov; Rachel Reicher,
Chief Counsel, (202) 418–6233,
rreicher@cftc.gov; Steven A. Haidar,
Assistant Chief Counsel, (202) 418–
5611, shaidar@cftc.gov; Aaron Brodsky,
Senior Special Counsel, (202) 418–5349,
abrodsky@cftc.gov; Steven Benton,
Industry Economist, (202) 418–5617,
sbenton@cftc.gov; Lillian Cardona,
Assistant Chief Counsel, (202) 418–
5012, lcardona@cftc.gov; Jeanette Curtis,
Assistant Chief Counsel, (202) 418–
5669, jcurtis@cftc.gov; Harold Hild,
Policy Advisor, (202) 418–5376, hhild@
cftc.gov; Division of Market Oversight,
in each case, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Three Lafayette
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW,
Washington, DC 20581; Michael
Ehrstein, Special Counsel, (202) 418–
5957, mehrstein@cftc.gov; Chang Jung,
Special Counsel, (202) 418–5202,
cjung@cftc.gov; Division of Swap Dealer
and Intermediary Oversight, in each
case, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Three Lafayette Centre,
1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC
20581; Rachel Hayes, Trial Attorney,
(816) 960–7741, rhayes@cftc.gov;
Division of Enforcement, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, 4900
Main Street, Suite 500, Kansas City, MO
64112; or Brigitte Weyls, Trial Attorney,
(312) 596–0547, bweyls@cftc.gov;
Division of Enforcement, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, 525 West
Monroe Street, Suite 1100, Chicago, IL
60661.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Introduction
B. Executive Summary
C. Section-by-Section Summary of Final
Rule
D. Effective Date and Compliance Period
E. The Commission Construes CEA Section
4a(a) To Require the Commission To
Make a Necessity Finding Before
Establishing Position Limits for Physical
Commodities Other Than Excluded
Commodities
F. The Commission’s Use of Certain
Terminology
G. Recent Volatility in the WTI Contract
H. Brief Summary of Comments Received
II. Final Rule
A. § 150.1—Definitions
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B. § 150.2—Federal Position Limit Levels
C. § 150.3—Exemptions From Federal
Position Limits
D. § 150.5—Exchange-Set Position Limits
and Exemptions Therefrom
E. § 150.6—Scope
F. § 150.8—Severability
G. § 150.9—Process for Recognizing NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions With Respect
to Federal Speculative Position Limits
H. Part 19 and Related Provisions—
Reporting of Cash-Market Positions
I. Removal of Part 151
III. Legal Matters
A. Interpretation of Statute Regarding
Whether Necessity Finding Is Required
for Position Limits Established Pursuant
to CEA 4a(a)(2)
B. Legal Standard for Necessity Finding
C. Necessity Finding as to the 25 Core
Referenced Futures Contracts
D. Necessity Finding as to Linked
Contracts
E. Necessity Finding for Spot/Non-Spot
Month Position Limits
IV. Related Matters
A. Cost-Benefit Considerations
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Antitrust Considerations
I. Background
A. Introduction
The Commission has long established
and enforced speculative position limits
for futures contracts and options on
futures contracts on nine agricultural
commodities as authorized by the CEA.1
These nine agricultural commodity
contracts, which have been subject to
Federal position limits for decades, are
generally referred to as the ‘‘nine legacy
agricultural contracts.’’ Under this Final
Rule, the Commission additionally will
establish Federal speculative position
limits for certain commodity derivatives
contracts associated with 16 additional
commodities. The Commission refers to
these 16 new commodities and their
associated commodity derivatives
contracts throughout this release as the
‘‘non-legacy’’ contracts since they are
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under this Final Rule.
Accordingly, under the Final Rule,
certain commodity derivatives contracts
associated with 25 commodities are
subject to Federal position limits.
The Commission’s existing position
limits regulations 2 in existing part 150
17
U.S.C. 1 et seq.
CFR part 150. Part 150 of the Commission’s
regulations establishes Federal position limits (that
is, position limits established by the Commission)
on the nine legacy agricultural contracts. The nine
legacy agricultural contracts are: CBOT Corn (and
Mini-Corn) (C), CBOT Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans
(and Mini-Soybeans) (S), CBOT Wheat (and MiniWheat) (W), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT
Soybean Meal (SM), MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat
(MWE), CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW),
2 17
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of the Commission’s regulations include
three components:
First, the Commission’s existing
regulations establish separate position
limit levels for each of the nine legacy
agricultural contracts. These Federal
position limit levels set the maximum
speculative positions in each of the nine
legacy agricultural contracts that a
person may hold in the spot month,
individual month, and all-monthscombined.3
Second, the existing Federal position
limits framework provides exemptions
to the Federal position limit levels for
positions that constitute ‘‘bona fide
hedging transactions or positions’’ and
for certain ‘‘spread or arbitrage’’
positions.4
Third, the Commission’s existing
regulations determine which accounts
and positions a person must aggregate
for the purpose of determining
compliance with the Federal position
limit levels.5
The existing Federal speculative
position limits function in parallel to
exchange-set position limits and/or
exchange-set position accountability
required by designated contract market
(‘‘DCM’’) Core Principle 5.6 As a result,
the nine legacy agricultural contracts are
subject to both Federal and exchange-set
limits, whereas other exchange-traded
futures contracts and options on futures
contracts are subject only to DCM-set
limits and/or position accountability.
As part of the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress amended the CEA’s position
limits provisions, which since 1936
have authorized the Commission (and
its predecessor) to impose limits on
speculative positions to prevent the
harms caused by excessive speculation.
As discussed below, the Commission
and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). See 17 CFR 150.2. The
Federal position limits on these agricultural
contracts are referred to as ‘‘legacy’’ limits because
these contracts have been subject to Federal
position limits for decades.
3 See 17 CFR 150.2.
4 See 17 CFR 150.3.
5 See 17 CFR 150.4.
6 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5); 17 CFR 38.300. Paragraph (A)
of DCM Core Principle 5 provides: To reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion (especially during trading in the
delivery month), the board of trade shall adopt for
each contract of the board of trade, as is necessary
and appropriate, position limitations or position
accountability for speculators. Position limits
generally cannot be exceeded absent an exemption,
whereas position accountability allows an exchange
to establish a level at which market participants,
including those participants who do not qualify for
an exemption, are required to: Provide position
information to the exchange prior to increasing a
position above the accountability level; halt further
position increases; and/or reduce positions in an
orderly manner. Core Principle 6 in part 37 of the
Commission’s regulations for swap execution
facilities (‘‘SEFs’’) contains similar language. 17
CFR 38.600.
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interprets these amendments as, among
other things, tasking the Commission
with establishing such position limits as
it finds are ‘‘necessary’’ for the purpose
of ‘‘diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing’’ excessive speculation
causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price of such commodity.7 The
Commission also interprets these
amendments as tasking the Commission
with establishing position limits on any
‘‘economically equivalent’’ swaps.8
The Commission previously issued
proposed and final rules in 2011 (‘‘2011
Final Rulemaking’’) to implement the
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
regarding position limits and the bona
fide hedge definition.9 A September 28,
2012 order of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia vacated the
2011 Final Rulemaking, with the
exception of the rule’s amendments to
17 CFR 150.2.10
Subsequently, the Commission
proposed position limits regulations in
2013 (‘‘2013 Proposal’’), in June of 2016
(‘‘2016 Supplemental Proposal’’), and
again in December of 2016 (‘‘2016
Reproposal’’).11 The 2016 Reproposal
would have amended part 150 of the
Commission’s regulations to, among
other things: Establish Federal position
limits for 25 physical commodity
futures contracts and their linked
futures contracts, options on futures
contracts, and ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ swaps; revise the existing
exemptions from such limits, including
for bona fide hedges; and establish a
framework for exchanges 12 to recognize
certain positions as bona fide hedges
and thus exempt from position limits.
To date, the Commission has not
issued any final rulemaking based on
the 2013 Proposal, 2016 Supplemental
Proposal, or 2016 Reproposal. The 2016
Reproposal generally addressed
comments received in response to the
2013 Proposal and the 2016
Supplemental Proposal. In a separate
2016 proposed rulemaking, the CFTC
7 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1); see infra Section III.C.
(discussion of the necessity finding).
8 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5); see also infra Section II.B.1.iii.
9 Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 FR 4752 (Jan.
26, 2011) (‘‘2011 Proposal’’); Position Limits for
Futures and Swaps, 76 FR 71626 (Nov. 18, 2011)
(‘‘2011 Final Rulemaking’’).
10 Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 887 F. Supp.
2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012) (‘‘ISDA’’).
11 Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680
(Dec. 12, 2013) (‘‘2013 Proposal’’); Position Limits
for Derivatives: Certain Exemptions and Guidance,
81 FR 38458 (June 13, 2016) (‘‘2016 Supplemental
Proposal’’); and Position Limits for Derivatives, 81
FR 96704 (Dec. 30, 2016) (‘‘2016 Reproposal’’).
12 Unless indicated otherwise, the use of the term
‘‘exchanges’’ throughout this release refers to DCMs
and SEFs.
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also proposed, and later adopted in
2016, amendments to rules in § 150.4 of
the Commission’s regulations governing
aggregation of positions for purposes of
compliance with Federal position
limits.13 These aggregation rules
currently apply only to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts subject to existing
Federal position limits. Going forward,
these aggregation rules will apply to all
commodity derivative contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits under
this Final Rule.
The Commission published a notice
of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register on February 27, 2020 for a new
position limits proposal (‘‘2020
NPRM’’). After reconsidering the prior
proposals, including reviewing the
comments responding thereto, the
Commission in the 2020 NPRM
withdrew from further consideration the
2013 Proposal, the 2016 Supplemental
Proposal, and the 2016 Reproposal.14
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
intended to: (1) Recognize differences
across commodities and contracts,
including differences in commercial
hedging and cash-market reporting
practices; (2) focus on commodity
derivative contracts that are critical to
price discovery and distribution of the
underlying commodities such that the
burden of excessive speculation in the
commodity derivative contracts may
have a particularly acute impact on
interstate commerce for the underling
commodities; and (3) reduce
duplication and inefficiency by
leveraging existing expertise and
processes at DCMs.
The public comment period for the
2020 NPRM ended May 15, 2020,15 and
13 Aggregation of Positions, 81 FR 91454 (Dec. 16,
2016) (‘‘Final Aggregation Rulemaking’’); see 17
CFR 150.4. Under the Final Aggregation
Rulemaking, unless an exemption applies, a
person’s positions must be aggregated with
positions for which the person controls trading or
for which the person holds a 10% or greater
ownership interest. The Division of Market
Oversight has issued time-limited no-action relief
from some of the aggregation requirements
contained in that rulemaking. See CFTC Letter No.
19–19 (July 31, 2019), available at https://
www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/download.
14 Because the earlier proposals were withdrawn
in the 2020 NPRM, comments on the earlier
proposals are not part of the administrative record
with respect to the 2020 NPRM nor with respect to
this Final Rule, except where expressly referenced
herein. In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission stated
that commenters to the 2016 Reproposal should
resubmit comments relevant to the subject proposal;
commenters who wish to reference prior comment
letters should cite those prior comment letters as
specifically as possible. (85 FR at 11597).
Accordingly, this Final Rule will not discuss
comments submitted in connection with the 2016
Reproposal unless such comments were
resubmitted for the 2020 NPRM.
15 Comments were originally due by April 29,
2020. Due to the COVID–19 pandemic, the
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the Commission received approximately
75 public comment letters.16 After
Commission extended the deadline to May 15,
2020.
16 The Commission states ‘‘approximately 75
relevant comment letters’’ since several commenters
submitted additional, or supplemental, comments.
As a result, the total could change slightly
depending on whether one includes these
supplemental comment letters in the total. Thus, for
the avoidance of doubt, the Commission uses
‘‘approximately.’’ The Commission received
comments from: American Cotton Shippers
Association (‘‘ACSA’’); American Feed Industry
Association (‘‘AFIA’’); American Gas Association
(‘‘AGA’’); AQR Capital Management, LLC (‘‘AQR’’);
Archer Daniels Midland (‘‘ADM’’); AMCOT;
Americans for Financial Reform (‘‘AFR’’); Arthur
Dunavant Investments (‘‘Dunavant’’); ASR Group
International, Inc. (‘‘ASR’’); Atlantic Cotton
Association (‘‘ACA’’); Barnard, Chris (Individual);
Better Markets, Inc. (‘‘Better Markets’’); Cargill, Inc.
(‘‘Cargill’’); Castleton Commodities International
LLC (‘‘CCI’’); Chevron USA Inc. (‘‘Chevron’’);
Choice Cotton Company, Inc. (‘‘Choice Cotton’’);
CHS Inc. (‘‘CHS Inc.’’) and CHS Hedging, LLC
(‘‘CHS Hedging’’) (collectively, ‘‘CHS’’); Citadel;
CME Group Inc. (‘‘CME Group’’); Commodity
Markets Council (‘‘CMC’’); DECA Global LLC
(‘‘DECA’’); East Cotton Company (‘‘East Cotton’’);
Ecom Agroindustrial (‘‘Ecom’’); Edison Electric
Institute (‘‘EEI’’) and Electric Power Supply
Association (‘‘EPSA’’) (collectively, the ‘‘Joint
Associations’’ or ‘‘EEI/EPSA’’); Futures Industry
Association (‘‘FIA’’); Glencore Agriculture Limited,
Glencore Agriculture B.V. (collectively,
‘‘Glencore’’); ICE Futures U.S. (‘‘IFUS’’); IMC
Companies (‘‘IMC’’); Industrial Energy Consumers
of America; Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy
(‘‘IATP’’); Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (‘‘ICE’’);
International Energy Credit Association (‘‘IECA’’);
International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc. (‘‘ISDA’’); Jess Smith & Sons (‘‘Jess Smith’’);
Lawson/O’Neill Global Institutional Commodity
(LOGIC) Advisors (‘‘Lawson/O’Neill’’); Long Island
Power Authority (‘‘LIPA’’); Louis Dreyfus Company
(‘‘LDC’’); Mallory Alexander International Logistics
(‘‘Mallory Alexander’’); Managed Funds Association
and Alternative Investment Management
Association (collectively, the ‘‘Associations’’ or
‘‘MFA/AIMA’’); Marshal, Gerald (Independent
Trader); Matsen, Eric (Individual—Physical
Commodity Risk Management Consultant);
McMeekin Cotton LLC (‘‘McMeekin’’); Memtex
Cotton Marketing, LLC (‘‘Memtex’’); Minneapolis
Grain Exchange, Inc. (‘‘MGEX’’); Moody Compress
& Warehouse Company (‘‘Moody Compress’’);
Namoi Cotton Alliance (‘‘Namoi’’); National Cotton
Council (‘‘NCC’’); National Council of Farmer
Cooperatives (‘‘NCFC’’); National Council of Textile
Organizations (‘‘NCTO’’); National Energy & Fuels
Institute (‘‘NEFI’’); National Grain and Feed
Association (‘‘NGFA’’); National Oilseed Processors
Association (‘‘NOPA’’); National Rural Electric
Cooperative; Association American Public Power
Association; and American Public Gas Association
(collectively, ‘‘NRECA’’); Natural Gas Supply
Association (‘‘NGSA’’); Olam International Limited
(‘‘Olam’’); Omnicotton Inc. (‘‘Omnicotton’’); Pacific
Investment Management Company LLC (‘‘PIMCO’’);
Parkdale Mills (‘‘Parkdale’’); Petroleum Marketers
Association of America (‘‘PMAA’’); Public Citizen;
Robert Rutkowski (‘‘Rutkowski’’); S. Canale Cotton
Co. (‘‘Canale Cotton’’); Shell Energy North America
(US), L.P. and Shell Trading (US) Company
(collectively, ‘‘Shell’’); SIFMA Asset Management
Group (‘‘SIFMA AMG’’); Skylar Capital
Management LP (‘‘SCM’’); Southern Cotton
Association (‘‘Southern Cotton’’); Southwest Ag
Sourcing (‘‘SW Ag’’); Suncor Energy Marketing Inc.
and Suncor Energy USA Marketing Inc.
(collectively, ‘‘SEMI’’); Texas Cotton Association
(‘‘Texas Cotton’’); The Coalition of Physical Energy
Companies; The Commercial Energy Working
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reviewing these public comment letters,
and for the general reasons discussed in
this release, the Commission is adopting
the 2020 NPRM with certain
modifications in this Final Rule.17
Before addressing the specifics of the
Final Rule, the Commission outlines
several themes underscoring the
Commission’s approach in the Final
Rule.
First, the Commission believes that
any position limits regime must take
into account differences across
commodities and contract types. The
existing Federal position limits
regulations apply only to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts, all of
which are physically-settled futures on
agricultural commodities. Limits on
these nine legacy agricultural contracts
have been in place for decades, as have
the Federal rules governing both the
exemptions from these Federal position
limits and the exchange-set position
limits on the nine legacy agricultural
contracts. The existing framework is
largely a historical remnant of an
approach that predates cash-settled
futures contracts, institutional-investor
interest in commodity indexes, highly
liquid energy markets, and the
Commission’s jurisdiction over certain
swaps.
Congress has tasked the Commission
with establishing such limits as it finds
are ‘‘necessary’’ for the purpose of
preventing the burdens associated with
excessive speculation causing sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price of an
underlying commodity; and establishing
limits on swaps that are ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ to any futures contracts or
options on futures contracts subject to
Federal position limits. An approach
that is flexible enough to accommodate
potential future, unpredictable
developments in commercial hedging
practices is well-suited for the current
derivatives markets by accommodating
differences in commodity types,
contract specifications, hedging
practices, cash-market trading practices,
organizational structures of hedging
participants, and liquidity profiles of
individual markets.
The Commission is building this
flexibility into several parts of the Final
Rule, including: (1) Exchange-set limits
or accountability levels outside of the
spot month for referenced contracts
based on commodities other than the
Group (‘‘CEWG’’); The Walcot Trading Company,
LLC (‘‘Walcot’’); Toyo Cotton Company (‘‘Toyo’’);
VLM Commodities (‘‘VLM’’); Western Cotton
Shippers Association (‘‘WCSA’’); White Gold
Cotton Marketing, LLC (‘‘White Gold’’).
17 The Final Rule’s regulations are discussed in
detail throughout this release.
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nine legacy agricultural contracts; (2)
the ability for exchanges to use more
than one formula when setting their
own limit levels; (3) an updated formula
for Federal non-spot month position
limit levels on the nine legacy
agricultural contracts that is calibrated
to recently observed open interest,
which has generally increased over
time; (4) a bona fide hedging definition
that is broad enough to accommodate
common commercial hedging practices,
including unfixed-price transactions as
well as anticipatory hedging practices,
such as anticipatory merchandising; (5)
a simplified process for market
participants to submit a single
application to obtain non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions for
purposes of Federal and exchange-set
position limits that are in line with
common commercial hedging practices;
(6) the elimination of a restriction for
purposes of Federal position limits on
holding positions during the last trading
days of the spot month; and (7) broader
discretion for market participants to
measure risk in the manner most
suitable for their businesses.
Second, the Final Rule establishes
position limits with respect to 16
additional commodities during the spot
month, for a total of 25 core referenced
futures contracts, and certain derivative
contracts linked thereto, for which the
Commission finds that speculative
position limits are necessary.18 As
described below, this necessity finding
for the 25 core referenced futures
contracts is based on two interrelated
factors: (1) The importance of the 25
core referenced futures contracts to their
respective underlying cash markets,
including that they require physical
delivery of the underlying commodity;
and (2) the particular importance to the
national economy of the commodities
underlying the 25 contracts.19
Third, there is an opportunity for
greater collaboration between the
Commission and the exchanges within
the statutorily created parallel Federal
and exchange-set position limit regimes.
Given the exchanges’ obligations to
carry out self-regulatory responsibilities,
resources, deep knowledge of their
markets and trading practices, close
interactions with market participants,
existing programs for addressing
exemption requests, and direct ability to
leverage these resources to generally act
more quickly than the Commission, the
Commission believes that cooperation
between the Commission and the
exchanges on position limits should not
only be continued, but enhanced. For
18 See
infra Section III.C.2.
19 Id.
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example, exchanges are particularly
well-positioned to: Provide the
Commission with estimates of
deliverable supply in connection with
their commodity contracts that require
physical delivery; recommend limit
levels for the Commission’s
consideration; and help administer the
program for recognizing bona fide
hedges. Further, given that the Final
Rule requires exchanges to collect, and
provide to the Commission upon
request, cash-market information from
market participants requesting
recognition of bona fide hedges, the
Commission is eliminating the Form
204 and part of the Form 304, which
market participants with bona fide
hedging positions in excess of position
limits currently file each month with
the Commission to demonstrate cashmarket positions justifying such
overages. Under enhanced
collaboration, the Commission will
maintain its access to such information
from the exchanges, which will result in
a more efficient administrative process,
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in part by reducing duplication of
efforts.
B. Executive Summary
This executive summary provides an
overview of the key components of the
Final Rule. The summary only
highlights certain aspects of the final
regulations and generally uses
shorthand to summarize complex
topics. The executive summary is
neither intended to be a comprehensive
recitation of the Final Rule nor intended
to supplement, modify, or replace any
interpretive or other language contained
herein. Section II of this release
includes a more detailed and
comprehensive discussion of all of the
final regulations. The final regulations
and related appendices and guidance
follow Section IV (Related Matters) of
this release.
1. Contracts Subject to Federal
Speculative Position Limits
Federal position limits apply to
‘‘referenced contracts,’’ which, as
described in turn below, include: (i) 25
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3239
‘‘core referenced futures contracts’’ (i.e.,
the nine legacy agricultural contracts
together with the new 16 non-legacy
contracts); (ii) futures contracts and
options on futures contracts directly or
indirectly linked to a core referenced
futures contract; and (iii) ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps.’’
i. Core Referenced Futures Contracts
Federal position limits under the
Final Rule will apply to the following
25 20 physically-settled core referenced
futures contracts:
20 Reference to, or discussion of, derivatives
contracts listed on IFUS, the DCM and subsidiary
of ICE, will be referred to herein as ‘‘ICE
[Commodity] [IFUS Commodity Code]’’ (e.g., ICE
Sugar No. 16 (SF)). Additionally, ‘‘CBOT’’ refers to
the DCM Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc.;
‘‘CME’’ refers to the DCM Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, Inc.; ‘‘COMEX’’ refers to the DCM
Commodity Exchange, Inc.; and ‘‘NYMEX’’ refers to
the DCM New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc.
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ii. Futures Contracts and Options on
Futures Contracts Linked to a Core
Referenced Futures Contract
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The term ‘‘referenced contract’’
encompasses any core referenced
futures contract as well as any futures
contract and any option on a futures
contract that is: (1) Directly or indirectly
linked to the price of a core referenced
futures contract; or (2) directly or
indirectly linked to the price of the
same commodity underlying the
applicable core referenced futures
contract, for delivery at the same
location as specified in that core
referenced futures contract.22 The term
21 While the Final Rule includes Federal non-spot
month limits only for referenced cintracts on the
nine legacy agricultural contracts, the Final Rule
requires exchanges to establish, consistent with
Commission standards set forth in this Final Rule,
exchange-set position limits and/or position
accountability levels in the non-spot months for the
16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts and
for any associated referenced contracts.
22 For clarity, clause (2) is intended to encompass
potential physically-settled ‘‘look-alike’’ contracts
that do not directly reference a core referenced
futures contract but that are nonetheless based on
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iii. Economically Equivalent Swaps
The term referenced contracts also
includes economically equivalent
swaps, defined as swaps with ‘‘identical
material’’ contractual specifications,
terms, and conditions to a referenced
contract. Swaps in a commodity other
than natural gas that have identical
material specifications, terms, and
conditions to a referenced contract are
still deemed economically equivalent
swaps even if they differ from the
referenced contract with respect to one
or more of the following: (a) Lot size
specifications or notional amounts, (b)
delivery dates diverging by less than
one calendar day for physically-settled
swaps, or (c) post-trade risk
management arrangement (e.g.,
uncleared swaps versus cleared futures
contracts).
The same general definition applies to
natural gas swaps, except that the
definition is expanded to include swaps
with delivery dates diverging from the
corresponding core referenced futures
contract by less than two calendar days.
Instruments that are exempt from
Commission jurisdiction or otherwise
not deemed to be swaps under the
Commission’s regulations (e.g.,
instruments that are excluded by the
CEA’s ‘‘swap’’ definition or Commission
regulations as physically-settled forward
contracts) are not ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps’’ even if they
otherwise fall within the ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition.
the same commodity and delivery location as a core
referenced futures contract.
2. Federal Position Limit Levels During
the Spot Month
‘‘referenced contract,’’ however,
explicitly excludes location basis
contracts, commodity index contracts,
contracts that are based on prices across
a month (i.e., contracts commonly
referred to as calendar month average
contracts, trade month average
contracts, or balance of month
contracts), outright contracts that are
based on a price reporting agency index
price, swap guarantees, and trade
options that meet certain requirements.
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below. Each spot month limit is set at
or below 25% of deliverable supply, as
estimated using recent data provided by
the DCM listing the core referenced
futures contract, and verified by the
Commission. The Federal spot month
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position limits apply on a futuresequivalent basis based on the size of the
unit of trading of the relevant core
referenced futures contract.
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
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Federal spot month position limits
apply to all 25 core referenced futures
contracts and their associated
referenced contracts. The Final Rule
establishes the spot month position
limit levels summarized in the table
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23 As
of October 15, 2020.
Federal spot month limit for Live Cattle
adopted herein features a step-down limit similar
to the CME’s existing Live Cattle step-down
exchange-set limit. The Federal spot month stepdown limit is: (1) 600 at the close of trading on the
first business day following the first Friday of the
contract month; (2) 300 at the close of trading on
the business day prior to the last five trading days
of the contract month; and (3) 200 at the close of
trading on the business day prior to the last two
trading days of the contract month.
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24 The
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25 ICE technically does not have an exchange-set
spot month position limit level for ICE Sugar No.
16 (SF). However, it does have a single-month
position limit level of 1,000 contracts, which
effectively operates as a spot month position limit.
26 As discussed below, the NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (NG) Federal spot month limit for cashsettled look-alike referenced contracts will apply on
a per-exchange and per-OTC swaps market basis
rather than on an aggregate basis across exchanges.
27 Currently, the cash-settled natural gas contracts
are subject to an exchange-set spot month position
limit level of 1,000 equivalent-sized contracts per
exchange. As of publication of the Final Rule, there
are three exchanges that list cash-settled natural gas
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contracts: NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal. As a result, a
market participant may hold up to 3,000 equivalentsized cash-settled natural gas contracts under
existing exchange-set limits.
The exchanges also have a conditional position
limit framework for natural gas contracts. This
exchange-set conditional spot month position limit
permits up to 5,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
equivalent-sized referenced contracts per exchange
that lists such contracts, provided that the market
participant does not hold positions in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract.
28 The Federal spot month limit for Light Sweet
Crude Oil adopted herein features the following
step-down limit: (1) 6,000 contracts as of the close
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i. Application of Federal Spot Month
Limits to Commodities Other Than
Natural Gas
With the exception of natural gas, the
Federal spot month position limit levels
apply in the aggregate across exchanges
and the over-the-counter (‘‘OTC’’) swap
markets.
During the spot month, Federal
position limits apply ‘‘separately’’ to
physically-settled and cash-settled
referenced contracts.29 Accordingly,
during the spot month, a market
participant is required to aggregate its
net physically-settled positions, and
separately its net cash-settled positions,
across exchanges and the OTC swaps
markets, but may not net cash-settled
referenced contracts with physicallysettled referenced contracts.
ii. Application of Federal Spot Month
Limits to Natural Gas
For the NYMEX Henry Hub Natural
Gas (‘‘NYMEX NG’’) physicallydelivered core referenced futures
contract and its associated cash-settled
referenced contracts, the Final Rule
modifies the 2020 NPRM by providing
that Federal position limits apply to
NYMEX NG cash-settled referenced
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of trading three business days prior to the last
trading day of the contract; (2) 5,000 contracts as
of the close of trading two business days prior to
the last trading day of the contract; and (3) 4,000
contracts as of the close of trading one business day
prior to the last trading day of the contract.
29 As discussed further under Section II.B.3.vi,
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts under
the Final Rule are subject to per-exchange and perOTC swaps market Federal position limits. As a
result, market participants are not required to
aggregate their positions in natural gas referenced
contracts across different exchanges and the OTC
swaps markets but also may not net such positions
across different exchanges or the OTC swaps
market.
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contracts on a per-exchange and perOTC swaps market basis (i.e., cashsettled positions are not aggregated
across different exchanges and the OTC
swaps market).
Specifically, a market participant may
hold up to 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts (i.e., the
NYMEX NG Federal spot month
position limit) on each exchange that
lists for trading a cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contract as well as the
OTC swap market. Currently, three
exchanges (NYMEX, IFUS, and
Nodal) 30 list cash-settled ‘‘look-alike’’
NYMEX NG referenced contracts. Thus,
a market participant is able to hold
2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced futures contracts on each
exchange, which is 6,000 cash-settled
look-alike NYMEX NG referenced
contracts in total. In addition, a market
participant is able to hold a position of
2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
equivalent-sized economically
equivalent swaps in the OTC swaps
markets for a total position of 8,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts across the four markets (i.e.,
NYMEX, IFUS, Nodal, and the OTC
swaps market).
As noted above, because Federal spot
month position limit levels apply
‘‘separately’’ to cash-settled and
physically-settled referenced contracts,
a market participant further is able to
hold an additional position of 2,000
physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts for a total position
of 10,000 NYMEX NG referenced
contracts.
As discussed further below, market
participants may hold additional cash30 ‘‘Nodal’’
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3243
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts
under the Final Rule’s Federal spot
month conditional position limit
exemption as long as the market
participant satisfies certain
requirements. However, for the
avoidance of doubt, the Commission
notes that the per-exchange 2,000
contract Federal spot month position
limit level for cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts discussed above is
not part of the Federal spot month
conditional position limit exemption
but rather constitutes the default
speculative Federal spot month position
limit.
3. Federal Position Limit Levels Outside
of the Spot Month
Under the Final Rule, Federal
position limits outside of the spot
month (‘‘non-spot month’’ position
limits) apply only to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts and their
associated referenced contracts.
In contrast, referenced contracts based
on the 16 core referenced futures
contracts subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final
Rule are only subject to Federal position
limits during the spot month, and are
otherwise only subject to exchange-set
limits or position accountability outside
of the spot month.
The following Federal non-spot
month position limit levels,
summarized in the table below, are set
at 10% of open interest for the first
50,000 contracts, with an incremental
increase of 2.5% of open interest
thereafter, and apply on a futuresequivalent basis based on the size of the
unit of trading of the relevant core
referenced futures contract:
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4. Exchange-Set Limits and Exemptions
Therefrom
i. Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
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An exchange that lists a contract
subject to Federal position limits, as
specified above, is required to set its
own limits for such contracts at a level
that is no higher than the Federal level.
Exchanges may grant exemptions from
their own limits to a level that exceeds
the applicable Federal limit, provided
the exemption is self-effectuating (e.g.,
an enumerated bona fide hedge or a
spread that satisfies the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition) or provided the
31 With the exception of the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
contract discussed below, for each of the legacy
agricultural contracts, the single month limit is
equal to the all-months-combined limit under the
Final Rule.
32 As of October 15, 2020.
33 The single month limit for ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT) is set at 50% of the all-months-combined limit,
or 5,950 contracts, as discussed more fully below.
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exemption is recognized by the
Commission for purposes of Federal
position limits (pursuant to an
application submitted either directly to
the Commission under § 150.3 or
indirectly to the Commission through an
exchange under § 150.9, as applicable).
Exchanges may grant exemptions that
are not recognized by the Final Rule;
however, such exemptions must be
capped at a level that is not higher than
the applicable Federal position limit
level.
ii. Physical Commodity Contracts Not
Subject to Federal Position Limits
For physical commodity contracts, for
which no necessity finding was
supported, and which are therefore not
subject to Federal position limits, an
exchange is generally required to set
spot month position limit levels at no
greater than 25% of deliverable supply,
but has flexibility to submit other
approaches for review by the
Commission, provided the approach
results in spot month position limit
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levels that are ‘‘necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or index’’
and complies with all other applicable
regulations.
Outside of the spot month, an
exchange has additional flexibility to set
either position limits or position
accountability levels, provided the
levels are ‘‘necessary and appropriate to
reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index.’’ Nonexclusive Acceptable Practices are
included in new Appendix F to part 150
under the Final Rule and provide
several examples of formulas that the
Commission has determined meet this
standard, but an exchange has flexibility
to develop other approaches.
An exchange has flexibility to grant a
variety of exemption types. Exchanges
must take into account whether the
exemption results in a position that is
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‘‘not in accord with sound commercial
practices’’ in the market for which the
exchange is considering the application,
and/or ‘‘exceed[s] an amount that may
be established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion in that market.’’
5. Limits on ‘‘Pre-Existing Positions’’
As discussed above, only swaps that
qualify as ‘‘economically equivalent
swaps’’ are subject to Federal position
limits under the Final Rule. However,
economically equivalent swaps entered
into in good faith prior to the Final
Rule’s Effective Date, including both
‘‘Pre-Enactment Swaps,’’ which are
swaps entered into prior to the DoddFrank Act whose terms have not
expired, and ‘‘Transition Period
Swaps,’’ which are swaps entered into
between July 22, 2010 and the Final
Rule’s effective date, are not subject to
Federal position limits. Other preexisting positions (i.e., pre-existing
positions that are futures contracts or
options on futures contracts) will be
subject to the Final Rule’s Federal
position limits.34
Market participants may net down
their post-Effective Date positions in
commodity derivatives contracts with
any pre-existing swaps (as long as such
swaps qualify as economically
equivalent swaps) for purposes of
complying with non-spot month Federal
position limits. In contrast, during the
spot month, market participants may
not apply these pre-existing swap
positions to net down their positions so
as to avoid rendering Federal spot
month position limits ineffective. The
Commission is particularly concerned
about protecting the spot month in
physically-delivered futures from price
distortions or potential manipulation
and consequent disruption of the
hedging and price discovery utility of
the related futures contract.
6. Legal Standards for Exemptions From
Federal Position Limits
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i. Bona Fide Hedge Recognition
A bona fide hedging transaction or
position may exceed Federal position
limits if the hedge position satisfies all
three elements of the Final Rule’s
‘‘general’’ bona fide hedging definition.
That is, (1) the position represents a
substitute for transactions or positions
34 However, as discussed further below, the
Commission is providing for a compliance period
until January 1, 2022 for the 16 non-legacy
referenced contracts that will be subject to Federal
position limits for the first time under this Final
Rule. Similarly, the Commission is providing for a
compliance period for any economically equivalent
swaps, as well as in connection with the
elimination of the risk management exemption,
until January 1, 2023.
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made or to be made at a later time in
a physical marketing channel
(‘‘temporary substitute test’’); (2) the
position is economically appropriate to
the reduction of price risks in the
conduct and management of a
commercial enterprise (‘‘economically
appropriate test’’); and (3) the position
arises from the potential change in value
of actual or anticipated assets,
liabilities, or services (‘‘change in value
requirement’’).
The Final Rule makes several changes
to the existing bona fide hedging
definition, including those described
immediately below:
First, the Commission is expanding
the existing list of ‘‘enumerated’’ bona
fide hedges to cover additional hedging
practices, including adding a bona fide
hedge for anticipated merchandising.35
To provide greater certainty, the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges is now
incorporated into the regulation. In
contrast, in the 2020 NPRM, this list of
enumerated bona fide hedges was
proposed in the form of non-binding
acceptable practices in Appendix A to
part 150. While the enumerated bona
fide hedges will remain listed in
Appendix A under the Final Rule,
Appendix A to part 150 is now
explicitly incorporated into Commission
regulations and is part of the regulatory
text rather than acceptable practices.
A person who holds a position that
qualifies as a bona fide hedge and that
is one of the enumerated hedges in
Appendix A to part 150 is not required
to request prior approval from the
Commission to hold such bona fide
hedge position above the Federal
position limit. That is, the enumerated
bona fide hedges are ‘‘self-effectuating’’
for purposes of Federal position limits.
A person with an enumerated bona fide
hedge position, however, would still
need to request an exemption from the
35 The existing definition of ‘‘bona fide hedging
transactions and positions’’ enumerates the
following hedging transactions or positions: (1)
Hedges of inventory and cash commodity fixedprice purchase contracts under 1.3(z)(2)(i)(A); (2)
hedges of unsold anticipated production under
1.3(z)(2)(i)(B); (3) hedges of cash commodity fixedprice sales and (4) hedges of fixed price sales of
their cash products and byproducts contracts under
1.3(z)(2)(ii)(A) and (B); (5) hedges of unfilled
anticipated requirements under 1.3(z)(2)(ii)(C); (6)
hedges of offsetting unfixed price cash commodity
sales and purchases under 1.3(z)(2)(iii); and (7)
cross-commodity hedges under 1.3(z)(2)(iv). The
following additional hedging practices are not
enumerated in the existing regulation, but are
included as enumerated hedges in the Final Rule:
(1) Hedges of anticipated merchandising; (2) hedges
by agents; (3) hedges of anticipated royalties; (4)
hedges of services; and (5) offsets of commodity
trade options.
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3245
relevant exchange for any exchange-set
limits.36
Second, with respect to the treatment
of unfixed-price forward transactions
and bona fide hedging under the Final
Rule, the Commission clarifies that a
commercial market participant may
qualify for one of the Final Rule’s
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges (i.e., enumerated bona fide
hedges for unsold anticipated
production, unfilled anticipated
requirements, and anticipated
merchandising) with respect to an
unfixed-price forward transaction. The
Commission believes that an unfixedprice forward transaction should not
preclude a commercial market
participant from qualifying for one of
these enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges, because such unfixed-price
forward transactions do not give rise to
outright price risk for a commercial
market participant and do not otherwise
fix an outright price. Accordingly,
unfixed-price transactions do not ‘‘fill’’
or ‘‘address’’ the hedging need for
which the enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges are predicated.
The Commission notes that an
unfixed-price forward transaction does
not itself allow a market participant to
qualify for one of these enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges, and that
a market participant must still satisfy
the requirements of the applicable
anticipatory bona fide hedge to qualify
(e.g., as an initial matter, by the
commercial market participant being
able to demonstrate its anticipated
unsold production, anticipated unfilled
requirements, and/or anticipated
merchandising).
Third, the Final Rule clarifies whether
and when market participants may
measure risk on a gross basis rather than
on a net basis. Instead of only being
permitted to hedge on a ‘‘net basis’’
except in a narrow set of circumstances,
a market participant is also able to
generally hedge positions on a ‘‘gross
basis,’’ provided that the participant has
done so over time in a consistent
manner and is not doing so to evade
Federal position limits. Among other
items, the Final Rule differs from the
2020 NPRM in that the Final Rule: (1)
Eliminates the requirement that
exchanges document their justifications
when allowing gross hedging; (2)
clarifies that market participants are not
required to develop written policies or
procedures that set forth when gross
36 The processes for obtaining bona fide hedge
recognitions and non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions are summarized in Section 7 below of
this executive summary (Processes for Requesting
Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions and Spread
Exemptions).
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versus net hedging is appropriate; and
(3) clarifies that gross hedging is
permissible for both enumerated and
non-enumerated hedges.
Fourth, market participants are
permitted to hold bona fide hedges in
excess of Federal position limits during
the last five days of the spot period (or
during the time period for the spot
month if less than five days). While the
Final Rule does not include a Federal
restriction on holding bona fide hedging
positions in excess of Federal position
limits during the spot period, exchanges
continue to have the discretion to adopt
such restrictions (commonly referred to
by market participants as the ‘‘Five-Day
Rule’’), or similar restrictions, for
purposes of exchange-set limits. The
Final Rule also includes guidance on
the application of spot-period
restrictions, including factors for
exchanges with such restrictions to
consider when determining to grant
exemptions that are not subject to any
such restrictions for purposes of their
own limits.
Finally, the Final Rule modifies the
‘‘temporary substitute test’’ to require
that a bona fide hedging transaction or
position in a physical commodity must
always, and not just normally, be
connected to the production, sale, or use
of a physical cash-market commodity.
Therefore, a market participant is
generally no longer allowed to treat
positions entered into for ‘‘risk
management purposes’’ 37 as a bona fide
hedge, unless the position qualifies as
either: (i) An offset of a pass-through
swap, where the offset reduces price
risk attendant to the pass-through swap
executed opposite a counterparty for
whom the swap qualifies as a bona fide
hedge; or (ii) a ‘‘swap offset,’’ where the
offset is used by a counterparty to
reduce price risk attendant to a swap
that qualifies as a bona fide hedge and
that was previously entered into by that
counterparty.
ii. Spread Exemption
A transaction or position may also
exceed Federal position limits if it
qualifies as a ‘‘spread transaction,’’
which includes the following common
types of spreads: Intra-market spreads;
inter-market spreads; intra-commodity
spreads; inter-commodity spreads;
calendar spreads; quality differential
spreads; processing spreads (such as
energy ‘‘crack’’ or soybean ‘‘crush’’
spreads); product and by-product
37 The phrase ‘‘risk management’’ as used in this
instance refers to derivatives positions, typically
held by a swap dealer, used to offset a swap
position, such as a commodity index swap, with
another entity for which that swap is not a bona
fide hedge.
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differential spreads; and futures-options
spreads.38
Spread exemptions may be granted
using the process described in Section
7 below of this executive summary
(Processes for Requesting Bona Fide
Hedge Recognitions and Spread
Exemptions).
iii. Financial Distress Exemption
This exemption allows a market
participant to exceed Federal position
limits if necessary to take on the
positions and associated risk of another
market participant during a potential
default or bankruptcy situation. This
exemption is available on a case-by-case
basis, depending on the facts and
circumstances involved.
iv. Conditional Spot Month Limit
Exemption in Natural Gas
As long as a market participant holds
no physically-settled NYMEX NG
contracts, the Final Rule allows that
market participant to exceed the
NYMEX NG Federal spot month
position limit level of 2,000 cash-settled
referenced contracts per exchange (and
an additional 2,000 equivalent-sized
economically equivalent OTC swaps) by
holding 10,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts per DCM that lists
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts, as well as an additional
10,000 equivalent-sized cash-settled
economically equivalent NYMEX NG
swaps. The Final Rule clarifies that
market participants may not use a
spread exemption to exceed the
aforementioned conditional spot month
limit for natural gas.
7. Processes for Requesting Bona Fide
Hedge Recognitions and Spread
Exemptions
i. Self-Effectuating Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
A position that complies with the
bona fide hedging definition in § 150.1
and falls within one of the enumerated
bona fide hedges is self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits,
provided the market participant
separately applies to the relevant
exchange for an exemption from
exchange-set limits. Such market
participants are no longer required to
file Form 204/304 with the Commission
on a monthly basis to demonstrate cashmarket positions justifying Federal
position limit overages. Instead, the
Commission will have access to cashmarket information that such market
38 The Final Rule expands the 2020 NPRM’s list
of exempt spread transactions by also including
intra-market spreads, inter-market spreads, and
intra-commodity spreads.
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participants submit as part of their
applications to an exchange for an
exemption from exchange-set limits,
typically filed on an annual basis.
ii. Bona Fide Hedges That Are Not SelfEffectuating
The Commission may consider adding
to the list of enumerated bona fide
hedges at a later time, as the
Commission may find appropriate. Until
that time, all bona fide hedge positions
that are not enumerated in Appendix A
to part 150 must be granted pursuant to
one of the processes for requesting a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition, as explained below.
A market participant seeking to
exceed Federal position limits for a nonenumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position is able to choose
whether to apply directly to the
Commission or, alternatively, apply
indirectly to the Commission through
the applicable exchange using a new
streamlined process. If applying directly
to the Commission, the market
participant must also separately apply
to the relevant exchange for relief from
exchange-set position limits. If applying
to an exchange using the new
streamlined process, a market
participant may file an application with
an exchange, generally at least annually,
which will be valid both for purposes of
Federal and exchange-set position
limits.
Under this streamlined process, if the
exchange determines to grant a nonenumerated bona fide hedge recognition
for purposes of its exchange-set position
limits, the exchange must notify the
Commission and the applicant
simultaneously. Then, 10 business days
(or two business days in the case of
retroactive applications filed late due to
sudden or unforeseen bona fide hedging
needs) after the exchange issues such a
determination, the bona fide hedge
exemption may be deemed approved for
purposes of Federal position limits
unless the Commission (and not
Commission staff) notifies the market
participant otherwise. That is, after the
10 (or two) business days expire, the
bona fide hedge exemption is
considered approved for purposes of
Federal position limits. Under the Final
Rule, once the exchange notifies the
Commission and the applicant of the
exchange’s determination to approve the
application, the applicant may, at its
own risk, exceed Federal position limits
during the Commission’s 10 businessday review period.
If the Commission determines to deny
an exemption application, the applicant
will not be subject to any Federal
position limits violation, provided the
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person filed the application in good
faith and brings the position into
compliance with the applicable Federal
position limit within a commercially
reasonable amount of time, as
applicable.
The Final Rule also allows a market
participant with sudden or unforeseen
hedging needs to file a request for a
bona fide hedge exemption within five
business days after exceeding the
Federal limit (i.e., commonly referred to
as a ‘‘retroactive’’ exemption
application). If the Commission denies
such application, the market participant
will not be subject to a Federal position
limit violation, provided the market
participant filed the application in good
faith and brings the position into
compliance with the applicable Federal
position limit within a commercially
reasonable amount of time, as
applicable.
Among other changes, market
participants are no longer required to
file Forms 204 or 304, as applicable,
with the Commission on a monthly
basis to demonstrate cash-market
positions justifying position limit
overages. Under the Final Rule, the
Commission will instead leverage cashmarket information submitted directly
to the exchanges.
iii. Spread Exemptions
For a referenced contract on any
commodity, a spread exemption is selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits, provided that (1) the
position falls within one of the
categories set forth in the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, and (2) the
market participant separately applies to
the applicable exchange for a spread
exemption from exchange-set position
limits.39
A market participant with a spread
position that does not fit within the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition with
respect to any of the commodities
Commission understands that certain
exchanges may distinguish between the terms
‘‘spread,’’ ‘‘arbitrage,’’ and ‘‘straddle.’’ For the
purposes of the Commission’s discussion and the
Final Rule in general, the Commission’s use of the
term ‘‘spread’’ is meant to include all of these
related trading strategies, and any Commission
reference to ‘‘spread’’ rather than ‘‘arbitrage’’ or
‘‘straddle’’ is not intended to suggest a substantive
difference in meaning.
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39 The
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subject to Federal position limits may
apply directly to the Commission, and
must also separately apply to the
applicable exchange.
8. Compliance Date and Effective Date
i. Summary
The Final Rule’s effective date is
March 15, 2021 (the ‘‘Effective Date’’).
This means that all aspects of the Final
Rule will be effective as of the Effective
Date, including the new enumerated
bona fide hedges (e.g., anticipated
merchandising) as well as the higher
Federal position limits for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts. However,
as discussed below, the Commission is
also providing for compliance dates that
extend beyond the Effective Date in
connection with several of the Final
Rule’s requirements.
The Final Rule provides market
participants with a compliance date of
January 1, 2022 for purposes of
compliance with the Federal position
limits for the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under this Final Rule. This
compliance date also applies to any
referenced contracts (other than
economically equivalent swaps, which
have a separate compliance date as
discussed further below) related to these
16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts.
The Final Rule also provides
exchanges with a compliance date of
January 1, 2022 for purposes of
establishing exchange-set position limits
and provisions associated with
exemptions therefrom, including certain
obligations to collect cash-market
information from market participants in
connection with market participants’
applications for bona fide hedging
exemptions to exchange-set limits, and
to share the same with the Commission,
consistent with the requirements under
the Final Rule.
Additionally, the Final Rule provides
a compliance date of January 1, 2023
with respect to (i) the elimination of
previously-granted risk management
exemptions,40 and (ii) Federal position
40 As discussed above in Section 6 of this
executive summary (Legal Standards for
Exemptions from Federal Position Limits), the
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3247
limits for economically equivalent
swaps.
Because the nine legacy agricultural
contracts are currently subject to
Federal position limits under the
existing Federal framework, the Final
Rule does not provide a compliance
date for the new Federal position limits
under the Final Rule for such contracts,
or a formal phase-in period. Therefore,
such limits go into effect on the
Effective Date. Thus, as of the Effective
Date, market participants will be able to
avail themselves of the Federal position
limits under the Final Rule for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts, all of
which are higher than the existing
Federal position limits (except for CBOT
Oats, which will maintain the existing
Federal position limit levels). However,
the Commission notes that exchange-set
position limits will remain at current
levels unless and until the relevant
exchange submits a rule amendment
pursuant to part 40 of the Commission’s
regulations to amend the relevant
exchange-set position limit.
Furthermore, the Commission is
delaying implementation of exchangeset position limits on swaps since
exchanges cannot view market
participants’ positions in swap positions
across the various places they trade,
including on competitor exchanges.41
However, after the January 1, 2023
compliance date for economically
equivalent swaps (discussed above), the
Commission underscores that it will
enforce Federal position limits in
connection with swaps.
For convenience, the Commission is
providing a table below identifying the
Final Rule’s Effective Date and
compliance dates for market
participants and exchanges in
connection with certain obligations.
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
Commission is no longer recognizing risk
management exemptions as bona fide hedges under
the Final Rule.
41 In two years, the Commission will reevaluate
the ability of exchanges to establish and implement
appropriate surveillance mechanisms to implement
DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6
with respect to swaps.
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C. Section-by-Section Summary of Final
Rule
The Commission is adopting revisions
to §§ 150.1, 150.2, 150.3, 150.5, and
42As noted above, under the Final Rule the
Federal position limit levels for all of the nine
legacy agricultural contracts will increase, other
than CBOT Oats. However, the Commission notes
that exchange-set position limits will remain at
current levels unless and until the relevant
exchange submits a rule amendment pursuant to
part 40 of the Commission’s regulations to amend
the relevant exchange-set position limit.
43As discussed further in this release, the
Commission will no longer recognize risk
management exemptions under the Final Rule.
However, positions that are entered into based on
a market participant’s previously-granted risk
management exemptions will be subject to an
extended compliance date until January 1, 2023
with respect to Federal position limits. That is, a
market participant with a previously granted risk
management exemption will have a compliance
date of January 1, 2023 with respect to the
elimination of such risk management exemption.
44Form 204 (for all nine legacy agricultural
contracts other than cotton) and Parts I and II of
Form 304 (for cotton) are submitted by a market
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150.6 and to parts 1, 15, 17, 19, 40, and
140, as well as adding §§ 150.8, 150.9,
and Appendices A–G to part 150.45
Most noteworthy, the Commission is
adopting the following amendments to
the foregoing rule sections, each of
which, along with all other changes in
the Final Rule, is discussed in greater
detail in Section II of this release. The
following summary is not intended to
provide a substantive overview of this
Final Rule, but rather is intended to
provide a guide to the rule sections that
address each topic. For an overview of
this Final Rule organized by topic
participant to the Commission under the existing
Federal position limits regulations in connection
with Federal enumerated bona fide hedges
employed by the market participants.
45 The 2020 NPRM proposed to remove and
reserve part 151. It did not propose to amend
current § 150.4 dealing with aggregation of
positions for purposes of compliance with Federal
position limits, which was amended in 2016 in a
prior rulemaking. See Final Aggregation
Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91454.
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(rather than by section number), please
see the executive summary above.
• The Commission finds that Federal
speculative position limits are necessary
for 25 core referenced futures contracts,
and for any futures contracts and
options on futures contracts linked
thereto. The Commission adopts Federal
position limits on physically-settled and
linked cash-settled futures contracts,
options on futures contracts, and
‘‘economically equivalent swaps’’ for
such commodities. The 25 core
referenced futures contracts include the
nine ‘‘legacy’’ agricultural contracts
currently subject to Federal position
limits and 16 additional non-legacy
contracts, which include: Seven
additional agricultural contracts, four
energy contracts, and five metals
contracts.46 Federal spot and non-spot
46 The seven additional agricultural contracts that
are subject to Federal spot month limits are: CME
Live Cattle (LC), CBOT Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa
(CC), ICE Coffee C (KC), ICE FCOJ–A (OJ), ICE Sugar
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month limits apply to the nine ‘‘legacy’’
agricultural contracts currently subject
to Federal position limits,47 and only
Federal spot-month limits apply to the
additional 16 non-legacy contracts.
Outside of the spot month, these 16
non-legacy contracts are subject to
exchange-set limits and/or
accountability levels if listed on an
exchange.
• Amendments to § 150.1 add or
revise several definitions for use
throughout part 150, including: New
definitions of the terms ‘‘core referenced
futures contract’’ (pertaining to the 25
physically-settled futures contracts
explicitly listed in the regulations) and
‘‘referenced contract’’ (pertaining to
futures contracts and options on futures
contracts that have certain direct and/or
indirect linkages to the core referenced
futures contracts, and to ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps’’) to be used as
shorthand to refer to contracts subject to
Federal position limits; an expanded
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition; and a
‘‘bona fide hedging transaction or
position’’ definition that is broad
enough to accommodate hedging
practices in a variety of contract types,
including hedging practices that may
develop over time.
• Amendments to § 150.2 list the 25
core referenced futures contracts which,
along with any associated referenced
contracts, are subject to Federal position
limits; and specify the Federal spot and
non-spot month position limit levels.
Federal spot month position limit levels
are set at or below 25 percent of
estimated deliverable supply, whereas
Federal non-spot month limit levels are
set at 10% of open interest for the first
50,000 contracts of open interest, with
No. 11 (SB), and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF). The four
energy contracts that are subject to Federal spot
month limits are: NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil
(CL), NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil
(HO), NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB Gasoline
(RB), and NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG).
The five metals contracts that are subject to Federal
spot month limits are: COMEX Gold (GC), COMEX
Silver (SI), COMEX Copper (HG), NYMEX
Palladium (PA), and NYMEX Platinum (PL). As
discussed below, any contracts for which the
Commission is adopting Federal position limits
only during the spot month are subject to exchangeset limits and/or accountability levels outside of the
spot month.
47 The Commission currently sets and enforces
speculative position limits with respect to certain
enumerated agricultural products. The
‘‘enumerated’’ agricultural products refer to the list
of commodities contained in the definition of
‘‘commodity’’ in CEA section 1a; 7 U.S.C. 1a. These
agricultural products consist of the following nine
currently traded contracts: CBOT Corn (and MiniCorn) (C), CBOT Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans (and
Mini-Soybeans) (S), CBOT Wheat (and Mini-Wheat)
(W), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT Soybean Meal
(SM), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). See 17 CFR
150.2.
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an incremental increase of 2.5% of open
interest thereafter.
• Amendments to § 150.3 specify the
types of positions for which exemptions
from Federal position limit
requirements may be granted, and set
forth and/or reference the processes for
requesting such exemptions, including
recognitions of bona fide hedges and
exemptions for spread positions,
financial distress positions, certain
natural gas positions held during the
spot month, and pre-enactment and
transition period swaps. For all
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, bona fide hedge exemptions
listed in Appendix A to part 150 as an
enumerated bona fide hedge are selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits. For non-enumerated
bona fide hedges, market participants
must submit an application either
directly to the Commission under
§ 150.3 or indirectly through an
exchange for Federal position limit
purposes under new § 150.9 (discussed
below).
• Amendments to § 150.5 refine the
process, and establish non-exclusive
methodologies, by which exchanges
may set exchange-level limits and grant
exemptions therefrom with respect to
futures and options on futures,
including separate methodologies for
contracts subject to Federal position
limits and physical commodity
derivatives not subject to Federal
position limits.48 While the Commission
will oversee compliance with Federal
position limits on swaps, the
Commission has also determined to
delay the enforcement of exchange-set
position limits on swaps otherwise
required in amended § 150.5 because
exchanges cannot view market
participants’ positions in swaps across
the various places they trade, including
on competitor exchanges.49
• New § 150.9 establishes a
streamlined process for addressing
requests for bona fide hedging
recognitions for purposes of Federal
position limits, and leveraging exchange
expertise and resources. This process
will be used by market participants with
48 Rule § 150.5 addresses exchange-set position
limits and exemptions therefrom, whereas § 150.3
addresses exemptions from Federal position limits,
and § 150.9 addresses a streamlined process for
recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedges for
purposes of Federal position limits. Exchange rules
typically refer to ‘‘exemptions’’ in connection with
bona fide hedging and spread positions, whereas
the Commission uses the nomenclature
‘‘recognition’’ with respect to bona fide hedges, and
‘‘exemption’’ with respect to spreads.
49 With respect to exchange-set position limits on
swaps, in two years the Commission will reevaluate
the ability of exchanges to establish and implement
appropriate surveillance mechanisms to implement
DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6.
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non-enumerated bona fide hedge
positions. Under the Final Rule, market
participants can provide one application
for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge to
a DCM or SEF, as applicable, and
receive approval of such request based
on the same application from both the
exchange for purposes of exchange-set
limits and from the Commission for
purposes of Federal position limits.
• New Appendix A to part 150
contains a list of enumerated bona fide
hedges. Positions that comply with the
bona fide hedging transaction or
position definition in § 150.1 and that
are enumerated in Appendix A may
exceed Federal position limits to the
extent that all applicable requirements
in part 150 are met. Persons holding
such positions enumerated in Appendix
A may exceed Federal position limits
without being required to request prior
approval under § 150.3 or § 150.9.
Positions that do not fall within any of
the enumerated hedges could still
potentially be recognized as bona fide
hedging positions, provided the
positions otherwise comply with the
proposed bona fide hedging definition
and all other applicable requirements,
including the approval process under
§ 150.3 or § 150.9.
• Amendments to part 19 and related
provisions eliminate Form 204 (and
corresponding Parts I and II of Form 304
for cotton), enabling the Commission to
leverage cash-market reporting
submitted directly to the exchanges
under §§ 150.5 and 150.9. The Final
Rule maintains Part III of Form 304,
related to the cotton on-call report.
D. Effective Date and Compliance
Period
The 2020 NPRM included proposed
§ 150.2(e), which provided that the
Federal position limit levels for the 25
core referenced futures contracts would
have a compliance date 365 days after
publication of the final position limits
regulations in the Federal Register.
Additionally, proposed § 150.3(c)
provided that previously-granted risk
management exemptions shall not be
effective after the Final Rule’s effective
date.
The Commission is removing from the
Final Rule the compliance date
requirements in proposed §§ 150.2(e)
and 150.3(c) and instead addressing the
effective and compliance dates together
within this Federal Register release.
The Commission is making two
modifications from the 2020 NPRM
relating to the effective date and
compliance period of the Final Rule.
First, as noted above in the executive
summary, the Commission is providing
a general compliance date of January 1,
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2022 for both market participants and
exchanges. In contrast, the 2020 NPRM
did not provide a specific date as the
compliance date but rather stated 365
days after publication in the Federal
Register.50
This compliance date of January 1,
2022 applies to (i) the Federal position
limits set forth in Appendix E to part
150 for only the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under this Final Rule, and (ii)
exchange obligations under final
§ 150.5. This compliance date also
applies to referenced contracts for any
of the 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts (other than
economically equivalent swaps, which
have a separate compliance date as
discussed immediately below). In
contrast, the 2020 NPRM’s compliance
date applied only to market
participants’ compliance with the new
Federal position limit levels. However,
as discussed below, the Final Rule does
not provide a separate compliance date
for the nine legacy agricultural contracts
since they are already subject to existing
Federal position limits.
Second, the Commission is
establishing a separate compliance date
of January 1, 2023 in connection with (i)
economically equivalent swaps and (ii)
the elimination of previously-granted
risk management exemptions (i.e.,
market participants may continue to
rely on their previously-granted risk
management exemptions until January
1, 2023). As noted above, the 2020
NPRM only had a single general
compliance date and did not provide a
separate compliance date for
economically equivalent swaps or
related to previously-granted risk
management exemptions.
In this section, the Commission will
discuss the following related issues: (i)
Compliance with Federal position limits
for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts; (ii) compliance by exchanges
with § 150.5 under the Final Rule and
market participants’ related obligation
to temporarily continue providing
Forms 204/304 in connection with bona
fide hedges; (iii) exchanges’ voluntary
implementation of § 150.9 under the
50 The Commission is adopting calendar dates for
compliance to provide clarity rather than the 2020
NPRM’s approach of stating that the compliance
period ends 365 days after publication in the
Federal Register since the Commission believes
that providing a set calendar date provides greater
clarity to market participants. Based on the timing
of the Final Rule, the Commission believes that the
January 1, 2022 general compliance date will not
reduce the compliance period compared to the 2020
NPRM’s approach and may provide slightly more
time prior to the commencement of the compliance
period.
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Final Rule; and (iv) comments received
in connection with the compliance date
proposed in the 2020 NPRM.
i. Compliance With Federal Position
Limits for the Nine Legacy Agricultural
Contracts
With respect to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, the Commission
is not providing a compliance date with
respect to the spot month and non-spot
month Federal position limit levels.
Accordingly, the new Federal position
limit levels under the Final Rule will
become effective on the Effective Date.
The nine legacy agricultural contracts
are currently subject to Federal position
limits and will continue to be subject
under the Final Rule, which, as noted
above, is increasing the Federal position
limit levels for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts (other than CBOT
Oats, which will maintain the existing
Federal position limit levels). The
Commission has determined not to
provide a separate compliance date for
the nine legacy agricultural contracts
since market participants trading in
these markets already are familiar with
Federal position limits and have
established the necessary monitoring
and compliance oversight processes, in
connection with these legacy contracts.
With respect to exchange-set position
limits, the Final Rule does not require
exchanges to increase their respective
exchange-set position limit levels.
Rather, the Final Rule only requires that
exchange-set position limits are
established at a level no higher than the
corresponding Federal position limits.
As a result, in response to the Final
Rule, an exchange may: (1) Raise its
exchange-set limits to be as high as (or
lower than) the corresponding Federal
position limits immediately on the
Effective Date or anytime thereafter; (2)
implement a phase-in period where
exchange-set position limits increase
from existing exchange-set levels over
time; or (3) not increase the exchangeset position limit levels at all, in each
case as the exchange may determine
appropriate for its markets.
ii. Exchange Implementation of § 150.5
and Market Participants’ Obligations To
Continue Providing Forms 204 and 304,
as Applicable, in Connection With
Federal Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
For clarity, in connection with the
nine legacy agricultural contracts,
market participants may avail
themselves of the new enumerated bona
fide hedges (e.g., anticipatory
merchandising) immediately upon the
Effective Date (market participants will
not need to be concerned with availing
themselves of bona fide hedge
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3251
recognitions for the 16 non-legacy
contracts upon the Effective Date since
these contracts will have a compliance
date of January 1, 2022). To the extent
that market participants seek to rely on
any Federal enumerated bona fide
hedges, market participants must
continue to provide, as applicable, the
Commission with Forms 204/304,
which are otherwise eliminated by the
Final Rule upon the Effective Date, until
the relevant exchange that lists the
applicable referenced contract
implements § 150.5 under the Final
Rule. As discussed below, final § 150.5
governs, among other things, exchange
rules and procedures, including (i) the
exchange’s collection of certain cashmarket information from market
participants in connection with their
bona fide hedge applications for
exchange-set limits and (ii) the
exchange’s sharing of related
information with the Commission. As
discussed further below, the Final Rule
predicates the elimination of Forms
204/304 on the relevant exchange’s
sharing of the information with the
Commission under final § 150.5 (which
provides for a new process for the
exchange to share data with the
Commission similar to data that the
Commission previously obtained
through Forms 204/304 under the
Federal framework existing prior to the
Final Rule).51 Exchanges must
implement final § 150.5 by the Final
Rule’s general compliance date of
January 1, 2022.
iii. Exchange Implementation of § 150.9
in Connection With the Market
Participants’ Applications Through
Exchanges for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges for Purposes of Federal
Position Limits
As discussed above, the Final Rule
establishes a streamlined process for
market participants to apply through
exchanges for non-enumerated bona fide
hedges for purposes of Federal position
limits. That is, a market participant may
submit a single non-enumerated bona
fide hedge exemption application to an
exchange for purposes of both Federal
and exchange-set position limits, and
the Commission will review, and make
a determination based on, the
application that the market participant
submitted to the exchange. For clarity,
the Commission notes that the Final
Rule does not require exchanges to
participate in such process.
However, if an exchange chooses to
do so, the Commission is clarifying, for
51 For further discussion of the elimination of
Form 204 and Parts I and II of Form 304, see Section
II.H.2, infra.
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the avoidance of doubt, that the
exchange may implement this
streamlined process for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications as soon as
the Effective Date, or anytime thereafter
(or not at all). In response to certain
concerns by market participants and
exchanges, discussed immediately
below, the Commission believes that, to
the extent an exchange chooses to
participate in this streamlined
application process, the implementation
of § 150.9 soon after the Effective Date
may help ensure minimal disruption to
market participants’ existing trading
strategies as well as avoid having the
potentially unfeasible situation of
requiring the exchanges to process a
number of non-enumerated bona fide
hedge applications simultaneously at
the end of the general compliance
period on January 1, 2022. Furthermore,
the Commission clarifies in Section
II.G.3.iii that market participants with
existing Commission-granted nonenumerated or anticipatory bona fide
hedge recognitions in connection with
the nine legacy agricultural contracts
under the existing framework are not
required to reapply to the Commission
for a new recognition under the Final
Rule.
iv. Comments—Compliance Period
Generally, commenters supported the
proposed compliance date, noting that
an adequate compliance period would
afford sufficient time to make necessary
business adjustments (e.g., time to build
compliance systems, develop
technology, train personnel, etc.).52 The
Commission agrees with these
observations and believes that a general
compliance date of January 1, 2022,
except for economically equivalent
swaps and positions based on a
previously-granted risk management
exemption, will provide exchanges and
market participants sufficient time to
adjust their operations and compliance
and monitoring systems.
Some commenters also requested an
extended compliance date (beyond the
general compliance date) for
economically equivalent swaps to
mitigate the numerous legal,
operational, and compliance challenges
of implementing position limits for
swaps for the first time.53 Unlike
exchange-listed contracts that are
currently subject to either Federal
position limits or exchange-set limits,
commenters noted that exchanges do
not have existing compliance and
52 CME Group at 8; FIA at 2–3; ISDA at 2, 8; Shell
at 4; and SIFMA AMG at 2, 9–10.
53 MFA/AIMA at 8; NCFC at 6; NGSA at 15–16;
SIFMA AMG at 9–10; and Citadel at 9–10.
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monitoring resources for economically
equivalent swaps from which to
leverage. The Commission agrees with
commenters that additional time for
economically equivalent swaps is
warranted, and, as discussed above, is
thus delaying the compliance date for
economically equivalent swaps for an
additional year, until January 1, 2023.
CME Group expressed concern that it
may receive an influx of exemption
applications at the end of the
compliance period, and therefore
suggested a rolling process where
market participants are grandfathered
into their current exemptions,
permitting them to file for those
exemptions on the same annual
schedule.54 The Commission believes
this concern is mitigated since
exchanges, at their discretion, may
implement final § 150.9 as soon as the
Effective Date, which will allow
exchanges to review non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications on a
rolling basis between the Effective Date
and the end of the compliance period
rather than having to process a large
number of applications at once.
Furthermore, as noted above, market
participants with existing Commissiongranted non-enumerated or anticipatory
bona fide hedge recognitions are not
required to reapply to the Commission
for a new recognition under the Final
Rule.
E. The Commission Construes CEA
Section 4a(a) To Require the
Commission To Make a Necessity
Finding Before Establishing Position
Limits for Physical Commodities Other
Than Excluded Commodities
The Commission is required by ISDA
to determine whether CEA section
4a(a)(2)(A) requires the Commission to
find, before establishing a position limit,
that such limit is ‘‘necessary.’’ 55 The
provision states in relevant part that
‘‘the Commission shall’’ establish
position limits ‘‘as appropriate’’ for
futures contracts in physical
commodities other than excluded
commodities ‘‘[i]n accordance with the
standards set forth in’’ the preexisting
section 4a(a)(1).56 That preexisting
provision requires the Commission to
establish position limits as it ‘‘finds are
necessary to diminish, eliminate, or
prevent’’ certain enumerated burdens on
interstate commerce.57 In the 2011 Final
Rulemaking, the Commission
interpreted this language as an
unambiguous mandate to establish
Group at 8.
887 F.Supp.2d at 281.
56 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(A).
57 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
position limits without first finding that
such limits are necessary, but with
discretion to determine the
‘‘appropriate’’ levels for each.58 In ISDA,
the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia disagreed and held that
section 4a(a)(2)(A) is ambiguous as to
whether the ‘‘standards set forth in
paragraph (1)’’ include the requirement
of an antecedent finding that a position
limit is necessary.59 The court vacated
the 2011 Final Rulemaking and directed
the Commission to apply its experience
and expertise to resolve that
ambiguity.60 The Commission has done
so and determines that section
4a(a)(2)(A) should be interpreted to
require that before establishing position
limits, the Commission must determine
that limits are necessary.61 A full legal
analysis is set forth infra at Sections
III.C.–E.
The Commission finds that position
limits are necessary for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts, including
certain commodity derivative contracts
that are directly or indirectly linked to
a core referenced futures contract. The
Commission’s finding with respect to
the 25 core referenced futures contracts
is based on two interrelated factors: The
particular importance of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts to their
respective underlying cash markets,
including that they require physical
delivery of the underlying commodity,
and, the commodities’ particular
importance to the national economy.
Separately, the Commission finds that
position limits are necessary during the
spot month for all 25 core referenced
futures contracts and outside of the spot
month only for the nine legacy
agricultural commodity contracts (in
each instance including certain
commodity derivative contracts that are
directly or indirectly linked to a core
referenced futures contract). A full
discussion of the necessity findings is
set forth infra at Sections III.C.–E.
F. The Commission’s Use of Certain
Terminology
The Commission is aware that this
Final Rule will likely be reviewed by a
diverse range of members of the public
from varied backgrounds and industries
and with different levels of knowledge
and experience with derivatives
markets. Furthermore, even among
experienced market participants,
terminology may differ by industry,
commodity, or exchange. The
Commission also recognizes that certain
54 CME
58 76
55 ISDA,
59 ISDA,
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FR at 71626, 71627.
887 F.Supp.2d at 279–280.
60 Id. at 281.
61 See infra Section III.B.
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terms commonly referenced by market
participants may differ from the
technical legal terms used in the
Commission’s regulations and/or the
CEA.
Accordingly, unless otherwise noted,
the Commission will attempt to use
terms and phrases in their ordinary,
plain English sense. When required, the
Commission will explicitly identify
technical or nuanced legal/regulatory or
industry ‘‘terms of art.’’ The
Commission wishes to briefly review
certain terms and phrases used
throughout this release below, as
follows:
• Bona fide hedges. The CEA uses the
legal term ‘‘bona fide hedging
transaction or position’’ in both the
singular and plural. The Commission
currently defines the term in existing
§ 1.3 in the plural as ‘‘bona fide hedging
transactions or positions’’ while the
Final Rule now incorporates the
singular ‘‘bona fide hedging transaction
or position.’’ The Commission
understands that most market
participants simply refer to ‘‘bona fide
hedge(s)’’ (in both the singular and the
plural). Accordingly, for short hand
throughout this release, the Commission
may refer to ‘‘bona fide hedges,’’ ‘‘bona
fide hedge positions,’’ ‘‘bona fide hedge
transactions,’’ ‘‘bona fide hedges,’’
‘‘bona fide hedging positions,’’ and
similar phrasing.
These terms are meant to apply as
short hand and are not intended to
imply a substantive difference either
with the defined legal term ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position’’ or with
one another.
Similarly, the plural term in the
existing Commission regulations and
the singular in the Final Rule, as
discussed below, are not intended to
reflect a substantive difference.
• Federal position limits. The Final
Rule creates a new defined term,
‘‘speculative position limit,’’ in part 150
of the Commission’s regulations to refer
to the maximum position, net long or
net short, that a market participant may
maintain in a referenced contract.
Throughout this release, the
Commission will use as a general term
either ‘‘position limits’’ or ‘‘Federal
position limits’’ to refer to the general
Federal position limits framework and
related regulations, including the
defined term ‘‘speculative position
limit.’’ When discussing the individual
‘‘speculative position limit’’ levels for
each commodity derivative contract, as
opposed to the Final Rule’s general
Federal regulatory framework, the
Commission instead may refer to the
‘‘Federal position limit levels,’’ although
all these phrases are intended to refer to
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the same general concept. The
Commission may also specifically refer
to exchange-set position limits when
referring to the general framework,
process, or specific position limit levels
established by the respective exchanges.
• Exchanges. This Final Rule applies
to both DCMs and SEFs. Unless
otherwise distinguished, the
Commission will refer to ‘‘exchanges’’
throughout this release to refer to any
relevant DCM or SEF.
• Cash-Settled and Physically-Settled.
The Commission throughout this release
refers to ‘‘cash-settled’’ and ‘‘physicallysettled’’ commodity derivative
contracts.
When a futures contract expires, all
open futures contract positions in such
contract are settled by either: (1)
Physical delivery, which the
Commission refers to as a ‘‘physicallysettled’’ contract, or (2) cash settlement,
which the Commission refers to as a
‘‘cash-settled’’ contract, in each case
depending on the contract terms set by
the exchange. Deliveries on ‘‘physicallysettled’’ futures contracts are made
through the exchange’s clearinghouse,
and the delivery of the physical
commodity must be consummated
between the buyer and seller per the
exchange rules and contract
specifications. On the other hand, other
futures contracts are ‘‘cash-settled’’
because they do not involve the transfer
of physical commodity ownership and
require that all open positions at
expiration be settled by a transfer of
cash to or from the clearinghouse based
upon the final settlement price of the
contracts.
The Commission further notes that
some market participants may instead
use the terms ‘‘physical-delivery’’
contracts or ‘‘financially-settled’’
contracts instead of the Commission’s
terms ‘‘physically-settled’’ contracts and
‘‘cash-settled’’ contracts, respectively.
The Commission does not intend a
substantive difference in meaning with
the choice of its terms.
• Spread Positions. The Commission
views its use of the term ‘‘spread’’ to
mean the same as ‘‘arbitrage’’ or
‘‘straddle’’ as those terms are used in
CEA section 4a(a) and existing
§ 150.3(a)(3) of the Commission’s
regulations. Consistent with existing
regulations, the Commission’s sole use
of the term ‘‘spread’’ in this Final Rule
is intended to also capture arbitrage or
straddle strategies referred to in CEA
section 4a(a) and existing § 150.3(a)(3),
and referring to ‘‘spread’’ rather than
‘‘arbitrage’’ or ‘‘straddle’’ is not intended
to be a substantive difference. The
Commission notes that certain
exchanges may distinguish between
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‘‘spread’’ and ‘‘arbitrage’’ positions for
purposes of exchange exemptions, but
the Commission does not make that
distinction here for purposes of its
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition as used
in this release.
• Unfixed Price Forward
Transactions. Throughout this release,
the Commission will use as general
terms either ‘‘unfixed price forward
transactions,’’ ‘‘unfixed price
transactions,’’ ‘‘unfixed price forward
contracts,’’ and/or ‘‘unfixed price
contracts’’ to refer to transactions that
are either purchases or sales of a cash
commodity where the purchase or sales
price, as applicable, is determined based
on the settlement price of a benchmark,
such as the settlement price of a
commodity derivative contract on a
certain date (e.g., the price on the
settlement date of a core referenced
futures contract) or other index price
(e.g., a spot index price). Market
participants may also refer to unfixed
price transactions as ‘‘floating price’’
transactions, and the Commission does
not intend a substantive difference in
meaning with the choice of these terms.
G. Recent Volatility in the WTI Contract
Several commenters noted the
volatility in the NYMEX Light Sweet
Crude Oil (CL) contract, also known as
the West Texas Intermediate crude oil
contract (‘‘WTI contract’’), that occurred
in April 2020 (subsequent to the
issuance of the 2020 NPRM) in their
comments to the 2020 NPRM. Some
commenters suggested that the volatility
may have been caused, in part, by
excessive speculation 62 or highly
leveraged traders,63 or both. Better
Markets suggested that a combination of
passive exchange-traded funds,64 the
use of trading-at-settlement (‘‘TAS’’)
orders,65 automated trading,66 and,
according to Better Markets, a lack of
‘‘meaningful position limits,’’ 67 may
have contributed to the volatility. Other
commenters suggested that this event
could have been mitigated through
additional liquidity provided by
financial end users during the critical
62 PMAA
at 2.
at 3–4.
64 Better Markets at 9.
65 Better Markets at 13. A TAS order is an order
that is placed during the trading session but is
executed at the settlement price (or with a small
price range around the settlement price). Trading at
Settlement (TAS), https://www.cmegroup.com/
trading/trading-at-settlement.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2020); TRADE AT SETTLEMENT (TAS)
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS July 2020,
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures_us/
TAS_FAQ.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
66 Better Markets at 14–17.
67 Better Markets at 10.
63 NEFI
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time period, among other measures.68
Commenters also pointed to the event to
bolster arguments for and against
Commission deference to exchanges in
implementing position limits.69 A few
commenters requested that the
Commission refrain from finalizing the
rule until it better understands this
event and other issues.70
The Commission has been closely
examining the circumstances
surrounding the volatility in the WTI
contract since it occurred in April 2020.
The Commission will continue to
analyze the events of April 2020 to
evaluate whether any changes to the
position limits regulations may be
warranted in light of the circumstances
surrounding the volatility in the WTI
contract. Any proposed changes that the
Commission finds may be warranted
would be subject to public comment
pursuant to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.
H. Brief Summary of Comments
Received
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As stated previously, the Commission
received approximately 75 relevant
comment letters in response to the 2020
NPRM.71 Though several commenters
did not support the Commission
adopting the 2020 NPRM and requested
its withdrawal,72 most of the 75
comments received generally supported
the 2020 NPRM, or supported specific
elements of the 2020 NPRM. However,
many of these commenters suggested
68 AQR at 5–7 (‘‘The inability of position limits
themselves to eliminate the unpredictability of
commodity futures markets highlights the
importance of existing Commission and exchange
oversight of these markets and the dangers of
overreliance on a single regulatory tool to address
market dynamics for which it may not have been
designed . . . [W]e encourage the Commission to
consider not only concerns around potential
manipulation, but also the potential unintended
consequences of such limits and the need for
liquidity during sensitive time periods for
commodity futures markets.’’); SCM at 2–3 (‘‘This
liquidity, provided by financial trading firms and
hedge funds . . ., is essential to balance, check and
smooth the otherwise uncontrollable trading that
can occur when only commercial firms and
unsophisticated trading participants are active in a
market.’’).
69 IATP suggested that the event demonstrates the
problems of Commission deference to DCMs’
‘‘experience and capacity’’ on many of the
provisions in the 2020 NPRM. See IATP at 18.
Conversely, SEMI stated that a final rule should not
be overly restrictive in response to the recent
market conditions in WTI oil markets, given that it
is the exchanges that ‘‘have the expertise,
experience and existing tools to effectively manage
the orderly expiration of futures contracts that are
in the spot month under such circumstances.’’
SEMI at 13.
70 AFR at 3; Rutkowski at 2; IATP at 2–3.
71 See supra, n.16.
72 E.g. AFR; Better Markets; IATP; Eric Matsen;
NEFI; Public Citizen; Robert Rutkowski; SCM; and
VLM.
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modifications to portions of the 2020
NPRM, which are discussed in the
relevant sections discussing the Final
Rule below. In addition, several
commenters requested Commission
action beyond the scope of the 2020
NPRM, also discussed in the relevant
sections below.
II. Final Rule
A. § 150.1—Definitions
Definitions relevant to the existing
position limits regime currently appear
in both §§ 1.3 and 150.1 of the
Commission’s regulations.73 The
Commission proposed to update and
supplement the definitions in § 150.1,
including moving a revised definition of
‘‘bona fide hedging transactions and
positions’’ from § 1.3 into § 150.1. The
proposed changes were intended,
among other things, to conform the
definitions to certain of the Dodd-Frank
Act amendments to the CEA.74 Each
proposed defined term is discussed in
alphabetical order below.
1. ‘‘Bona Fide Hedging Transaction or
Position’’
i. Background—Bona Fide Hedging
Transaction or Position
Under CEA section 4a(c)(1), position
limits shall not apply to transactions or
positions that are shown to be bona fide
hedging transactions or positions, as
such terms shall be defined by the
Commission.75 The Dodd-Frank Act
directed the Commission, for purposes
of implementing CEA section 4a(a)(2), to
adopt a bona fide hedging definition
consistent with CEA section 4a(c)(2).76
The existing definition of ‘‘bona fide
hedging transactions and positions,’’
which first appeared in § 1.3 of the
Commission’s regulations in the
1970s,77 is inconsistent, in certain ways
73 17
CFR 1.3 and 150.1, respectively.
addition to the amendments described
below, the Commission proposed to re-order the
defined terms so that they appear in alphabetical
order, rather than in a lettered list, so that terms can
be more quickly located. Moving forward, any new
defined terms would be inserted in alphabetical
order, as recommended by the Office of the Federal
Register. See Document Drafting Handbook, Office
of the Federal Register, National Archives and
Records Administration, 2–31 (Revision 5, Oct. 2,
2017) (stating, ‘‘[i]n sections or paragraphs
containing only definitions, we recommend that
you do not use paragraph designations if you list
the terms in alphabetical order. Begin the definition
paragraph with the term that you are defining.’’).
75 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1).
76 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2).
77 See, e.g., Definition of Bona Fide Hedging and
Related Reporting Requirements, 42 FR 42748 (Aug.
24, 1977). Previously, the Secretary of Agriculture,
pursuant to section 404 of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93–463),
promulgated a definition of bona fide hedging
transactions and positions. Hedging Definition,
74 In
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described below, with the revised
statutory definition in CEA section
4a(c)(2).
Accordingly, and for the reasons
outlined below, the Commission
proposed to remove the existing bona
fide hedging definition from § 1.3 and
replace it with a revised bona fide
hedging definition that would appear
alongside all of the other position limits
related definitions in proposed
§ 150.1.78 This definition would be
applied in determining whether a
position in a commodity derivative
contract is a bona fide hedge that may
exceed Federal position limits set forth
in § 150.2.
This section of the release discusses
the bona fide hedging definition and the
substantive standards for bona fide
hedges. The process for granting bona
fide hedge recognitions is discussed
later in this release in connection with
§§ 150.3 and 150.9.79
The discussion in this section is
organized as follows:
i. This background section discussion;
Reports, and Conforming Amendments, 40 FR
11560 (Mar. 12, 1975). That definition, largely
reflecting the statutory definition previously in
effect, remained in effect until the newlyestablished Commission defined that term. Id.
78 In a 2018 rulemaking, the Commission
amended § 1.3 to replace the sub-paragraphs that
had for years been identified with an alphabetic
designation for each defined term with an
alphabetized list. See Definitions, 83 FR 7979 (Feb.
23, 2018). The bona fide hedging definition,
therefore, is now a paragraph, located in
alphabetical order, in § 1.3, rather than in § 1.3(z).
Accordingly, for purposes of clarity and ease of
discussion, when discussing the Commission’s
existing version of the bona fide hedging definition,
this release will refer to the bona fide hedging
definition in § 1.3.
Further, the version of § 1.3 that appears in the
Code of Federal Regulations applies only to
excluded commodities and is not the version of the
bona fide hedging definition currently in effect. The
version currently in effect, the substance of which
remains as it was amended in 1987, applies to all
commodities, not just to excluded commodities. See
Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits, 52
FR 38914 (Oct. 20, 1987). While the 2011 Final
Rulemaking amended the § 1.3 bona fide hedging
definition to apply only to excluded commodities,
that rulemaking was vacated, as noted previously,
by a September 28, 2012 order of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, with the
exception of the rule’s amendments to 17 CFR
150.2. Although the 2011 Final Rulemaking was
vacated, the 2011 version of the bona fide hedging
definition in § 1.3, which applied only to excluded
commodities, has not yet been formally removed
from the Code of Federal Regulations. The
currently-in-effect version of the Commission’s
bona fide hedging definition thus does not currently
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. The
closest to a ‘‘current’’ version of the definition is the
2010 version of § 1.3, which, while substantively
current, still includes the ‘‘(z)’’ denomination that
was removed in 2018. The Commission proposed to
address the need to formally remove the incorrect
version of the bona fide hedging definition as part
of the 2020 NPRM.
79 See infra Section II.C. (discussing § 150.3) and
Section II.G. (discussing § 150.9).
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ii. An overview of the existing
‘‘general’’ elements of the bona fide
hedging definition and the specific
‘‘enumerated’’ bona fide hedges listed in
the existing bona fide hedge definition;
iii. A discussion of each of the
elements of the existing ‘‘general’’ bona
fide hedging definition, including the
(a) temporary substitute test (and the
related elimination of the risk
management exemption), (b)
economically appropriate test, (c)
change in value requirement, (d)
incidental test, and (e) orderly trading
requirement;
iv. The treatment of unfixed-price
transactions under the Final Rule;
v. A discussion of each enumerated
bona fide hedge in the Final Rule;
vi. A discussion of the elimination of
the Five-Day Rule;
vii. A discussion of the guidance on
measuring risk (i.e., gross versus net
hedging);
viii. A discussion of the Final Rule’s
implementation of the CEA’s statutory
pass-through swap and pass-through
swap offset provisions; and
ix. A discussion of the form, location,
and organization of the enumerated
bona fide hedges.
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ii. Overview of the Commission’s
Existing Bona Fide Hedging Definition
in § 1.3
Paragraph (1) of the existing bona fide
hedging definition in Commission
regulation § 1.3 contains what is
currently labeled the ‘‘general
definition’’ of bona fide hedging. This
‘‘general’’ bona fide hedging definition
comprises five key elements which
require that in order for a position to be
deemed a bona fide hedge for Federal
position limits, the position must:
• ‘‘normally’’ represent a substitute
for transactions to be made or positions
to be taken at a later time in a physical
marketing channel (‘‘temporary
substitute test’’);
• be economically appropriate to the
reduction of risks in the conduct and
management of a commercial enterprise
(‘‘economically appropriate test’’);
• arise from the potential change in
value of (1) assets which a person owns,
produces, manufactures, processes, or
merchandises or anticipates owning,
producing, manufacturing, processing,
or merchandising, (2) liabilities which a
person owns or anticipates incurring, or
(3) services which a person provides,
purchases, or anticipates providing or
purchasing (‘‘change in value
requirement’’);
• have a purpose to offset price risks
incidental to commercial cash or spot
operations (‘‘incidental test’’); and
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• be established and liquidated in an
orderly manner (‘‘orderly trading
requirement’’).80
As discussed more fully below, the
Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to the
CEA included the first three factors in
the amended CEA, but did not include
the last two factors.
Additionally, paragraph (2) of the
bona fide hedging definition in existing
§ 1.3 currently sets forth a non-exclusive
list of seven total enumerated bona fide
hedges, contained in four general bona
fide hedging transaction categories, that
comply with the general bona fide
hedging definition in paragraph (1).
These bona fide hedge categories that
are explicitly listed in existing § 1.3’s
bona fide hedging definition are
generally referred to as the
‘‘enumerated’’ bona fide hedges, a term
the Commission uses throughout in this
release. Market participants thus need
not seek approval from the Commission
of such positions as bona fide hedges
prior to exceeding limits for such
positions. Rather, market participants
must simply report any such positions
on the monthly Form 204 (or Form 304
for cotton), as required by part 19 of the
Commission’s existing regulations.81
The seven existing enumerated
hedges fall into the following four
categories: (1) Sales of futures contracts
to hedge (i) ownership or fixed-price
cash commodity purchases and (ii)
unsold anticipated production; (2)
purchases of futures contracts to hedge
(i) fixed-price cash commodity sales of
the same commodity, (ii) fixed-price
sales of the cash commodity’s cash
products and by-products, and (iii)
unfilled anticipated requirements; (3)
offsetting sales and purchases of futures
contracts to hedge offsetting unfixedprice cash commodity sales and
purchases; and (4) cross-commodity
hedges.82
As discussed further below, market
participants may not use either the
existing enumerated bona fide hedges
for unsold anticipated production or
unfilled anticipated requirements to
hedge more than twelve-months’ unsold
production or unfilled requirements,
respectively (the ‘‘twelve-month
restriction’’). Further, the existing
enumerated bona fide hedges for unsold
production and for offsetting sales and
purchases of unfixed price transactions
do not apply during the five last trading
days. Similarly, the existing enumerated
bona fide hedge for unfilled anticipated
requirements has a modified version of
the Five-Day Rule and provides that
80 17
CFR 1.3.
CFR part 19.
82 17 CFR 1.3.
81 17
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during the ‘‘five last trading days’’ a
market participant may not maintain a
position that exceeds the market
participant’s unfilled anticipated
requirement for ‘‘that month and for the
next succeeding month.’’
Paragraph (3) of the current bona fide
hedging definition states that the
Commission may recognize ‘‘nonenumerated’’ bona fide hedging
transactions and positions pursuant to a
specific request by a market participant
using the process described in § 1.47 of
the Commission’s regulations.83
iii. Amended Bona Fide Hedge
Definition for Physical Commodities in
§ 150.1; ‘‘General’’ Elements of the Bona
Fide Hedge Definition Under the Final
Rule
The Commission is adopting the
proposed general elements currently
found in the bona fide hedging
definition in § 1.3 that conform to the
revised statutory bona fide hedging
definition in CEA section 4a(c)(2), as
amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, and is
eliminating the general elements that do
not conform.84 In particular, the
Commission is adopting updated
versions of the temporary substitute test,
economically appropriate test, and
change in value requirements that are
described below, and eliminating the
incidental test and orderly trading
requirement, which are not included in
the revised statutory text. Each of these
changes is discussed in more detail
below.85
a. Temporary Substitute Test
(1) Background—Temporary Substitute
Test
The language of the temporary
substitute test in the Commission’s
existing bona fide hedging definition is
inconsistent with the language of the
temporary substitute test that appears in
the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank
Act. Specifically, the Commission’s
existing regulatory definition currently
provides that a bona fide hedging
83 Id.
84 The Commission is also making a nonsubstantive change to the introductory language of
§ 150.3 by referring in the proviso to ‘‘such person’s
transactions or positions.’’ The Commission views
this as a clarifying edit, and does not intend a
substantive difference in meaning with the choice
of these terms.
85 Bona fide hedge recognition is determined
based on the particular circumstances of a position
or transaction and is not conferred on the basis of
the involved market participant alone. Accordingly,
while a particular position may qualify as a bona
fide hedge for a given market participant, another
position held by that same participant may not.
Similarly, if a participant holds positions that are
recognized as bona fide hedges, and holds other
positions that are speculative, only the speculative
positions would be subject to position limits.
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position normally represents a
substitute for transactions to be made or
positions to be taken at a later time in
a physical marketing channel.86 Prior to
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act,
the temporary substitute test in section
4a(c)(2)(A)(i) of the CEA also contained
the word ‘‘normally,’’ so that the
Commission’s existing bona fide
hedging definition mirrored the
previous section 4a(c)(2)(A)(i) of the
CEA prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. The
word ‘‘normally’’ acted as a qualifier for
the instances in which a position must
be a temporary substitute for
transactions or positions made at a later
time in a physical marketing channel.
However, the Dodd-Frank Act removed
that qualifier by deleting the word
‘‘normally’’ from the temporary
substitute test in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(A)(i).87
In a 1987 interpretation, the
Commission stated that, among other
things, the inclusion of the word
‘‘normally’’ in connection with the preDodd-Frank-Act version of the
temporary substitute language indicated
that the bona fide hedging definition
should not be construed to apply only
to firms using futures to reduce their
exposures to risks in the cash market.88
Instead, the 1987 interpretation took the
view that to qualify as a bona fide
hedge, a transaction in the futures
market did not necessarily need to be a
temporary substitute for a later
transaction in the cash market.89 In
other words, that interpretation took the
view that a futures position could still
qualify as a bona fide hedging position
even if it was not in connection with the
production, sale, or use of a physical
commodity.
Commission staff has previously
granted so-called ‘‘risk management
exemptions’’ on such grounds. In
connection with physical commodities,
the phrase ‘‘risk management
exemption’’ has historically been used
by Commission staff to refer to nonenumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions granted under § 1.47 to
allow swap dealers and others to hold
agricultural futures positions in excess
of Federal position limits in order to
offset their positions in commodity
index swaps or related exposure.90 Risk
management exemptions were granted
outside of the spot month, and the
related swap exposure that was being
offset (i.e., hedged by the futures or
options position entered into based on
the risk management exemption) was
typically opposite an institutional
investor for which the swap was not a
bona fide hedge.
86 17 CFR 1.3. As noted earlier in this release, the
currently-in-effect version of the Commission’s
bona fide hedging definition does not currently
appear in the current Code of Federal Regulations.
The closest to a ‘‘current’’ version of the definition
is the 2010 version of § 1.3, which, while
substantively current, still includes the ‘‘(z)’’
denomination that was removed in 2018. The
Commission proposed to address the need to
formally remove the incorrect version of the bona
fide hedging definition as part of the 2020 NPRM.
See supra n.74.
87 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(i).
88 See Clarification of Certain Aspects of the
Hedging Definition, 52 FR 27195, 27196 (July 20,
1987).
89 Id.
90 As described below, due to differences in
statutory language, the phrase ‘‘risk management
exemption’’ often has a broader meaning in
connection with excluded commodities than with
physical commodities. See infra Section II.A.1.x.
(discussing proposed pass-through language).
91 85 FR at 11596.
92 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B).
93 See final § 150.3(c). See also infra Section
II.A.1.x.b. (discussing proposed pass-through
language). Excluded commodities, as described in
further detail below, are not subject to the statutory
bona fide hedging definition. Accordingly, the
statutory restrictions on risk management
exemptions that apply to physical commodities
subject to Federal position limits do not apply to
excluded commodities.
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(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Temporary Substitute Test
As described above, the Dodd-Frank
Act clearly and unambiguously removed
the word ‘‘normally’’ from the
temporary substitute test in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(A)(i), as amended by the DoddFrank Act. As such, in the 2020 NPRM,
the Commission interpreted the DoddFrank Act’s removal of the word
‘‘normally’’ as reflecting Congressional
statutory direction that a bona fide
hedging position in physical
commodities must always (and not just
‘‘normally’’) be in connection with the
production, sale, or use of a physical
cash-market commodity.91 The
Commission interpreted this change to
signal that the Commission should cease
to recognize ‘‘risk management’’
positions as bona fide hedges for
physical commodities, unless the
positions satisfy the pass-through swap/
swap offset requirements in section
4a(c)(2)(B) of the CEA, further discussed
below.92
In order to implement that statutory
change, the Commission: (1) Proposed a
narrower bona fide hedging definition
for physical commodities in proposed
§ 150.1 that did not include the word
‘‘normally’’ currently found in the
temporary substitute regulatory
language in paragraph (1) of the existing
§ 1.3 bona fide hedging definition; and
(2) proposed to eliminate all previouslygranted risk management exemptions
that did not otherwise qualify for passthrough treatment.93 Under the 2020
NPRM, any such previously-granted risk
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management exemption would
generally no longer apply 365 days after
publication of final position limits rules
in the Federal Register.94
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Temporary Substitute
Test
As proposed, the Final Rule
eliminates the word ‘‘normally’’ from
the Commission’s temporary substitute
test and eliminates the risk management
exemption for contracts subject to
Federal position limits. However, as
described below, the Final Rule is
extending the compliance date for
existing risk management exemption
holders.
(4) Comments—Temporary Substitute
Test
Commenters were divided regarding
the proposed elimination of the risk
management exemptions. Some public
interest groups and the agricultural
industry supported the proposed
removal of the word ‘‘normally’’ and/or
the accompanying rescission of risk
management exemptions.95 These
commenters argued that risk
management positions are harmful to
the market and can adversely impact
price dynamics.96
Commenters from the financial
industry, ICE, and MGEX opposed the
proposed removal of ‘‘normally’’ and/or
the proposed elimination of the risk
management exemption.97 These
commenters contended that the
elimination of the risk management
94 See infra Section II.A.1.iii.a(5) (discussing of
revoking existing risk management exemptions).
95 AMCOT at 1; Ecom at 1; White Gold at 1–2;
Walcot at 2; East Cotton at 2; CMC at 11 (stating
that the increased limits and allowances for passthrough exemptions will limit any potential loss of
liquidity); NCFC at 7 (noting that it supports the
elimination in light of the increased limits); NGFA
at 3; LDC at 2; PMAA at 4; ACSA at 2, 4; IMC at
2; Mallory at 1; McMeekin at 1–2; Memtex at 2;
Omnicotton at 2; NCC at 1; S Canale Cotton at 2;
Texas Cotton at 2; SW Ag at 2; Jess Smith at 2;
Choice Cotton at 1; Olam at 1–2; Better Markets at
4, 51–54 (agreeing with the proposed interpretation
that the Dodd-Frank Act requires the change and
stating that the elimination of the risk management
exemption may mean very little in light of the
increased limits); ACA at 2; Moody Compress at 2;
Toyo at 2; and DECA at 1.
96 See, e.g., Mallory Alexander at 1; DECA at 1;
Ecom at 2; Southern Cotton at 2; Canale Cotton at
2; ACA at 2; IMC at 2; Olam at 1–2; Moody
Compress at 1; SW Ag at 2; East Cotton at 2; Toyo
at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 1–2; Omnicotton
at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at
1–2; and PMAA at 3–4 (arguing that risk
management positions have the potential to create
significant volatility); Better Markets at 9, 17 (noting
the distortive effects of risk management positions).
97 ICE at 5–8 (noting that risk management
positions are non-speculative and arguing that the
pass-through provision is not an adequate substitute
for such positions); FIA at 10, 21–24; ISDA at 6;
PIMCO at 5–6; SIFMA AMG at 8; MGEX at 2.
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exemption will harm the market,
including by reducing liquidity,98 and
that even though Congress removed
‘‘normally’’ from the statute, Congress
did not use the term ‘‘always.’’ 99 One
commenter opposed to the ban claimed
that the European Commission is
considering revising MiFID II 100 to
address a ‘‘failure to include an
appropriate hedge exemption for
financial risks.’’ 101
Finally, several commenters noted
that even if the Commission finalizes
the ban as proposed, the Commission
should: (i) Revoke the exemptions
gradually so as to avoid disruption; 102
(ii) clarify that the Commission
maintains the authority under CEA
section 4a(a)(7) to grant risk
management exemptions in the
future; 103 and (iii) allow exchanges to
grant risk management exemptions.104
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(5) Discussion of Final Rule—
Temporary Substitute Test
The Commission is eliminating the
word ‘‘normally’’ from the
Commission’s temporary substitute test
and eliminating the existing risk
management exemption for contracts
subject to Federal position limits as
proposed. However, as described below,
the Commission is extending the
98 FIA at 23–24 (contending that the 2020 NPRM
may harm pension funds and create a bifurcated
liquidity pool since dealers may need to move their
hedges from physically-settled to financially-settled
contracts earlier than they would otherwise); ISDA
at 6, 11; PIMCO at 5–6; and ICE at 5–6.
99 ISDA at 6; FIA at 21–22; and ICE at 5, 8.
100 According to the European Securities and
Market Authority, ‘‘MiFID is the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC). It has
been applicable across the European Union since
November 2007. It is a cornerstone of the EU’s
regulation of financial markets seeking to improve
their competitiveness by creating a single market for
investment services and activities and to ensure a
high degree of harmonised protection for investors
in financial instruments.’’ MiFID sets out: conduct
of business and organisational requirements for
investment firms; authorisation requirements for
regulated markets; regulatory reporting to avoid
market abuse; trade transparency obligation for
shares; and rules on the admission of financial
instruments to trading.’’
‘‘On 20 October 2011, the European Commission
adopted a legislative proposal for the revision of
MiFID which took the form of a revised Directive
and a new Regulation. After more than two years
of debate, the Directive on Markets in Financial
Instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC and the
Regulation on Markets in Financial Instruments,
commonly referred to as MiFID II and MiFIR, were
adopted by the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union. They were
published in the EU Official Journal on 12 June
2014.’’ European Securities and Market Authority
website at https://www.esma.europa.eu/policyrules/mifid-ii-and-mifir.
101 SIFMA AMG at 8.
102 ISDA at 7.
103 ICE at 6; FIA at 3, 22, 24; ISDA at 6–7; and
IECA at 12.
104 FIA at 3, 22; ISDA at 6–7; and ICE at 5–6.
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compliance date by which positions
based on existing risk management
exemptions must be reduced to levels
that comply with the applicable Federal
position limits. While the Commission
appreciates commenter concerns
regarding the elimination of the risk
management exemption, the
Commission interprets the Dodd-Frank
Act’s removal of the word ‘‘normally’’
from the CEA’s statutory temporary
substitute test as signaling
Congressional intent to reverse the
flexibility afforded by the presence of
the word ‘‘normally’’ prior to the DoddFrank Act. As such, even were the
Commission inclined to retain the status
quo of risk management exemptions, the
Commission’s statutory interpretation
prevents it from doing so.
Further, retaining such exemptions
for swap intermediaries, without regard
to the purpose of their counterparties’
swaps, would not only be inconsistent
with the post-Dodd-Frank Act version of
the temporary substitute test, but would
also be inconsistent with the statutory
restrictions on pass-through swap
offsets. In particular, the statutory passthrough provision requires that the
swap position being offset qualify as a
bona fide hedging position.105 Many
risk management exemptions have been
used to offset swap positions that would
not qualify as bona fide hedging
positions.
In response to the comment regarding
a potential expansion of MiFID II to
accommodate activity akin to risk
management exemptions, the
Commission believes that the European
Commission’s stated posture does not
appear to contemplate a blanket
exemption for financial risks as
suggested by the commenter. Instead,
the European Commission’s approach
appears to be largely consistent with the
narrower pass-through approach
adopted by the Commission in this
Final Rule.106
105 See 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B)(i) (was executed
opposite a counterparty for which the transaction
would qualify as a bona fide hedging transaction).
The pass-through swap offset language in the Final
Rule’s bona fide hedging definition is discussed in
greater detail below.
106 See MiFID II Review report on position limits
and position management (April 1, 2020), available
at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
library/esma70-156-2311_mifid_ii_review_report_
position_limits.pdf. The exemption under
consideration for financial counterparties appears
to be in line with the Final Rule’s pass-through
provision, in that the ‘‘exemption would apply to
the positions held by that financial counterparty
that are objectively measurable as reducing risks
directly related to the commercial activities of the
non-financial entities of the group . . . . this
hedging exemption should not be considered as an
additional exemption to the position limit regime
but rather as a ‘transfer’ to the financial
counterparty of the group of the hedging exemption
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3257
The Commission is, however, making
several changes and clarifications to
address commenter concerns:
First, the Commission is extending
the compliance date by which risk
management exemption holders must
reduce their risk management
exemption positions to comply with
Federal position limits under the Final
Rule to January 1, 2023.107 This
provides approximately two years
beyond the Effective Date for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts.108 The
Commission believes that this will
provide sufficient time for existing
positions to roll off and/or be replaced
with positions that conform with the
Federal position limits adopted in this
Final Rule, without adversely affecting
market liquidity.
Second, including pass-through
swaps and pass-through swap offsets
within the definition of a bona fide
hedge will mitigate some of the
potential impact resulting from the
rescission of the risk management
exemption. The Final Rule’s passthrough provisions should help address
certain of the hedging needs of persons
seeking to offset the risk from swap
books, allowing for sufficient liquidity
in the marketplace for both bona fide
hedgers and their counterparties.
Third, although the Commission will
no longer recognize risk management
positions as bona fide hedges under this
Final Rule, the Commission maintains
other authorities, including the
authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7), to
exempt risk management positions from
Federal position limits.
Finally, consistent with existing
industry practice, exchanges may
continue to recognize risk management
positions for contracts that are not
subject to Federal position limits,
including for excluded commodities.
b. Economically Appropriate Test
(1) Background—Economically
Appropriate Test
The statutory and regulatory bona fide
hedging definitions in section
4a(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the CEA and in existing
§ 1.3 of the Commission’s regulations
both provide that a bona fide hedging
position must be economically
otherwise available to the commercial entities of the
group.’’ Id. at 32–33.
107 For clarity, a risk management exemption
holder may enter into new positions based on, and
in accordance with, its previously-granted risk
management exemption, during this compliance
period, until January 1, 2023.
108 For further discussion of the Final Rule’s
compliance and effective dates, see Section I.D.
Both existing risk management exemptions, as
discussed herein, and swap positions, will be
subject to the extended compliance data to January
1, 2023.
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appropriate to the reduction of risks in
the conduct and management of a
commercial enterprise.109 The
Commission has, when defining bona
fide hedging, historically focused on
transactions that offset price risk.110
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Economically Appropriate Test
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed to amend the economically
appropriate prong of the bona fide
hedge definition with one clarification:
Consistent with the Commission’s
longstanding practice regarding what
types of risk may be offset by bona fide
hedging positions in excess of Federal
position limits,111 the Commission
made explicit in the proposed bona fide
hedging definition that the word ‘‘risks’’
refers to, and is limited to, ‘‘price risk.’’
This proposed clarification did not
reflect a change in policy, as the
Commission has a longstanding policy
that hedges of non-price risk alone
cannot be recognized as bona fide
hedges.112
As stated in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission clarified its view that risk
must be limited to price risk for
purposes of the economically
appropriate test due to the difficulty
that the Commission or exchanges may
face in objectively evaluating whether a
particular derivatives position is
economically appropriate to the
reduction of non-price risks. For
example, the Commission or an
exchange’s staff can objectively evaluate
whether a particular derivatives
position is an economically appropriate
hedge of a price risk arising from an
underlying cash-market transaction,
including by assessing the correlations
between the risk and the derivatives
position. It would be more difficult, if
not impossible, to objectively determine
109 7
U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(ii) and 17 CFR 1.3.
example, in promulgating existing § 1.3,
the Commission explained that a bona fide hedging
position must, among other things, be economically
appropriate to risk reduction, such risks must arise
from operation of a commercial enterprise, and the
price fluctuations of the futures contracts used in
the transaction must be substantially related to
fluctuations of the cash-market value of the assets,
liabilities or services being hedged. Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR 14832,
14833 (Mar. 16, 1977) (emphasis added). ‘‘Value’’
is generally understood to mean price times
quantity. The Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section
4a(c)(2), which copied the economically
appropriate test from the Commission’s definition
in § 1.3. See also 78 FR at 75702, 75703 (stating that
the core of the Commission’s approach to defining
bona fide hedging over the years has focused on
transactions that offset a recognized physical price
risk).
111 See, e.g., 78 FR at 75709, 75710.
112 See supra n.109 for further discussion on the
Commission’s longstanding policy regarding
‘‘price’’ risk.
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110 For
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whether an offset of non-price risk is
economically appropriate for the
underlying risk.
Finally, the Commission requested
comment on whether price risk is
attributable to a variety of factors,
including political and weather risk,
and could therefore allow hedging
political, weather, or other risks, or
whether price risk is something
narrower in the application of bona fide
hedging.113
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Economically
Appropriate Test
The Commission is adopting the
economically appropriate prong of the
bona fide hedge definition as proposed.
However, as discussed below, the
Commission is clarifying in response to
commenter requests that while the
Commission is explicitly limiting
‘‘risks’’ to ‘‘price risks’’ as used in the
economically appropriate test, the
Commission recognizes that price risk
can be informed and impacted by
various other types of non-price risk.
(4) Comments—Economically
Appropriate Test
The Commission received comments
from market participants seeking greater
clarity with respect to the Commission’s
proposed reference to ‘‘price risk’’ in the
context of applying the ‘‘economically
appropriate’’ test in the bona fide
hedging definition. Many commenters
stated that the economically appropriate
test should include offsets of non-price
risk.114 Other commenters stated that a
variety of non-price risk factors (i)
actually affect price risk and therefore
are objective,115 or (ii) are simply
another form of price risk and therefore
should be permitted.116
For example, ADM stated that when
market participants discuss ‘‘risks’’ such
as political, weather, delivery,
transportation, and more, they are
discussing the impact these factors may
have on the price.117 Hence the risk
113 85
FR at 11622.
at 2; NGSA at 5–6; CHS at 3; NCFC at
2; FIA at 10–11; CMC at 3; LDC at 2; ICE at 4; IFUS
at Exhibit 1 RFC (6).
115 FIA at 10–11 (Stating that, ‘‘[T]he Commission
should recognize that the statutory definition of a
bona fide hedging position encompasses the
reduction of all risks that affect the value of a cashmarket position, including time risk, location risk,
quality risk, execution and logistics risk,
counterparty credit risk, weather risk, sovereign
risk, government policy risk (e.g., an embargo), and
any other risks that affect price. These are objective,
rather than subjective, risks that commercial
enterprises incur on a regular basis in connection
with their businesses as producers, processors,
merchants handling, and users of commodities that
underlie the core referenced futures contracts’’).
116 ADM at 5.
117 Id.
114 MGEX
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being hedged is price risk as influenced
by these factors.118 Other commenters
stated that market participants should
have the flexibility to measure risk in
the manner most suitable for their
business.119 In addition, commenters
also stated they were not opposed to
‘‘price risk’’ so long as the Commission
clarified that price risk is not static or
an absolute objective measure, and
consequently that the term ‘‘price risks’’
incorporates a commercial hedger’s
independent assessment of price risk.120
In contrast, Better Markets supported
the 2020 NPRM’s rationale to permit
only ‘‘price risk.’’ 121 Better Markets also
suggested that the Commission clarify
that the term ‘‘commercial enterprise’’
refers to ‘‘solely [a] transaction or
position that would be directly and
demonstrably risk reducing to ‘cash or
spot operations’ for physical
commodities underlying the contracts’’
to be hedged.122
Finally, ICE, MGEX, and FIA
requested that if the Commission adopts
the proposed economically appropriate
prong, the Commission should permit
market participants to use the nonenumerated bona fide hedge process to
receive recognition of bona fide hedges
of non-price risk on a case-by-case
basis.123
(5) Discussion of the Final Rule—The
Bona Fide Hedging Definition’s
‘‘Economically Appropriate Test’’
The Commission is adopting the
economically appropriate prong of the
bona fide hedging definition as
proposed, codifying existing practice, as
well as existing § 1.3’s treatment of price
risk, by making it explicit in the rule
text that the word ‘‘risks’’ refers to, and
is limited to, ‘‘price risk.’’
The Commission emphasizes that the
Final Rule is not intended to represent
a change to the Commission’s existing
interpretation of the economically
appropriate prong of bona fide hedging,
but rather is maintaining the application
of the economically appropriate test in
connection with bona fide hedges on the
nine legacy agricultural contracts to the
16 new non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts.
In promulgating existing § 1.3, the
Commission explained that a bona fide
hedging position must, among other
things, ‘‘be economically appropriate to
risk reduction, such risks must arise
from operation of a commercial
118 ADM
at 5.
at 2.
120 CMC at 3.
121 Better Markets at 52–53.
122 Better Markets at 53.
123 MGEX at 2; FIA at 11.
119 LDC
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enterprise, and the price fluctuations of
the futures contracts used in the
transaction must be substantially related
to fluctuations of the cash-market value
of the assets, liabilities or services being
hedged.’’ 124 (emphasis added).
Consistent with this longstanding policy
of the Commission to recognize hedges
of price risk of an underlying
commodity position as bona fide hedges
(and consistent with the Commission’s
existing application of bona fide
hedging to the nine legacy agricultural
contracts under the existing Federal
position limit regulations), the
Commission is also clarifying further
below that price risk can be informed
and impacted by various other types of
risks.
As the Commission stated in the 2020
NPRM and continues to believe, for any
given non-price risk, such as
geopolitical turmoil, weather, or
counterparty credit risks, there could be
multiple commodities, directions, and
contract months which a particular
market participant may subjectively
view as an economically appropriate
offset for that non-price risk. Moreover,
multiple market participants faced with
the same non-price risk might take
different views on which offset is the
most effective.125 A system of allowing
for bona fide hedges based solely by
reference to such non-price risks would
be difficult to administer on a pragmatic
and consistently fair basis.
Further, it also would be difficult to
evaluate whether a particular
commodity derivative contract would be
the proper offset as a bona fide hedge,
as defined in this Final Rule, to a
potential non-price risk, or would
remove exposure to the potential change
in value to the market participant’s cash
positions resulting from the non-price
risk. Thus, hedging solely to protect
against changes in value of non-price
risks would fall outside the category of
a bona fide hedge which offsets the
‘‘price risk’’ of an underlying
commodity cash position.
However, the Commission agrees with
commenters who stated that market
participants form independent
economic assessments of how different
possible events might create potential
124 Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions,
42 FR 14832, 14833 (Mar. 16, 1977) (emphasis
added). ‘‘Value’’ is generally understood to mean
price times quantity. The Dodd-Frank Act added
CEA section 4a(c)(2), which copied the
economically appropriate test from the
Commission’s definition in § 1.3. See also 78 FR at
75702, 75703 (stating that the ‘‘core of the
Commission’s approach to defining bona fide
hedging over the years has focused on transactions
that offset a recognized physical price risk’’).
125 85 FR at 11606.
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risk exposures for their business.126
Such risks that create or impact the
price risk of underlying cash
commodities may include, but are not
limited to, geopolitical turmoil, weather,
or counterparty credit risks. The
Commission recognizes that these risks
can create price risks and understands
that firms may manage these potential
risks to their businesses differently and
in the manner most suitable for their
business. As noted above, by limiting
the economically appropriate prong to
price risk, the Commission is reiterating
its historical practice, which has
applied well to the legacy agricultural
contracts for decades, to recognize
hedges of price risk of an underlying
commodity position as bona fide hedges
while acknowledging that price risk
may itself be impacted by non-price
risks.
The foregoing discussion of price risk
is limited to the question of whether a
position in a referenced contract meets
the economically appropriate test to
satisfy the bona fide hedge
requirements. Market participants may
thus continue to manage non-price risks
in a variety of ways, which may include
participation in the futures markets or
exposure to other financial products. In
fact, market participants may decide to
use futures contracts that are not subject
to Federal position limits (e.g., location
basis contracts), if they determine such
contracts will help them manage nonprice risks faced by their businesses.127
For example, a market participant
seeking to manage risk, including nonprice risk, with positions in contracts
that are not referenced contracts, such
as freight or weather derivatives, would
not be subject to Federal speculative
position limits and thus would not need
to comply with the economically
appropriate test in connection with such
positions in non-referenced contracts.
To satisfy the economically
appropriate test, a position must
ultimately offset the price risk of an
underlying cash commodity.128 Nonprice risk may also be a consideration in
hedging decisions, but cannot be a
substitute for price risk associated with
126 CMC
at 3.
enumerated cross-commodity hedge
provision adopted herein and discussed below
offers may also offer additional flexibility to those
market participants using referenced contracts to
manage risk, by allowing market participants to
hedge price risk associated with a particular
commodity using a derivative contract based on a
different commodity, assuming all applicable
requirements of the cross-commodity enumerated
bona fide hedge are met.
128 This view is consistent with the spirit of Better
Market’s comment suggesting a focus on reducing
risks associated with a cash-market position in a
physical commodity. See Better Markets at 53.
127 The
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3259
the cash commodity underlying the
derivatives position. The foregoing view
precludes the Commission from
adopting commenter suggestions to
permit market participants to use the
non-enumerated hedge process to
receive recognition of hedges of nonprice risk on a case-by-case basis
because, while the Commission
acknowledges that price risk can be
informed and impacted by non-price
risk, price risk is required to satisfy the
economically appropriate test.
c. Change in Value Requirement
(1) Background—Change in Value
Requirement
CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii) and
existing § 1.3 include the ‘‘change in
value requirement,’’ which provides
that the bona fide hedging position must
arise from the potential change in the
value of: (I) Assets that a person owns,
produces, manufactures, processes, or
merchandises or anticipates owning,
producing, manufacturing, processing,
or merchandising; (II) liabilities that a
person owns or anticipates incurring; or
(III) services that a person provides,
purchases, or anticipates providing or
purchasing.129
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Change in Value Requirement
The Commission proposed to retain
the substance of the change in value
requirement in existing § 1.3, with some
non-substantive technical
modifications, including modifications
to correct a typographical error.130
Aside from the typographical error, the
proposed § 150.1 change in value
requirement mirrors the Dodd-Frank
Act’s change in value requirement in
CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii).
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Change in Value
Requirement
For the same reasons set out in the
2020 NPRM, the Commission is
adopting the change in value
129 7
U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(iii), 17 CFR 1.3.
Commission proposed to replace the
phrase ‘‘liabilities which a person owns,’’ which
appears in the statute erroneously, with ‘‘liabilities
which a person owes,’’ which the Commission
believed was the intended wording (emphasis
added). The Commission interpreted the word
‘‘owns’’ to be a typographical error. A person may
owe on a liability, and may anticipate incurring a
liability. If a person ‘‘owns’’ a liability, such as a
debt instrument issued by another, then such
person owns an asset. The fact that assets are
included in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I) further
reinforces the Commission’s interpretation that the
reference to ‘‘owns’’ means ‘‘owes.’’ The
Commission also proposed several other nonsubstantive modifications in sentence structure to
improve clarity.
130 The
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requirement of the bona fide hedge
definition as proposed.
provisions are important for preventing
market disruption.134
(4) Comments—Change in Value
Requirement
No specific comments on the change
in value requirement were received.
(5) Discussion of the Final Rule—
Incidental Test and Orderly Trading
Requirement
The Commission is eliminating the
incidental test and orderly trading
requirement from the bona fide hedge
definition as proposed. As noted above,
neither the incidental test nor orderly
trading requirement is part of the CEA’s
current statutory definition of bona fide
hedge. The Commission views the
incidental test as redundant because the
Commission proposed to maintain both
(1) the change in value requirement (as
noted above, the reference to ‘‘value’’ in
the change in value requirement is
generally understood to mean price per
unit times quantity of units) as well as
(2) the economically appropriate test
(which includes the concept of the
offset of price risks in the conduct and
management of, i.e., incidental to, a
commercial enterprise).
In response to IATP and Better
Markets, the Commission does not view
the orderly trading requirement as
needed to prevent market disruption.
The statutory bona fide hedging
definition does not include an orderly
trading requirement,135 and the meaning
of ‘‘orderly trading’’ is unclear in the
context of the OTC swap market and in
the context of permitted off-exchange
transactions, such as exchange for
physicals. The elimination of the
orderly trading requirement does not
diminish an exchange’s obligation to
prohibit any disruptive trading
practices, including a case where an
exchange believes that a bona fide hedge
position may result in disorderly
trading. Further, in eliminating the
orderly trading requirement from the
definition in the regulations, the
Commission is not amending or
modifying interpretations of any other
related requirements, including any of
the anti-disruptive trading prohibitions
in CEA section 4c(a)(5),136 or any other
statutory or regulatory provisions.
Taken together, the retention of the
updated temporary substitute test,
economically appropriate test, and
change in value requirement, coupled
with the elimination of the incidental
test and orderly trading requirement,
d. Incidental Test and Orderly Trading
Requirement
(1) Background—Incidental Test and
Orderly Trading Requirement
Two general requirements contained
in the existing § 1.3 definition of bona
fide hedging position include: (I) The
incidental test and (II) the orderly
trading requirement. For a position to be
recognized as a bona fide hedging
position, the incidental test requires that
the purpose is to offset price risks
incidental to commercial cash, spot, or
forward operations.
Under the orderly trading
requirement, such position is
established and liquidated in an orderly
manner in accordance with sound
commercial practices. Notably, Congress
in the Dodd-Frank Act did not include
the incidental test or the orderly trading
requirement in the statutory bona fide
hedging definition in CEA section
4a(c)(2).131
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Incidental Test and Orderly Trading
Requirement
While the Commission proposed to
maintain the substance of the three core
elements of the existing bona fide
hedging definition described above,
with some modifications, the
Commission also proposed to eliminate
two elements contained in the existing
§ 1.3 definition: The incidental test and
orderly trading requirement that
currently appear in paragraph (1)(iii) of
the § 1.3 bona fide hedging
definition.132
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(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Incidental Test and
Orderly Trading Requirement
The Commission is eliminating the
incidental test and orderly trading
requirement from the bona fide hedge
definition as proposed.
(4) Comments—Incidental Test and
Orderly Trading Requirement
NGSA supported elimination of the
incidental test and orderly trading
requirement, claiming that the changes
will facilitate hedging,133 while IATP
and Better Markets opposed the removal
of these provisions, contending that the
131 7
U.S.C. 6a(c)(2).
CFR 1.3.
133 NGSA at 4.
132 17
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134 IATP
at 14–15; Better Markets at 53.
orderly trading requirement was added as
a part of the regulatory definition of bona fide
hedging in 1975; see Hedging Definition, Reports,
and Conforming Amendments, 40 FR 11560 (Mar.
12, 1975). Prior to 1974, the orderly trading
requirement was found in the statutory definition
of bona fide hedging position; changes to the CEA
in 1974 removed the statutory definition from CEA
section 4a(3).
136 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5).
135 The
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should reduce uncertainty by
eliminating provisions that do not
appear in the statute, and by clarifying
the language of the remaining
provisions. By reducing uncertainty
surrounding some parts of the bona fide
hedging definition for physical
commodities, the Commission
anticipates that, as described in greater
detail elsewhere in this release, it would
be easier going forward for the
Commission, exchanges, and market
participants to address whether novel
trading practices or strategies may
qualify as bona fide hedges.
iv. Treatment of Unfixed Price
Transactions Under the Final Rule
a. Background and Summary of
Commission Determination—Treatment
of Unfixed Price Transactions
The Commission has a long history of
recognizing fixed-price commitments as
the basis for a bona fide hedge.137 While
the existing bona fide hedging definition
in § 1.3 includes one enumerated hedge
that explicitly mentions ‘‘unfixed’’
prices,138 the availability of this hedge
is limited to circumstances where a
market participant has both an unfixedprice purchase and an unfixed-price
sale on hand, precluding a market
participant with only an unfixed-price
purchase or an unfixed-price sale from
qualifying for this particular
enumerated hedge. Further, the extent
to which the other existing enumerated
hedges apply to unfixed-price
commitments is ambiguous from the
plain reading of the text of the existing
bona fide hedging definition.
However, Commission staff have
previously considered the extent to
which market participants with unfixedprice commitments may qualify for an
enumerated hedge. Commission staff
issued interpretive letter 12–07 in 2012
(‘‘Staff Letter No. 12–07’’) in response to
a narrow question submitted by a
market participant regarding qualifying
for the existing enumerated unfilled
anticipated requirements bona fide
hedge 139 while entering into ‘‘unfixed137 See, e.g., paragraphs (2)(i)(A) and (2)(ii)(A) of
existing § 1.3.
138 See paragraph (2)(iii) of existing § 1.3
(Offsetting sales and purchases for future delivery
on a contract market which do not exceed in
quantity that amount of the same cash commodity
which has been bought and sold at unfixed prices
basis different delivery months of the contract
market)
139 Paragraph (2)(ii)(C) of existing § 1.3 provides
in relevant part that the bona fide hedging
definition includes purchases which do not exceed
in quantity Twelve months’ unfilled anticipated
requirements of the same cash commodity for
processing, manufacturing, or feeding by the same
person.
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price transactions.’’ 140 In that
interpretive letter, staff clarified that a
commercial entity may qualify for the
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements even
if the commercial entity has entered into
long-term, unfixed-price supply or
requirements contracts because, as staff
explained, the unfixed-price purchase
contract does not ‘‘fill’’ the commercial
entity’s anticipated requirements.141 As
explained in Staff Letter No. 12–07, the
price risk of such ‘‘unfilled’’ anticipated
requirements is not offset by the
unfixed-price forward contract because
the price risk remains with the
commercial entity, even though the
entity has contractually assured a
supply of the commodity.142 Instead,
the price risk continues until the
unfixed-price contract’s price is
fixed.143 Once the price is fixed on the
supply contract, the commercial entity
no longer has price risk, and its
derivative position, to the extent the
position is above an applicable position
limit, and unless the market participant
qualifies for another exemption (as
discussed below), must be liquidated in
an orderly manner in accordance with
sound commercial practices.144
As discussed below, the Commission
is affirming this narrow interpretation
for the Final Rule—that commercial
entities that enter into unfixed-price
transactions may continue to qualify for
the enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements—and
the Commission is adopting this
rationale to also apply to: (1) The
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
unsold anticipated production; 145 and
(2) the new enumerated bona fide hedge
for anticipated merchandising.146 In
other words, under this Final Rule, a
commercial market participant in the
physical marketing channel that enters
into an unfixed-price transaction may
qualify for one of these enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges, as long as
the commercial market participant
otherwise satisfies all applicable
140 CFTC Staff Letter 12–07, issued August 16,
2012, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/
CFTCStaffLetters/letters.htm, title search ‘‘12–07.’’
141 CFTC Staff Letter 12–07 at 1.
142 CFTC Staff Letter 12–07 at 1–2. In the 2016
Reproposal, the Commission affirmed staff’s
interpretation articulated in Staff Letter No. 12–07.
See 81 FR at 96750.
143 CFTC Staff Letter 12–07 at 2.
144 Id. at 2–3.
145 For further discussion regarding the
enumerated bona fide hedge for ‘‘unsold anticipated
production,’’ see Section II.A.1.vi.d.
146 For further discussion regarding the new
enumerated bona fide hedge for ‘‘anticipated
merchandising,’’ see Section II.A.1.vi.f.
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requirements for such anticipatory bona
fide hedge.
For this section of the release, the
Commission will refer to the
enumerated bona fide hedges for
anticipated unfilled requirements,
anticipated unsold production, and
anticipated merchandising, collectively,
as the ‘‘anticipatory bona fide hedges.’’
Additionally, by using the term
‘‘unfixed-price transaction,’’ the
Commission means a forward contract
(i.e., a firm commitment) at an open
price or at a price to be determined at
a later date (for example, by reference to
an index based on the settlement price
of a corresponding futures contract).
The Commission discusses the 2020
NPRM’s general treatment of unfixed
price transactions below, followed by a
summary of comments and the
Commission’s determination on the
issue of unfixed-price transactions
generally. A more detailed discussion of
each specific enumerated hedge,
including the three anticipatory bona
fide hedges, appears further below.
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Treatment of Unfixed Price Transactions
Like the bona fide hedging definition
in existing § 1.3, the proposed bona fide
hedging definition in § 150.1 of the 2020
NPRM included one enumerated hedge
addressing unfixed-price transactions,
which required offsetting unfixed-price
purchase and sale transactions.147 Aside
from that one enumerated bona fide
hedge, the other proposed bona fide
hedges did not specify whether a market
participant with an unfixed-price
transaction could qualify for a bona fide
hedge exemption, including any of the
proposed anticipatory bona fide hedges.
However, the 2020 NPRM did
preliminarily and indirectly address
previous queries on the matter of
unfixed-price transactions. In particular,
the 2020 NPRM addressed a petition for
exemptive relief submitted in response
to the 2011 Final Rule. In that petition,
the Working Group of Commercial
Energy Firms (which has since
reconstituted itself as the Commercial
Energy Working Group, or ‘‘CEWG’’)
requested exemptive relief for
transactions that are described by 10
examples set forth therein as bona fide
147 See proposed paragraph (a)(2) of Appendix A
to part 150. Like the existing enumerated hedge in
paragraph (2)(iii) of § 1.3, this proposed enumerated
hedge was limited to circumstances where a market
participant has both an unfixed-price purchase and
an unfixed-price sale in hand. This specific
proposed enumerated bona fide hedge, along with
all other proposed enumerated hedges, is described
in detail further below.
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3261
hedging transactions (‘‘BFH
Petition’’).148
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
preliminarily determined that
commodity derivative positions
described in two examples related to
unfixed-price transactions did not fit
within any of the proposed enumerated
hedges. Specifically, the Commission
preliminarily determined that the
positions described in examples #3
(unpriced physical purchase or sale
commitments) and #7 (scenario 2) (use
of physical delivery referenced contracts
to hedge physical transactions using
calendar month average pricing) of the
BFH Petition did not fit within any of
the proposed enumerated bona fide
hedges, but that market participants
could apply for a non-enumerated
exemption.149
The Commission requested comment
on the extent to which the proposed
enumerated bona fide hedges should
encompass the types of positions
discussed in examples #3 (unpriced
physical purchase or sale commitments)
and #7 (scenario 2) (use of physical
delivery reference contracts to hedge
physical transactions using calendar
month averaging pricing) of the CEWG’s
BFH Petition.150
c. Comments—Treatment of Unfixed
Price Transactions
In response to the 2020 NPRM, many
commenters requested the Commission
either clarify or make explicit that the
proposed bona fide hedge definition
would apply to commodity derivatives
contracts used to hedge exposure to
price risk arising from unfixed-price
transactions.151
148 The Working Group BFH Petition is available
at https://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/
@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/
wgbfhpetition012012.pdf. In the 2013 Proposal, the
Commission provided that the transactions
contemplated under the working group’s examples
Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7 (scenario 1), and 8 would be
permitted under the proposed definition of bona
fide hedging. In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
preliminarily determined that transactions
described in four additional CEWG examples would
comply with the proposed expanded bona fide
hedging definition in the 2020 NPRM: examples #4
(Binding, Irrevocable Bids or Offers), #5 (Timing of
Hedging Physical Transactions), #9 (Holding a
cross-commodity hedge using a physical delivery
contract into the spot month) and #10 (Holding a
cross-commodity hedge using a physical delivery
contract to meet unfilled anticipated requirements).
149 85 FR at 11612.
150 85 FR at 11622.
151 See, e.g., Ecom at 1; ACA at 2; CEWG at 22–
24; Chevron at 11; CME Group at 8–9; DECA at 2;
East Cotton at 2; Gerald Marshall at 2; IFUS at 5–
7; IMC at 2; Jess Smith at 2; LDC at 2; Mallory
Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2;
Moody Compress 1; NCC at 1; NGFA at 7; Olam at
2; Omnicotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Shell at 7;
Southern Cotton at 2; Suncor at 7; SW Ag at 2; Toyo
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Several commenters provided various
examples in support of their requests
that the Commission recognize that
unfixed price transactions may serve as
the basis for an enumerated bona fide
hedge position for purposes of Federal
position limits.152
Comments on the treatment of
unfixed price transactions often were
submitted in connection with
discussions on the scope of the
proposed enumerated bona fide hedge
for anticipated merchandising. As
discussed further below, under the Final
Rule’s enumerated anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge section,
many commenters requested the
Commission clarify whether the
proposed enumerated hedge for
anticipated merchandising could be
used to manage price risk arising from
unfixed-price physical commodity
transactions.
With regards to CEWG’s BFH Petition
example #3 (unpriced physical purchase
or sale commitments), many
commenters disagreed with the
Commission’s preliminary
determination in the 2020 NPRM that
this type of transaction would not
qualify for an enumerated bona fide
hedge. Generally, commenters
expressed the view that unfixed-price
transactions for physical commodities
are a common and standard market
practice. The CEWG indicated that
unfixed physical purchase or sale
commitments are routinely conducted
in numerous markets and commodities
on a daily basis.153
Similar to the BFH Petition’s example
#3 (unpriced physical purchase or sale
commitments), ACSA provided
examples intended to demonstrate that
merchants are exposed to calendar
spread and supply price risk because
they typically fulfill sales contracts by
selling a commodity for future delivery
in advance of purchasing the
commodity needed to fulfill the sale.154
ACSA, along with other commenters,155
stated that unfixed-price transactions for
the purchase or sale of the physical
commodities are common, where a
at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at
2.
152 CMC at 4; FIA at 16; ICE at 4–5; ACSA at 6–
7; ADM at 3; CME Group at 8–9; CEWG at 19–21.
153 CEWG at 20 (also providing a similar example
as it submitted in the original petition which
included Example #3 (unpriced physical purchase
and sale commitments)).
154 ACSA at 12–14; Several commenters
concurred with ACSA regarding exposure to
calendar spread. Mallory Alexander at 2; DECA at
2; CMC at 4; IMC at 2; Olam at 2; SW Ag at 2; White
Gold at 2; Walcot at 2.
155 ACSA at 4–7; CMC at 4; Mallory Alexander at
2; DECA at 2; IMC at 2; Olam at 2; SW Ag at 2;
White Gold at 2; Walcot at 2.
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market participant buys the commodity
at a price that is based on (i.e., is
‘‘indexed’’ to) the settlement price of the
nearby (or spot) futures month contract
and later sells the commodity at a price
that is indexed to the deferred month
futures contract. ACSA and other
commenters indicated that merchants
do this to ‘‘effectively bridge the gap
between timing mismatches of supply
and demand in the global
marketplace.’’ 156
Related to the BFH Petition example
#7 (scenario 2) (use of physical delivery
reference contracts to hedge physical
transactions using calendar month
averaging pricing ‘‘CMA’’), commenters
requested that the Commission clarify
that hedges of underlying physical
transactions that utilize CMA pricing
structures fall within the enumerated
bona fide hedge for anticipated
merchandising.157 Chevron requested
the Commission clarify that commercial
firms that price commercial transactions
to purchase or sell physical crude oil or
natural gas using a CMA pricing
structure (whether they are solely
merchants or conduct merchant
activities as part of an integrated energy
company), should receive bona fide
hedge treatment for their commodity
derivative contract positions that offset
the risks arising from those CMA priced
purchases or sales.158
Similarly, other commenters asked for
clarification regarding whether the
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirement
extends to scenarios that involve
unfixed-price contracts that many
electric generators enter into to address
their anticipated supply
requirements.159 These commenters
asked for clarification that unfixed-price
purchase commitments do not ‘‘fill’’ an
anticipated requirement such that the
market participant would be able to still
qualify for the enumerated unfilled
anticipated requirement bona fide
hedge.160
d. Discussion of Final Rule—Treatment
of Unfixed Price Transactions
As discussed above, the Commission
is affirming and broadening the
application of the interpretation
articulated in Staff Letter No. 12–07. As
a result, commercial market participants
in the physical marketing channel that
156 ACSA
at 5.
at 2; IMC at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2;
Walcot at 2; White Gold at 2; Olam at 2; LDC at 1;
Canale at 2; Moody Compress at 1; Gerald Marshall
at 2; SW Ag at 2; DECA at 2; Chevron at 12; Suncor
at 11; CEWG at 21.
158 Chevron at 11.
159 EPSA at 5; IECA at 8.
160 Id.
157 MGEX
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enter into unfixed price transactions
may qualify for bona fide hedge
treatment under the enumerated bona
fide hedges for anticipatory
merchandising, anticipated unsold
production, or anticipated unfilled
requirements because, as discussed
below, unfixed price transactions do not
give rise to outright price risk and do
not otherwise fix an outright price.161
Consistent with Staff Letter No. 12–
07, commercial market participants in
the physical marketing channel that
enter into unfixed-price transactions
may continue to qualify for the
enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled
anticipated requirements for those
unfixed price transactions. Further, the
Commission is broadening this rationale
to additionally include the existing
enumerated bona fide hedge for ‘‘unsold
anticipated production’’ 162 and the new
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated merchandising.163 A
commercial market participant that
enters into an unfixed-price transaction
may qualify for one of these enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges as long as
the commercial entity otherwise
satisfies all requirements for such
anticipatory bona fide hedge, including
demonstrating its anticipated need in
the physical marketing channel related
to either its unsold production, unfilled
requirements, and/or merchandising, as
applicable.164
Under this Final Rule, the
Commission is clarifying that a
commercial market participant may still
qualify for an enumerated anticipatory
bona fide hedge for an anticipated need,
based on a good-faith expectation of that
need, even if the market participant has
entered into an unfixed-price
transaction, since the Commission does
not deem the unfixed-price transaction
to ‘‘fill’’ or ‘‘address’’ the anticipated
need. This rationale is predicated on the
fact that an unfixed-price commitment
does not offset the price risk associated
with an anticipated need (i.e.,
161 As a result, based on this rationale, a
commercial market participant that has an unfixedprice commitment is treated the same as a
commercial market participant that has no unfixedprice commitment for purposes of determining
whether one qualifies for these enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges.
162 For further discussion regarding the
enumerated bona fide hedge for ‘‘unsold anticipated
production,’’ see Section II.A.1.vi.d.
163 For further discussion regarding the new
enumerated bona fide hedge for ‘‘anticipated
merchandising,’’ see Section II.A.1.vi.f.
164 As such, merely entering into an unfixed-price
transaction is not alone sufficient to demonstrate
compliance with one of the enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges. The specific
requirements associated with each enumerated
bona fide hedge, including each anticipatory bona
fide hedge, are described in detail further below.
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anticipated unsold production,
anticipated unfilled requirements, and/
or anticipated merchandising, as
applicable). This is because unfixedprice transactions do not give rise to
outright price risk and therefore do not
alter the outright price risks faced by a
commercial market participant, even
though the market participant has
contractually assured either a supply of
the commodity (in the case of
anticipated unfilled requirements), the
sale of its output (in the case of
anticipated unsold production), or the
purchase or sale of the commodity to be
merchandised (in the case of anticipated
merchandising).165
In other words, a trader with an
unfixed-price commitment still has
price risk related to its anticipated need
until the price is fixed. Once the price
has become fixed, the market
participant may no longer avail itself of
the enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedge, but may potentially avail itself of
another enumerated bona fide hedge,
(such as the bona fide hedges for fixedprice purchase contracts or for fixedprice sales contracts, as applicable),
provided all applicable requirements of
such other enumerated bona fide hedges
are satisfied.
Under the Final Rule, a commercial
market participant must continue to be
able to demonstrate an anticipated need
related to unsold production, unfilled
requirements, and/or merchandising.
Accordingly, the Commission
determines that the commercial market
participant engaged in unfixed-price
transactions in the BFH Petition’s
example #3 (unpriced physical purchase
or sale commitments) and example #7
(scenario 2) (use of physical delivery
referenced contracts to hedge physical
transactions using calendar month
average pricing) can qualify for one of
the enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges under the Final Rule to the
extent the market participant otherwise
complies with the applicable conditions
of the relevant enumerated anticipatory
bona fide hedge in connection with the
market participant’s commercial
activities.
For clarity, the Commission also
underscores that under the
Commission’s existing portfolio hedging
policy, market participants, including
vertically-integrated firms (i.e., those
firms that may qualify as more than one
of a producer; processor, manufacturer,
or utility; and/or merchandiser), may
continue to manage their price risks by
utilizing more than one enumerated
bona fide hedge (including more than
one anticipatory bona fide hedge).
The Commission recognizes that there
are many ways in which market
participants both structure their
organizations and engage in commercial
hedging practices. As such, market
participants may manage the price risk
from their various commercial activities
by utilizing multiple enumerated bona
fide hedge exemptions in the manner
that is most suitable to their particular
circumstances. Nevertheless, for
illustrative purposes, the Commission
provides a general example of how
market participants may utilize the
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges in connection with their unfixed
price transactions:
For example, Producer X has the
physical capacity to produce 100,000
barrels of physical WTI crude oil on an
annual basis. Producer X agrees to sell
80,000 barrels of WTI crude oil to
Merchandiser Y via a floating/unfixedprice contract in which the delivery will
be priced at the NYMEX March 2020
WTI crude oil futures final settlement
price. Producer X still does not have a
buyer for its remaining 20,000 barrels,
but anticipates selling all of its
production, as it has in previous years.
Under this scenario, Producer X may
utilize the enumerated unsold
anticipated production enumerated
hedge to offset the price risk from its
unsold production, which includes both
the 80,000 barrels of oil sold to
Merchandiser Y at an unfixed price, as
well as the unsold 20,000 barrels.166 On
the other hand, Merchandiser Y may
utilize the enumerated hedge for
anticipated merchandising to hedge its
anticipated merchandising transactions,
which include the 80,000 barrels it
purchased from Producer X at an
unfixed price. Because Merchandiser Y
has a history of merchandising more
than 80,000 barrels a year, and it
anticipates merchandising more than
80,000 barrels in the next twelve
months, Merchandiser Y’s anticipated
merchandising hedge may include the
80,000 barrels it purchased from
Producer X at an unfixed price and its
remaining anticipated twelve-months’
merchandising. Separately, assuming
Merchandiser Y also has crude oil it
purchased at a fixed price in a storage
tank, Merchandiser Y may also utilize
the enumerated hedge for inventory and
165 Consistent with the existing Federal position
limits framework, under the Final Rule, commercial
market participants may not qualify for any
anticipatory bona fide hedge merely to offset risks
associated with non-commercial (i.e., financial)
activities.
166 In the case where Producer X fixes the price
of its sale before delivery, while it no longer holds
an anticipatory hedge, Producer X may qualify for
the enumerated hedge for fixed price sales,
assuming all applicable requirements for that hedge
are satisfied.
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cash-commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts to hedge the price risk from
those fixed price purchases of crude oil.
In response to commenters requesting
that the Commission create a new
enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfixed-price transactions, the
Commission does not believe that this is
necessary because, as described above,
commercial market participants may
qualify for the enumerated anticipatory
bona fide hedges while also entering
into unfixed-price transactions. Further,
the Commission believes that it is not
suitable to create a new enumerated
bona fide hedge expressly covering all
unfixed price transactions to
accomplish the same since there is an
inherent difficulty in evaluating the
propriety of a hedge of an unfixed price
obligation with a fixed-price futures
contract as there is basis risk until the
unfixed price obligation is fixed. Given
differences among markets, creating a
new enumerated bona fide hedge for
any unfixed price transaction could,
under certain circumstances, harm
market integrity, enable potential
market manipulation, and/or allow
excessive speculation by potentially
affording bona fide hedging treatment
for speculative transactions.
For example, assume a market
participant enters into an unfixed-price
sales contract (e.g., priced at a fixed
differential to a deferred month futures
contract), and immediately enters into a
calendar month spread to reduce the
risk of the fixed basis moving adversely.
It may not be economically appropriate
to recognize as bona fide a long futures
position in the spot (or nearby) month
and a short futures position in a
deferred calendar month matching the
market participant’s cash delivery
obligation, in the event the spot (or
nearby) month price is higher than the
deferred contract month price (referred
to as backwardation, and characteristic
of a spot cash market with supply
shortages), because such a calendar
month futures spread would lock in a
loss. A position locking in a loss
generally is not economically
appropriate to the reduction of risk, as
it increases risk by generating a loss,
and such a transaction may be
indicative of an attempt—or at the very
least provides inappropriate
incentives—to manipulate the spot (or
nearby) futures price.167
Finally, the Commission emphasizes
that to the extent that a market
participant does not qualify for an
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedge in connection with an unfixedprice transaction, the market participant
167 See
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could still avail itself of the process
under §§ 150.3 and 150.9 for requesting
approval of non-enumerated bona fide
hedges.
v. The Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Exemptions, Generally
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a. Background—Bona Fide Hedge
Exemptions, Generally
As discussed earlier in this release,
the list of bona fide hedges explicitly
contained in paragraph (2) of the
existing bona fide hedging definition in
§ 1.3 of the Commission’s regulations
lists (or ‘‘enumerates’’) seven bona fide
hedges, which are generally referred to
as the ‘‘enumerated bona fide hedges,’’
in four general categories. These four
existing categories of enumerated
hedges include: (1) Sales of futures
contracts to hedge (i) ownership or
fixed-price cash commodity purchases
and (ii) unsold anticipated production;
(2) purchases of futures contracts to
hedge (i) fixed-price cash commodity
sales and (ii) unfilled anticipated
requirements; (3) offsetting sales and
purchases of futures contracts to hedge
offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity
sales and purchases; and (4) crosscommodity hedges.168
The list of enumerated bona fide
hedges found in paragraph (2) of the
existing bona fide hedging definition
was developed at a time when only
agricultural commodities were subject
to Federal position limits, and has not
been updated since 1987.169 The
Commission believes, as discussed
further below, that such list is too
narrow to reflect common commercial
hedging practices, including for metal
and energy contracts. Numerous market
and regulatory developments have taken
place since 1987, including, among
other things, increased futures trading
in the metals and energy markets, the
development of the swaps markets, and
the shift in trading from pits to
electronic platforms. In addition, the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 170 and the Dodd-Frank Act
introduced various regulatory reforms,
including the enactment of position
limits core principles.171 The
Commission thus proposed in the 2020
NPRM to update its bona fide hedging
definition to better conform to the
current state of the law and to better
reflect market developments over time.
168 17
CFR 1.3.
169 See Revision of Federal Speculative Position
Limits, 52 FR 38914 (Oct. 20, 1987).
170 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, Public Law 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21,
2000).
171 See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5) and 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(6).
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b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Bona
Fide Hedge Exemptions, Generally
So as not to reduce any of the clarity
provided by the existing list of
enumerated bona fide hedges, the
Commission proposed to maintain the
existing enumerated bona fide hedges,
with some modifications, and to expand
this list.
The existing definition of ‘‘bona fide
hedging transactions and positions’’
enumerates the following hedging
transactions:
a. Hedges of inventory and cash
commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts;
b. hedges of cash commodity fixedprice sales
c. hedges of the cash commodity’s
cash products and byproducts;
d. hedges of offsetting unfixed price
cash commodity sales and purchases
e. hedges of unsold anticipated
production;
f. hedges of unfilled anticipated
requirements; and
g. cross-commodity hedges.
The following additional hedging
practices are not enumerated in the
existing regulation, but were included
in the 2020 NPRM as additional
enumerated bona fide hedges:
a. Hedges by agents;
b. short hedges of anticipated mineral
royalties;
c. hedges of anticipated services;
d. offsets of commodity trade option;
and
e. hedges of anticipated
merchandising.
The Commission also proposed the
elimination, for purposes of Federal
position limits, of both the Five-Day
Rule and the twelve-month restriction.
However, under the 2020 NPRM,
exchanges would be able to establish
their own five-day rule and/or twelvemonth restriction, as applicable for any
or all of their respective referenced
contracts.
c. Commission Determination—Bona
Fide Hedge Exemptions, Generally
First, the Commission is adopting the
proposed expanded list of enumerated
bona fide hedges, with the
modifications described, as applicable,
in the discussions of the relevant bona
fide hedges below. Second, the
Commission is adopting, as proposed,
the elimination of both the existing
Five-Day Rule and the twelve-month
restriction.172 The comments received,
172 As discussed further below, the Final Rule
eliminates the existing twelve-month restriction
with respect to the anticipatory unsold production
and the anticipated unfilled requirements bona fide
hedges. However, the new anticipated
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and the Commission’s corresponding
responses, in connection with these
changes are discussed further below in
the corresponding section discussing
the applicable enumerated bona fide
hedge.
With respect to the treatment of the
enumerated bona fide hedges under the
Final Rule, the Commission notes that
positions in referenced contracts subject
to Federal position limits that meet any
of the enumerated bona fide hedges
will, for purposes of Federal position
limits, be deemed to meet the bona fide
hedging definition in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(A), as well as the Commission’s
bona fide hedging definition in § 150.1
under the Final Rule. As a result,
enumerated bona fide hedges are selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits, provided the market
participant separately requests an
exemption from the applicable
exchange-set limit established pursuant
to § 150.5(a).173
The enumerated hedges are each
described below, followed by a
discussion of the Five-Day Rule. When
first proposed, the Commission viewed
the enumerated bona fide hedges as
conforming to the general definition of
bona fide hedging ‘‘without further
consideration as to the particulars of the
case.’’ 174 Similarly, the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges under the
Final Rule reflects categories of bona
fide hedges for which the Commission
has determined, based on experience
over time, that no case-by-case
determination or review of additional
details by the Commission is needed to
determine that the position or
transaction is a bona fide hedge. This
Final Rule does not foreclose the
recognition of other hedging practices as
bona fide hedges, as discussed below.
While the enumerated bona fide
hedges adopted herein are selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits,175 the Commission and
the exchanges will continue to exercise
close oversight over such positions to
confirm that market participants’
claimed exemptions are consistent with
their cash-market activity. In particular,
because all contracts subject to Federal
position limits are also subject to
exchange-set limits, all traders seeking
to exceed Federal position limits must
request an exemption from the relevant
exchange for purposes of the exchange
merchandising bona fide hedge would be subject to
its own twelve-month restriction.
173 For further discussion of the exchange
exemption process, see Section II.D.3.i.b.
174 Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions,
42 FR 14832 (Mar. 16, 1977).
175 See infra Section II.C. (discussing § 150.3) and
Section II.G. (discussing § 150.9).
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position limit, regardless of whether the
position falls within one of the
enumerated hedges. In other words,
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions
that are self-effectuating for purposes of
Federal position limits are not selfeffectuating for purposes of exchangeset position limits.
Exchanges have well-established
programs for granting exemptions,
including, in some cases, experience
granting exemptions for anticipatory
merchandising for certain traders in
markets not currently subject to Federal
position limits. As discussed in greater
detail below, § 150.5 as adopted herein
helps ensure that such programs
conform to standards established by the
Commission.176 The Commission
expects exchanges will continue to be
thoughtful and deliberate in granting
exemptions, including anticipatory
exemptions. The Commission predicates
this expectation on its decades of
experience working together with the
relevant exchanges and observations
generally of the applicable exchangetraded futures markets.
The Commission and the exchanges
also have a variety of other tools
designed to help prevent misuse of selfeffectuating bona fide hedge
exemptions. For example, market
participants who apply to an exchange
as required pursuant to § 150.5 under
the Final Rule are subject to the
Commission’s false statements
authority, which carries substantial
penalties under both the CEA and
Federal criminal statutes. Similarly, the
Commission currently employs—and
will continue to use under the Final
Rule—surveillance tools, special call
authority, rule enforcement reviews,
and other formal and informal avenues
for obtaining additional information
from exchanges and market participants
in order to distinguish between true
bona fide hedging needs and speculative
trading masquerading as a bona fide
hedge.
While positions that fall within the
enumerated bona fide hedges, each
discussed in further detail below, are
the type of positions that comply with
the bona fide hedging definition, the
176 See infra Section II.D. For example, § 150.5
requires, among other things, that: Exemption
applications filed with an exchange include
sufficient information to enable the exchange and
the Commission to determine whether the exchange
may grant the exemption, including an indication
of whether the position qualifies as an enumerated
hedge for purposes of Federal limits and a
description of the applicant’s activity in the
underlying cash markets; and the exchange
provides the Commission with a monthly report
showing the disposition of all exemption
applications, including cash-market information
justifying the exemption.
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Commission recognizes that there may
be other positions or hedging strategies
that are not ‘‘enumerated’’ that similarly
could satisfy the bona fide hedge
definition.177 These ‘‘non-enumerated’’
bona fide hedges may be granted today
under existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48, and the
Commission can continue to recognize
non-enumerated bona fide hedges under
the Final Rule. For further discussion of
the recognition of non-enumerated bona
fide hedges, see infra Sections II.C. and
II.G.
With the exception of risk
management positions previously
recognized as bona fide hedges, and
assuming all regulatory requirements
continue to be satisfied, market
participants’ existing bona fide hedging
recognitions under existing Federal
position limits are grandfathered upon
the Final Rule’s Effective Date (i.e., bona
fide hedge exemptions that are currently
recognized for purposes of Federal
position limits, other than risk
management positions, will continue to
be recognized under the Final Rule).
Last, before describing each
individual enumerated hedge, the
Commission also notes that it is
adopting certain non-substantive,
technical changes, and such changes are
intended only to provide clarifications.
For example, the Commission is making
a technical change to the bona fide
hedging definition by adopting the term
in the singular tense in order to conform
to the phrasing in CEA section
4a(c)(2).178 The Commission is also reordering the enumerated bona fide
hedges to place related enumerated
bona fide hedges closer together.
vi. Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Exemptions for Physical Commodities
This Final Rule adopts the list of
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions
as proposed in the 2020 NPRM, with
certain amendments discussed
below.179
177 See
infra Section II.G. (discussing § 150.9).
existing definition in § 1.3 of the
Commission’s regulations is in the plural: ‘‘bona
fide hedging transactions and positions.’’ The 2020
NPRM’s proposed definition was similarly plural.
179 Appendix A to part 150 lists the following
enumerated bona fide hedges: (a)(1) Hedges of
Inventory and Cash Commodity Fixed-Price
Purchase Contracts; (a)(2) Hedges of Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Sales Contracts; (a)(3)
Hedges of Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash
Commodity Sales and Purchases; (a)(4) Hedges of
Unsold Anticipated Production; (a)(5) Hedges of
Unfilled Anticipated Requirements; (a)(6) Hedges of
Anticipated Merchandising; (a)(7) Hedges by
Agents; (a)(8) Short Hedges of Anticipated Mineral
Royalties; (a)(9) Hedges of Anticipated Services;
(a)(10) Offsets of Commodity Trade Options; (a)(11)
Cross-Commodity Hedges. As previously
mentioned, the Commission has also reorganized
the order of the list of enumerated hedges. The
Final Rule reorders Appendix A so that the bona
178 The
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3265
a. Hedges of Inventory and Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
(1) Background—Inventory and Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
Inventory and fixed-price cash
commodity purchase contracts have
long served as the basis for a bona fide
hedging position.180 This bona fide
hedge is enumerated in paragraph
(2)(i)(A) of the existing bona fide
hedging definition in § 1.3, and
recognizes as a bona fide hedge sales of
any commodity for future delivery on a
contract market which do not exceed in
quantity ownership (i.e., inventory) or
fixed-price purchase of the same
commodity by the same person.
Since 2011, the Commission has
included hedges of inventory and cash
commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts in each of its position limits
rulemakings, with minor proposed
modifications to improve clarity.181
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Inventory and Cash Commodity FixedPrice Purchase Contracts
This proposed enumerated bona fide
hedge recognized that a commercial
enterprise is exposed to price risk if it
has obtained inventory in the normal
course of business or has entered into a
fixed-price spot or forward purchase
contract calling for delivery in the
physical marketing channel of a cashmarket commodity (or a combination of
the two), and has not offset that price
risk exposure (e.g., that the market price
of the inventory could decrease). In
connection with the proposed
enumerated hedge, any such inventory,
or a fixed-price purchase contract, must
be on hand, as opposed to a non-fixed
purchase contract or an anticipated
purchase.
An appropriate hedge to offset the
price risk arising from inventory or a
fixed-price purchase contract under the
2020 NPRM would be to establish a
short position in a commodity
derivative contract. The Commission
also stated in the 2020 NPRM that an
exchange may require such short
position holders to demonstrate the
ability to deliver against the short
fide hedges are listed by hedges of purchases, sales,
anticipated activities, or other new types of hedges.
180 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 6(a)(3) (1970). That statutory
definition of bona fide hedging included sales of,
or short positions in, any commodity for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract
market made or held by such person to the extent
that such sales or short positions are offset in
quantity by the ownership or purchase of the same
cash commodity by the same person.
181 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75713; 76 FR at
11609.
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position in order to demonstrate a
legitimate purpose for holding a
position deep into the spot month.182
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Sales Contracts
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Inventory and Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge of
inventory and cash commodity fixedprice purchase contracts as proposed.
(4) Comments—Inventory and Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
Aside from ASR, which expressed
support for this enumerated hedge, the
Commission did not receive any other
specific comments on this enumerated
hedge.183
b. Hedges of Cash Commodity FixedPrice Sales Contracts
(1) Background—Cash Commodity
Fixed-Price Sales Contracts
Fixed-price cash commodity sales
have long served as the basis for a bona
fide hedging position.184 This bona fide
hedge is enumerated in paragraphs
(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the existing bona
fide hedging definition in § 1.3. This
enumerated bona fide hedge recognizes
as a bona fide hedging transaction or
position hedges against purchases of
any commodity for future delivery on a
contract market which do not exceed in
quantity: (A) The fixed price sale of the
same cash commodity by the same
person; and (B) the quantity equivalent
of fixed-price sales of the cash products
and by-products of such commodity by
the same person. Since 2011, the
Commission has included hedges of
cash commodity fixed-price sales
contracts in its position limits
rulemakings, with no substantive
modifications.185
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182 85
FR at 11609–11610. For example, it would
not appear to be economically appropriate to hold
a short position in the spot month of a commodity
derivative contract against fixed-price purchase
contracts that provide for deferred delivery in
comparison to the delivery period for the spot
month commodity derivative contract. This is
because the commodity under the cash contract
would not be available for delivery on the
commodity derivative contract.
183 ASR at 2.
184 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 6a(3) (1970). That statutory
definition of bona fide hedging includes purchases
of, or long positions in, any commodity for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract
market made or held by such person to the extent
that such purchases or long positions are offset by
sales of the same cash commodity by the same
person.
185 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75824; 76 FR at
71689.
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This proposed enumerated bona fide
hedge made minor modifications to the
existing bona fide hedge, and
recognized that a commercial enterprise
is exposed to price risk if it has entered
into a spot or forward fixed-price sales
contract calling for delivery in the
physical marketing channel of a cashmarket commodity, and has not offset
that price risk exposure (i.e., that the
market price of a commodity might be
higher than the price of its fixed-price
sales contract for that commodity).
Under the 2020 NPRM, an appropriate
hedge of a fixed-price sales contract
would be to establish a long position in
a commodity derivative contract to
offset such price risk.186
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Cash Commodity
Fixed-Price Sales Contracts
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated hedge for hedges of cash
commodity fixed-price sales contracts as
proposed.
(4) Comments—Cash Commodity FixedPrice Sales Contracts
Aside from ASR, which expressed
support for this enumerated hedge, the
Commission did not receive any other
specific comments on this enumerated
hedge.187
c. Hedges of Offsetting Unfixed Price
Cash Commodity Sales and Purchases
(1) Background—Offsetting Unfixed
Price Cash Commodity Sales and
Purchases
Hedges of offsetting unfixed price
cash commodity sales and purchases is
currently enumerated in paragraph
(2)(iii) of the existing bona fide hedging
definition in § 1.3 and is subject to the
Five-Day Rule. This enumerated hedge
is the only existing enumerated hedge
that expressly recognizes hedging the
price risk arising from cash commodity
unfixed-price transactions.
This enumerated bona fide hedge
allows a market participant to use
commodity derivatives in excess of
Federal position limits to offset an
unfixed-price cash commodity purchase
coupled with an unfixed-price cash
commodity sale. Specifically, this
enumerated bona fide hedge allows for
‘‘offsetting sales and purchases’’ for
future delivery on a contract market
which do not exceed in quantity that
amount of the same cash commodity
which has been bought and sold by the
186 85
FR at 11610.
at 2.
187 ASR
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same person at unfixed prices basis
different delivery months of the contract
market.
While not part of the original
regulatory bona fide hedge definition,
the Commission adopted this
enumerated bona fide hedge in 1987 to
‘‘remove any doubt’’ that certain cotton
and soybean crush inter-month spreads
were covered under the Commission’s
bona fide hedge definition.188 Since
2011, the Commission has included this
enumerated bona fide hedge in each of
its position limits rulemakings.189
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash
Commodity Sales and Purchases
The Commission proposed to
maintain this bona fide hedge, with a
few modifications.
The 2020 NPRM proposed to expand
the existing bona fide hedge, which
currently requires the offsetting
purchase and sale to be at basis to
different delivery months of the same
commodity derivative contract, to
additionally permit hedges of offsetting
unfixed sales and unfixed purchases for
different commodity derivative
contracts in the same commodity (e.g.,
Brent/WTI), regardless of whether the
contracts are in the same delivery
month. This proposed change would
permit the cash commodity to be bought
and sold at unfixed prices at a basis to
different commodity derivative
contracts in the same commodity, even
if the commodity derivative contracts
were in the same calendar month (i.e.,
buy Brent in January; sell WTI in
January).190 The Commission proposed
this change to allow a commercial
enterprise to enter into the described
derivatives transactions to reduce the
risk arising from either (or both) a
location differential or a time
differential in unfixed-price purchase
and sale contracts in the same cash
commodity.191
188 The Commission stated when it proposed this
enumerated bona fide hedge, in particular, a cotton
merchant may contract to purchase and sell cotton
in the cash market in relation to the futures price
in different delivery months for cotton, i.e., a basis
purchase and a basis sale. Prior to the time when
the price is fixed for each leg of such a cash
position, the merchant is subject to a variation in
the two futures contracts utilized for price basing.
This variation can be offset by purchasing the future
on which the sales were based and selling the future
on which the purchases were based. Revision of
Federal Speculative Position Limits, 51 FR 31648,
31650 (Sept. 4, 1986).
189 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75714; 76 FR at
71689.
190 85 FR at 11608.
191 Id. In the case of reducing the risk of a location
differential, and where each of the underlying
transactions in separate derivative contracts may be
in the same contract month, a position in a basis
contract would not be subject to position limits, as
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There were minimal comments on the
proposed amendments to this hedge.
IFUS explicitly supported the allowance
of hedges against cash positions in the
same delivery month.193 CMC and
ACSA requested that the Commission
modify the language of this enumerated
bona fide hedge to include ‘‘offsetting
sales or purchases.’’194 CMC and FIA
stated that because merchants often sell
commodities well in advance of
purchasing them, such merchants are
exposed to the exact same calendar
spread price risk as merchants that have
executed both unfixed price legs of a
transaction, because any futures market
calendar spread convergence or
divergence will ‘‘affect both scenarios in
exactly the same manner.’’195 These
commenters contended that changing
the language of the enumerated hedge
from ‘‘and’’ to ‘‘or’’ would allow
merchants to hedge against this
exposure.196
In addition, because this is the only
existing enumerated hedge that
expressly recognizes hedging for
unfixed price transactions, several
commenters cited to this hedge when
requesting that the Commission
explicitly endorse that commercial
transactions with unfixed-prices may
serve as the basis for, and satisfy, the
bona fide hedging definition.197
(5) Discussion of Final Rule—Offsetting
Unfixed Price Cash Commodity Sales
and Purchases
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge for
offsetting unfixed price cash commodity
sales and purchases as proposed. The
Commission considered the comments
requesting the Commission to change
this bona fide hedge’s language from
referring to offsetting unfixed-price
purchase ‘‘and’’ sale transactions
(which requires both an unfixed
purchase price transaction and an
unfixed sale price transaction) to
instead refer to unfixed-price purchase
‘‘or’’ sales transactions (which would
require only either a single unfixedprice purchase transaction or an
unfixed-price sale transaction) to
facilitate hedging calendar spread price
risk for those market participants that
have executed only one leg of an
unfixed-price physical transaction (i.e.,
only a physical purchase or a physical
sale).
The Commission continues to believe
that the enumerated bona fide hedge for
offsetting unfixed price cash commodity
sales and purchases should continue to
require both an unfixed-price cash
commodity purchase and an offsetting
unfixed-price cash commodity sale. For
this particular bona fide hedge, absent
either the unfixed-price purchase leg or
the unfixed-price sale leg (or absent
both legs), it would be less clear, and
require a facts and circumstances
analysis, to determine how the
transaction could be classified as a bona
fide hedge, that is, a transaction that
reduces price risk.198
Under the Final Rule, a single-sided
unfixed price physical transaction (i.e.,
a physical transaction involving an
unfixed price purchase or an unfixed
price sale, but not both) cannot be offset
with derivatives in excess of position
limits using this particular enumerated
bona fide hedge. However, a market
participant with an unfixed price
purchase in the absence of an unfixedprice sale, or vice versa, could
potentially qualify for one or more of
the enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges.199 Additionally, depending on
discussed in connection with paragraph (3) of the
proposed definition of ‘‘referenced contract.’’
192 For example, in the case of a calendar spread,
having both the unfixed-price sale and purchase in
hand would set the timeframe for the calendar
month spread being used as the hedge.
193 IFUS at 4.
194 CMC at 4; ACSA at 6.
195 CMC at 4; FIA at 16.
196 Id.
197 The Commission’s determination on the
treatment of unfixed-price transactions under this
Final Rule is in Section II.A.1.iv.
198 The contemplated derivative positions will
offset the risk that the difference in the expected
delivery prices of the two unfixed-price cash
contracts in the same commodity will change
between the time the hedging transaction is entered
and the time of fixing of the prices on the purchase
and sales cash contracts. Therefore, the
contemplated derivative positions are economically
appropriate to the reduction of risk.
199 Specifically, as discussed above, because the
Commission does not view an unfixed-price
commitment as filling, or satisfying, an anticipated
need, market participants with unfixed-price
commitments may qualify for an enumerated
To be eligible for this enumerated
hedge, both an unfixed-price cash
commodity purchase ‘‘and’’ an
offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity
sale would have to be in hand, because
having both the unfixed-price sale and
purchase in hand would allow for an
objective evaluation of the hedge.192
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Offsetting Unfixed
Price Cash Commodity Sales and
Purchases
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge for
offsetting unfixed price cash commodity
sales and purchases as proposed.
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Cash Commodity Sales and Purchases
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the facts and circumstances, a singlesided unfixed price contract could
potentially be the basis for a nonenumerated bona fide hedge.
While the Commission acknowledges
concerns from commenters that market
participants that have executed only one
leg of a physical transaction (i.e., only
an unfixed-price purchase or an
unfixed-price sale) may need to hedge
calendar spread price risk, the
Commission believes the Final Rule
offers several avenues for hedging such
risks.200 For example, under the
offsetting unfixed price cash commodity
sales and purchases enumerated bona
fide hedge, upon fixing the price of, or
taking delivery on, the purchase
contract, the owner of the cash
commodity no longer has offsetting
unfixed priced transactions, but may
continue to hold the short derivative leg
of the spread as a hedge against that
fixed-price purchase or as inventory
under the enumerated hedge for fixed
price transactions.
Alternatively, under this Final Rule, if
the market participant fixes the price
the sales contract first, he or she may
continue to hold the long derivative leg
of the spread by qualifying for bona fide
hedge treatment for that long position
under another enumerated bona fide
hedge. For example, a market
participant who otherwise meets all
applicable requirements of one of the
anticipatory bona fide hedges may
qualify for such hedge(s) regardless of
whether the market participant holds an
unfixed-price purchase transaction.
d. Hedges of Unsold Anticipated
Production
(1) Background—Unsold Anticipated
Production
Unsold anticipated production has
long served as the basis for an
enumerated bona fide hedging
position.201 This bona fide hedge is
currently enumerated in paragraph
(2)(i)(B) of the bona fide hedging
definition in existing § 1.3, and is
subject to the Five-Day Rule. This
anticipatory bona fide hedge, provided the market
participant meets all applicable requirements and
conditions. See Section II.A.1.iv.
200 The Final Rule also expands the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, so a market participant with
an unfixed price purchase or sale may also qualify
for a calendar spread exemption, for example, with
one leg in the spot month. For further discussion
of the Final Rule’s treatment of spread transactions,
see Section II.A.20.
201 See 7 U.S.C. 6a(3)(A) (1940). That statutory
definition of bona fide hedging, enacted in 1936,
included the amount of such commodity such
person is raising, or in good faith intends or expects
to raise, within the next twelve months, on land (in
the United States or its Territories) which such
person owns or leases.
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existing enumerated bona fide hedge
includes hedges against the sales of any
commodity for future delivery on a
contract market which does not exceed
in quantity twelve months’ unsold
anticipated production of the same
commodity by the same person.
The bona fide hedge of unsold
anticipated production is one of two
existing enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges currently included in § 1.3,
the other being unfilled anticipated
requirements (discussed further below).
The unsold anticipated production bona
fide hedge allows a market participant
who anticipates production, but who
has not yet produced anything, to enter
into a short derivatives position in
excess of Federal position limits to
hedge the price risk arising from that
anticipated production. Since 2011, the
Commission has included hedges of
unsold anticipated production in each
of its position limits rulemakings, with
some modifications.202 The regulatory
text for this existing enumerated bona
fide hedge is silent about whether it
applies to unsold anticipated
production that is contracted to be sold
under an unfixed-price transaction.
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Unsold Anticipated Production
The Commission proposed to
maintain the existing enumerated bona
fide hedge of unsold anticipated
production, with modifications as
follows. First, the Commission proposed
to remove the twelve-month
restriction.203 Second, consistent with
the treatment for the other anticipatory
bona fide hedges under the 2020 NPRM,
the Commission proposed to eliminate
the existing restrictions during the last
five days of trading (i.e., eliminate the
‘‘Five-Day Rule’’).204
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Unsold Anticipated
Production
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge of unsold
anticipated production as proposed.
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(4) Comments—Unsold Anticipated
Production
Several commenters, including ASR,
ADM, and ICE, supported eliminating
the twelve-month restriction.205 ASR,
for example, noted that the lifecycle of
202 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75714; 76 FR at
71689.
203 85 FR at 11608.
204 For further discussion of the Five-Day rule, see
Section II.A.1.viii, Elimination of Federal
Restriction Prohibiting Holding a Bona Fide Hedge
Exemption During Last Five Trading Days, the
‘‘Five-Day Rule,’’ below.
205 ASR at 2; ADM at 2; ICE at 2; IECA at 2; and
IFUS at 2.
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sugarcane extends beyond a twelvemonth period.206
Conversely, Better Markets and IATP
opposed the elimination of the twelvemonth restriction.207 IATP stated that
commercial market participants such as
storage facilities should instead use
insurance policies to manage their
risks.208 Further, IATP stated that if the
Commission extends the duration up to
24 months, the Commission should
retain discretion to require market
participants to demonstrate a
production level proportionate to the
amount in excess of the Federal position
limit throughout the duration of the
bona fide hedge exemption.209
(5) Discussion of Final Rule—Unsold
Anticipated Production
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge of unsold
anticipated production as proposed.
This enumerated bona fide hedge allows
a market participant who anticipates
production, but who has not yet
produced anything, to enter into a short
derivatives position in excess of Federal
position limits to hedge the anticipated
unsold production.210
The Commission clarifies, as
discussed above under Section
II.A.1.iv., that the enumerated bona fide
hedge for unsold production is available
to a market participant who satisfies all
applicable requirements regardless of
whether the market participant has
entered into an unfixed-price sales
transaction in connection with its
anticipated unsold production.
However, acquiring an unfixed-price
sales contract alone is not a basis for
qualifying for this bona fide hedge.
Rather, under the Final Rule, entering
into an unfixed-price sales transaction
will not prevent a market participant
from qualifying for the unsold
anticipated production bona fide hedge.
As the Commission explains above,
an unfixed-price sales commitment does
not address the bona fide hedging need
related to anticipated unsold production
because the market participant’s price
risk to its anticipated production has
not been fixed (i.e., the unfixed-price
sales contract may fall below the cost of
production). In other words, a producer
206 ASR
at 2.
at 15–17; Better Markets at 57–58.
208 IATP at 15–17.
209 Id.
210 Once a market participant finishes its
production, the market participant will no longer
qualify for this enumerated bona fide hedge since
its production is no longer anticipatory. Instead, its
completed production is now part of its inventory.
However, the enumerated bona fide hedge for
inventory and cash commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts (discussed below) would become
available to the market participant.
207 IATP
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with an unfixed-price sales commitment
for its production still has an
anticipated need related to its price risk
until the price of the commitment is
fixed. However, once the market
participant enters into a fixed-price
sales contract, the market participant no
longer has price risk that needs to be
hedged (i.e., its short futures contract is
no longer necessary as a hedge for its
anticipated production).
Accordingly, the market participant
that enters into the fixed-price
transaction no longer has an anticipated
need to hedge the price risk associated
with its unsold production (i.e., the
anticipated production is deemed to be
‘‘sold’’ by fixed-price sales transaction)
and would not qualify for this
anticipated unsold production bona fide
hedge.
Consequently, if the market
participant no longer qualifies for the
unsold anticipated production bona fide
hedging recognition (e.g., it has entered
into a fixed-price sales contract), its
derivative position, to the extent the
position is above an applicable position
limit, must be reduced in an orderly
manner in accordance with sound
commercial practices. However, if the
market participant entered into a fixedprice transaction, while it could not
continue to qualify for the unsold
anticipated production bona fide hedge,
the market participant may be able to
qualify for the enumerated bona fide
hedge for cash commodity fixed-price
sales contracts, assuming all applicable
requirements are met.211
While the Commission acknowledges
the comments from Better Markets and
IATP opposing the removal of the
twelve-month restriction, the
Commission believes that this twelvemonth restriction may be unsuitable in
connection with additional core
referenced futures contracts with the
underlying agricultural and energy
commodities that would be subject to
Federal position limits for the first time
under this Final Rule since these nonlegacy commodities may have longer
growth and/or production cycles than
the nine legacy agricultural contracts.
The existing twelve-month restriction
may thus be unnecessarily short in
comparison to the expected life of
investment in production facilities.
While this enumerated bona fide hedge
for unsold production does not have an
associated twelve-month restriction
under the Final Rule, the Commission
notes that because all bona fide hedges
must be economically appropriate to the
211 For further discussion of the enumerated bona
fide hedge for cash commodity fixed-price sales
contracts, see Section II.A.1.vi.b.
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reduction of price risk pursuant to the
CEA, a market participant may only
qualify for this enumerated bona fide
hedge for anticipated unsold production
to the extent the market participant has
a good faith anticipation of legitimate
anticipated unsold production giving
rise to such price risk.
Further, additional provisions
finalized herein under the Final Rule
will help ensure that all bona fide
hedges, including bona fide hedges of
unsold anticipated requirements,
comport with the CEA and the
Commission’s regulations, and are
objectively verifiable and free from
abuse.212
e. Hedges of Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements
(1) Background—Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements
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The existing bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements is
currently enumerated in paragraph
(2)(ii)(C) of the existing bona fide
hedging definition in § 1.3. This bona
fide hedge includes hedges against
purchases of any commodity for future
delivery on a contract market which do
not exceed in quantity twelve months’
unfilled anticipated requirements of the
same cash commodity for processing,
manufacturing, or feeding by the same
person.
Consistent with the existing
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated unsold production, as
discussed above, the existing bona fide
hedge for unfilled anticipated
requirements is similarly subject to the
twelve-month restriction as well as a
less-restrictive version of the ‘‘Five-Day
Rule.’’ With respect to the Five-Day
Rule, under existing § 1.3, the unfilled
anticipated requirements bona fide
hedge provides that the size of a market
participant’s position held ‘‘in the five
last trading days’’ must not exceed the
person’s unfilled anticipated
requirements of the same cash
commodity for that month and for the
next succeeding month.213
However, the regulatory text in
existing § 1.3 is silent about whether the
bona fide hedge applies to unfilled
anticipated requirements that are
contracted to be supplied under an
212 See infra §§ 150.5 and 150.9 (reporting and
recordkeeping obligations); Appendix B to part 150.
213 This is essentially a less-restrictive version of
the five-day rule, allowing a participant to hold a
position during the end of the spot period if
economically appropriate, but only up to two
months’ worth of anticipated requirements. The
two-month quantity limitation has long-appeared in
existing § 1.3 as a measure to prevent the sourcing
of massive quantities of the underlying in a short
period. 17 CFR 1.3.
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unfixed-price transaction or whether
such unfixed-price supply transaction
would ‘‘fill’’ the anticipated
requirements.
As discussed above, staff previously
has addressed this question through
Staff Letter No. 12–07, in which staff
clarified that a commercial entity may
qualify for the existing enumerated bona
fide hedge for unfilled anticipated
requirements even if the commercial
entity has entered into long-term,
unfixed-price supply or requirements
contracts because, as staff explained, the
unfixed-price purchase contract does
not ‘‘fill’’ the commercial entity’s
anticipated requirements.214 As
explained in Staff Letter No. 12–07, the
price risk of such ‘‘unfilled’’ anticipated
requirements is not offset by the
unfixed-price forward contract because
the price risk remains with the
commercial entity, even though the
entity has contractually assured a
supply of the commodity. Staff Letter
No. 12–07 had the practical effect of
affirming that market participants with
firm commitments at unfixed prices
may still be able to avail themselves of
this enumerated anticipatory hedge for
unfilled requirements.
new provision, however, the commodity
is not for use by the same person—that
is, the utility—but rather the commodity
is for anticipated use by the utility to
fulfill its obligation to serve retail
customers.
Finally, consistent with the treatment
for the other anticipatory bona fide
hedges under the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission proposed to eliminate the
existing restrictions during the last five
last days of trading.
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
The Commission proposed several
amendments to the unfilled anticipated
requirements bona fide hedge. First, the
Commission proposed to remove the
twelve-month restriction because the
Commission recognized that market
participants may have a legitimate
commercial need to hedge unfilled
anticipated requirements for a period
longer than twelve months.215
Second, the Commission proposed to
remove from the regulatory text the
agricultural-specific term ‘‘feeding,’’ and
to replace that word with a reference to
‘‘use by that person.’’
Third, recognizing that utilities are
not the entities who ‘‘use’’ the
commodity, the Commission also
proposed to add as a permissible hedge
the unfilled anticipated requirements
for the contract’s underlying cash
commodity for the resale by a utility to
meet the anticipated demand of its
customers. This proposed provision is
analogous to the existing unfilled
anticipated requirements provision ‘‘for
processing, manufacturing or use by the
same person[.]’’ 216 Under this proposed
(i) Elimination of Requirement to Hedge
Only Twelve Months’ Quantity of
Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
214 CFTC Letter No. 12–07, Interpretation, Request
for guidance regarding meaning of ‘‘unfilled
anticipated requirements’’ for purposes of bona fide
hedging under the Commission’s position limits
rules (Aug. 16, 2012).
215 See, e.g., 85 FR at 11610.
216 17 CFR 1.3.
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(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements
The Commission is adopting the
unfilled anticipated requirements
enumerated bona fide hedge as
proposed.
(4) Comments—Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements
Commenters supported continuing to
include this bona fide hedge as part of
the Commission’s amended suite of
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges.217 As described below,
commenters also requested the
Commission clarify certain aspects of
the proposed version.
Only a small group of commenters
directly commented on the elimination
of the twelve-month restriction. ICE,
IFUS, IECA, AGA, ADM and NOPA
supported eliminating the twelve-month
restriction,218 with ADM stating that
there may be times this anticipatory
hedge is needed for ‘‘commercial
purposes beyond twelve-months.’’ 219 In
contrast, Better Markets opposed the
removal of the restriction, stating that
such removal would make the hedge
less reasonably verifiable and open the
hedge to potential abuse.220
(a) Discussion of Final Rule—TwelveMonth Restriction
After considering public comments,
the Commission has determined that the
commercial need to hedge unfilled
anticipated requirements for a period
longer than twelve months, along with
the Commission’s experience in
overseeing exemptions 221 under this
217 e.g., AGA at 6–7; ADM at 2; CEWG at 4; EEI
and EPSA jointly at 5; IECA at 2; NOPA at 2; NGSA
at 3.
218 AGA at 6–7, ADM at 2, NOPA at 2, IFUS at
2, ICE at 2, and IECA at 2.
219 ADM at 2.
220 Better Markets at 58–59.
221 The Commission and its predecessor agency,
the Commodity Exchange Authority, has decades of
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enumerated bona fide hedge, suggest in
favor of eliminating the twelve-month
restriction. While the Commission
acknowledges the comments from Better
Markets opposing the removal of the
twelve-month restriction, the
Commission notes that, a twelve-month
limitation in connection with this
particular enumerated bona fide hedge
may be unsuitable in connection with
commodities other than the nine legacy
agricultural commodities. For example,
a processor or utility relying on the
unfilled anticipated requirements bona
fide hedge has a physical limit on
processing, or energy generation,
respectively, which should generally
result in relatively predictable levels of
activity that will not vary much year to
year. Further, additional provisions
finalized herein will help ensure that all
bona fide hedges, including hedges of
unfilled anticipated requirements,
comport with the CEA and the
Commission’s regulations, and are
reasonably verifiable and free from
abuse.
For example, under
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A), finalized herein, all
market participants seeking a bona fide
hedge exemption for referenced
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, including those market
participants with enumerated bona fide
hedges that are self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits,
must still file an application to the
exchange requesting an exemption from
the applicable exchange-set position
limits prior to exceeding the exchangeset limits. The application for an
exemption from exchange-set limits
must include information the exchange
needs to determine, and the
Commission can use that information to
independently determine, whether the
facts and circumstances support the
exchange granting such an exemption.
The market participant must include a
description of the applicant’s activity in
the cash markets and swaps markets for
the commodity underlying the position
for which the application is submitted,
including, but not limited to,
information regarding the offsetting cash
positions.222 The exchange is required
to take into account whether the
exemption would result in positions
that would not be in accord with sound
commercial practices and whether the
position would exceed an amount that
may be established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion.223 Accordingly, if
hedging more than twelve months’
expertise in granting bona fide exemptions. See 21
FR 6913 (Sep 13, 1956).
222 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A).
223 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G).
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quantity of unfilled anticipated
requirements would not be in accord
with sound commercial practices, or
would exceed an amount that may be
established and liquidated in an orderly
fashion, the exchange would be
prohibited from granting the exemption.
Even in the absence of a Federal
twelve-month restriction, when
administering exchange-set limits,
exchanges may, as they do today,
implement a variety of restrictions and
limitations on position size to maintain
orderly markets and to fulfill their
regulatory obligations. As described in
further detail below, the Commission is
finalizing guidance in paragraph (b) of
Appendix B to part 150 to help
exchanges determine when any such
restrictions during the spot month might
be appropriate, and when such
restrictions may not be needed. For
example, consistent with the guidance
in Appendix B to part 150, paragraph
(b), an exchange may consider adopting
rules to require that during the lesser of
the last five days of trading (or such
time period for the spot month), such
positions must not exceed the person’s
unfilled anticipated requirements of the
underlying cash commodity for that
month and for the next succeeding
month.224 Depending on the specific
facts and circumstances, and particular
market dynamics, any such quantity
limitation may prevent the use of long
futures to source large quantities of the
underlying cash commodity. The
Commission may be able to determine
that an exchange’s adoption of a twomonth limitation would allow for an
amount of activity that is economically
appropriate and in line with common
commercial hedging practices, without
jeopardizing any statutory objectives.
(ii) Scope of Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements and Unfixed-Price
Transactions
Commenters questioned the extent to
which anticipated requirements may be
considered to be ‘‘filled’’ by unfixedprice purchase supply contracts under
the proposed enumerated bona fide
hedge for unfilled anticipated
requirements. COPE, IECA, EPSA and
EEI requested clarification on whether
this enumerated hedge covers
anticipated requirements ‘‘filled’’ by an
224 This is essentially a less-restrictive version of
the Five-Day rule, allowing a participant to hold a
position during the end of the spot period if
economically appropriate, but only up to two
months’ worth of anticipated requirements. The
two-month quantity limitation has long-appeared in
existing § 1.3 as a measure to prevent the sourcing
of massive quantities of the underlying in a short
time period. 17 CFR 1.3.
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unfixed-price purchase contract
common to many electric generators.225
IECA recommended the Commission
should either (i) adopt a broad
definition of the word ‘‘unfilled’’ that
would include anticipated requirements
that are ‘‘filled’’ by unfixed-price
transactions, or (ii) expand this bona
fide hedge to include both ‘‘unfilled’’
and ‘‘unpriced’’ 226 anticipated
requirements.227
AGA also requested clarification 228
regarding the 2020 NPRM’s statement
that this bona fide hedge would
recognize a position where a utility is
‘‘required or encouraged’’ by its public
utility commission to hedge.229 AGA
noted that while the ‘‘required or
encouraged’’ language is not in the
proposed regulatory text, clarification of
the scope for the exemption would
result in more certainty for those
utilities in states where the public
utility commission may not directly
address or require hedging activities,
but instead may allow or permit hedging
for the potential benefits to
customers.230
(a) Discussion of Final Rule—Scope of
Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
Regarding the requests for
clarification on the scope of the term
‘‘unfilled’’ in this enumerated hedge,
the Commission clarifies that
anticipated ‘‘unfilled’’ requirements are
not ‘‘filled’’ by unfixed-price
transactions. Accordingly, a market
participant with a purchase or sale of a
physical commodity, entered into at an
unfixed price, may continue to avail
itself of this anticipatory hedge even
though the participant has entered into
a firm, albeit unfixed-price,
commitment, and provided all
applicable requirements are satisfied.231
As discussed above under Section
II.A.1.iv., the Commission adopts the
interpretation of Staff Letter No. 12–
07.232 That is, commercial entities that
225 COPE
at 6; IECA at 7–8; EPSA and EEI jointly
at 5.
226 The Commission recognizes that market
participants may utilize different nomenclature to
refer to unfixed-price contracts. For example, some
commenters may refer to these contracts as
‘‘unpriced’’ contracts, while others may refer to
these physical contracts as being at an unfixed spot
index price. See FIA at 17, 31; COPE at 6.
227 IECA at 7–8.
228 AGA at 6–7.
229 See 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(iii); 85 FR at 11610
(‘‘This would recognize a bona fide hedging
position where a utility is required or encouraged
by its public utility commission to hedge’’).
230 AGA at 6–7.
231 The Commission clarifies that unfixed-price
contracts include physical fuel agreements for
power production for security of supply that are
priced at an unfixed spot index price.
232 CFTC Staff Letter No. 12–07.
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enter into unfixed-price transactions
may continue to qualify for the
enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled
anticipated requirements as long as the
commercial entity otherwise satisfies
the criteria for this hedge. This rationale
is predicated on the fact that an unfixedprice purchase commitment does not fill
an anticipated requirement in that the
market participant’s price risk to the
input has not been fixed.
The Commission continues to believe
that unfilled anticipated requirements
are those anticipated inputs that are
estimated in good faith and that have
not been filled. As such, an anticipated
requirement may be filled by fixed-price
purchase commitments, holdings of
commodity inventory, or unsold
anticipated production of the market
participant.233 Unfixed-price
transactions, however, do not fill an
anticipated requirement.
Under this anticipatory hedge, once
the price is fixed on a supply contract,
the market participant holding the
anticipatory hedge position must, to the
extent the position is above an
applicable Federal position limit,
liquidate the position in an orderly
manner in accordance with sound
commercial practices. Nevertheless,
subject to the specific facts and
circumstances, the market participant at
that point may have established the
basis for a different bona fide hedge
exemption to offset the price risk arising
from its fixed price exposure.
Finally, the Commission agrees with
the commenters’ request for clarification
that a utility qualifies for the unfilled
anticipated requirements enumerated
hedge even if the utility is not ‘‘required
or encouraged’’ by its public utility
commission to hedge.
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f. Hedges of Anticipated Merchandising
(1) Background—Anticipated
Merchandising
The existing bona fide hedge
definition in § 1.3 includes enumerated
bona fide hedges that recognize offsets
of certain anticipated activities,234 but
does not currently include an
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated merchandising. While the
Commission’s 2011 Final Rule included
an enumerated hedge for anticipated
merchandising, it was a narrow hedge
focused on the leasing of storage
capacity,235 and that rulemaking was
ultimately vacated.
233 81
FR at 96752.
e.g., §§ 1.3(z)(2)(i)(B) (unsold anticipated
production) and 1.3(z)(2)(ii)(C) (unfilled anticipated
requirements).
235 The 2011 Final Rule was the first time the
Commission recognized that in some
234 See,
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3271
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Anticipated Merchandising
(4) Comments—Anticipated
Merchandising
The Commission proposed a new
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated merchandising. The
proposed anticipated merchandising
hedge recognized long or short positions
in commodity derivative contracts that
offset the anticipated change in value of
the underlying commodity that a person
anticipates purchasing or selling.236
While the proposed enumerated
anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge would operate as a selfeffectuating bona fide hedge, the
proposed bona fide hedge was subject to
the following conditions: (1) The
position offsets the anticipated change
in value of the underlying commodity
that a person anticipates purchasing or
selling; (2) the position does not exceed
in quantity twelve months’ of current or
anticipated purchase or sale
requirements of the same cash
commodity that is anticipated to be
purchased or sold; (3) the person
holding the position is a merchant
handling the underlying commodity
that is subject to the anticipated
merchandising hedge; (4) that such
merchant is entering into the position
solely for purposes related to its
merchandising business; and (5) the
person has a demonstrated history of
buying and selling the underlying
commodity for its merchandising
business.237
(i) Generally
A majority of commenters strongly
supported the addition of an
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipatory merchandising.238 In
particular, market participants from the
energy industry strongly supported the
inclusion of this enumerated hedge,
subject to certain clarifications
described in detail further below.239 On
the other hand, Better Markets indicated
that the enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges generally, and particularly
the enumerated hedge for anticipatory
merchandising, pose a regulatory
avoidance risk.240 Better Markets
expressed concern that market
participants could attempt to claim an
underlying risk is anticipated in a cash
commodity in order to justify positions
in referenced contracts that exceed
Federal position limits.241
In addition to expressing support for
the inclusion of this enumerated bona
fide hedge, most commenters also
requested clarity or guidance on the
scope of the proposed anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge. For
example, CMC stated that the
Commission must be clear with the
exchanges and the end-user community
about what activity is included in the
enumerated anticipated merchandising
bona fide hedge.242 Similarly, Cargill
and NGFA supported the addition of the
enumerated anticipated merchandising
bona fide hedge, but urged the
Commission to provide more clarity on
how the enumerated bona fide hedge
would be applied.243 Cargill and NGFA
also requested that the Commission
address language that appeared in
footnote 105 of the 2020 NPRM,244
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Anticipated
Merchandising
The Commission is adopting the
anticipated merchandising enumerated
hedge as proposed, and makes certain
clarifications below to respond to
specific questions from commenters
summarized below.
The Commission recognizes that
anticipated merchandising is a hedging
practice commonly used by some
commodity market participants, and
that merchandisers play an important
role in the physical supply chain. The
Commission also recognizes that the
derivative transactions utilized by
commercial participants to manage such
merchandising activity are beneficial to
price discovery.
circumstances, a market participant that owns or
leases an asset in the form of storage capacity could
establish positions to reduce the risk associated
with returns anticipated from owning or leasing
that capacity. In those narrow circumstances, the
Commission found that those transactions satisfied
the statutory definition of a bona fide hedging
transaction.
236 85 FR at 11727.
237 Id.
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238 AGA at 1, 8; AFR at 2; Cargill at 4–6; NGSA
at 2, 4; CMC at 4–5, 7–8; ADM at 3; NCFC at 2–
4; Chevron at 2, 5; Suncor at 3, 5; IFUS at 2 (Exhibit
1 RFC 4); ICEA at 2; NGFA at 4, 7; CCI at 7–9; ASR
at 2; FIA at 16; CEWG at 14.
239 AGA at 8; AFR at 2; Cargill at 5–6; NGSA at
4; CMC at 5, 7; ADM at 3; NCFC at 3–4; Chevron
at 5; Suncor at 5; IFUS at Exhibit 1 RFC 4; ICEA
at 2; NGFA at 7; CCI at 7–9.
240 Better Markets at 3, 59–60 (stating that ‘‘. . .
an identical conceptual avoidance risk continues to
exist across all of these anticipatory hedges—
namely, that firms may claim an underlying risk is
anticipated in order to justify positions well over
the speculative limits in Referenced Contracts’’).
241 Id.
242 CMC at 5 (stating that n.105 of the 2020 NPRM
casts a significant shadow of uncertainty and that
if the Commission believes limits are necessary, it
must be clear with the exchanges and the end-user
community about what activities are enumerated).
243 Cargill at 5–6; NGFA at 7.
244 85 FR at 11612. Footnote 105 from the 2020
NPRM provided: ‘‘Similarly, other examples of
anticipatory merchandising that have been
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which implied that certain storage
hedges and hedges of assets owned or
anticipated to be owned would be
evaluated through the non-enumerated
bona fide hedge process, rather than as
a self-effectuating enumerated
anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge.245
(ii) Requirements for Anticipated
Merchandising
(a) Requirement to Hedge Only Twelve
Months’ Worth of Anticipated
Requirements
Although many public comments
addressed the new anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge, only a
few commenters opposed the proposed
requirement to limit this hedge to only
twelve months’ worth of current or
anticipated purchase or sale
requirements of the same cash
commodity that is anticipated to be
purchased or sold. FIA opposed the
twelve-month restriction, stating that
CEA section 4a(c)(2) does not tie the
validity of a bona fide hedge to the
duration of the commercial requirement
being hedged.246 FIA also provided an
example pointing out that market
participants often need hedges of
anticipated purchases or sales longer
than twelve months, such as when a
merchant has a reasonable expectation
of anticipated sales beyond a twelvemonth quantity.247
Similarly, ADM stated that
anticipatory merchandising transactions
should be considered similar to ‘‘hedges
of anticipated requirements’’ and
therefore not subject to the twelvemonth restriction.248
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(b) Discussion of Final Rule—TwelveMonth Restriction
After considering the comments on
the requirement to hedge only twelve
months’ worth of anticipated
requirements, the Commission is
adopting the twelve-month restriction as
proposed. The Commission continues to
believe that, as stated in the 2020
NPRM, this requirement is intended to
ensure that merchants are hedging their
legitimate anticipated merchandising
described to the Commission in response to request
for comment on proposed rulemakings on position
limits (i.e., the storage hedge and hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned) would be the
type of transactions that market participants may
seek through one of the proposed processes for
requesting a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition.’’
245 Cargill at 5–6; NGFA at 7.
246 FIA at 16–17.
247 Id.
248 ADM at 3. The 2020 Proposal would remove
the existing 12-month restriction applicable to the
existing enumerated hedge for unfilled anticipated
requirements. See 85 FR at 11610.
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exposure to the value change of the
underlying commodity, while
calibrating the anticipated need within
a reasonable timeframe and subject to
the limitations in physical commodity
markets, such as annual production or
processing capacity.249 A twelve-month
restriction for anticipated
merchandising is suitable in connection
with contracts that are based on
anticipated activity on yet-to-be
established cash positions due to the
uncertainty of forecasting such activity
and, all else being equal, the increased
risk of excessive speculation on the
price of a commodity the longer the
time period before the actual need
arises.
Regarding FIA’s comment opposing
the twelve-month restriction based on
FIA’s interpretation of CEA section
4a(c)(2), the Commission is comfortable
that hedging twelve months’ or less of
current or anticipated purchase or sale
requirements of the same cash
commodity that is anticipated to be
purchased or sold is consistent with the
CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(ii) requirement
that bona fide hedges be economically
appropriate to the reduction of risks in
the conduct and management of a
commercial enterprise.250 However,
hedging more than twelve months’
anticipated purchase or sale
requirements could in some cases be
inconsistent with that statutory
requirement. Accordingly, bona fide
hedges involving more than twelve
months’ worth of anticipated
requirements for anticipated
merchandising are best evaluated on a
case-by-case basis under the nonenumerated process adopted herein.
The Commission understands that
commercial firms may seek to manage
the price risk of more than twelve
months’ anticipated merchandising
activities; where such situations arise,
the Commission believes a nonenumerated bona fide hedge could be
appropriate.
The Commission also considered
comments that stated that the
Commission should treat the proposed
anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge similar to the other anticipatory
bona fide hedges adopted herein (i.e.,
the enumerated bona fide hedges for
unsold anticipated production and
unfilled anticipated requirements),
which are no longer subject to the
twelve-month restriction.251 However,
the Commission believes that the
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated merchandising, which is a
249 85
FR at 11611.
7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(ii).
251 ADM at 3.
250 See
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new enumerated bona fide hedge, is
distinguishable from the enumerated
bona fide hedges for unsold anticipated
production and unfilled anticipated
requirements, which both have been
part of the Federal position limits
framework for decades.
In particular, the Commission has
determined that a twelve-month
restriction is unnecessary for bona fide
hedges of unfilled anticipated
requirements and unsold anticipated
production in part because anticipated
production and requirements, unlike
merchandising, are linked and subject to
inherent physical limits. For example, a
processor has a physical limit on
production capacity to support claims of
anticipated unsold production.
Likewise, a manufacturer, processor or
utility has a physical limit on
manufacturing, processing, or energy
generation, respectively, for similar
reasons to tie any claim of anticipated
requirements. In each case, anticipated
production or requirements generally
should result in relatively predictable
levels of activity that will not vary much
year to year. In contrast, the amount a
given market participant could claim to
anticipate merchandising is potentially
unlimited and less connected to
physical production capacity.252
(iii) Request for Clarification—Meaning
of ‘‘Merchant’’
Comments from energy market
participants requested that the
Commission clarify the meaning of the
term ‘‘merchant’’ as such term is used
in the regulatory text of the proposed
anticipated merchandising hedge.253
Specifically, market participants from
the energy industry expressed concern
about whether the Commission would
construe the term ‘‘merchant’’ such that
only entities that are solely merchants,
and not engaged in other business
activities, would qualify for the
anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge.254 These commenters explained
that large energy companies with
252 To verify market participants’ bona fide
hedging needs, the Final Rule’s recordkeeping
requirements require persons availing themselves of
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions to
maintain complete books and records concerning
all relevant information on their anticipated
requirements, production, and merchandising
activities. See 17 CFR 150.3(d)(1). Furthermore, the
Commission notes that as part of the exemption
application process under final § 150.5, persons
seeking exemptions from exchange-set position
limits are required to include a description of its
activities in the cash markets and swap markets for
the commodity underlying the position for which
the application is submitted.
253 CMC at 5; Shell at 8; Chevron at 5–6; Suncor
at 5–6; CEWG at 15–16.
254 Shell at 8; Chevron at 5–6; Suncor at 5–6;
CEWG at 15–16.
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vertically integrated corporate structures
typically have several legal entities that
perform individual business functions,
including merchandising.255 As such,
these commenters requested the
Commission clarify that integrated
energy companies routinely engaged in
merchandising activities, as well as
other activities such as production,
processing, marketing and power
generation, may utilize the enumerated
hedge for anticipated merchandising in
addition to other bona fide hedges.256
(a) Discussion of Final Rule—Meaning
of ‘‘Merchant’’
The Commission is adopting the term
‘‘merchant’’ in the final anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge as
proposed, but clarifies here the intended
meaning of that term.
In particular, the Commission is
clarifying that the term ‘‘merchant’’ in
the anticipated merchandising
enumerated bona fide hedge is not
limited to those entities exclusively
engaged in the business of
merchandising. Instead, the term
‘‘merchant’’ may include physical
commodity market participants that, in
addition to offering or entering into
transactions solely for purposes related
to their merchandising business, may
otherwise also be a producer, processor,
or commercial user of the commodity
that underlies the anticipated
merchandising transaction.
The Commission’s use of the term
‘‘merchant’’ is intended to capture
commercial market participants who
participate in the physical commodity
market, and does not exclude such
participants simply because they have a
vertically integrated corporate structure.
That is, energy, agricultural, or metal
companies in the physical commodity
market with vertically-integrated or
complex corporate structures are not
excluded as merchants, so long as they
otherwise satisfy all applicable
requirements related to the anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge.
The condition requiring the person to
be a merchant to qualify for this
enumerated hedge is consistent with the
Commission’s longstanding practice of
providing commercial market
participants relief from certain
regulatory requirements as a way of
reducing regulatory compliance
obligations that would otherwise burden
a commercial market participant’s
physical commodity business.
The Commission has taken a similar
approach under the trade option
exemption by exempting the physically
255 Id.
257 Trade Options, Final Rule, 81 FR 14966
(March 21, 2016).
256 Id.
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delivered commodity options purchased
by commercial users of the commodities
underlying the options. Under the trade
option relief, the Commission
recognized that commercial market
participants needed relief by generally
exempting qualifying commodity
options from the swap requirements of
the CEA and the Commission’s
regulations.257 Unlike in the trade
option requirements, there is no
requirement under the anticipated
merchandising enumerated bona fide
hedge that both counterparties qualify
as merchants. The anticipated
merchandising enumerated bona fide
hedge, however, is intended to generally
benefit the same type of market
participants as the trade option
exemption, that is, commercial market
participants who participate in the
physical commodity market for the
underlying commodity being
merchandised. As such, the text of the
anticipated merchandising enumerated
bona fide hedge excludes a party who is
not entering into the anticipated
merchandising activity solely for
commercial purposes related to its
merchandising business, but instead, to
speculate on the price of the underlying
commodity. For example, noncommercial market participants who
employ various arbitrage strategies,
including sometimes trading arbitrage
positions in cash commodity markets to
speculate on the price of the underlying
commodity, and those market
participants with highly leveraged
derivatives portfolios of non-physical
commodities, would not qualify as
merchants.
Finally, the Commission has
determined that it is not necessary to
amend the regulatory text’s reference to
merchant to expressly include
producers or processors. As clarified
above, a producer and a processor may
qualify for the anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge as a
merchant if a part of their business
involves merchandising. Furthermore,
such entities that are also producers or
processors may otherwise rely on the
enumerated anticipated unsold
anticipated production or unfilled
anticipated requirements bona fide
hedges, where applicable. Thus, the
Commission is providing these market
participants with ample flexibility to
manage the price risks arising from their
anticipated merchandising activity
using an expanded suite of anticipatory
bona fide hedges.
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3273
(iv) Requirement for a History of
Merchandising
The Commission did not receive any
specific comments on the proposed
requirement to demonstrate a history of
merchandising activity.
(a) Discussion of Final Rule—History of
Merchandising Requirement
The Commission is adopting the
requirement to demonstrate a history of
merchandising as proposed.
Such demonstrated history must
include a history of making and taking
delivery of the underlying commodity,
and a demonstrated ability to store and
move the underlying commodity.258 A
merchandiser that lacks the requisite
history of anticipated merchandising
activity could still potentially receive
bona fide hedge recognition under the
non-enumerated process, so long as the
merchandiser can otherwise
demonstrate compliance with the bona
fide hedging definition and other
applicable requirements, including
demonstrating activities in the physical
marketing channel, including, for
example, arrangements to take or make
delivery of the underlying
commodity.259
(v) Scope of Anticipated Merchandising
Activity
In response to comments from the
exchanges and market participants, the
Commission is providing further clarity
on the scope of the enumerated
anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge. The Commission discusses
below certain non-exclusive types of
activities that are covered by the
enumerated anticipated merchandising
bona fide hedge.
(a) Request for Clarification—UnfixedPrice Contracts and Enumerated
Anticipated Merchandising Hedge
Commenters requested clarification
on whether the enumerated bona fide
hedge for anticipated merchandising
may be used to manage price risk arising
from unfixed-price physical commodity
transactions. Specifically, several
commenters requested clarification on
whether a firm may use the anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge to
manage the risk associated with a
single-sided unfixed purchase or sale at
a moment when the same firm does not
have an offsetting sale or purchase.260 In
258 85
FR at 11611.
259 Id.
260 NCFC at 3–4; CMC at 4; IFUS at 4–5; NGSA
at 6 (requesting the Commission unambiguously
recognize hedges of index-price risk (not just fixedprice risk), noting that exchanges currently
recognize these types of hedges).
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addition to commercial market
participants, ICE and CME Group also
requested that the Commission
recognize single-sided hedges of
unfixed-price purchases or sales.
Similar to energy market participants,
ICE noted that pricing physical energy
commodity transactions at unfixed
prices is a common pricing mechanism
in the energy markets.261 CME Group
provided a hypothetical example of a
single-side floating or unfixed-price
purchase or sale to demonstrate that
derivatives positions entered into to
effectuate that single-sided unfixedprice purchase or sale would reduce the
price risk arising for each
counterparty.262
Some commenters requested the
Commission clarify that market
participants can utilize the enumerated
anticipatory merchandising hedge to
manage the price risks arising from
unfixed-price transactions.263
Other commenters suggested the
Commission could create a new
enumerated bona fide hedge category
solely to recognize hedges of unfixedprice transactions.264
(1) Discussion of Final Rule—UnfixedPrice Contracts and Enumerated
Anticipated Merchandising Hedge
As discussed above under Section
II.A.1.iv., the Commission is clarifying
that market participants that enter into
unfixed-price transactions may still be
able to qualify for the enumerated bona
fide hedge for anticipated
merchandising. In other words, a
commercial entity that enters into an
unfixed-price transaction may qualify
for an anticipated merchandising bona
fide hedge as long as the market
participant satisfies the other
requirements, discussed above and
below, of the final anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge (e.g.,
qualifies as a merchant, demonstrates a
history of merchandising and satisfies
the twelve-month restriction). This
rationale is predicated on the fact that
an unfixed-price transaction does not
address a merchant’s anticipated
merchandising need in that the
merchant’s price risk to the
merchandise has not been fixed.
Accordingly, a merchant may use the
anticipated merchandising hedge to
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261 ICE
at 4.
Group at 8.
263 CEWG at 19; CMC at 8; Shell at 7–8; ACSA
at 6; ICE at 5; CME Group at 8; Ecom at 1; Southern
Cotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Moody Compress
at 1; IMC at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; ACA at 2;
East Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; Olam at 2;
McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Toyo
at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; NCC at 1; Walcot at 2; White
Gold at 2.
264 ACSA at 6–7; NCC at 2.
262 CME
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manage the risk associated with a single
sided unfixed purchase or sale at a
moment when the same firm does not
have an offsetting sale or purchase. The
Commission’s treatment of unfixedprice transactions is discussed in more
detail in Section II.A.1.iv.265
While the Commission understands
market participants’ desire for a
standalone exemption for unfixed-price
transactions, the Commission finds that
such an exemption is unnecessary. The
Commission notes that the modified and
expanded suite of enumerated bona fide
hedges, including enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges,
adequately facilitates the hedging needs
of qualified commercial market
participants.
Finally, the Commission believes that
the enumerated anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge provides
for ample flexibility for hedging. Similar
to the enumerated unfilled anticipated
requirements and unsold production
bona fide hedges, this bona fide hedge
may be used even when the merchant
simply anticipates purchasing or selling
the commodity, and even when the
merchant may have yet to enter into an
unfixed-price transaction, as long as the
merchant has a good faith belief that it
will enter into the anticipated
merchandising transaction.
(b) Analysis of Examples Preliminarily
Recognized as Hedges of Anticipated
Merchandising in the 2020 NPRM
As discussed earlier in this release, in
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
addressed several requests that had been
submitted in CEWG’s BFH Petition in
response to the 2011 Final Rule, to
obtain exemptive relief for several
transactions described by CEWG as bona
fide hedging positions. In the 2020
NPRM, the Commission preliminarily
determined that two CEWG BFH
Petition examples complied with the
proposed hedge of anticipated
merchandising: Example #4 (Binding,
Irrevocable Bids or Offers); and example
#5 (Timing of Hedging Physical
Transactions).266
On the other hand, as discussed in
Section II.A.1.iv., the Commission
preliminarily determined in the 2020
NPRM that the positions described in
the CEWG’s BFH Petition examples #3
(unpriced physical purchase or sale
commitments) and #7 (scenario 2) (use
of physical delivery referenced contracts
to hedge physical transactions using
calendar month average pricing) did not
265 See Section II.A.1.iv, addressing the treatment
of unfixed price transactions.
266 85 FR at 11611.
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satisfy any of the proposed enumerated
hedges.267
(1) Comments—Examples Preliminarily
Recognized as Hedges of Anticipated
Merchandising in the 2020 NPRM
The Commission received comments
supporting the Commission’s
preliminary determination in the 2020
NPRM that CEWG’s BFH Petition
example #4 (Binding, Irrevocable Bids
or Offers) 268 and example #5 (Timing of
Hedging Physical Transactions) are
permitted under the 2020 NPRM’s
proposed enumerated hedge for
anticipated merchandising.269 The
public comments related to examples #3
and #7 (scenario 2) are discussed in the
preamble at Section II.A.1.iv.,
addressing the treatment of unfixed
price transactions.
(2) Discussion of Final Rule—Examples
Preliminarily Recognized as Hedges of
Anticipated Merchandising in the 2020
NPRM
The Commission has considered the
public’s response to its preliminary
determination that several of the CEWG
BFH Petition examples fit within the
2020 NPRM. The Commission
determines in this Final Rule that BFH
Petition example #4 (Binding,
Irrevocable Bids or Offers) and example
#5 (Timing of Hedging Physical
Transactions) comply with the
enumerated hedge for anticipated
merchandising, so long as all applicable
conditions are met.
In accordance with the Commission’s
treatment of unfixed-price transactions
under this Final Rule, discussed in
Section II.A.1.iv., the Commission has
determined that BFH Petition examples
#3 and #7 (scenario 2) are also permitted
under the Final Rule, so long as the
position or transaction complies with
the applicable conditions of the
enumerated anticipatory hedge.
(c) Anticipated Merchandising Includes
Hedges of Anticipated Storage and
Assets Owned or Anticipated To Be
Owned
Several commenters requested the
Commission clarify the scope of the
proposed anticipated merchandising
bona fide hedge in light of the
Commission’s observation in footnote
105 of the 2020 NPRM.270 That footnote
stated that certain hedges of storage and
267 85
FR at 11611–11612.
at 16. FIA supported the Commission’s
preliminary determination that Examples #4
(Binding, Irrevocable Bids or Offers) and #5 (Timing
of Hedging Physical Transactions) fit within the
newly proposed anticipatory merchandising hedge.
269 CEWG at 19.
270 Cargill at 5; CMC at 5; NGFA at 7.
268 FIA
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hedges of assets owned or anticipated to
be owned would not be within the
scope of the proposed anticipated
merchandising enumerated bona fide
hedge.271 However, the plain language
of the proposed anticipatory
merchandising bona fide hedge
appeared to be broad enough to cover
such activity. Commenters were thus
unsure whether the proposed
enumerated anticipated merchandising
hedge would apply to storage
transactions and to hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned.
Most commenters from the energy
industry requested the Commission
allow for anticipated storage positions
to be considered as falling within the
enumerated hedge exemption for
anticipated merchandising, contending
that such hedges are recognized as bona
fide hedge exemptions by the
exchanges.272 Chevron and Castleton
requested that the Final Rule clarify that
hedges of storage may qualify for the
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated merchandising if applicable
conditions are met.273
In the alternative, Chevron requested
the Commission identify and clarify that
storage hedges of this nature qualify for
another enumerated exemption, notably
the enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements.274
Citadel similarly requested recognition
of offsetting positions related to
anticipated changes in the value of the
underlying commodity to be stored in
facilities on lease, and up to the full
storage capacity on lease, rather than
271 85
FR at 11612 n.105.
at 7; CHS at 4 (requesting to include a
winter storage hedge in the list of enumerated
hedges); FIA at 16, 31 (requesting to include a
storage hedge as a separate enumerated BFH); Shell
at 7–8 (stating that assets used for the transport and
storage of energy are a critical part of the energy
value chain, including fuel storage tanks and
pipeline assets as examples where time spreads or
location basis spreads are used to lock-in the values
of the assets. This commenter stated that with
respect to such infrastructure assets, the
Commission should clarify that the use of the
hedges of anticipated storage or other physical
assets is the type of risk activity that falls within
the enumerated BFH for anticipated
merchandising); Chevron at 9–11 (requesting that a
final rule clarify that hedges of storage may qualify
for the enumerated BFH for anticipated
merchandising if applicable conditions are met. In
the alternative, Chevron requests the Commission
identify and clarify that storage hedges of this
nature qualify for another enumerated exemption,
notably the enumerated BFH for unfilled
anticipated requirements); Suncor at 9–10
(requesting that a final rule clarify that hedges of
storage may qualify for the enumerated BFH for
anticipated merchandising if applicable conditions
are met); CCI at 7–9; and CEWG at 16–19
(requesting that the Commission clarify that the
enumerated BFH for anticipatory merchandising
applies to hedges of storage).
273 Chevron at 5; CCI at 8–9.
274 Chevron at 11.
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272 NGSA
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only the currently utilized level of
leased capacity.275 Citadel argued that
storage facilities owned, but not those
leased, by the merchant would be
covered by the proposed anticipated
merchandising enumerated bona fide
hedge, and that such different treatment
depending on whether the facility was
owned or leased did not make sense.276
(1) Discussion of Final Rule—
Anticipated Merchandising Includes
Hedges of Anticipated Storage and
Assets Owned or Anticipated To Be
Owned
In response to public comments, the
Commission determines that both
hedges of storage and hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned can
potentially qualify for the enumerated
hedge for anticipated merchandising if
the applicable conditions are met.
In footnote 105 of the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission observed that market
participants could use the nonenumerated process (rather than a selfeffectuating enumerated hedge) to
receive bona fide hedge recognition for
storage hedges and hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned.277
This observation was predicated on the
Commission’s recognition that different
commodities have different storage
roles, manners, and procedures. For
example, the use of some storage
facilities is not exclusive to a specific
commodity and not all storage is
necessarily tied to anticipated
merchandising activity. As such, the
Commission believed that an analysis of
facts and circumstances under the nonenumerated bona fide hedge process
would facilitate a determination on
whether to recognize hedges of storage
or assets owned or anticipated to be
owned under the proposed enumerated
anticipated merchandising hedge.
The Commission has considered
comments with respect to the
appropriate treatment of storage
transactions and hedges of assets owned
or anticipated to be owned under the
Commission’s anticipated
merchandising enumerated hedge. The
Commission agrees that commercial
market participants may utilize storage
hedges or hedges of assets owned or
anticipated to be owned as risk reducing
practices.278 The Commission believes
that such risk reducing hedges may be
recognized as anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedges, if all
the applicable conditions of the
anticipated merchandising hedge are
275 Citadel
at 9.
276 Id.
277 85
FR at 11612.
at 16.
278 CEWG
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satisfied. The Commission clarifies that
commercial market participants in the
physical marketing channel that utilize
storage hedges or hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned may
continue to qualify for the anticipated
merchandising enumerated bona fide
hedge, whether the commercial market
participant owns or leases the storage or
asset, so long as the all other applicable
requirements for the bona fide hedge are
satisfied.
g. Hedges by Agents
(1) Background—Hedges by Agents
Existing § 1.3(z)(3) includes certain
hedges by agents as an example of a
potential non-enumerated bona fide
hedge.279 Since 2011, the Commission
has included an enumerated hedge for
hedges by agents in each of its position
limits rulemakings.280
Under the existing non-enumerated
hedge process, the Commission has
recognized non-enumerated bona fide
hedges for parties acting as agents who
had the responsibility to trade cash
commodities on behalf of another party
for which such positions qualified as
bona fide hedging positions. Such
agents could obtain bona fide hedge
treatment to offset, on a long or short
basis, the risks arising from those
underlying cash positions. For example,
this hedge has been recognized in
circumstances where a party traded or
managed a farmer’s, producer’s, or a
government entity’s inventory in the
party’s capacity as agent. In such
circumstances, the agent providing
services in the physical marketing
channel, such as a commercial firm, did
not take ownership of the commodity
and was eligible as an agent for an
exemption to hedge the risks associated
with such cash positions.
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Hedges by Agents
The Commission proposed to include
hedges by agents as an enumerated
hedge. The proposed hedge would grant
an enumerated hedge to an agent who
(1) did not own or was not contracted
to sell or purchase the offsetting cash
commodity at a fixed price, (2) was
responsible for merchandising the cash
positions being offset, and (3) had a
279 17 CFR 1.3(z)(3) (‘‘Such transactions and
positions may include, but are not limited to,
purchases or sales for future delivery on any
contract market by an agent who does not own or
who has not contracted to sell or purchase the
offsetting cash commodity at a fixed price, provided
That the person is responsible for the
merchandising of the cash position which is being
offset.’’).
280 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75714; 76 FR at
71689.
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contractual agreement with the person
who (i) owned the commodity or (ii)
held cash-market positions being offset.
The proposed hedge of agents would
substantively adopt the Commission’s
existing practice under the nonenumerated process in existing
§ 1.3(z)(3).281 The Commission,
however, proposed to include hedges of
agents in the list of enumerated hedges
because it preliminarily determined this
was a common hedging practice and
that positions which satisfy the
requirements of this enumerated hedge
conformed to the general definition of
bona fide hedging without further
consideration as to the particulars of the
case.282
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Hedges by Agents
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge for hedges
by agents as proposed.
(4) Comments—Hedges by Agents
The Commission received several
comments supporting recognition of the
hedge by agents, particularly as
included in an expanded list of
enumerated hedges.283 ASR identified
hedges of agents as a type of hedge that
is of particular importance to them
because it is used daily within its
business.284 The Commission did not
receive any comments opposed to the
enumerated hedge for hedges by agents.
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(5) Discussion of Final Rule—Hedges by
Agents
The Commission recognizes that
agents provide important services in the
physical marketing channel across
different commodity markets. For
example, in the agricultural sector, this
enumerated hedge will accommodate a
common hedging practice in the cotton
industry. This hedge will be particularly
useful in connection with cotton
equities purchased by a cotton merchant
from a producer, which is commonly
done under the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s loan program to facilitate
marketing tools for cotton producers.
Another example of when the
enumerated hedge by agents adopted
herein will apply is for those agents
who are in the business of
merchandising (selling) the cash grain
owned by multiple warehouse operators
and forwarding the merchandising
281 For example, the Commission proposed to
replace the phrase ‘‘offsetting cash commodity’’
with ‘‘contract’s underlying cash commodity’’ to
use language that is consistent with the other
proposed enumerated hedges.
282 85 FR at 11610.
283 FIA at 16; IECA at 2; and ASR at 2.
284 ASR at 2.
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revenues back to the warehouse
operators less the agent’s fees. Such
agents that satisfy the requirements of
this enumerated hedge, such as not
owning any cash commodity but being
responsible for merchandising the cash
grain positions of the warehouse
operators pursuant to contractual
agreements, will be able to hedge the
price risks arising from their
merchandising activity under those
agreements as a bona fide hedge by
agents.
h. Short Hedges of Anticipated Mineral
Royalties
(1) Background—Anticipated Mineral
Royalties
The Commission’s existing bona fide
hedging definition does not include an
enumerated hedge for anticipated
mineral royalties. Since 2011, the
Commission has, however, included
such a bona fide hedge in each of its
position limits rulemakings.285 While
the Commission’s 2011 Final Rule
initially recognized the hedging of
anticipated royalties generally, each
proposal since then, including the latest
2020 NPRM, has proposed that this
exemption apply to: (i) Short positions
(ii) that arise from production (iii) in the
context of mineral extraction.
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Anticipated Mineral Royalties
The Commission proposed a new
enumerated bona fide hedge for short
hedges of anticipated mineral royalties
that are not currently enumerated in
existing § 1.3. The proposed provision
would permit an owner of rights to a
future mineral royalty to lock in the
price of anticipated mineral production
by entering into a short position in a
commodity derivative contract to offset
the anticipated change in value of the
mineral royalty rights that were owned
by that person and arose out of the
production of a mineral commodity
(e.g., oil and gas).286 The owner of the
285 81
FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75715; 76 FR at
71689. In the 2011 Final Rule, the Commission
recognized anticipatory royalty transactions as a
bona fide hedge, provided the following conditions
were met: (1) The royalty or services contract arose
out of the production, manufacturing, processing,
use, or transportation of the commodity underlying
the Referenced Contract; (2) The hedge’s value was
‘‘substantially related’’ to anticipated receipts or
payments from a royalty or services contract; and
(3) No such position was maintained in any
physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the
last five days of trading of the Core Referenced
Futures Contract in an agricultural or metal
commodity or during the spot month for other
physical-delivery contracts.
286 85 FR at 11608–11609. A short position fixes
the price of the anticipated receipts, removing
exposure to change in value of the person’s share
of the production revenue. A person who has issued
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rights to the future mineral royalty
could be a producer, or, for example,
could also be a bank that holds the
relevant royalty rights and that is
financing, for example, a drilling well
operation for a producer. The
Commission preliminarily believed that
this represents a common hedging
practice, and that positions that satisfied
the requirements of this enumerated
bona fide hedge conformed to the
general definition of bona fide hedging
without further consideration as to the
particulars of the case.287
The Commission proposed to limit
this enumerated bona fide hedge only to
mineral royalties, noting that while
royalties have been paid for use of land
in agricultural production, the
Commission did not receive any
evidence of a need for a bona fide hedge
recognition from owners of agricultural
production royalties.288 The
Commission requested comment on
whether and why such an exemption
might be needed for owners of
agricultural production or other
royalties.289
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Anticipated Mineral
Royalties
For the reasons discussed in the
NPRM, the Commission is adopting the
enumerated hedge for anticipated
mineral royalties as proposed.
(4) Comments—Anticipated Mineral
Royalties
The Commission did not receive any
comments either opposing the addition
of an enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated mineral royalties or
requesting modifications to the hedge as
proposed. Further, no commenters
requested extending the enumerated
hedge to other types of royalties other
than mineral royalties. Several
commenters expressed support for the
new enumerated hedge.290
i. Hedges of Anticipated Services
(1) Background—Anticipated Services
The Commission’s existing bona fide
hedging definition does not include an
enumerated hedge of anticipated
services. Since 2011, however, the
a royalty, in contrast, has, by definition, agreed to
make a payment in exchange for value received or
to be received (e.g., the right to extract a mineral).
Upon extraction of a mineral and sale at the
prevailing cash-market price, the issuer of a royalty
remits part of the proceeds in satisfaction of the
royalty agreement. The issuer of a royalty, therefore,
does not have price risk arising from that royalty
agreement.
287 85 FR at 11609.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 FIA at 16; IECA at 2.
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Commission has included an
enumerated bona fide hedge exemption
for hedges of anticipated services in
each of its position limits
rulemakings.291
Further, in 1977, the Commission
noted that the existence of futures
markets for both source and product
commodities, such as soybeans, soybean
oil, and soybean meal, affords business
firms increased opportunities to hedge
the value of services.292
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Anticipated Services
The Commission proposed a new
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated services, not currently
enumerated in existing § 1.3. The
proposed provision would recognize as
a bona fide hedge a long or short
derivative contract position used to
hedge the anticipated change in value of
receipts or payments due or expected to
be due under an executed contract for
services arising out of the production,
manufacturing, processing, use, or
transportation of the commodity
underlying the commodity derivative
contract.293
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Anticipated Services
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated services as proposed.
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(4) Comments—Anticipated Services
The Commission received four
comments on the proposed enumerated
anticipated services bona fide hedge.
ASR and FIA expressed support for its
inclusion as a new enumerated bona
fide hedge.294 In contrast, IATP and
Better Markets urged the Commission to
exclude this hedge from the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges.295 IATP
stated that the anticipated services bona
fide hedge is ‘‘presumably connected to
hedges of anticipated production’’ and
that, as a result, it views the enumerated
hedge as ‘‘more vulnerable to
deliverable supply estimate
disruption.’’ 296 IATP also contended
that, absent a stronger argument for
inclusion of this enumerated bona fide
hedge aside from ‘‘such exemptions are
granted by exchanges,’’ the proposed
bona fide hedge of anticipated services
merits greater Commission review
before being included as an enumerated
291 81 FR at 96810; 78 FR at 75715. See 76 FR at
71646.
292 42 FR 14832, 14833 (Mar. 16, 1977).
293 85 FR at 11609.
294 ASR at 2; FIA at 16.
295 IATP at 17; Better Markets at 58.
296 IATP at 17.
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bona fide hedge.297 Better Markets
stated that the definition was too vague,
and that absent a time limitation, the
hedge could be used as a loophole for
speculation.298
(5) Discussion of the Final Rule—
Anticipated Services
The Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated services as proposed.
In response to IATP, the Commission
believes that hedging of anticipated
services may be useful to commercial
market participants in a variety of
commonly-occurring scenarios. For
example, one scenario may be when a
contract for services involves the
production of a commodity such as a
risk service agreement to drill an oil
well between two companies where the
risk service agreement between the
parties provides that a portion of the
revenue receipts to one of the
counterparties depends on the value of
the oil produced. To reduce the risk of
lower anticipated revenues resulting
from an anticipated lower price of oil,
the company may enter into a short
position in the NYMEX Light Sweet
Crude Oil referenced contract.
Under this enumerated bona fide
hedge of services, such a short position
fixes the price at the entry price to the
commodity derivative contract. For any
decrease in price of the commodity that
is the subject of the executed contract
for services, the expected receipts from
the contract for services would decline
in value, but the short commodity
derivative contract position would
increase in value—offsetting the price
risk from the expected receipts under
contract for services.
On the other hand, this enumerated
hedge of anticipated services may also
be utilized when a contract for services
involves a contract where one of the
counterparties is responsible for the cost
of the commodity used to provide the
service. Such a scenario may occur
when a city contracts with a firm to
provide waste management services.
The contract requires that the trucks
used to transport the solid waste use
natural gas as a power source.
According to the contract, the city
would pay for the cost of the natural gas
used to transport the solid waste by the
waste disposal company. In the event
that natural gas prices rise, the city’s
waste transport expenses would rise. To
mitigate this risk, the city establishes a
long position in the NYMEX natural gas
referenced contract that is equivalent to
297 Id.
298 Better
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3277
the expected use of natural gas over the
life of the service contract.
In this case, the long position fixes the
exit price of the commodity derivative
contract. For any increase in the
commodity that is the subject of the
executed contract for services, the
payment due or expected to be due
would increase in value, but the long
commodity derivative contract would
decrease in value—offsetting the price
risk from the payments under the
contract for services. Under both of
these examples, the transactions meet
the general requirements for a bona fide
hedging transaction and the specific
provisions for hedges of anticipated
services.
Regarding comments contending that
deliverable supply estimates are more
vulnerable to disruption under this
hedge, the Commission does not believe
that bona fide hedges for anticipated
services will impact actual deliverable
supplies. This is because this bona fide
hedge allows a market participant to
hedge the anticipated change in value of
receipts or payments due or expected to
be due under an executed contract for
services, and is not an alternative means
of procuring or selling the underlying
commodity.
In addition, the Commission will
continue to have sufficient access to
position and cash-market data to verify
all exemptions granted. The reporting
and recordkeeping obligations under
§§ 150.5 and 150.9 will require
exchanges to submit justifications,
amendments, and other necessary
information to the Commission on a
monthly basis. As such, exchanges and
the Commission will have visibility into
the amount of demand there is for a
commodity in the spot month via the
delivery notices. In the rare event that
an exchange observes an imbalance, it
has the ability under its rules to require
the trader to reduce its positions.
Finally, the Commission notes that a
time limitation is unnecessary because,
among other things, when administering
exchange-set limits, under the Final
Rule, exchanges may rely on the
Commission’s guidance in Appendix B
to part 150 to protect price convergence
and ensure an orderly spot period.
Under the guidance in Appendix B
adopted herein, an exchange may adopt
rules to impose a restriction on holding
a position in a physically delivered
referenced contract during the lesser of
either the last five days of trading or the
time period for the spot month in order
to limit such positions to only those that
are economically appropriate for that
person’s specific anticipated or real
needs.
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j. Offsets of Commodity Trade Options
(1) Background—Offsets of Commodity
Trade Options
Commodity trade options are not
subject to Federal position limits under
existing regulations.299 Generally, a
commodity trade option is a physicallydelivered commodity option purchased
by commercial users of the commodities
underlying the options. In the 2016
trade options final rule, the Commission
stated that Federal position limits
should not apply to trade options.300
Further, in that trade options final rule,
the Commission indicated it would
address the applicability of position
limits to trade options in the context of
any final rulemaking on position
limits.301
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Offsets of Commodity Trade Options
The Commission proposed a new
enumerated hedge for offsets of
commodity trade options not currently
enumerated in § 1.3. Under the 2020
NPRM, a qualifying commodity trade
option under § 32.3 302 would be treated
as a cash position, on a futuresequivalent basis,303 and serve as the
basis for a bona fide hedge position.
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299 See
17 CFR 32.3(c).
300 Trade Options, 81 FR at 14966, 14971 (Mar.
21, 2016). Under the trade options final rule, trade
options are generally exempted from the rules
otherwise applicable to swaps, subject to the
conditions enumerated in § 32.3. For example, trade
options do not factor into the determination of
whether a market participant is an SD or MSP; trade
options are exempt from the rules on mandatory
clearing; and trade options are exempt from the
rules related to real-time reporting of swaps
transactions.
301 Id.
302 17 CFR 32.3. In order to qualify for the trade
option exemption, § 32.3 requires, among other
things, that: (1) The offeror is either (i) an eligible
contract participant, as defined in section 1a(18) of
the Act, or (ii) offering or entering into the
commodity trade option solely for purposes related
to its business as a ‘‘producer, processor, or
commercial user of, or a merchant handling the
commodity that is the subject of the’’ trade option;
and (2) the offeree is offered or entering into the
commodity trade option solely for purposes related
to its business as ‘‘a producer, processor, or
commercial user of, or a merchant handling the
commodity that is the subject of the commodity’’
trade option.
303 It may not be possible to compute a futuresequivalent basis for a trade option that does not
have a fixed strike price. As discussed in the
Section II.A.1.iv., under the Commission’s existing
portfolio hedging policy, market participants may
manage their price risks by utilizing more than one
enumerated bona fide hedge (including a
commodity trade option hedge and other
anticipatory bona fide hedges, if necessary based on
the market participant’s applicable facts and
circumstances). For example, a commodity trade
option with a fixed strike price may be converted
to a futures-equivalent basis, and, on that futuresequivalent basis, deemed a cash commodity sale
contract, in the case of a short call option or long
put option, or a cash commodity purchase contract,
in the case of a long call option or short put option.
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Treating qualifying commodity trade
options as cash positions, either as a
cash commodity purchase or sales
contract, would allow the Commission
to extend the existing enumerated hedge
exemptions for cash positions to the
offsets of commodity trade options. That
is, the offsets of qualifying commodity
trade options would be treated like the
enumerated hedges for cash commodity
fixed-price purchase contracts or hedges
of cash commodity fixed-price sales
contracts.304
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Offsets of Commodity
Trade Options
The Commission continues to believe
that Federal position limits should not
apply to trade options. Thus, the
Commission is adopting the enumerated
bona fide hedge for offsets of
commodity trade options as proposed,
with a few clarifying, non-substantive
technical edits in the regulatory text.
(4) Comments—Offsets of Commodity
Trade Options
The Commission did not receive any
comments opposing the addition of an
enumerated hedge for offsets of
commodity trade options. The
Commission received comments
generally supporting the bona fide
hedge for offsets of commodity trade
options, particularly as included in an
expanded list of enumerated bona fide
hedges.305 NGSA stated that defining
bona fide hedging in a way that
recognizes that trade options, adjusted
on a futures-equivalent basis, constitute
cash commodity purchase or sale
contracts that underlie bona fide hedge
positions should ‘‘facilitate hedging
rather than restrict it.’’ 306
k. Cross-Commodity Hedges
(1) Background—Cross-Commodity
Hedges
The Commission has long recognized
cross-commodity bona fide hedging
under paragraph (2)(iv) of the bona fide
hedging definition in existing § 1.3,
which has allowed cross-commodity
bona fide hedging in connection with all
of the enumerated bona fide hedges
included in the existing bona fide hedge
definition.307
The existing enumerated crosscommodity bona fide hedge recognizes
that risk from some cash commodity
price exposures can be practically and
effectively managed through commodity
304 85
FR at 11610.
at 1; CCI at 2; CEWG at 4; Chevron at
3; Suncor at 3; FIA at 16; and NGSA at 4.
306 NGSA at 4.
307 42 FR 14832, 14834 (March 16, 1977).
305 IECA
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derivative contracts on a related
commodity. As such, positions in any of
the existing enumerated bona fide
hedges may be offset by a cash position
held in a different commodity than the
commodity underlying the futures
contract.
The existing cross-commodity
enumerated hedge, however, is subject
to two conditions. First, the fluctuations
in value of the position in the futures
contract must be ‘‘substantially related’’
to the fluctuations in value of the actual
or anticipated cash position. Second,
under the cross-commodity enumerated
bona fide hedge exemption, a position
may not be held in excess of the Federal
position limit during the last five
trading days for that futures contract.
Cross-commodity hedging also allows
market participants to hedge the price
exposure arising from the products and
byproducts of a commodity where there
is no futures contract for those products
or byproducts, but there is a futures
contract for the source commodity of
those products or byproducts. Since
2011, the Commission has included an
enumerated cross-commodity bona fide
hedge in each of its position limits
rulemakings.308
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—CrossCommodity Hedges
The Commission proposed to include
cross-commodity hedges as an
enumerated bona fide hedge, and to
expand the application of this bona fide
hedge such that it could be used to
establish compliance with: (1) Each of
the proposed enumerated bona fide
hedges listed in Appendix A to part 150
except for unfilled anticipated
requirements and anticipated
merchandising, which were excluded
from the regulatory text of the crosscommodity enumerated hedge; 309 and
(2) the proposed pass-through
provisions under paragraph (2) of the
proposed bona fide hedging definition
discussed further below; provided, in
each case, that the position satisfied
each element of the relevant enumerated
bona fide hedge.310 In addition, the
308 81 FR at 96752–96753; 78 FR at 75716; 76 FR
at 71689.
309 Specifically, the 2020 NPRM allowed for
cross-commodity hedging for any of the following
proposed enumerated hedges: (i) Hedges of unsold
anticipated production, (ii) hedges of offsetting
unfixed-price cash commodity sales and purchases,
(iii) hedges of anticipated mineral royalties, (iv)
hedges of anticipated services, (v) hedges of
inventory and cash commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts, (vi) hedges of cash commodity fixed-price
sales contracts, (vii) hedges by agents, and (viii)
offsets of commodity trade options.
310 85 FR at 11609. For example, an airline that
wishes to hedge the price of jet fuel may enter into
a swap with a swap dealer. In order to remain flat,
the swap dealer may offset that swap with a futures
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Commission also proposed to eliminate
the Five-Day Rule in connection with
the proposed cross-commodity bona
fide hedge (i.e., the 2020 NPRM
eliminated the restriction from holding
a position in excess of the Federal
position limit under the enumerated
cross-commodity bona fide hedge
during the last five days of trading).
The proposed cross-commodity
enumerated bona fide hedge was
conditioned on the existence of a
‘‘substantial relationship’’ between the
commodity derivative contract and the
related cash commodity position.
Specifically, the fluctuations in value of
the position in the commodity
derivative contract, that is, of the
underlying cash commodity of that
derivative contract, were required to be
‘‘substantially related’’ 311 to the
fluctuations in value of the actual or
anticipated cash commodity position or
pass-through swap.312 This was
intended to be a qualitative analysis,
rather than quantitative.
For example, the 2020 NPRM stated
that there is a substantial relationship
between grain sorghum, which is used
as a food grain for humans or as animal
feedstock, and the corn referenced
contracts. Because there is not a futures
contract for grain sorghum grown in the
United States listed on a U.S. DCM,313
corn represents a substantially related
commodity to grain sorghum in the
United States.314 The 2020 NPRM noted
that, in contrast, there did not appear to
be a reasonable commercial relationship
between a physical commodity, say
copper, and a broad-based stock price
index, such as the S&P 500 Index,
because these commodities were not
reasonable substitutes for each other in
that they had very different pricing
position, for example, in ULSD. Subsequently, the
airline may also offset the swap exposure using
ULSD futures. In this example, under the passthrough swap language of proposed § 150.1, the
airline would be acting as a bona fide hedging swap
counterparty and the swap dealer would be acting
as a pass-through swap counterparty. In this
example, provided each element of the enumerated
hedge in paragraph (a)(5) of Appendix A, the passthrough swap provision in § 150.1, and all other
regulatory requirements are satisfied, the airline
and swap dealer could each exceed limits in ULSD
futures to offset their respective swap exposures to
jet fuel. See infra Section II.A.1.c.v. (discussion of
proposed pass-through language).
311 See 85 FR at 11726–11727.
312 85 FR at 11609.
313 This remains true at the publication of this
rulemaking.
314 85 FR at 11609. Grain sorghum was previously
listed for trading on the Kansas City Board of Trade
and Chicago Mercantile Exchange, but because of
liquidity issues, grain buyers continued to use the
more liquid corn futures contract, which suggests
that the basis risk between corn futures and cash
sorghum could be successfully managed with the
corn futures contract.
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drivers.315 That is, the price of a
physical commodity is based on supply
and demand, whereas the stock price
index is based on various individual
stock prices for different companies.316
The 2020 NPRM also preliminarily
determined that CEWG BFH Petition
example #9 (Holding a cross-commodity
hedge using a physical delivery contract
into the spot month) and example #10
(Holding a cross-commodity hedge
using a physical delivery contract to
meet unfilled anticipated requirements)
were permitted as cross-commodity
enumerated hedges.317
(3) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Cross-Commodity
Hedges
The Commission is finalizing the
cross-commodity enumerated bona fide
hedge largely as proposed, with
amendments to expand the ability to use
cross-commodity hedges.
(4) Comments—Cross-Commodity
Hedges
Commenters generally supported the
proposed cross-commodity enumerated
bona fide hedge, and a few commenters
explicitly supported the Commission’s
decision not to propose a quantitative
test requirement for the proposed
enumerated cross-commodity bona fide
hedge.318
Better Markets stated that it views
some cross-commodity hedges as
‘‘appropriate, normal, and legitimate
market practices,’’ but claimed that
there is a potential for abuse if the bona
fide hedge exemption requires less than
a ‘‘demonstrable price relationship’’
between the two commodities.319 ICE
recommended that the Commission
include a non-exclusive list of
commonly-used cross-commodity
hedges that satisfy the ‘‘substantially
related’’ requirement, which ICE
believes should include the natural gas
core referenced futures contract and its
linked referenced contracts as bona fide
hedges of electricity price exposure, and
vice versa.320
The majority of energy market
participants commented on a separate
item: That the express language of
proposed paragraph (a)(5) of Appendix
B to part 150, which sets forth the
proposed cross-commodity bona fide
hedge, inappropriately failed to cover
315 85
FR at 11609.
3279
bona fide hedges for unfilled anticipated
requirements and anticipated
merchandising.321 Chevron, Suncor,
CCI, and the CEWG requested that the
Commission revise the proposed crosscommodity enumerated bona fide hedge
to specifically clarify that enumerated
bona fide hedges for unfilled anticipated
requirements and anticipated
merchandising may be utilized as crosscommodity bona fide hedges in energy
markets.322 IECA also requested that the
cross-commodity enumerated hedge
include bona fide hedges of anticipated
requirements, which would capture
bona fide hedges of anticipated
requirements commonly used by many
electric utilities that enter into heat-rate
transactions.323
Suncor and Chevron highlighted an
internal inconsistency in the 2020
NPRM. These commenters pointed out
that while the 2020 NPRM preliminarily
determined that CEWG BFH Petition
Example #10 (Holding a crosscommodity hedge using a physical
delivery contract to meet unfilled
anticipated requirements) satisfies the
proposed cross-commodity hedge, the
proposed cross-commodity hedge
excluded unfilled anticipated
requirements.324
(5) Discussion of Final Rule—CrossCommodity Hedges
The Commission is finalizing the
cross-commodity enumerated bona fide
hedge largely as proposed, with
amendments to expand the ability to use
cross-commodity hedges. Specifically,
the Commission is amending the
express language of the crosscommodity enumerated hedge in
Appendix B to include the enumerated
hedges of unfilled anticipated
requirements and hedges of anticipated
merchandising so that the crosscommodity provision applies to all
enumerated hedges adopted herein. The
2020 NPRM excluded the enumerated
bona fide hedges for unfilled anticipated
requirements and for anticipated
merchandising from the crosscommodity provision. As a result, any
internal inconsistency related to
example #10 has been resolved.
Separately, as stated in the 2020
NPRM, the Commission reaffirms that
the requirement that the value
fluctuations of the commodity
derivatives contract used to hedge and
the value fluctuations of the commodity
316 Id.
317 85
FR at 11611.
at 2; NGSA at 3–4; NOPA at 2; and ICE
at 7. Prior position limits proposals included a
quantitative test, whereas the 2020 NPRM included
a qualitative ‘‘substantially related’’ requirement.
319 Better Markets at 58.
320 ICE at 7.
318 ADM
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321 Chevron at 8–9; Suncor at 6–8; NOPA 2; CCI
at 5–9; CEWG at 10–14; NGSA at 4; ICE at 2, 4; Shell
at 7–8; ADM at 2; and IECA at 8.
322 Chevron at 8; Suncor at 8; NOPA at 2; CCI at
5–7; CEWG at 10–14; NGSA at 4; and IECA at 8.
323 IECA at 7–8.
324 Chevron at 7; Suncor at 7.
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cash position being hedged must be
‘‘substantially related’’ is an important
factor in determining whether a crosscommodity hedge satisfies the
requirements to be a bona fide hedge.
Accordingly, the Commission believes
that the ‘‘substantially related’’
requirement sufficiently ties derivative
and cash positions between two
different, but comparable, commodities
that have a reasonable commercial
relationship as a result of their ability to
serve as reasonable substitutes for each
other, due to, for example, similar
pricing drivers.
The Commission agrees with
commenters who stated that market
participants use cross-commodity
hedging to manage their price risk,
particularly when a cash commodity is
not necessarily deliverable under the
terms of any derivative contract or the
cash-market transactions are not in the
same commodity underlying the futures
contract. For example, an airline that
uses a predictable volume of jet fuel
every month may cross hedge its
anticipated jet fuel requirements with
the ultralow sulfur diesel (‘‘ULSD’’)
heating oil commodity derivative
contract because there are no
physically-settled jet fuel commodity
derivative contracts available. The value
fluctuations in jet fuel are substantially
related to the value fluctuations in the
ULSD ‘‘HO’’ futures contract.
The Commission believes that a
determination of whether commodities
are ‘‘substantially related’’ for purposes
of the cross-commodity bona fide hedge
depends on a facts and circumstances
analysis and that the relationship
between the two is not static, as it may
change over time depending on market
factors. Accordingly, the Commission’s
position is not to publish a list of crosscommodity hedges satisfying the
‘‘substantially related’’ requirement at
this time.
vii. Location and Regulatory Treatment
of the Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
a. Background—Location and
Regulatory Treatment of the Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
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As noted above, the existing
enumerated bona fide hedges are
explicitly incorporated in the regulatory
bona fide hedging definition in § 1.3 of
the Commission’s regulations.
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Location and Regulatory Treatment of
the Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed to move the expanded list of
the enumerated bona fide hedges from
the bona fide hedging definition in
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regulation § 1.3 to the proposed
acceptable practices in Appendix A to
part 150. The Commission stated that
the list of enumerated bona fide hedges
should appear as acceptable practices in
an appendix, rather than as regulations
in the regulatory bona fide hedging
definition, because each enumerated
bona fide hedge represents just one way,
but not the only way, to satisfy the
proposed bona fide hedging definition
and § 150.3(a)(1).325 The Commission
requested comment on whether the list
of enumerated hedges should be
included in the regulatory text or in an
appendix as acceptable practices.326
c. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Location and
Regulatory Treatment of the Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission has determined to
incorporate the enumerated bona fide
hedges as part of the regulatory text.
While the Final Rule will maintain the
enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A to part 150, Appendix A
will be incorporated into final § 150.3,
and therefore under the Final Rule the
enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A will be deemed to be part
of the regulatory text rather than treated
as acceptable practices.
d. Comments—Location and Regulatory
Treatment of the Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
FIA and MGEX supported moving the
list of enumerated bona fide hedges to
the rule text.327 FIA stated that
‘‘including the list in the regulatory text
would provide market participants
greater regulatory certainty by making it
clear that it could not be amended
absent notice and comment
rulemaking.’’ 328
On the other hand, CMC and the Joint
Associations (i.e., EEI and EPSA)
preferred keeping the enumerated
hedges in Appendix A to part 150. CMC
stated its understanding that an
amendment to either Appendix A or the
rule text would require the same formal
rulemaking procedures.329 The Joint
Associations based their support of
Appendix A because it allows for ‘‘for
flexibility’’ in their view.330
325 As discussed below, proposed § 150.3(a)(1)
would allow a person to exceed position limits for
bona fide hedging transactions or positions, as
defined in proposed § 150.1.
326 85 FR at 11622.
327 MGEX at 2; FIA at 15–16.
328 FIA at 16.
329 CMC at 6.
330 EEI/EPSA at 5.
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e. Discussion of Final Rule—Location
and Regulatory Treatment of the
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Under the Final Rule, the enumerated
bona fide hedges are incorporated as
part of the regulatory text. While the
Final Rule will maintain the
enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A to part 150, Appendix A
will be incorporated in final § 150.3 as
positions that are deemed to be bona
fide hedges that are self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits. In
other words, while the Final Rule will
maintain the enumerated bona fide
hedges in Appendix A, Appendix A will
be deemed to be part of the regulatory
text rather than treated as acceptable
practices as the Commission proposed
in the 2020 NPRM.
The Commission agrees that including
the enumerated bona fide hedges as part
of the regulations, rather than as
acceptable practices, provides market
participants with greater regulatory
certainty. To reflect that Appendix A to
part 150 is part of the regulatory text,
the Commission is amending the
introductory language to the Appendix
to remove any references to acceptable
practices.
In addition, while not a substantive
change, the Commission has also reordered the list of enumerated hedges.
The Final Rule reorders Appendix A so
that the bona fide hedges are listed by
hedges of purchases, sales, anticipated
activities, or other new types of hedges.
Finally, the cross-commodity hedge,
which applies to all the enumerated
hedges in the appendix, is listed last.
viii. Elimination of Federal Restriction
Prohibiting Holding a Bona Fide Hedge
Exemption During Last Five Trading
Days, the ‘‘Five-Day Rule;’’ Proposed
Guidance in Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
a. Background—Elimination of the
‘‘Five-Day Rule;’’ Proposed Guidance in
Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
Some of the existing enumerated bona
fide hedge exemptions in § 1.3 include
a restriction on the market participant
holding a commodity derivative
contract position in excess of Federal
position limits during the last five days
of trading (generally referred to as the
‘‘Five-Day Rule’’). The restriction limits
the applicability of exemptions during
the last five days of trading because for
many agricultural commodity derivative
contracts, those last five days of trading
coincide with the physical-delivery
process. The practical effect of the FiveDay Rule is a winnowing of the universe
of market participants who maintain
large positions throughout the last five
days of trading to only those market
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participants who actually intend to
make or take delivery at the end of the
spot period. Narrowing the universe of
market participants in this way helps
ensure an orderly trading environment
and maintains the integrity of the
physical-delivery process for those
market participants who rely on price
convergence between the cash and
futures markets during the last days of
trading.
When the Commission adopted the
Five-Day Rule, it believed that, as a
general matter, there was little
commercial need to maintain a large
position that exceeds position limits
during or through the last five days of
trading.331
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Elimination of the ‘‘Five-Day Rule;’’
Proposed Guidance in Appendix B,
Paragraph (b)
The Commission proposed to
eliminate the restriction on holding a
bona fide hedge exemption during the
last five days of trading from all the
enumerated hedges to which such fiveday rule restriction applies under
existing § 1.3.332 Instead, under
proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), exchanges
could apply a restriction against holding
positions under a bona fide hedge in
excess of limits during the lesser of the
last five days of trading or the time
period for the spot month in such
physical-delivery contract, or otherwise
limit the size of such position. The
exchanges would thus have the ability
and discretion, but not an obligation, to
apply a five-day rule or similar
restriction to exemptions on any
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, regardless of whether such
contracts have been subject to Federal
position limits before.
The 2020 NPRM also included
guidance for exchanges on factors to
consider when applying a restriction
against holding physically delivered
futures contracts into the spot month.
The proposed guidance set forth in
Appendix B, paragraph (b) provided
that a position held during the spot
period may still qualify as a bona fide
hedging position, provided that: (1) The
position complies with the bona fide
hedging transaction or position
definition; and (2) there is an
economically appropriate need to
maintain such position in excess of
331 Definition of Bona Fide Hedging and Related
Reporting Requirements, 42 FR 42748, 42750 (Aug.
24, 1977).
332 The existing enumerated hedges limited by the
Five-Day rule are as follows: Unsold anticipated
production, unfilled anticipated requirements,
offsetting sales and purchases, and crosscommodity hedges.
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Federal speculative position limits
during the spot period, and that need
relates to the purchase or sale of a cash
commodity.333
In addition, the guidance provided
several factors the exchange should
weigh when evaluating whether a
person wishing to exceed Federal
position limits should be able to do so
during the spot period. For example,
whether the person: (1) Intends to make
or take delivery during that period; (2)
provided materials to the exchange
supporting the waiver of the Five-Day
Rule; (3) demonstrated supporting cashmarket exposure in-hand that is verified
by the exchange; (4) demonstrated that,
for short positions, the delivery is
feasible, meaning that the person has
the ability to deliver against the short
position; 334 and (5) demonstrated that,
for long positions, the delivery is
feasible, meaning that the person has
the ability to take delivery at levels that
are economically appropriate.335
c. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Elimination of the
‘‘Five-Day Rule;’’ Proposed Guidance in
Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
The Commission is finalizing the
proposal to eliminate the restriction on
holding a bona fide hedge exemption
during the last five days of trading from
all the enumerated hedges to which
such Five-Day Rule restriction applies
under existing § 1.3. Additionally, the
Commission has carefully considered
the various comments regarding the
proposed guidance in Appendix B,
paragraph (b) and has determined to
finalize the guidance, subject to several
amendments and clarifications.
The Commission discusses and
addresses comments on the proposed
elimination of the Five-Day Rule
immediately below, followed by a
discussion of comments on the
proposed guidance further below.
333 For example, an economically appropriate
need for soybeans would mean obtaining soybeans
from a reasonable source (considering the
marketplace) that is the least expensive, at or near
the location required for the purchaser, and that
such sourcing does not cause market disruptions or
prices to spike.
334 That is, the person has inventory on-hand in
a deliverable location and in a condition in which
the commodity can be used upon delivery and that
it represents the best sale for that inventory.
335 That is, the delivery comports with the
person’s demonstrated need for the commodity, and
the contract is the cheapest source for that
commodity.
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3281
d. Comments—Elimination of the ‘‘FiveDay Rule;’’ Proposed Guidance in
Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
(1) Elimination of the ‘‘Five-Day Rule’’
Several public interest commenters
opposed the elimination of the Five-Day
Rule.336 IATP viewed allowing the
exchanges to impose a five-day rule or
similar restriction as relegating the
Commission’s function to merely
monitoring ‘‘DCM decisions and their
consequences for market participants
and the public after the fact.’’ 337
Conversely, commercial market
participants and exchanges generally
supported the proposal to eliminate the
Five-Day Rule and instead afford the
exchanges the discretion whether to
impose restrictions on holding
physically-delivered contracts.338
(i) Discussion of the Final Rule—
Elimination of the ‘‘Five-Day Rule’’
The Commission is finalizing the
proposal to eliminate the restriction on
holding a bona fide hedge exemption
during the last five days of trading from
all the enumerated hedges to which
such Five-Day Rule restriction applies
under existing § 1.3.
In place of the ‘‘Five-Day Rule,’’ the
Commission is finalizing proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), which provides that
an exchange may grant exemptions,
subject to terms, conditions, or
restrictions against holding large
positions in physically delivered futures
contracts, as a bona fide hedge in excess
of limits during the lesser of the last five
days of trading or the time period for the
spot month in such physical-delivery
contract, or otherwise limit the size of
such position under that exemption.
For the legacy agricultural contracts,
the Five-Day Rule has been an
important way to help ensure that
futures and cash-market prices
converge. Price convergence helps
protect the integrity of the price
discovery function and facilitates an
orderly delivery process, which
overlaps with the last days of trading.
As stated in the 2020 NPRM, however,
a strict five-day rule may be
inappropriate and unnecessary, as the
Commission expands its Federal
position limits beyond the nine legacy
agricultural contracts.339
336 IATP at 17–18; Better Markets at 61
(contending that if the CFTC does eliminate the
Five-Day rule, it should at least formalize the
proposed guidance in the rule text).
337 IATP at 18.
338 ADM at 3; Cargill at 8; CCI at 2, 9; CEWG at
4, 24; Chevron at 3, 9; CMC at 5; CME Group at 9;
ICE at 2, 8; IFUS at 2; FIA at 3; NGFA at 9; NGSA
at 2; Shell at 3; Suncor at 3, 12.
339 85 FR at 11612.
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In particular, while the Commission
continues to believe that the
justifications described above for the
existing Five-Day Rule remain valid for
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, the exchanges—subject to
Commission oversight—are better
positioned to decide whether to apply a
restriction, such as the Five-Day Rule, in
connection with exemptions to their
own exchange-set limits, or whether to
apply other tools that may be equally
effective. This Final Rule affords
exchanges with the discretion to apply,
and when appropriate, grant exemptions
subject to terms, conditions or
limitations like the Five-Day Rule (or
similar restrictions) for purposes of their
own exchange-set limits. Allowing for
such discretion when granting
exemptions will afford exchanges
flexibility to quickly impose, modify, or
waive any such limitation as
circumstances dictate. While a strict
Five-Day Rule may be inappropriate in
certain circumstances, including when
applied to energy contracts that
typically have a shorter spot period than
agricultural contracts,340 the flexible
approach adopted herein may allow for
the development and implementation of
additional solutions other than a FiveDay Rule that protect convergence,
while minimizing the impact on market
participants.
This approach allows exchanges to
design and tailor a variety of limitations
to protect convergence during the spot
period. For example, in certain
circumstances, a smaller quantity
restriction, rather than a complete
restriction on holding positions in
excess of limits during the spot period,
may be effective at protecting
convergence. Similarly, exchanges
currently utilize other tools to achieve
similar policy goals, such as by
requiring market participants to ‘‘step
down’’ the levels of their exemptions as
they approach the spot period, or by
establishing exchange-set speculative
position limits that include a similar
step-down feature. Since § 150.5(a) as
adopted herein would require that any
exchange-set limits for contracts subject
to Federal position limits must be less
than or equal to the Federal limit, any
exchange application of the Five-Day
Rule, or a similar restriction, would
have the same effect as if administered
by the Commission for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits, but
could be administered by the exchange
in a more tailored and efficient manner.
340 Energy
contracts typically have a three-day
spot period, whereas the spot period for agricultural
contracts is typically two weeks.
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In response to commenters who stated
this approach would relegate the
Commission’s functions to merely
monitoring the DCMs’ decisions after
the fact, the Commission points out that
regardless of whether there is a Federal
Five-Day Rule, the Commission will
continue to exercise oversight over
exchanges before, during, and after
exchange action relating to position
limits. For example, all exchange rules,
including those establishing/modifying
exchange-set position limits,
accountability levels, step downs, and
five-day rules and similar restrictions,
must be submitted to the Commission in
advance pursuant to part 40 of the
Commission’s regulations.
Additionally, any exemption granted
by an exchange from its own position
limits must meet standards established
by the Commission in § 150.5(a)(ii)(C) of
this Final Rule, including considering
whether the requested exemption would
result in positions that would not be in
accord with sound commercial practices
and/or would exceed an amount that
may be established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion. Further, any waiver of
an exchange five-day rule or similar
restriction should consider the
Appendix B guidance adopted herein.
Additionally, the Commission will
continue to leverage its own market
surveillance and oversight functions to
ensure that exchanges continue to
comply with their legal obligations,
including with respect to Core
Principles 2, 3, 4, and 5, among
others.341 Finally, under § 150.3(b)(6)
finalized herein, the Commission
continues to have the authority to
revoke any bona fide hedge exemption.
(2) Proposed Guidance in Appendix B,
Paragraph (b)
There were several comments on the
proposed guidance in Appendix B,
paragraph (b) regarding the
circumstances when an exchange may
grant waivers from any exchange-set
five-day rule or similar restriction. A
few commenters requested that the
Commission eliminate the proposed
guidance altogether.342 IFUS stated that
the proposed guidance is unnecessary
and should be removed, contending that
the guidance ‘‘reflects many of the
considerations currently taken by
[e]xchange staff when reviewing
exemptions and spot month
positions.’’ 343 CME Group expressed a
similar view, stating that in lieu of the
proposed guidance, ‘‘the Commission
341 7 U.S.C. 7B–3(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7B–3(f)(2); 7
U.S.C. 7B–3(f)(3); 7 U.S.C. 7B–3(f)(5).
342 CMC at 5; CME Group at 9; IFUS at 10.
343 IFUS at 3.
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should allow exchanges to continue to
rely on their established market
surveillance expertise and regular
interactions to make decisions around
exemptions.’’ 344
Most commercial market participants
and Better Markets,345 however, did not
request to eliminate the proposed
guidance in Appendix B, paragraph (b),
but instead requested certain changes or
clarifications. These commenters
focused on whether the guidance: (i)
Only applies to physically-settled
contracts expressly designated by an
exchange as subject to a five-day rule or
similar restriction; 346 and (ii) is too
prescriptive by imposing new
documentation requirements on
exchanges.347 CME Group requested
clarification on whether the proposed
guidance applies to all exemptions or
only those exemptions previously
subject to a five-day rule.348 Several
energy market participants requested
the Commission expressly clarify that
the restrictions or guidance do not apply
to markets for energy commodity
derivatives.349 Alternatively, these
energy market participants stated that if
the Commission declined to include in
a final rule an express prohibition on
the application of the Five-Day Rule to
energy commodity derivative contracts,
the Commission should clarify that an
exchange is not bound to apply the
waiver guidance to any physicallysettled referenced contract that has not
been expressly designated as subject to
the Five-Day Rule.350
(i) Discussion of Final Rule—Appendix
B, Paragraph (b)
The Commission has carefully
considered the various comments
regarding the guidance in Appendix B,
paragraph (b) and has determined to
finalize the guidance, subject to several
amendments and clarifications,
discussed below.
The Commission is not persuaded by
requests to eliminate the guidance based
on arguments that exchanges have
current market surveillance practices or
procedures to review the
appropriateness of an exemption during
the relevant referenced contract’s spot
period. The Commission continues to
believe that the justifications described
above for the existing Five-Day Rule
344 CME
Group at 9.
Markets supported the proposed
guidance. Better Markets at 46–48.
346 Chevron at 13–14; Suncor at 13–14; CCI at 9–
10; CEWG at 25–26.
347 CME Group at 9.
348 Id.
349 Chevron at 13.
350 Chevron at 13; Suncor at 14; CCI at 9–10;
CEWG at 25–26.
345 Better
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remain valid. The Commission has
determined, however, that with an
expanded list of contracts subject to
Federal position limits, it is best to
provide the exchanges additional
discretion when granting exemptions to
protect their markets using tools other
than a Five-Day Rule, and to
supplement that discretion with
guidance highlighting the importance of
the spot month to ensure price
convergence and an orderly delivery
process.
For certain referenced contract
markets, rather than imposing a
complete restriction on holding
positions in excess of limits during the
spot period, an exchange may, when
appropriate, grant an exemption which
allows exceeding the position limit by a
small increment. Such approach would
be an effective way of protecting
convergence while still maintaining
orderly trading. Similarly, exchanges
currently utilize other tools in
administering their position limits. For
example, CME and CBOT establish
certain exchange-set speculative
position limits that include a ‘‘step
down’’ feature so that the permitted
position limit level is lower each day as
the contract nears its last trading days.
Further, when granting position limit
exemptions, exchanges may grant such
exemptions subject to a ‘‘step down’’
level restriction as well. The
Commission expects that exchanges
would closely scrutinize any participant
who requests recognition during the last
five days of the spot period or in the
time period for the spot month.
The Commission clarifies that any
exchange, for the purposes of exchangeset position limits, that elects to grant an
exemption subject to terms, conditions,
or limitations, that restrict the size of a
position during the time period for the
spot month of a physically-settled
contract under § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H) may
do so on any referenced contract subject
to Federal position limits under the
Final Rule, not just the nine legacy
agricultural contracts. As such, the
Commission clarifies for the avoidance
of doubt that exemptions in energy
contracts may be subject to an
exchange’s restriction aimed to monitor
the spot period for that energy contract.
Since price convergence and an
orderly trading environment serve as a
deterrent or mitigate certain types of
market manipulation schemes such as
corners and squeezes, the guidance is
intended to include a non-exclusive list
of considerations the Commission
expects the exchanges to consider when
determining whether to allow a position
in excess of limits throughout the spot
month.
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Regarding various comments
contending that the proposed guidance
was too prescriptive, the Commission
reiterates the appendix is not intended
to be used as a mandatory checklist.
Further, the Commission is finalizing
various amendments to Appendix B,
paragraph b, to respond to commenters’
requests.
First, the Commission is amending
the introductory paragraph of the
guidance to clarify that under
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H) as finalized herein,
exchanges may impose restrictions on
bona fide hedge exemptions in the spot
month. This discretion does not require
any express designation by the
exchange.
Second, the Commission is modifying
the proposed guidance to clarify that the
guidance may be used when considering
either an enumerated or nonenumerated bona fide hedge exemption.
Third, the Commission clarifies here
that the guidance imposes no additional
reporting requirements on market
participants as the factors described in
the guidance apply simply to the
exchanges’ evaluation of the specific
contract market when considering
whether an exemption shall be granted
subject to any condition or limitation in
the spot month. Fourth, the Commission
is eliminating the proposed factor which
would have required a market
participant to provide materials to the
exchange supporting a classification of
the position as a bona fide hedge. The
Commission notes that the exchange
application requirements already
require market participants to provide
relevant cash-market information. In
addition, the Commission is amending
language throughout the guidance to
clarify that exchanges have flexibility
when considering applying the
guidance. For example, the Commission
is removing proposed language that
would have required the exchange to
verify the market participant’s cashmarket exposure. The Commission is
comfortable removing this language
because the cash-market information is
already required as part of the
exemption application process
described elsewhere in this release.351
Finally, the Commission is making
technical edits to clarify that any
delivery under a physical delivery
contract is economically appropriate
and the ‘‘most economical’’ source for
that commodity.
351 See
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3283
ix. Guidance on Measuring Risk
a. Background—Measuring Risk
In prior proposals, the Commission
discussed the issue of whether to
recognize as bona fide both ‘‘gross
hedging’’ and ‘‘net hedging.’’ 352 While
the Commission has previously
expressed a willingness to consider
gross hedging in certain limited
circumstances, such proposals reflected
the Commission’s longstanding
preference for net hedging.353 That
preference, although not stated
explicitly in prior releases, has been
underpinned by a concern that
unfettered recognition of gross hedging
could potentially allow for the cherry
picking of positions in a manner that
subverts the position limits rules.354
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Measuring Risk
The Commission recognized in the
2020 NPRM that additional flexibility to
hedge on a gross basis may be warranted
given that there are myriad ways in
which organizations, particularly those
not currently subject to Federal position
limits, are structured and engage in
commercial hedging practices.355 For
example, in the energy space, it is
common for market participants to use
multi-line business strategies where
risks are managed by trading desk or
business line rather than on a global
basis. Accordingly, in an effort to clarify
its view on this issue, the Commission
proposed guidance on gross hedging
positions in paragraph (a) to Appendix
B.
The proposed guidance provided
flexibility for a person to measure risk
either on a net or gross basis, provided
that: (A) The manner in which the
person measures risk is consistent over
time and follows the person’s regular,
historical practice (meaning the person
352 81
FR at 96747–96747.
81 FR at 96747 (stating that gross hedging
was economically appropriate in circumstances
where ‘‘net cash positions do not necessarily
measure total risk exposure due to differences in
the timing of cash commitments, the location of
stocks, and differences in grades or the types of
cash commodity.’’) See also Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions, 42 FR at 14832, 14834
(Mar. 16, 1977) and Definition of Bona Fide
Hedging and Related Reporting Requirements, 42
FR 42748, 42750 (Aug. 24, 1977).
354 For example, using gross hedging, a market
participant could potentially point to a large long
cash position as justification for a bona fide hedge,
even though the participant, or an entity with
which the participant is required to aggregate, has
an equally large short cash position. The presence
of such offsetting cash positions would result in the
participant having no net price risk to hedge.
Instead, the participant created price risk exposure
to the commodity by establishing the derivative
position.
355 See 85 FR at 11613.
353 See
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is not switching between net hedging
and gross hedging on a selective basis
simply to justify an increase in the size
of the person’s derivatives positions);
(B) the person is not measuring risk on
a gross basis to evade the limits set forth
in proposed § 150.2 and/or the
aggregation rules currently set forth in
§ 150.4; (C) the person is able to
demonstrate (A) and (B) above to the
Commission and/or an exchange upon
request; and (D) an exchange that
recognizes a particular gross hedging
position as a bona fide hedge pursuant
to proposed § 150.9 documents the
justifications for doing so and maintains
records of such justifications in
accordance with proposed § 150.9(d).
c. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Measuring Risk
The Commission is adopting the
proposed guidance with modifications
and clarifications to address commenter
concerns.
d. Comments—Measuring Risk
While Better Markets expressed
concern that gross hedging could be
used to conduct an ‘‘end-run’’ around
position limits,356 many other
commenters expressed support for
flexibility to hedge on a net or gross
basis.357 Multiple commenters who
expressed support for such flexibility
also requested discrete changes to the
proposed guidance and/or associated
preamble, including: (i) Elimination of
the requirement that exchanges
document their justifications when
allowing gross hedging; 358 (ii)
clarification that gross hedging is
permissible for both enumerated and
non-enumerated hedges; 359 and (iii)
clarification that market participants do
not need to develop procedures setting
forth when gross vs. net hedging is
appropriate.360 Finally, IFUS requested
that the Commission eliminate the
proposed guidance on the grounds that
the guidance reflects considerations
currently taken by exchange staff when
reviewing exemptions.361
e. Discussion of Final Rule—Measuring
Risk
The Commission continues to believe
that the guidance on gross hedging is
important because it will allow market
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356 Better
Markets at 60.
at 2; LDC at 2; NGSA at 3; COPE at 3;
Chevron at 4; Suncor at 4.
358 MGEX at 3; FIA at 14; CEWG at 4.
359 Chevron at 4–5; Suncor at 4–5; CCI at 4–5;
CEWG at 7–10.
360 FIA at 14–15 (stating that risk managers decide
on a case-by-case basis whether to hedge on a net
or gross basis).
361 IFUS at 3.
357 ASR
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participants to measure risk in the
manner most suited to their particular
circumstances, while preventing the use
of gross hedging to subvert the Federal
position limits regime.362
First, the Commission is eliminating
proposed prong (D) of the guidance,
which provided that an exchange that
recognizes a gross position as a nonenumerated bona fide hedge pursuant to
§ 150.9 documents the justifications for
doing so. Prong (D) is unnecessary given
that the Commission and exchanges
have other tools for accessing such
information. In particular, prong (C) of
the guidance allows the Commission
and exchanges to request, on an asneeded basis, information about the
manner in which market participants
are measuring risk.363 To ensure the
Commission and exchanges have access
to sufficient information in light of the
removal of prong (D), the Commission is
expanding prong (C) to require that a
person also demonstrate, upon request
by the Commission or an exchange,
justifications for measuring risk on a
gross basis. Additionally, the proposed
prong (D) reference to the nonenumerated process in § 150.9 may have
created confusion regarding the
applicability of the proposed gross
hedging guidance to enumerated
hedges. Thus, the Commission is also
revising the introductory language of the
guidance to clarify that the guidance
applies equally to enumerated and nonenumerated bona fide hedges.
362 The guidance will help ensure the integrity of
the position limits regime for the reasons discussed
below in response to comments from Better
Markets. The Commission thus disagrees with IFUS
that the guidance is unnecessary, but agrees with
IFUS that the proposed guidance reflects
considerations currently taken by exchange staff. In
particular, the guidance is consistent in many ways
with the manner in which exchanges require their
participants to measure and report risk, which is
consistent with the Commission’s requirements
with respect to the reporting of risk. For example,
under § 17.00(d), futures commission merchants
(‘‘FCMs’’), clearing members, and foreign brokers
are required to report certain reportable net
positions, while under § 17.00(e), such entities may
report gross positions in certain circumstances,
including if the positions are reported to an
exchange or the clearinghouse on a gross basis. 17
CFR 17.00. The Commission’s understanding is that
certain exchanges generally prefer, but do not
require, their participants to report positions on a
net basis. For those participants that elect to report
positions on a gross basis, such exchanges require
such participants to continue reporting that way,
particularly through the spot period. Such
consistency is a strong indicator that the participant
is not measuring risk on a gross basis simply to
evade regulatory requirements.
363 Additionally, market participants seeking
exemptions remain subject to a variety of
recordkeeping requirements, including Commission
regulation § 1.31, and the Commission will receive
information about all exchange-granted exemptions,
including cash-market information, via the monthly
spreadsheet submission required by § 150.5(a)(4).
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Second, the Commission is clarifying
that the guidance does not require
market participants to develop written
policies or procedures setting forth
when gross or net hedging is
appropriate. However, having such
policies or procedures may help market
participants demonstrate compliance
with prongs (A), (B), and (C) of the
guidance as finalized herein.
Finally, the Commission believes the
concerns regarding subversion of
position limits raised by Better Markets
are already addressed by a combination
of the guardrails in prongs (A)–(C) of the
guidance as well as other Commission
provisions, including some finalized
herein. First, to receive recognition as a
bona fide hedge, a position must comply
with the bona fide hedging definition,
regardless of whether the underlying
risk is measured on a net or gross basis.
A market participant thus may not use
gross hedging to receive bona fide hedge
treatment for a speculative position,364
and measuring risk on a gross basis to
willfully circumvent or evade
speculative position limits would
potentially run afoul of the § 150.2(i)(2)
anti-evasion provision finalized herein.
Similarly, market participants must
comply with the Commission’s
aggregation requirements regardless of
whether the participants are measuring
risk on a net or gross basis.365
Second, concerns about cherrypicking are addressed by the guidance.
By focusing on consistency and
historical practice with respect to the
manner in which a person measures
risk, the guidance enables market
participants to measure risk on a gross
basis when dictated by the nature of the
exposure,366 but not simply when
364 The introductory language to the guidance
provides in relevant part that a person’s ‘‘gross
hedging positions may be deemed in compliance
. . . provided that all applicable regulatory
requirements are met, including that the position is
economically appropriate to the reduction of risks
in the conduct and management of a commercial
enterprise and otherwise satisfies the bona fide
hedging definition . . .’’
365 Under § 150.4, unless an exemption applies, a
person’s positions must be aggregated with
positions for which the person controls trading or
for which the person holds a 10% or greater
ownership interest. Commission Regulation
§ 150.4(b) sets forth several permissible exemptions
from aggregation. See Final Rule, Aggregation of
Positions, 81 FR 91454, (December 16, 2016).
366 The Commission continues to believe that a
gross hedge may be a bona fide hedge in
circumstances where net cash positions do not
necessarily measure total risk exposure due to
differences in the timing of cash commitments, the
location of stocks, and differences in grades or types
of the cash commodity. See, e.g., Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR at 14834.
However, the Commission clarifies that these may
not be the only circumstances in which gross
hedging may be recognized as bona fide. Like the
analysis of whether a particular position satisfies
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utilizing gross hedging will yield a
larger exposure than net hedging or will
otherwise subvert Federal position limit
or aggregation requirements. Use of
gross or net hedging that is inconsistent
with an entity’s historical practice, or a
change from gross to net hedging (or
vice versa), could be an indication that
an entity is seeking to evade position
limits regulations.367
Third, all market participants seeking
to exceed Federal position limits must
request hedge exemptions at the
exchange level, regardless of whether
they are measuring risk on a gross or net
basis, and regardless of whether they are
seeking an enumerated or nonenumerated exemption at the Federal
level. Under the Final Rule, the
exchanges would have an opportunity
to confirm whether such participants’
use of gross hedging is consistent with
the proposed guidance, including by
reviewing detailed position information.
The Commission will also have access
to such information through a variety of
means, including: Records maintained
by market participants pursuant to
Commission regulation § 1.31; the
monthly spreadsheets that exchanges
must submit to the Commission under
§ 150.5(a)(4) summarizing exchangegranted exemptions and related cashmarket information; and the ability for
the Commission to request such
information directly from a market
participant pursuant to prong (C) of the
gross hedging guidance.
x. Pass-Through Swap and PassThrough Swap Offset Provisions
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a. Background—Pass-Through Swap and
Pass-Through Swap Offset
As the Commission has noted above,
CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B) 368 contemplates
bona fide hedges that by themselves do
not meet the criteria of CEA section
4a(c)(2)(A), but that are used to offset
the swap exposure of a market
participant (e.g., a dealer) to the extent
that the swap exposure does satisfy CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(A) for such market
participant’s counterparty (e.g., a
commercial end user).369 The
the proposed bona fide hedge definition, the
analysis of whether gross hedging may be utilized
would involve a case-by-case determination made
by the Commission and/or by an exchange using its
expertise and knowledge of its participants.
367 If an entity’s (including a vertically-integrated
entity’s) practice is to switch between net and gross
hedging based on particular circumstances, and
those circumstances do not involve evading
position limits or aggregation requirements, then
such switching would not run afoul of prong (A).
See Section II.B.9. (discussing anti-evasion).
368 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B).
369 CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B)(i) recognizes as a bona
fide hedging position a position that reduces risks
attendant to a position resulting from a swap that
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Commission believes that, in affording
bona fide hedging recognition for such
offsets, Congress in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(B) intended to: (1) Encourage
the provision of liquidity to commercial
entities that are hedging physical
commodity price risk in a manner
consistent with the bona fide hedging
definition; and (2) only recognize risk
management positions as bona fide
hedges when such positions are
opposite a bona fide hedging swap
counterparty.370 The Commission has
proposed a pass-through swap provision
in each of its position limits
rulemakings since 2011.
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—PassThrough Swap and Pass-Through Swap
Offset
The Commission proposed to
implement the statutory pass-through
swap provision in paragraph (2) of the
bona fide hedging definition for
physical commodities in proposed
§ 150.1. Proposed paragraph (2)(i) of the
2020 NPRM’s bona fide hedging
definition addressed a situation where:
(a) A particular swap qualifies as a bona
fide hedge by satisfying the temporary
substitute test, the economically
appropriate test, and the change in
value requirement under proposed
paragraph (1) of the bona fide hedging
definition for one of the counterparties
(the ‘‘bona fide hedging swap
counterparty’’), but not for the other
counterparty; and (b) the bona fide
hedge treatment ‘‘passes through’’ from
the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty to the other counterparty
(the ‘‘pass-through swap counterparty’’).
The pass-through swap counterparty
could be an entity that provides
liquidity to the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty (such as a swap dealer or
a non-dealer that offers swaps).
Under the 2020 NPRM, the passthrough of the bona fide hedge
treatment from the bona fide hedging
swap counterparty to the pass-through
swap counterparty was contingent on:
(1) The pass-through swap
counterparty’s ability to demonstrate
upon request from the Commission and/
or from an exchange that the passwas executed opposite a counterparty for which the
transaction would qualify as a bona fide hedging
transaction pursuant to’’ 4a(c)(2)(A). 7 U.S.C.
6a(c)(2)(B)(i). CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B)(ii) further
recognizes as a bona fide hedging position a
position that ‘‘reduce risks attendant to a position
resulting from a swap that meets the requirements
of 4a(c)(2)(A). 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B)(ii).
370 As described above, the Commission
interprets the revised statutory temporary substitute
test as limiting the Commission’s authority to
recognize risk management positions as bona fide
hedges unless the position is used to offset
exposure opposite a bona fide hedging swap
counterparty.
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3285
through swap is a bona fide hedge; 371
and (2) the pass-through swap
counterparty entering into a futures,
option on a futures, or swap position in
the ‘‘same physical commodity’’ as the
pass-through swap to offset and reduce
the price risk attendant to the passthrough swap.
If the two conditions above were
satisfied, then the bona fides of the bona
fide hedging swap counterparty ‘‘pass
through’’ to the pass-through swap
counterparty for purposes of recognizing
as a bona fide hedge any futures
position, option on futures position, or
swap position entered into by the passthrough swap counterparty to offset the
pass-through swap (i.e., to offset and
reduce the risks of the swap opposite
the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty). The pass-through swap
counterparty could thus exceed Federal
position limits for both: (1) The swap
opposite the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty, if applicable; and (2) an
offsetting futures position, option on a
futures position, or swap position in the
same physical commodity, even though
any such offsetting position on its own
would not qualify as a bona fide hedge
for the pass-through swap counterparty
under proposed paragraph (1) of the
bona fide hedging transaction or
position definition. The Commission
clarified that once the original bona fide
pass-through swap is settled, positions
held under the pass-through swap
provision must be liquidated in an
orderly manner in accordance with
sound commercial practices. Further,
under proposed § 150.3(d)(2), a passthrough swap counterparty would be
required to maintain any representation
it relied on regarding the bona fide
hedge status of the swap for at least two
years.
Proposed paragraph (2)(ii) of the bona
fide hedging definition addressed a
situation where a market participant
who qualifies as a bona fide hedging
swap counterparty (i.e., a counterparty
with a position in a previously-entered
into swap that qualified, at the time the
371 While the 2020 NPRM’s proposed paragraph
(2)(i) of the bona fide hedging definition in § 150.1
required the pass-through swap counterparty to be
able to demonstrate the bona fides of the passthrough swap upon request, the 2020 NPRM did not
prescribe the manner by which the pass-through
swap counterparty obtains the information needed
to support such a demonstration. The 2020 NPRM
noted that the pass-through swap counterparty
could base such a demonstration on a
representation made by the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty, and such determination may be made
at the time when the parties enter into the swap,
or at some later point. The 2020 NPRM also stated
that for the bona fides to pass-through as described
above, the swap position need only qualify as a
bona fide hedging position at the time the swap was
entered into.
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swap was entered into, as a bona fide
hedge under paragraph (1)) seeks, at
some later time, to offset that bona fide
hedge swap position using a futures
position, option on a futures position, or
a swap in excess of Federal position
limits. Such step might be taken, for
example, to respond to a change in the
bona fide hedging swap counterparty’s
risk exposure in the underlying
commodity.372 Proposed paragraph
(2)(ii) would allow such a bona fide
hedging swap counterparty to use a
futures position, option on a futures
position, or a swap in excess of Federal
position limits to offset the price risk of
the previously-entered into swap, even
though the offsetting position itself does
not qualify for that participant as a bona
fide hedge under paragraph (1).
The proposed pass-through
exemption under paragraph (2) of the
bona fide hedging or transaction
definition would only apply to the passthrough swap counterparty’s offset of
the bona fide hedging swap, and/or to
the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty’s offset of its bona fide
hedging swap. Any further offset would
not be eligible for a pass-through
exemption under paragraph (2) unless
the offsetting position itself meets
paragraph (1) of the proposed bona fide
hedging definition.
The Commission stated in the 2020
NPRM that it believes the pass-through
swap provision may help mitigate some
of the potential impact resulting from
the removal of the ‘‘risk management’’
exemptions that are currently in
effect.373
a bona fide hedging pass-through swap.
Instead, under the Final Rule, in order
for a pass-through swap counterparty to
treat a pass-through swap offset as a
bona fide hedge, the pass-through swap
counterparty must receive from the bona
fide hedging swap counterparty a
written representation that the passthrough swap qualifies as a bona fide
hedge. Under the Final Rule, the
Commission is also amending the
proposed regulatory text to add that the
pass-through swap counterparty may
rely in good faith on such written
representation(s) made by the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty, unless the
pass-through swap counterparty has
information that would cause a
reasonable person to question the
accuracy of the representation.
Second, the Commission is adopting a
revised paragraph (i)(B) of the bona fide
hedging transaction or position
definition in § 150.1 to delete the
language in the pass-through swap
provision that requires the offset to be
in the ‘‘same physical commodity’’ as
the pass-through swap.
c. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Pass-Through Swap
and Pass-Through Swap Offset; Related
Recordkeeping Requirement; CrossCommodity Hedging Under the PassThrough Swap Provision
The Commission is finalizing the
pass-through swap and pass-through
swap offset provision of the ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position’’
definition largely as proposed, with
certain amendments in response to
commenters’ requests discussed below:
First, the Commission is amending
the 2020 NPRM’s proposed provision
that would have required that the passthrough swap counterparty demonstrate
upon request that its offsetting position
is attendant to a position resulting from
(1) Application of Pass-Through Swap
Offset to Affiliates
Commenters generally supported
amending the bona fide hedge definition
in accordance with the statutory
language in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B) to
include a pass-through swap and passthrough swap offset.374 Some
commenters requested clarification on
the application of the pass-through
swap offset exemption to corporate
affiliates. For example, Shell stated that
an overly strict interpretation of ‘‘passthrough swap counterparty’’ may limit
the application of the pass-through
swap offset exemption to only one
entity within a corporate structure, and
such entity may not be the affiliate
entity used by the firm for its marketfacing activities or to execute
transactions with exchanges to manage
portfolios and position limits on an
aggregated basis.375 NGSA similarly
372 Examples of a change in the bona fide hedging
swap counterparty’s cash-market price risk could
include a change in the amount of the commodity
that the hedger will be able to deliver due to
drought, or conversely, higher than expected yield
due to growing conditions.
373 See supra Section II.A.1.iii.a. (discussion of
the temporary substitute test).
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d. Comments—Application of PassThrough Swap Offset to Affiliates;
Recordkeeping; Cross-Commodity
Hedging Under the Pass-Through Swap
Provision
Comments generally fell into three
categories, each discussed in turn
below: (1) Application of pass-through
swap offsets to affiliates; (2) passthrough recordkeeping requirements;
and (3) pass through swaps and crosscommodity hedging.
374 CEWG at 4; CMC at 5–6; FIA at 3; ICE at 6–
7; ISDA at 12–13; and Shell at 2, 4–5.
375 Shell at 4.
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requested that the Commission’s
interpretation of a pass-through swap
counterparty apply to affiliates who may
pass through their bona fide hedge
position exemption to a market-facing,
‘‘treasury-affiliate’’ subsidiary within a
corporate structure.376
(i) Discussion of Final Rule—
Application of Pass-Through Swap
Offset to Affiliates
The Commission clarifies that within
a group of entities that aggregates its
positions under § 150.4 377 (such as an
aggregated corporate group), any entity
that is part of the aggregated group may
avail itself of the pass-through swap
offset exemption. For example, the passthrough swap offset provision extends
to market-facing affiliates that are part of
an aggregated group pursuant to § 150.4,
such as treasury affiliate subsidiaries
that firms commonly use to manage
market-facing activities and portfolios.
In such circumstances, recognition of a
secondary pass-through swap
transaction would not be necessary
among an aggregated group because an
aggregated group is treated as one
person for purposes of Federal position
limits.
Separately, in response to commenter
requests to allow secondary pass
throughs (i.e., the further ‘‘passthrough’’ of a pass-through exemption
from one entity to another), the
Commission clarifies that outside the
context of an aggregated group,
additional positions entered into as an
offset of a pass-through swap would not
be eligible for a pass-through exemption
under paragraph (2) of the bona fide
hedging definition unless the offsetting
position itself meets the bona fide
hedging definition. Accordingly, the
bona fides of a transaction will not
extend to a third-party through the passthrough swap counterparty. For
instance, if Producer A enters into an
OTC swap with Swap Dealer B, and the
OTC swap qualifies as a bona fide hedge
for Producer A, then Swap Dealer B
could be eligible for a pass-through
exemption to offset that swap in the
futures market. However, if Swap Dealer
B offsets its swap opposite Producer A
using an OTC swap with Swap Dealer
C, Swap Dealer C would not be eligible
for a pass-through exemption.
(2) Pass-Through Swap Provision and
Recordkeeping
Commenters raised concerns with the
2020 NPRM’s requirements that the
pass-through swap counterparty
376 NGSA
at 8.
377 Aggregation
16, 2016).
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document, and upon request,
demonstrate the bona fides of the passthrough swap.378 Commenters also
requested that the Commission clarify
the nature of the required
documentation,379 and/or eliminate the
required demonstration/documentation
altogether, provided that the passthrough swap counterparty has a
legitimate, good-faith belief the swap is
a bona fide hedge.380
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(i) Discussion of Final Rule—PassThrough Swap Provision and
Recordkeeping
The Commission is amending the
2020 NPRM’s proposed provision that
would have required that the passthrough swap counterparty demonstrate
upon request that its offsetting position
is attendant to a position resulting from
a bona fide hedging pass-through swap.
For the Final Rule, the Commission is
amending the pass-through swap
provision’s regulatory text to clarify that
in order for a pass-through swap
counterparty to treat a pass-through
swap as a bona fide hedge, the passthrough swap counterparty must receive
from the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty a written representation
that the pass-through swap qualifies as
a bona fide hedge. The Commission is
further amending the regulatory text to
add that the pass-through swap
counterparty may rely in good faith on
such written representation(s) made by
the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty, unless the pass-through
swap counterparty has information that
would cause a reasonable person to
question the accuracy of the
representation. The Commission is
adding the written representation
requirement to enable to Commission to
verify that only market participants with
bona fide hedge exemptions are able to
pass-through those exemptions to their
swap counterparties.
The Commission agrees with
commenters who stated that the bona
fide hedging counterparty is the suitable
party to determine the bona fide
hedging status of the pass-through swap.
This is because the bona fide hedging
status is determined based upon the
bona fide hedging counterparty’s
confidential, proprietary information.
The Commission clarifies that the
Commission is not requiring the bona
fide hedging counterparty to share the
proprietary, confidential information
378 Cargill at 10; FIA at 11–12; CMC at 5; Shell
at 6–7; ICE at 6–7; and ISDA at 11–12.
379 ICE at 6–7; Shell at 6.
380 Cargill at 10; CMC at 5; FIA at 11–12; and
ISDA at 11–12.
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upon which it is basing its
determination with its counterparties.
Similar to the 2020 NPRM, this Final
Rule does not prescribe the form or
manner by which the pass-through swap
counterparty obtains the written
representation. The Commission
recognizes that the bona fide hedging
counterparty may make such
representations on a relationship basis
through counterparty relationship
documentation (e.g., through ISDA
documentation or other forms of
documentation as agreed upon by the
parties) or on a transaction basis (e.g.,
through trade confirmations or in other
forms as agreed upon by the parties).381
For example, if agreed to by the
counterparties, the pass-through swap
counterparty may rely on a written
representation made by the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty that an
original pass-through swap and any
subsequent pass-through swaps entered
into by and between the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty and the
pass-through swap counterparty are
bona fide hedges, unless the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty provides
written notice to the pass-through swap
counterparty that a particular swap is
not a bona fide hedge. The Commission
believes providing market participants
with flexibility recognizes
counterparties’ ongoing relationships,
while enabling the Commission to verify
that the pass-through swap offset
reduces the risks of a bona fide hedging
swap.
The Commission considered
comments requesting the elimination of
the pass-through swap provision
recordkeeping requirement in § 150.3(d)
based on arguments that requiring this
recordkeeping was not practical. The
Commission is not persuaded by those
arguments as the recordkeeping
requirements assist the Commission in
verifying that the pass-through swap
provision is only being utilized to offset
risks arising from bona fide hedges.
Accordingly, the Commission is
finalizing the proposed pass-through
swap recordkeeping requirement in
§ 150.3(d), subject to certain conforming
changes to reflect amendments to the
pass-through swap paragraph of the
bona fide hedging definition.
Since not all swaps entered into by a
commercial entity would qualify as a
bona fide hedge, the Commission
381 The Commission believes that allowing market
participants to determine the form and manner of
how they will document the written representation
by the bona fide hedging counterparty and allowing
the pass-through swap counterparty to rely on such
representation addresses NRECA’s comments on the
pass-through swap provision recordkeeping
obligations. NRECA at 23.
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declines commenters’ requests that a
pass-through swap counterparty may
reasonably rely solely upon the fact that
the counterparty is a commercial end
user and, absent an agreement between
the counterparties, that the swap
appears to be consistent with hedges
entered into by end users in the same
line of business.
(3) Comments—Pass-Through Swap
Provision and Cross-Commodity
Hedging
Commenters requested amending
paragraph (i)(B) of the proposed bona
fide hedge definition to permit the passthrough swap provision to apply to
cross-commodity hedges by eliminating
the proposed requirement that the passthrough swap offset must be in the
‘‘same physical commodity’’ as the passthrough swap.382
(i) Discussion of Final Rule—PassThrough Swap Provision and CrossCommodity Hedging
The Commission is adopting a revised
paragraph (i)(B) of the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition in
§ 150.1 to delete the language in the
pass-through swap provision that
requires the offset to be in the ‘‘same
physical commodity’’ as the passthrough swap. The Commission’s
enumerated cross-commodity bona fide
hedge adopted herein thus applies to all
the enumerated hedges, as well as to the
pass-through swap provision in the
bona fide hedge definition. The revised
regulatory text confirms the
Commission’s intent to allow a passthrough swap counterparty to utilize the
pass-through swap offset exemption
when the offset itself is a crosscommodity hedge of the underlying
pass-through swap, provided that such
cross-commodity hedge meets all
applicable requirements, including
being substantially related to the
commodity being offset.
2. ‘‘Commodity Derivative Contract’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Commodity Derivative Contract
The Commission proposed to create
the defined term ‘‘commodity derivative
contract’’ for use throughout part 150 of
the Commission’s regulations as
shorthand for any futures contract,
option on a futures contract, or swap in
a commodity (other than a security
futures product as defined in CEA
section 1a(45)).
382 FIA at 13 (quoting 85 FR at 11614); Shell at
5 (quoting 85 FR at 11614).
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ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—
Commodity Derivative Contract
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘commodity
derivative contract.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed,
with some non-substantive technical
modifications.
These technical changes include the
Final Rule’s reference to ‘‘futures
contract’’ rather than merely ‘‘futures,’’
and ‘‘swap’’ rather than ‘‘swap contract’’
to conform to other uses in final
§ 150.1.383
3. ‘‘Core Referenced Futures Contract’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Core
Referenced Futures Contract
The Commission proposed to create
the term ‘‘core referenced futures
contract’’ as a short-hand phrase to refer
to the futures contracts listed in
proposed § 150.2(d) to which the
Federal position limit rules would
apply.384 As per the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition described below,
position limits would also apply to any
contract that is directly or indirectly
linked to, or that has certain pricing
relationships with, a core referenced
futures contract.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Core
Referenced Futures Contract
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘core referenced
futures contract.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed.
4. ‘‘Economically Equivalent Swap’’
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i. Background—Economically
Equivalent Swap
The Commission’s existing
regulations do not currently subject
swaps to Federal position limits.
Similarly, the Commission is unaware
of any exchange-set limits for swaps on
any of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts. Pursuant to CEA section
4a(a)(5), when the Commission imposes
383 The Commission notes that these technical
changes are to conform more closely to CEA section
4a(a), which refers to ‘‘contracts of sale of such
commodity for future delivery’’ (7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1)
(emphasis added)), ‘‘contracts of sale for future
delivery’’ (7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added)),
or similar phraseology. Accordingly, the
Commission is making the technical change to refer
to ‘‘futures contracts’’ rather than merely ‘‘futures’’
in order to more closely conform to the CEA’s
terms. Similarly, CEA section 4a(a)(6) and section
1a(47) both refer to ‘‘swap’’ but not ’’ swap
contract,’’ and so the Commission is making a
similar conforming change.
384 The selection of the proposed core referenced
futures contracts is explained below in the
discussions of § 150.2 at Section II.B. and the
necessity finding infra at Section III.C.
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position limits on futures and options
on futures pursuant to CEA section
4a(a)(2), the Commission also must
develop limits ‘‘concurrently’’ and
establish limits ‘‘simultaneously’’ for
‘‘economically equivalent’’ swaps ‘‘as
appropriate.’’ 385 As the statute does not
define the term ‘‘economically
equivalent,’’ the Commission must
apply its expertise in construing such
term, and, as discussed further below,
must do so consistent with the policy
goals articulated by Congress, including
in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C) and 4a(a)(3).
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Economically Equivalent Swap
The 2020 NPRM proposed a new
term, ‘‘economically equivalent swap.’’
Under the 2020 NPRM, a swap would be
deemed an ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ with respect to a referenced
contract so long as the swap shared
identical ‘‘material’’ contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions
with the referenced contract, and
provided that any differences between
the swap and referenced contract with
respect to the following would be
disregarded: (i) Lot size or notional
amount; (ii) for a swap and relevant
referenced contract that are both
physically-settled, delivery dates
diverging by less than one calendar day,
except for a physically-settled natural
gas swap which could diverge by less
than two calendar days; and (iii) posttrade risk management arrangements.
Because the proposed ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition referred to
‘‘referenced contracts,’’ under the 2020
NPRM’s approach a swap could be
deemed to be ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ to not just a core referenced
futures contract, but also to any cashsettled look alike futures contract or
option on a futures contract.386
385 CEA section 4a(a)(5); 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5). In
addition, CEA section 4a(a)(4) separately
authorizes, but does not require, the Commission to
impose Federal position limits on swaps that meet
certain statutory criteria qualifying them as
‘‘significant price discovery function’’ swaps. 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(4). The Commission reiterates, for the
avoidance of doubt, that the definitions of
‘‘economically equivalent’’ in CEA section 4a(a)(5)
and ‘‘significant price discovery function’’ in CEA
section 4a(a)(4) are separate concepts and that
contracts can be economically equivalent without
serving a significant price discovery function. See
81 FR at 96736 (the Commission noting that certain
commenters may have been confusing the two
definitions).
386 As discussed under the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, the term ‘‘referenced contract’’ includes
core referenced futures contracts, linked cashsettled futures contracts, and options thereon. For
further discussion, see Section II.A.16.
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iii. Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Economically Equivalent Swap
a. The Inclusion of Certain Swaps
Within the Federal Position Limits
Framework
Many commenters generally
supported the proposed definition.387
However, other commenters argued that
swaps should not be subject to Federal
position limits at all 388 or that
subjecting swaps to position limits
would increase costs without
commensurate benefits.389 Nevertheless,
several of these same commenters that
stated that swaps should not be subject
to Federal position limits also generally
supported the proposed ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition to the
extent the Commission determined to
include swaps within Federal position
limits.390 Similarly, IATP stated that it
was unclear why swaps are part of the
2020 NPRM given the Commission’s
limited information on the swaps
market.391
In response to these comments, as an
initial matter, the Commission
emphasizes that Congress has
determined, through the Dodd-Frank
Act’s amendments to CEA section
4a(a)(5), that the Commission must
develop Federal position limits for
economically equivalent swaps
‘‘concurrently,’’ and must establish such
limits ‘‘simultaneously,’’ with the
Federal position limits for futures and
options on futures. Accordingly, the
Commission has determined that, as a
legal matter, a swap that qualifies as
‘‘economically equivalent’’ to any
referenced contract must be included
within the Federal position limits
framework.
While it did not oppose the proposed
definition, NCFC expressed a similar
concern with respect to the costs that
the proposed definition could impose
on commercial end users and small- and
mid-sized FCMs. To mitigate these
costs, NCFC suggested that any swap
that qualifies for an exception to the
Commission’s clearing requirement
under existing § 50.50 of the
Commission’s regulations should not be
deemed to be an ‘‘economically
equivalent swap.’’ According to NCFC,
such ‘‘swap contracts already must meet
the test ‘to hedge or mitigate commercial
387 E.g., AQR at 10; FIA at 2–3; NCFC at 5; Suncor
at 2; SIFMA AMG at 7; ISDA at 5; Chevron at 2;
CEWG at 3; Citadel at 6.
388 SIFMA AMG at 6–8; IATP at 19.
389 CHS at 4–5; NCFC at 5; SIFMA AMG at 6–7;
and ISDA at 5.
390 Chevron at 2; FIA at 2, 3, 5; MFA/AIMA at 3;
SIFMA AMG at 7; Suncor at 2; AQR at 10–11; COPE
at 3; Better Markets at 4; 31; NCFC at 5; ISDA at
5; CEWG at 3; and Citadel at 6.
391 IATP at 19.
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risk,’ and are ‘not used for a purpose
that is in the nature of speculation,
investing, or trading,’’’ pursuant to
§ 50.50.392 The Commission
understands NCFC’s concern, but
believes NCFC’s alternative is
unnecessary for two reasons. First, to
the extent a swap described by NCFC
would ‘‘hedge or mitigate commercial
risk,’’ such swap likely would qualify
for an enumerated bona fide hedge
under the Final Rule and therefore
would not contribute to a commercial
end-user’s net position for Federal
position limits purposes.393 Second,
commodity swaps are not required to be
cleared under the Commission’s existing
regulations, so determining whether the
end-user clearing exemption applies is
not necessarily a helpful proxy in
determining whether a swap is
‘‘economically equivalent’’ for purposes
of CEA section 4a(a)(5).
b. Statutory Basis for the Commission’s
‘‘Economically Equivalent Swap’’
Definition
In promulgating the Federal position
limits framework, Congress instructed
the Commission to consider several
factors. First, CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)
requires the Commission when
establishing Federal position limits, to
the maximum extent practicable, in its
discretion, to: (i) Diminish, eliminate, or
prevent excessive speculation; (ii) deter
and prevent market manipulation,
squeezes, and corners; (iii) ensure
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide
hedgers; and (iv) ensure that the price
discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted. Second, CEA
section 4a(a)(2)(C) requires the
Commission to strive to ensure that any
limits imposed by the Commission will
not cause price discovery in a
commodity subject to Federal position
limits to shift to trading in foreign
markets.
Accordingly, any definition of
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ must
consider these statutory objectives. The
Commission also recognizes that swaps
may include customized (i.e.,
‘‘bespoke’’) terms and are largely
negotiated bilaterally and traded offexchange (i.e., OTC). In contrast, futures
contracts have standardized terms and
are generally exchange-traded or
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392 NCFC
at 5–6.
the extent an FCM would not be able to
qualify for a bona fide hedge, the Commission
believes that excepting such swaps for purely
financial firms would functionally have the same
effect as maintaining the risk-management
exemption, which Congress, through the DoddFrank Act’s amendments to the CEA, has directed
the Commission to eliminate. See Section
IV.A.4.ii.a(1) (discussing elimination of the risk
management exemption).
393 To
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otherwise traded subject to the rules of
an exchange. As explained further
below, due to these differences between
swaps and exchange-traded futures and
related options, the Commission has
preliminarily determined that
Congress’s underlying policy goals in
CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) and (3)(B) are
best achieved by adopting a narrow
definition of ‘‘economically equivalent
swap,’’ compared to the broader
definition of ‘‘referenced contract.’’ 394
The ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition
adopted in § 150.1 will include
‘‘economically equivalent swaps,’’
meaning any economically equivalent
swap is subject to Federal position
limits. Thus, a swap that is deemed
economically equivalent would be
required to be added to, and could be
netted against, as applicable, an entity’s
other referenced contracts in the same
commodity for the purpose of
determining one’s aggregate positions
for Federal position limits.395 Any swap
that is not deemed economically
equivalent is not a referenced contract,
and thus could not be netted with
referenced contracts nor required to be
aggregated with any referenced contract
for Federal position limits purposes.
The Commission has determined that
the ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition adopted herein supports the
statutory objectives in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B)(i) and (ii) by helping to
prevent excessive speculation and
market manipulation, including corners
and squeezes, respectively, by: (1)
Focusing on swaps that are the most
economically equivalent in every
significant way to the futures contracts
and options on futures contracts for
which the Commission deems position
limits to be necessary; 396 and (2)
limiting the ability of speculators to
obtain excessive positions through
394 The definition of ‘‘referenced contract’’
adopted herein will incorporate cash-settled lookalike futures contracts and related options that are
either (i) directly or indirectly linked, including
being partially or fully settled on, or priced at a
fixed differential to, the price of that particular core
referenced futures contract; or (ii) directly or
indirectly linked, including being partially or fully
settled on, or priced at a fixed differential to, the
price of the same commodity underlying that
particular core referenced futures contract for
delivery at the same location or locations as
specified in that particular core referenced futures
contract. See infra Section II.A.16. (definition of
‘‘referenced contract’’). The definition of
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ adopted herein is
a type of ‘‘referenced contract,’’ but, as discussed
herein, the ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition includes a relatively narrower class of
swaps compared to other types of ‘‘referenced
contracts,’’ such as look-alike futures and options
on futures contracts, for the reasons discussed
below.
395 See infra Section II.B.10. (discussion of
netting).
396 See infra Section III. (necessity finding).
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3289
netting. Any swap that meets the
economically equivalent swap
definition offers identical risk
sensitivity to its associated referenced
contract with respect to the underlying
commodity, and thus could be used to
effect a manipulation, benefit from a
manipulation, or otherwise potentially
distort prices in the same or similar
manner as the associated futures
contract or option on the futures
contract. The Commission further has
determined that the relatively narrow
definition supports the statutory
objective in CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) by
not causing price discovery to shift to
trading in foreign markets.397
c. The Definition Balances Competing
Statutory Goals and Is Neither Too
Broad Nor Too Narrow
Several commenters argued that the
proposed ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ definition was too narrow and
would therefore allow market
participants to avoid Federal position
limits.398 In particular, CME Group and
Better Markets requested the general
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition that
applies to futures and options on futures
also apply to swaps.399 The Commission
agrees with these commenters’ general
concerns that the ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition should not
allow market participants to avoid
Federal position limits. In fact, the
Commission believes that the approach
adopted in this Final Rule achieves that
goal better than the approach proposed
by Better Markets and CME Group, first
and foremost by preventing parties from
using netting of swaps to create large
positions in the futures market. The
Final Rule’s definition, compared to the
relatively broader ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition that applies to futures and
options on futures, better prevents
inappropriate netting of market
participants’ positions and advances
Congress’s underlying policy goals in
397 For clarity, a swap may be eligible for
treatment under the pass-through swap provision as
either a pass-through swap or a pass-through swap
offset, discussed above under the bona fide hedge
definition, and not necessarily be deemed to be an
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ since the passthrough swap provision focuses on whether the
swap serves as a bona fide hedge to one of the
counterparties. Similarly, status as an economically
equivalent swap is not dispositive for treatment
under the pass-through swap provision.
398 CME Group at 3; NEFI at 3; Better Markets at
31–33 (generally arguing that the ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ and ‘‘referenced contract’’
definitions should be consistent to prevent
loopholes).
399 CME Group at 3–4; Better Markets at 33–34
(arguing that excluding penultimate swaps creates
a technical delineation that is largely divorced from
the economic realities relating to physical
commodities underlying both contracts).
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CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) and (3)(B) for
the following three reasons.
First, as the Commission stated above,
it believes that a narrow ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition that focuses
on swaps with identical material terms
and conditions reduces the ability of
market participants to structure
tangentially-related (i.e., non-identical)
swaps simply to net down large,
speculative positions in excess of
Federal position limits in futures or
options on futures. Because referenced
contracts in the same commodity are
generally netted,400 and because OTC
swaps are bilaterally negotiated and
customizable, market participants could
structure swaps that do not necessarily
offer identical risk or economic
exposure or sensitivity simply to net
down large positions in other referenced
contracts. This is less of a concern with
exchange-traded futures and related
options, which are subject to exchange
rules and oversight, and which have
standardized terms, meaning they
cannot be structured simply to net down
large speculative positions in core
referenced futures contracts.
The Commission recognizes as
reasonable the concerns of CME Group
and Better Markets that a relatively
narrow ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition, compared to a broader
definition, could enable market
participants to build excessive
speculative risk exposure on one side of
the market through OTC swap
transactions. As discussed herein, the
Commission is equally concerned that a
broader definition similarly would
permit a market participant to acquire a
large position in a core referenced
futures contract through inappropriate
netting.401 However, the Commission
400 See Section II.B.10. (discussing the application
of netting).
401 For example, a broader economically
equivalent swap definition would allow a market
participant to hold a long position in a physicallysettled futures contract that exceeds the applicable
Federal position limit levels by netting down with
an ‘‘offsetting’’ short OTC swap, even if the swap
has a different material term than the futures
contract. That is, the ‘‘offsetting’’ short swap could
have different delivery location(s), delivery date(s),
quality differential(s), or even a different underlying
commodity (depending on how broad the definition
would be) than the physically-settled futures
contract. Such an ‘‘offsetting’’ short swap would
allow the market participant to more profitably
engage in—and therefore more likely to successfully
effect—a corner or squeeze in two respects. First,
the ‘‘offsetting’’ short swap would allow the market
participant to obtain a larger long futures position,
thus creating a more dominant position on the long
side of the market. Second, the ‘‘offsetting’’ short
swap would allow the market participant to more
easily ‘‘dispose’’ of or ‘‘bury the corpse’’ at smaller
expense by enabling the market participant to
deliver the underlying physical commodity, which
the market participant received pursuant to its long
physically-settled futures positions, under more
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believes that a broader ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition as
advocated by these commenters also
would be more likely to lead to the
additional harms discussed below.
Accordingly, while the Commission
shares the same ultimate concerns as
CME Group and Better Markets with
respect to protecting market integrity,
the Commission has determined that the
relatively narrow definition
concurrently protects market integrity
while also better supporting the
statutory directives in CEA sections
4a(a)(2)(C) and 4a(a)(3)(B) as discussed
below.
Second, the Commission believes that
the Final Rule’s definition addresses
statutory objectives by focusing Federal
position limits on those swaps that pose
the greatest threat for facilitating corners
and squeezes. That is, the Final rule
addresses those swaps with similar
delivery dates and identical material
economic terms to futures and options
on futures subject to Federal position
limits while also minimizing market
impact and liquidity for bona fide
hedgers for other positions and
transactions. For example, if the
Commission were to adopt a broader
economically equivalent swap
definition that included delivery dates
that diverge by one or more calendar
days, perhaps by several days or weeks,
a liquidity provider (including a market
maker or a speculator) with a large
portfolio of swaps may be more likely to
be constrained by the applicable
position limits and therefore may have
incentive either to minimize its swaps
activity or move its swaps activity to
foreign jurisdictions, resulting in
reduced liquidity. If there were many
similarly situated market participants,
the market for such swaps could become
less liquid, which in turn could harm
liquidity for bona fide hedgers. As a
result, the Commission has determined
that the relatively narrow scope of the
Final Rule’s definition reasonably
balances the factors in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii) by decreasing the
possibility of illiquid markets for bona
fide hedgers on the one hand while, on
the other hand, focusing on the
prevention of market manipulation
during the most sensitive period of the
spot month.
Third, the ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ definition helps prevent
profitable circumstances compared to the terms
specified in the futures contract. For example, the
‘‘offsetting’’ short swap could allow the market
participant to deliver the commodity (i.e., ‘‘dispose
of’’ or ‘‘bury the corpse’’) at a different, more
profitable (or at least for less of a loss) delivery
location and/or wait for more favorable delivery
dates with more favorable prices.
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regulatory arbitrage as required by CEA
section 4a(a)(2)(C) and additionally will
strengthen international comity. For
example, if the Commission instead
adopted a broader definition, U.S.-based
swaps activity could potentially migrate
to other jurisdictions with a narrower
definition, such as the European Union
(‘‘EU’’). In this regard, the Final Rule’s
definition is similar in certain ways to
the EU definition for OTC contracts that
are ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to
commodity derivatives traded on an EU
trading venue.402 The Commission’s
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition thus furthers the statutory
402 See EU Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2017/591, 2017 O.J. (L 87). The applicable EU
regulations define an OTC derivative to be
‘‘economically equivalent’’ when it has ‘‘identical
contractual specifications, terms and conditions,
excluding different lot size specifications, delivery
dates diverging by less than one calendar day and
different post trade risk management
arrangements.’’ While the Final Rule’s
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ definition is
similar, the Final Rule’s definition requires
‘‘identical material’’ terms rather than merely
‘‘identical’’ terms. Further, the Final Rule’s
definition excludes different ‘‘lot size specifications
or notional amounts’’ rather than referencing only
‘‘lot size’’ since swaps terminology usually refers to
‘‘notional amounts’’ rather than to ‘‘lot sizes.’’ The
Commission notes that SIFMA AMG argued in its
comment letter that the Commission should adopt
the economically equivalent swap definition
proposed by the EU. See SIFMA AMG at 7.
However, while the Commission’s definition will be
similar to the EU’s definition, to the extent that the
Commission’s definition differs from the EU’s by
requiring ‘‘material identical’’ rather than merely
‘‘identical’’ terms, the Commission discusses its
reasoning below.
Both the Commission’s definition and the
applicable EU regulation are intended to prevent
harmful netting. See European Securities and
Markets Authority, Draft Regulatory Technical
Standards on Methodology for Calculation and the
Application of Position Limits for Commodity
Derivatives Traded on Trading Venues and
Economically Equivalent OTC Contracts, ESMA/
2016/668 at 10 (May 2, 2016), available at https://
www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
2016-668_opinion_on_draft_rts_21.pdf (‘‘[D]rafting
the [economically equivalent OTC swap] definition
in too wide a fashion carries an even higher risk of
enabling circumvention of position limits by
creating an ability to net off positions taken in onvenue contracts against only roughly similar OTC
positions.’’).
The applicable EU regulator, the European
Securities and Markets Authority (‘‘ESMA’’),
released a ‘‘consultation paper’’ discussing the
status of the existing EU position limits regime and
specific comments received from market
participants. According to ESMA, no commenter,
with one exception, supported changing the
definition of an economically equivalent swap
(referred to as an ‘‘economically equivalent OTC
contract’’ or ‘‘EEOTC’’). ESMA further noted that for
some respondents, ‘‘the mere fact that very few
EEOTC contracts have been identified is no
evidence that the regime is overly restrictive.’’ See
European Securities and Markets Authority,
Consultation Paper MiFID Review Report on
Position Limits and Position Management Draft
Technical Advice on Weekly Position Reports,
ESMA70–156–1484 at 46, Question 15 (Nov. 5,
2019), available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/
document/ consultation-paper-position-limits.
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goals set forth in CEA section
4a(a)(2)(C), which requires the
Commission to strive to ensure that any
Federal position limits are
‘‘comparable’’ to foreign exchanges and
will not cause ‘‘price discovery . . . to
shift to trading’’ on foreign
exchanges.403 Further, market
participants trading in both U.S. and EU
markets should find the Commission’s
and the EU’s respective definitions to be
familiar, which may help reduce
compliance costs for those market
participants that already have systems
and personnel in place to identify and
monitor such swaps.
Each element of the Final Rule’s
definition, including the exclusions
from the definition, and related
comments, is discussed below.
d. Scope of Identical Material Terms
Under the Final Rule’s definition,
only ‘‘material’’ contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions are
relevant to the analysis of whether a
particular swap qualifies as an
economically equivalent swap. The
definition thus does not require that a
swap be identical in all respects to a
referenced contract in order to be
deemed ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to
that referenced contract. Under the
Final Rule, ‘‘material’’ specifications,
terms, and conditions are limited to
those provisions that drive the
economic value of a swap, including
with respect to pricing and risk.
Examples of ‘‘material’’ provisions
include, for example: The underlying
commodity, including commodity
reference price and grade differentials;
maturity or termination dates;
settlement type (i.e., cash-settled versus
physically-settled); and, as applicable
for physically delivered swaps, delivery
specifications, including commodity
quality standards and delivery
locations.404
In addition, a swap that either
references another referenced contract,
or incorporates by reference the other
referenced contract’s terms, is deemed
to share identical terms with the
403 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(C).
developing its definition of an
‘‘economically equivalent swap,’’ the Commission,
based on its experience, has determined that for a
swap to be ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to a futures
or option on a futures contract, the material
contractual specifications, terms, and conditions
must be identical. In making this determination, the
Commission took into account, in regards to the
economics of swaps, how a swap and a
corresponding futures contract or option on a
futures contract react to certain market factors and
movements, the pricing variables used in
calculating each instrument, the sensitivities of
those variables, the ability of a market participant
to gain the same type of exposures, and how the
exposures move to changes in market conditions.
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404 In
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referenced contract and therefore
qualifies as an economically equivalent
swap.405 Any change in the material
terms of such a swap, however, could
render the swap no longer economically
equivalent for Federal position limits
purposes.
The Commission recognizes that the
material swap terms noted above are
essential to determining the pricing and
risk profile for swaps. However, there
may be other contractual terms that also
may be important for the counterparties
in determining the pricing and
transaction risks, but that are not
necessarily ‘‘material’’ for purposes of
position limits. For example, as
discussed below, certain other terms,
such as clearing arrangements or
governing law, may not be material for
the purpose of determining economic
equivalence for Federal position limits,
but may nonetheless affect pricing and
risk or otherwise be important to the
counterparties.
Accordingly, the Commission
generally considers those swap
contractual terms, provisions, or
terminology (e.g., ISDA terms and
definitions) that are unique to swaps
(whether standardized or bespoke) not
to be material for purposes of
determining whether a swap is
economically equivalent to a particular
referenced contract, even though such
terms may be important when
negotiating the swap or contribute to the
valuation and/or the counterparties’ risk
analysis. For example, the following
swap provisions or terms are generally
unique to swaps and/or otherwise not
material, and therefore are not to be
dispositive for determining whether a
swap is economically equivalent:
Designating business day or holiday
conventions; day count (e.g., 360 or
actual); calculation agent; dispute
resolution mechanisms; choice of law;
or representations and warranties.406
405 For example, a cash-settled swap that either
settles to the pricing of a corresponding cash-settled
referenced contract, or incorporates by reference the
terms of such referenced contract, would be deemed
to be economically equivalent to the referenced
contract.
406 Commodity swaps, which generally are traded
OTC, are less standardized compared to exchangetraded futures and therefore must include these
provisions in an ISDA master agreement between
counterparties. While certain provisions, for
example choice of law, dispute resolution
mechanisms, or the general representations made in
an ISDA master agreement, may be important
considerations for the counterparties, the
Commission would not deem such provisions
material for purposes of determining economic
equivalence under the Federal position limits
framework for the same reason the Commission
would not deem a core referenced futures contract
and a look-alike referenced contract to be
economically different, even though the look-alike
contract may be traded on a different exchange with
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Because the Commission considers
settlement type to be a material
‘‘contractual specification, term, or
condition,’’ a cash-settled swap could
only be deemed to be economically
equivalent to a cash-settled referenced
contract, and a physically-settled swap
could only be deemed to be
economically equivalent to a physicallysettled referenced contract. However, a
cash-settled swap that initially did not
qualify as ‘‘economically equivalent’’
due to no corresponding cash-settled
referenced contract (i.e., no cash-settled
look-alike futures contract) could
subsequently become an ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ if a cash-settled
futures contract market were to develop.
Commenters had various views on the
treatment of cash-settled and physicallysettled swaps. First, certain commenters
requested the Commission exclude
physically-settled swaps from Federal
position limits 407 or at least clarify the
class of instruments that would be
deemed to be physically-settled
swaps.408 Second, other commenters
requested the opposite—that the
Commission instead exclude cashsettled swaps from Federal position
limits.409 Third, Better Markets argued
that differentiating between cash-settled
and physically-settled swaps by
including settlement type as a material
term would ‘‘incentivize[ ] speculative
liquidity formation away from more
liquid, more transparent, and more
restrictive futures exchanges and to the
swaps markets.’’ 410
i. Treatment of Physically-Settled Swaps
Under the Final Rule
Several commenters requested that
the Commission exclude physicallysettled swaps from Federal position
limits,411 or at least clarify the scope of
physically-settled swaps that would be
subject to Federal position limits.412
However, the Commission has
determined that doing so is inconsistent
with the statutory goals in CEA section
different contractual representations, governing
law, holidays, dispute resolution processes, or other
provisions unique to the exchanges. Similarly, with
respect to day counts, a swap could designate a day
count that is different than the day count used in
a referenced contract but adjust relevant swap
economic terms (e.g., relevant rates or payments,
fees, basis, etc.) to achieve the same economic
exposure as the referenced contract. In such a case,
the Commission would not find such differences to
be material for purposes of determining the swap
to be economically equivalent for Federal position
limits purposes.
407 COPE at 4–5.
408 ICEA at 3–5; NRECA at 19–20, 27.
409 SIFMA AMG at 7; PIMCO at 3; and ISDA at
5.
410 Better Markets at 32.
411 COPE at 4–5.
412 IECA at 3–5; NRECA at 1, 28.
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4a(a)(3)(B), especially the mandates to
deter corners and squeezes and to
ensure sufficient market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers enumerated in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii),
respectively. For example, excluding
physically-settled swaps could
potentially incentivize liquidity to move
from physically-settled core referenced
futures contracts to physically-settled
swaps, which could both harm market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers and also
enable potential manipulators to
accumulate large directional positions
in physically-settled contracts to effect a
corner and squeeze more easily.
The Commission also received several
comments requesting clarification
regarding the Commission’s use of the
term ‘‘physically-settled’’ swaps in the
2020 NPRM’s discussion of the
definition.
First, COPE opined that since the
2020 NPRM excluded trade options
from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, as a result, only cash-settled
swaps would be deemed to be
‘‘economically equivalent swaps’’ for
purposes of Federal position limits. The
Commission confirms that under the
Final Rule, any swap that qualifies as a
trade option under § 32.3 is ipso facto
not subject to Federal position limits.413
However, the Commission does not
believe this means that only cash-settled
swaps could be deemed ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps.’’ For example, it is
possible that a physically-settled swap
may not qualify as a trade option, and
if it were to otherwise satisfy the
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition, it therefore would be subject
to Federal position limits.
Second, IECA and NRECA requested
the Commission clarify what it means
when using language referring to a
‘‘physically-settled swap,’’ and
suggested the Commission instead refer
to a ‘‘swap that allows for physical
settlement or delivery.’’ 414 IECA stated
that ‘‘using this term in place of the
term ‘physically-settled swaps’ in the
Commission’s proposed rulemaking will
help to avoid confusion and
misinterpretation in the future.’’ 415
While the Commission is adopting the
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition as proposed (which includes
the reference to ‘‘delivery date’’), the
413 As discussed under Section II.A.16., the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition explicitly excludes
any ‘‘trade options that meets the requirements of
§ 32.3’’ of the Commission’s regulations.
Accordingly, a ‘‘trade option’’ is not subject to
Federal position limits under the Final Rule, even
if the trade option otherwise would satisfy the
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ definition.
414 IECA at 3–5; NRECA at 1, 28.
415 IECA at 5.
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Commission agrees with IECA’s
statement and confirms that when the
Commission refers to ‘‘physicallysettled swaps’’ for the purpose of this
definition, the Commission means a
‘‘swap that allows for physical
settlement or delivery.’’ The
Commission agrees with IECA that
referring to ‘‘swaps that allow for
physical settlement or delivery’’ does
not alter the Commission’s intended
meaning and may avoid confusion and
misinterpretation.416 However, the
Commission will continue to refer to
‘‘physically-settled swaps’’ in this
preamble discussion because the
Commission believes that changing the
term for discussion purposes herein,
compared to the 2020 NPRM’s preamble
discussion, could raise additional
confusion. Further, the Commission
distinguishes between ‘‘cash-settled’’
and ‘‘physically-settled’’ referenced
contracts throughout this preamble
discussion, and using different terms to
refer to swaps also could increase
confusion.
IECA was concerned that the term
‘‘physically-settled swap’’ could suggest
that the Commission was seeking to
regulate a commodity for deferred
delivery as a swap, which is otherwise
excluded from the ‘‘swap’’ definition
under CEA section 1a(47)(B)(ii). The
Commission confirms that neither the
use of ‘‘delivery dates’’ in the definition
adopted herein nor the Commission’s
use of the term ‘‘physically-settled
swaps’’ for the purposes of this
preamble discussion is intended to
capture instruments that are excluded
from the Commission’s jurisdiction
either by statute (e.g., the CEA’s
statutory exclusion of the sale of a nonfinancial commodity for deferred
shipment or delivery that is intended to
be physically-settled) 417 or otherwise
not deemed to be swaps pursuant to the
Commission’s rules and regulations,
interpretations, exemption orders, or
other guidance.418
NRECA additionally requested the
Commission clarify that the
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition does not include any
‘‘customary commercial agreement,
contract or transaction entered into as
part of operations (so long as it is
entered into off-facility and not
416 IECA
at 4–5.
CEA section 1a(47)(B)(ii).
418 See NRECA at 18–19. For clarity, and as
requested by NRECA, the Commission notes that
these ‘‘rules and regulations’’ include the
Commission’s trade option rule in § 32.3 as well as
the Commission’s forward contract exclusion (i.e.,
the Brent forward exclusion) in 55 FR 39188–92
and 77 FR 48,208, 48,246 (August 13, 2012).
417 See
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involving a financial intermediary).’’ 419
As noted, to the extent such customary
commercial agreement, contract, or
transaction is exempt or excluded from
either treatment as, or from the
definition of, a ‘‘swap’’ by either statute
or by the Commission’s rules and
regulations, interpretations, exemption
orders, or other guidance, the
Commission does not deem it to be an
economically equivalent swap or
otherwise subject to Federal position
limits under the Final Rule.420
ii. Treatment of Cash-Settled Swaps
Under the Final Rule
The Commission also received several
comments discussing the treatment of
cash-settled swaps under the proposed
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition. Several financial industry
commenters argued that the Final Rule
should include only physically-settled
swaps and should exclude cash-settled
swaps, contending that cash-settled
swaps do not affect price discovery or
contribute to manipulation.421
The Commission disagrees with the
commenters’ request to exclude cashsettled swaps from the final definition,
as doing so could incentivize liquidity
to move from cash-settled referenced
contracts to cash-settled OTC swaps,
potentially harming the liquidity in the
futures markets, including liquidity for
bona fide hedgers. At the very least, the
Commission does not want to
preference OTC cash-settled swaps at
the expense of corresponding exchangetraded cash-settled futures or options on
futures contracts.
In contrast, Better Markets objected to
the proposed definition because,
according to Better Markets, under the
2020 NPRM cash-settled swaps would
not be able to qualify as economically
equivalent to a physically-settled core
referenced futures contract.422 As Better
Markets commented, distinguishing
between cash-settled and physicallysettled swaps and futures contracts by
419 NRECA
at 16–20.
example, the Commission’s swap
definition excludes certain capacity contracts and
peaking supply contracts that qualify as forward
contracts with ‘‘embedded volumetric optionality.’’
See Further Definition of ‘‘Swap,’’ ‘‘Security-Based
Swap,’’ and ‘‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’’;
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement
Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48,246. Since such
instruments are excluded from the Commission’s
regulatory ‘‘swap’’ definition, they ipso facto will
not be deemed to be ‘‘economically equivalent
swaps’’ for purposes of Federal position limits.
421 SIFMA AMG at 7; PIMCO at 3; and ISDA at
5 (PIMCO and ISDA each believe neither cashsettled swaps nor cash-settled futures should be
subject to position limits).
422 Better Markets at 32 (stating that cash-settled
swaps would be ‘‘essentially excluded from Federal
position limits).
420 For
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deeming settlement type (i.e., cashsettled vs. physically-settled settlement)
to be a material term would
‘‘incentivize[ ] speculative liquidity
formation away from more liquid, more
transparent, and more restrictive futures
exchanges and to the swaps
markets.’’ 423
The Commission believes Better
Markets’ concern is mitigated since
under the Final Rule, cash-settled swaps
are subject to Federal position limits
only if there is a corresponding (i.e.,
‘‘economically equivalent’’) cash-settled
futures contract or option on a futures
contract.424 That is, cash-settled swaps
are not subject to Federal position limits
if there are no corresponding cashsettled futures contracts or options on a
futures contract. In these situations, if
no corresponding futures contract or
option thereon exists, then there is no
liquidity formation in cash-settled
futures and options on futures contracts
with which a cash-settled swap would
be competing for liquidity in the first
place.
FIA argued that cash-settled swaps
should be subject to a separate spotmonth limit.425 However, as discussed
in II.A.16.ii.a., the Commission has
determined that FIA’s request to
establish separate Federal position
limits for cash-settled swaps is not, as
a default rule, consistent with the
statutory goals in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B). In particular, separate
position limits for cash-settled swaps
would make it easier for potential
manipulators to engage in market
manipulation, such as ‘‘banging’’ or
‘‘marking’’ the close, by effectively
permitting higher Federal position
limits in cash-settled referenced
contracts. For example, a market
participant would be able to double its
cash-settled positions by maintaining
positions in both cash-settled futures
and cash-settled economically
equivalent swaps since positions in
each class would not be required to be
aggregated for purposes of Federal
position limits.
Furthermore, the Commission is
concerned that class limits could impair
liquidity in futures contracts or swaps,
as the case may be. For example, a
market participant (including a market
maker or speculator) with a large
portfolio of swaps (or futures contracts)
near a particular class limit would be
assumed to have a strong preference for
executing futures contracts (or swaps)
transactions in order to maintain a
swaps (or futures contracts) position
below the class limit. If there were many
similarly situated market participants,
the market for such swaps (or futures
contracts) could become less liquid. The
absence of class limits should decrease
the possibility of illiquid markets for
referenced contracts subject to Federal
position limits. Because economically
equivalent swaps and the corresponding
futures contracts and option on futures
contracts are close substitutes for each
other, the absence of class limits should
allow greater integration between the
economically equivalent swaps and
corresponding futures and options
markets for referenced contracts and
should also provide market participants
with more flexibility whether hedging,
providing liquidity or market making, or
speculating.
e. Exclusions From the Definition of
‘‘Economically Equivalent Swap’’
As noted above, the Final Rule’s
definition provides that differences in
lot size or notional amount, delivery
dates diverging by less than one
calendar day (or less than two calendar
days for natural gas), or post-trade risk
management arrangements do not
disqualify a swap from being deemed
‘‘economically equivalent’’ to a
particular referenced contract.
i. Delivery Dates Diverging by Less Than
One Calendar Day
The definition as it applies to
commodities (other than natural gas)
encompasses swaps with delivery dates
that diverge by less than one calendar
day from that of a referenced
contract.426 As a result, a swap with a
delivery date that differs from that of a
referenced contract by one calendar day
or more is not deemed economically
equivalent under the Final Rule, and
such swaps are not required to be added
to, nor permitted to be netted against,
any referenced contract when
calculating compliance with Federal
position limits.427 For example, these
include contracts commonly referred to
as ‘‘penultimate’’ contracts, which settle
on the trading day immediately
preceding the final trading day of the
corresponding core referenced futures
contract.
423 Id.
424 The Commission notes that a swap could be
deemed to be ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to any
referenced contract, including cash-settled lookalikes, and that the ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ definition is not limited to core referenced
futures contracts.
425 FIA at 7–8.
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426 This aspect of the proposed definition would
be irrelevant for cash-settled swaps since ‘‘delivery
date’’ applies only to physically-settled swaps.
427 A swap as so described that is not
‘‘economically equivalent’’ would not be subject to
a Federal speculative position limit under the Final
Rule.
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In response to the definition’s
proposed exclusion of physically-settled
penultimate swaps, Better Markets
argued, among other things, that
excluding penultimate swaps ‘‘creates
technical delineations that are largely
divorced from the economic realities
relating to physical commodities
underlying both contracts.’’ 428 In
response, the Commission recognizes
that while a penultimate contract may
be significantly correlated to its
corresponding spot-month contract, a
penultimate contract does not
necessarily offer identical economic or
risk exposure to the spot-month
contract, and depending on the
underlying commodity and market
conditions, a market participant may
open itself up to material basis risk by
moving from the spot-month contract to
a penultimate contract.429
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that it is not appropriate ex
ante to permit market participants to net
such penultimate swap positions (other
than natural gas) against their core
referenced futures contract positions
since such positions do not necessarily
reflect equivalent economic or risk
exposure. However, the Commission
underscores that under the Final Rule,
a penultimate swap still could be
deemed economically equivalent to the
extent that another penultimate
referenced contract exists (assuming the
swap and other referenced contract
share identical material terms and the
swap otherwise satisfies the
economically equivalent swap
definition). For example, if a core
referenced futures contract has a
corresponding penultimate futures
contract that qualifies as a referenced
contract, then a penultimate swap could
be deemed economically equivalent to
the penultimate futures contract. In
such cases, the penultimate swap would
be an economically equivalent swap
subject to Federal position limits.
The Commission acknowledges that
liquidity could shift from the core
referenced futures contract to
penultimate swaps in cases where there
are no corresponding penultimate
futures contracts or options contracts
(and therefore the swap would not be
deemed to be an economically
equivalent swap), but the Commission
428 Better
Markets at 32.
discussed under Sections II.A.16.iii.a(2)(iii)
and II.B.3.vi.c, the Final Rule includes penultimate
look-alike futures contracts and options on futures
contracts as ‘‘referenced contracts.’’ Since futures
contracts and options on futures contracts are
standardized and exchange-traded, the Commission
is less concerned about the potential for
manipulation or evasion through inappropriate
netting in this context.
429 As
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believes that this concern is mitigated
for two reasons. First, basis risk may
exist between the penultimate swap and
the referenced contract, and so the
Commission believes that a market
participant is less likely to hold a
penultimate swap the greater the
economic difference compared to the
corresponding referenced contract.
Second, the absence of penultimate
futures contracts or options contracts
may indicate lack of appropriate
penultimate liquidity to hedge or offset
one’s penultimate swap position and
therefore may militate against entering
into penultimate swaps. However, as
discussed below, these reasons do not
necessarily apply to penultimate swaps
for natural gas.
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ii. Post-Trade Risk Management
The Commission is specifically
excluding differences in post-trade risk
management arrangements, such as
clearing or margin, in determining
whether a swap is economically
equivalent. As noted above, many
commodity swaps are traded OTC and
may be uncleared or cleared at a
different clearing house than the
corresponding referenced contract.430
Moreover, since the core referenced
futures contracts, along with futures and
options on futures contracts in general,
are traded on DCMs with vertically
integrated clearing houses, as a practical
matter, it is unlikely that OTC
commodity swaps, which historically
have been uncleared, would share
identical post-trade clearing house or
other post-trade risk management
arrangements with their associated core
referenced futures contracts. However,
to the extent an OTC commodity swap
does share the same clearing
arrangements as a corresponding
referenced contract, the Commission
does not want to incentivize the
switching of cleared swap contracts to
non-cleared status for the sake of
avoiding Federal position limits.
Therefore, if differences in post-trade
risk management arrangements were
sufficient to exclude a swap from
economic equivalence to a core
referenced futures contract, then such
an exclusion could otherwise render
ineffective the Commission’s statutory
430 Similar to the Commission’s understanding of
‘‘material’’ terms, the Commission construes ‘‘posttrade risk management arrangements’’ to include
various provisions included in standard swap
agreements, including, for example: Margin or
collateral requirements, including with respect to
initial or variation margin; whether a swap is
cleared, uncleared, or cleared at a different clearing
house than the applicable referenced contract;
close-out, netting, and related provisions; and
different default or termination events and
conditions.
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directive under CEA section 4a(a)(5) to
include economically equivalent swaps
within the Federal position limits
framework. Accordingly, the
Commission has determined that
differences in post-trade risk
management arrangements should not
prevent a swap from qualifying as
economically equivalent with an
otherwise materially identical
referenced contract.431
iii. Lot Size or Notional Amount
The last exclusion clarifies that
differences in lot size or notional
amount do not prevent a swap from
being deemed economically equivalent
to its corresponding referenced contract.
The Commission’s use of ‘‘lot size’’ and
‘‘notional amount’’ refer to the same
general concept. Futures terminology
usually employs ‘‘lot size,’’ and swap
terminology usually employs ‘‘notional
amount.’’ Accordingly, the Commission
is using both terms to convey the same
general meaning, and in this context
does not mean to suggest a substantive
difference between the two terms.
f. Economically Equivalent Natural Gas
Swaps
Market dynamics in natural gas are
unique in several respects including,
among other things, that ICE and
NYMEX both list high volume contracts,
whereas liquidity in other commodities
tends to pool at a single DCM. As
expiration approaches for natural gas
contracts, volume tends to shift from the
NYMEX NG core referenced futures
contract that is physically-settled, to an
ICE look-alike contract that is cash
settled. This trend reflects certain
market participants’ desire for exposure
to natural gas prices without having to
make or take delivery.432 NYMEX and
431 In addition, CEWG asked for clarification that
the Commission would not extend certain preamble
language in the 2020 NPRM addressing the
exclusion of post-trade risk management
arrangements from consideration when determining
whether a swap is economically equivalent to
support a finding that such swaps are actually offexchange futures contracts rather than swaps.
CEWG at 31. The Commission confirms that
excluding post-trade risk management arrangements
from the determination that a swap is economically
equivalent does not extend to supporting a finding
that such swaps are actually off-exchange futures
contracts rather than swaps.
432 In part to address historical concerns over the
potential for manipulation of physically-settled
natural gas contracts during the spot month in order
to benefit positions in cash-settled natural gas
contracts, the Commission discusses later in this
release that the Final Rule will allow for a higher
‘‘conditional’’ spot month limit in cash-settled
natural gas referenced contracts under the condition
that market participants seeking to utilize such
conditional limit exit any positions in physicallysettled natural gas referenced contracts. See infra
Section II.C.2.e. (proposed conditional spot month
limit exemption for natural gas).
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ICE also list several ‘‘penultimate’’ cashsettled referenced contracts that use the
price of the physically-settled NYMEX
contract as a reference price for cash
settlement on the day before trading in
the physically-settled NYMEX contract
terminates.433
In order to recognize the existing
natural gas markets, which include
active and vibrant markets in
penultimate natural gas contracts, the
Final Rule includes a slightly broader
economically equivalent swap
definition for natural gas so that
physically-settled swaps with delivery
dates that diverge by less than two
calendar days from an associated
referenced contract could still be
deemed economically equivalent and
would be subject to Federal position
limits. The Commission intends for this
provision to prevent and disincentivize
manipulation and regulatory arbitrage
and to prevent volume from shifting
away from the NYMEX NG core
referenced futures contract to
penultimate natural gas contract futures
and/or penultimate swap markets in
order to avoid Federal position limits.
As noted above, the Commission is
adopting a relatively narrow
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition in order to prevent market
participants from inappropriately
netting positions in referenced contracts
against swap positions further out on
the curve. The Commission
acknowledges that liquidity could shift
to penultimate swaps as a result but
believes that, with the exception of
natural gas, this concern is mitigated
since there may be basis risk between
the penultimate swap and the
referenced contract and lack of liquidity
to specifically hedge or offset one’s
penultimate swap position. However,
compared to other contracts, the
Commission believes that natural gas
has a relatively liquid penultimate
futures market that enables a market
participant to hedge or set-off its
penultimate swap position. The
Commission believes that without the
exception to the economically
equivalent swap definition for natural
gas swaps, liquidity otherwise could be
incentivized to shift from the NYMEX
NG core referenced futures contract to
penultimate natural gas swaps in order
to avoid Federal position limits.
CME Group stated in its comment
letter that that these concerns also may
apply to other energy core referenced
433 Such penultimate contracts include: ICE’s
Henry Financial Penultimate Fixed Price Futures
(PHH) and options on Henry Penultimate Fixed
Price (PHE), and NYMEX’s Henry Hub Natural Gas
Penultimate Financial Futures (NPG).
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futures contracts.434 As a result, the
Commission intends to observe the
behavior in these other markets in
response to the Final Rule, but the
Commission understands that the
natural gas markets are likely the most
sensitive to these concerns based on the
size of the corresponding natural gas
penultimate market. As a result, the
Commission is adopting the proposed
exception for natural gas, but
emphasizes that it will continue to
observe the other energy markets in
order to determine the proper course of
action with respect to those markets.
g. Determination of Economic
Equivalence
The Commission is unable to publish
a list of swaps it deems to be
economically equivalent swaps because
any such determination would involve
a facts and circumstances analysis, and
because most physical commodity
swaps are created bilaterally between
counterparties and traded OTC. Absent
a requirement that market participants
identify their economically equivalent
swaps to the Commission on a regular
basis, the Commission believes that
market participants are best positioned
to determine whether particular swaps
share identical material terms with
referenced contracts and would
therefore qualify as ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ for purposes of Federal
position limits. However, the
Commission understands that for
certain bespoke swaps it may be unclear
whether the facts and circumstances
demonstrate whether the swap qualifies
as ‘‘economically equivalent’’ with
respect to a referenced contract.
MFA/AIMA requested that the
Commission facilitate compliance by
providing clearer guidance on terms that
would be deemed material for
determining which swaps are
‘‘economically equivalent.’’ 435
Similarly, NCFC requested that the
Commission adopt a ‘‘safe harbor’’
under which ‘‘demonstrable good faith
compliance with respect to inadvertent
violations would not serve as the basis
for an enforcement action.’’ 436 In
response, the Commission emphasizes
that under the Final Rule, a market
participant will have the discretion to
make such determination as long as the
market participant makes a reasonable,
good faith effort in reaching such
determination. The Commission will
not pursue any enforcement action for
violating Federal position limits against
such market participant with respect to
434 CME
Group at 4.
at 9.
436 NCFC at 6.
435 MFA/AIMA
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such swaps positions as long as the
market participant (i) performed the
necessary due diligence and is able to
provide sufficient evidence, if
requested, to support its reasonable,
good faith determination that the swap
is or is not an economically equivalent
swap and (ii) comes into compliance
with the applicable Federal position
limits within a commercially reasonable
time, as determined by the Commission
in consultation with the market
participant, and if applicable, any
relevant exchange.437 The Commission
anticipates that this should provide a
greater level of certainty to provide
market participants with the comfort
they need to enter into swap positions,
in contrast to the alternative in which
market participants would be required
to first submit swaps to the Commission
staff and wait for feedback before
entering into swaps.438
While the Commission will primarily
rely on market participants to initially
determine whether their swaps meet the
proposed ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ definition, the Commission is
adopting paragraph (3) to the
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition to clarify that the
Commission may determine on its own
initiative that any swap or class of
swaps satisfies, or does not satisfy, the
economically equivalent definition with
respect to any referenced contract or
class of referenced contracts. The
Commission believes that this provision
will provide the ability to offer clarity
to the marketplace in cases where
uncertainty exists as to whether certain
swaps would qualify (or would not
qualify) as ‘‘economically equivalent,’’
437 As noted below, the Commission reserves the
authority under the Final Rule to determine that a
particular swap or class of swaps either is or is not
‘‘economically equivalent’’ regardless of a market
participant’s determination. See infra Section
II.A.4.iii.g. (discussion of commission
determination of economic equivalence). As long as
the market participant made its determination, prior
to such Commission determination, using
reasonable, good faith efforts, the Commission
would not take any enforcement action for violating
the Commission’s position limits regulations if the
Commission’s determination subsequently differs
from the determination of the market participant
and the market participant comes into compliance
with the applicable Federal position limits within
a commercially reasonable time, as determined by
the Commission in consultation with the market
participant, and if applicable, any relevant
exchange.
438 As discussed under Section II.A.16. (definition
of ‘‘referenced contract’’), the Commission is
including a list of futures contracts and options on
futures contracts that qualify as referenced contracts
because such contracts are standardized and
published by exchanges. In contrast, since swaps
are largely bilaterally negotiated and OTC traded, a
swap could have multiple permutations and any
published list of economically equivalent swaps
would be unhelpful or incomplete.
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3295
and therefore would be (or would not
be) subject to Federal position limits.
Similarly, where market participants
hold divergent views as to whether
certain swaps qualify as ‘‘economically
equivalent,’’ the Commission can ensure
that all market participants treat OTC
swaps with identical material terms
similarly, and serve as a backstop in
case market participants fail to properly
treat economically equivalent swaps as
such. As noted above, the Commission
will not take any enforcement action
with respect to violating the
Commission’s position limits
regulations if the Commission disagrees
with a market participant’s
determination as long as the market
participant is able to provide sufficient
support to show that it made a
reasonable, good faith effort in applying
its discretion.439
Better Markets encouraged the release
of additional guidance, suggesting that
the Commission should delegate its
authority to the DMO Director to issue
guidance with respect to specific types
of terms and conditions, and noting that
the proposed process for the
Commission to provide clarification is
cumbersome.440 The Commission does
not believe such delegation is necessary
since Commission staff will continue to
have the ability to offer informal
guidance as well as formal no-action
relief or interpretive guidance as
needed.
Better Markets also suggested that in
order to ensure market participants
conduct proper diligence, the
Commission should clarify and codify
that a swap dealer must include an
appendix in its reasonably-designed
policies and procedures under existing
§ 23.601 that identifies swaps ‘‘in any
manner’’ referencing commodities
subject to Federal position limits,
regardless of whether the entity deems
the swap to be ‘‘economically
equivalent.’’ 441 In contrast, ISDA
believed the obligations in § 23.601
impose costs that are overly
burdensome and are not commensurate
with benefits.442 ISDA stated that
further guidance is necessary, but noted
that even if further guidance is
provided, the regime would still impose
unnecessary burdens on swap
dealers.443 ISDA requested the
Commission consider including further
439 See supra Section II.A.4. (discussing market
participants’ discretion in determining whether a
swap is economically equivalent).
440 Better Markets at 34.
441 Better Markets at 34.
442 ISDA at 10.
443 Id.
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clarification and/or interim relief for
swap dealers.444
At this time, the Commission does not
believe it is necessary to provide further
detail with respect to § 23.601 because,
as discussed above, the Commission
will defer to a market participant’s
determination as long as the market
participant is able to provide sufficient
support to show that it made a
reasonable, good faith effort in applying
its discretion.445
h. Phased Implementation of Federal
and Exchange-Set Limits on Swaps
As discussed under Section I.D., the
Final Rule generally gives market
participants until January 1, 2022 to
comply with Federal position limits for
the 16 non-legacy referenced contracts
that are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final
Rule, and the Final Rule provides an
extra year to comply with respect to
economically equivalent swaps (January
1, 2023). After such compliance period,
economically equivalent swaps will be
subject to Federal position limits. In
general, commenters supported a phasein for such swaps.446
As discussed further under Section
II.D.4.i, final § 150.5 requires exchanges
to establish and enforce exchange-set
limits for any referenced contract,
which includes economically equivalent
swaps. The Commission has determined
to permit exchanges to delay enforcing
their respective exchange-set position
limits on economically equivalent
swaps at this time. Specifically, with
respect to exchange-set position limits
on swaps, the Commission notes that in
two years (which generally coincides
with the compliance date for
economically equivalent swaps), the
Commission will reevaluate the ability
of exchanges to establish and implement
appropriate surveillance mechanisms to
implement DCM Core Principle 5 and
SEF Core Principle 6 with respect to
economically equivalent swaps.
However, after the swap compliance
date (January 1, 2023), the Commission
underscores that it will enforce Federal
position limits in connection with OTC
swaps.
In response to the Commission’s
proposal to allow exchanges to delay
enforcing exchange-set position limits
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444 Id.
445 See supra Section II.A.4. (discussing market
participants’ discretion in determining whether a
swap is economically equivalent).
446 MFA/AIMA at 8 (requesting an additional 6–
12 months phase-in); SIFMA AMG at 9 (requesting
an additional 6–12 months); Citadel at 9 (requesting
an additional 6 months); and NGSA at 15–16
(requesting a general phase-in in order ‘‘to avoid the
risk of harm to market recovery and to facilitate
efficiency in market participant implementation’’).
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on swaps, IATP opined that the
Commission’s decision to ‘‘[d]elay
compliance with position limit
requirement [sic] to avoid imposing
costs on market participants makes it
appear that the Commission is serving
as a swap dealer booster, although
swaps dealers are amply resourced to
provide the necessary data to the
exchanges and to the Commission. The
Commission is bending over backward
to avoid requiring swaps market
participants from paying the costs of
exchange trading.’’ 447 However, the
Commission stated in the same section
of the 2020 NPRM that it would enforce
Federal position limits on swaps even
though it would not require exchanges
to enforce position limits on swaps until
the Commission determines that
exchanges have had the opportunity to
access swaps data and establish
appropriate swaps oversight
infrastructure.448 Additionally, the
Commission notes that physical
commodity swaps are not subject to the
Commission’s trade execution mandate
to trade on exchanges, and the
Commission understands that most
physical commodity swaps are traded
OTC rather than on exchanges.
Accordingly, the Commission’s
rationale for delaying the requirement
that exchanges enforce position limits
for swaps is based on exchanges’
existing capabilities and lack of insight
into the OTC swaps markets, rather than
for swap dealers who will remain
subject to Federal position limits and
Commission oversight.449
i. Cross-Border Application
Several commenters opined that the
Commission should address the crossborder application of the Final Rule,
including in connection with OTC
swaps.450
447 IATP
at 20.
2020 NPRM stated, ‘‘Nonetheless, the
Commission’s preliminary determination to permit
exchanges to delay implementing Federal position
limits on swaps could incentivize market
participants to leave the futures markets and
instead transact in economically-equivalent swaps,
which could reduce liquidity in the futures and
related options markets, although the Commission
recognizes that this concern should be mitigated by
the reality that the Commission would still oversee
and enforce Federal position limits on economically
equivalent swaps.’’ (emphasis added). 85 FR at
11680.
449 The Commission also notes that IATP quotes
from the cost-benefits considerations section of the
2020 NPRM, and thus the Commission’s focus on
benefits and costs to exchanges and market
participants in the excerpt quoted by IATP.
450 FIA at 27–28; ISDA at 11; CHS at 6 (‘‘CHS
believes that global organizations should be in a
position to better understand the Commission’s
approach with respect to the cross–border
application of the rules to referenced contract
positions. In CHS’s view, the proposal does not
448 The
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In response, the Commission makes
three observations. First, as discussed
above regarding the treatment of
physically-settled swaps, if a swap is
otherwise excluded from the
Commission’s jurisdiction either by
statute or pursuant to the Commission’s
rules and regulations, interpretations,
exemption orders, or other guidance,
then the swap is not subject to Federal
position limits. Accordingly, while
related, this determination is distinct
from the Final Rule’s position limits
framework. Second, the Final Rule
provides a compliance period for
economically equivalent swaps until
January 1, 2023. Accordingly, the
Commission and its staff expect to
continue to discuss the status of OTC
swaps with market participants during
this compliance period and provide
additional feedback as necessary based
on the individual facts and
circumstances. Third, to a certain
extent, some of the comments are more
related to the position limit aggregation
rules in existing § 150.4, which was
finalized in 2016.451 Moreover, the 2020
NPRM did not discuss cross-border
application, which is therefore beyond
the scope of this rulemaking.
5. ‘‘Eligible Affiliate’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Eligible
Affiliate
The Commission proposed to create
the new defined term ‘‘eligible affiliate’’
to be used in proposed § 150.2(k). As
discussed further in connection with
§ 150.2, an entity that qualifies as an
‘‘eligible affiliate’’ would be permitted
to voluntarily aggregate its positions,
even though it is eligible for an
exemption from aggregation under
§ 150.4(b).452
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Eligible
Affiliate
The Commission received no
comments on this definition and is
adopting it as proposed with certain
technical changes. The Commission is
making these technical changes to
clarify the antecedent to the use of ‘‘its’’
and ‘‘such entity’’ in the definition. The
Commission expects these changes will
clarify the definition, but do not
represent a substantive change in the
meaning.
address whether and how global companies must
aggregate referenced contract positions of affiliates
around the world. As part of the retooling of the
position limit regime, CHS urges the Commission
to address such an application’’).
451 For further discussion related to the position
limits aggregation rules, see Section II.B.11.
452 See Section II.B.11.
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6. ‘‘Eligible Entity’’
iii. Discussion of Final Rule—Entity
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Eligible
Entity
The Commission declines to adopt the
commenters’ suggestion to carve
‘‘individuals’’ out of the proposed
definition of ‘‘entity’’ or to otherwise
differentiate between ‘‘person(s)’’ and
‘‘entity(ies)’’ for purposes of part 150 of
the Final Rule. The proposed definition
of ‘‘entity’’ expressly included
‘‘individuals’’ and neither commenter
explained why individuals should be
excluded from the definition and why
the CEA’s statutory definition of
‘‘person’’ is inappropriate. Accordingly,
the Commission is adopting the
definition of ‘‘entity’’ as proposed.
The Commission adopted a revised
‘‘eligible entity’’ definition in the 2016
Final Aggregation Rulemaking.453 The
Commission proposed no further
amendments to this definition, but is
including the revised definition in this
Final Rule given that the definitions for
part 150 are set forth or restated in
§ 150.1, thus ensuring that all defined
terms are included. As noted above, the
Commission also proposed a nonsubstantive change to remove the
lettering from this and other definitions
that appear lettered in existing § 150.1,
and to list the definitions in
alphabetical order.
7. ‘‘Entity’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Entity
The Commission proposed defining
‘‘entity’’ to mean ‘‘a ‘person’ as defined
in section 1a of the Act.’’ 454 The term
‘‘entity,’’ not defined in existing § 150.1,
is used throughout proposed part 150 of
the Commission’s regulations.
ii. Comments—Entity
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The Commission received two
comments that recommended
clarification of the proposed definition
of ‘‘entity.’’ 455 FIA and MGEX
contended the proposed definition of
‘‘entity’’ should not cross-reference the
definition of ‘‘person’’ in section 1a of
the CEA because the CEA defines
‘‘person’’ to include individuals (i.e.,
natural persons), as well as entities.456
MGEX argued that the definition of
‘‘entity’’ should not apply to
individuals.457 FIA stated that, for
purposes of the 2020 NPRM, it is
unclear whether the cross-reference to
the definition of ‘‘person’’ in section 1a
of the CEA is meant to be limited to
non-natural persons.458 If so, FIA
recommended that the Commission
amend the definition of ‘‘entity’’ to refer
only to the non-natural persons listed in
the definition of ‘‘person’’ under section
1a of the CEA.459 Further, FIA suggested
that provisions in part 150 that are
applicable to both natural and nonnatural persons should refer to
‘‘persons’’ and those that apply to only
non-natural persons should refer to
‘‘entity.’’ 460
453 See
17 CFR 150.1(d).
U.S.C. 1a(38).
455 FIA at 26; MGEX at 2.
456 Id.
457 MGEX at 2.
458 FIA at 26.
459 Id.
460 Id.
454 7
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8. ‘‘Excluded Commodity’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Excluded Commodity
The phrase ‘‘excluded commodity’’ is
defined in CEA section 1a(19), but is not
defined or used in existing part 150 of
the Commission’s regulations. The
Commission proposed including a
definition of ‘‘excluded commodity’’ in
part 150 that references that term as
defined in CEA section 1a(19).461
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Excluded
Commodity
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘excluded
commodity.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed.
9. ‘‘Futures-Equivalent’’
i. Background—Futures-Equivalent
The phrase ‘‘futures-equivalent’’ is
currently defined in existing § 150.1(f)
and is used throughout existing part 150
of the Commission’s regulations to
describe the method for converting a
position in an option on a futures
contract to an economically equivalent
amount in a futures contract. The DoddFrank Act amendments to CEA section
4a, in part, direct the Commission to
apply aggregate Federal position limits
to physical commodity futures contracts
and to swap contracts that are
economically equivalent to such
physical commodity futures contracts.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Futures-Equivalent
In order to aggregate positions in
futures, options 462 on futures, and
swaps for purposes of calculating
compliance with the Federal position
limits set forth in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission proposed adjusting
461 7
U.S.C. 1a(19).
stated in this definition, the term ‘‘option’’
includes an option on a futures contract and an
option that is a swap.
3297
position sizes to an equivalent position
based on the size of the unit of trading
of the relevant core referenced futures
contract. The phrase ‘‘futuresequivalent’’ is used for that purpose
throughout the 2020 NPRM, including
in connection with the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition in proposed § 150.1.
The Commission also proposed
broadening the existing ‘‘futuresequivalent’’ definition to include
references to the proposed new term
‘‘core referenced futures contracts.’’
Additionally, with respect to options,
the proposed ‘‘futures-equivalent’’
definition also provided that a
participant that exceeds Federal
position limits as a result of an option
assignment would be allowed a one-day
grace period to liquidate the excess
position.
iii. Commission Determination—
Futures-Equivalent
The Commission is adopting the
proposed definition of ‘‘futuresequivalent’’ with one substantive
modification: In addition to the 2020
NPRM’s grace period in connection with
position limit overages dues to option
assignments, under the Final Rule, the
one-day grace period would also extend
to an option position that exceeds
Federal position limits as a result of
certain changes in the option’s exposure
to price changes of the underlying
referenced contract, as long as the
applicable option contract does not
exceed such position limits under the
previous business day’s exposure to the
underlying referenced contract. This
grace period does not apply on the last
day of the spot month for the
corresponding core referenced futures
contract.
As discussed further below, the Final
Rule also includes several technical
changes, including referring to an
option’s ‘‘exposure’’ to price changes of
the underlying referenced contract and
eliminating references to an option’s
‘‘risk factors’’ and ‘‘delta coefficient.’’
As discussed below, the Commission
believes these changes will add
flexibility in assessing exposure to price
changes of an option to the underlying
futures contract and are not intended to
reflect a substantive difference.
iv. Comments—Futures-Equivalent
Several commenters supported the
proposed definition, including the onebusiness-day grace period related to
position limit overages due to options
assignments.463 In addition to
462 As
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463 MFA/AIMA at 11; CME Group at 14; FIA at
26; and IFUS Exhibit 1 RFC 23.
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supporting the proposed definition,
CME Group and ICE both supported
expanding the proposed definition’s one
business day grace period to include
Federal position limit overages resulting
from changes in the option’s delta
coefficient, noting that such a change is
consistent with their respective
exchange rules.464 However, CME
Group noted that exercising an in-themoney option that results in a position
over the position limit should be treated
as a violation if the futures-equivalent
position was over the position limit
based on both the previous and current
day’s delta.465
FIA sought clarification from the
Commission on certain aspects of the
proposed definition. FIA stated that it is
unclear how a spread contract that
qualifies as a referenced contract would
be converted to a futures-equivalent
position.466 FIA also requested the
Commission clarify which calculation
method applies to swaps and options
that are swaps.467
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v. Discussion of Final Rule—FuturesEquivalent
The Commission agrees with CME
Group and ICE that the one-businessday grace period also should apply to
position overages in connection with
changes in the current day’s option’s
exposure to price changes of the
underlying referenced contract (e.g.,
option delta coefficient). The
Commission understands that providing
a one business day grace period for
these situations is consistent with
existing market practice. Further,
consistent with CME Group’s comment,
a market participant will not have a
grace period if the market participant’s
position also exceeded Federal position
limits based on the previous day’s
exposure (including option delta
coefficient). To alleviate concerns about
464 CME Group MRAN 1907–5 states that ‘‘[i]f a
position exceeds position limits as a result of an
option assignment, the person who owns or
controls such position shall be allowed one
business day to liquidate the excess position
without being considered in violation of the limits.
Additionally, if, at the close of trading, a position
that includes options exceeds position limits when
evaluated using the delta factors as of that day’s
close of trading, but does not exceed the limits
when evaluated using the previous day’s delta
factors, then the position shall not constitute a
position limit violation.’’ See CME Group Market
Regulation Advisory Notice RA1907–5 (Aug. 2,
2019), available at: https://www.cmegroup.com/
content/dam/cmegroup/notices/market-regulation/
2019/08/RA1907-5.pdf; IFUS Rule 6.13(a) similarly
provides persons one business day to bring into
position limits compliance any position that
exceeds limits due to changes in the deltas of the
options, or as the result of an option assignment.
465 CME Group at 14.
466 FIA at 7.
467 FIA at 6–7.
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delivery and to help prevent corners
and squeezes, this one-day grace period
does not apply on the last trading day
of the spot month of the option’s
corresponding core referenced futures
contract.
Additionally, the Commission is
eliminating references to an option’s
‘‘risk factor’’ and ‘‘delta co-efficient’’
and instead referring to an option’s
‘‘exposure’’ to price changes of the
underlying referenced contract.
The Commission understands that the
term ‘‘exposure’’ in the present context
is more commonly used by market
participants. Accordingly, the
Commission believes that the reference
to an option’s ‘‘exposure’’ to price
changes of the underlying referenced
contract is the technically correct term
to use over ‘‘risk factor’’ or ‘‘delta
coefficient,’’ which are used in the
existing ‘‘futures-equivalent’’ definition.
However, the Commission’s use of
‘‘exposure’’ here is meant to encompass
the concepts of ‘‘risk factor’’ and ‘‘delta
co-efficient.’’ As a result, the
Commission believes that this change
provides flexibility, and is consistent
with existing market practice and
understanding, in assessing the
exposure of an option to the price
movement of futures contract and is not
intended to reflect a substantive change.
Additional technical changes include
the Final Rule’s reference to ‘‘futures
contract’’ rather than merely ‘‘futures’’
and ‘‘entity’’ rather than ‘‘participant’’
since the former terms conform to other
uses in final § 150.1. The Final Rule also
makes several technical changes in
connection with the use of ‘‘computed’’
in the definition, and these changes are
meant to clarify the meaning rather than
imply a substantive change.
With respect to FIA’s request for
clarification regarding how a spread
contract that qualifies as a referenced
contract would be converted to a
futures-equivalent position, the
Commission recognizes the inherent
challenge with converting a spread
contract that qualifies as a referenced
contract to a futures-equivalent
position.468 The Commission expects
that a market participant will adjust
such a spread contract to a futuresequivalent position consistent with
existing exchange practice.
With respect to FIA’s question
regarding the calculation for swaps and
options that are swaps, subparagraph (1)
of the futures-equivalent definition
applies to an option that is a swap, and
subparagraph (3) of the definition
applies to a swap that is not an option.
10. ‘‘Independent Account Controller’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Independent Account Controller
The Commission adopted a revised
‘‘independent account controller’’
definition in the 2016 Final Aggregation
Rule.469 The Commission proposed no
further amendments to this definition,
but included that revised definition in
the 2020 NPRM so that all defined terms
appeared together.
11. ‘‘Long Position’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Long
Position
The phrase ‘‘long position’’ is
currently defined in § 150.1(g) to mean
‘‘a long call option, a short put option
or a long underlying futures contract.’’
The Commission proposed to update
this definition to apply to swaps and to
clarify that such positions would be on
a futures-equivalent basis. This
provision would thus be applicable to
options on futures and swaps such that
a long position would also include a
long futures-equivalent option on
futures and a long futures-equivalent
swap.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Long
Position
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘long position.’’
The Commission is adopting the
definition as proposed.
12. ‘‘Physical Commodity’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Physical Commodity
The Commission proposed to define
the term ‘‘physical commodity’’ for
position limits purposes. Congress used
the term ‘‘physical commodity’’ in CEA
sections 4a(a)(2)(A) and 4a(a)(2)(B) to
mean commodities ‘‘other than
excluded commodities as defined by the
Commission.’’ 470 The proposed
definition of ‘‘physical commodity’’
thus included both exempt and
agricultural commodities, but not
excluded commodities.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Physical
Commodity
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘physical
commodity.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed.
469 See
468 FIA
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17 CFR 150.1(e).
U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(A) and (B).
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13. ‘‘Position Accountability’’
15. ‘‘Pre-Existing Position’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Position Accountability
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—PreExisting Position
The Commission proposed to create
the defined term ‘‘pre-existing position’’
to reference any position in a
commodity derivative contract acquired
in good faith prior to the effective date
of a final Federal position limit
rulemaking. Proposed § 150.2(g) would
set forth the circumstances under which
Federal position limits would apply to
such positions.
Existing § 150.5 permits position
accountability in lieu of exchange
position limits in certain cases, but does
not define the term ‘‘position
accountability.’’ The proposed
amendments to § 150.5 would allow
exchanges, in some cases, to adopt
position accountability levels in lieu of,
or in addition to, position limits. The
Commission proposed a definition of
‘‘position accountability’’ for use
throughout proposed § 150.5 as
discussed in greater detail in connection
with proposed § 150.5.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Position
Accountability
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘position
accountability.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed
with some non-substantive technical
changes related to the numbering
structure. The Commission is also
changing the reference of ‘‘trader’’ to
‘‘entity’’ since ‘‘entity’’ is the proper
defined term in § 150.1 under the Final
Rule while ‘‘trader’’ is not a defined
term under § 150.1.
14. ‘‘Pre-Enactment Swap’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—PreEnactment Swap
The Commission proposed to create
the defined term ‘‘pre-enactment swap’’
to mean any swap entered into prior to
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 (July 21, 2010), the terms of which
had not expired as of the date of
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. As
discussed in connection with proposed
§ 150.3 later in this release, if acquired
in good faith, such swaps would be
exempt from Federal position limits,
although such swaps could not be
netted with post-effective date swaps for
purposes of complying with spot month
Federal position limits.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—PreEnactment Swap
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘pre-enactment
swap.’’ The Commission is adopting the
definition as proposed. For further
discussion of the treatment of preexisting positions, see Sections II.B.7.
and II.C.7.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—PreExisting Position
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘pre-existing
position.’’ The Commission is adopting
the term ‘‘pre-existing position’’ as
proposed. However, the Commission
did receive comments related to the
treatment of certain pre-existing
positions. For further discussion of the
treatment of pre-existing positions and
related comments, see Sections II.B.7.
and II.C.7.
16. ‘‘Referenced Contracts’’
i. Background—Referenced Contracts
When a futures contract expires, all
open futures contract positions in such
contract are settled by physical delivery
(which the Commission refers to as
‘‘physically-settled’’ herein) or cash
settlement (which the Commission
refers to as ‘‘cash-settled’’ herein),
depending on the contract terms set by
the exchange. The nine legacy
agricultural contracts currently subject
to Federal position limits are all
physically-settled futures contracts.
Deliveries on physically-settled futures
contracts are made through the
exchange’s clearinghouse, and the
delivery of the physical commodity
must be consummated between the
buyer and seller per the exchange rules
and contract specifications. On the other
hand, other futures contracts are ‘‘cashsettled’’ because they do not involve the
transfer of physical commodity
ownership and require that all open
positions at expiration be settled by a
transfer of cash to or from the
clearinghouse based upon the final
settlement price of the contracts.
Market participants may use the
settlement price of physically delivered
futures contracts as a key benchmark to
price cash-market contracts and other
derivatives, including so-called ‘‘lookalike’’ cash-settled derivatives (which
could be futures, options on futures, or
swaps contracts). Look-alike cashsettled derivative contracts are
explicitly linked to the physically-
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settled futures contracts. A look-alike
cash-settled derivatives contract has
nearly identical specifications as its
physically-settled counterpart, but
rather than calling for delivery of the
underlying commodity at expiration, the
contract terms require a cash payment at
expiration. Each look-alike cash-settled
derivatives contract is linked by design
to its respective physically-settled
contract in that the final settlement
value of the cash-settled contract is
defined as the final settlement price of
the physically-settled contract in the
same commodity for the same month.
Additionally, other types of cash-settled
derivatives contracts may be similar to
a look-alike, but the final settlement
price of such contracts are determined
based on a basis, or differential, to the
final settlement price of the
corresponding physically-settled
contract.
Existing § 150.2 applies Federal
position limits to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts as well as to
options thereon on a futures-equivalent
basis, but the existing Federal
framework does not include provisions
to apply Federal position limits to
contracts that are linked in some
manner to the nine physically-settled
legacy agricultural contracts. As a result,
the existing Federal position limits do
not apply to any cash-settled contracts,
including both look-alike contracts and
contracts that settle at a basis or
differential to a physically-settled
contract, options on such cash-settled
contracts, or swaps.471
As the Final Rule is expanding the
position limits framework to cover
certain cash-settled futures contracts,
options on such futures contracts, and
economically equivalent swaps, for the
reasons discussed below, the
Commission is adopting the proposed
defined term ‘‘referenced contract,’’
with modifications, for use throughout
final part 150 to refer to derivatives
contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Referenced Contracts
The 2020 NPRM proposed a new
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition that
included:
(1) Any core referenced futures
contract listed in proposed § 150.2(d);
(2) any other contract (futures or option
on futures), on a futures-equivalent
basis with respect to a particular core
referenced futures contract, that is
directly or indirectly linked to the price
of a core referenced futures contract, or
471 Under CEA section 1a(47)(A), an option on a
swap is deemed to be a swap.
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that is directly or indirectly linked to
the price of the same commodity
underlying a core referenced futures
contract (for delivery at the same
location(s)); and (3) any economically
equivalent swap, on a futures-equivalent
basis.
The proposed referenced contract
definition thus included look-alike
futures contracts and options on lookalike futures contracts (as well as
economically equivalent swaps with
respect to such look-alike contracts),
contracts of the same commodity but
different sizes (e.g., mini contracts), and
penultimate contracts.472
Additionally, the 2020 NPRM
explicitly excluded from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition: (1)
Commodity index contracts; (2) location
basis contracts; (3) swap guarantees; and
(4) trade options that satisfy the
requirement of § 32.3 of the
Commission’s regulations. Further,
while not in the proposed regulatory
text, the Commission indicated in the
preamble to the 2020 NPRM that a
contract for which the settlement price
is based on an index published by a
price reporting agency (a ‘‘PRA index
contract’’) that surveys cash-market
transactions (even if the cash-market
practice is to price at a differential to a
futures contract) was not deemed to be
‘‘directly or indirectly’’ linked to a
referenced contract, and thus that such
PRA index contract also was excluded
from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition under the 2020 NPRM.473
Under the 2020 NPRM, a position in
a referenced contract in certain
circumstances could be netted with a
position in another referenced contract,
including a core referenced futures
contract, which as noted above is a type
of referenced contract under the
proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition. However, to avoid evasion
and undermining of the Federal position
limits framework, the 2020 NPRM
prohibited the use of non-referenced
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472 A
penultimate contract is a cash-settled
contract in which trading ceases one business day
prior to the settlement date of the corresponding
referenced contract with which the penultimate
contract is linked. With respect to penultimate
contracts, the 2020 NPRM stated that ‘‘Federal
limits would apply to all cash-settled futures and
options on futures contracts on physical
commodities that are linked in some manner,
whether directly or indirectly, to physically-settled
contracts subject to Federal limits.’’ Further to this
general statement, the 2020 NPRM provided a
footnote example of a penultimate contact that,
because it cash-settles directly to a core referenced
futures contract, the 2020 NPRM explained would
therefore be included as a referenced contract. 85
FR at 11619.
473 85 FR at 11620.
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contracts to net down positions in
referenced contracts.474
Finally, the 2020 NPRM also stated
that, in an effort to provide clarity to
market participants regarding which
exchange-traded contracts would be
subject to Federal position limits, the
Commission anticipated publishing, and
regularly updating, a list of such
contracts on its website. The
Commission thus proposed to publish a
‘‘CFTC Staff Workbook,’’ which would
provide a non-exhaustive list of
referenced contracts and may be helpful
to market participants in determining
categories of contracts that would fit
within the referenced contract
definition.
iii. Commission Determination—
Referenced Contracts
The Commission is adopting the
proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition with the modification
discussed below, as well as one
technical change that the Commission
believes clarifies the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition, consistent with the
intent of the 2020 NPRM.475 Like the
proposed definition, the final
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition also
includes (1) the 25 core referenced
futures contracts, (2) futures and options
on futures that are directly or indirectly
linked either to (i) the price of any other
core referenced futures contract or (ii)
the same commodity underlying a core
referenced futures contract,476 and (3)
economically equivalent swaps. Like the
2020 NPRM, the final definition also
explicitly excludes certain contract
types so that these contracts may not be
netted against referenced contract
positions for purposes of Federal
position limits (but also are not
aggregated with referenced contract
positions).
However, in addition to the proposed
definition’s exclusions of commodity
index contracts, location basis contracts,
swap guarantees, and trade options that
satisfy the requirement of § 32.3 of the
Commission’s regulations, the Final
Rule is modifying the 2020 NPRM’s
definition to also exclude two
474 85 FR at 11619. For further discussion of the
Final Rule’s treatment of the netting of positions,
see Section II.B.10.
475 The Commission is providing a clarifying
technical change to the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition in that the final definition refers to ‘‘an
option on a futures contract’’ instead of ‘‘options on
a futures contract’’ as proposed by the 2020 NPRM,
to make clear the original intent of the Commission
in the 2020 NPRM that a single option would
qualify as a referenced contract.
476 Prong (ii) encompasses physically-settled
contracts that do not directly reference a core
referenced futures contract but that are nonetheless
based on the same commodity and delivery location
as the core referenced futures contract.
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additional contract types: ‘‘outright
price reporting agency index contracts’’
and ‘‘monthly average pricing
contracts.’’
This section will address the
following issues, including related
comments, in the following order:
a. Cash-settled referenced contracts
and contracts that are ‘‘directly or
indirectly’’ linked to a core referenced
futures contract, including cash-settled
and penultimate contracts;
b. Contracts explicitly excluded from
the ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition;
and
c. The list of referenced contracts and
the related Commission staff
‘‘Workbook.’’
The Commission is also adopting
‘‘economically equivalent swaps,’’ as
proposed, as part of the final
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition.
However, the Commission addresses the
final ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition in Section II.A.4.
a. Contracts That Are Directly or
Indirectly Linked to a Core Referenced
Futures Contract
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Linked to a Core Referenced Futures
Contract
Paragraph (1) of the proposed
referenced contract definition provided
that a contract would qualify as a
referenced contract if it is a core
referenced futures contract, or, with
respect to a particular core referenced
futures contract, if it is directly or
indirectly linked, including being
partially or fully settled on, or priced at
a fixed differential to, the price of either
(i) the core referenced futures contract
itself or (ii) the same commodity
underlying the core referenced futures
contract for delivery at the same
location or locations as specified in the
core referenced futures contract’s
specifications. As the Commission
explained in the 2020 NPRM, this
provision included a cash-settled ‘‘lookalike’’ future or an option thereon.477
(2) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Linked to a Core
Referenced Futures Contract
The Commission is adopting as final
the language in paragraph (1) of the
proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition. Accordingly, under
paragraph (1) of the final ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition, referenced
contracts include a core referenced
477 For example, the 2020 NPRM noted that ICE’s
Henry Penultimate Fixed Price Future, which cashsettles directly to NYMEX’s Henry Hub Natural Gas
core referenced futures contract, would be
considered a referenced contract. 85 FR at 11620.
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futures contract, and any cash-settled
futures and options on futures that are
directly or indirectly linked either to (i)
the price of any other core referenced
futures contract or (ii) the same
commodity underlying a core referenced
futures contract for delivery at the same
location or locations as specified in the
core referenced futures contract’s
specifications.478
Further, in response to the comments
described below, the Commission is
reaffirming that penultimate futures
contracts and options thereon qualify as
referenced contracts because they satisfy
paragraph (1) of the referenced contract
definition under the Final Rule.
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(i) Comments—Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
Commenters provided differing
opinions as to whether linked cashsettled futures and related options
should be subject to Federal position
limits.479 CME Group and NEFI
supported the Commission’s proposal to
subject these contracts to Federal
position limits.480 According to CME
Group, absent parity between cash and
physically-settled contracts, artificial
distortions on one side of the market
could occur due to manipulations on
the other side of the market, regulatory
arbitrage, or liquidity drain.481 CME
Group warned that, ultimately, a lack of
parity could undermine the statutory
goals of position limits.482 NEFI agreed,
arguing that applying Federal position
limits to cash-settled contracts is
478 Clause (ii) of this description comprises as
referenced contracts any physically-settled
contracts that are linked to the same commodity for
delivery at the same location underlying a core
referenced futures contract. The Commission
believes as failure to do so could undermining this
Federal position limits framework through the
creation of physically-settled look-alike contracts by
other exchanges. For example, without including
clause (ii) above, an exchange could create a
physically-settled look-alike contract, but unlike the
existing core referenced futures contract, this new
contract would be outside the Federal position
limits framework. Such an outcome would clearly
disadvantage the exchange with the existing core
referenced futures contract and harm liquidity for
bona fide hedgers by possibly dividing liquidity
among competing physically-settled look-alike
contracts, as well as provide significant incentives
for market participants to trade contracts that
subvert this Federal position limits framework.
479 CME Group at 3–4; FIA at 7–8; ICE at 12; ISDA
at 3–5; NEFI at 3; PIMCO at 3; and SIFMA AMG
at 4–6.
480 CME Group at 3–4 (stating ‘‘CME Group
believes that economically and substantively alike
contracts should be accorded the same regulatory
treatment to prevent artificial distortions from
opening doors for manipulators or shifting one
market’s liquidity to another. . . In this regard, as
noted above, CME Group recommends that the
Commission apply similar provisions to both cashsettled and physically settled swaps.’’).
481 CME Group at 6.
482 Id.
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essential to guard against manipulation
by a trader who holds positions in both
physically-settled and cash-settled
contracts for the same underlying
commodity.483
Other commenters disagreed. PIMCO
and SIFMA AMG contended that cashsettled referenced contracts should not
be subject to Federal position limits at
all because cash-settled contracts do not
introduce the same risk of market
manipulation. They argued that
subjecting cash-settled referenced
contracts to Federal position limits
would reduce market liquidity and
depth in these instruments.484
ISDA argued that cash-settled
contracts should not be included in an
immediate Federal position limits
rulemaking, and should instead be
deferred until the Commission has
adopted Federal limits with respect to
physically-delivered spot month futures
contracts, and after which the
Commission should revisit Federal
limits for cash-settled contracts.485
FIA and ICE suggested that Federal
position limits for cash-settled
referenced contracts should apply per
DCM (rather than in aggregate across
DCMs).486 FIA additionally suggested
setting a separate Federal spot-month
position limit for economically
equivalent swaps.487 FIA and ICE
further argued that limits for cashsettled referenced contracts should be
higher relative to Federal position limits
for physically-settled referenced
contracts. They similarly posited that
cash-settled referenced contracts are
‘‘not subject to corners and squeezes’’
and higher limits for cash-settled
contracts will ‘‘ ‘ensure market liquidity
for bona fide hedgers.’ ’’ 488
Further, the Commission addresses
FIA’s contention that the Commission
should impose a separate Federal spotmonth position limit for economically
equivalent swaps in further detail above
under Section II.A.4.iii.
While the Commission acknowledges
commenter views to the effect that cashsettled contracts are less susceptible to
effectuating corners and squeezes,490 the
Commission is of the view that
generally speaking, linked cash-settled
and physically-settled contracts form
one market, and thus should be subject
to Federal position limits. Because the
settlement price of a physically
delivered futures contract is used as a
price benchmark in many other
derivative and cash-market contracts, a
change in the futures settlement price
can affect the value of a trader’s overall
portfolio of derivative and cash-market
positions. Accordingly, the link between
physically delivered futures and their
cash-settled derivative counterparts can
create incentives for manipulation. This
view is informed by the Commission’s
experience overseeing derivatives
markets, where the Commission has
observed that it is common for the same
market participant to arbitrage linked
cash- and physically-settled contracts,
and where the Commission has also
observed instances where linked cashsettled and physically-settled contracts
have been used together as part of an
attempted manipulation.491
Applying position limits to both
physically delivered futures and linked
cash-settled contracts, including their
look-alike cash-settled derivative
contracts, reduces a trader’s incentive
and ability to manipulate futures
markets. Without position limits on
(ii) Discussion of Final Rule—CashSettled Reference Contracts
general rule for natural gas pursuant to the
Commission’s exemptive authority under CEA
section 4a(a)(7). For further discussion, see Sections
II.B.3.vi. and II.B.11.
490 FIA at 7, stating ‘‘Section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) directs
the Commission to set limits as appropriate ‘to deter
and prevent market manipulation, squeezes and
corners.’ ’’ The Commission notes that FIA provides
an example as to the effect of squeezes and corners
for cash-settled contracts—only two out of three of
the points for which the Commission should set an
appropriate limit—the third point, which is
overlooked by the commenter (market
manipulation) is also a statutory objective, and for
the reasons described below, provides a basis for
including cash-settled contracts within the Federal
position limits regime.
491 The Commission has previously found that
traders with positions in a cash-settled contract may
have an incentive to manipulate and undermine
price discovery in the physically-settled contract to
which the cash-settled contract is linked. See, e.g.,
CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc. et al., No. 1:11-cv03543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (alleging defendants amassed
sufficient quantity of physical WTI while
contemporaneously purchasing cash-settled WTI
derivatives positions on NYMEX and ICE with the
intent to profit on those positions by manipulating
the price of the physically-settled WTI contract).
As a general matter, the Commission
does not agree with FIA and ICE that
Federal position limits should be
applied at the DCM level instead of in
the aggregate for the reasons discussed
below under Section II.B.11.489
483 NEFI
at 3.
at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4–6.
485 ISDA at 3–5.
486 FIA at 7–8; ICE at 12.
487 FIA 7–8.
488 ICE at 3, 15 (also arguing that cash-settled
limits should apply per exchange, rather than
across exchanges); FIA at 7–8; For further
discussion on the Commission’s determination to
generally apply Federal position limits on an
aggregate basis across exchanges, see Section
II.B.11.
489 As discussed below, as an initial matter, the
Commission interprets CEA section 4a(a)(6) as
requiring aggregate Federal position limits across
exchanges. However, as discussed below, the
Commission is providing an exception to this
484 PIMCO
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both types of futures contracts, traders
could amass a substantial position in
the cash-settled look-alike contract and
benefit their position by manipulating
the settlement price of the physically
delivered futures contracts.
Additionally, the absence of position
limits on look-alike cash-settled
derivative contracts would enable
traders to manipulate a particular cash
commodity price to benefit their cashsettled derivatives position. For
example, where market conditions
create a shortage of a particular
commodity, that shortage should
increase the price of the commodity. If
markets are functioning properly, the
price of the physically delivered futures
contract will also increase. A trader
could acquire a massive long position in
the look-alike cash-settled derivative
contract and profit by bidding up the
cash price of an already scarce cash
commodity. Thus, the trader’s cash
commodity positions would directly
affect the price of the physically-settled
futures contract and its look-alike cashsettled derivative. The trader’s strategy
to purchase the cash commodity and bid
up its price could cause the value of the
look-alike cash-settled derivative
position to increase because of the
direct links connecting all three markets
(i.e., the positions in the underlying
cash commodity, the physically-settled
derivative, and the cash-settled
derivative). Accordingly, the absence of
position limits in look-alike cash-settled
derivative contracts would enable
traders to effectively influence and
manipulate cash prices to benefit their
cash-settled derivatives position, which
could impact the price of the physicallysettled futures contract as well.
Additionally, excessive speculation in
cash-settled derivative contracts can
affect the price of the physically-settled
futures contract and the underlying cash
commodity and therefore harm the price
discovery function of the underlying
markets. That is, futures prices are
determined by immediate cash
commodity prices, and therefore the
relationship between cash and futures
prices also depends, in part, on the
storage location of a particular
commodity in relation to its delivery
point, and should result in the correct
amount of a particular commodity
available at the delivery point. Thus,
excessive speculation in cash-settled
derivative contracts can produce
excessive supplies at delivery points
and a disruption of the flows of money
and commodities exchanged.492
492 For example, manipulated ‘‘higher’’ futures
contract prices in a cash-settled futures contract can
spill over into ‘‘lower’’ prices for a physically-
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Accordingly, the Commission
considers cash-settled referenced
contracts to be generally economically
equivalent to physical-delivery
contracts in the same commodity. In the
absence of position limits, an entity
with positions in both the physically
delivered and cash-settled contracts
may have an increased ability and an
increased incentive to manipulate one
of these contracts to benefit positions in
the other contract. As such, the
Commission believes that it is essential
to apply Federal position limits to cashsettled futures and options on futures
that are directly or indirectly linked to
physically-settled contracts in order to
further the statutory objective in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B)(iv) to deter and
prevent market manipulation.
Furthermore, the Commission has
determined that including futures
contracts and options on futures
contracts that are indirectly linked to
the core referenced futures contract
under the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition will help prevent the evasion
of position limits through the creation of
an economically equivalent futures
contract or option on a futures contract,
as applicable, that does not directly
reference the price of the core
referenced futures contract. Such
contracts that settle to the price of a
referenced contract but not to the price
of a core referenced futures contract, for
example, would be indirectly linked to
the core referenced futures contract.493
However, a physically-settled
derivative contract with a settlement
price that is based on the same
underlying commodity at a different
delivery location would not be linked,
settled futures contract through arbitrage trades
between the two futures contracts. Traders
arbitraging between the cash-settled and physicallysettled futures contracts would short the ‘‘higher
priced’’ cash-settled and long the ‘‘lower-priced’’
physically-settled futures contracts until an
equilibrium price is achieved. However, that
equilibrium price may be distorted due to the
manipulation occurring in the higher priced cashsettled contract, and as a result the physicallysettled contract would have an artificially higher
price relative to the actual cash-market price of the
underlying commodity. That higher futures contract
price would then act as a false price signal to the
underlying cash commodity market, thus
incentivizing owners of the cash commodity to
increase supplies at the delivery points for the
physically-settled futures contract. Accordingly,
excessive speculation in cash-settled derivative
contracts can produce excessive supplies at
delivery points and a disruption of liquidity, price
discovery, and distribution of the underlying cash
commodities.
493 As discussed above, the Commission adopted
an ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ definition that
is narrower than the class of futures contracts and
option on futures contracts that would be included
as referenced contracts. For further discussion of
the ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ definition, see
Section II.A.4.
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directly or indirectly, to the core
referenced futures contract. By way of
example, a hypothetical physicallysettled futures contract on ultra-low
sulfur diesel delivered at L.A. Harbor
instead of the NYMEX ultra-low sulfur
diesel core referenced futures contract
delivered in New York Harbor would
not be linked, directly or indirectly, to
the core referenced futures contract
because NYMEX’s ultra-low sulfur
diesel futures contract does not include
L.A. Harbor as a possible delivery point.
Therefore, the contract specification
price of the hypothetical physically
delivered L.A. Harbor contract would
reflect the L.A. Harbor market price for
ultra-low sulfur diesel and not the
NYMEX contract’s price.
(iii) Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Penultimate Contracts Are a
Subset of Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
Penultimate contracts are a type of
cash-settled futures contract (or an
option thereon) that settles the day
before the corresponding physicallysettled futures contract. Penultimate
contracts therefore share the same
determinative attributes as the other
cash-settled look-alike referenced
contracts discussed above, including the
fact that the settlement price of a
penultimate contract is linked to the
corresponding physically-settled core
referenced futures contract.
In response to certain commenters
requesting that the Commission exclude
penultimate contracts from the 2020
NPRM’s proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition (discussed below), the
Commission is affirming that
penultimate contracts, as a type of
linked cash-settled look-alike contracts,
fall within the Final Rule’s ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition.
Commenters were split as to whether
these penultimate contracts should be
included within the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition. ICE argued that
penultimate contracts, and specifically
its penultimate cash-settled natural gas
contract, should be excluded from
position limits for several reasons,
including that its natural gas
penultimate contract is economically
distinct from the NYMEX NG core
referenced futures contract and has no
ability to impact settlement of that core
referenced futures contract.494 SIFMA
AMG and ISDA broadly concurred with
this position.495 In contrast, CME Group
supported the inclusion of penultimate
contracts within the definition of
494 ICE
at 13–14.
at 9; SIFMA AMG at 10–11.
495 ISDA
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referenced contract.496 As the
Commission outlined above, its ‘‘one
market’’ view applies to cash-settled
contracts that are linked in some
manner to physically-settled contracts.
Penultimate futures contracts (including
options thereon), as a type of linked
cash-settled contract, have the same
relation to their physically-settled
counterparts as discussed above for
other linked cash-settled contracts. The
Commission therefore is applying
Federal position limits to all of these
instruments.
In support of its view that
penultimate contracts should not be
subject to Federal position limits, ICE
offered the example of the Henry Hub
LD1 (‘‘H’’) futures contract (which has
an exchange-set spot-month position
limit) and the Henry Hub Penultimate
(‘‘PHH’’) futures contract (which has
exchange-set position accountability),
stating that these contracts trade sideby-side, and that there has been no
evidence of a migration to the
penultimate contract due to the
presence of an accountability level
rather than a hard spot-month position
limit. According to ICE, this suggests
that the Commission need not be
concerned about an arbitrage
opportunity between the two.497
However, in further support of its
argument that penultimate contracts
should not be subject to Federal
position limits, ICE suggested that
penultimate contracts ‘‘empirically’’ are
not economically the same as the last
day contract, as demonstrated by
settlement prices.498 To that end, the
Commission reviewed the settlement
prices of NYMEX NG (the physically
settled natural gas core referenced
futures contract), H (the ICE LD1 natural
gas contract cash-settled to the NYMEX
NG), and PHH (the ICE natural gas
penultimate contract cash-settled to the
NYMEX NG).499 Contrary to the
empirical assertion made by ICE, the
prices of the six near-month contracts
for each of the contracts described above
settled at identical prices on the
relevant penultimate day for all
contracts at all months.500 As reinforced
496 CME Group at 3–4 (arguing that ‘‘economically
and substantively alike contracts should be
accorded the same regulatory treatment to prevent
artificial distortions from opening doors for
manipulations or shifting one market’s liquidity to
another.’’).
497 ICE at 14.
498 Id.
499 Commission review of these contracts as of
August 4, 2020, based on data submitted to the
Commission pursuant to part 16 of the
Commission’s regulations.
500 The six near-month contracts reviewed by the
Commission are as follows: Sep20, Oct20, Nov20,
Dec20, Jan21, and Feb21, for each of NYMEX NG,
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by this observation, the Commission
agrees with the commenter that the
penultimate contract is tightly
correlated (and trades side-by-side) with
the cash-settled contract, as well as
being demonstrated here, with the
physically settled futures contract.
However, it is not in spite of this tight
correlation, but rather because of it, that
the Commission considers these
contracts to form one market, and as
such, raises the importance of Federal
position limits for these instruments. As
noted above, the Commission believes
that Federal position limits should
apply to all contracts covered by the
Final Rule’s ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, including all varieties of
linked cash-settled contracts, such as
linked penultimate contracts, given the
linkages between the physically-settled
contract, the cash-settled contract
(including penultimate contracts), and
the underlying cash-market commodity,
and the incentives and opportunities for
market manipulation that those linkages
create.
b. Exclusions From the Referenced
Contract Definition
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exclusions From the Referenced
Contract Definition
In the 2020 NPRM, paragraph (3) of
the proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition explicitly excluded: (1) A
location basis contract; (2) a commodity
index contract; (3) a swap guarantee;
and (4) a trade option that meets the
requirements of Commission regulation
§ 32.3. The 2020 NPRM also included
guidance in proposed Appendix C
setting forth additional clarification
regarding the types of contracts that
would qualify as either a location basis
contract or a commodity index contract
for purposes of the proposed exclusions
from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition.
(2) Summary of the Commission
Determination—Exclusions From the
Referenced Contract Definition
The Commission is adopting
paragraph (3) of the 2020 NPRM’s
proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’ with the
following changes. In addition to
excluding the contracts mentioned
above, the Final Rule is modifying
paragraph (3) to additionally exclude
H, and PHH. The Commission does not compare the
spot-day price on the last day of trading of the
NYMEX NG contract with the penultimate PHH
contract since by definition the PHH contract settles
on the penultimate day—that is, PHH settles on the
day before NYMEX NG’s last day of trading and
therefore there is no PHH price to compare against
the NYMEX NG price on NYMEX NG’s last day of
trading.
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3303
‘‘outright price reporting agency index
contracts’’ and ‘‘monthly average
pricing contracts’’ from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition. To the extent a
contract fits within one of the excluded
contracts in paragraph (3), such contract
is not a referenced contract, is not
subject to Federal position limits, and
could not be used to net down positions
in referenced contracts (but also is not
required to be added to referenced
contract positions when determining
compliance with Federal position
limits).
In order to clarify the types of
contracts that qualify as location basis
contracts and commodity index
contracts, and thus are excluded from
the ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition, the
Commission also is adopting, with
modifications described below, the
guidance with respect to these
instruments in Appendix C to part 150
of the Commission’s regulations. This
guidance includes information to help
define the parameters of the terms
‘‘location basis contract’’ and
‘‘commodity index contract.’’ 501 To the
extent a particular contract fits within
this guidance, such contract would not
be a referenced contract, would not be
subject to Federal position limits, and
could not be used to net down positions
in referenced contracts.502 Unlike the
2020 NPRM, the final guidance in
Appendix C will also include additional
information regarding the definition of
the terms ‘‘outright price reporting
agency index contracts’’ and ‘‘monthly
average pricing contracts.’’
Comments on these topics, and the
Commission’s responses, are set forth
below.
(3) Comments—Exclusions From the
Referenced Contract Definition
On balance, commenters were
generally supportive of the 2020
NPRM’s proposed exclusions from the
referenced contract definition.503
(i) Location Basis Contracts
Commenters that provided an explicit
opinion about location basis contracts
were unanimously supportive of the
Commission excluding such contracts
from the definition of a referenced
contract.504
501 The Commission notes that the further
definition of parameters regarding a commodity
index contract is responsive to the Better Markets
comment letter suggesting such additional
clarifications. Better Markets at 34.
502 See infra Section II.B.10. (discussion of
netting).
503 AGA at 9; CHS at 2; FIA at 2; ICE at 10–11;
NCFC at 2.
504 AGA at 9; ICE at 10.
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(ii) Commodity Index Contracts
Commenters were divided, however,
regarding the exclusion of commodity
index contracts. Better Markets and
IATP opposed the exclusion,505 while
ICE and PIMCO supported it.506 Better
Markets concurred with the view
expressed by the Commission in the
2020 NPRM that commodity index
contracts should not be permitted to net
down referenced contract positions, but
in lieu of the Commission’s proposal to
exclude commodity index contracts as
referenced contracts, Better Markets
suggested in the alternative that the
Commission adopt individual limits for
commodity index contracts for persons
also involved in physically-settled
contracts on physical commodities
serving as a constituent in the
applicable index.507 IATP cited several
studies, including one published by
Better Markets, contending that
commodity index contracts have price
impacts that are detrimental to
commercial hedgers.508 IECA stated that
the passive speculation provided by
commodity index contracts is harmful
to the price discovery function of the
market.509
In contrast, PIMCO argued in favor of
the exclusion for commodity index
contracts, contending that commodity
index contracts are useful tools for
investors looking for broad-based
portfolio hedging or to take a view on
price trends in the commodity
markets.510
(iii) Trade Options
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All commenters offering a specific
opinion regarding trade options
unanimously supported the exclusion of
trade options from the definition of
referenced contract.511
505 Better Markets at 34, 46; IATP at 7–8 (citing
studies which they believe demonstrate that
commodity index trading harms commercial
hedgers).
506 ICE at 2; PIMCO at 5.
507 Better Markets at 46.
508 IATP at 7–8 (citing David Frenk and Wallace
Turbeville, ‘‘Commodity Index Traders: Boom and
Bust in Commodity Prices,’’ Better Markets, October
2011, at 15). https://bettermarkets.com/sites/
default/files/Better%20Markets%20Commodity%20
Index%20Traders%20and%20Boom-Bust%20in
%20Commodities%20Prices.pdf.
509 Industrial Energy at 3–4, suggesting a ban on
natural gas commodity index contracts, which
functionally equates to a Federal position limit of
zero, or alternatively a limit to not exceed the
current percentage of the physical market.
510 PIMCO at 5.
511 AGA at 8; CCI at 2; EPSA at 3–4; NGSA at 4;
NRECA at 17; CEWG at 4; Chevron at 3; CHS at 2;
FIA at 2; NCFC at 2; NGSA at 4; and Suncor at 3.
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(iv) Swap Guarantees
Similarly, commenters supported the
exclusion of swap guarantees from the
definition of reference contract.512
(v) Outright Price Reporting Agency
Index Contracts
FIA and ICE further recommended
that the Commission should exclude
any outright contracts whose settlement
price is based on an index published by
a price reporting agency that surveys
cash-market transaction prices from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition.513
(vi) Monthly Average Pricing Contracts
CME Group commented that because
a significant amount of commerce is
transacted on a monthly average basis,
and that because monthly average
pricing contracts are calculated using
the daily prices during the contract
month such that a final settlement price
of a core referenced futures contract
would have the same weight as the
other twenty or more daily prices used
in the monthly average price
calculation, it would be extremely
unlikely for monthly average pricing
contracts to be used to manipulate or
benefit from a manipulation during the
spot period. Thus, CME Group argued
monthly average pricing contracts
should also be excluded from the
definition of referenced contracts.514
(vii) Additional Basis, Differential, and
Spread Contracts
ICE recommended that certain other
contracts, such as additional basis and
spread contracts, should generally be
excluded from the definition of a
referenced contract, even if the contracts
reference a core referenced futures
contract as one component.515
(4) Discussion of Final Rule—
Exclusions From the Referenced
Contract Definition
The Commission is finalizing as
proposed the exclusions from the
referenced contract definition for
location basis contracts, commodity
index contracts, swap guarantees, and
trade options that meet the requirements
of § 32.3. Further, as noted above, the
Commission is expanding prong (3) of
the proposed referenced contract
definition to additionally exclude two
512 CHS at 2; FIA at 2; NCFC at 2, offering general
support for excluding swap guarantees, but not
providing a specific rationale for doing so.
513 FIA at 6; ICE at 10–11.
514 CME Group at 13.
515 ICE at 12; see also FIA at 4 (recommending
that the spread transaction definition should be
expanded to exempt additional, commonly used
spreads). For further discussion on the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, see Section II.A.20.
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other contract types: ‘‘outright price
reporting agency index contracts’’ and
‘‘monthly average pricing contracts.’’
(i) Location Basis Contracts
The Commission has determined that,
unless location basis contracts are
excluded from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, speculators would be able to
net portions of their location basis
contracts with outright positions in one
of the locations comprising the core
referenced futures contract, which
would permit extraordinarily large
speculative positions in the outright
core referenced futures contract.516 For
example, the 2020 NPRM explained that
a large outright position in NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) futures
contracts could not be netted down
against a location basis contract that
cash-settles to the difference in price
between the Gulf Coast Natural Gas
futures contract and the NYMEX NG
futures contract.517 Absent this
exclusion, a market participant could
increase its exposure in the outright
contract by using the location basis
contract to net down against its NYMEX
NG futures position, thereby allowing
the market participant to further
increase the outright NYMEX NG
futures contract position that would
otherwise exceed the Federal position
limits.
While excluding location basis
contracts from the referenced contract
definition would prevent the
circumstance described above, it would
also mean that location basis contracts
would not be subject to Federal position
limits. The Commission is comfortable
with this outcome because location
basis contracts generally demonstrate
minimal volatility and are typically
significantly less liquid than the core
referenced futures contracts, meaning,
in the Commission’s estimation, it is
less likely that a potential manipulator
would be able to effect a market
manipulation using these contracts.
Further, excluding location basis
contracts from the referenced contract
definition may allow commercial endusers to more efficiently hedge the cost
of commodities at their preferred
location to the extent they may
frequently require the physical
commodity at a location other than the
core referenced futures contract’s
specified contract delivery point.
(ii) Commodity Index Contracts
With respect to commodity index
contracts, the Commission similarly has
516 See infra Section II.B.10. (discussion of
netting).
517 85 FR at 11620.
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determined that excluding commodity
index contracts from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition will ensure that
market participants cannot use a
position in a commodity index contract
to net down an outright position in a
referenced contract that was a
component of the commodity index
contract.
Regarding Better Markets’ and IATP’s
requests that the Commission alter the
proposed ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition to include commodity index
contracts (i.e., to remove commodity
index contracts from the list of excluded
contracts in paragraph (3) of the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition), the
Commission notes that if it did not
exclude commodity index contracts, the
Commission’s rules would allow
speculators to take on massive outright
positions in referenced contracts by
netting against a position in a
commodity index contract, which could
lead to excessive speculation.
For example, the Commission
understands that it is common for swap
dealers to enter into commodity index
contracts with participants for which
the contract would not qualify as a bona
fide hedging position (e.g., with a
pension fund). Failing to exclude
commodity index contracts from the
referenced contract definition could
enable a swap dealer to use positions in
commodity index contracts to net down
offsetting outright futures positions in
the components of the index.
Additionally, this would have the effect
of subverting the statutory pass-through
swap provision in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(B), which is intended to
foreclose the recognition of positions
entered into for risk management
purposes as bona fide hedges unless the
swap dealer is entering into positions
opposite a counterparty for which the
swap position is a bona fide hedge.518
The Commission recognizes that
although excluding commodity index
contracts from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition would prevent the potentially
risky netting circumstance described
above, it would also mean that
commodity index contracts would not
be subject to Federal position limits.
The Commission concludes that this is
an acceptable outcome because the
contracts comprising the index would
themselves be subject to limits, and
because commodity index contracts
generally tend to exhibit low volatility
since they are diversified across many
different commodities.
With respect to Better Markets’,
ICEA’s, and PMAA’s requests to impose
separate standalone, or aggregate,
518 7
U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B).
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position limits on commodity index
contracts, the Commission does not
believe doing so is useful to the extent
that the individual components of a
commodity index contract are subject to
Federal position limits under the Final
Rule. The Commission also is concerned
that adopting a standalone limit for a
commodity index contract could
inadvertently limit transactions in
commodity derivatives contracts outside
the Final Rule’s scope. Specifically, a
commodity index contract may contain
components that are subject to Federal
position limits, as well as additional
components that are not. If the
Commission were to place standalone
limits on these commodity index
contracts, it would impose de facto
constraints on commodity derivative
contracts that are not intended to be the
subject to the Final Rule and for which
the Commission has not found position
limits to be necessary.
position.521 Excluding guarantees of
swaps from the definition of ‘‘referenced
contract’’ will help avoid any potential
confusion regarding the application of
position limits to guarantees of swaps.
The Commission understands that swap
guarantees generally serve as insurance,
and, in many cases, swap guarantors
guarantee the performance of an affiliate
in order to entice a counterparty to enter
into a swap with such guarantor’s
affiliate. As a result, the Commission
believes that swap guarantees do not
contribute to excessive speculation,
market manipulation, squeezes, or
corners. Furthermore, the Commission
believes that swap guarantees were not
contemplated by Congress when
Congress articulated its policy goals
with respect to position limits in CEA
section 4a(a).522 Accordingly, the
Commission is finalizing the exclusion
of swap guarantees from the definition
of ‘‘referenced contract.’’
(iii) Trade Options
The Commission also is finalizing, as
proposed, the exclusion of trade options
that meet the requirements of § 32.3
from the definition of referenced
contract. The Commission has
traditionally exempted trade options
from a number of Commission
requirements because trade options are
typically employed by end-users to
hedge physical risk and thus do not
contribute to excessive speculation.
Trade options are not subject to position
limits under current regulations, and the
proposed exclusion of trade options
from the referenced contract definition
would simply codify existing
practice.519
(v) New Exclusions from the
‘‘Referenced Contract’’ Definition—Price
Reporting Agency Index Contracts and
Monthly Average Pricing Contracts
(iv) Swap Guarantees
The Commission additionally is
excluding, as proposed, swap
guarantees from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition. In connection with
further defining the term ‘‘swap’’ jointly
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the ‘‘Product Definition
Adopting Release,’’ 520 the Commission
interpreted the term ‘‘swap’’ (that is not
a ‘‘security-based swap’’ or ‘‘mixed
swap’’) to include a guarantee of such
swap, to the extent that a counterparty
to a swap position would have recourse
to the guarantor in connection with the
519 In the trade options final rule, the Commission
stated its belief that Federal position limits should
not apply to trade options, and expressed an
intention to address trade options in the context of
any final rulemaking on position limits. See Trade
Options, 81 FR at 14971.
520 See generally Further Definition of ‘‘Swap,’’
‘‘Security-Based Swap,’’ and ‘‘Security-Based Swap
Agreement’’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48208 (Aug. 13,
2012) (‘‘Product Definitions Adopting Release’’).
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Finally, the Commission is modifying
prong (3) of the proposed ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition to additionally
exclude from the Final Rule: (a)
Monthly average pricing contracts and
(b) outright price reporting agency index
contracts.
(a) Monthly Average Pricing Contracts
In response to commenter
suggestions, the Commission is
providing non-binding guidance in
Appendix C to this Final Rule to assist
market participants and exchanges in
determining whether a particular
contract qualifies as a ‘‘monthly average
pricing contract,’’ that the Final Rule is
excluding from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition. Specifically, in
response to Question 15 of the 2020
NPRM, CME Group commented that
contract types that are generally referred
to in industry nomenclature as calendarmonth average (‘‘CMA’’), trade-month
average (‘‘TMA’’), and balance-of-themonth (‘‘BALMO’’) contracts should be
excluded from the list of referenced
contracts and subject solely to
exchange-set position limits.523 CME
521 77
FR at 48226.
the extent that swap guarantees may lower
costs for uncleared OTC swaps in particular by
incentivizing a counterparty to enter into a swap
with the guarantor’s affiliate, excluding swap
guarantees may improve market liquidity, which is
consistent with the CEA’s statutory goals in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B) to ensure sufficient liquidity for
bona fide hedgers when establishing its position
limit framework.
523 CME Group at 13.
522 To
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Group explains the prevalence of these
contracts in the market, and notes an
example of the June 2020 monthly
average contract (in which there are 22
U.S. business days and thus 22 daily
referenced prices incorporated into the
calendar month average), concluding
that it is difficult to manipulate a CMA.
CME Group thus posits that excluding
CMAs would not incentivize
manipulation of the underlying core
referenced futures contract.524
As an initial matter, the Commission’s
addition of the new term ‘‘monthly
average pricing contracts’’ to Appendix
C of this Final Rule is intended to
generally cover the types of contracts
addressed in CME Group’s comments,
which are generally referred to in the
industry as ‘‘CMAs,’’ ‘‘TMAs,’’ and
‘‘BALMOs.’’ The Commission agrees
with CME Group’s rationale. The
Commission understands that because
the final settlement price of a core
referenced futures contract is only one
of many pricing points that constitute
that monthly average, and as such
generally has a relatively insignificant
impact on such core referenced futures
contract’s monthly average price, it
therefore also has a relatively
insignificant impact on the settlement
price of the corresponding monthly
average pricing contract. Accordingly,
the Commission concludes that on
balance, excluding monthly average
pricing contracts from the definition of
referenced contract is consistent with
the statutory goals in CEA section
4a(a)(3), including with respect to
ensuring sufficient market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers due to: (1) The
difficulty and expense of any entity
artificially moving the price of the
monthly average by manipulating one or
more component prices within the
contract; and (2) the widespread use and
utility of these contracts to commercial
entities to hedge their risk. The
Commission provides non-binding
guidance in Appendix C of the Final
Rule to assist market participants and
exchanges in determining whether a
particular contract qualifies as a
‘‘monthly average pricing contract.’’
(b) Outright Price Reporting Agency
Index Contracts
The Commission is also modifying
prong (3) of the proposed ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition to explicitly
exclude ‘‘outright price reporting agency
index contracts.’’ ICE supported the
exclusion of such contracts in its
comment letter.525 Further, FIA also
commented that it believed that a price
524 Id.
525 ICE
reporting agency index contract is
outside the definition of a referenced
contract.526
The Commission agrees with ICE and
FIA and confirms this understanding.
The Commission explained in the 2020
NPRM that based on its plain reading,
the ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition
excluded such contracts because
outright price reporting agency index
contracts were not ‘‘directly or
indirectly’’ linked to the price of a
referenced contract.527 The Commission
reaffirms its conclusion that an
‘‘outright price reporting agency index
contract,’’ which is based on an index
published by a price reporting agency
that surveys cash-market transaction
prices (even if the cash-market practice
is to price at a differential to a futures
contract), is not directly or indirectly
linked to the corresponding referenced
contract. The Commission is modifying
the final ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition to explicitly exclude such
contracts for the sake of regulatory
certainty. Similar to the other contracts
excluded from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, the Commission is providing
non-binding guidance in Appendix C of
the Final Rule to assist market
participants and exchanges in
determining whether a particular
contract qualifies as an ‘‘outright price
reporting agency index contract’’ and
therefore is excluded as a referenced
contract. The Commission underscores
that this exclusion applies only to
‘‘outright’’ price reporting agency index
contracts, and that a contract that settles
to the difference (i.e., settled at a basis)
between a referenced contract and the
price reporting agency index would be
directly linked, and thus would qualify
as a referenced contract, because it
settles in part to the referenced contract
price.
Since the Commission stated in the
preamble to the 2020 NPRM that an
outright price reporting agency index
contract does not qualify as a
‘‘referenced contract,’’ the Commission
does not believe that the Final Rule’s
modification to explicitly exclude the
term in the regulatory definition of
‘‘referenced contract’’ represents a
change in policy. Instead, it is merely a
technical change to the regulatory text
to provide regulatory clarity to market
participants.
from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition,528 the Commission notes a
heightened concern with potential
manipulation through the use of
outright positions (particularly through
inappropriate netting) and spreads,
compared to location basis contracts or
commodity index contracts.529 Notably,
and as described in greater detail above,
the Commission views the constraints
on the liquidity and volatility associated
with location basis and commodity
index contracts as not present to an
equal degree in other basis and spread
contracts. As noted above, while
excluding location basis contracts and
commodity index contracts from the
referenced contract definition could
permit large outright positions in such
contracts, the Commission believes that
excluding these contracts will
nonetheless prevent the potentially
risky and inappropriate netting of a core
referenced futures contract described
above. Further, as stated above, the
Commission believes that location basis
contracts generally demonstrate
minimal volatility and are typically
significantly less liquid than the core
referenced futures contracts, meaning
they would be more costly to try to use
to manipulate a core referenced futures
contract. Similarly, with respect to
commodity index contracts,
commodities comprising the index
could themselves be subject to Federal
position limits, and commodity index
contracts also generally tend to exhibit
low volatility since they are diversified
across many different commodities.
Additionally, it is unclear from ICE’s
discussion what additional contract
types that ICE has in mind, other than
outright price reporting agency index
contracts that the Commission discusses
above, since several of the examples
provided by ICE may already be exempt
under the ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition (e.g., the spread examples
provided by ICE 530 may qualify for a
spread exemption under the Final Rule
as either a quality differential spread or
an inter-commodity spread). ICE also
stated that the requirement that a spread
exemption be approved by the exchange
seems unnecessary and is probably
unworkable, but did not provide any
arguments as to why obtaining exchange
approval would be unnecessary.531
(vi) Additional Basis, Differential, and
Spread Contracts
Regarding ICE’s comment that
additional basis, differential, and spread
contracts should generally be excluded
528 ICE at 12, noting contracts that capture the
differential between different grades of a
commodity (e.g., WTI vs. sour crude) or between
different but related commodities (e.g., a crack
differential) as examples of contracts it believes
should excluded.
529 See 78 FR at 75696–75697.
530 ICE at 12.
531 For further discussion of the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, see Section II.A.20.
526 FIA
at 10.
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Additionally, the Commission notes that
under the Final Rule, an exemption for
any spread that is included in the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition is selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits, and, unlike the role that
exchanges may play with respect to
non-enumerated bona fide hedges in
final § 150.9, exchanges have no
analogous role with respect to spread
exemptions for Federal position limits
purposes under the Final Rule.
iv. List of Referenced Contracts
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a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—List of
Referenced Contracts
In order to provide clarity to market
participants, the Commission proposed
to publish, and anticipated regularly
updating, a CFTC Staff Workbook of
Commodity Derivative Contracts under
the Regulations Regarding Position
Limits for Derivatives (the ‘‘Staff
Workbook’’) on the Commission’s
website which would list exchangetraded products that are subject to
Federal position limits. In order to
ensure that the list remained accurate,
the Commission also proposed changes
to certain provisions of part 40 of its
regulations, which pertain to the
collection of position limits information
through the filing of product terms and
conditions.
In particular, under existing §§ 40.2,
40.3, and 40.4, DCMs and SEFs must
submit certain requirements related to
the listing of certain new products.
Many of the required submissions
include the product’s ‘‘terms and
conditions,’’ as defined in § 40.1(j),
which in turn includes under
§ 40.1(j)(1)(vii) ‘‘Position limits, position
accountability standards, and position
reporting requirements.’’
The Commission proposed to expand
§ 40.1(j)(1)(vii), which addresses futures
contracts and options contracts, to also
include an indication as to whether the
submitted contract meets the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition in
proposed § 150.1. If so, proposed
§ 40.1(j)(1)(vii) required the submission
to also include the name of the core
referenced futures contract on which the
submitted new product is based.
The Commission further proposed to
expand § 40.1(j)(2)(vii), which addresses
swaps, to require the applicant to
indicate whether the submitted contract
meets the proposed ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition in § 150.1.
If so, proposed § 40.1(j)(2)(vii) similarly
required the submission to include the
name of the referenced contract to
which the swap is economically
equivalent.
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b. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—List of
Referenced Contracts
The Commission is adopting as final
the 2020 NPRM’s amendments to part
40 of its regulations with one
modification that relates to filing the
name of the referenced contract on
which the new product is based. Part 40
and the Commission’s amendments
pertain to the collection of position
limits information through the filing of
product terms and conditions, and the
publication and regular updates of
exchange-traded contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits.532
The Commission notes that the Staff
Workbook is intended to provide a nonexhaustive list of exchange-traded
referenced contracts that are subject to
Federal position limits. Although the
Commission endeavors to timely update
this list of contracts, the omission of a
contract from the Staff Workbook does
not mean that such contract is outside
the definition of a referenced contract
subject to Federal position limits.
While proposed § 40.1(j)(1)(vii)
required the submitted futures contract
(or option thereon) to also include the
name of the core referenced futures
contract on which the submitted new
product is based, final § 40.1(j)(1)(vii)
instead requires that the submitted
product includes the name of either the
core referenced futures contract or
referenced contract, as applicable, on
which the contract is based. This is
because, as discussed above under the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition, a
referenced contract could be indirectly
or directly linked to another referenced
contract that is not a core referenced
futures contract. For example, an
options contract could be based on a
cash-settled look-alike or penultimate
futures contract that is a referenced
contract rather than on the physicallysettled core referenced futures contract.
The Commission’s concurrent
publication of the Staff Workbook will
provide a non-exhaustive list of
exchange-traded referenced contracts,
and will help market participants in
determining categories of contracts that
fit within the referenced contract
definition. This effort is intended to
provide clarity to market participants
regarding which exchange-traded
532 As discussed above, the Commission will
provide market participants with reasonable, goodfaith discretion to determine whether a swap would
qualify as economically equivalent for Federal
position limit purposes. Due to differences between
OTC swaps and exchange-traded futures contracts
and options thereon, the Staff Workbook would not
include a list of economically equivalent swaps. For
further discussion, see supra Section II.A.4.
(discussion of economically equivalent swaps).
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3307
contracts are subject to Federal position
limits.
The proposed amendments to part 40
to specify new referenced contracts
generally received support.533 ICE noted
the need for clear guidance on how new
contracts will be assessed, in order to
determine whether such contracts will
be referenced contracts, and make
consistent determinations with respect
to economically similar products.534
Although commenters also generally
supported the publication of the
Workbook, many suggested
modifications, including clarifications
regarding which contracts are included
as referenced contracts, and the basis for
making such determinations.535 The
Commission believes that the
amendments to part 40 will allow the
Commission to consistently and
accurately assess whether contracts
should be included within the Staff
Workbook. The Commission also
believes that by providing regular
updates to the Staff Workbook, market
participants will have accurate and
consistent information to assess whether
such contracts are subject to Federal
position limits. Additionally, the Staff
Workbook will provide a linkage
between each referenced contract, and
either the core referenced futures
contract or referenced contract, as
applicable, to which it is linked, to aid
in market participants’ understanding of
the Commission’s determination.
Alternatively, some commenters
suggested that the Staff Workbook could
include a list of all contracts
Commission staff finds are not
referenced contracts,536 and CME Group
and ICE each provided a list of contracts
they believe should be excluded from
the Staff Workbook.537
The Commission believes that by
providing a Staff Workbook listing core
referenced futures contracts, and the
referenced contracts that are directly or
indirectly related to them, the
Commission is presenting a list of
contracts subject to Federal position
limits in the clearest possible fashion.
Additionally, the amendments to part
40 will allow regular and accurate
updates to this list.
Some commenters expressed concern
that the Staff Workbook lists contracts
that are not referenced contracts,538 or
533 AGA
at 10; MFA/AIMA at 4.
at 12.
535 AGA at 10; MFA/AIMA at 9; FIA at 6; Chevron
at 14; Suncor at 14; and CEWG at 29–30.
536 FIA at 6; MFA/AIMA at 9.
537 CME Group at 13; ICE at 12.
538 FIA at 6; ICE at 9–12. ICE is specifically
concerned that the proposed workbook contains
534 ICE
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provided examples asking for
clarification.539 One commenter
recommended that the Commission
appoint a task force to develop a
comprehensive baseline list of
referenced contracts listed for trading on
exchanges.540
The Commission believes that
Commission staff (as opposed to a
taskforce) is best positioned to
continually refine the Workbook
through accurate, timely updates, as
aided by the additional information
required by the newly adopted
amendments to part 40 under the Final
Rule.
Further, some commenters believed
that the Commission should require
exchanges to publish and maintain a
definitive list of referenced contracts
(other than economically equivalent
swaps).541 While CME Group did not
believe that the Commission should
impose such a requirement on
exchanges, it supported coordinating
with the Commission to ensure
consistency, and publishing this
information on CME Group’s website.542
The Commission believes that
publication of the Staff Workbook on
the www.cftc.gov website will provide a
centralized location for market
participants to assess whether certain
instruments are subject to Federal
position limits. Although the
Commission is encouraged that
exchanges may provide redundancy in
also publishing this list of core
referenced futures contracts and related
referenced contracts listed for trading on
their respective exchanges, the
Commission is not adopting a
requirement for exchanges to publish
this information at this time.
Finally, CME Group contended that
for commodities with only spot month
limits, financially-settled futures and
options contracts should be excluded
from the Staff Workbook and not subject
to Federal position limits if the final
settlement/expiry of the cash-settled
futures or option occurs before the spot
month period of its core referenced
futures contract begins. CME Group
additionally asserted that option
contracts that exercise into physicallysettled core referenced futures contracts
should be included in the Staff
Workbook and subject to Federal
position limits even if final settlement/
expiry of the option occurs before spot
month period begins.
inconsistencies, such as including location basis
contracts and PRA/Price Index Contracts.
539 Chevron at 14; CEWG at 29.
540 CEWG at 30.
541 MFA/AIMA at 7; Citadel at 4–5; SIFMA AMG
at 11–12.
542 CME Group at 14.
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The Commission agrees with both of
CME Group’s assertions with one
exception. While the Commission agrees
that cash-settled futures contracts and
options on such futures contracts that
are non-legacy contracts (i.e., the 16
core referenced futures contracts that
will not have Federal non-spot position
limits) and settle or expire prior to when
the spot month limits would become
effective in the spot period are not
subject to Federal spot month position
limits, such futures and options
contracts do qualify as referenced
contracts based on the settlement price
being linked to a core referenced futures
contract. However, because the
corresponding 16 core referenced
futures contracts are not subject to nonspot month Federal position limits, then
these cash-settled futures contracts and
options contracts similarly are also not
subject to Federal position limits during
the non-spot month. Accordingly, as
contracts not subject to Federal spot or
non-spot month position limits, these
contracts will not be included in the
Staff Workbook, even if such contracts
qualify as referenced contracts. The
Commission further agrees that options
that exercise into the physically-settled
core referenced futures contract are
within the definition of referenced
contract because when the options are
exercised, they become positions in the
core referenced futures contract.
The Commission is clarifying that it
will publish a revised Staff Workbook
shortly after the publication of this Final
Rule on the Commission’s website and
before the Final Rule’s Effective Date.
This revised Staff Workbook will reflect
the revised ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, clarify CME Group’s
discussion with respect to options
discussed in the immediately above
paragraph, and generally fix any errors
identified by commenters.
17. ‘‘Short Position’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Short
Position
The Commission proposed to expand
the existing definition of ‘‘short
position,’’ currently defined in
§ 150.1(h), to include swaps and to
clarify that any such positions would be
measured on a futures-equivalent basis.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Short
Position
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘short position.’’
The Commission is adopting the
definition as proposed.
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18. ‘‘Speculative Position Limit’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Speculative Position Limit
The Commission proposed to define
the term ‘‘speculative position limit’’ for
use throughout part 150 of the
Commission’s regulations to refer to
Federal or exchange-set limits, net long
or net short, including single month,
spot month, and all-months-combined
limits. This proposed definition was not
intended to limit the authority of
exchanges to adopt other types of limits
that do not meet the ‘‘speculative
position limit’’ definition, such as a
limit on gross long or gross short
positions, or a limit on holding or
controlling delivery instruments.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—
Speculative Position Limit
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘speculative
position limit.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed
with some non-substantive technical
changes related to the numbering
structure.
19. ‘‘Spot Month,’’ ‘‘Single Month,’’ and
‘‘All-Months’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Spot
Month, Single Month, and All Months
The Commission proposed to expand
the existing definition of ‘‘spot month’’
to: (1) Account for the fact that the
proposed limits would apply to both
physically-settled and certain cashsettled contracts; (2) clarify that the spot
month for referenced contracts would be
the same period as that of the relevant
core referenced futures contract; and (3)
account for variations in spot month
conventions that differ by commodity.
In particular, for the ICE Sugar No. 11
(SB) core referenced futures contract,
the spot month would mean the period
of time beginning at the opening of
trading on the second business day
following the expiration of the regular
option contract traded on the expiring
futures contract and ending when the
contract expires. For the ICE Sugar No.
16 (SF) core referenced futures contract,
the spot month would mean the period
of time beginning on the third-to-last
trading day of the contract month and
ending when the contract expires. For
the CME Live Cattle (LC) core
referenced futures contract, the spot
month would mean the period of time
beginning at the close of trading on the
first business day following the first
Friday of the contract month and ending
when the contract expires.
The Commission also proposed to
eliminate the existing definitions of
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‘‘single month’’ and ‘‘all-months’’
because the definitions for those terms
would be built into the proposed
definition of ‘‘speculative position
limit’’ described above.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Spot
Month, Single Month, and All Months
No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘spot month’’ or
the proposed elimination of the existing
definitions of ‘‘single month’’ and ‘‘all
months.’’ The Commission is adopting
the definition of spot month as
proposed, but with a correction to
reflect the proper spot month period for
the Live Cattle (LC) core referenced
futures contract. Final § 150.1 defines
the spot month for the Live Cattle (LC)
core referenced futures contract as the
period of time beginning at the close of
trading on the first business day
following the first Friday of the contract
month and ending when the contract
expires. The Commission is eliminating
the existing definitions of ‘‘single
month’’ and ‘‘all months’’ as proposed.
Finally, the Commission is adopting
some non-substantive technical changes
related to the numbering structure.
20. ‘‘Spread Transaction’’
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i. Background—Spread Transaction,
Existing § 150.3(a)(3)
In existing § 150.3(a)(3), the
Commission exempts from Federal
position limits ‘‘spread or arbitrage
positions,’’ subject to certain
restrictions, including the restriction
that the spread position be outside of
the spot month.543 The existing
regulations do not, however, define
‘‘spread or arbitrage positions.’’ Further,
under existing regulations, spread
exemptions from Federal positions
limits are self-effectuating and do not
require prior Commission approval.
Rather, market participants must request
spread exemptions from the relevant
exchange(s) in advance of exceeding
exchange limits.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Spread
Transaction
The Commission proposed a ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition to exempt from
Federal position limits transactions
normally known to the trade as
‘‘spreads.’’ The proposed definition
would explicitly include common types
543 See 17 CFR 150.3(a)(3) (permitting spread or
arbitrage positions that are ‘‘between single months
of a futures contract and/or, on a futures-equivalent
basis, options thereon, outside of the spot month,
in the same crop year; provided, however, that such
spread or arbitrage positions, when combined with
any other net positions in the single month, do not
exceed the all-months limit set forth in § 150.2.’’)
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of spread strategies, including: Calendar
spreads; inter-commodity spreads;
quality differential spreads; processing
spreads (such as energy ‘‘crack’’ or
soybean ‘‘crush’’ spreads); product or
by-product differential spreads; and
futures-options spreads. The proposed
spread transaction definition would also
eliminate the existing § 150.3(a)(3)
restrictions on spread exemptions,
including the restriction that spread
positions be outside of the spot-month.
Under proposed § 150.3(a)(2)(i),
positions that meet the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition would be selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits. Separately, under
proposed § 150.3(a)(2)(ii), the
Commission would, on a case-by-case
basis, be able to exempt any other
spread transaction that was not
included in the proposed spread
transaction definition, but that the
Commission has determined is
consistent with CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B),544 and exempted, pursuant
to proposed § 150.3(b).
iii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Spread Transaction
The Commission is adopting the
definition of ‘‘spread transaction’’ with
certain modifications to the definition to
include additional spread types, as
described below, to address
commenters’ views and other
considerations. The Commission is
providing additional clarification with
respect to cash-and-carry exemptions as
well as the application of spread
exemptions to the NYMEX NG core
referenced futures contract. The
Commission is also adopting Appendix
G to part 150 under the Final Rule to
provide additional clarifications to
market participants in connection with
the Commission’s treatment of spread
exemptions under the Final Rule.
iii. Comments—Spread Transaction
Generally, commenters requested that
the Commission expand or clarify the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition to
ensure that other commonly-used
spread strategies are exempted from
Federal position limits, including: (1)
Intra-market and inter-market spread
positions; 545 (2) inter-market spread
positions where the legs of the
544 As noted above, CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)
provides that the Commission shall set limits ‘‘to
the maximum extent practicable, in its discretion—
(i) to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation as described under this section; (ii) to
deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes,
and corners; (iii) to ensure sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (iv) to ensure
that the price discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted.’’
545 MFA/AIMA at 10; CMC at 7.
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3309
transaction are futures contracts in the
same commodity and same calendar
month or expiration; 546 (3) inter-market
spreads in which one leg is a referenced
contract and the other is a commodity
derivative contract (including an OTC
swap) that is not subject to Federal
positions limits; 547 (4) a spread between
a physically-settled position and a cashsettled position; 548 (5) a spread between
two cash-settled contracts in the spot
period, even if one leg is not subject to
Federal position limits; 549 (6) intracommodity spreads (including an intracommodity spread between two cashsettled contracts or between the cashsettled and related physically-settled
futures contract); 550 and (7) cash-andcarry exemptions that are currently
permitted under IFUS Rule 6.29(e).551
546 ICE
at 7.
at 7; FIA at 21.
548 CME Group at 11.
549 Id.
550 CEWG at 27; FIA at 20–21 (explaining that the
intra-commodity spread would acknowledge the
link between the prices of cash-settled and physical
delivery futures involving the same commodity).
See also CEWG at 27; CCI at 2–3 (requesting an
exemption for intra-commodity spreads that are: (1)
In the same class of referenced contract, (2) across
classes of referenced contracts, or (3) across markets
in referenced contracts (i.e., on different exchanges)
in the same or different calendar months); CEWG
at 27 (providing proposed revisions to the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ regulatory text); CME Group at 11.
551 FIA at 21; see also, IFUS at 7–9 (providing an
example of a cash-and-carry exemption and
describing such exemption as a type of calendar
month spread where a person holds a long position
in the spot month and a short position in the
second nearby contract month) and IFUS Rule
6.29(e) (outlining its strict procedures that set the
terms by which cash-and-carry exemptions may be
permitted, including the following conditions: (i)
The person seeking the exemption must provide the
cost of carrying the physical commodity, the
minimum spread differential at which it will enter
into a straddle position in order to obtain profit,
and the quantity of stocks currently owned in IFUS
licensed warehouses or tank facilities; (ii) when
granted a cash and carry exemption, the person
receiving the exemption shall agree that before the
price of the nearby contract month rises to a
premium to the second contract month, it will
liquidate all long positions in the nearby contract
month; and (iii) block trades may not be used to
establish positions upon which a cash and carry
exemption request is based). IFUS further explained
that it has a long history of granting cash and carry
exemptions for certain warehoused contracts
(specifically coffee, cocoa, and FCOJ), and that
where there are plentiful supplies, these
exemptions serve an economic purpose in the days
leading up to the first notice day and throughout
the notice period, because: (1) They help maintain
an appropriate economic relationship between the
nearby and next successive contract month; (2) they
allow commercial market participants the
opportunity to compete for the ownership of
certified inventories beyond the limitations of the
spot-month position limit; and (3) the holder of the
exemption provides liquidity so that traders that
carry short positions into the notice period without
capability to deliver may exit their positions in an
orderly manner. According to IFUS, if the
appropriate supply and price relationship exists in
a given expiry, and the exchange grants the
547 ICE
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In addition, commenters requested
that the Commission clarify that: (1) The
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition is a nonexhaustive list, and therefore, permit
exchanges to grant spread exemptions
that are not covered by § 150.3(a)(2) by
using the streamlined process in § 150.9
for recognizing non-enumerated bona
fide hedges; 552 and (2) a calendar
spread would permit a market
participant to net down its positions for
the purposes of Federal spot-month and
single-month limits.553
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—Spread
Transaction
The Commission is adopting the
proposed definition of ‘‘spread
transaction’’ with certain modifications,
as described below, to address
commenters’ views and other
considerations. First, the Commission is
expanding the definition to include
additional types of spreads. Second, the
Commission is clarifying the treatment
of cash-and-carry exemptions as
permissible calendar spreads and
providing additional guidance to
exchanges in connection with such
spreads. Third, the Commission
addresses the application of spread
exemptions in connection with the
NYMEX NG core referenced futures
contract. The Commission is also
providing additional guidance on the
use of exempt spread transactions in
Appendix G of this Final Rule.
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a. The ‘‘Spread Transaction’’ Definition
Includes Several Additional Spread
Types Under the Final Rule
First, the Commission is expanding
the proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition to make clear that the
definition as finalized includes intramarket, inter-market, and intracommodity spread positions in addition
to the spread strategies listed in the
proposed definition. The final ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition will cover: Intramarket spreads, inter-market spreads,
intra-commodity spreads, and intercommodity spreads, including calendar
spreads, quality differential spreads,
processing spreads, product or byproduct differential spreads, and
futures-options spreads.554 The
application, then proper application of the terms as
expiry approaches will assist in an orderly
expiration. IFUS 7–9; FIA at 21.
552 ICE at 7.
553 Citadel at 8–9.
554 For example, trading activity in many
commodity derivative markets is concentrated in
the nearby contract month, but a hedger may need
to offset risk in deferred months where derivative
trading activity may be less active. A calendar
spread trader could provide liquidity without
exposing himself or herself to the price risk
inherent in an outright position in a deferred
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Commission intends for the spread
transaction definition to be sufficiently
broad to capture most, if not all, spread
strategies currently granted by
exchanges and used by market
participants. The Commission believes
this is consistent with, but provides
more clarity than, its existing approach
to spread exemptions in existing
§ 150.3(a)(3), which broadly exempts
‘‘spread or arbitrage positions.’’ 555
In light of the revised ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, the Commission
expects that most spread strategies will
qualify as intra-market, inter-market,
inter-commodity, or intra-commodity
spreads, and is providing a nonexhaustive list of the most common
specific types of spread strategies that
fall within those four categories. Any
requests for spread exemptions that fall
outside of the spread transaction
definition are required to be submitted
to the Commission in advance pursuant
to § 150.3(b) of the Final Rule.
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined not to allow exchanges to
grant new types of spread exemptions
using the streamlined process in § 150.9
for various reasons explained below in
detail under the discussion of
§ 150.3.556
In addition, considering the
significant number of requests for
clarification commenters submitted
regarding the spread transaction
definition, the Commission is providing
guidance on spread transactions in
Appendix G to part 150 of the
month. Processing spreads can serve a similar
function. For example, a soybean processor may
seek to hedge his or her processing costs by entering
into a ‘‘crush’’ spread, i.e., going long soybeans and
short soybean meal and oil. A speculator could
facilitate the hedger’s ability to do such a
transaction by entering into a ‘‘reverse crush’’
spread (i.e., going short soybeans and long soybean
meal and oil). Quality differential spreads, and
product or by-product differential spreads, may
serve similar liquidity-enhancing functions when
spreading a position in an actively traded
commodity derivatives market such as CBOT Wheat
(W) against a position in another actively traded
market, such as MGEX Wheat.
555 Under existing regulations, the Commission
views its use of the term ‘‘spread’’ to mean the same
as ‘‘arbitrage’’ or ‘‘straddle’’ as those terms are used
in CEA section 4a(a) and existing § 150.3(a)(3) of the
Commission’s regulations. Consistent with existing
regulations, the Commission’s sole use of the term
‘‘spread’’ in this rulemaking is intended to also
capture arbitrage or straddle strategies, and is not
intended to be a substantive change from its
existing regulations. The Commission notes that
certain exchanges may distinguish between
‘‘spread’’ and ‘‘arbitrage’’ positions for purposes of
exchange exemptions, but the Commission does not
make that distinction here for purposes of its
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition.
556 See infra Section II.C.4. (discussing statutory
and policy reasons why the Commission will not
permit exchanges to process requests for spread
exemptions that are not included in the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition using the § 150.9 process).
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Commission’s regulations, as adopted in
this Final Rule, to address those
questions and other considerations. In
particular, paragraph (a) of the guidance
provides some recommended best
practices for exchanges to consider
when granting spread exemptions,
especially during the spot period.
Paragraph (a) of the guidance also
reminds exchanges of their existing
obligations as self-regulatory
organizations, including under DCM
Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle
6, as applicable, to implement their
exchange-set limits and exemption
granting processes in a way that
(consistent with the rules and
procedures in final § 150.5 adopted
herein) 557 reduces the potential threat
of market manipulation or congestion.
Moreover, paragraph (b) of the
guidance clarifies that the following
spread strategies are covered by the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition: (1)
Inter-market spread positions where the
legs of the transaction are futures
contracts in the same commodity and
same calendar month or expiration; (2)
spread positions in which one leg is a
referenced contract and the other is a
commodity derivative contract that is
not subject to Federal positions limits
(including OTC commodity derivative
contracts, but not including commodity
index contracts); 558 (3) a spread
between a physically-settled position
and a cash-settled position; (4) a spread
between two cash-settled contracts; (5)
certain cash-and-carry exemptions,
subject to certain recommendations and
considerations outlined in paragraph (c)
of the Commission’s guidance in
Appendix G of this Final Rule; and (6)
spreads that are ‘‘legged in’’ or carried
out in two steps.
b. ‘‘Cash-and-Carry’’ Exemptions
Second, as mentioned above,
paragraph (c) of the guidance
recommends certain factors for
exchanges to consider when granting
cash-and-carry exemptions.559 The
557 See infra Section II.D. (discussing exchanges’
obligations when setting exchange position limits
and granting exemptions therefrom).
558 To avoid subverting the Commission’s policy
on not allowing self-effectuating risk management
exemptions (except through the pass-through swap
provision), the spread transaction definition would
not cover a spread position in which one leg is a
referenced contract and the other leg is a
commodity index contract, as clarified in Appendix
G.
559 As final Appendix G provides, the spread
transaction definition in § 150.1 permits
transactions commonly known as ‘‘cash-and-carry’’
trades whereby a market participant enters a long
futures positions in the spot month and an
equivalent short futures position in the following
month, in order to guarantee a return that, at
minimum, covers the costs of its carrying charges.
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Commission understands that IFUS has
granted this type of calendar spread
exemption for some time, and has
experience monitoring the use of such
exemptions to ensure that its market
operates in a manner that is consistent
with the applicable DCM Core
Principles.560 The Commission has,
however, previously expressed concern
about these exemptions and their
impact on the spot month price for a
particular futures contract.561 In
particular, the Commission has
explained that a large demand for
delivery on cash-and-carry positions
might distort the price of the expiring
futures contract upwards.562 This would
particularly be a concern in those
commodity markets where price
discovery for the cash spot price
occurred in the expiring futures
contract.563
The Commission recognizes, however,
the importance of cash-and-carry
positions in the price discovery process
in certain markets and reminds
exchanges of their responsibility to
monitor and safeguard against
convergence issues that could arise
related to the use of cash-and-carry
exemptions. Accordingly, the
Commission views these exemptions as
a type of calendar spread strategy that
warrants additional guidance to
encourage exchanges to have suitable
safeguards in place to ensure that they
grant and monitor cash-and-carry
exemptions in a manner that is
consistent with their obligation to
reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation and congestion.
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c. Treatment of Spread Transactions
Involving NYMEX NG
Third, the Commission is providing
clarification regarding the intersection
of the conditional natural gas spot
month limit exemption and spread
exemptions permitted under § 150.3. As
set forth in Appendix G, the
Commission reinforces that a spread
transaction exemption would not cover
natural gas spot month positions that
exceed the conditional natural gas spot
month limit in § 150.3(a)(4) of this Final
Rule. That is, a market participant
cannot rely on a spread transaction
exemption to hold a spot month
position that would exceed the
equivalent of 10,000 contracts of the
With this exemption, the market participant is able
to take physical delivery of the product in the
nearby month and may redeliver the same product
in a deferred month.
560 See IFUS at 7–9 and ICE Futures U.S. Rule
6.29(e).
561 See 81 FR at 96833.
562 Id.
563 See 81 FR at 96833.
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NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas core
referenced futures contract per exchange
that lists a natural gas cash-settled
referenced contract. Additional
discussion on the natural gas
conditional spot month limit exemption
is provided further below.564
As discussed further below, in
§ 150.3, the Commission is providing an
exemption from the Federal spot month
position limit level for natural gas. The
natural gas conditional spot month limit
exemption allows a trader to hold up to:
(1) 10,000 spot month cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts per
exchange that lists a cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract (of
which there are currently three—
NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal); and (2) an
additional position in cash-settled
economically equivalent NYMEX NG
OTC swaps that has a notional amount
equal to 10,000 equivalent-sized
contracts; provided, that the market
participant does not hold positions in
the spot month of the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract.565 The
Commission adopted the Federal
conditional limit for natural gas in order
to avoid disrupting the well-developed,
unique liquidity characteristics of the
natural gas derivatives markets, in
which the cash-settled natural gas
referenced contracts, when combined,
have significantly higher liquidity than
the physically-settled natural gas
contracts. The Federal conditional limit
requires divestiture of the spot month
physically-settled NYMEX referenced
contract due to concerns about, among
other things, fostering an environment
that incentivizes traders to manipulate
the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract in order to benefit a
larger cash-settled position in natural
gas (i.e., ‘‘bang’’ or ‘‘mark’’ the close).
The Commission intends for the natural
gas conditional limit’s position limit
levels to serve as a firm cap for the
maximum amount of cash-settled
natural gas spot month positions a
trader can hold. The Commission
clarifies that a person cannot
circumvent this cap using a spread
transaction exemption.
564 See infra Section II.B.3.vi.a. (discussing the
Federal spot-month limit for natural gas under
§ 150.2) and Section II.C.6 (discussing the
conditional spot-month limit for natural gas under
§ 150.3(a)(4)).
565 This is different from the final Federal spot
month position limits for NYMEX NG, pursuant to
which a trader may hold up to: (1) 2,000 cashsettled NYMEX NG referenced contracts per
exchange that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract; (2) an additional position in
cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG
OTC swaps that has a notional amount equal to
2,000 equivalent-sized contracts; and (3) 2,000
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
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3311
That is, the Commission believes that
cash-settled natural gas positions that
exceed the natural gas conditional limit
in the spot month would be unusually
large and could potentially have a
disruptive effect on the physicallysettled natural gas contract, including
by inhibiting convergence at expiration.
Specifically, by allowing traders to layer
additional cash-settled natural gas spot
month positions on top of the maximum
cash-settled natural gas spot month
positions permitted under the natural
gas conditional limit, a person could
amass an extremely large cash-settled
spot month position in natural gas. This
extremely large cash-settled spot month
position could push prices up for cashsettled spot month contracts vis-a`-vis
the physically-settled spot month
contracts. In response, arbitrageurs may
attempt to capitalize on this price
discrepancy by going short the cashsettled spot month contracts, which
would have a downward pressure on
the price of these contracts, and going
long on the physically-settled spot
month contracts, which would have an
upward pressure on the price of these
contracts. This upward price pressure
on the physically-settled contract could
potentially push the price of the
physically-settled contract away from
the actual cash price for the natural gas
commodity, which could disrupt
convergence upon expiration of the
physically-settled contract. As such, the
Commission clarifies that a person
cannot layer a spread exemption on top
of the conditional spot month limit in
natural gas and thereby circumvent the
conditional spot month limit cap.566
21. ‘‘Swap’’ and ‘‘Swap Dealer’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Swap
and Swap Dealer
The Commission proposed to
incorporate the definitions of ‘‘swap’’
and ‘‘swap dealer’’ as they are defined
in section 1a of the Act and § 1.3 of this
chapter.567
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Swap and
Swap Dealer
No commenter addressed the
proposed definitions of ‘‘swap’’ or
‘‘swap dealer.’’ The Commission is
adopting these definitions as proposed.
566 For the avoidance of doubt, traders who avail
themselves of a spread exemption and enter into
spread positions between the physically-settled
NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract during
the spot month and one or more cash-settled natural
gas referenced contracts or cross commodity
contracts, are not allowed under the Final Rule to
avail themselves of the natural gas conditional limit
until they exit the above-noted spread position.
567 7 U.S.C. 1a(47) and 1a(49); 17 CFR 1.3.
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22. ‘‘Transition Period Swap’’
23. Deletion of § 150.1(i)
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Transition Period Swap
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM—Deletion of
§ 150.1(i)
The Commission proposed to
eliminate existing § 150.1(i), which
includes a table specifying the ‘‘first
delivery month of the crop year’’ for
certain commodities. The crop year
definition had been pertinent for
purposes of the spread exemption to the
individual month limit in current
§ 150.3(a)(3), which limits spreads to
those between individual months in the
same crop year and to a level no more
than that of the all-months limit. This
provision was pertinent at a time when
the single month and all-monthscombined limits were different, which
is no longer the case.
The Commission proposed to create
the defined term ‘‘transition period
swap’’ to mean any swap entered into
during the period commencing after the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 (July 22, 2010) and ending 60 days
after the publication of a final Federal
position limits rulemaking in the
Federal Register. As discussed in
connection with proposed § 150.3 later
in this release, if acquired in good faith,
such swaps would be exempt from
Federal position limits, although such
swaps could not be netted with posteffective date swaps for purposes of
complying with spot month speculative
position limits.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Transition
Period Swap
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No commenter addressed the
proposed definition of ‘‘transition
period swap.’’ The Commission is
adopting the definition as proposed,
with two modifications. The
Commission is clarifying that a
transition period swap is a swap entered
into during the period commencing ‘‘on
the day of,’’ rather than ‘‘after,’’ the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 to clarify the ambiguity of the
phrase ‘‘after the enactment.’’ The
Commission is also adding a phrase to
clarify that the terms of such swaps
‘‘have not expired as of 60 days after the
publication date.’’ The Commission
intended to include this in the 2020
NPRM, but the language was
inadvertently omitted from the
proposed definition. This modification
conforms to the definition of ‘‘preenactment swap,’’ which also addresses
the timeframe for expiration of a swap’s
terms.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Deletion of
§ 150.1(i)
No commenter addressed the
proposed elimination of existing
§ 150.1(i). The Commission is adopting
as proposed. Now that the current and
proposed single month and all months
combined limits are the same, and now
that the Commission is adopting new
enumerated bona fide hedges in § 150.1
and Appendix B to part 150 as well as
a new process for granting spread
exemptions in § 150.3, this provision is
no longer needed.
B. § 150.2—Federal Position Limit
Levels
This section will address the issues
related to Federal position limit levels
in final § 150.2 in the following
order:568
(1) Background of the existing Federal
position limit levels;
(2) identification of contracts subject
to both Federal spot and non-spot
568 In connection with the discussion of § 150.2
that appears below, for each numbered section, the
Commission generally provides a summary of the
proposed approach, a brief overview of the
Commission’s final determination, a summary of
comments, and the Commission’s response to
comments.
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month position limits, and contracts
subject only to Federal spot month
position limits;
(3) Federal spot month position limit
levels;
(4) Federal non-spot month position
limit levels;
(5) the establishment of subsequent
spot month and non-spot month
position limit levels;
(6) relevant contract months;
(7) limits on ‘‘pre-existing positions’’;
(8) positions on foreign boards of
trade;
(9) anti-evasion;
(10) netting and Federal position limit
levels for cash-settled referenced
contracts; and
(11) ‘‘eligible affiliates’’ and position
aggregation.
As part of the discussion of Federal
spot month position limit levels (noted
as issue (3) above and found in Section
II.B.3. below), the Commission also will
address Federal spot month position
limit levels specifically for (i) ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT), (ii) NYMEX Henry
Hub Natural Gas (NG), and (iii) the three
wheat core referenced futures contracts.
Similarly, as part of the discussion of
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels (noted as issue (4) above and
found in Section II.B.4. below), the
Commission will also address Federal
non-spot month position limit levels
specifically for (i) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
and (ii) the three wheat core referenced
futures contracts.
1. Background—Existing Federal
Position Limit Levels—§ 150.2
Federal spot month, single month,
and all-months-combined position
limits currently apply to the nine
physically-settled legacy agricultural
contracts listed in existing § 150.2, and,
on a futures-equivalent basis, to options
contracts thereon. Existing Federal
position limit levels set forth in
§ 150.2 569 apply net long or net short
and are as follows:
569 17
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2. Application of Federal Position
Limits During the Spot Month and the
Non-Spot Month
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i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Application of Federal Position Limits
During the Spot Month and the NonSpot Month
The Commission proposed to
maintain (rather than remove) Federal
non-spot month position limits for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts, with
the modifications described further
below, because the Commission has
observed no reason to eliminate
them.572 These non-spot month position
limits have been in place for decades,
and while the Commission proposed to
modify the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels, the Commission
believed that removing them entirely
could potentially result in market
disruption. The Commission’s position
was reinforced by the feedback it
received from commercial market
participants trading the nine legacy
agricultural contracts who requested
that the Commission maintain Federal
position limits outside of the spot
month in order to promote market
integrity.573
The 2020 NPRM imposed Federal
position limits during all contract
months for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts (and their associated
referenced contracts), and only during
the spot month for the 16 non-legacy
core referenced futures contracts (and
their associated referenced contracts)
that would be subject to Federal
position limits for the first time.570 For
the 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts (and their associated
referenced contracts), the 2020 NPRM
also required that they be subject to
exchange-set position limits or position
accountability outside of the spot
month.571
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Application of Federal
Position Limits During the Spot Month
and the Non-Spot Month
The Commission is adopting the
approach that was proposed in the 2020
NPRM. Under the Final Rule, Federal
position limits apply to all 25 core
referenced futures contracts during the
spot month. The 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts subject to
Federal position limits for the first time
under the Final Rule are subject to
Federal position limits only during the
570 As noted in further detail in Section II.A.16.,
their associated referenced contracts are also subject
to Federal position limits.
571 Proposed § 150.5(b)(2). For existing exchangeset position limits, see Market Resources, ICE
Futures U.S. Website, available at https://
www.theice.com/futures-us/market-resources (ICE
exchange-set position limits); Position Limits, CME
Group website, available at https://
www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/positionlimits.html; Rules and Regulations of the
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc., MGEX, available
at https://www.mgex.com/documents/Rulebook_
051.pdf (MGEX exchange-set position limits).
572 85 FR at 11628.
573 Id.
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spot month (and not outside of the spot
month). Outside of the spot month,
these 16 core referenced futures
contracts are subject only to exchangeset position limits or position
accountability.
iii. Comments—Application of Federal
Position Limits During the Spot Month
and the Non-Spot Month
Many commenters generally agreed
with the proposed approach and
supported Federal position limits
during the spot month for all 25 core
referenced futures contracts, and
outside of the spot month for only the
nine legacy agricultural contracts.574
The Commission did not receive any
comments objecting to Federal spot
month position limits for all 25 core
referenced futures contracts.
On the other hand, the Commission
received comments expressing concern
over two related issues. First, a few
commenters disagreed with the 2020
NPRM imposing Federal non-spot
month position limits on only the nine
legacy agricultural contracts.575 NEFI
stated that ‘‘the proposed rule arbitrarily
fails to establish limits for non-spot
month referenced energy contracts’’ and
stated that ‘‘distributing limits across all
574 See MGEX at 1; CHS at 2; CME Group at 2;
IFUS at 2; ICE at 2, 3–4; Chevron at 2; CMC at 6;
EEI at 4; FIA at 2; MFA/AIMA at 2–3; NCFC at 4;
Shell at 3; PIMCO at 4; SIFMA AMG at 4; Suncor
at 2; AQR at 2, 4–5, 7–10; CCI at 2; COPE at 4; IECA
at 2; NGSA at 3; CEWG at 3; and AFIA at 2.
575 In addition to comments from NEFI and
PMAA, which are discussed below, AFR and
Rutkowski asserted that the 2020 NPRM will likely
be ‘‘ineffective in controlling excessive
speculation’’ due, in part, to its failure to ‘‘impose
Federal position limits outside of the current spot
month for most commodities (outside of legacy
agricultural commodities).’’ AFR at 2 and
Rutkowski at 2.
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While not explicitly stated in § 150.2,
the Commission’s practice has been to
set Federal spot month position limit
levels at or below 25% of deliverable
supply based on exchange estimates of
deliverable supply (‘‘EDS’’) that are
verified by the Commission, and to set
Federal position limit levels outside of
the spot month at 10% of open interest
for the first 25,000 contracts of open
interest, with a marginal increase of
2.5% of open interest thereafter.
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months is preferable, as it would protect
market convergence and mute
disruptive signals from large speculative
trades.’’ 576 PMAA echoed similar
concerns by stating that there was ‘‘no
data or discussion provided in the
proposal indicating why the
Commission believes limits for non-spot
months are not appropriate.’’ 577
Second, commenters also expressed
concern that, by only having Federal
non-spot month position limits for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts, the
Commission is relying too much on the
exchanges to address excessive
speculation.578 In particular,
commenters were concerned about the
incentives and other conflicts of interest
that exchanges may have to permit
‘‘higher trading volumes and large
numbers of market participants’’ 579 and
about the exchanges’ use of position
accountability by alleging that it is a
‘‘voluntary’’ limit 580 and pointing to
‘‘recent notable failures in exchange
accountability regimes.’’ 581
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—
Application of Federal Position Limits
During the Spot Month and the NonSpot Month
The Commission is adopting the
approach that was proposed in the 2020
NPRM by applying Federal position
limits to all 25 core referenced futures
contracts during the spot month, but
only to the existing nine legacy
agricultural contracts outside of the spot
month for the reasons discussed below.
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a. Response to Comments Opposing the
2020 NPRM’s Approach To Subject
Only the Nine Legacy Agricultural
Contracts to Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limits
The Commission has concluded that,
while it may be important and, as
described below, necessary 582 to
impose Federal spot month position
limits on each core referenced futures
contract, the analysis changes with
576 NEFI at 3 and PMAA at 3 (with respect to
energy commodity positions, ‘‘[h]istory has shown
on a number of occasions that large trades in nonspot months can distort markets and increase
volatility’’).
577 PMAA at 3. PMAA also suggested that the
Commission apply the ‘‘traditional 2.5% limit
formula to energy contracts and economically
equivalent energy futures, options, and swaps in
non-spot months.’’
578 NEFI at 3; PMAA at 3; and IATP at 10.
579 NEFI at 3.
580 Id.
581 IATP at 10. See also PMAA at 3
(‘‘[u]nfortunately, the proposal instead finds
accountability limits to be sufficient to manage
speculation’’).
582 See infra Section III.E. (discussing necessity
finding for spot month and non-spot month
position limits).
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respect to the non-spot month for the
following reasons.
First, while the Final Rule only
applies Federal position limits to the 16
non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts during the spot month, the
Final Rule requires exchanges to
establish either position limit levels or
position accountability outside of the
spot month for all such contracts.583
Accordingly, all 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts will be
subject to either position limits or
position accountability outside of the
spot month at the exchange level. Any
such exchange-set position limit and
position accountability must comply
with the standards established by the
Commission in final § 150.5(b)
including, among other things, that any
such levels be ‘‘necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or
index.’’ 584 Exchanges are also required
to submit any rules adopting or
modifying such position limit or
position accountability to the
Commission in advance of
implementation pursuant to part 40 of
the Commission’s regulations.585
Additionally, exchanges are subject to
DCM Core Principle 5 or SEF Core
Principle 6, as applicable, which
establish additional protections against
manipulation and congestion.586 These
583 Final
§ 150.5(b)(2).
584 Id.
585 17 CFR part 40. Under the final ‘‘position
accountability’’ definition in § 150.1, exchange
accountability rules must require a trader whose
position exceeds the accountability level to consent
to: (1) Provide information about its position to the
exchange; and (2) halt increasing further its position
or reduce its position in an orderly manner, in each
case as requested by the exchange.
586 Commission regulation § 38.300, which
mirrors DCM Core Principle 5, states: ‘‘To reduce
the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion (especially during trading in the
delivery month), the board of trade shall adopt for
each contract of the board of trade, as is necessary
and appropriate, position limitations or position
accountability for speculators. For any contract that
is subject to a position limitation established by the
Commission, pursuant to section 4a(a), the board of
trade shall set the position limitation of the board
of trade at a level not higher than the position
limitation established by the Commission.’’ 17 CFR
38.300 and 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5). Likewise, Commission
regulation § 37.600, which mirrors SEF Core
Principle 6, states: ‘‘(a) In general. To reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion, especially during trading in the delivery
month, a swap execution facility that is a trading
facility shall adopt for each of the contracts of the
facility, as is necessary and appropriate, position
limitations or position accountability for
speculators. (b) Position limits. For any contract that
is subject to a position limitation established by the
Commission pursuant to section 4a(a) of the Act,
the swap execution facility shall: (1) Set its position
limitation at a level no higher than the Commission
limitation; and (2) Monitor positions established on
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tools and legal obligations, in
conjunction with surveillance at both
the exchange and Federal level, will
continue to offer strong deterrence and
protection against manipulation and
disruptions outside of the spot
month.587
Second, in response to the concerns
expressed by NEFI and PMAA that a
lack of Federal non-spot month position
limits could harm market convergence
and lead to disruptive signals from large
speculative trades,588 the Commission
reiterates that corners and squeezes, and
related convergence issues, do not occur
outside of the spot month when there is
no threat of delivery.589 Convergence
occurs during the spot month and,
specifically, at the expiration of the spot
month for a physically-settled contract.
As a result, positions outside of the spot
month have minimal impact on
convergence. The Commission,
however, recognizes that it is possible
that unusually large positions in
contracts outside of the spot month
could distort the natural spread
relationship between contract months.
For example, if traders hold unusually
large positions outside of the spot
month, and if those traders exit those
positions immediately before the spot
month, that could cause congestion and
also affect the pricing of the spot month
contract. While such congestion or price
distortion cannot be ruled out,
exchange-set position limits and
position accountability function to
mitigate against such risks. Thus, the
position limits framework adopted
herein is able to guard against any such
possibility through the tools and legal
obligations applicable to exchanges that
are described in the prior paragraph.
Third, limiting Federal non-spot
month position limits to the nine legacy
agricultural commodities may limit any
market disruptions that could result
or through the swap execution facility for
compliance with the limit set by the Commission
and the limit, if any, set by the swap execution
facility.’’ 17 CFR 37.600 and 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(6).
587 85 FR at 11629.
588 NEFI at 3 and PMAA at 3.
589 In the case of certain commodities, it may
become difficult to exert market power via
concentrated futures positions in deferred month
contracts. For example, a participant with a large
cash-market position and a large deferred futures
position may attempt to move cash markets in order
to benefit that deferred futures position. Any
attempt to do so could become muted due to
general futures market resistance from multiple
vested interests present in that deferred futures
month (i.e., the overall size of the deferred contracts
may be too large for one individual to influence via
cash-market activity). However, if a large position
that is accumulated over time in a particular
deferred month is held into the spot month, it is
possible that such positions could form the
groundwork for an attempted corner or squeeze in
the spot month.
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from adding new Federal non-spot
month position limits on certain metal
and energy commodities that have never
been subject to Federal position
limits.590
b. Response to Comments Regarding the
Commission’s Reliance on Exchanges
In response to commenters’ specific
concerns about the reliance on
exchanges’ position accountability, the
Commission views position
accountability outside of the spot month
as a more flexible alternative to Federal
non-spot month position limits.591
Position accountability establishes a
level at which an exchange will start
investigating a trader’s current position.
This will include, among other things,
asking traders additional questions
regarding their strategies and their
purpose for the positions, while
evaluating them under current market
conditions. If a position does not raise
any concerns, the exchange will allow
the trader to exceed the accountability
level. If the position raises concerns, the
exchange has the authority to instruct
the trader to stop adding to the trader’s
position, or to reduce the position.
Position accountability is a particularly
effective tool because it provides the
exchanges with an opportunity to
intervene once a position hits a
relatively low level (vis-a`-vis the level at
which a Federal or an exchange position
limit level would typically be set), while
still affording market participants with
the flexibility to establish a position that
exceeds the position accountability
level if it is justified by the nature of the
position and market conditions.
Position accountability applies to all
participants on the exchange, whether
commercial or non-commercial, and
regardless of whether the relevant
participant would qualify for an
exemption.
The Commission has decades of
experience overseeing position
accountability implemented by
exchanges, including for all 16 nonlegacy core referenced futures contracts
that are not subject to Federal position
limits outside of the spot month.592
590 85
FR at 11629.
591 Id.
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592 See, e.g., 56 FR at 51687 (Oct. 15, 1991)
(permitting CME to establish position
accountability for certain financial contracts traded
on CME); Speculative Position Limits—Exemptions
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Based on the Commission’s experience,
position accountability has functioned
effectively.593 Furthermore, the
Commission notes that position
accountability is not the only tool
available for exchanges. As noted
previously, exchanges can also utilize
exchange-set position limits. Several
exchanges have set non-spot month
position limits for contracts that are not
subject to Federal position limits, and
all of them appear to have functioned
effectively based on the Commission’s
observation of those markets.594
With respect to IATP’s reference to
‘‘recent notable failures’’ in position
accountability levels, IATP appears to
be referencing the events that involve
Kraft Foods Group, Inc. and Mondele¯z
Global LLC with respect to the CBOT
Wheat (W) contract in 2011595 and
United States Oil Fund, LP (‘‘US Oil’’)
with respect to the WTI contract earlier
this year.596 With respect to CBOT
Wheat (W), CBOT did not have position
accountability for that contract at that
time. With respect to the WTI contract,
IATP does not describe the failure in
position accountability that occurred
with respect to US Oil and how such
failure resulted in negative prices in the
WTI contract.597
With respect to commenter concerns
about the incentives of exchanges, the
from Commission Rule 1.61, 57 FR 29064 (June 30,
1992) (permitting the use of accountability for
trading in energy commodity contracts); and 17 CFR
150.5(e) (2009) (formally recognizing the practice of
accountability for contracts that met specified
standards).
593 85 FR at 11629.
594 For example, exchanges have set non-spot
month position limits for the following core
referenced futures contracts, even though such
contracts currently are not subject to Federal nonspot month position limits (and will continue to be
subject only to Federal spot month position limits
under this Final Rule): (1) CME Live Cattle (LC),
which has an exchange-set single month position
limit level of 6,300 contracts, but no all-monthscombined position limit; (2) ICE FCOJ–A (OJ),
which has an exchange-set single month position
limit level of 3,200 contracts and an all-monthscombined position limit level of 3,200 contracts;
and (3) ICE Sugar No. 16, which has an exchangeset single month position limit level of 1,000
contracts and an all-months-combined position
limit level of 1,000 contracts.
595 CFTC Charges Kraft Foods Group, Inc. and
Mondele¯z Global LLC with Manipulation of Wheat
Futures and Cash Wheat Prices (Apr. 1, 2015), U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission website,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/7150–15.
596 IATP at 5, 10, and 18.
597 Id.
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Commission believes that, although
exchanges may have a financial interest
in increased trading volume, whether
speculative or hedging, the Commission
closely oversees the establishment,
modification, and implementation of
exchange-set position limits and
position accountability. As noted above,
both exchange-set position limits and
position accountability must comply
with standards established by the
Commission in final § 150.5(b)
including, among other things, that any
such levels be ‘‘necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or
index.’’ 598 Exchanges are also required
to submit any rules adopting or
modifying exchange-set position limits
or position accountability to the
Commission in advance of
implementation, pursuant to part 40 of
the Commission’s regulations.599
Additionally, exchanges are subject to
DCM Core Principle 5 or SEF Core
Principle 6, as applicable, which
establishes additional protections
against manipulation and congestion.600
Furthermore, exchange-set position
limits and position accountability will
be subject to rule enforcement reviews
by the Commission.601 Finally, the
Commission notes that exchanges also
have significant financial incentives and
regulatory obligations to maintain wellfunctioning markets. This observation,
which has been supported by studies, is
discussed in greater detail below.602
3. Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Levels
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Levels
598 Final
§ 150.5(b)(2).
CFR part 40.
600 17 CFR 38.300 and 17 CFR 37.600.
601 The Commission conducts regular rule
enforcement reviews of each exchange’s audit trail,
trade practice surveillance, disciplinary, and
dispute resolution programs for ongoing
compliance with the Core Principles. See Rule
Enforcement Reviews of Designated Contract
Markets, available at https://www.cftc.gov/
IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/
dcmruleenf.html.
602 Section II.B.3.iii.b.(3)(iii) (Concern over
Exchanges’ Conflict of Interest and Improper
Incentives in Maintaining Their Markets).
599 17
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Under the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission proposed applying Federal
spot month position limits to all 25 core
referenced futures contracts and any
associated referenced contracts.603 The
spot month limits would apply
separately to physically-settled and
cash-settled referenced contracts, which
meant that a market participant could
net positions across physically-settled
referenced contracts and separately net
positions across cash-settled referenced
contracts.604 However, the market
participant would not be permitted to
net cash-settled referenced contracts
with physically-settled referenced
603 As described below, under the 2020 NPRM,
Federal non-spot month position limit levels would
only apply to the nine legacy agricultural contracts
and their associated referenced contracts. The 16
non-legacy core referenced futures contracts and
their associated referenced contracts would be
subject to Federal position limits during the spot
month, and exchange-set position limits or position
accountability outside of the spot month.
604 See Section II.B.10.
605 Id.
606 Proposed 150.2(e) additionally provided that
market participants would not need to comply with
the Federal position limit levels until 365 days after
publication of the Final Rule in the Federal
Register. For further discussion of the Final Rule’s
compliance and effective dates, see Section I.D.
(Effective Date and Compliance Period).
607 As of October 15, 2020.
608 CBOT’s existing exchange-set position limit
level for CBOT Wheat (W) is 600 contracts.
However, for its May contract month, CBOT has a
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contracts.605 Proposed § 150.2(e)
provided that Federal spot month
position limit levels would be set forth
in proposed Appendix E to part 150.606
The proposed spot month position limit
levels were as follows:
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variable spot month position limit level that is
dependent upon the deliverable supply that it
publishes from the CBOT’s Stocks and Grain report
on the Friday preceding the first notice day for the
May contract month. In the last five trading days
of the expiring futures month in May, the
speculative spot month position limit level is: (1)
600 contracts if deliverable supplies are at or above
2,400 contracts; (2) 500 contracts if deliverable
supplies are between 2,000 and 2,399 contracts; (3)
400 contracts if deliverable supplies are between
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1,600 and 1,999 contracts; (4) 300 contracts if
deliverable supplies are between 1,200 and 1,599
contracts; and (5) 220 contracts if deliverable
supplies are below 1,200 contracts.
609 The proposed Federal spot month position
limit levels for CME Live Cattle (LC) would feature
step-down limit levels similar to the CME’s existing
Live Cattle (LC) step-down exchange-set limit
levels. The proposed Federal spot month step down
limit level is: (1) 600 contracts at the close of
trading on the first business day following the first
Friday of the contract month; (2) 300 contracts at
the close of trading on the business day prior to the
last five trading days of the contract month; and (3)
200 contracts at the close of trading on the business
day prior to the last two trading days of the contract
month.
610 CME’s existing exchange-set limit for Live
Cattle (LC) has the following step-down spot month
position limit levels: (1) 600 contracts at the close
of trading on the first business day following the
first Friday of the contract month; (2) 300 contracts
at the close of trading on the business day prior to
the last five trading days of the contract month; and
(3) 200 contracts at the close of trading on the
business day prior to the last two trading days of
the contract month.
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611 CBOT’s existing exchange-set spot month
position limit level for Rough Rice (RR) is 600
contracts for all contract months. However, for July
and September, there are step-down limit levels
from 600 contracts. In the last five trading days of
the expiring futures month, the speculative spot
month position limit for the July futures month
steps down to 200 contracts from 600 contracts and
the speculative position limit for the September
futures month steps down to 250 contracts from 600
contracts.
612 IFUS technically does not have an exchangeset spot month position limit level for ICE Sugar
No. 16 (SF). However, it does have a single-month
position limit level of 1,000 contracts, which
effectively operates as a spot month position limit.
613 NYMEX recommended implementing the
following step-down Federal spot month position
limit levels with respect to its Light Sweet Crude
Oil (CL) core referenced futures contract: (1) 6,000
contracts as of the close of trading three business
days prior to the last trading day of the contract;
(2) 5,000 contracts as of the close of trading two
business days prior to the last trading day of the
contract; and (3) 4,000 contracts as of the close of
trading one business day prior to the last trading
day of the contract.
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614 In Proposed § 150.3(a)(4), the Commission also
proposed an exemption that provided a Federal
conditional spot month position limit for NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) (‘‘NYMEX NG’’) that
permits a market participation that does not hold
any positions in the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract to hold: (1) 10,000 NYMEX NG
equivalent-sized referenced contracts per exchange
that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contract; and (2) an additional position in cashsettled economically equivalent swaps with respect
to NYMEX NG that has a notional amount equal to
10,000 contracts.
615 Currently, the cash-settled natural gas
contracts are subject to an exchange-set spot month
position limit level of 1,000 equivalent-sized
contracts per exchange. Currently, there are three
exchanges that list cash-settled natural gas
contracts—NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal. As a result,
a market participant may hold up to 3,000
equivalent-sized cash-settled natural gas contracts.
The exchanges also have a conditional position
limit framework for natural gas. The conditional
position limit permits up to 5,000 cash-settled
equivalent-sized natural gas contracts per exchange
that lists such contracts, provided that the market
participant does not hold a position in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG contract.
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The proposed Federal spot month
position limit levels for all referenced
contracts were set at 25% or less of
updated EDS and were derived from the
recommendations by CME Group,616
IFUS,617 and MGEX618 for each of their
respective core referenced futures
contracts. Federal spot month position
limit levels for any contract with a
proposed level above 100 contracts were
rounded up to the nearest 100 contracts
from the exchange-recommended limit
level or from 25% of updated EDS, as
applicable.
As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, the
existing Federal spot month position
limit levels have remained constant for
decades, but the markets have changed
significantly during that time period.619
616 See Summary DSE Proposed Limits, CME
Group Comment Letter (Nov. 26, 2019), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for
Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596). CME Group formally
provided recommended Federal spot month
position limit levels for each of its core referenced
futures contracts.
617 See IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—
Softs Methodology, IFUS Comment Letter (May 14,
2019) and Reproposal—Position Limits for
Derivatives (RIN 3038–AD99) and ICE Comment
Letter (Feb. 28, 2017) (attached Sept. 28, 2016
comment letter), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596 and Proposed Rule 81 FR 96704,
respectively). IFUS did not formally provide
recommended Federal spot month position limit
levels for each of IFUS’s core referenced futures
contracts. However, ICE had previously
recommended setting Federal spot month position
limit levels for IFUS’s core referenced futures
contracts at 25% of EDS in its comment letter in
connection with the 2016 Reproposal and
Commission staff also confirmed with ICE/IFUS’s
representatives that ICE/IFUS’s position has
remained the same with respect to the Federal spot
month position limit levels since the 2016
Reproposal. The Commission notes, however, with
respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), that IFUS has
submitted a supplemental comment letter
recommending that the Federal spot month position
limit level be set at 900 contracts, instead of at 25%
of EDS. See IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—
Cotton Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment
Letter (August 27, 2020), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
618 See Updated Deliverable Supply Data—
Potential Position Limits Rulemaking, MGEX
Comment Letter (Aug. 31, 2018), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for
Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596). MGEX did not
formally provide a recommended Federal spot
month position limit level for its core referenced
futures contract (MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat
(MWE)) because it was opposed to providing a
static number for the Federal spot month position
limit level that was based on a fixed formula.
Instead, MGEX sought to be able to adjust the
Federal spot month position limit level based on
updated EDS figures and market conditions.
However, MGEX stated that the Federal spot month
position limit level for MGEX Hard Red Spring
Wheat (MWE) should be no lower than 1,000
contracts and also submitted calculations for setting
the Federal spot month position limit level at 25%
of EDS. Furthermore, MGEX supported setting the
Federal spot month position limit level for MGEX
Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE) at 25% of EDS level
in its comment letter. MGEX at 3.
619 85 FR at 11625.
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As a result, some of the deliverable
supply estimates on which the existing
Federal spot month position limits were
originally based were decades out of
date.620
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
a. Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Levels Adopted as Proposed, Except for
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) and NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
The Commission is adopting the
Federal spot month position limit levels
as proposed, except for modifications
with respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
and NYMEX NG. Specifically, the
Federal spot month position limit levels
for all 25 core referenced futures
contracts are set at or below 25% of
EDS, except for the cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts.
With respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT),
the Commission is adopting a lower
Federal spot month position limit level
of 900 contracts instead of the proposed
1,800 contracts. The reasons for this
change are discussed in Section II.B.3.v.
With respect to NYMEX NG, the Final
Rule is adopting the same Federal spot
month position limit level as proposed
in the 2020 NPRM, but the Final Rule
is applying the cash-settled portion of
the Federal spot month position limit
for NYMEX NG separately for each
exchange that lists a cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract, as well
as the cash-settled NYMEX NG OTC
swaps market, rather than on an
aggregate basis across all exchanges and
the OTC swaps market as it does for
each of the other core referenced futures
contracts. The reasons for this change
are discussed in Section II.B.3.vi.
(1) The Final Rule Achieves the Four
Statutory Objectives in CEA Section
4a(a)(3)(B)
Before summarizing and addressing
comments below regarding the proposed
Federal spot month position limit
levels, the Commission states at the
outset that the final Federal spot month
position limit levels, in conjunction
with the rest of the Federal position
limits framework, will achieve the four
policy objectives in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B). Namely, they will: (1)
Diminish, eliminate, or prevent
excessive speculation; (2) deter and
prevent market manipulation, squeezes,
and corners; (3) ensure sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (4)
ensure that the price discovery function
620 Id.
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of the underlying market is not
disrupted.621
In achieving these four statutory
objectives, the Commission first believes
that the Federal spot month position
limit levels are low enough to prevent
excessive speculation and also protect
price discovery. Setting the Federal spot
month position limit levels at or below
25% of EDS is critically important
because it would be difficult, in the
absence of other factors, for a market
participant to corner or squeeze a
market if the participant holds less than
or equal to 25% of deliverable
supply.622 This is because, among other
things, any potential economic gains
resulting from the manipulation may be
insufficient to justify the potential costs,
including the costs of acquiring and
ultimately offloading the positions used
to effectuate the manipulation.623 By
restricting positions to a proportion of
the deliverable supply of the
commodity, the Federal spot month
position limits require that no one
speculator can hold a position larger
than 25% of deliverable supply,
reducing the possibility that a market
participant can use derivatives,
including referenced contracts, to affect
the price of the cash commodity (and
vice versa). Limiting a speculative
position based on a percentage of
deliverable supply also restricts a
speculative trader’s ability to establish a
leveraged position in cash-settled
derivative contracts, reducing that
trader’s incentive to manipulate the
cash settlement price. Further, by
finalizing levels that are sufficiently low
to prevent market manipulation,
including corners and squeezes, the
levels also help ensure that the price
discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted, because
markets that are free from corners,
squeezes, and other manipulative
activity reflect fundamentals of supply
and demand, rather than artificial
pressures.
The Commission also believes that the
Federal spot month position limit levels
adopted herein are high enough to
ensure that there is sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers.624 The
621 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B).
FR at 11625–11626.
623 Id.
624 CEA section 4a(a)(1) requires the Commission
to address ‘‘[e]xcessive speculation . . . causing
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted [price] changes . . . .’’ Speculative
activity that is not ‘‘excessive’’ in this manner is not
a focus of CEA section 4a(a)(1). Rather, speculative
activity may generate liquidity, including liquidity
for bona fide hedgers, by enabling market
participants with bona fide hedging positions to
trade more efficiently. Setting position limits too
622 85
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Commission has not observed a general
lack of liquidity for bona fide hedgers in
the markets for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts, which are some of the
most liquid markets overseen by the
Commission.625 By generally increasing
the existing Federal spot month position
limit levels for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts based on updated
data, and by adopting Federal spot
month position limit levels that are
generally equal to or higher than
existing exchange-set levels for the 16
non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts, the Commission does not
expect the final Federal position limit
levels to reduce liquidity for bona fide
hedgers.626
Furthermore, the Commission has
previously stated that ‘‘there is a range
of acceptable limit levels,’’ 627 and
continues to believe that is true.628
There is no single ‘‘correct’’ spot month
position limit level for a given contract,
and it is likely that a number of limit
levels within a certain range could
effectively achieve the four policy
objectives in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).629
The Commission believes that the spot
month position limit levels adopted
herein fall within a range of acceptable
levels.630 This determination is based
on the Commission’s experience in
administering its own Federal position
limits regime, overseeing exchange-set
position limits, and being closely
involved in determining the EDS figures
underlying the position limit levels, as
well as the fact that the Federal spot
month position limit levels are generally
set at or below 25% of EDS.631
low could result in reduced liquidity, including for
bona fide hedgers. 85 FR at 11626.
625 85 FR at 11626. The Commission notes that it
has observed a brief period of illiquidity during the
early part of the spot month for ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT), which is discussed in Section II.B.3.v.
626 Id. Eighteen of the core referenced futures
contracts will have Federal spot month position
limit levels that are higher than current exchangeset spot month position limit levels. CME Live
Cattle (LC), COMEX Gold (GC), COMEX Copper
(HG), CBOT Oats (O), NYMEX Platinum (PL), and
NYMEX Palladium (PA) will have Federal spot
month position limit levels that are equal to the
current exchange-set spot month position limit
levels. Finally, although currently there is
technically no exchange-set spot month position
limit for ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF), this contract is
subject to a single month position limit level of
1,000 contracts, which effectively serves as its spot
month position limit level. As a result, the Federal
spot month position limit level for ICE Sugar No.
16 (SF) will effectively be higher than its current
exchange-set spot month position limit level.
627 See, e.g., Revision of Federal Speculative
Position Limits, 57 FR 12766, 12770 (Apr. 13,
1992).
628 85 FR at 11627.
629 Id.
630 Id.
631 The exception to this is the cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts, which is
discussed in detail in Section II.B.3.vi.
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In addition, the Federal spot month
position limit levels are properly
calibrated to account for differences
between markets. For example, the
Commission considered the unique
delivery mechanisms for CME Live
Cattle (LC) and the NYMEX metals core
referenced futures contracts in
calibrating the Federal spot month
position limit levels for those
contracts.632 The Commission also
considered the volatility of the EDS for
COMEX Copper (HG) in determining its
limit level.633 Furthermore, with respect
to NYMEX NG, the Commission, in finetuning the proposed limits, considered:
the underlying natural gas infrastructure
vis-a`-vis commodities underlying other
energy core referenced futures contracts;
the relatively high liquidity in the cashsettled markets; and the public
comments received in response to the
2020 NPRM.634
(2) Federal Position Limit Levels
Operate as Ceilings
Finally, consistent with the 2020
NPRM and the Final Rule’s position
limits framework that leverages existing
exchange-level programs and expertise,
the Federal position limit levels operate
as ceilings. This framework, with
Federal spot month limits layered over
exchange-set limits, achieves the
Commission’s objectives in preventing
market manipulation, squeezes, corners,
and excessive speculation while also
ensuring sufficient market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers and avoiding a
disruption of the price discovery
function of the underlying market. This
is, in part, because a layered approach
facilitates more expedited responses to
rapidly evolving market conditions
through exchange action. Under the
Final Rule, exchanges are required to set
their own spot month position limit
levels at or below the respective Federal
spot month position limit levels.635
They are also permitted to adjust those
levels based on market conditions as
long as they are set at or below the
Federal spot month position limit
levels. Exchanges may also impose
632 85
633 Id.
FR at 11627.
at 11628.
634 Id.
635 Final § 150.5(a). For the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, the Final Rule also requires
exchanges to set their own non-spot month position
limit levels at or below the respective Federal nonspot month position limit level. For the 16 nonlegacy core referenced futures contracts, final
§ 150.5(b)(2) requires exchanges to implement
either position limits or position accountability
during the non-spot month for physical commodity
derivatives that are not subject to Federal position
limits ‘‘at a level that is necessary and appropriate
to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the contract’s or
the underlying commodity’s price or index.’’
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3319
liquidity and concentration surcharges
to initial margin if they are vertically
integrated with a derivatives clearing
organization.636 All of these exchange
actions can be implemented
significantly faster than Commission
action, and an immediate response is
critical in managing rapidly evolving
market conditions. As a result, by
having the Federal position limit levels
function as ceilings, the position limits
framework adopted in this Final Rule
will allow exchanges to lower or raise
their position limit levels across a
greater range of acceptable Federal
position limit levels, which will
facilitate a faster response to more
varied market conditions than if the
Federal position limit levels did not
operate as ceilings.
iii. Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
Many commenters supported the
proposed Federal spot month position
limit levels and the method by which
the Commission determined those limit
levels.637 However, some commenters
raised concerns or otherwise
commented with respect to: (1) The
proposed Federal spot month position
limit levels and the methodology used
to arrive at those levels generally; (2) the
Commission’s review of exchanges’ EDS
figures and their recommended spot
month position limit levels; (3) a lack of
a phase-in for Federal spot month
position limit levels; (4) the proposed
spot month position limit level for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT); (5) the proposed spot
month position limit level for NYMEX
NG and other issues relating to NYMEX
NG; and (6) the issue of parity among
the proposed Federal spot month
position limit levels for the three wheat
core referenced futures contracts. The
Commission will discuss each of these
issues, the related comments, and the
Commission’s corresponding
determination in greater detail below.
a. Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Levels and the Commission’s
Underlying Methodology, Generally
(1) Comments—Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels and the
Commission’s Underlying Methodology,
Generally
Better Markets objected to the
Commission’s proposed Federal spot
month position limit levels and
636 85
FR at 11633.
ASR at 2; CCI at 2; Shell at 3; EEI/EPSA
at 3; Suncor at 2, CEWG at 3; COPE at 2, 4; SIFMA
AMG at 3–4; MGEX at 1; 3; MFA/AIMA at 1; AFIA
at 1; CMC at 6; NGFA at 3; PIMCO at 6; CME Group
at 4–6; NOPA at 1; FIA at 2; and AQR at 8–10.
637 See
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suggested that there should be a
presumption that the Federal spot
month position limit levels be set at
10% of EDS, which could be adjusted as
needed.638 Another commenter, PMAA,
requested Federal spot month position
limit levels of less than 25% of EDS, but
did not provide a specific level or a
range of levels.639 Other commenters
believed that the proposed spot month
levels were generally too high merely
because they were higher than existing
levels.640
In support of its suggestion, Better
Markets claimed that, ‘‘speculative
trading has been sufficient to
accommodate legitimate hedging at
currently permissible levels,’’ noting
that the Commission has previously
stated that ‘‘open interest and trading
volume have reached record levels’’ and
‘‘the 25 [core referenced futures
contracts] represent some of the most
liquid markets overseen by the
[CFTC].’’ 641 Better Markets also claimed
that, if the Commission conducted a
study as to whether the increase in open
interest for ‘‘particular [core referenced
futures contracts] would warrant lower
speculative position limits,’’ those
studies would have shown that
substantially lower position limit levels
would be warranted.642 Better Markets
also took issue with the Commission’s
25% or less of EDS formula as a basis
for determining Federal spot month
position limit levels by stating, ‘‘while
deliverable supply must be one key
measure for constraining speculation, it
is not sufficient to address all statutory
objectives for Federal position
limits.’’ 643
(2) Discussion of Final Rule—Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Levels and
the Commission’s Underlying
Methodology, Generally
The Commission declines to adopt a
10% of EDS across-the-board Federal
spot month position limit level, or a
general reduction in Federal spot month
position limit levels to a level below
25% of EDS for those core referenced
futures contracts with a proposed
position limit level set at 25% of EDS.
In response to Better Markets’
suggestion to adopt Federal spot month
position limit levels set at 10% of EDS,
the Commission first notes that,
although Better Markets provided some
arguments for why the Commission
should consider lower Federal position
638 Better
Markets at 41.
639 PMAA at 2.
640 AFR at 2 and Rutkowski at 2.
641 Better Markets at 37–38.
642 Id. at 38.
643 Id. at 37.
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limit levels, Better Markets did not
provide any support for the 10% level
that it suggested, including any support
for the comment letter’s implication that
setting limits at or below 25% of EDS
is insufficient to prevent corners and
squeezes. Likewise, PMAA did not
provide any support for adopting
Federal spot month position limit levels
of less than 25% of EDS, other than
claiming that a ‘‘spot month limit of 25
percent of deliverable supply is not
sufficiently aggressive to deter excessive
speculation’’ and ‘‘prevent market
manipulation.’’ 644
The 25% or less of EDS formula that
the Commission is utilizing, and has
utilized for many years, is a
longstanding methodology that was
adopted to address corners and squeezes
based on the Commission’s
experience.645 Also, as described in
detail above, the Commission believes
that the position limits framework in
both the 2020 NPRM and the Final Rule
that incorporates the 25% or less of EDS
formula achieves the Commission’s
statutory objectives in preventing
market manipulation, squeezes, corners,
and excessive speculation while also
ensuring sufficient market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers and avoiding a
disruption of the price discovery
function of the underlying market.
In addition, the Final Rule’s position
limits framework further addresses the
statutory objectives of CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B) by utilizing the Federal
position limit levels as a ceiling and
leveraging the exchanges’ expertise and
experience in determining and adjusting
exchange-set position limit levels for
their referenced contracts as
appropriate, as long as they are under
the Federal position limit levels.646 This
exchange action can be effectuated
significantly faster than a Federal
position limit level adjustment, which
requires the Commission to engage in a
rulemaking process that includes a
notice-and-comment period. As a result,
compared to the alternative approaches
suggested by commenters, this
framework will generally facilitate a
more expedited response to a more
varied set of market conditions, because
the exchanges can lower or raise their
position limit levels across a greater
644 PMAA
at 2.
e.g., Chicago Board of Trade Futures
Contracts in Corn and Soybeans; Order To Change
and To Supplement Delivery Specifications, 62 FR
60831, 60838 (Nov. 13, 1997) (‘‘The 2,400-contract
level of deliverable supplies constitutes four times
the speculative position limit for the contract, a
benchmark historically used by the Commission’s
staff in analyzing the adequacy of deliverable
supplies for new contracts’’).
646 See 85 FR at 11629, 11633.
645 See
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range of acceptable Federal position
limit levels.
In response to Better Markets’ claim
that the Federal spot month position
limit levels should not be adjusted
upward as a result of the higher open
interest levels and trading volumes that
exist today because they demonstrate
that there are sufficient levels of
speculation and liquidity under the
current rules, the Commission first
notes that Better Markets did not
provide a methodology based on open
interest and/or trading volume that the
Commission should consider as an
alternative to the Commission’s 25% or
less of EDS approach.
Regardless, the Commission believes
that EDS is the more appropriate basis
by which the Commission should adjust
Federal spot month position limit
levels, rather than open interest and/or
trading volume, because the likelihood
of a corner or squeeze occurring in the
spot month is more closely correlated
with the percentage of deliverable
supply that a market participant
controls. Corners and squeezes are
possible in the spot month only because
of the imminent prospect of making or
taking delivery in the physically-settled
contract. Therefore, understanding the
amount of deliverable supply in the spot
month is critically important.647
Accordingly, the Commission, in
consultation with the exchanges,
estimated the amount of the underlying
commodity available at the specified
delivery points in the core referenced
futures contract that meet the quality
standards set forth in the core
referenced futures contract’s terms and
conditions in order to understand the
size of the relevant commodity market
underlying each core referenced futures
contract. Once the Commission
determined that information in the form
of an EDS figure, the Commission was
able to determine whether a Federal
spot month position limit level would
advance the statutory objectives of CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B), including preventing
corners and squeezes.
A spot month position limit
methodology based on open interest
and/or trading volume does not take
into account the central factors that
make corners and squeezes possible
(i.e., the imminent prospect of delivery
on a physically-settled contract and the
deliverable supply of an underlying
647 Deliverable supply is the quantity of the
commodity that meets contract specifications that is
reasonably expected to be readily available to short
traders and salable by long traders at its market
value in normal cash-marketing channels at the
contract’s delivery points during the specified
delivery period, barring abnormal movements in
interstate commerce. 17 CFR part 38, Appendix C.
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commodity). Also, open interest and
trading volume in an expiring
physically-settled contract generally
declines as the contract nears
expiration, as most traders are not
looking to make or take delivery of the
underlying commodity. As a result, they
would likely not provide additional
insights that would materially inform
the Commission’s determination of
Federal spot month position limit levels
in a way that is responsive to CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).
Furthermore, the Commission did not
adjust the Federal spot month position
limit levels merely by applying a
percentage to EDS. As discussed in
further detail below, the Commission
proposed Federal spot month position
limit levels only after the Commission:
(1) Extensively reviewed and verified
the underlying methodology for each
core referenced futures contract’s EDS
figure; and (2) reviewed the
recommended Federal spot month
position limit levels from exchanges
that are thoroughly knowledgeable
about their own respective core
referenced futures contracts’ markets in
order to determine whether they
advanced the policy objectives of CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B). Also, in adopting the
final Federal spot month position limit
levels, the Commission also considered
comments from market participants,
including comments from the end-users
of these markets.
On a related note, Better Markets and
PMAA appear to have misunderstood
the proposed Federal spot month
position limit levels and the
methodology on which they were
based.648 The Commission did not
propose an across-the-board Federal
level set at 25% of EDS. As noted above,
the Commission’s methodology sets
Federal spot month position limit levels
at or below 25% of EDS for each
particular commodity.649 As a result,
under the Final Rule, only seven of 25
core referenced futures contracts have
Federal spot month position limit levels
at 25% of EDS. With respect to the 18
remaining core referenced futures
contracts, all 18 are set below 20% of
EDS, 14 are below 15% of EDS, and
eight are already below the 10% of EDS
threshold recommended by Better
Markets.650 With respect to the
petroleum core referenced futures
contracts with which PMAA is most
likely concerned (i.e., NYMEX Light
Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX NYH
ULSD Heating Oil (HO), and NYMEX
RBOB Gasoline (RB)), all three levels are
at or below 11.16% of EDS.
b. Commission Review of Exchanges’
EDS Figures and Recommended Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Levels
(1) Additional Background
Information—Commission Review of
Exchanges’ EDS Figures and
Recommended Federal Spot Month
Position Limits
In connection with the 2020 NPRM,
the Commission received deliverable
supply estimates and recommended
Federal spot month position limit levels
from CME Group, ICE, and MGEX for
their respective core referenced futures
contracts.651 Commission staff reviewed
these recommendations and conducted
its own analysis of them using its own
experience, observations, and
knowledge.652 This included closely
and independently assessing the EDS
figures upon which the recommended
limit levels were based.653 In reviewing
the recommended spot month position
limit levels, the Commission considered
the four policy objectives in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B) and preliminarily
determined that none of the
recommended levels appeared
improperly calibrated such that they
might hinder liquidity for bona fide
hedgers or invite excessive speculation,
manipulation, corners, or squeezes,
including activity that could impact
price discovery.654 As a result, the
Commission proposed to adopt each of
the exchange-recommended spot month
position limit levels as Federal spot
month position limit levels.655
(2) Comments—Commission Review of
Exchanges’ EDS Figures and
Recommended Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
The Commission received several
comments concerning the Commission’s
review and verification of the EDS
figures and the rationale used by the
Commission in accepting the spot
month position limit levels that were
recommended by exchanges.
One commenter, EPSA, supported
adopting CME Group’s EDS figures for
energy commodities, stating that
exchanges are in the ‘‘best position to
provide accurate and current
651 See
648 See
Better Markets at 39–40 and PMAA at 2.
649 85 FR at 11624.
650 For CME Live Cattle (LC) and NYMEX Light
Sweet Crude Oil (CL), which have step-down
Federal spot month position limit levels, these
percentages were calculated using the first and
highest step.
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supra n.616, n.617, and n.618.
FR at 11625.
653 Id. at 11625–11626.
654 Id. at 11625.
655 Id. Also, a more detailed discussion about the
methodology employed by the Commission in
determining proposed Federal spot month position
limit levels can be found at 85 FR at 11625–11628.
652 85
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3321
information on the markets.’’ 656
However, other commenters expressed
concerns. Better Markets commented
that the Commission failed to ‘‘explain
the means by which the DCM-provided
data was collected and later ‘verified’ in
arriving at proposed spot month
position limits, nor the dependencies of
the DCM methodologies employed to
arrive at those estimates.’’ 657 Similarly,
IATP commented that the 2020 NPRM
provided insufficient detail about how
the Commission concluded that the
exchange-recommended spot month
position limit levels were appropriate
and how the Commission determined
that the EDS figures submitted by the
exchanges were reasonable.658 On a
related note, PMAA commented that the
exchanges should not be providing EDS
figures and that the Commission instead
should ‘‘retain exclusive discretion in
determining ‘deliverable supply’ for the
purposes of establishing speculative
position limits’’ and ‘‘consult with . . .
market experts when determining
‘deliverable supply’ and formulating
limits.’’ 659 Furthermore, CME Group
recommended ‘‘that the Commission not
adopt final spot month position limit
levels at 25% of deliverable supply as
a rigid formula and . . . work with the
exchange to determine an appropriate
limit based on the market
dynamics.’’ 660 Likewise, MGEX
commented that it ‘‘fundamentally
disagrees with the 25% formulaic
calculation for the spot month position,
especially if a limit is codified by rule
and does not allow for adjustments as
deliverable supply changes.’’ 661
Finally, Better Markets also raised
concerns about the incentives of
exchanges as public, for-profit
enterprises, presumably, in part,
because the exchanges submitted the
EDS figures, upon which the Federal
spot month position limit levels are
656 EPSA
at 3.
Markets at 36.
658 IATP at 9.
659 PMAA at 2–3 (these market experts include
governmental entities, such as the Department of
Energy’s Energy Information Administration and
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, academics, and
representatives of industries that produce, refine,
process, store, transport, market, and consume the
underlying commodity).
660 CME Group at 5–6. Specifically, CME Group
believed that using a 25% of EDS formula ‘‘as a
fixed formula for establishing recommended limits
. . . is unsound as a matter of policy and
incompatible with the Commission’s statutory
authority to determine that a specific position limit
is necessary and set it at an appropriate level.’’
661 Updated Deliverable Supply Data—Potential
Position Limits Rulemaking, MGEX Comment Letter
(Aug. 31, 2018) at 2, available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
657 Better
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based.662 Specifically, Better Markets
stated that exchanges ‘‘must balance the
interests of their shareholders against
the public interest and their commercial
interests in market integrity’’ and, as a
result, may be incentivized to permit
‘‘speculation—even excess
speculation,’’ because it ‘‘is a key
revenue driver.’’ 663
(3) Discussion of Final Rule—
Commission Review of Exchanges’ EDS
Figures and Recommended Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission declines to utilize a
different methodology and process for
determining EDS figures and Federal
spot month position limit levels.
(i) Determination of EDS Figures
In response to comments concerning
the Commission’s EDS determinations,
the Commission notes that its process
for reviewing and verifying the EDS
figures provided by exchanges entailed
extensive independent review and
analysis of each EDS figure and its
underlying methodology, and the
Commission retained exclusive
discretion to determine the
reasonableness of the EDS figures. This
review and analysis by Commission
staff occurred prior to the exchanges’
formal EDS submissions, during which
time Commission staff verified that each
exchange’s EDS figure for each
commodity underlying a core referenced
futures contract was reasonable. In
doing so, Commission staff confirmed
that the methodology and the data 664
for the underlying commodity for each
core referenced futures contract
reflected the commodity
Markets at 22.
at 22–23. Better Markets referenced CME
Group Inc.’s Form 10–K filings, which stated that
‘‘[t]he adoption and implementation of position
limits rules . . . could have a significant impact on
our commodities business if Federal rules for
position limit management differ significantly from
current exchange-administered rules.’’
664 The data underlying the EDS figures are from
sources that Commission staff had determined as
accurately representing the underlying commodity.
These were typically from publicly available
sources. For example, these include data published
by the U.S. Department of Energy for NYMEX Light
Sweet Crude Oil (CL), data published by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture for CBOT Soybeans (S),
data published by the Florida Department of Citrus
for ICE FCOJ–A (OJ), and data published by CME
Group concerning the gold inventories at its
approved depositories for COMEX Gold (GC).
Furthermore, most data sources were also adjusted
based on interviews with market experts and
market participants in order to better reflect the
actual deliverable supply by taking into
consideration the amount of time it takes to move
the commodity to/from the delivery points, quality
standards, and supplies that are not readily
available due to being tied up in long-term
contracts.
characteristics 665 described in the core
referenced futures contract’s terms and
conditions, while also recognizing that
more than one methodology and one set
of assumptions, allowances, and data
sources could result in a reasonable EDS
figure for a commodity. In addition,
Commission staff replicated the
exchanges’ EDS figures using the
methodology provided. For some
commodities, Commission staff also
determined the reasonableness of an
exchange’s EDS by constructing an
alternate EDS using an alternate
methodology using other available data
and comparing that internal EDS with
the exchange’s EDS. In some cases,
Commission staff consulted industry
experts and market participants to verify
that the assumptions and allowances
used by the EDS methodology were
reasonable and that the EDS figure itself
was reasonable.
When Commission staff identified any
issues during the review process, they
raised those concerns with the
exchanges in order to revise the
methodologies, including the
assumptions, allowances, and data
sources used therein. As a result, when
the exchanges formally submitted their
EDS figures, both the EDS figures and
the methodologies underlying their
calculations had been thoroughly
reviewed and analyzed by Commission
staff, and some had been refined based
on input from Commission staff. The
EDS figures and the methodologies used
were published in the comment section
of the 2020 NPRM on the Commission’s
website and have been available for
review by the public.666
Additionally, for the past 10 years,
commenters to previous Federal
position limits rule proposals have
662 Better
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663 Id.
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665 These characteristics are provided in the
guidance in section (b)(1)(i) of Appendix C to part
38, and include, among other things, the
commodity’s quality and grade specifications,
delivery points (including storage capacity), historic
storage levels, processing capacity, and adjustments
to remove supply that is committed for long-term
contracts and not available to underlie a futures
contract. The verified EDS for each commodity
reflects the quantity of the commodity that can be
reasonably expected to be readily available to short
traders and salable by long traders at its market
value in normal cash-marketing channels at the
contract’s delivery points during the specified
delivery period, barring abnormal movements in
interstate commerce.
666 See IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—
Softs Methodology, IFUS Comment Letter (May 14,
2019); Updated Deliverable Supply Data—Potential
Position Limits Rulemaking, MGEX Comment Letter
(Aug. 31, 2018); and Summary DSE Proposed
Limits, CME Group Comment Letter (Nov. 26, 2019)
(CME Group also provided separate EDS
methodology submissions for each of its 18 core
referenced futures contracts, which can also be
found in the comment file), all available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
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consistently recommended that the EDS
figures should be supplied by
exchanges, given the exchanges’
expertise with their own contract
markets and because of the experience
they have in producing such figures.667
The Commission has agreed and
continues to agree with those
comments. As a result, Commission staff
has also previously worked in
collaboration with the exchanges as part
of an iterative process to review and
refine the methodologies, assumptions,
allowances, and data sources used in
calculating the EDS figure for each
commodity underlying a core referenced
futures contract.
(ii) Determination of Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
In response to comments concerning
the Commission’s determination of the
Federal spot month position limit
levels, the Commission first notes that
exchanges were invited to submit their
recommended Federal spot month
position limit levels for their respective
core referenced futures contracts. In
response, CME Group,668 ICE,669 and
MGEX 670 provided recommended
levels for their core referenced futures
contracts.
When deciding whether to adopt,
reject, or modify the exchangerecommended position limit levels, the
Commission considered a variety of
factors, including whether the
recommended level: (i) Was consistent
with the 25% or less of EDS formula, as
provided in the guidance in Appendix
C to part 38; (ii) reflected changes in the
EDS of the underlying commodity and
trading activity in the core referenced
futures contract; and (iii) achieved the
four policy objectives in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B). Furthermore, as described in
detail above, the Commission also
thoroughly reviewed the methodologies
for determining the EDS figures upon
which the exchange-recommended spot
month position limit levels are based.
Finally, the Commission also
considered input from market
participants concerning the EDS figures
and the exchange-recommended Federal
position limit levels in recalibrating the
Federal position limit levels, as it has
done for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) and
NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) in
this Final Rule, as discussed further
below.
667 See e.g. 81 FR at 96754, n.495 (listing the
commenters that expressed the view that exchanges
are best able to determine appropriate spot month
position limits and that the Commission should
defer to their expertise).
668 See supra n.616.
669 See supra n.617.
670 See supra n.618.
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(iii) Concern Over Exchanges’ Conflict
of Interest and Improper Incentives in
Maintaining Their Markets
In response to Better Markets’ concern
about the incentives of exchanges as
public, for-profit businesses, as a
preliminary matter, the Commission
acknowledges that exchanges have a
financial interest in increased trading
volume, whether speculative or
hedging, and, as a result, may be
incentivized to increase EDS figures and
recommend higher position limit levels.
However, as previously discussed, the
Commission independently assessed
and verified the exchanges’ EDS
estimates. Specifically, the Commission:
(1) Worked closely with the exchanges
to independently verify that all EDS
methodologies and figures were
reasonable; 671 and (2) reviewed each
exchange-recommended level for
compliance with the requirements
established by the Commission and/or
by Congress, including those in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).672 Also, as discussed
at length above, the Commission
conducted its own analysis of the
exchange-recommended Federal spot
month position limit levels and
determined that the levels adopted
herein: (1) Are low enough to diminish,
eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation and also protect price
discovery; (2) are high enough to ensure
that there is sufficient market liquidity
for bona fide hedgers; (3) fall within a
range of acceptable limit levels; and (4)
are properly calibrated to account for
differences between markets. Thus, the
Commission believes that the impact, if
any, of such financial incentives were
sufficiently mitigated through the
Commission’s close review of the
methodology underlying the EDS
figures, the EDS figures themselves, and
the recommended Federal position limit
levels.
The Commission also notes that
exchanges have significant incentives
and obligations to maintain wellfunctioning markets as self-regulatory
organizations that are themselves
subject to regulatory requirements.
Specifically, the DCM and SEF Core
Principles, as applicable, require
exchanges to, among other things, list
contracts that are not readily susceptible
to manipulation, and surveil trading on
671 As discussed in detail above, the verification
involved: Confirming that the methodology and
data for the underlying commodity reflected the
commodity characteristics described in the core
referenced futures contract’s terms and conditions;
replicating exchange EDS figures using the
methodology provided by the exchange; and
working with the exchanges to revise the
methodologies as needed.
672 See Section II.B.3.iii.b.(3).
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their markets to prevent market
manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the delivery or cashsettlement process.673 Exchanges also
have significant incentives to maintain
well-functioning markets to remain
competitive with other exchanges.
Market participants may choose
exchanges that are less susceptible to
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes caused by
excessive speculation or corners,
squeezes, and manipulation, which
could, among other things, harm the
price discovery function of the
commodity derivative contracts and
negatively impact the delivery of the
underlying commodity, bona fide
hedging strategies, and market
participants’ general risk
management.674 Furthermore, several
academic studies, including one
concerning futures exchanges and
another concerning demutualized stock
exchanges, support the conclusion that
exchanges are able to both satisfy
shareholder interests and meet their
self-regulatory organization
responsibilities.675
iv. Phase-In of Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—PhaseIn of Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Levels
The 2020 NPRM did not include a
phase-in mechanism in which the
Commission would gradually adjust the
Federal position limit levels over a
period of time. As a result, under the
2020 NPRM, the proposed Federal spot
month position limit levels for all core
referenced futures contracts would
immediately go into effect on the
proposed effective date.
673 17 CFR 38.200; 17 CFR 38.250; 17 CFR 37.300;
and 17 CFR 37.400.
674 Kane, Stephen, Exploring price impact
liquidity for December 2016 NYMEX energy
contracts, n.33, available at https://www.cftc.gov/
sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@
economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_
priceimpact.pdf.
675 See David Reiffen and Michel A. Robe,
Demutualization and Customer Protection at SelfRegulatory Financial Exchanges, Journal of Futures
Markets, Vol. 31, 126–164, Feb. 2011 (in many
circumstances, an exchange that maximizes
shareholder (rather than member) income has a
greater incentive to aggressively enforce regulations
that protect participants from dishonest agents); and
Kobana Abukari and Isaac Otchere, Has Stock
Exchange Demutualization Improved Market
Quality? International Evidence, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Dec 09, 2019,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156–019–00863-y
(demutualized exchanges have realized significant
reductions in transaction costs in the postdemutualization period).
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b. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Phase-In of Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission declines to adopt a
formal phase-in for the Federal spot
month position limit levels, because it
believes that the markets would operate
in an orderly fashion with the Federal
position limit levels adopted under this
Final Rule. However, as a practical
matter, the Commission notes that the
operative spot month position limit
levels for market participants trading in
exchange-listed referenced contracts
will be the exchange-set spot month
position limit levels, which will
continue to remain at their existing
levels unless and until an exchange
affirmatively modifies its exchange-set
spot month position limit levels
pursuant to part 40 of the Commission’s
regulations.676
c. Comments—Phase-In of Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received comments
requesting that the Commission
‘‘consider phasing in these adjustments
for agricultural commodities to assess
the impacts of increasing limits on
contract performance.’’ 677 CMC also
noted that, ‘‘A phased approach could
provide market participants, exchanges,
and the Commission a way to build in
scheduled pauses to evaluate the effects
of increased limits, thereby fostering
confidence and trust in the markets.’’ 678
d. Discussion of the Final Rule—PhaseIn of Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Levels
In response to comments, the
Commission first notes that, although
the Federal spot month position limit
levels will generally be higher than
existing Federal and/or exchange-set
spot month position limit levels, the
Commission believes that the referenced
contract markets will be able to function
in an orderly fashion when the final
Federal spot month position limit levels
676 17
CFR part 40.
at 2 and CMC at 6.
678 CMC at 6. Although commenters did not
provide specific details about what they meant by
‘‘phase-in,’’ the Commission understands these
comments to mean that they are requesting a
gradual, step-up increase in Federal spot month and
non-spot month position limit levels over time for
agricultural core referenced futures contracts,
instead of having an abrupt change to the new
Federal position limit levels. This section only
addresses the Commission’s response to
commenters’ request for phased-in Federal spot
month position limit levels. The Commission
separately addresses commenters’ request for
phased-in Federal non-spot month position limit
levels below in Section II.B.4.iv.a.(2)(v).
677 AFIA
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go into effect.679 This is because, among
other things, these final Federal spot
month position limit levels are
supported by the updated EDS figures
and are set at or below 25% of EDS.680
However, as a practical matter, the
operative spot month position limit
level for market participants with
respect to exchange-listed referenced
contracts is not the Federal spot month
position limit levels, but the exchangeset spot month position limit levels,
which must be set at or below the
corresponding Federal spot month
position limit levels. As a result, despite
the changes in the Federal spot month
position limit levels (or the imposition
of a Federal spot month position limit
level for the first time) in this Final
Rule, there will be no practical impact
on market participants trading in
exchange-listed referenced contracts
unless and until an exchange
affirmatively modifies its exchange-set
spot month position limit levels through
a rule submission to the Commission
pursuant to part 40 of the Commission’s
regulations.681
v. ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Level
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a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Level
The Commission proposed to increase
the Federal spot month position limit
level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) from the
existing Federal position limit of 300
contracts to 1,800 contracts. Like all of
the Federal spot month position limit
levels, the Commission’s proposed level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) was based on
Commission staff’s review, analysis, and
verification of IFUS’s updated EDS
figure and Commission staff’s review
and analysis of IFUS’s initial
recommended Federal spot month
position limit level.682
679 A phase-in is unnecessary with respect to the
Federal spot month position limit level for CBOT
Oats (O), because the Federal spot month position
limit level for the contract remains at the current
level.
680 The final Federal spot month position limit
levels for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts may exceed 25% of EDS because the
Federal spot month position limit level is being
applied separately for each exchange and OTC
swaps market, but the Commission believes that
this approach will not cause any issues, in part,
because of the highly liquid nature of that particular
market. For additional details concerning the
NYMEX NG market, see Section II.B.3.vi.a.
681 17 CFR part 40.
682 See IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—
Softs Methodology, IFUS Comment Letter (May 14,
2019) and Reproposal—Position Limits for
Derivatives (RIN 3038–AD99); ICE Comment Letter
(Feb. 28, 2017) (attached Sept. 28, 2016 comment
letter), available at https://comments.cftc.gov
(comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596 and
Proposed Rule 81 FR 96704, respectively). IFUS did
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b. Summary of the Commission
Determination—ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
In the Final Rule, the Commission is
adopting a Federal spot month position
limit level of 900 contracts instead of
the proposed level of 1,800 contracts for
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The reasons for
this change are based on the comments
received in response to the 2020 NPRM.
noted that, ‘‘[i]n a smaller market like
cotton, such a drastic increase and high
limit will cause excessive volatility and
hinder convergence in the spot
month.’’ 688
In addition to the market participants,
IFUS also submitted a comment letter
with respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT),
in which it provided an updated
recommended Federal spot month
position limit level of 900 contracts.689
c. Comments—ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
The Commission received numerous
comments objecting to the higher
proposed Federal spot month position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) in
the 2020 NPRM.683 The commenters
requested that the Commission either
maintain the current 300 contract limit
level or drastically lower the limit from
the proposed 1,800 contract limit
level.684 In doing so, commenters
argued that they disagreed with the EDS
figure for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) because
it does ‘‘not reflect the cotton industry’s
historical ability to deliver the physical
commodity.’’ 685 AMCOT similarly
noted that the ‘‘methodology used in
determining the limits is flawed and
lacks consideration of the industry’s
intricacies including the non-fungible
quality as well as warehousing, location,
and logistical challenges.’’ 686
Furthermore, AMCOT believed that the
Federal spot month position limit level
‘‘would likely be disruptive to orderly
market flows.’’ 687 Likewise, ACSA
d. Discussion of Final Rule—ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Level
As a preliminary matter, and as
discussed previously, the Commission
believes that there is a range of
acceptable Federal position limit levels
that will achieve the objectives of CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B). Thus, the
Commission acknowledges that there
may be other acceptable Federal spot
month position limit levels in addition
to the proposed 1,800 contract level for
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). Commenters to
the 2020 NPRM suggested three
alternatives to the proposed Federal
spot month position limit level for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT): (1) 300 contracts; (2)
900 contracts; or (3) a level ‘‘drastically
lower’’ than 1,800 contracts. All of these
alternatives are below 25% of EDS. The
Commission considered the two
specifically enumerated levels (i.e., 300
contracts and 900 contracts) and the
proposed 1,800 contract level, and has
determined that the 900 contract level is
the most appropriate among the three
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT).
not formally provide recommended Federal spot
month position limit levels for each of its core
referenced futures contracts. However, ICE had
previously recommended setting Federal spot
month position limit levels for IFUS’s core
referenced futures contracts at 25% of EDS in its
comment letter in connection with the 2016
Reproposal and Commission staff also confirmed
with ICE/IFUS’s representatives that ICE/IFUS’s
position has remained the same with respect to the
Federal spot month position limit levels since the
2016 Reproposal. The Commission notes, however,
with respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), IFUS
submitted an updated recommended Federal spot
month position limit level recommending a Federal
spot month position limit level of 900 contracts. See
IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—Cotton
Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter
(August 27, 2020), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
683 AMCOT at 1–2; ACSA at 8; Ecom at 1;
Southern Cotton at 2; NCC at 1; Mallory Alexander
at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; IMC at 2; Olam at 3; DECA
at 2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2; Choice at 1;
East Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2;
Memtex at 2; NCC at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Toyo at
2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at 1;
LDC at 1; SW Ag at 2; NCTO at 2; and Parkdale at
2.
684 Id.
685 See, e.g., ACA at 2.
686 AMCOT at 1.
687 Id.
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(1) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Level Should Be
Above 300 Contracts
The Commission believes that it is
more appropriate to raise the Federal
spot month position limit level than to
maintain its existing level of 300
contracts, as long as that level is set at
or below 25% of EDS. One reason is
because the current 300 contract Federal
spot month position limit level for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) has been in place
since at least 1987 while the size of the
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) market has
significantly increased over the years, as
evidenced by the material increases in
deliverable supply and open interest.690
688 ACSA
at 8.
689 IFUS—Estimated
Deliverable Supply—Cotton
Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter
(Aug. 14, 2020), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
690 For example, between the periods of 1994–
1999 and 2015–2018, the maximum open interest
in ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) increased from 122,989
contracts to 344,302 contracts. Also, the EDS for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) increased from 6,005 contracts to
6,948 contracts between 2016 and 2019.
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A second reason why the Commission
believes that it is appropriate to raise
the Federal spot month position limit
level above the existing level of 300
contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is
because of potential liquidity concerns.
At 300 contracts, the Federal spot
month position limit level for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) would be set at 4.32%
of EDS, which would be the lowest
Federal spot month position limit level,
by far, in terms of percentage of EDS
among all core referenced futures
contracts.691 At such a low level, the
Commission is concerned that this
could hamper liquidity in the market,
especially if the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
market continues to grow as it has done
over the years. This concern is
supported by the Commission’s
observation that there has been a lack of
liquidity at the start of the spot month
period in recent years as speculative
traders exited the market or reduced
their positions to the Federal spot
month position limit level of 300
contracts. The Commission’s
observation is based on its assessment of
the daily price impact liquidity in basis
points with the gauge: 692
Raising the limit level above 300
contracts to a higher level, such as 900
contracts, should help alleviate some of
the liquidity problems that market
participants have experienced because
they will not have to reduce their
positions to such a low level (i.e., 300
contracts).
A third reason for raising the Federal
spot month position limit level above its
existing level of 300 contracts is because
a 300 contract level may not provide
adequate headroom under which
exchanges may set and adjust their own
position limit levels, up or down, in
response to market conditions within
this position limits framework. This is
an especially acute issue because, as
noted above, a Federal spot month
position limit level of 300 contracts is
extremely low in terms of percentage of
EDS when compared to other core
referenced futures contracts, and there
is no market-based reason (e.g., higher
susceptibility for corners and squeezes)
for why the level should be set so low.
A final reason for supporting a
Federal spot month position limit level
higher than 300 contracts is because
IFUS, which is the exchange that lists
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), has
recommended a level higher than 300
contracts.693 This is significant because
exchanges have deep knowledge about
their markets and are particularly wellpositioned to recommend position limit
levels for the Commission’s
consideration.694
The Commission recognizes that the
comments from the end-users of ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) unanimously
requested that the Commission
consider, among other options,
maintaining the 300 contract Federal
position limit level. The main
justifications underlying this request are
that: (1) The ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
market is small; and (2) the EDS figure
is extremely high. In response to
commenters’ claim about the size of the
market, the Commission notes that the
market for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is not
as small as suggested. Open interest data
indicate that the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
futures market had a larger average
notional open interest in 2019 than nine
other core referenced futures
contracts.695 Six of these contracts have
higher Federal position limit levels in
terms of percentage of EDS in this Final
Rule.696
In response to commenters’ issue with
the EDS, the Commission notes that the
cotton merchants may have focused on
too narrow of a scope in their comment
letters. The commenters appear to focus
on the actual cotton that was delivered
pursuant to holding the physicallysettled ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core
referenced futures contract to
expiration, and they use that data as
evidence that the EDS is extremely
high.697 The Commission’s EDS figures
are not meant to reflect the actual
commodity delivered. Rather, as the
term estimated deliverable supply
indicates, it is the quantity of the
commodity that meets contract
specifications that is reasonably
expected to be readily available to short
traders and salable by long traders at its
market value in normal cash-marketing
channels at the contract’s delivery
points during the specified delivery
period, barring abnormal movements in
interstate commerce.698 The
Commission believes that limiting a
speculative trader from controlling more
than 25% of this supply, and not the
actual commodity delivered, is critical
for ensuring that corners and squeezes
do not happen.699
691 CBOT KC HRS Wheat (KW) generally has the
lowest Federal spot month position limit level in
terms of percentage of EDS at 6.82%, which is 58%
higher than 4.32%. However, following the close of
trading on the business day prior to the last two
trading days of the contract month, CME Live Cattle
(LC) has the lowest Federal spot month position
limit level in terms of percentage of EDS at 5.29%,
which is 22% higher than 4.32%.
692 P is the price of trade i. P * is the proxy for
i
i
the current market price (the price of the last trade,
Pi—1). Q1 is the quantity traded (the number of
futures contracts traded in trade i). See Kane,
Stephen, Exploring price impact liquidity for
December 2016 NYMEX energy contracts, p.5–6,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/
idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/
file/oce_priceimpact.pdf.
693 IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—Cotton
Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter
(Aug. 14, 2020), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
694 85 FR at 11598. However, as noted before, the
Commission independently reviewed and analyzed
the exchange-recommended levels, including the
EDS figures that support such levels.
695 These are CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), CBOT
Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE FCOJ–A (OJ),
ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF), NYMEX Platinum (PL), and
NYMEX Palladium (PA). See Section III.C.
696 These are CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat
(MWE), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE FCOJ–A (OJ), ICE Sugar
No. 16 (SF), and NYMEX Platinum (PL).
697 See ACSA at 7–8.
698 17 CFR part 38, Appendix C.
699 Generally, only a small percentage of futures
contracts actually go to delivery. Basing a
speculative position limit on past deliveries for a
futures contract would be far too limiting for a
speculative position limit and would not reasonably
achieve the four policy objectives of CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B).
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Furthermore, commenters did not
provide specific issues with respect to
the methodology used to determine EDS
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), which has
been available for review by the public
since the 2020 NPRM was published.700
As a result, the Commission believes
that the EDS for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
is appropriate and reasonable based on
its review and analysis of the
methodology used.701
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(2) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Level Should Be
Below 1,800 Contracts
However, the Commission believes
that it is appropriate to lower the
Federal spot month position limit for
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) from the proposed
1,800 contract level. First, as noted
previously, the Commission received an
updated recommended Federal spot
month position limit level from IFUS
that is lower than 1,800 contracts.702
Second, although the Commission
believes that there are issues with the
cotton industry commenters’
justifications for lowering the Federal
spot month position limit level, the
Commission still believes that their
comments are informative. Specifically,
the Commission believes that the
unanimous comments from the endusers of the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core
referenced futures contract suggest that
lowering the Federal spot month
position limit level from 1,800 contracts
will not have a material detrimental
effect on liquidity for bona fide hedgers
in the market. All things being equal, a
lower spot month position limit level
will better protect the markets against
corners and squeezes, but at the expense
of a reduction in liquidity for bona fide
hedgers as positions held by speculators
will be more constrained. However, in
this instance, the Commission believes
that it could improve protections against
corners and squeezes without materially
700 IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—Softs
Methodology, IFUS Comment Letter (May 14, 2019),
available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment
file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
701 Specifically, the estimate took into account
cotton certified stocks, which are reported daily for
the five delivery points specified in the contract
specifications, as well as the exchange estimated
deliverable stocks close to the delivery points that
are not included as certified stocks based on the
USDA’s Weekly Bales Made Available to Ship
(‘‘BMAS’’) Summary report. The exchange
estimated the deliverable stocks contained in or
near exchange warehouses, both certified and noncertified, during notice and delivery periods for the
futures contract. BMAS deliverable stocks data was
also adjusted to exclude cotton at locations that
were far away from the delivery points.
702 IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—Cotton
Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter
(Aug. 14, 2020), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
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impacting liquidity for bona fide
hedgers by adopting a Federal spot
month position limit level that is lower
than 1,800 contracts, based on the
comments received.703
(3) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Level Should Be
Set at 900 Contracts
Given that the Commission believes
that it is preferable to set a Federal spot
month position limit level higher than
300 contracts but lower than 1,800
contracts for the aforementioned
reasons, the Commission believes that a
Federal position limit level of 900
contracts is preferable to those
alternatives. Specifically, the
Commission notes that IFUS, which has
deep knowledge about the ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) market and is particularly
well-positioned to recommend the
position limit level for the
Commission’s consideration, has
recommended a Federal spot month
position limit level of 900 contracts.
This is also supported by commenters
who requested a ‘‘drastically lower’’
Federal spot month position limit level
as an alternative to maintaining a
Federal spot month position limit level
of 300 contracts.
The Commission also believes that a
level of 900 contracts is sufficiently high
to address concerns about a lack of
liquidity. This is, in part, because a
Federal spot month position limit level
of 900 contracts would result in a level
that is set at 12.95% of EDS, which
would coincidentally place ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) exactly at the median among
the legacy agricultural contracts and all
core referenced futures contracts in
terms of percentage of EDS. Finally,
based on the comments received and
because, all things being equal, lower
spot month position limit levels provide
better protection against corners and
squeezes, the Commission believes that
a level of 900 contracts will provide
stronger protection against corners and
squeezes without materially impacting
liquidity for bona fide hedgers vis-a`-vis
a level of 1,800 contracts.704
vi. NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
This section will address the
following issues concerning NYMEX
703 However, for the reasons discussed
previously, the Commission does not believe that
lowering the Federal spot month position limit
level to 300 contracts is appropriate, given the
observed issues in liquidity during the early part of
the spot month period.
704 The Commission recognizes that this will limit
the range through which an exchange may set and
adjust its own exchange-set position limit level.
However, based on the comments received, the
Commission believes that the stronger protections
against corners and squeezes is appropriate.
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NG: (i) The Federal spot month position
limit level for NYMEX NG; (ii) the
conditional spot month position limit
exemption for positions in natural gas
referenced contracts, which is located in
final § 150.3(a)(4); and (iii) NYMEX NG
penultimate referenced contracts. The
Commission is addressing the latter two
issues in this section in order to allow
the reader to review all discussions
regarding natural gas in one place in
this Final Rule.
a. NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and
Additional Background Information—
NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Level
Under the existing Federal position
limits framework, there are no Federal
position limits for NYMEX NG in either
the spot month or the non-spot month.
There is, however, an exchange-set spot
month position limit for NYMEX NG,
which is set at 1,000 contracts for the
physically-settled NYMEX NG contract
and 1,000 contracts per exchange for
cash-settled equivalent-sized natural gas
contracts. Because there are three
exchanges that list such cash-settled
natural gas contracts (NYMEX, IFUS,
and Nodal), a market participant can
currently hold up to 3,000 such cashsettled contracts during the spot month.
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed a Federal spot month position
limit level of 2,000 contracts for
NYMEX NG. The 2,000 contract level
was determined based on 25% of
updated EDS and was recommended by
CME Group. Consistent with the other
core referenced futures contracts, the
proposed netting and aggregation
requirements permitted a market
participant to hold up to 2,000
physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts and another 2,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts across all exchanges and in the
OTC swaps market.705
(2) Summary of the Commission
Determination—NYMEX NG Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Level
The Commission is adopting its
proposed approach with respect to
physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts, but is modifying
its proposed approach with respect to
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts, as discussed below.
705 For further discussion of netting and
aggregation, see Section II.B.10. (Application of
Netting and Related Treatment of Cash-settled
Referenced Contracts).
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(3) Comments—NYMEX NG Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Level
With respect to the proposed NYMEX
NG Federal spot month position limit
level, NGSA requested that the
Commission ‘‘increase the spot month
limit on the NG Contract by recognizing
the transportation capacity available
now at Henry Hub provided by
displacement and the increasing
capacity which is coming from future
but imminent displacement.’’ 706 In
support, NGSA noted that CME Group’s
EDS figure has ‘‘incorporated
displacement into its estimate of
deliverable supply at Henry Hub for
years.’’ 707
MFA/AIMA, Citadel, and SIFMA
AMG requested that the Commission
raise the Federal spot month position
limit level for NYMEX NG referenced
contracts to at least 3,000 contracts,
because the 2020 NPRM effectively
decreases the total number of exchangetraded cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts that a market
participant may hold in the spot month
from the current level of 3,000 contracts
to 2,000 contracts.708 In support of this
request, MFA/AIMA argued that the
2020 NPRM ‘‘could adversely affect the
ability of traders to optimize the
proportion of physically-settled and
cash-settled natural gas contracts that
they wish to hold in their portfolio.’’ 709
SIFMA AMG argued that the 2020
NPRM ‘‘would disrupt existing trading
practices and business models without
any corresponding regulatory or policy
benefit.’’ 710
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(4) Discussion of Final Rule—NYMEX
NG Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
Under the Final Rule, market
participants may hold up to 2,000 cashsettled NYMEX NG referenced contracts
per exchange during the spot month and
an additional 2,000 cash-settled
economically equivalent OTC swaps,
rather than being subject to an aggregate
position limit level of 2,000 cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts across
all exchanges and the OTC swaps
market as proposed under the 2020
NPRM. Because there are currently three
exchanges that list natural gas
referenced contracts, this will allow
market participants to hold a total of
706 NGSA
at 10–11.
at 11.
708 MFA/AIMA at 11–12; Citadel at 7–8; and
SIFMA AMG at 10–11 (SIFMA AMG supported the
2,000 contract limit level for physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts, but requested at
least a 3,000 contract limit level for the cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts).
709 MFA/AIMA at 11–12.
710 SIFMA AMG at 11.
707 Id.
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8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts between positions
held in cash-settled futures and in cashsettled economically equivalent OTC
swaps.711 This is in addition to the
2,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts a market
participant may hold during the spot
month. These amendments to the
proposal are reflected in a revised
Appendix E to part 150 that the
Commission is adopting in this Final
Rule.
(i) Request To Increase the Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Level To Account
for Displacement
In response to NGSA’s request, the
Commission first notes that CME Group
provided the EDS figure that was used
as a basis for determining its exchangerecommended Federal spot month
position limit level, which the
Commission ultimately used as a basis
for its own proposed Federal spot
month position limit level for NYMEX
NG after independently reviewing and
assessing the methodology underlying
the EDS figure and the EDS figure
itself.712 As NGSA noted, CME Group’s
EDS has ‘‘incorporated displacement
into its estimate of deliverable supply at
Henry Hub for years,’’ 713 which means
that the EDS figure on which the
proposed Federal spot month position
limit level was based already
‘‘recogniz[ed] the transportation
capacity available now at Henry Hub
provided by displacement.’’ 714 As a
result, the proposed Federal spot month
position limit level took this into
account as well. With respect to future
increases in EDS based on ‘‘future but
imminent displacement,’’ 715 in the
event that this occurs, CME Group may
submit an updated EDS figure pursuant
to § 150.2(f), at which time the
Commission would consider whether to
modify the Federal spot month position
limit level.
711 2,000 cash-settled referenced contracts
multiplied by three exchanges plus 2,000 cashsettled economically equivalent OTC swaps equals
8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
712 Summary DSE Proposed Limits, CME Group
Comment Letter (Nov. 26, 2019), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for
Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
713 NGSA at 11.
714 Id. at 10. Furthermore, CME Group’s
methodology for determining EDS for NYMEX NG
explicitly states, ‘‘Additionally, the Exchange has
taken into consideration backhaul in estimating the
deliverable supply.’’ New York Mercantile
Exchange, Inc., Analysis of Deliverable Supply
Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures, December 2018
(Dec. 1, 2018), available at https://
comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule
85 FR 11596).
715 NGSA at 10.
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3327
(ii) Request To Increase the Cash-Settled
Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
As previewed above, in response to
comments from MFA/AIMA, Citadel,
and SIFMA AMG, the Commission is
modifying the proposed NYMEX NG
Federal spot month position limit level
for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts, so that the Federal spot
month position limit applies separately
per each exchange and the OTC swaps
market, rather than across exchanges
and the OTC swaps market.
The Commission believes that this
modification is warranted in order to
avoid disrupting the well-developed,
unique liquidity characteristics of the
natural gas derivatives markets. As
detailed below, the cash-settled natural
gas market is significantly more liquid
than the physically-settled natural gas
market during the spot month. This is
in contrast with typical commodity
markets, in which the physically-settled
contracts are generally more liquid than
the cash-settled contracts during the
spot month.716
The unique nature of the natural gas
markets is reflected in the current
exchange-set natural gas position limit
framework, in which market
participants may hold up to 1,000 cashsettled natural gas contracts per
exchange, which can result in a position
of up to 3,000 cash-settled natural gas
contracts (instead of 1,000 cash-settled
natural gas contracts altogether), despite
only being able to hold up to 1,000
physically-settled NYMEX NG
contracts. The Commission believes
that, absent the modification adopted
herein to apply the spot month limit to
NYMEX NG on a per exchange basis, the
proposed Federal spot month position
limit level could disrupt the cash-settled
natural gas markets, in part, because, as
commenters have noted: (1) Market
participants would be able to hold fewer
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts (i.e., 2,000 contracts) than they
were previously permitted under the
exchange-set position limit framework
(i.e., 3,000 contracts); and (2) some
market participants may not be able to
hold the same proportion of physicallysettled to cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts that they are
716 Typically, this is because the physicallysettled contract is established first and the natural
formation of liquidity in the physically-settled
contract historically stays in the established
contract due to first mover advantage. More liquid
markets provide for better bid/ask spreads and can
execute larger transaction sizes without substantial
effects on the price of the contract. Thus, in the
past, cash-settled look-alike contracts historically
have not been as liquid as the original physicallysettled futures contract.
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currently able to hold if they wish to
maximize their positions in physicallysettled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts. The Commission also believes
that it is appropriate to maintain
consistency vis-a`-vis the exchange-set
position limit framework in order to
minimize disruptions, since the
Commission has not observed any
issues with the exchange-set position
limit framework with respect to natural
gas.
Accordingly, under the Final Rule,
market participants (that are not
availing themselves of the Federal spot
month conditional position limit
exemption for NYMEX NG, which is
discussed below) may hold up to 2,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts on each exchange that lists a
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contract (which is currently NYMEX,
IFUS, and Nodal), a total position of
6,000 exchange-listed cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts.717
Furthermore, under the Final Rule,
traders may also hold an additional
position in cash-settled economically
equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps that
has a notional amount of up to 2,000
equivalent-sized contracts. The
Commission is separately permitting up
to 2,000 referenced contracts in the
NYMEX NG OTC swaps market in order
to avoid disruptions to that market,
given that traders may be currently
participating in that market as well. As
a result, under the Final Rule, traders
may hold up to a total of 8,000 cashsettled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts 718 and 2,000 physicallysettled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts.719
The Commission notes that, as
discussed further below, as an initial
legal matter, the Commission interprets
CEA section 4a(a)(6) as generally
717 The Commission notes that market
participants are not permitted to net cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract positions across
exchanges or the OTC swaps market for Federal
spot month position limit purposes.
718 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts multiplied by three exchanges plus 2,000
cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG
OTC swaps equals 8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts.
719 CME Group also commented that it ‘‘objects to
any disparities in the spot-month limits and would
rigorously disagree if the Commission adopts any
other disparities in treatment between physicallysettled and cash-settled contracts,’’ in the context of
the proposed Federal conditional limit, which is
discussed in the section below. CME Group at 6.
This comment could also be viewed as an objection
to the Final Rule’s Federal spot month position
limit level for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts. The Commission believes that the
rationale set forth in this section and the Federal
conditional limit section below is responsive to
CME Group’s possible concern with respect to the
Final Rule’s Federal spot month position limit level
for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
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requiring aggregate Federal position
limits across exchanges.720
Notwithstanding the requirements of
CEA section 4a(a)(6), the Commission is
adopting this approach with respect to
NYMEX NG referenced contracts
pursuant to its exemptive authority in
CEA section 4a(a)(7). In doing so, the
Commission believes that, based on the
foregoing reasons, applying the Federal
spot month position limit level for cashsettled NYMEX NG referenced contracts
separately per exchange and the OTC
swaps market does not undermine the
purposes of the Federal position limits
framework pursuant to CEA section 4a.
b. NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month
Conditional Position Limit Level
(1) Summary of 2020 NPRM and
Additional Background Information—
NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month
Conditional Position Limit Level
In addition to the proposed 2,000
contract Federal spot month position
limit level for NYMEX NG, proposed
§ 150.3(a)(4) also included a spot month
conditional position limit exemption
(‘‘Federal conditional limit’’) from the
standard Federal spot month position
limit level for NYMEX NG for market
participants that do not hold a position
in the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract.721 The proposed
Federal conditional limit would allow,
during the spot month, market
participants that do not hold a position
in the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract to hold: (1) Up to
10,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts per exchange that
lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract; and (2) an
additional position in cash-settled
economically equivalent NYMEX NG
OTC swaps that has a notional amount
of up to 10,000 equivalent-sized
contracts. As a result, the proposed
Federal conditional limit would permit
a market participant that does not hold
a physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract to hold a total of
40,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts (up to 10,000
contracts on each of the three exchanges
(NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal) that lists a
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contract and in the OTC swaps market)
during the spot month.
The proposed framework for the
Federal conditional limit was derived
from the existing exchange-set spot
720 For further discussion of the Commission’s
aggregation and netting rules, see Section II.B.10.
(application of netting section).
721 The Commission is adopting the Federal
conditional limit pursuant to its exemptive
authority in CEA section 4a(a)(7). 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(7).
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month conditional position limit
framework that has been in place for
approximately a decade. This existing
conditional position limit framework
permits, during the spot month, up to
5,000 equivalent-sized cash-settled
natural gas contracts per exchange that
lists a cash-settled natural gas contract,
provided that the market participant
does not hold a position in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG
contract.722 The 5,000 contract
conditional spot month position limit
level equals five-times the existing
exchange-set 1,000 contract spot month
position limit level for the physicallysettled NYMEX NG contract.723 Noting
the unique circumstances of the natural
gas futures markets, the Commission’s
proposed Federal conditional limit level
applied the same multiplier of five to its
proposed Federal spot month position
limit level for the physically-settled
NYMEX NG contract in order to arrive
at the 10,000 contract Federal
conditional limit level that applies for
each exchange and OTC swaps market.
The 2020 NPRM included the Federal
conditional limit to accommodate
certain trading dynamics unique to the
natural gas contracts.724 For example,
the Commission has observed that, as
the physically-settled NYMEX NG core
referenced futures contract approaches
expiration, open interest tends to
decline in NYMEX NG and tends to
increase rapidly in ICE’s cash-settled
Henry Hub LD1 contract.725 This is in
contrast with other commodities in
which the physically-settled markets are
more liquid than the cash-settled
markets during the spot month. These
dynamics suggest that cash-settled
natural gas contracts serve an important
function for hedgers and speculators
who wish to recreate and/or hedge the
physically-settled NYMEX NG contract
price during the spot month without
being required to make or take
723 See IFUS Rule 6.20(c), NYMEX Rule 559.F,
and Nodal Rule 6.5.7. The spot month for such
contracts is three days. See also Position Limits,
CMG Group website, available at https://
www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/positionlimits.html (NYMEX position limits spreadsheet);
Market Resources, IFUS website, available at
https://www.theice.com/futures-us/marketresources (IFUS position limits spreadsheet).
NYMEX rules establish an exchange-set spot month
limit of 1,000 contracts for its physically-settled
NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract and a
separate spot month limit of 1,000 contracts for its
cash-settled Henry Hub Natural Gas Last Day
Financial Futures contract. IFUS’s natural gas
contract is one quarter the size of the NYMEX
contract. IFUS thus has rules in place establishing
an exchange-set spot month limit of 4,000 contracts
(equivalent to 1,000 NYMEX NG contracts) for its
cash-settled Henry Hub LD1 Fixed Price Futures
contract.
724 85 FR at 11641.
725 Id.
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delivery.726 In addition, the
Commission also proposed the
divestiture requirement in the Federal
conditional limit in order to address
historical concerns over the potential for
manipulation of physically-settled
natural gas contracts during the spot
month in order to benefit positions in
cash-settled natural gas contracts.727
(2) Summary of the Commission
Determination—NYMEX NG Federal
Spot Month Conditional Position Limit
Level
The Commission is adopting the
Federal conditional limit as proposed.
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(3) Comments—NYMEX NG Federal
Spot Month Conditional Position Limit
Level
With respect to the proposed Federal
conditional limit, several commenters
generally supported its adoption.728
COPE believed that the proposed
conditional limit ‘‘permits market
liquidity . . . without sacrificing the
benefits of position limits.’’729 ICE
supported the Federal conditional limit,
noting that ‘‘cash-settled contracts
present a reduced potential for
manipulation of the price of the
physically-settled contract.’’ 730 CME
Group, on the other hand, objected to
the proposal, arguing that it could
‘‘drain liquidity for bona fide hedgers in
the physically-settled market and could
prevent physical delivery markets from
serving the price discovery function that
they have long provided’’ and believed
that it ‘‘could incentivize the
manipulation of a cash commodity price
in order to benefit a position in a cashsettled contract.’’ 731
A number of commenters also
requested that the Federal conditional
limit levels be available to market
participants that do not exit positions in
the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract during the spot
month, which would effectively
establish the Federal conditional limit
level as the operative Federal spot
month limit level for cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts. In
support of this request, several
commenters argued that the 2020
NPRM’s approach to the Federal
conditional limit would result in
liquidity leaving the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract when it
726 Id.
727 Id.
728 COPE
at 2–3; EEI/EPSA at 4; and ICE at 13.
at 2–3.
730 ICE at 13 (referencing a sentiment previously
expressed by the Commission).
731 CME Group at 6.
729 COPE
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is needed the most.732 EEI/EPSA also
commented that the Federal conditional
limit framework in the 2020 NPRM is
‘‘excessive and is an overly rigid
solution that may unnecessarily restrict
legitimate trading activity.’’ 733 NGSA
commented that the 2020 NPRM
‘‘removes important hedging optionality
for physical market participants.’’ 734
Citadel argued that the 2020 NPRM
would limit flexibility and impair
market efficiency by preventing ‘‘market
participants with a meaningful position
in the cash-settled market from
participating in the physically-settled
market—limiting flexibility and
impairing market efficiency.’’ 735 CCI
also believed that the 2020 NPRM
would ‘‘impair price discovery’’ and
‘‘negatively impact price
convergence.’’ 736
Finally, ICE requested that ‘‘the
Commission revert back to the five-time
conditional limit for cash settled
contracts . . . instead of the conditional
limit of 10,000 contracts in the Proposed
Rule,’’ because ‘‘[a]pplying a five-time
multiplier versus a hard limit, would
allow the conditional limit to track any
changes in the spot month limits over
time, which in turn will reflect changes
in deliverable supply.’’ 737
(4) Discussion of Final Rule—NYMEX
NG Federal Spot Month Conditional
Position Limit Level
(i) Availability of the Federal
Conditional Limit for NYMEX NG
In response to CME Group’s comment
supporting the elimination of the
Federal condition limit, the Commission
is concerned that eliminating the
proposed conditional limit could result
in potential market disruptions, given
that a conditional limit framework for
natural gas has been in place at the
exchange level for many years. For
example, eliminating the existing
conditional limit structure could restrict
the positions that market participants
may hold in cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts during the spot
month, resulting in reduced liquidity,
including for commercial hedgers
seeking to offset price risks but not
necessarily looking to make or take
delivery. Additionally, since it was
instituted approximately a decade ago,
the exchange-set conditional limit
framework has functioned well.738 The
732 ISDA at 8; SIFMA AMG at 10–11; FIA at 7–
8; NGSA at 12–14; Citadel at 7; and CCI at 4.
733 EEI/EPSA at 4.
734 NGSA at 12.
735 Citadel at 7.
736 CCI at 4.
737 ICE at 13.
738 85 FR at 11640.
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Commission has not observed any of the
concerns raised by CME Group come to
fruition, and the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract remains
highly liquid. Furthermore, as discussed
above, other commenters supported the
availability of the Federal conditional
limit.
(ii) Federal Conditional Limit’s
Divestiture Requirement
In response to comments requesting
that the Federal conditional limit be
available to market participants that do
not exit the spot month physicallysettled NYMEX NG referenced contract,
the Commission first notes that the
requirement that market participants
exit the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract has been reflected in
exchange rulebooks for many years, in
part because the requirement is
critically important to discouraging
manipulation.739 Without this
requirement, a trader could hold up to
40,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts (or more, if
additional exchanges list cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts in the
future), which is at 500% of EDS, and
2,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts, which is at 25% of
EDS. At these levels, it may not require
much movement in the physicallysettled markets to disproportionately
benefit the cash-settled holdings. As a
result, the requirement to exit the
physically-settled contract is critical for
reducing the market participant’s
incentive to manipulate the cash
settlement price by, for example,
banging-the-close or distorting physical
delivery prices in the physically-settled
contract to benefit leveraged cashsettled positions.740
With respect to commenters’ concerns
about removing flexibility and options
for market participants, as well as a
potential decrease in liquidity in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract, the Commission
notes that the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract remains
highly liquid even in spite of the
implementation of the exchange-set
conditional limit framework instituted
approximately a decade ago. Also,
market participants should have more
flexibility and options than before
because the Federal spot month position
limit level for NYMEX NG adopted
herein will now permit up to 8,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts, even if the market participant
holds 2,000 physically-settled NYMEX
739 85
FR at 11641.
85 FR 11626, 11641.
740 See
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NG referenced contracts.741 Finally, the
Commission reiterates that Federal
position limit levels only apply to
speculative positions and, as a result,
bona fide hedging positions will
continue to be allowed to exceed the
Federal position limit levels, including
the Federal conditional limit level, from
the Federal position limits
perspective.742
(iii) Application of a Five-Times
Multiplier for the Federal Conditional
Limit Level
The Commission clarifies that, in
accordance with historical practice, if
the Federal spot month position limit
level for the physically-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contract is updated in the
future through rulemaking, the
Commission expects to simultaneously
adjust the Federal conditional limit in
the same rulemaking, such that the
Federal conditional limit level is set at
a multiple of five of the new Federal
spot month position limit level for
NYMEX NG, provided that the
Commission does not observe any issues
in the markets.
c. NYMEX NG Penultimate Referenced
Contracts
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(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and
Additional Background Information—
NYMEX NG Penultimate Referenced
Contracts
With respect to NYMEX NG, the
Commission proposed that penultimate
741 Under the Final Rule’s Federal spot month
position limit level for NYMEX NG, a trader may
hold 2,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts, 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts per exchange that lists such
contracts, and 2,000 cash-settled economically
equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps. Currently, there
are three exchanges that list cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts—NYMEX, IFUS, and
Nodal. As a result, a trader may hold up to 6,000
exchange-listed cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts and 2,000 cash-settled economically
equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps, which brings
the total number of cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts a trader may hold to 8,000
under the Federal spot month position limit level.
742 This also answers EEI/EPSA’s request to
confirm ‘‘that a participant may rely upon the
conditional limit in the first instance but may also
utilize a hedge exemption to exceed the conditional
limit.’’ EEI/EPSA at 4. However, the Commission
notes that exchanges have rarely, if ever, allowed
a market participant to exceed the exchange-set
natural gas conditional limit by layering a bona fide
hedge position on top of the cash-settled natural gas
contract position permitted under the natural gas
conditional limit. Similar to this existing practice,
the Commission expects that, under the Final Rule,
a market participant will rarely be permitted to
hold: (1) A bona fide hedge position in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract
while taking advantage of the conditional limit for
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts; or (2)
a bona fide hedge position in cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts on top of the maximum
position permitted under the conditional limit for
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
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contracts, which are cash-settled
contracts that settle on the trading day
immediately preceding the final trading
day of the corresponding referenced
contract, are also considered referenced
contracts that are subject to Federal spot
month position limits.743 The
Commission also proposed a slightly
broader economically equivalent swap
definition for natural gas, so that swaps
with delivery dates that diverge by less
than two calendar days (instead of one
calendar day) from an associated
referenced contract could still be
deemed economically equivalent and
therefore subject to Federal position
limits. The Commission made these
adjustments to: Recognize the active and
vibrant penultimate natural gas contract
markets; prevent and disincentivize
manipulation and regulatory arbitrage;
and prevent volume from shifting away
from non-penultimate cash-settled
NYMEX NG markets to penultimate
NYMEX NG contract futures and/or
penultimate NYMEX NG swaps markets
in order to avoid Federal position
limits.744
(2) Comments—NYMEX NG
Penultimate Referenced Contracts
In response to this part of the 2020
NPRM, ICE requested ‘‘that the
Commission continue to allow
exchanges to impose spot month
accountability levels which expire
during the period when spot month
limits for the Henry Hub core-referenced
futures contract are in effect and to not
aggregate penultimate options into the
Henry Hub LD1 cash-settled limit.’’ 745
One of the ways in which ICE supported
this request was by claiming that, ‘‘The
Commission states that penultimate
743 Such penultimate contracts include: ICE’s
Henry Financial Penultimate Fixed Price Futures
(PHH) and options on Henry Penultimate Fixed
Price (PHE), and NYMEX’s Henry Hub Natural Gas
Penultimate Financial Futures (NPG).
744 The Commission proposed a relatively narrow
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ definition in order
to prevent market participants from inappropriately
netting positions in core referenced futures
contracts against swap positions further out on the
curve. The Commission acknowledges that liquidity
could shift to penultimate swaps as a result, but
believes that, with the exception of natural gas, this
concern is mitigated since certain constraints exist
that militate against this from occurring, including
basis risk between the penultimate swap and the
core referenced futures contract. However, this
constraint does not necessarily apply to the natural
gas futures markets, because natural gas has a
relatively liquid penultimate futures market that
enables a market participant to hedge or off-set its
penultimate swap positions. As a result, the
Commission believes that liquidity may be
incentivized to shift from NYMEX NG to
penultimate natural gas swaps in order to avoid
Federal position limits in the absence of the
Commission’s exception for natural gas in the
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ definition.
745 ICE at 14.
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contracts are economically the same as
the last day contract, however,
empirically, this statement is not correct
as settlement prices have
demonstrated.’’ 746
(3) Discussion of Final Rule—NYMEX
NG Penultimate Referenced Contracts
The Commission declines to exclude
NYMEX NG penultimate contracts from
Federal position limits for the reasons
set forth in this Final Rule’s section
addressing ‘‘Referenced Contract.’’ 747 In
doing so, the Commission notes, in
particular, that ICE’s specific assertion
that penultimate natural gas contracts
are not economically the same as last
day contracts based on settlement prices
runs counter to the Commission’s
review of a sample of the daily
settlement prices for NYMEX NG (the
physically-settled natural gas contract),
ICE Henry Hub LD1 (the ICE natural gas
contract cash-settled to NYMEX NG),
and ICE Henry Hub Penultimate (the
ICE penultimate natural gas contract
cash-settled to NYMEX NG).748
vii. Wheat Core Referenced Futures
Contracts’ Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM and
Additional Background Information—
Wheat Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
The Commission proposed to increase
the Federal spot month position limit
levels for all three wheat core referenced
futures contracts (CBOT Wheat (W),
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE)) from 600 contracts
to 1,200 contracts. The proposed
Federal limit levels were based on the
underlying EDS figures for each wheat
core referenced futures contract and
CME’s and MGEX’s recommended
Federal spot month position limit levels
of 1,200 contracts for each of their
respective wheat core referenced futures
contracts.
b. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Wheat Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission is adopting the
Federal spot month position limit levels
for all three wheat core referenced
futures contracts as proposed.
c. Comments—Wheat Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received one
comment, from MGEX, fully supporting
746 Id.
747 For further discussion of the Commission’s
determination to include penultimate contracts
within the Federal position limits framework, see
Section II.A.16.iii.a.(2)(iii).
748 Id.
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4. Federal Non-Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
i. Background—Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission most recently
updated the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels in 2011.750 At that
time, the Commission utilized a formula
749 MGEX
at 3.
Commission notes that the 2011 Final
Rulemaking that adopted the most recent Federal
non-spot month position limit levels was vacated
by an order of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia on September 28, 2012. However, that
order did not apply with respect to the 2011 Final
Rulemaking’s amendments to the Federal non-spot
month position limit levels in § 150.2. ISDA, 887
F.Supp.2d 259 (2012).
751 See, e.g., Revision of Federal Speculative
Position Limits and Associated Rules, 64 FR at
24038 (May 5, 1999) (increasing deferred-month
limit levels based on 10% of open interest up to an
open interest of 25,000 contracts, with a marginal
increase of 2.5% thereafter). Prior to 1999, the
Commission had given little credence to the size of
open interest in the contract in determining the
position limit level. Instead, the Commission’s
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750 The
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that was called the ‘‘10/2.5%
formula,’’ 751 which calculated the
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels by multiplying the first 25,000
contracts in open interest by 10% and
multiplying the remaining contracts by
2.5% and adding the two numbers
together.752 The 10/2.5% formula was
first adopted in 1999 based on two
primary factors: Growth in open interest
and the size of large traders’
positions.753 The existing Federal nonspot month position limit levels that
traditional standard was to set limit levels based on
the distribution of speculative traders in the market.
See, e.g., 64 FR at 24039; Revision of Federal
Speculative Position Limits and Associated Rules,
63 FR at 38525, 38527 (July 17, 1998).
752 For example, assume a commodity contract
has an aggregate open interest of 200,000 contracts
over the past 12 month period. Applying the 10/
2.5% formula to an aggregate open interest of
200,000 contracts would yield a non-spot month
position limit level of 6,875 contracts. That is, 10%
of the first 25,000 contracts would equal 2,500
contracts (25,000 contracts × 0.10 = 2,500
contracts). Then add 2.5% of the remaining 175,000
of aggregate open interest or 4,375 contracts
(175,000 contracts × 0.025 = 4,375 contracts) for a
total non-spot month position limit level of 6,875
contracts (2,500 contracts + 4,375 contracts = 6,875
contracts).
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were adopted in 2011 have not been
updated to reflect changes in open
interest data in over a decade.754
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit
Levels
Proposed § 150.2(e) provided that
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels were set forth in proposed
Appendix E to part 150 and were as
follows: 755
753 See 64 FR at 24038. See also 63 FR at 38525,
38527 (The 1998 proposed revisions to non-spot
month levels, which were eventually adopted in
1999, were based upon two criteria: ‘‘(1) The
distribution of speculative traders in the markets;
and (2) the size of open interest.’’).
754 In setting the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels in 2011, the Commission used open
interest data from 2009. 76 FR at 71642.
755 85 FR at 11624. As discussed above, the
proposed Federal non-spot month position limits
would apply to only the nine legacy agricultural
contracts and any associated referenced contracts.
All other referenced contracts subject to Federal
position limits would be subject to Federal position
limits only during the spot month, as specified
above, and would only be subject to exchange-set
position limits or position accountability levels
outside of the spot month.
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the 2020 NPRM’s Federal spot month
parity among the three wheat core
referenced futures contracts.749
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In generally calculating the above
levels, the Commission proposed to
maintain the existing 10/2.5% formula
for non-spot month position limit levels,
but with the following limited changes:
(1) The 10% rate would apply to the
first 50,000 contracts of open interest
(instead of the first 25,000 contracts); (2)
the 2.5% rate would apply to open
interest above 50,000 contracts (rather
than above the current level of 25,000
contracts); and (3) the modified 10/2.5%
formula would apply to updated open
interest data for the applicable futures
and delta-adjusted options for the
periods from July 2017 to June 2018 and
July 2018 to June 2019.756 All Federal
non-spot month position limit levels
that were calculated based on the 10/
2.5% formula (i.e., all legacy
agricultural contracts, with the
exception of CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW), MGEX HRS Wheat
(MWE), and the single month position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT))
were rounded up to the nearest 100
contracts.
As outlined in the table above, the
proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels are generally higher
than the existing Federal non-spot
month position limit levels, with the
exception of CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE), for which the proposed
limit levels would remain at existing
levels. As described in detail below, this
proposed general increase is primarily
due to the increases in open interest that
have occurred since the Federal nonspot month position limit levels were
last updated approximately a decade
ago.757
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iii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission is adopting each of
the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels as proposed in § 150.2(e)
and Appendix E to part 150, with the
exception of setting a lower single
month position limit for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT). The Commission will first
describe the general rationale for the
final Federal non-spot month position
limit levels that are being adopted. Next,
the Commission will describe the
756 The 12-month period yielding the higher open
interest level is selected as the basis for the Federal
non-spot month position limit level.
757 See 85 FR at 11630. The 2020 NPRM’s
proposed modification to the 10/2.5% formula from
25,000 to 50,000 contracts results in a modest
increase in the Federal non-spot month position
limit level of 1,875 contracts over what the limit
level would be if the 10/2.5% formula were applied
at 25,000 contracts, assuming that the market for the
core referenced futures contract has an open
interest of at least 50,000 contracts.
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comments it received in connection
with the proposed Federal non-spot
month position limit levels. Finally, the
Commission will provide responses to
such comments, including further
rationale for the Commission’s position
concerning the final Federal non-spot
month position limit levels.
a. Rationale for the Final Federal NonSpot Month Position Limit Levels
As explained below, the Commission
believes that the final Federal non-spot
month position limit levels, in
conjunction with the rest of the Federal
position limits framework, will achieve
the four policy objectives in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B). Namely, they will:
(1) Diminish, eliminate, or prevent
excessive speculation; (2) deter and
prevent market manipulation, squeezes,
and corners; (3) ensure sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (4)
ensure that the price discovery function
of the underlying market is not
disrupted.758
As a preliminary matter, the
Commission continues to believe that a
formula based on a percentage of open
interest, such as the 10/2.5% formula,
will permit position limit levels to
better reflect the changing needs and
composition of the futures markets.759
Open interest is a measure of market
activity that reflects the number of
contracts that are ‘‘open’’ or live, where
each contract of open interest represents
both a long and a short position.760 The
Commission believes that limiting
positions to a percentage of open
interest: (1) Helps ensure that positions
are not so large relative to observed
market activity that they risk disrupting
the market; (2) allows speculators to
hold sufficient contracts to provide a
healthy level of liquidity for bona fide
hedgers; and (3) allows for increases in
position limits and position sizes as
markets expand and become more
active.761
(1) Modification of the 10/2.5% Formula
However, the Commission believes
that the current 10/2.5% formula should
be updated based on market
developments since it was adopted in
1999. As a result, the Commission
proposed modifying the 10/2.5%
formula by adjusting the inflection point
between the 10% rate and the 2.5% rate
from 25,000 contracts to 50,000
contracts.762 The Commission also
758 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B).
FR at 11630.
760 Id.
761 Id.
762 This results in a modest increase in the
Federal non-spot month position limit level of
1,875 contracts over what the limit level would be
759 85
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proposed applying updated open
interest data to the modified 10/2.5%
formula.
The Commission is adopting these
changes as proposed because: (1) Open
interest has increased significantly since
the 10/2.5% formula was originally
adopted in 1999; and (2) futures market
composition has changed significantly
since 1999. The Commission discusses
both developments in turn below.
(i) Increases in Open Interest
As noted in the 2020 NPRM, there has
generally been a significant increase in
maximum open interest for each of the
legacy agricultural contracts (except for
CBOT Oats (O)) since the existing 10/
2.5% formula was first adopted in
1999.763 Under the existing 10/2.5%
formula, because the 2.5% incremental
increase applies after the first 25,000
contracts of open interest, limit levels
with respect to contracts with open
interest above 25,000 contracts (i.e., all
applicable core referenced futures
contracts other than CBOT Oats (O))
continue to increase at the much slower
rate of 2.5% rather than the 10% rate
that’s applicable for the first 25,000
contracts. As a result, the existing 10/
2.5% formula has become
proportionally more restrictive as the
percentage of open interest above 25,000
contracts increased.
The table below provides data that
describes the market environment
during the period prior to, and
subsequent to, the adoption of the
existing 10/2.5% formula by the
Commission in 1999. The data includes
futures contracts and the delta-adjusted
options on futures open interest.764 The
first column of the table provides the
maximum open interest in the nine
legacy agricultural contracts over the
five year period ending in 1999. The
CBOT Corn (C) contract had a maximum
open interest of approximately 463,000
contracts, and the CBOT Soybeans (S)
contract had a maximum open interest
if the 10/2.5% formula were applied at 25,000
contracts, assuming that the market for the core
referenced futures contract has an open interest of
at least 50,000 contracts.
763 85 FR at 11631.
764 Delta is a ratio comparing the change in the
price of an asset (a futures contract) to the
corresponding change in the price of its derivative
(an option on that futures contract) and has a value
that ranges between zero and one. In-the-money call
options get closer to 1 as their expiration
approaches. At-the-money call options typically
have a delta of 0.5, and the delta of out-of-themoney call options approaches 0 as expiration
nears. The deeper in-the-money the call option, the
closer the delta will be to 1, and the more the option
will behave like the underlying asset. Thus, deltaadjusted options on futures will represent the total
position of those options as if they were converted
to futures.
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of approximately 227,000 contracts. The
other seven contracts had maximum
open interest figures that ranged from
less than 20,000 contracts for CBOT
Oats (O) to approximately 172,000 for
CBOT Soybean Oil (SO). Hence, when
adopting the 10/2.5% formula in 1999,
the Commission’s experience in these
markets was of aggregate futures and
options on futures open interest well
below 500,000 contracts.
The table also displays the maximum
open interest figures for subsequent
periods up to, and including, 2018. The
maximum open interest for all legacy
agricultural contracts, except for CBOT
Oats (O), generally increased over the
period. By the 2015–2018 period
covered in the last column of the table,
five of the contracts had maximum open
interest greater than 500,000 contracts.
Also, the contracts for CBOT Corn (C),
CBOT Soybeans (S), and CBOT Hard
Red Winter Wheat (KW) saw maximum
open interest increase by a factor of four
to five times the maximum open interest
observed during the 1994–1999 period
when the Commission adopted the 10/
2.5% formula in 1999.
As open interest has increased, the
current Federal non-spot month
position limit levels have become
significantly more restrictive over time.
In particular, as discussed above,
because the 2.5% incremental increase
applies after the first 25,000 contracts of
open interest under the existing 10/
2.5% formula, Federal non-spot month
position limit levels on legacy
agricultural contracts with open interest
above 25,000 contracts (i.e., all contracts
other than CBOT Oats (O)) continue to
increase at a much slower rate of 2.5%
rather than the 10% that applies for the
first 25,000 contracts.
The existing 10/2.5% formula’s
inflection point of 25,000 contracts was
less of a problem in the latter part of the
1990s, for example, when open interest
in each of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts was below 500,000, and in
many cases below 200,000. More
recently, however, open interest has
grown above 500,000 for a majority of
the legacy agricultural contracts. The
existing 10/2.5% formula has thus
become more restrictive for market
participants, including, as discussed
immediately below, certain banks and
dealers with positions that may not be
eligible for a bona fide hedging
exemption, but who might otherwise
provide valuable liquidity to
commercial firms.
individual traders, who tended to be
long.765
Several years after the Commission
adopted the 10/2.5% formula, the
composition of futures market
participants changed as dealers began to
enter the physical commodity futures
market in larger size. These dealers,
including ones affiliated with banks or
large financial institutions that are now
provisionally registered and regulated as
swap dealers, sometimes held
significant positions in these markets by
acting as aggregators or market makers
and providing swaps to commercial
hedgers and to other market
participants.766 The existing 10/2.5%
formula has thus become particularly
restrictive for dealers, including those
with positions that may not be eligible
for a bona fide hedging exemption, but
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(ii) Changes in Market Composition
The potentially restrictive nature of
the existing Federal non-spot month
position limit levels has become more
problematic over time because dealers
play a much more significant role in the
market today than at the time the
Commission adopted the 10/2.5%
formula. Prior to 1999, the Commission
regulated physical commodity markets
where the largest participants were
often large commercial interests who
held short positions. The offsetting
positions were often held by small,
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Fmt 4701
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765 Stewart, Blair, An Analysis of Speculative
Trading in Grain Futures, Technical Bulletin No.
1001, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Oct. 1949).
See also Draper, Dennis, ‘‘The Small Public Trader
in Futures Markets’’, pp. 211–269, Futures Markets:
Regulatory Issues (ed. Anne Peck, 1985): American
Enterprise Institute.
766 Staff Report on Commodity Swap Dealers &
Index Traders with Commission Recommendations,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(Sept. 2008), available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/cftcstaffreportonswapdealers09.pdf.
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that might otherwise provide valuable
liquidity to commercial firms.767
The table below demonstrates the
trend of increased dealer participation
by presenting data from the
Commission’s publicly available ‘‘Bank
Participation Report’’ (‘‘BPR’’), as of the
December report for 2002–2018.768 The
table displays the number of banks
holding reportable positions for the
seven futures contracts for which
Federal position limits apply and that
were reported in the BPR.769 The report
presents data for every market where
five or more banks hold reportable
positions. The BPR is based on the same
large-trader reporting system database
used to generate the Commission’s
Commitments of Traders (‘‘COT’’)
report.770
No data was reported for the seven
futures contracts in December 2002,
indicating that fewer than five banks
held reportable positions at the time of
the report. The December 2003 report
shows that five or more banks held
reportable positions in four of the
commodity futures. The number of
banks with reportable positions
generally increased in the early to mid-
2000s, which included dealers that
operated in the swaps markets by acting
as aggregators or market makers,
providing swaps to commercial hedgers
and to other market participants while
using the futures markets to hedge their
own exposures.771 When the
Commission adopted the 10/2.5%
formula in 1999, it had limited
experience with physical commodity
derivatives markets in which such
banks were significant participants.
For 2003, which was the first year in
the report with reported data on the
futures for these physical commodities,
the BPR showed, as displayed in the
table below, that the reporting banks
held modest positions, totaling 3.4% of
futures long open interest for CBOT
Wheat (W) and smaller positions in
other futures. The positions displayed
in the table below increased over the
next several years, generally peaking
around 2005/2006 as a percentage of the
long open interest.
767 The Commission notes that this issue with
respect to swap dealers is being addressed through
a combination of a modification of the 10/2.5%
formula and the pass-through swap provision, the
latter of which is described in Section II.A.1.x.
(Pass-Through Swap and Pass-Through Swap Offset
Provisions).
768 Bank Participation Reports, available at
https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/
BankParticipationReports/index.htm.
769 The term ‘‘reportable position’’ is defined in
§ 15.00(p) of the Commission’s regulations. 17 CFR
15.00(p).
770 Commitments of Traders, available at
www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/
CommitmentsofTraders/index.htm. Commitments
of Traders reports indicate that there are generally
still as many large commercial traders in the
markets today as there were in the 1990s.
771 Staff Report on Commodity Swap Dealers &
Index Traders with Commission Recommendations,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(Sept. 2008), available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/cftcstaffreportonswapdealers09.pdf.
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The Commission believes that the
application of the modified 10/2.5%
formula adopted herein to updated open
interest data will prevent the Federal
non-spot month limits from becoming
overly restrictive by providing an
appropriate increase in the non-spot
month position limit levels for most
contracts to better reflect the abovedescribed changes in market dynamics
observed since the late 1990s.
(2) Non-Spot Month Position Limit
Levels for CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE)
The Commission is adopting the
proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels with respect to
CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE).
These remain at the current Federal
non-spot month position limit levels,
which are 2,000 contracts for CBOT
Oats (O) and 12,000 contracts for both
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE). These Federal nonspot month position limit levels are
higher than the levels that would have
been determined using the modified 10/
2.5% formula and updated open interest
data, which would have resulted in 700
contracts for CBOT Oats (O), 11,900
contracts for CBOT KC HRW Wheat
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(KW), and 5,700 contracts for MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE). However, the
Commission saw no reason to reduce
these Federal non-spot month position
limit levels in accordance with the 10/
2.5% formula because the Commission
has observed that the existing limit
levels have functioned well for these
core referenced futures contracts and
the Commission believes that strictly
following the 10/2.5% formula to
determine Federal non-spot month
position limit levels could harm
liquidity in those markets.
(3) Single Month Position Limit Level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
The Commission is adopting a
modified single month Federal position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT).
The Commission proposed a uniform
single month and all-months-combined
position limit for the ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT) contract, as well as uniform single
month and all-months-combined
position limits for the eight other legacy
agricultural contracts. However, in the
2020 NPRM the Commission requested
comments from the public concerning
whether the Commission should adopt
a lower single month position limit
level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
compared to the all-months-combined
position limit level.772
The Commission received numerous
comments from the end users of ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) in the cotton industry,
including growers and merchants, who
requested that the Commission establish
a lower Federal single month position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
compared to the all-months-combined
position limit level, including
establishing the single month position
limit level at 50% of the all-monthscombined position limit level.773 The
Commission did not receive any
comments from commercial end-users
opposing a lower Federal single month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT) compared to the all-monthscombined position limit level. In
response to the comments received, the
Commission is adopting a lower Federal
single month position limit level of
5,950 contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT), which is 50% of the proposed
Federal non-spot month position limit
level. However, the Commission is
adopting the proposed all-months772 85
FR 11637 (Request for Comment #26).
at 2, 8; LDC at 2; Olam at 2; Ecom at
1; ACA at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Choice at 2; Jess
Smith at 2; East Cotton at 2; Memtex at 2; NCC at
1–2; Southern Cotton at 2–3; Texas Cotton at 2;
Toyo Cotton Co. at 2; WCSA at 2; and Omnicotton
at 2.
773 ACSA
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combined position limit level of 11,900
contracts, which is based on the
modified 10/2.5% formula. This change
is discussed further below.
(4) The Final Rule’s Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limits Achieve the Four
Statutory Objectives in CEA Section
4a(a)(3)(B)
As noted above, in the Final Rule, the
Commission is not reducing Federal
non-spot month position limit levels for
any of the legacy agricultural contracts
and will be raising them for six of the
nine such contracts in accordance with
the updated open interest data and the
modified 10/2.5% formula.774 As a
result, the Commission believes that the
final Federal non-spot month position
limit levels will generally improve
liquidity for bona fide hedgers and, at
the very least, not harm liquidity
compared to the status quo.
The Commission also believes that the
final Federal non-spot month position
limit levels remain low enough to
diminish, eliminate, or prevent
excessive speculation, and to deter and
prevent market manipulation. This is
because, as discussed above, by taking
into account the amount of observed
market activity through open interest,
the modified 10/2.5% formula adopted
herein helps ensure, among other
things, that positions are not so large
relative to observed market activity that
they risk disrupting the market.775 This,
in turn, also helps ensure that the price
discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted, because
markets that are free from manipulative
activity reflect fundamentals of supply
and demand rather than artificial
pressures. The Commission also notes
that the 10/2.5% formula has functioned
well, based on the Commission’s
decades of experience administering the
formula.776
The Commission reiterates that the
modified 10/2.5% formula provided in
this Final Rule is generally a
continuation of the same approach the
Commission has taken for decades. The
increased levels adopted herein are
primarily driven by utilizing updated
open interest figures. With respect to the
slight modification to the 10/2.5%
formula, the Commission does not
believe that the modification will
negatively impact the formula’s
effectiveness in ensuring that the
774 As noted previously, the Commission is not
following the modified 10/2.5% formula for
determining the single month position limit level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). However, the Final Rule
still increases that limit level compared to its
existing limit level.
775 85 FR at 11630.
776 Id. at 11675.
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Federal non-spot month position limit
levels remain low enough to diminish,
eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation, and to deter and prevent
market manipulation. This is because
the difference between utilizing the
existing 10/2.5% formula and the
modified 10/2.5% formula results in a
modest increase in Federal non-spot
month position limit level of 1,875
contracts, which is generally
counterbalanced by the increased
amount of open interest that is subject
to the 2.5% rate.777 Additionally, the
Commission has previously studied
prior increases in Federal non-spot
month position limit levels and
concluded that the overall impact was
modest, and that any changes in market
performance were most likely
attributable to factors other than
changes in the Federal position limit
rules.778 The Commission has since
gained additional experience which
supports that conclusion, including by
monitoring amendments to position
limit levels by exchanges. Further, given
the significant increases in open interest
and changes in market composition that
have occurred since the 1990s, the
Commission is comfortable that the
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels adopted herein will adequately
address each of the policy objectives set
forth in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B),
including preventing manipulation and
excessive speculation.
(5) Federal Non-Spot Month Position
Limits as Ceilings
The Commission reiterates that, under
this position limits framework, the
Federal non-spot month position limit
777 When the Commission adopted the existing
Federal non-spot month position limit levels in
2011, the Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for four of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts were based on the existing 10/2.5%
formula and utilized open interest data from 2009.
These were CBOT Corn (C), CBOT Soybeans (S),
CBOT Wheat (W), and CBOT Soybean Oil (SO). For
those four contracts, the ratio of Federal non-spot
month position limit level to open interest changes
as follows: CBOT Corn (C) (the ratio increases from
0.026 to 0.027); CBOT Soybeans (S) (the ratio
increases from 0.028 to 0.029); CBOT Wheat (W)
(the ratio increases from 0.029 to 0.031); and CBOT
Soybean Oil (SO) (the ratio increases from 0.030 to
0.032).
The other five legacy agricultural contracts’
Federal non-spot month position limit levels
deviated from the 10/2.5% formula. The ratio
changes for these five contracts are as follows
(based on 2009 open interest data): ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT) (the ratio increases from 0.025 to 0.037 for
the all-months-combined and decreases from 0.025
to 0.018 for the single month); CBOT Soybean Meal
(SM) (the ratio decreases from 0.038 to 0.032);
CBOT Oats (O) (the ratio increases from 0.130 to
0.291); MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE) (the
ratio decreases from 0.323 to 0.162); and CBOT KC
Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW) (the ratio decreases
from 0.113 to 0.037).
778 64 FR at 24039.
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levels serve as ceilings. Exchanges are
required to establish their own non-spot
month position limit levels with respect
to the nine legacy agricultural contracts
pursuant to final § 150.5(a)(1). A
discussion of the implications of this
approach is provided above in Section
II.B.3.ii.a(2).
iv. Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Federal Non-Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
Most commenters did not express
concerns with respect to the proposed
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels and the method by which the
Commission determined those levels.779
However, some commenters raised
concerns with respect to: (1) The
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels, generally; (2) the proposed nonspot month position limit level for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT); and (3) the issue of
partial parity for the three wheat core
referenced futures contracts with
respect to their Federal non-spot month
position limit levels. The Commission
will discuss each of these issues, the
related comments, and the
Commission’s corresponding
determination in greater detail below.
a. Federal Non-Spot Month Position
Limit Levels, Generally
(1) Comments—Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Levels, Generally
Several commenters raised concerns
about the proposed Federal non-spot
month position limit levels generally.
Two commenters, NGFA and LDC,
advocated for lowering the Federal nonspot month position limit levels for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts.780
NGFA stated that the proposed
increases are ‘‘very large’’ and that the
Commission should not view increasing
non-spot month position limit levels as
a ‘‘tradeoff’’ for eliminating the risk
management exemption, but should
instead establish limits that ‘‘will
telescope down to relatively muchsmaller spot-month limits in an orderly
fashion.’’ 781 LDC and several others
779 See, e.g., COPE at 2; CMC at 6; CCI at 2; and
CHS at 2.
780 NGFA at 3 and LDC at 2.
781 NGFA at 3. NGFA also commented that,
‘‘NGFA still is not completely convinced that open
interest is the best yardstick for this exercise,’’
because ‘‘[a]s volume and open interest grow,
Federal non-spot limits expand correspondingly
. . . which leads to yet higher volume and open
interest. . .which again prompts expanded Federal
non-spot limits . . . and so on.’’ However, NGFA
did not provide any alternatives to utilizing open
interest for determining Federal non-spot month
position limit levels. As discussed previously, the
Commission believes that open interest is an
appropriate means of measuring market activity for
a particular contract and that a formula based on
open interest, such as the 10/2.5% formula: (1)
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believed that adopting lower Federal
single month position limit levels
would ‘‘prevent speculative activity
from concentrating in a single contract
month and thus jeopardizing
convergence.’’ 782 NGFA and LDC also
offered the following alternatives to the
proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels: (1) Set singlemonth limits at some percentage of the
all-months-combined limit, such as
50%; or (2) maintain existing singlemonth limits while adopting the
proposed all-months-combined
limits.783 NGFA also offered a third
alternative, which was to adopt a
phased-in approach to the higher nonspot month position limits, ‘‘together
with very active monitoring of contract
performance, though NGFA does not
favor this option.’’ 784
On the other hand, ISDA requested
higher Federal non-spot month position
limit levels.785 ISDA stated that the
proposed levels ‘‘for the legacy
agricultural contracts are not high
enough to provide [ ] significant
liquidity to these markets based on the
experience of market participants and
anticipated growth in these
markets.’’ 786 ISDA also appeared to
suggest that higher levels could ‘‘help
markets offset any liquidity that may be
lost if the risk management exemption
is not retained.’’ 787 Finally, ISDA also
provided a table with suggested Federal
non-spot month position limit levels
that ranged from 18% to 191% higher
than the proposed levels, except for
CBOT Oats (O), which remained the
same.788
Another commenter, MGEX,
disagreed with the 10/2.5% formula,
stating that ‘‘a formulaic approach is too
Helps ensure that positions are not so large relative
to observed market activity that they risk disrupting
the market; (2) allows speculators to hold sufficient
contracts to provide a healthy level of liquidity for
hedgers; and (3) allows for increases in position
limits and position sizes as markets expand and
become more active. Furthermore, the Commission
notes that under the Final Rule, Federal non-spot
month position limit levels do not automatically
increase with higher open interest levels. In order
to make any amendments to the Federal position
limit levels, the Commission is required to engage
in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
782 LDC at 2. See also e.g., Moody Compress at 1;
ACA at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex
at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; Walcot at 2; and White
Gold at 1.
783 NGFA at 4 and LDC at 2.
784 NGFA at 4. IATP also provided a similar
suggestion, by stating that, ‘‘it is prudent to phase
in new non-spot month limit levels so that the
Commission can acquire data and experience with
how the new Federal non-spot limits are working
for the commercial hedging of those legacy
contracts.’’ IATP at 11.
785 ISDA at 7.
786 Id.
787 Id.
788 Id.
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rigid and inflexible’’ and that the
‘‘Commission needs to be flexible in the
future and should not preclude further
limits or discussion.’’ 789
(2) Discussion of Final Rule—Federal
Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels,
Generally
With the exception of ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT), as discussed below, the
Commission declines to modify the
proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels or the general
methodology underlying the
determination of those levels for the
remaining legacy agricultural contracts,
and also declines to adopt a phase-in for
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels.
3337
the modification is modest and is
supported by the general increase in
open interest among the legacy
agricultural contracts and the change in
the composition of market participants
in those markets, as discussed above.794
(ii) Request To Generally Lower Single
Month Position Limit Levels
In response to comments generally
requesting lower single month position
limit levels, the Commission first
acknowledges that it has set singlemonth position limit levels lower than
all-months-combined position limit
levels in the past. However, since the
Commission set both single month and
all-months-combined levels set at the
same level in 2011, the Commission has
(i) Request To Generally Lower Federal
not observed any issues with respect to
Non-Spot Month Position Limits
the nine legacy agricultural contracts as
a result of that change.
In response to these comments, the
Commission believes that the modified
In response to commenters’ concern
10/2.5% formula is generally an
about possible convergence issues from
appropriate way to calculate Federal
setting the single-month and all-monthsnon-spot month position limit levels.
combined levels set at the same level,
The Commission also believes that the
the Commission notes that positions in
final non-spot month position limit
the non-spot months have minimal
levels are supported by updated open
impact on convergence. This is because
interest data, some of which have
convergence occurs in the spot month,
increased significantly since 2009.
and, specifically, at the expiration of the
The Commission continues to believe physically-settled spot month
that a formula based on a percentage of
contract.795
open interest, such as the 10/2.5%
Furthermore, the Commission notes
formula, is appropriate for establishing
that an important benefit of having a
limit levels outside of the spot month,
single Federal non-spot month limit
as discussed above and in the 2020
NPRM.790 The Commission believes that level for both the single-month and allmonths-combined is the ability for
limiting positions to a percentage of
market participants to enter into
open interest, such as through the 10/
calendar spread transactions that would
2.5% formula: (1) Helps ensure that
normally be constrained by the lower
positions are not so large relative to
single month position limit level.
observed market activity that they risk
However, the Commission notes that, in
disrupting the market; (2) allows
response to comments received, it is
speculators to hold sufficient contracts
adopting a lower Federal single month
to provide a healthy level of liquidity
for bona fide hedgers; and (3) allows for position limit level for ICE Cotton No.
increases in position limits and position 2 (CT), the reasons for which is
discussed below.
sizes as markets expand and become
791
more active.
Furthermore, the 10/
factors that counsel in favor of deviating from the
2.5% formula has functioned well for
10/2.5% formula.
Federal non-spot month position limit
794 The modification results in a modest increase
purposes for many years.792 Also, the
in the Federal non-spot month position limit level
of 1,875 contracts over what the limit level would
Commission does not believe that the
be if the inflection point for the 10/2.5% formula
slight modification to the 10/2.5%
was set at 25,000 contracts, assuming that the
formula materially impacts the
market for the core referenced futures contract has
formula’s efficacy in determining an
an open interest of at least 50,000 contracts.
795 The Commission, however, recognizes that it
appropriate Federal non-spot month
is possible that unusually large positions in
position limit level as well,793 because
789 MGEX
at 3.
790 See 85 FR at 11630–11633.
791 Id.
792 See id. at 11675.
793 The Commission notes, as discussed
elsewhere in this Final Rule, that CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), CBOT Oats
(O), and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) (single month limit
only) are subject to unique circumstances or other
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contracts outside of the spot month could distort
the natural spread relationship between contract
months. For example, if traders hold unusually
large positions outside of the spot month, and if
those traders exit those positions immediately
before the spot month, that could cause congestion
and also affect the pricing of the spot month
contract. While such congestion or price distortion
cannot be ruled out, exchange-set position limits
and position accountability function to mitigate
against such risks.
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(iii) Request To Increase Federal NonSpot Month Position Limit Levels
In response to ISDA’s comment that
the proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels should be higher to
compensate for the proposed loss of risk
management exemptions for swap
dealers, the Commission believes that
any potential impact on existing risk
management exemption holders may be
mitigated by the finalized pass-through
swap provision, to the extent swap
dealers can utilize it.796 The
Commission believes that this is a
preferable approach to either a
hypothetical alternative formula or
ISDA’s own suggested Federal non-spot
month position limit levels that would
allow higher limit levels beyond those
adopted in this Final Rule for all market
participants. This is because, while the
pass-through swap provision adopted
herein is narrowly-tailored to enable
liquidity providers to continue
providing liquidity to bona fide hedgers,
higher limit levels beyond those
adopted in this Final Rule for all market
participants could also permit excessive
speculation and increase the possibility
of market manipulation or harm to the
underlying price discovery function.797
(iv) Concern With the Commission’s
‘‘Formulaic’’ Approach
In response to MGEX’s concern that
the Commission’s approach is too
formulaic and rigid, the Commission
notes that the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels will operate as
ceilings within a broader Federal
position limits framework in which
exchanges, including MGEX, are always
free to determine their own exchangeset position limit levels and position
accountability levels below the Federal
position limit levels as they see fit based
on market conditions. In fact, by having
the Federal position limit levels operate
as ceilings, this framework will enable
exchanges to respond to market
conditions through a greater range of
acceptable position limit levels than if
the Federal position limit levels did not
operate as ceilings.
In addition, as described further
below, the Commission has deviated
from the 10/2.5% formula with respect
to CBOT Oats (O), ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
(single month only), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat
(MWE) based on the unique
circumstances concerning those core
referenced futures contracts.
Furthermore, the Commission also notes
796 See 85 FR at 11676. See also Section II.A.1.x.
(Pass-Through Swap and Pass-Through Swap Offset
Provisions).
797 See 85 FR at 11676.
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that this Final Rule does not ‘‘preclude
further limits or discussion.’’ 798 The
Commission is also continually
monitoring market conditions to
evaluate whether different Federal
position limit levels may be warranted.
(v) Request To Implement a Phase-In
Period
The Commission declines to adopt a
formal phase-in period for Federal nonspot month position limits, in which the
Commission gradually implements the
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels over a period of time. The
Commission believes that the markets
will operate in an orderly fashion with
the Federal position limit levels adopted
under this Final Rule, because the final
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels are supported by increased open
interest and are generally set pursuant
to the modified 10/2.5% formula,
which, as discussed above, achieves the
policy objectives set forth in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).799
However, as noted in the Federal spot
month position limit level phase-in
discussion above, as a practical matter,
the Commission emphasizes that the
operative non-spot month position limit
levels for a market participant trading in
exchange-listed referenced contracts is
not the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels, but the exchange-set nonspot month position limit levels. As a
result, despite the changes in the
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels in this Final Rule, there will be
no practical impact on market
participants trading in exchange-listed
referenced contracts unless and until an
exchange affirmatively modifies its
exchange-set non-spot month position
limit levels through a rule submission to
the Commission pursuant to part 40 of
the Commission’s regulations.800
c. ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal NonSpot Month Position Limit Level
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and
Additional Background Information—
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Level
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed to increase both the Federal
single month and all-months-combined
position limit levels for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT) from the existing Federal level of
5,000 contracts to 11,900 contracts by
applying the updated open interest data
798 MGEX
at 3.
phase-in is not necessary with respect to the
Federal non-spot month position limit levels for
CBOT Oats (O), KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE), because the Federal non-spot
month position limit levels will remain at the
current levels.
800 17 CFR part 40.
799 A
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into the proposed modified 10/2.5%
formula. The Commission also solicited
comments asking whether the
Commission should consider lowering
the Federal single month position limit
level to a percentage of the Federal allmonths-combined position limit level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), and if so,
what percentage of the all-monthscombined position limit level should be
used.801
(2) Comments—ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit
Level
In response to the 2020 NPRM,
numerous commenters from the cotton
industry, including growers and
merchants, requested that the
Commission ‘‘maintain its single-month
limit, particularly for smaller markets
like cotton,’’ 802 or, in the alternative, set
a Federal single month position limit
level of 50% of the all-monthscombined limit (i.e., 5,950 contracts).803
In support, commenters also noted that
the proposed non-spot month position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) was
‘‘not in line with historical limits.’’ 804
One commenter also stated, ‘‘Experience
with modern trading has shown a
propensity by speculators to focus too
heavily on the nearest futures contract,
leaving later months with poor liquidity
from time to time.’’ 805 In contrast, ISDA
argued that the proposed Federal nonspot month position limit levels,
including that for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT),
were too low and asserted that the level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) should be
increased to 24,000 contracts to make
up for the elimination of the risk
management exemption.806
(3) Discussion of Final Rule—ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Level
The Commission is adopting the
proposed all-months-combined position
limit level of 11,900 contracts, but is
801 85
FR at 11637 (Request for Comment #26).
e.g., East Cotton at 2; Omnicotton at 2;
Choice at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Ecom at 1; Olam
at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Toyo Cotton at 2; Walcot
Trading at 2; White Gold at 2; and NCTO at 2. See
also ACA at 2; Gerald Marshall at 1–2; Jess Smith
at 2; LDC at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; McMeekin
at 2; MemTex at 2; Moody Compress at 2; Parkdale
at 2; Southern Cotton at 2–3; SW Ag at 2; and ACSA
at 8.
803 ACSA at 8; LDC at 2; and Olam at 2. The
following commenters also supported ACSA’s
comment letter: ACA at 2; Ecom at 1; East Cotton
at 2; Jess Smith at 2; IMC at 2; Mallory Alexander
at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Moody Compress
at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; SW Ag
at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Toyo Cotton at 2; Walcot
at 2; and White Gold at 2.
804 AMCOT at 1–2 and Parkdale at 2.
805 Gerald Marshall at 2.
806 ISDA at 7 (providing specific alternative
levels).
802 See
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adopting a modified single month
position limit level of 5,950 contracts
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT).
The Commission is adopting the
proposed 11,900 contract Federal allmonths-combined position limit level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) because, as
discussed earlier, the Commission
believes that a formula based on a
percentage of open interest—specifically
the modified 10/2.5% formula—is an
appropriate tool for establishing limits
outside of the spot month. However, the
Commission does not believe that it is
appropriate to raise either the Federal
single month or all-months-combined
position limit level for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT) to 24,000 contracts as suggested
by ISDA, because the open interest
levels do not support such a drastic
increase and there is no other reason to
deviate so significantly upward from the
modified 10/2.5% formula.807
On the other hand, the Commission
believes that it is appropriate to adopt
a lower Federal single month position
limit level at this time. As noted in the
Commission’s request for comment in
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
believed that there could be concerns
with respect to the Federal single month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT), especially from the commercial
end-users of the core referenced futures
contract.808 In response to the
Commission’s request for comment, the
Commission received approximately 25
comment letters from the cotton
industry (out of approximately 75
comment letters on the 2020 NPRM
from all commenters) unanimously
requesting a lower Federal single month
position limit level compared to the
Federal all-months-combined position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT).
The Commission believes that these
unanimous comments from the
commercial end-users of the ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) core referenced futures
contract are informative, because they
suggest that lowering the 2020 NPRM’s
Federal single month position limit
level from the proposed 11,900 contract
level to either the existing 5,000
contract level or a 5,950 contract level
(which is 50% of the all-monthscombined position limit level of 11,900
807 The Commission acknowledges ISDA’s
comment that the proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels should be higher to
compensate for the proposed loss of risk
management exemptions for swap dealers.
However, as noted previously, the Commission
believes that any potential impact on existing risk
management exemption holders may be mitigated
by the pass-through swap provision adopted herein,
and that this is a preferable and more tailored
approach than increasing the non-spot month
position limit levels for all market participants.
808 85 FR 11637 (Request for Comment #26).
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contracts) may not have a material
detrimental effect on liquidity for bona
fide hedgers in the market.
All things being equal, a lower single
month position limit level will better
protect the markets against
manipulation and price distortion,809
but at the expense of reduced liquidity
for bona fide hedgers. However, in this
instance, in light of the comments
received, the Commission believes that
it could improve protections against
manipulation and price distortion
without materially impacting liquidity
for bona fide hedgers by adopting a
lower Federal single month position
limit level of either 5,000 contracts or
5,950 contracts. Of these two suggested
levels, the Commission believes that it
is more appropriate to adopt the 5,950
contract level over the existing 5,000
contract level to account, in part, for the
increase in open interest levels since the
single month position limit level of
5,000 contracts was adopted in 2011.810
d. Wheat Core Referenced Futures
Contracts’ Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and
Additional Background Information—
Wheat Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
There are three wheat contracts:
CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat
(MWE). Currently, the Federal non-spot
month position limit levels for all three
are set at 12,000 contracts. This has
been referred to as ‘‘full wheat parity.’’
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed ‘‘partial wheat parity’’ by
increasing the Federal non-spot month
position limit level for CBOT Wheat (W)
from 12,000 contracts to 19,300 based
on the application of the modified 10/
2.5% formula and updated open interest
levels, while maintaining the existing
levels of 12,000 contracts for CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW) and MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE). The 12,000 contract
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)
and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) are above
the levels that would be calculated
based on the application of the modified
10/2.5% formula and recent open
interest levels, which would be 11,900
contracts for CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW) and 5,700 contracts for MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE).
809 Specifically, the Commission is referring to
the price distortion that could be caused by a
speculative trader who, after amassing a large
position during the non-spot month, exits the entire
position immediately before the spot month.
810 The maximum open interest for ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) was 197,191 contracts in 2009, 161,582
contracts in 2011, and 324,952 contracts in 2019.
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3339
The Commission proposed partial
wheat parity between CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW) and MGEX HRS Wheat
(MWE) at 12,000 contracts for two
reasons. First, both contracts provide
exposure to hard red wheats. As a
result, the Commission believed that
drastically decreasing the Federal nonspot month position limit level for
MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) vis-a`-vis
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) by
following the 10/2.5% formula could
impose liquidity costs on the MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE) market and harm
bona fide hedgers, which could further
harm liquidity for bona fide hedgers in
the related CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)
market.811 Second, the existing Federal
non-spot month position limit levels for
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE) appear to have
functioned well, and the Commission
saw no market-based reason to reduce
those levels based on recent open
interest data.812
(2) Comments—Wheat Federal NonSpot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received several
comments concerning the proposed
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels with respect to the three wheat
core referenced futures contracts. One
commenter, MGEX, stated that it
‘‘supports maintaining partial wheat
parity by keeping the existing non-spot
month limits for [MGEX HRS Wheat
(MWE)] and CBOT KC Hard Red Wheat
at 12,000.’’ 813 Another commenter
agreed ‘‘with the increase in the nonspot month for CBOT Wheat (W).’’ 814
However, other commenters requested
that the Federal non-spot month
position limit level for CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW) be at least the same as
CBOT Wheat (W) (i.e., raise it to 19,300
contracts).815 In support, commenters
contended that the ‘‘physical market for
the wheat crop that is deliverable under
[CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)] is much
larger than the wheat crop that is
deliverable under [CBOT Wheat
(W)].’’ 816 Also, commenters stated that
the ‘‘characteristics of the physical
wheat that is deliverable under [CBOT
KC HRW Wheat (KW)] is more similar
to the global wheat crop than the wheat
that is deliverable under [CBOT Wheat
811 85
FR at 11633.
at 11632.
813 MGEX at 3.
814 MFA/AIMA at 12.
815 SIFMA AMG at 3–4; ISDA at 12; PIMCO at 4–
5; MFA/AIMA at 12; and Citadel at 6–7.
816 PIMCO at 4. See also ISDA at 12 and SIFMA
AMG at 3–4.
812 Id.
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(W)].’’ 817 As a result, commenters stated
that, ‘‘[CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)]
may be important for hedging for many
market participants.’’ 818 Similarly,
MFA/AIMA stated that ‘‘open interest
data and supply data published by the
USDA for hard red winter wheat, which
is the underlying commodity for [CBOT
KC HRW Wheat (KW)], would also
justify an increase in the [CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW)] non-spot month
limit.’’ 819
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(3) Discussion of Final Rule—Wheat
Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit
Levels
The Commission declines to raise the
proposed 12,000 contract Federal nonspot month position limit level for
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) to match
the final Federal non-spot month
position limit level of CBOT Wheat (W)
at 19,300 contracts.
First, as noted earlier, the Federal
non-spot month position limit level for
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) is already
set higher, albeit slightly, than the limit
level calculated under the updated open
interest figure and 10/2.5% formula,
which, as discussed previously, is a
formula that the Commission believes is
generally proper for determining
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels.820 Raising the Federal non-spot
month position limit level for CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW) to 19,300 contracts
would be a drastic increase over the
existing level that is not supported by
the 10/2.5% formula or by the
Commission’s observations of how that
market has functioned under the 12,000
contract Federal non-spot month
position limit level. As a result, the
Commission is concerned that this
could result in excessive speculation
and increase the possibility of market
manipulation or harm to the underlying
price discovery function with respect to
that contract.
Second, the Commission believes that
maintaining partial wheat parity
between CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)
and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) is
appropriate because the commodities
underlying both of those wheat core
referenced futures contracts are hard red
wheats that, together, represent the
majority of the wheat grown in both the
United States and Canada, which results
in those markets being closely
intertwined.821 This is in contrast with
CBOT Wheat (W), which typically sees
deliveries of soft white wheat varieties
(even though it allows for delivery of
hard red wheat).822
Finally, the Commission reiterates
that bona fide hedging positions will
continue to be allowed to exceed the
Federal position limit levels.
Intermarket spreading is also permitted
as well, which should address any
concerns over the potential for loss of
liquidity in the spread trades among the
three wheat core referenced futures
contracts during the non-spot
months.823
5. Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot
Month Limit Levels
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month
Limit Levels
Unlike in previous iterations of the
position limit rules, the 2020 NPRM did
not require the Commission to
periodically review and revise EDS
figures or adjust the Federal spot month
position limit levels.824 Instead, under
proposed § 150.2(f), an exchange listing
a core referenced futures contract would
be required to provide EDS figures only
if requested by the Commission.
Proposed § 150.2(j) delegated the
authority to make such requests to the
Director of the Division of Market
Oversight.825 The 2020 NPRM also
allowed exchanges to voluntarily submit
EDS figures to the Commission at any
time, and encouraged them to do so.826
When submitting EDS figures,
exchanges would be required to provide
a description of the methodology used
to derive the EDS figures, as well as all
data and data sources used to calculate
the estimate, so that the Commission
could verify that the EDS figures are
reasonable.827
Likewise, the 2020 NPRM also did not
require the Commission to periodically
review the open interest data and
update the non-spot month position
limit levels for the legacy agricultural
core referenced futures contracts, unlike
in previous iterations of the position
limit rules.828
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Subsequent Spot and
Non-Spot Month Limit Levels
The Commission is adopting § 150.2(f)
as proposed and will not include a
formal mechanism to periodically renew
or revise EDS figures or otherwise
822 Id.
817 SIFMA
AMG at 3. See also ISDA at 12 and
PIMCO at 4.
818 SIFMA AMG at 4. See also ISDA at 12.
819 MFA/AIMA at 12. See also Citadel at 6–7.
820 85 FR at 11630.
821 Id. at 11632.
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823 Id.
at 11633.
e.g., 81 FR at 96769–96771.
825 85 FR at 11633.
826 Id. at 11633–11634.
827 Id. at 11634.
828 See e.g., 81 FR at 96769, 96771–96773.
824 See
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review and update the Federal spot
month or non-spot month position limit
levels. The Commission is also adopting
the delegation provision in § 150.2(j) as
proposed.829
iii. Comments—Subsequent Spot and
Non-Spot Month Limit Levels
The Commission received several
comments concerning updates to the
Federal position limit levels, with
commenters requesting that the
Commission periodically review the
levels and revise them if appropriate.830
One commenter was concerned that the
Federal position limit levels could
become too high over time,831 while the
rest were concerned that the levels
could become too low.832 In addition,
CME Group also suggested that
exchanges should update the EDS
figures ‘‘every two years [and] . . .
DCMs should be provided the
opportunity to submit data voluntarily
to the Commission on a more frequent
basis.’’ 833
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—
Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month
Limit Levels
The Commission declines to
implement a periodic, predetermined
schedule to review Federal position
limits because the Commission believes
that it is more appropriate to retain
flexibility for both the exchanges and
the Commission itself in updating the
Federal position limit levels.
Reviewing and adjusting the Federal
spot month position limit levels
requires the Commission to review,
among other things, updated EDS
figures for the core referenced futures
contracts. Having worked closely with
829 The Commission did not receive any
comments on proposed § 150.2(j).
830 MFA/AIMA at 5 (‘‘the Commission should
direct exchanges to periodically monitor the
proposed new position limit levels’’); PIMCO at 6
(‘‘we urge the CFTC to include . . . a mandatory
requirement to regularly (and at least annually)
review and update limits as markets grow and
change’’); SIFMA AMG at 10 (the Final Rule should
require ‘‘that the Commission regularly consult
with exchanges and review and adjust position
limits when it is necessary to do so based on
relevant market factors’’); ISDA at 10 (‘‘the
Commission must regularly convene and consult
with exchanges on deliverable supply and, if
appropriate, propose notice and comment
rulemaking to adjust limit levels’’); and IATP at 16–
17 (the Commission should engage in ‘‘an annual
review of position limit levels to give [commercial
hedgers] legal certainty over that period’’ and also
retain ‘‘the authority to revise position limits . . .
if data monitoring and analysis show that those
annual limit levels are failing to prevent excessive
speculation and/or various forms of market
manipulation’’).
831 IATP at 16–17.
832 MFA/AIMA at 5–6; PIMCO at 6; SIFMA AMG
at 10; and ISDA at 10.
833 CME Group at 5.
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exchanges to analyze and independently
verify the methodology underlying the
EDS figures and the EDS figures
themselves, the Commission recognizes
that estimating deliverable supply can
be a time and resource consuming
process for both the exchanges and the
Commission.834 Furthermore, periodic,
predetermined review intervals may not
always align with market changes or
other events resulting in material
changes to deliverable supply that
would warrant adjusting Federal spot
month position limit levels. As a result,
the Commission believes that it would
be more efficient, timely, and effective
to review the EDS figure and the Federal
position limit level for a core referenced
futures contract if warranted by market
conditions, including changes in the
underlying cash market, which the
Commission and exchanges continually
monitor.
Reviewing and adjusting the Federal
non-spot month position limit levels
requires the Commission to review,
among other things, open interest data
for the relevant core referenced futures
contracts. Unlike EDS figures, open
interest is easily obtainable because it is
regularly updated by the exchanges. As
a result, the output of the 10/2.5%
formula can be quickly calculated.
However, the Commission does not
believe that it is appropriate to update
the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels separately from the Federal
spot month position limit levels. The
Commission has historically reviewed
all of the Federal position limit levels—
spot month and non-spot month—
together for a particular contract
because all months of a particular
contract are part of the same market. As
a result, updating both the spot and
non-spot month position limits levels at
the same time provides a holistic and
integrated position limit regime for each
commodity contract because the limits
are based upon updated data covering
the same or overlapping time period.
Final § 150.2(f) provides flexibility
and authority for the Commission to be
able to request an updated EDS figure,
along with the methodology and
underlying data, for a core referenced
futures contract whenever market
conditions suggest that a change in
Federal position limit levels may be
warranted. The exchanges are also
encouraged to submit such information
at any time as well under final
§ 150.2(f).835 Once the Commission
834 85
FR at 11633.
providing an updated EDS figure,
exchanges should consult the guidance concerning
estimating deliverable supply set forth in section
(b)(1)(i) (‘‘Estimating Deliverable Supplies’’) of 17
CFR part 38, Appendix C.
835 In
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receives the updated EDS figures, then
the Commission can undertake the
appropriate review and analysis of the
EDS figures and any additional
information, such as exchange
recommendations, to adjust the Federal
spot month position limit levels, if
necessary, through rulemaking. At that
time, the Commission would also
review the open interest data for the
core referenced futures contract and
undertake the necessary analysis to
ensure that the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels are set at
appropriate levels as well.
Finally, the Commission notes that,
under this position limits framework,
the exchanges always have the freedom
to set their exchange-set position limit
levels lower than the Federal position
limit levels. Adjusting the Federal
position limit levels necessarily requires
the Commission to engage in
rulemaking with notice-and-comment,
which can take a significant amount of
time.836 Thus, an exchange may adjust
its exchange-set position limit levels
lower in response to market conditions,
while waiting for the Commission to
adjust the Federal position limit
levels.837
6. Relevant Contract Month
Proposed § 150.2(c) clarified that the
spot month and single month for any
given referenced contract is determined
by the spot month and single month of
the core referenced futures contract to
which that referenced contract is linked.
The Commission did not receive any
comments and is adopting as proposed.
Final § 150.2(c) requires that referenced
contracts be linked to the core
referenced futures contract in order to
be netted for position limit purposes.
For example, for the NYMEX NY
Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO) core
referenced futures contract, the spot
month period starts at the close of
trading three business days prior to the
last trading day of the contract. The spot
month period for the NYMEX NY
Harbor ULSD Financial (MPX) futures
referenced contract would thus start at
the same time—the close of trading
three business days prior to the last
836 Market participants may petition the
Commission to adjust Federal position limit levels,
subject to the Commission’s notice-and-comment
rulemaking, under existing § 13.1, which provides
that any ‘‘person may file a petition with . . . the
Commission . . . for the issuance, amendment or
repeal of a rule of general application.’’
837 However, an exchange cannot set its exchangeset position limit levels above the Federal position
limit levels, even if market conditions may warrant
raising the levels. Thus, in order to allow market
participants to hold positions higher than the
Federal position limit levels (absent an exemption),
the Commission would need to raise the Federal
position limit levels through rulemaking.
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3341
trading day of the core referenced
futures contract.
7. Limits on ‘‘Pre-Existing Positions’’
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—PreExisting Positions
Under proposed § 150.2(g)(1) Federal
spot month position limits applied to
‘‘pre-existing positions, other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps,’’ each defined in proposed
§ 150.1. Accordingly, Federal spot
month position limits would not apply
to any pre-existing positions in
economically equivalent swaps. The
2020 NPRM defined ‘‘pre-existing
positions’’ in proposed § 150.1 as
positions established in good faith prior
to the effective date of a final Federal
position limits rulemaking.
In contrast, proposed § 150.2(g)(2)
provided that Federal non-spot month
limits would not apply to pre-existing
positions, including pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps, if
acquired in good faith prior to the
effective date of such limit. However,
other than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps, any preexisting positions held outside the spot
month would be attributed to such
person if the person’s position is
increased after the effective date of a
final Federal position limits rulemaking.
The 2020 NPRM’s disparate treatment
of pre-existing positions during and
outside the spot month was predicated
on the concern that failing to apply spot
month limits to such pre-existing
positions could result in a large,
preexisting position either intentionally
or unintentionally causing a disruption
to the price discovery function of the
core referenced futures contract as
positions are rolled into the spot month.
In contrast, outside the spot month,
large, pre-existing positions may have a
relatively less disruptive effect given
that physical delivery occurs only
during the spot month.
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Pre-Existing Positions
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.2(g)(1) as proposed, and is
adopting § 150.2(g)(2) with the
following two changes:
First, the Commission is amending
proposed § 150.2(g)(2) to provide that
non-spot month limits shall apply to
pre-existing positions, other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps. As noted above, proposed
§ 150.2(g)(2) in the 2020 NPRM
exempted pre-existing positions from
the Final Rule’s Federal non-spot month
position limits. However, as discussed
below, the nine legacy agricultural
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contracts currently are subject to the
Commission’s existing non-spot month
position limits, and the Commission did
not intend to exclude existing non-spot
month positions in the nine legacy
agricultural contracts that would
otherwise qualify as ‘‘pre-existing
positions’’ under the Final Rule. As
discussed, the other 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under the Final Rule are not
subject to Federal non-spot month
position limits and therefore proposed
§ 150.2(g)(2) would not have applied to
these contracts in any event.
The Commission based the language
in proposed § 150.2(g) on similar
language found in the 2016 Reproposal,
which imposed Federal non-spot month
position limits on all of the proposed
core referenced futures contracts (as
opposed to only on the nine legacy
agricultural contracts under the Final
Rule). In the context of the 2016
Reproposal, the Commission believed it
made sense to exempt pre-existing
positions in non-spot months in core
referenced futures contracts that would
have been subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the 2016
Reproposal. However, as noted above,
such core referenced futures contracts
that are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final
Rule are not subject to Federal non-spot
month position limits. Accordingly, the
Commission is modifying § 150.2(g) so
that pre-existing positions in the nine
legacy agricultural contracts remain
subject to Federal non-spot month
position limits under the Final Rule, as
the Commission had originally
intended.
Second, since the Commission is
clarifying that pre-existing positions in
the nine legacy agricultural contracts,
other than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps, are subject to
Federal non-spot month position limits
under the Final Rule, the language in
proposed § 150.2(g)(2) that would
attribute to a person any increase in
their non-spot month positions after the
effective date of the Final Rule’s nonspot month limits is no longer
necessary. The Commission is therefore
removing this language from final
§ 150.2(g)(2).
iii. Comments—Pre-Existing Positions
Commenters generally supported
proposed § 150.2(g), although several
commenters asked for additional
clarity.838 MGEX and FIA both argued
that the provision could be simplified
by creating only two categories: ‘‘pre838 MGEX
at 4; FIA at 9; ISDA at 8.
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existing swaps’’ (exempt from all spot/
non-spot Federal position limits) and
‘‘pre-existing futures’’ (exempt from all
non-spot Federal position limits,
provided there is no increase in such
non-spot positions), stating that relying
upon the proposed relief as structured
will be ‘‘operationally challenging’’ for
market participants.839 MGEX and FIA
also requested that the Commission
clarify that a market participant is not
required to rely upon the exemption so
that its pre-existing positions could be
netted, as applicable, with the market
participant’s other referenced
contracts.840 ISDA encouraged the
Commission to provide that the Final
Rule’s new Federal position limits do
not apply to any pre-existing positions,
whether in futures contracts or
swaps.841 Finally, CHS encouraged the
Commission to adopt a ‘‘safe harbor’’
provision where participants could
demonstrate a ‘‘good-faith’’ effort at
compliance so ‘‘inadvertent’’ violations
would not trigger possible enforcement
action.842
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—PreExisting Positions
As stated in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission believes that the absence of
spot-month limits on pre-existing
positions, other than pre-existing swaps
and transition period swaps, could
render the Federal spot month position
limits ineffective. Failure to apply spot
month limits to such pre-existing
positions, particularly for the 16
commodities that are not currently
subject to Federal position limits and
where market participants may have
pre-existing positions in excess of the
spot-month position limits adopted
herein, could result in a large, preexisting position either intentionally or
unintentionally causing a disruption to
the price discovery function of the core
referenced futures contract as positions
are rolled into the spot month.843 The
Commission is particularly concerned
about protecting the spot month in
physically delivered futures contracts
from price distortions or manipulation
that would disrupt the hedging and
price discovery utility of the futures
contract.844
With respect to non-spot month
position limits, only the nine legacy
agricultural contracts are currently
subject to such limits under the existing
Federal position limits framework and
839 FIA
at 8–9; MGEX at 4.
at 3–4; FIA at 8–9, 18–19.
841 ISDA at 2, 8.
842 CHS at 5.
843 85 FR at 11634.
844 Id.
840 MGEX
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will continue to be subject to Federal
non-spot month position limits under
the Final Rule. The Commission did not
intend in the 2020 NPRM to exclude
such pre-existing positions in the nine
legacy agricultural contracts from nonspot month limits. Accordingly, for the
Final Rule the Commission is modifying
final § 150.2(g)(2) to make clear that
Federal non-spot month position limits
do apply to these pre-existing positions.
However, as noted above, the 16 nonlegacy core referenced futures contracts
that are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under this Final
Rule are not subject to Federal non-spot
month position limits and so are not
affected by the Commission’s change in
final § 150.2(g)(2).
The Commission agrees with MGEX’s
and FIA’s comments that pre-existing
positions can be netted. The
Commission confirms that market
participants may continue to net their
pre-existing positions, as applicable,
with market participants’ post-effective
date referenced contract positions. In
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission made
explicit in proposed § 150.3(a)(5) that
market participants would be permitted
to net pre-existing swap positions with
post-effective date referenced contract
positions (to the extent such preexisting swap positions qualify as
‘‘economically equivalent swaps’’ under
the Final Rule).845 The Commission
adopted this clarification in final
§ 150.3(a)(5) for the avoidance of doubt.
The Commission believes this explicit
clarification with respect to swaps is
helpful to market participants since
swaps are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under this Final
Rule and since it may not otherwise be
clear whether a market participant
could net a pre-enactment swap or
transition period swap given that such
pre-enactment and transition period
swaps are exempt from Federal position
limits under final § 150.3(a)(5).
However, the Commission similarly
intended that market participants also
would be able to net pre-existing futures
contracts and option on futures
contracts against post-effective date
positions. The Commission did not feel
such a clarification was necessary since
futures contracts and options thereon
have been subject to the existing Federal
position limits framework. Accordingly,
for the avoidance of doubt, the
Commission is affirming that market
participants may continue to net preexisting futures contracts and option on
845 Pre-existing swap positions (i.e., preenactment swaps and transition period swaps)
would otherwise be exempt from Federal position
limits.
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futures contracts with post-effective
date positions in referenced contracts.
In response to ISDA’s request for
clarification, the Commission notes that
Federal non-spot month position limits
will apply to pre-existing positions in
the nine legacy agricultural contracts
(but not to the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts). However,
for the reasons articulated above,
Federal position limits will apply
during the spot month for futures
contracts and options on futures
contracts for all 25 core referenced
futures contracts, other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps.
While the Commission is not adopting
a ‘‘safe harbor’’ provision, it is providing
a transition period, as requested by
CHS,846 so that market participants will
have until January 1, 2022 (or January
1, 2023 for economically-equivalent
swaps or positions relying on the riskmanagement exemption) to comply with
the Final Rule. The Commission
believes this will provide sufficient time
for market participants to implement
and test new systems and processes that
have been established to comply with
the Final Rule.
8. Positions on Foreign Boards of Trade
i. Background
CEA section 4a(a)(6)(B) directs the
Commission to establish limits on the
aggregate number of positions in
contracts based upon the same
underlying commodity that may be held
by any person across contracts traded on
a foreign board of trade (‘‘FBOT’’) with
respect to a contract that settles against
any price of at least one contract listed
for trading on a registered entity.847
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ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Foreign Boards of Trade
Proposed § 150.2(h) applied the
proposed Federal position limits to a
market participant’s aggregate positions
in referenced contracts executed on a
DCM or SEF and on, or pursuant to the
rules of, an FBOT, provided that (1) the
referenced contracts settle against a
price of a contract listed for trading on
a DCM or SEF and (2) the FBOT makes
such contract available in the United
States through ‘‘direct access.’’ 848 In
other words, a market participant’s
846 CHS
at 5.
U.S.C. 6a(a)(6)(B). The CEA’s definition of
‘‘registered entity’’ includes DCMs and SEFs. 7
U.S.C. 1a(40).
848 Commission regulation § 48.2(c) defines
‘‘direct access’’ to mean an explicit grant of
authority by an FBOT to an identified member or
other participant located in the United States to
enter trades directly into the trade matching system
of the FBOT. 17 CFR 48.2(c).
847 7
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positions in referenced contracts listed
on a DCM or SEF and on an FBOT
registered to provide direct access
would collectively have to stay below
the Federal position limit for the
relevant core referenced futures
contract.
iii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Foreign Boards of Trade
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.2(h) as proposed.
iv. Comments—Foreign Boards of Trade
The Commission received comments
from CEWG, Chevron, and Suncor
regarding proposed § 150.2(h) and its
possible effects with respect to certain
contracts listed on ICE Futures Europe
(‘‘IFEU’’) that are price-linked to the
energy core referenced futures
contracts.849 Each of the commenters
expressed concern that the extension of
the proposed Federal position limits
regime to referenced contracts listed for
trading on IFEU could have unintended
consequences, such as: (1) Requiring
U.S.-based market participants to
comply with potentially conflicting
requirements of multiple regulators and
position limits regimes; and (2)
incentivizing foreign regulators to
extend their reach into the
Commission’s jurisdictional markets.850
Chevron and Suncor requested that
the Commission reconsider what they
perceive to be the potential regulatory
conflicts and burdens that could be
imposed on market participants who
transact referenced contracts listed on
IFEU, and adopt a policy of substituted
compliance to minimize such
conflicts.851 CEWG recommended that
the Commission adopt an approach
based on substituted compliance with
respect to referenced contracts listed on
FBOTs similar to that adopted for swaps
under CEA section 2(i).852
v. Discussion of Final Rule—Foreign
Boards of Trade
As stated above, the Commission is
adopting § 150.2(h) as proposed. As
stated in the 2020 NPRM,853 CEA
section 4a(a)(6)(B) requires the
Commission to establish limits on the
aggregate number or amount of
positions in contracts based upon the
same underlying commodity that may
be held by any person across certain
contracts traded on an FBOT with
linkages to a contract traded on a
registered entity. Final § 150.2(h) simply
849 CEWG at 28–29; Chevron at 15–16; Suncor at
14–15.
850 CEWG at 28; Chevron at 16; Suncor at 15.
851 Chevron at 16; Suncor at 15.
852 CEWG at 29.
853 85 FR at 11634.
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3343
codifies requirements set forth in CEA
section 4a(a)(6)(B), and will lessen
regulatory arbitrage by eliminating a
potential loophole whereby a market
participant could accumulate positions
on certain FBOTs in excess of limits in
referenced contracts.854
Accordingly, the Commission believes
that § 150.2(h) is consistent with the
goal set forth in CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C)
to ensure that liquidity does not move
to foreign jurisdictions or place U.S.
exchanges at a competitive disadvantage
to foreign competitors. If the
Commission did not attribute positions
held in referenced contracts on FBOTs,
the Commission inadvertently could
incentivize market participants to shift
trading and liquidity in referenced
contracts to FBOTs in order to avoid
Federal position limits.
9. Anti-Evasion
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—AntiEvasion
Pursuant to the Commission’s
rulemaking authority in section 8a(5) of
the CEA,855 the Commission proposed
§ 150.2(i), which was intended to deter
and prevent a number of potential
methods of evading Federal position
limits. The proposed anti-evasion
provision provided: (1) A commodity
index contract and/or location basis
contract, which would otherwise be
excluded from the proposed referenced
contract definition, would be
considered a referenced contract subject
to Federal position limits if used to
willfully circumvent position limits; (2)
a bona fide hedge recognition or spread
exemption would no longer apply if
used to willfully circumvent speculative
position limits; and (3) a swap contract
used to willfully circumvent speculative
position limits would be deemed an
economically equivalent swap, and thus
a referenced contract, even if the swap
does not meet the economically
equivalent swap definition set forth in
proposed § 150.1.
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Anti-Evasion
The Commission is adopting § 150.2(i)
as proposed with conforming changes
that reflect revisions to the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition adopted herein in
854 In addition, CEA section 4(b)(1)(B) prohibits
the Commission from permitting an FBOT to
provide direct access to its trading system to its
participants located in the United States unless the
Commission determines, in regards to any FBOT
contract that settles against any price of one or more
contracts listed for trading on a registered entity,
that the FBOT (or its foreign futures authority)
adopts position limits that are comparable to the
position limits adopted by the registered entity. 7
U.S.C. 6(b)(1)(B).
855 7 U.S.C. 12a(5).
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which the Final Rule additionally is
excluding ‘‘monthly average pricing
contracts’’ and ‘‘outright price reporting
agency index contracts’’ from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition.856 A
discussion of these conforming changes
appears immediately below, followed by
a summary of the comments, which
addressed different aspects of the
proposed anti-evasion provision.
a. Discussion of Conforming Changes—
Anti-Evasion
The Commission is revising proposed
§ 150.2(i)(1), which addressed evasion
of Federal position limits by using
commodity index contracts and location
basis contracts, to also cover monthly
average pricing contracts and outright
price reporting agency index contracts.
This change is needed to conform the
anti-evasion provision to the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition
adopted herein. In particular, while the
2020 NPRM would exclude commodity
index contracts and location basis
contracts from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, the Final Rule excludes those
contracts as well as monthly average
pricing contracts and outright price
reporting agency index contracts from
the ‘‘referenced contract definition.’’ 857
Because contracts that are excluded
from the final ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition are not subject to Federal
position limits, the Commission intends
that final § 150.2(i)(1) will prevent a
potential loophole whereby a market
participant who has reached its limits
could otherwise utilize these contract
types to willfully circumvent or evade
speculative position limits. For
example, a market participant could
purchase a commodity index contract in
a manner that allowed the participant to
exceed limits when taking into account
the weighting in the component
commodities of the index contract. The
Final Rule also will avoid creating what
could otherwise be similar potential
loopholes with respect to monthly
average pricing contracts, outright price
reporting agency index contracts, and
location basis contracts.
Additionally, the Commission is
adopting § 150.2(i)(2) as proposed. This
provision provides that a bona fide
hedge recognition or spread exemption
will no longer apply if used to willfully
circumvent speculative position limits.
This provision is intended to help
ensure that bona fide hedge recognitions
and spread exemptions are granted and
utilized in a manner that comports with
856 See supra Section II.A.16.iii.b. (explanation of
proposed exclusions from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition).
857 See Section II.A.16.iii.b.
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the CEA and Commission regulations,
and that the ability to obtain bona fide
hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions does not become an avenue
for market participants to
inappropriately exceed speculative
position limits.
The Commission is also adopting
§ 150.2(i)(3) as proposed. Under this
provision, a swap contract used to
willfully circumvent speculative
position limits is deemed an
economically equivalent swap, and thus
a referenced contract, even if the swap
does not meet the economically
equivalent definition set forth in final
§ 150.1. This provision is intended to
deter and prevent the structuring of a
swap in order to willfully evade
speculative position limits.
iii. Comments—Anti-Evasion
Several commenters stated that the
anti-evasion provision is prudent, but
would be difficult to apply in practice,
in part due to the subjective ‘‘willful
circumvention’’ standard.858 FIA
recommended that, instead, the antievasion analysis should be based on the
presence of ‘‘deceit, deception, or other
unlawful or illegitimate activity’’ so
market participants will be better
equipped to evaluate the surrounding
facts and circumstances in making an
evasion determination.859 FIA further
expressed that, because markets evolve,
it is inadvisable to consider ‘‘historical
practices behind the market participant
and transaction in question.’’ 860 FIA
also asked the Commission to confirm
that it is not evasion for a market
participant to consider ‘‘costs or
regulatory burdens, including the
avoidance thereof,’’ if that participant
has a legitimate business purpose for a
transaction.861
Specific to swaps, ISDA encouraged
the Commission to expressly
acknowledge and confirm that an out-ofscope swap transaction would not be
considered evasion under any set of
circumstances.862 FIA recommended
that, for structured swaps, the antievasion analysis should ask whether the
858 SIFMA AMG at 7, n.16 (noting that the antievasion provision makes the application of the
proposed ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition less clear because it incorporates a
subjective measure of intent); see also FIA at 25
(questioning how a participant would distinguish a
strategy that minimizes position size with an
evasive strategy); Better Markets at 33 (describing
the anti-evasion provision as a ‘‘useful deterrent,’’
but noting that the willful circumvention standard
would be difficult to meet and partially turns on the
Commission’s consideration of the legitimate
business purpose analysis).
859 FIA at 25–26.
860 Id.
861 Id.
862 ISDA at 5, n.7
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swap serves the market participant’s
commercial needs or objectives.863
Finally, FIA suggested that the Final
Rule should provide an automatic safe
harbor from a retroactive evasion
determination for all swaps entered into
prior to the compliance date.864
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—AntiEvasion
The Final Rule’s anti-evasion
provision is not intended to capture a
trading strategy merely because the
strategy may result in a smaller position
size for purposes of position limits.
Instead, the anti-evasion provision is
intended to deter and prevent cases of
willful evasion of speculative position
limits, the specifics of which the
Commission may be unable to
anticipate. The Federal position limit
requirements adopted herein will apply
during the spot month for all referenced
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, while non-spot month Federal
position limit requirements will only
apply for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts. Under this framework, and
because the threat of corners and
squeezes is the greatest in the spot
month, the Commission anticipates that
it may focus its attention on antievasion activity during the spot month.
The determination of whether
particular conduct is intended to
circumvent or evade requires a facts and
circumstances analysis. In interpreting
these anti-evasion rules, the
Commission is guided by its
interpretations of anti-evasion
provisions appearing elsewhere in the
Commission’s regulations, including the
interpretation of the anti-evasion rules
that the Commission adopted in its
rulemakings to further define the term
‘‘swap’’ and to establish a clearing
requirement under section 2(h)(1)(A) of
the CEA.865
Generally, consistent with those
interpretations, in evaluating whether
conduct constitutes evasion, the
Commission will consider, among other
things, the extent to which the person
lacked a legitimate business purpose for
structuring the transaction in that
particular manner. For example, an
analysis of how a swap was structured
could reveal that a person or persons
crafted derivatives transactions,
structured entities, or conducted
863 FIA
at 25.
864 Id.
865 See Further Definition of ‘‘Swap, ‘‘SecurityBased Swap,’’ and ’’Security-Based Swap
Agreement;’’ Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48208, 48297–
48303 (Aug. 13, 2012); Clearing Requirement
Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77
FR 74284, 74317–74319 (Dec. 13, 2012).
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themselves in a manner without a
legitimate business purpose and with
the intent to willfully evade position
limits by structuring one or more swaps
such that such swap(s) would not meet
the ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition in final § 150.1.
In response to FIA’s comment that the
Commission should confirm that it is
not evasion for a market participant
with a legitimate business purpose for a
transaction to consider ‘‘costs or
regulatory burdens,866 the Commission
acknowledges that it fully expects that
a person acting for legitimate business
purposes within its respective industry
will naturally consider a multitude of
costs and benefits associated with
different types of financial transactions,
entities or instruments, including the
applicable regulatory obligations.867 As
stated in a prior rulemaking, a person’s
specific consideration of, for example,
costs or regulatory burdens, including
the avoidance thereof, is not, in and of
itself, dispositive that the person is
acting without a legitimate business
purpose in a particular case.868
In response to FIA’s comment 869 that
an anti-evasion analysis of a structured
swap should evaluate whether the
transaction serves the market
participant’s commercial needs or
objectives, as stated in the 2020 NPRM,
the Commission will view legitimate
business purpose considerations on a
case-by-case basis in conjunction with
all other relevant facts and
circumstances. Additionally, the
Commission disagrees with FIA’s
comment 870 that an historical practices
inquiry is inadvisable. Because
transactions and instruments are
regularly structured, and entities
regularly formed, in a particular way
and for various, often times multiple,
reasons, the Commission believes it is
essential that all relevant facts and
circumstances be considered, including
historical practices.871 While historical
practice is a factor the Commission will
consider as part of its facts and
circumstances analysis, it is not
dispositive in determining whether
particular conduct constitutes evasion.
As part of its facts and circumstances
analysis, the Commission will look at
factors such as the historical practices
behind the market participant and
transaction in question. For example,
with respect to § 150.2(i)(2) (i.e., bona
fide hedges or spreads used to evade),
at 25.
867 See 77 FR at 48301.
868 See 77 FR at 74319.
869 FIA at 25.
870 Id. at 25–26.
871 See 77 FR at 48302.
03:06 Jan 14, 2021
872 See
Section II.A.1.ix.
873 Id.
874 See 77 FR at 48297–48303; 77 FR at 74317–
74319.
875 FIA at 25.
876 SIFMA AMG at 7, n.16; see also FIA at 25;
Better Markets at 33.
877 See In re Squadrito, [1990–1992 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,262 (CFTC
866 FIA
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the Commission is adopting guidance in
Appendix B to part 150 with respect to
gross versus net hedging. As discussed
elsewhere in this release, the
Commission believes that measuring
risk on a gross basis to willfully
circumvent or evade speculative
position limits would potentially run
afoul of § 150.2(i)(2).872 Use of gross or
net hedging that is inconsistent with an
entity’s historical practice, or a change
from gross to net hedging (or vice versa),
could be an indication that an entity is
seeking to evade position limits
regulations.873 With respect to
§ 150.2(i)(3) (i.e., swaps used to evade),
the Commission will consider whether
a market participant has a history of
structuring its swaps one way, but then
starts structuring its swaps a different
way around the time the participant
risked exceeding a speculative position
limit as a result of its swap position,
such as by modifying the delivery date
or other material terms and conditions
such that the swap no longer meets the
definition of an ‘‘economically
equivalent swap.’’
Consistent with interpretive language
in prior rulemakings addressing
evasion,874 when determining whether a
particular activity constitutes willful
evasion, the Commission will consider
the extent to which the activity involves
deceit, deception, or other unlawful or
illegitimate activity. Although it is
likely that fraud, deceit, or unlawful
activity will be present where willful
evasion has occurred, the Commission
disagrees with FIA’s comment 875 that
these factors should be a prerequisite to
an evasion finding. A position that does
not involve fraud, deceit, or unlawful
activity could still lack a legitimate
business purpose or involve other
indicia of evasive activity. The presence
or absence of fraud, deceit, or unlawful
activity is one fact the Commission will
consider when evaluating a person’s
activity. That said, the final anti-evasion
provision does require willfulness, i.e.
‘‘scienter.’’ In response to
commenters 876 who expressed concern
regarding the practical application of
this intent standard, the Commission
will interpret ‘‘willful’’ consistently
with how the Commission has done so
in the past, i.e., that acting either
intentionally or with reckless disregard
constitutes acting ‘‘willfully.’’ 877
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3345
In determining whether a transaction
has been entered into or structured
willfully to evade position limits, the
Commission will not consider the form,
label, or written documentation as
dispositive. The Commission also is not
requiring a pattern of evasive
transactions as a prerequisite to prove
evasion, although such a pattern may be
one factor in analyzing whether evasion
has occurred. In instances where one
party willfully structures a transaction
to evade but the other counterparty does
not, § 150.2(i) will apply to the party
who willfully structured the transaction
to evade.
Further, entering into transactions
that qualify for the forward exclusion
from the swap definition, standing
alone, shall not be considered evasive.
However, in circumstances where a
transaction does not, in fact, qualify for
the forward exclusion, the transaction
may or may not be evasive depending
on an analysis of all relevant facts and
circumstances.
The Commission declines to adopt
ISDA’s request 878 to carve out-of-scope
swap transactions from the anti-evasion
provision. This request was
unsupported and did not address
whether an out-of-scope swap could be
used to evade position limits.
Finally, the Commission declines to
adopt FIA’s request 879 that all swaps
entered into prior to the compliance
date be granted an automatic safe harbor
from a retroactive finding of evasion.
This change is unnecessary given that
under final § 150.3, pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps will
not be subject to Federal position limits
at all during or outside the spot
month.880
10. Application of Netting and Related
Treatment of Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
i. Background
Under the existing Federal
framework, Federal position limits
apply only to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, which are all
physically-settled. However, existing
part 150 does not include the equivalent
concept of a ‘‘referenced contract,’’ and
therefore existing Federal position
limits do not apply to any cash-settled
look-alike contracts as they would
under the Final Rule. Accordingly, the
issue of netting across look-alike
contracts that may be located across
Mar. 27, 1992) (adopting definition of ‘‘willful’’ in
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128
(1987)).
878 ISDA at 5, n.7.
879 FIA at 25.
880 See final § 150.3(a)(5).
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different exchanges is not addressed
under the existing framework.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Netting and Related Treatment of CashSettled Referenced Contracts
Under the 2020 NPRM, the referenced
contract definition in proposed § 150.1
included, among other things, (i) cashsettled contracts that are linked, either
directly or indirectly, to a core
referenced futures contract, and (ii)
‘‘economically equivalent swaps.’’ 881
Proposed § 150.2(a) provided that
during the spot month, Federal position
limits would apply ‘‘separately’’ to
physically delivered referenced
contracts and cash-settled referenced
contracts. Under the 2020 NPRM,
positions in a physically-settled core
referenced futures contract would not be
required to be added to, nor permitted
to be netted down by, positions in
corresponding cash-settled referenced
contracts (and vice-versa).
Proposed § 150.2(b), in contrast,
provided that during the non-spot
months, including the single month and
all-months-combined, Federal position
limits would apply in the aggregate to
both physically-delivered referenced
contracts and cash-settled referenced
contracts. This meant that for the
purposes of determining whether a
market participant complies with the
Federal non-spot month position limits,
a person’s physically-settled and cashsettled referenced contract positions
would be added together and could net
against each other.
Under both proposed §§ 150.2(a) and
(b), positions in referenced contracts
would be aggregated across exchanges
for purposes of determining one’s net
position for Federal position limit
purposes.
iii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Netting and Related
Treatment of Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
The Commission is finalizing
§ 150.2(a) and (b) of the 2020 NPRM as
proposed.882
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iv. Comments—Netting and Related
Treatment of Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
PIMCO, SIFMA AMG, and ISDA
contended that cash-settled referenced
contracts should not be subject to
881 See Section II.A.16. (discussion of the
proposed referenced contract definition).
882 As discussed above, the Commission is
making an exception for natural gas referenced
contracts to the general netting rules discussed
below. For further discussion on the Final Rule’s
treatment of natural gas referenced contracts, see
Section II.B.3.vi.
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Federal position limits at all because
cash-settled contracts do not introduce
the same risk of market manipulation.
They argued that subjecting cash-settled
referenced contracts to Federal position
limits would reduce market liquidity
and depth in these instruments.883
FIA and ICE argued that limits for
cash-settled referenced contracts should
be higher relative to Federal position
limits for physically-settled referenced
contracts. They similarly argued that
cash-settled referenced contracts are
‘‘not subject to corners and squeezes’’
and will ‘‘ ‘ensure market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers.’ ’’ 884 FIA and ICE
further suggested that Federal position
limits for cash-settled referenced
contracts should apply per DCM (rather
than in aggregate across DCMs).885 FIA
additionally suggested setting a separate
Federal spot-month position limit for
economically equivalent swaps.886
In contrast, CME Group supported the
Commission’s approach for spot-month
parity for physically-settled and cashsettled referenced contracts across all
commodity markets. CME Group
explained that absent such parity, one
side of the market could be vulnerable
to: Artificial distortions from
manipulations on the other side of the
market; regulatory arbitrage; and
liquidity drain to the other side of the
market.887 CME Group warned that,
ultimately, a lack of parity could
undermine the statutory goals of
position limits.888 NEFI agreed, arguing
similarly that ‘‘this move is essential to
guard against manipulation by a trader
who holds positions in both physicallysettled and cash-settled contracts for the
same underlying commodity.’’ 889
v. Discussion of Final Rule—Netting
and Related Treatment of Cash-Settled
Referenced Contracts
The Commission is finalizing
§§ 150.2(a) and (b) as proposed. Under
final § 150.2(a), Federal spot month
limits apply to physical-delivery
referenced contracts ‘‘separately’’ from
883 PIMCO at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4–7; ISDA at 3–
5. These entities did not specifically argue that
cash-settled contracts should be excluded from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition, but rather in
general that such instruments should not be subject
to Federal position limits. The Commission noted
that this is technically a different argument since
cash-settled instruments could be exempt from
position limits while still technically qualifying as
‘‘referenced contracts,’’ but the end result is the
same as a practical matter.
884 ICE at 3, 15 (also arguing that cash-settled
limits should apply per exchange, rather than
across exchanges); FIA at 7–8.
885 FIA at 7–8; ICE at 13.
886 FIA 7–8.
887 CME Group at 3–4.
888 Id. at 6.
889 NEFI at 3.
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Federal spot month limits applied to
cash-settled referenced contracts,
meaning that during the spot month,
positions in physically-settled contracts
may not be netted with positions in
linked cash-settled contracts but also are
not required to be added to linked cashsettled contracts for the purposes of
determining compliance with Federal
position limits. Specifically, all of a
trader’s positions (long or short) in a
given physically-settled referenced
contract (across all exchanges and OTC
as applicable) 890 are netted and subject
to the spot month limit for the relevant
commodity, and all of such trader’s
positions in any cash-settled referenced
contracts (across all exchanges and OTC
as applicable) linked to such physicallysettled core referenced futures contract
are netted and independently (rather
than collectively along with the
physically-settled positions) subject to
the Federal spot month limit for that
commodity.891
Additionally, a position in a
commodity contract that is not a
referenced contract, and therefore is not
subject to Federal position limits, as a
consequence, cannot be netted with
positions in referenced contracts for
purposes of Federal position limits.892
For example, a swap that is not a
referenced contract because it does not
meet the economically equivalent swap
definition could not be netted with
positions in a referenced contract.
890 In practice, the only physically-settled
referenced contracts subject to the Final Rule will
be the 25 core referenced futures contracts, none of
which are listed on multiple DCMs, although there
could potentially be physically-settled OTC swaps
that would satisfy the ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ definition and therefore would also qualify
as referenced contracts. For further discussion on
economically equivalent swaps, see Section II.A.4.
891 Consistent with CEA section 4a(a)(6), this
would include positions across exchanges.
However, for the reasons discussed in Section
II.B.3.vi., the Commission is exercising its
exemptive authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7) to
provide an exception for natural gas to the general
aggregation rule in CEA section 4a(a)(6). As
discussed above, the Commission has concluded
that the natural gas market is well-established with
contracts that currently trade across several
exchanges, and is relatively liquid with significant
open interest. Accordingly, the Commission is
exercising its judgment to establish Federal position
limits on a per-exchange (and OTC as applicable)
basis in order to maintain the status quo rather than
risk disturbing the existing natural gas market.
892 Proposed Appendix C to part 150 provides
guidance regarding the referenced contract
definition, including that the following types of
contracts are not deemed referenced contracts,
meaning such contracts are not subject to Federal
position limits and cannot be netted with positions
in referenced contracts for purposes of Federal
position limits: Location basis contracts;
commodity index contracts; swap guarantees; trade
options that meet the requirements of 17 CFR 32.3;
monthly average pricing contracts; and outright
price reporting agency index contracts.
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Allowing the netting of linked
physically-settled and cash-settled
contracts during the spot month could
lead to disruptions in the price
discovery function of the core
referenced futures contract or allow a
market participant to manipulate the
price of the core referenced futures
contract. Absent separate spot month
position limits for physically-settled
and cash-settled contracts, the spot
month position limit would be rendered
ineffective, as a participant could
maintain large positions in excess of
limits in both the physically-settled
contract and the linked cash-settled
contract, enabling the participant to
disrupt the price discovery function as
the contracts go to expiration by taking
large opposite positions in the
physically-settled core referenced
futures and cash-settled referenced
contracts, or potentially allowing a
participant to effect a corner or
squeeze.893 Consistent with current and
historical practice, the Federal position
limits adopted herein apply to positions
throughout each trading session (i.e., on
an intra-day basis during each trading
session), as well as at the close of each
trading session.894
In response to the comments from
PIMCO, SIFMA AMG, and ISDA that
cash-settled referenced contracts should
not be subject to position limits at all
because such contracts do not introduce
the same risk of market manipulation, as
discussed above under Section
II.A.16.iii.a., the Commission has
concluded that cash-settled referenced
contracts should be subject to Federal
position limits since they form one
market with their corresponding
physically-settled core referenced
futures contracts.895
In response to ISDA’s
recommendation that the Final Rule
only include physically-settled
referenced contracts and that the
Commission apply Federal position
limits on cash-settled referenced
contracts at a later time, the
Commission notes that as discussed
under Section I.D., the Final Rule will
be subject to a general compliance
period until January 1, 2022. During this
period, exchanges may choose to
implement exchange-set position limits
that provide for a different phased-in
893 For example, absent such a restriction in the
spot month, a trader could stand for 100 percent of
deliverable supply during the spot month by
holding a large long position in the physicaldelivery contract along with an offsetting short
position in a cash-settled contract, which effectively
would corner the market.
894 See, e.g., Elimination of Daily Speculative
Trading Limits, 44 FR 7124, 7125 (Feb. 6, 1979).
895 For further discussion, see Section
II.A.16.iii.a(2).
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approach for cash-settled versus
physically-settled referenced contracts
as the exchanges may find appropriate
for their respective markets.
Additionally, the compliance period
will be further extended until January 1,
2023 for economically equivalent swaps
and positions held in reliance on a riskmanagement exemption, which in each
case the Commission notes include
mostly cash-settled positions.
Accordingly, as a practical matter, many
cash-settled contracts will be subject to
a longer compliance period. However,
as discussed further above under
Section II.A.16.iii.a, the Commission
has determined that it is appropriate to
include cash-settled referenced
contracts in Federal position limits
under this Final Rule.896
FIA and ICE similarly argued that
cash-settled referenced contracts should
be subject to higher Federal position
limits compared to the physicallysettled core referenced futures contracts.
Their arguments were predicated, in
part, on their conclusions that market
participants cannot use cash-settled
contracts to effect a corner or
squeeze.897
The Commission declines to adopt
higher Federal position limits for cashsettled referenced contracts for several
reasons. First, as an initial matter, the
Commission acknowledges that
preventing corners and squeezes is a
crucial focus of the Commission.
However, in response to FIA’s and ICE’s
arguments that cash-settled referenced
contracts should be subject to higher
Federal position limits compared to
physically-settled futures contracts
because cash-settled contracts cannot be
used to effect a corner or squeeze, the
Commission notes that there are other
forms of manipulation, such as
‘‘banging’’ or ‘‘marking’’ the close, that
cash-settled referenced contracts can
effect, and the Commission emphasizes
that it endeavors to prevent all such
market manipulation, consistent with
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii).898 While
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) specifically
references corners and squeezes, the
CEA section also references
‘‘manipulation’’ generally, and neither
FIA nor ICE recognized the existence of
other types of market manipulation,
such as ‘‘banging’’ the close, in their
analysis.
Second, the Commission believes that
FIA’s and ICE’s arguments for higher
896 For further discussion of the Commission’s
rationale for including cash-settled referenced
contracts under the Final Rule, see Section
II.A.16.iii.a.
897 FIA at 7; ICE at 12–13.
898 For further discussion, see Sections II.A.16.,
II.A.4.iii.d(2), and II.B.10.iv.
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Federal position limits for cash-settled
referenced contracts is intrinsically
related to the comments from PIMCO,
SIFMA AMG, and ISDA discussed
above arguing that cash-settled
referenced contracts should not be
subject to Federal position limits at all.
That is, the higher the Federal position
limits for cash-settled referenced
contracts that FIA or ICE recommend
establishing, the closer, as a practical
matter, it is to having no Federal
position limits for cash-settled
referenced contracts.899 As a result, the
Commission believes that its general
rationale for including cash-settled
referenced contracts within the Federal
position limits framework similarly
supports parity between cash-settled
and physically-settled referenced
contracts.
Third, the Commission generally
agrees with the reasons articulated in
the comments from CME Group and
NEFI that it is appropriate to establish
spot-month parity for physically-settled
and cash-settled referenced contracts
across all commodity markets. While
FIA argued that higher position limits
for cash-settled referenced contracts
could ensure liquidity for bona fide
hedgers,900 the Final Rule has
established the Federal position limit
levels in general for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts (including
increases for many of the nine legacy
agricultural contracts) and has
expanded the enumerated bona fide
hedges and streamlined the related
application process under final §§ 150.3
and 150.9 in order to ensure sufficient
liquidity for bona fide hedgers.
FIA and ICE similarly argued that
market participants should not be
required to aggregate cash-settled
positions across all exchanges but rather
should be subject to a disaggregated
Federal position limit that applies perexchange. In other words, as the
Commission understands FIA’s and
ICE’s request, if the Federal position
limit is 1,000 contracts, FIA and ICE
believe that a market participant should
be able to hold 1,000 cash-settled
referenced contracts per exchange rather
than being required to aggregate
positions across all exchanges. Under
this approach, a long position of 1,000
contracts on Exchange A would not be
aggregated with a long position of 1,000
contracts on Exchange B. However,
under this approach, a long position on
Exchange A also would not net with a
short position on Exchange B.
ICE specifically argued that a single,
aggregate Federal position limit for all
899 See
900 FIA
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referenced contracts across exchanges
may make it difficult for an exchange to
launch a new referenced contract since
the hypothetical new referenced
contract would be aggregated with an
existing referenced contract for
purposes of Federal position limits.901
According to ICE, establishing new
exchanges and/or new contracts is made
more difficult under the Commission’s
aggregated approach, since it is
purportedly more difficult to attract
sufficient liquidity to establish a
sustainable exchange or contract.902 ICE
also references the Commission’s
obligations under CEA section 15 to
consider the public interest and
antitrust laws.903 ICE recommends a
more flexible approach to allow an
exchange to develop its own liquidity
and establish its own limits, even for
similar or look-alike cash-settled
referenced contracts, to help develop
robust and liquid markets while
protecting against excessive
speculation.904
In response to FIA and ICE, as
discussed immediately below, the
Commission believes that, as a general
matter, establishing aggregate limits
across exchanges promotes competition
and innovation while also better
addressing the statutory goals in CEA
section 4a(a)(3) as compared to ICE’s
request to establish disaggregated, perexchange position limits. However,
before discussing the Commission’s
underlying policy rationale supporting
aggregate Federal position limits, the
Commission has determined that as an
initial legal matter that CEA section
4a(a)(6)(B) requires the Commission to
establish the ‘‘aggregate number or
amount of positions . . . that maybe
held by any person . . . for each month
across . . . contracts listed by [DCMs]
. . . .’’ (emphasis added).905 While ICE
cites CEA section 15 in its comment
letter, ICE does not address CEA section
4a(a)(6)’s requirement that the
Commission generally must establish
aggregate position limits across
exchanges. Accordingly, in addition to
the policy rationale discussed
immediately below, the Commission
further has determined that the Final
Rule’s requirement to aggregate
positions across exchanges does not on
its face violate CEA section 15.906
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901 ICE
902 ICE
at 12–13.
at 12–13.
903 Id.
904 Id.
905 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(6); CEA 4a(a)(6).
Section IV.D. As discussed elsewhere in
this release, the Commission is exercising its
exemptive authority pursuant to CEA Section
4a(a)(7) to establish an exception to this rule in
connection with, and based on the particular
906 See
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As noted above, the Commission also
believes it is appropriate to aggregate
positions across exchanges for Federal
position limit purposes for the same
general reasons that the Commission has
determined both to include cash-settled
referenced contracts within the Federal
position limits framework and also to
maintain parity for Federal position
limit levels between physically-settled
and cash-settled referenced contracts.
For example, applying a per-exchange
Federal position limit, rather than
aggregating across exchanges, effectively
increases the applicable Federal
position limit. Accordingly, the
Commission likewise believes it
generally is inappropriate to permit perexchange Federal position limits for
cash-settled referenced contracts.
In response to ICE’s concern regarding
liquidity formation and that aggregating
cash-settled positions across exchanges
would harm competitiveness and
innovation by making it more difficult
to attract enough liquidity to become
sustainable on an ongoing basis,907 the
Commission believes that to the extent
Federal position limit levels under the
Final Rule have been correctly
calibrated, the Federal position limits
framework should promote—or at least
not disincentivize—liquidity formation.
However, ICE’s proposal to allow
Federal position limits to apply on a
disaggregated, per-exchange basis risks
dividing liquidity among several
liquidity pools, which itself could harm
liquidity for bona fide hedgers and
reduce price discovery. The
Commission also observes that, as a
practical matter, ICE’s request to
disaggregate positions across exchanges
would significantly increase the
applicable position limit (possibly by a
multiple of two or three—or more—
depending on the number of exchanges
that list referenced contracts).
Consequently, if the Commission
assumes, in arguendo, that Federal
position limit levels are reasonably
calibrated under the Final Rule, then
applying a per-exchange limit by
definition would increase the potential
risks of excessive speculation and
possible manipulation as market
participants are permitted to hold larger
directional positions in referenced
contracts. Moreover, to the extent
Federal position limits under this Final
Rule are not reasonably calibrated to
ensure necessary liquidity for bona fide
hedgers, then the Commission, as a
general matter, would prefer to address
the lack of liquidity by adjusting the
circumstances of the natural gas market. See
Section II.B.3.iv (discussing natural gas).
907 ICE at 12–13.
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Federal position limit levels to
appropriate levels rather than applying
Federal position limits on a perexchange basis for the reasons discussed
in the paragraphs above and as
discussed in the paragraph immediately
below.
Last, the Commission believes that
ICE’s approach could actually harm
innovation since under ICE’s rationale,
Federal position limit levels would need
to be set lower than the Federal levels
adopted herein. For example, if the
Commission were to allow
disaggregated netting across exchanges
as a general rule, then it would likely
lead to increased excessive speculation
and possible manipulation, as discussed
above.
Accordingly, in order to avoid the
threat of excessive speculation and
manipulation, the Commission would
be obligated to set Federal position
limits sufficiently low in order to
compensate for a per-exchange position
limit disaggregated approach. However
if the Commission were to establish
Federal position limits sufficiently low
to prevent these concerns from
happening, then innovation could be
adversely affected since it means that
the concomitant lower Federal position
limit levels likely would make it
difficult for exchanges to develop
sufficient liquidity for a new product—
unless other competing exchanges
offered linked contracts to add sufficient
liquidity to the market. In such a case,
the success of any new product offered
by the initial exchange could be
dependent upon competing exchanges
offering competing look-alike contracts
to allow for sufficient liquidity. In
contrast, the Commission believes that
the Final Rule’s approach to make the
full aggregated Federal position limit
available to the contract is more
responsive to the needs of the market
compared to a disaggregated approach,
and the Commission believes that the
Final Rule’s aggregated approach
promotes innovation and competition in
the marketplace. Accordingly, the
Commission does not believe that
applying netting on an aggregate basis
harms competition and innovation.
Rather, the Commission believes its
approach supports healthy competition
and innovation while ICE’s approach
could harm liquidity and innovation.
While the Commission believes the
above rationale generally applies, the
Commission notes that for the reasons
discussed in Section II.B.3.vi., the
Commission is exercising its exemptive
authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7) to
provide an exception for natural gas to
the general aggregation rule in CEA
section 4a(a)(6). The Commission does
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not believe that the rationale above
necessarily applies to the natural gas
market. As discussed above, the natural
gas market has existing natural gas
commodity derivatives contracts that
are well-established with liquidity,
trading, and open interest currently
across several exchanges. Accordingly,
the Commission is exercising its
judgment to establish Federal position
limits on a per-exchange basis in order
to maintain the status quo rather than
risk disturbing the structure of the
existing natural gas market, which could
harm liquidity for bona fide hedgers or
price discovery.
In response to FIA’s suggestion that
economically equivalent swaps should
be subject to separate Federal spotmonth position limits, as discussed
under Section II.A.4.iii., the
Commission does not believe doing so
would be appropriate.908 As discussed
above, the Commission believes that
establishing separate class position
limits for futures contracts and swaps
could harm liquidity formation while
establishing a single Federal position
limit promotes integration between the
futures and swaps markets.
11. ‘‘Eligible Affiliates’’ and Position
Aggregation
i. Background
In 2016, the Commission amended
§ 150.4 to adopt new rules governing the
aggregation of positions for purposes of
compliance with Federal position
limits.909 These aggregation rules
currently apply only to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts previously subject
to Federal position limits, but now will
also apply to the 16 new contracts
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under this Final Rule. Under
the existing aggregation rules, unless an
exemption applies, all of the positions
held and trading done by the person
must be aggregated with positions for
which the person controls trading or for
which the person holds a 10% or greater
ownership interest. DMO has issued
time-limited no-action relief through
August 12, 2022 (‘‘NAL 19–19’’) from
some of the aggregation requirements
contained in that rulemaking.910
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908 FIA
7–8.
81 FR at 91454.
910 See CFTC Letter No. 19–19 (July 31, 2019),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/
download. NAL 19–19 extends NAL 17–37 and
provides an additional three-year period of noaction relief from compliance with certain position
aggregation requirements under Commission
Regulation 150.4 by streamlining the compliance
requirements that must be satisfied for a person or
entity to rely on an exemption from aggregation.
909 See
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ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Eligible Affiliates and Position
Aggregation
Proposed § 150.2(k) addressed entities
that would qualify as an ‘‘eligible
affiliate’’ as defined in proposed § 150.1.
Under the proposed definition, an
‘‘eligible affiliate’’ would include
certain entities that, among other things,
are required to aggregate their positions
under § 150.4 and that do not claim an
exemption from aggregation. There may
be certain entities that would be eligible
for an exemption from aggregation, but
that prefer to aggregate rather than
disaggregate their positions (such as
when aggregation would result in
advantageous netting of positions with
affiliated entities). Proposed § 150.2(k)
intended to address such a circumstance
by making clear that an ‘‘eligible
affiliate’’ may opt to aggregate its
positions even though it is eligible to
disaggregate.
iii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Eligible Affiliates and
Position Aggregation
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.2(k) as proposed.
iv. Comments—Eligible Affiliates and
Position Aggregation
Although the Commission did not
receive any comments on this provision,
it received a number of comments
related to position aggregation in
general. These commenters urged the
Commission to amend the Federal
position limits aggregation rules in
existing § 150.4 by codifying existing
NAL 19–19.911 Some commenters
further requested that the Commission
revisit certain aspects of NAL 19–19 and
the aggregation rules, such as the
threshold ownership percentage set
forth in existing § 150.4 that triggers the
requirement to aggregate positions or
rely upon an exemption.912 Conversely,
IATP argued that before applying the
existing aggregation rules, and
accompanying exemptions, to
additional commodities, the
Commission should study whether the
existing exemptions from aggregation
have resulted in increased
speculation.913
v. Discussion of Final Rule—Eligible
Affiliates and Position Aggregation
The Commission declines to codify
NAL 19–19 914 in this rulemaking since
911 FIA at 28; ISDA at 11; PIMCO at 6; CMC at
12–13; and SIFMA AMG at 2, 9.
912 CMC at 12–13; FIA at 28.
913 IATP at 18–19.
914 See CFTC Letter No. 19–19 (July 31, 2019),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/
download.
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3349
NAL 19–19’s relief from some of the
aggregation requirements contained in
2016 Final Aggregation Rulemaking 915
continues to apply until August 12,
2022. DMO extended this relief for three
years to provide sufficient time to
‘‘evaluate whether the relief granted is
hindering Commission staff’s ability to
conduct surveillance; assess the impact
of the relief; and consider long-term
solutions that must, appropriately, be
implemented by a notice and comment
rulemaking.’’ 916 Accordingly, the
Commission believes it is appropriate to
first monitor the application of the
existing position aggregation
requirements before considering
amendments to those aggregation
requirements, and the Commission will
address the aggregation rules, including
whether to codify NAL 19–19, as
needed, after this Final Rule goes into
effect.
C. § 150.3—Exemptions From Federal
Position Limits
1. Background—Existing §§ 150.3, 1.47,
and 1.48—Exemptions From Federal
Position Limits
Existing § 150.3(a), which pre-dates
the Dodd-Frank Act, lists positions that
may, under certain circumstances,
exceed Federal position limits,
including: (1) Bona fide hedging
transactions, as defined in the current
bona fide hedging definition in § 1.3;
and (2) spread or arbitrage positions,
subject to certain conditions.917 Existing
§ 150.3(b) provides that the Commission
or certain Commission staff may make a
‘‘call’’ to demand certain information
from exemption holders so that the
Commission can effectively oversee the
use of such exemption. Section
§ 150.3(b) also provides that any such
call may request information relating to
positions owned or controlled by that
person, trading done pursuant to that
exemption, the futures, options or cashmarket positions that support the
claimed exemption, and the relevant
business relationships supporting a
claim of exemption.918
The current bona fide hedge
definition in existing § 1.3 requires
applicants who wish to receive bona
fide hedging recognition and exceed
Federal position limits to apply for nonenumerated bona fide hedges under
§ 1.47 and to apply for anticipatory bona
fide hedges under § 1.48 of the
Commission’s existing regulations.
Under § 1.47, persons seeking
recognition by the Commission of a non915 81
FR 91454 (December 16, 2016).
CFTC Letter No. 19–19 at 4.
917 17 CFR 150.3(a).
918 17 CFR 150.3(b).
916 See
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enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position must file certain
initial statements with the Commission
at least 30 days in advance of the date
that such transaction or position would
be in excess of Federal position
limits.919 Similarly, persons seeking
recognition by the Commission of
certain anticipatory bona fide hedges
must submit their application 10 days in
advance of the date that such
transactions or positions would be in
excess of Federal position limits.920
With respect to spread exemptions,
the Commission’s authority and existing
regulation for exempting certain spread
positions can be found in CEA section
4a(a)(1) and existing § 150.3(a)(3) of the
Commission’s regulations. In particular,
CEA section 4a(a)(1) authorizes the
Commission to exempt from Federal
position limits transactions ‘‘normally
known to the trade as ’spreads’ or
’straddles’ or ’arbitrage.’’’ Similarly, in
existing § 150.3(a)(3), the Commission
exempts ‘‘spread or arbitrage positions,’’
and allows such exemptions to be selfeffectuating for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts currently subject
to Federal position limits. The
Commission does not specify a formal
process, in § 150.3(a)(3), for granting
spread exemptions.921
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2. Overview of Proposed § 150.3,
Commenters’ Views, and the
Commission’s Final Rule Determination
This section provides a brief overview
of proposed § 150.3, commenters’
general views, and the Commission’s
determination. The Commission will
summarize and address each subsection of § 150.3 in greater detail
further below. The Commission
proposed several changes to § 150.3.
First, the Commission proposed to
update § 150.3 to conform to the
proposed bona fide hedging definition
in § 150.1 (described above) and the
new streamlined process in proposed
§ 150.9 for recognizing non-enumerated
bona fide hedging positions (described
further below). The Commission also
proposed to amend § 150.3 to include
new exemption types not explicitly
listed in existing § 150.3, including: (i)
Exemptions for financial distress
situations; (ii) conditional exemptions
for certain spot month positions in cashsettled natural gas contracts; and (iii)
919 17
CFR 1.47.
CFR 1.48.
921 Since 1938, the Commission (then known as
the Commodity Exchange Commission) has
recognized the use of spread positions to facilitate
liquidity and hedging. See Notice of Proposed
Order in the Matter of Limits on Position and Daily
Trading in Grain for Future Delivery, 3 FR 1408
(June 14, 1938).
920 17
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exemptions for pre-enactment swaps
and transition period swaps.922
Proposed § 150.3(b)–(g) respectively
addressed: Non-enumerated bona fide
hedge and spread exemption requests
submitted directly to the Commission;
previously-granted risk management
exemptions to Federal position limits;
exemption-related recordkeeping and
reporting requirements; the aggregation
of accounts; and the delegation of
certain authorities to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight.
The most substantive comments on
proposed § 150.3 relate to the spread
transaction exemption in proposed
§ 150.3(a)(2) and to the natural gas
conditional position limit exemption in
proposed § 150.3(a)(4), as described in
detail below and under the discussion
of § 150.2, above.923 In addition, one
commenter expressed general support
for the Commission’s proposed
approach to recognizing exemptions
under § 150.3.924
The Commission has determined to
adopt § 150.3 largely as proposed, with
certain modifications and clarifications
in response to commenters’ views and
other considerations, as described in
detail below.
3. Section 150.3(a)(1)—Exemption for
Bona Fide Hedging Transaction or
Position
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exemption for Bona Fide Hedging
Transaction or Position
First, under proposed § 150.3(a)(1)(i),
a bona fide hedging transaction or
position that falls within one of the
proposed enumerated hedges set forth
in proposed Appendix A to part 150,
discussed above, would be selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits. A market participant
thus would not be required to request
Commission approval prior to exceeding
Federal position limits for such
transaction or position. However, this
does not affect a market participant’s
obligations under proposed § 150.5(a)
and under the relevant exchange’s rules
and thus, the market participant would
be required to request a bona fide hedge
exemption from the relevant exchange
for purposes of exchange-set limits
established pursuant to proposed
§ 150.5(a), and submit required cashmarket information to the exchange as
922 The Commission revised § 150.3(a) in 2016,
relocating the independent account controller
aggregation exemption from § 150.3(a)(4) in order to
consolidate it with the Commission’s aggregation
requirements in § 150.4(b)(4). See Final Aggregation
Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91489–91490.
923 See supra Section II.B.3.vi.a. (discussing the
spot-month limit for natural gas).
924 See CMC at 6.
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part of that request.925 The Commission
also proposed to allow the existing
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges (some of which are not currently
self-effectuating, and must be approved
by the Commission, under existing
§ 1.48) to be self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits (and
thus would not require prior
Commission approval).
Second, under proposed
§ 150.3(a)(1)(ii), for positions in
referenced contracts that do not satisfy
one of the proposed enumerated hedges
in Appendix A, (i.e., non-enumerated
bona fide hedges), a market participant
must request approval from the
Commission either directly, or
indirectly through an exchange, prior to
exceeding Federal position limits. Such
exemptions thus would not be selfeffectuating and a market participant in
such cases would have one of the
following two options for requesting
such a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition: (1) Apply directly to the
Commission in accordance with
§ 150.3(b) (described below), and,
separately, also apply to an exchange
pursuant to exchange rules established
under proposed § 150.5(a); 926 or (2)
apply through an exchange pursuant to
proposed § 150.9 for a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognition that could
ultimately be valid both for purposes of
Federal and exchange-set position limit
requirements, unless the Commission
(and not staff, which would not have
delegated authority) denies the
application within a limited period of
time.927 As discussed in the 2020
NPRM, market participants relying on
enumerated or non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions would no longer
have to file the monthly Form 204/304
with supporting cash-market
information.928
ii. Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Exemption for Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions
The Commission did not receive any
comments on proposed § 150.3(a)(1). As
such, the Commission is finalizing
§ 150.3(a)(1) with a few grammatical and
organizational changes to improve
readability. The Commission is also
finalizing the introductory text in
§ 150.3(a) with a clarification that
‘‘each’’ of a person’s transactions or
positions must satisfy at least one of the
925 See infra Section II.D.3. See also 85 FR at
11644 (proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)).
926 See infra Section II.D.3. (discussion of
proposed § 150.5).
927 See infra Section II.G. (discussion of proposed
§ 150.9).
928 See infra Section II.H.2. (discussion of the
proposed elimination of Form 204).
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exemptions in § 150.3(a) in order to
exceed Federal limits. None of the
technical revisions are intended to
change the substance of proposed
§ 150.3(a)(1).
4. Section 150.3(a)(2)—Spread
Exemptions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Spread
Exemptions
Under proposed § 150.3(a)(2)(i), a
spread position would be selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits, provided that the
position fits within at least one of the
types of spread strategies listed in the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition in
proposed § 150.1,929 and provided
further that the market participant
separately requests a spread exemption
from the relevant exchange’s limits
established pursuant to proposed
§ 150.5(a).
Under proposed § 150.3(a)(2)(ii), for a
spread strategy that does not meet the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition in
proposed § 150.1, a market participant
must apply for a spread exemption
directly from the Commission in
accordance with proposed § 150.3(b).
The market participant must also
receive a notification of the approved
spread exemption under proposed
§ 150.3(b)(4) before exceeding the
Federal speculative position limits for
that spread position. The Commission
thus did not propose a process akin to
§ 150.9 for spreads that do not meet the
proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition.
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ii. Comments—Spread Exemptions
Several commenters advocated for the
Commission to expand the proposed
§ 150.9 process, which would allow
exchanges to process applications for
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions for purposes of both Federal
and exchange limits, to also allow
exchanges to grant ‘‘non-enumerated’’
spread exemptions for spread positions
that do not meet the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition.930 Commenters
also requested that the Commission
929 See supra Section II.A.20. (proposed
definition of ‘‘spread transaction’’ in § 150.1, which
would cover: Intra-market, inter-market, intracommodity, or inter-commodity spreads, including
calendar spreads, quality differential spreads,
processing spreads (such as energy ‘‘crack’’ or
soybean ‘‘crush’’ spreads), product or by-product
differential spreads, and futures-options spreads.)
930 See MFA/AIMA at 10; FIA at 21; Citadel at 8–
9; ISDA at 9; ICE at 7–8 (suggesting that if the list
of spread positions in the spread transaction
definition is determined to be an exhaustive list,
then the Commission should permit additional
flexibility for an exchange to grant additional
spread exemptions—that are not covered in the
spread transaction definition—using the proposed
§ 150.9 process).
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provide an explanation for why the
Commission would not expand § 150.9
to cover ‘‘non-enumerated’’ spread
exemptions.931 Finally, commenters
requested that market participants be
able to apply for spread exemptions on
a late or retroactive basis the same way
they would be permitted to apply for
bona fide hedge exemptions within five
days of exceeding Federal position
limits under proposed §§ 150.3 and
150.9.932
iii. Discussion of Final Rule—Spread
Exemptions
The Commission has determined to
adopt § 150.3(a)(2) with non-substantive
revisions to address technical edits or
improve readability. For the reasons
discussed immediately below, the
Commission has determined not to
expand § 150.3(a)(2) as requested by
commenters to allow market
participants to apply to exchanges for
‘‘non-enumerated’’ spread exemptions
that are not covered in the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition in § 150.1.
First, as discussed above,933 the
Commission has determined to expand
the ‘‘spread transaction’’ definition so
that it covers most, if not all, of the most
common spread exemptions used by
market participants. With this
expansion, the Commission expects that
most spread exemption requests will fall
within the scope of the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition. Accordingly,
the Commission expects that most
spread exemptions will thus be selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits. Also, the Commission
expects that any spread exemption
requests falling outside of the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition are likely to be
novel exemption requests that the
Commission—and not exchanges—
should review, considering certain
statutory considerations in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B). As explained immediately
below, the Commission cannot
authorize exchanges to conduct this
analysis because exchanges would lack
clear standards for assessing whether a
particular spread position satisfies the
requirements of the CEA.
Second, bona fide hedge recognitions
and spread exemptions are subject to
different legal standards. That is, under
CEA section 4a(a)(c)(2), Congress
provided clear criteria to the
Commission for determining what
constitutes a bona fide hedging
transaction or position. In turn, the
Commission has defined in detail the
931 See
MFA/AIMA at 10.
ICE at 8.
933 See supra Section II.A.20. (discussing changes
to expand the spread transaction definition).
term bona fide hedging transaction or
position in § 150.1. As a result, under
final § 150.9, the Commission is
permitting exchanges to evaluate
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedges for purposes of exchange-set
limits in accordance with the same clear
criteria used by the Commission.
In contrast, the CEA does not include
clear criteria for granting spread
exemptions. Instead, CEA section
4a(a)(1) generally permits the
Commission to exempt ‘‘transactions
normally known to the trade as
‘‘spreads’’ or ‘‘straddles’’ or ‘‘arbitrage’’
from position limits 934 and requires the
Commission to administer Federal
position limits in a manner that
comports with certain policy
considerations in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B).935 Analyzing novel spread
exemption requests in accordance with
these general principles requires the
Commission to use its judgment to
conduct a highly fact-specific analysis.
And, in the absence of any detailed
statutory or regulatory criteria, the
Commission is not comfortable, at this
time, with leveraging an exchange’s
analysis and determination with respect
to novel spread exemption requests. As
such, the Commission has determined
that the Commission should conduct a
direct review of any spread exemptions
that do not meet the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, and the
Commission thus will not expand
§ 150.9 to cover spreads because
exchanges would lack clear standards
for assessing whether a particular
spread position satisfies the
requirements of the CEA. In the future,
the Commission may, however, consider
developing regulatory criteria for spread
exemptions such that novel spread
exemptions could be considered
through a more streamlined process,
such as § 150.9.
Finally, unlike for certain bona fide
hedge recognitions as discussed below,
the Commission has determined not to
permit retroactive applications for
spread exemptions or other exemptions
permitted under this § 150.3(a). The
Commission believes that the Federal
position limits framework adopted
herein provides sufficient flexibility
through expanded speculative limits,
and a clear, comprehensive set of
exemptions, most of which are selfeffectuating and thus do not require
prior Commission approval. As such,
the Commission believes that market
participants will be able to identify their
exemption needs based on these clear
regulatory requirements and apply for
932 See
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934 7
935 7
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U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(b).
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all such exemptions ahead of time. In
addition, the Commission believes that
allowing retroactive spread exemptions
and other types of retroactive
exemptions (such as the financial
distress or conditional natural gas spot
month exemption) could potentially be
harmful to the market as these types of
strategies may involve non-riskreducing or speculative activity that
should be evaluated prior to a person
exceeding Federal position limits.
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5. Section 150.3(a)(3)—Financial
Distress Exemptions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Financial Distress Exemptions
Proposed § 150.3(a)(3) would allow
for a financial distress exemption in
certain situations, including the
potential default or bankruptcy of a
customer or a potential acquisition
target. For example, in periods of
financial distress, such as a customer
default at an FCM or a potential
bankruptcy of a market participant, it
may be beneficial for a financiallysound market participant to take on the
positions and corresponding risk of a
less stable market participant, and in
doing so, exceed Federal speculative
position limits. Pursuant to authority
delegated under §§ 140.97 and 140.99,
Commission staff previously granted
exemptions in these types of situations
to avoid sudden liquidations required to
comply with a position limit.936 Such
sudden liquidations could otherwise
potentially hinder statutory objectives,
including by reducing liquidity,
disrupting price discovery, and/or
increasing systemic risk.937
The proposed exemption would be
available for the positions of ‘‘a person,
or related persons,’’ meaning that a
financial distress exemption request
should be specific to the circumstances
of a particular person, or to persons
affiliated with that person, and not a
more general request by a large group of
unrelated people whose financial
distress circumstances may differ from
one another. The proposed exemption
would be granted on a case-by-case
basis in response to a request submitted
to the Commission pursuant to § 140.99,
and would be evaluated based on the
specific facts and circumstances of a
particular person or a related person or
persons. Any such financial distress
position would not be a bona fide
hedging transaction or position unless it
otherwise met the substantive and
936 See, e.g., CFTC Press Release No. 5551–08,
CFTC Update on Efforts Underway to Oversee
Markets, (Sept. 19, 2008), available at https://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5551-08.
937 See 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3).
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procedural requirements set forth in
proposed §§ 150.1, 150.3, and 150.9, as
applicable.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Financial
Distress Exemptions
The Commission did not receive any
substantive comments on proposed
§ 150.3(a)(3), although one commenter
expressed general support for the
financial distress exemption.938 As
such, the Commission has determined
to finalize § 150.3(a)(3) as proposed, for
the reasons discussed above and in the
2020 NPRM.
6. Section 150.3(a)(4)—Conditional Spot
Month Exemption in Natural Gas
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Conditional Spot Month Exemption in
Natural Gas
Certain natural gas contracts are
currently subject to exchange-set
position limits, but not Federal position
limits.939 In the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission proposed applying Federal
position limits to certain natural gas
contracts for the first time by including
the physically-settled NYMEX Henry
Hub Natural Gas (‘‘NYMEX NG’’)
contract as a core referenced futures
contract listed in proposed § 150.2(d).
The Commission also proposed,
consistent with existing exchange
practice, establishing a conditional spot
month exemption for Federal position
limit purposes that would permit larger
positions during the spot month for
cash-settled natural gas referenced
contracts so long as the market
participant held no physically-settled
NYMEX NG.
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Conditional Spot
Month Exemption in Natural Gas
For the Final Rule, the Commission is
adopting the conditional spot month
exemption in natural gas, as proposed.
The Commission discusses this
conditional spot month exemption, as
well as other issues in connection with
NYMEX NG, above under the discussion
of § 150.2.940 The Commission is
discussing all the issues related to the
NYMEX NG core referenced futures
at 2.
examples include natural gas contracts
that use the NYMEX NG futures contract as a
reference price, such as ICE’s Henry Financial
Penultimate Fixed Price Futures (PHH), options on
Henry Penultimate Fixed Price (PHE), Henry Basis
Futures (HEN) and Henry Swing Futures (HHD),
NYMEX’s E-mini Natural Gas Futures (QG), Henry
Hub Natural Gas Last Day Financial Futures (HH),
and Henry Hub Natural Gas Financial Calendar
Spread (3 Month) Option (G3).
940 See supra Section II.B.3.vi.a. (discussing the
Federal spot-month limit for natural gas).
contract, including this conditional spot
month exemption, together in one place
in this release for the reader’s
convenience.
7. Section 150.3(a)(5)—Exemption for
Pre-Enactment Swaps and Transition
Period Swaps
i. Background and Summary of the 2020
NPRM—Exemption for Pre-Enactment
Swaps and Transition Period Swaps
Currently, swaps are not subject to the
existing Federal position limits
framework, and the Commission is
unaware of any exchange-set limits on
swaps with respect to any of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts.
In order to promote a smooth
transition to compliance for swaps,
which were not previously subject to
Federal speculative position limits, in
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed to exempt pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps from
Federal position limits. Proposed
§ 150.3(a)(5) provided that Federal
position limits would not apply to
positions acquired in good faith in any
pre-enactment swaps or in any
transition period swaps, in either case
as defined by § 150.1.941 Under the 2020
NPRM, any pre-enactment swap or
transition period swap would be exempt
from Federal position limits—even if
the swap would qualify as an
economically equivalent swap under the
2020 NPRM. This proposed exemption
would be self-effectuating and would
not require a market participant to
request relief from the Commission.
For purposes of complying with the
proposed Federal non-spot month
limits, the 2020 NPRM would also allow
both pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps (to the extent
such swaps qualify as ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps’’) to be netted with
post-Effective Date commodity
derivative contracts. The 2020 NPRM
did not permit such positions to be
netted during the spot month so as to
avoid rendering spot month limits
ineffective. Specifically, the
Commission explained that it was
particularly concerned about protecting
the spot month in physically-delivered
futures contracts from price distortions
or manipulation to protect against
938 CCI
939 Some
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941 ‘‘Pre-enactment swap’’ would mean any swap
entered into prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010 (July 21, 2010), the terms of which have
not expired as of the date of enactment of that Act.
‘‘Transition period swap’’ would mean a swap
entered into during the period commencing after
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (July
21, 2010), and ending 60 days after the publication
in the Federal Register of final amendments to this
part implementing section 737 of the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010, the terms of which have not expired
as of 60 days after the publication date.
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disrupting the hedging and price
discovery utility of the futures contract.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Exemption
for Pre-Enactment Swaps and Transition
Period Swaps
The Commission did not receive any
comments specifically addressing the
exemption for pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps addressed in
proposed § 150.3(a)(5). The Commission
is adopting § 150.3(a)(5) as proposed
with certain limited grammatical and
technical changes that are not intended
to reflect a change in the substantive
meaning. For comments generally
related to the exemption for preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps, please refer to the discussion of
pre-existing positions in general and
comments thereto, in § 150.2(g)
above,942 and § 150.5(a)(3)(ii) below.943
8. Section 150.3(b)—Application for
Relief and Removal of Existing
Commission Application Processes
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i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Application for Relief and Removal of
Existing Commission Application
Processes
The Commission proposed two
avenues for a market participant to
request a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition: § 150.3(b), described
below, which would allow market
participants to apply directly to the
Commission; and § 150.9, which, as
described in detail further below, would
allow market participants to apply to
exchanges for a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge exemption for purposes of
both Federal and exchange limits.944
The Commission proposed to remove its
existing processes for applying for such
exemptions under §§ 1.47 and 1.48. The
Commission also proposed to remove
existing § 140.97, which delegates to the
Director of the Division of Enforcement
or his designee authority regarding
requests for classification of positions as
bona fide hedges under existing §§ 1.47
and 1.48.945
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
explained that it did not intend the
proposed replacement of §§ 1.47 and
1.48 to have any bearing on bona fide
hedges previously recognized under
those provisions. With the exception of
certain recognitions for risk
management positions discussed below,
942 See supra Section II.B.7. (discussing § 150.2
Federal position limits on pre-existing positions).
943 See infra Section II.D.3. (discussing § 150.5
requirements for exchange limits on pre-existing
positions in a non-spot month).
944 See infra Section II.G.
945 17 CFR 140.97.
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positions that were previously
recognized as bona fide hedges under
§§ 1.47 or 1.48 would continue to be
recognized, provided such positions
continue to meet the statutory bona fide
hedging definition and all other existing
and proposed requirements.
With respect to a § 150.3(b)
application for a bona fide hedge
recognition, the Commission proposed
that such application must include: (i)
A description of the position in the
commodity derivative contract for
which the application is submitted,
including the name of the underlying
commodity and the position size; (ii)
information to demonstrate why the
position satisfies CEA section 4a(c)(2)
and the definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in proposed
§ 150.1, including ‘‘factual and legal
analysis;’’ (iii) a statement concerning
the maximum size of all gross positions
in derivative contracts for which the
application is submitted (in order to
provide a view of the true footprint of
the position in the market); (iv)
information regarding the applicant’s
activity in the cash markets and the
swaps markets for the commodity
underlying the position for which the
application is submitted; 946 and (v) any
other information that may help the
Commission determine whether the
position meets the requirements of CEA
section 4a(c)(2) and the definition of
bona fide hedging transaction or
position in § 150.1.947
In addition, under the 2020 NPRM, a
market participant would be required to
apply to the Commission using the
application process in § 150.3(b) for
exemptions for any spread positions
that do not meet the proposed ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition. With respect to
a § 150.3(b) application for a spread
exemption, the Commission proposed
that such application must include: (i)
A description of the spread transaction
for which the exemption application is
submitted; 948 (ii) a statement
concerning the maximum size of all
gross positions in derivative contracts
for which the application is submitted;
and (iii) any other information that may
946 The Commission stated that it would expect
applicants to provide cash-market data for at least
the prior year.
947 For example, the Commission may, in its
discretion, request a description of any positions in
other commodity derivative contracts in the same
commodity underlying the commodity derivative
contract for which the application is submitted.
Other commodity derivative contracts could
include other futures contracts, option on futures
contracts, and swaps (including OTC swaps)
positions held by the applicant.
948 The nature of such description would depend
on the facts and circumstances, and different details
may be required depending on the particular
spread.
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3353
help the Commission determine
whether the position is consistent with
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).
Under proposed § 150.3(b)(2), the
Commission (or Commission staff
pursuant to delegated authority
proposed in § 150.3(g)) could request
additional information from the
applicant and would provide the
applicant with ten business days to
respond. Under proposed § 150.3(b)(3)
and (4), the applicant, however, could
not exceed Federal position limits
unless it receives a notice of approval
from the Commission or from
Commission staff pursuant to delegated
authority proposed in § 150.3(g)—with
one exception. That is, due to
demonstrated sudden or unforeseen
increases in a person’s bona fide
hedging needs, the person could request
a recognition of a bona fide hedging
transaction or position within five
business days after the person
established the position that exceeded
the Federal speculative position
limit.949
Under this proposed process, market
participants would be encouraged to
submit their requests for bona fide
hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions as early as possible since
proposed § 150.3(b) would not set a
specific timeframe within which the
Commission must make a determination
for such requests. Further, under the
2020 NPRM, all approved bona fide
hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions would need to be renewed
if there are any changes to the
information submitted as part of the
request, or upon request by the
Commission or Commission staff.950
949 Where a person requests a bona fide hedge
recognition within five business days after
exceeding Federal position limits, such person
would be required to demonstrate that they
encountered sudden or unforeseen circumstances
that required them to exceed Federal position limits
before submitting and receiving approval of their
bona fide hedge application. These applications
submitted after a person has exceeded Federal
position limits should not be habitual and would
be reviewed closely. If the Commission reviews
such application and finds that the position does
not qualify as a bona fide hedge, then the applicant
would be required to bring its position into
compliance within a commercially reasonable time,
as determined by the Commission in consultation
with the applicant and the applicable DCM or SEF.
If the applicant brings the position into compliance
within a commercially reasonable time, then the
applicant would not be considered to have violated
the position limits rules. Further, any intentional
misstatements to the Commission, including
statements to demonstrate why the bona fide
hedging needs were sudden and unforeseen, would
be a violation of sections 6(c)(2) and 9(a)(2) of the
Act. 7 U.S.C. 9(2) and 13(a)(2).
950 See proposed § 150.3(b)(5). Currently, the
Commission does not require automatic updates to
bona fide hedge applications, and does not require
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Finally, under proposed § 150.3(b)(6),
the Commission (and not staff) could
revoke or modify any bona fide hedge
recognition or spread exemption at any
time if the Commission determines that
the bona fide hedge recognition or
spread exemption, or portions thereof,
are no longer consistent with the
applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements.951
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
noted that it anticipates that most
market participants would utilize the
streamlined process set forth in
proposed § 150.9 rather than the process
proposed in § 150.3(b) because:
Exchanges would generally be able to
make an initial determination more
efficiently than Commission staff; and
market participants are likely already
familiar with the proposed processes set
forth in § 150.9 (which are intended to
leverage the processes currently used by
exchanges to address requests for
exemptions from exchange-set limits).
Nevertheless, proposed § 150.3(a)(1) and
(2) clarify that market participants could
request non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions that do not meet the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition directly
from the Commission. After receiving
any approval of a bona fide hedge
recognition or spread exemption from
the Commission under proposed
§ 150.3(b), the market participant would
still be required to request a bona fide
hedge recognition or spread exemption
from the relevant exchange for purposes
of exchange-set limits established
pursuant to proposed § 150.5(a).
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ii. Comments—Application for Relief
and Removal of Existing Commission
Application Processes
The Commission received one
comment on proposed § 150.3(b)
requesting that the Commission remove
the requirement proposed in
§ 150.3(b)(1)(i)(B) that an applicant
provide a ‘‘factual and legal analysis’’ as
part of an exemption application for a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge.952
applications or updates thereto for spread
exemptions, which are self-effectuating. Consistent
with current practices, under proposed
§ 150.3(b)(5), the Commission would not require
automatic annual updates to bona fide hedge and
spread exemption applications; rather, updated
applications would only be required if there are
changes to information the requestor initially
submitted or upon Commission request. This
approach is different than the proposed streamlined
process in § 150.9, which would require automatic
annual updates to such applications, which is more
consistent with current exchange practices. See,
e.g., CME Rule 559.
951 This proposed authority to revoke or modify
a bona fide hedge recognition or spread exemption
would not be delegated to Commission staff.
952 CME Group at 10.
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule—
Application for Relief and Removal of
Existing Commission Application
Processes
The Commission has determined to
finalize its proposal to remove existing
§§ 1.47, 1.48, and 140.97.953 The
Commission has also determined to
finalize § 150.3(b) largely as proposed
but with the following modifications in
response to commenters and other
considerations.
Generally, the information required to
be submitted as part of the § 150.3(b)
application is necessary to allow the
Commission to evaluate whether the
applicant’s position satisfies the
requirements in § 150.3(b)(1), as
applicable. The Commission has
determined to modify the requirement,
as it appears in both § 150.3(b) and
§ 150.9(c), that an applicant provide a
‘‘factual and legal analysis’’ as part of its
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
exemption application. As explained
further below, in proposing this
requirement, the Commission did not
intend to require that applicants engage
legal counsel to complete their
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions. Rather, the
purpose of this proposed requirement
was to ensure that applicants explain
their hedging strategies and provide
sufficient information to demonstrate
why a particular position satisfies the
bona fide hedge definition in proposed
§ 150.1 and CEA section 4a(c)(2).954
Accordingly, the Commission has
revised § 150.3(b)(1)(i)(B) to replace the
requirement to provide ‘‘factual and
legal’’ analysis with the requirement
that an applicant provide: (1) An
explanation of the hedging strategy,
including a statement that the
applicant’s position complies with the
applicable requirements of the bona fide
hedge definition, and (2) information
953 Although §§ 1.47 and 1.48 are currently
reflected in the Code of Federal Regulations
(‘‘CFR’’) as ‘‘[Reserved]’’, §§ 1.47 and 1.48 that
existed prior to the 2011 Final Rulemaking are
currently in effect. The 2011 Final Rulemaking
removed and reserved §§ 1.47 and 1.48. However,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
in ISDA subsequently vacated the 2011 Final
Rulemaking on September 28, 2012. As a result,
§§ 1.47 and 1.48 that existed prior to the 2011 Final
Rulemaking went back into effect, though they were
not recodified in the CFR. This Final Rule removes
§§ 1.47 and 1.48 as they are currently in effect (i.e.,
as they existed prior to the 2011 Final Rulemaking)
and leaves those two sections reserved in the CFR.
As this action does not result in a change to the
currently codified CFR, there is no corresponding
amendment in the regulatory text of this document.
954 See supra Section II.G.5. (providing a more
detailed discussion of this requirement as it appears
in § 150.9(c)).
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that demonstrates why the position
satisfies the applicable requirements.
The Commission is also making
several other clarifications to § 150.3(b).
First, in § 150.3(b)(3)(ii)(C), the
Commission proposed that, for a
retroactive application submitted to the
Commission after a person has already
exceeded Federal position limits, the
Commission would not hold an
applicant accountable for a position
limits violation during the period of the
Commission’s review, nor once the
Commission has issued its
determination. The Commission is
revising this provision to clarify that the
Commission ‘‘will not pursue an
enforcement action’’ in these
circumstances. The Commission is also
revising this provision to clarify that the
provision applies so long as the
applicant submitted its application in
good faith and, if required, the applicant
brings its position below the Federal
position limits. This revision is simply
intended to make explicit an implicit
presumption that the applicant should
have a reasonable and good faith basis
for determining that its position meets
the requirements of § 150.3(b) and for
submitting the retroactive application.
This requirement is also intended to
deter the filing of frivolous retroactive
exemption applications. Finally, the
Commission is making a few technical
revisions to clarify that this section is
referring to the retroactive application
provisions in § 150.3(b)(3)(ii), and to
correct a cross-reference in this
paragraph to correctly reference
paragraph § 150.3(b)(3)(ii)(B).
In addition, the Commission is
modifying proposed § 150.3(b)(5) to
clarify that an applicant who received
its original approval of a recognition of
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge or
spread exemption through the
Commission’s § 150.3(b) process is
required to submit a renewal
application if there are any ‘‘material’’
changes to the original application, but
is not required to submit a renewal
application as a result of circumstances
involving any minor or non-substantive
changes to the information underlying
the original application. If a market
participant using the § 150.3(b) process
has any questions regarding what
qualifies as a material change to the
original application, the Commission
encourages the market participant to
contact DMO staff for guidance on a
case-by-case basis.
Next, the Commission is revising its
revocation authority under § 150.3(b)(6)
to expressly require that the
Commission provide a person with an
opportunity to respond after the
Commission notifies such person that
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the Commission believes their
transactions or positions no longer
satisfy the bona fide hedge definition or
spread exemption requirements, as
applicable. The Commission is also
revising § 150.3(b)(6) to clarify that the
Commission will discuss with the
applicant and consult with the relevant
exchange when determining what is a
commercially reasonable amount of
time for the applicant to bring its
position below the Federal position
limits. The Commission also
reorganized this section to improve
readability.
Finally, the Commission made several
grammatical and technical changes to
§ 150.3(b) that are not intended to
change the substance of the remaining
sections, unless discussed above.
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9. Section 150.3(c)—Previously-Granted
Risk Management Exemptions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Previously-Granted Risk Management
Exemptions
As discussed above, the Commission
previously recognized, as bona fide
hedges under § 1.47, certain riskmanagement positions in physical
commodity futures and/or option on
futures contracts held outside of the
spot month that were used to offset the
risk of commodity index swaps and
other related exposures, but that did not
represent substitutes for transactions or
positions to be taken in a physical
marketing channel.955 However, the
2020 NPRM interpreted the Dodd-Frank
Act amendments to the CEA as
eliminating the Commission’s authority
to grant such relief unless the position
satisfies the pass-through provision in
CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B).956 Accordingly,
to ensure consistency with the DoddFrank Act, the Commission proposed
that it would not recognize further risk
management positions as bona fide
hedges, unless the position otherwise
satisfies the requirements of the passthrough provisions.957
In addition, the Commission proposed
in § 150.3(c) that such previouslygranted exemptions shall not apply after
the effective date of a final Federal
position limits rulemaking
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act.
Proposed § 150.3(c) used the phrase
‘‘positions in financial instruments’’ to
refer to such commodity index swaps
and related exposure, and would have
the effect of revoking the ability to use
previously-granted risk management
955 See supra Section II.A.1.iii. (discussing the
temporary substitute test and risk management
exemption under § 150.1).
956 Id.
957 85 FR at 11641.
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exemptions once the limits proposed in
§ 150.2 go into effect.
ii. Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Previously-Granted Risk
Management Exemptions
The Commission has addressed any
comments on risk management
exemptions in the discussion of § 150.1
above.958 As discussed above, to ensure
consistency with the Dodd-Frank Act,
the Commission will not recognize risk
management positions as bona fide
hedges under the Final Rule, unless the
position otherwise satisfies the
requirements of the Final Rule’s passthrough swap provisions.959
Consequently, the Commission is
adopting § 150.3(c) largely as proposed,
which provides that such previouslygranted risk management exemptions
issued pursuant to § 1.47 shall no longer
be recognized.960 However, the Final
Rule is also providing for a compliance
date of January 1, 2023 with respect to
the elimination of the risk management
exemption by which risk management
exemption holders must reduce their
risk management exemption positions to
comply with Federal position limits
under the Final Rule.961
Section 150.3(c) uses the phrase
‘‘positions in financial instruments’’ to
refer to such commodity index swaps
and related exposure and would have
the effect of revoking the ability to use
previously-granted risk management
exemptions once the Final Rule’s
Federal position limits in § 150.2
become effective. However, the Final
Rule will also include an extended
compliance date until January 1, 2023
with respect to positions entered into
upon reliance of an existing risk
management exemption.962
The Final Rule also deletes the
sentence in proposed § 150.3(c), which
stated that nothing in § 150.3(c) shall
preclude the Commission, a DCM, or
SEF from recognizing a bona fide
hedging transaction or position for the
former holder of such a risk
management exemption if the position
complies with the definition of bona
fide hedging transaction or position
under this part, including appendices
hereto. This sentence was intended to
958 See supra Section II.A.1.iii (discussing risk
management exemptions and comments received in
greater detail).
959 See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing the
proposed pass-through swap provisions).
960 Under this Final Rule, however, exchanges
may continue to grant risk management exemptions
(that do not otherwise meet the bona fide hedge
definition in § 150.1) up to the applicable Federal
position limit.
961 See supra Section I.D. (discussing the effective
and compliance dates).
962 Id.
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3355
clarify what has been explained above—
risk management exemptions that meet
the pass-through swap provisions are
permitted under the Final Rule.963 The
Commission has determined that this
sentence is unnecessary.
The Commission is making several
technical changes to proposed
§ 150.3(c), including to clarify that the
provision covers risk management
exemptions previously granted by the
Commission or by Commission staff.
The Commission also reorganized
§ 150.3(c) to improve readability.
10. Section 150.3(d)—Recordkeeping
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Recordkeeping
Proposed § 150.3(d) would establish
recordkeeping requirements for persons
who claim any exemption under
proposed § 150.3. Proposed § 150.3(d) is
intended to help ensure that any person
who claims any exemption permitted
under proposed § 150.3 could
demonstrate compliance with the
applicable requirements by providing
all relevant records to support the claim
of a particular exemption. That is, under
proposed § 150.3(d)(1), any persons
claiming an exemption would be
required to keep and maintain complete
books and records concerning all details
of their related cash, forward, futures,
options on futures, and swap positions
and transactions, including anticipated
requirements, production and royalties,
contracts for services, cash commodity
products and by-products, crosscommodity hedges, and records of bona
fide hedging swap counterparties.
Proposed § 150.3(d)(2) would address
recordkeeping requirements related to
the pass-through swap provision in the
proposed definition of bona fide
hedging transaction or position in
proposed § 150.1.964 Under proposed
§ 150.3(d)(2), a pass-through swap
counterparty, as contemplated by
proposed § 150.1, that relies on a
representation received from a bona fide
hedging swap counterparty that a swap
qualifies in good faith as a bona fide
hedging position or transaction under
proposed § 150.1, would be required to:
(i) Maintain any written representation
for at least two years following the
expiration of the swap; and (ii) furnish
the representation to the Commission
upon request.
ii. Comments—Recordkeeping
Several commenters requested
clarification that the recordkeeping
963 See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing the
proposed pass-through language).
964 See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussion of
proposed pass-through swap provision).
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requirements in proposed § 150.3(d)(1)
would not impose an additional
recordkeeping obligation on commercial
end-users beyond the records that are
kept in the normal course of business
and are typical for the relevant
industry.965
In addition, commenters
recommended that the Commission
delete the pass-through swap
recordkeeping requirements in proposed
§ 150.3(d)(2).966 Commenters were
concerned that the pass-through swap
provision in § 150.1 places all
compliance burdens on the passthrough swap counterparty offering the
swap, and not on the bona fide hedging
counterparty using the swap.967
Commenters expressed that this
recordkeeping provision would require
the pass-through swap counterparty to
maintain records of each representation
made by the bona fide hedging
counterparty on a trade-by-trade basis—
a practice commenters view as onerous
and unnecessary.968 Commenters
suggested that the Commission will
have access to records from anyone
availing themselves of any exemption
from speculative limits, and thus does
not need the additional recordkeeping
requirement in proposed
§ 150.3(d)(2).969 One commenter also
requested that the Commission clarify
that the pass-through swap counterparty
can rely on the bona fide hedging
counterparty’s good faith representation
that a record of an agreement or
confirmation of the transaction
containing the bona fide hedge passthrough representation would satisfy the
record retention requirements set forth
in proposed § 150.3(d)(2).970
iii. Discussion of Final Rule—
Recordkeeping
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.3(d), for the reasons stated
in the 2020 NPRM, with certain
clarifications discussed below.
First, the Commission clarifies that
the recordkeeping requirements in
§ 150.3(d)(1) are not intended to impose
any additional recordkeeping
obligations on market participants
beyond the records they are required to
keep in the normal course of business.
The Commission notes, however, that,
consistent with the general
recordkeeping obligations in
Commission regulation 1.31, and as
explained in the 2020 NPRM,
965 Cope
at 5–6; EEI/EPSA at 7–8.
at 6; Shell at 6.
966 Cargill
§ 150.3(d)(1) is intended to capture
records market participants should be
maintaining with respect to each of their
exemptions from Federal position
limits. The Commission is revising
§ 150.3(d)(1) to clarify that market
participants that avail themselves of
exemptions under this section are
required to keep the relevant ‘‘books
and records’’ of ‘‘each of their
exemptions’’ and any related position or
transaction information for such
applications, including any books and
records market participants create for
related ‘‘merchandising activity’’ or
other relevant aspects of a particular
exemption (including the items listed in
§ 150.3(d)(1)), as applicable.
Next, regarding the pass-through swap
recordkeeping requirements, in
§ 150.2(d)(2), the Commission intended
for this requirement to be an extension
of market participants’ existing
obligations to maintain swap data
records under Part 45 and regulatory
records under § 1.31.971 That is, under
§ 150.1, the Commission has revised
paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition to
require that a pass-through swap
counterparty receive a written
representation from its bona fide
hedging swap counterparty that the
swap ‘‘qualifies as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position’’ pursuant to
paragraph (1) of the definition of a bona
fide hedging transaction or position in
§ 150.1 in order for the pass-through
swap to qualify as a bona fide hedge.
The pass-through swap counterparty
may rely in good faith on such written
representation from the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty, unless the
pass-through swap counterparty has
information that would cause a
reasonable person to question the
accuracy of the representation. Thus,
the recordkeeping requirements in
§ 150.3(d)(2) are intended to capture any
‘‘written’’ record created for purposes of
making such demonstration. The
Commission provides additional
explanation above on how a passthrough swap counterparty can
demonstrate good faith reliance.972 For
the avoidance of doubt, the Commission
is revising § 150.3(d)(2) to clarify that a
person relying on the pass-through swap
provision is required to maintain any
records created for purposes of
demonstrating a good faith reliance on
that provision in accordance with
§ 150.1.
The Commission also clarifies that,
pursuant to the swap recordkeeping
967 Id.
968 Shell
at 7; CMC at 5.
at 5–6.
970 Shell at 6.
971 17
CFR 1.31(a)–(b).
supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing the
pass-through swap provision in greater detail).
969 COPE
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972 See
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requirements in § 45.2(b) 973 and the
general recordkeeping requirements in
§ 1.31,974 the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty to the pass-through swap
is required to maintain a record of such
pass-through swap. The Commission
considers any written representation the
bona fide hedging swap counterparty
provides to the pass-through swap
counterparty as being part of the full,
complete, and systematic records that
the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty is required to keep
pursuant to § 45.2(b), with respect to
each pass-through swap to which it is a
counterparty. The bona fide hedging
swap counterparty is required to keep
such records according to the form and
duration requirements of § 1.31. Such
records are also subject to the inspection
and production requirements of both
§ 1.31(d) 975 and § 45.2(h).976 As such,
the Commission reminds bona fide
hedging swap counterparties to a passthrough swap that they are responsible
for maintaining an accurate and true
record of any written representations
they make to the pass-through swap
counterparty regarding the bona fides of
the pass-through swap. Further, any
such records and written
representations that a bona fide hedging
swap counterparty makes may, upon
request, be filed with the Commission as
part of an inspection, pursuant to
§§ 1.31(d) and 45.2(h), and would be
subject to the Commission’s prohibition
regarding false statements in section
6(c)(2) of the Act, as well as any other
applicable provisions regarding false
information.977
11. Section 150.3(e)—Call for
Information
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Call for
Information
The Commission proposed to move
existing § 150.3(b), which currently
allows the Commission or certain
Commission staff to make calls to
demand certain information regarding
positions or trading, to proposed
973 17 CFR 45.2(b) (requiring that all non-swap
dealer/non-major swap participant counterparties
keep full, complete, and systematic records,
together with all pertinent data and memoranda,
with respect to each swap in which they are a
counterparty).
974 17 CFR 1.31 (regulatory records, retention, and
production requirements).
975 17 CFR 1.31(d) (requirement for a records
entity, as defined in § 1.31(a), to produce or make
accessible for inspection all regulatory records).
976 17 CFR 45.2(h) (swap record inspection
requirements).
977 7 U.S.C. 9(2) (prohibition on making a false or
misleading statement of material fact to the
Commission); see also 7 U.S.C. 9(4) (general
enforcement authority of the Commission).
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§ 150.3(e), with some technical
modifications.
Together with the recordkeeping
provision of proposed § 150.3(d),
proposed § 150.3(e) should enable the
Commission to monitor the use of
exemptions from speculative position
limits and help to ensure that any
person who claims any exemption
permitted by proposed § 150.3 can
demonstrate compliance with the
applicable requirements.
ii. Comments and Summary of
Commission Determination—Call for
Information
The Commission did not receive
comments on proposed § 150.3(e).
Accordingly, the Commission is
adopting § 150.3(e) with one
grammatical edit that is not intended to
reflect a substantive change to this
section.
12. Section 150.3(f)—Aggregation of
Accounts
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Aggregation of Accounts
Proposed § 150.3(f) would clarify that
entities required to aggregate under
§ 150.4 would be considered the same
person for purposes of determining
whether they are eligible for a bona fide
hedge recognition under § 150.3(a)(1).978
ii. Comments and Summary of
Commission Determination—
Aggregation of Accounts
The Commission did not receive
comments on proposed § 150.3(f).
Accordingly, the Commission is
adopting § 150.3(f) as proposed.979
13. Section § 150.3(g)—Delegation of
Authority
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i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Delegation of Authority
Proposed § 150.3(g) would delegate
authority to the Director of the Division
of Market Oversight to: Grant financial
distress exemptions pursuant to
proposed § 150.3(a)(3); request
additional information with respect to
an exemption request pursuant to
proposed § 150.3(b)(2); determine, in
consultation with the exchange and
applicant, a commercially reasonable
978 See 17 CFR 150.4 (providing the Commission’s
existing aggregation requirements for Federal
position limits); See also supra Section II.B.11.
(discussing eligible affiliates and position
aggregation requirements).
979 The Commission did receive general
comments on position aggregation discussing
existing no-action relief in connection with the
position aggregation requirement in existing
§ 150.4. For a discussion on comments received in
connection with existing staff no-action relief for
position aggregation requirements, see supra
Section II.B.11.
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amount of time for a person to bring its
positions within the Federal position
limits pursuant to proposed
§ 150.3(b)(3)(ii)(B); make a
determination whether to recognize a
position as a bona fide hedging
transaction or to grant a spread
exemption pursuant to proposed
§ 150.3(b)(4); and to request that a
person submit additional application
information or updated materials or
renew their request pursuant to
proposed § 150.3(b)(2) or (5). This
proposed delegation would enable the
Division of Market Oversight to act
quickly in the event of financial distress
and in the other circumstances
described above.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Delegation
of Authority
The Commission did not receive
comments on proposed 150.3(g).
Accordingly, the Commission is
adopting § 150.3(g) with one technical
edit to correct a punctuation error,
which is not intended to reflect a
change in the substance of this section.
14. Request for a New Exemption in
§ 150.3(a) for Certain Energy Utility
Entities
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM and
Comments—New Exemption for Certain
Energy Utility Entities
Although the 2020 NPRM did not
include a new exemption explicitly
applicable to certain energy utility
entities, it did include a request for
comment regarding the possibility of
such an exemption.980 In response,
NRECA (which encompasses several
not-for-profit energy associations) 981
along with other commenters,982
requested that the Commission use its
authority in CEA section 4a(a)(7) to
exempt certain not-for-profit electric
and natural gas utility entities (‘‘NFP
Energy Entities’’) from position limits.
These commenters (in particular,
NRECA) argued that Congress did not
intend for the Commission’s position
limits regime to apply to commercial
market participants engaged in hedging
and mitigating commercial risk, such as
the NFP Energy Entities.983 The
commenters also provided several
reasons why the Commission’s position
limits regulatory regime is incongruous
with the operations of NFP Energy
Entities, including that NFP Energy
Entities: (a) Operate on a not-for-profit
basis; (b) have unique public service
980 See
85 FR at 11642.
at 3–14.
982 See IECA at 5; LIPA at 1; NFPEA at 6.
983 NRECA at 19.
obligations to provide reliable,
affordable utility services to residential,
commercial, and industrial customers;
(c) have governance structures with
oversight by elected or appointed
government officials or cooperative
members/consumers; (d) do not engage
in speculative trading in derivatives
markets; and (e) enter into energy
commodity swaps and trade options
only to hedge or mitigate commercial
risk arising from ongoing business
operations.984 NRECA expressed
concern that the effort required for NFP
Energy Entities to analyze and identify
every transaction as non-speculative
would be purely academic and would
unnecessarily increase the cost of
electricity, natural gas and other fuels
for generation for American consumers
and businesses served by the NFP
Energy Entities.985
ii. Discussion of the Commission
Determination—New Exemption for
Certain Energy Utility Entities
The Commission has considered these
comments and believes that many of the
concerns raised by NFP Energy Entities
are addressed through the Final Rule’s
pass-through swap provision and the
expanded list of enumerated bona fide
hedge exemptions. That is, the
Commission believes that most, if not
all, of the hedging needs of NFP Energy
Entities will be considered enumerated,
self-effectuating bona fide hedges that
will not be subject to Federal position
limits. Further, NFP Energy Entity
counterparties that are not bona fide
hedgers would receive pass-through
bona fide hedging treatment for any
swaps with NFP Energy Entities, or any
offsetting positions as a result of such
swaps with NFP Energy Entities. This
expanded flexibility should
significantly alleviate the compliance
burdens and cost concerns voiced by
NFP Energy Entities.
The Commission recommends that
NFP Energy Entities assess the impact of
the Final Rule on their operations, and
if needed, pursue the requested
exemption separate from this Final
Rule. The Commission also believes that
the extended compliance date for the
Final Rule of January 1, 2022 in
connection with the Federal position
limits for the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts, and the
further extended compliance date of
January 1, 2023 for swaps that are
subject to Federal position limits under
the Final Rule, should give commenters
and the Commission sufficient time to
981 NRECA
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984 Id.
985 Id.
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continue to discuss this request if
necessary.
D. § 150.5—Exchange-Set Position
Limits and Exemptions Therefrom
For the avoidance of confusion, this
discussion of § 150.5 addresses
exchange-set limits and exemptions
therefrom, not Federal position limits.
For a discussion of the proposed
processes by which an exemption may
be recognized for purposes of Federal
position limits, please see the
discussion of proposed § 150.3 above
and § 150.9 below.986
1. Background—Existing Requirements
for Exchange-Set Position Limits
i. Applicable DCM and SEF Core
Principles
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Under DCM Core Principle 5, a DCM
shall adopt for each contract, as is
necessary and appropriate, position
limitations or position accountability for
speculators. In addition, for any contract
that is listed on a DCM and subject to
a Federal position limit, the DCM must
establish exchange-set limits for such
contract no higher than the Federal limit
level.987 Finally, DCMs are required to
monitor their markets and enforce
compliance with their rules.988
Similarly, under SEF Core Principle 6,
a SEF that is a trading facility must
adopt for each contract, as is necessary
and appropriate, position limitations or
position accountability for
speculators.989 Such SEF must also, for
any contract that is listed on the SEF
and subject to a Federal position limit,
establish exchange-set limits for such
contract no higher than the Federal
limit.990 Finally, such SEF must monitor
positions established on or through the
SEF for compliance with the limit set by
the Commission and the limit, if any, set
by the SEF.991 Beyond these and other
statutory and certain specified
Commission requirements, unless
otherwise determined by the
Commission, DCM Core Principle 1 and
SEF Core Principle 1 afford DCMs and
SEFs, respectively, ‘‘reasonable
discretion’’ in establishing the manner
in which they comply with the core
principles.992
986 See supra Section II.C. (discussing § 150.3
exemptions from Federal position limits). See also
infra Section II.G. (discussing the § 150.9
streamlined process for recognizing nonenumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of both
exchange and Federal position limits).
987 See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5).
988 See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(2).
989 See 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(6).
990 Id.
991 Id.
992 See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(1) and 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(1).
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The current regulatory provisions
governing exchange-set position limits
and exemptions therefrom appear in
§ 150.5.993 To align § 150.5 with
statutory changes made by the DoddFrank Act,994 and with other changes in
the 2020 NPRM,995 the Commission
proposed a new version of § 150.5. This
new proposed § 150.5 would generally
afford exchanges the discretion to
decide how best to set limit levels and
grant exemptions from such limits in a
manner that best reflects their specific
markets.
ii. Existing § 150.5
As noted above, existing § 150.5 predates the Dodd-Frank Act and addresses
the establishment of DCM-set position
limits for all contracts not subject to
Federal position limits under existing
§ 150.2 (aside from certain major foreign
currencies).996 First, existing § 150.5(a)
authorizes DCMs to set different limits
for different contracts and contract
months, and permits DCMs to grant
exemptions from DCM-set limits for
spreads, straddles, or arbitrage trades.
Existing § 150.5(b) provides a limited set
of methodologies for DCMs to use in
establishing initial limit levels,
including separate maximum spotmonth limit levels for physical-delivery
contracts and cash-settled contracts,997
as well as separate non-spot month
limits for tangible commodities (other
than energy),998 and for energy products
and non-tangible commodities,
including financials.999 Existing
993 17
CFR 150.5.
existing § 150.5 on its face only applies
to contracts that are not subject to Federal position
limits, DCM Core Principle 5, as amended by the
Dodd-Frank Act, and SEF Core Principle 6,
establish requirements both for contracts that are,
and are not, subject to Federal position limits. 7
U.S.C. 7(d)(5) and 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(6).
995 Significant changes discussed herein include
the process set forth in proposed § 150.9 and
revisions to the bona fide hedging definition
proposed in § 150.1.
996 Existing § 150.5(a) states that the requirement
to set position limits shall not apply to futures or
option contract markets on major foreign
currencies, for which there is no legal impediment
to delivery and for which there exists a highly
liquid cash market. 17 CFR 150.5(a).
997 See 17 CFR 150.5(b)(1) (providing that, for
physical delivery contracts, the spot month limit
level must be no greater than one-quarter of the
estimated spot month deliverable supply,
calculated separately for each month to be listed,
and for cash settled contracts, the spot month limit
level must be no greater than necessary to minimize
the potential for manipulation or distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying commodity’s price).
998 See 17 CFR 150.5(b)(2) (providing that
individual non-spot or all-months-combined levels
must be no greater than 1,000 contracts for tangible
commodities other than energy products).
999 See 17 CFR 150.5(b)(3) (providing that
individual non-spot or all-months-combined levels
must be no greater than 5,000 contracts for energy
products and nontangible commodities, including
contracts on financial products).
994 While
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§ 150.5(c) provides guidelines for how
DCMs may adjust their speculative
initial levels.
Next, existing § 150.5(d) addresses
bona fide hedging exemptions from
DCM-set limits, including an exemption
application process, providing that
exchange-set speculative position limits
shall not apply to bona fide hedging
positions as defined by a DCM in
accordance with the definition of bona
fide hedging transactions and positions
for excluded commodities in § 1.3.
Existing § 150.5(d) also addresses factors
for DCMs to consider in recognizing
bona fide hedging exemptions (or
position accountability), including
whether such positions ‘‘are not in
accord with sound commercial practices
or exceed an amount which may be
established and liquidated in an orderly
fashion.’’ 1000
As an alternative to exchange-set
position limits set in accordance with
the provisions described above, existing
§ 150.5(e) permits a DCM, in certain
circumstances, to submit for
Commission approval a rule requiring
traders ‘‘to be accountable for large
positions’’ (or position accountability
levels). That is, under certain
circumstances, the DCM would require
traders to, upon request, provide
information about their position to the
exchange, and/or consent to halt further
increasing a position if so ordered by
the exchange.1001 Among other things,
this provision includes open interest
and volume-based parameters for
determining when DCMs may do so.1002
In addition, existing § 150.5(f)
provides that DCM speculative position
limits adopted pursuant to § 150.5 shall
not apply to certain positions acquired
in good faith prior to the effective date
of such limits or to a person that is
registered as an FCM or as a floor broker
under the CEA except to the extent that
transactions made by such person are
made on behalf of, or for the account or
benefit of, such person.1003 This
provision also provides that in addition
to the express exemptions specified in
§ 150.5, a DCM may propose such other
exemptions from the requirements of
§ 150.5 as are consistent with the
purposes of § 150.5, and submit such
rules for Commission review.1004
Finally, existing § 150.5(g) addresses
aggregation of positions for which a
person directly or indirectly controls
trading.
1000 See
17 CFR 150.5(d)(1).
CFR 150.5(e).
1002 17 CFR 150.5(e)(1)–(4).
1003 17 CFR 150.5(f).
1004 Id.
1001 17
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2. Overview of the 2020 NPRM,
Commenters’ Views, and Commission
Final Rule Determination—ExchangeSet Position Limits and Exemptions
Therefrom
This section provides a brief overview
of proposed § 150.5, commenters’
general views, and the Commission’s
determination. The Commission will
summarize and address each subsection of § 150.5 in greater detail
further below.
Pursuant to CEA sections 5(d)(1) and
5h(f)(1), the Commission proposed a
new version of § 150.5.1005 Proposed
§ 150.5 is intended to allow DCMs and
SEFs to set limit levels and grant
exemptions in a manner that best
accommodates activity particular to
their markets, while promoting
compliance with DCM Core Principle 5
and SEF Core Principle 6. Proposed
§ 150.5 is also intended to ensure
consistency with other changes
proposed herein, including the process
for exchanges to administer applications
for non-enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions for purposes of Federal
position limits proposed in § 150.9.1006
Proposed § 150.5 contains two main
sub-sections, with each sub-section
addressing a different category of
contract: (i) § 150.5(a) proposed rules
governing exchange-set limits for
referenced contracts subject to Federal
position limits; and (ii) § 150.5(b)
proposed rules governing exchange-set
limits for physical commodity
derivative contracts that are not subject
to Federal position limits.
Notably, with respect to exchange-set
limits on swaps, the Commission
proposed to delay compliance with
DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6, as compliance would
otherwise be impracticable, and, in
some cases, impossible, at this time. In
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
explained that this delay was based
largely on the fact that exchanges cannot
view positions in OTC swaps across the
various places they are trading,
including on competitor exchanges.
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.5 largely as proposed,
with certain modifications and
1005 While proposed § 150.5 included references
to swaps and SEFs, the proposed rule would
initially only apply to DCMs, as requirements
relating to exchange-set limits on swaps would be
phased in at a later time.
1006 To avoid confusion created by the parallel
Federal and exchange-set position limit
frameworks, the Commission clarifies that proposed
§ 150.5 deals solely with exchange-set position
limits and exemptions therefrom, whereas proposed
§ 150.9 deals solely with a streamlined process for
the Commission to recognize non-enumerated bona
fide hedges for purposes of Federal position limits
by leveraging exchanges.
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clarifications in response to commenters
and other considerations, as discussed
below.
The Commission will oversee swaps
in connection with compliance with
Federal position limits under the Final
Rule. The Commission has also
determined to delay compliance for the
requirement for exchanges to set
position limits on swaps at this time.
Specifically, with respect to exchangeset position limits on swaps, the
Commission notes that in two years, the
Commission will reevaluate the ability
of exchanges to establish and implement
appropriate surveillance mechanisms
with respect to swaps and to implement
DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6, as applicable.
The Commission believes that
delayed implementation of exchange-set
position limits on swaps at this time is
not inconsistent with the statutory
objectives outlined in section 4a(a)(3) of
the CEA for several reasons. First, as
explained above, at this time, it would
be impracticable and, in some cases,
impossible for exchanges to comply
with any requirement for establishing
exchange-set limits on swaps. Next, the
Commission is adopting in this Final
Rule Federal position limits on
economically equivalent swaps, which
the Commission will monitor. These
factors, coupled with the Commission’s
existing ability to surveil swap exposure
across markets in a manner that at this
time would be impracticable for the
exchanges, will help ensure that the
Commission meets its statutory
obligations. Accordingly, while § 150.5
as finalized herein will apply to DCMs
and SEFs, the Final Rule’s requirements
associated with exchange oversight of
swaps, including with respect to
exchange-set position limits, will be
enforced at a later time. In other words,
upon the compliance date, exchanges
must comply with final § 150.5 only
with respect to futures and options on
futures traded on DCMs.
3. Section 150.5(a)—Requirements for
Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity
Derivative Contracts Subject to Federal
Position Limits Set Forth in § 150.2
The following section discusses the
2020 NPRM, comments received, and
the Commission’s final determination
with respect to each sub-section of
§ 150.5(a), which addresses exchangeset position limits on contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits.
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i. Section § 150.5(a)(1)—Requirements
for Exchange-Set Limits on Contracts
Subject to Federal Position Limits
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits
on Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
Proposed § 150.5(a) would apply to all
contracts subject to the Federal position
limits proposed in § 150.2 and, among
other things, is intended to help ensure
that exchange-set limits do not
undermine the Federal position limits
framework. Under proposed
§ 150.5(a)(1), for any contract subject to
a Federal limit, DCMs and, ultimately,
SEFs, would be required to establish
exchange-set limits for such contracts.
Consistent with DCM Core Principle 5
and SEF Core Principle 6, the exchangeset limit levels on such contracts,
whether cash-settled or physicallysettled, and whether during or outside
the spot month, would have to be no
higher than the level specified for the
applicable referenced contract in
proposed § 150.2. An exchange would
be free to set position limits that are
lower than the Federal limit. An
exchange would also be permitted to
adopt position accountability levels that
are lower than the Federal position
limits, in addition to any exchange-set
position limits it adopts that are equal
to or less than the Federal position
limits.
b. Comments—Requirements for
Exchange-Set Limits on Contracts
Subject to Federal Position Limits
With respect to requirements for
exchange-set limits under proposed
§ 150.5(a)(1), some commenters
expressed concern that if an exchange
determines to set a position limit for a
particular contract significantly below
the Federal position limit for that
contract, then market participants could
be restricted in their ability to provide
liquidity, hedge activity, and otherwise
pursue their trading objectives.1007
ISDA recommended that to the extent
that an exchange determines to set
position limits significantly below
Federal position limits, CFTC staff,
through its exchange examination
process, should make transparent the
exchange’s reasoning and analysis
underlying any lower position
limits.1008 Likewise, SIFMA AMG
encouraged the Commission to require
exchanges to explain and justify any
exchange-set limits that are below
Federal position limits, and to work
1007 ISDA
1008 ISDA
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at 11.
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with exchanges to ensure that exchange
limits do not discourage liquidity.1009
c. Discussion of Final Rule—
Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits
on Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.5(a)(1) as proposed. In response to
comments on § 150.5(a)(1) requesting
that the Commission require
transparency into exchanges’ reasoning
for when they set limits well below
Federal position limits, the Commission
believes market participants already
have sufficient transparency under part
40 of the Commission’s regulations.
When exchanges seek to implement
rules to establish new or amended
exchange-set limits, exchanges are
required to submit those rules through
the Commission’s part 40 process, and
the rules are made publicly available on
the CFTC’s website.1010 Exchanges are
also required to post such submissions
on their own websites.1011
Further, regarding the request that the
Commission work with exchanges on
exchange-set limits that are below
Federal position limits, exchanges are
permitted to establish exchange-set
limits in a manner that is most
appropriate for their own marketplaces
and in a manner that allows them to
comply with the applicable DCM and
SEF core principles. The Commission
views this process as a business and
compliance decision that is best left in
the discretion of each exchange.
However, pursuant to DCM Core
Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6,
exchanges must implement exchangeset position limits in a manner that
reduces market manipulation and
congestion.
ii. Section 150.5(a)(2)—Exemptions to
Exchange-Set Limits for Contracts
Subject to Federal Position Limits
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a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exemptions to Exchange-Set Limits for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
Under the 2020 NPRM,
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii) would permit exchanges
to grant exemptions from exchange-set
limits according to the guidelines
outlined below.
First, if such exemptions from
exchange-set limits conform to the types
of exemptions that may be granted for
purposes of Federal position limits
1009 SIFMA
AMG at 4.
1010 See CFTC Industry Filings available at
https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
IndustryFilings/index.htm.
1011 See 17 CFR 40.2(a)(3)(vi), 40.3(a)(9),
40.5(a)(6), 40.6(a)(2).
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under proposed sections: (1)
150.3(a)(1)(i) (enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions), (2) 150.3(a)(2)(i)
(spread exemptions that meet the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition in
§ 150.1), (3) 150.3(a)(4) (exempt
conditional spot month positions in
natural gas), or (4) 150.3(a)(5) (preenactment and transition period swaps),
then the level of the exemption may
exceed the applicable Federal position
limit under proposed § 150.2. Because
the proposed exemptions listed in the
four provisions above are selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits, exchanges may grant
such exemptions pursuant to proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(i) without prior
Commission approval.
Second, if such exemptions from
exchange-set limits conform to the
exemptions from Federal position limits
that may be granted under proposed
§§ 150.3(a)(1)(ii) (non-enumerated bona
fide hedges) and 150.3(a)(2)(ii) (spread
positions that do not meet the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition in proposed
§ 150.1), then the level of the exemption
may exceed the applicable Federal
position limit under proposed § 150.2,
provided that the exemption for
purposes of Federal position limits is
first approved in accordance with
proposed § 150.3(b) or, in the case of
non-enumerated bona fide hedges,
§ 150.9, as applicable.
Third, if such exemptions conform to
the exemptions from Federal position
limits that may be granted under
proposed § 150.3(a)(3) (financial distress
positions), then the level of the
exemption may exceed the applicable
Federal position limit under proposed
§ 150.2, provided that the Commission
has first issued a letter or other notice
approving such exemption pursuant to
a request submitted under § 140.99.1012
Finally, for purposes of exchange-set
limits only, under the 2020 NPRM,
exchanges may grant exemption types
that are not listed in § 150.3(a).
However, in such cases, the exemption
level would have to be capped at the
level of the applicable Federal position
limit, so as not to undermine the
Federal position limits framework,
unless the Commission has first
approved such exemption for purposes
of Federal position limits pursuant to
§ 140.99 or proposed § 150.3(b).
The 2020 NPRM also explained that
exchanges that wish to offer exemptions
1012 Under the 2020 NPRM, requests for
exemptions for financial distress positions would
be submitted directly to the Commission (or
delegated staff) for consideration, and any approval
of such exemption would be issued in the form of
an exemption letter from the Commission (or
delegated staff) pursuant to § 140.99.
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from their own limits other than the
types listed in proposed § 150.3(a) could
also submit rules for the Commission’s
review, pursuant to part 40, allowing for
such exemptions. The Commission
would carefully review any such
exemption types for compliance with
applicable standards, including any
statutory requirements 1013 and
Commission regulations.1014
Under proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(1),
exchanges that wish to grant exemptions
from their own limits would have to
require traders to file an application.
The 2020 NPRM explained that,
generally, exchanges would have
flexibility to establish the application
process as they see fit, but subject to the
requirements discussed below,
including the requirement that the
exchange collect cash-market and swaps
market information from the applicant.
For all exemption types, exchanges
would have to generally require that
such applications be filed in advance of
the date such position would be in
excess of the limits. However, under
proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(B) and (C),
exchanges would be given the discretion
to adopt rules allowing traders to file
retroactive applications for bona fide
hedges within five business days after a
trader established such position so long
as the applicant demonstrates a sudden
and unforeseen increase in its hedging
needs. Further, under proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), if the exchange
denies a retroactive application, it
would require that the applicant bring
its position into compliance with
exchange-set limits within a
commercially reasonable amount of
time (as determined by the exchange).
Finally, pursuant to proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(5), neither the
Commission nor the exchange would
enforce a position limits violation for
such retroactive applications.
Proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(B) provided
that an exchange would require that a
trader reapply for the exemption granted
1013 For example, an exchange would not be
permitted to adopt rules allowing for risk
management exemptions for positions in physical
commodities that exceed Federal limits because the
Commission interprets the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to CEA section 4a(c)(2) as prohibiting
risk management exemptions in such commodities
(unless such position is considered a pass-through
swap under paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging
definition in § 150.1). See supra Section II.A.1.
(discussing of the temporary substitute test, riskmanagement exemptions, and the pass-through
swap provision).
1014 For example, as discussed below, proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(C) would require that exchanges
consider whether the requested exemption would
result in positions that are not in accord with sound
commercial practices in the relevant commodity
derivative market and/or would not exceed an
amount that may be established and liquidated in
an orderly fashion in that market.
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under proposed § 150.5(a)(2) at least
annually so that the exchange and the
Commission can closely monitor
exemptions for contracts subject to
Federal position limits, and to help
ensure that the exchange and the
Commission remain aware of the
trader’s activities.
Proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(C) would
authorize an exchange to deny, limit,
condition, or revoke any exemption
request in accordance with exchange
rules,1015 and would set forth a
principles-based standard for doing so.
Specifically, under proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(C), exchanges would be
required to take into account: (i)
Whether granting the exemption request
would result in a position that is ‘‘not
in accord with sound commercial
practices’’ in the market in which the
DCM is granting the exemption; and (ii)
whether granting the exemption request
would result in a position that would
‘‘exceed an amount that may be
established or liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market.’’ The 2020
NPRM explained that exchanges’
evaluation of exemption requests
against these standards would be a facts
and circumstances determination.
The 2020 NPRM further explained
that activity may reflect ‘‘sound
commercial practice’’ for a particular
market or market participant but not for
another market or market participant.
Similarly, activity may reflect ‘‘sound
commercial practice’’ outside the spot
month, but not in the spot month.
Further, activity with manipulative
intent or effect, or that has the potential
or effect of causing price distortion or
disruption, would be inconsistent with
‘‘sound commercial practice,’’ even if it
is common practice among market
participants. While an exemption
granted to an individual market
participant may reflect ‘‘sound
commercial practice’’ and may not
‘‘exceed an amount that may be
established or liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market,’’ the 2020 NPRM
clarified that the Commission expects
exchanges to also evaluate whether the
granting of a particular exemption type
to multiple participants could have a
collective impact on the market in a
1015 Currently, DCMs review and set exemption
levels annually based on the facts and
circumstances of a particular exemption and the
market conditions at that time. As such, a DCM may
decide to deny, limit, condition, or revoke a
particular exemption, typically, if the DCM
determines that certain conditions have changed
and warrant such action. This may happen if, for
example, there are droughts, floods, embargoes,
trade disputes, or other events that cause shocks to
the supply or demand of a particular commodity
and thus impact the DCM’s disposition of a
particular exemption.
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manner inconsistent with ‘‘sound
commercial practice’’ or in a manner
that could result in a position that
would ‘‘exceed an amount that may be
established or liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market.’’
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
explained that it understands that the
above-described parameters for
exemptions from exchange-set limits are
generally consistent with current
practice among DCMs. Bearing in mind
that proposed § 150.5(a) would apply to
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, the Commission proposed
codifying such parameters, as they
would establish important, minimum
standards needed for exchanges to
administer, and the Commission to
oversee, a robust program for granting
exemptions from exchange-set limits in
a manner that does not undermine the
Federal position limits framework.
Proposed § 150.5(a) also would afford
exchanges the ability to generally
oversee their programs for granting
exemptions from exchange-set limits as
they see fit, including to establish
different application processes and
requirements to accommodate the
unique characteristics of different
contracts.
Finally, proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D)
would permit an exchange, in its
discretion, to require a person relying
on an exchange-granted exemption (for
contracts subject to Federal position
limits) to exit or limit the size of any
position in excess of exchange-set limits
during the lesser of the last five days of
trading or the time period for the spot
month in a physical-delivery contract.
The Commission has traditionally
referred to such requirements as a
‘‘Five-Day Rule.’’
b. Comments—Exemptions to ExchangeSet Limits for Contracts Subject to
Federal Position Limits
With respect to permitted exemptions
from exchange-set limits under
proposed § 150.5(a)(2), CMC requested
that the Commission clarify that each
exchange has discretion to determine
what information is required of
applicants when applying for a spread
exemption from exchange-set limits,
and that an exchange is not responsible
for monitoring the use of spread
positions for purposes of Federal
position limits.1016
In addition, regarding the retroactive
application provision in proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(5), CME Group
recommended that the Commission
should implement a standard that
permits exchanges to impose position
1016 CMC
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3361
limits violations in cases where a person
has exceeded Federal position limits
and filed a late or retroactive
application that the exchange then
denies.1017
The Commission also received several
comments regarding the provision that
allows exchanges to impose a Five-Day
Rule in proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D). In
particular, commenters requested that
the Commission expressly clarify that
the Five-Day Rule does not apply to
markets for energy commodity
derivatives.1018 Commenters also
requested clarification about whether, in
cases where an exchange opts not to
apply the Five-Day Rule, the
Commission expects the exchange to
follow the waiver guidance in proposed
Appendix B, or whether the exchange
can simply take no further action.1019
c. Discussion of Final Rule—
Exemptions to Exchange-Set Limits for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.5(a)(2) largely as proposed
and with the clarifications and
modifications, described below, in
response to commenters and other
considerations.
Regarding comments on application
information exchanges are required to
collect under § 150.5(a)(2), as explained
in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission is
providing exchanges great flexibility to
create an application process for
exemptions from exchange-set limits as
they see fit. This means an exchange has
discretion to determine what
information is required of applicants
applying for a spread exemption, or any
other exemption from exchange-set
limits, except for instances where the
exchange is processing a nonenumerated bona fide hedge application
1017 See CME Group at 10 (explaining that today
at the exchange level, CME Group considers firms
to be in violation of a position limit if the firms
exceed a limit and the exemption application is
denied. CME Group believes the Commission
should implement this standard, rather than
permitting the proposed grace period for denial of
an exemption application. CME Group explains
that, otherwise, market participants with
excessively large speculative positions could
exploit the grace period accompanying an
application for an exemption and intentionally go
over the applicable limit without consequences—all
the while disrupting orderly market operations. In
CME Group’s experience, the prospect of having an
application denied and being found in violation of
position limits has worked to deter market
participants from attempting to exploit the
retroactive exemption process).
1018 Chevron at 13; Suncor at 12.
1019 CCI at 9–10; CEWG at 25–26. See also supra
Section II.A.1.viii. (explaining Appendix B, which
provides guidance the Commission believes
exchanges should consider when determining
whether to apply the Five-Day Rule restriction).
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in accordance with the application
requirements of § 150.9. The
Commission is making one modification
to clarify the Commission’s posture
when reviewing exchange-granted
exemptions. In proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A), the Commission
proposed to require exchanges to collect
sufficient information for the exchange
to determine and the Commission to
‘‘verify’’ that the facts and
circumstances demonstrate that the
exchange may grant the exemption. In
final § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A), the
Commission is revising this provision to
make clear that the Commission will
conduct an independent evaluation of
any application it reviews to
‘‘determine’’ (not verify) whether the
facts and circumstances demonstrate
that the exchange may grant the
exemption.
Further, regarding monitoring spread
exemptions, exchanges are required to
administer and monitor their position
limits and any exemptions therefrom in
accordance with DCM Core Principle 5
and SEF Core Principle 6, as applicable.
To the extent, however, that an
exchange grants an inter-market spread
exemption where part of the spread
position is executed on another
exchange or OTC, although an exchange
is not responsible for monitoring a
trader’s position on other exchanges or
OTC, an exchange should request
information from the spread exemption
applicant about the entire composition
of the spread position so that the
exchange is best informed about
whether to grant the exemption.
Ultimately, the person relying on the
spread exemption is responsible for
monitoring for compliance with the
applicable Federal position limits. The
Commission reminds market
participants that an approved
exemption does not preclude the
Commission from finding that a person
has otherwise disrupted or manipulated
the market.
Next, regarding comments on the
retroactive application provision in
proposed § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(5), the
Commission believes that exchanges are
in the best position to determine
whether to pursue enforcement actions
for violations of exchange-set limits.
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined to revise this provision so
that exchanges have discretion to
determine whether to impose a position
limits violation for any retroactive
exemption request for exchange-set
limits that the exchange ultimately
denies. The Commission, however,
retains its position that the Commission
will not pursue a position limits
violation in those circumstances,
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provided that the application was
submitted in good faith and the
applicant brings its position within the
DCM or SEF’s speculative position
limits within a commercially reasonable
time, as determined by the DCM or
SEF.1020 This revision is simply
intended to make explicit an implicit
presumption that the applicant should
have a reasonable and good faith basis
for determining that its position meets
the requirements of § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)
and for submitting the retroactive
application.
Next, regarding various comments on
the provision that allows exchanges to
impose the Five-Day Rule, or a similar
requirement, in proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), for the avoidance of
doubt, the Commission reiterates that
exchanges are not required to impose
the Five-Day Rule. Further, the
Commission is adopting Appendix B
and Appendix G to provide guidance for
exchanges to consider when
determining whether to impose the
Five-Day Rule or similar requirements
in the spot period with respect to bona
fide hedge exemptions or spread
exemptions, respectively.1021 The Final
Rule permits exchanges to determine
whether any such restriction on trading
in the spot period is necessary given the
facts and circumstances of a particular
exemption request. Further, when an
exchange determines not to impose the
Five-Day Rule or similar requirement for
an approved exemption, it is not
obligated to take any additional steps.
The Commission has revised
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H) to make these points
clear.
Finally, the Commission is making
various non-substantive technical and
grammatical changes to § 150.5(a)(2) to
improve readability. The Commission
has also updated the outline numbering
of § 150.5(a)(2)(ii). These changes are
not intended to change the substance of
this section.
1020 The
Commission notes that, under Section
4a(e) of the Act, the Commission could pursue
violations of exchange position limit rules;
however, the Commission, as a matter of policy,
will not pursue such violations so long as the
conditions of § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(E) are met.
1021 See supra Sections II.A.1.viii. (discussing
Appendix B) and II.A.20 (discussing Appendix G).
See also infra Appendices B and G.
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iii. Section 150.5(a)(3)—Exchange-Set
Limits on Pre-Existing Positions for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exchange-Set Limits on Pre-Existing
Positions for Contracts Subject to
Federal Position Limits
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
recognized that the proposed Federal
position limits framework may result in
certain ‘‘pre-existing positions’’ being
subject to speculative position limits,
even though the positions predated the
adoption of such limits. So as not to
undermine the Federal position limits
framework during the spot month, and
to minimize disruption outside the spot
month, proposed § 150.5(a)(3) would
require that during the spot month, for
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, exchanges impose limits no
larger than Federal levels on ‘‘preexisting positions,’’ other than for preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps. However, outside the spot
month, an exchange would not be
required to impose limits on any such
position, provided the position is
acquired in good faith consistent with
the ‘‘pre-existing position’’ definition of
proposed § 150.1, and provided further
that if the person’s position is increased
after the effective date of the limit, such
pre-existing position (other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps) along with the position
increased after the effective date, would
be attributed to the person. This
provision is consistent with the
proposed treatment of pre-existing
positions for purposes of Federal
position limits set forth in proposed
§ 150.2(g), and was intended to prevent
spot-month limits from being rendered
ineffective.
That is, not subjecting pre-existing
positions to spot-month position limits
could result in a large, pre-existing
position either intentionally or
unintentionally causing a disruption as
it is rolled into the spot month, and the
Commission was particularly concerned
about protecting the spot month in
physical-delivery futures from corners
and squeezes. Outside of the spot
month, however, concerns over corners
and squeezes may be less acute.
b. Comments—Exchange-Set Limits on
Pre-Existing Positions for Contracts
Subject to Federal Position Limits
The Commission addressed comments
on pre-existing positions under its
discussion of § 150.2(g)(2) above.1022
1022 See supra Section II.B.7. (further discussing
limits on pre-existing positions).
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c. Discussion of Final Rule—ExchangeSet Limits on Pre-Existing Positions for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.5(a)(3) with two modifications to
conform to the changes made to
§ 150.2(g)(2), described below.
First, the Commission is amending
§ 150.5(a)(3)(ii) to clarify that non-spot
month limits shall apply to pre-existing
positions, other than pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps. As
discussed above in Section II.B.7., the
Commission did not intend in the 2020
NPRM to exclude existing non-spot
month positions in the nine legacy
agricultural contracts that would
otherwise qualify as ‘‘pre-existing
positions.’’ As discussed, the other 16
non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits for the first time under
the Final Rule are not subject to Federal
non-spot month position limits and
therefore proposed § 150.5(a)(3)(ii)
would not have applied to these
contracts in any event.1023
Second, the Commission is
eliminating the language in proposed
§ 150.5(a)(3)(ii) that would attribute to a
person any increase in their position
after the effective date of the non-spot
month limit. This language is no longer
necessary since final § 150.5(a)(3)(ii)
clarifies that pre-existing positions,
other than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps, are subject to
non-spot month limits.
For further discussion on pre-existing
positions in general and comments
thereto, please refer to §§ 150.2(g).1024
iv. Section 150.5(a)(4)—Monthly Report
Detailing Exemption Applications for
Contracts Subject to Federal Limits
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a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Monthly Report Detailing Exemption
Applications for Contracts Subject to
Federal Limits
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
explained that it seeks a balance
between having sufficient information
to oversee the exchange-granted
exemptions, and not burdening
exchanges with excessive periodic
reporting requirements. The
Commission thus proposed under
§ 150.5(a)(4) to require one monthly
report by each exchange providing
certain information about exchangegranted exemptions for contracts that
are subject to Federal position limits.
Certain exchanges already voluntarily
1023 See supra Section II.B.7. (discussing § 150.2
Federal position limits on pre-existing positions).
1024 Id.
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file these types of monthly reports with
the Commission, and proposed
§ 150.5(a)(4) would standardize such
reports for all exchanges that process
applications for bona fide hedges,
spread exemptions, and other
exemptions from exchange-set limits for
contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits. The proposed report
would provide information regarding
the disposition of any application to
recognize a position as a bona fide
hedge (both enumerated and nonenumerated) or to grant a spread or
other exemption, including any
renewal, revocation of, or modification
to the terms and conditions of, a prior
recognition or exemption.1025
As specified under proposed
§ 150.5(a)(4), the report would provide
certain details regarding any application
to recognize a bona fide hedging
position, or grant a spread exemption or
other exemption, including: The
effective date and expiration date of any
recognition or exemption; any unique
identifier assigned to track the
application or position; identifying
information about the applicant; the
derivative contract or positions to which
the application pertains; the maximum
size of the commodity derivative
position that is recognized or exempted
by the exchange (including any ‘‘walkdown’’ requirements); 1026 any size
limitations the exchange sets for the
position; and a brief narrative
summarizing the applicant’s relevant
cash-market activity.
With respect to any unique identifiers
to be included in the proposed monthly
report, the exchange’s assignment of a
unique identifier would assist the
Commission’s tracking process.
Accordingly, the Commission suggested
that, as a ‘‘best practice,’’ the exchange’s
procedures for processing bona fide
hedging position and spread exemption
applications contemplate the
assignment of such unique
1025 Under the 2020 NPRM, in the monthly report,
exchanges may elect to list new recognitions or
exemptions, and modifications to or revocations of
prior recognitions and exemptions each month.
Alternatively, exchanges may submit cumulative
monthly reports listing all active recognitions and
exemptions (i.e., including exemptions that are not
new or have not changed).
1026 An exchange could determine to recognize as
a bona fide hedge or spread exemption all, or a
portion, of the commodity derivative position for
which an application has been submitted, provided
that such determination is made in accordance with
the requirements of proposed § 150.5 and is
consistent with the Act and the Commission’s
regulations. In addition, an exchange could require
that a bona fide hedging position or spread position
be subject to ‘‘walk-down’’ provisions that require
the trader to scale down its positions in the spot
month in order to reduce market congestion as
needed based on the facts and circumstances.
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3363
identifiers.1027 The proposed report
would also be required to specify the
maximum size and/or size limitations
by contract month and/or type of limit
(e.g., spot month, single month, or allmonths-combined), as applicable. The
proposed monthly report would be a
critical element of the Commission’s
surveillance program by facilitating the
Commission’s ability to track bona fide
hedging positions and spread
exemptions approved by exchanges. The
proposed monthly report would also
keep the Commission informed as to the
manner in which an exchange is
administering its application
procedures, the exchange’s rationale for
permitting large positions, and relevant
cash-market activity. The Commission
expected that exchanges would be able
to leverage their current exemption
processes and recordkeeping procedures
to generate such reports.
In certain instances, information
included in the proposed monthly
report may prompt the Commission to
request records required to be
maintained by an exchange. For
example, the Commission proposed
that, for each derivative position that an
exchange wishes to recognize as a bona
fide hedge, or any revocation or
modification of such recognition, the
report would include a concise
summary of the applicant’s activity in
the cash markets and swaps markets for
the commodity underlying the position.
The Commission explained that it
expects that this summary would focus
on the facts and circumstances upon
which an exchange based its
determination to recognize a bona fide
hedge, to grant a spread exemption, or
to revoke or modify such recognition or
exemption. In light of the information
provided in the summary, or any other
information included in the proposed
monthly report regarding the position,
the Commission may request the
exchange’s complete record of the
application. The Commission also
explained that it expects that it would
only need to request such complete
records in the event that it noticed an
issue that could cause market
disruptions.
Proposed § 150.5(a)(4) would require
an exchange, unless instructed
otherwise by the Commission, to submit
such monthly reports according to the
form and manner requirements the
Commission specifies. In order to
facilitate the processing of such reports,
1027 The unique identifier could apply to each of
the bona fide hedge or spread exemption
applications that the exchange receives, and,
separately, each type of commodity derivative
position that the exchange wishes to recognize as
a bona fide hedge or spread exemption.
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and the analysis of the information
contained therein, the Commission
would establish reporting and
transmission standards. The 2020
NPRM would also require that such
reports be submitted to the Commission
using an electronic data format, coding
structure, and electronic data
transmission procedures specified on
the Commission’s Forms and
Submissions page of its website.
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b. Comments—Monthly Report
Detailing Exemption Applications for
Contracts Subject to Federal Limits
With respect to the monthly reporting
requirement in proposed § 150.5(a)(4),
ICE requested that the Commission
clarify that the monthly report is only
required to capture positions that are
subject to Federal position limits and
does not apply to other exchange-set
non-enumerated exemptions.1028 ICE
also requested that the Commission
codify when the monthly reports are
required to be submitted, and that any
regular reports can be made at the
discretion of the exchange.1029 Other
commenters expressed that they prefer
that the Commission not specify a
particular day each month as a deadline
for exchanges to submit their monthly
reports pursuant to § 150.5(a)(4).1030
Finally, ICE requested that the
Commission clarify how factual and
legal justifications for exemptions
should be provided in the monthly
report, and the level of granularity
required.1031
c. Discussion of Final Rule—Monthly
Report Detailing Exemption
Applications for Contracts Subject to
Federal Limits
The Commission is finalizing
§ 150.5(a)(4) as proposed, with minor
technical revisions. The Commission
clarifies, as stated in the proposed and
final regulation text, that the monthly
reporting requirement only applies to
exemptions an exchange grants for
contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits. Further, in
consideration of comments and the
Commission’s past with collecting
voluntary monthly reports from
exchanges, the Commission has
determined not to prescribe a particular
day of the month or monthly deadline
for exchanges to submit the monthly
reports. Rather, the Commission defers
to exchanges on the best timing for
submitting their reports so long as the
reports are submitted on a monthly
1028 ICE
at 14.
basis in accordance with § 150.5(a)(4).
Finally, the Commission clarifies that
§ 150.5(a)(4) does not require exchanges
to provide factual and legal analysis in
the monthly report. The monthly report
is intended to give the Commission a
snapshot of all exemptions the exchange
has granted from exchange-set limits for
contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits. The Commission’s
expectation is that in circumstances
when it needs additional information on
the exchange’s analysis for a particular
exemption application, it will work
with the exchange to obtain such
additional information.
4. Section 150.5(b)—Requirements and
Acceptable Practices for Exchange-Set
Limits on Commodity Derivative
Contracts in a Physical Commodity That
Are Not Subject to the Limits Set Forth
in § 150.2
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity
Derivative Contracts in a Physical
Commodity Not Subject to the Limits
Set Forth in § 150.2
Under proposed § 150.5(b), for
physical commodity derivative
contracts that are not subject to Federal
position limits, whether cash-settled or
physically-settled, exchanges would be
subject to flexible standards for setting
exchange limits during the contract’s
spot month and non-spot month.
During the spot month, under
proposed § 150.5(b)(1)(i), exchanges
would be required to establish position
limits, and such limits would have to be
set at a level that is no greater than 25
percent of deliverable supply. As
described in detail in connection with
the proposed Federal spot-month limits
described above, it would be difficult, in
the absence of other factors, for a
participant to corner or squeeze a
market if the participant holds less than
or equal to 25 percent of deliverable
supply, and the Commission has long
used deliverable supply as the basis for
spot month position limits due to
concerns regarding corners, squeezes,
and other settlement-period
manipulative activity.1032
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
recognized, however, that there may be
circumstances where an exchange may
not wish to use the 25% formula,
including, for example, if the contract is
cash-settled, does not have a measurable
deliverable supply, or if the exchange
can demonstrate that a different
parameter is better suited for a
1029 Id.
1030 CME
1031 ICE
Group at 14; IFUS at 13.
at 14.
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1032 See supra Section II.B. (discussing proposed
§ 150.2).
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particular contract or market.1033
Accordingly, proposed § 150.5(b)(1)
would afford exchanges the ability to
submit to the Commission alternative
potential methodologies for calculating
spot month limit levels, provided that
the limits are set at a level that is
‘‘necessary and appropriate to reduce
the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index.’’ This
standard has appeared in existing
§ 150.5 since its adoption in connection
with spot-month limits on cash-settled
contracts.
As noted above, existing § 150.5
includes separate parameters for spotmonth limits in physical-delivery
contracts and for cash-settled contracts,
but does not include flexibility for
exchanges to consider alternative
parameters. In an effort to both simplify
the regulation and provide the ability
for exchanges to consider multiple
parameters that may be better suited for
certain products, the Commission
proposed the above standard as a
principles-based requirement for both
cash-settled and physically-settled
contracts subject to proposed § 150.5(b).
Outside of the spot month, where,
historically, attempts at certain types of
market manipulation is generally less of
a concern, proposed § 150.5(b)(2)(i)
would allow exchanges to choose
between position limits or position
accountability for physical commodity
contracts that are not subject to Federal
position limits. While exchanges would
be permitted to decide whether to use
limit levels or accountability levels for
any such contract, under either
approach, the exchange would have to
set a level that is ‘‘necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or
index.’’
To help exchanges efficiently
demonstrate compliance with this
standard for physical commodity
contracts outside of the spot month, the
Commission proposed separate
acceptable practices for exchanges that
wish to adopt non-spot month position
limits and exchanges that wish to adopt
non-spot month accountability.1034 For
1033 Guidance for calculating deliverable supply
can be found in Appendix C to part 38. 17 CFR part
38, Appendix C.
1034 The acceptable practices in Appendix F to
part 150 of the 2020 NPRM reflected non-exclusive
methods of compliance. Accordingly, the language
of these proposed acceptable practices, used the
word ‘‘shall’’ not to indicate that the acceptable
practice is a required method of compliance, but
rather to indicate that in order to satisfy the
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exchanges that choose to adopt non-spot
month position limits, rather than
position accountability, proposed
paragraph (a)(1) to Appendix F of part
150 would set forth non-exclusive
acceptable practices. Under that
provision, an exchange would be
deemed in compliance with proposed
§ 150.5(b)(2)(i) if the exchange sets nonspot limit levels for each contract
subject to § 150.5(b) at a level no greater
than: (1) The average of historical
position sizes held by speculative
traders in the contract as a percentage of
the contract’s open interest; 1035 (2) the
spot month limit level for the contract;
(3) 5,000 contracts (scaled up
proportionally to the ratio of the
notional quantity per contract to the
typical cash-market transaction if the
notional quantity per contract is smaller
than the typical cash-market
transaction, or scaled down
proportionally if the notional quantity
per contract is larger than the typical
cash-market transaction); 1036 or (4) 10%
of open interest in that contract for the
most recent calendar year up to 50,000
contracts, with a marginal increase of
2.5% of open interest thereafter.1037
When evaluating average position sizes
acceptable practice, a market participant must (i.e.,
shall) establish compliance with that particular
acceptable practice.
1035 For example, if speculative traders in a
particular contract typically make up 12 percent of
open interest in that contract, the exchange could
set limit levels no greater than 12 percent of open
interest.
1036 Under the 2020 NPRM, for exchanges that
choose to adopt a non-spot month limit level of
5,000 contracts, this level assumes that the notional
quantity per contract is set at a level that reflects
the size of a typical cash-market transaction in the
underlying commodity. However, if the notional
quantity of the contract is larger/smaller than the
typical cash-market transaction in the underlying
commodity, then the DCM must reduce/increase the
5,000 contract non-spot month limit until it is
proportional to the notional quantity of the contract
relative to the typical cash-market transaction.
These required adjustments to the 5,000-contract
metric are intended to avoid a circumstance where
an exchange could allow excessive speculation by
setting excessively large notional quantities relative
to typical cash-market transaction sizes. For
example, if the notional quantity per contract is set
at 30,000 units, and the typical observed cashmarket transaction is 2,500 units, the notional
quantity per contract would be 12 times larger than
the typical cash-market transaction. In that case, the
non-spot month limit would need to be 12 times
smaller than 5,000 (i.e., at 417 contracts.). Similarly,
if the notional quantity per contract is 1,000
contracts, and the typical observed cash-market
transaction is 2,500 units, the notional quantity per
contract would be 2.5 times smaller than the typical
cash-market transaction. In that case, the non-spot
month limit would need to be 2.5 times larger than
5,000, and would need to be set at 12,500 contracts.
1037 In connection with the proposed Appendix F
to part 150 acceptable practices, open interest
should be calculated by averaging the month-end
open positions in a futures contract and its related
option contract, on a delta-adjusted basis, for all
months listed during the most recent calendar year.
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held by speculative traders, the
Commission expected exchanges: (i) To
be cognizant of speculative positions
that are extraordinarily large relative to
other speculative positions, and (ii) to
not consider any such outliers in their
calculations.
These proposed parameters have
largely appeared in existing § 150.5 for
many years in connection with either
initial or subsequent levels.1038 The
Commission was of the view that these
parameters would be useful, flexible
standards to carry forward as acceptable
practices. For example, the Commission
expected that the 5,000-contract
acceptable practice would be a useful
benchmark for exchanges because it
would allow them to establish limits
and demonstrate compliance with
Commission regulations in a relatively
efficient manner, particularly for new
contracts that have yet to establish open
interest. Similarly, for purposes of
exchange-set limits on physical
commodity contracts that are not subject
to Federal position limits, the
Commission proposed to maintain the
baseline 10/2.5 percent formula as an
acceptable practice. Because these
parameters are simply acceptable
practices, exchanges may, after
evaluation, propose higher limits or
accountability levels.
Along those lines, the Commission
recognized that other parameters may be
preferable and/or just as effective, and
was open to considering alternative
parameters submitted pursuant to part
40 of the Commission’s regulations,
provided, at a minimum, that the
parameter complies with § 150.5(b)(2)(i).
The Commission encouraged exchanges
to submit potential new parameters to
Commission staff in draft form prior to
submitting them under part 40.
For exchanges that choose to adopt
position accountability, rather than
limits, outside of the spot month,
proposed paragraph (a)(2) of Appendix
F to part 150 would set forth a nonexclusive acceptable practice that would
permit such exchanges to comply with
proposed § 150.5(b)(2)(i) by adopting
rules establishing ‘‘position
accountability’’ as defined in proposed
§ 150.1. ‘‘Position accountability’’
would mean rules that the exchange
submits to the Commission pursuant to
part 40 that require a trader, upon
request by the exchange, to consent to:
(i) Provide information to the exchange
about their position, including, but not
limited to, information about the nature
of the positions, trading strategies, and
1038 17 CFR 150.5(b) and (c). Proposed § 150.5(b)
would address physical commodity contracts that
are not subject to Federal position limits.
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3365
hedging information; and (ii) halt
further increases to their position or to
reduce their position in an orderly
manner.1039
Proposed § 150.5(b)(3) addressed a
circumstance where multiple exchanges
list contracts that are substantially the
same, including physically-settled
contracts that have the same underlying
physical commodity and delivery
location, or cash-settled contracts that
are directly or indirectly linked to a
physically-settled contract. Under
proposed § 150.5(b)(3), exchanges listing
contracts that are substantially the same
in this manner must either adopt
‘‘comparable’’ limits for such contracts,
or demonstrate to the Commission how
the non-comparable levels comply with
the standards set forth in proposed
§ 150.5(b)(1) and (2). Such a
determination also must address how
the levels are necessary and appropriate
to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index. Proposed
§ 150.5(b)(3) would apply equally to
cash-settled and physically-settled
contracts, and to limits during and
outside of the spot month, as
applicable.1040 Proposed § 150.5(b)(3)
was intended to help ensure that
position limits established on one
exchange would not jeopardize market
integrity or otherwise harm other
markets. Further, proposed § 150.5(b)(3)
would be consistent with the
Commission’s proposed approach to
generally apply equivalent Federal
position limits to linked contracts,
including linked contracts listed on
multiple exchanges.1041
Finally, under proposed § 150.5(b)(4),
exchanges would be permitted to grant
exemptions from any limits established
under proposed § 150.5(b). As noted,
proposed § 150.5(b) would apply to
physical commodity contracts not
subject to Federal position limits; thus,
exchanges would be given flexibility to
1039 While existing § 150.5(e) includes openinterest and volume-based limitations on the use of
position accountability, the Commission opted not
to include such limitations in the 2020 NPRM.
Under the 2020 NPRM, if an exchange submitted a
part 40 filing seeking to adopt position
accountability, the Commission would determine
on a case-by-case basis whether such rules are
consistent with the Act and the Commission’s
regulations. The Commission did not want to use
one-size-fits-all volume-based limitations for
making such determinations.
1040 For reasons discussed elsewhere in the 2020
NPRM, this provision would not apply to natural
gas contracts. See supra Section II.C.6. (discussion
of proposed conditional spot month exemption in
natural gas).
1041 See supra Section II.A.16. (discussion of the
proposed referenced contract definition and linked
contracts).
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grant exemptions in such contracts,
including exemptions for both intramarket and inter-market spread
positions,1042 as well as other
exemption types (including risk
management exemptions) not explicitly
listed in proposed § 150.3.1043 However,
such exchanges must require that
traders apply for the exemption. In
considering any such application, the
exchanges would be required to
consider whether the exemption would
result in a position that would not be in
accord with ‘‘sound commercial
practices’’ in the market for which the
exchange is considering the application,
and/or would ‘‘exceed an amount that
may be established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion in that market.’’
While exchanges would be subject to
the requirements of § 150.5(a) and (b)
described above, such proposed
requirements are not intended to limit
the discretion of exchanges to utilize
other tools to protect their markets.
Among other things, an exchange would
have the discretion to: Impose
additional restrictions on a person with
a long position in the spot month of a
physical-delivery contract who stands
for delivery, takes that delivery, and
then re-establishes a long position;
establish limits on the amount of
delivery instruments that a person may
hold in a physical-delivery contract; and
impose such other restrictions as it
deems necessary to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or
congestion, to maintain orderly
execution of transactions, or for such
other purposes consistent with its
responsibilities.
ii. Comments—Exchange-Set Limits on
Commodity Derivative Contracts in a
Physical Commodity Not Subject to the
Limits Set Forth in § 150.2
Better Markets recommended
revisions for proposed § 150.5(b)(2) if
the Commission decides to finalize the
proposed approach to only implement
spot month limits on contracts that are
not subject to Federal position
limits.1044 Proposed § 150.5(b)(2)
requires exchanges to have either nonspot month position limits or
accountability levels, as necessary and
appropriate, to reduce manipulation and
price distortions for contracts that are
not subject to limits in § 150.2. Better
Markets’ recommendation goes a step
1042 See Appendix G (providing additional
guidance on spread exemptions).
1043 As noted above, proposed § 150.3 would
allow for several exemption types, including: Bona
fide hedging positions; certain spreads; financial
distress positions; and conditional spot month limit
exemption positions in natural gas.
1044 Better Markets at 47–48.
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further and would require exchanges to
set position limits and position
accountability levels outside of the spot
month to reduce the potential threat of
market manipulation or price distortion
and the potential for sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes.1045
iii. Discussion of Final Rule—ExchangeSet Limits on Commodity Derivative
Contracts in a Physical Commodity Not
Subject to the Limits Set Forth in
§ 150.2
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.5(b), as proposed, with a few
technical or grammatical revisions to
improve readability and the following
explanation. Of note, the Commission is
revising the beginning of § 150.5(b)(1) to
clarify that this section applies to
exchange-set limits on cash-settled and
physically-settled commodity derivative
contracts in a physical commodity that
are not subject to the Federal position
limits set forth in § 150.2. Although this
point is made clear in the preamble and
the introductory title of § 150.5(b), the
Commission has added the additional
clarification for the avoidance of any
confusion.
In response to comments from Better
Markets, and as explained in detail
earlier in this release, the Commission
believes that outside the spot month,
either exchange-set position limits or
exchange-set accountability levels will
be sufficient for exchanges to reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation
and price distortions and manage
fluctuations and changes in their
markets.1046 Accordingly, the
Commission has determined to finalize
the position limits and accountability
requirements as proposed.
5. Section 150.5(c)—Requirements for
Security Futures Products
i. Background and Summary of the 2020
NPRM—Requirements for Security
Futures Products
As the Commission has previously
noted, security futures products and
security options may serve
economically equivalent or similar
functions to one another.1047 Therefore,
when the Commission originally
adopted position limits regulations for
security futures products in part 41, it
set levels that were generally
comparable to, although not identical
1045 Id.
1046 See supra Section II.B.2.iv. (providing a
detailed discussion of the Commission’s extensive
experience monitoring position accountability
levels, which have been effective at exchanges).
1047 See Position Limits and Position
Accountability for Security Futures Products, 83 FR
at 36799, 36802 (July 31, 2018).
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with, the limits that applied to options
on individual securities.1048 The
Commission has pointed out that
security futures products may be at a
competitive disadvantage if position
limits for security futures products vary
too much from those of security
options.1049 As a result, the Commission
in 2019 adopted amendments to the
position limitations and accountability
requirements for security futures
products, noting that one goal was to
provide a level regulatory playing field
with security options.1050 The
Commission proposed § 150.5(c),
therefore, to include a cross-reference
clarifying that for security futures
products, position limitations and
accountability requirements for
exchanges are specified in § 41.25.1051
This would allow the Commission to
take into account the position limits
regime that applies to security options
when considering position limits
regulations for security futures
products.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—
Requirements for Security Futures
Products
The Commission did not receive
comments on § 150.5(c) and is adopting
this section as proposed.
6. Section 150.5(d)—Rules on
Aggregation
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Rules
on Aggregation
As noted earlier in this release, the
Commission adopted in 2016 final
aggregation rules under § 150.4 that
apply to all contracts subject to Federal
position limits. The Commission
recognized that with respect to contracts
not subject to Federal position limits,
market participants may find it
burdensome if different exchanges
adopt different aggregation standards.
Accordingly, under proposed § 150.5(d),
all DCMs, and, ultimately, SEFs, that list
any physical commodity derivatives,
regardless of whether the contract is
subject to Federal position limits, would
be required to adopt position
aggregation rules for such contracts that
1048 Id. See also Listing Standards and Conditions
for Trading Security Futures Products, 66 FR at
55078, 55082 (Nov. 1, 2001) (explaining the
Commission’s adoption of position limits for
security futures products).
1049 See 83 FR at 36802.
1050 See Position Limits and Position
Accountability for Security Futures Products, 84 FR
at 51005, 51009 (Sept. 27, 2019).
1051 See 17 CFR 41.25. Rule § 41.25 establishes
conditions for the trading of security futures
products.
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conform to § 150.4.1052 Exchanges that
list excluded commodities would be
encouraged to also adopt position
aggregation rules that conform to
§ 150.4. Aggregation policies that
otherwise vary from exchange to
exchange would increase the
administrative burden on a trader active
on multiple exchanges, as well as
increase the administrative burden on
the Commission in monitoring and
enforcing exchange-set position limits.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Rules on
Aggregation
The Commission did not receive
comments on § 150.5(d) and is adopting
this section as proposed.
7. Section 150.5(e)—Requirements for
Submissions to the Commission
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Requirements for Submissions to the
Commission
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Proposed § 150.5(e) reflects that,
consistent with the definition of ‘‘rule’’
in existing § 40.1, any exchange action
establishing or modifying exchange-set
position limits or exemptions therefrom,
or position accountability, in any case
pursuant to proposed § 150.5(a), (b), (c),
or Appendix F to part 150, would
qualify as a ‘‘rule’’ and must be
submitted to the Commission as such
pursuant to part 40 of the Commission’s
regulations. Such rules would also
include, among other things, parameters
used for determining position limit
levels, and policies and related
processes setting forth parameters
addressing, among other things, which
types of exemptions are permitted, the
parameters for the granting of such
exemptions, and any exemption
application requirements.
Proposed § 150.5(e) further provides
that exchanges would be required to
review regularly1053 any position limit
levels established under proposed
1052 Under § 150.4, unless an exemption applies,
a person’s positions must be aggregated with
positions for which the person controls trading or
for which the person holds a 10% or greater
ownership interest. Commission Regulation
§ 150.4(b) sets forth several exemptions from
aggregation. See Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81
FR at 91454. The Division of Market Oversight has
issued time-limited no-action relief from some of
the aggregation requirements contained in that
rulemaking. See CFTC Letter No. 19–19 (July 31,
2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/
download.
1053 Under the 2020 NPRM, an acceptable, regular
review regime would consist of both a periodic
review and an event-specific review (e.g., in the
event of supply and demand shocks such as
unanticipated shocks to supply and demand of the
underlying commodity, geo-political shocks, and
other events that may result in congestion and/or
other disruptions).
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§ 150.5 to ensure the level continues to
comply with the requirements of those
sections. For example, in the case of
§ 150.5(b), exchanges would be expected
to ensure the limits comply with the
requirement that limits be set ‘‘at a level
that is necessary and appropriate to
reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index.’’ Exchanges
would also be required to update such
levels as needed, including if the levels
no longer comply with the proposed
rules.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—
Requirements for Submissions to the
Commission
The Commission did not receive
comments on § 150.5(e) and is adopting
this section with a few non-substantive
revisions to address grammatical issues
and improve the readability and
organization of the section. These
revisions are not intended to change the
substance of this section.
8. Section 150.5(f)—Delegation of
Authority to the Director of the Division
of Market Oversight
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Delegation of Authority to the Director
of the Division of Market Oversight
The Commission proposed to delegate
its authority, pursuant to proposed
§ 150.5(a)(4)(ii), to the Director of the
Commission’s Division of Market
Oversight, or such other employee(s)
that the Director may designate from
time to time, to provide instructions
regarding the submission of information
required to be reported by exchanges to
the Commission on a monthly basis, and
to determine the manner, format, coding
structure, and electronic data
transmission procedures for submitting
such information.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Delegation
of Authority to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight
The Commission did not receive
comments on § 150.5(f) and is adopting
this section as proposed.
9. Commission Enforcement of
Exchange-Set Limits
As discussed throughout this Final
Rule, the framework for exchange-set
limits operates in conjunction with the
Federal position limits framework. The
Futures Trading Act of 1982 gave the
Commission, under CEA section 4a(5)
(since re-designated as section 4a(e)),
the authority to directly enforce
violations of exchange-set, Commission-
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approved speculative position limits in
addition to position limits established
directly by the Commission.1054 Since
2008, it has also been a violation of the
Act for any person to violate an
exchange position limit rule certified to
the Commission by such exchange
pursuant to CEA section 5c(c)(1).1055
Thus, under CEA section 4a(e), it is a
violation of the Act for any person to
violate an exchange position limit rule
certified to or approved by the
Commission, including to violate any
subsequent amendments thereto, and
the Commission has the authority to
enforce those violations.
The Commission did not receive
comments on its authority to enforce
exchange-set position limits.
E. § 150.6—Scope
Existing § 150.6 provides that nothing
in this part shall be construed to affect
any provisions of the CEA relating to
manipulation or corners nor to relieve
any contract market or its governing
board from responsibility under the
CEA to prevent manipulation and
corners.1056
1. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Scope
Proposed § 150.6 was intended to
make clear that fulfillment of specific
part 150 requirements alone does not
necessarily satisfy other obligations of
an exchange. Proposed § 150.6 provided
that part 150 of the Commission’s
regulations would only be construed as
having an effect on position limits set by
the Commission or an exchange
including any associated recordkeeping
and reporting requirements. Proposed
§ 150.6 provided further that nothing in
part 150 would affect any other
provisions of the CEA or Commission
regulations including those relating to
actual or attempted manipulation,
corners, squeezes, fraudulent or
deceptive conduct, or to prohibited
1054 See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Public Law
97–444, 96 Stat. 2299–30 (1983).
1055 See CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, Food,
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Public Law
110–246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18, 2008) (also known
as the ‘‘Farm Bill’’) (amending CEA section 4a(e),
among other things, to assure that a violation of
exchange-set position limits, regardless of whether
such position limits have been approved by or
certified to the Commission, would constitute a
violation of the Act that the Commission could
independently enforce). See also Federal
Speculative Position Limits for Referenced Energy
Contracts and Associated Regulations, 75 FR at
4144, 4145 (Jan. 26, 2010) (summarizing the history
of the Commission’s authority to directly enforce
violations of exchange-set speculative position
limits).
1056 17 CFR 150.6. The Commission notes that
while existing § 150.6 references ‘‘section 5(4) of the
[CEA]’’ no such CEA section currently exists. The
Final Rule instead references section 5(d)(4) of the
CEA.
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transactions. For example, proposed
§ 150.5 would require DCMs, and,
ultimately, SEFs, to impose and enforce
exchange-set speculative position limits.
The fulfillment of the requirements of
§ 150.5 alone would not satisfy any
other legal obligations under the CEA or
Commission regulations applicable to
exchanges to prevent manipulation and
corners. Likewise, a market participant’s
compliance with position limits or an
exemption thereto would not confer any
type of safe harbor or good faith defense
to a claim that the participant had
engaged in an attempted or perfected
manipulation.
Further, the proposed amendments
were intended to help clarify that
§ 150.6 would apply to: Regulations
related to position limits found outside
of part 150 of the Commission’s
regulations (e.g., relevant sections of
part 1 and part 19); and recordkeeping
and reporting regulations associated
with speculative position limits.
2. Comments and Discussion of Final
Rule—Scope
The Commission received no
comments on proposed § 150.6 and is
adopting as proposed.
As the Commission explained in the
2020 NPRM, position limits are meant
to diminish, eliminate, and prevent
excessive speculation and to deter and
prevent market manipulation, squeezes,
and corners. The Commission stresses
that nothing in the Final Rule’s
revisions to part 150 would impact the
anti-disruptive, anti-cornering, and antimanipulation provisions of the CEA and
Commission regulations, including but
not limited to CEA sections 6(c) or
9(a)(2) regarding manipulation, CEA
section 4c(a)(5) regarding disruptive
practices including spoofing, or sections
180.1 and 180.2 of the Commission’s
regulations regarding manipulative and
deceptive practices. It may be possible
for a trader to manipulate or attempt to
manipulate the prices of futures
contracts or the underlying commodity
with a position that is within the
Federal position limits. It may also be
possible for a trader holding a bona fide
hedge, as recognized by the Commission
or an exchange, to manipulate or
attempt to manipulate the markets. The
Commission would not consider it a
defense to a charge under the antimanipulation provisions of the CEA or
the regulations that a trader’s position
was within position limits.
F. § 150.8—Severability
Final § 150.8 provides that should any
provision(s) of part 150 be declared
invalid, including the application
thereof to any person or circumstance,
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all remaining provisions of part 150
shall not be affected to the extent that
such remaining provisions, or the
application thereof, can be given effect
without the invalid provisions.
The Commission did not receive
comments on proposed § 150.8, and is
adopting it as proposed.
G. § 150.9—Process for Recognizing
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions With Respect
to Federal Speculative Position Limits
1. Background—Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions
The Commission’s authority and
existing processes for recognizing bona
fide hedges can be found in CEA section
4a(c), and §§ 1.3, 1.47, and 1.48 of the
Commission’s regulations.1057 In
particular, CEA section 4a(c)(1) provides
that no CFTC rule issued under CEA
section 4a(a) applies to ‘‘transactions or
positions which are shown to be bona
fide hedging transactions or
positions.’’ 1058 Under the existing
definition of ‘‘bona fide hedging
transactions and positions’’ in § 1.3,1059
paragraph (1) provides the
Commission’s general definition of bona
fide hedging transactions or positions;
paragraph (2) provides a list of
enumerated bona fide hedging positions
that, generally, are self-effectuating, and
must be reported (along with supporting
cash-market information) to the
Commission monthly on Form 204 after
the positions are taken; 1060 and
paragraph (3) provides a procedure for
market participants to seek recognition
from the Commission for nonenumerated bona fide hedging
positions. Under paragraph (3), any
person that seeks a Commission
recognition of a position as a nonenumerated bona fide hedge must apply
to the Commission in advance of taking
on the position, and pursuant to the
processes outlined in § 1.47 (30 days in
advance for non-enumerated bona fide
hedges) or § 1.48 (10 days in advance for
enumerated anticipatory hedges), as
applicable.
For the nine legacy agricultural
contracts currently subject to Federal
position limits, the Commission’s
current process for recognizing nonenumerated bona fide hedge positions
1057 7
U.S.C. 6a(c); 17 CFR 1.3, 1.47, and 1.48.
U.S.C. 6a(c)(1).
1059 As described above, the Commission is
moving an amended version of the bona fide
hedging definition from § 1.3 to § 150.1. See supra
Section II.A.1. (discussion of § 150.1).
1060 As described below, the Commission is
eliminating Form 204 and relying instead on the
cash-market information submitted to exchanges
pursuant to §§ 150.5 and 150.9. See infra Section
II.H. (discussion of amendments to part 19).
1058 7
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exists in parallel with exchange
processes for granting exemptions from
exchange-set limits, as described below.
The exchange processes for granting
exemptions vary by exchange, and
generally do not mirror the
Commission’s processes.1061 Thus,
when requesting a non-enumerated
bona fide hedging position recognition,
currently market participants must
submit two applications—one
application submitted to the
Commission in accordance with § 1.47
for purposes of compliance with Federal
position limits, and another application
submitted to the relevant exchange in
accordance with the exchange’s rules for
purposes of exchange-set position
limits.
2. Overview of the 2020 NPRM,
Comments, and the Commission’s
Determination
Generally, the Commission is
adopting § 150.9 largely as proposed,
but with certain clarifications and
modifications to address commenters’
views and other considerations. This
section provides an overview of, and
addresses general comments regarding,
proposed § 150.9. Further below, the
Commission summarizes each subsection of § 150.9 and comments
relevant to that sub-section, and
provides a more detailed discussion of
the Commission’s determination and
any changes to each sub-section of
§ 150.9.
i. General Overview of the 2020 NPRM
The Commission proposed § 150.9 to
establish a new framework whereby a
1061 As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, exchanges
typically use one application process to grant all
exemption types, whereas the Commission has
different processes for different bona fide hedge
exemption types. That is, the Commission currently
has different processes for permitting enumerated
bona fide hedges and for recognizing positions as
non-enumerated bona fide hedges or anticipatory
bona fide hedges. Generally, for bona fide hedges
enumerated in paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedge
definition in § 1.3, no formal process is required by
the Commission. Instead, such enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions are self-effectuating and
Commission staff reviews monthly reporting of
cash-market positions on existing Form 204 and
part 17 position data to monitor such positions.
Requests for recognitions of non-enumerated bona
fide hedging positions and for certain enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedge positions, as explained
above, must be submitted to the Commission
pursuant to the processes in existing §§ 1.47 and
1.48 of the regulations, as applicable. Further,
exchanges generally do not require the submission
of monthly cash-market information; instead, they
generally require exemption applications to include
cash-market information supporting positions that
exceed the limits, to be filed prior to exceeding a
position limit, and to be updated on an annual
basis. On the other hand, the Commission has
various monthly reporting requirements under
Form 204 and part 17 of the Commission’s
regulations as described above.
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market participant seeking a nonenumerated bona fide hedge recognition
could file one application with an
exchange to receive a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognition for
purposes of both exchange-set limits
and Federal position limits.1062 The
proposed framework was intended to be
independent of, and serve as an
alternative to, the Commission’s process
for reviewing exemption requests under
proposed § 150.3. The proposed
framework was also intended to help:
(1) Streamline the process by which
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications are addressed; (2) minimize
disruptions by leveraging existing
exchange-level processes with which
many market participants are already
familiar; 1063 and (3) reduce
inefficiencies created when market
participants are required to comply with
different Federal and exchange-level
processes.
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
emphasized that proposed § 150.9
would serve as a separate, selfcontained process that is related to, but
independent of, the proposed
regulations governing: (1) The process
in proposed § 150.3 for traders to apply
directly to the Commission for a bona
fide hedge recognition; and (2) exchange
processes for establishing exchange-set
limits and granting exemptions
therefrom in proposed § 150.5. The
Commission also emphasized that
proposed § 150.9 would serve as a
voluntary process that exchanges could
implement to provide additional
flexibility for their market participants
to file one non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application with an exchange to
receive a recognition for purposes of
both exchange-set limits and Federal
speculative position limits. Finally, the
2020 NPRM made clear that an
exchange’s determination to recognize a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge in
accordance with proposed § 150.9 with
respect to exchange-set limits would
serve to inform the Commission’s own
1062 Alternatively, under the proposed framework,
a trader could submit a request directly to the
Commission pursuant to proposed § 150.3(b). A
trader that submitted such a request directly to the
Commission for purposes of Federal position limits
would have to separately request an exemption
from the applicable exchange for purposes of
exchange-set limits. As discussed earlier in this
release, the Commission proposed to separately
allow for enumerated hedges and spreads that meet
the ‘‘spread transaction’’ definition to be selfeffectuating. See supra Section II.C. (discussing
proposed § 150.3).
1063 In particular, the Commission recognizes
that, in the energy and metals spaces, market
participants are familiar with exchange application
processes and are not familiar with the
Commission’s processes since, currently, there are
no Federal position limits for those commodities.
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decision as to whether to recognize the
exchange’s determination for purposes
of Federal speculative position limits set
forth in proposed § 150.2, and would
not be a substitute for the Commission’s
determination.
Under the proposed procedural
framework, an exchange’s determination
to recognize a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge in accordance with proposed
§ 150.9 with respect to exchange-set
limits would serve to inform the
Commission’s own decision as to
whether to recognize the exchange’s
determination for purposes of Federal
position limits set forth in proposed
§ 150.2. Among other conditions, the
exchange would be required to base its
determination on standards that
conform to the Commission’s own
standards for recognizing bona fide
hedges for purposes of Federal position
limits.
Further, the exchange’s determination
with respect to its own position limits
and application process would be
subject to Commission review and
oversight. These requirements were
proposed to facilitate the Commission’s
independent review and determination
by ensuring that any bona fide hedge
recognized by an exchange for purposes
of exchange-set limits in accordance
with proposed § 150.9 conforms to the
Commission’s standards. For a given
referenced contract, proposed § 150.9
would allow a person to exceed Federal
position limits if the exchange listing
the contract recognized the position as
a bona fide hedge with respect to
exchange-set limits, unless the
Commission denies or stays the
application within ten business days (or
two business days for applications,
including retroactive applications, filed
due to sudden or unforeseen
circumstances) (the ‘‘10/2-day review’’).
Under the 2020 NPRM, if the
Commission does not intervene during
that 10/2-day review period, then the
exemption would be deemed approved
for purposes of Federal position limits.
The Commission provides a more
detailed discussion of each sub-section
of proposed § 150.9 further below.
ii. General Comments—NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions, Generally
Generally, the majority of commenters
supported the Commission’s proposed
approach in § 150.9.1064 In particular,
one commenter expressed that § 150.9
1064 ICE at 8; CCI at 2; IECA at 1–2; NGFA at 9;
MGEX at 4; AGA at 11; CME Group at 7; FIA at 2;
CMC at 10–11; EPSA at 6–7; Suncor at 2; COPE at
4; Shell at 3–4; and CEWG at 3; See also ASR at
3 (noting that proposed § 150.9 effectively leverages
existing exchange frameworks).
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3369
represents a ‘‘fair and balanced’’
approach,1065 and another commenter
expressed that § 150.9 offers an
‘‘efficient and timely process for hedgers
to obtain permission to mitigate their
risk.’’ 1066 On the other hand, certain
commenters opposed the streamlined
process in § 150.9 and requested that the
Commission reduce or eliminate the
role of exchanges in processing nonenumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions.1067
In particular, certain commenters
expressed concerns regarding the
proposed role of exchanges in § 150.9.
That is, certain commenters were
concerned that the streamlined
approach in proposed § 150.9 would
create conflicts of interest for exchanges
(which commenters note are for-profit
entities) where exchanges could benefit
from granting non-compliant nonenumerated bona fide hedge exemptions
to boost trading volume and profits.1068
Other commenters expressed concern
that § 150.9 delegates too much
discretion to exchanges to determine
what qualifies as a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge without well-defined
criteria, and that such discretion could
lead to an unlimited universe of new
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions that could adversely impact
1065 Suncor
at 2.
at 4.
1067 Rutkowski at 1; AFR at 2; IECA at 2–3; Public
Citizen at 2–3; NEFI at 4; Better Markets at 3, 62;
IATP at 13–14; NEFI at 4; and PMAA at 4 (noting
a concern that non-enumerated bona fide hedges
would be granted outside of the notice and
comment rulemaking process).
1068 Rutkowski at 1; see also AFR at 2 (stating
concerns that proposed § 150.9 would be ineffective
at controlling speculation due, in part, to the
substantially increased flexibility of exchanges and
market participants to determine whether positions
qualify for bona fide hedge exemptions or to
propose and institute new non-enumerated hedge
exemptions, despite clear conflicts posed by
exchanges’ incentive to directly profit from trading
volume); IECA at 2–3 and NEFI at 4 (stating that
proposed § 150.9 would perpetuate a concern,
raised by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act, that
exchanges may be motivated by profit to allow
broad hedge exemptions that may include noncommercial market participants); Public Citizen at
2–3 (stating that proposed § 150.9 puts for-profit
exchanges in the driver’s seat of making decisions
on granting exemptions, and that customer
incentive programs offered by exchanges to increase
trading volumes would undermine the exchanges’
efforts to determine hedge exemptions; arguing that
certain exchanges have experienced difficulty in
‘‘cooperating’’ with current laws and regulations,
thus casting doubt on their ability to enforce the
proposed rule; and arguing that no additional
authority should be granted to CME pending
resolution of CFTC v. Byrnes, Case. No. 13–cv–
01174 (SDNY) (alleging a violation of internal
firewalls and sales of confidential trading
information to an outside broker). Regarding Public
Citizen’s comment on CFTC v. Byrnes, the
Commission notes that this case has been resolved
and is not a condition precedent to this Final Rule.
1066 COPE
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markets.1069 Finally, several
commenters shared the view that
§ 150.9 would erode the Commission’s
authority over exchange-granted
exemptions, and that the Commission
should retain all authority to grant nonenumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions.1070
iii. Discussion of Final Rule—NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions, Generally—
General Concerns and Comments on
§ 150.9
First, the Commission reiterates, as
stated in the 2020 NPRM, that an
exchange’s determination to recognize a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge in
accordance with proposed § 150.9 with
respect to exchange-set limits would
serve to inform the Commission’s
decision whether to recognize such
position as a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge for purposes of Federal position
limits set forth in proposed § 150.2. The
Commission is not delegating or ceding
its authority to exchanges to make the
determination for purposes of Federal
position limits to recognize a position as
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge for
applications submitted under § 150.9. In
that regard, the exchange’s
determination to recognize a bona fide
hedge with respect to exchange-set
limits established under § 150.5 is not a
substitute for the Commission’s
independent review of, and
determination with respect to, nonenumerated bona fide hedge
applications submitted pursuant to
§ 150.9.
As described in detail below, under
§ 150.9 as adopted herein, exchanges
that elect to review non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications under
§ 150.9 are required to establish and
maintain standards and processes for
such review, approved by the
Commission pursuant to § 40.5. Section
150.9 requires, among other things, that
the exchanges base their determinations
on standards that conform to the
Commission’s own standards for
recognizing bona fide hedges for
purposes of Federal position limits. The
Final Rule also requires an exchange to
directly notify the Commission of any
determinations to recognize a nonenumerated bona fide hedge for
purposes of exchange-set limits, and,
upon such notification, the Commission
1069 PMAA at 4; see also Better Markets at 63
(arguing that the standards for exchanges to grant
non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions are
too flexible and lack meaningful constraints).
1070 PMAA at 4 (noting a concern that nonenumerated bona fide hedges would be granted
outside of the notice and comment rulemaking
process); IATP at 13–14; NEFI at 4.
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will make its determination as to such
applications for purposes of Federal
position limits. The Commission also
reserves authority to, at a later date and
after providing an opportunity to
respond, revoke a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition that is approved
through the § 150.9 process and require
a participant to lower its position below
the Federal position limit level within a
commercially reasonable time if the
Commission finds that the position no
longer meets the bona fide hedge
definition in § 150.1.
In response to general concerns that
§ 150.9 would create conflicts of interest
for exchanges, the Commission does not
believe that § 150.9 creates incentives
for exchanges to grant non-enumerated
bona fide hedge exemptions in order to
boost trading volume and profits.1071 On
the contrary, the Commission believes
there are several requirements and
obligations that incentivize and require
exchanges to implement § 150.9 in a
manner that protects their markets.
First, under § 150.9, exchanges may
only grant non-enumerated bona fide
hedges that meet the Commission’s bona
fide hedging definition, and each nonenumerated bona fide hedge approved
by an exchange for purposes of its own
limits is separately and independently
reviewed by the Commission for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Next, under § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G)
finalized herein, exchanges are required
to consider whether approving a
particular exemption request would
result in positions that would not be in
accord with sound commercial practices
in the relevant commodity derivatives
market and/or whether the position
resulting from an approved exemption
would exceed an amount that may be
established and liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market.1072
Finally, under DCM Core Principle 5
and SEF Core Principle 6, exchanges are
accountable for administering position
limits in a manner that reduces the
potential threat of market manipulation
or congestion.1073 The Commission
believes that these requirements,
working in concert, provide sufficient
guardrails to mitigate any potential
conflicts of interest for exchanges.
Further, the Commission does not
agree that § 150.9 improperly delegates
discretion to exchanges or erodes the
Commission’s authority over exchanges
and the non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition process because, as
1071 See generally supra Sections II.B.2.iv.b. and
II.G.2. (discussing studies that indicate that
exchanges are incentivized to maintain market
integrity).
1072 See infra Final Rule § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G).
1073 See 17 CFR 37.600 and 38.300.
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discussed above, the Commission is not
delegating its decision-making authority
with respect to the granting of bona fide
hedge recognitions for purposes of
Federal position limits. Rather, the
Commission is allowing exchanges to
offer traders the opportunity to submit
their applications for a bona fide hedge
recognition pursuant to a consolidated
review process under which the
Commission will conduct its own
review and make an independent
determination for purposes of Federal
speculative position limits.
The Commission has thus determined
to adopt § 150.9 largely as proposed, but
with certain modifications and
clarifications, as described further
below, to address commenters’ views
and other considerations. The following
discussions summarize each sub-section
of proposed § 150.9, as well as
comments received and the
Commission’s final determination with
respect to each sub-section of § 150.9.
3. Section 150.9(a)—Approval of
Exchange Rules Related to the
Application Submission Process for
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM—Approval
of Rules
Proposed § 150.9(a) would require an
exchange to have rules, adopted
pursuant to the existing rule-approval
process in § 40.5 of the Commission’s
regulations, that establish standards and
processes in accordance with proposed
§ 150.9 as described below. The
Commission would review such rules to
ensure that the exchange’s standards
and processes for recognizing bona fide
hedges for its own exchange-set limits
conform to the Commission’s standards
and processes for recognizing bona fide
hedges for Federal position limits.
ii. Comments—Approval of Exchange
Rules Related to the Application
Submission Process for NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions
Although the Commission did not
receive comments directly about the
requirements under proposed § 150.9(a),
the Commission did receive comments
related to when an exchange could start
implementing § 150.9, which is
contingent on the exchange having
approved rules in place. That is, several
commenters recommended a phased
implementation for starting the § 150.9
process to avoid a concentration of nonenumerated bona fide hedge
applications at one time.1074
1074 See ICE at 9; IFUS at 7; CMC at 12; Shell at
4; FIA at 18; Chevron at 16; and CEWG at 27. See
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Commenters suggested starting the
process either six months prior to the
effective date or permitting phased
compliance for six months after the
effective date of the Final Rule.
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule—Approval
of Exchange Rules Related to the
Application Submission Process for
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions
The Commission is finalizing
§ 150.9(a) with the clarifications and
rewording changes described below. As
explained in the Proposal, the
Commission’s pre-approval of an
exchange’s standards and process for
review of non-enumerated bona fide
hedge applications ensures that the
exchange’s determination is based on
the Commission’s applicable standards
and process, allowing the Commission
to leverage off exchange determinations
in conducting the Commission’s own,
independent review.
While the Commission has
determined, as described above, to
extend the compliance period with
respect to certain obligations under this
Final Rule,1075 exchanges may start, but
are not required, to implement and
begin processing non-enumerated bona
fide hedge applications under § 150.9 as
early as the Effective Date of the Final
Rule.1076 The Commission reminds
exchanges that, to implement § 150.9,
they will first need to submit new or
amended rules to the Commission,
pursuant to the existing rule-approval
process in § 40.5 (which could take up
to 45–90 days or longer, as agreed to by
the exchange) before they exchanges can
begin processing applications under
§ 150.9.
Finally, the Commission clarifies that
market participants with existing
Commission-granted non-enumerated or
anticipatory bona fide hedge
recognitions (other than risk
management exemptions) are not
required to reapply to the Commission
for a new recognition under the Final
Rule. That is, if the Commission
previously issued a non-enumerated or
anticipatory bona fide hedge recognition
for one of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts pursuant to existing § 1.47 or
§ 1.48, as applicable, a market
participant is not required, under the
also CME Group at 8 (supporting a 12-month
compliance date, but suggesting that the
Commission work with exchanges to implement a
rolling process where market participants are
‘‘grandfathered into current exchange approved
exemptions they hold today, permitting them to file
for those exemptions on the same annual
schedule’’).
1075 See supra Section I.D. (discussing the
effective and compliance dates for the Final Rule).
1076 Id.
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Final Rule, to reapply to the
Commission for such recognition
pursuant to final § 150.3 or § 150.9.
In addition, the Commission is
making a technical change by rewording
§ 150.9(a) to clarify that exchanges must
seek approval, using the Commission’s
rule approval process in existing § 40.5,
to implement their rules establishing
application processes under § 150.9.
4. Section 150.9(b)—Prerequisites for an
Exchange To Recognize NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedges in
Accordance With This Section
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM—
Prerequisites for an Exchange To
Recognize Non-Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
Proposed § 150.9(b) set forth
conditions that would require an
exchange-recognized bona fide hedge to
conform to the corresponding
definitions and standards the
Commission uses in proposed §§ 150.1
and 150.3 for purposes of the Federal
position limits regime. Proposed
§ 150.9(b) would require the exchange to
meet the following conditions: (i) The
exchange lists the applicable referenced
contract for trading; (ii) the position is
consistent with both the definition of
bona fide hedging transaction or
position in proposed § 150.1 and
existing CEA section 4a(c)(2); and (iii)
the exchange does not recognize as bona
fide hedges any positions that include
commodity index contracts and one or
more referenced contracts, including
exemptions known as risk management
exemptions.1077
ii. Comments and Summary of
Commission Determination—
Prerequisites for an Exchange To
Recognize Non-Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
The Commission did not receive any
comments on proposed § 150.9(b) and is
finalizing this section as proposed, for
reasons stated above with respect to
§ 150.9(b), and with only minor
grammatical edits to change certain
words to a singular tense.
5. Section 150.9(c)—Application
Process
Proposed § 150.9(c) set forth the
information and representations that the
exchange, at a minimum, would be
1077 The Commission finds that financial products
are not substitutes for positions taken or to be taken
in a physical marketing channel. Thus, the offset of
financial risks arising from financial products
would be inconsistent with the definition of bona
fide hedging transactions or positions for physical
commodities in proposed § 150.1. See supra Section
II.A.1. (discussion of the temporary substitute test
and risk-management exemptions).
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required to obtain from applicants as
part of the § 150.9 application process.
Proposed § 150.9(c) would permit
exchanges to rely upon their existing
application forms and processes in
making such determinations, provided
that they collect the information
outlined below. The following sections
summarize each sub-section of proposed
§ 150.9(c) as well as comments received
and the Commission’s determination on
each sub-section.
i. Section 150.9(c)(1)—Required
Information for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedging Positions
a. Summary of 2020 NPRM—Required
Information for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedging Positions
With respect to bona fide hedging
positions in referenced contracts,
proposed § 150.9(c)(1) would require
that any application include: (i) A
description of the position in the
commodity derivative contract for
which the application is submitted
(which would include the name of the
underlying commodity and the position
size); (ii) information to demonstrate
why the position satisfies CEA section
4a(c)(2) and the definition of bona fide
hedging transaction or position in
proposed § 150.1, including ‘‘factual
and legal analysis;’’ (iii) a statement
concerning the maximum size of all
gross positions in derivative contracts
for which the application is submitted
(in order to provide a view of the true
footprint of the position in the market);
(iv) information regarding the
applicant’s activity in the cash markets
for the commodity underlying the
position for which the application is
submitted; 1078 and (v) any other
information the exchange requires, in its
discretion, to enable the exchange and
the Commission to determine whether
such position should be recognized as a
bona fide hedge.1079
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
noted that exchanges would not need to
require the identification of a hedging
need against a particular identified
1078 The Commission expects that exchanges
would require applicants to provide cash-market
data for at least the prior year.
1079 Under proposed § 150.9(c)(1)(iv) and (v),
exchanges, in their discretion, could request
additional information as necessary, including
information for cash-market data similar to what is
required in the Commission’s existing Form 204.
See infra Section II.H.2. (discussion of Form 204
and amendments to part 19). Exchanges could also
request a description of any positions in other
commodity derivative contracts in the same
commodity underlying the commodity derivative
contract for which the application is submitted.
Other commodity derivatives contracts could
include other futures contracts, option on futures
contracts, and swaps (including OTC swaps)
positions held by the applicant.
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category, but that the requesting party
must satisfy all applicable requirements
in proposed § 150.9, including
demonstrating with a factual and legal
analysis that a position would fit within
the bona fide hedge definition. The 2020
NPRM was not intended to require the
hedging party’s books and records to
identify the particular type of hedge
being applied.
b. Comments—Required Information for
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Positions
The Commission received few
comments related to the application
requirements exchanges must
implement under proposed
§ 150.9(c)(1). Some commenters
requested that the Commission remove
the requirement that the exchange
applications implemented under
proposed § 150.9(c)(1)(ii) require a
‘‘factual and legal analysis’’ from
applicants.1080 Another commenter
requested that the Commission clarify
any additional factors exchanges should
consider when granting non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications pursuant
to proposed § 150.9.1081
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c. Discussion of Final Rule—Required
Information for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedging Positions
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.9(c)(1), with certain revisions and
clarifications, explained below. The
information required to be submitted as
part of the application is necessary to
allow the exchange and the Commission
to evaluate whether the applicant’s
hedging position satisfies the bona fide
hedge definition in proposed § 150.1
and CEA section 4a(c)(2).
The Commission is making one
modification to clarify the
1080 CME Group at 10 (noting its concern that this
requirement could be interpreted as requiring
applicants to engage legal counsel to complete their
applications. CME Group stated that by way of
background, CME Group exchanges have never
required detailed legal or economic analysis to
demonstrate compliance with regulatory
requirements. Instead, CME Group requires the
applicant to explain its strategy, and CME Group
considers and analyzes this explanation using the
exchange’s expertise. CME Group recommends that
the CFTC instead require an applicant to ‘‘explain
its strategy and state that it complies with the
regulatory requirements for a bona fide hedge
exemption without having to provide a legal
analysis.’’ The exchange can solicit additional
information from the applicant as needed.) and
CMC at 11 (providing that, in the alternative, the
Commission could clarify that exchanges or the
Commission might request legal analyses at their
discretion, which may be in the form of analysis
provided by in-house counsel).
1081 See ISDA at 9 (requesting that the final rule
include factors exchanges should consider, such as
‘‘sound commercial practices’’ or ‘‘necessary and
appropriate to reduce potential threat of market
manipulation’’).
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Commission’s posture when reviewing
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications under the § 150.9 process.
In proposed § 150.9(c)(1) the
Commission proposed to require
exchanges to collect sufficient
information for the exchange to
determine and the Commission to
‘‘verify’’ that the facts and
circumstances demonstrate that the
exchange may recognize a position as a
bona fide hedge. In final § 150.9(c)(1),
the Commission is revising this
provision to make clear that the
Commission will conduct an
independent evaluation of any
application it reviews to ‘‘determine’’
(not verify) whether the facts and
circumstances demonstrate that the
exchange may recognize the position as
a bona fide hedge. Likewise, the
Commission is also revising final
§ 150.9(c)(1)(v), to require that
exchanges collect any other information
they deem necessary to ‘‘determine’’
(not ‘‘verify’’ as proposed) whether a
particular position meets the bona fide
hedge definition. The term ‘‘determine’’
more accurately describes the
exchange’s responsibility to conduct an
independent evaluation of each
application, as opposed to a verification,
as proposed.
In final § 150.9(c)(1)(ii), the
Commission is modifying the
requirement from proposed
§ 150.9(c)(1)(ii) that exchanges request a
‘‘factual and legal’’ analysis from
applicants for non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions. In proposing
this requirement, the Commission did
not intend for exchanges to require that
applicants engage legal counsel to
complete their applications for nonenumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions. Rather, the purpose of this
proposed provision was to ensure that
applicants provide an explanation and
information that sufficiently
demonstrates why a particular position
qualifies as bona fide hedge, as defined
in § 150.1 and CEA section 4a(c)(2).
Instead of requiring a ‘‘factual and legal
analysis,’’ the Commission has revised
§ 150.9(c)(1)(ii) in the Final Rule
accordingly so that an applicant must
provide an explanation of the hedging
strategy, including a statement that the
applicant’s position complies with the
applicable requirements of the bona fide
hedge definition, and information to
demonstrate why the position satisfies
the applicable requirements. This
revision is intended to clarify that the
applicant is not required to provide a
detailed legal analysis or engage legal
counsel to complete their application.
Rather, the applicant must provide: (1)
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A simple explanation or description of
the hedging strategy (and include a
statement that the strategy complies
with the bona fide hedge definition
requirements); and (2) the relevant
information that shows why or how the
strategy meets the bona fide hedge
definition requirements. The exchange
can then consider this explanation and
information in light of its expertise with
the relevant market in performing its
own analysis.
Also, under § 150.9(c)(1), regarding
the request that the Commission provide
additional factors that exchanges should
consider when granting non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions, the
Commission believes that the
requirements under final § 150.9(c)
provide sufficient criteria for exchanges
to consider when evaluating
applications. As stated in the 2020
NPRM, the Commission believes the
information an exchange is required to
collect under § 150.9(c) is sufficient for
the exchange and the Commission to
determine whether a particular
transaction or position satisfies the
definition of bona fide hedging
transaction for purposes of Federal
position limits. The Commission further
highlights that, under final
§ 150.9(c)(1)(v), an exchange has the
authority to collect any additional
information that, in its discretion,
would help it assess whether to approve
a request for a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition. Further, in
response to ISDA’s request, an exchange
is required by § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G) to
consider some of the factors ISDA
recommended when determining
whether to grant an exemption,
including whether the approval of an
exemption would result in positions
that are in accord with sound
commercial practices, among other
considerations.1082 In summary, the
Commission believes that the final
regulations strike the proper balance by
providing sufficient guidance to the
exchanges for their review and
determination in the context of
exchange-set limits, while preserving
the exchanges’ discretionary authority
to determine what types of additional
information, if any, to collect.
In addition to the revisions and
explanations above, the Commission is
adding the word ‘‘needed’’ to
§ 150.9(c)(1) to clarify that exchanges
may collect all information needed to
conduct their analysis of a particular
application.
1082 See supra Section II.D.3. (addressing other
factors exchanges must consider, under
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G), when granting exemptions for
contracts that are subject to Federal position limits).
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ii. Section 150.9(c)(2)—Timing of NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
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a. Summary of 2020 NPRM—Timing of
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
The Commission did not propose to
prescribe timelines (e.g., a specified
number of days) for exchanges to review
applications because the Commission
believed that exchanges are in the best
position to determine how to best
accommodate the needs of their market
participants. Rather, under proposed
§ 150.9(c)(2), an applicant must submit
its application in advance of exceeding
the applicable Federal position limits
for any given referenced contract.
However, the 2020 NPRM would
permit a person to submit a bona fide
hedge application within five days after
the person has exceeded Federal
speculative limits (commonly referred
to as retroactive applications) if such
person exceeds the limits due to
‘‘demonstrated sudden or unforeseen
increases in its bona fide hedging
needs.’’ Where an applicant claims a
sudden or unforeseen increase in its
bona fide hedging needs, the 2020
NPRM would require exchanges to
require that the person provide
materials demonstrating that the person
exceeded the Federal speculative limit
due to sudden or unforeseen
circumstances. Further, in the 2020
NPRM, the Commission cautioned
exchanges that applications submitted
after a person has exceeded Federal
position limits should not be habitual
and would be reviewed closely. Finally,
if the Commission found that the
position did not qualify as a bona fide
hedge, then the applicant would be
required to bring its position into
compliance, and could face a position
limits violation if it did not reduce the
position within a commercially
reasonable time.
b. Comments—Timing of NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
The Commission received several
comments regarding the retroactive
application provision in proposed
§ 150.9(c)(2)(ii). CME preferred allowing
retroactive application exemptions that
are not limited to circumstances
involving sudden/unforeseen increases
in bona fide hedging needs.1083 Instead,
1083 CME
Group at 9–10 (explaining that in its
experience, position limit violations ‘‘often occur
unintentionally due to operational or administrative
oversight, not because the market participant
needed to enter into a hedge quickly in response to
changing market conditions’’ and that over the past
three years, CME Group has received at least 49
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CME Group recommended that the
Commission (i) allow retroactive
applications regardless of the
circumstances, and (ii) impose a
position limits violation upon an
applicant if the exchange denies the
retroactive application.1084 ICE
recommended that the Commission
permit retroactive exemptions for other
types of exemptions (including spread
exemptions and pass-through-swap
exemptions) as well as for position limit
overages that occur as a result of
operational or incidental issues where
the applicant did not intend to evade
position limits.1085 Finally, IFUS
supported the retroactive application
provision as it was proposed.1086 IFUS
noted that it follows a similar approach
under its existing rules.1087
c. Discussion of Final Rule—Timing of
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.9(c) largely as proposed, with
certain modifications and clarifications
to reflect commenters’ views and other
considerations. First, the Commission is
revising Final Rule § 150.9(c)(2)(i) so
that it is consistent with changes the
Commission is making to § 150.9(e)(3),
discussed further below.1088 As
explained below, under Final Rule
§ 150.9(e)(3),1089 applicants may elect
(at their own risk) 1090 to exceed Federal
position limits after an exchange
notifies the Commission of the
exchange’s approval of the application
for purposes of exchange-set limits,1091
retroactive exemption applications to address some
type of administrative oversight issue); See also
CMC at 11 (agreeing with CME Group), and FIA at
18 (recommending the Commission allow
retroactive exemptions within five business days for
any reason).
1084 CME Group at 9–10 (explaining that without
the threat of a potential position limits violation,
market participants could exploit the retroactive
provision and intentionally exceed position limits
without consequences—‘‘all while disrupting
orderly market operations.’’ According to CME
Group, the prospect of having an application denied
and being found in violation of position limits has
worked to deter market participants from
attempting to exploit the retroactive exemption
process).
1085 ICE at 10.
1086 IFUS at 13–14.
1087 Id.
1088 See infra Section II.G.7. (discussing when a
person may exceed Federal position limits).
1089 Id.
1090 See infra Section II.G.7.ii. (explaining that an
applicant bears the risk that the Commission could
deny the application and require the person to bring
their position into compliance with Federal
position limits).
1091 The Commission clarifies, for the avoidance
of doubt, that an exchange approval of a nonenumerated bona fide hedge (for purposes of
exchange limits) issued under § 150.9 is not a
Commission approval of the non-enumerated bona
fide hedge.
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3373
and during the Commission’s 10-day
review period. This is a change from the
2020 NPRM under which a person
would be required to wait until the
Commission’s 10-day review period
expired before exceeding Federal
position limits. Proposed § 150.9(c)(2)(i)
was drafted in a manner that reflects
this proposed requirement. Accordingly,
the Commission is revising
§ 150.9(c)(2)(i) to clarify that an
applicant may exceed Federal position
limits after receiving a notice of
approval from the relevant designated
contract market or swap execution
facility.
Next, the Commission has determined
not to expand the retroactive
application provision in § 150.9(c)(2)(ii)
to be available in any circumstances
(i.e., not just for sudden or unforeseen
hedging needs) or for other exemption
types. The Final Rule provides broad
flexibility to market participants in the
form of various exemptions from
Federal position limits. In particular,
this Final Rule significantly expands the
list of self-effectuating enumerated bona
fide hedges available to market
participants,1092 provides an expansive
spread transaction exemption
provision,1093 and provides new
exemptions for relief for financial
distress positions and conditional spot
month limits for certain natural gas
positions.1094 This Final Rule also
grants additional flexibility for market
participants to exceed Federal position
limits during the pendency of the
Commission’s review of the application.
Given these additional enhancements to
the Federal position limits framework
for bona fide hedges and other
exemptions, the Commission expects
that there will be a limited number of
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
requests submitted through the § 150.9
process and that it is reasonable to
expect that market participants will be
able to file any such non-enumerated
bona fide hedge requests ahead of
needing to exceed limits.
The Commission is willing to permit
the limited exception for retroactive
applications that occur due to sudden or
unforeseen bona fide hedging needs, as
described above. Otherwise, market
participants would be penalized and
prevented from assuming appropriate
hedges even though their hedging need
arises from circumstances beyond their
1092 See supra Section II.A.1. (discussing the
expanded list of enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A).
1093 See supra Section II.A.20. (discussing the
expanded spread transaction definition in § 150.1).
1094 See supra Section II.C.5–6. (discussing the
financial distress exemption and the conditional
spot month limit exemption in natural gas).
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control. Beyond that exception, the
Commission believes that market
participants are able, and should be
required, to file timely applications. The
Commission believes this is particularly
true for trading strategies that are not
enumerated bona fide hedges and thus
may involve some element of non-risk
reducing activity. Expanding the
exception beyond bona fide hedging
needs that arise due to sudden or
unforeseen circumstances may disincentivize market participants from
properly monitoring their hedging
activities and filing exemption
applications in a timely manner.
iii. Section 150.9(c)(3)—Renewal of
Applications for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
a. Summary of 2020 NPRM—Renewal of
Applications for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
Proposed § 150.9(c)(3) would require
that the exchange require persons with
approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedges that were previously granted
pursuant to proposed § 150.9 to reapply
to the exchange at least on an annual
basis by updating their original
applications. Proposed § 150.9(c)(3)
would also require that the exchange
require applicants to receive a notice of
approval of the renewal from the
exchange prior to exceeding the
applicable position limit.
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b. Comments—Renewal of Applications
for Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Several commenters requested a
clarification that an applicant (i) would
only be subject to the Commission’s 10/
2-day review process in § 150.9(e)
(described below) for initial
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions, and (ii) would
not be subject to such review for annual
renewal applications, unless the facts
and circumstances materially change
from those presented in the initial
application.1095
Commission is also clarifying that,
except as provided below, renewals of
previously-approved non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications are not
required to be submitted to the
Commission under § 150.9, and need
only be submitted to and approved by
the relevant exchange at least on an
annual basis for the applicant to
continue relying on such recognition for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Such renewal application serves the
purpose of confirming that the facts and
circumstances underlying the original
application approved by the
Commission remain operative.
However, if the facts and circumstances
underlying a renewal application are
materially different than the initial
application, then such application
should be treated as a new request that
should be submitted through the § 150.9
process and subject to the Commission’s
10/2-day review process in § 150.9(e).
iv. Section 150.9(c)(4)—Exchange
Revocation Authority
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exchange Revocation Authority
Proposed § 150.9(c)(4) would require
that an exchange retain its authority to
limit, condition, or revoke, at any time,
any recognition previously issued
pursuant to proposed § 150.9, for any
reason, including if the exchange
determines that the recognition is no
longer consistent with the bona fide
hedge definition in proposed § 150.1 or
section 4a(c)(2) of the Act.
b. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Exchange
Revocation Authority
The Commission did not receive
comments on proposed § 150.9(c)(4) and
is finalizing this section as proposed.
6. Section 150.9(d)—Recordkeeping
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Recordkeeping
c. Discussion of Final Rule—Renewal of
Applications for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.9(c)(3) with modifications to
clarify that the Commission’s review
and determination conducted under
final § 150.9(e) is required only for
initial applications for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions. The
Proposed § 150.9(d) would require
exchanges to maintain complete books
and records of all activities relating to
the processing and disposition of
applications in a manner consistent
with the Commission’s existing general
regulations regarding recordkeeping.1096
Such records would need to include: All
information and documents submitted
by an applicant in connection with its
application; records of oral and written
1095 CEWG at 27; MGEX at 3; CME Group at 8;
FIA at 17; ICE at 9; and IFUS at 7 (further requesting
that if a non-enumerated bona fide hedge is granted,
a participant should be able to treat similar
positions as bona fide hedges so long as they reapply to the exchange through the annual renewal
process).
1096 Requirements regarding the keeping and
inspection of all books and records required to be
kept by the Act or the Commission’s regulations are
found at § 1.31. 17 CFR 1.31. DCMs are already
required to maintain records of their business
activities in accordance with the requirements of
§ 1.31 and § 38.951. 17 CFR 38.951.
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communications between the exchange
and the applicant in connection with
the application; and information and
documents in connection with the
exchange’s analysis of, and action on,
such application. Exchanges would also
be required to maintain any
documentation submitted by an
applicant after the disposition of an
application, including, for example, any
reports or updates the applicant files
with the exchange.
ii. Comments—Recordkeeping
The Commission received one
comment regarding exchange
recordkeeping requirements under
proposed § 150.9. NGSA requested that
any exchange recordkeeping/reporting
requirements that apply to the proposed
§ 150.9 process do not require matching
applicants’ hedge positions to their
underlying cash positions on a one-tobasis, but should instead allow for
recordkeeping/reporting of positions on
an aggregate basis.1097
iii. Discussion of Final Rule—
Recordkeeping
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.9(d) as proposed, and with only
one minor grammatical edit to change
the term ‘‘designated contract market’’
to the correct possessive tense. The
Commission also clarifies here, in
response to comments, that the
§ 150.9(d) recordkeeping requirements
do not prescribe the manner in which
exchanges record how they match
applicants’ bona fide hedge positions to
applicants’ underlying cash positions.
Rather, final § 150.9(c)(1)(iv) requires
that an exchange collect the necessary
information regarding an applicant’s
cash-market activity and offsetting cash
positions, and final § 150.9(d) simply
requires the exchange to keep a record
of such application materials and
information collected. However, an
exchange’s records should be sufficient
to demonstrate that any approved nonenumerated bona fide hedges meet the
requirements of § 150.9(b). The
Commission also reiterates, as explained
in the 2020 NPRM, that exchanges are
required to store and produce records
pursuant to existing § 1.31,1098 and will
1097 See NGSA at 9 (noting that allowing
matching on an aggregate basis would accommodate
the practical needs of many market participants to
hedge their risks on a portfolio basis).
1098 Consistent with existing § 1.31, the
Commission expects that these records would be
readily available during the first two years of the
required five-year recordkeeping period for paper
records, and readily accessible for the entire fiveyear recordkeeping period for electronic records. In
addition, the Commission expects that records
required to be maintained by an exchange pursuant
to this section would be readily accessible during
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be subject to requests for information
pursuant to other applicable
Commission regulations, including, for
example, existing § 38.5.1099
7. Section 150.9(e)—Process for a Person
To Exceed Federal Position Limits
The following discussion summarizes
proposed § 150.9(e), comments received,
and the Commission’s determination
according to each sub-section, or a
combination of certain subsections, of
§ 150.9(e).
i. Section 150.9(e)(1)–(2)—Notification
to the Commission and Notification
Requirements
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Notification to the Commission and
Notification Requirements
Under proposed § 150.9(e)(1), once an
exchange recognizes a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge with respect to its own
exchange-set position limits established
pursuant to § 150.5(a), the exchange
would be required to notify the
Commission concurrently with the
approval notice it provides to the
applicant. Under proposed § 150.9(e)(2),
such notification to the Commission
would need to include a copy of the
application and any supporting
materials, as well as certain basic
information, outlined in § 150.9(e)(2)(i)–
(vi), about the exemption. The exchange
would only be required to provide this
notice to the Commission with respect
to its initial (and not renewal)
determination for a particular
application.
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b. Comments—Notification to the
Commission and Notification
Requirements
While proposed § 150.9(e)(1) would
require an exchange to notify the
Commission upon making an initial
determination to recognize a nonenumerated bona fide hedge, that rule
would not require the exchange to
notify the public of any such
determination. Commenters submitted
several general requests related to the
publication of non-enumerated bona
fide hedges and the future expansion of
the list of enumerated bona fide hedges
in Appendix A to the proposed
regulatory text in the 2020 NPRM.
Specifically, certain commenters
requested that exchanges be required to
the pendency of any application, and for two years
following any disposition that did not recognize a
derivative position as a bona fide hedge.
1099 See 17 CFR 38.5 (requiring, in general, that
upon request by the Commission, a DCM must file
responsive information with the Commission, such
as information related to its business, or a written
demonstration of the DCM’s compliance with one
or more core principles).
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publicize approved non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions so that
market participants are aware of the
types of recognitions they can
receive.1100
c. Discussion of Final Rule—
Notification to the Commission and
Notification Requirements
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.9(e)(1)–(2) as proposed.
While the Final Rule does not require
exchanges to publicize approved nonenumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions, an exchange may elect, in
its discretion, to provide such a list. The
Commission understands, however, that
in the past, exchanges and market
participants have raised concerns that
publicizing information about approved
non-enumerated bona fide hedges could
divulge confidential information (such
as trade secrets, intellectual property,
the market participant’s identity or
position).1101
To the extent that an exchange elects
to publicize descriptions of approved
non-enumerated bona fide hedges, the
Commission cautions that any such data
published should not disclose the
identity of, or confidential information
about, the applicant. Rather, any
published summaries are expected to be
general (generic facts and
circumstances). While the decision
whether to publicize descriptions of
approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedges is at the discretion of the
exchange, the exchange remains subject
to all applicable laws and regulations
(including exchange bylaws) governing
the protection of confidential trade and
trader information. The Commission
also cautions exchanges to make clear
that any descriptions or lists of
approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedges they elect to publish are for
informational purposes only and do not
bestow any rights upon applicants to a
claim that a particular strategy is a nonenumerated bona fide hedge simply
because it aligns with a published
example or description provided by the
exchange.
1100 See COPE at 5 (noting that such notice should
provide market participants the facts upon which
the recognition is based, and would save the
Commission from repeatedly processing requests
for the same hedging strategy); FIA at 15, 19
(requesting that exchanges be required to publish
anonymized descriptions of non-enumerated
hedging recognitions granted by the exchange);
EPSA at 5–7.
1101 See 81 FR at 96824.
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3375
ii. Section 150.9(e)(3)–(4)—Exceeding
Federal Speculative Position Limits and
the Commission’s 10/2-Day Review
Process
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Exceeding Federal Speculative Position
Limits and the Commission’s 10/2-Day
Review Process
Under proposed § 150.9(e)(3), a
person could exceed Federal position
limits ten business days after the
exchange notifies the Commission in
accordance with proposed § 150.9(e)(2)
that the exchange has approved the nonenumerated bona fide hedge application
for purposes of exchange limits,
provided that the Commission does not
notify the exchange or applicant that the
Commission has determined to stay or
deny the application during its ten-day
review.
Under proposed § 150.9(e)(4), if a
person exceeds Federal position limits
due to sudden or unforeseen bona fide
hedging needs and then files a
retroactive application pursuant to
proposed § 150.9(c)(2)(ii), then such
application would be deemed approved
by the Commission two business days
after the exchange issues the required
notification, provided that the
Commission does not notify the
exchange or applicant that the
Commission has determined to stay or
deny the application during its two-day
review.
Under the 2020 NPRM, once those ten
(or two) business days have passed, the
person could rely on the bona fide
hedge recognition both for purposes of
exchange-set and Federal position
limits, with the certainty that the
Commission (and not Commission staff)
would only revoke that determination in
the limited circumstances set forth in
proposed § 150.9(f)(1) and (2) described
further below.
b. Comments—Exceeding Federal
Speculative Position Limits and the
Commission’s 10/2-Day Review Process
The bulk of the comments the
Commission received on proposed
§ 150.9 relate to the Commission’s
proposed ten-day or two-day period for
reviewing a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application after an exchange has
already approved the application for
purposes of the exchange-set limits (as
noted above,1102 the 10/2-day review).
In particular, the Commission received
several comments on the sufficiency of
the proposed review periods, including
that the Commission’s proposed 10/21102 See
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day review period is: (1) Too long; 1103
(2) too short; 1104 and (3) just right.1105
In addition, several commenters
suggested that the Commission permit
applicants to exceed Federal position
limits during the Commission’s ten-day
review period (which occurs after an
exchange issues its approval with
respect to exchange-set limits).1106
Commenters also suggested that rather
than the CFTC reviewing each nonenumerated bona fide hedge exemption
application after each exchange
determination, the CFTC should
monitor exchanges at a higher level
(such as through the rule enforcement
review process).1107
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c. Discussion of Final Rule—Exceeding
Federal Speculative Position Limits and
the Commission’s 10/2-Day Review
Process
The Commission is adopting
§ 150.9(e)(3)–(4) with certain revisions
and clarifications as discussed below.
First, regarding general comments on
the length of the Commission’s 10/2-day
review periods, the Commission
acknowledges commenters’ concerns
regarding whether the Commission will
have enough time to review and act on
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications. However, the Commission
will continue to develop internal
processes and systems to respond to
§ 150.9 applications as needed and
within those timeframes. In addition,
1103 ADM at 6 (suggesting a five/one business day
review period); ICE at 9 (explaining that the 10-day
review period would impose unnecessary burdens
and delay and create uncertainty for market
participants); IFUS at 14 (explaining that the 10-day
review period potentially conflicts with the
exchange’s spot-month exemption review process,
as contracts could expire before the review period
ends, and noting that a two day review, although
not ideal, is preferred); NGFA at 9 (suggesting a
two-business-day review period).
1104 IATP at 13–14 (contending that the 10/2-day
review period would burden an under-resourced
Commission); Better Markets at 3, 63 (asserting that,
under proposed § 150.9, it is impossible for
Commission staff to, within the prescribed amount
of time: review and collect additional information
on non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications;
draft orders; receive the Chairman’s approval for a
seriatim process; and secure the necessary
Commissioner votes).
1105 CME Group at 7 (also agreeing that a timeline
for exchanges’ review of applications should not be
prescribed).
1106 ADM at 6; ICE at 9; IFUS at 7; CME Group
at 7–8 (explaining that exchanges have ‘‘strong
incentives to grant exemptions only after careful
review’’ because they have statutory obligations to
prevent manipulation); CMC at 12 (noting that it is
currently unclear whether an applicant can enter
into a position during the Commission’s 10/2-day
review).
1107 ICE at 9; IFUS at 7 (questioning whether it
is necessary for the Commission to routinely review
each non-enumerated bona fide hedge application);
CEWG at 26–27 (suggesting an annual exchange
rule enforcement review process instead of the 10/
2-day review).
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the § 150.9 process enables the
Commission to leverage the exchange’s
review and analysis, which would serve
to inform the Commission’s own review.
The Commission believes that this
streamlined approach will reduce the
amount of time required for the
Commission’s review each application.
In addition, regarding comments
suggesting that the 10/2-day review
periods are too long and will impose
unnecessary delays on market
participants, and the request that market
participants be able to exceed Federal
position limits during the Commission’s
10-day review, the Commission is
revising proposed § 150.9(e)(3) to
provided additional flexibility. Under
§ 150.9(e)(3), applicants may elect to
exceed Federal position limits once they
receive a notice of approval from the
relevant exchange and during the
Commission’s 10-day review period, but
will do so at their own risk.
That is, if an applicant exceeds
Federal position limits before the
Commission’s 10-day review period
ends, the applicant bears market risk for
that position, in that the Commission
could, in accordance with § 150.9(e)(6)
described below, deny the application
for purposes of Federal position limits
and require the applicant to bring its
position back into compliance with the
Federal position limits within a
commercially reasonable amount of
time, as determined by the Commission
in consultation with the relevant
exchange and applicant. As discussed
below in connection with § 150.9(e)(6),
in these circumstances where an
applicant is required to lower its
position, as a matter of policy, the
Commission will not pursue an
enforcement action against the applicant
so long as the application was filed in
good faith (meaning the applicant and
exchange have a reasonable and good
faith basis for determining that the
position meets the requirements of
§ 150.9(b)) and the applicant brings its
position into compliance within a
commercially reasonable amount of
time.
Further, regarding general comments
that the length of the 10/2-day review
period is too long, the Commission
believes allowing applicants to exceed
Federal position limits during the
Commission’s ten-day review period
addresses many commenter concerns.
As described above, the Final Rule also
affords applicants the ability to file
retroactive applications in certain
limited circumstances, and to hold
positions above Federal position limits
during the Commission’s two-day
review of such retroactive application.
The Commission believes that these
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avenues adequately accommodate
market participants’ needs to hedge in a
timely manner, and are well-balanced
with the Commission’s need to maintain
adequate oversight of non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications through its
limited 10/2-day review periods.
Furthermore, the Commission would
consider it to be a reasonable and
helpful practice if exchanges elect to
provide information to the Commission
on non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications as the exchange is
considering such applications. That is,
the Commission would find it helpful to
receive an advance courtesy copy of any
§ 150.9 applications the exchange
receives. The exchange is not, however,
required to provide such advance
copies, and would not be required to
obtain an opinion on such applications
from the Commission before making its
determination. Rather, providing such
application information as the exchange
receives it could facilitate a more rapid
Commission evaluation of § 150.9
applications. This would help facilitate
additional regulatory certainty for
market participants and would aid the
Commission in its review of
applications processed under § 150.9.
Also, while commenters requested
that the Commission should not review
each non-enumerated bona fide hedge
application, the Commission is of the
view that it must review each
application in order to conform to the
legal limits on what an agency may
delegate to persons outside the
agency.1108 Under the new model
finalized herein, the Commission will
be informed by the exchanges’
determinations to make the
Commission’s own determination for
purposes of Federal position limits
before the 10/2-day review period
expires. Accordingly, the Commission
will retain its decision-making authority
with respect to the Federal position
limits and provide legal certainty to
market participants of their
determinations.
Finally, in § 150.9(e)(3) and (4), the
Commission is making one technical
correction to clarify that a person may
exceed Federal position limits or rely on
1108 In U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit held ‘‘that, while Federal agency officials
may sub-delegate their decision-making authority to
subordinates absent evidence of contrary
congressional intent, they may not sub-delegate to
outside entities—private or sovereign—absent
affirmative evidence of authority to do so.’’ U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565–68 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, there
are three circumstances that the agency may
‘‘delegate’’ its authority to an outside party because
they do not involve sub-delegation of decisionmaking authority: (1) Establishing a reasonable
condition for granting Federal approval; (2) fact
gathering; and (3) advice giving. Id. at 568.
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an approved retroactive application
after the 10/2-day review period, as
applicable, unless the Commission
notifies the person and relevant
exchange that it has determined to stay
or deny the application, pursuant to
§ 150.9(e)(5) or (e)(6). In the 2020
NPRM, the Commission only referred to
its stay authority in § 150.9(e)(5),
discussed in detail below. However, as
clarified in the Final Rule, the
Commission could also notify the
applicant and exchange of its
determination to deny the application
for purposes of Federal position limits
under § 150.9(e)(6), also discussed
below. This change is a technical
correction and does not change the
substance of § 150.9(e)(3) or (4).
iii. Section 150.9(e)(5)—Commission
Stay of Pending Applications and
Requests for Additional Information
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with RULES2
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Commission Stay of Pending
Applications and Requests for
Additional Information
Under proposed § 150.9(e)(5), the
Commission could stay a nonenumerated bona fide hedge application
that an exchange has approved,
pursuant to § 150.9(e)(2), for purposes of
exchange-set limits. Under the 2020
NPRM, if, during the ten (or two)
business day timeframe in § 150.9(e)(3)
or (4), the Commission notifies the
exchange and applicant that the
Commission (and not staff) has
determined to stay the application, the
applicant would not be able to rely on
the exchange’s approval of the
application for purposes of exceeding
Federal position limits, unless the
Commission approves the application
after further review. The proposed stay
provision did not include a time
limitation on the duration of a
Commission stay.
Separately, under proposed
§ 150.9(e)(5), the Commission (or
Commission staff) could request
additional information from the
exchange or applicant in order to
evaluate the application, and the
exchange and applicant would have an
opportunity to provide the Commission
with any supplemental information
requested to continue the application
process. Any such request for additional
information by the Commission (or
staff), however, would not stay or toll
the ten (or two) business day
application review period.
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3377
b. Comments—Commission Stay of
Pending Applications and Requests for
Additional Information
edits to improve readability, none of
which impact the substance of the
section.
With respect to instances where the
Commission has stayed an exchangegranted non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application or elects to review a
previously approved-application,
several commenters requested that the
Commission limit the duration of its
review period, which was unlimited in
the 2020 NPRM.1109
iv. Section 150.9(e)(6)—Commission
Determination for Applications During
the 10/2-Day Review
The following discussion addresses
§ 150.9(e)(6), which deals with any
Commission determinations that are
issued for pending applications and
during the Commission’s 10/2-day
review.
c. Discussion of Final Rule—
Commission Stay of Pending
Applications and Requests for
Additional Information
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Commission Determination for
Applications During the 10/2-Day
Review
Under proposed § 150.9(e)(6), if the
Commission determined that an
application does not meet the
conditions set forth in proposed
§ 150.9(b), the Commission would notify
the exchange and the applicant and
provide an opportunity for the applicant
to respond. After doing so, the
Commission could, in its discretion,
deny the application for purposes of
Federal position limits, and require the
person to reduce the position within a
commercially reasonable amount of
time, as determined by the Commission
in consultation with the applicant and
the exchange.
In such a case, the applicant would
not be subject to any finding of a
position limits violation during the
Commission’s review of a pending
application or after the Commission
makes its determination. A person
would also not be subject to a violation
if they already exceeded Federal
position limits and filed a retroactive
application, and the Commission then
determined that the bona fide hedge is
not approved for purposes of Federal
position limits. In either case, the 2020
NPRM provided that the Commission
would not find that the person had
committed a position limits violation so
long as the person brings the position
into compliance within a commercially
reasonable time.
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.9(e)(5) with certain
modifications and clarifications in
response to commenters and other
considerations.
In response to commenters’ requests,
the Commission is modifying its stay
authority under proposed § 150.9(e)(5).
Under the Final Rule, any Commission
stay issued pursuant to § 150.9(e)(5) will
be limited to 45 days. The Commission
has a long history of conducting other
extensive regulatory reviews within a
45-day period.1110 The Commission has
found that this timeframe provides
sufficient time for the Commission to
conduct an adequate review while also
providing certainty to market
participants that the review will not be
indefinite.
The Commission is also clarifying in
final § 150.9(e)(5) that if the
Commission stays a pending application
where the applicant has not yet
exceeded Federal position limits, then
the applicant may not exceed Federal
position limits until the Commission
issues a final determination. Further, if
the Commission stays a pending
application and the applicant has
already exceeded Federal position limits
(either during the Commission’s 10-day
review period or as part of a retroactive
application), then the applicant may
continue to maintain its position unless
the Commission notifies the designated
contract market or swap execution
facility and the applicant otherwise,
pursuant to § 150.9(e)(6).
In addition to the changes above, the
Commission is making several technical
1109 ICE at 9; FIA at 18; CME Group at 7
(suggesting that the Commission’s stay or review of
an application should not exceed 30 calendar days);
IFUS at 15 (noting that any Commission stay will
almost certainly conflict with IFUS procedures for
reviewing exemptions in the spot month, where
certain exemptions may be in effect for less than 10
days).
1110 See 17 CFR 40.3 and 40.5 (providing the
Commission’s 45-day review period for new
product and rule approval applications).
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b. Comments—Commission
Determination for Applications During
the 10/2-Day Review
Commenters requested that the
Commission allow traders sufficient
time to exit a position if the
Commission denies an exchangeapproved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application before the end of the
10/2-day review period.1111
1111 CMC at 12 (requesting a commercially
reasonably amount of time to exit positions); ADM
at 6 (requesting, in addition, that the Commission
consult exchanges on what is a commercially
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c. Discussion of Final Rule—
Commission Determination for
Applications During the 10/2-Day
Review
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.9(e)(6) with certain
modifications and clarifications in
response to commenters and other
considerations.
First, for the avoidance of doubt and
in response to comments, the
Commission clarifies and reiterates how
it will handle any determination to deny
an application under final § 150.9(e)(6).
Generally, if the Commission denies an
application under § 150.9(e)(6), and the
applicant consequently is required to
reduce its position below the applicable
Federal position limit, the Commission
will allow the applicant a commercially
reasonable amount of time to do so. The
Commission will determine the
commercially reasonable amount of
time in consultation with the relevant
exchange and the applicant. The
Commission intends for the applicant
and the relevant exchange to have input
regarding what amount of time is
sufficient.
Further, the Commission is clarifying
for final § 150.9(e)(6) that it expects all
applicants to submit their applications
in good faith. As part of that good faith
submission, the Commission expects
each applicant will have a reasonable
basis for determining that the purported
non-enumerated bona fide hedge meets
the requirements of § 150.9(b).
Accordingly, the Commission is revising
§ 150.9(e)(6) to clarify that the
Commission will not pursue an
enforcement action for a position limits
violation for the applicant holding the
position if the applicant exceeds Federal
position limits during the 10/2-day
review and the Commission
subsequently determines to deny the
application, so long as: (1) The
application was submitted to the
exchange pursuant to § 150.9 in good
faith, and (2) if required, the applicant
reduces its positions within a
commercially reasonable amount of
time.
In addition, the Commission is
making several non-substantive
clarifications to final § 150.9(e)(6). The
Commission is clarifying that this
section deals with any Commission
determination issued for pending
applications during the 10/2-day review
period (as opposed to Commission
determinations issued under § 150.9(f)
after the 10/2-day review period). The
Commission is also adding language to
clarify that the Commission must notify
reasonable amount of time for an applicant to exit
a position); CME Group at 7–8.
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the applicant and relevant exchange of
any determination within the 10/2-day
review period. In addition, the
Commission is adding language to
clarify that § 150.9(e)(6) is not limited to
Commission denials of applications;
rather, the Commission could also
determine to issue an approval with
certain conditions or limitations that
may be different from the approval
issued by the exchange for purposes of
exchange-set limits. Finally, the
Commission is making various nonsubstantive technical and organizational
changes to make the section more
readable.
v. Section 150.9(e)—Recognition of
Additional Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Recognition of Additional Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
Proposed Appendix A to the Final
Rule identified each of the enumerated
bona fide hedges, and under the 2020
NPRM, the Commission’s recognition of
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge,
pursuant to § 150.3 or § 150.9, would
not add new bona fide hedges to the list
of enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A.
b. Comments—Recognition of
Additional Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
Commenters requested that the
Commission codify a path to move
commonly granted non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions to the list
of enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions in Appendix A.1112
c. Discussion of Final Rule—
Recognition of Additional Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission has determined to
finalize the approach as proposed.
Regarding a path forward for the
Commission to expand the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges to include
certain non-enumerated bona fide
hedges that are commonly granted, the
Commission notes that it has an existing
rulemaking process (which requires
public notice and comment) to
accomplish this. The Commission also
clarifies, for the avoidance of doubt, that
it remains open to expanding the list of
enumerated hedges, as appropriate, but
that the Commission would be required
1112 See MGEX at 4; EPSA at 5–7; COPE at 5; FIA
at 19 (noting that the process should be subject to
the notice and comment rulemaking process); ICE
at 10; and IFUS at 7 (requesting that such process
also require Commission staff to provide an annual
report to the Commission recommending nonenumerated bona fide hedges that should be
enumerated).
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to do so under its existing rulemaking
process subject to public notice and
comment. Market participants are
welcome to request that the Commission
take up future rulemakings to amend the
list of enumerated bona fide hedges.1113
8. Section 150.9(f)—Commission
Revocation of an Approved Application
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM—
Commission Revocation of an Approved
Application
Proposed § 150.9(f) set forth the
limited circumstances under which the
Commission would revoke a previouslyapproved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition granted pursuant to
proposed § 150.9. First, under proposed
§ 150.9(f)(1), if an exchange limits,
conditions, or revokes its recognition of
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge that
was previously approved under § 150.9,
then such bona fide hedge would also
be deemed limited, conditioned, or
revoked for purposes of Federal position
limits.
Next, under proposed § 150.9(f)(2), if
the Commission determines that an
application that has been approved or
deemed approved by the Commission is
no longer consistent with the applicable
sections of the Act and the
Commission’s regulations, the
Commission could revoke the nonenumerated bona fide hedge recognition
and/or require the person to reduce its
position within a commercially
reasonable time, or otherwise come into
compliance.
Under proposed § 150.9(f)(2), if the
Commission makes such determination,
it would need to first notify the person
holding the position and provide them
with an opportunity to respond. The
Commission would also provide a
notification briefly explaining the
nature of the issues raised and the
regulatory provision with which the
position is inconsistent. If the
Commission requires the person to
reduce the position, the Commission
would allow the person a commercially
reasonable amount of time to do so, as
determined by the Commission in
consultation with the applicable
exchange and applicant. Finally, under
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission would
not find that the person has committed
a position limit violation so long as the
person comes into compliance within
the commercially reasonable time.
1113 Market participants may petition the
Commission to expand the list of enumerated bona
fide hedges under existing § 13.1, which provides
that any ‘‘person may file a petition with . . . the
Commission . . . for the issuance, amendment or
repeal of a rule of general application.’’
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ii. Comments—Commission Revocation
of an Approved Application
Commenters’ views on proposed
§ 150.9(f) tended to overlap with their
views on the Commission’s
determination authority under
§ 150.9(e)(6) (discussed above). In
particular, commenters requested that
the Commission allow traders sufficient
time to exit a position if the
Commission revokes a previously
approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition.1114 Commenters also
requested that the Commission further
clarify that an applicant will not be
penalized for relying on an approved
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition if the Commission later
revokes such approval after the 10/2-day
review period.1115
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule—
Commission Revocation of an Approved
Application
The Commission has determined to
finalize § 150.9(f) with certain
modifications and clarifications in
response to commenters and other
considerations.
First, under the Final Rule, if the
Commission limits, conditions, or
revokes a previously approved nonenumerated bona fide hedge recognition
under § 150.9(f)(2), and the applicant
consequently is required to reduce its
position below the applicable Federal
position limit, the Commission will
allow the applicant a commercially
reasonable amount of time to do so. The
Commission will determine the
commercially reasonable amount of
time in consultation with the relevant
exchange and the applicant. The
Commission intends for the applicant
and the relevant exchange to have input
regarding what amount of time is
sufficient.
Further, if the Commission limits,
conditions, or revokes a previously
approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition under § 150.9(f)(2),
the Commission will not pursue an
enforcement action for a position limits
violation for the person holding the
position in excess of Federal position
limits so long as the person: (1)
Submitted its application pursuant to
§ 150.9 in good faith,1116 and (2) if
required, reduces the position within a
1114 CMC
at 12 (requesting a commercially
reasonable amount of time to exit positions); ADM
at 6 (requesting, in addition, that the Commission
consult exchanges on what is a commercially
reasonably amount of time for an applicant to exit
a position).
1115 CMC at 12; ADM at 6.
1116 See supra Section II.G.7. (providing
additional discussion of the premise that a person
submit their § 150.9 application in good faith).
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commercially reasonable amount of
time as determined by the Commission
in consultation with the person and the
relevant exchange.
The Commission is revising the title
of final § 150.9(f) to clarify that this
section is limited to revocations of nonenumerated bona fide hedges previously
approved by the Commission. The
Commission is also adding language to
final § 150.9(f)(2)(i) (consistent with
language in § 150.9(f)(1)) to clarify that,
in addition to revoking a previouslygranted non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition, the Commission
could alternatively determine to limit or
condition a previously-granted
recognition. The Commission believes
that there could be circumstances where
it would not need to completely revoke
a previously-granted recognition, but
instead may determine a less drastic
measure is more appropriate to enable a
market participant to achieve
compliance with the applicable
requirements. Finally, the Commission
is revising § 150.9(f)(2)(iii) to include
the same language that it added to
§ 150.9(e)(6) to explicitly make clear an
underlying premise that the
Commission will not pursue Federal
position limits violations so long as any
applications are filed in good faith.
Finally, the Commission is making a
number of technical and grammatical
corrections in § 150.9(f) that are not
substantive revisions.
In addition to the clarifications and
modifications above, the Commission
would like to reiterate the following
explanations and guidance from the
2020 NPRM. The Commission expects
for persons to be able to rely on nonenumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions granted pursuant to § 150.9
with the certainty that the final
determination would only be limited,
conditioned, or revoked in very limited
circumstances. The Commission expects
that it (and not Commission staff) would
only exercise such authority under rare
circumstances where the disposition of
an application has resulted, or is likely
to result, in price anomalies, threatened
manipulation, actual manipulation,
market disruptions, or disorderly
markets. The Commission also expects
that any action compelling a market
participant to reduce its position
pursuant to § 150.9(f)(2) would be a rare
Commission action, and such action is
not delegated to Commission staff. In
determining requirements for a person
to reduce a position, the Commission
may consult the person and relevant
exchange, and may also consider factors
such as current market conditions and
the protection of price discovery in the
market. Finally, for the avoidance of
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3379
doubt, the Commission expects that its
exercise of its authorities under
§ 150.9(f)(2) would not be subject to the
requirements of CEA section 8a(9), that
is, the Commission would not be
compelled to find that a CEA section
8a(9) emergency condition exists prior
to requiring that a market participant
reduce certain positions.
9. Section 150.9(g)—Delegation of
Authority to the Director of the Division
of Market Oversight
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Delegation of Authority to the Director
of the Division of Market Oversight
The Commission proposed to delegate
certain of its authorities under proposed
§ 150.9 to the Director of the
Commission’s Division of Market
Oversight, or such other employee(s)
that the Director may designate from
time to time. Proposed § 150.9(g)(1)
would delegate the Commission’s
authority, in § 150.9(e)(5), to request
additional information from the
exchange and applicant.
The Commission did not propose,
however, to delegate its authority, in
proposed § 150.9(e)(5) and (6) to stay or
deny a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
application. The Commission also did
not delegate its authority in proposed
§ 150.9(f)(2) to revoke a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognition granted
pursuant to § 150.9, or to require an
applicant to reduce its positions or
otherwise come into compliance. The
Commission stated that if an exchange’s
disposition of an application raises
concerns regarding consistency with the
CEA, presents novel or complex issues,
or requires remediation, then the
Commission (and not Commission staff)
would make the final determination,
after taking into consideration any
supplemental information provided by
the exchange or the applicant.
As with all authorities delegated by
the Commission to staff, under the 2020
NPRM, the Commission would maintain
the authority to consider any matter
which has been delegated. The
Commission stated in the 2020 NPRM
that it intended to closely monitor staff
administration of the proposed
processes for granting non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Delegation
of Authority to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight
The Commission did not receive
comments on proposed § 150.9(g). The
Commission is finalizing § 150.9(g) with
one revision to reorganize certain text to
improve readability. This update is not
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intended to change the substance of this
section.
2. Elimination of Form 204 and CashReporting Elements of Form 304
H. Part 19 and Related Provisions—
Reporting of Cash-Market Positions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Elimination of Form 204 and CashReporting Elements of Form 304
The Commission proposed to
eliminate existing Form 204. The
Commission also proposed to eliminate
Parts I and II of existing Form 304,
which request information on cashmarket positions for cotton akin to the
information requested in Form 204.1122
As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission believed that eliminating
these forms would reduce duplicative
reporting requirements for market
participants without hindering the
Commission’s ability to access cashmarket information, which the
exchanges would be required to collect
and provide to the Commission under
proposed §§ 150.3, 150.5, and 150.9.1123
For a market participant accustomed
to filing series ‘04 reports the 2020
NPRM would result in a slight change
in practice. Under the 2020 NPRM, such
participant’s bona fide hedge
recognitions could still be selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits, provided that the market
participant also separately applies for a
bona fide hedge exemption from
exchange-set limits established pursuant
to proposed § 150.5(a), discussed above,
and provided further that the
participant submits the requisite cashmarket information to the exchange as
required by proposed
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A).
1. Background
Key reports currently used for
purposes of monitoring compliance
with Federal position limits include
Form 204 1117 and Parts I and II of Form
304,1118 known collectively as the
‘‘series ‘04’’ reports. Under existing
§ 19.01, market participants that hold
bona fide hedging positions in excess of
limits for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts currently subject to Federal
position limits must justify such
overages by filing the applicable report
each month: Form 304 for cotton, and
Form 204 for the other commodities.1119
These reports are: Generally filed after
exceeding the Federal position limit;
show a snapshot of such trader’s cash
positions on one given day each month;
and are used by the Commission to
determine whether a trader has
sufficient cash positions to justify
futures and options on futures positions
above the speculative limits.
The existing series ‘04 reports are
both duplicative of, and inconsistent
with, the processes market participants
use to report cash-market information to
the exchanges. When granting
exemptions from their own limits,
exchanges do not use a monthly cashmarket reporting framework akin to the
‘04 reports. Instead, exchanges generally
require market participants who wish to
exceed exchange-set limits, including
for bona fide hedging positions, to
submit an annual exemption application
form in advance of exceeding the
limits.1120 Such applications are
typically updated annually and
generally include a month-by-month
breakdown of cash-market positions for
the previous year supporting any
position-limits overages during that
period.1121
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1117 CFTC
Form 204: Statement of Cash Positions
in Grains, Soybeans, Soybean Oil, and Soybean
Meal, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/idc/groups/public/@forms/documents/
file/cftcform204.pdf (existing Form 204).
1118 CFTC Form 304: Statement of Cash Positions
in Cotton, available at https://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@forms/documents/file/
cftcform304.pdf (existing Form 304). Parts I and II
of Form 304 address fixed-price cash positions used
to justify cotton positions in excess of Federal
position limits. As described below, Part III of Form
304 addresses unfixed-price cotton ‘‘on-call’’
information, which is not used to justify cotton
positions in excess of limits, but rather to allow the
Commission to prepare its weekly cotton on-call
report.
1119 17 CFR 19.01.
1120 See, e.g., ICE Rule 6.29 and CME Rule 559.
1121 For certain physically-delivered agricultural
contracts, some exchanges may require that spot
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ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Elimination of Form
204 and Cash-Reporting Elements of
Form 304
The Commission has carefully
considered the comments received and
is eliminating existing Form 204 and
Parts I and II of existing Form 304 as
proposed.
iii. Comments—Elimination of Form
204 and Cash-Reporting Elements of
Form 304
Numerous commenters supported the
elimination of the Form 204 and Parts
I and II of the Form 304.1124 In
month exemption applications be renewed several
times a year for each spot month, rather than
annually.
1122 Part III of Form 304, which addresses cottonon-call, is discussed below.
1123 78 FR at 11694, 11655–11656.
1124 See, e.g., ACSA at 3; AMCOT at 2–3; ACA at
3; Canale Cotton at 3; Cargill at 9–10; CCI at 2;
CEWG at 4; Chevron at 3; CHS at 2, 6; CMC at 12;
COPE at 3–4; DECA at 2; East Cotton at 3; Ecom at
1; EEI at 7; EPSA at 7; FIA at 3; IMC at 3; ISDA
at 9–10; Jess Smith at 3; LDC at 2; Mallory
Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2–3; Memtex at 2–3;
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particular, several commenters
supported the proposed streamlined
process that eliminates duplicative
reporting requirements to both the
Commission and the exchanges.1125
ISDA additionally recommended that
the Commission rely on its special call
authority and relevant exchange
authority to request additional
information on an as-need basis.1126
Three commenters opposed the
elimination of the series ‘04 reports. In
particular, AFR and Rutkowski
expressed concern that eliminating
Form 204 will delegate position limit
oversight and enforcement
responsibilities to the exchanges.1127
These commenters contended that the
exchanges are financially
disincentivized from imposing limits on
speculation because the exchanges
profit from trading volume.1128
Similarly, Better Markets also opposed
the elimination of the series ‘04 reports,
contending that Federal law provides
more substantial deterrents for
misreporting information on a form
provided to Federal agencies such as the
Commission.1129
Better Markets also commented that
the reporting changes would increase
the industry’s overall reporting burdens
because market participants would have
to report information to multiple
exchanges.1130 Better Markets suggested
that the Commission should instead
‘‘ensure that all cash positions reporting
is automated’’ and ‘‘amenable to
aggregation’’ in order to provide such
information to the exchanges.1131
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—
Elimination of Form 204 and CashReporting Elements of Form 304
The Commission is eliminating Form
204 and Sections I and II of existing
Form 304, as proposed. For the reasons
described below and as discussed in the
2020 NPRM, the Commission believes
that the elimination of these forms will
reduce duplication and inefficiency
resulting from market participants
submitting cash-market information to
both the Commission and the exchanges
under the existing framework.1132 As
described below, under the approach
Moody Compress at 2; Namoi at 1; NCFC at 2; Olam
at 3; Omnicotton at 2–3; Parkdale at 2; SEMI at 3;
Shell at 4; SCA at 3; SW Ag at 2–3; Texas Cotton
at 2–3; Toyo at 2–3; Walcot at 3; WCSA at 3; White
Gold at 2–3.
1125 See, e.g., Cargill at 9–10; CCI at 2; CEWG at
4; COPE at 3–4; ISDA at 10.
1126 ISDA at 10.
1127 AFR at 2–3; Rutkowski at 2.
1128 Id.
1129 Better Markets at 59–60.
1130 Id. at 59.
1131 Id. at 60.
1132 85 FR at 11694.
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adopted herein, the Commission will
receive any necessary information
related to market participants’
recognized bona fide hedges by
leveraging existing expertise and
processes at the exchanges, as well as
information that market participants
will be required to submit to exchanges
under the Final Rule.
The Commission finds comments that
the elimination of the series ‘04 reports
would require the Commission to
delegate authority to the exchanges to be
misplaced for several reasons. First, by
eliminating the series ‘04 reports, the
Commission is not delegating any
oversight or enforcement
responsibilities to the exchanges. The
CEA establishes the statutory framework
under which the Commission
operates.1133 Even without the series ‘04
reports, the Commission will continue
to administer the CEA to monitor and
protect the derivatives markets, market
users, and the public from fraud,
manipulation, and other abusive
practices that are prohibited by the CEA
and Commission regulations. The
Commission will continue to do so
through its market surveillance
program,1134 rule enforcement
reviews,1135 and other regulatory tools.
The Commission will also continue to
investigate and prosecute persons who
violate the CEA and Commission
regulations in connection with
derivatives trading on exchanges and
related conduct in cash-market
commodities.1136
Second, the elimination of Form 204
and the cash-market reporting portions
of Form 304 will not hinder the
Commission’s access to the cash-market
information needed for the Commission
to effectuate its oversight and
enforcement responsibilities. Instead,
1133 See
7 U.S.C. 2(a)(1).
Market Surveillance Program, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission website,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
MarketSurveillance/CFTCMarket
SurveillanceProgram/index.htm#P5_912. The
Commission’s Market Surveillance Program is
responsible for collecting market data and position
information from registrants and large traders, and
for monitoring the daily activities of large traders,
key price relationships, and relevant supply and
demand factors in a continuous review for potential
market problems. Id.
1135 The Commission conducts regular rule
enforcement reviews of each exchange’s audit trail,
trade practice surveillance, disciplinary, and
dispute resolution programs for ongoing
compliance with the Core Principles. See Rule
Enforcement Reviews of Designated Contract
Markets, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission website, available at https://
www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
TradingOrganizations/DCMs/dcmruleenf.html.
1136 Enforcement, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission website, available at https://
www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Enforcement/
OfficeofDirectorEnforcement.html.
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1134 CFTC
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the Commission is ensuring that it will
continue to have access to sufficient
cash-market information by adopting
several reporting and recordkeeping
requirements in final §§ 150.3, 150.5,
and 150.9.1137 In particular, under
§ 150.5, an exchange will be required to
collect applications, which must be
updated at least on an annual basis, for
purposes of granting bona fide hedge
recognitions from exchange-set limits
for contracts subject to Federal position
limits,1138 and for recognizing bona fide
hedging positions for purposes of
Federal position limits.1139 Among
other things, each application will be
required to include: (1) Information
regarding the applicant’s activity in the
cash markets for the underlying
commodity; and (2) any other
information to enable the exchange and
the Commission to determine whether
the exchange may recognize such
position as a bona fide hedge.1140
Additionally, consistent with existing
industry practice for certain exchanges,
exchanges will be required to file
monthly reports to the Commission
showing, among other things, for all
bona fide hedges (whether enumerated
or non-enumerated), a concise summary
of the applicant’s activity in the cash
markets.1141
Collectively, final §§ 150.5 and 150.9
will provide the Commission with the
same substantive information from
monthly reports about all recognitions
granted for purposes of contracts subject
to Federal position limits, including
cash-market information supporting the
applications, and annual information
regarding all month-by-month cashmarket positions used to support a bona
fide hedging recognition. These reports
will help the Commission determine
whether any person who claims a bona
fide hedging position can demonstrate
satisfaction of the relevant
requirements. This information will also
help the Commission perform market
surveillance in order to detect and deter
1137 As discussed earlier in this Final Rule, Final
§ 150.9 also includes reporting and recordkeeping
requirements pertaining to spread exemptions.
Those requirements will not be discussed again in
this Section of the Final Rule, which addresses
cash-market reporting in connection with bona fide
hedges.
1138 See Final § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A).
1139 As discussed above in connection with Final
§ 150.9, market participants who wish to request a
bona fide hedge recognition under § 150.9 will not
be required to file such applications with both the
exchange and the Commission. They will only file
the applications with the exchange, which will then
be subject to recordkeeping requirements in Final
§ 150.9(d), as well as Final §§ 150.5 and 150.9
requirements to provide certain information to the
Commission on a monthly basis and upon demand.
1140 See Final § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G).
1141 See Final § 150.5(a)(4).
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manipulation and abusive trading
practices in physical commodity
markets.
While the Commission will no longer
receive the monthly snapshot data
currently included on the series ‘04
reports, the Commission will have broad
access, at any time, to the cash-market
information described above, as well as
any other data or information exchanges
collect as part of their application
processes.1142 This will include any
updated application forms and periodic
reports that exchanges may require
applicants to file regarding their
positions. To the extent that the
Commission observes market activity or
positions that warrant further
investigation, § 150.9 will also provide
the Commission with access to any
supporting or related records the
exchanges will be required to
maintain.1143
Furthermore, the Final Rule will not
impact the Commission’s existing
provisions for gathering information
through special calls relating to
positions exceeding limits and/or to
reportable positions. As discussed
further below, under the Final Rule, all
persons exceeding the Federal position
limits set forth in final § 150.2, as well
as all persons holding or controlling
reportable positions pursuant to
§ 15.00(p)(1), must file any pertinent
information as instructed in a special
call.1144
In response to commenter concerns
that elimination of the series ‘04 reports
may increase reliance on exchanges
which may lack incentives to impose
position limits, the Commission does
not view the question of whether
exchanges impose speculative position
limits in this context as a matter of
incentives. Even with the elimination of
the series ‘04 reports, exchanges will be
under statutory and regulatory
obligations, as they are today, to
establish speculative position limits for
all contracts subject to Federal position
limits.1145 Additionally, as discussed
above, the Commission does not believe
that exchanges generally lack proper
incentives to maintain the integrity of
their markets; to the contrary, they are
subject to various statutory core
principles and regulatory obligations
1142 See, e.g., Final § 150.9(d) (requiring that all
such records, including cash-market information
submitted to the exchange, be kept in accordance
with the requirements of § 1.31), and Final
§ 19.00(b) (requiring, among other things, all
persons exceeding speculative position limits who
have received a special call to file any pertinent
information as specified in the call).
1143 See Final § 150.9(d).
1144 See Final § 19.00(b).
1145 See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5) and § 150.5(a).
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that require them to maintain integrity
in their markets.1146 Further, exchanges
will remain subject to regulatory
oversight and enforcement
responsibilities required for DCMs by
CEA section 5(d) and part 38 of the
Commission’s regulations and for SEFs
by CEA section 5h and part 37 of the
Commission’s regulations.1147
Specifically, several existing
Commission regulations in parts 38 and
37 require exchanges to monitor for
violations of exchange-set position
limits,1148 and detect and prevent
manipulation, price distortions and,
where possible, disruptions of the
physical-delivery or cash-settlement
process.1149
In response to Better Markets’ concern
that eliminating the ’04 reports will
reduce deterrents for misreporting, the
Commission believes that the false
reporting provision in Section 9(a)(4) of
the CEA, which makes it a felony to
make any false statements to an
exchange, is sufficient to deter market
participants from misreporting cashmarket information to exchanges.1150
Further, the Commission disagrees
with Better Markets’ concerns about
increased burdens. Given that market
participants are currently required both
to file the series ‘04 reports with the
Commission, and to submit cash-market
information to the exchanges,
eliminating the series ‘04 reports will
reduce burdens on market
participants.1151 In fact, the Commission
did not receive any comments opposing
the elimination of the series ‘04 reports
from traders who currently have an
obligation to file such forms. While the
Commission supports streamlined and
automated reporting requirements
whenever possible, Better Markets has
not identified any practicable method or
program that would permit the
automated reporting of the kinds of
disparate cash-market information
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1146 For
further discussion, see Section
II.B.3.iii.b(3)(iii) (addressing comments from Better
Markets related to conflicts-of-interest).
1147 See 7 U.S.C. 7(d); 17 CFR 38; 7 U.S.C. 7b–
3(f); 17 CFR 37.
1148 See 17 CFR 38.251(d); 17 CFR 37.205(b).
1149 See 17 CFR 38.251(a); 17 CFR 37.205(a).
1150 7 U.S.C. 13(a)(4). The Commission has not
hesitated to impose severe penalties on market
participants that mislead exchanges about cash
positions. See, e.g., In the Matter of EMF Financial
Products LLC, CFTC Docket No. 10–02, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission website,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/5751-09 (imposing a $4,000,000 civil
monetary penalty on a firm that misled an exchange
about the firm’s cash positions in treasury futures).
See also supra Section II.D.9. (discussing
Commission enforcement of exchange-set position
limits).
1151 See infra Section IV.A.5.iii. (discussing the
benefits of elimination of Form 204 and amendment
of Form 304).
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currently reflected in Forms 204 and
304.
In addition to the justifications for
eliminating the series ‘04 reports
described above, the Commission has
also determined that Form 204,
including the timing and procedures for
its filing, is inadequate for the reporting
of cash-market positions relating to
certain energy contracts, which will be
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under the Final Rule. For
example, when compared to agricultural
contracts, energy contracts generally
expire more frequently, have a shorter
delivery cycle, and have significantly
more product grades. The information
required by Form 204, as well as the
timing and procedures for its filing,
reflects the way agricultural contracts
trade, but is inadequate for purposes of
reporting cash-market information
involving energy contracts.
Finally, the Commission understands
that the exchanges maintain regular
dialogue with their participants
regarding cash-market positions, and
that it is common for exchange
surveillance staff to make informal
inquiries of market participants,
including if the exchange has questions
about market events or a participant’s
use of an exemption or recognition. The
Commission encourages exchanges to
continue this practice. Similarly, the
Commission anticipates that its own
staff will engage in dialogue with
market participants, either through the
use of informal conversations or, in
limited circumstances, via special call
authority.
3. Changes to Parts 15 and 19 To
Implement the Elimination of Form 204
and Portions of Form 304
i. Background—Changes to Parts 15 and
19 To Implement the Elimination of
Form 204 and Portions of Form 304
The market and large-trader reporting
rules are contained in parts 15 through
21 of the Commission’s regulations.
Collectively, these reporting rules
effectuate the Commission’s market and
financial surveillance programs by
enabling the Commission to gather
information concerning the size and
composition of the commodity
derivative markets and to monitor and
enforce any established speculative
position limits, among other regulatory
goals.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Changes to Parts 15 and 19 To
Implement the Elimination of Form 204
and Portions of Form 304
To effectuate the proposed
elimination of Form 204 and the cash-
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market reporting components of Form
304, the Commission proposed to
eliminate: (a) Existing § 19.00(a)(1),
which requires persons holding
reportable positions which constitute
bona fide hedging positions to file a
Form 204; and (b) existing § 19.01,
which, among other things, sets forth
the cash-market information required on
Forms 204 and 304.1152 Based on the
proposed elimination of existing
§§ 19.00(a)(1) and 19.01 and Form 204,
the Commission proposed conforming
technical changes to remove related
reporting provisions from: (i) The
‘‘reportable position’’ definition in
§ 15.00(p); (ii) the list of ‘‘persons
required to report’’ in § 15.01; and (iii)
the list of reporting forms in § 15.02.
iii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Changes to
Parts 15 and 19 To Implement the
Elimination of Form 204 and Portions of
Form 304
The Commission did not receive any
comments on the conforming changes to
parts 15 and 19 that implement the
elimination of Form 204 and Sections I
and II of Form 304, and is adopting the
changes as proposed.
4. Special Calls
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Special
Calls
Notwithstanding the proposed
elimination of the series ‘04 reports, the
Commission did not propose to make
any significant substantive changes to
information requirements relating to
positions exceeding limits and/or to
reportable positions. Accordingly, in
proposed § 19.00(b), the Commission
proposed that all persons exceeding the
proposed limits set forth in § 150.2, as
well as all persons holding or
controlling reportable positions
pursuant to § 15.00(p)(1), must file any
pertinent information as instructed in a
special call. This proposed provision is
similar to existing § 19.00(a)(3), but
would require any such person to file
the information as instructed in the
special call, rather than to file the
information on a series ‘04 report.1153
The Commission also proposed to add
language to existing § 15.01(d) to clarify
that persons who have received a
special call are deemed ‘‘persons
required to report’’ as defined in
§ 15.01.1154 The Commission proposed
this change to clarify an existing
requirement found in § 19.00(a)(3),
which requires persons holding or
controlling positions that are reportable
1152 17
CFR 19.01.
CFR 19.00(a)(3).
1154 17 CFR 15.01.
1153 17
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pursuant to § 15.00(p)(1) who have
received a special call to respond.1155
The proposed changes to part 19 operate
in tandem with the proposed additional
language for § 15.01(d) to reiterate the
Commission’s existing special call
authority without creating any new
substantive reporting obligations.
Finally, proposed § 19.03 delegated
authority to issue such special calls to
the Director of the Division of
Enforcement, and proposed § 19.03(b)
delegated to the Director of the Division
of Enforcement the authority in
proposed § 19.00(b) to provide
instructions or to determine the format,
coding structure, and electronic data
transmission procedures for submitting
data records and any other information
required under part 19.
ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Special
Calls
The Commission did not receive any
comments on these changes and is
adopting the changes to §§ 15.01(d),
§ 19.00(b), and 19.03(b) as proposed.
5. Form 304 Cotton On-Call Reporting
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—Form
304 Cotton On-Call Reporting
With the proposed elimination of the
cash-market reporting portions of Form
304 as described above, Form 304
would be used exclusively to collect the
information needed to publish the
Commission’s weekly cotton on-call
report, which shows the quantity of
unfixed-price cash cotton purchases and
sales that are outstanding against each
cotton futures month.1156 While the
Commission did not propose to
eliminate the cotton on-call portions of
Form 304, or to stop publishing the
cotton on-call report, the Commission
did request comment about the
implications of doing so.1157
In addition to requesting comment
regarding continued collection of the
1155 17
CFR 19.00(a)(3).
On-Call, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission website, available at https://
www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CottonOnCall/
index.htm (weekly report).
1157 Specifically, the Commission requested
comments on the following issues: To what extent,
and for what purpose, do market participants and
others rely on the information contained in the
Commission’s weekly cotton on-call report;
Whether publication of the cotton on-call report
creates any informational advantages or
disadvantages, and/or otherwise impact
competition in any way; Whether the Commission
should stop publishing the cotton on-call report,
but continue to collect, for internal use only, the
information required in Part III of Form 304
(Unfixed-Price Cotton ‘‘On-Call’’); Or alternatively,
whether the Commission should stop publishing
the cotton on-call report and also eliminate the
Form 304 altogether, including Part III. See 85 FR
at 11657.
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Form 304 and publication of the cottonon-call report, the Commission
proposed a number of technical changes
to the Form 304. Under the 2020 NPRM,
the requirements pertaining to that
report would remain in proposed
§§ 19.00(a) and 19.02, with minor
modifications to existing provisions. In
particular, the Commission proposed to
update cross references (including to
renumber § 19.00(a)(2) as § 19.00(a)) and
to clarify and update the procedures and
timing for the submission of Form 304.
Specifically, proposed § 19.02(b) would
require that each Form 304 report be
made weekly, dated as of the close of
business on Friday, and filed not later
than 9 a.m. Eastern Time on the third
business day following that Friday using
the format, coding structure, and
electronic data transmission procedures
approved in writing by the Commission.
The Commission also proposed some
modifications to the Form 304 itself,
including conforming and technical
changes to the organization,
instructions, and required identifying
information.1158
ii. Summary of the Commission
Determination—Form 304 Cotton OnCall Reporting
The Commission has determined to
maintain the status quo as proposed by
not eliminating the cotton on-call
portions (currently Part III) of the Form
304, and by continuing to publish the
cotton on-call report. The Commission
is also adopting the proposed technical
changes described above.
iii. Comments—Form 304 Cotton OnCall Reporting
Commenters were divided on the
questions posed by the Commission on
whether to retain Part III of the Form
304 and to continue publishing the
weekly cotton on-call report.
CMC, along with numerous
commenters from the cotton industry,
believed the Commission should
eliminate Form 304 in its entirety and
stop publishing the cotton on-call
report.1159 For example, Namoi and
1158 Among other things, the proposed changes to
the instructions would clarify that traders must
identify themselves on Form 304 using their Public
Trader Identification Number, in lieu of the CFTC
Code Number required on previous versions of
Form 304. This change will help Commission staff
to connect the various reports filed by the same
market participants. This release includes a
representation of the final Form 304, which is to be
submitted in an electronic format published
pursuant to this Final Rule, either via the
Commission’s web portal or via XML-based, secure
FTP transmission.
1159 ACA at 3; ACSA at 3, 9–11; Cargill at 10;
CMC at 12; East Cotton at 3; McMeekin at 2–3;
Namoi at 1–2; Omnicotton at 2–3; Texas Cotton at
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ACSA both argued that the cotton oncall report allows market participants to
see proprietary cash-market information
for every other participant in the cotton
market, which among other things,
creates an opportunity for speculators to
profit by trading against this publicly
disclosed unfixed-price positions.1160
Additionally, Namoi and ACSA each
highlighted that the Commission does
not collect or publish similar
information for any other
commodities.1161 ACSA also argued that
the cotton on-call report causes
competitive harm to the U.S. cotton
industry because, according to ACSA,
foreign mills believe that the report
imposes risks and costs and are
therefore more likely to purchase cotton
from outside of the United States in
order to avoid completing Part III of
Form 304.1162 The NCTO suggested that
textile mills are particularly harmed
when speculators trade against the cashmarket positions disclosed in the cotton
on-call report because textile mills
purchase the majority of their cotton on
call.1163
Conversely, several commenters,
including other cotton industry
members, stated that the Commission
should continue to collect the
information required by Form 304 and
to publish the cotton on-call report.1164
For example, Glencore argued that
discontinuing the report would reduce
transparency, open the market to more
manipulation, and harm smaller
participants due to asymmetrical
information.1165 Similarly, AMCOT
argued that without the report, large
participants, who account for a
significant amount of the cotton bought
or sold on call, would have an
informational advantage over small
producers who have less visibility into
a large portion of the cotton market.1166
iv. Discussion of Final Rule—Form 304
Cotton On-Call Reporting
After reviewing the comments
discussed above, the Commission has
decided to retain the cotton on-call
portions (currently Section III) of
existing Form 304 and to continue
publishing its weekly cotton on-call
report. Because the comments from
cotton industry firms were divided, and
2–3; Toyo at 2–3; Walcot at 3; and White Gold at
2.
1160 Namoi at 1–2; ACSA at 9–11.
1161 Namoi at 1–2.
1162 ACSA at 9–11.
1163 NCTO at 1–2.
1164 VLM Comment Text; Eric Matsen Comment
Text; AMCOT at 2–3; Gerald Marshall at 3; Lawson/
O’Neill at 1; Glencore at 2; and Dunavant at 1.
1165 Glencore at 2; Dunavant at 1.
1166 AMCOT at 2.
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because the cotton on-call report has
been a part of the cotton market for
more than 80 years, the Commission
believes that it would be imprudent to
eliminate the report based solely on the
information provided in the comment
letters, which do not include any
concrete data, studies, or quantifiable
financial harms. The Commission
further notes that continued publication
of the cotton on-call report will not
change the existing dynamics of the
cotton market.
In the future, the Commission may
solicit comments to determine whether
the cotton on-call report continues to
benefit the market and whether the
report hinders the competitiveness of
U.S. firms in the global cotton market.
The Commission may seek input from
cotton market participants in the form of
additional comments, data, studies, or
information about specific financial
harms that would warrant discontinuing
the report. The Commission emphasizes
that it remains open to continuing to
discuss this important issue with market
participants and to receive additional
data and information that may more
concretely demonstrate the competitive
harms discussed by commenters above.
6. Proposed Technical Changes to Part
17
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Proposed Technical Changes to Part 17
Part 17 of the Commission’s
regulations addresses reports by
reporting markets, FCMs, clearing
members, and foreign brokers.1167 The
Commission proposed to amend
existing § 17.00(b), which addresses
information to be furnished by FCMs,
clearing members, and foreign brokers,
to delete certain provisions related to
position aggregation, because those
provisions have become duplicative of
aggregation provisions that were
adopted in § 150.4 in the 2016 Final
Aggregation Rulemaking.1168 The
Commission also proposed to add a new
provision, § 17.03(i), which delegates
certain authority under § 17.00(b) to the
Director of the Office of Data and
Technology.1169
1167 17
CFR part 17.
Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR at
91455. Specifically, the Commission proposes to
delete paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) from § 17.00(b).
17 CFR 17.00(b).
1169 Under § 150.4(e)(2), which was adopted in
the 2016 Final Aggregation Rulemaking, the
Director of the Division of Market Oversight is
delegated authority to, among other things, provide
instructions relating to the format, coding structure,
and electronic data transmission procedures for
submitting certain data records. 17 CFR 150.4(e)(2).
A subsequent rulemaking changed this delegation
of authority from the Director of the Division of
Market Oversight to the Director of the Office of
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ii. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Proposed
Technical Changes to Part 17
The Commission did not receive any
comments addressing these changes and
is adopting these technical changes as
proposed.
I. Removal of Part 151
1. Summary of the 2020 NPRM—
Removal of Part 151
Finally, the Commission proposed to
remove and reserve part 151 in response
to its vacatur by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia,1170 as well
as in light of the proposed revisions to
part 150 that conform part 150 to the
amendments made to CEA section 4a by
the Dodd-Frank Act.
2. Comments and Summary of the
Commission Determination—Removal
of Part 151
The Commission did not receive any
comments regarding these changes and
is adopting these conforming changes as
proposed.
III. Legal Matters
This section of the release sets forth
certain legal determinations by the
Commission that underlie the
determinations regarding the specifics
of the Final Rule set forth previously in
this preamble, as well as the reasons for
those legal determinations and
consideration of relevant comments.
Specifically, Part A sets forth the
Commission’s determination that, in a
rulemaking pursuant to CEA section
4a(a)(2), the Commission must find
position limits to be ‘‘necessary’’ within
the meaning of paragraph 4a(a)(1). Part
B sets forth the Commission’s
interpretation of the criteria for finding
position limits to be necessary within
the meaning of the statute. Part C sets
forth the Commission’s necessity
findings for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts. Part D sets forth the
Commission’s necessity finding for
futures contracts and options on futures
contracts linked to a core referenced
futures contract. Finally, Part E sets
forth the Commission’s necessity
finding for spot and non-spot months.
Data and Technology, with the concurrence of the
Director of the Division of Enforcement. See 82 FR
at 28763 (June 26, 2017). The proposed addition of
§ 17.03(i) would conform § 17.03 to that change in
delegation.
1170 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying
discussion.
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A. Interpretation of Statute Regarding
Whether Necessity Finding Is Required
for Position Limits Established Pursuant
to CEA Section 4a(a)(2)
1. The Commission’s Preliminary
Interpretation in the 2020 NPRM
In the 2020 NPRM the Commission
considered whether CEA section 4a, as
amended, requires the Commission to
issue Federal position limits for all
physical commodities other than
excluded commodities without making
its own antecedent finding that such
position limits are necessary. This was
in response to ISDA, in which the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the CEA was
ambiguous in that respect. Specifically,
the court held that where CEA section
4a(a)(2) (‘‘paragraph 4a(a)(2)’’) states
that the Commission shall issue such
position limits ‘‘[i]n accordance with
the standards set forth in paragraph
(1),’’ 1171 it is unclear whether the
‘‘standards’’ include the requirement in
paragraph (1) of CEA section 4a(a)
(‘‘paragraph 4a(a)(1)’’) that the
Commission establish such limits as it
‘‘finds are necessary to diminish,
eliminate, or prevent’’ specified burdens
on interstate commerce.1172 In the 2020
NPRM, the Commission preliminarily
determined that paragraph 4a(a)(2)
should be interpreted as incorporating
the necessity requirement of paragraph
4a(a)(1).1173 For the Final Rule, the
Commission herein adopts that
determination as final, along with the
reasoning set forth in the 2020 NPRM.
1171 Paragraph 4a(a)(1) of the CEA states, in
relevant part:
‘‘Excessive speculation in any commodity under
contracts of sale of such commodity for future
delivery made on or subject to the rules of contract
markets or derivatives transaction execution
facilities, or swaps that perform or affect a
significant price discovery function with respect to
registered entities causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of
such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary
burden on interstate commerce in such commodity.
For the purpose of diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing such burden, the Commission shall,
from time to time, after due notice and opportunity
for hearing, by rule, regulation, or order, proclaim
and fix such limits on the amounts of trading which
may be done or positions which may be held by any
person, including any group or class of traders,
under contracts of sale of such commodity for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any
contract market or derivatives transaction execution
facility, or swaps traded on or subject to the rules
of a designated contract market or a swap execution
facility, or swaps not traded on or subject to the
rules of a designated contract market or a swap
execution facility that performs a significant price
discovery function with respect to a registered
entity as the Commission finds are necessary to
diminish, eliminate, or prevent such burden.’’
1172 Paragraphs 4a(a)(1) and 4a(a)(2)(A); ISDA,
887 F. Supp. 2d at 280–81.
1173 85 FR at 11659.
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The Commission’s preliminary
determination was based on a number of
considerations, set forth in detail in the
2020 NPRM.1174 Consistent with the
district court’s instructions,1175 the
Commission based its determination
both on analysis of the CEA’s statutory
language and on application of the
Commission’s experience and expertise
to relevant facts and policy
concerns.1176 Among the most
important factual and policy concerns
relied upon by the Commission in the
2020 NPRM were:
a. Absent the necessity-finding
requirement, the language of paragraph
4a(a)(2) would evidently require the
imposition of some level of position
limits for a physical commodity even if
limits at any level would be likely to do
more harm than good, including with
respect to public interests specifically
identified in paragraph 4a(a)(1) and
elsewhere in section 4a or the CEA
generally.1177 In addition to being
inconsistent with the thrust of section
4a taken as a whole, this approach
makes little sense as a matter of
policy.1178
b. Subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(A) requires
that position limits be set ‘‘as
appropriate.’’ At a minimum, this
language requires the Commission to
use its best judgment in determining the
levels at which position limits are set.
In addition, there is authority from case
law that the word ‘‘appropriate’’ in a
regulatory statute requires agencies to
take into account the costs of regulation,
if only in a rough or approximate way,
and that consideration may preclude the
considered action if the costs are highly
disproportionate.1179 The statute thus
allows for the possibility that, in
establishing position limit levels for
some commodities or contracts, the
Commission, in its judgment, may
determine that the optimal level is no
limit at all. This possibility does not
harmonize with a requirement to
impose limits for all physical
commodities, but is consistent with a
1174 Id.
at 11659–11661.
court directed the Commission, on
remand, to resolve the ambiguity not by ‘‘rest[ing]
simply on its parsing of the statutory language’’ but
by ‘‘bring[ing] its experience and expertise to bear
in light of the competing interests at stake.’’ 85 FR
at 11659, quoting ISDA, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
1176 85 FR at 11659–11661.
1177 Id. at 11659, citing as examples CEA sections
5, 4a(a)(2)(C), and 4a(a)(3)(B).
1178 Id. at 11660.
1179 See Michigan v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 2699, 2707–
08, 2711 (2015) (agency could not disregard major
costs under statute requiring that regulation be
‘‘appropriate,’’ but use of this word did not require
formal cost-benefit analysis).
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requirement to impose limits where
they are necessary.
c. Requiring position limits without a
necessity finding would be a ‘‘sea
change’’ in derivatives regulation since
it would involve a shift from Federal
limits on a small number of agricultural
commodities to limits on all physical
commodities.1180 The Commission was
skeptical that Congress would have
made such a change through ambiguous
language.1181 The Commission noted
that there are currently over 1,200 listed
futures contracts on physical
commodities and that there is no
indication that Congress had concerns
about, or even considered, all of
them.1182 To the contrary, the legislative
history suggests that enactment of
paragraph 4a(a)(2) was driven, in part,
by studies of potential excessive
speculation in a small number of
particularly important commodities.1183
This history is consistent with an
interpretation of the statute as requiring
position limits for commodities where
controlling excessive speculation is
most important, absent statutory
language that unambiguously requires
limits for all commodities.
d. A necessity finding allows the
Commission to apply its experience and
expertise to impose position limits
where they are likely to do the most
good, taking into consideration the fact
that even well-crafted position limits
create compliance costs and potentially
may have a negative effect on liquidity
and forms of speculation that benefit the
market.1184
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
recognized that it was proposing to
change its interpretation regarding
whether paragraph 4a(a)(2) incorporates
a requirement to find position limits
necessary.1185 The Commission noted
that, in the preamble to the 2011 Final
Rulemaking as well as the Commission’s
subsequent position limits
proposals,1186 the Commission had
interpreted paragraph 4a(a)(2) to
mandate the imposition of position
limits without the need for a necessity
finding.1187 As part of its preliminary
determinations in the 2020 NPRM that
the CEA does require a necessity
finding, the Commission explained in
detail why the reasons it had previously
given for the ‘‘mandate’’ approach do
1180 85
FR at 11660.
1181 Id.
1182 Id.
1183 85 FR at 1160 (discussing Congressional staff
studies of potential excessive speculation in oil,
natural gas, and wheat).
1184 85 FR at 11660.
1185 Id. at 11658.
1186 See supra Section I.A.
1187 85 FR at 11658.
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3385
not compel that interpretation of the
statute. Taken as a whole, such reasons
are insufficiently persuasive to
outweigh the factors that favor a
necessity finding.1188
2. Comments on the Commission’s
Preliminary Interpretation in the 2020
NPRM and Commission Responses
In response to the Commission’s
preliminary interpretation provided in
the 2020 NPRM, a number of
commenters stated that the Commission
must make a necessity finding before
establishing position limits under
paragraph 4a(a)(2).1189 These
commenters generally asserted that this
result was required by the language of
the statute, although they did not
provide a detailed analysis of that
language beyond that set forth in the
2020 NPRM.1190 Some commenters also
asserted that a necessity finding is
important to avoid imposing
unwarranted costs on market
participants, a position consistent with
the policy concerns that entered into the
Commission’s preliminary
determination that paragraph 4a(a)(2)
requires a necessity finding.1191
A number of other commenters stated
that the statute does not require a
necessity finding for the establishment
of position limits pursuant to paragraph
4a(a)(2).1192 These commenters made
the following points:
a. Some commenters asserted that the
language of paragraph 4a(a)(2) requires
the Commission to establish position
limits for all physical commodities
without first determining that limits are
necessary.1193 Commenters making this
point emphasized the language of
subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(A) stating that the
Commission ‘‘shall’’ impose position
limits on physical commodities and the
1188 85 FR at 11661–64. CEA Section 4a(a)(2),
which was enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act,
directs the Commission to ‘‘establish’’ limits on
positions. The Commission does not interpret this
directive to apply to the nine legacy agricultural
contracts included in the list of core referenced
futures contracts because they are already subject to
Federal position limits that have existed for decades
based on prior necessity findings pursuant to CEA
Section 4a(a)(1). Nevertheless, as discussed infra at
Section III.C, the Commission has determined that
such limits are necessary.
1189 E.g., Citadel at 2; EEI at 2–3; ISDA at 3; MFA/
AIMA at 1, 14; SIFMA AMG at 1–2.
1190 Id.
1191 E.g., EEI at 3.
1192 E.g., AFR at 1; Better Markets at 3–4, 64; IATP
at 4; NEFI at 2–3.
1193 E.g., Better Markets at 64 (incorporating by
reference amicus brief by Senators Levin et al. in
the ISDA litigation). The statute applies to all
physical commodities ‘‘other than excluded
commodities.’’ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2). The Commission
here refers to ‘‘all physical commodities’’ for
purposes of brevity only, and does not mean to
imply that the statute covers excluded
commodities.
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language of subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(B)
referring to position limits ‘‘required’’
by subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(A).1194
However, while these words are
suggestive of a mandatory requirement
of some kind, they do not dictate the
conclusion that paragraph 4a(a)(2)
requires position limits across-the-board
without a necessity finding, and to
conclude otherwise would contradict
the holding in ISDA that the statutory
text is ambiguous.1195 The requirements
of paragraph 4a(a)(2) are subject to the
condition that position limits be
imposed ‘‘[i]n accordance with the
standards set forth in paragraph
[4a(a)(1)].’’ The meaning of that text,
and specifically the meaning of ‘‘the
standards,’’ is the primary issue for the
Commission to resolve here. For reasons
explained above and in the 2020 NPRM,
these standards are best interpreted as
including the paragraph 4a(a)(1)
necessity requirement.1196
b. Some commenters asserted that the
legislative history of paragraph 4a(a)(2)
supports imposing limits on all physical
commodities without requiring a
necessity finding.1197 Among the points
emphasized by commenters were that
(1) certain bill language that ultimately
became paragraph 4a(a)(2) evolved from
using the permissive word ‘‘may’’ to the
mandatory word ‘‘shall’’; and (2) the
House Committee on Agriculture voted
out a predecessor bill containing
language similar to that of paragraph
4a(a)(2), and there are indications that
members of the committee viewed this
language as requiring limits for all
physical commodities.1198 In the view
of the Commission, neither of these
points is sufficient to resolve the
ambiguity in the language of paragraph
4a(a)(2) or dictate the conclusion that
the statute mandates position limits
without a necessity finding.
With regard to the first point, there is
no question that the final version of
paragraph 4a(a)(2) states that the
Commission ‘‘shall’’ impose position
1194 E.g., Better Markets at 64; NEFI at 1. Better
Markets stated that the Commission should adopt
the legal views set forth in the amicus brief filed
by certain U.S. Senators in the ISDA case. Better
Markets at 64. However, in ISDA, the district court
stated that ‘‘[g]iven the fundamental ambiguities in
the statute,’’ it was ‘‘not persuaded by their
arguments.’’ ISDA, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
1195 ISDA, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
1196 Other arguments against a necessity
requirement made by commenters based on the
statutory wording have previously been addressed
in the 2020 NPRM. Compare Better Markets at 64
(incorporating by reference amicus brief by Senators
Levin et al. in the ISDA litigation) with 85 FR at
11661–64.
1197 E.g., Better Markets at 64 (incorporating by
reference amicus brief by Senators Levin et al. in
the ISDA litigation).
1198 Id.
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limits. But, as explained above, this
mandatory language is explicitly subject
to a requirement that limits be imposed
in accordance with the standards of
paragraph 4a(a)(1), and that condition is
ambiguous. The commenters’ second
point was addressed in detail in the
2020 NPRM.1199 Briefly, the House
Committee on Agriculture bill described
by commenters was never approved by
the full House of Representatives.1200 Its
language on position limits was
included in the Dodd-Frank Act, but
discussion of this language in the floor
debate and conference committee report
did not characterize it as requiring
limits for all physical commodities.1201
And nothing in the legislative history
specifies that the word ‘‘standards’’ in
paragraph 4a(a)(2) excludes the
paragraph 4a(a)(1) necessity
requirement. As a result, the legislative
history, taken as a whole, does not
resolve the ambiguity in the statute.
c. Some commenters asserted that to
require a necessity finding construes the
Dodd-Frank Act’s amendment to section
4a as narrowing the Commission’s
power to impose position limits, which
is implausible as an interpretation given
the overall thrust of the Dodd-Frank Act
and the legislative history of paragraph
4a(a)(2).1202 However, the CEA already
required the Commission to find
position limits necessary before the
Dodd-Frank Act, so continuing to
require such a finding is not a new
constraint on the Commission.1203 And,
even with a necessity requirement,
paragraph 4a(a)(2) imposes an important
new duty on the Commission: to
affirmatively proceed to establish
position limits for physical commodities
where limits are necessary, within a
specified period of time, including as to
economically equivalent swaps, and to
report to Congress on the effects of those
limits, if any.1204 So the Commission’s
preliminary interpretation of the statute
is consistent with legislative history
indicating that Congress wanted the
Commission to take action on the
subject of position limits.
1199 85
FR at 11663.
1200 Id.
1201 Id.
1202 E.g.
AFR at 1.
paragraph 4a(a)(1). The House Committee
on Agriculture summarized this provision as giving
the government ‘‘the power, after due notice and
opportunity for hearing and a finding of a burden
on interstate commerce caused by such speculation,
to fix and proclaim limits on futures trading . . .’’
H.R. Rep. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935),
stated more specifically in the statutory text as
authority to diminish, eliminate, or prevent burdens
that are ‘‘undue and unnecessary.’’ Public Law 74–
675 section 5.
1204 See paragraphs 4a(a)(2) and 4a(a)(5), 7 U.S.C.
6a(a)(2), 6a(a)(5); Public Law 111–203 § 719(a).
1203 See
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d. Some commenters asserted that a
necessity finding creates unnecessary
administrative obstacles to establishing
position limits.1205 In the view of the
Commission, any extra needed
administrative activity is a reasonable
tradeoff for the flexibility and public
policy benefits of imposing position
limits only where they are economically
justified as an efficient means of
addressing the concerns Congress
expressed in section 4a(a)(1). One
commenter went further and suggested
that a requirement to find necessity
could make implementation and
enforcement of position limits ‘‘nigh to
impossible.’’ 1206 However, that
commenter premised this assertion on a
different necessity standard, that the
Commission is not adopting in this
rulemaking.1207 In the view of the
Commission, the necessity standard it is
adopting herein is both consistent with
the statute and workable in practice, as
demonstrated by the necessity findings
below. The workability of the
Commission’s standard is supported by
a commenter who was opposed to a
requirement to find necessity but
nevertheless acknowledged that the
necessity standard preliminarily
adopted in the 2020 NPRM is ‘‘unlikely
to limit the CFTC’s practical ability to
impose Federal position limits.’’ 1208
Commenters who opposed a
necessity-finding requirement also set
forth a number of justifications for broad
use of Federal position limits without
asserting specifically that these
concerns require limits for all physical
commodities or justify imposing limits
without finding them to be necessary.
For example, commenters pointed out
that unjustified volatility in derivatives
markets can have negative consequences
for price discovery and hedging in
related non-financial markets.1209 The
Commission agrees with this point and
agrees that preventing these
consequences is the major reason why
the CEA provides for position limits.1210
However, this observation does not
justify limits for all physical
commodities since (a) the importance of
the link between derivatives markets
and associated cash markets can vary for
1205 E.g.,
Better Markets at 4.
at 5.
1207 Id. IATP assumed the use of a necessity
standard, which it attributed to an industry group,
requiring the Commission to, among other things,
‘‘determine the likelihood that a specific limit
would curtail excessive speculation in a specific
market.’’ Id. The Commission has determined that
the statute does not require that. 85 FR at 11664–
66 and infra.
1208 Better Markets at 4.
1209 Id. at 25–29.
1210 See Congressional finding in first sentence of
paragraph 4a(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
1206 IATP
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different commodities; and (b) good
policy requires consideration of the
costs and burdens associated with
position limits as well as their potential
preventative effects.1211 These points
are discussed further in sections of this
release dealing with the Commission’s
legal standard for necessity, necessity
findings, and consideration of costs and
benefits pursuant to CEA section 15(a).
Commenters opposed to a necessityfinding requirement also asserted that
exchanges cannot always be relied upon
to establish optimal position limits
since they may benefit from revenue
generated from high levels of
speculation, including, in some
instances, high levels of speculation by
individual market participants.1212 To
the extent that this is so, it is a reason
for Congress to authorize, and the
Commission to implement, position
limits where needed. But it is not a
reason to apply them to physical
commodities across the board for the
reasons just stated: The importance of
unjustified volatility in derivatives
markets for the non-financial economy
can vary, and position limits have
associated costs and burdens. Moreover,
as discussed earlier in the preamble,
exchanges are subject to statutory and
regulatory obligations to establish
position limits or position
accountability and must do so in
accordance with standards established
by the Commission. Further, any
incentives for exchanges to impose
suboptimal position limits are reduced
because an exchange that leaves itself
open to an enhanced risk of excessive
speculation, manipulation, or other
forms of unjustified pricing is likely to
lose business from traders seeking a
stable market that reflects fundamental
conditions.1213
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3. Commission Determination
Having reviewed the comments and
further considered the issue, the
Commission has determined that the
interpretation of paragraph 4a(a)(2) as
incorporating the requirement of
paragraph 4a(a)(1) to find position limits
necessary before imposing them is the
best interpretation of the statute, and the
Commission adopts this interpretation
as its interpretation under the Final
Rule. This determination is based on the
1211 In reaching this conclusion, the Commission
draws upon its experience and expertise in
considering costs and benefits before promulgating
a rule, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 19(a). The Commission
believes that such consideration (which need not be
mathematical) leads to better outcomes.
1212 Better Markets at 22–24.
1213 See supra Section II.B.2.iv.b., for additional
discussion of exchange incentives and related
statutory and regulatory obligations to maintain
market integrity.
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reasons set forth above and in the
relevant portion of the 2020 NPRM.1214
The Commission further recognizes that
this determination is a change from the
Commission’s earlier interpretation of
paragraph 4a(a)(2) as not requiring a
necessity finding. The Commission has
determined that the reasons previously
given for such an interpretation of
paragraph 4a(a)(2) are not compelling
for the reasons stated above and in the
relevant portion of the 2020 NPRM.1215
The specifics of what the term
‘‘necessary’’ means in this context are
discussed in the next section, followed
by the Commission’s final necessity
finding.
B. Legal Standard for Necessity Finding
For the reasons discussed above,
paragraph 4a(a)(2) requires the
Commission to establish position limits
to the extent they are ‘‘necessary’’ to
‘‘diminish, eliminate, or prevent’’ the
burden on interstate commerce in a
commodity from ‘‘sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price’’ of
the commodity caused by excessive
speculation in futures contracts (and
options thereon) or swaps.1216 In the
2020 NPRM the Commission
preliminarily interpreted this
requirement and preliminarily reached
several conclusions about what sort of
necessity finding the statute requires.
This section of the preamble (1) reviews
the preliminary conclusions set forth in
the 2020 NPRM with some additional
clarification and elaboration; 1217 (2)
reviews and evaluates important points
made in comments regarding the CEA’s
statutory standard for finding necessity;
and (3) sets forth the Commission’s
conclusions for this Final Rule on the
legal standard for finding position limits
to be necessary within the meaning of
CEA section 4a.
1214 85
FR at 11658–61.
at 11661–64.
1216 The first sentence of paragraph 4a(a)(1) is a
Congressional finding that ‘‘excessive speculation
in any commodity’’ under futures contracts or
certain swaps ‘‘causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of
such commodity’’ is ‘‘an undue and unnecessary
burden on interstate commerce in such
commodity.’’ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1). The second sentence
of paragraph 4a(a)(1), referring back to the burden
on interstate commerce found in the first sentence,
states that the Commission shall establish such
position limits ‘‘as the Commission finds are
necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent such
burden.’’ Id.
1217 Certain points relevant to the legal standard
for necessity that were made in a number of
different sections of the NPRM are integrated into
the discussion of the legal standard here.
1215 Id.
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3387
1. Preliminary Legal Standard for
Necessity in 2020 NPRM
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
reached a number of conclusions: First,
the CEA does not require the
Commission to determine whether
excessive speculation in general may
create a risk of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price of a commodity or whether
position limits are an effective tool for
controlling or preventing these potential
effects.1218 Section 4a(a)(1) of the CEA
contains a Congressional finding that
‘‘[e]xcessive speculation . . . causing
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in . . . price . . .
is an undue and unnecessary burden on
interstate commerce in such
commodity’’ and prescribes position
limits for the purpose of ‘‘diminishing,
eliminating, or preventing’’ that
burden.1219 The analysis in the 2020
NPRM accepted those premises as
established by Congress.
Second, the word ‘‘necessary’’ has a
spectrum of legal meanings from
absolute physical necessity to merely
useful or convenient.1220 The 2020
NPRM explained that it is unlikely
Congress intended either extreme.1221
The Commission preliminarily
determined in the 2020 NPRM that the
necessity requirement is best interpreted
as a directive to establish position limits
where they are economically justified as
an efficient mechanism to advance the
Congressional goal of preventing undue
burdens on commerce in an underlying
commodity caused by excessive
speculation in the associated futures or
swaps markets.1222
Under this approach, the Commission
explained, position limits are necessary
where diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing burdens on commerce in a
commodity caused by excessive
speculation in the associated derivatives
market is likely to offer the greatest
benefits to the cash market for the
commodity and the economy, and not
where the benefit of controlling or
preventing such burdens is likely to be
less significant or to be accompanied by
disproportionate costs or negative
consequences, including negative
1218 85
FR at 11664.
Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v.
Hunt, 592 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir. 1979)
(‘‘Congress concluded that excessive speculation in
commodity contracts for future delivery can cause
adverse fluctuations in the price of a commodity,
and authorized the Commission to restrict the
positions held or trading done by any individual
person or by certain groups of people acting in
concert.’’).
1220 85 FR at 11664.
1221 Id.
1222 Id. at 11665.
1219 See
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consequences with respect to Congress’s
stated purpose, to prevent the burdens
of sudden or unreasonable fluctuations
or unwarranted changes in price that
burden interstate commerce.1223 For
example, it may be that for a given
commodity, high levels of sudden or
unreasonable fluctuation or
unwarranted changes in the price of a
commodity would have little overall
impact on commerce in the cash
commodity market or the national
economy. If the burdens or negative
economic consequences associated with
position limits for that commodity, as
discussed in the Commission’s
consideration of costs and benefits, are
out of proportion to the likely economic
benefits of position limits, it would be
unwarranted to impose them.1224
However, there are markets in which
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price of a
commodity caused by excessive
speculation would have significantly
negative effects on the cash commodity
market or the broader economy. Even if
such disruptions would be unlikely due
to the particular characteristics of the
relevant derivatives market, the
Commission may nevertheless
determine that position limits are
necessary as a prophylactic measure
given the potential magnitude or impact
of the unlikely event.1225
The Commission’s proposed test in
the 2020 NPRM thus focused on the
Congressional purpose implicit in the
finding in the first sentence of
paragraph 4a(a)(1): Protecting the cash
commodity markets from such sudden
or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price. The
Commission specified that this standard
cannot be determined by a mathematical
formula, but requires judgment by the
Commission, taking into account
available facts but also based on the
Commission’s experience and
expertise.1226 The Commission further
specified that this standard includes
consideration of costs and benefits
under CEA section 15(a), insofar as the
Commission is required by that section
to consider the costs and benefits of its
discretionary choices.1227
In applying this necessity standard in
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
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1223 85
FR at 11665.
1224 Id.
1225 Id.
1226 85
FR at 11665.
For further discussion of the cost-benefit
implications of the Commission’s necessity finding
with respect to the 25 core referenced futures
contracts, see infra Section IV.A.2. For further
discussion of the cost-benefit implications of
Federal position limits in light of existing exchangeset limits, see infra Section IV.A.6.
1227 Id.
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identified two primary factors to be
used in identifying commodities where
using position limits in derivatives
markets to control or prevent injury to
the underlying commodity market
would be most valuable:
The first primary factor is the
importance of the derivatives market for
a commodity to the operation of the
market for the cash commodity
itself.1228 Examples of links between
derivatives markets and cash markets
that exemplify this factor include:
a. The extent to which volatility in the
derivatives market is likely to result in
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price in the
cash commodity market including, in
particular, the extent to which
participants in the cash market rely on
the derivatives market as a price
discovery mechanism. This includes the
use of futures prices for pricing cashmarket transactions and the use of
futures prices for planning purposes,
such as when farmers decide what crops
to plant or manufacturers estimate the
cost of inputs to their production
processes.1229
b. The extent to which participants in
the cash market use the derivatives
market for hedging.1230 The second
primary factor specified in the 2020
NPRM is the importance of the
underlying commodity to the economy
as a whole.1231 In the view of the
Commission, evidence demonstrating
either one of these primary factors is
sufficient to establish that position
limits are necessary. This is so because
each primary factor identifies
circumstances that present an undue
risk that disruptions to derivatives
markets for a commodity will have
consequences for industries that
produce and use the relevant
commodity and, ultimately, the general
public that invests in and is employed
by those industries and purchases their
end-products.1232 Thus, each of the
primary factors relates to the statutory
objective of diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing undue and unnecessary
burdens on interstate commerce in a
commodity arising from excessive
speculation in associated derivatives
contracts. Of course, to the extent that
both factors are present, a necessity
finding will be strengthened.
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
emphasized that a necessity
determination cannot be reduced to a
1228 85
FR at 11665, 11666.
FR at 11665, 11666.
1230 Id. at 11666.
1231 Id. at 11665, 11666.
1232 See Id. at 11664, fn. 471, 11666–11670 (giving
examples as part of necessity finding).
1229 85
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mathematical formula, though data may
of course be highly relevant. To the
extent that the primary factors identified
by the Commission cannot be directly
measured, the Commission, in the
exercise of its judgment, may look to
market data or qualitative information
that correlates with these factors for
guidance in applying them.1233
With respect to futures contracts and
options contracts linked to core
referenced futures contracts, the
Commission determined that position
limits are necessary for linked contracts
because such position limits are likely
to make position limits for core
referenced futures contracts more
effective in preventing manipulation
and other sources of sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price in the
underlying commodity.1234
The Commission’s preliminary
necessity finding in the 2020 NPRM also
took into consideration economic
differences between derivatives
positions held during spot months and
those held during other months that
affect the extent to which position limits
are an efficient mechanism for
controlling or preventing sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price in
underlying commodities. Specifically,
the Commission stated that corners and
squeezes can occur only during the spot
month.1235 Thus, certain important
sources of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price are present only during the
spot month. While the fact that certain
types of disruptions in a given market
may be unlikely is not dispositive of the
necessity question,1236 the Commission
judged that the impossibility of corners
and squeezes in non-spot months
diminished the likelihood of excessive
speculation causing sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price in
underlying commodities to such an
extent as to reduce the benefit of
position limits for those months below
the point where, in the Commission’s
judgment, position limits would be
justified under the necessity
standard.1237 Nevertheless, the
Commission did not rescind existing
non-spot month limits for legacy
1233 See
discussion in findings section below.
FR at 11619–11620. See also supra at
Section II.A.16.iii.
1235 85 FR at 11629.
1236 Id. at 11665.
1237 85 FR at 11628. The Commission also
believes that the relevant benefits and burdens
indicate that no level of new non-spot-month limits
is ‘‘appropriate’’ as that term is used in Section
4a(a)(2)(A). See discussion at Section IV.A.6.iii.b.
1234 85
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agricultural contracts, because it did not
observe problems that would give a
reason to eliminate them at this
time.1238
2. Comments and Commission
Responses
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Relatively few commenters addressed
the substance of the Commission’s legal
interpretation of what CEA section 4a
requires in order for the Commission to
determine that position limits are
necessary for a particular commodity or
contract. Major points made by
commenters, and the Commission’s
evaluation of these points include:
a. Several commenters stated that the
necessity finding must be ‘‘robust and
data-driven.’’ 1239 The Commission
agrees that the agency is required to
consider available data, to the extent
that it is relevant, in determining
whether to establish position limits. At
the same time, the Commission
interprets the statute as requiring it to
exercise judgment regarding the need
for position limits where data is not
available. The statute does not specify
the use of any particular methodology,
quantitative or otherwise, in
determining whether position limits are
necessary.
In addition, the Commission must
implement CEA section 4a in a fashion
consistent with the finding regarding
excessive speculation and its effects on
commerce in the first sentence of
paragraph 4a(a)(1) and the directive in
paragraph 4a(a)(2) that the Commission
‘‘shall’’ promptly establish position
limits for physical commodities, albeit
subject to the necessity-finding
requirement. These provisions imply
that the Commission must act on
position limits, even if available data is
imperfect, so long as it has a reasonable
basis for determining limits to be
necessary. Other language of CEA
section 4a further supports the
conclusion that Congress intended the
Commission to consider available data
but also to exercise judgment in
establishing position limits. For
example, paragraph 4a(a)(2) requires
that limits be established ‘‘as
appropriate,’’ which implies
consideration of a broad range of
relevant factors, but subject to the
reasonable exercise of subjective
1238 85 FR at 11628. Specifics of the
Commission’s findings with regard to the need for
limits during spot and non-spot months are in the
2020 NPRM at 85 FR 11596, 11628, and supra at
Sections II.B.3. and II.B.4.
1239 E.g. ISDA at 3; SIFMA AMG at 2. See also
MFA/AIMA at 4 (advocating for individualized
necessity findings based on detailed analyses for
each contract).
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judgment.1240 Similarly, paragraph
4a(a)(3)(B) lists policy objectives for
position limits that the Commission
must achieve ‘‘to the maximum extent
possible’’ but specifies that the
Commission must do this ‘‘in its
discretion.’’ The Commission also
believes it is better policy to interpret
‘‘as necessary’’ to permit flexibility in
response to imperfect available data, so
long as there is a reasonable basis for its
decisions.1241 Such flexibility may
facilitate achieving the objectives of the
statute, whether by determining that
position limits either are necessary or
not necessary in particular
circumstances.
b. One commenter, MGEX, supported
the Commission’s general approach of
focusing on the relationship between
the derivatives market and the
underlying commodity in making
necessity determinations.1242 This
commenter stated, ‘‘As the Commission
appropriately points out, it is important
to focus on derivatives that are vital to
price discovery and distribution of the
underlying commodity so that any
excessive speculation may have a small
impact.’’ 1243 The Commission agrees
with that statement.
c. One commenter, Citadel, asserted
that the statute required a different test
for a finding of necessity than that used
by the Commission.1244 According to
this commenter, for each commodity
subject to position limits, the
Commission must establish ‘‘when and
how holding a large position in a given
commodity could allow a market
participant to exert undue market power
or influence.’’ 1245 The commenter
criticized the Commission for relying on
the role core referenced futures
contracts play in price discovery and
the fact that they require physical
delivery.1246 According to the
commenter, the Commission proposed
position limits on certain commodities
‘‘based merely on their size or
importance’’ and ‘‘did not explain why
size or importance, without more’’
justifies position limits.1247 The
commenter expressed concern that the
Commission’s standard could set a
precedent for the establishment of
1240 See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.C. 743, 752
(2015).
1241 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B).
1242 MGEX at 1.
1243 Id.
1244 Citadel at 2–4. Somewhat similar views have
been expressed by other commenters in earlier
phases of the Commission’s efforts to promulgate a
position limits rule under paragraph 4a(a)(2). See,
e.g., IATP at 5 (describing views of ISDA/SIFMA
AMG in connection with ISDA litigation).
1245 Citadel at 2.
1246 Id.
1247 Id.
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3389
position limits for additional
commodities in the future without
adequate justification and therefore
could reduce investor participation in
commodity markets in a fashion that
would impair the use of those markets
for risk management and commercial
decision making.1248
The Commission disagrees with
Citadel’s interpretation of the CEA
section 4a necessity requirement and
criticism of the Commission’s
interpretation for several reasons, most
of which have been stated previously.
i. The statutory language does not
state a requirement to make the
particular findings Citadel claims are
necessary. To the contrary, it includes a
Congressional finding that excessive
speculation can cause sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price that
are a burden on interstate commerce in
commodities. The Commission is
required to establish position limits in
light of that finding, and neither
Congress nor the Commission have ever
required the sort of showing Citadel
suggests here with respect to individual
commodities.1249 It is not reasonable to
surmise that Congress intended
Citadel’s test to apply without saying so,
particularly under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
amendments, which reflect a
Congressional intent, or at least
expectation, that the position limits
regime be expanded. The Commission
also notes that Citadel set forth its
proposed standard for necessity in just
a few sentences and did not spell out
what sort of data would be needed to
comply with it in practice and how such
data would be used.1250 If there were
any evidence that Congress intended
Citadel’s approach, or if a case could be
made that the Commission should
prefer it, such specifics would have
been readily available.
1248 Id.
1249 The Commission has made similar
determinations in connection with requirements for
DCMs to impose position limits or position
accountability levels by DCM rule. E.g.,
Establishment of Speculative Position Limits, 46 FR
50938, 50940 (Oct. 16, 1981) (‘‘it appears that the
capacity of any contract market to absorb the
establishment and liquidation of large speculative
positions in an orderly manner is related to the
relative size of such positions, i.e., the capacity of
the market is not unlimited’’). See also 2020 NPRM,
85 FR at 11665–11666 (Commission has repeatedly
found that all markets in physical commodities are
‘‘susceptible to the burdens of excessive
speculation’’ because they ‘‘have a finite ability to
absorb the establishment and liquidation of large
speculative positions in an orderly manner,’’ but
this characteristic of these markets is not sufficient
to establish that limits are necessary within the
meaning of paragraph 4a(a)(1) for all physical
commodities).
1250 Citadel at 2–3.
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ii. The Congressional finding at the
beginning of paragraph 4a(a)(1) makes
clear that Congress’s primary concern
was the effect of excessive speculation
in derivatives markets on the related
cash markets for the associated
commodities. The Commission’s focus
on the role the core referenced futures
contracts play in price discovery and
hedging and the importance of certain
commodities to the economy as a whole
therefore is directly responsive to the
statutory purpose of position limits. The
Commission’s focus on hedging and
price discovery is further supported by
CEA section 3, which sets forth the
purpose of the CEA. Subsection 3(a)
contains a Congressional finding that
the transactions subject to the CEA serve
a ‘‘national public interest’’ by
providing a means for ‘‘managing and
assuming price risks’’ (i.e., hedging and
supporting hedging) ‘‘discovering
prices’’ and ‘‘disseminating pricing
information.’’ Subsection 3(b) states that
the purpose of the CEA, among other
things, is to ‘‘serve the public interests’’
described in subsection 3(a).1251 The
Commission’s focus is thus consistent
with the Congressional intent.
The Commission’s consideration of
the size of the futures market for the
core referenced futures contracts also is
consistent with the statutory purpose.
As explained below,1252 contracts with
a large volume of trading, generally
speaking, are contracts that are likely to
be heavily used for price discovery and
hedging by participants in the cash
market. It is rational to conclude that
position limits are unnecessary for
contracts that play little role in price
discovery or for commodities that have
a lesser economic footprint. In addition,
imposing position limits based on the
size or importance of futures markets is
a rational way to avoid imposing
compliance costs related to position
limits on futures contracts and related
options contracts that are relatively
inactive or otherwise a minor part of the
market.
iii. As for Citadel’s claim that the
Commission’s standard for necessity
will set a precedent for imposing
position limits on additional
commodities in the future without
adequate justification, if the
Commission were to establish
additional position limits in the future,
it would need to justify that decision
through reasoned decision making in a
new rulemaking, which would be
subject to public comment and judicial
review to the same extent as other rules.
1251 7
U.S.C. 5(a), (b).
infra Section III. (discussing necessity
finding).
1252 See
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iv. Citadel’s concern with adequate
investor participation in the derivatives
markets applies to varying degrees with
respect to all position limits. The
Commission has considered such
effects, including on liquidity and bona
fide hedging, throughout this
rulemaking, including in its
consideration of costs and benefits and
in connection with the determination of
position limit levels.1253
c. One commenter, IATP, endorsed a
dissenting Commissioner’s criticism of
the necessity standard set forth in the
2020 NPRM.1254 The criticism was to
the effect that the standard ‘‘boils
down’’ to the assertion that the core
referenced futures contracts are large
and critically important to the
underlying cash markets.1255 However,
for reasons set forth above and in the
2020 NPRM, this is an incomplete
characterization of the Commission’s
standard. Moreover, as also explained
above and in the 2020 NPRM,
importance to the cash market is a
criterion for necessity that flows directly
from the statutory purpose and, for
reasons explained in the necessity
findings section, the amount of trading
in a contract, generally speaking, is
likely to correlate with factors relevant
to the statutory purpose, including use
of the contract for price discovery and
hedging.
While critical of the Commission’s
standard, IATP was even more critical
of a standard like that proposed by
Citadel that would require the
Commission to ‘‘determine the
likelihood that a specific limit would
curtail excessive speculation in a
specific market.’’ 1256 According to
IATP, such a standard, in combination
with a requirement to avoid undue
costs, would make implementation of
position limits ‘‘nigh to
impossible.’’ 1257 However, whether or
not such a standard is possible to apply,
the Commission has determined that the
statute does not require it, and that the
Commission’s approach to the necessity
finding is the one most consistent with
the statutory language and purpose.
d. Many commenters asserted that
necessity findings needed to be made
for each contract or commodity subject
1253 See 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B)(iii) (position limits
should be set at level that ensures sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers to the maximum
extent practicable in the discretion of the
Commission).
1254 IATP at 4 (quoting dissenting statement of
Commissioner Berkovitz).
1255 Id.
1256 IATP at 5. IATP did not refer specifically to
Citadel’s comment but to similar concepts in
connection with the ISDA litigation.
1257 IATP at 5.
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to position limits.1258 The Commission
agrees with this interpretation of the
statute, subject to a number of
clarifications and provisos.
i. While the Commission must find
position limits necessary for each
contract, it may do so based on different
criteria for different types of contracts so
long as the criteria are reasonable and
consistent with the Commission’s
overall interpretation of the necessity
provision. For example, as described
above, the Commission has determined
that, where limits are necessary for a
core referenced futures contract,
position limits for contracts linked to
the core referenced futures contract are
also necessary to enable position limits
on the associated core referenced
futures contract to function as
intended.1259
ii. The statute does not require a
necessity finding for economically
equivalent swaps for which position
limits are required pursuant to
paragraph 4a(a)(5) of the CEA.1260 While
a necessity finding is required for
position limits established under
paragraph 4a(a)(2) because the
Commission must apply ‘‘the standards
set forth in paragraph [4a(a)(1)],’’ no
similar language appears in paragraph
4a(a)(5). To the contrary, paragraph
4a(a)(5)(A) states that position limits for
economically equivalent swaps must be
established ‘‘[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of this section.’’
Moreover, the statute requires the
Commission to develop position limits
for economically equivalent swaps
‘‘concurrently’’ with position limits
established under paragraph 4a(a)(2),
and establish those limits
‘‘simultaneously’’ with those
established under paragraph
4a(a)(2).1261 The necessity finding
provision of paragraph 4a(a)(1) therefore
does not apply to economically
equivalent swaps. Rather, when position
limits are necessary under paragraph
4a(a)(2), the requirement to establish
them for economically equivalent swaps
is automatically triggered under CEA
section 4a(a)(5).
In addition to being compelled by the
statutory language, this is a reasonable
1258 E.g., ISDA at 3 (necessity determination must
be made ‘‘in connection with any specific position
limits that are adopted’’); PIMCO at 3 (necessity
determination should be made on a ‘‘commodityby-commodity and product-by-product basis’’);
MFA/AIMA at 4 (advocating ‘‘for individualized
necessity findings based on detailed analyses for
each contract . . . including a more specific
necessity finding for each contract’’).
1259 For further discussion on contracts linked to
core referenced futures contracts, see Sections
II.A.16. and III.D.
1260 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5).
1261 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5)(B).
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interpretation of the statute in policy
terms because Congress could
reasonably have determined that the
necessity finding for position limits for
futures contracts (and options thereon)
carries over to economically equivalent
swaps by virtue of the fact that they are
economically equivalent.1262 The
Commission notes that, while paragraph
4a(a)(5) does not require the
Commission to make a necessity finding
for economically equivalent swaps, it
requires the Commission to make policy
judgments with respect to such swaps in
connection with the definition of what
swaps are economically equivalent and
the requirement that limit levels be
established ‘‘as appropriate.’’ 1263 The
relevant discussion with respect to the
determination of what swaps that are
deemed to be ‘‘economically equivalent
swaps’’ is set forth elsewhere in this
preamble.1264
e. Some commenters asked the
Commission to clarify that it finds
position limits not to be necessary for
futures contracts other than the
referenced contracts specified in the
rule.1265 The Commission agrees that,
for commodities falling within the scope
of this rulemaking, i.e., ‘‘physical
commodities other than excluded
commodities’’ for which position limits
are required by paragraph 4a(a)(2), the
Commission has determined that
position limits are necessary only for
the 25 core referenced futures contracts
and any associated referenced contracts
on futures contracts or options on
futures contracts, but not for other
futures contracts or options on futures
contracts.1266 As with any rulemaking,
the necessity determinations made in
connection with this rule may change in
the future based on market
developments, new information or
analysis, or changes in Commission
policy.
1262 Some commenters stated that the statute
requires a necessity finding for swaps. E.g., ISDA
at 4. The Commission generally agrees with this
position for swaps, but not for economically
equivalent swaps for the reasons stated herein.
1263 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5)(A), (B).
1264 See Section II.A.4.
1265 E.g. SIFMA AMG at 5 (‘‘spot month limits
should apply only to physically settled futures
contracts (i.e., the core referenced futures
contracts), and the Commission should not make
any determinations on, or adopt final rules
applicable to, financially settled futures at this
time.’’); ISDA at 4 (stating that the Commission
should start with final rules only for physicallysettled contracts during the spot month.)
1266 As discussed above, while economically
equivalent swaps are encompassed within the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition, such swaps are
subject to Federal position limits pursuant to 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(5) and therefore are not subject to a
necessity determination.
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3. Commission Determination Regarding
Necessity Standard
For these reasons and those set forth
in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
adopts the interpretation of ‘‘necessity’’
set forth in the 2020 NPRM and clarified
and elaborated upon here.
C. Necessity Finding as to the 25 Core
Referenced Futures Contracts
1. Introduction
This Final Rule imposes Federal
position limits on 25 core referenced
futures contracts, any futures contracts
or options on futures contracts directly
or indirectly linked to the core
referenced futures contracts, and any
economically equivalent swaps. As
discussed above, the Commission bases
its necessity analysis on the following
propositions reflected in the text of CEA
section 4a(a)(1). First, that excessive
speculation in derivatives markets can
cause sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price of an underlying commodity.
Second, that such price fluctuations and
changes are an undue and unnecessary
burden on interstate commerce in that
commodity. Third, that position limits
can diminish, eliminate, or prevent that
burden. With these propositions
established by Congress, the
Commission makes a further
determination of whether it is necessary
to use position limits, Congress’s
prescribed tool to address those burdens
on interstate commerce, in light of the
facts and circumstances.
The Commission finds that position
limits on the 25 core referenced futures
contracts identified in the 2020 NPRM
are necessary to prevent the economic
burdens on interstate commerce
associated with excessive speculation
causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price of the commodities underlying
these contracts.1267 As in the 2020
NPRM, this necessity determination is
based on two interrelated factors: The
importance of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts to their respective
underlying cash markets, including that
they require physical delivery of the
underlying commodity; and the
particular importance to the national
economy of the commodities underlying
the 25 core referenced futures contracts.
The Commission analyzes both factors
in turn below.
1267 See
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2. Importance of the 25 Core Referenced
Futures Contracts to Their Respective
Underlying Cash Markets
a. Link Between the Derivatives Market
and Its Underlying Cash-Market
As explained in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission has determined that
position limits are necessary for
physical commodities only where there
exists a physically-settled futures
contract for two reasons. First, physical
settlement establishes a direct link
between the futures market and the cash
market since futures contracts, while
normally closed out by offset, may be
settled by delivery of the commodity
itself. This link helps to force
convergence between futures contract
settlement prices and cash-market
prices by ensuring that futures prices in
the delivery period reflect supply and
demand in the cash-market, whereas
cash-settled futures contracts do not
provide a direct link because physicaldelivery is not an option.1268 As a
result, in many circumstances,
commercial participants use physicallysettled futures contracts for price
discovery. Illustrative of this point, at
the May 2020 public meeting of the
Commission’s Energy and
Environmental Markets Advisory
Committee, an industry representative
discussing application of position limits
to power markets observed, ‘‘In futures
markets, where physically-settled
contracts are established, such as
natural gas or crude oil, these physical
contracts effectively serve as the most
important price discovery tool for the
spot market at baseload supply and
demand for the delivery month is
managed with the physical futures or
physical deals linked to it.’’ 1269
Second, physically-settled contracts
may be at risk of corners and squeezes,
because the settlement mechanism of
the contract requires participants with
short positions to deliver the underlying
commodity at expiration.1270 Physical
1268 See 85 FR at 11667. Many participants rely
on the possibility of settlement by physical delivery
to foster convergence at expiration of the futures
contract. Id. Because of imperfect contract design or
other factors, the convergence mechanism does not
always work as hoped in practice. Id. at 11676, fn.
575. Such malfunctions are considered to be a
public policy concern because bona fide hedgers
and other participants seek to hedge cash-market
prices with futures contract prices. Id. at 11667.
1269 See Transcript of Committee Meeting at
46:19–47:06, Comment by Nodal Exchange, Inc.,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Energy and Environmental Markets Advisory
Committee (2020), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/2020/06/1591218221/
eemactranscript050720.pdf.
1270 85 FR at 11672. For example, based on its
general experience, the Commission recognizes that
if the underlying commodity is ‘‘cornered’’ and the
supra Section III.B.
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settlement therefore may increase the
sources of the risk of sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price of the
underlying commodity arising from
excessive speculation.1271 Applying
position limits to commodities where
there is a physically-settled core
referenced futures contract therefore is
consistent with the Commission’s
interpretation of the paragraph 4a(a)(1)
necessity requirement as directing the
Commission to impose limits where
they are most likely to be an efficient
mechanism for achieving the statutory
objectives.1272
b. The 25 Core Referenced Futures
Contracts Are Used for Hedging and
Price Discovery
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
presented information supporting its
determination that the proposed 25 core
referenced futures contracts are used
extensively for hedging and price
discovery, thus establishing a close link
between the markets for these futures
contracts and commerce in the relevant
commodities.1273 The Commission’s
conclusions on this point are further
supported by comments discussing the
use of particular core referenced futures
contracts for hedging and price
discovery, or discussing more generally
the use of futures contracts for hedging
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participant with the short position does not already
have the commodity to deliver, then the short
participant must exit its position through an
offsetting long position. As a consequence, the
participant will likely have to bid up the price of
the futures contract to exit the market, thus
‘‘squeezing’’ the short to pay a higher price for the
offsetting long position. Conversely, for a cashsettled contract, a market participant who has
cornered the cash market for an underlying
commodity cannot squeeze someone who is short
the cash-settled futures contract because the short
does not have to acquire the underlying commodity
to make delivery to the long in a cash-settled
contract.
1271 See 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B)(ii) (identifying
deterrence and prevention of corners and squeezes
as one of the objectives of position limits required
by 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)).
1272 See ISDA at 3–4 (suggesting that the
Commission ‘‘finalize the proposed Federal
position limits rules only for physically delivered
spot month futures contracts, in the first phase . . .
as the Commission finds are necessary to . . .
prevent [e]xcessive speculation . . . .’’)
1273 85 FR at 11666–71.
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and price discovery in the context of the
Commission’s proposed rule.1274
The 25 core referenced futures
contracts also serve as key benchmarks
for use in pricing cash-market and other
transactions.1275 For example, NYMEX
1274 See, e.g., ASR at 1 (stating that ICE Sugar No.
11 and ICE Sugar No. 16 are commonly used by
commercial participants for hedging.); NGSA at 12
(‘‘Physical market participants currently hedge
Henry Hub price risk through both physically
settled and financially-settled futures contracts.’’);
Cargill at 2 (‘‘Commercial end-users . . . rely on the
futures and derivatives markets to perform vital
functions including price discovery and risk
management related to significant physical
commodity origination, production and processing,
transportation, purchasing and sales, among other
things.’’); EEI/EPSA at 2 (‘‘The Joint Associations
members are not financial entities. Rather, they are
physical commodity market participants that rely
on futures and swaps to hedge and mitigate their
commercial risk.’’); ADM at 2 (‘‘Many . . . [futures]
transactions are critical elements of risk
management, price discovery and hedging while
also playing a role in the acquisition of physical
commodities.’’); CMC at 1 (noting that commercial
participants ‘‘use futures markets to hedge risk
exposures related to commercial activities in
physical commodities.’’); DECA at 2 (‘‘The [Cotton]
CT contract plays an indispensable role in the
global cotton ecosystem and it is needed to provide
price discovery for all market participants.’’); AFIA
at 2 (‘‘As commercial end-users, AFIA’s members
prioritize the need for [futures] markets to work
well for their primary function of price discovery
and risk management.); NGFA at 2 (‘‘The NGFA’s
member firms are bona fide hedgers who hedge
physical commodity risk and depend on futures
markets for price discovery and risk
management.’’); ACSA at 5 (‘‘. . . the futures
delivery process is essential to maintaining
functioning agricultural markets, price discovery,
and convergence.’’); PMAA at 1 (‘‘For decades,
petroleum marketers have been utilizing oil and
refined product futures markets for their hedging
needs to protect customers from volatility and price
spikes. Well-functioning markets are critical to
commodity price discovery.’’); CCI at 3 (‘‘In
addition to covering timing differentials in
commodity prices, intra-commodity spreads
perform an important function in energy markets
by, among other things, promoting price discovery
and convergence as well as providing liquidity for
priced-linked, physically-settled and cash-settled
Referenced Contracts in the same underlying
commodity during the spot month as market
participants manage their risks across markets.’’).
See also NFP Electric Associations, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule on Position Limits for Derivatives
and Aggregation of Positions (July 3, 2014), https://
comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/
ViewComment.aspx?id=59934&SearchText=
(noting that the ‘‘[energy] markets . . . provide
commercial risk management opportunities and
achieve price convergence between futures and
cash-market prices for the benefit of commercial
hedgers and their counterparties.’’).
1275 See, e.g., USDA Economic Research Service,
Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the
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NY Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB) is the
main benchmark used for pricing
gasoline in the U.S. petroleum products
market, a huge physical market with
total U.S. refinery capacity of
approximately 9.5 million barrels per
day of gasoline.1276 Similarly, the
NYMEX NY Harbor ULSD Heating Oil
(HO) contract is the main benchmark
used for pricing the distillate products
market, which includes diesel fuel,
heating oil, and jet fuel.1277 The utility
of the price discovery function for these
futures contracts is thus impactful for
commercial participants regardless of
whether they are actively trading in the
futures market.
There is also evidence that the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are the
physically-settled contracts in physical
commodities traded on U.S. exchanges
that, by and large, are most used for
hedging and price discovery by cashmarket participants. Unfortunately, the
Commission does not have information
that permits a direct comparative
measurement of the extent to which
each of the actively traded futures
contracts is used for hedging and price
discovery. However, available statistics
from exchanges show that the 25 core
referenced futures contracts, with the
partial exception of CBOT Oats (O), a
legacy contract, are the most actively
traded physically-settled contracts in
physical commodities, as measured by
open interest and trading volume. As
discussed in detail further below, the
most actively traded futures contracts
will usually be the contracts that are
most used for hedging and price
discovery.
Production and Use of Agricultural Commodities,
Agricultural Economic Report No. 837, at 6 (Nov.
2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/41702/14700_aer837_1_.pdf?v.=41061
(one-third of all U.S. agricultural production is
produced under contracts using pricing formulas
determined by reference to futures prices); see also
Paul Peterson, Fixing Prices and Fixing Markets,
farmdoc daily (4): 118, Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign (June 25, 2014), https://
farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/06/fixing-pricesand-fixing-markets.html (explaining that futures
markets provide price discovery for cash grain spot
markets and how price discovery through
negotiated prices has diminished over time).
1276 See 85 FR at 11669.
1277 Id.
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To follow up on the discussion of
trading activity in the 2020 NPRM,1278
the Commission analyzed average total
open interest 1279 and average notional
open interest 1280 for all physicallysettled futures contracts for the period
between January 2019 and December
2019.1281 From that data, the
Commission assessed the 30 largest
physically-settled contracts in terms of
average total open interest and average
notional open interest for
comparison.1282 These 30 contracts
comprised the 25 core referenced
futures contracts, and the five
physically-settled physical commodity
contracts with the next-highest amounts
of average total open interest and
average notional open interest. As
1278 See
id. at 11666, 11668–70.
interest refers to the total number of
outstanding futures contracts that have not been
offset at the end of the trading day.
1280 Notional value means the value of average
open interest without adjusting for delta in options.
1281 The 25 core referenced futures contract are all
long-standing, established contracts. Generally
speaking, for purposes of this Final Rule, the
Commission focused on mature contract markets
with at least five years of reported open interest and
volume. For example, the Commission notes that
the ICE Canola Futures (RS) and NYMEX WTI
Houston Crude Oil Futures (HCL) contracts appear
to have characteristics similar to those which the
Commission has found support a necessity finding,
but these contracts are both much newer, and the
Commission finds that this militates against finding
a position limit necessary until their respective
markets mature further. The Commission may
consider a position limit necessary for one or both
in the future, as it revisits these issues from time
to time as required by statute.
1282 As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission also analyzed FIA end of month open
interest data for December 2019 and FIA 12-month
total trading volume data (January 2019 through
December 2019) and reached the same conclusion
as discussed herein. See 85 FR at 11670.
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1279 Open
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shown in the tables below, there is a
significant drop in open interest
between CBOT Oats (O), which has the
lowest open interest of the core
referenced futures contracts, and CME
Random Length Lumber (LBS), which is
the 27th largest physically-settled
futures contract and has the second
highest open interest of the five
contracts not selected from the group of
30 contracts.1283 Specifically, average
total open interest in CBOT Oats (O)
(5,630 OI) is almost twice the size of
average total open interest in CME
Random Length Lumber (LBS) (3,025
OI).1284
1283 Many commenters suggested that the
Commission’s final rule should demonstrate that
position limits are necessary on a ‘‘commodity-bycommodity basis’’ as supported by empirical
evidence or data. See, e.g. PIMCO at 3; ISDA at 3;
SIFMA AMG at 2; MFA/AIMA at 4. As discussed
in Section III.B.2.a., supra, the Commission agrees
that the agency is required to consider relevant
data, where available, in determining whether to
establish position limits. The Commission however
notes that the CEA does not specify the use of any
particular methodology, quantitative or otherwise,
in determining whether position limits are
necessary.
1284 During the period January 1, 2019 through
December 31, 2019, the NYMEX Loop Crude Oil
Storage (LPS) futures contract had higher open
interest than four of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts and the remaining largest contracts that
were not selected, as shown in the chart below. The
Commission, however, notes that the contract is a
capacity allocation contract, which gives the buyer
of the contract the legal right to store crude oil at
a storage facility in Louisiana for a specified
calendar month. The Commission further notes that
the contract is a newer one, has fewer reportable
traders, and significantly lower average daily
trading volume (NYMEX Loop Crude Oil Storage
(LPS) 131 Vol.) and average notional value than any
of the 25 core referenced futures contracts during
this same period. In addition, open interest in the
contract has dropped precipitously between January
1, 2020 and September 30, 2020. The Commission
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3393
With the exception of CBOT Oats
(O),1285 as shown in the tables below,
the average notional open interest
values for the 25 core referenced futures
contracts are all substantially larger and
more valuable than the five contracts
that were not selected. Specifically,
outstanding futures average notional
values range from approximately $ 33
billion for CBOT Corn (C) to
approximately $ 80 million for CBOT
Oats (O), with the other core referenced
futures contracts on agricultural
commodities all falling somewhere in
between.1286 Outstanding futures
average notional values of the core
referenced futures contracts on metal
commodities range from approximately
$ 80 billion in the case of COMEX Gold
(GC), to approximately $ 3.6 billion in
the case of NYMEX Platinum (PL), with
the other metals core referenced futures
contracts all falling somewhere in
between.1287 With regard to energy
commodities, futures average notional
values range from $ 116.7 billion in the
case of NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil
(CL) to $ 28.3 billion in the case of
NYMEX NY Harbor RBOB Gasoline
(RB).1288
finds that all of these reasons militate against
finding a position limit necessary for this contract
until its market matures further. The Commission
may consider a position limit necessary for this
contract in the future, as it revisits these issues from
time to time as required by statute.
1285 See supra Section II.B.1. (discussing CBOT
Oats (O) legacy contract status).
1286 Calculations are based on data submitted to
the Commission pursuant to part 16 of the
Commission’s regulations.
1287 Id.
1288 Id.
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In addition to open interest and
notional value, the Commission
analyzed average daily trading
volume 1290 for the period January 1,
2019 through December 31, 2019 and
notes that trading volume on the 25 core
referenced futures contracts is also
generally larger than trading volume on
the five contracts that were not selected.
For example, the CBOT Corn (C) and
CBOT Soybean (S) contracts trade over
409,000 and 211,000 contracts
respectively per day.1291 The COMEX
1289 Id.
1290 Daily trading volume represents the total
quantity of futures contracts traded within a day.
1291 Calculations are based on data submitted to
the Commission pursuant to part 16 of the
Commission’s regulations.
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Gold (GC) contract trades approximately
343,288 contracts daily.1292 The
NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL)
contract, which is the world’s most
liquid and actively traded crude oil
contract, trades nearly 1.2 million
contracts a day, and the NYMEX Henry
Hub Natural Gas (NG) contract trades on
average approximately 409,480
contracts daily.1293 In contrast, the CME
Random Length Lumber (LBS), CBOT
Ethanol (EH), COMEX Aluminum (ALI),
and NYMEX Mont Belvieu Spot
Ethylene In-Well (MBE) contracts,
which were not selected, trade
1292 Id.
1293 Id.
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Frm 00160
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
approximately 645, 315, 123, and 15.7
contracts respectively per day.1294
1294 Id. The average daily trading volume for
CBOT Oats (O) (645.04 Vol) is approximately the
same as the average daily trading volume for CME
Random Length Lumber (LBS) (645.56 Vol), which
is the largest contract in terms of volume of the five
contracts that were not selected. While the average
daily trading volume for ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF)
(307.32 Vol), which is the smallest of the 25 core
contracts in terms of volume, is less than the
average daily trading volume for both CME Random
Length Lumber (LBS) (645.56 Vol) and CBOT
Ethanol (EH) (315.7 Vol), the Commission notes that
many commercial participants frequently use both
ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) and ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
together for hedging and price discovery because
the underlying commodity is the same for both
contracts. See infra Section III.C.5. (discussing the
ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) and ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contracts).
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There are a number of reasons to
expect that, generally speaking, the most
actively traded futures contracts will
usually be the contracts that are most
used for hedging and price discovery.
First, it is generally accepted that
successful futures contracts usually
require active market participation by
hedgers as well as speculators.1295 It is
therefore reasonable to expect that some
significant proportion of the activity in
the most active futures contracts will
normally consist of hedging and not
solely consist of purely speculative
trading. In addition, the most active
futures contracts are likely to be the
most liquid, at least most of the time.
Such contracts are likely to be heavily
relied upon as sources of price
information because their prices reflect
the collective opinion of more traders
and are therefore likely to be a more
accurate representation of the
underlying cash-market price
conditions.1296 While the correlation
between the magnitude of trading
activity and use of a contract for
hedging and price discovery is likely
imperfect, it provides reason to expect
that the 25 core referenced futures
contracts are, on the whole, the
physically-settled contracts in physical
commodities traded on U.S. exchanges
that are most used for hedging and price
discovery. This is particularly true given
the very large gap in activity levels
between most of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts and physically-settled
contracts not included as core
referenced futures contracts.
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c. Conclusion Regarding Importance of
the 25 Core Referenced Futures
Contracts to Their Respective
Underlying Cash Markets
Based on the information set forth in
the NPRM and supplemented here, the
Commission concludes that the
importance of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts to their respective
underlying cash markets supports the
conclusion that position limits are
necessary for these contracts.
1295 See, e.g., Holbrook Working, Futures Trading
and Hedging, 43 a.m. Econ. Rev. 314, 319–320 (June
1953), https://www.jstor.org/stable/
1811346?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_
contents. See also William L. Silber, Innovation,
Competition, and New Contract Design in Futures
Markets, 1 J. of Futures Markets 129, 131 (Summer
1981), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/
10.1002/fut.3990010205.
1296 See, e.g., 85 FR at 11669, fn. 522–523. See
generally William L. Silber, The Economic Role of
Financial Futures, in Futures Markets: Their
Economic Role 83, 89–90 (A. Peck ed., Am. Enter.
Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Rsch. 1985), https://
legacy.farmdoc.illinois.edu/irwin/archive/books/
Futures-Economic/Futures-Economic_chapter2.pdf
(discussing the price discovery and hedging
functions of futures markets).
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3. Importance of the Commodities
Underlying the 25 Core Referenced
Futures Contracts to the National
Economy
With respect to the second factor,
importance of the cash commodity to
the U.S. economy as a whole, the 2020
NPRM set forth information
demonstrating that each of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts is important
to the U.S. economy in various
ways.1297 Many of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts involve
commodities that are among the most
important physical commodities for the
U.S. economy, among those
commodities for which physicallysettled contracts are traded on U.S.
exchanges.1298
For example, in the agricultural
sector, three of the top five commodities
in the United States, as measured by
cash receipts, underlie core referenced
futures contracts, including cattle, corn,
and soybeans.1299 An additional
commodity that underlies several core
referenced contracts, wheat, is in the top
ten.1300 Primary energy commodities
that underlie core referenced futures
contracts, specifically crude oil and
natural gas, account for over half of U.S.
energy production.1301 Two additional
core referenced futures contracts in the
energy space, NYMEX New York Harbor
ULSD Heating Oil (HO) and NYMEX
New York Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB),
relate, in turn, to commodities that are
among the most widely used byproducts
of crude oil.1302
Thus, based on the information set
forth in the NPRM and supplemented
here, the importance of the underlying
commodity to the national economy
supports the conclusion that position
limits are necessary for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts.
3395
commodities included in several
widely-tracked third-party commodity
indices: The Bloomberg Commodity
Index, the S&P GSCI index, and the
Rogers International Commodity Index.
Based on the criteria used to create
these indices, inclusion of a commodity
in the index is an indication that the
commodity is important to the world or
U.S. economy, and that futures prices
for the commodity are considered to be
an important source of price
information. In particular, Bloomberg
states that it selects commodities for its
Bloomberg Commodity Index that in its
view are ‘‘sufficiently significant to the
world economy to merit consideration,’’
that are ‘‘tradeable through a qualifying
related futures contract’’ and that
generally are the ‘‘subject of at least one
futures contract that trades on a U.S.
exchange.’’ 1303 Similarly, S&P’s GSCI
index is, among other things, ‘‘designed
to reflect the relative significance of
each of the constituent commodities to
the world economy.’’ 1304 Likewise, the
Rogers International Commodity Index
‘‘represents the value of a basket of
commodities consumed in the global
economy’’ that are ‘‘tracked via futures
contracts on 38 different exchangetraded physical commodities’’ and that
‘‘aims to be an effective measure of the
price action of raw materials not just in
the United States but also around the
world.’’ 1305
Applying these criteria, Bloomberg,
S&P, and Rogers have all deemed
eligible for inclusion in their indices
lists of commodities that overlap
significantly with the Commission’s 25
core referenced futures contracts. In
particular, Bloomberg, S&P, and Rogers
include 17, 15, and 22 contracts
respectively per index of the 25
contracts selected by the
Commission.1306 Independent index
4. Commodity Indices
As an independent check on its
selection of core referenced futures
contracts, the Commission has
compared its list with the lists of
1297 See
85 FR at 11666–11671.
e.g., 85 FR at 11668 (discussing
agricultural commodities and their downstream
uses), id. at 11669–70 (discussing energy contracts).
1299 USDA Economic Research Service, Cash
receipts by State, commodity ranking and share of
U.S. total, 2019 Nominal (current dollars), https://
data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17843.
1300 Id.
1301 U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Annual Energy Review, Primary Energy Production
by Source, Table 1.2 (last updated Sept. 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/
sec1_5.pdf.
1302 See, e.g., U.S. Energy Information
Administration, U.S. petroleum flow, 2018, https://
www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/flow/
petroleum.pdf.
1298 See,
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
1303 The Bloomberg Commodity Index
Methodology, Bloomberg, at 16–17 (Jan. 2020),
https://data.bloomberglp.com/professional/sites/
10/BCOM-Methodology.pdf.
1304 S&P GSCI Methodology, S&P Dow Jones
Indices, at 8 (May 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/
spdji/en/indices/commodities/sp-gsci/#overview.
1305 The RICI Handbook, The Guide to the Rogers
International Commodity Index, at 4–5 (Aug. 2020),
https://www.rogersrawmaterials.com/documents/
RICIHndbk_01.31.19.pdf.
1306 The 17 Bloomberg contracts are ICE Coffee C
(KC), COMEX Copper (HG), CBOT Corn (and MiniCorn) (C), ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), COMEX Gold
(GC), NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil
(HO), CME Live Cattle (LC), NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (NG), NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB
Gasoline (RB), COMEX Silver (SI), CBOT Soybeans
(and Mini-Soybeans) (S), CBOT Soybean Meal (SM),
CBOT Soybean Oil (SO), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB),
CBOT Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW), and NYMEX Light Sweet Crude
Oil (CL). See https://data.bloomberglp.com/
professional/sites/10/BCOM-Methodology.pdf.
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providers thus appear to have arrived at
similar conclusions to the Commission’s
necessity finding regarding the relative
importance of certain commodity
markets for the economy and price
discovery. The indices, taken
individually or as a whole, support the
Commission’s conclusion that position
limits are necessary for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts.
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5. Comments on Proposed Necessity
Finding for Core Referenced Futures
Contracts
While some commenters asserted that
position limits are mandatory for all
physical commodities, no commenter
argued that the necessity finding should
apply to any particular contract other
than the 25 core referenced futures
contracts.1307
Only one commenter advocated that
the Commission remove commodities
from the proposed list of 25 core
referenced futures contracts. That
commenter, IFUS, objected to imposing
Federal position limits on its Sugar No.
11 (SB) contract.1308 IFUS argued that
the Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract does not
have ‘‘a major significance to U.S.
interstate commerce’’ because the
The 15 S&P GSCI contracts are ICE Cocoa (CC),
ICE Coffee C (KC), CBOT Corn (and Mini-Corn) (C),
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), COMEX Gold (GC), NYMEX
New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), CME
Live Cattle (LC), NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(NG), NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB Gasoline
(RB), COMEX Silver (SI), CBOT Soybeans (and
Mini-Soybeans) (S), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), CBOT
Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), and NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil
(CL). See S&P GSCI Methodology, S&P Dow Jones
Indices, at 26 (May 2020), https://
www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/commodities/
sp-gsci/#overview. The 22 Rogers contracts are ICE
Cocoa (CC), ICE Coffee C (KC), COMEX Copper
(HG), CBOT Corn (and Mini-Corn) (C), ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT), COMEX Gold (GC), NYMEX New York
Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), CME Live Cattle
(LC), NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG), CBOT
Oats (O), ICE FCOJ–A (OJ), NYMEX Palladium (PA),
NYMEX Platinum (PL), NYMEX New York Harbor
RBOB Gasoline (RB), CBOT Rough Rice (RR),
COMEX Silver (SI), CBOT Soybeans (and MiniSoybeans) (S), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), CBOT Wheat
(and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW),
MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE), and NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL). See https://
www.rogersrawmaterials.com/weight.asp.
1307 E.g., NEFI at 2 (supporting Federal position
limits for all 25 core referenced futures contracts,
but stating that the list is too limited because it
included only four energy contracts and that
Congress imposed a clear mandate to establish
limits on all commercially-traded energy
derivatives); Better Markets at 64.
1308 IFUS at 3. The ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
‘‘contract prices the physical delivery of raw cane
sugar free-on-board the receiver’s vessel to a port
within the country of origin of the sugar.’’ See Sugar
No. 11 Futures Product Specs, Intercontinental
Exchange website, available at https://
www.theice.com/products/23/Sugar-No-11-Futures.
The United States is one of the delivery points for
the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract because U.S.
origin raw cane sugar is one of the 29 deliverable
origins under the contract. Id.
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contract prices the physical delivery of
raw cane sugar for more than 30
delivery points around the world and
only a de minimis amount of the raw
sugar represented by the contract can be
imported into the U.S. under U.S. sugar
tariff-rate quotas.1309 In addition, IFUS
stated that the Commission’s necessity
finding does not establish that ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) is used for price discovery
for sugar produced and consumed in the
United States.1310
The Commission has considered the
comments and is adopting the list of the
25 core referenced futures contracts as
proposed, including incorporating the
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract as a core
referenced futures contract. In response
to IFUS’ comment, the Commission
recognizes that ‘‘Sugar No. 11 (SB) is
primarily an international
benchmark.’’ 1311 The Commission,
however, disagrees with IFUS’ comment
that the Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract does
not have a major significance to U.S.
interstate commerce or play a role in
price discovery for sugar produced and
consumed in the United States.1312
For several reasons, the Commission
finds that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract has sufficient connection to the
domestic sugar market to warrant
Federal position limits. First, USDA
data reflects that roughly one-quarter of
the annual U.S. raw sugar supply is
imported.1313 While U.S. imports may
be a small percentage of the total sugar
represented by open interest in the ICE
1309 IFUS
at 3–4.
at Exhibit 1, No. 52.
1311 85 FR at 11668, fn. 507.
1312 The Commission notes that IFUS did not
object to the inclusion of ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) as
a core referenced futures contract in the 2020
NPRM. The ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) ‘‘contract prices
physical delivery of US-grown (or foreign origin
with duty paid by deliverer) raw cane sugar at one
of five U.S. refinery ports as selected by the
receiver.’’ See Sugar No. 16 Futures Product Specs,
Intercontinental Exchange website, available at
https://www.theice.com/products/914/Sugar-No-16Futures. The same commodity, raw centrifugal cane
sugar based on 96 degrees average polarization,
underlies both ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) and ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) contracts. Id. See also Sugar No. 11
Futures Product Specs, Intercontinental Exchange
website, available at https://www.theice.com/
products/23/Sugar-No-11-Futures. Both contracts
also trade on IFUS in units of 112,000 pounds per
contract. Id.
1313 USDA Economic Research Service, Sugar and
Sweeteners Yearbook Tables, World Production,
Supply, and Distribution, at Table 1 (July 19, 2018),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/sugar-andsweeteners-yearbook-tables. For example, between
2009 and 2019, the United States has imported
between 22.7% and 28.6% of its raw sugar from
other countries. Id. In 2019, the United States
imported approximately 3 million metric tons of
sugar from other countries whose sugar is
deliverable under the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract. See USDA, U.S. Sugar Monthly Import
and Re-Exports, Final Report, Fiscal Year 2019
(Oct. 2019), https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-01/fy_2019_final_sugar_report.pdf.
1310 IFUS
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract, U.S. imports
still account for a significant percentage
of the total U.S. raw sugar supply. As
described below, Commission data
suggests that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract is used for price discovery and
hedging within the United States. Thus,
when the contract is being used by
commercial participants for price
discovery or hedging in the domestic
raw sugar market, it is therefore
reasonable to expect that any sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the global price
of raw sugar could impose significant
disruptions or harms to the domestic
raw sugar markets. Because the ICE
Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract represents a
material portion of the U.S. sugar
market, the Commission determines that
it is necessary to include it as a core
referenced futures contract to protect
against any sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes,
which could result in undue burdens on
the U.S. economy. Additionally, as
further discussed below, since the ICE
Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract represents a
material portion of the U.S. raw sugar
supply, the Commission concludes that
disruptions to this contract potentially
could harm both the price discovery
process for the domestic sugar markets
as well as the physical delivery of the
underlying commodity.
Second, the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract is listed on IFUS, a DCM
registered with the Commission that
lists derivatives contracts for trading by
U.S. participants in the United States,
among others. Data reported to the
Commission through Form 102s reflects
that domestic firms account for
approximately 20% of commercial
market participants and 65%–70% of
the non-commercial market participants
trading in the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract.1314 This data supports the
Commission’s finding that the ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) contract is ‘‘used for price
discovery and hedging within the
United States.’’ 1315
Finally, as the Commission noted in
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
believes that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) contracts
together ‘‘[a]s a pair’’ are ‘‘crucial tools
for risk management and for ensuring
reliable pricing.’’ 1316 The Commission’s
view is informed by the fact that both
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) and ICE Sugar No.
16 (SF) call for delivery of the same size
and quality of raw cane sugar, with the
1314 See also ASR at 1 (stating that the ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) contracts are
commonly used by commercial participants for
hedging).
1315 85 FR at 11668, fn. 507.
1316 Id.
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former contract calling for delivery from
29 different country origins of growth,
including the United States, and the
latter contract calling for delivery of
domestic origin.1317 This implies that
there is likely to be a common group of
market participants trading in both
contracts. Based on its experience in
other markets, the Commission
understands that U.S. firms may utilize
both contract markets to hedge cash
positions and offset other related risks
even if their inventories cannot be
delivered against both contracts.
In that regard and as discussed above
in Section III.C.2.b, the Commission
analyzed average open interest and
average notional values for ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF)
for the period January 1, 2019 through
December 31, 2019. Specifically,
average open interest in ICE Sugar No.
11 (SB) (947,198 OI) is more than 100
times the size of average open interest
in ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) (8,485 OI).1318
Similarly, the average notional value for
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) ($13,535,036,765
Notional OI) is roughly 54 times greater
than the average notional value for ICE
Sugar No. 16 (SF) ($250,447,669
Notional OI).1319 In terms of average
trading volume for the same time
period, the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract trades approximately 146,077
contracts per day, whereas the ICE
Sugar No. 16 (SF) contract trades
approximately 307 contracts per
day.1320 Accordingly, the Commission
believes, and the data supports, that
U.S. commercial participants use the
more-liquid ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract to hedge domestically sourced
raw sugar or domestic inventories and
for price discovery for sugar produced
and consumed in the United States. 1321
6. Commission Determination
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For the reasons stated in the 2020
NPRM and further discussed here, the
Commission finds that position limits
are necessary for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts.
1317 See ICE Sugar No. 16 Futures Product Specs,
Intercontinental Exchange website, available at
https://www.theice.com/products/914/Sugar-No-16Futures; see also Sugar No. 11 Futures Product
Specs, Intercontinental Exchange website, available
at https://www.theice.com/products/23/Sugar-No11-Futures.
1318 Calculations are based on data submitted to
the Commission pursuant to part 16 of the
Commission’s regulations and does not include
delta adjusted option on futures contracts.
1319 Id.
1320 Id.
1321 USDA data reflects that each year, U.S.
commercial firms hold over 1 million metric tons
of raw sugar as inventory (after accounting for all
imports, production, and use during the year).
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3397
D. Necessity Finding as to Linked
Contracts
E. Necessity Finding for Spot/Non-Spot
Month Position Limits
The Commission finds that position
limits on futures and options on futures
contracts that are linked to core
referenced futures contracts are
necessary to enable position limits to
function effectively for commodities
where position limits have been found
to be necessary in connection with the
relevant core referenced futures
contracts. As explained in detail above
at Section II.A.16, due to the nature of
the linkages specified in the definition
of ‘‘referenced contract’’ in § 150.1, and
the resulting possibilities for arbitrage,
contracts linked to core referenced
futures contracts, including cash-settled
linked contracts, function together with
the linked core referenced futures
contract as part of one market.1322 As a
result, without position limits on such
linked contracts, excessive speculative
positions in these contracts can affect
associated core referenced futures
contracts and cash commodity markets
in a variety of ways that undermine the
effectiveness of position limits on the
core contracts.
For example, large positions in linked
contracts can serve as a vehicle for
profiting from manipulation of the
prices of core referenced futures
contracts and cash commodities.1323
Conversely, excessive speculation that
artificially affects the price of a linked
contract can distort pricing, liquidity,
and delivery in the market for the core
referenced futures contract and cash
commodity to which the contract is
linked.1324 Finally, physically-settled
indirectly linked contracts, if not subject
to position limits, can serve as a vehicle
for evasion through the creation of
contracts that are economically
equivalent to core referenced futures
contracts.1325
The Commission therefore finds that
position limits for futures contracts and
options on futures contracts that are
linked to core referenced futures
contracts are necessary within the
meaning of paragraph 4a(a)(1) where
limits are necessary for the associated
core referenced futures contracts.
As discussed above in Section II.B.2.
and in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
preliminarily determined that Federal
position limits should only apply to
spot month positions except with
respect to the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, where non-spot month
position Federal position limits have
been in place for many years. As
discussed above, the Commission is
adopting this aspect of the rule as
proposed. Consistent with this policy
determination, the Commission finds
that position limits are necessary during
all months for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts. The Commission
further finds that position limits are
necessary only during the spot month
for the 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts and unnecessary
outside of the spot month.1326
The Commission makes this necessity
finding for substantially the reasons set
forth above, including in responses to
comments on the spot/non-spot month
issue. Briefly, certain potential sources
of sudden or unreasonable fluctuations
or unwarranted changes in commodity
prices caused by excessive speculation,
particularly corners, squeezes, and
certain convergence problems, are
associated primarily with large
positions held during spot months.1327
And, to the extent that these problems
may arise in prior months, they are
mitigated by exchange policies
including exchange-set position limits
and position accountability.1328 As a
result, even if position limits may have
benefits outside the spot month,
restricting Federal position limits to
spot months for most commodities is
consistent with the Commission’s
interpretation of the paragraph 4a(a)(1)
necessity requirement as directing the
Commission to impose position limits
where they are most economically
justified as an efficient mechanism for
achieving the statutory objectives.
The Commission similarly finds
position limits in non-spot months to be
necessary for the legacy agricultural
contracts for substantially the reasons
discussed above.1329 These limits were
put in place pursuant to past statutory
necessity findings and have been in
place for decades without the
Commission observing problems that
1322 For further discussion of referenced contracts
and linked contracts, see supra Section II.A.16.
1323 Id. (discussing the use of linked contracts to
manipulate prices of physically-settled contracts
and the use of cash-market transactions to affect
prices of physically-settled futures contracts and
their linked counterparts).
1324 Id.
1325 See supra Section II.A.16. (discussing
referenced contracts).
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
1326 At least one commenter asked to Commission
to explicitly clarify this point, see ISDA at 3.
1327 See supra Section II.B.2. (discussing Final
Rule provisions).
1328 Id.
1329 See supra Section II.B.2. (discussing Final
Rule provisions).
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would give reasons to remove them.1330
And they are generally supported by
many market participants.1331 Because
no commenters argued that the
Commission should eliminate Federal
non-spot month position limits for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts and
because these limits have been in
existence for decades, the Commission
believes that it would be imprudent to
eliminate them absent any specific
reason in support thereof, particularly
insofar as maintaining them, by
definition, will result in no new costs or
burdens. The Commission further notes
that maintaining non-spot month limits
for the nine legacy agricultural contracts
will not change the existing dynamics of
these markets.
The Commission is therefore satisfied
that these limits remain an efficient
mechanism for achieving the objectives
of CEA section 4a.
IV. Related Matters
A. Cost-Benefit Considerations
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1. Introduction
Section 15(a) of the Commodity
Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’ or ‘‘Act’’) requires
the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (‘‘Commission’’) to
consider the costs and benefits of its
actions before promulgating a regulation
under the CEA.1332 Section 15(a) further
specifies that the costs and benefits
shall be evaluated in light of five broad
areas of market and public concern: (1)
Protection of market participants and
the public; (2) efficiency,
competitiveness, and financial integrity
of futures markets; (3) price discovery;
(4) sound risk management practices;
and (5) other public interest
considerations (collectively, the
‘‘section 15(a) factors’’).1333
The Commission interprets section
15(a) to require the Commission to
consider only those costs and benefits of
its changes that are attributable to the
Commission’s discretionary
determinations (i.e., changes that are not
otherwise required by statute) compared
to the existing status quo baseline
requirements. For this purpose, the
status quo requirements, which serve as
the baseline for the consideration of the
costs and benefits of the regulations
adopted in this final position limits
1330 Id.
1331 Id. The Commission notes that while ISDA
did not specifically address the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, it suggested that the
Commission ‘‘should finalize the proposed Federal
position limits rules only for physically delivered
spot month futures contracts, in the first phase.’’
See ISDA at 3–4.
1332 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
1333 Id.
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rulemaking (‘‘Final Rule’’), include the
CEA’s statutory requirements as well as
any applicable existing Commission
regulations.1334 As a result, any changes
to the Commission’s regulations that are
required by the CEA or other applicable
statutes are not deemed to be
discretionary changes for purposes of
discussing related costs and benefits of
the Final Rule.
The Commission anticipates that the
Final Rule will affect market
participants differently depending on
their business models and scale of
participation in the commodity
contracts that are covered by the Final
Rule.1335 The Commission also
anticipates that the Final Rule may
result in ‘‘programmatic’’ costs to some
market participants. Generally, affected
market participants may incur increased
costs associated with developing or
revising, implementing, and
maintaining compliance functions and
procedures. Such costs might include
those related to the monitoring of
positions in the relevant referenced
contracts; related filing, reporting, and
recordkeeping requirements; and the
costs of changes to information
technology systems.
The Commission has determined that
it is not feasible to quantify the costs or
benefits with reasonable precision and
instead has identified and considered
the costs and benefits qualitatively.1336
The Commission believes that, for many
of the costs and benefits, quantification
is not feasible with reasonable
1334 This cost-benefit consideration section is
divided into seven parts, including this
introductory section, with respect to any applicable
CEA or regulatory provisions.
1335 For example, the Final Rule could result in
increased costs to market participants who may
need to adjust their trading and hedging strategies
to ensure that their aggregate positions do not
exceed Federal position limits, particularly those
who will be subject to Federal position limits for
the first time (i.e., those who may trade contracts
for which there are currently no Federal position
limits). On the other hand, existing costs could
decrease for those existing market participants
whose positions would fall below the new Federal
position limits and therefore such market
participants would not be required to adjust their
trading strategies and/or apply for exemptions from
the limits, particularly if the Final Rule improves
market liquidity or other metrics of market health.
Similarly, for those market participants who would
become subject to the Federal position limits,
general costs would be lower to the extent such
market participants can leverage their existing
compliance infrastructure in connection with
existing exchange position limit regimes, relative to
those market participants that do not currently have
such systems.
1336 With respect to the Commission’s analysis
under its discussion of its obligations under the
Paperwork Reduction Act (‘‘PRA’’), the Commission
has endeavored to quantify certain costs and other
burdens imposed on market participants related to
collections of information as defined by the PRA.
See generally Section IV.B. (discussing the
Commission’s PRA determinations).
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precision, because quantification
requires understanding all market
participants’ business models, operating
models, cost structures, and hedging
strategies, including an evaluation of the
potential alternative hedging or business
strategies that could be adopted under
the Final Rule. Further, while Congress
has tasked the Commission with
establishing such Federal position limits
as the Commission finds are
‘‘necessary,’’ some of the benefits, such
as mitigating or eliminating
manipulation or excessive speculation,
may be very difficult or infeasible to
quantify. These benefits, moreover, will
likely manifest over time and be
distributed over the entire market.
In light of these limitations, to inform
its consideration of costs and benefits of
the Final Rule, the Commission in its
discretion relies on: (1) Its experience
and expertise in regulating the
derivatives markets; (2) information
gathered through public comment
letters 1337 and meetings with a broad
range of market participants; and (3)
certain Commission data, such as the
Commission’s Large Trader Reporting
System and data reported to swap data
repositories.
The Commission considers the
benefits and costs discussed below in
the context of international markets,
because market participants and
exchanges subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction for purposes of position
limits may be organized outside of the
United States; some industry leaders
typically conduct operations both
within and outside the United States;
and market participants may follow
substantially similar business practices
wherever located. Where the
Commission does not specifically refer
to matters of location, the discussion of
benefits and costs below refers to the
effects of the Final Rule on all activity
subject to it, whether by virtue of the
activity’s physical location in the
United States or by virtue of the
activity’s connection with, or effect on,
U.S. commerce under CEA section
2(i).1338
The Commission sought comments on
all aspects of the cost and benefit
considerations in the 2020 NPRM,
including: (1) Identification and
assessment of any costs and benefits not
discussed in the 2020 NPRM; (2) data
and any other information to assist or
otherwise inform the Commission’s
1337 While the general themes contained in
comments submitted in response to prior proposals
informed this rulemaking, the Commission
withdrew the 2013 Proposal, the 2016
Supplemental Proposal, and the 2016 Reproposal.
See supra Section I.A.
1338 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
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ability to quantify or qualify the costs
and benefits of the 2020 NPRM; and (3)
substantiating data, statistics, and any
other information to support positions
posited by comments with respect to the
Commission’s consideration of costs
and benefits.1339 The Commission also
requested specific comments regarding
its considerations of the benefits and
costs of proposed §§ 150.3 and 150.9, as
well as comments on whether a
Commission-administered exemption
process, such as the process in proposed
§ 150.3, would promote more consistent
and efficient decision-making or
whether an alternative to proposed
§ 150.9 would result in a superior costbenefit profile.1340 Last, the Commission
requested comment on all aspects of the
Commission’s discussion of the 15(a)
factors for the 2020 NPRM.1341
The Commission identifies and
discusses the costs and benefits of the
Final Rule organized conceptually by
topic, and certain topics may generally
correspond with a specific regulatory
section. The Commission’s discussion is
organized as follows: (1) This
introduction discussion section; (2) a
discussion of the Commission’s
necessity finding with respect to the 25
core referenced futures contracts that
are subject to the Federal position limits
framework; (3) the Federal position
limit levels (final § 150.2), and the
definitions of ‘‘referenced contract’’ and
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’; (4) the
Commission’s exemptions from Federal
position limits (final § 150.3), including
the Federal bona fide hedging definition
(final § 150.1); (5) the streamlined
process for the Commission to recognize
non-enumerated bona fide hedges (final
§ 150.9) and to grant other exemptions
for purposes of Federal position limits
(final § 150.3) and related reporting
changes to part 19 of the Commission’s
regulations; (6) the exchange-set
position limits framework and
exchange-granted exemptions thereto
(final § 150.5); and (7) the section 15(a)
factors.
2. Costs and Benefits of Commission’s
Necessity Finding for the 25 Core
Referenced Futures Contracts With
Respect to Liquidity and Market
Integrity and Resulting Impact on
Market Participants and Exchanges
Rather than discussing the general
costs and benefits of the Federal
position limits framework in this
section, the Commission will instead
address the potential costs and benefits
resulting from the Commission’s
1339 85
FR 11671, 11698.
FR 11693.
1341 85 FR 11700.
1340 85
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necessity finding with respect to the 25
core referenced futures contracts.1342
The discussion in this section begins
with an overview of the Commission’s
Federal position limits framework in
part one followed by an overview of the
Commission’s interpretation of the
criteria for finding position limits
necessary within the meaning of CEA
section 4a(a)(1) in part two. An
overview of the Commission’s necessity
finding for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts, linked ‘‘referenced
contracts,’’ and spot/non-spot month
position limits is discussed in part
three. Finally, part four includes a
discussion of the potential costs and
benefits of the Commission’s necessity
finding for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts with respect to (a) the
liquidity and integrity of the futures and
related options markets; and (b) market
participants and exchanges.
i. Federal Position Limits Framework
The Commission currently enforces
and sets Federal spot and non-spot
month position limits only for futures
and options on futures contracts on the
nine legacy agricultural
commodities.1343 The Final Rule
expands the scope of commodity
derivative contracts subject to the
Commission’s existing Federal position
limits framework 1344 to include (a)
1342 This Section does not address the cost-benefit
implications for imposing position limits on futures
contracts and options thereon that are directly or
indirectly linked to a core referenced futures
contract. That discussion is below in Section
IV.A.4. Further, this Section does not address the
cost-benefit implications for maintaining non-spot
month position limits on the nine legacy
agricultural contracts. The Commission is of the
view that the Final Rule should not have any costbenefit consideration impacts due to the existence
of Federal non-spot month position limits on the
nine legacy agricultural commodities since the
Commission is maintaining the status quo with
respect to the existence of such limits for those
contracts. As a result, the Commission does not
expect there to be a change with respect to the costs
and benefits of its approach by simply finding that
Federal position limits continue to be necessary
during the non-spot months for the nine legacy
agricultural commodities. However, with the
exception of CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRS Wheat
(KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), the final rule
will result in higher non-spot month position limit
levels for the remaining legacy agricultural
commodities. See infra Section IV.A.4. (addressing
the costs and benefits of generally increased nonspot month position limit levels for the legacy
agricultural contracts).
1343 The nine legacy agricultural contracts
currently subject to Federal spot and non-spot
month limits are: CBOT Corn (C), CBOT Oats (O),
CBOT Soybeans (S), CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT
Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT Soybean Meal (SM),
MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE), ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT), and CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat
(KW).
1344 17 CFR 150.2. Because the Commission had
not yet implemented the Dodd-Frank Act’s
amendments to the CEA regarding position limits,
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3399
futures contracts and options on futures
contracts on 16 additional contracts
during the spot month only, for a total
of 25 core referenced futures
contracts,1345 (b) futures contracts and
options on futures contracts directly or
indirectly linked to one of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts, and (c)
swaps that are ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ to certain referenced
contracts.1346 Under this Final Rule,
Federal non-spot month position limits
will continue to apply only to futures
and options on futures on the nine
legacy agricultural commodities. As
discussed above in Section III.B.2.,
while economically equivalent swaps
are encompassed within the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition, such swaps are
subject to Federal position limits
pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(5) and
therefore not subject to a necessity
determination. The cost-benefit
implications of the Commission’s
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition are discussed further below.
ii. The Commission’s Interpretation of
Section 4a
As previously discussed, the
Commission interprets CEA section 4a
to require that the Commission make an
antecedent ‘‘necessity’’ finding that
establishing Federal position limits is
‘‘necessary’’ to diminish, eliminate, or
prevent certain burdens on interstate
commerce with respect to the physical
commodities in question.1347 As the
statute does not define the term
‘‘necessary,’’ the Commission must
apply its expertise in construing this
term, and, as discussed further below,
must do so consistent with the policy
except with respect to aggregation (see generally
Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91454) and
the vacated 2011 Position Limits Rulemaking’s
amendments to 17 CFR 150.2 (see ISDA, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 259 (2012)), the existing baseline or status
quo consisted of the provisions of the CEA relating
to position limits immediately prior to effectiveness
of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to the CEA and
the relevant provisions of existing parts 1, 15, 17,
19, 37, 38, 140, and 150 of the Commission’s
regulations, subject to the aforementioned
exceptions.
1345 The 16 new products that are subject to
Federal spot month position limits for the first time
include seven agricultural (CME Live Cattle (LC),
CBOT Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE Coffee
C (KC), ICE FCOJ–A (OJ), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB),
and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF)), four energy (NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX New York
Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), NYMEX New York
Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB), NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (NG)), and five metals (COMEX Gold
(GC), COMEX Silver (SI), COMEX Copper (HG),
NYMEX Palladium (PA), and NYMEX Platinum
(PL)) contracts.
1346 See supra Section II.A.4. (defining the term
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ for purposes of the
Federal position limits framework under the Final
Rule).
1347 See supra Section III.B. (discussing legal
standard for necessity finding).
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goals articulated by Congress, including
in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C) and 4a(a)(3),
as noted throughout this discussion of
the Commission’s cost-benefit
considerations.1348
Under this Final Rule, the
Commission is establishing position
limits on 25 core referenced futures
contracts 1349 and any futures contracts
or options on futures contracts directly
or indirectly linked to the core
referenced futures contracts,1350 on the
basis that position limits on such
contracts are ‘‘necessary’’ to achieve the
purposes of the CEA. In reaching this
conclusion, the Commission analyzed
(1) the importance of these contracts to
the operation of the underlying cash
commodity market, including that they
require physical delivery; and (2) the
importance of the underlying
commodity to the economy as a
whole.1351 As discussed above, the
Commission is of the view that evidence
demonstrating one or both of these
factors is sufficient to establish that
position limits are necessary because
each factor relates to the statutory
objective identified in paragraph
4a(a)(1).1352 As a result, the Commission
has concluded that it must exercise its
judgment in light of facts and
circumstances, including its experience
and expertise, in determining whether
Federal position limit levels are
economically justified.1353
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iii. The Commission’s Necessity Finding
With respect to the first factor of the
Commission’s necessity analysis, the
Commission focused on physicallysettled futures contracts because they
perform an important price discovery
function for many cash-market
participants and may be affected by
corners and squeezes, which can occur
near the expiration of these contracts,
1348 In promulgating the position limits
framework, Congress instructed the Commission to
consider several factors: First, CEA section 4a(a)(3)
requires the Commission when establishing
position limits, to the maximum extent practicable,
in its discretion, to (i) diminish, eliminate, or
prevent excessive speculation; (ii) deter and prevent
market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; (iii)
ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona fide
hedgers; and (iv) ensure that the price discovery
function of the underlying market is not disrupted.
Second, CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) requires the
Commission to strive to ensure that any limits
imposed by the Commission will not cause price
discovery in a commodity subject to position limits
to shift to trading on a foreign exchange.
1349 See supra Section III.C. (discussing necessity
finding for the 25 core referenced futures contracts).
1350 See supra Section III.D. (discussing necessity
finding for linked contracts).
1351 See supra Section III.B. (discussing and
adopting legal standard for necessity finding in
2020 NPRM).
1352 Id.
1353 Id.
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compared to cash-settled contracts.1354
Based on the above discussion, the
Commission determined that the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are
important to their respective underlying
cash markets because they (1) are the
physically-settled contracts in physical
commodities traded on U.S. exchanges
that are the most used for hedging and
price discovery by commercial
participants, as measured by open
interest, notional value, and trading
volume; and (2) serve as key
benchmarks for use in pricing cashmarket and other transactions.1355 Upon
consideration of the second factor, as
discussed in further detail above, the
Commission has determined that the
cash markets underlying the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are all, to
varying degrees, vitally important to the
U.S. economy because many of the
commodities underlying the 25
contracts are among the most important
physical commodities, as measured by
production and use, for commodities for
which physically-settled futures
contracts are traded on U.S.
exchanges.1356 For these reasons, the
Commission finds that position limits
are necessary for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts to achieve the
purposes of the CEA.1357
As noted previously, the Commission
has determined that position limits for
futures and options on futures contracts
that are linked to core referenced futures
contracts are necessary within the
meaning of paragraph 4a(a)(1) because
such position limits are likely to make
position limits for core referenced
futures contracts more effective in
preventing manipulation and other
sources of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price of the underlying
commodity.1358
Further, the Commission has
determined that position limits are
necessary during all months for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts, where
non-spot month Federal position limits
have been in place for decades, and only
necessary during the spot month for the
16 additional core referenced futures
1354 See supra Section III.C.2.a. (discussing the
link between the derivatives markets and
underlying cash-markets).
1355 See supra Section III.C.2.b. (discussing the
Commission’s determination that the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are used extensively for
hedging and price discovery, thus establishing a
close link between both markets).
1356 See supra Section III.C.3. (discussing second
factor of necessity analysis).
1357 See supra Section III.C. (discussing necessity
finding for 25 core referenced futures contracts).
1358 See supra Section III.D. (discussing necessity
finding for linked contracts).
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contracts.1359 Specifically, the
Commission found that certain potential
sources of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
commodity prices caused by excessive
speculation, particularly corners,
squeezes, and certain convergence
problems, are associated primarily with
large positions held during spot
months.1360 And, to the extent that
these problems may arise in prior
months, they are mitigated by exchange
policies including exchange-set position
limits and position accountability.1361
As a result, even if position limits may
have benefits outside the spot month,
restricting Federal position limits to
spot months for most commodities is
consistent with the Commission’s
interpretation of the CEA section
4a(a)(1) necessity requirement as
directing the Commission to impose
position limits where they are
economically justified as an efficient
mechanism for achieving the statutory
objectives.
The Commission similarly found
position limits in non-spot months to be
necessary for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts for the reasons
previously stated above.1362 Briefly,
these limits were put in place pursuant
to past statutory necessity findings and
have been in place for decades without
the Commission observing problems or
concerns by market participants that
would give reasons to remove them.1363
For these reasons, the Commission has
determined that it would be imprudent
to eliminate them absent any specific
reason in support thereof.
iv. Potential Costs and Benefits of the
Commission’s Necessity Finding for the
25 Core Referenced Futures Contracts
In this section, the Commission will
discuss potential costs and benefits
resulting from the Commission’s
necessity finding with respect to: (1)
The liquidity and integrity of the futures
and related options markets; and (2)
market participants and exchanges. The
Commission discusses each factor in
turn below.
a. Potential Impact of the Scope of the
Commission’s Necessity Findings on
Market Liquidity and Integrity
The Commission has determined that
the 25 core referenced futures contracts
included in its necessity finding are
1359 See supra Section III.E. (discussing necessity
finding for spot/non-spot month position limits).
1360 See supra Section III.C.2.a. (discussing link
between derivatives market and cash markets).
1361 See supra Section III.E. (discussing necessity
finding for spot/non-spot month position limits).
1362 Id.
1363 Id.
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among the most liquid physical
commodity contracts, as measured by
open interest and trading volume,1364
and, therefore, imposing positions limits
on these contracts may impose costs on
market participants by constraining
liquidity because a trader may be
prevented from trading due to a position
limit reducing liquidity on the other
side of the contract. However, to the
extent that the nine legacy agricultural
contracts already are subject to existing
Federal position limits, the Final Rule
does not represent a change to the status
quo baseline (although, as noted below,
the applicable Federal position limits
will increase under the Final Rule for
most of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts and the associated costs and
benefits are discussed thereunder).
Nonetheless, the Commission believes
that any potential harmful effect on
liquidity will be muted, as a result of
the generally high levels of open interest
and trading volumes of the respective 25
core referenced futures contracts. This is
so because, all other things being equal,
large, liquid markets tend to have more
participants and tend to be less
concentrated. As a result, in such
markets, if position limits on some
occasion restrict trading by one or a
small number of large traders, it is
highly likely that other traders will be
participating in the market in sufficient
volume for the purpose of providing
liquidity on reasonable terms.
The Commission has determined that,
as a general matter, focusing on the 25
core referenced futures contracts may
benefit market integrity since these
contracts generally are amongst the
largest physically-settled contracts with
respect to relative levels of open interest
and trading volumes.1365 The
Commission therefore believes that
excessive speculation or potential
market manipulation in such contracts
is more likely to affect additional market
participants and therefore potentially
more likely to cause an undue and
unnecessary burden (e.g., potential
harm to market integrity or liquidity) on
interstate commerce. Because each core
referenced futures contract is
physically-settled, as opposed to cashsettled, the Final Rule focuses on
preventing corners and squeezes in
those contracts where such market
manipulation could cause significant
harm in the price discovery process for
1364 See
supra Section III.C.2.b. (discussing
average open interest and average daily trading
volume for the 25 core referenced futures contracts
for the period January 1, 2019 through December
31, 2019).
1365 Id.
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their respective underlying
commodities.1366
While the Commission recognizes that
market participants may engage in
market manipulation through cashsettled futures contracts and options on
futures contracts, the Commission has
determined that focusing on the
physically-settled core referenced
futures contracts will benefit market
integrity by reducing the risk of corners
and squeezes in particular. In addition,
not imposing position limits on
additional commodities may foster nonexcessive speculation, leading to better
prices and more efficient resource
allocation in these commodities. This
may ultimately benefit commercial end
users and possibly be passed on to the
general public in the form of better
pricing. As noted above, the scope of the
Commission’s necessity finding with
respect to the 25 core referenced futures
contracts allows the Commission to
focus on those contracts that, in general,
the Commission recognizes as having
particular importance in the price
discovery process for their respective
underlying commodities as well as
potentially acute economic burdens that
would arise from excessive speculation
causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the commodity prices underlying these
contracts.1367
To the extent the Commission did not
include additional commodities in its
necessity finding, those markets will not
receive the benefits intended from the
Final Rule’s Federal position limits
framework. It is conceivable that this
could entice bad actors to turn to those
markets for illegal schemes. On the
other hand, markets outside the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are not left
totally exposed. Some of the potential
harms to market integrity associated
with not including additional
commodities within the Federal
position limits framework could be
mitigated to an extent by exchanges,
which can use tools other than position
limits, such as margin requirements or
position accountability at lower levels
than the Federal position limits adopted
in the Final Rule, to defend against
certain market behavior.
Further, burdens related to potential
market manipulation for markets
outside the 25 core referenced futures
contracts may be mitigated through
exchanges also establishing exchange1366 The Commission must also make this
determination in light of its limited available
resources and responsibility to allocate taxpayer
resources in an efficient manner to meet the goals
of CEA section 4a(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1), and the
CEA generally.
1367 See supra Section III.C.2.b.
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3401
set position limits. Under final
§ 150.5(a) and (b), exchanges are
required to adopt exchange-set position
limits both (i) for contracts subject to
Federal position limits and (ii) during
the spot month for physical commodity
contracts not subject to Federal position
limits.1368 Final § 150.5(b) also requires
exchanges to adopt position limits or
position accountability outside the spot
month for those physical commodity
contracts not subject to Federal position
limits outside of the spot month.
Exchange-set position limits,
including amendments to existing
limits, are reviewed by Commission
staff via submissions under part 40 of
the Commission’s regulations, and must
meet standards established by the
Commission, including in §§ 150.1 and
150.5.1369 While the review of
exchange-set limits is focused on the
adequacy of the exchange-set position
limit to minimize the potential for
manipulation, it isn’t reviewed
considering all of the CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B) factors as Federal position
limits require. Thus, exchange-set limits
may be set at a more restrictive level
than a Federal speculative position limit
might be set for the same contract if it
were subject to Federal limits and
therefore may have higher compliance
and liquidity costs than Federal limits
on the same contract for periods of time.
Exchange limits may be updated much
faster and more frequently than Federal
limits can be updated.1370 Therefore,
any added compliance and liquidity
costs may only be realized in the shortterm relative to any compliance and
liquidity costs from a Federal limit on
the same contract.
1368 As discussed earlier in this release, final
§ 150.5(a) requires exchange-set limits for contracts
subject to Federal limits to be no higher than the
Federal limit. Final § 150.5(b)(1) requires exchanges
to establish position limits for spot-month contracts
in physical commodities that are not subject to
Federal position limits at a level that is ‘‘necessary
and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of
market manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying commodity’s price or
index.’’ See supra Section II.D. (discussing Final
§ 150.5).
1369 Further, as part of the submission process,
exchanges are encouraged to determine exchangeset limits based on the guidance in Appendix C to
part 38 (‘‘Demonstration of compliance that a
contract is not readily susceptible to
manipulation’’). See 17 CFR part 38, Appendix C.
Appendix C provides guidance on calculating
deliverable supply for physical commodity
contracts based on the terms and conditions of the
futures contract and also refers to part 150 for
specific information regarding the establishment of
speculative position limits including exchange-set
speculative position limits.
1370 Exchanges can self-certify amendments to
exchange-set limits under § 40.6. Federal position
limits are updated only through the rulemaking
process.
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Although the Commission does not
find that exchange-set limits render
Federal position limits unnecessary for
the 25 core referenced futures contracts
and associated markets, due to their
overall importance, these tools do
diminish the potential costs of
refraining from imposing Federal
position limits outside of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts. Bad actors
may also be deterred by the
Commission’s anti-manipulation
authority and the Commission’s
authority to purse violations of
exchange-set limits.1371
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b. Potential Impact of the Scope of the
Commission’s Necessity Findings on
Market Participants and Exchanges
The Commission acknowledges that
the Final Rule’s Federal position limits
framework could impose certain
administrative, logistical, technological,
and financial burdens on exchanges and
market participants, especially with
respect to developing or expanding
compliance systems and the adoption of
monitoring policies.1372 The
Commission, however, believes that
these burdens will be mostly
incremental as many of the fixed costs
have already been incurred by
exchanges and market participants. For
example, exchanges are currently
required to comply with comparable
requirements such as calculating
average daily trading volume. Further,
market participants are required to
comply with existing requirements such
as existing Federal position limits and
exchange-set limits and accountability
levels.1373
The Commission further believes that
these potential burdens are mitigated by
1371 See, e.g., In the Matter of Sukarne SA de CV,
CFTC No. 20–60, 2020 WL 5701586 (Sept. 18, 2020)
(imposing a $35,000 civil monetary penalty for a
one-day violation of exchange-set position limits in
CME live cattle futures).
1372 See, e.g., ISDA at 4 (‘‘new Federal position
limits rulemaking will involve significant
compliance costs and burdens . . . that the CFTC
can mitigate . . . by starting with final rules only
for physically-delivered spot month futures
contracts in a first phase.’’).
1373 See NFPEA at 6 and 14 (explaining that the
Federal position limits framework would ‘‘place
unnecessary regulatory burdens and costs on the
NFP Energy Entities, without providing the
Commission with useful or usable information
about speculators, speculative transactions or
speculative positions’’ and asserting that ‘‘[t]here is
no regulatory benefit in terms of reducing the
burdens of excessive speculation on CFTCregulated markets to balance against the costs and
burdens for NFP Energy Entities (on-speculators) to
study, understand and apply the Commission’s
Speculative Position Limits rules to their
transactions and positions’’). See also supra Section
II.C.14.i. (discussing NFPEA’s request for an
exemption from the Federal position limits
framework and how the Final Rule addresses many
of the concerns raised by NFPEA).
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(1) the compliance date of January 1,
2022 in connection with the Federal
position limits for the 16 non-legacy
core referenced futures contracts, and
(2) the compliance date of January 1,
2023 for both (a) economically
equivalent swaps that are subject to
Federal position limits under the Final
Rule and (b) the elimination of
previously-granted risk management
exemptions (i.e., market participants
may continue to rely on their
previously-granted risk management
exemptions until January 1, 2023).1374
These delayed compliance deadlines
should mitigate compliance costs by
permitting the update and build out of
technological and compliance systems
more gradually. They may also reduce
the burdens on market participants not
previously subject to position limits,
who will have a longer period of time
to determine whether they may qualify
for certain bona fide hedging
recognitions or other exemptions, and to
possibly alter their trading or hedging
strategies.1375 Further, the delayed
compliance dates will reduce the
burdens on exchanges, market
participants, and the Commission by
providing each with more time to
resolve technological and other
challenges for compliance with the new
regulations. In turn, the Commission
anticipates that the extra time provided
by the delayed compliance dates will
result in more robust systems for market
oversight, which should better facilitate
the implementation of the Final Rule
and avoid unnecessary market
disruptions while exchanges and market
participants prepare for its
implementation. However, the delayed
compliance deadlines will extend the
time it will take to realize the benefits
identified above.
This January 1, 2022 compliance date
also applies to exchange obligations
under final § 150.5, and market
participants’ related obligation to
temporarily continue providing Forms
204/304 in connection with bona fide
hedges. Furthermore, with respect to
exchanges’ implementation of § 150.9,
the Commission is clarifying that
exchanges may choose to implement the
streamlined process for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications as soon as
1374 See supra Section I.D. (discussing effective
date and compliance date of the Final Rule).
1375 Commenters on the Commission’s notice of a
proposed rulemaking for a new position limits
proposal issued on February 27, 2020 (‘‘2020
NPRM’’) and prior proposals have requested a
sufficient phase-in period. See supra Section I.D.iv.
(discussing comments regarding compliance period
of Final Rule); see also 81 FR at 96815
(implementation timeline).
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the Final Rule’s effective date,1376 or
anytime thereafter (or not at all).
CME expressed concern that it may
receive an influx of exemption
applications at the end of the
compliance period, and therefore
suggested a rolling process where
market participants are grandfathered
into their current exemptions,
permitting them to file for those
exemptions on the same annual
schedule.1377 ISDA urged the
Commission to recognize the burdens
associated with implementing a new set
of rules, and adopt a phase-in to
minimize market disruptions and
increases in compliance costs.1378 As
noted above, the Commission seeks to
alleviate the compliance burdens on
exchanges associated with the Final
Rule by providing for a compliance date
of January 1, 2022 for exchanges with
respect to their obligations under
§ 150.5. The Commission believes
CME’s concern is mitigated since
exchanges, at their discretion, may
implement final § 150.9 as soon as the
Effective Date, which will allow
exchanges to review non-enumerated
bona fide hedges on a rolling basis
between the Effective Date and the end
of the compliance period rather than
having to process a large number of
applications at once. Furthermore,
market participants with existing
Commission-granted non-enumerated or
anticipatory bona fide hedge
recognitions are not required to reapply
to the Commission for a new recognition
under the Final Rule. The delayed
compliance should better facilitate the
implementation of the Final Rule by
preventing unnecessary market
disruptions and reducing the burdens
on exchanges, market participants, and
the Commission by providing each with
more time to resolve technological and
other challenges for compliance with
the new regulations.
The 2020 NPRM did not provide a
specific date as the compliance date but
rather stated ‘‘365 days after publication
. . . in the Federal Register,’’ and did
not provide a separate compliance date
for economically equivalent swaps or
related to previously-granted risk
management exemptions. In response,
several commenters requested the that
Commission further extend the
compliance date for swaps to provide
market participants additional time to
identify which swaps would be deemed
economically equivalent to a referenced
contract, refine their compliance
1376 The Final Rule’s effective date is March 15,
2021 (the ‘‘Effective Date’’).
1377 CME Group at 8.
1378 ISDA at 2.
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systems, and manage other operational
and administrative challenges.1379
These commenters generally stressed
that burdens related to economically
equivalent swaps may be greater than
related futures contracts and options
thereon.1380 The Commission generally
agrees with commenters that additional
time would reduce burdens associated
with establishing compliance and
monitoring systems, and has therefore
extended the compliance date for
economically equivalent swaps until
January 1, 2023. Because the
Commission understands that risk
management positions tend to also
involve OTC swap positions, the
Commission believes that having the
same compliance date as economically
equivalent swaps in connection with the
elimination of the risk management
exemption would similarly reduce
burdens.
3. Federal Position Limit Levels (Final
§ 150.2)
i. General Approach
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Existing § 150.2 establishes Federal
position limit levels that apply net long
or net short to futures and, on a futuresequivalent basis, to options on futures
contracts on nine legacy physicallysettled agricultural contracts.1381 The
Commission has previously set separate
Federal position limits for: (i) The spot
month, and (ii) a single month and allmonths-combined (i.e., ‘‘non-spot
months’’).1382 For the existing spot
month Federal position limit levels, the
contract levels are based on, among
other things, 25% or lower of the
estimated deliverable supply
(‘‘EDS’’).1383 For the existing non-spot
month position limit levels, the levels
are generally set at 10% of open interest
for the first 25,000 contracts of open
interest, with a marginal increase of
1379 MFA/AIMA at 8; NCFC at 6; NGSA at 15–16;
SIFMA AMG at 9–10; and Citadel at 9.
1380 Id.
1381 The nine legacy agricultural contracts subject
to existing Federal spot and non-spot month
position limits were: CBOT Corn (C), CBOT Oats
(O), CBOT Soybeans (S), CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT
Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT Soybean Meal (SM),
MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE), ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT), and CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat
(KW).
1382 For clarity, limits for single and all-monthscombined apply separately. However, the
Commission previously has applied the same limit
levels to the single month and all-monthscombined. Accordingly, the Commission will
discuss the single and all-months limits, i.e., the
non-spot month limits, together.
1383 See supra Section II.B.1—Existing § 150.2
(discussing that establishing spot month levels at
25% or less of EDS is consistent with past
Commission practices).
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2.5% of open interest thereafter (the
‘‘10/2.5% formula’’).
Final § 150.2 revises and expands the
existing Federal position limits
framework as follows. First, during the
spot month, § 150.2: (i) Subjects 16
additional core referenced futures
contracts and their associated
referenced contracts to Federal spot
month position limits, which are based
on, among other things, the
Commission’s existing approach of
establishing limit levels at 25% or lower
of EDS, for a total of 25 core referenced
futures contracts (and their associated
referenced contracts) subject to Federal
spot month position limits (i.e., the nine
legacy agricultural contracts plus the 16
additional contracts); 1384 and (ii)
updates the existing spot month levels
for the nine legacy agricultural contracts
based on, among other things, revised
EDS.1385
Second, for non-spot month position
limit levels, final § 150.2 revises the 10/
2.5% formula so that: (i) The
incremental 2.5% increase takes effect
after the first 50,000 contracts of open
interest, rather than after the first 25,000
contracts under the existing rule (the
‘‘marginal threshold level’’); and (ii) the
limit levels are calculated by applying
the updated 10/2.5% formula to open
interest data for the two 12-month
periods from July 2017 to June 2018 and
July 2018 to June 2019 of the applicable
futures contracts and delta-adjusted
options on futures contracts.1386 The 12month period yielding the higher limit
1384 The 16 new products that are subject to
Federal spot month position limits for the first time
include seven agricultural (CME Live Cattle (LC),
CBOT Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE Coffee
C (KC), ICE FCOJ–A (OJ), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB),
and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF)), four energy (NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX NY Harbor
ULSD Heating Oil (HO), NYMEX NY Harbor RBOB
Gasoline (RB), and NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(NG)), and five metals (COMEX Gold (GC), COMEX
Silver (SI), COMEX Copper (HG), NYMEX
Palladium (PA), and NYMEX Platinum (PL))
contracts.
1385 The Final Rule maintains the current spot
month limits on CBOT Oats (O).
1386 As discussed below, for most of the legacy
agricultural commodities, this results in a higher
non-spot month limit. However, the Commission is
not changing the non-spot month limits for either
CBOT Oats (O) or MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat
(MWE) based on the revised open interest since this
would result in a reduction of non-spot month
limits from 2,000 to 700 contracts for CBOT Oats
(O) and 12,000 to 5,700 contracts for MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE). Similarly, the Commission also is
maintaining the current non-spot month limit for
CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW).
Furthermore, the Commission is adopting a separate
single month position limit level of 5,950 contracts
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The all-months-combined
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is set
at 11,900 contracts, based on the modified 10/2.5%
formula and updated open interest figures.
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3403
is selected as the non-spot month limit
for that legacy agricultural commodity.
Third, the final Federal position
limits framework expands to cover (i)
any cash-settled futures and related
options on futures contracts directly or
indirectly linked to any of the 25
proposed physically-settled core
referenced futures contracts as well as
(ii) any economically equivalent swaps.
For spot month positions, the Federal
position limits in final § 150.2 apply
separately, net long or short, to cashsettled referenced contracts and to
physically-settled referenced contracts
in the same commodity. This results in
a separate net long/short position for
each category so that cash-settled
contracts in a particular commodity are
netted with other cash-settled contracts
in that commodity, and physicallysettled contracts in a given commodity
are netted with other physically-settled
contracts in that commodity; a cashsettled contract and a physically-settled
contract may not be netted with one
another during the spot month. Outside
the spot month, cash and physicallysettled contracts in the same commodity
are netted together to determine a single
net long/short position.
Fourth, final § 150.2 subjects preexisting positions, other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps, to Federal position limits during
the spot month and non-spot months.
In setting the Federal position limit
levels, the Commission seeks to advance
the enumerated statutory objectives
with respect to position limits in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).1387 The Commission
recognizes that relatively high Federal
position limit levels may be more likely
to support some of the statutory goals
and less likely to advance others. For
instance, a relatively higher Federal
position limit level may be more likely
to benefit market liquidity for hedgers or
ensure that the price discovery of the
underlying market is not disrupted, but
may be less likely to benefit market
integrity by being less effective at
diminishing, eliminating, or preventing
excessive speculation or at deterring
and preventing market manipulation,
corners, and squeezes. In particular,
setting relatively high Federal position
limit levels may result in excessively
large speculative positions and/or
increased volatility, especially during
speculative showdowns (when two
market participants disagree about the
proper market price and trade
aggressively in large quantities
1387 See supra Sections II.B.3.ii.a(1) and
II.B.4.iii.a(4) (further discussing the CEA’s statutory
objectives for the Federal position limits
framework).
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expressing their view causing the
market price to be volatile), which may
cause some market participants to
retreat from the commodities markets
due to perceived decreases in market
integrity. In turn, fewer market
participants may result in lower
liquidity levels for hedgers and harm to
the price discovery function in the
underlying markets.
Conversely, setting a relatively lower
Federal position limit level may be more
likely to diminish, eliminate, or prevent
excessive speculation, but may also
limit the availability of certain hedging
strategies, adversely affect levels of
liquidity, and increase transaction
costs.1388 Additionally, setting Federal
position limits too low may cause nonexcessive speculation to exit a market,
which could reduce liquidity, cause
‘‘choppy’’ 1389 prices and reduced
market efficiency, and increase option
premia to compensate for the more
volatile prices. The Commission in its
discretion has nevertheless endeavored
to set Federal position limit levels, to
the maximum extent practicable, to
benefit the statutory goals identified by
Congress.
As discussed above, the contracts that
are subject to the Federal position limits
adopted in the Final Rule are currently
subject to either Federal or exchange-set
position limits (or both). To the extent
that the Federal position limit levels in
final § 150.2 are higher than the existing
Federal position limit levels for either
the spot or non-spot month, market
participants currently trading these
contracts could engage in additional
trading under the Federal position limit
levels in final § 150.2 that otherwise
would be prohibited under existing
§ 150.2.1390 On the other hand, to the
extent an exchange—set position limit
level is lower than its corresponding
Federal position limit level in final
1388 For example, relatively lower Federal
position limits may adversely affect potential
hedgers by reducing liquidity. In the case of
reduced liquidity, a potential hedger may face
unfavorable spreads and prices, in which case the
hedger must choose either to delay implementing
its hedging strategy and hope for more favorable
spreads in the near future or to choose immediate
execution (to the extent possible) at a less favorable
price.
1389 ‘‘Choppy’’ prices often refer to illiquidity in
a market where transacted prices bounce between
the bid and the ask prices. Market efficiency may
be harmed in the sense that transacted prices might
need to be adjusted for the bid-ask bounce to
determine the fundamental value of the underlying
contract.
1390 For the spot month, all the legacy agricultural
contracts other than CBOT Oats (O) have higher
Federal position limit levels. For the non-spot
months, all the legacy agricultural contracts other
than CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE),
and CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), have higher
Federal position limit levels.
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§ 150.2, the Federal position limit does
not affect market participants since
market participants are required to
comply with the lower exchange—set
position limit level (to the extent that
the exchanges maintain their current
levels).1391
ii. Spot Month Levels
The Commission is maintaining 25%
of EDS as a ceiling for Federal spot
month position limits, except for cashsettled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(‘‘NYMEX NG’’) referenced contracts,
which is discussed below. Based on the
Commission’s experience overseeing
Federal position limits for decades, and
overseeing exchange-set position limits
submitted to the Commission pursuant
to part 40 of the Commission’s
regulations, none of the Federal spot
month position limit levels listed in
final Appendix E of part 150 of the
Commission’s regulations: (i) Are so low
as to reduce liquidity for bona fide
hedgers or disrupt the price discovery
function of the underlying market; 1392
or (ii) so high as to invite excessive
speculation, manipulation, corners, or
squeezes because, among other things,
any potential economic gains resulting
from the manipulation may be
insufficient to justify the potential costs,
including the costs of acquiring, and
ultimately offloading, the positions used
to effect the manipulation.1393
The Commission considered
alternative Federal spot month position
limit levels provided by Better Markets,
which requested a standard Federal spot
month position limit level of 10% of
EDS, which could be adjusted as
1391 While the Final Rule generally either
increases or maintains the Federal position limits
for both the spot months and non-spot months
compared to existing Federal position limits, where
applicable, and exchange limits, the Federal spot
month position limit level for COMEX Copper (HG)
is below the existing exchange-set level.
Accordingly, market participants may have to
change their trading behavior with respect to
COMEX Copper (HG), which could impose
compliance and transaction costs on these traders,
to the extent their existing trading exceeds the
lower Federal spot month position limit levels.
1392 The Federal spot month position limit levels
adopted in the Final Rule are set at, or higher than,
existing Federal spot month position limit levels
(for the nine legacy agricultural contracts) or at, or
higher than, existing exchange-set spot month
position limit levels (for the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts). As a result, the
Commission does not believe that liquidity will be
reduced with respect to the core referenced futures
contracts and their associated referenced contracts.
Consequently, the Commission also believes that
the Federal spot month position limit levels will be
less burdensome on market participants. See AFIA
at 1.
1393 This is driven primarily by the Federal spot
month position limit levels being set at or below
25% of EDS.
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needed.1394 The Commission believes
that this across-the-board approach fails
to take into account the differences
between the core referenced futures
contracts and could result in material
costs to certain types of referenced
contracts without concomitant benefits.
For example, the Commission has
determined to set the Federal spot
month position limit levels for eight
core referenced futures contracts below
10% of EDS. Raising the levels to 10%
of EDS for some of these contracts could
increase the risk of market
manipulation. As an example, raising
the Federal position limit level to 10%
of EDS would result in an increase of
approximately 46% over the proposed
and final Federal spot month position
limit level for CBOT KC HRS Wheat
(KW). The Commission believes that,
despite the increased potential for
market manipulation, this would result
in a negligible improvement in
liquidity, because the level for CBOT KC
HRS Wheat (KW) is being set as a
ceiling within the Federal position
limits framework.
On the other end of the spectrum, for
some core referenced futures contracts
with proposed and final Federal
position limit levels higher than 10% of
EDS, decreasing the levels to 10% of
EDS could have a material negative
impact on liquidity. For example, this
would result in a reduction in the
Federal spot month position limit levels
by approximately 60% for the seven
core referenced futures contracts for
which the Commission is adopting a
Federal spot month position limit level
of 25% of EDS.1395 This could cause a
significant decrease in liquidity in those
markets, as speculative traders may not
be of sufficient size and quantity to take
the other side of bona fide hedgers’
positions. This may impact the price
discovery function and hedging utility
of those contracts because hedgers could
not transact at better prices provided by
the presence of the speculative traders.
Furthermore, it could severely restrict
the breadth of exchange-set spot month
position limit levels that an exchange
may set, which would provide less
1394 Better Markets at 41. Other commenters, such
as PMAA and AFR, generally suggested lowering
Federal spot month position limit levels. However,
neither provided specific levels or a formula for
determining alternative levels. As a result, the
Commission is unable to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis with respect to their suggestions.
1395 The seven such core referenced futures
contracts are: (1) MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE); (2) ICE
Cocoa (CC); (3) ICE Coffee C (KC); (4) ICE FCOJ–A
(OJ); (5) ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB); (6) ICE Sugar No.
16 (SF); and (7) NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(NYMEX NG).
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flexibility to the exchanges to respond
to rapidly changing market conditions.
The Commission also considered
PMAA’s statement that ‘‘the spot-month
limit of 25 percent of deliverable supply
is not sufficiently aggressive to deter
excessive speculation.’’ 1396 However,
PMAA provides no defined alternative
for the Commission to consider, which
makes it difficult to compare the costs
and benefits of PMAA’s suggested
approach. Nonetheless, the Commission
acknowledges that, as a general
principle, lowering position limit levels
may decrease the likelihood of excessive
speculation.1397 However, that may
come at the cost of liquidity for bona
fide hedgers. The Commission notes
that PMAA’s suggestion would apply to
only seven of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts that have Federal spot
month position limit levels set at 25%
of EDS in the Final Rule.1398 The others
are all set well below 25% of EDS, with
the highest being 19.29% of EDS for
CBOT Oats (O). For all core referenced
futures contracts, including ones that
have Federal spot month position limit
levels set at 25% of EDS, the
Commission reviewed the methodology
underlying the EDS figures and the
Federal spot month position limit
levels, and determined that they
advance the objectives of CEA section
4a(a)(3), including preventing excessive
speculation and manipulation, while
also ensuring sufficient market liquidity
for bona fide hedgers. Finally, the Final
Rule’s position limits framework also
leverages the exchanges’ expertise and
ability to quickly set and adjust their
exchange-set spot month position limits
at any level lower than the Federal spot
month position limit levels in response
to market conditions, which relieves
some of the potential costs of setting the
Federal spot month position limit levels
at 25% of EDS (i.e., a higher likelihood
of excessive speculation compared to
lower levels) for the seven core
referenced futures contracts discussed
above.
The Commission also considered
CME Group’s recommendation with
respect to the non-CME Group-listed
core referenced futures contracts ‘‘that
the Commission not adopt final spot
1396 PMAA
at 2.
based on the Commission’s past
experience in setting Federal speculative position
limits, the Commission notes that it is very unlikely
that there will be excessive speculation if the
Federal spot month position limit level is set at
25% or less of EDS.
1398 The seven such core referenced futures
contracts are: (1) MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE); (2) ICE
Cocoa (CC); (3) ICE Coffee C (KC); (4) ICE FCOJ–A
(OJ); (5) ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB); (6) ICE Sugar No.
16 (SF); and (7) NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(NYMEX NG).
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1397 However,
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month position limit levels at 25% of
deliverable supply as a rigid formula
and, based on the factors previously
described above, work with the
exchange to determine an appropriate
limit based on the market dynamics
previously described.’’ 1399 CME Group
commented that, ‘‘[t]aking an across-theboard approach by setting a Federal
limit at the full 25 percent of deliverable
supply could have a significant negative
impact on many markets across all asset
classes. . . . For example, setting a
uniform and high Federal limit without
regard to the unique characteristics of a
particular contract market can
encourage exchanges to set limits for
competitive reasons rather than for
regulatory purposes . . . [and] that
perverse incentive structure could lead
to a race to the bottom and undermine
the statutory goals of deterring
manipulation and excessive speculation
through position limits.’’ 1400 The
Commission agrees that mechanically
applying a Federal spot month position
limit level of 25% of EDS can
undermine the statutory goals of CEA
section 4a(a)(3). However, in proposing
the Federal spot month position limit
levels, the Commission did not
mechanically apply 25% of EDS as a
rigid formula for the non-CME Grouplisted core referenced futures contracts.
Instead, as it did for the CME Grouplisted core referenced futures contracts,
the Commission reviewed the
methodology underlying the EDS figures
and the Federal spot month position
limit levels, and determined that they
advance the objectives of CEA section
4a(a)(3), including preventing excessive
speculation and manipulation, while
also ensuring sufficient market liquidity
for bona fide hedgers. The Commission
also considered the Federal spot month
position limit levels in the context of
the Final Rule’s position limits
framework, which leverages the
exchanges’ expertise and ability to
quickly set and adjust their exchange-set
spot month position limits at any level
lower than the Federal spot month
position limit levels in response to
market conditions, which relieves some
of the potential costs of setting the
Federal spot month position limit levels
at 25% of EDS. Furthermore, the
Commission considered comments
received in response to the 2020 NPRM
before finalizing the Federal spot month
position limit levels. This is evidenced
1399 CME Group at 5. CME considered the
following factors: contract specifications, market
participation, physical market fundamentals,
delivery process, convergence, market liquidity,
volatility, market participant concentration, and
market participant feedback.
1400 CME Group at 5.
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3405
in the changes to the Federal spot
month position limit levels with respect
to NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), the latter of
which is set at 12.95% of EDS in the
Final Rule.
The Commission also recognizes
comments from Better Markets and
NEFI, which state that exchanges have
incentives to maximize shareholder
profits, which could be accomplished
by, among other things, maximizing
trading.1401 One way exchanges could
spur trading in the context of setting
Federal spot month position limit levels
in this rulemaking is by taking steps to
ensure that the Federal spot month
position limit levels are set as high as
possible by providing higher EDS
figures and recommending higher
Federal spot month position limit
levels. A potential cost of extremely
high Federal spot month position limit
levels is harm to market integrity
through excessive speculation and
manipulation. However, the
Commission believes that these costs are
mitigated through a number of
mechanisms. First, the Commission
independently assessed and verified the
exchanges’ EDS estimates, which
included: (1) Working closely with the
exchanges to independently verify that
all EDS methodologies and figures are
reasonable; 1402 and (2) reviewing each
exchange-recommended level for
compliance with the requirements
established by the Commission and/or
by Congress, including those in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).1403 Second, the
Commission conducted its own analysis
of the exchange-recommended Federal
spot month position limit levels and
determined that the levels adopted
herein are: (1) Low enough to diminish,
eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation and also protect price
discovery; (2) high enough to ensure
that there is sufficient market liquidity
for bona fide hedgers; (3) fall within a
range of acceptable limit levels; and (4)
are properly calibrated to account for
differences between markets. Third, the
Commission notes that exchanges have
significant incentives and obligations to
maintain well-functioning markets as
self-regulatory organizations that are
themselves subject to regulatory
requirements. Specifically, the DCM and
1401 Better
Markets at 22–23; NEFI at 3.
discussed in detail in Section II.B.3.iii.b.,
the verification involved: confirming that the
methodology and data for the underlying
commodity reflected the commodity characteristics
described in the core referenced futures contract’s
terms and conditions; replicating exchange EDS
figures using the methodology provided by the
exchange; and working with the exchanges to revise
the methodologies as needed.
1403 See supra Section II.B.3.ii.a(1).
1402 As
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SEF Core Principles require exchanges
to, among other things, list contracts
that are not readily susceptible to
manipulation, and surveil trading on
their markets to prevent market
manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the delivery or cashsettlement process.1404 Fourth,
exchanges also have significant
incentives to maintain well-functioning
markets to remain competitive with
other exchanges. Market participants
may choose exchanges that are less
susceptible to sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes
caused by corners, squeezes, and
manipulation, which could, among
other things, harm the price discovery
function of the commodity derivative
contracts and negatively impact the
delivery of the underlying commodity,
bona fide hedging strategies, and market
participants’ general risk
management.1405 In addition, several
academic studies, including one
concerning futures exchanges and
another concerning demutualized stock
exchanges, support the conclusion that
exchanges are able to both satisfy
shareholder interests and meet their
self-regulatory organization
responsibilities.1406 Finally, the
Commission itself conducts general
market oversight through, among other
things, its own surveillance program to
ensure well-functioning markets.
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a. NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(NYMEX NG) Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
Based on comments received 1407 and
based on the existing exchange-set
practices with respect to the NYMEX
NG core referenced futures contract and
its associated cash-settled referenced
contracts, the Commission is permitting
1404 17 CFR 38.200; 17 CFR 38.250; 17 CFR
37.300; and 17 CFR 37.400.
1405 Kane, Stephen, Exploring price impact
liquidity for December 2016 NYMEX energy
contracts, n.33, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission website, available at https://
www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/
@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_
priceimpact.pdf.
1406 See David Reiffen and Michel A. Robe,
Demutualization and Customer Protection at SelfRegulatory Financial Exchanges, Journal of Futures
Markets, Vol. 31, 126–164 (in many circumstances,
an exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather
than member) income has a greater incentive to
aggressively enforce regulations that protect
participants from dishonest agents); and Kobana
Abukari and Isaac Otchere, Has Stock Exchange
Demutualization Improved Market Quality?
International Evidence, Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting, Dec 09, 2019, https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00863-y (demutualized
exchanges have realized significant reductions in
transaction costs in the post-demutualization
period).
1407 See MFA/AIMA at 11–12; Citadel at 7–8; and
SIFMA AMG at 10–11.
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market participants to hold a position in
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts up to the Federal spot month
position limit level of 2,000 referenced
contracts per exchange and another
position in cash-settled economically
equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps that
has a notional amount of up to 2,000
equivalent-sized contracts. This is: (i) A
modification from the proposed Federal
spot month position limit level for
NYMEX NG referenced contracts, in
which market participants would be
able to hold only 2,000 cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts
aggregated between all exchanges and
the OTC swaps market; but (ii) a
continuation of the existing exchangeset spot month position limit framework
that has been in place for over a decade.
The Commission believes that this
modification from the 2020 NPRM will,
relative to the proposed approach, help
minimize liquidity costs for market
participants trading in both cash and
physically-settled natural gas
derivatives markets, in which the
markets for cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts is significantly
more liquid than the market for the
physically-settled NYMEX NG core
referenced futures contract during the
spot month. This is, in part, because this
modification will continue to allow
existing market participants ‘‘to
optimize the proportion of physicallysettled and cash-settled natural gas
contracts that they wish to hold.’’ 1408
Finally, although the Commission
acknowledges that market participants
may hold an aggregate position in the
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts that is in excess of 25% of
EDS, the Commission does not believe
that this will lead to excessive
speculation and volatility in the natural
gas markets, because of the highly liquid
nature of the cash-settled natural gas
markets and the Commission’s
experience in overseeing the exchangeset framework with respect to cashsettled natural gas contracts.
b. ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
The Commission also modified the
Federal spot month position limit level
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) by adopting
a level of 900 contracts, instead of 1,800
contracts as proposed. The Commission
is adopting the level of 900 contracts
based on its analysis of the alternatives
suggested by bona fide hedgers using
the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core
referenced futures contract.1409 The
1408 MFA/AIMA
at 11–12.
at 1–2; ACSA at 8; Ecom at 1;
Southern Cotton at 2; NCC at 1; Mallory Alexander
at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; IMC at 2; Olam at 3; DECA
1409 AMCOT
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Commission received two defined
alternatives to the proposed level of
1,800 contracts—300 contracts and 900
contracts. Specifically, based on those
comments, the Commission believes
that it could further improve protections
against corners and squeezes without
materially sacrificing liquidity for bona
fide hedgers by reducing the Federal
spot month position limit level from the
proposed 1,800 contracts to 900
contracts. However, the Commission
believes that retaining the existing
Federal spot month limit level of 300
contracts may cause concerns about
adequate liquidity, especially because it
would be the lowest Federal spot month
position limit level, by far, in terms of
percent of EDS, among all core
referenced futures contracts, and the
Commission has observed illiquidity
during the early part of the spot
month.1410
iii. Levels Outside of the Spot Month
a. The 10/2.5% Formula
The Commission has determined that
the existing 10/2.5% formula generally
has functioned well for the existing nine
legacy agricultural contracts, and has
successfully benefited the markets by
taking into account the competing goals
of facilitating both liquidity formation
and price discovery, while also
protecting the markets from harmful
market manipulation and excessive
speculation. However, since the existing
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels are based on open interest levels
from 2009 (except for CBOT Oats (O),
CBOT Soybeans (S), and ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT), for which existing levels are
based on the respective open interest
from 1999), the Commission is revising
the levels based on the periods from
July 2017 to June 2018 and July 2018 to
June 2019 to reflect the general
increases in open interest 1411 that have
at 2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2; Choice at 1;
East Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2;
Memtex at 2; NCC at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Toyo at
2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at 1;
LDC at 1; SW Ag at 2; NCTO at 2; Parkdale at 2;
and IFUS—Estimated Deliverable Supply—Cotton
Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter
(Aug. 14, 2020).
1410 At 300 contracts, the Federal spot month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) would
be set at 4.32% of EDS. CBOT KC HRS Wheat (KW)
generally has the lowest Federal spot month
position limit level in terms of percentage of EDS
at 6.82%, which is 58% higher than 4.32%.
However, following the close of trading on the
business day prior to the last two trading days of
the contract month, CME Live Cattle (LC) has the
lowest Federal spot month position limit level in
terms of percentage of EDS at 5.29%, which is 22%
higher than 4.32%.
1411 The Commission notes that NGFA
commented ‘‘NGFA still is not completely
convinced that open interest is the best yardstick
for this exercise,’’ because ‘‘[a]s volume and open
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occurred over time in the nine legacy
agricultural contracts (other than CBOT
Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), and
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)).1412
Since the increase for most of the
Federal non-spot position limits is
predicated on the increase in open
interest, as reflected in the revised data
reviewed by the Commission, the
Commission believes that the increases
may enhance, or at least should
maintain, general liquidity, which the
Commission believes may benefit those
with bona fide hedging positions, and
commercial end users in general. On the
other hand, the Commission believes
that many market participants,
especially commercial end users,
generally accept that the existing
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for the nine legacy agricultural
commodities function well, including
promoting liquidity and facilitating
bona fide hedging in the respective
markets. As a result, the Final Rule may
in some cases result in higher Federal
non-spot month position limits, which
could increase speculation without
achieving any concomitant benefits of
increased liquidity for bona fide hedgers
compared to the status quo.
The Commission also recognizes that
there could be potential costs to keeping
the existing 10/2.5% formula (even if
revised to reflect current open interest
levels) compared to alternative formulae
interest grow, Federal non-spot limits expand
correspondingly . . . which leads to yet higher
volume and open interest . . . which again prompts
expanded Federal non-spot limits . . . and so on.’’
However, NGFA did not provide any alternatives to
utilizing open interest for determining Federal nonspot month position limit levels. As discussed
previously in the Final Rule, the Commission
believes that open interest is an appropriate way of
measuring market activity for a particular contract
and that a formula based on open interest, such as
the 10/2.5% formula: (1) Helps ensure that
positions are not so large relative to observed
market activity that they risk disrupting the market;
(2) allows speculators to hold sufficient contracts to
provide a healthy level of liquidity for hedgers; and
(3) allows for increases in position limits and
position sizes as markets expand and become more
active. Furthermore, the Commission notes that
under the Final Rule, Federal non-spot month
position limit levels do not automatically increase
with higher open interest levels. In order to make
any amendments to the Federal position limit
levels, the Commission is required to engage in
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
1412 For most of the legacy agricultural
commodities, this results in a higher non-spot
month limit. However, the Commission is not
changing the non-spot month limits for either CBOT
Oats (O) or MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) based on the
revised open interest since this would result in a
reduction of non-spot month limits from 2,000 to
700 contracts for CBOT Oats (O) and 12,000 to
5,700 contracts for MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE).
Similarly, the Commission also is maintaining the
current non-spot month limit for CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW). See supra Section II.B.4.—Federal
Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels for further
discussion.
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that would result in even higher Federal
position limit levels. First, while the 10/
2.5% formula may have reflected
‘‘normal’’ observed market activity
through 1999 when the Commission
adopted it, there have been changes in
the markets themselves and the entities
that participate in those markets. When
adopting the 10/2.5% formula in 1999,
the Commission’s experience in these
markets reflected aggregate futures and
options open interest well below
500,000 contracts, which no longer
reflects market reality.1413 As the nine
legacy agricultural contracts (with the
exception of CBOT Oats (O)) all have
open interest well above 25,000
contracts, and in some cases above
500,000 contracts, the existing formula
may act as a negative constraint on
liquidity formation relative to the higher
revised formula. Further, if open
interest continues to increase over time,
the Commission anticipates that the
existing 10/2.5% formula could impose
even greater marginal costs on bona fide
hedgers by potentially constraining
liquidity formation (i.e., as the open
interest of a commodity contract
increases, a greater relative proportion
of the commodity’s open interest is
subject to the 2.5% limit level rather
than the initial 10% limit). In turn, this
may increase costs to commercial firms,
which may be passed to the public in
the form of higher prices.
Further, to the extent there may be
certain liquidity constraints, the
Commission has determined that this
potential concern could be mitigated, at
least in part, by the Final Rule’s change
to increase the marginal threshold level
from 25,000 contracts to 50,000
contracts, which the Commission
believes should provide an appropriate
increase in the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels for most contracts
to better reflect the general increase
observed in open interest across futures
markets. The Commission acknowledges
that, as an alternative, the Commission
could have adopted a marginal
threshold level above 50,000 contracts,
but notes that each increase of 25,000
1413 See 64 FR at 24038, 24039 (May 5, 1999). As
discussed in the preamble, the data show that by
the 2015–2018 period, five of the nine legacy
agricultural contracts had maximum open interest
greater than 500,000 contracts. The contracts for
CBOT Corn (C), CBOT Soybeans (S), and CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW) saw increased maximum open
interest by a factor of four to five times the
maximum open interest during the years leading up
to the Commission’s adoption of the 10/2.5%
formula in 1999. Similarly, the contracts for CBOT
Soybean Meal (SM), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT
Wheat (W), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) saw
increased maximum open interest by a factor of
three to four times. See supra Section II.B.4.,
Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels, for
further discussion.
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3407
contracts in the marginal threshold level
would only increase the permitted nonspot month level by 1,875 contracts (i.e.,
(10% of 25,000 contracts)¥(2.5% of
25,000 contracts) = 1,875 contracts). The
Commission has observed based on
current data that changing the marginal
threshold to 50,000 contracts could
benefit several market participants per
legacy agricultural commodity who
otherwise would bump up against the
non-spot month position limit levels
based on the status quo threshold of
25,000 contracts. As a result, the
Commission has determined that
changing the marginal threshold level
could result in marginal benefits and
costs for many of the legacy agricultural
commodities, but the Commission
acknowledges the change is relatively
minor compared to revising the existing
10/2.5% formula based on updated
open interest data.
Second, the Commission recognizes
that an alternative formula that allows
for higher Federal non-spot month
position limit levels, compared to the
existing 10/2.5% formula, could benefit
liquidity and market efficiency by
creating a framework that is more
conducive to the larger liquidity
providers that have entered the market
over time.1414 Compared to when the
Commission first adopted the 10/2.5%
formula, today there are relatively more
large non-commercial traders, such as
banks, managed money traders, and
swap dealers, which generally hold long
positions and act as aggregators or
market makers that provide liquidity to
short positions (e.g., commercial
hedgers).1415 These dealers also
function in the swaps market and use
the futures market to hedge their
exposures. Accordingly, to the extent
that larger non-commercial market
makers and liquidity providers have
entered the market—particularly to the
extent they are able to take offsetting
positions to commercial short
interests—a hypothetical alternative
formula that would permit higher
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels might provide greater market
liquidity, and possibly increased market
efficiency, by allowing for greater
market-making activities.1416
1414 See supra Section II.B.4., Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Levels, for further discussion.
1415 Id.
1416 For example, the Commission is aware of
several market makers that either have left
particular commodity markets, or reduced their
market making activities. See, e.g., McFarlane,
Sarah, Major Oil Traders Don’t See Banks Returning
to the Commodity Markets They Left, The Wall
Street Journal (Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://
www.wsj.com/articles/major-oil-traders-dont-seebanks-returning-to-the-commodity-markets-they-
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However, the Commission believes
that any purported benefits related to a
hypothetical alternative formula, or a
suggested alternative such as the one
provided by ISDA,1417 that would allow
for higher Federal non-spot month
position limits would be minimal at
best. Liquidity providers are still able to
maintain, and possibly increase, market
making activities under the Final Rule
since the Federal non-spot month
position limits are generally still
increasing under the existing 10/2.5%
formula to reflect the increase in open
interest. Further, to the extent that the
Final Rule’s elimination of the risk
management exemption could
theoretically force liquidity providers to
reduce their trading activities, the
Commission believes that certain
liquidity-providing activity of the
existing risk management exemption
holders may still be permitted under the
Final Rule, either as a result of the passthrough swap provision or because of
the general increase in limits based on
the revised open interest levels.1418
Furthermore, bona fide hedgers and
end-users generally have not requested
a revised formula to allow for
significantly higher Federal non-spot
month position limits. The Commission
also recognizes an additional benefit to
market integrity of the Final Rule
compared to a hypothetical alternative
formula: While the Commission believes
that the pass-through swap provision is
narrowly-tailored to enable liquidity
providers to continue providing
liquidity to bona fide hedgers, in
contrast, an alternative formula that
would allow higher limit levels for all
market participants would potentially
permit increased excessive speculation
and increase the probability of market
manipulation or harm the underlying
price discovery function.1419
left-1490715761?mg=prod/com-wsj (describing how
‘‘Morgan Stanley sold its oil trading and storage
business . . . and J.P. Morgan unloaded its physical
commodities business . . . .’’); Decambre, Mark,
Goldman Said to Plan Cuts to Commodity Trading
Desk: WSJ (Feb. 5, 2019), available at https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-said-toplan-cuts-to-commodity-trading-desk-wsj-2019-0205 (describing how Goldman Sachs ‘‘plans on
making cuts within its commodity trading platform
. . . .’’).
1417 ISDA at 7.
1418 See supra Sections II.A.1.x. (discussing passthrough swap provision), II.B.4.iii.a(1)(i) (discussing
increases in open interest); see also NCFC at 7
(stating that NCFC is ‘‘confident that the substantial
increase in the overall speculative position limits
and allowances for pass-through swaps will limit
any potential loss of liquidity’’ that might be
associated with the elimination of the risk
management exemption).
1419 See Section II.B.4.iv.a(2)(iii).
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Additionally, some 1420 have voiced
general concern that permitting
increased Federal non-spot month limits
in the nine legacy agricultural contracts
(at any level), especially in connection
with commodity indices, could disrupt
price discovery and result in a lack of
convergence between futures and cash
prices, resulting in increased costs to
end users, which ultimately could be
borne by the public. The Commission
has not seen data demonstrating this
causal connection, but acknowledges
arguments to that effect.1421
Third, if the Final Rule’s Federal nonspot position limits are too high for a
commodity, the Final Rule might be less
effective in deterring excessive
speculation and market manipulation
for that commodity’s market.
Conversely, if the Commission’s Federal
position limit levels are too low for a
commodity, the Final Rule could
unduly constrain liquidity for bona fide
hedgers or result in a diminished price
discovery function for that commodity’s
underlying market. In either case, the
Commission would view these as costs
imposed on market participants.
However, to the extent the
Commission’s Federal non-spot month
position limit levels could be too high,
1420 AMCOT at 1–2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA
at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2;
Mallory Alexander at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at
2; LDC at 2; Southern Cotton at 2–3; and Better
Markets at 44–48.
1421 IECA expressed similar concerns with respect
to commodity index funds. IECA at 4 (stating that
a June 2009 bipartisan report of the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee for Investigation
concluded that the ‘‘activities of commodity index
traders, in the aggregate, constituted ‘excessive
speculation,’ ’’ and that index funds have caused an
‘‘unwarranted burden on commerce.’’). The
Commission notes that one of the concerns that
prompted the 2008 moratorium on granting risk
management exemptions was a lack of convergence
between futures and cash prices in wheat. Some at
the time hypothesized that perhaps commodity
index trading was a contributing factor to the lack
of convergence, and, some have argued that this
could harm price discovery since traders holding
these positions may not react to market
fundamentals, thereby exacerbating any problems
with convergence. However, the Commission has
determined for various reasons that risk
management exemptions did not lead to the lack of
convergence since the Commission understands
that many commodity index traders vacate
contracts before the spot month and therefore
would not influence convergence between the spot
and futures price at expiration of the contract.
Further, the risk-management exemptions granted
prior to 2008 remain in effect, yet the Commission
is unaware of any significant convergence problems
relating to commodity index traders at this time.
Additionally, there did not appear to be any
convergence problems between the period when
Commission staff initially granted risk management
exemptions and 2007. Instead, the Commission
believes that the convergence issues that started to
occur around 2007 were due to the contract
specification underpricing the option to store wheat
for the long futures holder making the expiring
futures price more valuable than spot wheat.
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the Commission believes these costs
could be mitigated because exchanges
would potentially be able to establish
lower non-spot month position limit
levels.1422 Moreover, these concerns
may be mitigated further to the extent
that exchanges use other tools for
protecting markets aside from position
limits, such as establishing position
accountability levels below Federal
position limit levels or imposing
liquidity and concentration surcharges
to initial margin if vertically integrated
with a derivatives clearing organization.
Further, as discussed below, the
Commission is maintaining current
Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE), and CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), which otherwise would be
lower based on current open interest
levels for these contracts.
b. Setting a Lower Single Month
Position Limit Level for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT)
The Commission is adopting a single
month position limit level of 5,950
contracts, which is 50% of the proposed
level of 11,900 contracts, which, in turn,
was based on the modified 10/2.5%
formula. This was in response to
numerous comments from end-users
suggesting that the Commission set the
single month position limit level lower
than the all-months-combined position
limit level.1423
The Commission notes that there
could be a benefit to setting the single
month position limit level lower than
the all-months-combined position limit
level, because it could help diminish
excessive speculation or prevent price
distortions if traders hold unusually
large positions in contracts outside of
the spot month and those traders
simultaneously exit those positions
immediately before the spot month.
However, the Commission
acknowledges that there could be a cost
to adopting a single month limit that is
half of the all-months-combined
position limit levels. Specifically, it
1422 The Commission notes that several
commenters, including Better Markets, stated that
exchanges may have financial incentives to increase
trading volume, which could incentivize exchanges
to set the highest possible exchange-set position
limit levels. See, e.g., Better Markets at 22–24, 46–
47. While the Commission acknowledges that this
is the case, the Commission also believes that such
costs are sufficiently mitigated through exchange
statutory and regulatory obligations, the
Commission’s oversight of the exchanges, and the
exchanges’ own financial incentives to maintain
well-functioning markets. This is discussed more in
depth in Sections II.B.2.iv.b and III.B.3.iii.b(3)(iii).
1423 E.g., LDC at 2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA
at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2;
Mallory Alexander at 2; Walcot at 2; and White
Gold at 1.
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would restrict a speculative trader’s
ability to take opposite positions to bona
fide hedgers by, for example, entering
into calendar spread transactions that
would normally provide liquidity to
bona fide hedgers. Thus, by adopting
the lower single month limit, liquidity
in deferred month contracts would be
reduced because the speculative trader
would not be able to hold positions in
excess of the single month limit.
Nonetheless, the Commission believes
that, based on the unanimous comments
from the end-users of the ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT) contract requesting a lower single
month position limit level, such costs
may not materially negatively impact
liquidity for bona fide hedgers.
c. Exceptions to the 10/2.5% Formula
for CBOT Oats (O), MGEX Hard Red
Spring Wheat (MWE), and CBOT Kansas
City Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW)
Based on the Commission’s
experience since 2011 with Federal nonspot month position limit levels for the
MGEX HRS Wheat (‘‘MWE’’) and CBOT
KC HRW Wheat (‘‘KW’’) core referenced
futures contracts, the Commission is
maintaining the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels for MWE and KW
at the existing level of 12,000 contracts,
rather than reducing them to the lower
level that would result from applying
the proposed updated 10/2.5% formula.
Maintaining the status quo for the MWE
and KW Federal non-spot month
position limit levels results in partial
wheat parity between those two wheat
contracts, but not with CBOT Wheat
(‘‘W’’), which increases to 19,300
contracts under the Final Rule.
The Commission believes that this
benefits the MWE and KW markets
since the two species of wheat are
similar to one another; accordingly,
decreasing the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels for MWE could
impose liquidity costs on the MWE
market and harm bona fide hedgers,
which could further harm liquidity for
bona fide hedgers in the KW market. On
the other hand, although commenters
requested raising the Federal non-spot
month position limit level for KW to
match the level for W,1424 the
Commission has determined not to raise
the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels for KW and for MWE as well
to the Federal non-spot month position
limit level for W. This is because the
limit level for W appears to be
extraordinarily large in comparison to
open interest in KW and MWE markets,
and the limit levels for both the KW and
the MWE contracts are already larger
1424 SIFMA AMG at 3–4; ISDA at 12; PIMCO at
4–5; MFA/AIMA at 12; and Citadel at 6–7.
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than the limit levels would be based on
the 10/2.5% formula. While W is a
potential substitute for KW and MWE, it
is not similar to the same extent that
MWE and KW are to one another, and
so the Commission has determined that
partial wheat parity outside of the spot
month will maintain liquidity and price
discovery while not unnecessarily
inviting excessive speculation or
potential market manipulation in the
MWE and KW markets.
Likewise, based on the Commission’s
experience since 2011 with the Federal
non-spot month speculative position
limit for CBOT Oats (O), the
Commission is maintaining the limit
level at the current 2,000 contracts level,
rather than reducing it to the lower level
that would result from applying the
updated 10/2.5% formula based on
current open interest. The Commission
has determined that there is no evidence
of potential market manipulation or
excessive speculation, and so there
would be no perceived benefit to
reducing the Federal non-spot month
position limit for the CBOT Oats (O)
contract, while reducing the level could
impose liquidity costs.
iv. Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received several
comments concerning updates to the
Federal position limit levels, with
commenters requesting that the
Commission periodically review the
levels and revise them if
appropriate.1425 One commenter was
concerned that the Federal position
limit levels could become too high over
time,1426 while the rest were concerned
that the levels could become too
low.1427 In addition, CME Group also
suggested that exchanges should update
1425 MFA/AIMA at 5 (stating that ‘‘the
Commission should direct exchanges to
periodically monitor the proposed new position
limit levels’’); PIMCO at 6 (urging the CFTC ‘‘to
include . . . a mandatory requirement to regularly
(and at least annually) review and update limits as
markets grow and change’’); SIFMA AMG at 10
(suggesting the Final Rule should require ‘‘that the
Commission regularly consult with exchanges and
review and adjust position limits when it is
necessary to do so based on relevant market
factors’’); ISDA at 10 (stating that ‘‘the Commission
must regularly convene and consult with exchanges
on deliverable supply and, if appropriate, propose
notice and comment rulemaking to adjust limit
levels’’); and IATP at 16–17 (proposing that the
Commission should engage in ‘‘an annual review of
position limit levels to give [commercial hedgers]
legal certainty over that period’’ and also retain ‘‘the
authority to revise position limits . . . if data
monitoring and analysis show that those annual
limit levels are failing to prevent excessive
speculation and/or various forms of market
manipulation’’).
1426 IATP at 16–17.
1427 MFA/AIMA at 5–6; PIMCO at 6; SIFMA AMG
at 10; and ISDA at 10.
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3409
the EDS figures ‘‘every two years [and]
. . . DCMs should be provided the
opportunity to submit data voluntarily
to the Commission on a more frequent
basis.’’ 1428
The Commission recognizes that there
may be costs if Federal position limit
levels become too high or low over time.
For example, levels that become too
high may permit excessive speculation;
levels that become too low may
negatively impact liquidity. However,
the Commission believes that the Final
Rule’s position limits framework, which
utilizes Federal position limit levels as
ceilings and allows exchange-set
position limits to operate under that
ceiling, will mitigate such potential
costs. Specifically, because the Federal
position limits are utilized as ceilings,
this framework will enable exchanges to
respond to market conditions through a
greater range of acceptable exchange-set
position limit levels than if the Federal
position limit levels did not operate as
ceilings. Furthermore, because such
exchange actions can be effectuated
significantly faster than modifying
Federal position limits, the Final Rule’s
position limits framework is able to
quickly respond to rapidly evolving
market conditions through exchangeaction as well.1429
v. Phase-In of Federal Position Limit
Levels
The Commission received comments
requesting that the Commission
‘‘consider phasing in these adjustments
for agricultural commodities to assess
the impacts of increasing limits on
contract performance.’’ 1430 CMC also
noted that, ‘‘[a] phased approach could
provide market participants, exchanges,
and the Commission a way to build in
scheduled pauses to evaluate the effects
of increased limits, thereby fostering
confidence and trust in the
markets.’’ 1431
1428 CME
Group at 5.
the Commission notes that
updating EDS figures and Federal position limit
levels is a resource-intensive endeavor for both the
Commission and the exchanges. Also, periodic,
predetermined review intervals may not always
align with market changes or other events resulting
in material changes to deliverable supply that
would warrant adjusting Federal spot month
position limit levels. As a result, the Commission
believes that it would be more efficient, timely, and
effective to review the EDS figure and the Federal
position limit level for a core referenced futures
contract if warranted by market conditions,
including changes in the underlying cash market,
which the Commission and exchanges continually
monitor.
1430 AFIA at 2; CMC at 6.
1431 CMC at 6. Although commenters did not
provide specific details about what they meant by
‘‘phase-in,’’ the Commission understands these
comments to mean that they are requesting a
1429 Furthermore,
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The Commission acknowledges that
there could be some benefit in
implementing a formal, gradual phasein for the Federal position limit levels,
because this could allow the
Commission to more incrementally
assess whether there are any issues with
respect to the referenced contract
markets.1432 However, the Commission
believes that the position limits
framework that is implemented in the
Final Rule effectively provides a similar,
but more flexible result. Specifically,
market participants will still be subject
to the exchange-set spot month position
limit levels even after the Final Rule’s
Federal spot month position limit levels
go into effect. The existing exchange-set
position limit levels are lower than the
corresponding Federal levels as adopted
in this Final Rule for most core
referenced futures contracts 1433 and,
unless and until exchanges affirmatively
modify their exchange-set spot month
position limit levels pursuant to part 40
of the Commission’s regulations,1434 the
operative spot month position limit
levels for market participants trading
exchange-listed referenced contracts
will be the exchange-set ones. So, if an
exchange deems it appropriate to
gradual, step-up increase in Federal spot month and
non-spot month position limit levels over time for
agricultural core referenced futures contracts,
instead of having the new Federal position limit
levels apply all at once.
1432 As a preliminary matter, the Commission
believes that the referenced contract markets will be
able to function in an orderly fashion when the
final Federal position limit levels go into effect.
This is because, among other things, the final
Federal spot month position limit levels are
supported by the updated EDS figures and are set
at or below 25% of EDS, and the final Federal nonspot month position limit levels are supported by
increased open interest and are generally set
pursuant to the modified 10/2.5% formula. The
three core referenced futures contracts that do not
strictly follow the 10/2.5% formula in the non-spot
month (i.e., CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE), and CBOT Oats (O)) do not
require any phase-in period, because they remain at
existing Federal and exchange-set non-spot month
position limit levels.
1433 Nineteen of the core referenced futures
contracts will have Federal spot month position
limit levels that are higher than current exchangeset spot month position limit levels. COMEX
Copper (HG), CBOT Oats (O), NYMEX Platinum
(PL), and NYMEX Palladium (PA) will have Federal
spot month position limit levels that are equal to
the current exchange-set spot month position limit
levels. The last two steps of the Federal spot month
step-down position limit levels for CME Live Cattle
(LC) are equal to the corresponding last two steps
of exchange-set spot month step-down position
limit levels. Finally, although currently there is
technically no exchange-set spot month position
limit for ICE Sugar No. 16, this contract is subject
to a single month position limit level of 1,000
contracts, which effectively serves as its spot month
position limit level. As a result, the Federal spot
month position limit level for ICE Sugar No. 16 will
effectively be higher than its current exchange-set
spot month position limit level.
1434 17 CFR part 40.
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maintain its existing exchange-set
position limit levels and does not
choose to adopt the new applicable
Federal speculative position limit level
as the new exchange-set speculative
limit for any relevant referenced
contract listed on its exchange, then
there will be no practical change from
the status quo for market participants
from a position limits perspective. If the
exchange believes that it is appropriate
to raise its exchange-set spot month
position limit levels either up to the
Federal position limit levels or lower
levels as it deems appropriate, then the
exchange may do so in a way that is
tailored for each referenced contract
(including through a phased-in
approach) and that is informed by the
exchange’s knowledge of each market.
A further benefit to the Final Rule’s
position limits framework over a
federally-mandated phase-in is that
exchanges have greater flexibility
(relative to the Commission) to quickly
modify exchange-set levels, including
modifying any phase-in levels, to
respond to sudden and changing market
conditions.
vi. Core Referenced Futures Contracts
and Linked Referenced Contracts;
Netting
The definitions of the terms ‘‘core
referenced futures contract’’ and
‘‘referenced contract’’ set the scope of
contracts to which Federal position
limits apply. As discussed above, by
applying the Federal position limits to
‘‘referenced contracts,’’ the Final Rule
expands the Federal position limits
beyond the 25 physically-settled ‘‘core
referenced futures contracts’’ listed in
final Appendix E to part 150 by also
including any cash-settled and
physically-settled ‘‘referenced
contracts’’ linked thereto, as well as
swaps that meet the ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition in final
§ 150.1 and thus qualify as ‘‘referenced
contracts.’’ 1435
creation of a financially equivalent
contract that references the price of a
core referenced futures contract, or of
the commodity underlying a core
referenced futures contract. The
Commission has determined that this
benefits market integrity and potentially
reduces costs to market participants that
otherwise could result from market
manipulation.
The Commission also recognizes that
including cash-settled contracts within
the final Federal position limits
framework may impose additional
compliance costs on market participants
and exchanges. Further, the Federal
position limits—especially outside the
spot month—may not provide all of the
benefits discussed above with respect to
market integrity and manipulation
because there is no physical delivery
outside the spot month and therefore
there is reduced concern for corners and
squeezes. However, to the extent that
there is manipulation or price distortion
involving such non-spot, cash-settled
contracts, the Commission’s authority to
regulate and oversee futures and related
options on futures markets (other than
through establishing Federal position
limits) may also be effective in
uncovering or preventing manipulation
or distortion, especially in the non-spot
cash markets, and may result in
relatively lower compliance costs
incurred by market participants.
Similarly, the Commission
acknowledges that exchange oversight
could provide similar benefits to market
oversight and prevention of market
manipulation, but with lower costs
imposed on market participants—given
the exchanges’ deep familiarity with
their own markets and their ability to
tailor a response to a particular market
disruption—compared to Federal
position limits.
The ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition
in final § 150.1 also includes
‘‘economically equivalent swap,’’ and,
for the reasons discussed below,
includes a narrower set of swaps
compared to the set of futures contracts
and options thereon that would be,
under the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition, captured as either ‘‘directly’’
or ‘‘indirectly linked’’ to a core
referenced futures contract.1436
a. Referenced Contracts
The Commission has determined that
including futures contracts and options
thereon that are ‘‘directly’’ or
‘‘indirectly linked’’ to the core
referenced futures contracts, including
cash-settled contracts, under the
definition of ‘‘referenced contract’’ in
final § 150.1 helps prevent the evasion
of Federal position limits—especially
during the spot month—through the
b. List of Referenced Contracts 1437
The Commission’s publication of the
Staff Workbook is intended to provide a
non-exhaustive list of exchange-traded
1435 As discussed in the preamble, the position
limits framework also applies to physically-settled
swaps that qualify as economically equivalent
swaps. However, the Commission believes that
physically-settled economically equivalent swaps
would be few in number.
1436 See infra Section IV.A.3.vi.e. (discussing
economically equivalent swaps).
1437 Appendix C of the Final Rule provides staff
guidance to assist market participants and
exchanges in determining whether a particular
contract qualifies as a referenced contract.
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referenced contracts that are subject to
Federal position limits. Although the
Commission expects to timely update
this list of contracts, the omission of a
contract from the Staff Workbook does
not mean that such contract is outside
the definition of a referenced contract
subject to Federal position limits.
Additionally, the Staff Workbook will
provide a linkage between each
referenced contract, and either the core
referenced futures contract or referenced
contract, as applicable to which it is
linked, to aid in market participants’
understanding of the Commission’s
determination.
Although some commenters believed
that the Commission should require
exchanges to publish and maintain a
definitive list of referenced contracts
(other than economically equivalent
swaps) 1438 the Commission believes
that the centralized publication of this
Workbook creates efficiency by
providing market participants a known
access location, and minimizes costs by
not requiring redundant publication.
The Commission’s concurrent
publication of the Staff Workbook
provides a non-exhaustive list of
exchange-traded referenced contracts,
and will help market participants in
determining categories of contracts that
fit within the referenced contract
definition. This effort is intended to
provide clarity to market participants
regarding which exchange-traded
contracts are subject to Federal position
limits.
c. Netting and Related Treatment of
Cash-Settled Referenced Contracts
Under paragraph (1) of the final
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition,
referenced contracts include a core
referenced futures contract, and any
cash-settled futures contracts and
options on futures contacts that are
directly or indirectly linked to a
physically-settled core referenced
futures contract.
PIMCO and SIFMA AMG contended
that cash-settled referenced contracts
should not be subject to Federal
position limits at all because cashsettled contracts do not introduce the
same risk of market manipulation. They
argued that subjecting cash-settled
referenced contracts to Federal position
limits would increase transaction costs
and reduce market liquidity and depth
in these instruments.1439
1438 MFA/AIMA at 7; Citadel at 4–5; SIFMA AMG
at 11–12.
1439 PIMCO at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4–7. These
entities did not specifically argue that cash-settled
contracts should be excluded from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition; rather, they contended that in
general such instruments should not be subject to
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ISDA argued that cash-settled
contracts should not be included in an
immediate Federal position limits
rulemaking, and should instead be
deferred until the Commission has
adopted Federal limits with respect to
physically-delivered spot month futures
contracts, and after which the
Commission should revisit Federal
limits for cash-settled contracts.1440
FIA and ICE argued that limits for
cash-settled referenced contracts should
be higher relative to Federal position
limits for physically-settled referenced
contracts. They similarly argued that
cash-settled referenced contracts are
‘‘not subject to corners and squeezes’’
and will ‘‘ ‘ensure market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers.’ ’’ 1441
In contrast, CME supported the
Commission’s approach for spot-month
parity for physically-settled and cashsettled referenced contracts across all
commodity markets. CME explained
that absent such parity, one side of the
market could be vulnerable to artificial
distortions from manipulations on the
other side of the market, regulatory
arbitrage, and liquidity drain to the
other side of the market.1442
The Commission believes that its
parity approach, including parity with
respect to the size of the Federal
position limits for both cash-settled and
physically-settled contracts, benefits
market integrity, liquidity, and price
discovery by not providing skewed
incentives to a market participant to
favor one group of contracts over the
other, or providing avenues for
manipulation that this rulemaking seeks
to avoid.
The Commission is also generally
adopting Federal position limits on an
aggregated, instead of on a per-DCM
basis.1443 FIA and ICE suggested that
Federal position limits for cash-settled
referenced contracts should apply per
DCM (rather than in the aggregate across
DCMs).1444 The Commission views
DCM-based limits as restrictive and
costly for the most innovative DCMs, as
DCM-based limits would necessarily
Federal position limits. The Commission notes that
this is technically a different argument since cashsettled instruments could be exempt from position
limits but still qualify as ‘‘referenced contracts.’’
Nevertheless, the practical result is the same.
1440 ISDA at 3–5.
1441 ICE at 3, 15 (also arguing that cash-settled
limits should apply per exchange, rather than
across exchanges); FIA at 7–8.
1442 CME Group at 6.
1443 The Commission is permitting market
participants to hold a position in cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts up to the Federal
spot month position limit on a per exchange basis.
This is discussed more in depth in Section
IV.A.3.ii.a.
1444 FIA at 7–8; ICE at 13.
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3411
represent a smaller volume of contracts
available than would an aggregated
limit. By making the full aggregated
Federal position limit available to the
contract that is most responsive to the
needs of the market, the Commission
believes that this provides a marketwide benefit by promoting innovation
and competition in the marketplace.
The Final Rule permits market
participants to net positions outside the
spot month in linked physically-settled
and cash-settled referenced contracts,
but during the spot month market
participants may not net their positions
in cash-settled referenced contracts
against their positions in physicallysettled referenced contracts. The
Commission believes that final
§ 150.2(a) and (b) benefits liquidity
formation and bona fide hedgers outside
the spot months since the netting rules
facilitate the management of risk on a
portfolio basis for liquidity providers
and market makers. In turn, improved
liquidity may benefit bona fide hedgers
and other end users by facilitating their
hedging strategies and reducing related
transaction costs (e.g., improving
execution timing and reducing bid-ask
spreads). On the other hand, the
Commission recognizes that allowing
such netting could increase transaction
costs and harm market integrity by
allowing for a greater possibility of
market manipulation since market
participants and speculators can
maintain larger gross positions outside
the spot month. However, the
Commission has determined that such
potential costs may be mitigated since
concerns about corners and squeezes
generally are less acute outside the spot
month given there is no physical
delivery involved, and because there are
tools other than Federal position limits
for preventing and deterring other types
of manipulation, including banging the
close, such as exchange-set limits and
accountability and surveillance both at
the exchange and Federal level.
Moreover, prohibiting the netting of
physical and cash positions during the
spot month should benefit bona fide
hedgers as well as price discovery of the
underlying markets since market makers
and speculators are not able to maintain
a relatively large position in the
physical markets by netting it against its
positions in the cash markets.1445 While
1445 Otherwise, a market participant could
maintain large, offsetting positions in excess of
limits in both the physically-settled and cashsettled contract, which might harm market integrity
and price discovery and undermine the Federal
position limits framework. For example, absent
such a restriction in the spot month, a trader could
stand for over 100% of deliverable supply during
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this may increase compliance and
transaction costs for speculators, it may
benefit some bona fide hedgers and end
users. It may also impose costs on
exchanges, including increased
surveillance and compliance costs and
lost fees related to the trading that such
market makers or speculators otherwise
might engage in absent Federal position
limits or with the ability to net their
physical and cash positions.
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d. Exclusions From the ‘‘Referenced
Contract’’ Definition
Although the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition in final § 150.1 includes
linked contracts, it explicitly excludes
location basis contracts,1446 commodity
index contracts, swap guarantees, trade
options that satisfy § 32.3 of the
Commission’s regulations,1447 outright
price reporting agency index contracts,
and monthly average pricing contracts.
First, the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition explicitly excludes location
basis contracts, which are contracts that
reflect the difference between two
delivery locations or quality grades of
the same commodity.1448 The
Commission believes that excluding
location basis contracts from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition benefits
market integrity by preventing a trader
from obtaining an extraordinarily large
speculative position in the commodity
underlying the referenced contract.
Absent this exclusion, a market
participant could increase its exposure
in the commodity underlying the
referenced contract by using the
location basis contract to net down
the spot month by holding a large long position in
the physical-delivery contract along with an
offsetting short position in a cash-settled contract,
which effectively would corner the market.
1446 ICE further recommended that additional
basis and spread contracts be excluded from the
referenced contract definition. ICE at 10–11. The
Commission has determined not to exclude these
additional contracts from the referenced contract
definition, as, among other reasons discussed
further above, the Commission views the
constraints on the liquidity and volatility associated
with other excluded contracts as not present to an
equal degree in basis and spread contracts proposed
to be excluded by ICE.
1447 17 CFR 32.3.
1448 The term ‘‘location basis contract’’ generally
means a derivative that is cash-settled based on the
difference in price, directly or indirectly, of (1) a
core referenced futures contract; and (2) the same
commodity underlying a particular core referenced
futures contract at a different delivery location than
that of the core referenced futures contract. See
Appendix C to final part 150. For clarity, a core
referenced futures contract may have specifications
that include multiple delivery points or different
grades (i.e., the delivery price may be determined
to be at par, a fixed discount to par, or a premium
to par, depending on the grade or quality). The
above discussion regarding location basis contracts
is referring to delivery locations or quality grades
other than those contemplated by the applicable
core referenced futures contract.
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against its position in a referenced
contract, and then further increase its
position in the referenced contract that
would otherwise be restricted by
position limits. Similarly, the
Commission believes that the exclusion
of location basis contracts reduces
hedging costs for hedgers and
commercial end-users, as they are able
to more efficiently hedge the cost of
commodities at their preferred location
without the risk of possibly hitting a
position limits ceiling or incurring
compliance costs related to applying for
a bona fide hedge recognition related to
such position.1449
Excluding location basis contracts
from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition also could impose costs for
market participants that wish to trade
location basis contracts since, as noted,
such contracts are not subject to Federal
position limits and thus could be more
easily subject to manipulation by a
market participant that obtained an
excessively large position. However, the
Commission believes such costs are
mitigated because location basis
contracts generally demonstrate less
volatility and are less liquid than the
core referenced futures contracts,
meaning the Commission believes that it
would be an inefficient method of
manipulation (i.e., too costly to
implement and therefore, the
Commission believes that the
probability of manipulation is low).
Further, excluding location basis
contracts from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition is consistent with existing
market practice since the market treats
a contract on one grade or delivery
location of a commodity as different
from another grade or delivery location.
Accordingly, to the extent that this
exclusion is consistent with current
market practice, any benefits or costs
already may have been realized.
Second, the Commission has
concluded that excluding commodity
index contracts from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition benefits market
integrity by preventing speculators from
using a commodity index contract to net
down an outright position in a
referenced contract that is a component
1449 AGA agrees that the exclusion of location
basis contracts from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition creates certain netting benefits and may
allow commercial end-users to more efficiently
hedge the cost of commodities at a preferred
location. AGA at 9. In general, AGA supported all
of the proposed exclusions from the ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition in the 2020 NPRM, as it
believes that market participants benefit from clear
rules and definitions that help prevent ‘‘potential
disagreement leading to increased transaction costs,
potential loss of liquidity, and compliance
strategies that generally make the markets less
efficient.’’ Id.
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of the commodity index contract, which
would allow the speculator to take on
large outright positions in the
referenced contracts and therefore result
in increased speculation, undermining
the Federal position limits
framework.1450 However, the
Commission believes that this exclusion
could impose costs on market
participants that trade commodity index
contracts since, as noted, such contracts
are not subject to Federal position limits
and thus could be more easily subject to
manipulation by a market participant
that obtained an excessively large
position. The Commission believes such
costs would be mitigated because the
commodities comprising the index are
themselves subject to limits, and
because commodity index contracts
generally tend to exhibit low volatility
since they are diversified across many
different commodities. Further, the
Commission believes that it is possible
that excluding commodity index
contracts from the definition of
‘‘referenced contract’’ could result in
some trading shifting to commodity
index contracts, which may reduce
liquidity in exchange-listed core
referenced futures contracts, harm pretrade transparency and the price
discovery process in the futures
markets, and depress open interest (as
volumes shift to index positions, which
would not count toward open interest
calculations). However, the Commission
believes that the probability of this
occurring is low because the
Commission believes that using
commodity index contracts is an
1450 Further, the Commission believes that
prohibiting the netting of a commodity index
position with a referenced contract is required by
its interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
amendments to the CEA’s definition of ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position.’’ The Commission
interprets the amended CEA definition to eliminate
the Commission’s ability to recognize risk
management positions as bona fide hedges or
transactions. See infra Section IV.A.4, Exemptions
from Federal Position Limits—Bona Fide Hedging
Recognitions, Spread and Other Exemptions (Final
§§ 150.1 and 150.3), for further discussion. In this
regard, the Commission has observed that it is
common for swap dealers to enter into commodity
index contracts with participants for which the
contract would not qualify as a bona fide hedging
position (e.g., with a pension fund). Failing to
exclude commodity index contracts from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition could enable a
swap dealer to use positions in commodity index
contracts as a risk management hedge by netting
down its offsetting outright futures positions in the
components of the index. Permitting this type of
risk management hedge would subvert the statutory
pass-through swap language in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(B), which the Commission interprets as
prohibiting the recognition of positions entered into
for risk management purposes as bona fide hedges
unless the swap dealer is entering into positions
opposite a counterparty for which the swap
position is a bona fide hedge.
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inefficient means of obtaining exposure
to a specific commodity.
Third, the Commission’s
determination to exclude trade options
from the referenced contract definition
is consistent with the historical practice
of the Commission, in which it has
exempted a number of trade options
from Commission requirements. This
exclusion benefits end-users who hedge
their physical risk through these
instruments, yet do not contribute to
excessive speculation.
Fourth, the Commission’s exclusion
of swap guarantees from the referenced
contract definition will help avoid any
potential confusion regarding the
application of position limits to
guarantees of swaps. The Commission
understands that swap guarantees
generally serve as insurance, and, in
many cases, swap guarantors guarantee
the performance of an affiliate in order
to entice a counterparty to enter into a
swap with such guarantor’s affiliate. As
a result, the Commission believes that
swap guarantees do not contribute to
excessive speculation, market
manipulation, squeezes, or corners.
Furthermore, the Commission believes
that swap guarantees were not
contemplated when Congress
articulated its policy goals in CEA
section 4a(a).1451
Fifth, the Final Rule reaffirms the
Commission’s determination that an
outright price reporting agency index
contract does not qualify as a
‘‘referenced contract.’’ 1452 To provide
market participants clarity regarding
this determination, the Commission
modified the regulatory text of the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition in final
§ 150.1 to explicitly exclude the term
‘‘outright price reporting agency index
contracts.’’ 1453 The exclusion of
outright price reporting agency index
contracts from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
1451 To the extent that swap guarantees may lower
costs for uncleared OTC swaps in particular by
incentivizing a counterparty to enter into a swap
with the guarantor’s affiliate, excluding swap
guarantees may benefit market liquidity, which is
consistent with the CEA’s statutory goals in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B) to ensure sufficient liquidity for
bona fide hedgers when establishing its position
limit framework.
1452 As explained in the preamble to the Final
Rule, the Commission has concluded that an
‘‘outright price reporting agency index contract,’’
which is based on an index published by a price
reporting agency that surveys cash-market
transaction prices (even if the cash-market practice
is to price at a differential to a futures contract), is
not directly or indirectly linked to the
corresponding referenced contract. See supra
Section II.A.16.iii.b(4)(v) (discussing new
exclusions from the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition).
1453 The Commission does not believe this
technical change to the regulatory text represents a
change in policy. See supra Section II.A.16.
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definition benefits market participants
through clarity and mitigation of costs,
such as costs to monitor positions for
aggregation and other compliance
purposes. The Commission believes that
this exclusion maintains market
integrity as it would be costly to employ
these contracts to circumvent position
limits.
Finally, the Commission has
concluded that excluding ‘‘monthly
average pricing contracts’’ 1454 from the
‘‘referenced contract’’ definition benefits
market integrity by ensuring sufficient
market liquidity for bona fide hedgers
due to: (1) The difficulty and expense of
any entity artificially moving the price
of the monthly average by manipulating
one or more component prices within
the contract; and (2) the widespread use
of these contracts by, and their utility to,
commercial entities in hedging their
risk. As with the outright price reporting
agency index contracts, this exclusion
benefits market participants to the
extent it mitigates costs to monitor
positions for aggregation and other
compliance purposes.
e. Economically Equivalent Swaps
The existing Federal position limits
framework does not include Federal
position limit levels on swaps. The
Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section
4a(a)(5), which requires that when the
Commission imposes Federal position
limits on futures contracts and options
on futures contracts pursuant to CEA
section 4a(a)(2), the Commission also
establish limits simultaneously for
‘‘economically equivalent’’ swaps ‘‘as
appropriate.’’ 1455 As the statute does
not define the term ‘‘economically
equivalent,’’ the Commission is
applying its expertise in construing
such term consistent with the policy
goals articulated by Congress, including
in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C) and 4a(a)(3)
as discussed below.
Specifically, under the Commission’s
definition of ‘‘economically equivalent
1454 The definition of the new term ‘‘monthly
average pricing contracts’’ in Appendix C of this
Final Rule is intended to cover the types of
contracts generally referred to in the industry as
calendar-month average, trade-month average, and
balance-of-the-month contracts. See supra Section
II.A.16.iii.b(4)(v) (discussing new exclusions from
the ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition).
1455 CEA section 4a(a)(5); 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5). In
addition, CEA section 4a(a)(4) separately
authorizes, but does not require, the Commission to
impose Federal position limits on swaps that meet
certain statutory criteria qualifying them as
‘‘significant price discovery function’’ swaps. 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(4). The Commission reiterates, for the
avoidance of doubt, that the definitions of
‘‘economically equivalent’’ in CEA section 4a(a)(5)
and ‘‘significant price discovery function’’ in CEA
section 4a(a)(4) are separate concepts and that
contracts can be economically equivalent without
serving a significant price discovery function.
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swap’’ set forth in final § 150.1, a swap
generally qualifies as economically
equivalent with respect to a particular
referenced contract so long as the swap
shares ‘‘identical material’’ contract
specifications, terms, and conditions
with the referenced contract. Further,
any differences between the swap and
referenced contract with respect to the
following are disregarded for purposes
of determining whether the swap
qualifies as economically equivalent: (i)
Lot size or notional amount; (ii) for a
natural gas swap and a referenced
contract that are both physically-settled,
delivery dates diverging by less than
two calendar days, and for any other
swap and referenced contract that are
both physically-settled, delivery dates
diverging by less than one calendar
day; 1456 and (iii) post-trade riskmanagement arrangements.1457
As discussed in turn below, the
Commission believes that the Final
Rule’s definition of ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps’’ benefits (1) market
integrity by protecting against excessive
speculation and potential manipulation
and (2) market liquidity by not favoring
OTC or foreign markets over domestic
markets. Additionally, (3) the
Commission will discuss the costs and
benefits related to the Final Rule’s
economically equivalent swap
definition’s treatment of natural gas
swaps; and (4) the Commission will
address the several proposed alternative
definitions included in commenter
letters.
As discussed further below, with
respect to exchange-set position limits
on swaps, the Commission proposed to
delay compliance with DCM Core
Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6, as
compliance would otherwise be
impracticable, and, in some cases,
impossible, at this time. In the 2020
NPRM, the Commission explained that
this delay was based largely on the fact
that exchanges cannot view positions in
OTC swaps across the various places
they are trading, including on
competitor exchanges. The Commission
is maintaining this approach to permit
exchanges to delay compliance with
respect to exchange-set position limits
on swaps, although the Commission
emphasizes, for the avoidance of doubt,
that it will monitor and enforce swaps
for compliance with Federal position
limits subject to the compliance dates
1456 As discussed below, the definition of
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ with respect to
natural gas referenced contracts contains the same
terms, except that it includes delivery dates
diverging by less than two calendar days.
1457 See supra Section II.A.4. (further discussing
the Commission’s definition of ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’).
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discussed above.1458 However, the
Commission notes that in two years, the
Commission will reevaluate the ability
of exchanges to establish and implement
appropriate surveillance mechanisms to
implement DCM Core Principle 5 and
SEF Core Principle 6 with respect to
swaps.
(1) Benefits and Costs Related to Market
Integrity
The Commission believes that the
final economically equivalent swap
definition benefits market integrity in
two ways. First, the final definition
protects against excessive speculation
and potential market manipulation by
limiting the ability of speculators to
obtain excessive positions through
netting. As explained above, under the
Final Rule, market participants may net
positions across linked referenced
contracts, including positions across
linked referenced contracts in
economically equivalent swaps and
futures.1459 Accordingly, a more
inclusive ‘‘economically equivalent’’
definition that would encompass
additional swaps (e.g., swaps that may
differ in their ‘‘material’’ terms or
physically-settled swaps with delivery
dates that diverge by one day or more)
could make it easier for market
participants to inappropriately net
down against their referenced futures
contracts by allowing market
participants to structure swaps that do
not necessarily offer identical risk or
economic exposure or sensitivity as the
linked futures contract, but which could
still be netted under the Final Rules. In
such a hypothetical case, a market
participant could enter into an OTC
swap with a maturity that differs by
days or even weeks in order to net down
a position in a referenced contract,
enabling the market participant to hold
an even greater position in the
referenced contract.
Similarly, applying Federal position
limits to swaps that share identical
‘‘material’’ terms with their
corresponding referenced contracts
benefits market integrity by preventing
market participants from escaping the
position limits framework merely by
altering non-material terms, such as
holiday conventions. On the other hand,
the Commission recognizes that such a
narrow ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition could impose costs on the
marketplace by possibly permitting
excessive speculation since market
participants would not be subject to
1458 For discussion of the relevant compliance
dates for the Final Rule, see supra Section I.D.
1459 See supra Section II.B.10. (discussing
netting).
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Federal position limits if they were to
enter into swaps that may have different
material terms (e.g., penultimate swaps
to the extent a penultimate futures
contract or options contract does not
exist to which a penultimate swap could
possibly be deemed to be ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ and therefore subject to the
applicable Federal position limits) 1460
but may nonetheless be sufficiently
correlated to their corresponding
referenced contract. In this case, it is
possible that there may be potential for
excessive speculation, market
manipulation, or it is possible that
market participants could leave the
futures markets for the swaps markets,
which could introduce new costs to
commercial market participants due to
reduced market liquidity or disruptions
to the price discovery function.1461
Nonetheless, to the extent that swaps
currently are not subject to Federal
position limit levels, such potential
costs would remain unchanged
compared to the status quo.
Second, the relatively narrow final
definition benefits market integrity, and
reduces associated compliance and
implementation costs, by permitting
exchanges, market participants, and the
Commission to focus resources on those
swaps that pose the greatest threat for
facilitating corners and squeezes—that
is, those swaps with substantially
identical delivery dates and identical
material economic terms to futures and
options on futures subject to Federal
position limits. While swaps that have
different material terms than their
corresponding referenced contracts,
including different delivery dates, may
potentially be used for engaging in
market manipulation, the final
definition benefits market integrity by
allowing exchanges and the
1460 Or, in the case of natural gas referenced
contracts, which would potentially include
penultimate swaps as economically equivalent
swaps, a swap with a maturity of less than one day
away from the penultimate swap. See supra
Sections II.A.4.iii.f. and II.B.3.vi. (discussing
natural gas swaps).
1461 The Commission acknowledges that liquidity
could shift to penultimate swaps, which would
impose costs on price discovery and market
efficiency in the futures markets, in cases where
there are no corresponding penultimate futures
contracts or options contracts (and therefore the
swap would not be deemed to be an economically
equivalent swap), but the Commission believes that
this concern is mitigated for two reasons. First,
basis risk may exist between the penultimate swap
and the referenced contract, and so the Commission
believes that a market participant is less likely to
hold a penultimate swap the greater the economic
difference compared to the corresponding
referenced contract. Second, the absence of
penultimate futures contracts or options contracts
may indicate lack of appropriate penultimate
liquidity to hedge or offset one’s penultimate swap
position and therefore may militate against entering
into penultimate swaps.
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Commission to focus on the most
sensitive period of the spot month,
including with respect to the
Commission’s and exchanges’ various
surveillance and enforcement functions.
To the extent market participants would
be able to use swaps that fall outside the
scope of the final definition to effect
market manipulation, such potential
costs would remain unchanged from the
status quo since no swaps are currently
covered by existing Federal position
limits. The Commission however
acknowledges that its narrow
economically equivalent swap
definition may introduce possible
burdens to market integrity—as the form
of an opportunity cost—since fewer
swaps are covered under the Federal
position limits compared to the
alternative in which the Commission
adopted a broader definition.
Further, the Final Rule’s delayed
compliance with respect to the
establishment and enforcement of
exchange-set limits on swaps benefits
exchanges by facilitating exchanges’
ability to establish surveillance and
compliance systems. As noted above,
exchanges currently lack sufficient data
regarding individual market
participants’ open swap positions since
exchanges cannot view positions in
OTC swaps across the various places
they are trading, including competitor
exchanges, which means that requiring
exchanges to establish oversight over
market participants’ positions currently
could impose substantial costs and also
may be impractical to achieve.1462
As a result, the Commission has
determined that allowing exchanges
delayed compliance with respect to
swaps reduces unnecessary costs.
Nonetheless, the Commission’s
determination to permit exchanges to
delay implementing Federal position
limits on swaps could incentivize
market participants to leave the futures
markets and instead transact in
economically-equivalent swaps, which
could reduce liquidity in the futures
and related options markets. However,
the Commission emphasizes that the
Commission will oversee and enforce
compliance with Federal position limits
for economically equivalent swaps,
which should mitigate the concern
related to incentivizing futures contracts
and related options on futures contracts
to move trading and related liquidity to
1462 SIFMA AMG agrees with the Commission’s
assessment, stating that ‘‘[s]ince the exchanges do
not have visibility into OTC swaps markets, market
participants and the CFTC would be responsible for
implementing position limits on swaps without the
benefit of the exchanges’ extensive experience in
monitoring and applying position limits for
exchange-listed contracts.’’ SIFMA AMG at 10.
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the OTC swaps markets. With respect to
exchange-set position limits on swaps,
the Commission notes that in two years,
the Commission will reevaluate the
ability of exchanges to establish and
implement appropriate surveillance
mechanisms to implement position
limits for economically equivalent
swaps at the exchange level.1463
Additionally, while futures contracts
and options thereon are subject to
clearing and exchange oversight,
economically equivalent swaps may be
transacted bilaterally off-exchange (i.e.,
OTC swaps). As a result, it is relatively
easy to create customized OTC swaps
that may be highly correlated to its
corresponding futures (or options)
contract, which would allow the market
participant to create an exposure in the
underlying commodity similar to the
referenced contract’s exposure. Due to
the relatively narrow ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition, the
Commission believes that it may be
possible for market participants to
attempt to avoid Federal position limits
by entering into such OTC swaps.1464
While such swaps may not be perfectly
correlated to their corresponding
referenced contracts, market
participants may find this risk
acceptable in order to avoid Federal
position limits. An increase in OTC
swaps at the expense of futures
contracts and options on futures
contracts may impose costs on market
integrity due to lack of exchange
oversight. If liquidity were to move from
futures exchanges to the OTC swaps
markets, non-dealer commercial entities
may face increased transaction costs and
widening spreads, as swap dealers gain
market power in the OTC market
relative to centralized exchange trading.
1463 In response to the 2020 NPRM’s proposal to
permit exchanges to delay oversight and
enforcement of exchanges’ position limit rules on
economically equivalent swaps, IATP stated that
‘‘[d]elaying compliance with position limit
requirement [sic] to avoid imposing costs on market
participants makes it appear that the Commission
is serving as a swap dealer booster, although swap
dealers are amply resourced to provide the
necessary data to the exchanges and to the
Commission. The Commission is bending over
backward to avoid requiring swaps market
participants from paying the costs of exchange
trading.’’ However, the Commission emphasizes
that the Commission will still implement, oversee,
and enforce Federal position limits on swaps. As a
result, the proposed delayed enforcement of
exchange-set position limits is designed to reduce
costs imposed on exchanges rather than swap
dealers, which will be subject to Federal position
limits under the Final Rule.
1464 In contrast, since futures contracts and
options on futures contracts are created by
exchanges and submitted to the Commission for
either self-certification or approval under part 40 of
the Commission’s regulations, a market participant
would not be able to customize an exchange-traded
futures contract or option on futures contract.
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The Commission is unable to quantify
the costs of these potential harms.
However, while the Commission
acknowledges these potential costs,
such costs to those contracts that
already have limits (including Federal
and/or exchange-set position limits) on
them already may have been realized in
the marketplace because swaps are not
subject to Federal position limits under
the status quo.
Lastly, under the Final Rule, market
participants are able to determine
whether a particular swap satisfies the
definition of ‘‘economically equivalent
swap,’’ as long as market participants
make a reasonable, good faith effort in
reaching their determination and are
able to provide sufficient evidence, if
requested, to support a reasonable, good
faith effort.1465 The Commission
anticipates that this flexibility will
benefit market integrity by providing a
greater level of certainty to market
participants, in contrast to the
alternative in which market participants
would be required to first submit swaps
to the Commission staff and wait for
feedback or approval. On the other
hand, the Commission also recognizes
that not having the Commission
explicitly opine on whether a swap
would qualify as economically
equivalent could cause market
participants to avoid entering into such
swaps.1466 In turn, this could lead to
1465 See supra Section II.A.4.g (discussing market
participants’ discretion in determining whether a
swap is economically equivalent). Regarding the
obligations of swap dealers to monitor position
limits, ISDA commented that the requirements
imposed by § 23.601 are burdensome and requested
additional guidance regarding same. ISDA at 10.
The Commission believes it is unnecessary to
provide further detail with respect to § 23.601
because, as discussed above and in the preamble,
the Commission will defer to a market participant’s
determination as long as the market participant is
able to provide sufficient support to show that it
made a reasonable, good faith effort in applying its
discretion. Furthermore, the Commission is not
adopting any amendments to § 23.601, so the
baseline status quo in connection with § 23.601 is
unchanged under the Final Rule. See supra Section
II.A.4.g.
1466 For example, NRECA believes that a
standardized reference source to confirm whether a
particular swap is subject to Federal position limits
would benefit market participants: ‘‘Because the
Commission has determined not to codify its
interpretations and other guidance, or to establish
a single reference source for assistance in
confirming ‘swap/not-a-swap’ distinction, the two
counterparties to a bilateral off-facility energy
transaction must make the ‘swap/not-a-swap’
determination without the benefit of standardized
rules or product definitions. Although the terms of
many off-facility, bilateral energy commodity
transactions are highly-customized, other such
transactions may be many iterations closer to
futures contract ‘look-alikes,’ that is, to referenced
contracts. If such a transaction is (or may be) a
‘swap,’ such a swap would then also need to be
evaluated to determine whether it was
‘economically equivalent’ under the Speculative
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3415
less efficient hedging strategies if the
market participant is forced to turn to
the futures markets (e.g., a market
participant may choose to transact in
the OTC swaps markets for various
reasons, including liquidity, margin
requirements, or simply better
familiarity with ISDA and swap
processes over exchange-traded futures).
However, as noted below, the
Commission reserves the right to declare
whether a swap or class of swaps is or
is not economically equivalent, and a
market participant could petition, or
request informally, that the Commission
make such a determination, although
the Commission acknowledges that
there could be costs associated with
this, including delayed timing and
monetary costs.
Further, the Commission recognizes
that requiring market participants to
conduct reasonable due diligence and
maintain related records also could
impose new compliance costs.
Additionally, the Commission
recognizes that certain market
participants could assert that an OTC
swap is (or is not) ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ depending upon whether
such determination benefits the market
participant. In such a case, market
participants could theoretically subvert
the intent of the Federal position limits
framework, although the Commission
believes that such potential costs would
be mitigated due to the Commission’s
surveillance functions and authority to
declare that a particular swap or class of
swaps either does or does not qualify as
economically equivalent.
(2) The Final Definition Could Increase
Benefits or Costs Related to Market
Liquidity and Price Discovery
First, the final economically
equivalent swap definition could benefit
market liquidity by being, in general,
less disruptive to the swaps markets,
which in turn may reduce the potential
for disruption for the price discovery
function compared to a possible
alternative, broader definition. For
example, if the Commission were to
adopt an alternative to its final
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition that encompassed a broader
range of swaps by including, for
example, delivery dates that diverge by
one or more calendar days—perhaps by
several days or weeks—a market
participant (including speculators) with
a large portfolio of swaps could more
easily bump up against the applicable
position limits and therefore would
have an incentive either to reduce its
Position Limits Rules.’’ NRECA at 18; see also
CEWG at 30–31.
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swaps activity or move its swaps
activity to foreign jurisdictions. If there
were many similarly situated market
participants, the market for such swaps
could become less liquid, which in turn
could harm liquidity for bona fide
hedgers as large liquidity providers
could move to other markets.
Second, the final definition could
benefit market liquidity by being
sufficiently narrow to reduce incentives
for liquidity providers to move to
foreign jurisdictions, such as the
European Union (‘‘EU’’).1467
Additionally, the Commission believes
that proposing a definition similar to
that used by the EU will benefit
international comity.1468 Further,
market participants trading in both U.S.
and EU markets would find the final
definition to be familiar, which may
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1467 In
this regard, the final definition is similar
in certain ways to the EU definition for OTC
contracts that are ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to
commodity derivatives traded on an EU trading
venue. The applicable European regulations define
an OTC derivative to be ‘‘economically equivalent’’
when it has ‘‘identical contractual specifications,
terms and conditions, excluding different lot size
specifications, delivery dates diverging by less than
one calendar day and different post trade risk
management arrangements.’’ While the
Commission’s final definition is similar, the
Commission’s final definition requires ‘‘identical
material’’ terms rather than simply ‘‘identical’’
terms. Further, the Commission’s final definition
excludes different ‘‘lot size specifications or
notional amounts’’ rather than referencing only ‘‘lot
size’’ since swaps terminology usually refers to
‘‘notional amounts’’ rather than to ‘‘lot sizes.’’ See
EU Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/
591, 2017 O.J. (L 87).
1468 Both the Commission’s definition and the
applicable EU regulation are intended to prevent
harmful netting. See European Securities and
Markets Authority, Draft Regulatory Technical
Standards on Methodology for Calculation and the
Application of Position Limits for Commodity
Derivatives Traded on Trading Venues and
Economically Equivalent OTC Contracts, ESMA/
2016/668 at 10 (May 2, 2016), available at https://
www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
2016-668_opinion_on_draft_rts_21.pdf (‘‘[D]rafting
the [economically equivalent OTC swap] definition
in too wide a fashion carries an even higher risk of
enabling circumvention of position limits by
creating an ability to net off positions taken in onvenue contracts against only roughly similar OTC
positions.’’)
The applicable EU regulator, the European
Securities and Markets Authority (‘‘ESMA’’),
recently released a ‘‘consultation paper’’ discussing
the status of the existing EU position limits regime
and specific comments received from market
participants. According to ESMA, no commenter,
with one exception, supported changing the
definition of an economically equivalent swap
(referred to as an ‘‘economically equivalent OTC
contract’’ or ‘‘EEOTC’’). ESMA further noted that for
some respondents, ‘‘the mere fact that very few
EEOTC contracts have been identified is no
evidence that the regime is overly restrictive.’’ See
European Securities and Markets Authority,
Consultation Paper MiFID Review Report on
Position Limits and Position Management Draft
Technical Advice on Weekly Position Reports,
ESMA70–156–1484 at 46, Question 15 (Nov. 5,
2019), available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/
document/ consultation-paper-position-limits.
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help reduce compliance costs for those
market participants that already have
systems and personnel in place to
identify and monitor such swaps. As
discussed by SIFMA AMG, ‘‘[m]any
market participants are active in
markets and products that are regulated
by the CFTC and EU authorities. Having
different definitions would be costly for
firms, since they would have to build
out different compliance functions, and
inefficient for markets.’’ 1469 As noted
above, any differences between the
Final Rule’s ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ and the EU’s corresponding
definition by the addition of the
‘‘material’’ qualifier should lead to the
benefits identified in the above
discussion, along with the
corresponding costs.
(3) The Final Definition Could Create
Costs or Benefits Related to Market
Liquidity for the Natural Gas Market
SIFMA AMG commented that
‘‘financially-settled penultimate day
expiry products in natural gas should be
excluded from limits to the same extent
as penultimate day expiry contracts for
each of the other 24 core referenced
futures contracts. To introduce a change
from existing exchange practice (under
which these financially-settled
penultimate day contracts are out of
scope) could introduce an otherwise
avoidable disruption to trading during
the closing days of the natural gas
contract month, with no corresponding
benefits to market oversight or
integrity.’’ 1470
As discussed in greater detail in the
preamble, the Commission recognizes
that the market dynamics in natural gas
are unique in several respects, including
the fact that unlike with respect to other
core referenced futures contracts, for
natural gas, relatively liquid spot-month
and penultimate cash-settled futures
exist.1471 However, in contrast to
SIFMA AMG’s comment, the
Commission has determined that
creating an exception to the proposed
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition for natural gas benefits
market liquidity by not unnecessarily
favoring existing natural gas
penultimate contracts over spot
contracts. The Commission is especially
1469 SIFMA
AMG at 6–7.
AMG at 11. For the purpose of this
comment, even though SIFMA AMG refers
generally to ‘‘financially-settled penultimate’’
contracts in natural gas, the Commission assumes
it is referring to penultimate cash-settled
economically equivalent swaps since penultimate
futures contracts and options on futures contracts
are included under the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition.
1471 See supra Section II.A.4.iii.f. (discussing
economically equivalent natural gas swaps).
1470 SIFMA
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sensitive to potential market
manipulation in the natural gas markets
since market participants—to a
significantly greater extent compared to
the other core referenced futures
contracts that are included in the Final
Rule—regularly trade in both the
physically-settled core referenced
futures contract and the cash-settled
look-alike referenced contracts that are
penultimate contracts. Accordingly, the
Commission has concluded that a
slightly broader definition of
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’ to
encompass penultimate natural gas
swaps uniquely benefits the natural gas
markets by helping to deter and prevent
manipulation of a physically-settled
contract to benefit a related cash-settled
contract, including penultimate
positions.
(4) Alternatives to the ‘‘Economically
Equivalent Swap’’ Definition
Several commenters provided
alternative approaches to the 2020
NPRM’s proposed ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition.
First, SIFMA AMG argued that the
Commission should not impose Federal
position limits on swaps at all, and that
the proposed Federal position limits
were ‘‘unnecessary and would in fact
impose cost burdens . . . that are not
commensurate with any of the suggested
benefits . . . .’’ 1472 Similarly, CHS
stated that ‘‘[t]here is little doubt, from
CHS’s perspective, that including
economically equivalent swaps as
‘referenced contracts’ for position limit
purposes will result in a material
burden for (a) commercial end-users and
(b) small to mid-sized FCMs that focus
on the needs of grain and energy
hedgers, which are referred to as
‘Commodity-Focused FCMs’. The costs
of compliance on such participants will
likely be large and time-consuming, and
possibly entail some risk of operational
error arising out of the implementation
process.’’ 1473
1472 SIFMA AMG at 6–7. Additional commenters
similarly argued that subjecting swaps to position
limits is unnecessary and would increase costs
without commensurate benefits. E.g., CHS at 5;
NCFC at 5; and ISDA at 5.
1473 CHS at 4. See also NCFC at 5 (similarly
stating that ‘‘[t]he costs of compliance on such
participants will likely be large and timeconsuming, and possibly entail some risk of
operational error arising out of the implementation
process.’’). CHS further stated, ‘‘[w]ith respect to
commercial end-users, absent additional
Commission guidance CHS believes that the
burdens will take the form of (a) determining which
types of swaps will be deemed to be economically
equivalent swaps, (b) making significant and costly
modifications to systems to identify and track
transactions for reporting purposes, (c) developing
tools for swaps aggregation purposes (or manually
conducting such tasks if such a tool is not readily
available to be interpolated into existing systems)
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However, as discussed above, the
Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section
4a(a)(5), which explicitly requires that
the Commission impose Federal
position limits on swaps that are
‘‘economically equivalent’’ to the
futures contracts and options on futures
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, and that the Commission
establish limits simultaneously for
‘‘economically equivalent’’ swaps.
Accordingly, from the perspective of
this cost-benefit discussion, the
question is not whether the Final Rule
should encompass swaps at all, but only
the extent to which swaps should be
incorporated as ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ pursuant to CEA section
4a(a)(5). Nonetheless, the Commission
recognizes that subjecting economically
equivalent swaps to Federal position
limits could impose the compliance
costs referenced above by CHS and
others. However, to the extent that the
Final Rule adopts a narrow
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition, the Commission anticipates
these costs should be mitigated
compared to alternative definitions,
while simultaneously satisfying the
statutory requirement under CEA
section 4a(a)(5).
Second, CME and Better Markets both
suggested that the general ‘‘referenced
contract’’ definition that applies to
futures contracts and options on futures
contracts should also apply to swaps,
rather than the narrower ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition. Similarly,
NEFI argued that the narrower
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition could allow for easy
avoidance of Federal position limits.1474
The Commission discusses the possible
costs and benefits of the Final Rule’s
narrow definition versus this proposed
alternative of a broader definition
throughout this cost-benefit discussion
of economically equivalent swaps, and
the reasons discussed by the
and (d) determining intra-day positions when
addressing economically equivalent swaps, which
will require real-time system reporting and real–
time exception alerts, among other things . . . . In
these respects, CHS asks the Commission to be
mindful and more fully address the costs and
benefits applicable to commercial end-users and
Commodity-Focused FCMs, and to provide more
clarity regarding the scope of referenced contracts.
As a guide, CHS urges the Commission to maintain
as narrow a definition of ‘referenced contract’ as
possible. CHS also urges the Commission, both in
the context of market participants generally and
commercial end-users and Commodity-Focused
FCMs particularly, to address CHS’s
recommendations in the following section.’’ Id. at
4–5. NCFC similarly stated that ‘‘NCFC believes any
Federal speculative position limits rule should not
unduly burden commercial end-users who utilize
derivatives markets for economically appropriate
risk management activities.’’ NCFC at 7.
1474 NEFI at 3.
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Commission throughout this section
similarly apply in response to CME’s,
Better Markets’, and NEFI’s proposed
alternative to establish a broader
‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition.
Third, SIFMA AMG argued that while
it opposed including swaps within the
Final Rule, to the extent the
Commission determines to include
swaps within the Final Rule, that, in the
alternative, at least cash-settled swaps
should be excluded from the
economically equivalent swap
definition since these types of swaps
‘‘have not historically been the source of
manipulative corners, squeezes, or other
disruptions related to physical
commodity prices, and SIFMA AMG
does not believe limits on these
products would be necessary to further
deter and prevent this type of trading
activity.’’ 1475
However, the Commission believes
that SIFMA AMG’s proposed alternative
to exclude all cash-settled swaps ex ante
would impose liquidity costs for bona
fide hedgers since excluding all cashsettled swaps could incentivize
liquidity to move from corresponding
cash-settled referenced contracts to
cash-settled OTC swaps, potentially
harming the liquidity in the futures
markets, including liquidity for bona
fide hedgers. This could also harm price
discovery if significant liquidity and
trading migrates from the exchangetraded futures markets to the more
opaque OTC swaps markets. For
example, as noted above, if liquidity
were to move from futures exchanges to
the OTC swaps markets, non-dealer
commercial entities may face increased
transaction costs and widening spreads,
as swap dealers gain market power in
1475 SIFMA AMG at 7. SIFMA AMG further
argued that ‘‘imposing spot month limits only on
physically-settled futures contracts would avoid
such confusion, and more importantly, would
adequately address the products of greatest concern
and would serve to reduce compliance costs and
related burdens (i.e., technology builds, personnel
allocation, training, etc.) for the Commission and
market participants by allowing the Commission to
observe the impact of limits for physically-settled
futures prior to evaluating whether to extend limits
to a broader scope of derivatives products.’’ SIFMA
AMG at 5–6.
PIMCO and ISDA similarly argue that neither
cash-settled swaps nor futures contracts should be
subject to position limits. PIMCO at 3; ISDA at 5
(arguing that position limits on cash-settled
referenced contracts, whether futures contracts or
swaps, ‘‘impose a level of cost and complexity in
implementation that does not correspond to any
identified regulatory or policy benefit of such
limits.’’) AQR similarly argued that the
‘‘opportunity or ability to use a swap to squeeze or
corner an underlying physical commodity is
extremely remote and thus extension of position
limits to swaps would likely not be merited based
on an analysis of the costs and benefits of such
action.’’ AQR at 10.
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3417
the OTC market relative to centralized
exchange trading. The Commission is
unable to quantify the costs of these
potential harms.1476
Furthermore, the Commission notes
that CEA section 4a(a)(3) does not
merely refer to corners and squeezes,
but also refers to ‘‘manipulation’’
generally. Accordingly, the Commission
believes that the Final Rule will better
benefit market integrity to the extent
that cash-settled swaps would be subject
to the Final Rule by helping to prevent
other forms of manipulation, such as
‘‘banging’’ or ‘‘marking’’ the close.
Fourth, in contrast to the alternative
posited by SIFMA AMG immediately
above in which the Commission would
exclude all cash-settled swaps, Better
Markets believed that the Final Rule’s
exclusion of certain cash-settled swaps
could actually impose costs on liquidity
formation. Better Markets thus proposed
an alternative where settlement type
(i.e., cash-settled versus physicallysettled) was not considered to be a
‘‘material’’ difference and therefore
cash-settled swaps could be deemed to
be ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to core
referenced futures contracts, which are
all physically-settled. Better Markets
argued that the 2020 NPRM’s
economically equivalent definition
‘‘essentially excludes’’ cash-settled
swaps from Federal position limits
because cash-settled swaps would not
be able to qualify as economically
equivalent to a physically-settled core
referenced futures contract.1477 As
Better Markets commented,
distinguishing between cash-settled and
physically-settled swaps and futures
contracts by deeming settlement type
(i.e., cash-settled vs. physically-settled
settlement) to be a material term would
‘‘incentivize[ ] speculative liquidity
formation away from more liquid, more
transparent, and more restrictive futures
exchanges and to the swaps
markets.’’ 1478
However, the Commission does not
believe that the treatment of cash-settled
swaps under the Final Rule imposes
such costs, at least to the extent
assumed by Better Markets. The
1476 However, while the Commission
acknowledges these potential costs, such costs to
the nine legacy agricultural contracts may already
have been realized because their corresponding
swaps are not subject to Federal position limits
under the status quo. Nonetheless, the Commission
also recognizes that certain of the 16 non-legacy
core referenced futures contracts that would be
subject to Federal position limits for the first time
under the Final Rule may have larger, more liquid
swaps markets than the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, and therefore potentially larger
concomitant benefits and/or costs.
1477 Better Markets at 32.
1478 Id.
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Commission believes Better Markets’
concern is mitigated since under the
Final Rule cash-settled swaps are
subject to Federal position limits only if
there is a corresponding (i.e.,
‘‘economically equivalent’’) cash-settled
futures contract or option on a futures
contract.1479 That is, cash-settled swaps
are free from Federal position limits if
there are no corresponding cash-settled
futures contracts or options on futures
contracts. In these situations, if no
corresponding futures contract or option
thereon exists, then there is no liquidity
formation in cash-settled futures
contracts and options on futures
contracts with which a cash-settled
swap would be competing for liquidity
in the first place.1480
Fifth, FIA proposed an alternative in
which cash-settled economically
equivalent swaps would be subject to a
separate (higher) Federal spot-month
position limit levels compared to their
corresponding referenced contracts, and
FIA argued that its proposed alternative
would benefit innovation and
competition between exchanges.1481
However, the Commission believes that
establishing separate (or higher)
position limits for economically
equivalent swaps could impose
liquidity costs and burden market
integrity and price discovery.
In particular, separate position limits
for cash-settled swaps would make it
easier for potential manipulators to
engage in market manipulation, such as
‘‘banging’’ or ‘‘marking’’ the close, by
effectively permitting higher Federal
position limits in cash-settled
referenced contracts. For example, a
market participant would be able to
double its cash-settled positions by
maintaining positions in both cashsettled futures and cash-settled
economically equivalent swaps since
under FIA’s proposed alternative
positions in each contract type, that is
futures contracts (including options
1479 The Commission notes that a swap could be
deemed to be ‘‘economically equivalent’’ to any
referenced contract, including cash-settled lookalikes, and that the ‘‘economically equivalent
swap’’ definition is not limited to core referenced
futures contracts.
1480 In contrast to Better Markets, AQR noted that
any ‘‘extension of position limits to swaps risks
negatively impacting commercial hedgers by
reducing market liquidity, increasing transaction
costs, and increasing commodity market volatility.
While the Commission cannot entirely avoid those
risks if compelled to impose such limits, the
proposed approach to economically equivalent
swaps may mitigate them in ways that allow the
Commission to fully discharge its statutory
obligation without unnecessarily restricting market
activity.’’ AQR at 11.
1481 FIA at 7–8. The Commission generally
addresses FIA’s argument about innovation and
competition in the preamble above under Section
II.B.10.v.
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thereon) and swaps, would be subject to
their own separate position limits for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Furthermore, imposing position limits
separately on economically equivalent
swaps and futures contracts (and
options thereon) as requested under
FIA’s proposed alternative would mean
that market participants would not be
able to net their economically
equivalent swaps with their futures
positions. In contrast, the absence of
separate Federal position limits for
economically equivalent swaps means
that market participants are able to net
economically equivalent swaps with
other referenced contracts, i.e., futures
contracts against swaps. The
Commission also recognizes that netting
could permit larger speculative
positions in futures markets for market
participants who did not previously
have bona fide hedge exemptions, but
who have positions in swaps in the
same commodity that could be netted
against futures contracts in the same
commodity. This observation might
seem to be at cross-purposes with the
relatively narrow ‘‘economically
equivalent swap’’ definition. However,
the Commission is concerned that
separate position limits for swaps could
impair liquidity in futures contracts or
swaps, as the case may be. For example,
a market participant (including a market
maker or speculator) with a large
portfolio of swaps (or futures contracts)
near the applicable position limit would
be assumed to have a strong preference
for executing futures contracts (or
swaps) transactions in order to maintain
a swaps (or futures contracts) position
below the applicable position limit. If
there were many similarly situated
market participants, the market for such
swaps (or futures contracts) could
become less liquid, which could burden
market efficiency and impose higher
trading costs for bona fide hedgers. The
absence of separate position limits for
swaps should decrease the possibility of
illiquid markets for referenced contracts
subject to Federal position limits.
Because economically equivalent swaps
and the corresponding futures contracts
and options on futures contracts are
close substitutes for each other, the
absence of separate position limits
should allow greater integration
between the economically equivalent
swaps and corresponding futures and
options markets for referenced
contracts, which should benefit price
discovery, and should also provide
market participants with more
flexibility whether hedging, providing
liquidity or market making, or
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speculating, which should benefit
market efficiency and price discovery.
Sixth, COPE alternatively requested
that the Commission explicitly exclude
physically-settled swaps, or at least
provide specific examples of the
contracts intended to be included.1482
While the Commission provides greater
clarity in the corresponding preamble
discussion above,1483 the Commission
has determined that excluding all
physically-settled swaps ex ante is
inconsistent with the statutory goals in
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B), especially the
requirements to deter corners and
squeezes and to ensure sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers
enumerated in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii), respectively. For
example, excluding physically-settled
swaps could potentially incentivize
liquidity to move from physicallysettled core referenced futures contracts
to physically-settled swaps, which
could impose costs both on market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers and also
on market integrity by enabling
potential manipulators to accumulate
large directional positions in physicallysettled contracts to effect a corner and
squeeze more easily. This could
additionally harm price discovery as
liquidity and trading would move from
the more transparent exchange-traded
futures contracts and options thereon to
the more opaque OTC swaps markets.
Seventh, NCFC stated that it
‘‘appreciate[s] that CFTC proposed a
narrow definition of an economically
equivalent swap under a Federal
position limits regime. Likewise, we do
not object to an inclusion of such swaps
in theory since our members use them
for legitimate hedging purposes.
However, NCFC continues to be
concerned with the operational
difficulties, burdens, and costs for
commercial end users and small- to
mid-sized FCMs that focus on the needs
of agricultural hedgers of including
swaps for position limit purposes. The
costs of compliance on such
participants will likely be large and
time-consuming, and possibly entail
some risk of operational error arising
out of the implementation process.’’ 1484
As a result, NCFC suggested, as an
alternative to the 2020 NPRM’s
approach, that the Final Rule exclude
from a commercial end-user’s Federal
position limits those agricultural
commodity swaps that are transacted by
invoking the ‘‘End-User Exemption to
Mandatory Clearing’’ rule.1485
1482 COPE
at 4–5.
Section II.A.4.iii.d(1).
1484 NCFC at 5.
1485 Id.
1483 See
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According to NCFC, those swap
contracts already must meet the test ‘‘to
hedge or mitigate commercial risk,’’ and
are ‘‘not used for a purpose that is in the
nature of speculation, investing, or
trading,’’ as outlined in § 50.50 of the
Commission’s regulations, and
therefore, by definition, these contracts
should not be subject to end-user
Federal speculative position limits.1486
The Commission understands NCFC’s
concern, but believes NCFC’s alternative
is unnecessary for two reasons. First, to
the extent a swap described by NCFC
would ‘‘hedge or mitigate commercial
risk,’’ the Commission believes that the
costs described by NCFC are mitigated
since such swap likely would qualify for
an enumerated bona fide hedge under
the Final Rule and therefore would not
contribute to a commercial end-user’s
net position for Federal position limits
purposes.1487 Second, the Commission
believes the purported benefits related
to NCFC’s alternative are limited since
physical commodity swaps are not
required to be cleared under the
Commission’s existing regulations, so
determining whether the end-user
clearing exemption applies is not
necessarily a helpful proxy in
determining whether a swap is
‘‘economically equivalent’’ or not for
purposes of CEA section 4a(a)(5).
vii. Pre-Existing Positions
Final § 150.2(g) imposes Federal
position limits on ‘‘pre-existing
positions’’ 1488—other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps—during both the spot month and
non-spot month.
The Commission believes that final
§ 150.2(g) benefits market integrity since
pre-existing positions (other than preenactment and transition period swaps)
that exceed spot-month limits could
result in market or price disruptions as
positions are rolled into the spot
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1486 Id.
1487 To the extent an FCM would not be able to
qualify for a bona fide hedge, the Commission
believes that excepting such swaps for purely
financial firms would functionally have the same
effect as maintaining the risk-management
exemption, which Congress, through the DoddFrank Act’s amendments to the CEA, has directed
the Commission to eliminate. See Section II.A.4.iii.
Nonetheless, to the extent that NCFC’s comment is
limited to small- and medium-sized FCMs, the
Commission does not believe that such FCMs
generally will violate the Federal position limit
levels based on the Commission’s understanding of
existing market dynamics and positions held by
market participants under the status quo, and
therefore costs should be comparatively mitigated
for small- and medium-sized FCMs.
1488 Final § 150.1 defines ‘‘pre-existing position’’
to mean ‘‘any position in a commodity derivative
contract acquired in good faith prior to the effective
date’’ of any applicable position limit.
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month.1489 The Commission recognizes
some costs and benefits associated with
final § 150.2(g)(2) may have already
been realized given that the nine legacy
agricultural contracts are already subject
to the Federal non-spot month position
limits. Therefore, exchanges and market
participants should not incur any
significant new costs to comply with
§ 150.2(g)(2), and will likely continue to
benefit from market integrity as a result
of the Final Rule.
In response to the 2020 NPRM, FIA
and MGEX suggested that the
Commission alternatively restructure
the provision to include just two
categories, ‘‘pre-existing swaps’’ and
‘‘pre-existing futures,’’ because the
variability of exemptive relief could
create operational challenges for market
participants.’’ 1490 Although the
Commission did not adopt the terms
‘‘pre-existing swaps’’ and ‘‘pre-existing
futures’’ for the Final Rule as FIA and
MGEX suggested, the practical effect is
that final § 150.2(g) creates two
categories—(1) pre-existing futures
contracts (including options thereon),
which are subject to both the spot
month and non-spot month Federal
position limits; and (2) pre-existing
swaps, which are not subject to such
limits. Furthermore, to offset the
operational challenges or other burdens
associated with final § 150.2(g), the
Commission is delaying the compliance
date to January 1, 2022 in connection
with the Federal position limits for the
16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts, and further delaying the
compliance date to January 1, 2023 for
swaps that are subject to Federal
position limits under the Final Rule.
to anticipate. Like the Federal position
limits it supports, § 150.2(i) helps to
protect market integrity by preventing
excessive speculation and market
manipulation. However, the
Commission also recognizes possible
costs to market participants due to
uncertainty under the Final Rule’s antievasion provision since it may be
difficult for market participants to
determine, as a bright-line matter,
whether their positions and trading
strategies represent legitimate avoidance
of position limits or instead represent
malfeasant evasive practices.1491 As a
result, the lack of a bright-line standard
could potentially impose liquidity costs
as market participants may instead
choose to engage in less efficient trading
strategies in order to err cautiously to
avoid engaging in potentially ‘‘evasive’’
behavior.
As an alternative to the ‘‘willfully’’
standard, FIA recommended that the
anti-evasion analysis be based on the
presence of ‘‘deceit, deception, or other
unlawful or illegitimate activity.’’ 1492
Because a position that does not involve
fraud or deceit can still involve other
indicia of evasive activity, the proposed
alternative would be less effective in
protecting market integrity to the extent
it failed to capture evasive activity.
Further, the incorporation of a standard
other than ‘‘willful’’ would create
confusion to market participants by
resulting in divergent standards among
Commission rulemakings concerning
evasion.
viii. Anti-Evasion
Final § 150.2(i) provides that, if used
to willfully circumvent or evade
speculative position limits: (1) A
commodity index contract, monthly
average pricing contract, outright price
reporting contract, and/or a location
basis contract will be considered to be
a referenced contract; (2) a bona fide
hedging transaction or position
recognition or spread exemption will no
longer apply; and (3) a swap will
considered to be an economically
equivalent swap even if it does not meet
the economically equivalent swap
definition set forth in § 150.1. This
provision serves to deter and prevent a
number of potential methods of evading
Federal position limits, the specifics of
which the Commission may not be able
i. Background
The Final Rule provides for several
exemptions that, subject to certain
conditions, permit a trader to exceed the
applicable Federal position limit set
forth in final § 150.2. Specifically,
§ 150.3 generally maintains but
modifies, as discussed below, the two
existing Federal exemptions that
include (1) bona fide hedging positions
and (2) spread positions. Final § 150.3
also includes new Federal exemptions
1489 The Commission is particularly concerned
about protecting the spot month in physicaldelivery futures from corners and squeezes.
1490 FIA at 8–9; MGEX at 4.
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4. Exemptions From Federal Position
Limits—Bona Fide Hedging
Recognitions, Spread and Other
Exemptions (Final §§ 150.1 and 150.3)
1491 SIFMA AMG at 7, n.16 (noting that the antievasion provision makes the application of the
proposed ‘‘economically equivalent swap’’
definition less clear because it incorporates a
subjective measure of intent); see also FIA at 25
(questioning how a participant would distinguish a
strategy that minimizes position size with an
evasive strategy); Better Markets at 33 (describing
the anti-evasion provision as a ‘‘useful deterrent,’’
but noting that the willful circumvention standard
would be difficult to meet and partially turns on the
Commission’s consideration of the legitimate
business purpose analysis).
1492 FIA at 25–26.
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for certain conditional spot month
positions in natural gas, financial
distress positions, and pre-enactment
and transition period swaps. Final
§ 150.1 sets forth the definitions for
which positions may qualify as a ‘‘bona
fide hedging transaction or position’’
and for ‘‘spread transaction.’’ 1493
ii. Bona Fide Hedging Definition;
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges; and
Guidance on Spot Month Hedge
Exemption Restrictions and Measuring
Risk
The Commission is adopting several
amendments to the bona fide hedge
definition. First, the Commission is
revising some of the general elements of
the ‘‘bona fide hedging transaction or
position’’ definition in final § 150.1 to
conform the Commission’s regulatory
definition to the statutory bona fide
hedge definition in CEA section 4a(c), as
amended by Congress in the DoddFrank Act. As discussed in greater detail
in the preamble, the Final Rule (1)
revises the temporary substitute test,
consistent with the Commission’s
understanding of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
amendments to section 4a of the CEA,
to no longer recognize as bona fide
hedges certain risk management
positions; (2) revises the economically
appropriate test to make explicit that the
position must be economically
appropriate to the reduction of ‘‘price
risk’’; and (3) eliminates the incidental
test and orderly trading requirement,
which the Dodd-Frank Act did not
include in section 4a of the CEA. The
Commission believes that these
amendments to the existing general
elements of the regulatory definition
include non-discretionary changes that
are required by Congress’s amendments
to section 4a of the CEA, or in the case
of the incorporation of ‘‘price risk,’’ do
not represent a change from the status
quo baseline. The Commission is also
amending the bona fide hedge definition
to conform to the CEA’s statutory
definition, by adding a provision for
positions that qualify as pass-through
swaps and pass-through swap
offsets.1494
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1493 The
Commission currently defines this term
in existing § 1.3 in the plural as ‘‘bona fide hedging
transactions or positions’’ while the Final Rule
defines it in the singular ‘‘bona fide hedging
transaction or position.’’ See supra Section I.E.
(discussing use of certain terminology). This
discussion sometimes refers to the ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position’’ definition as ‘‘bona
fide hedges,’’ ‘‘bona fide hedging,’’ or ‘‘bona fide
hedge positions.’’ For the purpose of this
discussion, the terms have the same meaning.
1494 As discussed in Section II.A.—§ 150.1—
Definitions of the preamble, the existing definition
of ‘‘bona fide hedging transactions and positions’’
appears in existing § 1.3 of the Commission’s
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Second, the Commission is
maintaining the distinction between
enumerated and non-enumerated bona
fide hedges but is (1) moving the
location of the enumerated bona fide
hedges, which will remain part of the
regulatory text, from the existing
definition of ‘‘bona fide hedging
transactions and positions’’ currently
found in Commission regulation § 1.3 to
final Appendix A in part 150; 1495 and
(2) expanding the list of enumerated
hedges, which will continue to be selfeffectuating for Federal position limit
purposes, thereby not requiring prior
Commission approval.
Third, the Commission is proposing
guidance in Appendix B with respect to
(i) whether an entity may measure risk
on a net or gross basis for purposes of
determining its bona fide hedge
positions, and (ii) factors exchanges
could consider when applying a
restriction on an exemption against
holding a position under a bona fide
hedge or spread transaction exemption
in excess of limits during the lesser of
the last five days of trading or the time
period for the spot month in a
physically-delivered contract, or
otherwise limit the size of such
position.
The Commission expects that these
modifications related to bona fide
hedging will primarily benefit physical
commodity commercial market
participants, as well as their
counterparties. CEA section 4a(c)(1)
directs the Commission to exclude bona
fide hedge positions from any Federal
position limits framework. Further, the
Commission believes that, generally,
recognizing bona fide hedges supports
all section 15(a) factors under this costbenefit discussion. For example,
recognizing bona fide hedges
encourages participation in the futures
markets by commercial market
participants.1496 Increasing
participation from different types of
market participants, including
commercial market participants: (i)
protects the legitimate commercial
activity of cash-market participants,1497
regulations; the revised definition of this term, in
singular form, now appears in § 150.1.
1495 For the avoidance of doubt, Appendix A will
still be incorporated as part of the Commission’s
regulations under the Final Rule. In contrast, the
2020 NPRM had proposed to make Appendix A
Acceptable Practices.
1496 NFPEA at 6 (stating that ‘‘Congress intended
the Commission to protect end-users’ continued
access to cost-effective commercial risk
management tools, and did not intend to burden
end-users with unnecessary regulatory compliance
obligations’’).
1497 AGA expressed its support of an expanded
list of enumerated hedges by stating that,
‘‘consistent with the mandate of the CEA, any
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(ii) increases competitiveness, and (iii)
supports the financial integrity of
futures markets. Further, increased
participation and competitiveness will
benefit price discovery. Finally, an
expanded list of enumerated bona fide
hedges supports sound risk management
practices by commercial market
participants and their counterparties,
which may result in indirect benefits to
commodity end users or the public.1498
Recognizing an expanded list of
enumerated bona fide hedges, which are
self-effectuating and do not require prior
approval from the Commission, will
mitigate related compliance costs for
those contract markets that will be
newly subject to Federal position limits
under the Final Rule. This is in
comparison to an alternative scenario in
which a narrow set of available
enumerated hedges would have
required market participants to obtain
prior approval before availing
themselves of an exemption for Federal
position limit purposes.
The Commission notes that this
section will discuss the substantive
exemptions for Federal position limit
purposes while the next section will
discuss the process for the Commission
or exchanges, as applicable, to grant
exemptions and bona fide hedge
recognitions.
a. Bona Fide Hedging Definition
(1) Elimination of Risk Management
Exemptions; Addition of the PassThrough Swap
Exemption
The Commission is eliminating the
word ‘‘normally’’ from the bona fide
hedge definition’s temporary substitute
test and, as a result, prohibiting
recognition, as bona fide hedges, of risk
management positions in physical
commodity derivatives subject to
Federal speculative position limits. This
amendment conforms the regulatory
bona fide hedging definition with the
Commission’s interpretation that the
removal of the word ‘‘normally’’ from
the CEA’s section 4a(c)(2) statutory
temporary substitute test by the DoddFrank Act signaled Congressional intent
speculative position limits regime adopted by the
CFTC must be established in a way that allows
commercial end-users, such as natural gas utilities,
to continue to enter into bona fide hedges to
manage, hedge and mitigate the commercial risks of
their natural gas distribution business in a nonburdensome and cost-effective manner on behalf of
customers.’’ AGA at 2.
1498 In expressing overall support for the
proposed definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in the 2020 NPRM, CME
Group noted that the Commission’s recognition of
a wider range of commercial hedging practices
generally reflects Congress’s intent not to unduly
burden bona fide hedgers. CME Group at 9.
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to cease recognizing ‘‘risk management’’
positions as bona fide hedges for
physical commodities.
Additionally, in accordance with CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(B), the Commission is,
however, expanding the bona fide
hedging definition to also include as a
bona fide hedge any position that
qualifies as a pass-through swap/swap
offset, discussed further below.1499 The
Commission believes that including
pass-through swaps and pass-through
swap offsets within the definition of a
bona fide hedge will mitigate some of
the potential impact resulting from the
rescission of the risk management
exemption,1500 and the Commission
discusses the costs and benefits related
to the pass-through swap provision
further below.
As discussed below, the Final Rule’s
pass-through provisions should help
address certain of the hedging needs of
persons seeking to offset the risk from
1499 See infra Section IV.A.4.ii.a(2). The existing
bona fide hedging definition in § 1.3 requires that
a position must ‘‘normally’’ represent a substitute
for transactions or positions made at a later time in
a physical marketing channel (i.e., the ‘‘temporary
substitute test’’). The Dodd-Frank Act amended the
temporary substitute language that previously
appeared in the statute by removing the word
‘‘normally’’ from the phrase normally ‘‘represents a
substitute for transactions made or to be made or
positions taken or to be taken at a later time in a
physical marketing channel.’’ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(i).
The Commission interprets this change as reflecting
Congressional direction that a bona fide hedging
position in physical commodities must always (and
not just ‘‘normally’’) be in connection with the
production, sale, or use of a physical cash-market
commodity.
Previously, the Commission stated that, among
other things, the inclusion of the word ‘‘normally’’
in connection with the pre-Dodd-Frank-Act version
of the temporary substitute language indicated that
the bona fide hedging definition should not be
construed to apply only to firms using futures to
reduce their exposures to risks in the cash market,
and that to qualify as a bona fide hedge, a
transaction in the futures market did not need to be
a temporary substitute for a later transaction in the
cash market. See Clarification of Certain Aspects of
the Hedging Definition, 52 FR at 27195, 27196 (Jul.
20, 1987). In other words, that 1987 interpretation
took the view that a futures position could still
qualify as a bona fide hedging position even if it
was not in connection with the production, sale, or
use of a physical commodity. Accordingly, based on
the Commission’s interpretation of the revised
statutory definition of bona fide hedging in CEA
section 4a(c)(2), risk-management hedges would not
be recognized under the Commission’s bona fide
hedging definition in § 150.1.
1500 See, e.g., ICE at 5–6 (contending that
eliminating risk management exemptions could
make it less efficient and more expensive for
commercial end-users to hedge risks and that passthrough exemption is an inadequate substitution);
ISDA at 6–7 (arguing that the elimination of the risk
management exemptions will result in increased
costs for ‘‘tailored over-the-counter financial
products, . . . will cause some dealers to exit the
business and will in any event lead to decreases in
liquidity in the underlying futures markets, with a
corresponding increase in volatility.’’); see also
supra Section II.A.1.iii.a(4) (discussing elimination
of the risk management exemptions).
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swap books, allowing for sufficient
liquidity in the marketplace for both
bona fide hedgers and their
counterparties. Accordingly, under the
Final Rule, market participants with
positions that do not otherwise satisfy
the bona fide hedging definition or
qualify for another exemption are no
longer able to rely on recognition of
such risk-reducing techniques as bona
fide hedges. Market participants who
provide liquidity to commercial market
participants and have obtained or
requested a risk management exemption
under the existing definition, and who
do not qualify for a pass-through swap
offset, may resort to other hedging
strategies. These other hedging
strategies may result in increased costs
for these liquidity providers for those
activities that are not eligible for the
bona fide hedge treatment.
The Commission recognizes the
possible liquidity costs as a result of
eliminating risk management
exemptions. Specifically, the
Commission considered the risk that
dealers who approach or exceed the
Federal position limit may decide to
pull back on providing liquidity,
including to bona fide hedgers, due to
the exclusion of risk management
positions from the bona fide hedge
definition. However, the Commission
considered the risk of possible reduced
liquidity against various factors and
believes that the potential cost of
reduced liquidity will be mitigated for
several reasons.
First, the Final Rule extends the
compliance date by which risk
management exemption holders must
reduce their positions to comply with
Federal position limits under the Final
Rule to January 1, 2023. This delay
provides sufficient time for existing
positions to roll off and/or be replaced
with positions that conform with the
Federal position limits adopted in this
Final Rule.
Second, for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, the Final Rule
generally sets Federal non-spot month
position limit levels higher than existing
non-spot limits, which may enable
additional dealer activity described
above.1501 The remaining non-legacy 16
core referenced futures contracts will
not be subject to non-spot month
Federal position limits and will remain
subject to existing exchange-set limits or
1501 See infra Section II.B.4. (discussing non-spot
month limit levels). Final § 150.2 generally
increases position limits for non-spot months for
contracts that currently are subject to the Federal
position limits framework other than for CBOT Oats
(O), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE), for which the Commission is
maintaining existing levels.
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3421
accountability levels outside of the spot
month, which does not represent a
change from the status quo. The
generally higher levels with respect to
the nine legacy agricultural contracts,
and the exchanges’ flexible
accountability regimes with respect to
the new 16 core referenced futures
contracts, should mitigate at least some
potential costs related to the prohibition
on recognizing risk management
positions as bona fide hedges.
Third, the Final Rule may improve
market competitiveness and reduce
transaction costs. As noted above,
existing holders of the risk management
exemption, and the levels permitted
thereunder, are currently confidential,
and the Commission is no longer
granting new risk management
exemptions to potential new liquidity
providers. Accordingly, by eliminating
the risk management exemption, the
Final Rule benefits the public and
strengthens market integrity by
improving market transparency since
certain dealers are no longer able to
maintain the grandfathered risk
management exemption while other
dealers lack this ability under the status
quo. While the Commission believes
that the risk management exemption
may allow dealers to provide additional
market making activities, which benefits
market liquidity and may result in lower
prices for end-users, as noted above, the
potential costs resulting from removing
the risk management exemption may be
mitigated by the Final Rule’s revised
position limit levels that reflect current
EDS for spot month levels and current
open interest and trading volume for
non-spot month levels. Therefore, the
Commission believes that existing risk
management exemption holders should
be able to continue providing liquidity
to bona fide hedgers, but acknowledges
that some may not to the same degree
as under the exemption. However, the
Commission believes that any potential
harm to liquidity should be mitigated.
Further, the spot month and non-spot
month levels, which generally are
higher than the status quo, together with
the elimination of the risk management
exemptions that benefit only certain
dealers, may enable new liquidity
providers to enter the markets on a level
playing field with the existing risk
management exemption holders. With
the possibility of additional liquidity
providers, the framework may
strengthen market integrity by
decreasing concentration risk
potentially posed by too few market
makers. However, the benefits to market
liquidity the Commission described
above may be muted since this analysis
is predicated, in part, on the
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understanding that dealers are the
predominant large traders. Data in the
Commission’s Supplementary COT and
its underlying data indicate that riskmanagement exemption holders are not
the only large participants in these
markets—large commercial firms also
hold large positions in such
commodities.
Fourth, although the Commission will
no longer recognize risk management
positions as bona fide hedges under this
Final Rule, the Commission maintains
other authorities, including the
authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7), to
exempt risk management positions from
Federal position limits.
Fifth, consistent with existing
industry practice, exchanges may
continue to recognize risk management
positions for contracts that are not
subject to Federal position limits,
including for excluded commodities.
Finally, as discussed immediately
below, the Commission believes the
recognition of pass-through swaps and
pass-through swap offsets could
mitigate, to some extent, the costs to the
market in general, or to specific market
participants, resulting from the risk
management exemption’s
elimination.1502
(2) Pass-Through Swaps and PassThrough Swap Offsets
The revised bona fide hedging
definition, consistent with the DoddFrank Act’s changes to CEA section
4a(c)(2), permits the recognition as bona
fide hedges of futures and options on
futures positions that offset passthrough swaps entered into by dealers
and other liquidity providers (the ‘‘passthrough swap counterparty’’) 1503
opposite bona fide hedging swap
counterparties (the ‘‘bona fide hedge
counterparty’’), as long as: (1) The passthrough swap counterparty receives
from the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty a written representation
that the pass-through swap qualifies as
a bona fide hedge; and (2) the passthrough swap counterparty enters into a
futures or option on a futures position
or a swap position to offset and reduce
the price risk attendant to the passthrough swap.1504 Accordingly, a subset
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1502 NCFC
concurs that ‘‘the substantial increase
in the overall speculative position limits and
allowances for pass-through swaps will limit any
potential loss of liquidity’’ that may result from the
elimination of the risk management exemption.
NCFC at 7.
1503 Such pass-through swap counterparties are
typically swap dealers providing liquidity to bona
fide hedgers.
1504 See paragraph (2)(i) of the proposed bona fide
hedging definition. Of course, if the pass-through
swap qualifies as an ‘‘economically equivalent
swap,’’ then the pass-through swap counterparty
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of risk management exemption holders
and transactions they enter into could
continue to benefit from an exemption,
and potential counterparties could
benefit from the liquidity they provide,
as long as the position being offset
qualifies as a bona fide hedge for the
bona fide hedge counterparty.
The Commission has determined that
any resulting costs or benefits related to
the proposed pass-through swap
exemption are a result of Congress’s
amendments to CEA section 4a(c) rather
than the Commission’s discretionary
action. On the other hand, the
Commission’s discretionary action to
require the pass-through swap
counterparty to receive and maintain a
written representation from the bona
fide hedging swap counterparty that the
pass-through swap qualifies as a bona
fide hedging position causes the swap
counterparty to incur marginal
recordkeeping costs.1505 The
Commission considered comments
requesting the elimination of the passthrough swap provision recordkeeping
requirement in § 150.3(d) based on
arguments that requiring this
recordkeeping was not practical.1506
The Commission is not persuaded by
those arguments as the recordkeeping
requirements assist the Commission in
verifying that the pass-through swap
provision is only being utilized to offset
risks arising from bona fide hedges.
Accordingly, the Commission is
finalizing the proposed pass-through
swap recordkeeping requirement in
§ 150.3(d), subject to certain conforming
changes to reflect amendments to the
pass-through swap paragraph of the
bona fide hedging definition.
Since not all swaps entered into by a
commercial entity may qualify as a bona
fide hedge, the Commission declines
commenters’ requests that a passthrough swap counterparty may
reasonably rely solely upon the fact that
the counterparty is a commercial end
user and, absent an agreement between
the counterparties, that the swap
appears to be consistent with hedges
entered into by end users in the same
line of business. The Commission,
does not need to rely on the pass-through swap
provision since it may be able to offset its long (or
short) position in the economically equivalent swap
with the corresponding short (or long) position in
the futures or option on futures position or on the
opposite side of another economically equivalent
swap.
1505 To the extent that the pass-through swap
counterparty is a swap dealer or major swap
participant, it already may be subject to similar
recordkeeping requirements under § 1.31 and part
23 of the Commission’s regulations. As a result,
such costs may already have been realized.
1506 Cargill at 10; EEI/EPSA at 7–8; FIA at 11–12;
CMC at 5; Shell at 6–7; ICE at 6–7; ISDA at 11–12.
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however, is amending the regulatory
text to provide flexibility and avoid a
prescriptive requirement that would
otherwise cause additional costs or
burdens.
Instead, the Final Rule provides that
the pass-through swap counterparty
(i.e., the swap dealer) may rely in good
faith on a written representation made
by its bona fide hedging swap
counterparty, unless the pass-through
swap counterparty has information that
would cause a reasonable person to
question the accuracy of the
representation. The Commission is
adding the written representation
requirement to enable the Commission
to verify that only market participants
with bona fide hedge exemptions are
able to pass-through those exemptions
to their swap dealer counterparties. To
avoid a prescriptive requirement that
would incur additional costs to market
participants, the Final Rule does not
prescribe the form or manner by which
the pass-through swap counterparty
obtains the written representation. The
Commission recognizes that such
flexibility would allow for the bona fide
hedging counterparty to make such
representations on a relationship basis
through counterparty relationship
documentation (e.g., through ISDA
documentation) or on a transaction basis
(e.g., through trade confirmations or in
other forms as agreed upon by the
parties), based on the most cost efficient
manner for the market participants.
The Final Rule’s pass-through swap
provision, consistent with the DoddFrank Act’s changes to CEA section
4a(c)(2), also addresses a situation
where a participant who qualifies as a
bona fide hedging swap counterparty
(i.e., a participant with a position in a
previously-entered into swap that
qualified, at the time the swap was
entered into, as a bona fide hedging
position under the revised definition)
seeks, at some later time, to offset that
swap position.1507 Such step might be
taken, for example, to respond to a
change in the participant’s risk exposure
in the underlying commodity. As a
result, a participant could use futures
contracts or options on futures contracts
in excess of Federal position limits to
offset the price risk of a previouslyentered into swap, which would allow
the participant to exceed Federal
position limits using either new futures
or options on futures or swap positions
that reduce the risk of the original swap.
The Commission expects the passthrough swap provision to facilitate
1507 See paragraph (2)(ii) of the ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position’’ definition in
§ 150.1.
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dynamic hedging by market
participants. The Commission
recognizes that a significant number of
market participants use dynamic
hedging to more effectively manage
their portfolio risks. Therefore, this
provision may increase operational
efficiency. In addition, by permitting
dynamic hedging, a greater number of
dealers should be better able to provide
liquidity to the market, as these dealers
will be able to more effectively manage
their risks by entering into pass-through
swaps with bona fide hedgers as
counterparties. Moreover, market
participants are not precluded from
using swaps that are not ‘‘economically
equivalent swaps’’ for such risk
management purposes since swaps that
are not deemed to be ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ to a referenced contract are
not subject to the Commission’s position
limits framework.
(3) Limiting ‘‘Risk’’ to ‘‘Price’’ Risk;
Elimination of the Incidental Test and
Orderly Trading Requirement
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The bona fide hedging definition’s
‘‘economically appropriate test’’ set out
in final § 150.1 explicitly provides that
only hedges that offset price risks can be
recognized as bona fide hedging
transactions or positions. The
Commission does not believe that this
particular change imposes any new
costs or benefits, as it is consistent with
both the existing bona fide hedging
definition 1508 as well as the
Commission’s longstanding policy.1509
Nonetheless, the Commission realizes
that hedging occurs for more types of
risks than price (e.g., volumetric
hedging) and hedging solely to protect
against changes in value of non-price
risks would fall outside the category of
a bona fide hedge, which offsets the
1508 The existing bona fide hedging definition in
§ 1.3 provides that ‘‘no transactions or positions
shall be classified as bona fide hedging unless their
purpose is to offset price risks incidental to
commercial cash or spot operations.’’ (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the definition in final § 150.1
merely moves this requirement to the definition’s
revised ‘‘economically appropriate test’’
requirement.
1509 For example, in promulgating existing § 1.3,
the Commission explained that a bona fide hedging
position must, among other things, ‘‘be
economically appropriate to risk reduction, such
risks must arise from operation of a commercial
enterprise, and the price fluctuations of the futures
contracts used in the transaction must be
substantially related to fluctuations of the cashmarket value of the assets, liabilities or services
being hedged.’’ Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or
Positions, 42 FR at 14832, 14833 (Mar. 16, 1977).
The Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section 4a(c)(2),
which copied the ‘‘economically appropriate test’’
from the Commission’s definition in § 1.3. See also
78 FR at 75702, 75703.
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‘‘price risk’’ of an underlying
commodity cash position.
In response to commenters, the
Commission clarifies in the preamble
that price risk can be informed and
impacted by various other types of
risks.1510 The Commission agrees with
commenters who stated that market
participants form independent
economic assessments of how different
risks (including, but not limited to,
geopolitical, turmoil, weather, or
counterparty) might create or impact the
price risk of underlying
commodities.1511 The Commission
recognizes these risks can create price
risks and understands that firms may
manage these potential risks to their
businesses differently and in the
manner most suitable for their business.
By limiting the economically
appropriate prong to price risk, the
Commission is reiterating its historical
practice (which has adequately applied
to the legacy agricultural contracts for
decades) to recognize hedges of price
risk of an underlying commodity
position as bona fide hedges while
acknowledging that price risk may itself
be impacted by non-price risks. Market
participants may continue to manage
non-price risks in a variety of ways,
which may include participation in the
futures markets or exposure to other
financial products. In fact, market
participants may decide to use futures
contracts that are not subject to Federal
position limits, if they determine such
contracts will help them manage nonprice risks faced by their businesses.
Alternatively, commenters suggested
that the Commission permit market
participants to use the non-enumerated
hedge process to receive recognition of
hedges of non-price risk on a case-bycase basis.1512 The Commission is
precluded from adopting this alternative
in light of its view that price risk is
required to satisfy the CEA’s
economically appropriate test. Further,
the Commission is unaware of
commercial market participants
historically seeking non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognition for nonprice risk in the spot month.
The Commission further implements
Congress’s Dodd-Frank Act amendments
that did not include in the statutory
bona fide hedge definition the
incidental test and orderly trading
requirement by eliminating those
elements from to the Commission’s
regulatory definition. As discussed in
the preamble, the Commission believes
1510 See supra Section II.A.1.iii.b (discussing
economically appropriate test); Cargill at 3.
1511 See, e.g., CMC at 3.
1512 MGEX at 2; FIA at 11.
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3423
that these changes do not represent a
change in policy or regulatory
requirement. As a result, the
Commission does not identify any costs
or benefits related to these changes.
b. Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission maintains, and
incorporates in final § 150.3, a list of
enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A to part 150 of the
Commission’s regulations that includes:
(i) All of the existing enumerated
hedges; and (ii) additional enumerated
bona fide hedges. The Commission
reinforces that hedging practices not
otherwise listed may still be deemed, on
a case-by-case basis, to comply with the
proposed bona fide hedging definition
(i.e., non-enumerated bona fide hedges).
As discussed further below, the
enumerated bona fide hedges in
Appendix A are ‘‘self-effectuating’’ for
purposes of Federal position limit
levels. This is expected to help in
ensuring timely hedging and therefore
reduce compliance costs associated with
seeking an exemption.1513
(1) Treatment of Unfixed Price
Transactions
As discussed in the preamble, the
Commission has long recognized fixedprice commitments as the basis for a
bona fide hedge.1514 Under existing
§ 1.3, only one enumerated hedge
explicitly mentions ‘‘unfixed price,’’
and its availability is limited to
circumstances where a market
participant has both an unfixed-price
purchase and an unfixed-price sale on
hand (precluding a market participant
with only an unfixed-price purchase or
an unfixed price sale from qualifying for
this particular enumerated hedge).1515
In 2012, Commission staff issued
interpretive letter 12–07 (‘‘Staff Letter
12–07’’), which clarified that a
commercial entity may qualify for the
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements even
if the commercial entity has entered into
long-term, unfixed-price supply or
requirements contracts because, as staff
explained, the unfixed-price purchase
1513 For example, AGA expressed support for the
Commission’s proposal to recognize anticipatory
merchandising as an enumerated hedge because it
promotes liquidity. AGA at 8. AGA stated that
‘‘[a]bsent such an enumerated hedge, there would
be a piecemeal approach to permitting such hedges
which could reduce liquidity, raise costs, and create
undue risks for gas utilities, without any regulatory
benefits toward the Commission’s goal to reduce
excessive speculative activities.’’ Id.
1514 See supra Section I.
1515 See, e.g., paragraphs (2)(i)(A) and 2(ii)(A) of
existing § 1.3.
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contract does not ‘‘fill’’ the commercial
entity’s anticipated requirements.1516
The Final Rule affirms and broadens
the application of the interpretation
provided in Staff Letter No. 12–07. As
a result, commercial market participants
with unfixed price transactions may
qualify for bona fide hedge treatment
under the enumerated bona fide hedges
for anticipatory merchandising,
anticipated unsold production, or
anticipated unfilled requirements.1517
The Commission clarifies that a
commercial market participant that
enters into an unfixed-price transaction
will not be precluded from qualifying
for one of these anticipatory enumerated
bona fide hedges as long as the
commercial entity otherwise satisfies all
requirements for such anticipatory bona
fide hedge, including demonstrating its
anticipated need in the physical
marketing channel related to either its
unsold production, unfilled
requirements, and/or merchandising, as
applicable.1518 As such, merely entering
into an unfixed-price transaction is not
alone sufficient to demonstrate
compliance with one of the enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges.
The same costs and benefits described
above with respect to an expanded list
of enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions also apply to such
recognition based on unfixed-price
transactions. The Commission’s
treatment of unfixed price transactions
under the Final Rule will benefit
physical commodity commercial market
participants. As discussed previously,
CEA section 4a(c)(1) directs the
Commission to exclude bona fide hedge
positions from any Federal position
limits framework. In accordance with
CEA section 4a(c)(1), the Commission’s
treatment of unfixed price transactions
entered into by commercial market
participants protects the legitimate
commercial activity of cash-market
participants,1519 thereby encouraging
participation in the futures markets by
commercial market participants.
Additionally, bona hedge treatment for
qualified unfixed price transactions
benefits the public by allowing
commercial market participants to more
effectively and predictably hedge their
1516 CFTC Staff Letter 12–07 at 1, issued August
16, 2012, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/
CFTCStaffLetters/letters.htm, title search ‘‘12–07.’’
1517 See supra Section II.A.1.iv (discussing
treatment of unfixed price transactions).
1518 The specific requirements associated with
each enumerated bona fide hedge, including each
anticipatory bona fide hedge, are described in detail
further below.
1519 See Cargill at 6 (stating that the Commission
should recognize unfixed price transactions as they
are ‘‘fundamental to price risk management and
routinely used by firms to manage risk’’).
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price risks, thus controlling costs that
might be passed on to the public.1520
However, to the extent the Commission
currently allows exemptions related to
unfixed-price transactions, the costs and
benefits already may be realized by
market participants and may not
represent a change from the status quo
baseline.
Alternatively, several commenters
requested that the Commission create a
new enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfixed-price transactions or amend the
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
offsetting unfixed purchase and
sales.1521 The Commission does not
believe that this is necessary since, as
described above, commercial market
participants may continue to both
qualify for anticipatory bona fide hedges
while also entering into unfixed-price
transactions. Further, the Commission
believes that neither of these
alternatives is suitable because there is
an inherent difficulty in evaluating the
propriety of a hedge of an unfixed price
obligation with a fixed-price futures
contract due to the basis risk that exists
until the unfixed price obligation is
fixed. Given differences among markets,
creating a new enumerated bona fide
hedge for any unfixed price transaction
could, under certain circumstances,
impose costs on market integrity,
including by enabling potential market
manipulation and/or allowing excessive
speculation by potentially affording
bona fide hedging treatment for
speculative transactions. To the extent
that a market participant does not
qualify for an enumerated bona fide
hedge in connection with an unfixedprice transaction, the Commission
believes that any potential harms or
costs to that market participant would
be mitigated because the participant
could still avail itself of the process
under §§ 150.3 and 150.9 for nonenumerated bona fide hedges.1522
1520 CEWG at 18 (discussing storage hedges,
stating that ‘‘(‘‘[n]ot allowing commercial energy
firms to utilize these industry-standard hedges on
an enumerated basis because they are
‘‘anticipatory’’ in nature or viewed as a form of
‘‘merchandising’’—or both—could result in storage
assets being underutilized, which could increase
volatility in physical and financial markets for
energy commodities that ultimately could translate
into higher costs for consumers’’).
1521 See, e.g., Ecom at 1; ACA at 2; CEWG at 19–
21; Chevron at 11; CME Group at 8–9; DECA at 2;
East Cotton at 2; Gerald Marshall at 2; IFUS at 5–
7; IMC at 2; Jess Smith at 2; LDC at 2; Mallory
Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2;
Moody Compress 1; NCC at 1; NGFA at 7; Olam at
2; Omnicotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Shell at 7;
Southern Cotton at 2; Suncor at 7; SW Ag at 2; Toyo
at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at
2.
1522 One commenter maintains that reliance on
the non-enumerated bona fide hedge process for
management of unpriced physical purchase or sale
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(2) Elimination of the Five-Day Rule
The Final Rule eliminates the existing
restriction on holding certain
enumerated bona fide hedges during the
last five days of trading under existing
§ 1.3. Instead, under final
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H), the exchanges have
discretion to determine, for purposes of
their own exchange-granted exemptions
(for contracts subject to Federal position
limits), whether to apply a restriction
against holding positions in excess of
limits during the lesser of the last five
days of trading or the time period for the
spot month in such physical-delivery
contract (the ‘‘Five-Day Rule’’). Under
final § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H), exchanges are
able to establish their own Five-Day
Rule, or otherwise limit the size of
positions. The exchanges would thus
have the ability and discretion, but not
an obligation, to apply a five-day Rule
or similar restriction to exemptions on
any contracts subject to Federal position
limits, regardless of whether such
contracts have been subject to Federal
position limits before.1523 The
Commission has determined that
exchanges are well-informed with
respect to their respective markets, and
well-positioned to make a determination
with respect to imposing the Five-Day
Rule in connection with recognizing
bona fide hedges for their respective
commodity contracts.
In general, the Commission believes
that, on the one hand, limiting a trader’s
ability to establish a position in this
manner by requiring the Five-Day Rule
could result in increased costs related to
operational inefficiencies, as a trader
may believe that holding a position late
into the spot period is necessary for the
bona fide hedge position. On the other
hand, the Commission believes that
price convergence may be particularly
sensitive to potential market
manipulation or excessive speculation
during the spot period. Accordingly, the
Commission believes that the
commitments ‘‘will impose procedural hurdles,
uncertainty, and additional costs on a critically
important function of the supply chain in the U.S.
economy.’’ CEWG at 21. Another commenter stated
that imposing a burden on commercial end users
with unpriced physical purchase or sale
commitments to rely on the non-enumerated hedge
exemption process is contrary to the intent and
language of the CEA. Cargill at 6. These concerns,
however, are mitigated because, under the Final
Rule, commercial market participants with unfixed
price transactions may qualify for bona fide hedge
treatment under the enumerated bona fide hedges
for anticipatory merchandising, anticipated unsold
production, or anticipated unfilled requirements.
1523 The Commission is adopting Appendix B and
Appendix G of this Final Rule to provide guidance
for exchanges to consider when determining
whether to impose the Five-Day Rule or similar
requirements on bona fide hedge exemptions and
spread exemptions, respectively.
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determination to not impose the FiveDay Rule with respect to any of the
enumerated bona fide hedges for
Federal purposes, but to instead rely on
exchanges’ determinations with respect
to exchange-granted exemptions, helps
to better optimize these considerations.
The Commission notes there is a
potential cost to market integrity and
price convergence since the Five-Day
Rule is being eliminated as a blanket
Federal requirement from some
enumerated hedges while the exchanges
will now have guidance from the
Commission to consider when choosing
whether to grant a position limits
exemption subject to a five-day rule or
similar restriction.1524 Under this new
framework, however, the Commission
will continue to leverage its own market
surveillance and oversight functions to
ensure that exchanges continue to
comply with their legal obligations,
including with respect to Core
Principles 2, 3, 4, and 5, among
others.1525 With an expanded list of
contracts subject to Federal position
limits, it is best to provide the
exchanges additional discretion to
protect their markets using tools other
than a five-day rule, and to supplement
that discretion with guidance
highlighting the importance of the spot
month to ensure price convergence and
an orderly delivery process. Finally, the
Commission believes a concern over
oversight is also mitigated by the fact
that the exchanges have an economic
incentive to ensure that price
convergence occurs with their
respective contracts since commercial
end-users would be less willing to use
such contracts for hedging purposes if
price convergence failed to occur in
such contracts as they may generally
desire to hedge cash-market prices with
futures contracts.
The Commission is also adopting
guidance in Appendix B to part 150 on
factors for the exchanges to consider
when granting an exemption subject to
a restriction against holding physically
delivered futures contracts into the spot
month. In response to some commenters
who stated that the proposed guidance
was too prescriptive and would result in
additional burdens,1526 the Commission
1524 Better Markets at 61 (discussing elimination
of the Five-Day Rule and Appendix B guidance by
stating that ’’ the CFTC proposes to abolish the rule
for enumerated hedges, over-relying instead—and
again—on the judgment of the exchanges to
determine whether to apply the Five-Day Rule, or
apply and grant fact specific waivers’’).
1525 Core Principle 4, 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(4)(B); 7
U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b–3(f)(3); 7 U.S.C.7b–
3(f)(5).
1526 Cargill at 9; CME Group at 9 (stating that the
‘‘CME Group believes the proposed guidance could
be interpreted to cause unnecessary burden and
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clarifies and reiterates the appendix is
not intended to be used as a mandatory
checklist. The Commission, however,
has determined it is helpful to provide
the exchanges with guidance
highlighting the importance of the spot
month to ensure price convergence and
an orderly delivery process. Since price
convergence and an orderly trading
environment serve as a deterrent to
mitigate certain types of market
manipulation schemes such as corners
and squeezes, the guidance is intended
to include a non-exclusive list of
considerations the Commission expects
the exchanges to consider when
determining whether to allow a position
in excess of limits throughout the spot
month. The Commission does not
expect the guidance to impose
additional burdens on the exchanges, as
the exchanges currently have in place
market surveillance practices or
procedures to review the
appropriateness of an exemption during
the relevant referenced contract’s spot
period. The guidance is intended to
supplement that existing process.
As discussed in the preamble, the
guidance does not impose any
additional reporting requirements on
market participants, and the factors
described in the guidance apply simply
to the exchanges’ evaluation of the
specific contract market when
considering whether an exemption shall
be granted subject to any condition or
limitation in the spot month. Finally,
the Commission is making certain
amendments to the guidance to ensure
that the factors maintain a flexible
approach, particularly where existing
exchange application requirements
already require market participants to
provide relevant cash-market
information.
c. Guidance for Measuring Risk
The Commission is issuing guidance
in paragraph (a) of final Appendix B to
part 150 on whether positions may be
hedged on either a gross or net basis.
Under the guidance, among other
things, a trader may measure risk on a
gross basis if that approach is consistent
with the trader’s historical practice and
is not intended to evade applicable
limits. The key cost associated with
allowing gross hedging is that it may
provide opportunity for hidden
speculative trading or for cherry picking
costs to market participants. The guidance appears
to create a formal process for firms to provide
information outlined in the Appendix as part of
their bona fide hedge exemption applications, but
the Proposal does not seem to consider this
additional burden in its cost analysis’’).
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3425
of positions in a manner that subverts
positions limits.1527
Such risk is mitigated to a certain
extent by the guidance’s provisos that
the trader does not switch between net
hedging and gross hedging in order to
evade limits and that the trader must
demonstrate, upon request by the
Commission or an exchange, the
justifications for measuring risk on a
gross basis.1528 By focusing on
consistency and historical practice with
respect to the manner in which a person
measures risk, the guidance enables
market participants to measure risk on
a gross basis when dictated by the
nature of the exposure, but not simply
when utilizing gross hedging will yield
a larger exposure than net hedging, or
will otherwise subvert Federal position
limit or aggregation requirements.
However, the Commission also
recognizes that there are myriad ways in
which organizations are structured and
engage in commercial hedging practices,
including the use of multi-line business
strategies in certain industries that are
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under this Final Rule and for
which net hedging could impose
significant costs or be operationally
unfeasible.1529
1527 For example, using gross hedging, a market
participant could potentially point to a large long
cash position as justification for a bona fide hedge,
even though the participant, or an entity with
which the participant is required to aggregate, has
an equally large short cash position that would
result in the participant having no net price risk to
hedge as the participant had no price risk exposure
to the commodity prior to establishing such
derivative position. Instead, the participant created
price risk exposure to the commodity by
establishing the derivative position.
1528 The proposed guidance on gross hedging
positions in the 2020 NPRM provided that an
exchange document the justifications for
recognizing a gross position as a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge pursuant to § 150.9. Several
commenters alternatively requested elimination of
that requirement as imposing unnecessary burdens
directly on exchanges and indirectly on market
participants. See CEWG at 4; FIA at 14; and MGEX
at 3. Because the Commission and exchanges have
other tools for accessing such information, the
Commission eliminated that requirement from the
guidance in Appendix B of this Final Rule. Under
final § 150.3(b)(2) and (e) and final § 150.9(e)(5),
and (g), the Commission has access to any
information related to the applicable exemption
request, and therefore concludes that eliminating
this requirement does not result in any related costs
and benefits.
1529 FIA stated that ‘‘the recommendation to
implement specific policies and procedures
governing gross and net hedging has the potential
to create unnecessary, unintended and burdensome
conflicts with other company policies, such as
accounting policies, with little or no measurable
benefit.’’ FIA at 15. The Final Rule clarifies that the
guidance does not require market participants to
develop written policies or procedures setting forth
when gross or net hedging is appropriate.
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iii. Spread Exemptions
Under existing § 150.3, certain spread
exemptions are self-effectuating.
Specifically, existing § 150.3 allows for
‘‘spread or arbitrage positions’’ that are
‘‘between single months of a futures
contract and/or, on a futures-equivalent
basis, options thereon, outside of the
spot month, in the same crop year;
provided, however, that such spread or
arbitrage positions, when combined
with any other net positions in the
single month, do not exceed the allmonths limit set forth in § 150.2.’’ 1530
Final §§ 150.1 and 150.3 amend the
existing spread position exemption for
Federal position limits by (i) listing, in
the spread transaction definition,
specific types of spread exemptions that
are self-effectuating for purposes of
Federal limits and that may be granted
by an exchange; (ii) creating a process
that requires a person to apply for
spread exemptions (that are not listed in
the spread transaction definition)
directly with the Commission pursuant
to final § 150.3; 1531 and (iii) providing
guidance on the types of spread
positions that meet the spread
transaction definition in a new
Appendix G to part 150 under the Final
Rule. In addition, final § 150.3 permits
spread exemptions outside the same
crop year and/or during the spot
month.1532
In connection with the spread
exemption provisions, the Commission
is relaxing the prohibition for contracts
during the same crop year and/or the
spot month so that market participants
may receive spread exemptions outside
the same crop year and/or during the
spot month. There may be benefits that
result from permitting these types of
spread exemptions. For example, the
Commission believes that permitting
1530 17 CFR 150.3. CEA section 4a(a)(1) provides
the Commission with authority to exempt from
position limits transactions ‘‘normally known to the
trade’’ as ‘‘spreads’’ or ‘‘straddles’’ or ‘‘arbitrage’’ or
to fix limits for such transactions or positions
different from limits fixed for other transactions or
positions.
1531 The ‘‘spread transaction’’ definition lists the
most common types of spread positions: intramarket spread, inter-market spread, intracommodity spread, or inter-commodity spread,
including a calendar spread, quality differential
spread, processing spread, product or by-product
differential spread, or futures-option spread. Final
§ 150.3(b) also permits market participants to apply
to the Commission for other spread transactions.
1532 As discussed under final § 150.3, spread
exemptions identified in the proposed ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition in final § 150.1 are selfeffectuating, similar to the status quo, and do not
represent a change to the status quo baseline. The
related costs and benefits, particularly with respect
to requesting exemptions with respect to spreads
other than those identified in the proposed ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition, are discussed under the
respective sections below.
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spread exemptions in different crop
years or during the spot month may
potentially improve price discovery and
provide market participants with the
ability to use additional strategies
involving spread positions, which may
reduce hedging costs.
As in the inter-market wheat example
discussed below, the spread relief,
which is not limited to the same crop
year, may better link prices between two
markets (e.g., the price of MGEX wheat
futures and the price of CBOT wheat
futures). Put another way, permitting
spread exemptions outside the same
crop year may enable pricing in two
different but related markets for
substitute goods to be more highly
correlated, which benefits market
participants with a price exposure to the
underlying protein content in wheat
generally, rather than that of a particular
commodity.
However, the Commission also
recognizes certain potential costs to
permitting spread exemptions during
the spot month, particularly to extend
into the last five days of trading. This
feature could raise the risk of allowing
participants in the market at a time in
the contract where only those interested
in making or taking delivery should be
present. When a contract goes into
expiration, open interest and trading
volume naturally decrease, as traders
not interested in making or taking
delivery roll their positions into
deferred calendar months. The presence
of large spread positions, normally tied
to large liquidity providers so close to
the expiration of a futures contract,
could lead to disruptions in the price
discovery function of the contract by
disrupting the futures/cash price
convergence. This could lead to
increased transaction costs and harm
the hedging utility for end-users of the
futures contract, which could lead to
higher costs passed on to consumers.
However, the Commission believes
that these concerns are mitigated, as
spread exemptions will not be selfeffectuating for purposes of exchangeset position limits. Accordingly,
exchanges will continue to apply their
expertise in overseeing and maintaining
the integrity of their markets. For
example, an exchange could: Refuse to
grant a spread exemption if the
exchange determines that the exemption
is inconsistent with the requirements of
§ 150.5(a) or harmful to its markets;
require a market participant to reduce
its positions; or implement a five-day
rule for spread exemptions, as discussed
above.1533 The Commission has also
1533 See supra Section II.A.1.viii. (discussing the
Five-Day Rule).
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provided guidance to exchanges in a
new Appendix G to support exchange
analysis of whether to grant a particular
spread exemption and to remind
exchanges of their oversight obligations
when granting spread exemptions.
Generally, the Commission finds that,
by allowing speculators to execute intermarket and intra-market spreads,
speculators are able to hold a greater
amount of open interest in underlying
contract(s), and therefore, bona fide
hedgers may benefit from any increase
in market liquidity. Spread exemptions
may also lead to better price continuity
and price discovery if market
participants who seek to provide
liquidity (for example, through entry of
resting orders for spread trades between
different contracts) receive a spread
exemption, and thus would not
otherwise be constrained by a position
limit.
For clarity, the Commission has
identified the following two examples of
spread positions that could benefit from
the spread exemptions permitted by this
Final Rule:
• Reverse crush spread in soybeans
on the CBOT subject to an inter-market
spread exemption. In the case where
soybeans are processed into two
different products, soybean meal and
soybean oil, the crush spread is the
difference between the combined value
of the products and the value of
soybeans. There are two actors in this
scenario: The speculator and the
soybean processor. The spread’s value
approximates the profit margin from
actually crushing (or mashing) soybeans
into meal and oil. The soybean
processor may want to lock in the
spread value as part of its hedging
strategy, establishing a long position in
soybean futures and short positions in
soybean oil futures and soybean meal
futures, as substitutes for the processor’s
expected cash-market transactions (the
long position hedges the purchase of the
anticipated inputs for processing and
the short position hedges the sale of the
anticipated soybean meal and oil
products). On the other side of the
processor’s crush spread, a speculator
takes a short position in soybean futures
against long positions in soybean meal
futures and soybean oil futures. The
soybean processor may be able to lock
in a higher crush spread because of
liquidity provided by such a speculator
who may need to rely upon a spread
exemption. In this example, the
speculator is accepting basis risk
represented by the crush spread, and the
speculator is providing liquidity to the
soybean processor. The crush spread
positions may result in greater
correlation between the futures prices of
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soybeans on the one hand and those of
soybean oil and soybean meal on the
other hand, which means that prices for
all three products may move up or
down together in a more correlated
manner.
• Wheat spread subject to intermarket spread exemptions. There are
two actors in this scenario: The
speculator and the wheat farmer. In this
example, a farmer growing hard wheat
would like to reduce the price risk of
her crop by shorting a MGEX wheat
futures. There, however, may be no
hedger, such as a mill, that is
immediately available to trade at a
desirable price for the farmer. There
may be a speculator willing to offer
liquidity to the hedger; however, the
speculator may wish to reduce the risk
of an outright long position in MGEX
wheat futures through establishing a
short position in CBOT wheat futures
(soft wheat). Such a speculator, who
otherwise would have been constrained
by a position limit at MGEX and/or
CBOT, may seek exemptions from
MGEX and CBOT for an inter-market
spread, that is, for a long position in
MGEX wheat futures and a short
position in CBOT wheat futures of the
same maturity. As a result of the
exchanges granting an inter-market
spread exemption to such a speculator,
who otherwise may be constrained by
limits, the farmer might be able to
transact at a higher price for hard wheat
than might have existed absent the
inter-market spread exemptions. Under
this example, the speculator is accepting
basis risk between hard wheat and soft
wheat, reducing the risk of a position on
one exchange by establishing a position
on another exchange, and potentially
providing liquidity to a hedger. Further,
spread transactions may aid in price
discovery regarding the relative protein
content for each of the hard and soft
wheat contracts.
iv. Conditional Spot Month Exemption
Positions in Natural Gas
Final § 150.3(a)(4) provides a new
Federal conditional spot month position
limit exemption for cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts. The
conditional exemption permits traders
to acquire positions up to 10,000 cashsettled NYMEX NG referenced contracts
(the Federal spot month limit in final
§ 150.2 for cash-settled NYMEX NG is
2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts per exchange and
another 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts in the OTC swaps
market) per exchange that lists a cashsettled NYMEX NG referenced contract,
along with an additional position in
cash-settled economically equivalent
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NYMEX NG OTC swaps that has a
notional amount of up to 10,000
equivalent-sized contracts, as long as
such person does not also hold
positions in the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract.1534
NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal currently
have rules in place establishing a
conditional spot month limit exemption
of up to 5,000 equivalent-sized cashsettled natural gas contracts per
exchange, provided that the market
participant does not hold any
physically-settled natural gas contracts.
Finalizing the conditional limit
exemption for NYMEX NG enables the
NYMEX NG referenced contract market
to continue to operate as it has under
the existing exchange-set conditional
limit exemption framework, which the
Commission notes has functioned well
based on its observation over the past
decade. Removing the conditional limit
exemption will result in reduced
liquidity, including for commercial
hedgers seeking to offset price risks but
not necessarily looking to make or take
delivery, due to the significantly lower
positions a market participant would be
able to hold in the cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts.
Several commenters suggested
removing the NYMEX NG conditional
limit exemption’s requirement to divest
all holdings in the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract.1535
The Commission believes that this
could result in significant costs to the
market by encouraging manipulation of
the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract to benefit a large
position in the cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract available through
the conditional limit exemption.
Specifically, without this divestiture
requirement, a trader could hold up to
40,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts and 2,000
physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts. At these levels, it
may not require much movement in the
physically-settled markets to
disproportionately benefit the cashsettled holdings. As a result, the
requirement to exit the physicallysettled contract is critical for reducing a
market participant’s incentive to
manipulate the cash settlement price by,
for example, banging-the-close or
distorting physical delivery prices in the
physically-settled contract to benefit
leveraged cash-settled positions.
1534 The NYMEX NG contract is the only natural
gas contract included as a core referenced futures
contract under the Final Rule.
1535 ISDA at 8; SIFMA AMG at 10–11; FIA at 7–
8; NGSA at 12–14; Citadel at 7; CCI at 4; EEI/EPSA
at 4.
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3427
CME commented that the conditional
limit exemption for NYMEX NG could
‘‘incentivize the manipulation of a cash
commodity price in order to benefit a
position in a cash-settled contract.’’ 1536
The Commission notes that the
conditional limit exemption does
provide for a substantial increase in a
trader’s cash-settled position, but the
core requirement that a trader must
divest out of the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract during
the spot month period is intended to
address and reduce the incentive for a
trader to manipulate the physicallysettled NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contract to benefit a position in
the cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts. Furthermore, based on its
experience in monitoring the NYMEX
NG market since the conditional limit
exemption was adopted, the
Commission has not observed any
market manipulations attributable to a
trader utilizing the conditional limit
exemption. That said, the Commission
is aware of instances where traders
violated the conditional exemption by
holding or trading in the physicallysettled NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contracts. The exchanges also
detected and took corrective action
against those traders. The Commission
will continue to closely monitor natural
gas trader positions across exchanges
and work with the exchanges to ensure
the CME Group’s concerns continue to
be addressed to protect the market
participants and the public and defend
the financial integrity and price
discovery function of the NYMEX NG
core referenced futures contract.1537
Further, the Commission has heeded
natural gas traders’ concerns about
disrupting market practices and
harming liquidity in the cash-settled
contract, which could increase the cost
of hedging and possibly prevent
convergence between the physical
delivery futures and cash markets.1538
While a trader with a position in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract may incur costs
associated with liquidating that position
in order to meet the conditions of the
Federal exemption, such costs are
incurred outside of the Final Rule, as
the trader would have to do so as a
condition of the exchange-level
1536 CME
Group at 6.
IFUS Rule 6.20(c) and NYMEX Rule
559.F. See, e.g., Nodal Rulebook Appendix C
(equivalent rule of Nodal).
1538 See 81 FR at 96862, 96863.
1537 See
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exemption under current exchange
rules.1539
v. Financial Distress Exemption
Final § 150.3(a)(3) provides an
exemption for certain financial distress
circumstances, including the default of
a customer, affiliate, or acquisition
target of the requesting entity that may
require the requesting entity to take on,
in short order, the positions of another
entity. In codifying the Commission’s
historical practice, the Final Rule
accommodates transfers of positions
from financially distressed firms to
financially secure firms. The disorderly
liquidation of a position threatens price
impacts that may harm the efficiency
and price discovery function of markets,
and § 150.3(a)(3) makes it less likely that
positions are prematurely or needlessly
liquidated. The Commission has
determined that costs related to filing
and recordkeeping are negligible. The
Commission cannot accurately estimate
how often this exemption may be
invoked because emergency or
distressed market situations are
unpredictable and dependent on a
variety of firm and market-specific
factors as well as general
macroeconomic indicators.1540 The
Commission, nevertheless, believes that
emergency or distressed market
situations that might trigger the need for
this exemption are infrequent, and that
codifying this historical practice adds
transparency to the Commission’s
oversight responsibilities.
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vi. Pre-Enactment and Transition Period
Swaps Exemption
Final § 150.3(a)(5) provides an
exemption from position limits for
positions acquired in good faith in any
‘‘pre-enactment swap,’’ or in any
‘‘transition period swap,’’ in either case
as defined in final § 150.1. A person
relying on this exemption may net such
positions with post-effective date
commodity derivative contracts for the
purpose of complying with any nonspot month speculative positions limits,
but may not net against spot month
positions. This exemption is selfeffectuating, and the Commission
believes that § 150.3(a)(5) benefits both
individual market participants by
lessening the impact of the Federal
position limits in final § 150.2, and
market liquidity in general as liquidity
providers initially will not be forced to
reduce or exit their positions.
1539 See IFUS Rule 6.20(c) and NYMEX Rule
559.F. See, e.g., Nodal Rulebook Appendix C
(equivalent rules of Nodal).
1540 See 81 FR at 96862, 96863.
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Final § 150.3(a)(5) benefits price
discovery and convergence by
prohibiting large traders seeking to roll
their positions into the spot month from
netting down positions in the spotmonth against their pre-enactment swap
or transition period swap. The
Commission acknowledges that, on its
face, including a ‘‘good-faith’’
requirement in final § 150.3(a)(5) could
hypothetically diminish market
integrity since determining whether a
trader has acted in ‘‘good faith’’ is
inherently subjective and could result in
disparate treatment among traders,
where certain traders may assert a more
aggressive position in order to seek a
competitive advantage over others. The
Commission believes the risk of any
such unscrupulous trader or exchange is
mitigated since exchanges are still
subject to Commission oversight and to
DCM Core Principles 4 (‘‘prevention of
market disruption’’) and 12 (‘‘protection
of markets and market participants’’),
among others. The Commission has
determined that market participants
who voluntarily employ this exemption
also incur negligible recordkeeping
costs.
5. Process for the Commission or
Exchanges To Grant Exemptions and
Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions for
Purposes of Federal Position Limits
(Final §§ 150.3 and 150.9) and Related
Changes to Part 19 of the Commission’s
Regulations
Existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48 set forth the
process for market participants to apply
to the Commission for recognition of
certain bona fide hedges for purposes of
Federal position limits, and existing
§ 150.3 set forth the types of spread
exemptions a person can rely on for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Under existing Commission practices,
spread exemptions and certain
enumerated bona fide hedges are
generally self-effectuating and do not
require market participants to apply to
the Commission for purposes of Federal
position limits. Market participants are
currently, however, required to file
Form 204 monthly reports 1541 to justify
certain position limit overages.
Further, for those bona fide hedges for
which market participants are required
to apply to the Commission, existing
regulations and market practice require
market participants to apply both to the
Commission for purposes of Federal
position limits and also to the relevant
exchanges for purposes of exchange-set
limits. The Commission has determined
that this dual application process
1541 In the case of cotton, market participants
currently file the relevant portions of Form 304.
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creates inefficiencies for market
participants.
Final §§ 150.3 and 150.9, taken
together, make several changes to the
process of acquiring bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions for
Federal position limits purposes. Final
§§ 150.3 and 150.9 maintain certain
elements of the status quo while also
adopting certain changes to facilitate the
exemption process.1542
First, with respect to the proposed
enumerated bona fide hedges, final
§ 150.3 maintains the status quo by
providing that those enumerated bona
fide hedges that currently are selfeffectuating for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts will continue to
remain self-effectuating for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts for
purposes of Federal position limits.1543
Similarly, the enumerated bona fide
hedges for the additional 16 contracts
that are newly subject to Federal
position limits (i.e., those contracts
other than the nine legacy agricultural
contracts) also are self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Second, for recognition of any nonenumerated bona fide hedge in
connection with any referenced
contract, market participants are
required to apply either directly to the
Commission under final § 150.3 or
through an exchange that adheres to
certain requirements under final § 150.9.
The Commission notes that existing
regulations require market participants
to apply to the Commission for
recognition of non-enumerated bona
fide hedges, and so the Final Rule does
not represent a change to the status quo
in this respect for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts.
Third, final § 150.3 maintains the
status quo by providing that the most
common spread exemptions for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts remain selfeffectuating. Similarly, these common
spread exemptions also are selfeffectuating for the additional 16
contracts that are newly subject to
Federal position limits. These common
spread exemptions are listed in the
1542 In this section the Commission discusses the
costs and benefits related to the application process
for these exemptions and bona fide hedge
recognitions. For a discussion of the costs and
benefits related to the scope of the exemptions and
bona fide hedge recognitions, see supra Section
IV.A.4.
1543 Final § 150.3(a)(1)(i). Under the status quo,
market participants must apply to the Commission
for recognition of certain enumerated anticipatory
bona fide hedges. The Final Rule also makes these
enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges selfeffectuating for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts.
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‘‘spread transaction’’ definition under
final § 150.1.1544
Fourth, for any spread exemption not
listed in the ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition, market participants are
required to apply directly to the
Commission under final § 150.3. There
is no exception for the nine legacy
agricultural products, nor are market
participants permitted to apply through
an exchange under final § 150.9 for
these types of spread exemptions.1545
The Commission anticipates that
most—if not all—market participants
will utilize the exchange-centric process
set forth in final § 150.9 with respect to
applying for recognition of nonenumerated bona fide hedges, rather
than applying directly to the
Commission under § 150.3. Market
participants are likely already familiar
with the processes set forth in § 150.9,
which is intended to leverage the
processes currently in place at the
exchanges for addressing requests for
bona fide hedge recognitions from
exchange-set limits. In the sections
below, the Commission will discuss the
costs and benefits related to both
processes.
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i. Process for Requesting Exemptions
and Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions
Directly From the Commission (Final
§ 150.3)
Under existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48, and
existing § 150.3, the processes for
obtaining a recognition of a bona fide
hedge or for relying on a spread
exemption, are similar in some respects
and different in other respects than the
approach adopted in final § 150.3.
Existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48 require market
participants seeking recognition of nonenumerated bona fide hedges and
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges, respectively, for purposes of
Federal position limits to apply directly
to the Commission for prior approval.
In contrast, existing non-anticipatory
enumerated bona fide hedges and
spread exemptions are self-effectuating,
which means that market participants
are not required to submit any
information to the Commission for prior
approval, although such market
participants must subsequently file
Form 204 or Form 304 each month in
order to describe their cash-market
positions and justify their bona fide
1544 Final § 150.1 defines ‘‘spread transaction’’ to
include an intra-market spread, inter-market spread,
intra-commodity spread, or inter-commodity
spread, including a calendar spread, quality
differential spread, processing spread, product or
by-product differential spread, or futures-option
spread.
1545 As discussed below, the Final Rule also
eliminates the Form 204 and the equivalent
portions of the Form 304.
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hedge position. There currently is no
codified Federal process related to
financial distress exemptions or natural
gas conditional spot month exemptions.
Final § 150.3 provides a process for
market participants to apply directly to
the Commission for recognition of nonenumerated bona fide hedges or spread
exemptions not included in the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition in final § 150.1,
which in each case would not be selfeffectuating under the Final Rule. Under
final § 150.3, any person seeking
Commission recognition of these types
of bona fide hedges or spread
exemptions (as opposed to applying for
recognition of non-enumerated bona
fide hedges using the exchange-centric
process under proposed § 150.9
described below) are required to submit
a request directly to the Commission
and to provide information similar to
what is currently required under
existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48.1546
a. Existing Bona Fide Hedges That
Currently Require Prior Submission to
the Commission Under Existing §§ 1.47
and 1.48 for the Nine Legacy
Agricultural Contracts
Under the Final Rule, the Commission
maintains the distinction between
enumerated bona fide hedges and nonenumerated bona fide hedges in final
§ 150.3: (1) Enumerated bona fide
hedges continue to be self-effectuating;
(2) enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges are now self-effectuating, so
market participants no longer need to
apply to the Commission for
recognition; and (3) non-enumerated
bona fide hedges still require market
participants to apply for recognition.
Market participants that choose to apply
directly to the Commission for a bona
fide hedge recognition (i.e., for nonenumerated bona fide hedges) are
subject to an application process that
1546 For bona fide hedges and spread exemptions,
this information includes: (i) A description of the
position in the commodity derivative contract
(including the name of the underlying commodity
and the derivative position size) or of the spread
position for which the application is submitted; (ii)
an explanation of the hedging strategy, including a
statement that the position complies with the
applicable requirements for, and the definition of,
a bona fide hedging transaction or position, and
information to demonstrate why the position
satisfies such requirements and definition; (iii) a
statement concerning the maximum size of all gross
positions in commodity derivative contracts for
which the application is submitted; (iv) for bona
fide hedges, a description of the applicant’s activity
in the cash markets and swaps markets for the
commodity underlying the position for which the
application is submitted, including information
regarding the offsetting cash positions; and (v) any
other information that may help the Commission
determine whether the position meets the
applicable requirements for a bona fide hedge
position or spread transaction.
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3429
generally is similar to what the
Commission currently administers for
the non-enumerated bona fide hedges
and the enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges.1547
With respect to enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts, for
which market participants currently are
required to apply to the Commission for
recognition for Federal position limit
purposes, the Commission anticipates
that the Final Rule will benefit market
participants by making such hedges selfeffectuating.1548 As a result, market
participants will no longer be required
to spend time and resources applying to
the Commission.
Further, for these enumerated
anticipatory hedges, existing § 1.48
requires market participants to submit
either an initial or supplemental
application to the Commission 10 days
prior to entering into the bona fide
hedge that would cause the hedger to
exceed Federal position limits.1549
Under existing § 1.48, a market
participant could proceed with its
proposed bona fide hedge if the
Commission does not notify a market
participant otherwise within the
specific 10-day period. Under the Final
Rule, because bona fide hedgers can
implement enumerated anticipatory
bona fide hedges without filing an
application with the Commission for
approval and waiting the requisite 10
days, they may be able to implement
their hedging strategy more efficiently
with reduced cost and risk. The
1547 As noted above, under the existing
framework, market participants are not required to
apply for any type of bona fide hedge recognition
or spread exemption from the Commission for any
of the additional 16 contracts that are newly subject
to Federal position limits (i.e., those contracts other
than the nine legacy agricultural contracts); rather,
under the existing framework, such market
participants must apply to the exchanges for bona
fide hedge recognitions or exemptions for purposes
of exchange-set position limits. Accordingly, to the
extent that market participants do not need to apply
to the Commission in connection with any of the
additional 16 contracts, the Final Rule does not
impose additional costs or benefits compared to the
status quo.
1548 As noted above, since market participants do
not need to apply to the Commission for bona fide
hedge recognition for any of the additional 16
contracts that are newly subject to Federal position
limits, the Commission’s proposal does not result
in any additional costs or benefits to the extent such
bona fide hedge recognitions are self-effectuating.
1549 Under the Commission’s existing regulations,
non-anticipatory enumerated bona fide hedges are
self-effectuating, and market participants do not
have to file any applications for recognition under
existing Commission regulations. However, existing
Commission regulations require bona fide hedgers
to file with the Commission monthly Form 204 (or
Form 304 in connection with ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT))
reports discussing their underlying cash positions
in order to substantiate their bona fide hedge
positions.
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Commission acknowledges that making
such bona fide hedges more efficient to
obtain could increase the possibility of
excess speculation since anticipatory
exemptions are theoretically more
difficult to substantiate compared to the
other existing enumerated bona fide
hedges.
However, the Commission has gained
significant experience over the years
with bona fide hedging practices in
general, and with enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedging practices
in particular, and the Commission has
determined that making such hedges
self-effectuating should not increase the
risk of excessive speculation or market
manipulation compared to the status
quo.
For non-enumerated bona fide hedges,
existing § 1.47 requires market
participants to submit (i) initial
applications to the Commission 30 days
prior to the date the market participant
would exceed the applicable position
limits and (ii) supplemental
applications (i.e., applications for a
market participant that desires to exceed
the bona fide hedge amount provided in
the person’s previous Commission
filing) 10 days prior for Commission
approval, and market participants can
proceed with their proposed bona fide
hedges if the Commission does not
intervene within the specific time (e.g.,
either 10 days or 30 days).
Final § 150.3 similarly requires
market participants that elect to apply
directly to the Commission (as opposed
to applying through an exchange
pursuant to final § 150.9) for a
recognition of a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge for any of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts to apply to
the Commission prior to exceeding
Federal position limits. Final § 150.3
does not, however, prescribe a certain
time period by which a bona fide hedger
must apply or by which the Commission
must respond. The Commission
anticipates that the Final Rule benefits
bona fide hedgers by enabling them, in
many cases, to generally implement
their hedging strategies sooner than the
existing 30-day or 10-day waiting
period, as applicants will have access to
an expanded list of enumerated hedges
(which don’t require prior Commission
approval), a new streamlined process for
applying through exchanges for nonenumerated hedges, increased position
limits, and, as discussed here, a more
flexible approach for applying directly
to the Commission for a nonenumerated hedge. Considering these
factors, the Commission believes that,
ultimately, hedging-related costs would
likely decrease. However, the
Commission believes that there could
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also be circumstances in which the
overall process for applying directly to
the Commission could take longer than
the existing timelines under § 1.47,
which could increase hedging-related
costs if a bona fide hedger is compelled
to wait longer, compared to existing
Commission practices, before executing
its hedging strategy.
On the other hand, the Commission
also recognizes that there could be
potential costs to bona fide hedgers if,
under the Final Rule, they are forced
either to enter into less effective bona
fide hedges, or to wait to implement
their hedging strategy, as a result of the
potential uncertainty that could result
from § 150.3 not requiring the
Commission to respond within a certain
amount of time. However, the
Commission believes this concern is
mitigated since market participants will
likely also have the option to apply for
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
under final § 150.9. As explained further
below, final § 150.9(e)(3) is a
streamlined process whereby a market
participant in receipt of a notice of
approval from the relevant exchange
may elect, at its own risk, to exceed
Federal position limits during the
Commission’s review period, which is
limited to 10 (or 2) days under
§ 150.9.1550
This concern is also mitigated to the
extent market participants utilize the
§ 150.3 process that permits a market
participant that demonstrates a ‘‘sudden
or unforeseen’’ increase in its bona fide
hedging needs to enter into a bona fide
hedge without first obtaining the
Commission’s prior approval, as long as
the market participant submits a
retroactive application to the
Commission within five business days
of exceeding the applicable position
limit. The Commission believes this
‘‘five-business day retroactive
exemption’’ benefits bona fide hedgers
compared to existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48,
which require Commission prior
approval, since hedgers that qualify to
exercise the five-business day
retroactive exemption are also likely
facing more acute hedging needs—with
potentially commensurate costs if
required to wait. This provision also
leverages, for Federal position limit
purposes, existing exchange practices
for granting retroactive exemptions from
exchange-set limits.
On the other hand, the proposed fivebusiness day retroactive exemption
could harm market liquidity and bona
fide hedgers if the applicable exchange
or the Commission were to not approve
1550 See supra Section II.G.7. (discussing when a
person may exceed Federal position limits).
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the retroactive request, and the
Commission subsequently required
liquidation of the position in question.
As a result, such possibility could cause
market participants to either enter into
smaller bona fide hedge positions than
they otherwise would, or cause the bona
fide hedger to delay entering into its
hedge, in either case potentially causing
bona fide hedgers to incur increased
hedging costs.
However, the Commission believes
this concern is partially mitigated since
proposed § 150.3 requires the purported
bona fide hedger to exit its position in
a ‘‘commercially reasonable time,’’
which the Commission believes should
partially mitigate any costs incurred by
the market participant compared to
either an alternative that would require
the bona fide hedger to exit its position
immediately, or the status quo where
the market participant either is unable
to enter into a hedge at all without
Commission prior approval.
b. Spread Exemptions and NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Final § 150.3 imposes a new
requirement for Federal position limit
purposes for market participants to (1)
apply either directly to the Commission
pursuant to § 150.3 or indirectly through
an exchange pursuant to final § 150.9 for
any non-enumerated bona fide hedge;
and (2) to apply directly to the
Commission pursuant to § 150.3 for any
spread exemptions not identified in the
proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition (the Commission notes that a
market participant may not apply
indirectly through an exchange for
spread exemptions for Federal position
limit purposes).1551 As noted above,
common spread exemptions (i.e., those
identified in the definition of ‘‘spread
transaction’’ in final § 150.1) remain
self-effectuating for the nine legacy
agricultural products, and also are selfeffectuating for the 16 additional core
referenced futures contracts.1552
The baseline is the status quo under
existing § 150.3(a)(3), which provides
that certain spread exemptions are selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits. As noted above, § 150.3
is also the baseline for non-enumerated
bona fide hedges. The final rule
1551 As discussed below, for spread exemptions
not identified in the proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition in § 150.3, market participants are
required to apply directly to the Commission under
§ 150.3 and are not able to apply under § 150.9.
1552 Existing § 150.3(a)(2) does not specify a
formal process for granting either spread
exemptions or non-anticipatory enumerated bona
fide hedges that are consistent with CEA section
4a(a)(1), so, in practice, spread exemptions and
non-anticipatory enumerated bona fide hedges have
been self-effectuating.
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maintains the status quo with respect to
spread exemptions that meet the
‘‘spread transaction definition’’ for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts as
such spread exemptions will continue
to be self-effectuating. The final rule
also maintains the status quo for any
non-enumerated bona fide hedge in one
of the nine legacy agricultural contracts
by requiring an applicant to receive
prior approval, and similarly requiring
prior approval for such non-enumerated
bona fide hedges for the additional 16
contracts that are newly subject to
Federal position limits.1553
The Commission concludes that there
is a change to the status quo baseline
with respect to the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts to the
extent that they will be subject to
Federal position limits for the first time
under the Final Rule. However, since
the most common spread exemptions
will be ‘‘self-effectuating’’ for Federal
purposes, market participants will not
need to do anything new, compared to
the status quo, under the Final Rule in
connection with self-effectuating spread
exemptions. Accordingly, as a practical
matter, the Commission does not believe
that the Final Rule will impose any new
costs or benefits with respect to the 16
non-legacy core referenced futures
products related to the Final Rule’s
treatment of these self-effectuating
spread exemptions since market
participants will not need to do
anything differently compared to the
status quo (i.e., market participants will
still need to obtain exchange approval of
any spread exemption for purposes of
exchange-set position limits, but will
not be required to do anything for
Federal purposes in connection with
self-effectuating spread exemptions).
Alternatively, several commenters
advocated for the Commission to
expand the proposed § 150.9 process to
also allow exchanges to grant ‘‘nonenumerated’’ spread exemptions for
spread positions that do not meet the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition.1554 As
more fully explained in the preamble,
the Commission determined not to
expand § 150.9 for two primary
reasons.1555 First, most of the more
common spread exemptions used by
market participants fall within the scope
of the Final Rule’s expanded ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition and are selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
1553 The Commission discusses the costs and
benefits related to the process for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions with respect to the
nine legacy agricultural products in the above
section.
1554 See MFA/AIMA at 10; FIA at 21; Citadel at
8–9; ISDA at 9; ICE at 7–8.
1555 See supra Sections II.G.4., II.G.5.
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position limits. Spread exemption
requests that fall outside of the ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition are likely to be
novel exemption requests that require
Commission review.
Second, bona fide hedge recognitions
and spread transactions are subject to
different legal standards under CEA
section 4a(a). Because CEA section
4a(a)(c)(2) provides clear criteria to the
Commission for determining what
constitutes a bona fide hedging
transaction or position, the Commission
has defined in detail the term ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position’’ in
§ 150.1. As a result, the Commission is
permitting exchanges to evaluate
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedges for purposes of exchange-set
limits in accordance with the same clear
criteria used by the Commission. In
contrast, CEA section 4(a)(a)(1) does not
include clear criteria to the Commission
for the granting of spread exemptions
and requires the Commission to use its
judgment to conduct a fact-specific
analysis of novel spread exemption
requests. Because exchanges would lack
clear standards for assessing whether a
particular spread position satisfies the
requirements of the CEA, the
Commission currently is uncomfortable
with leveraging an exchange’s analysis
and determination with respect to novel
spread exemption requests and believes
that such an alternative could impose
costs on risk management practices due
to possible inconsistent treatment of
such exemption requests across
exchanges as well as potential
uncertainty due to lack of a clear
statutory standard.
To the extent market participants are
required to obtain prior approval for a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge or
spread exemption for any of the
additional 16 contracts that are newly
subject to Federal position limits, the
Commission recognizes that § 150.3
imposes costs on market participants
who are now required to spend time and
resources submitting applications to the
Commission or an exchange, or both, as
applicable, for prior approval of
exemptions for Federal position limit
purposes.1556 Further, compared to the
status quo in which the proposed new
16 contracts are not subject to Federal
position limits, the process in § 150.3
could increase uncertainty since market
participants are required to seek prior
approval and wait for an undetermined
amount of time for a Commission
response. As a result, such uncertainty
1556 The Commission’s Paperwork Reduction Act
analysis identifies some of these information
collection burdens in greater specificity. See infra
Section IV.B.3.ii.c. (discussing in greater detail the
cost and benefits related to spread exemptions).
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3431
could cause market participants to
either enter into smaller spread or bona
fide hedging positions or do so at a later
time. In either case, this could cause
market participants to incur additional
costs and/or implement less efficient
hedging strategies.
However, the Commission believes
that final § 150.3’s framework is familiar
to market participants that currently
apply to the Commission for bona fide
exemptions for the nine legacy
agricultural products, which should
serve to reduce costs for some market
participants associated with obtaining
recognition of a bona fide hedge or
spread exemption from the Commission
for Federal position limits for those
market participants.1557
The Commission believes that this
analysis also applies to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts for spread
exemptions that are not listed in the
proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition and therefore also requires
market participants to apply to the
Commission for these types of spread
exemptions for the first time for the nine
legacy agricultural products. However,
because the Commission has
determined that most spread
transactions are self-effectuating
(especially for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts based on the
Commission’s experience), the
Commission believes that § 150.3
imposes only small costs with respect to
spread exemptions for both the nine
legacy agricultural contracts as well as
the additional 16 contracts that are
newly subject to Federal position
limits.1558
1557 The Commission anticipates that the
application process in § 150.3(b) could slightly
reduce compliance-related costs, compared to the
status quo application process to the Commission
under existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48, because § 150.3
provides a single, standardized process for all bona
fide hedge and spread exemption requests that is
slightly less complex—and more clearly laid out in
the proposed regulations—than the Commission’s
existing application processes. Nonetheless, since
the Commission anticipates that most market
participants would apply directly to exchanges for
bona fide hedges when provided the option under
§ 150.9, the Commission believes that most market
participants would incur the costs and benefits
discussed thereunder.
1558 ICE requested that market participants be able
to apply for spread exemptions on a late or
retroactive basis the same way they would be
permitted to apply for bona fide hedge exemptions
within five days of exceeding Federal position
limits under proposed §§ 150.3 and 150.9. ICE at 8.
The Commission has determined not to permit late
retroactive applications for spread exemptions
under § 150.3(a) because the Commission believes
that the Final Rule provides sufficient flexibility to
allow market participants to identify their
exemption needs and submit timely applications.
See supra Section II.C.4.iii. The Commission further
believes that allowing retroactive spread
exemptions (and other types of retroactive
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While the Commission has years of
experience granting and monitoring
spread exemptions and enumerated and
non-enumerated bona fide hedges for
the nine legacy agricultural contracts, as
well as overseeing exchange processes
for administering exemptions from
exchange-set limits on such
commodities, the Commission does not
have the same level of experience or
comfort administering bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions for
the additional 16 contracts that are
subject to the Federal position limits
and the new exemption processes for
the first time. Accordingly, the
Commission recognizes that permitting
enumerated bona fide hedges and
spread exemptions identified in the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition for these
additional 16 contracts might not
provide the purported benefits, or could
result in increased costs, compared to
the nine legacy agricultural products.
The Commission also believes that
§ 150.3 benefits market participants by
providing them the option to choose the
process for applying for a nonenumerated bona fide hedge (i.e., either
directly with the Commission or,
alternatively, through the exchangecentric process discussed under § 150.9
below) for the additional 16 contracts
that are newly subject to Federal
position limits that are more efficient
given the market participants’ unique
facts, circumstances, and
experience.1559 If a market participant
chooses to apply through an exchange
for Federal position limits pursuant to
final § 150.9, the market participant
receives the added benefit of not being
required to also submit another
application directly to the Commission.
The Commission anticipates that most
market participants would apply
directly to exchanges for nonenumerated bona fide hedges, pursuant
to the streamlined process § 150.9, as
explained below, in which case the
exemptions) could potentially be harmful to the
market, as these types of strategies may involve
non-risk-reducing or speculative activity that
should be evaluated prior to a person exceeding
Federal position limits. Id.
1559 As noted above, market participants seeking
spread exemptions not listed in the proposed
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition in § 150.1 are
required to apply directly with the Commission
under § 150.3 and are not permitted to apply under
§ 150.9. The Commission recognizes that these
types of spread exemptions are difficult to analyze
compared to either the spread exemptions
identified in § 150.1 or bona fide hedges in general.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined to
require market participants to apply directly to the
Commission. Further, compared to the spread
exemptions identified in final § 150.1, the
Commission anticipates relatively few requests, and
so does not believe the application requirement will
impose a large aggregate burden across market
participants.
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Commission believes that most market
participants would incur the costs and
benefits discussed thereunder. The
Commission also believes that this
analysis applies with respect to nonenumerated bona fide hedges for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts.
c. Exemption-Related Recordkeeping
Final § 150.3(d) requires persons who
avail themselves of any of the foregoing
exemptions to maintain complete books
and records concerning all details of
each of their exemptions and any
related position, and to make such
records available to the Commission
upon request under § 150.3(e).
Several commenters recommended
that the Commission delete the passthrough swap recordkeeping
requirements in proposed § 150.3(d)(2)
based on concerns it would place all
compliance burdens on the passthrough swap counterparty offering the
swap rather than the bona fide hedging
counterparty.1560 Commenters further
expressed concerns the proposed
provision would be burdensome to the
extent it would require the pass-through
swap counterparty to maintain records
of each representation made by the bona
fide hedging counterparty on a trade-bytrade basis.1561
The Commission intended
§ 150.3(d)(2) to be an extension of
market participants’ existing obligations
to maintain regulatory records under
part 45 and § 1.31. As discussed above,
the revised ‘‘bona fide hedging
transaction or position’’ definition in
final § 150.1 requires that a pass-through
swap counterparty receive a written
representation from its bona fide
hedging swap counterparty in order for
the pass-through swap to qualify as a
bona fide hedge.1562 In light of that,
final § 150.3(d)(2) requires a person
relying on the pass-through swap
provision to maintain any records
created for purposes of demonstrating a
good faith reliance on that provision in
accordance with § 150.1.
These recordkeeping requirements
benefit market integrity by providing the
Commission with the necessary
information to monitor the use of
exemptions from speculative position
limits and help to ensure that any
person who claims any exemption
permitted by § 150.3 can demonstrate
compliance with the applicable
requirements. The Commission does not
expect these requirements to impose
significant new costs on market
participants, as these requirements are
1560 Cargill
at 6; Shell at 6.
1561 Id.
1562 See
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in line with existing Commission and
exchange-level recordkeeping
obligations.
d. Exemption Renewals
Consistent with existing §§ 1.47 and
1.48, with respect to any Commissionrecognized bona fide hedge or
Commission-granted spread exemption
pursuant to final § 150.3, the
Commission does not require a market
participant to reapply annually to the
Commission.1563 The Commission
believes that this reduces burdens on
market participants but also recognizes
that not requiring market participants to
annually reapply to the Commission
ostensibly could harm market integrity
since the Commission will not directly
receive updated information with
respect to particular bona fide hedgers
or exemption holders prior to the trader
exceeding the applicable Federal
position limits.
However, the Commission believes
that any potential harm is mitigated
since the Commission, unlike
exchanges, has access to aggregate
market data, including positions held by
individual market participants. Further,
§ 150.3 requires a market participant to
submit a new application if any material
information changes, or upon the
Commission’s request. In addition, the
Commission will receive information
about any annual renewals of such
requests made to an exchange (for
purposes of exchange-set limits) through
the monthly exchange reports required
under § 150.5(a)(4). On the other hand,
market participants benefit by not being
required to annually submit new
applications, which the Commission
believes reduces compliance costs.
e. Exemptions for Financial Distress and
Conditional Natural Gas Positions
Final § 150.3 codifies the
Commission’s existing informal practice
with respect to exemptions for financial
distress and existing industry practice
with respect to the conditional spot
month limit exemption positions in
natural gas. The same costs and benefits
described above with respect to
applications for bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions
also apply to these exemptions.
However, to the extent the Commission
currently allows exemptions related to
financial distress, the Commission has
determined that the costs and benefits
with respect to the related application
1563 As discussed below, with respect to
exchange-set limits under § 150.5 or the exchange
process for Federal position limits under § 150.9,
market participants are required to annually
reapply to exchanges.
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process already may be recognized by
market participants.
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ii. Process for Market Participants To
Apply to an Exchange for NonEnumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Recognitions for Purposes of Federal
Position Limits (Final § 150.9) and
Related Changes to Part 19 of the
Commission’s Regulations
Final § 150.9 provides a framework
whereby a market participant could
avoid the existing dual application
process described above and, instead,
file one application with an exchange to
receive a non-enumerated bona fide
hedging recognition, which as discussed
previously is not self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Under this process, a person is allowed
to exceed the Federal position limit
levels following an exchange’s review
and approval of an application for a
bona fide hedge recognition, provided
that the Commission during its review
does not notify the exchange otherwise
within a certain period of time
thereafter. Market participants who do
not elect to use the process in final
§ 150.9 for purposes of Federal position
limits are required to request relief both
directly from the Commission under
§ 150.3, as discussed above, and also
apply to the relevant exchange,
consistent with existing practices.1564
a. Final § 150.9—Establishment of
General Exchange Process
Pursuant to final § 150.9, exchanges
that elect to process these applications
are required to file new rules or rule
amendments with the Commission
under § 40.5 of the Commission’s
regulations and obtain from applicants
all information to enable the exchange
and the Commission to determine that
the facts and circumstances support a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition. Also, final § 150.9(e)(1)
requires exchanges to provide real-time
notification to the Commission of each
initial determination to recognize a nonenumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position. The
Commission believes that exchanges’
existing practices generally are
consistent with the requirements of
§ 150.9, and, therefore, exchanges will
only incur marginal costs, if any, to
modify their existing practices to
comply. Similarly, the Commission
anticipates that establishing uniform,
standardized exemption processes
across exchanges benefits market
participants by reducing compliance
1564 As noted above, the Commission anticipates
that most, if not all, market participants will use
§ 150.9, rather than § 150.3, where permitted.
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costs. On the other hand, the
Commission recognizes that exchanges
that wish to participate in the
processing of applications with the
Commission under § 150.9 are required
to expend resources to establish a
process consistent with the Final Rule.
However, to the extent exchanges have
similar procedures, such benefits and
costs may already have been realized by
market participants and exchanges.
The Commission believes that there
are significant benefits to the § 150.9
process that will be largely realized by
market participants. The Commission
has determined that the use of a single
application to process both exchange
and Federal position limits exemptions
benefits market participants and
exchanges by simplifying and
streamlining the process. For applicants
seeking recognition of a nonenumerated bona fide hedge, § 150.9
should reduce duplicative efforts,
because applicants are saved the
expense of applying in parallel to both
an exchange and the Commission for
relief from exchange-set position limits
and Federal position limits,
respectively. Because many exchanges
already possess similar application
processes with which market
participants are likely accustomed,
compliance costs should be decreased
in the form of reduced applicationproduction time by market participants
and reduced response time by
exchanges.1565
As discussed above, in connection
with the recognition of bona fide hedges
for Federal position limit purposes,
current practices set forth in existing
§§ 1.47 and 1.48 require market
participants to differentiate between (i)
enumerated non-anticipatory bona fide
hedges that are self-effectuating, and (ii)
enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges and non-enumerated bona fide
hedges for which market participants
must apply to the Commission for prior
approval. Under the Final Rule, the
Commission’s application processes no
longer distinguish among different types
of enumerated bona fide hedges (e.g.,
anticipatory versus non-anticipatory
enumerated bona fide hedges), and
therefore, do not require exchanges to
have separate processes for enumerated
anticipatory positions under § 150.9.
The Final Rule also eliminates the
requirement for bona fide hedgers to file
Form 204 or the relevant portions of
Form 304, as applicable, with respect to
1565 The Commission has previously estimated
the combined annual burden hours for submitting
applications under both §§ 1.47 and 1.48 to be 42
hours. See infra Section IV.B. (Paperwork
Reduction Act) and 85 FR 11596, 11700 (Feb. 27,
2020).
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3433
any bona fide hedge, whether
enumerated or non-enumerated.1566 The
Commission expects this to benefit
market participants by providing a more
efficient and less complex process that
is consistent with existing practices at
the exchange-level.1567
On the other hand, the Commission
recognizes that § 150.9 imposes new
costs related to non-enumerated bona
fide hedges for the additional 16
contracts that are newly subject to
Federal position limits. Under final
§ 150.9(c), market participants are now
required to submit applications,
including information to demonstrate
why a particular position qualifies as
bona fide hedge, as defined in § 150.1
and CEA section 4a(c)(2), to receive
prior approval for Federal position
limits purposes.1568 However, since the
Commission understands that
exchanges already require market
participants to submit applications and
receive prior approval under exchangeset limits for all types of bona fide
hedges, the Commission does not
believe § 150.9 imposes any additional
incremental costs on market
participants beyond those already
incurred under exchanges’ existing
processes.1569 Accordingly, the
1566 See supra Section II.H.2. (discussing changes
to part 19 eliminating Form 204 and portions of
Form 304).
1567 See infra Section IV.A.5.iii. for discussion
related to changes to part 19 regarding the provision
of information by market participants, noting that
the elimination of Form 204 by the Final Rule
reduces the burden hours estimates by 300 annual
aggregate burden hours.
1568 One commenter requested that the
Commission provide additional factors that
exchanges should consider when granting nonenumerated bona fide hedge recognitions. ISDA at
9. As discussed more fully in the preamble, the
Commission believes that the final regulations
strike a reasonable tradeoff by providing sufficient
guidance to the exchanges for their review and
determination in the context of exchange limits,
while preserving the exchanges’ discretionary
authority to determine what types of additional
information, if any, to collect. See supra Section
II.G.5. (discussing final § 150.9(c)).
1569 Under the 2020 NPRM, proposed
§ 150.9(c)(1)(ii) would have required exchanges to
request a ‘‘factual and legal’’ analysis from
applicants for non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions. 85 FR 11638. Two commenters
expressed concern that the proposed requirement
could be interpreted as requiring applications to
engage legal counsel to complete their applications,
which would result in additional costs to market
participants. See CME Group at 10 and CMC at 11.
The Commission did not intend for exchanges to
require that applicants engage legal counsel to
complete their applications for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions. Final § 150.9(c)(1)(ii),
instead of requiring a ‘‘factual and legal analysis,’’
requires an applicant to provide ‘‘an explanation of
the hedging strategy,’’ including a statement that
the position complies with the applicable
requirements of the bona fide hedge definition, and
information to demonstrate why the position
satisfies the applicable requirements. See supra
Section II.G.5. (discussing final § 150.9(c)).
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Commission believes that any costs
already may have been realized by
market participants.
Further, the Commission believes that
employing a concurrent process with
exchanges that are self-regulatory
organizations responsible for overseeing
non-enumerated bona fide hedges
executed on their platforms and that are
not self-effectuating for Federal position
limits purposes benefits market integrity
by ensuring that market participants are
appropriately relying on such bona fide
hedges and not entering into such
positions in order to attempt to
manipulate the market or evade position
limits. However, to the extent that
exchange oversight, consistent with
Commission standards and DCM core
principles, already exists, such benefits
may already be realized.
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b. Final § 150.9—Exchange Expertise,
Market Integrity, and Commission
Oversight
For non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions that require the
Commission’s prior approval, the Final
Rule provides a framework that utilizes
existing exchange resources and
expertise so that fair access and
liquidity are promoted at the same time
market manipulations, squeezes,
corners, and other conduct that would
disrupt markets are deterred and
prevented.1570 Final § 150.9 builds on
existing exchange processes, which the
Commission believes strengthens the
ability of the Commission and
exchanges to monitor markets and
trading strategies while reducing
burdens on both the exchanges, which
administer the process, and market
participants, who utilize the process.
For example, exchanges are familiar
with their market participants’
commercial needs, practices, and
trading strategies, and already evaluate
hedging strategies in connection with
setting and enforcing exchange-set
position limits.1571 Accordingly,
exchanges should be able to readily
identify bona fide hedges.
For these reasons, the Commission
has determined that allowing market
participants to apply through an
exchange under § 150.9, rather than
directly to the Commission as required
under existing § 1.47, is likely to be
1570 See CME Group at 7 (stating that the § 150.9
streamlined process would wisely leverage
exchanges’ long history of reviewing hedging
approaches and applying those approaches to
specific facts and circumstances, and would thereby
advance the statutory goal of allowing commercial
parties to ‘‘hedge their legitimate anticipated
business needs’’ without imposing any undue
burden in doing so).
1571 For a discussion on the history of
exemptions, see 78 FR at 75703–75706.
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more efficient than if the Commission
itself initially had to review and
approve all applications. The
Commission considers the increased
efficiency in processing applications
under § 150.9 as a benefit to bona fide
hedgers and liquidity providers. By
having the availability of the exchange’s
analysis and view of the markets, the
Commission is better informed in its
review of the market participant and its
application, which in turn may further
benefit market participants in the form
of administrative efficiency and
regulatory consistency. However, the
Commission recognizes additional costs
for exchanges required to create and
submit real-time notices under final
§ 150.9(e). In particular, commenters
voiced concerns that the Commission’s
review of each non-enumerated bona
fide hedge application could impose
significant burdens on exchanges,
market participants, and the
Commission.1572 To the extent
exchanges already provide similar
notice to the Commission or to market
participants, or otherwise are required
to notify the Commission under certain
circumstances, such benefits and costs
already may have been realized. In
addition, the Commission expects that,
due to the expanded list of enumerated
hedges and other exemptions available
to market participants as well as the
higher Federal limits in the Final Rule,
there will be a manageable amount of
non-enumerated bona fide hedges that
exchanges and the Commission will
review through the new streamlined
process. The Commission also reiterates
that § 150.9 is an optional process that
exchanges and market participants may
elect to use in lieu of utilizing the
traditional process of requesting nonenumerated bona fide hedges directly
from the Commission under § 150.3.
On the other hand, to the extent
exchanges become more involved with
respect to review and oversight of
market participants’ bona fide hedges
and spread exemptions, exchanges
could incur additional costs. However,
as noted, the Commission believes most
of the costs have been realized by
1572 IFUS at 52 (stating that the ‘‘exemption-byexemption review of exchange decisions is a novel
and significant departure from the longstanding
process for the implementation of the position
limits regime, imposes substantial burdens on the
Commission and the exchanges, and decreases
regulatory certainty for market participants
regarding the status of an exemption’’). See also ICE
at 9 (questioning ‘‘whether it is necessary for the
Commission to routinely review each nonenumerated determination by the exchange’’ and
asserting that the § 150.9 10-day review process
‘‘imposes unnecessary burdens and delays on
market participants’’).
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exchanges under current market
practice.
At the same time, the Commission
also recognizes that this aspect of the
Final Rule could hypothetically harm
market integrity. Absent other
provisions, since exchanges profit from
increased activity, an exchange could
hypothetically seek a competitive
advantage by offering excessively
permissive exemptions, which could
allow certain market participants to
utilize non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions to engage in excessive
speculation or to manipulate market
prices. If an exchange engaged in such
activity, other market participants
would likely face greater costs through
increased transaction fees, including
forgoing trading opportunities resulting
from market prices moving against
market participants and/or preventing
the market participant from executing at
its desired prices, which may also
further lead to inefficient hedging.
However, the Commission believes
that these hypothetical costs are
unfounded since under final § 150.9 the
Commission reviews the applications
submitted by market participants for
bona fide hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions for Federal position limits.
The Commission emphasizes that
§ 150.9 is not providing exchanges with
an ability to recognize a bona fide hedge
or grant an exemption for Federal
position limit purposes in lieu of a
Commission review.1573 Rather,
§ 150.9(e) and (f) require an exchange to
provide the Commission with notice of
the disposition of any application for
purposes of exchange limits
concurrently with the notice the
exchange provides to the applicant, and
the Commission will have 10 business
days to make its determination for
Federal position limits purposes
(although, in connection with ‘‘sudden
or unforeseen increases’’ in bona fide
hedging needs, as discussed in
connection with final § 150.3, § 150.9
requires the Commission to make its
determination within two business
days). Each non-enumerated bona fide
hedge approved by an exchange for
purposes of its own limits is separately
and independently reviewed by the
Commission for purposes of Federal
position limits. Finally, under DCM
Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle
6, exchanges are accountable for
administering position limits in a
manner that reduces the potential threat
of market manipulation or congestion.
The Commission believes that these
1573 See supra Section II.G. (discussing
Commission determination of non-enumerated bona
fide hedge applications submitted under § 150.9).
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requirements, working in concert,
provide sufficient protection against any
potential harm to market integrity.
On the other hand, the Commission
also recognizes that there could be
potential costs to bona fide hedgers if,
under the Final Rule, they wait up to 10
business days for the Commission to
complete its review after the exchange’s
initial review—especially compared to
the status quo for the 16 commodities
that are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final
Rule and currently are not required to
receive the Commission’s prior
approval. As a result, the Commission
recognizes that a market participant
could incur costs by waiting during the
10 business day period, or be required
to enter into a less efficient hedge,
which would harm liquidity.1574
However, the Commission believes this
concern is mitigated since, under final
§ 150.9(e)(3), a market participant in
receipt of a notice of approval from the
relevant exchange may elect, at its own
risk, to exceed Federal position limits
during the Commission’s 10-day review
period.1575
Further, final § 150.9(c)(2)(i), similar
to final § 150.3, permits a market
participant that demonstrates a ‘‘sudden
or unforeseen’’ increase in its bona fide
hedging needs to enter into a bona fide
hedge without first obtaining the
Commission’s prior approval, as long as
the market participant submits a
retroactive application to the
Commission within five business days
of exceeding the applicable position
limit.1576 In turn, the Commission only
has two business days (as opposed to
the default 10 business days) to
complete its review for Federal
purposes. The Commission believes this
retroactive application exemption
benefits bona fide hedgers compared to
existing § 1.47, which requires
Commission prior approval, since
hedgers that qualify to exercise the
retroactive exemption are also likely
facing more acute hedging needs—with
potentially commensurate costs if
required to wait. Absent the retroactive
application exemption, market
participants would be penalized and
prevented from assuming appropriate
hedges even though their hedging need
arises from circumstances beyond their
control. This provision also leverages,
for Federal position limit purposes,
existing exchange practices for granting
1574 See ICE at 9 (requesting that the Commission
permit a ‘‘market participant to engage in hedging
up to the requested exemption limit while waiting
for approval’’).
1575 See supra Sections II.G.7. (discussing when a
person may exceed Federal position limits).
1576 Id.
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retroactive exemptions from exchangeset limits.
On the other hand, the retroactive
application exemption could harm
market liquidity and bona fide hedgers
since the Commission is able to require
a market participant to exit its position
if the exchange or the Commission does
not approve of the retroactive request.
Such uncertainty could cause market
participants to either enter into smaller
bona fide hedge positions than it
otherwise would, or could cause the
bona fide hedger to delay entering into
its hedge, in either case potentially
causing bona fide hedgers to incur
increased hedging costs. However, the
Commission believes this concern is
partially mitigated since § 150.9 requires
the purported bona fide hedger to exit
its position in a ‘‘commercially
reasonable time,’’ which the
Commission believes should partially
mitigate any costs incurred by the
market participant compared to either
an alternative that would require the
bona fide hedger to exit its position
immediately, or the status quo where
the market participant is unable to enter
into a hedge at all without Commission
approval.
As discussed in the preamble, the
Commission received and considered
two comments recommending a broader
retroactive application exemption: (1)
CME recommended that the
Commission allow retroactive
applications regardless of the
circumstances and impose a position
limits violation on an applicant in the
event the exchange denies its
application; and (2) ICE recommended
that the Commission permit retroactive
exemptions for other types of
exemptions, as well as for position limit
overages that occur as a result of
operational or incidental issues where
the applicant did not intend to evade
position limits.1577 An expansion of this
exception beyond bona fide hedge needs
that arise due to sudden or unforeseen
circumstances could disincentivize
market participants from properly
monitoring their hedging activities and
filing applications in a timely manner.
Because the Final Rule provides broad
flexibility to market participants in the
form of various exemptions, among
other enhancements to the Federal
position limits framework for bona fide
hedges and other exemptions, the
Commission determined not to expand
the retroactive application provision in
§ 150.9(c)(2)(ii).1578
1577 See supra Section II.G.5.iii.b. (citing CME
Group at 9–10 and ICE at 10).
1578 See supra Section II.G.5.ii. (discussing final
§ 150.9(c)(2)(i)).
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While existing § 1.47 does not require
market participants to annually reapply
for certain bona fide hedges, final
§ 150.9(c)(3) requires market
participants to reapply at least annually
with exchanges to maintain previouslyapproved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition for purposes of
Federal position limits. Several
commenters requested the Commission
to clarify that an applicant is subject to
the Commission’s 10/2-day review
process in § 150.9(e) only for initial
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedges, and is not subject to such
review for annual renewal applications
unless the facts and circumstances
materially change from those presented
in the initial application. As discussed
in the preamble, market participants are
only subject to the Commission’s 10/2day review process for their initial
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedges unless there are material
changes to their initial application.
The Commission recognizes that
requiring market participants to reapply
annually could impose additional costs
on those that are not currently required
to do so. However, the Commission
believes that this is consistent with
industry practice with respect to
exchange-set limits and that market
participants are familiar with
exchanges’ exemption processes, which
should reduce related costs.1579 Further,
the Commission believes that market
integrity is strengthened by ensuring
that exchanges receive updated trader
information that may be relevant to the
exchange’s oversight.1580 However, to
the extent any of these benefits and
costs reflects current market practice,
they already may have been realized by
exchanges and market participants.
The Commission anticipates
additional costs for exchanges required
to create and submit certain
notifications and monthly reports. Final
§ 150.9(e)(1) requires exchanges to
provide real-time notification to the
Commission of each initial
determination to recognize a bona fide
hedging transaction or position.1581
1579 See infra Section IV.A.6. (discussing final
§ 150.5).
1580 In contrast, the Commission, unlike
exchanges, has access to aggregate market data,
including positions held by individual market
participants, and so the Commission has
determined that requiring market participants to
apply annually under final § 150.3, absent any
changes to their application, does not benefit
market integrity to the same extent.
1581 In addition to submitting a copy of any
exchange-approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application to the Commission under
§ 150.9(e), an exchange may, on a voluntary basis,
send the Commission an advance courtesy copy of
the non-enumerated bona fide hedge application
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Final § 150.5(a)(4) requires exchanges to
provide monthly reports with necessary
information in the form and manner
required by the Commission. The
exchange-to-Commission monthly
report for contracts subject to Federal
speculative position limits in final
§ 150.5(a)(4) further details the
exchange’s disposition of a market
participant’s application for recognition
of a bona fide hedge position or spread
exemption as well as the related
position(s) in the underlying cash
markets and swaps markets.1582 The
Commission believes that such reports
provide greater transparency by
facilitating the tracking of these
positions by the Commission and
further assist the Commission in
ensuring that a market participant’s
activities conform to the exchange’s
rules and to the CEA. The combination
of the ‘‘real-time’’ exchange notification
and exchanges’ provision of monthly
reports to the Commission under final
§§ 150.9(e)(1) and 150.5(a)(4),
respectively, provides the Commission
with enhanced surveillance tools on
both a ‘‘real-time’’ and a monthly basis
to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the Final Rule.
However, to the extent exchanges
already provide similar notice to the
Commission, or otherwise are required
to notify the Commission under certain
circumstances, such benefits and costs
already may have been realized.
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c. Final § 150.9(d)—Recordkeeping
Final § 150.9(d) requires exchanges to
maintain complete books and records of
all activities relating to the processing
and disposition of any applications,
including applicants’ submission
materials,1583 and determination
when the exchange first receives it from the
applicant. For purposes of the cost-benefit
considerations, we expect this to be a de minimis
burden on an exchange that elects to provide the
courtesy copy to the Commission. In addition, we
expect that providing the courtesy copy could
facilitate a more rapid Commission evaluation of
applications submitted under § 150.9, help facilitate
additional regulatory certainty for market
participants, and aid the Commission in its review
of applications processed under § 150.9.
1582 In response to concerns from ICE that
proposed § 150.5(a)(4) may be overly burdensome
and redundant, the Commission clarified that the
monthly report is required to capture only positions
that are subject to Federal position limits (as
opposed to other exchange-set non-enumerated
exemptions), exchanges have discretion as to the
best timing for submitting their reports so long as
they are submitted on a monthly basis, and
exchanges need not include factual and legal
analysis in the monthly report. See supra Section
II.D.3.iv. (discussing § 150.5(a)(4)).
1583 One commenter requested that § 150.9 allow
exchanges to maintain records of applicants’
positions on an aggregate basis, as opposed to
requiring an exchange to match applicants’ bona
fide hedge positions to their underlying cash
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documents.1584 The Commission
believes that this benefits market
integrity and Commission oversight by
ensuring that pertinent records are
readily accessible, as needed by the
Commission. However, the Commission
acknowledges that such requirements
impose costs on exchanges.
Nonetheless, to the extent that
exchanges are already required to
maintain similar records, such costs and
benefits already may be realized.1585
d. Final § 150.9(f)—Commission
Revocation of Previously Approved
Applications
The Commission acknowledges that
there may be costs to market
participants if the Commission revokes
a previously-approved non-enumerated
hedge recognition for Federal purposes
under final § 150.9(f). Specifically,
market participants could incur costs to
unwind trades or reduce positions if the
Commission required the market
participant to do so under final
§ 150.9(f)(2).
However, the potential cost to market
participants is mitigated under final
§ 150.9(f) since the Commission
provides a commercially reasonable
time for a person to come back into
compliance with the Federal position
limits, which the Commission believes
should mitigate transaction costs to exit
the position and allow a market
participant the opportunity to
potentially execute other hedging
strategies.
e. Final § 150.9—Commodity Indexes
and Risk Management Exemptions
Final § 150.9(b) prohibits exchanges
from recognizing as a bona fide hedge
positions on a one-to-one basis. NGSA at 9. In the
preamble, the Commission noted that final
§ 150.9(d) does not prescribe the manner in which
exchanges record application materials and
information—it simply requires exchanges to keep
a record of application materials and information
collected. See supra Section II.G.6.iii.
1584 Moreover, consistent with existing § 1.31, the
Commission expects that these records will be
readily accessible until the termination, maturity, or
expiration date of the bona fide hedge recognition
or exempt spread position and during the first two
years of the subsequent five-year retention period.
1585 The Commission believes that exchanges that
process applications for recognition of bona fide
hedging transactions or positions and/or spread
exemptions currently maintain records of such
applications as required pursuant to other existing
Commission regulations, including existing § 1.31.
The Commission, however, also believes that final
§ 150.9(d) may impose additional recordkeeping
obligations on such exchanges. The Commission
estimates that each exchange electing to administer
the processes will likely spend five (5) hours
annually to comply with the recordkeeping
requirement of final § 150.9(d) and thus will incur
minimal costs compared to the status quo. See
generally Section IV.B. (discussing the
Commission’s PRA determinations).
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any positions that include commodity
index contracts and one or more
referenced contracts, including
exemptions known as risk management
exemptions. The Commission
recognizes that this prohibition could
alter trading strategies that currently use
commodity index contracts as part of an
entity’s risk management program.
Although there likely is a cost to change
risk management strategies for entities
that currently rely on a bona fide hedge
recognition for positions in commodity
index contracts, as discussed above, the
Commission believes that such financial
products are not substitutes for
positions in a physical market and
therefore do not satisfy the statutory
requirement for a bona fide hedge under
section 4a(c)(2) of the Act.1586 In
addition, the Commission further posits
that this cost may be reduced or
mitigated by the proposed increase in
Federal position limit levels set forth in
final § 150.2, or by the implementation
of the pass-through swap provision of
the bona fide hedge definition in final
§ 150.1.1587
iii. Related Changes to Part 19 of the
Commission’s Regulations Regarding
the Provision of Information by Market
Participants
Under existing regulations, the
Commission relies on Form 204 1588 and
Form 304,1589 known collectively as the
‘‘series ‘04’’ reports, to monitor for
compliance with Federal position
limits. Prior to the amendments to part
19 in the Final Rule, market participants
that held bona fide hedging positions in
excess of Federal position limits for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts had to
justify such overages by filing the
applicable report (Form 304 for cotton
and Form 204 for the other eight legacy
commodities) each month.1590 The
1586 See supra Section III.C.4. (discussing
commodity indices); see supra Section IV.A.4.ii.a(1)
(discussing elimination of the risk management
exemption).
1587 See supra Section IV.A.4.b.i(1) (discussing
the pass-through swap exemption).
1588 CFTC Form 204: Statement of Cash Positions
in Grains, Soybeans, Soybean Oil, and Soybean
Meal, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/
default/files/idc/groups/public/@forms/documents/
file/cftcform204.pdf (existing Form 204).
1589 CFTC Form 304: Statement of Cash Positions
in Cotton, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission website, available at https://
www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@forms/
documents/file/cftcform304.pdf (existing Form
204). Parts I and II of Form 304 address fixed-price
cash positions used to justify cotton positions in
excess of Federal position limits. As described
below, Part III of Form 304 addresses unfixed price
cotton ‘‘on-call’’ information, which is not used to
justify cotton positions in excess of limits, but
rather to allow the Commission to prepare its
weekly cotton on-call report.
1590 17 CFR 19.01.
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Commission has used these reports to
determine whether a trader had
sufficient cash positions to justify
purported bona fide hedges positions
using futures and options on futures
positions above the applicable Federal
position limits.
As discussed above, with respect to
bona fide hedging positions, the
Commission is adopting a streamlined
approach, under final §§ 150.5 and
150.9, to cash-market reporting that
reduces duplication between the
Commission and the exchanges.
Generally, the Commission is adopting
amendments to part 19 and related
provisions in part 15 that: (i) Eliminate
Form 204; and (ii) amend the Form 304,
in each case to remove any cash-market
reporting requirements. Under the Final
Rule, the Commission instead relies on
cash-market reporting submitted
directly to the exchanges, pursuant to
final §§ 150.5 and 150.9,1591 or requests
cash-market information through a
special call.1592
The cash-market and swap-market
reporting elements of §§ 150.5 and 150.9
discussed above are largely consistent
with current market practices with
respect to exchange-set limits and thus
should not result in any new costs.1593
The Final Rule’s elimination of Form
204 and the cash-market reporting
segments of the Form 304 eliminate the
reporting burden and associated
costs.1594 Market participants should
realize significant benefits by being able
to submit cash-market reporting to one
entity—the exchanges—instead of
having to comply with duplicative
reporting requirements between the
Commission and applicable exchange,
or implement new Commission
processes for reporting cash-market data
for market participants who will be
newly subject to position limits.1595
1591 See supra Section II.G.ii.3. (discussing final
§ 150.9). As discussed above, leveraging existing
exchange application processes should avoid
duplicative Commission and exchange procedures
and increase the speed by which position limit
exemption applications are addressed. For purposes
of Federal position limits, the cash-market reporting
regime discussed in this section of the release only
pertains to bona fide hedges, not to spread
exemptions, because the Commission has not
traditionally relied on cash-market information
when reviewing requests for spread exemptions.
1592 See final § 19.00(b).
1593 See, e.g., CME Rule 559 and ICE Rule 6.29.
1594 Based on revised estimates of the current
collections of information under existing part 19,
the Commission estimates that the Final Rule
reduces the collections of information in part 19 by
600 reports and by 300 annual aggregate burden
hours since the Final Rule eliminates Form 204. See
infra Section IV.B. (Paperwork Reduction Act) and
85 FR 11596, 11700 (Feb. 27, 2020).
1595 The Commission has noted that certain
commodity markets are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time. In addition, the existing
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Further, market participants are
generally already familiar with
exchange processes for reporting and
recognizing bona fide hedging
exemptions, which is an added benefit,
especially for market participants that
are newly subject to Federal position
limits.
Further, these changes do not impact
the Commission’s existing provisions
for gathering information through
special calls relating to positions
exceeding limits and/or to reportable
positions. Accordingly, as discussed
above, the Commission requires that all
persons exceeding the Federal position
limits set forth in final § 150.2, as well
as all persons holding or controlling
reportable positions pursuant to existing
§ 15.00(p)(1), must file any pertinent
information as instructed in a special
call.1596 The Commission acknowledges
that, on its face, not obtaining the cashmarket position information in the form
of a series ‘04 report could
hypothetically result in some increase
in speculation; however, as set out
above, this risk is mitigated by the
Commission’s special call authority and
by the requirements that the exchanges
receive this information under §§ 150.5
and 150.9, as applicable. The
Commission in turn would be able to
receive this information from the
applicable exchange. Final § 19.00(a)(3)
is similar to existing § 19.00(a)(3), but
requires any such person to file the
information as instructed in the special
call, rather than to file a series ‘04
report.1597 The Commission believes
that relying on its special call authority
is less burdensome for market
participants than the existing Forms 204
and 304 reporting costs, as special calls
are discretionary requests for
information whereas the series ‘04
reporting requirements are a monthly,
recurring reporting burden for market
participants. While collecting this data
monthly would permit the Commission
to analyze the bona fide hedges in a
time series, which may be helpful in
understanding trends in hedging
techniques, the Commission will have
access to this same data from the
exchanges and could do the same
analysis if required.
The Commission received one
comment addressing the purported
burdens that would accompany
elimination of the cash-market reporting
forms. Better Markets, for example,
argued that eliminating these series ‘04
Form 204 would be inadequate for reporting of
cash-market positions relating to certain energy
contracts that are subject to Federal position limits
for the first time under the Final Rule.
1596 See final § 19.00(b).
1597 17 CFR 19.00(a)(3).
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3437
forms would impose additional
reporting burdens on market
participants by requiring participants to
report cash-market information to
multiple exchanges, and suggested that
the Commission should instead ‘‘ensure
that all cash positions reporting is
automated’’ and ‘‘amenable to
aggregation’’ in order to provide such
information to the exchanges.1598 The
Commission disagrees with Better
Markets’ concerns about increased
reporting burdens and criticism of the
existing reporting infrastructure for the
reasons discussed above.1599 However,
as noted above, eliminating the ‘04
forms will reduce burdens on market
participants.1600
Separately, ACSA argued for the
elimination of Form 304 in its
entirety.1601 ACSA asserted that Part III
of Form 304, which is used to prepare
the Commission’s cotton on-call report,
causes competitive harm to the U.S.
cotton industry because the report
divulges one market participant’s
proprietary information to another
market participant and, according to
ACSA, foreign mills believe that the
report imposes risks and costs and are
therefore more likely to purchase cotton
from outside of the United States in
order to avoid completing Part III of
Form 304.1602
As discussed in detail above at
Section II.H.5.iv, the Commission
believes that the cotton on-call report
contributes to efficient price
discovery,1603 and that continued
publication of the cotton on-call report
will not change the existing dynamics of
the cotton market.
6. Exchange-Set Position Limits (Final
§ 150.5)
i. Introduction
Existing § 150.5 addresses exchangeset position limits on contracts not
1598 Better
Markets at 59–60.
supra Section H.2.iii.–iv. (discussing
Better Markets’ comments and the Commission’s
responses thereto).
1600 Id.
1601 ACSA at 9–11.
1602 See id.; see also NCTO at 1–2 (arguing against
publication of the cotton-on-call report and that
textile mills are particularly harmed when
speculators trade against the cash-market positions
disclosed in the cotton on-call report because textile
mills purchase the majority of their cotton on call).
1603 See, e.g., Glencore at 2. One commenter
stated that it is difficult to see the benefit in limiting
transparency in the cotton market and that cotton
on-call report is useful and necessary because it
allows market participants to identify market
composition. Dunavant at 1. Similarly, another
commenter stated that discontinuation of the cotton
on-call report would widen the informational
divide between large and small market participants
while providing no benefits to the public or price
discovery. Gerald Marshall at 3.
1599 See
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subject to Federal position limits under
existing § 150.2, and sets forth different
standards for DCMs to apply in setting
limit levels depending on whether the
DCM is establishing limit levels: (1) On
an initial or subsequent basis; (2) for
cash-settled or physically-settled
contracts; and (3) during or outside the
spot month.
In contrast, for physical commodity
derivatives, final § 150.5(a) and (b): (1)
Expands existing § 150.5’s framework to
also cover contracts subject to Federal
position limits under final § 150.2; (2)
simplifies the existing standards that
DCMs apply when establishing
exchange-set position limits; and (3)
provides non-exclusive acceptable
practices for compliance with those
standards.1604 Additionally, final
§ 150.5(d) requires DCMs to adopt
aggregation rules that conform to
existing § 150.4.1605
As a general matter, one factor (in
addition to more specific factors
discussed throughout this Final Rule’s
cost-benefit considerations) affecting the
costs and benefits of the Federal
position limits established by this Final
Rule is the fact that exchanges, for many
years, have had in place spot month
position limits for all of the core
referenced contracts and non-spot
month limits for all of the nine legacy
agricultural contracts.1606 Under final
§ 150.5(a) and (b), exchanges will be
required to adopt exchange-set position
limits both (i) for contracts subject to
Federal position limits and (ii) during
the spot month for physical commodity
contracts not subject to Federal position
limits. Exchanges also will be required
to adopt position limits or position
accountability outside the spot month
for those physical commodity contracts
not subject to non-spot month Federal
position limits, although the specifics
may change with evolving market
1604 See 17 CFR 150.2. Existing § 150.5 addresses
only contracts not subject to Federal position limits
under existing § 150.2 (aside from certain major
foreign currency contracts). To avoid confusion
created by the parallel Federal and exchange-set
position limit frameworks, the Commission clarifies
that final § 150.5 deals solely with exchange-set
position limits and exemptions therefrom, whereas
final § 150.9 deals solely with the process for
purposes of Federal position limits.
1605 See 17 CFR 150.4.
1606 See Section II.D, supra, CME Group, Position
Limits, https://www.cmegroup.com/marketregulation/position-limits.html; IFUS, Market
Resources, Position Limits & Reporting, https://
www.theice.com/futures-us/market-resources; CEA
section 5(d)(5)(A) (requiring position limits or
accountability); existing § 150.5; final § 150.5(a).
This is generally true with the exception of ICE
Sugar No. 16, which is only subject to exchange-set
single month and all-months-combined position
limits. However, the single month position limit
effectively acts as the spot month position limits for
this contract.
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conditions and regulatory
requirements.1607 Exchange-set position
limits, broadly speaking, have much the
same effect as Federal position limits
since both restrict the size of speculative
positions market participants may
hold.1608 Moreover, there is significant
interaction between Federal position
limits and exchange-set position limits.
In particular, CEA section 5(d)(5)(B)
provides that, for contracts where the
Commission has established a position
limit, exchange-set position limits must
be set at a level no higher than the
Federal limit.1609 In addition, where
both the Commission and an exchange
have position limits in place for a
contract, final § 150.5(a)(2) puts
constraints on exemptions from the
exchange-set limit that are tied to the
Commission’s position limits in ways
described in detail in Section II.D.3,
above. As a result, the costs and benefits
considered by the Commission, to a
considerable extent, are jointly
attributable to Federal and exchange-set
position limits. The Commission does
not have information that would permit
a quantitative evaluation of the extent to
which this is true. Qualitatively, where
position limits overlap, a greater
attribution of costs and benefits to the
Federal limits appears appropriate to
the extent that Federal limits trigger
exchange-set limits pursuant to CEA
section 5(d)(5)(B). However, this is less
true if an exchange elects to impose
position limits that are more stringent
than the Federal limits for particular
contracts.1610
Despite the overlap in the effects of
Federal and exchange-set position
limits, there are a number of distinctive
features of Federal position limits. Most
importantly, as noted above, for
contracts where Federal position limits
are established, they establish a ceiling
on positions that can be held, both as a
matter of law under CEA section
5(d)(5)(B) and as a matter of practicality
since market participants must comply
with Federal limits no matter what the
1607 See supra Section II.D; see also CEA section
5(d)(5); final § 150.5(a).
1608 See ICE Futures U.S. at 3 (‘‘There is no
apparent benefit provided by adding a Federal
position limit and guidance’’ to ICE’s procedures for
position limits and exemptions to such limits.)
1609 See also final § 150.5(a)(1).
1610 For example, exchanges sometimes reduce
position limit levels in response to particular
market conditions. See, e.g., ICE Futures U.S. at 3,
n.3 (describing a reduction in spot month position
limit for cocoa in March of 2020 in response to
potential impact of disruptions to normal business
conditions on ability of market participants to
submit cocoa for grading). In addition, an exchange
could routinely set a lower position limit based on
its judgment of what is necessary to prevent
manipulation or other problems or based on the
preferences of important participants in its market.
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level of exchange-set limits. In addition,
while exchanges can share information
to some extent, the Commission
regulates trading on all exchanges and
therefore is generally in a position to
better monitor and enforce compliance
with position limits across more than
one exchange, for example in
connection with positions in a core
referenced futures contract in one
exchange and a linked cash-settled lookalike referenced contract on another
exchange.
There are other differences as well.
Even where the Commission and an
exchange set the same numerical
position limit for a contract, final
§ 150.5(a)(2) allows for the possibility
that there may be some differences in
the exemptions allowed.1611 And
Federal position limits established
pursuant to paragraph CEA section
4a(a)(2) are subject to a statutory
requirement to achieve, to the maximum
extent practicable, the multiple policy
objectives set forth in subparagraph
4a(a)(3)(B) of the CEA. By contrast,
exchanges have a narrower statutory
mandate to adopt position limits or
position accountability to ‘‘reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation
or congestion.’’ 1612 Finally, Federal
position limits create compliance costs
beyond those attributable to exchangeset position limits since market
participants will need to establish
systems to ensure compliance with
Federal requirements. However, some
compliance costs, for example keeping
track of position levels, may be common
to both forms of position limits.1613
Exchange-set position limits for
contracts and commodities not subject
to Federal position limits also affect the
costs and benefits of Federal position
limits, and, in particular, of the
Commission’s finding that position
limits are necessary only for the 25
CRFCs and contracts linked to them.1614
1611 See
supra Section II.D.
section 5(d)(5)(A), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5)(A).
However, the statutory policy objectives for Federal
position limits may indirectly affect exchange-set
limits where Federal limits set a ceiling for
exchange-set limits pursuant to CEA section
5(d)(5)(B), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5)(B).
1613 See supra Section III.B.2.c.ii; see also COPE
at 3 (rule does not require market participants to
create recordkeeping system to track data solely for
purpose of filing forms with the Commission
although some additions to existing tracking effort
will be required).
1614 For information on exchange-set position
limits and position accountability for contracts and
commodities not subject to Federal position limits,
see, e.g., CME Group, Position Limits, https://
www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/positionlimits.html; IFUS, Market Resources, Position
Limits & Reporting, https://www.theice.com/
futures-us/market-resources; CEA section 5(d)(5)(A)
(requiring position limits or accountability);
existing § 150.5; final § 150.5(b).
1612 CEA
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The Commission also has concluded
that the existence of exchange-set limits
and position accountability (discussed
further below) mitigates the effects of
not establishing Federal position limits
for other commodity derivatives
contracts.1615
ii. Physical Commodity Derivative
Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits Under the Final Rule (Final
§ 150.5(a))
a. Exchange-Set Position Limits and
Related Exemption Process
For contracts subject to Federal
position limits under the Final Rule,
final § 150.5(a)(1) requires DCMs to
establish exchange-set limits no higher
than the level set by the Commission.
This is not a new requirement, and
merely restates the applicable
requirement in DCM Core Principle
5.1616
Final § 150.5(a)(2) authorizes DCMs to
grant exemptions from such limits and
is generally consistent with current
industry practice. The Commission has
determined that codifying such practice
establishes important, minimum
standards needed for DCMs to
administer—and the Commission to
oversee—an effective and efficient
program for granting exemptions to
exchange-set limits in a manner that
does not undermine the Federal
position limits framework.1617
In particular, § 150.5(a)(2) protects
market integrity and prevents exchangegranted exemptions from undermining
the Federal position limits framework
by requiring DCMs to either conform
their exemptions to the type the
Commission would grant under final
§§ 150.3 or 150.9, or to cap the
exemption at the applicable Federal
position limit level and to assess
whether an exemption request would
result in a position that is ‘‘not in accord
1615 See
infra Section IV.A.6.
Commission regulation § 38.300
(restating DCMs’ statutory obligations under the
CEA 5(d)(5), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5)). Accordingly, the
Commission will not discuss any costs or benefits
related to this proposed change since it merely
reflects an existing regulatory and statutory
obligation.
1617 This standard is substantively consistent with
current market practice. See, e.g., CME Rule 559
(providing that CME will consider, among other
things, the ‘‘applicant’s business needs and
financial status, as well as whether the positions
can be established and liquidated in an orderly
manner . . .’’) and ICE Rule 6.29 (requiring a
statement that the applicant’s ‘‘positions will be
initiated and liquidated in an orderly manner . . .’’).
This standard is also substantively similar to
existing § 150.5’s standard and is not intended to
be materially different. See existing § 150.5(d)(1) (an
exemption may be limited if it would not be ‘‘in
accord with sound commercial practices or exceed
an amount which may be established and
liquidated in orderly fashion.’’) 17 CFR 150.5(d)(1).
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1616 See
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with sound commercial practices’’ or
would ‘‘exceed an amount that may be
established or liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market.’’
Absent other factors, this element of
the Final Rule could potentially
increase compliance costs for traders
since each DCM could establish
different exemption-related rules and
practices. However, to the extent that
rules and procedures currently differ
across exchanges, any compliancerelated costs and benefits for traders
may already be realized. Similarly,
absent other provisions, a DCM could
hypothetically seek a competitive
advantage by offering excessively
permissive exemptions, which could
allow certain market participants to
utilize exemptions in establishing
sufficiently large positions to engage in
excessive speculation and to manipulate
market prices. However, final
§ 150.5(a)(2) mitigates these risks by
requiring that exemptions that do not
conform to the types the Commission
may grant under final § 150.3 cannot
exceed final § 150.2’s applicable Federal
position limit unless the Commission
has first approved such exemption.
Moreover, before a DCM could permit a
new exemption category, final § 150.5(e)
requires a DCM to submit rules to the
Commission allowing for such
exemptions, allowing the Commission
to ensure that the proposed exemption
type would be consistent with
applicable requirements, including with
the requirement that any resulting
positions would be ‘‘in accord with
sound commercial practices’’ and may
be ‘‘established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion.’’
Final § 150.5(a)(2) additionally
requires traders to re-apply to the
exchange at least annually for the
exchange-level exemption. The
Commission recognizes that requiring
traders to re-apply annually could
impose additional costs on traders that
are not currently required to do so.
However, the Commission believes this
is industry practice among existing
market participants, who are likely
already familiar with DCMs’ exemption
processes.1618 This familiarity should
reduce related costs, and the Final Rule
should strengthen market integrity by
ensuring that DCMs receive updated
1618 As noted above, the Commission believes this
requirement is consistent with current market
practice. See, e.g., CME Rule 559 and ICE Rule 6.29.
While ICE Rule 6.29 merely requires a trader to
‘‘submit to [ICE Exchange] a written request’’
without specifying how often a trader must reapply,
the Commission understands from informal
discussions between Commission staff and ICE that
traders must generally submit annual updates.
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3439
information related to a particular
exemption.
The Commission received various
comments pertaining to § 150.5(a)(2).
CMC requested that the Commission
clarify that each exchange has discretion
to determine what information is
required of applicants when applying
for a spread exemption from exchangeset limits.1619 As noted in the 2020
NRPM, exchanges have discretion to
determine what information is required
of applicants applying for a spread
exemption, or any other exemption from
exchange-set limits, except for instances
where the exchange is processing a nonenumerated bona fide hedge
applications in accordance with the
applications requirements of § 150.9.1620
This flexibility permits exchanges to
further mitigate costs and/or burdens
associated with the exemption process
by adopting protocols that leverage
existing processes with which their
participants are already familiar.
CMC also requested that the
Commission clarify that an exchange is
not responsible for monitoring the use
of spread positions for purposes of
Federal position limits.1621 Exchanges
are required to administer and monitor
their position limits and any
exemptions therefrom in accordance
with DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF
Core Principle 6, as applicable.1622 For
an inter-market spread exemption where
part of the spread position is executed
on another exchange or over the
counter, exchanges are encouraged to
request information from the spread
exemption applicant about the entire
composition of the spread position.1623
Even though an exchange is not
responsible for monitoring a trader’s
position on other exchanges, it is
beneficial to the exchange to obtain this
information so it is best informed about
whether to grant the exemption. The
Commission notes while an exchange
may incur costs through requesting
information from (or providing
information to) another exchange, these
costs already may have been realized by
exchanges to the extent they reflect
existing market practice. Similarly, such
information sharing benefits market
integrity, but such benefits likewise
already may have been realized.
Final § 150.5(a)(4) requires a DCM to
provide the Commission with certain
monthly reports regarding the
disposition of any exemption
1619 CMC
at 7.
FR 11644 (explaining that exchanges have
flexibility to establish the application process as
they see fit).
1621 CMC at 7.
1622 See supra Section II.D.3.ii.c.
1623 See id.
1620 85
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application, including the recognition of
any position as a bona fide hedge, the
exemption of any spread transaction or
other position, the revocation or
modification or previously granted
recognitions or exemptions, or the
rejection of any application, as well as
certain related information similar to
the information that applicants must
provide the Commission under final
§ 150.3 or an exchange under final
§ 150.9, including underlying cashmarket and swap-market information
related to bona fide hedge positions.
The Commission generally recognizes
that this monthly reporting requirement
could impose additional costs on
exchanges, although the Commission
also has determined that this
requirement would assist with the
Commission’s oversight functions and
therefore benefit market integrity. The
Commission discusses this proposed
requirement in greater detail in its
discussion of final § 150.9.1624
Further, while existing § 150.5(d) does
not explicitly address whether traders
should request an exemption prior to
taking on its position, final § 150.5(a)(2),
in contrast, explicitly authorizes (but
does not require) DCMs to permit
traders to file a retroactive exemption
request due to ‘‘demonstrated sudden or
unforeseen increases in its bona fide
hedging needs,’’ but only within five
business days after the trade and as long
as the trader provides a supporting
explanation.1625 As noted above, these
provisions are largely consistent with
existing market practice, and to this
extent, the benefits and costs already
may have been realized by DCMs and
market participants.
b. Pre-Existing Positions
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Final § 150.5(a)(3) requires DCMs to
impose exchange-set position limits on
‘‘pre-existing positions,’’ other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps.1626 The Commission believes
that this approach benefits market
integrity since pre-existing positions
that exceed spot-month limits could
result in market or price disruptions as
1624 See supra Section IV.A.5.b.ii. (discussing
monthly exchange-to-Commission report in final
§ 150.5(a)).
1625 Certain exchanges currently allow for the
submission of exemption requests up to five
business days after the trader established the
position that exceeded a limit in certain
circumstances. See, e.g., CME Rule 559 and ICE’s
‘‘Guidance on Position Limits’’ (Mar. 2018).
1626 Final § 150.1 defines ‘‘pre-existing position’’
to mean ‘‘any position in a commodity derivative
contract acquired in good faith prior to the effective
date’’ of any applicable position limit.
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positions are rolled into the spot
month.1627
The Commission is alleviating the
burden associated with final 150.5(a)(3)
by delaying the compliance date to
allow exchanges sufficient time to
implement the Final Rule.
iii. Physical Commodity Derivative
Contracts Not Subject to Federal
Position Limits Under the Final Rule
(Final § 150.5(b))
a. Spot Month Limits and Related
Acceptable Practices
For cash-settled contracts during the
spot month, existing § 150.5 sets forth
the following qualitative standard:
exchange-set limits should be ‘‘no
greater than necessary to minimize the
potential for market manipulation or
distortion of the contract’s or underling
commodity’s price.’’ However, for
physically-settled contracts, existing
§ 150.5 provides a one-size-fits-all
parameter that exchange limits must be
no greater than 25% of EDS.
In contrast, the standard for setting
spot month limit levels for physical
commodity derivative contracts not
subject to Federal position limits set
forth in final § 150.5(b)(1) does not
distinguish between cash-settled and
physically-settled contracts, and instead
requires DCMs to apply the existing
§ 150.5 qualitative standard to both.1628
The Commission also provides a related,
non-exclusive acceptable practice that
deems exchange-set position limits for
both cash-settled and physically-settled
contracts subject to § 150.5(b) to be in
compliance if the limits are no higher
than 25% of the spot-month EDS.
Applying the existing § 150.5
qualitative standard and non-exclusive
acceptable practice in final 150.5(b)(1),
rather than a one-size-fits-all regulation,
to both cash-settled and physicallysettled contracts during the spot month
is expected to enhance market integrity
by permitting a DCM to establish a more
tailored, product-specific approach by
1627 The Commission is particularly concerned
about protecting the spot month in physicaldelivery futures from corners and squeezes.
1628 Final § 150.5(b)(1) requires DCMs to establish
position limits for spot-month contracts at a level
that is ‘‘necessary and appropriate to reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index.’’ Existing § 150.5 also
distinguishes between ‘‘levels at designation’’ and
‘‘adjustments to levels,’’ although each category
similarly incorporates the qualitative standard for
cash-settled contracts and the 25% metric for
physically-settled contracts. Final § 150.5(b)
eliminates this distinction. The Commission
intends the final § 150.5(b)(1) standard to be
substantively the same as the existing § 150.5
standard for cash-settled contracts, except that
under final § 150.5(b)(1), the standard applies to
physically-settled contracts.
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applying other parameters that may take
into account the unique liquidity and
other characteristics of the particular
market and contract, which is not
possible under the one-size-fits-all 25%
of EDS parameter set forth in existing
§ 150.5. While the Commission
recognizes that the existing 25% of EDS
parameter has generally worked well,
the Commission also recognizes that
there may be circumstances where other
parameters may be preferable and just as
effective, if not more, including, for
example, if the contract is cash-settled
or does not have a reasonably accurate
measurable deliverable supply, or if the
DCM can demonstrate that a different
parameter would better promote market
integrity or efficiency for a particular
contract or market.
On the other hand, the Commission
recognizes that final § 150.5(b)(1) could
adversely affect market integrity by
theoretically allowing DCMs to establish
excessively high position limits in order
to gain a competitive advantage, which
also could harm the integrity of other
markets that offer similar products.1629
However, the Commission believes
these potential risks are mitigated since
(i) final § 150.5(e) requires DCMs to
submit proposed position limits to the
Commission, which will review those
rules for compliance with § 150.5(b),
including to ensure that the proposed
limits are ‘‘in accord with sound
commercial practices’’ and that they
may be ‘‘established and liquidated in
an orderly fashion’’; and (ii) final
§ 150.5(b)(3) requires DCMs to adopt
position limits for any new contract at
a ‘‘comparable’’ level to existing
contracts that are substantially similar
(i.e., ‘‘look-alike contracts’’) on other
exchanges unless the exchange listing
the new contracts demonstrates to the
satisfaction of Commission staff, in their
product filing with the Commission,
how its levels comply with the
requirements of § 150.5(b)(1) and (2).
Moreover, this latter requirement also
may reduce the amount of time and
effort needed for the DCM and
Commission staff to assess proposed
limits for any new contract that
competes with another DCM’s existing
contract.
1629 Since the existing § 150.5 framework already
applies the proposed qualitative standard to cashsettled spot-month contracts, any new risks
resulting from the proposed standard would occur
only with respect to physically-settled contracts,
which are currently subject to the one-size-fits-all
25% EDS parameter under the existing framework.
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b. Non-Spot Month Limits/
Accountability Levels and Related
Acceptable Practices
Existing § 150.5 provides one-size-fitsall levels for non-spot month contracts
and allows for position accountability
after a contract’s initial listing only for
those contracts that satisfy certain
trading thresholds.1630 In contrast, for
contracts outside the spot-month, final
§ 150.5(b)(2) requires DCMs to establish
either position limits or position
accountability levels that satisfy the
same proposed qualitative standard
discussed above for spot-month
contracts.1631 For DCMs that establish
position limits, final Appendix F to part
150 sets forth related acceptable
practices that provide non-exclusive
parameters that are generally consistent
with existing § 150.5’s parameters for
non-spot month contracts.1632 For DCMs
that establish position accountability,
1630 As noted above, in establishing the specific
metric, existing § 150.5 distinguishes between
‘‘levels at designation’’ and ‘‘adjustments to
[subsequent] levels.’’ Final § 150.5(b)(2) eliminates
this distinction and applies the qualitative standard
for all non-spot month position limit and
accountability levels.
1631 DCM Core Principle 5 requires DCMs to
establish either position limits or accountability for
speculators. See Commission regulation § 38.300
(restating DCMs’ statutory obligations under the
CEA 5(d)(5)). Accordingly, inasmuch as final
§ 150.5(b)(2) requires DCMs to establish position
limits or accountability, the Final Rule does not
represent a change to the status quo baseline
requirements.
1632 Specifically, the acceptable practices in final
Appendix F to part 150 provides that DCMs are
deemed to comply with final § 150.5(b)(2)(i)
qualitative standard if they establish non-spot limit
levels no greater than any one of the following: (1)
Based on the average of historical positions sizes
held by speculative traders in the contract as a
percentage of open interest in that contract; (2) the
spot month limit level for that contract; (3) 5,000
contracts (scaled up proportionally to the ratio of
the notional quantity per contract to the typical
cash-market transaction if the notional quantity per
contract is smaller than the typical cash-market
transaction, or scaled down proportionally if the
notional quantity per contract is larger than the
typical cash-market transaction); or (4) 10% of open
interest in that contract for the most recent calendar
year up to 50,000 contracts, with a marginal
increase of 2.5% of open interest thereafter.
These parameters have largely appeared in
existing § 150.5 for many years in connection with
non-spot month limits, either for levels at
designation, or for subsequent levels, with certain
revisions. For example, while existing § 150.5(b)(3)
has provided a limit of 5,000 contracts for energy
products, existing § 150.5(b)(2) provides a limit of
1,000 contracts for physical commodities other than
energy products. The acceptable practice
parameters in final Appendix F create a uniform
standard of 5,000 contracts for all physical
commodities. The Commission expects that the
5,000 contract acceptable practice, for example, is
a useful rule of thumb for exchanges because it
allows them to establish limits and demonstrate
compliance with Commission regulations in a
relatively efficient manner, particularly for new
contracts that have yet to establish open interest.
The spot month limit level under item (2) above is
a new parameter for non-spot month contracts.
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§ 150.1’s definition of ‘‘position
accountability’’ provides that a trader
must reduce its position upon a DCM’s
request, which is generally consistent
with existing § 150.5’s framework, but
does not distinguish between trading
volume or contract type, like existing
§ 150.5. While DCMs are provided the
ability to decide whether to use limit
levels or accountability levels for any
such contract, under either approach,
the DCM has to set a level that is
‘‘necessary and appropriate to reduce
the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index.’’
One commenter alternatively
recommended that § 150.5(b)(2) should
require exchanges to set position limits
and position accountability levels
outside of the spot month at levels that
reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion and the
potential for sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted
changes.1633 For the reasons more fully
discussed below, the Commission
believes that outside the spot-month,
either exchange-set position limits or
exchange-set accountability levels are
sufficient for exchanges to reduce these
potential threats.
Proposed § 150.5(b)(2) benefits market
efficiency by authorizing DCMs to
determine whether position limits or
accountability is best-suited outside of
the spot month based on the DCM’s
knowledge of its markets. For example,
position accountability could improve
liquidity compared to position limits
since liquidity providers may be more
willing or able to participate in markets
that do not have hard limits. As
discussed above, DCMs are wellpositioned to understand their
respective markets, and best practices in
one market may differ in another
market, including due to different
market participants or liquidity
characteristics of the underlying
commodities. For DCMs that choose to
establish position limits, the
Commission believes that applying the
final § 150.5 qualitative standard to
contracts outside the spot-month
benefits market integrity by permitting a
DCM to establish a more tailored,
product-specific approach by applying
other tools that may take into account
the unique liquidity and other
characteristics of the particular market
and contract, which is not possible
under the existing § 150.5 specific
parameters for non-spot month
contracts. While the Commission
recognizes that the existing parameters
1633 Better
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3441
may have been well-suited to market
dynamics when initially promulgated,
the Commission also recognizes that
open interest may have changed for
certain contracts subject to final
§ 150.5(b), and open interest will likely
continue to change in the future (e.g., as
new contracts may be introduced and as
supply and/or demand may change for
underlying commodities). In cases
where open interest has not increased,
the exchange may not need to change
existing limit levels. But, for contracts
where open interest has increased, the
exchange is able to raise its limits to
facilitate liquidity consistent with an
orderly market. However, the
Commission reiterates that the specific
parameters in the acceptable practices
set forth in final Appendix F to part 150
are merely non-exclusive examples, and
an exchange is be able to establish
higher (or lower) limits, provided the
exchange submits its proposed limits to
the Commission under final § 150.5(e)
and explains how its proposed limits
satisfy the qualitative standard and are
otherwise consistent with all applicable
requirements.
The Commission, however, recognizes
that final § 150.5(b)(2) could adversely
affect market integrity by potentially
allowing DCMs to establish position
accountability levels rather than
position limits, regardless of whether
the contract exceeds the volume-based
thresholds provided in existing § 150.5.
However, final § 150.5(e) requires DCMs
to submit any proposed position
accountability rules to the Commission
for review, and the Commission will
determine on a case-by-case basis
whether such rules satisfy regulatory
requirements, including the proposed
qualitative standard. Similarly, in order
to gain a competitive advantage, DCMs
could theoretically set excessively high
accountability (or position limit) levels,
which also could potentially adversely
affect markets with similar products.
However, the Commission believes
these risks are mitigated since (i) final
§ 150.5(e) requires DCMs to submit
proposed position accountability (or
limits) to the Commission, which will
review those rules for compliance with
§ 150.5(b), including to ensure that the
exchange’s proposed accountability
levels (or limits) are ‘‘necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion’’ of the contract or underlying
commodity; and (ii) final § 150.5(b)(3)
requires DCMs to adopt position limits
for any new contract at a ‘‘comparable’’
level to existing contracts that are
substantially similar on other exchanges
unless the exchange listing the new
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contracts demonstrates to the
satisfaction of Commission staff, in their
product filing with the Commission,
how its levels comply with the
requirements of § 150.5(b)(1) and (2).
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c. Exchange-Set Limits on Economically
Equivalent Swaps
As discussed above, swaps that
qualify as ‘‘economically equivalent
swaps’’ are subject to the Federal
position limits framework. However, the
Commission has determined to permit
exchanges to delay enforcing their
respective exchange-set position limits
on economically equivalent swaps at
this time. Specifically, with respect to
exchange-set position limits on swaps,
the Commission notes that in two years
(which generally coincides with the
compliance date for economically
equivalent swaps), the Commission will
reevaluate the ability of exchanges to
establish and implement appropriate
surveillance mechanisms to implement
DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6. However, after the swap
compliance period (January 1, 2023), the
Commission underscores that it will
enforce Federal position limits in
connection with OTC swaps.
Nonetheless, the Commission’s
determination to permit exchanges to
delay implementing exchange-set
position limits on swaps could
incentivize market participants to leave
the futures markets and instead transact
in economically equivalent swaps,
which could reduce liquidity in the
futures and related options markets,
which could also increase transaction
and hedging costs. Delaying position
limits on swaps therefore could harm
market participants, especially endusers that do not transact in swaps, if
many participants were to shift trading
from the futures to the swaps markets.
In turn, end-users could pass on some
of these increased costs to the public at
large.1634 However, the Commission
believes that these concerns are
mitigated to the extent the Commission
still oversees and enforces Federal
position limits even if the exchanges are
not be required to do so.
iv. Position Aggregation
Final § 150.5(d) requires all DCMs
that list physical commodity derivative
contracts to apply aggregation rules that
conform to existing § 150.4, regardless
1634 On the other hand, the Commission has not
seen any shifting of liquidity to the swaps
markets—or general attempts at market
manipulation or evasion of Federal position
limits—with respect to the nine legacy core
referenced futures contracts, even though swaps
currently are not subject to Federal or exchange
position limits.
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of whether the contract is subject to
Federal position limits under
§ 150.2.1635 The Commission believes
final § 150.5(d) benefits market integrity
in several ways. First, a harmonized
approach to aggregation across
exchanges that list physical commodity
derivative contracts prevents confusion
that could result from divergent
standards between Federal position
limits under § 150.2 and exchange-set
limits under § 150.5(b). As a result, final
§ 150.5(d) provides uniformity,
consistency, and reduced administrative
burdens for traders who are active on
multiple trading venues and/or trade
similar physical contracts, regardless of
whether the contracts are subject to
§ 150.2’s Federal position limits.
Second, a harmonized aggregation
policy eliminates the potential for DCMs
to use excessively permissive
aggregation policies as a competitive
advantage, which would impair the
effectiveness of the Commission’s
aggregation policy and position limits
framework. Third, since, for contracts
subject to Federal position limits, final
§ 150.5(a) requires DCMs to set position
limits at a level not higher than that set
by the Commission under final § 150.2,
differing aggregation standards could
effectively lead to an exchange-set limit
that is higher than that set by the
Commission. Accordingly, harmonizing
aggregation standards reinforces the
efficacy and intended purpose of final
§§ 150.2 and 150.5 and existing § 150.4
by eliminating DCMs’ ability to
circumvent the applicable Federal
aggregation and position limits rules.
To the extent a DCM currently is not
applying the Federal aggregation rules
in existing § 150.4, or similar exchangebased rules, final § 150.5(d) could
impose costs with respect to market
participants trading referenced contracts
for the 16 new commodities that are
subject to Federal position limits for the
first time. Market participants are
required to update their trading and
1635 The Commission adopted final aggregation
rules in 2016 under existing § 150.4, which applies
to contracts subject to Federal position limits under
§ 150.2. See Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR
at 91454. Under the Final Aggregation Rulemaking,
unless an exemption applies, a person’s positions
must be aggregated with positions for which the
person controls trading or for which the person
holds a 10% or greater ownership interest. The
Division of Market Oversight has issued timelimited no-action relief from some of the
aggregation requirements contained in that
rulemaking. See CFTC Letter No. 19–19 (July 31,
2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/
download. Commission regulation § 150.4(b) sets
forth several permissible exemptions from
aggregation. The Commission, outside the Final
Rule, will separately consider comments related to
the Final Aggregation Rulemaking and codification
of NAL 19–19.
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compliance systems to ensure they
comply with the new aggregation rules.
7. Section 15(a) Factors 1636
i. Protection of Market Participants and
the Public
A chief purpose of speculative
position limits is to preserve the
integrity of derivatives markets for the
benefit of commercial interests,
producers, and other end- users that use
these markets to hedge risk and of
consumers that consume the underlying
commodities. As discussed above, the
Commission believes that the final
position limits regime operates to deter
excessive speculation and
manipulation, such as corners and
squeezes, which might impair the
contract’s price discovery function and
liquidity for bona fide hedgers—and
ultimately, protects the integrity and
utility of the commodity markets for the
benefit of both producers and
consumers.
The Commission is including 25 core
referenced futures contracts, as well as
any referenced contracts directly or
indirectly linked thereto, within the
final Federal position limits framework.
In selecting the 25 core referenced
futures contracts, the Commission
analyzed (1) the importance of these
contracts to the operation of the
underlying cash commodity market,
including that they require physical
delivery; and (2) the importance of the
underlying commodity to the economy
as a whole. As discussed above, the
Commission is of the view that evidence
demonstrating one or both of these
factors is sufficient to establish that
position limits are necessary because
each factor relates to the statutory
objective identified in CEA section
4a(a)(1).1637
Of particular importance in the
Commission’s position limit regime are
the limits on the spot month, because
the Commission believes that deterring
and preventing manipulative behaviors,
such as corners and squeezes, is more
urgent during this period. The spot
month position limits are designed,
among other things, to deter and prevent
corners and squeezes, as spot months
are more susceptible to such activities
1636 The discussion here covers the Final Rule
amendments that the Commission has identified as
being relevant to the areas set out in section 15(a)
of the CEA: (i) Protection of market participants and
the public; (ii) efficiency, competitiveness, and
financial integrity of futures markets; (iii) price
discovery; (iv) sound risk management practices;
and (v) other public interest considerations. For
amendments that are not specifically addressed, the
Commission has not identified any effects.
1637 See supra Section III.C. (discussing the
necessity findings as to the 25 core referenced
futures contacts).
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than non-spot months, as well as
promote a more orderly liquidation
process at expiration.1638 By restricting
derivatives positions to a proportion of
the deliverable supply of the
commodity, the spot month position
limits reduce the possibility that a
market participant can use derivatives
to affect the price of the cash
commodity (and vice versa).1639
Limiting a speculative position based on
a percentage of deliverable supply also
restricts a speculative trader’s ability to
establish a leveraged position in cashsettled derivative contracts, diminishing
that trader’s incentive to manipulate the
cash settlement price. As the
Commission has determined in the
preamble, excessive speculation or
manipulation during the spot month
may cause sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price of the commodities underlying
these contracts.1640 In this way, the
Commission believes that the limits in
the Final Rule benefit market
participants that seek to hedge the spot
price of a commodity at expiration, and
benefit consumers who are able to
purchase underlying commodities for
which prices are determined by
fundamentals of supply and demand,
rather than influenced by excessive
speculation, manipulation, or other
undue and unnecessary burdens on
interstate commerce.
The Commission believes that the
Final Rule’s Commission and exchangecentric processes for granting
exemptions from Federal position
limits, including non-enumerated bona
fide hedging recognitions, help ensure
the hedging utility of the derivatives
markets for commercial end-users.
First, the Final Rule allows exchanges
to leverage existing processes and their
knowledge of their own markets,
including participant positions and
activities, along with their knowledge of
the underlying commodity cash market,
which should allow for more timely
review of exemption applications than if
the Commission were to conduct such
initial application reviews. This benefits
the public by allowing producers and
end-users of a commodity to more
efficiently and predictably hedge their
price risks, thus controlling costs that
might be passed on to the public.
Second, exchanges may be bettersuited than the Commission to leverage
their knowledge of their own markets,
including participant positions and
activities, along with their knowledge of
1638 See
supra Sections II.A.19 and II.B.3.iii.
supra Section II.B.3.iii.
1640 See supra Section III.C. (discussing the
necessity finding).
1639 See
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the underlying commodity cash market,
in order to recognize whether an
applicant qualifies for an exemption and
what the level for that exemption
should be. This benefits market
participants and the public by helping
assure that exemption levels are set in
a manner that meets the risk
management needs of the applicant
without negatively impacting the
derivative and cash market for that
commodity.
Third, allowing for self-effectuating
spread exemptions for purposes of
Federal position limits could improve
liquidity in all months for a listed
contract or across commodities,
benefitting hedgers by providing tighter
bid-ask spreads for out-right trades.
Furthermore, traders using spreads can
arbitrage price discrepancies between
calendar months within the same
commodity contract or price
discrepancies between commodities,
helping ensure that futures prices more
accurately reflect the underlying market
fundamentals for a commodity.
Lastly, the Commission will review
each application for bona fide hedge
recognitions (other than those bona fide
hedges that would be self-effectuating
under the Final Rule), but the Final Rule
allows the Commission to also leverage
the exchange’s knowledge and
experience of its own markets and
market participants discussed above for
market participants that applies to the
Commission by first submitting the
application for a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge exemption to the exchange
for purposed of exchange-set limits
under final § 150.9. Similarly, the
Commission will review each
application for a spread exemption that
is not covered by the spread transaction
definition and therefore is not selfeffectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits.
The Commission also understands
that there are costs to market
participants and the public to setting
position limit levels that are too high or
too low. If the levels are set too high,
there’s greater risk of excessive
speculation, which may harm market
participants and the public. Further, to
the extent that the limits are set at such
a level that even without these proposed
exemptions, the probability of nearing
or breaching such levels may be
negligible for most market participants,
benefits associated with such
exemptions may be reduced.
Conversely, if the limits are set too
low, transaction costs for market
participants who are near or above the
limit will rise as they transact in other
instruments with higher transaction
costs to obtain their desired level of
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3443
speculative positions. Additionally,
limits that are too low could incentivize
speculators to leave the market and be
unavailable to provide liquidity for
hedgers, resulting in ‘‘choppy’’ prices. It
is also possible for limits that are set too
low to harm market efficiency because
the views of some speculators might not
be reflected fully in the price formation
process.
In setting the final Federal position
limit levels, the Commission considered
these factors in order to implement to
the maximum extent practicable, as it
finds necessary in its discretion, to
apply the position limits framework
articulated in CEA section 4a(a) to set
Federal position limits to protect market
integrity and price discovery, thereby
benefiting market participants and the
public.
ii. Efficiency, Competitiveness, and
Financial Integrity of Futures Markets
Position limits help to prevent market
manipulation or excessive speculation
that may unduly influence prices at the
expense of the efficiency and integrity
of markets. The Final Rule’s expansion
of the Federal position limits regime to
25 core referenced futures contracts
(e.g., the existing nine legacy
agricultural contracts and the 16 new
contracts) enhances the buffer against
excessive speculation historically
afforded exclusively to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, improving the
financial integrity of those markets.
Moreover, the limits in final § 150.2 may
promote market competitiveness by
preventing a trader from gaining too
much market power in the respective
markets.
Also, in the absence of position limits,
market participants may be deterred
from participating in a particular market
if the market participants perceive that
there is a participant with an unusually
large speculative position exerting what
they believe is unreasonable market
power. A lack of participation may harm
liquidity, and consequently, may harm
market efficiency.
On the other hand, traders who find
position limits overly constraining may
seek to trade in substitute instruments
in order to meet their demand for
speculative instruments. The substitute
instruments could be futures contracts
or swaps that are similar to or highly
correlated with their corresponding core
referenced futures contracts (but not
otherwise deemed to be referenced
contracts). They could also be trade
options or other forward contracts.
These traders may also decide to not
trade beyond the Federal speculative
position limit.
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Trading in substitute instruments may
be less effective than trading in
referenced contracts. For example, the
trading of futures contracts has strong
safeguards since futures contracts are by
definition exchange-traded, which
includes (1) the posting of initial and
variation margin and (2) credit reviews
and guarantees by futures commission
merchants. These safeguards protect the
integrity of futures markets but are
generally not required for forward
transactions, which are generally not
traded on exchanges or centrally
cleared. Forward contract
nonperformance may result in
dislocations in the physical marketing
channel, which may lead to higher
prices for consumers and end users and
otherwise impose burdens on
commerce. Further, with the use of
substitute instruments, futures prices
might not fully reflect all the
speculative demand to hold the futures
contract, because substitute instruments
may not fully influence prices the same
way that trading directly in the futures
contract does. Thus, market efficiency
and price discovery might be harmed,
too.
The Commission believes that
focusing on the 25 core referenced
futures contracts (included any
referenced contracts linked thereto),
which generally have high levels of
open interest and trading volume and/
or have been subject to existing Federal
position limits for many years, should,
in general, be less disruptive for the
respective derivatives markets, which in
turn may reduce the potential for
disruption for the price discovery
function of the underlying commodity
markets as compared to including less
liquid contracts (only to the extent that
the Commission is able to make the
requisite necessity finding for such
contracts).
Finally, the Commission believes that
eliminating certain risk management
positions as bona fide hedges, coupled
with the increased non-spot month limit
levels for most of the nine legacy
agricultural contracts, will foster
competition among swap dealers by
subjecting all market participants,
including all swap dealers, to the same
non-spot month limit rather than
limited staff-granted risk management
exemptions. Accommodating risk
management activity by additional
entities with higher position limit levels
may also help lessen the concentration
risk potentially posed by a few
commodity index traders holding
exemptions that are not available to
competing market participants.
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iii. Price Discovery
As discussed above, market
manipulation may result in artificial or
distorted prices.1641 Similarly, excessive
speculation may result in ‘‘sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in the price of
such commodity.’’ 1642 Position limits
may help to prevent the price discovery
function of the underlying commodity
markets from being disrupted.1643 Also,
in the absence of position limits, market
participants might elect to trade less as
a result of a perception that the market
pricing does not reflect market forces, as
a consequence of what they perceive is
the exercise of too much market power
by a concentration of several or one
larger speculator. This reduced trading
may result in a reduction in liquidity,
which may have a negative impact on
price discovery.
On the other hand, imposing position
limits raises the concerns that liquidity
and price discovery may be diminished,
because certain market segments, i.e.,
speculative traders, are restricted. For
certain commodities, the Final Rule sets
the levels of position limits at increased
levels, to avoid harming liquidity that
may be provided by speculators that
would establish large positions, while
restricting speculators from establishing
extraordinarily large positions. The
Commission further believes that the
bona fide hedging recognition and
exemption processes will foster
liquidity and potentially improve price
discovery by making it more efficient for
market participants to apply for bona
fide hedging recognitions and spread
exemptions.
In addition, position limits may serve
as a prophylactic measure that reduces
market volatility due to a participant
otherwise engaging in large quantity
trades in a short time interval that
induce price impacts that interfere with
price discovery. In particular, spot
month position limits make it more
difficult to mark the close of a futures
contract to possibly benefit other
contracts that settle on the closing
futures price. Marking the close harms
markets by spoiling convergence
between futures prices and spot prices
at expiration and by damaging price
discovery.
iv. Sound Risk Management Practices
The Final Rule promotes sound risk
management practices by providing
exemptions for bona fide hedgers to
1641 See
supra Section II.A.16. (discussing the
referenced contract definition).
1642 See supra Section III.A. (discussing the
necessity finding).
1643 Id.
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hedge their corresponding risk. In
addition, the Commission crafted the
Final Rule to ensure sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers to the
maximum extent practicable, e.g., by: (1)
Creating a bona fide hedging definition
that is broad enough to accommodate
common commercial hedging practices,
including anticipatory hedging, for a
variety of commodity types; (2)
maintaining the status quo with respect
to existing bona fide hedge recognitions
and spread exemptions that will remain
self-effectuating and make additional
bona fide hedges and spreads selfeffectuating (i.e., certain anticipatory
hedging); (3) providing additional
ability for a streamlined process where
market participants can make a single
submission to an exchange in which the
exchange and Commission will each
review applications for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions for
purposes of Federal and exchange-set
limits that are in line with commercial
hedging practices; and (4) allowing for
a conditional spot month limit
exemption in natural gas.
To the extent that monitoring for
position limits requires market
participants to create internal risk limits
and evaluate position size in relation to
the market, position limits may also
provide an incentive for market
participants to engage in sound risk
management practices. Further, sound
risk management practices will be
promoted by the Final Rule to allow for
market participants to measure risk in
the manner most suitable for their
business (i.e., net versus gross hedging
practices), rather than having to
conform their hedging programs to a
one-size-fits-all standard that may not
be suitable for their risk management
needs. Finally, generally increasing nonspot month limit levels for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts to levels
that reflect observed levels of trading
activity, based on recent data reviewed
by the Commission, should allow swap
dealers, liquidity providers, market
makers, and others who have risk
management needs, but who are not
hedging a physical commercial, to
soundly manage their risks.
v. Other Public Interest
The Commission has not identified
any additional public interest
considerations related to the costs and
benefits of this Final Rule.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
1. Overview
Certain provisions of the Final Rule
amend or impose new ‘‘collection of
information’’ requirements as that term
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is defined under the Paperwork
Reduction Act (‘‘PRA’’).1644 An agency
may not conduct or sponsor, and a
person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it
displays a valid control number from
the Office of Management and Budget
(‘‘OMB’’). The Final Rule modifies the
following existing collections of
information previously approved by
OMB and for which the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) has received control
numbers: (i) OMB control number 3038–
0009 (Large Trader Reports), which
generally covers Commission
regulations in parts 15 through 21; (ii)
OMB control number 3038–0013
(Aggregation of Positions), which covers
Commission regulations in part 150; 1645
and (iii) OMB control number 3038–
0093 (Provisions Common to Registered
Entities), which covers Commission
regulations in part 40.
The Commission requested that OMB
approve and revise OMB control
numbers 3038–0009, 3038–0013, and
3038–0093 in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
2. Commission Reorganization of OMB
Control Numbers 3038–0009 and 3038–
0013
The Commission requested two nonsubstantive changes so that all
collections of information related solely
to the Commission’s position limit
requirements are consolidated under
one OMB control number.1646 First, the
Commission is transferring collections
of information under part 19 (Reports by
Persons Holding Bona Fide Hedge
Positions and By Merchants and Dealers
in Cotton) related to position limit
requirements from OMB control number
3038–0009 to OMB control number
3038–0013. Second, the modified OMB
control number 3038–0013 is renamed
as ‘‘Position Limits.’’ This renaming
change is non-substantive and allows
for all collections of information related
to the Federal position limits
requirements, including exemptions
from speculative position limits and
1644 44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
OMB control number 3038–0013 is
titled ‘‘Aggregation of Positions.’’ The Commission
is renaming the OMB control number ‘‘Position
Limits’’ to better reflect the nature of the
information collections covered by that OMB
control number.
1646 The Commission notes that certain
collections of information under OMB control
number 3038–0093 relate to several Commission
regulations in addition to the Commission’s final
position limits framework. As a result, the
collections of information discussed herein under
this OMB control number 3038–0093 are not being
consolidated under OMB control number 3038–
0013.
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1645 Currently,
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related large trader reporting, to be
housed in one collection.
A single collection makes it easier for
market participants to know where to
find the relevant position limits PRA
burdens. The remaining collections of
information under OMB control number
3038–0009 cover reports by various
entities under parts 15, 17, and 21 1647
of the Commission’s regulations, while
OMB control number 3038–0013 holds
collections of information arising from
parts 19 and 150.
As discussed in Section 3 below, this
non-substantive reorganization results
in: (i) A decreased burden estimate
under control number 3038–0009 due to
the transfer of the collection of
information arising from obligations in
part 19; and (ii) a corresponding
increase of the amended part 19 burdens
under control number 3038–0013.
However, as discussed further below,
the collection of information and
burden hours arising from revised part
19 that is transferred to OMB control
number 3038–0013 is less than the
existing burden estimate under OMB
control number 3038–0009 since the
Final Rule amends existing part 19 by
eliminating existing Form 204 and
certain parts of Form 304 and the
reporting burdens related thereto. As a
result, market participants will see a net
reduction of collections of information
and burden hours under revised part 19.
3. Collections of Information
The Final Rule amends existing
regulations, and creates new
regulations, concerning speculative
position limits. Among other
amendments, the Final Rule includes:
(1) New and amended Federal spotmonth limits for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts; (2) amended Federal
non-spot limits for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts subject to existing
Federal position limits; (3) amended
rules governing exchange-set limit
levels and grants of exemptions
therefrom; (4) an amended process for
requesting certain spread exemptions
and non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions for purposes of Federal
position limits directly from the
Commission; (5) a new streamlined
process for recognizing non-enumerated
bona fide hedge positions from Federal
limit requirements; and (6) amendments
to part 19 and related provisions that
eliminate certain reporting obligations
1647 As noted above, OMB control number 3038–
0009 generally covers Commission regulations in
parts 15 through 21. However, it does not cover
§§ 16.02, 17.01, 18.04, or 18.05, which are under
OMB control number 3038–0103. 78 FR at 69200
(transferring §§ 16.02, 17.01, 18.04, and 18.05 to
OMB Control Number 3038–0103).
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that require traders to submit a Form
204 and Parts I and II of Form 304.
Specifically, the Final Rule amends
parts 15, 17, 19, 40, and 150 of the
Commission’s regulations to implement
the revised Federal position limits
framework. The Final Rule also transfers
an amended version of the ‘‘bona fide
hedging transactions or positions’’
definition from existing § 1.3 to final
§ 150.1, and removes §§ 1.47, 1.48, and
140.97. The Final Rule revises existing
collections of information covered by
OMB control number 3038–0009 by
amending part 19,1648 along with
conforming changes to part 15, in order
to narrow the scope of who is required
to report under part 19.1649
Furthermore, the Final Rule’s
amendments to part 150 revise existing
collections of information covered by
OMB control number 3038–0013,
including new reporting and
recordkeeping requirements related to
the application and request for relief
from Federal position limit
requirements submitted to exchanges.
Finally, the Final Rule amends part 40
to incorporate a new reporting
obligation into the definition of ‘‘terms
and conditions’’ in § 40.1(j) and results
in a revised existing collection of
information covered by OMB control
number 3038–0093.
i. OMB Control Number 3038–0009—
Large Trader Reports; Part 19—Reports
by Persons Holding Bona Fide Hedge
Positions and by Merchants and Dealers
in Cotton
Under OMB control number 3038–
0009, the Commission currently
estimates that the collections of
information related to existing part 19,
including Form 204 and Form 304,
collectively known as the ‘‘series ‘04’’
reports, have a combined annual burden
hours of 1,553 hours. Under existing
part 19, market participants that hold
bona fide hedging positions in excess of
position limits for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts subject to existing
Federal position limits must file a
monthly report on Form 204 (or Parts I
and II of Form 304 for cotton). These
reports show a snapshot of traders’ cash
1648 See supra Section IV.B.2 (discussing the
transfer of information collection under part 19
from OMB control number 3038–0009 to 3038–
0013).
1649 As noted above, the Commission
accomplishes this by eliminating existing Form 204
and Parts I and II of Form 304. Additionally,
changes to part 17, covered by OMB control number
3038–0009, make conforming amendments to
remove certain duplicative provisions and
associated information collections related to
aggregation of positions, which are in existing
§ 150.4. These conforming changes do not impact
the burden estimates of OMB control number 3038–
0009.
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positions on one given day each month,
and are used by the Commission to
determine whether a trader has
sufficient cash positions to justify
futures and options on futures positions
above the applicable Federal position
limits in existing § 150.2.
The Final Rule amends part 19 to
remove these reporting obligations
associated with Form 204 and Parts I
and II of Form 304. As discussed under
final § 150.9 below, the Commission has
determined to eliminate these forms
because the Commission will still
receive adequate information to carry
out its market and financial surveillance
programs since its amendments to
§§ 150.5 and 150.9 enable the
Commission to obtain the necessary
information from the exchanges. To
effect these changes to traders’ reporting
obligations, the Commission is
eliminating (i) existing § 19.00(a)(1),
which requires the applicable persons to
file a Form 204; and (ii) existing § 19.01,
which among other things, sets forth the
cash-market information required to be
submitted on Forms 204 and 304.1650
The Commission is maintaining Part III
of Form 304, which requests
information on unfixed-price ‘‘on call’’
purchases and sales of cotton and which
the Commission utilizes to prepare its
weekly cotton on-call report.1651 The
Commission is also maintaining its
existing special call authority under part
19.
The supporting statement for the
current active information collection
request for part 19 under OMB control
number 3038–0009 1652 states that in
2014: (i) 135 reportable traders filed the
series ‘04 reports (i.e., Form 204 and
Form 304 in the aggregate), (ii) totaling
3,105 series ‘04 reports, for a total of (iii)
1,553 burden hours.1653 However, based
on more current and recent 2019
submission data, the Commission has
revised its existing estimates slightly
higher for the series ‘04 reports under
part 19:
Accordingly, based on the above
revised estimates, the Commission is
revising its estimate of the current
collections of information under
existing part 19 to reflect that
approximately 105 reportable
traders 1654 file a total of 3,460 responses
annually 1655 resulting in an aggregate
annual burden of 1,730 hours.1656 1657
The Final Rule reduces the current OMB
control number 3038–0009 by these
revised burden estimates under part 19
as they will be transferred to OMB
control number 3038–0013.
With respect to the overall collections
of information transferred to OMB
control number 3038–0013 based on the
Commission’s revised part 19 estimate,
the Commission estimates that the Final
Rule reduces the collections of
information in part 19 by 600
reports 1658 and by 300 annual aggregate
burden hours since the Final Rule
eliminates Form 204, as discussed
above.1659 The Commission does not
expect a change in the number of
reportable traders that are required to
file Part III of Form 304.1660 Thus, the
Commission continues to expect
approximately 55 weekly Form 304
reports, for an annual total of 2,860
reports 1661 for an aggregate total of
1,430 burden hours, which information
collection burdens will be transferred to
OMB control number 3038–0013.1662
In addition, the Commission is
maintaining its authority to issue
special calls for information to any
person claiming an exemption from
speculative Federal position limits.
While the position limits framework
expands to traders in the 25 core
referenced futures contacts (an increase
from the existing nine legacy
agricultural products), the position limit
levels themselves are also generally
higher. The higher position limit levels
result in a smaller universe of traders
who may exceed the position limits and
thus be subject to a special call for
information on their large position(s).
Taking into account the higher limits
1650 As noted above, the amendments to part 19
affect certain provisions of part 15 and § 17.00.
Based on the elimination of Form 204 and Parts I
and II of Form 304, as discussed above, the
Commission is adopting conforming technical
changes to remove related reporting provisions from
(i) the ‘‘reportable position’’ definition in § 15.00(p);
(ii) the list of ‘‘persons required to report’’ in
§ 15.01; and (iii) the list of reporting forms in
§ 15.02. These conforming amendments to part 15
do not impact the existing burden estimates.
1651 The Commission is adopting a conforming
technical change to Part III of Form 304 to require
traders to identify themselves on the Form 304
using their Public Trader Identification Number, in
lieu of the CFTC Code Number required on
previous versions of the Form 304. However, the
Commission has determined that this does not
result in any change to its existing PRA estimates
with respect to the collections of information
related to Part III of Form 304.
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1652 See
ICR Reference No: 201906–3038–008.
Series ’04 submissions × 0.5 hours per
submission = 1,553 aggregate burden hours for all
submissions. The Commission notes that it has
estimated that it takes approximately 20 minutes to
complete a Form 204 or 304. However, in order to
err conservatively, the Commission now uses a
figure of 30 minutes.
1654 55 Form 304 reports + 50 Form 204 reports
= 105 reportable traders.
1655 2,860 Form 304s + 600 Form 204s = 3,460
total annual series ’04 reports.
1656 3,460 series ‘04 reports × 0.5 hours per report
= 1,730 annual aggregate burden hours.
1657 These revised estimates result in an increased
estimate under existing part 19 of 355 series ’04
reports submitted by traders (3,460 estimated series
’04 reports¥3,105 submissions from the
Commission’s previous estimate = an increase of
355 response difference); an increase of 177
1653 3,105
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aggregate burden hours across all respondents
(1,730 aggregate burden hours¥1,553 aggregate
burden hours from the Commission’s previous
estimate = an increase of 177 aggregate burden
hours); and a decrease of 30 respondent traders (105
respondents¥135 respondents from the
Commission’s previous estimate = a decrease of 30
respondents).
1658 50 monthly Form 204 reports × 12 months =
600 total annual reports.
1659 600 Form 204 reports × 0.5 burden hours per
report = 300 aggregate annual burden hours.
1660 Since the Final Rule eliminates Parts I and II
of Form 304, amended Form 304 only refers to
existing Part III of that form.
1661 55 weekly Form 304 reports × 52 weeks =
2,860 total annual Form 304 reports.
1662 2,860 Form 304 reports × 0.5 burden hours
per report = 1,430 aggregate annual burden hours.
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and smaller universe of traders who will
likely exceed the position limits, the
Commission estimates that it is likely to
issue a special call for information to
four reportable traders. The Commission
estimates that it will take approximately
five hours to respond to a special call.
The Commission therefore estimates
that industry will incur a total of 20
aggregate annual burden hours.1663
ii. OMB Control Number 3038–0013—
Aggregation of Positions (Renaming
‘‘Position Limits’’)
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a. Introduction; Bona Fide Hedge
Recognition and Exemption Process
The Final Rule amends the existing
process for market participants to apply
to obtain an exemption or recognition of
a bona fide hedge position. Currently,
the ‘‘bona fide hedging transaction or
position’’ definition appears in existing
§ 1.3. Under existing §§ 1.47 and 1.48, a
market participant must apply directly
to the Commission to obtain a bona fide
hedge recognition in accordance with
§ 1.3 for Federal position limit purposes.
Final §§ 150.3 and 150.9 establish an
amended process for obtaining a bona
fide hedge exemption or recognition,
which includes: (i) A new bona fide
hedging definition in § 150.1, (ii) a new
process administered by the exchanges
in final § 150.9 for recognizing nonenumerated bona fide hedging positions
for Federal limit requirements, and (iii)
an amended process to apply directly to
the Commission for certain spread
exemptions or for recognition of nonenumerated bona fide hedging positions
in final § 150.3. Final § 150.3 also
includes new exemption types not
explicitly listed in existing § 150.3.
The Commission has previously
estimated the combined annual burden
hours for submitting applications under
both §§ 1.47 and 1.48 to be 42 hours.1664
The Final Rule largely maintains the
existing process where market
participants may apply directly to the
Commission, although the Commission
expects market participants to
predominantly rely on the streamlined
process to obtain recognition of their
non-enumerated bona fide hedging
positions for purposes of Federal
position limit requirements.
Enumerated bona fide hedge positions
1663 Four possible reportable traders x 5 hours
each = 20 aggregate annual burden hours.
1664 The supporting statement for a previous
information collection request, ICR Reference No:
201808–3038–003, for OMB control number 3038–
0013, estimated that seven respondents would file
the §§ 1.47 and 1.48 submissions, and that each
respondent would file two submissions for a total
of 14 annual submissions, requiring 3 hours per
response, for a total of 42 burden hours for all
respondents.
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remain self-effectuating, which means
that market participants do not need to
apply to the Commission for purposes of
Federal position limits, although market
participants still need to apply to an
exchange for recognition of bona fide
hedge positions for purposes of
exchange-set position limits. The
Commission expects market participants
to rely on the streamlined exchange
process because all the contracts that are
now subject to Federal position limits
are already subject to exchange-set
limits. Thus, most market participants
are likely to already be familiar with an
exchange-administered process, as
adopted under § 150.9. Familiarity with
an exchange-administered process will
result in operational efficiencies, such
as completing one application for nonenumerated bona fide hedge requests for
both Federal and exchange-set limits
and thus a reduced burden on market
participants.
As previously discussed, the Final
Rule moves the ‘‘bona fide hedge
transaction or position’’ definition to
final § 150.1. The Final Rule maintains
the distinction between enumerated and
non-enumerated bona fide hedges, and
market participants are required to
apply for recognition of non-enumerated
bona fide hedge positions either directly
from the Commission pursuant to
§ 150.3 or through an exchange-centric
process under § 150.9.1665 The
Commission does not believe that this
amendment has any PRA impacts since
it is maintaining the status quo in which
enumerated bona fide hedges are selfeffectuating while requiring traders to
apply to the Commission or an exchange
for recognition of non-enumerated bona
fide hedge positions.
b. § 150.2 Speculative Limits
Under final § 150.2(f), upon request
from the Commission, DCMs listing a
core referenced futures contract are
required to supply to the Commission
deliverable supply estimates for each
core referenced futures contract listed at
that DCM. DCMs are only required to
submit estimates if requested to do so by
the Commission on an as-needed basis.
When submitting estimates, DCMs are
required to provide a description of the
methodology used to derive the
estimate, as well as any statistical data
supporting the estimate. Appendix C to
1665 Currently, in order to determine whether a
futures or an option on futures as a bona fide hedge,
either (1) the position in question must qualify as
an enumerated bona fide hedge, as defined in
existing § 1.3, or (2) the trader must file a statement
with the Commission, pursuant to existing § 1.47
(for non-enumerated bona fide hedges) and/or
existing § 1.48 (for enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges). The Commission does not expect this
change to have any PRA impacts.
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3447
part 38 sets forth guidance regarding
estimating deliverable supply.
Submitting deliverable supply
estimates upon demand from the
Commission for contracts subject to
Federal position limits is a new
reporting obligation for DCMs. The
Commission estimates that six DCMs
will be required to submit initial
deliverable supply estimates. The
Commission estimates that it will
request each DCM that lists a core
referenced futures contract to file one
initial report for each core reference
futures contract it lists on its market.
Such requests from the Commission will
result in one initial submission for each
of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts. The Commission further
estimates that it will take 20 hours to
complete and file each report for a total
annual burden of 500 hours for all
respondents.1666 Accordingly, the
changes to § 150.2(f) result in an initial,
one-time increase to the current burden
estimates of OMB control number 3038–
0013 of 25 submissions across six
respondent DCMs for the initial number
of submissions for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts and an
initial, one-time burden of 500 hours.
c. § 150.3 Exemptions From Federal
Position Limit Requirements
Market participants may currently
apply directly to the Commission for
recognition of certain bona fide hedges
under the process set forth in existing
§§ 1.47 and 1.48. There is no existing
process that is codified under the
Commission’s regulations for spread
exemptions or other exemptions
included under final § 150.3.
Final § 150.3(a) specifies the
circumstances in which a trader could
exceed Federal position limits.1667 With
respect to non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions not identified in the
proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’
definition in § 150.1, final § 150.3(b)
provides a process for market
participants to request such non1666 20 initial hours × 25 core referenced futures
contracts = 500 one-time, aggregate burden hours.
While there is an initial annual submission, the
Commission does not expect to require the
exchanges to resubmit the supply estimates on an
annual basis.
1667 Final § 150.3(b) includes (1) recognitions of
bona fide hedges under § 150.3(b); (2) spread
exemptions under § 150.3(b); (3) financial distress
positions a person could request from the
Commission under § 140.99(a)(1); and (4)
exemptions for certain natural gas positions held
during the spot month. Final § 150.3(b) also
exempts pre-enactment and transition period
swaps. The enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions identified in
the proposed ‘‘spread transaction’’ definition in
§ 150.1 are self-effectuating.
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enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions or spread exemptions
directly from the Commission (as
previously noted, both enumerated bona
fide hedges and spread exemptions
identified in the proposed ‘‘spread
transaction’’ definition are selfeffectuating and do not require a market
participant to submit an exemption
request to the Commission). Final
§ 150.3(b), (d), and (e) sets forth
exemption-related reporting and
recordkeeping requirements that impact
the current burden estimates in OMB
control number 3038–0013.1668 The
collection of information under final
§ 150.3(b), (d) and (e) is necessary for
the Commission to determine whether
to recognize a trader’s position qualifies
for one of the exemptions from Federal
position limit requirements listed in
§ 150.3(a).
Final § 150.3(b) establishes
application filing requirements and
recordkeeping and reporting
requirements that are similar to existing
requirements for bona fide hedge
recognitions under existing §§ 1.47 and
1.48. Although these requirements in
final § 150.3 are new for market
participants seeking spread exemptions
(which are currently self-effectuating),
the filing, recordkeeping, and reporting
requirements in § 150.3(b) are otherwise
familiar to market participants that have
requested certain bona fide hedging
recognitions from the Commission
under existing regulations.
The Commission estimates that very
few or no traders will request
recognition of a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge, and any traders that do
would likely prefer the streamlined
process in final § 150.9 (discussed
further below) rather than applying
directly to the Commission under final
§ 150.3(b). Similarly, the Commission
estimates that very few or no traders
will submit a request for a spread
exemption since the Commission has
determined that the most common
spread exemptions are included in the
‘‘spread transaction’’ definition and
therefore are self-effectuating and do not
need Commission approval for purposes
of Federal position limits. The
Commission expects that traders are
likely to rely on the § 150.3(b) process
when dealing with a spread transaction
or non-enumerated bona fide hedge
1668 Final § 150.3(f) clarifies the implications on
entities required to aggregate accounts under
§ 150.4, and § 150.3(g) provides for delegation of
certain authorities to the Director of the Division of
Market Oversight. The changes to §§ 150.3(f) and
150.3(g) do not impact the current estimates for
these OMB control numbers. Also, the Final Rule
reminds persons of the relief provisions in § 140.99,
covered by OMB control number 3038–0049, which
does not impact the burden estimates.
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position that poses a novel or complex
question under the Commission’s rules.
Particularly when the exchanges have
not recognized a particular hedging
strategy as a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge previously, the Commission
expects market participants to seek
more regulatory clarity under § 150.3(b).
In the event a trader submits such
request under § 150.3, the Commission
estimates that traders would file one
request per year for a total of one annual
request for all respondents. The
Commission further estimates that in
such situation, it would take 20 hours
to complete and file each report, for a
total of 20 aggregate annual burden
hours for all traders.
Final § 150.3(d) establishes
recordkeeping requirements for persons
who claim any exemptions or relief
under § 150.3. Section 150.3(d) should
help to ensure that if any person claims
any exemption permitted under § 150.3
such exemption holder can demonstrate
compliance with the applicable
requirements as follows:
First, under § 150.3(d)(1), any person
claiming an exemption is required to
keep and maintain complete books and
records concerning certain details.1669
Section 150.3(d)(1) establishes
recordkeeping requirements for any
person relying on an exemption
permitted under final § 150.3(a). Under
§ 150.3(d), the Commission estimates
that 425 traders will create five records
each, per year, for a total of 2,125
annual records for respondents. The
Commission further estimates that it
will take one hour to comply with the
recordkeeping requirement of
§ 150.3(d)(1) for a total of five aggregate
annual burden hours for each trader.
Second, under § 150.3(d)(2), a passthrough swap counterparty, as defined
by § 150.1, that relies on a written
representation received from a bona fide
hedging swap counterparty that the
swap qualifies in good faith as a ‘‘bona
fide hedging position or transaction,’’ as
defined under § 150.1, is required to: (i)
Maintain the relevant books and records
of any such written representation for at
least two years following the expiration
of the swap; and (ii) furnish any books
and records of such written
representation to the Commission upon
request. Section 150.3(d)(2) creates a
new recordkeeping obligation for certain
persons relying on the pass-through
1669 The requirement includes all details of
related cash, forward, futures, options on futures,
and swap positions and transactions (including
anticipated requirements, production,
merchandising activities, royalties, contracts for
services, cash commodity products and byproducts, cross-commodity hedges, and records of
bona fide hedging swap counterparties).
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swap representations, and the
Commission estimates that 425 traders
will be requested to maintain the
required records. The Commission
estimates that each trader will maintain
at least five records per year for a total
of 2,125 aggregate annual records for all
respondents. The Commission further
estimates that it will take one hour to
comply with the recordkeeping
requirement of § 150.3(d) for a total of
five annual burden hours for each trader
and 2,125 aggregate annual burden
hours for all traders.
The Commission is moving existing
§ 150.3(b), which currently allows the
Commission or certain Commission staff
to make special calls to demand certain
information regarding persons claiming
exemptions, to final § 150.3(e), with
some modifications to include
swaps.1670 Together with the
recordkeeping provision of § 150.3(d),
§ 150.3(e) should enable the
Commission to monitor the use of
exemptions from speculative position
limits and help to ensure that any
person who claims any exemption
permitted by § 150.3 can demonstrate
compliance with the applicable
requirements. The Commission’s
existing collection under existing
§ 150.3 estimated that the Commission
issues two special calls per year for
information related to exemptions, and
that each response to a special call for
information takes 3 burden hours to
complete. This includes two burden
hours to fulfill reporting requirements
and one burden hour related to
recordkeeping for an aggregate total for
all respondents of six annual burden
hours, broken down into four aggregate
annual burden hours for reporting and
two aggregate annual burden hours for
recordkeeping.1671
The Commission estimates that
§ 150.3(e) imposes information
collection burdens related to special
calls by the Commission on
approximately 18 additional
respondents, for an estimated 20 special
calls per year.1672 The Commission
1670 Final § 150.3(e) refers to commodity
derivative contracts, whereas existing § 150.3(b)
refers to futures and options on futures. The change
results in the inclusion of swaps.
1671 The special call authority under part 19 and
the special call authority discussed under § 150.3
are similar in nature; however, part 19 applies to
special calls regarding bona fide hedge recognitions
and related underlying cash-market positions while
the special calls under § 150.3 applies to the other
exemptions under § 150.3.
1672 2 respondents subject to special calls under
existing § 150.3 + 18 additional respondents under
final § 150.3 = 20 total respondents. The
Commission estimates, at least during the initial
implementation period, that it is likely to issue
more special calls for information to monitor
compliance with position limits, particularly in the
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estimates that these 20 market
participants will provide one
submission per year to respond to the
special call for a total of 20 annual
submissions for all respondents. The
Commission estimates it will take a
market participant approximately 10
hours to complete a response to a
special call. Therefore, the Commission
estimates responses to special calls for
information will take an aggregate total
of 200 burden hours for all traders.1673
The Commission notes that it is also
maintaining its special call authority for
reporting requirements under part 19
discussed above.
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d. § 150.5 Exchange-Set Limits and
Exemptions
Amendments to § 150.5 refine the
process, and establish non-exclusive
methodologies, by which exchanges
may set exchange-level limits and grant
exemptions therefrom, including
separate methodologies for setting limit
levels for contracts subject to Federal
position limits (§ 150.5(a)) and physical
commodity derivatives not subject to
Federal position limits (§ 150.5(b)).1674
In compliance with part 40 of the
Commission’s regulations, exchanges
currently have policies and procedures
in place to address exemptions from
exchange-set limits through their
rulebooks. The Commission expects that
the exchanges will accordingly update
their rulebooks, both to conform to new
requirements and to incorporate the
additional contracts that are subject to
Federal position limits for the first time
into their process for setting exchangelevel limits and exemptions therefrom.
The collections of information related
to amended rulebooks under part 40 are
covered by OMB control number 3038–
0093. Separately, the collections of
information related to applications for
exemptions from exchange-set limits are
covered by OMB control number 3038–
0013.
Under final § 150.5(a)(1), for any
contract subject to a Federal position
limit, DCMs and, ultimately, SEFs, will
be required to establish exchange-set
position limits for such contracts. Under
final § 150.5(a)(2), exchanges that wish
to grant exemptions from exchange-set
limits on commodity derivative
commodity markets that will now be subject to
Federal position limits for the first time.
1673 20 special calls × 10 burden hours per call
= 200 total burden hours.
1674 Final § 150.5 addresses exchange-set position
limits and exemptions therefrom, whereas final
§ 150.9 addresses Federal position limits and a
streamlined process for purposes of Federal
position limits where an applicant may apply
through an exchange to the Commission for
recognition of an non-enumerated bona fide hedge
for purposes of Federal position limits.
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contracts subject to Federal position
limits must require traders to file an
application that shows a request for a
bona fide hedge recognition or
exemption conforms to a type that may
be granted under final § 150.3(a)(1)–(4).
Exchanges must require that such
exchange-set limit exemption
applications be filed in advance of the
date such position would be in excess
of the limits, but exchanges have the
discretion to adopt rules allowing
traders to file bona fide hedging
applications within five business days
after a trader took on such position due
to sudden or unforeseen increases in the
trader’s bona fide hedging needs. Final
§ 150.5(a)(2) also provides that
exchanges must require that the trader
reapply for the exemption at least
annually. Final § 150.5(a)(4) requires
each exchange to provide a monthly
report showing the disposition of any
exemption application, including the
recognition of any position as a bona
fide hedge, the exemption of any spread
transaction, the renewal, revocation, or
modification of a previously granted
recognition or exemption, or the
rejection of any application.1675
These collections of information
related to exemptions from exchange-set
limits are necessary to ensure that such
exchange-set limits comply with
Commission regulations, including that
exchange limits are no higher than the
applicable Federal level; to establish
minimum standards needed for
exchanges to administer the exchange’s
position limits framework; and to enable
the Commission to oversee an
exchange’s exemptions process to
1675 Additionally, each report should include the
following details: (A) The date of disposition; (B)
The effective date of the disposition; (C) The
expiration date of any recognition or exemption; (D)
Any unique identifier(s) the designated contract
market or swap execution facility may assign to
track the application, or the specific type of
recognition or exemption; (E) If the application is
for an enumerated bona fide hedging transaction or
position, the name of the enumerated bona fide
hedging transaction or position listed in Appendix
A to this part; (F) If the application is for a spread
transaction listed in the spread transaction
definition in § 150.1, the name of the spread
transaction as it is listed in § 150.1; (G) The identity
of the applicant; (H) The listed commodity
derivative contract or position(s) to which the
application pertains; (I) The underlying cash
commodity; (J) The maximum size of the
commodity derivative position that is recognized by
the designated contract market or swap execution
facility as a bona fide hedging transaction or
position, specified by contract month and by the
type of limit as spot month, single month, or allmonths-combined, as applicable; (K) Any size
limitations or conditions established for a spread
exemption or other exemption; and (L) For a bona
fide hedging transaction or position, a concise
summary of the applicant’s activity in the cash
markets and swaps markets for the commodity
underlying the commodity derivative position for
which the application was submitted.
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3449
ensure it does not undermine the
Federal position limits framework. In
addition, the Commission will use the
information to confirm that exemptions
are granted and renewed in accordance
with the types of exemptions that may
be granted under final § 150.3(a)(1)–(4).
The Commission estimates under
final § 150.5(a) that 425 traders will
submit applications to claim spread
exemptions and bona fide hedge
recognitions from exchange-set position
limits on commodity derivatives
contracts subject to Federal position
limits set forth in § 150.2. The
Commission estimates that each trader
on average will submit five applications
to an exchange each year for a total of
2,125 applications for all respondents.
The Commission further estimates that
it will take two hours to complete and
file each application for a total of 10
annual burden hours for each trader and
4,250 aggregate burden hours for all
traders.1676
The Commission estimates under
final § 150.5(a)(4) that six exchanges
will provide monthly reports for an
annual total of 72 monthly reports for
all exchanges.1677 The Commission
further estimates that it will take five
hours to complete and file each monthly
report for a total of 60 annual burden
hours for each exchange and 360 annual
burden hours for all exchanges.1678
Final § 150.5(b) requires exchanges,
for physical commodity derivatives that
are not subject to Federal position
limits, to set limits during the spot
month and to set either limits or
accountability outside of the spot
month. Under § 150.5(b)(3), where
multiple exchanges list contracts that
are substantially the same, including
physically-settled contracts that have
the same underlying commodity and
delivery location, or cash-settled
contracts that are directly or indirectly
linked to a physically-settled contract,
the exchange must either adopt
‘‘comparable’’ limits for such contracts,
or demonstrate to the Commission how
1676 To increase efficiency and reduce duplicative
efforts, the Final Rule permits an exchange to have
a single process in place that allows market
participants to request non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions from both Federal and
exchange-set position limits at the same time. The
Commission believes that under a single process,
the estimated burdens under final § 150.5(a)
discussed in this section for exemptions from
exchange-set limits includes the burdens under the
Federal limit exemption process for nonenumerated bona fide hedges under final § 150.9
discussed below.
1677 6 exchanges × 12 months = 72 total monthly
reports per year.
1678 5 hours per monthly report × 12 months = 60
hours per year for each exchange. 60 annual hours
× 6 exchanges = 360 aggregate annual hours for all
exchanges.
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the non-comparable levels comply with
the standards set forth in § 150.5(b)(1)
and (2). Such a determination also must
address how the levels are necessary
and appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or index.
Final § 150.5(b)(3) is intended to help
ensure that position limits established
on one exchange do not jeopardize
market integrity or otherwise harm other
markets. This provision may also
improve the efficiency with which
exchanges adopt limits on newly-listed
contracts that compete with an existing
contract listed on another exchange and
help reduce the amount of time and
effort needed for Commission staff to
assess the new limit levels. Further,
§ 150.5(b)(3) is consistent with the
Commission’s determination to
generally apply equivalent Federal
position limits to linked contracts,
including linked contracts listed on
multiple exchanges.
The Commission estimates that under
§ 150.5(b)(3), six exchanges will make
submissions to demonstrate to the
Commission how the non-comparable
levels comply with the standards set
forth in § 150.5(b)(1) and (2). The
Commission estimates that each
exchange on average will make three
submissions each year for a total of 18
submissions for all exchanges. The
Commission further estimates that it
will take 10 hours to complete and file
each submission for a total of 18 annual
burden hours for each exchange and 180
burden hours for all exchanges.1679
Final § 150.5(b)(4) permits exchanges
to grant exemptions from any exchange
limit established for physical
commodity contracts not subject to
Federal position limits. To grant such
exemptions, exchanges must require
traders to file an application to show
whether the requested exemption from
exchange-set limits is in accord with
sound commercial practices in the
relevant commodity derivative market
and/or that may be established and
liquidated in an orderly fashion in that
market. This collection of information is
necessary to confirm that any
exemptions granted from exchange
limits on physical commodity contracts
not subject to Federal position limits do
not pose a threat of market
manipulation or congestion, and
maintains orderly execution of
transactions. The Commission estimates
that 200 traders will submit one
application each year and that each
1679 18 estimated annual submissions × 10 burden
hours per submission = 180 aggregate annual
burden hours.
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application will take approximately two
hours to complete, for an aggregate total
of 400 burden hours per year for all
traders.
Final § 150.5(e) reflects that,
consistent with the definition of ‘‘rule’’
in existing § 40.1, any exchange action
establishing or modifying position
limits or exemptions therefrom, or
position accountability, in any case
pursuant to § 150.5(a), (b), or (c),
including related guidance in
Appendices F or G, to part 150, qualifies
as a ‘‘rule’’ and must be submitted to the
Commission pursuant to part 40 of the
Commission’s regulations. Final
§ 150.5(e) further provides that
exchanges are required to review
regularly any position limit levels
established under § 150.5 to ensure the
level continues to comply with the
requirements of those sections. The
Commission estimates under § 150.5(e)
that six exchanges will submit revised
rulebooks to satisfy their compliance
obligations under part 40. The
Commission estimates that each
exchange on average will make one
initial revision of its rulebook to reflect
the new position limit framework for a
total of six applications for all
exchanges. The Commission further
estimates that it will take 30 hours to
revise a rulebook for a total of 30 annual
burden hours for each exchange and 180
burden hours for all exchanges.1680
This collection of information is
necessary to ensure that the exchanges’
rulebooks reflect the most up-to-date
rules and requirements in compliance
with the position limits framework. The
information is used to confirm that
exchanges are complying with their
requirements to regularly review any
position limit levels established under
§ 150.5.
e. § 150.9 Exchange Process for Bona
Fide Hedge Recognitions From Federal
Position Limits
Final § 150.9 establishes a new
streamlined process in which a trader
could apply through an exchange to
request a non-enumerated bona fide
hedging recognition for purposes of
Federal position limits. As part of the
process, final § 150.9 creates certain
recordkeeping and reporting obligations
on the market participant and the
exchange, including: (i) An application
to request non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions, which the trader
submits to the exchange and which the
exchange subsequently provides to the
Commission if the exchange approves
the application for purposes of
1680 6 initial applications × 30 burden hours = 180
initial aggregate burden hours.
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exchange-set limits; (ii) a notification to
the Commission and the applicant of the
exchange’s determination for purposes
of exchange limits regarding the trader’s
request for recognition of a bona fide
hedge or spread exemption; (iii) and a
requirement to maintain full, complete
and systematic records for Commission
review of the exchange’s decisions. The
Commission believes that the exchanges
that will elect to process applications
for non-enumerated bona fide hedging
exemptions under § 150.9(a) already
have similar processes for the review
and disposition of such exemption
applications in place through their
rulebooks for purposes of exchange-set
position limits.
Accordingly, the estimated burden on
an exchange to comply with final
§ 150.9 will be less burdensome because
the exchanges may leverage their
existing policies and procedures to
comply with the Final Rule. The
Commission estimates that six
exchanges will elect to process
applications for non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions that satisfy the
Federal position limit requirements
under final § 150.9, and will be required
to file amended rulebooks pursuant to
part 40 of the Commission’s regulations.
The Commission bases its estimate on
the number of exchanges that have
submitted similar rules to the
Commission in the past.
Final § 150.9(c) requires a trader to
submit an application with certain
information to enable the exchange to
determine whether it should recognize a
position as a bona fide hedge for
purposes of exchange-set position
limits. Each applicant will need to
reapply to the exchange for its nonenumerated bona fide hedge recognition
at least on an annual basis by updating
its original application. The
Commission expects that traders will
benefit from the streamlined framework
established under final § 150.9 because
traders may submit one application to
obtain a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition for purposes of both
exchange-set and Federal position
limits, as opposed to submitting
separate applications to the Commission
for Federal position limit purposes and
separate applications to an exchange for
exchange limit purposes.1681
1681 The Commission believes the collections of
information set forth above are necessary for the
exchange to process requests for recognition of nonenumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of
exchange-set position limits, and separately, if
applicable, for the Commission to make its
determination for purposes of Federal position
limits. The information is used by the exchange to
determine, and the Commission to review and
determine, whether the facts and circumstances
demonstrate it is appropriate to recognize a position
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Accordingly, the estimated burden for
traders requesting non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognitions from exchangeset limits under § 150.5(a) will subsume
the burden estimates in connection with
final § 150.9 for requesting nonenumerated bona fide hedge
recognition’s from Federal position
limits since the Commission believes
exchanges will combine the two
processes (i.e., any trader who applies
through an exchange under final § 150.9
for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
for Federal position limits purposes also
will be deemed to be applying at the
same time under final § 150.5(a) for
exchange position limits purposes and
thus it would not be appropriate to
distinguish between the two for PRA
purposes). Accordingly, the
Commission anticipates that six
exchanges each will receive only one
application for a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition under final
§ 150.9 for a total of six aggregate annual
applications for all exchanges; however,
as noted above, this amount is included
in the Commission’s estimate in
connection with final § 150.5(a).1682
Specifically, as discussed above in
connection with final § 150.5(a), the
Commission estimates under final
§§ 150.5(a) and 150.9(a) that 425 traders
will submit applications to claim
exemptions and/or bona fide hedge
recognitions for contracts subject to
Federal position limits as set forth in
§ 150.2.1683
as a non-enumerated bona fide hedging transaction
or position.
1682 As discussed above, the process and
estimated burdens under final § 150.9 do not apply
to § 150.5(b) because final § 150.5(b) applies to
those physical commodity contracts that are not
subject to Federal position limits (as opposed to
final § 150.5(a), which applies to those contracts
subject to Federal position limits). As a result, a
trader that would use the process established under
§ 150.5(b) for exchange-set limits will not need to
apply under final § 150.9 since the traders would
not need a bona fide hedge recognition or an
exemption from Federal position limits.
1683 As discussed in connection with final
§ 150.5(a) above, the Commission estimates that
each trader on average will make five applications
each year for a total of 2,125 applications across all
exchanges. The Commission further estimates that,
for final §§ 150.5(a) and 150.9(a), taken together, it
will take two hours to complete and file each
application for a total of 10 annual burden hours
for each trader and 4,250 aggregate annual burden
hours for all traders (2,125 total annual applications
× two burden hours per application = 4,250
aggregate annual burden hours). The Commission
anticipates that compared to final § 150.5(a), fewer
traders will apply under final § 150.9 since final
§ 150.9 applies only to non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions for Federal purposes. In
comparison, while final § 150.5 encompasses these
same applications for non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions (but for the purpose of
exchange-set limits), final § 150.5(a) also includes
enumerated bona fide hedge applications along
with spread exemption requests. The Commission’s
estimate of 4,250 aggregate annual burden hours
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Final § 150.9(d) requires exchanges to
keep full, complete, and systematic
records, including all pertinent data and
memoranda, of all activities relating to
the processing of such applications and
the disposition thereof. In addition, as
provided for in final § 150.9(g) and
existing § 1.31, the Commission may, in
its discretion, at any time, review the
exchange’s records retained pursuant to
final § 150.9(d) or request additional
information pursuant to § 150.9(e)(5).
The recordkeeping requirement is
necessary for the Commission to review
the exchanges’ processes, retention of
records, and compliance with
requirements established and
implemented under this section.
Final § 150.9(d) creates a new
recordkeeping obligation consistent
with the standards in existing § 1.31.1684
The Commission estimates that six
exchanges will each create one record in
connection with final § 150.9 each year
for a total of six annual records for all
respondents. The Commission further
estimates that it will take five hours to
comply with the recordkeeping
requirement of § 150.9(d) for a total of
five annual burden hours for each
exchange and 30 aggregate annual
burden hours across all exchanges.
Final § 150.9(d) allows the
Commission to inspect such books and
records.1685 In the event the
Commission exercises its authority to
inspect such books and records, it
estimates that the Commission will
conduct an inspection of two exchanges
per year and each exchange will incur
encompasses all such requests from all traders.
However, for the sake of clarity, the Commission
anticipates that six exchanges each will receive one
application per year for a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge under final § 150.9 (for a total of six
applications across all exchanges); as noted, this
burden is included in the Commission’s estimate of
425 respondents in connection with its estimate
under final § 150.5(a).
1684 Consistent with existing § 1.31, the
Commission expects that these records will be
readily available during the first two years of the
required five-year recordkeeping period for paper
records, and readily accessible for the entire fiveyear recordkeeping period for electronic records. In
addition, the Commission expects that records
required to be maintained by an exchange pursuant
to this section will be readily accessible during the
pendency of any application, and for two years
following any disposition that did not recognize a
derivative position as a bona fide hedge.
1685 Final § 150.9(d)(1) requires the exchange to
keep full, complete, and systematic records, which
include all pertinent data and memoranda, of all
activities relating to the processing of such
applications and the disposition thereof. This
requirement working in concert with § 1.31 allows
the Commission to inspect any such records.
Separately, under § 150.9(e)(5), if the Commission
determines additional information is required to
conduct its review, then it would notify the
exchange and the relevant market participant of any
issues identified and provide them with an
opportunity to provide supplemental information.
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3451
four hours to make its books and records
available to the Commission for review
for a total of eight aggregate annual
burden hours for the two estimated
respondent exchanges.1686
Under final § 150.9(e), an exchange
needs to provide an applicant and the
Commission with notice of any
approved application of an exchange’s
determination to recognize bona fide
hedges with respect to its own position
limits for purposes of exceeding the
Federal position limits. The notification
requirement is necessary to inform the
Commission of the details of the type of
bona fide hedge recognitions being
granted. The information is used to keep
the Commission informed as to the
manner in which an exchange
administers its application procedures,
and the exchange’s rationale for
permitting large positions.
The Commission estimates that under
final § 150.9(e), six exchanges will
submit notifications of approved
application of an exchange’s
determination to recognize nonenumerated bona fide hedges for
purposes of exceeding the Federal
position limits. The Commission
estimates that each exchange on average
will make two notifications: One
notification each to the applicant trader
and to the Commission each year for a
total of 12 notices for all exchanges. The
Commission further estimates that it
will take 0.5 hours to complete and file
each notification for a total of one
annual burden hour for each exchange
and six burden hours for all
exchanges.1687
In addition to submitting a copy of
any exchange-approved nonenumerated bona fide hedge application
to the Commission under § 150.9(e), the
preamble clarifies that an exchange
may, on a voluntary basis, send the
Commission an advance courtesy copy
of the non-enumerated bona fide hedge
application when the exchange first
receives it from the applicant. Although
this advance courtesy copy would be a
voluntary submission, it is still
considered a new information collection
under the PRA. However, the
Commission believes there is no
corresponding burden for this filing
because the Commission considers this
practice to be in the ordinary course of
business as it is usual and customary for
exchanges to provide the Commission
with advance copies of various filings
under other Commission
1686 2 exchanges per year subject to a Commission
inspection × 4 hours per inspection request = 8
aggregate annual burden hours for all exchanges.
1687 Twelve notices for all exchanges × 0.5 hours
per notice = six total burden hours across all
exchanges.
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regulations.1688 In the event that this
practice is not considered usual and
customary, the Commission estimates
that the burden of such filing will be de
minimis and take less than five minutes
for an exchange to send an application
to the Commission, if the exchange
elects to do so (less than 30 total
minutes in the aggregate across all
exchanges: 6 exchanges × 1 advance
copy × less than 5 minutes = less than
30 minutes).
iii. OMB Control Number 3038–0093—
Provisions Common to Registered
Entities
a. § 150.9(a)
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Under final § 150.9(a), exchanges that
would like for their market participants
to be able to exceed Federal position
limits based on a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition granted by the
exchange with respect to its own limits
must maintain rules that establish
processes consistent with the provisions
of final § 150.9 and must seek approval
of such rules from the Commission
pursuant to § 40.5 of the Commission’s
regulations. The collection of
information is necessary to capture the
new non-enumerated bona fide hedge
process in the exchanges’ rulebook,
which is subject to Commission
approval. The information is used to
assess the process put in place by each
exchange submitting amended
rulebooks.
The Commission has previously
estimated the combined annual burden
hours for both §§ 40.5 and 40.6 to be
7,000 hours.1689 Upon implementation
of final § 150.9, the Commission
estimates that six exchanges will each
make one initial § 40.5 rule filing per
year for a total of six one-time initial
submissions for all exchanges. The
Commission further estimates that the
exchanges will employ a combination of
in-house and outside legal and
compliance counsel to update existing
rulebooks and it will take 25 hours to
complete and file each rule for a total 25
one-time burden hours for each
exchange and 150 one-time burden
hours for all exchanges.
1688 For example, exchanges have frequently
submitted advance courtesy copies of new rule
filings and product filings to the Commission under
the part 40 regulations.
1689 The supporting statement for the current
active information collection request, ICR Reference
No: 201503–3038–002, for OMB control number
3038–0013, estimated that seven respondents
would file the §§ 1.47 and 1.48 reports, and that
each respondent would file two reports for a total
of 14 annual responses, requiring three hours per
response, for a total of 42 burden hours for all
respondents.
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C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(‘‘RFA’’) requires that agencies consider
whether the rules they propose will
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities
and, if so, provide a regulatory
flexibility analysis respecting the
impact.1690 A regulatory flexibility
analysis or certification typically is
required for ‘‘any rule for which the
agency publishes a general notice of
proposed rulemaking pursuant to’’ the
notice-and-comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
553(b).1691 The requirements related to
the Final Rule fall mainly on registered
entities, exchanges, FCMs, swap dealers,
clearing members, foreign brokers, and
large traders. The Commission has
previously determined that registered
DCMs, FCMs, swap dealers, major swap
participants, eligible contract
participants, SEFs, clearing members,
foreign brokers and large traders are not
small entities for purposes of the
RFA.1692
Further, while the requirements under
this rulemaking may impact
nonfinancial end users, the Commission
notes that position limits levels apply
only to large traders. Accordingly, the
Chairman, on behalf of the Commission,
hereby certifies, on behalf of the
Commission, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
605(b), that the actions taken herein will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. The Chairman made the same
certification in the 2013 Proposal,1693
the 2016 Supplemental Proposal,1694 the
2016 Reproposal,1695 and the 2020
NPRM.1696
D. Antitrust Considerations
Section 15(b) of the CEA requires the
Commission to take into consideration
1690 44
U.S.C. 601 et seq.
U.S.C. 601(2), 603–05.
1692 See Policy Statement and Establishment of
Definitions of ‘‘Small Entities’’ for Purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 47 FR 18618–19, (Apr.
30, 1982) (DCMs, FCMs, and large traders) (‘‘RFA
Small Entities Definitions’’); Opting Out of
Segregation, 66 FR 20740–20743, (Apr. 25, 2001)
(eligible contract participants); Position Limits for
Futures and Swaps; Final Rule and Interim Final
Rule, 76 FR 71626, 71680, (Nov. 18, 2011) (clearing
members); Core Principles and Other Requirements
for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 FR 33476, 33548,
(Jun. 4, 2013) (SEFs); A New Regulatory Framework
for Clearing Organizations, 66 FR 45604, 45609,
(Aug. 29, 2001) (DCOs); Registration of Swap
Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 FR 2613,
Jan. 19, 2012, (swap dealers and major swap
participants); and Special Calls, 72 FR 50209, (Aug.
31, 2007) (foreign brokers).
1693 See 2013 Proposal, 78 FR at 75784.
1694 See 2016 Supplemental Proposal, 81 FR at
38499.
1695 See 2016 Reproposal, 81 FR at 96894.
1696 See 2020 NPRM, 85 FR at 11708.
1684 5
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the public interest to be protected by the
antitrust laws and endeavor to take the
least anticompetitive means of
achieving the purposes of the CEA, in
issuing any order or adopting any
Commission rule or regulation.1697 The
Commission believes that the public
interest to be protected by the antitrust
laws is generally to protect competition.
In the Proposal, the Commission
requested comments on whether: (1)
The proposed rules could be
anticompetitive; (2) there are other less
anticompetitive means of deterring and
preventing price manipulation or any
other disruptions to market integrity;
and (3) requiring DCOs to impose initial
margin surcharges in lieu of imposing
position limits is feasible.
The Commission does not anticipate
that the position limits regime that it is
adopting today will result in
anticompetitive behavior. To the
contrary, the Commission believes that
the relatively high position limit levels
(coupled with the numerous exemptions
from position limits adopted as part of
this rulemaking) do not establish any
barriers to entry or competitive
restraints. As noted above, the
Commission encouraged comments
from the public on any aspect of the
rulemaking that may have the potential
to be inconsistent with the antitrust
laws or be anticompetitive in nature.
The Commission received two (2)
comments asserting that the proposed
rule may be anticompetitive.
ICE commented that it has concerns
regarding the potential anticompetitive
aspects of the Commission’s approach to
aggregation of contracts across all
exchanges rather than on a per exchange
basis.1698 In particular, ICE asserted that
the aggregation of referenced contracts
across all exchanges by the Commission
fails to comply with the requirements of
Section 15(b) of the CEA that requires
the Commission take into consideration
the public interest to be protected by the
antitrust laws and endeavor to take the
least anticompetitive means of
achieving the purposes of the CEA.1699
ICE noted that an aggregated Federal
position limit, across all exchanges, may
make it very difficult for an exchange to
launch a new contract or that would be
aggregated with an existing contract for
position limit purposes. In addition, ICE
also indicated that launching a new
exchange may even be more difficult
given the aggregate approach to position
limits across exchanges. The underlying
1697 7
U.S.C. 19(b).
at 12.
1699 ICE believes that this is particularly true for
cash-settled contracts and for other contracts
outside of the delivery month.
1698 ICE
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basis for ICE’s assertion is that
aggregation may potentially reduce the
ability of a new exchange or new
contract to attract enough liquidity to
become sustainable. ICE argued that a
more flexible approach to aggregation of
positions that allows each exchange to
develop its own liquidity (and establish
its own limits), even for similar or lookalike contracts, would better advance
the goals of developing robust and
liquid markets while providing
adequate means to protect against
excessive speculation.
Similarly, FIA commented that the
Commission’s aggregation of position
limits across exchanges in connection
with financially-settled reference
contracts ‘‘will reduce innovation and
competition between exchanges because
any new proposed financially-settled
referenced futures contracts will have to
share the same liquidity pool with
existing financially-settled referenced
futures contracts, including
economically-equivalent swaps.’’ 1700
Instead, FIA argued that position limits
should be established per designated
contract spot month limits for
financially-settled referenced contracts
and a separate spot month limit should
be established for economicallyequivalent swaps in order to enhance
competition, innovation and liquidity
for bona fide hedgers.
As an initial legal matter, the
Commission interprets CEA section
4a(a)(6) to generally require aggregated
Federal position limits across
exchanges. CEA section 4a(a)(6) requires
the Commission to ‘‘establish limits . . .
on the aggregate number or amount of
positions . . . across—(A) contracts
listed by designated contract markets
. . . .’’ Accordingly, even if the
Commission were to grant ICE’s claim in
arguendo of possible anti-competitive
affects, the requirement in CEA section
4a(a)(6) that Federal position limits
should apply in the aggregate across
exchanges is dispositive for the
Commission’s approach under the Final
Rule.1701
As stated above in Section II.B.10 of
the preamble, the Commission disagrees
with comments by ICE and FIA
asserting that generally the aggregation
of cash-settled positions across
exchanges would impair competition
and provide a barrier to financial
innovation. Both commenters
1700 FIA
at p. 8.
discussed in the preamble to this release,
however, the Commission is making an exception
under its exemptive authority for position limits in
CEA section 4a(a)(7) for the NYMEX NG referenced
contracts, which will be subject to a per-exchange
position limit level, based on the unique liquidity
characteristics of the natural gas markets.
1701 As
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essentially advocate for a disaggregated
Federal position limit that applies on a
per-exchange basis based on the notion
that this will promote and attract greater
liquidity to the markets regardless of the
potential for manipulation and/or
market disruption. In contrast to these
commenters’ concerns, the Commission
submits that in general an aggregate
position limit framework across
exchanges should promote, not prohibit,
competition and therefore enhance
liquidity formation.1702 The ability to
apply the Federal position limits
framework on a disaggregated basis
would also significantly increase
position limits so that the potential risk
of excessive speculation and
manipulation would become a much
greater concern to the Commission
based on the ability of market
participants to hold larger positions in
the aggregate across exchanges.
Therefore, under the approach
supported by ICE and FIA, the
Commission would be required to readjust Federal position limits to a much
lower level, potentially impacting
liquidity and future financial
innovation. The Commission also
asserts that the application of the
Federal position limit levels across
exchanges promotes innovation and
competition in the marketplace because
the full aggregate position limit level is
available for market participants
regardless of the particular trading
venue/exchange, which, by definition,
promotes greater competition and
significant price discovery.
As noted in the 2020 NPRM and the
preamble of this adopting release,1703
the Commission is aware that exchanges
may also have conflicting and
competing interests in connection with
the adoption of exchange position limits
and accountability levels. Additionally,
the final rules with respect to exchangeset position limits require any new
commodity derivative contract to
establish limits at a ‘‘comparable’’ level
to existing contracts that are
substantially similar (i.e., ‘‘look-alike
contracts’’) on other exchanges unless
the exchange listing the new contract
demonstrates to the satisfaction of
Commission staff, in its product filing
with the Commission, how its levels
comply with the requirements of
1702 The Commission believes that permitting
Federal position limits to apply on a disaggregated,
per-exchange basis also has the potential to further
divide liquidity among several liquidity pools,
which could make accessing liquidity for bona fide
hedgers more difficult and reduce price discovery.
1703 See 85 FR 11596, 11677 at fn. 576; see also
Section II.G. (discussing the § 150.9 process and the
role of the exchanges) and Section II.B.2 (discussing
the role of exchanges in connection with non-spot
month limits under § 150.2).
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3453
§ 150.5(b)(1) and (2). This requirement
could potentially provide competitive
advantages to the ‘‘first mover’’
exchange since such exchange could
effectively establish the position limit
for all other exchanges that seek to list
and trade substantially similar
contracts.
Although the Commission
acknowledges these competitive
concerns, the Commission believes that
these concerns are mitigated because (i)
an exchange is required to submit any
proposed position limits to the
Commission under part 40 of the
Commission’s regulations and (ii) an
exchange is required pursuant to
§ 150.5(b) to set limits that are necessary
and appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or index.
In addition, for those commodity
derivative contracts that are subject to a
Federal speculative position limit under
§ 150.2, the limit set by the exchange
can be no higher than Federal
speculative position limit specified in
§ 150.2. The Commission believes that
exchanges have significant incentives to
maintain well-functioning markets to
remain competitive with other
exchanges. Market participants may
choose exchanges that are less
susceptible to sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes
caused by excessive speculation or
corners, squeezes, and manipulation,
which could, among other things, harm
the price discovery function of the
commodity derivative contracts and
negatively impact the delivery of the
underlying commodity, bona fide
hedging strategies, and market
participants’ general risk
management.1704 Furthermore, several
academic studies, including one
concerning futures exchanges and
another concerning demutualized stock
exchanges, support the conclusion that
exchanges are able to both satisfy
shareholder interests and meet their
self-regulatory organization
responsibilities.1705
1704 Kane, Stephen, Exploring price impact
liquidity for December 2016 NYMEX energy
contracts, n.33, available at https://www.cftc.gov/
sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@
economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_
priceimpact.pdf.
1705 See David Reiffen and Michel A. Robe,
Demutualization and Customer Protection at SelfRegulatory Financial Exchanges, Journal of Futures
Markets, Vol. 31, 126–164, Feb. 2011 (in many
circumstances, an exchange that maximizes
shareholder (rather than member) income has a
greater incentive to aggressively enforce regulations
that protect participants from dishonest agents); and
Kobana Abukari and Isaac Otchere, Has Stock
Exchange Demutualization Improved Market
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The Commission has determined that
the position limit rules adopted today
serve the regulatory purpose of the CEA
‘‘to deter and prevent price
manipulation or any other disruptions
to market integrity.’’ 1706 In addition, the
Commission notes that the adopted
position limit rules implement
additional purposes and policies set
forth in section 4a(a) of the CEA.1707
The Commission has considered the
rulemaking and related comments to
determine whether it is anticompetitive,
and continues to believe that the
position limits rulemaking will not
result in any unreasonable restraint of
trade or impose any material
anticompetitive burden on trading in
the markets.
17 CFR Part 19
Commodity futures, Cottons, Grains,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swaps.
■
17 CFR Part 40
Commodity futures, Procedural rules,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
*
Final Regulatory Text and Related
Appendices
17 CFR Part 151
Bona fide hedging, Commodity
futures, Cotton, Grains, Position limits,
Referenced Contracts, Swaps.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR
chapter I as follows:
List of Subjects
17 CFR Part 1
Agricultural commodity, Agriculture,
Brokers, Committees, Commodity
futures, Conflicts of interest, Consumer
protection, Definitions, Designated
contract markets, Directors, Major swap
participants, Minimum financial
requirements for intermediaries,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swap dealers, Swaps.
17 CFR Part 15
Brokers, Commodity futures,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swaps.
1. The authority citation for part 1
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6a, 6b, 6c,
6d, 6e, 6f, 6g, 6h, 6i, 6k, 6l, 6m, 6n, 6o, 6p,
6r, 6s, 7, 7a–1, 7a–2, 7b, 7b–3, 8, 9, 10a, 12,
12a, 12c, 13a, 13a–1, 16, 16a, 19, 21, 23, and
24 (2012).
[Amended]
2. In § 1.3, remove the definition of
the term ‘‘bona fide hedging
transactions and positions for excluded
commodities’’.
Quality? International Evidence, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Dec 09, 2019,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00863-y
(demutualized exchanges have realized significant
reductions in transaction costs in the postdemutualization period).
1706 Section 3(b) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
1707 7 U.S.C. 7a(a) (burdens on interstate
commerce; trading or position limits).
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PART 1—GENERAL REGULATIONS
UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT
■
Brokers, Commodity futures,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swaps.
03:06 Jan 14, 2021
17 CFR Part 150
Bona fide hedging, Commodity
futures, Cotton, Grains, Position limits,
Referenced Contracts, Swaps.
§ 1.3
17 CFR Part 17
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17 CFR Part 140
Authority delegations (Government
agencies), Conflict of interests,
Organizations and functions
(Government agencies).
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PART 15—REPORTS—GENERAL
PROVISIONS
3. The authority citation for part 15
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2, 5, 6a, 6c, 6f, 6g, 6i,
6k, 6m, 6n, 7, 7a, 9, 12a, 19, and 21, as
amended by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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4. In § 15.00, revise paragraph (p)(1) to
read as follows:
§ 15.00 Definitions of terms used in parts
15 to 19, and 21 of this chapter.
*
*
*
*
(p) * * *
(1) For reports specified in parts 17
and 18 and in § 19.00(a) and (b) of this
chapter, any open contract position that
at the close of the market on any
business day equals or exceeds the
quantity specified in § 15.03 in either:
(i) Any one futures of any commodity
on any one reporting market, excluding
futures contracts against which notices
of delivery have been stopped by a
trader or issued by the clearing
organization of the reporting market; or
(ii) Long or short put or call options
that exercise into the same futures
contract of any commodity, or other
long or short put or call commodity
options that have identical expirations
and exercise into the same commodity,
on any one reporting market.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 5. In § 15.01, revise paragraph (d) to
read as follows:
§ 15.01
Persons required to report.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Persons, as specified in part 19 of
this chapter, who:
(1) Are merchants or dealers of cotton
holding or controlling positions for
future delivery in cotton that equal or
exceed the amount set forth in § 15.03;
or
(2) Are persons who have received a
special call from the Commission or its
designee under § 19.00(b) of this
chapter.
*
*
*
*
*
■
6. Revise § 15.02 to read as follows:
§ 15.02
Reporting forms.
Forms on which to report may be
obtained from any office of the
Commission or via https://www.cftc.gov.
Listed below are the forms to be used for
the filing of reports. To determine who
shall file these forms, refer to the
Commission rule listed in the column
opposite the form number.
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7. The authority citation for part 17
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2, 6a, 6c, 6d, 6f, 6g,
6i, 6t, 7, 7a, and 12a.
8. In § 17.00, revise paragraph (b)
introductory text to read as follows:
■
§ 17.00 Information to be furnished by
futures commission merchants, clearing
members and foreign brokers.
*
*
*
*
(b) Interest in or control of several
accounts. Except as otherwise
instructed by the Commission or its
designee and as specifically provided in
§ 150.4 of this chapter, if any person
holds or has a financial interest in or
controls more than one account, all such
accounts shall be considered by the
futures commission merchant, clearing
member, or foreign broker as a single
account for the purpose of determining
special account status and for reporting
purposes.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 9. In § 17.03, add paragraph (i) to read
as follows:
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*
§ 17.03 Delegation of authority to the
Director of the Office of Data and
Technology or the Director of the Division
of Market Oversight.
*
*
*
*
*
(i) Pursuant to § 17.00(b), and as
specifically provided in § 150.4 of this
chapter, the authority shall be
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designated to the Director of the Office
of Data and Technology to instruct a
futures commission merchant, clearing
member, or foreign broker to consider
otherwise than as a single account for
the purpose of determining special
account status and for reporting
purposes all accounts one person holds
or controls, or in which the person has
a financial interest.
■ 10. Revise part 19 to read as follows:
PART 19—REPORTS BY PERSONS
HOLDING REPORTABLE POSITIONS
IN EXCESS OF POSITION LIMITS, AND
BY MERCHANTS AND DEALERS IN
COTTON
Sec.
19.00 Who shall furnish information.
19.01 [Reserved]
19.02 Reports pertaining to cotton on call
purchases and sales.
19.03 Delegation of authority to the Director
of the Division of Enforcement.
19.04–19.10 [Reserved]
Appendix A to Part 19—Form 304
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 6g, 6c(b), 6i, and
12a(5).
§ 19.00
Who shall furnish information.
(a) Persons filing cotton-on-call
reports. Merchants and dealers of cotton
holding or controlling positions for
future delivery in cotton that are
reportable pursuant to § 15.00(p)(1)(i) of
this chapter shall file CFTC Form 304.
(b) Persons responding to a special
call. All persons: Exceeding speculative
position limits under § 150.2 of this
chapter; or holding or controlling
positions for future delivery that are
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reportable pursuant to § 15.00(p)(1) of
this chapter and who have received a
special call from the Commission or its
designee shall file any pertinent
information as instructed in the special
call. Filings in response to a special call
shall be made within one business day
of receipt of the special call unless
otherwise specified in the call. Such
filing shall be transmitted using the
format, coding structure, and electronic
data submission procedures approved in
writing by the Commission.
§ 19.01
[Reserved]
§ 19.02 Reports pertaining to cotton on
call purchases and sales.
(a) Information required. Persons
required to file CFTC Form 304 reports
under § 19.00(a) shall file CFTC Form
304 reports showing the quantity of call
cotton bought or sold on which the
price has not been fixed, together with
the respective futures on which the
purchase or sale is based. As used
herein, call cotton refers to spot cotton
bought or sold, or contracted for
purchase or sale at a price to be fixed
later based upon a specified future.
(b) Time and place of filing reports.
Each CFTC Form 304 report shall be
made weekly, dated as of the close of
business on Friday, and filed not later
than 9 a.m. Eastern Time on the third
business day following that Friday using
the format, coding structure, and
electronic data transmission procedures
approved in writing by the Commission.
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§ 19.03 Delegation of authority to the
Director of the Division of Enforcement.
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(a) The Commission hereby delegates,
until it orders otherwise, the authority
in § 19.00(b) to issue special calls to the
Director of the Division of Enforcement,
or such other employee or employees as
the Director may designate from time to
time.
(b) The Commission hereby delegates,
until it orders otherwise, to the Director
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of the Division of Enforcement, or such
other employee or employees as the
Director may designate from time to
time, the authority in § 19.00(b) to
provide instructions or to determine the
format, coding structure, and electronic
data transmission procedures for
submitting data records and any other
information required under this part.
(c) The Director of the Division of
Enforcement may submit to the
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Commission for its consideration any
matter which has been delegated in this
section.
(d) Nothing in this section prohibits
the Commission, at its election, from
exercising the authority delegated in
this section.
§ § 19.04—19.10
[Reserved]
Appendix A to Part 19—Form 304
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
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BILLING CODE 6351–01–C
PART 40—PROVISIONS COMMON TO
REGISTERED ENTITIES
11. The authority citation for part 40
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 7, 7a, 8 and
12, as amended by Titles VII and VIII of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Public Pub. L.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
12. In § 40.1, revise paragraphs
(j)(1)(vii) and (j)(2)(vii) to read as
follows:
■
§ 40.1
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13. The authority citation for part 140
continues to read as follows:
*
*
*
*
(j) * * *
(1) * * *
(vii) Speculative position limits,
position accountability standards, and
position reporting requirements,
including an indication as to whether
the contract meets the definition of a
referenced contract as defined in § 150.1
of this chapter, and, if so, the name of
either the core referenced futures
contract or other referenced contract
upon which the new referenced contract
submitted under this part 40 is based.
*
*
*
*
*
(2) * * *
(vii) Speculative position limits,
position accountability standards, and
position reporting requirements,
including an indication as to whether
the contract meets the definition of
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PART 140—ORGANIZATION,
FUNCTIONS, AND PROCEDURES OF
THE COMMISSION
■
Definitions.
*
economically equivalent swap as
defined in § 150.1 of this chapter, and,
if so, the name of either the core
referenced futures contract or referenced
contract, as applicable, to which the
swap submitted under this part 40 is
economically equivalent.
*
*
*
*
*
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2(a) (12), 12a, 13(c),
13(d), 13(e), and 16(b).
§ 140.97
■
[Removed and Reserved]
14. Remove and reserve § 140.97.
PART 150—LIMITS ON POSITIONS
15. The authority citation for part 150
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6a, 6c, 6f,
6g, 6t, 12a, and 19, as amended by Title VII
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
■
16. Revise § 150.1 to read as follows:
§ 150.1
Definitions.
As used in this part—
Bona fide hedging transaction or
position means a transaction or position
in commodity derivative contracts in a
physical commodity, where:
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(1) Such transaction or position:
(i) Represents a substitute for
transactions made or to be made, or
positions taken or to be taken, at a later
time in a physical marketing channel;
(ii) Is economically appropriate to the
reduction of price risks in the conduct
and management of a commercial
enterprise; and
(iii) Arises from the potential change
in the value of—
(A) Assets which a person owns,
produces, manufactures, processes, or
merchandises or anticipates owning,
producing, manufacturing, processing,
or merchandising;
(B) Liabilities which a person owes or
anticipates incurring; or
(C) Services that a person provides or
purchases, or anticipates providing or
purchasing; or
(2) Such transaction or position
qualifies as a:
(i) Pass-through swap and passthrough swap offset pair. Paired
positions of a pass-through swap and a
pass-through swap offset, where:
(A) The pass-through swap is a swap
position entered into by one person for
which the swap would qualify as a bona
fide hedging transaction or position
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
definition (the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty) that is opposite another
person (the pass-through swap
counterparty);
(B) The pass-through swap offset:
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(1) Is a futures contract position,
option on a futures contract position, or
swap position entered into by the passthrough swap counterparty; and
(2) Reduces the pass-through swap
counterparty’s price risks attendant to
the pass-through swap; and
(C) With respect to the pass-through
swap offset, the pass-through swap
counterparty receives from the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty a written
representation that the pass-through
swap qualifies as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this definition, and the
pass-through swap counterparty may
rely in good faith on such written
representation, unless the pass-through
swap counterparty has information that
would cause a reasonable person to
question the accuracy of the
representation; or
(ii) Offset of a bona fide hedger’s
qualifying swap position. A futures
contract position, option on a futures
contract position, or swap position
entered into by a bona fide hedging
swap counterparty that reduces price
risks attendant to a previously-enteredinto swap position that qualified as a
bona fide hedging transaction or
position at the time it was entered into
for that counterparty pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this definition.
Commodity derivative contract means
any futures contract, option on a futures
contract, or swap in a commodity (other
than a security futures product as
defined in section 1a(45) of the Act).
Core referenced futures contract
means a futures contract that is listed in
§ 150.2(d).
Economically equivalent swap means,
with respect to a particular referenced
contract, any swap that has identical
material contractual specifications,
terms, and conditions to such
referenced contract.
(1) Other than as provided in
paragraph (2) of this definition, for the
purpose of determining whether a swap
is an economically equivalent swap
with respect to a particular referenced
contract, the swap shall not be deemed
to lack identical material contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions
due to different lot size specifications or
notional amounts, delivery dates
diverging by less than one calendar day,
or different post-trade risk management
arrangements.
(2) With respect to any natural gas
referenced contract, for the purpose of
determining whether a swap is an
economically equivalent swap to such
referenced contract, the swap shall not
be deemed to lack identical material
contractual specifications, terms, and
conditions due to different lot size
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specifications or notional amounts,
delivery dates diverging by less than
two calendar days, or different posttrade risk management arrangements.
(3) With respect to any referenced
contract or class of referenced contracts,
the Commission may make a
determination that any swap or class of
swaps satisfies, or does not satisfy, this
economically equivalent swap
definition.
Eligible affiliate means an entity with
respect to which another person:
(1) Directly or indirectly holds either:
(i) A majority of the equity securities
of such entity, or
(ii) The right to receive upon
dissolution of, or the contribution of, a
majority of the capital of such entity;
(2) Reports its financial statements on
a consolidated basis under Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles or
International Financial Reporting
Standards, and such consolidated
financial statements include the
financial results of such entity; and
(3) Is required to aggregate the
positions of such entity under § 150.4
and does not claim an exemption from
aggregation for such entity.
Eligible entity means a commodity
pool operator; the operator of a trading
vehicle which is excluded, or which
itself has qualified for exclusion from
the definition of the term ‘‘pool’’ or
‘‘commodity pool operator,’’
respectively, under § 4.5 of this chapter;
the limited partner, limited member or
shareholder in a commodity pool the
operator of which is exempt from
registration under § 4.13 of this chapter;
a commodity trading advisor; a bank or
trust company; a savings association; an
insurance company; or the separately
organized affiliates of any of the above
entities:
(1) Which authorizes an independent
account controller independently to
control all trading decisions with
respect to the eligible entity’s client
positions and accounts that the
independent account controller holds
directly or indirectly, or on the eligible
entity’s behalf, but without the eligible
entity’s day-to-day direction; and
(2) Which maintains:
(i) Only such minimum control over
the independent account controller as is
consistent with its fiduciary
responsibilities to the managed
positions and accounts, and necessary
to fulfill its duty to supervise diligently
the trading done on its behalf; or
(ii) If a limited partner, limited
member or shareholder of a commodity
pool the operator of which is exempt
from registration under § 4.13 of this
chapter, only such limited control as is
consistent with its status.
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Entity means a ‘‘person’’ as defined in
section 1a of the Act.
Excluded commodity means an
‘‘excluded commodity’’ as defined in
section 1a of the Act.
Futures-equivalent means:
(1)(i) An option contract, whether an
option on a futures contract or an option
that is a swap, which has been:
(A) Adjusted by an economically
reasonable and analytically supported
exposure to price changes of the
underlying referenced contract that has
been computed for that option contract
as of the previous day’s close or the
current day’s close or computed
contemporaneously during the trading
day, and
(B) Converted to an economically
equivalent amount of an open position
in the underlying referenced contract.
(ii) An entity is allowed one business
day to liquidate an amount of the
position that is in excess of speculative
position limits without being
considered in violation of the
speculative position limits if such
excess position results from:
(A) A position that exceeds
speculative position limits as a result of
an option contract assignment; or
(B) A position that includes an option
contract that exceeds speculative
position limits when the applicable
option contract is adjusted by an
economically reasonable and
analytically supported exposure to price
changes of the underlying referenced
contract as of that business day’s close
of trading, as long as the applicable
option contract does not exceed such
speculative position limits when
evaluated using the previous business
day’s exposure to the underlying
referenced contract. This paragraph (B)
shall not apply if such day would be the
last trading day of the spot month for
the corresponding core referenced
futures contract.
(2) A futures contract which has been
converted to an economically equivalent
amount of an open position in a core
referenced futures contract; and
(3) A swap which has been converted
to an economically equivalent amount
of an open position in a core referenced
futures contract.
Independent account controller
means a person:
(1) Who specifically is authorized by
an eligible entity, as defined in this
section, independently to control
trading decisions on behalf of, but
without the day-to-day direction of, the
eligible entity;
(2) Over whose trading the eligible
entity maintains only such minimum
control as is consistent with its
fiduciary responsibilities for managed
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positions and accounts to fulfill its duty
to supervise diligently the trading done
on its behalf or as is consistent with
such other legal rights or obligations
which may be incumbent upon the
eligible entity to fulfill;
(3) Who trades independently of the
eligible entity and of any other
independent account controller trading
for the eligible entity;
(4) Who has no knowledge of trading
decisions by any other independent
account controller; and
(5) Who is:
(i) Registered as a futures commission
merchant, an introducing broker, a
commodity trading advisor, or an
associated person of any such registrant,
or
(ii) A general partner, managing
member or manager of a commodity
pool the operator of which is excluded
from registration under § 4.5(a)(4) of this
chapter or § 4.13 of this chapter,
provided that such general partner,
managing member or manager complies
with the requirements of § 150.4(c).
Long position means, on a futuresequivalent basis, a long call option, a
short put option, a long underlying
futures contract, or a swap position that
is equivalent to a long futures contract.
Physical commodity means any
agricultural commodity as that term is
defined in § 1.3 of this chapter or any
exempt commodity as that term is
defined in section 1a of the Act.
Position accountability means any
bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution
that:
(1) Is submitted to the Commission
pursuant to part 40 of this chapter in
lieu of, or along with, a speculative
position limit, and
(2) Requires an entity whose position
exceeds the accountability level to
consent to:
(i) Provide information about its
position to the designated contract
market or swap execution facility; and
(ii) Halt increasing further its position
or reduce its position in an orderly
manner, in each case as requested by the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility.
Pre-enactment swap means any swap
entered into prior to enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (July 21, 2010),
the terms of which have not expired as
of the date of enactment of that Act.
Pre-existing position means any
position in a commodity derivative
contract acquired in good faith prior to
the effective date of any bylaw, rule,
regulation, or resolution that specifies a
speculative position limit level or a
subsequent change to that level.
Referenced contract means:
(1) A core referenced futures contract
listed in § 150.2(d) or, on a futures-
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equivalent basis with respect to a
particular core referenced futures
contract, a futures contract or an option
on a futures contract, including a
spread, that is either:
(i) Directly or indirectly linked,
including being partially or fully settled
on, or priced at a fixed differential to,
the price of that particular core
referenced futures contract; or
(ii) Directly or indirectly linked,
including being partially or fully settled
on, or priced at a fixed differential to,
the price of the same commodity
underlying that particular core
referenced futures contract for delivery
at the same location or locations as
specified in that particular core
referenced futures contract; or
(2) On a futures-equivalent basis, an
economically equivalent swap.
(3) The definition of referenced
contract does not include a location
basis contract, a commodity index
contract, any guarantee of a swap, a
trade option that meets the requirements
of § 32.3 of this chapter, any outright
price reporting agency index contract, or
any monthly average pricing contract.
Short position means, on a futuresequivalent basis, a short call option, a
long put option, a short underlying
futures contract, or a swap position that
is equivalent to a short futures contract.
Speculative position limit means the
maximum position, either net long or
net short, in a commodity derivative
contract that may be held or controlled
by one person absent an exemption,
whether such limits are adopted for:
(1) Combined positions in all
commodity derivative contracts in a
particular commodity, including the
spot month futures contract and all
single month futures contracts (the spot
month and all single month futures
contracts, cumulatively, ‘‘all-monthscombined’’);
(2) Positions in a single month of
commodity derivative contracts in a
particular commodity other than the
spot month futures contract (‘‘single
month’’); or
(3) Positions in the spot month of
commodity derivative contacts in a
particular commodity. Such a limit may
be established under Federal regulations
or rules of a designated contract market
or swap execution facility. For
referenced contracts other than core
referenced futures contracts, single
month means the same period as that of
the relevant core referenced futures
contract.
Spot month means:
(1) For physical-delivery core
referenced futures contracts, the period
of time beginning at the earlier of:
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(i) The close of business on the
trading day preceding the first day on
which delivery notices can be issued by
the clearing organization of a contract
market or
(ii) The close of business on the
trading day preceding the third-to-last
trading day and ending when the
contract expires, except as follows:
(A) For the ICE Futures U.S. Sugar No.
11 (SB) core referenced futures contract,
the spot month means the period of time
beginning at the opening of trading on
the second business day following the
expiration of the regular option contract
traded on the expiring futures contract
and ending when the contract expires;
(B) For the ICE Futures U.S. Sugar No.
16 (SF) core referenced futures contract,
the spot month means the period of time
beginning on the third-to-last trading
day of the contract month and ending
when the contract expires; and
(C) For the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange Live Cattle (LC) core
referenced futures contract, the spot
month means the period of time
beginning at the close of trading on the
first business day following the first
Friday of the contract month and ending
when the contract expires; and
(2) For referenced contracts other than
core referenced futures contracts, the
spot month means the same period as
that of the relevant core referenced
futures contract.
Spread transaction means an intramarket spread, inter-market spread,
intra-commodity spread, or intercommodity spread, including a calendar
spread, quality differential spread,
processing spread, product or byproduct differential spread, or futuresoption spread.
Swap means ‘‘swap’’ as that term is
defined in section 1a of the Act and as
further defined in § 1.3 of this chapter.
Swap dealer means ‘‘swap dealer’’ as
that term is defined in section 1a of the
Act and as further defined in § 1.3 of
this chapter.
Transition period swap means a swap
entered into during the period
commencing on the day of the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 (July 21, 2010), and ending 60 days
after the publication in the Federal
Register of final amendments to this
part implementing section 737 of the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the terms of
which have not expired as of 60 days
after the publication date.
■ 17. Revise § 150.2 to read as follows:
§ 150.2
Federal speculative position limits.
(a) Spot month speculative position
limits. For physical-delivery referenced
contracts and, separately, for cashsettled referenced contracts, no person
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may hold or control positions in the
spot month, net long or net short, in
excess of the levels specified by the
Commission.
(b) Single month and all-monthscombined speculative position limits.
For any referenced contract, no person
may hold or control positions in a single
month or in all-months-combined
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(including the spot month), net long or
net short, in excess of the levels
specified by the Commission.
(c) Relevant contract month. For
purposes of this part, for referenced
contracts other than core referenced
futures contracts, the spot month and
any single month shall be the same as
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those of the relevant core referenced
futures contract.
(d) Core referenced futures contracts.
Federal speculative position limits
apply to referenced contracts based on
the following core referenced futures
contracts:
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
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BILLING CODE 6351–01–C
(e) Establishment of speculative
position limit levels. The levels of
Federal speculative position limits are
fixed by the Commission at the levels
listed in appendix E to this part.
(f) Designated contract market
estimates of deliverable supply. Each
designated contract market listing a core
referenced futures contract shall supply
to the Commission an estimated spot
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month deliverable supply upon request
by the Commission, and may supply
such estimates to the Commission at any
other time. Each estimate shall be
accompanied by a description of the
methodology used to derive the estimate
and any statistical data supporting the
estimate, and shall be submitted using
the format and procedures approved in
writing by the Commission. A
designated contract market should use
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3467
the guidance regarding deliverable
supply in appendix C to part 38 of this
chapter.
(g) Pre-existing positions—(1) Preexisting positions in a spot month. A
spot month speculative position limit
established under this section shall
apply to pre-existing positions, other
than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps.
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(2) Pre-existing positions in a nonspot month. A single month or allmonths-combined speculative position
limit established under this section
shall apply to pre-existing positions,
other than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps.
(h) Positions on foreign boards of
trade. The speculative position limits
established under this section shall
apply to a person’s combined positions
in referenced contracts, including
positions executed on, or pursuant to
the rules of, a foreign board of trade,
pursuant to section 4a(a)(6) of the Act,
provided that:
(1) Such referenced contracts settle
against any price (including the daily or
final settlement price) of one or more
contracts listed for trading on a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility; and
(2) The foreign board of trade makes
available such referenced contracts to its
members or other participants located in
the United States through direct access
to its electronic trading and order
matching system.
(i) Anti-evasion provision. For the
purposes of applying the speculative
position limits in this section, if used to
willfully circumvent or evade
speculative position limits:
(1) A commodity index contract,
monthly average pricing contract,
outright price reporting agency index
contract, and/or a location basis contract
shall be considered to be a referenced
contract;
(2) A bona fide hedging transaction or
position recognition or spread
exemption shall no longer apply; and
(3) A swap shall be considered to be
an economically equivalent swap.
(j) Delegation of authority to the
Director of the Division of Market
Oversight. (1) The Commission hereby
delegates, until it orders otherwise, to
the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight or such other employee or
employees as the Director may designate
from time to time, the authority in
paragraph (f) of this section to request
estimated spot month deliverable
supply from a designated contract
market and to provide the format and
procedures for submitting such
estimates.
(2) The Director of the Division of
Market Oversight may submit to the
Commission for its consideration any
matter which has been delegated in this
section.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits
the Commission, at its election, from
exercising the authority delegated in
this section.
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(k) Eligible affiliates and aggregation.
For purposes of this part, if an eligible
affiliate meets the conditions for any
exemption from aggregation under
§ 150.4, the eligible affiliate may choose
to utilize that exemption, or it may opt
to be aggregated with its affiliated
entities.
■ 18. Revise § 150.3 to read as follows:
§ 150.3
Exemptions.
(a) Positions which may exceed limits.
A person may exceed the speculative
position limits set forth in § 150.2 to the
extent that all applicable requirements
in this part are met, provided that such
person’s transactions or positions each
satisfy one of the following:
(1) Bona fide hedging transactions or
positions. Positions that comply with
the bona fide hedging transaction or
position definition in § 150.1, and are:
(i) Enumerated in appendix A to this
part; or
(ii) Approved as non-enumerated
bona fide hedging transactions or
positions in accordance with paragraph
(b)(4) of this section or § 150.9.
(2) Spread transactions. Transactions
that:
(i) Meet the spread transaction
definition in § 150.1; or
(ii) Do not meet the spread transaction
definition in § 150.1, but have been
approved by the Commission pursuant
to paragraph (b)(4) of this section.
(3) Financial distress positions.
Positions of a person, or a related person
or persons, under financial distress
circumstances, when exempted by the
Commission from any of the
requirements of this part in response to
a specific request made pursuant to
§ 140.99(a)(1) of this chapter, where
financial distress circumstances
include, but are not limited to,
situations involving the potential
default or bankruptcy of a customer of
the requesting person or persons, an
affiliate of the requesting person or
persons, or a potential acquisition target
of the requesting person or persons.
(4) Conditional spot month limit
exemption positions in natural gas. Spot
month positions in natural gas cashsettled referenced contracts that exceed
the spot month speculative position
limit set forth in § 150.2, provided that:
(i) Such positions do not exceed the
futures-equivalent of 10,000 NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas core referenced
futures contracts per designated contract
market that lists a cash-settled
referenced contract in natural gas;
(ii) Such positions do not exceed the
futures-equivalent of 10,000 NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas core referenced
futures contracts in economically
equivalent swaps in natural gas; and
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(iii) The person holding or controlling
such positions does not hold or control
positions in spot month physicaldelivery referenced contracts in natural
gas.
(5) Pre-enactment and transition
period swaps exemption. The
speculative position limits set forth in
§ 150.2 shall not apply to positions
acquired in good faith in any preenactment swap or any transition period
swap, provided however that a person
may net such positions with posteffective date commodity derivative
contracts for the purpose of complying
with any non-spot month speculative
position limit.
(b) Application for relief. Any person
with a position in a referenced contract
seeking recognition of such position as
a bona fide hedging transaction or
position in accordance with paragraph
(a)(1)(ii) of this section, or seeking an
exemption for a spread position in
accordance with paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) of
this section, in each case for purposes
of Federal speculative position limits set
forth in § 150.2, may apply to the
Commission in accordance with this
section.
(1) Required information. The
application shall include the following
information:
(i) With respect to an application for
recognition of a bona fide hedging
transaction or position:
(A) A description of the position in
the commodity derivative contract for
which the application is submitted,
including but not necessarily limited to,
the name of the underlying commodity
and the derivative position size;
(B) An explanation of the hedging
strategy, including a statement that the
position complies with the requirements
of section 4a(c)(2) of the Act and the
definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in § 150.1, and
information to demonstrate why the
position satisfies such requirements and
definition;
(C) A statement concerning the
maximum size of all gross positions in
commodity derivative contracts for
which the application is submitted;
(D) A description of the applicant’s
activity in the cash markets and swaps
markets for the commodity underlying
the position for which the application is
submitted, including, but not
necessarily limited to, information
regarding the offsetting cash positions;
and
(E) Any other information that may
help the Commission determine
whether the position satisfies the
requirements of section 4a(c)(2) of the
Act and the definition of bona fide
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hedging transaction or position in
§ 150.1.
(ii) With respect to an application for
a spread exemption:
(A) A description of the spread
position for which the application is
submitted;
(B) A statement concerning the
maximum size of all gross positions in
commodity derivative contracts for
which the application is submitted; and
(C) Any other information that may
help the Commission determine
whether the position is consistent with
section 4a(a)(3)(B) of the Act.
(2) Additional information. If the
Commission determines that it requires
additional information in order to
determine whether to recognize a
position as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position or to grant a
spread exemption, the Commission
shall:
(i) Notify the applicant of any
supplemental information required; and
(ii) Provide the applicant with ten
business days in which to provide the
Commission with any supplemental
information.
(3) Timing of application. (i) Except as
provided in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this
section, a person seeking relief in
accordance with this section must apply
to the Commission and receive a notice
of approval of such application prior to
the date that the position for which the
application was submitted would be in
excess of the applicable Federal
speculative position limit set forth in
§ 150.2;
(ii) Due to demonstrated sudden or
unforeseen increases in its bona fide
hedging needs, a person may apply for
recognition of a bona fide hedging
transaction or position within five
business days after the person
established the position that exceeded
the applicable Federal speculative
position limit.
(A) Any application filed pursuant to
paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section must
include an explanation of the
circumstances warranting the sudden or
unforeseen increases in bona fide
hedging needs.
(B) If an application filed pursuant to
paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section is
denied, the person must bring its
position within the Federal speculative
position limits within a commercially
reasonable time, as determined by the
Commission in consultation with the
applicant and the applicable designated
contract market or swap execution
facility.
(C) If an application filed pursuant to
paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section is
denied, the Commission will not pursue
an enforcement action for a position
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limits violation for the person holding
the position during the period of the
Commission’s review nor once the
Commission has issued its
determination so long as the application
was submitted in good faith and the
person brings its position within the
Federal speculative position limits
within a commercially reasonable time
in accordance with paragraph
(b)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.
(4) Commission determination. After a
review of any application submitted
under paragraph (b) of this section and
any supplemental information provided
by the applicant, the Commission will
determine, with respect to the
transaction or position for which the
application is submitted, whether to
recognize all or a specified portion of
such transaction or position as a bona
fide hedging transaction or position or
whether to exempt all or a specified
portion of such spread transaction, as
applicable. The Commission shall notify
the applicant of its determination, and
an applicant may exceed Federal
speculative position limits set forth in
§ 150.2, or in the case of applications
filed pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of
this section, the applicant may rely
upon the Commission’s determination,
upon receiving a notice of approval.
(5) Renewal of application. With
respect to any application approved by
the Commission pursuant to this
section, a person shall renew such
application if there are any material
changes to the information provided in
the original application pursuant to
paragraph (b)(1) of this section or upon
request by the Commission.
(6) Commission revocation or
modification. If the Commission
determines, at any time, that a
recognized bona fide hedging
transaction or position is no longer
consistent with section 4a(c)(2) of the
Act or the definition of bona fide
hedging transaction or position in
§ 150.1, or that a spread exemption is no
longer consistent with section
4a(a)(3)(B) of the Act, the Commission
shall:
(i) Notify the person holding such
position;
(ii) Provide an opportunity for the
applicant to respond to such
notification; and
(iii) Issue a determination to revoke or
modify the bona fide hedge recognition
or spread exemption for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits and,
as applicable, require the person to
reduce the derivative position within a
commercially reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission in
consultation with the applicant and the
applicable designated contract market or
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3469
swap execution facility, or otherwise
come into compliance. This notification
shall briefly specify the nature of the
issues raised and the specific provisions
of the Act or the Commission’s
regulations with which the position or
application is, or appears to be,
inconsistent.
(c) Previously-granted risk
management exemptions. To the extent
that exemptions previously granted
under § 1.47 of this chapter or by a
designated contract market or a swap
execution facility are for the risk
management of positions in financial
instruments, including but not limited
to index funds, such exemptions shall
no longer apply as of January 1, 2023.
(d) Recordkeeping. (1) Persons who
avail themselves of exemptions under
this section shall keep and maintain
complete books and records concerning
all details of each of their exemptions,
including relevant information about
related cash, forward, futures contracts,
option on futures contracts, and swap
positions and transactions (including
anticipated requirements, production,
merchandising activities, royalties,
contracts for services, cash commodity
products and by-products, crosscommodity hedges, and records of bona
fide hedging swap counterparties) as
applicable, and shall make such books
and records available to the Commission
upon request under paragraph (e) of this
section.
(2) Any person that relies on a written
representation received from another
person that a swap qualifies as a passthrough swap under paragraph (2) of the
definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in § 150.1 shall
keep and make available to the
Commission upon request the relevant
books and records of such written
representation, including any books and
records that the person intends to use to
demonstrate that the pass-through swap
is a bona fide hedging transaction or
position, for a period of at least two
years following the expiration of the
swap.
(3) All books and records required to
be kept pursuant to this section shall be
kept in accordance with the
requirements of § 1.31 of this chapter.
(e) Call for information. Upon call by
the Commission, the Director of the
Division of Enforcement, or the
Director’s delegate, any person claiming
an exemption from speculative position
limits under this section shall provide
to the Commission such information as
specified in the call relating to: the
positions owned or controlled by that
person; trading done pursuant to the
claimed exemption; the commodity
derivative contracts or cash-market
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positions which support the claimed
exemption; and the relevant business
relationships supporting a claimed
exemption.
(f) Aggregation of accounts. Entities
required to aggregate accounts or
positions under § 150.4 shall be
considered the same person for the
purpose of determining whether they
are eligible for an exemption under
paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this
section with respect to such aggregated
account or position.
(g) Delegation of authority to the
Director of the Division of Market
Oversight. (1) The Commission hereby
delegates, until it orders otherwise, to
the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight, or such other employee or
employees as the Director may designate
from time to time:
(i) The authority in paragraph (a)(3) of
this section to provide exemptions in
circumstances of financial distress;
(ii) The authority in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section to request additional
information with respect to a request for
a bona fide hedging transaction or
position recognition or spread
exemption;
(iii) The authority in paragraph
(b)(3)(ii)(B) of this section to, if
applicable, determine a commercially
reasonable amount of time required for
a person to bring its position within the
Federal speculative position limits;
(iv) The authority in paragraph (b)(4)
of this section to determine whether to
recognize a position as a bona fide
hedging transaction or position or to
grant a spread exemption; and
(v) The authority in paragraph (b)(2)
or (5) of this section to request that a
person submit updated materials or
renew their request with the
Commission.
(2) The Director of the Division of
Market Oversight may submit to the
Commission for its consideration any
matter which has been delegated in this
section.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits
the Commission, at its election, from
exercising the authority delegated in
this section.
■ 19. Revise § 150.5 to read as follows:
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§ 150.5 Exchange-set speculative position
limits and exemptions therefrom.
(a) Requirements for exchange-set
limits on commodity derivative
contracts subject to Federal speculative
position limits set forth in § 150.2—(1)
Exchange-set limits. For any commodity
derivative contract that is subject to a
Federal speculative position limit under
§ 150.2, a designated contract market or
swap execution facility that is a trading
facility shall set a speculative position
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limit no higher than the level specified
in § 150.2.
(2) Exemptions to exchange-set limits.
A designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility may grant exemptions from any
speculative position limits it sets under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section in
accordance with the following:
(i) Exemption levels. An exemption
that conforms to an exemption the
Commission identified in:
(A) Sections 150.3(a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(i),
(a)(4) and (a)(5) may be granted at a
level that exceeds the level of the
applicable Federal limit in § 150.2;
(B) Sections 150.3(a)(1)(ii) and
(a)(2)(ii) may be granted at a level that
exceeds the level of the applicable
Federal limit in § 150.2, provided the
exemption is first approved in
accordance with § 150.3(b) or 150.9, as
applicable;
(C) Section 150.3(a)(3) may be granted
at a level that exceeds the level of the
applicable Federal limit in § 150.2,
provided that, a division of the
Commission has first approved such
exemption pursuant to a request
submitted under § 140.99(a)(1) of this
chapter; and
(D) An exemption of the type that
does not conform to any of the
exemptions identified in § 150.3(a) must
be granted at a level that does not
exceed the applicable Federal limit in
§ 150.2 and that complies with
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(G) of this section,
unless the Commission has first
approved such exemption pursuant to
§ 150.3(b) or pursuant to a request
submitted under § 140.99(a)(1).
(ii) Application for exemption from
exchange-set limits. With respect to a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility that elects to grant exemptions
under paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section:
(A) Except as provided in paragraph
(a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section, the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility shall require an entity
to file an application requesting such
exemption in advance of the date that
such position would be in excess of the
limits then in effect. Such application
shall include any information needed to
enable the designated contract market or
swap execution facility and the
Commission to determine whether the
facts and circumstances demonstrate
that the designated contract market or
swap execution facility may grant an
exemption. Any application for a bona
fide hedging transaction or position
shall include a description of the
applicant’s activity in the cash markets
and swaps markets for the commodity
underlying the position for which the
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application is submitted, including, but
not limited to, information regarding the
offsetting cash positions.
(B) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility may adopt rules
that allow a person, due to
demonstrated sudden or unforeseen
increases in its bona fide hedging needs,
to file an application to request a
recognition of a bona fide hedging
transaction or position within five
business days after the person
established the position that exceeded
the applicable exchange-set speculative
position limit.
(C) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility must require
that any application filed pursuant to
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section
include an explanation of the
circumstances warranting the sudden or
unforeseen increases in bona fide
hedging needs.
(D) If an application filed pursuant to
paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section is
denied, the applicant must bring its
position within the designated contract
market or swap execution facility’s
speculative position limits within a
commercially reasonable time as
determined by the designated contract
market or swap execution facility.
(E) The Commission will not pursue
an enforcement action for a position
limits violation for the person holding
the position during the period of the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility’s review nor once the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility has issued its
determination, so long as the
application was submitted in good faith
and the applicant brings its position
within the designated contract market or
swap execution facility’s speculative
position limits within a commercially
reasonable time as determined by the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility.
(F) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility shall require, for
any such exemption granted, that the
entity re-apply for the exemption at
least annually;
(G) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility:
(1) May, in accordance with the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility’s rules, deny any such
application, or limit, condition, or
revoke any such exemption, at any time
after providing notice to the applicant,
and
(2) Shall consider whether the
requested exemption would result in
positions that would not be in accord
with sound commercial practices in the
relevant commodity derivative market
and/or that would exceed an amount
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that may be established and liquidated
in an orderly fashion in that market; and
(H) Notwithstanding paragraph
(a)(2)(ii)(G) of this section, the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility may grant
exemptions, subject to terms,
conditions, or limitations, that require a
person to exit any referenced contract
positions in excess of position limits
during the lesser of the last five days of
trading or the time period for the spot
month in such physical-delivery
contract, or to otherwise limit the size
of such position during that time period.
Designated contract markets and swap
execution facilities may refer to
paragraph (b) of appendix B or appendix
G to part 150, for guidance regarding the
foregoing, as applicable.
(3) Exchange-set limits on pre-existing
positions—(i) Pre-existing positions in a
spot month. A designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is
a trading facility shall require
compliance with spot month exchangeset speculative position limits for preexisting positions in commodity
derivative contracts other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps.
(ii) Pre-existing positions in a nonspot month. A single month or allmonths-combined speculative position
limit established under paragraph (a)(1)
of this section shall apply to any preexisting positions in commodity
derivative contracts, other than preenactment swaps and transition period
swaps.
(4) Monthly reports detailing the
disposition of each exemption
application. (i) For commodity
derivative contracts subject to Federal
speculative position limits, the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility shall submit to the
Commission a report each month
showing the disposition of any
exemption application, including the
recognition of any position as a bona
fide hedging transaction or position, the
exemption of any spread transaction or
other position, the renewal, revocation,
or modification of a previously granted
recognition or exemption, and the
rejection of any application, as well as
the following details for each
application:
(A) The date of disposition;
(B) The effective date of the
disposition;
(C) The expiration date of any
recognition or exemption;
(D) Any unique identifier(s) the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility may assign to track
the application, or the specific type of
recognition or exemption;
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(E) If the application is for an
enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position, the name of the
enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position listed in
appendix A to this part;
(F) If the application is for a spread
transaction listed in the spread
transaction definition in § 150.1, the
name of the spread transaction as it is
listed in § 150.1;
(G) The identity of the applicant;
(H) The listed commodity derivative
contract or position(s) to which the
application pertains;
(I) The underlying cash commodity;
(J) The maximum size of the
commodity derivative position that is
recognized by the designated contract
market or swap execution facility as a
bona fide hedging transaction or
position, specified by contract month
and by the type of limit as spot month,
single month, or all-months-combined,
as applicable;
(K) Any size limitations or conditions
established for a spread exemption or
other exemption; and
(L) For a bona fide hedging
transaction or position, a concise
summary of the applicant’s activity in
the cash markets and swaps markets for
the commodity underlying the
commodity derivative position for
which the application was submitted.
(ii) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility shall submit to
the Commission the information
required by paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this
section:
(A) As specified by the Commission
on the Forms and Submissions page at
www.cftc.gov; and
(B) Using the format, coding structure,
and electronic data transmission
procedures approved in writing by the
Commission.
(b) Requirements for exchange-set
limits on commodity derivative
contracts in a physical commodity that
are not subject to the limits set forth in
§ 150.2—(1) Exchange-set spot-month
limits. For any physical commodity
derivative contract that is not subject to
a Federal speculative position limit
under § 150.2, a designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is
a trading facility shall set a speculative
position limit as follows:
(i) Spot month speculative position
limit levels. For any commodity
derivative contract subject to paragraph
(b) of this section, a designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is
a trading facility shall establish
speculative position limits for the spot
month no greater than 25 percent of the
estimated spot month deliverable
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3471
supply, calculated separately for each
month to be listed.
(ii) Additional sources for
compliance. Alternatively, a designated
contract market or swap execution
facility that is a trading facility may
submit rules to the Commission
establishing spot month speculative
position limits other than as provided in
paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section,
provided that each limit is set at a level
that is necessary and appropriate to
reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the
contract’s or the underlying
commodity’s price or index.
(2) Exchange-set limits or
accountability outside of the spot
month—(i) Non-spot month speculative
position limit or accountability levels.
For any commodity derivative contract
subject to paragraph (b) of this section,
a designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility shall adopt either speculative
position limits or position
accountability outside of the spot month
at a level that is necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price
distortion of the contract’s or the
underlying commodity’s price or index.
(ii) Additional sources for
compliance. A designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is
a trading facility may refer to the nonexclusive acceptable practices in
paragraph (b) of appendix F of this part
to demonstrate to the Commission
compliance with the requirements of
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section.
(3) Look-alike contracts. For any
newly listed commodity derivative
contract subject to paragraph (b) of this
section that is substantially the same as
an existing contract listed on a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility, the designated contract market
or swap execution facility that is a
trading facility listing such newly listed
contract shall adopt spot month,
individual month, and all-monthscombined speculative position limits
comparable to those of the existing
contract. Alternatively, if such
designated contract market or swap
execution facility seeks to adopt
speculative position limits that are not
comparable to those of the existing
contract, such designated contract
market or swap execution facility shall
demonstrate to the Commission how the
levels comply with paragraphs (b)(1)
and/or (b)(2) of this section.
(4) Exemptions to exchange-set limits.
A designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility may grant exemptions from any
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speculative position limits it sets under
paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section in
accordance with the following:
(i) An entity seeking an exemption
shall be required to apply to the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility for any such
exemption from its speculative position
limit rules; and
(ii) A designated contract market or
swap execution facility that is a trading
facility may deny any such application,
or limit, condition, or revoke any such
exemption, at any time after providing
notice to the applicant. Such designated
contract market or swap execution
facility shall consider whether the
requested exemption would result in
positions that would not be in accord
with sound commercial practices in the
relevant commodity derivative market
and/or would exceed an amount that
may be established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion in that market.
(c) Requirements for security futures
products. For security futures products,
speculative position limits and position
accountability requirements are
specified in § 41.25 of this chapter.
(d) Rules on aggregation. For
commodity derivative contracts in a
physical commodity, a designated
contract market or swap execution
facility that is a trading facility shall
have aggregation rules that conform to
§ 150.4.
(e) Requirements for submissions to
the Commission. In order for a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading
facility to adopt speculative position
limits and/or position accountability
pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of this
section and/or to elect to offer
exemptions from any such levels
pursuant to such paragraphs, the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility shall submit to the
Commission pursuant to part 40 of this
chapter rules establishing such levels
and/or exemptions. To the extent that a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility adopts speculative
position limit levels, such part 40
submission shall also include the
methodology by which such levels are
calculated. The designated contract
market or swap execution facility shall
review such speculative position limit
levels regularly for compliance with this
section and update such speculative
position limit levels as needed.
(f) Delegation of authority to the
Director of the Division of Market
Oversight—(1) Commission delegations.
The Commission hereby delegates, until
it orders otherwise, to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight, or such
other employee or employees as the
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Director may designate from time to
time, the authority in paragraph (a)(4)(ii)
of this section to provide instructions
regarding the submission to the
Commission of information required to
be reported, pursuant to paragraph
(a)(4)(i) of this section, by a designated
contract market or swap execution
facility, to specify the manner for
submitting such information on the
Forms and Submissions page at
www.cftc.gov, and to determine the
format, coding structure, and electronic
data transmission procedures for
submitting such information.
(2) Commission consideration of
delegated matter. The Director of the
Division of Market Oversight may
submit to the Commission for its
consideration any matter which has
been delegated in this section.
(3) Commission authority. Nothing in
this section prohibits the Commission,
at its election, from exercising the
authority delegated in this section.
■
20. Revise § 150.6 to read as follows:
§ 150.6
Scope.
This part shall only be construed as
having an effect on speculative position
limits set by the Commission or by a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility, including any
associated recordkeeping and reporting
regulations in this chapter. Nothing in
this part shall be construed to relieve
any designated contract market, swap
execution facility, or its governing board
from responsibility under section 5(d)(4)
of the Act to prevent manipulation and
corners. Further, nothing in this part
shall be construed to affect any other
provisions of the Act or Commission
regulations, including, but not limited
to, those relating to actual or attempted
manipulation, corners, squeezes,
fraudulent or deceptive conduct, or to
prohibited transactions.
§ 150.7
[Reserved]
■
21. Add reserved § 150.7.
■
22. Add § 150.8 to read as follows:
§ 150.8
Severability.
If any provision of this part, or the
application thereof to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, such
invalidity shall not affect the validity of
other provisions or the application of
such provision to other persons or
circumstances that can be given effect
without the invalid provision or
application.
■
23. Add § 150.9 to read as follows:
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§ 150.9 Process for recognizing nonenumerated bona fide hedging transactions
or positions with respect to Federal
speculative position limits.
For purposes of Federal speculative
position limits, a person with a position
in a referenced contract seeking
recognition of such position as a nonenumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position, in accordance
with § 150.3(a)(1)(ii), shall apply to the
Commission, pursuant to § 150.3(b), or
apply to a designated contract market or
swap execution facility in accordance
with this section. If such person submits
an application to a designated contract
market or swap execution facility in
accordance with this section, and the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility, with respect to its
own speculative position limits
established pursuant to § 150.5(a),
recognizes the person’s position as a
non-enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position, then the person
may also exceed the applicable Federal
speculative position limit for such
position in accordance with paragraph
(e) of this section. The designated
contract market or swap execution
facility may approve such applications
only if the designated contract market or
swap execution facility complies with
the conditions set forth in paragraphs (a)
through (e) of this section.
(a) Approval of rules. The designated
contract market or swap execution
facility must maintain rules that
establish application processes and
conditions for recognizing bona fide
hedging transactions or positions
consistent with the requirements of this
section, and must seek approval of such
rules from the Commission pursuant to
§ 40.5 of this chapter.
(b) Prerequisites for a designated
contract market or swap execution
facility to recognize a bona fide hedging
transaction or position in accordance
with this section. (1) The designated
contract market or swap execution
facility lists the applicable referenced
contract for trading;
(2) The position meets the definition
of bona fide hedging transaction or
position in section 4a(c)(2) of the Act
and the definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in § 150.1; and
(3) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility does not
recognize as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position any position
involving a commodity index contract
and one or more referenced contracts,
including exemptions known as risk
management exemptions.
(c) Application process. The
designated contract market or swap
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execution facility’s application process
meets the following conditions:
(1) Required application information.
The designated contract market or swap
execution facility requires the applicant
to provide, and can obtain from the
applicant, all information needed to
enable the designated contract market or
swap execution facility and the
Commission to determine whether the
facts and circumstances demonstrate
that the designated contract market or
swap execution facility may recognize a
position as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position, including the
following:
(i) A description of the position in the
commodity derivative contract for
which the application is submitted,
including but not limited to, the name
of the underlying commodity and the
derivative position size;
(ii) An explanation of the hedging
strategy, including a statement that the
position complies with the requirements
of section 4a(c)(2) of the Act and the
definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in § 150.1, and
information to demonstrate why the
position satisfies such requirements and
definition;
(iii) A statement concerning the
maximum size of all gross positions in
commodity derivative contracts for
which the application is submitted;
(iv) A description of the applicant’s
activity in the cash markets and the
swaps markets for the commodity
underlying the position for which the
application is submitted, including, but
not limited to, information regarding the
offsetting cash positions; and
(v) Any other information the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility requires, in its
discretion, to determine that the
position complies with paragraph (b)(2)
of this section, as applicable.
(2) Timing of application. (i) Except as
provided in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this
section, the designated contract market
or swap execution facility requires the
applicant to submit an application and
receive a notice of approval of such
application from the designated contract
market or swap execution facility prior
to the date that the position for which
such application was submitted would
be in excess of the applicable Federal
speculative position limits.
(ii) A designated contract market or
swap execution facility may adopt rules
that allow a person, due to
demonstrated sudden or unforeseen
increases in its bona fide hedging needs,
to file an application with the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility to request a
recognition of a bona fide hedging
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transaction or position within five
business days after the person
established the position that exceeded
the applicable Federal speculative
position limit.
(A) The designated contract market or
swap execution facility must require
that any application filed pursuant to
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section
include an explanation of the
circumstances warranting the sudden or
unforeseen increases in bona fide
hedging needs.
(B) If an application filed pursuant to
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section is
denied by the designated contract
market, swap execution facility, or
Commission, the applicant must bring
its position within the applicable
Federal speculative position limits
within a commercially reasonable time
as determined by the Commission in
consultation with the applicant and the
applicable designated contract market or
swap execution facility.
(C) The Commission will not pursue
an enforcement action for a position
limits violation for the person holding
the position during the period of the
designated contract market, swap
execution facility, or Commission’s
review nor once a determination has
been issued, so long as the application
was submitted in good faith and the
person complies with paragraph
(c)(2)(ii)(B) of this section.
(3) Renewal of applications. The
designated contract market or swap
execution facility requires each
applicant to reapply with the designated
contract market or swap execution
facility to maintain such recognition at
least on an annual basis by updating the
initial application, and to receive a
notice of extension of the original
approval from the designated contract
market or swap execution facility to
continue relying on such recognition for
purposes of Federal speculative position
limits. If the facts and circumstances
underlying a renewal application are
materially different than the initial
application, the designated contract
market or swap execution facility is
required to treat such application as a
new request submitted through the
§ 150.9 process and subject to the
Commission’s 10/2-day review process
in paragraph (e) of this section.
(4) Exchange revocation authority.
The designated contract market or swap
execution facility retains its authority to
limit, condition, or revoke, at any time
after providing notice to the applicant,
any bona fide hedging transaction or
position recognition for purposes of the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility’s speculative position
limits established under § 150.5(a), for
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3473
any reason as determined in the
discretion of the designated contract
market or swap execution facility,
including if the designated contract
market or swap execution facility
determines that the position no longer
meets the conditions set forth in
paragraph (b) of this section, as
applicable.
(d) Recordkeeping. (1) The designated
contract market or swap execution
facility keeps full, complete, and
systematic records, which include all
pertinent data and memoranda, of all
activities relating to the processing of
such applications and the disposition
thereof. Such records include:
(i) Records of the designated contract
market’s or swap execution facility’s
recognition of any derivative position as
a bona fide hedging transaction or
position, revocation or modification of
any such recognition, or the rejection of
an application;
(ii) All information and documents
submitted by an applicant in connection
with its application, including
documentation and information that is
submitted after the disposition of the
application, and any withdrawal,
supplementation, or update of any
application;
(iii) Records of oral and written
communications between the
designated contract market or swap
execution facility and the applicant in
connection with such application; and
(iv) All information and documents in
connection with the designated contract
market or swap execution facility’s
analysis of, and action(s) taken with
respect to, such application.
(2) All books and records required to
be kept pursuant to this section shall be
kept in accordance with the
requirements of § 1.31 of this chapter.
(e) Process for a person to exceed
Federal speculative position limits on a
referenced contract—(1) Notification to
the Commission. The designated
contract market or swap execution
facility must submit to the Commission
a notification of each initial
determination to recognize a bona fide
hedging transaction or position in
accordance with this section,
concurrently with the notice of such
determination the designated contract
market or swap execution facility
provides to the applicant.
(2) Notification requirements. The
notification in paragraph (e)(1) of this
section shall include, at a minimum, the
following information:
(i) Name of the applicant;
(ii) Brief description of the bona fide
hedging transaction or position being
recognized;
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(iii) Name of the contract(s) relevant
to the recognition;
(iv) The maximum size of the position
that may exceed Federal speculative
position limits;
(v) The effective date and expiration
date of the recognition;
(vi) An indication regarding whether
the position may be maintained during
the last five days of trading during the
spot month, or the time period for the
spot month; and
(vii) A copy of the application and
any supporting materials.
(3) Exceeding Federal speculative
position limits on referenced contracts.
A person may exceed Federal
speculative position limits on a
referenced contract after the designated
contract market or swap execution
facility issues the notification required
pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this
section, unless the Commission notifies
the designated contract market or swap
execution facility and the applicant
otherwise, pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)
or (6) of this section, before the ten
business day period expires.
(4) Exceeding Federal speculative
position limits on referenced contracts
due to sudden or unforeseen
circumstances. If a person files an
application for a recognition of a bona
fide hedging transaction or position in
accordance with paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of
this section, then such person may rely
on the designated contract market or
swap execution facility’s determination
to grant such recognition for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits two
business days after the designated
contract market or swap execution
facility issues the notification required
pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this
section, unless the Commission notifies
the designated contract market or swap
execution facility and the applicant
otherwise, pursuant to paragraph (e)(5)
or (6) of this section, before the two
business day period expires.
(5) Commission stay of pending
applications and requests for additional
information. The Commission may stay
an application that requires additional
time to analyze, and/or may request
additional information to determine
whether the position for which the
application is submitted meets the
conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of
this section. The Commission shall
notify the applicable designated
contract market or swap execution
facility and the applicant of a
Commission determination to stay the
application and/or request any
supplemental information, and shall
provide an opportunity for the applicant
to respond. The Commission will have
an additional 45 days from the date of
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the stay notification to conduct the
review and issue a determination with
respect to the application. If the
Commission stays an application and
the applicant has not yet exceeded
Federal speculative position limits, then
the applicant may not exceed Federal
speculative position limits unless the
Commission approves the application. If
the Commission stays an application
and the applicant has already exceeded
Federal speculative position limits, then
the applicant may continue to maintain
the position unless the Commission
notifies the designated contract market
or swap execution facility and the
applicant otherwise, pursuant to
paragraph (e)(6) of this section.
(6) Commission determination for
pending applications. If, during the
Commission’s ten or two business day
review period in paragraphs (e)(3) and
(4) of this section, the Commission
determines that a position for which the
application is submitted does not meet
the conditions set forth in paragraph (b)
of this section, the Commission shall:
(i) Notify the designated contract
market or swap execution facility and
the applicant within ten or two business
days, as applicable, after the designated
contract market or swap execution
facility issues the notification required
pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this
section;
(ii) Provide an opportunity for the
applicant to respond to such
notification;
(iii) Issue a determination to deny the
application, or limit or condition the
application approval for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits and,
as applicable, require the person to
reduce the derivatives position within a
commercially reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission in
consultation with the applicant and the
applicable designated contract market or
swap execution facility, or otherwise
come into compliance; and
(iv) The Commission will not pursue
an enforcement action for a position
limits violation for the person holding
the position during the period of the
Commission’s review nor once the
Commission has issued its
determination, so long as the
application was submitted in good faith
and the person complies with any
requirement to reduce the position
pursuant to paragraph (e)(6)(iii) of this
section, as applicable.
(f) Commission revocation of
applications previously approved. (1) If
a designated contract market or a swap
execution facility limits, conditions, or
revokes any recognition of a bona fide
hedging transaction or position for
purposes of the respective designated
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contract market’s or swap execution
facility’s speculative position limits
established under § 150.5(a), then such
recognition will also be deemed limited,
conditioned, or revoked for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits.
(2) If the Commission determines, at
any time, that a position that has been
recognized as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits is no
longer consistent with section 4a(c)(2) of
the Act or the definition of bona fide
hedging transaction or position in
§ 150.1, the following applies:
(i) The Commission shall notify the
person holding the position and the
relevant designated contract market or
swap execution facility. After providing
such person and such designated
contract market or swap execution
facility an opportunity to respond, the
Commission may, in its discretion,
limit, condition, or revoke its
determination for purposes of Federal
speculative position limits and require
the person to reduce the derivatives
position within a commercially
reasonable time as determined by the
Commission in consultation with such
person and such designated contract
market or swap execution facility, or
otherwise come into compliance;
(ii) The Commission shall include in
its notification a brief explanation of the
nature of the issues raised and the
specific provisions of the Act or the
Commission’s regulations with which
the position or application is, or appears
to be, inconsistent; and
(iii) The Commission will not pursue
an enforcement action for a position
limits violation for the person holding
the position during the period of the
Commission’s review, nor once the
Commission has issued its
determination, provided the person
submitted the application in good faith
and reduces the position within a
commercially reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission in
consultation with such person and the
relevant designated contract market or
swap execution facility, or otherwise
comes into compliance.
(g) Delegation of authority to the
Director of the Division of Market
Oversight—(1) Commission delegations.
The Commission hereby delegates, until
it orders otherwise, to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight, or such
other employee or employees as the
Director may designate from time to
time, the authority to request additional
information, pursuant to paragraph
(e)(5) of this section, from the applicable
designated contract market or swap
execution facility and applicant.
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(2) Commission consideration of
delegated matter. The Director of the
Division of Market Oversight may
submit to the Commission for its
consideration any matter which has
been delegated in this section.
(3) Commission authority. Nothing in
this section prohibits the Commission,
at its election, from exercising the
authority delegated in this section.
■ 24. Add appendices A through G to
read as follows:
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Appendix A to Part 150—List of
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Pursuant to § 150.3(a)(1)(i), positions that
comply with the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition in § 150.1
and that are enumerated in this appendix A
may exceed Federal speculative position
limits to the extent that all applicable
requirements in this part are met. A person
holding such positions enumerated in this
appendix A may exceed Federal speculative
position limits for such positions without
requesting prior approval under § 150.3 or
§ 150.9. A person holding such positions that
are not enumerated in this appendix A must
request and obtain approval pursuant to
§ 150.3 or § 150.9 prior to exceeding the
applicable Federal speculative position
limits—unless such positions qualify for the
retroactive approval process, and the person
seeks retroactive approval in accordance with
§ 150.3 or § 150.9.
The enumerated bona fide hedges do not
state the exclusive means for establishing
compliance with the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition in § 150.1
or with the requirements of § 150.3(a)(1).
(a) Enumerated hedges—(1) Hedges of
inventory and cash commodity fixed-price
purchase contracts. Short positions in
commodity derivative contracts that do not
exceed in quantity the sum of the person’s
ownership of inventory and fixed-price
purchase contracts in the commodity
derivative contracts’ underlying cash
commodity.
(2) Hedges of cash commodity fixed-price
sales contracts. Long positions in commodity
derivative contracts that do not exceed in
quantity the sum of the person’s fixed-price
sales contracts in the commodity derivative
contracts’ underlying cash commodity and
the quantity equivalent of fixed-price sales
contracts of the cash products and byproducts of such commodity.
(3) Hedges of offsetting unfixed-price cash
commodity sales and purchases. Both short
and long positions in commodity derivative
contracts that do not exceed in quantity the
amount of the commodity derivative
contracts’ underlying cash commodity that
has been both bought and sold by the same
person at unfixed prices:
(i) Basis different delivery months in the
same commodity derivative contract; or
(ii) Basis different commodity derivative
contracts in the same commodity, regardless
of whether the commodity derivative
contracts are in the same calendar month.
(4) Hedges of unsold anticipated
production. Short positions in commodity
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derivative contracts that do not exceed in
quantity the person’s unsold anticipated
production of the commodity derivative
contracts’ underlying cash commodity.
(5) Hedges of unfilled anticipated
requirements. Long positions in commodity
derivative contracts that do not exceed in
quantity the person’s unfilled anticipated
requirements for the commodity derivative
contracts’ underlying cash commodity, for
processing, manufacturing, or use by that
person, or for resale by a utility as it pertains
to the utility’s obligations to meet the
unfilled anticipated demand of its customers
for the customer’s use.
(6) Hedges of anticipated merchandising.
Long or short positions in commodity
derivative contracts that offset the
anticipated change in value of the underlying
commodity that a person anticipates
purchasing or selling, provided that:
(i) The positions in the commodity
derivative contracts do not exceed in
quantity twelve months’ of current or
anticipated purchase or sale requirements of
the same cash commodity that is anticipated
to be purchased or sold; and
(ii) The person is a merchant handling the
underlying commodity that is subject to the
anticipatory merchandising hedge, and that
such merchant is entering into the position
solely for purposes related to its
merchandising business and has a
demonstrated history of buying and selling
the underlying commodity for its
merchandising business.
(7) Hedges by agents. Long or short
positions in commodity derivative contracts
by an agent who does not own or has not
contracted to sell or purchase the commodity
derivative contracts’ underlying cash
commodity at a fixed price, provided that the
agent is responsible for merchandising the
cash positions that are being offset in
commodity derivative contracts and the agent
has a contractual arrangement with the
person who owns the commodity or holds
the cash-market commitment being offset.
(8) Hedges of anticipated mineral royalties.
Short positions in a person’s commodity
derivative contracts offset by the anticipated
change in value of mineral royalty rights that
are owned by that person, provided that the
royalty rights arise out of the production of
the commodity underlying the commodity
derivative contracts.
(9) Hedges of anticipated services. Short or
long positions in a person’s commodity
derivative contracts offset by the anticipated
change in value of receipts or payments due
or expected to be due under an executed
contract for services held by that person,
provided that the contract for services arises
out of the production, manufacturing,
processing, use, or transportation of the
commodity underlying the commodity
derivative contracts.
(10) Offsets of commodity trade options.
Long or short positions in commodity
derivative contracts that do not exceed in
quantity, on a futures-equivalent basis, a
position in a commodity trade option that
meets the requirements of § 32.3 of this
chapter. Such commodity trade option
transaction, if it meets the requirements of
§ 32.3 of this chapter, may be deemed, for
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3475
purposes of complying with this paragraph
(a)(10) of this appendix A, as either a cash
commodity purchase or sales contract as set
forth in paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this
appendix A, as applicable.
(11) Cross-commodity hedges. Positions in
commodity derivative contracts described in
paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition in § 150.1
or in paragraphs (a)(1) through (10) of this
appendix A may also be used to offset the
risks arising from a commodity other than the
cash commodity underlying the commodity
derivative contracts, provided that the
fluctuations in value of the cash commodity
underlying the commodity derivative
contracts, shall be substantially related to the
fluctuations in value of the actual or
anticipated cash commodity position or a
pass-through swap.
(b) [Reserved]
Appendix B to Part 150—Guidance on
Gross Hedging Positions and Positions
Held During the Spot Period
(a) Guidance on gross hedging positions.
(1) A person’s gross hedging positions may be
deemed in compliance with the bona fide
hedging transaction or position definition in
§ 150.1, whether enumerated or nonenumerated, provided that all applicable
regulatory requirements are met, including
that the position is economically appropriate
to the reduction of risks in the conduct and
management of a commercial enterprise and
otherwise satisfies the bona fide hedging
definition in § 150.1, and provided further
that:
(i) The manner in which the person
measures risk is consistent and follows
historical practice for that person;
(ii) The person is not measuring risk on a
gross basis to evade the speculative position
limits in § 150.2 or the aggregation rules in
§ 150.4; and
(iii) The person is able to demonstrate
compliance with paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii)
of this appendix, including by providing
justifications for measuring risk on a gross
basis, upon the request of the Commission
and/or of a designated contract market,
including by providing information regarding
the entities with which the person aggregates
positions.
(b) Guidance regarding positions held
during the spot period. The regulations
governing exchange-set speculative position
limits and exemptions therefrom under
§ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D) provide that designated
contract markets and swap execution
facilities (‘‘exchanges’’) may impose
restrictions on bona fide hedging transaction
or position exemptions to require the person
to exit any such positions in excess of limits
during the lesser of the last five days of
trading or the time period for the spot month
in such physical-delivery contract, or
otherwise limit the size of such position.
This guidance is intended to provide factors
the Commission believes exchanges should
consider when determining whether to
impose a five-day rule or similar restriction
but is not intended to be used as a mandatory
checklist. The exchanges may consider
whether:
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(1) The position complies with the bona
fide hedging transaction or position
definition in § 150.1, whether enumerated or
non-enumerated;
(2) There is an economically appropriate
need to maintain such position in excess of
Federal speculative position limits during the
spot period for such contract, and such need
relates to the purchase or sale of a cash
commodity; and
(3) The person wishing to exceed Federal
position limits during the spot period:
(i) Intends to make or take delivery during
that time period;
(ii) Has the ability to take delivery for any
long position at levels that are economically
appropriate (i.e., the delivery comports with
the person’s demonstrated need for the
commodity and the contract is the most
economical source for that commodity);
(iii) Has the ability to deliver against any
short position (i.e., has inventory on hand in
a deliverable location and in a condition in
which the commodity can be used upon
delivery and that delivery against futures
contracts is economically appropriate, as it is
the best sales option for that inventory).
Appendix C to Part 150—Guidance
Regarding the Definition of Referenced
Contract
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This appendix C provides guidance
regarding the ‘‘referenced contract’’
definition in § 150.1, which provides in
paragraph (3) of the definition of referenced
contract that the term referenced contract
does not include a location basis contract, a
commodity index contract, a swap guarantee,
a trade option that meets the requirements of
§ 32.3 of this chapter, a monthly average
pricing contract, or an outright price
reporting agency index contract. The term
‘‘referenced contract’’ is used throughout part
150 of the Commission’s regulations to refer
to contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits. A position in a contract that
is not a referenced contract is not subject to
Federal position limits, and, as a
consequence, cannot be netted with positions
in referenced contracts for purposes of
Federal position limits. This guidance is
intended to clarify the types of contracts that
would qualify as a location basis contract,
commodity index contract, monthly average
pricing contract, or outright price reporting
agency index contract.
Compliance with this guidance does not
diminish or replace, in any event, the
obligations and requirements of any person
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to comply with the regulations provided
under this part, or any other part of the
Commission’s regulations. The guidance is
for illustrative purposes only and does not
state the exclusive means for a contract to
qualify, or not qualify, as a referenced
contract as defined in § 150.1, or to comply
with any other provision in this part.
(a) Guidance. (1) As provided in paragraph
(3) of the ‘‘referenced contract’’ definition in
§ 150.1, the following types of contracts are
not deemed referenced contracts, meaning
such contracts are not subject to Federal
position limits and cannot be netted with
positions in referenced contracts for purposes
of Federal position limits: location basis
contracts; commodity index contracts; swap
guarantees; trade options that meet the
requirements of § 32.3 of this chapter;
monthly average pricing contracts; and
outright price reporting agency index
contracts.
(2) Location basis contract. For purposes of
the referenced contract definition in § 150.1,
a location basis contract means a commodity
derivative contract that is cash-settled based
on the difference in:
(i) The price, directly or indirectly, of:
(A) A particular core referenced futures
contract; or
(B) A commodity deliverable on a
particular core referenced futures contract,
whether at par, a fixed discount to par, or a
premium to par; and
(ii) The price, at a different delivery
location or pricing point than that of the
same particular core referenced futures
contract, directly or indirectly, of:
(A) A commodity deliverable on the same
particular core referenced futures contract,
whether at par, a fixed discount to par, or a
premium to par; or
(B) A commodity that is listed in appendix
D to this part as substantially the same as a
commodity underlying the same core
referenced futures contract.
(3) Commodity index contract. For
purposes of the referenced contract definition
in § 150.1, a commodity index contract
means an agreement, contract, or transaction
that is based on an index comprised of prices
of commodities that are not the same or
substantially the same, and that is not a
location basis contract, a calendar spread
contract, or an intercommodity spread
contract as such terms are defined in this
guidance, where:
(i) A calendar spread contract means a
cash-settled agreement, contract, or
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transaction that represents the difference
between the settlement price in one or a
series of contract months of an agreement,
contract, or transaction and the settlement
price of another contract month or another
series of contract months’ settlement prices
for the same agreement, contract, or
transaction; and
(ii) An intercommodity spread contract
means a cash-settled agreement, contract, or
transaction that represents the difference
between the settlement price of a referenced
contract and the settlement price of another
contract, agreement, or transaction that is
based on a different commodity.
(4) Monthly average pricing contract means
a contract that satisfies one of the following:
(i) The contract’s price is calculated based
on the equally-weighted arithmetic average of
the daily prices of the underlying referenced
contract for the entire corresponding
calendar month or trade month, as
applicable; or
(ii) In determining the price of such
contract, the component daily prices, in the
aggregate, during the spot month of the
underlying referenced contract comprise no
more than 40 percent of such contract’s
weighting.
(5) Outright price reporting agency index
contract means any outright commodity
derivative contract whose settlement price is
based solely on an index published by a price
reporting agency that surveys cash-market
transaction prices, provided, however, that
this term does not include any commodity
derivative contract that settles at a basis, or
differential, between a referenced contract
and a price reporting agency index.
(b) [Reserved]
Appendix D to Part 150—Commodities
Listed as Substantially the Same for
Purposes of the Term ‘‘Location Basis
Contract’’ as Used in the Referenced
Contract Definition
The following table lists each relevant core
referenced futures contract and associated
commodities that are treated as substantially
the same as a commodity underlying a core
referenced futures contract for purposes of
the term ‘‘location basis contract’’ as such
term is used in the referenced contract
definition under § 150.1, and as such term is
discussed in appendix C to this part.
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1 Step-down spot month limits apply to positions
net long or net short as follows: 600 contracts at the
close of trading on the first business day following
the first Friday of the contract month; 300 contracts
at the close of trading on the business day prior to
the last five trading days of the contract month; and
200 contracts at the close of trading on the business
day prior to the last two trading days of the contract
month.
2 For persons that are not availing themselves of
the § 150.3(a)(4) conditional spot month limit
exemption in natural gas, the 2,000 contract spot
month speculative position limit level applies to:
(1) the physically-settled NYMEX Henry Hub
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Natural Gas (NG) core referenced futures contract
and any other physically-settled contract that
qualifies as a referenced contract to NYMEX Henry
Hub Natural Gas (NG) under the definition of
‘‘referenced contract’’ under § 150.1, in the
aggregate across all exchanges listing a physicallysettled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
referenced contract and the OTC swaps market, net
long or net short; and (2) the cash-settled NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) referenced contracts,
net long or net short, on a per-exchange basis for
each exchange that lists one or more cash-settled
NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) referenced
contract(s) rather than aggregated across such
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exchanges. Further, an additional 2,000 contract
limit, net long or net short, applies across all cashsettled economically equivalent NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (NG) OTC swaps.
3 Step-down spot month limits apply to positions
net long or net short as follows: 6,000 contracts at
the close of trading three business days prior to the
last trading day of the contract; 5,000 contracts at
the close of trading two business days prior to the
last trading day of the contract; and 4,000 contracts
at the close of trading one business day prior to the
last trading day of the contract.
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Appendix E to Part 150—Speculative
Position Limit Levels
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Appendix F to Part 150—Guidance on,
and Acceptable Practices in,
Compliance With the Requirements for
Exchange-Set Limits and Position
Accountability on Commodity
Derivative Contracts
The following are guidance and acceptable
practices for compliance with § 150.5.
Compliance with the acceptable practices
and guidance does not diminish or replace,
in any event, the obligations and
requirements of the person to comply with
the other regulations provided under this
part. The acceptable practices and guidance
are for illustrative purposes only and do not
state the exclusive means for establishing
compliance with § 150.5.
(a) Acceptable practices for compliance
with § 150.5(b)(2)(i) regarding exchange-set
limits or accountability outside of the spot
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month. A designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading facility
may satisfy § 150.5(b)(2)(i) by complying
with either of the following acceptable
practices:
(1) Non-spot month speculative position
limits. For any commodity derivative
contract subject to § 150.5(b), a designated
contract market or swap execution facility
that is a trading facility sets individual single
month or all-months-combined levels no
greater than any one of the following:
(i) The average of historical position sizes
held by speculative traders in the contract as
a percentage of the average combined futures
and delta-adjusted option month-end open
interest for that contract for the most recent
calendar year;
(ii) The level of the spot month limit for
the contract;
(iii) 5,000 contracts (scaled-down
proportionally to the notional quantity per
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contract relative to the typical cash-market
transaction if the notional quantity per
contract is larger than the typical cash-market
transaction, and scaled up proportionally to
the notional quantity per contract relative to
the typical cash-market transaction if the
notional quantity per contract is smaller than
the typical cash-market transaction); or
(iv) 10 percent of the average combined
futures and delta-adjusted option month-end
open interest in the contract for the most
recent calendar year up to 50,000 contracts,
with a marginal increase of 2.5 percent of
open interest thereafter.
(2) Non-spot month position
accountability. For any commodity
derivative contract subject to § 150.5(b), a
designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading facility
adopts position accountability, as defined in
§ 150.1.
(b) [Reserved]
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Appendix G to Part 150—Guidance on
Spread Transaction Exemptions
Granted for Contracts that are Subject
to Federal Speculative Position Limits
Positions that comply with § 150.3(a)(2)(i)
or (ii) may exceed Federal speculative
position limits, provided that the entity
separately requests a spread transaction
exemption from the relevant exchange’s
position limits established pursuant to
proposed § 150.5(a). The following provides
guidance to exchanges and market
participants on the use of spread transaction
exemptions granted pursuant to § 150.5(a).
Exchanges and market participants may also
consider this guidance for purposes of spread
transaction exemptions granted pursuant to
§ 150.5(b). The following guidance includes
recommendations for exchanges and market
participants to consider when granting or
relying on spread transaction exemptions for
positions that include referenced contracts
that are subject to Federal speculative
position limits.
(a) General guidance on spread transaction
exemptions for referenced contracts. (1)
When granting spread transaction
exemptions pursuant to § 150.5(a), an
exchange should:
(i) Collect sufficient information from the
market participant to be able to:
(A) Understand the spread strategy,
consistent with § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A); and
(B) Verify that there is a material economic
relationship between the legs of the spread
transaction, consistent with the requirement
in § 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G) to grant exemptions in
accordance with sound commercial practices;
(ii) Consider whether granting the spread
transaction exemption would, to the
maximum extent practicable:
(A) Ensure sufficient market liquidity for
bona fide hedgers; and
(B) Not unduly reduce the effectiveness of
Federal speculative position limits to:
(1) Diminish, eliminate, or prevent
excessive speculation;
(2) Deter and prevent market
manipulations, squeezes, and corners; and
(3) Ensure that the price discovery function
of the underlying market is not disrupted;
(iii) Consider implementing safeguards to
ensure that when granting spread transaction
exemptions, especially during the spot
period, the exchange is able to comply with
all statutory and regulatory obligations,
including the requirements of:
(A) DCM Core Principle 2 and SEF Core
Principle 2, as applicable, to, among other
things, prohibit abusive trading practices on
its markets by members and market
participants, and prohibit any other
manipulative or disruptive trading practices
prohibited by the Act or Commission
regulations;
(B) DCM Core Principle 4 and SEF Core
Principle 4, as applicable, to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the delivery or cash-settlement
process through market surveillance,
compliance, and enforcement practices and
procedures;
(C) DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6, as applicable, to implement
exchange-set position limits in a manner that
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reduces the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion; and
(D) DCM Core Principle 12, as applicable,
to protect markets and market participants
from abusive practices committed by any
party, including abusive practices committed
by a party acting as an agent for a participant;
and to promote fair and equitable trading on
the contract market;
(iv) Ensure that any spread exemption
transaction does not impede convergence or
facilitate the formation of artificial prices;
and
(v) Provide a cap or limit on the maximum
size of all gross positions permitted under the
spread transaction exemption.
(2) The Commission reminds market
participants that when utilizing a spread
transaction exemption, compliance with
Federal speculative position limits or an
exemption thereto does not confer any type
of safe harbor or good faith defense to a claim
that the participant has engaged in an
attempted or perfected manipulation or
willfully circumvented or evaded speculative
position limits, consistent with the
Commission’s anti-evasion provision in
§ 150.2(i).
(b) Guidance on transactions permitted
under the spread transaction definition. (1)
The Commission understands that market
participants are generally familiar with the
meaning of intra-market spreads, intermarket spreads, intra-commodity spreads,
and inter-commodity spreads, as those terms
are used in the spread transaction definition
in § 150.1. However, for the avoidance of
confusion, the Commission provides the
following descriptions of such spread
strategies to assist exchanges in their analysis
of whether a spread position complies with
the spread transaction definition. The
Commission generally understands that the
following spread strategies are typically
defined as follows:
(i) Intra-market spread means a long (short)
position in one or more commodity
derivative contracts in a particular
commodity, or its products or by-products,
and a short (long) position in one or more
commodity derivative contracts in the same,
or similar, commodity, or its products or byproducts, on the same designated contract
market or swap execution facility.
(ii) Inter-market spread means a long
(short) position in one or more commodity
derivative contracts in a particular
commodity, or its products or by-products, at
a particular designated contract market or
swap execution facility and a short (long)
position in one or more commodity
derivative contracts in that same, or similar,
commodity, or its products or by-products,
away from that particular designated contract
market or swap execution facility.
(iii) Intra-commodity spread means a long
(short) position in one or more commodity
derivatives contracts in a particular
commodity, or its product or by-products,
and a short (long) position in one or more
commodity derivative contracts in the same,
or similar, commodity, or its products or byproducts.
(iv) Inter-commodity spread means a long
(short) position in one or more commodity
derivatives contracts in a particular
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commodity, or its product or by-products,
and a short (long) position in one or more
commodity derivative contracts in a different
commodity or its products or by-products.
(2) The following is a non-exhaustive list
of spread strategies that comply with the
spread transaction definition in § 150.1:
(i) An inter-market spread transaction in
which the legs of the transaction are futures
contracts in the same, or similar commodity,
or its products or its by-products, and same
calendar month or expiration;
(ii) A spread transaction in which one leg
is a referenced contract, as defined in § 150.1,
and the other leg is a commodity derivative
contract, as defined in § 150.1, that is not a
referenced contract (including over-thecounter commodity derivative contracts);
(iii) A spread transaction between a
physically-settled contract and a cash-settled
contract;
(iv) A spread transaction between two
cash-settled contracts; and
(v) Spread transactions that are ‘‘legged
in,’’ that is, carried out in two steps, or
alternatively are ‘‘combination trades,’’ that
is, all components of the spread are executed
simultaneously or contemporaneously.
(3) A spread transaction exemption cannot
be used to exceed the conditional spot month
limit exemption, in § 150.3(a)(4), for
positions in natural gas.
(4) The spread transaction definition does
not include a single cash-settled agreement,
contract or transaction that, by its terms and
conditions:
(i) Simply represents the difference (or
basis) between the settlement price of a
referenced contract and the settlement price
of another contract, agreement, or transaction
(whether or not a referenced contract), and
(ii) Does not comprise separate long and
short positions.
(5) The spread transaction definition does
not include a spread position involving a
commodity index contract and one or more
referenced contracts.
(c) Guidance on cash-and-carry
exemptions. The spread transaction
definition in § 150.1 would permit
transactions commonly known as ‘‘cash-andcarry’’ trades whereby a market participant
enters a long futures position in the spot
month and an equivalent short futures
position in the following month, in order to
guarantee a return that, at minimum, covers
the costs of its carrying charges, such as the
cost of financing, insuring, and storing the
physical inventory until the next expiration
(including insurance, storage fees, and
financing costs, as well as other costs such
as aging discounts that are specific to
individual commodities). With this
exemption, the market participant is able to
take physical delivery of the product in the
nearby month and may redeliver the same
product in a deferred month. When
determining whether to grant, and when
monitoring, cash-and-carry spread
transaction exemptions, the exchange should
consider:
(1) Implementing safeguards to require a
market participant relying on such an
exemption to reduce its position below the
speculative Federal position limit within a
timely manner once market prices no longer
permit entry into a full carry transaction;
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(2) Implementing safeguards that require
market participants to liquidate all long
positions in the nearby contract month before
the price of the nearby contract month rises
to a premium to the second (2nd) contract
month; and
(3) Requiring market participants that seek
to rely on such exemption to:
(i) Provide information about their
expected cost of carrying the physical
commodity, and the quantity of stocks
currently owned in exchange-licensed
warehouses or tank facilities; and
(ii) Agree that before the price of the
nearby contract month rises to a premium to
the second (2nd) contract month, the market
participant will liquidate all long positions in
the nearby contract month.
PART 151 [REMOVED AND
RESERVED]
27. Under the authority of section
8a(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act,
7 U.S.C. 12a(5), remove and reserve part
151.
■
Issued in Washington, DC, on November
12, 2020, by the Commission.
Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.
Note: The following appendices will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendices to Position Limits for
Derivatives—Commission Voting
Summary, Chairman’s Statement, and
Commissioners’ Statements
Appendix 1—Commission Voting
Summary
On this matter, Chairman Tarbert and
Commissioners Quintenz and Stump voted in
the affirmative. Commissioners Behnam and
Berkovitz voted in the negative.
Appendix 2—Statement of Support of
Chairman Heath P. Tarbert
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I am very proud to bring to a final vote the
Commission’s rule on speculative position
limits. Like my fellow Commissioners and so
many who have held these seats before us,
I promised during my confirmation hearing
that I would work to finalize this rule. So to
the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, to the market
participants who rely on futures markets, and
to the American people, I am pleased to
say—promise made, promise kept.
Today, we are removing a cloud that has
hung over both the CFTC and the derivatives
markets for a decade. Market participants,
particularly Americans who need these
markets to hedge the risks inherent in their
businesses, will finally have regulatory
certainty.
Long Journey of Position Limits
Ralph Waldo Emerson is quoted as saying
‘‘Life is a journey, not a destination.’’ Lucky
for him, his journey did not involve position
limits. This rule has been one of the most
difficult undertakings in CFTC history.
The Commission has issued five position
limits proposals over the past 10 years. The
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first was adopted in 2011, but vacated by the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia before it took effect. One proposal
issued in 2013, and two more in 2016, were
never finalized. All told, those four proposals
received thousands of comments from the
public—the vast majority of which objected
to the proposals for good reason. Much ink
was spilled, and many trees were felled over
those proposals.
Finally, the Commission issued its fifth
position limits proposal in January of this
year. Today we will finalize that rule. But it
is important to note we are not completely
rejecting prior attempts. Instead, we build on
the good from previous proposals while
recognizing and fixing their shortcomings.
Any position limits rule involves a
balancing act. To paraphrase a famous
saying—You can please some of the people
all the time, and all the people some of the
time, but—as is certainly the case with
position limits—you can’t please all the
people all the time.
That is especially true given the three
things the Commission is tasked with
balancing for position limits:
1. Whether position limits on a particular
contract are more helpful than harmful;
2. which positions should be subject to the
limits and which should not; and
3. at what levels position limits should be
set to allow for liquid markets but not
excessive speculation.
Recognizing Dead Ends
Prior position limits proposals ultimately
failed because they were unable to strike the
correct balance on these three points.
First, prior proposals were based on a
plausible, but ultimately unsupportable,
interpretation—‘‘the mandate.’’ The mandate
would mean there is no balancing test;
instead, all futures would be subject to
Federal limits. Given the wide range of
futures in our markets, this approach would
require the CFTC to evaluate thousands of
contracts. It also would necessitate limits on
everything—regardless of the benefits those
limits would bring or the burdens they would
impose.
Second, prior proposals failed to recognize
all the ways that participants use futures
markets to hedge price risks. Agricultural,
energy, and metal futures markets are a vital
to American businesses, which is why
Congress explicitly excluded bona fide
hedging positions from position limits.
Reading the term bona fide hedging too
broadly risks inviting the wolf of speculative
activity into the market wearing sheep’s
clothing. Reading it too narrowly creates the
possibility of locking out the businesses that
need these markets to manage their risks.
And taking away that ability to manage risk
jeopardizes economic growth.
As a result, the Commission’s prior
proposals were too restrictive on what
constitutes bona fide hedging. They threw up
too many roadblocks for businesses to access
futures markets. Ultimately, an overly rigid
interpretation of bona fide hedging stood in
the way of finalizing a position limits rule.
Finally, prior proposals set limits that were
both too low and too rigid. Those limits did
not balance the need for liquidity and price
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discovery against the risks of excessive
speculation, which is the real mandate of
Congress. The proposed limits were frozen in
time, not budging from limits last updated as
far back as 1999.
Getting Back on the Right Path
Recognizing the missteps of the past yields
a path to success. Unlike prior position limits
proposals that garnered a library of negative
comment letters, this proposal is
overwhelmingly supported by businesses and
trade groups across many facets of our real
economy.
There are several differences that will let
today’s rule succeed where others failed.
First, the rule recognizes the limits of
limits. Position limits are one method to
combat corners and squeezes, but that does
not mean they are the singular tool that
should always be deployed. Position limits
are like a medicine that can help cure a
disease, but also carries potential side effects.
That is why Congress told us to use them
only when ‘‘necessary.’’ The necessity
finding is like a doctor’s prescription—
someone needs to evaluate the risks of the
disease against the side effects.
In addition, the rule takes into account
market participants’ needs. As I have always
said, position limits is the rare case where
the exception is as important as the rule.
Today’s rule lays out a robust set of
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions to
ensure that participants in the physical
commodity markets can access the futures
markets. Building on the proposal, we have
added clarity around unfixed price
transactions and storage.
The rule also acknowledges the different
ways people access the markets. We have
streamlined the process for pass-through
swap exemptions, making it easier for dealers
to provide liquidity to commercial users in
the swaps market. And the rule clarifies that
someone can take a position during the
Commission’s 10-day review period of an
exchange-granted, non-enumerated
exemption. In short, we have built a robust
set of enumerated exemptions and a
workable non-enumerated exemption
process.
The rule also strikes a balance with respect
to the limits themselves. The January
proposal included significant increases to
spot and non-spot limits for the legacy
agricultural products. Many commenters
were concerned about these increases,
particularly for non-spot limits.
The level of the non-spot limits in the final
rule are a function of the significant growth
in the market and the long delay in making
adjustments. Open interest in many of the
legacy grains contracts has doubled or tripled
since we last updated position limits,
reflecting the usefulness of these contracts as
a benchmark for cash market transactions
and faith in CFTC-regulated markets. The
non-spot limits we are adopting are the same
percentage of today’s open interest as the
2011 limits were compared to open interest
back then. Our markets have grown
tremendously, and we cannot expect them to
be subject to the same limits they were 10
years ago.
It is important to remember that Federal
position limits are a ceiling, not a floor.
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Exchanges have their own limits, which can
be no higher than what we specify. And
exchanges can calibrate those limits quickly
to account for issues with deliverable supply
or other cash market issues. As we have seen
play out over the past decade, the CFTC has
a difficult time adjusting position limits.
Therefore, exchange-set limits are a way to
fine tune position limits on a particular
market within the outer bounds of the
Federal limits. Similar to the process for
granting non-enumerated exemptions, we are
leveraging the knowledge of the exchanges as
well as their ability to act more nimbly to
respond to market needs.
Arriving at the Destination
Some of my colleagues may see these
features of the final rule as a flaw. While
there are significant departures from prior
proposals, after four failed attempts, that
departure is exactly what we need. The
flexibility in the necessity finding, the
exemption process, and the adjusted limits
are what make this rule workable. Otherwise,
we are just repeating past mistakes and
hoping for a different result—the very
definition of insanity.
So let me conclude by saying that we have
come a long way. Today we have reached the
end of an arduous journey. We have learned
from our mistakes and adjusted our
approach. We have balanced the interests of
all the participants in these markets—some of
which are in diametric opposition to one
another. Most importantly, we have crafted a
workable and flexible system. The rule sets
hard limits, but leverages the flexibility of
exchanges to adjust for a particular market.
The rule recognizes the variety of ways that
businesses use these markets to hedge their
risks, while recognizing how vital it is to
have a method to address the unknown
unknowns. And the rule acknowledges that
position limits are not always necessary and
sets out a solid methodology for determining
when they are.
I again want to thank the CFTC staff and
my fellow Commissioners for their tireless
commitment to finishing this journey. I look
forward to voting in favor of this final rule.
Appendix 3—Supporting Statement of
Commissioner Brian Quintenz
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I am pleased to support the agency’s
revitalized approach to position limits. The
rulemaking finalized today follows four
proposals since the passage of the DoddFrank Act 1 and is, by far, the strongest of
them all. I commend Chairman Tarbert for
his leadership in completing this rulemaking.
I am very pleased that today’s final rule
echoes the key policy points I outlined in my
remarks before the 2018 Commodity Markets
Council State of the Industry Conference.2
The new position limits regime will provide
1 76 FR 4752 (Jan. 26, 2011); 78 FR 75680 (Dec.
12, 2013); 81 FR 38458 (June 13, 2016)
(‘‘supplemental proposal’’); and 81 FR 96704 (Dec.
30, 2016). The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)
addresses position limits in Section (Sec.) 4a (7
U.S.C. 6a).
2 Remarks of Commissioner Brian Quintenz
before the CMC State of the Industry 2018
Conference, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz5.
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commercial market participants with
sufficient flexibility to hedge their risks
efficiently and will promote liquidity and
price discovery.
Today’s rule promotes flexibility, certainty,
and market integrity for end-users—farmers,
ranchers, energy producers, transporters,
processors, manufacturers, merchandisers,
and all who use physically-settled
derivatives to risk manage their exposure to
physical goods. The rule includes an
expansive list of enumerated and selfeffectuating bona fide hedge exemptions and
spread exemptions, and a streamlined,
exchange-centered process to adjudicate nonenumerated bona fide hedge exemption
requests. I am pleased that the rule seriously
considered the usability of hedging
exemptions, and I thank Commissioner
Stump for her leadership on that point.
In contrast to the Commission’s failed
proposed rulemakings in 2011, 2013, and
2016, this rule is the most true to the CEA
in many significant respects. It requires, as
has long been the Commission’s practice, a
necessity finding before imposing limits. It
includes economically equivalent swaps.
And, perhaps most importantly, it balances
the interests among promoting liquidity,
deterring manipulation, and ensuring the
price discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted.3 The confluence of
these factors occurs most acutely in the spot
month for physically-settled contracts. In the
spot month, price convergence is
exceptionally vulnerable to potential
manipulation or disruption due to outsized
positions. By establishing position limits for
non-legacy contracts only in the spot month,
the rule elegantly balances the countervailing
policy interests enumerated in the statute.
Responding to the Public’s Concerns
Through staff’s serious consideration of
over 70 public comments, the final rule
significantly improves on what appears in
the proposal. Examples of modifications
based on public comment include
considerations of gross hedging, price risk,
the pass-through swap exemption, spot
month limits for natural gas and cotton, a
special non-spot single-month limit for
cotton, spread exemptions, and the
Commission’s review of exchange-granted
non-enumerated hedge exemptions.
With regard to enumerated bona fide
hedges, the final rule took into account
several suggestions from commenters. The
proposed enumerated hedges were already a
significant improvement upon previously
proposed hedge exemptions (for example,
eliminating a mandatory ‘‘five-day rule’’ 4
and no longer conditioning cross-commodity
hedging on a needlessly rigid quantitative
test). Now, under the final rule, the
enumerated hedges will be even more
practical. For example, the final rule makes
clear that a hedger with only an unfixedprice cash commodity sale or purchase, but
not an offsetting pair, may rely on one of the
three anticipatory hedges, provided that the
3 Sec.
4a(a)(3).
versions of enumerated hedges had
required a hedger to eliminate positions in excess
of position limits during the last five days of the
spot month.
4 Previous
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other elements of such hedge are also met,
even though the hedger is ineligible to elect
the hedge for a pair of unfixed-price sale and
purchase transactions.5 The final rule also
makes clear that the new anticipatory
merchandising hedge can be used both by
integrated energy firms and by firms that
limit their business to merchandising.
Furthermore, the final rule permits the
anticipatory merchandising hedge to now be
used in connection with storage hedges.
I support the final rule’s determination to
delay by two years two important elements
that will require significant changes in the
marketplace: The imposition of position
limits on swaps economically equivalent to
the referenced futures contracts and the
required unwinding of previously elected
risk management exemptions.6 It is prudent
to allow for additional time for financial
entities to adjust to these significant new
policies.
Necessity Finding
Today’s rule correctly premises new limits
on a finding that they are necessary to
diminish, eliminate, or prevent the burden
on interstate commerce from extraordinary
price movements caused by excessive
speculation (‘‘necessity finding’’) in specific
contracts, as Congress has long required in
the CEA and its legislative precursors since
1936.7 I am pleased that the rule complies
with the District Court’s ruling in the ISDAposition limits litigation: That the
Commission must decide whether Section 4a
of the CEA mandates the CFTC set new limits
or only permits the CFTC to set such limits
pursuant to a necessity finding.8 As the
District Court noted, ‘‘the Dodd-Frank
amendments do not constitute a clear and
unambiguous mandate to set position
limits.’’ 9 I agree with the rule’s
determination that, when read together,
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 4a demand
a necessity finding.
Section 4a(a)(2)(A) states that the
Commission shall establish limits ‘‘in
accordance with the standards set forth in
paragraph (1) of this subsection.’’ 10
Paragraph (1) establishes the Commission’s
5 Preamble discussion of Exemptions from
Federal Position Limits. The hedge for a pair of
offsetting unfixed-price transactions is described in
Appendix B, paragraph (a)(3), and the anticipatory
hedges are described in Appendix B, paragraphs
(a)(4)–(6).
6 Whereas the general compliance date for the
final rule is January 1, 2022, the compliance date
for these two items is January 1, 2023.
7 Sec. 4a(1).
8 ISDA et al. v. CFTC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259, 278
and 283–84 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2012).
9 Id. at 280.
10 Sec. 4a(a)(2)(A) (‘‘In accordance with the
standards set forth in paragraph (1) of this
subsection and consistent with the good faith
exception cited in subsection (b)(2), with respect to
physical commodities other than excluded
commodities as defined by the Commission, the
Commission shall by rule, regulation, or order
establish limits on the amount of positions, as
appropriate, other than bona fide hedge positions,
that may be held by any person with respect to
contracts of sale for future delivery or with respect
to options on the contracts or commodities traded
on or subject to the rules of a designated contract
market.’’)
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authority to, ‘‘proclaim and fix such limits on
the amounts of trading . . . as the
Commission finds are necessary to diminish,
eliminate or prevent [the] burden’’ on
interstate commerce caused by unreasonable
or unwarranted price moves associated with
excessive speculation. This language dates
back almost verbatim to legislation passed in
1936, in which Congress directed the CFTC’s
precursor to make a necessity finding before
imposing position limits. The Congressional
report accompanying the CEA from the 74th
Congress includes the following directive,
‘‘[Section 4a of the CEA] gives the
Commodity Exchange Commission the
power, after due notice and opportunity for
hearing and a finding of a burden on
interstate commerce caused by such
speculation, to fix and proclaim limits on
futures trading . . .’’ 11 In its ISDA opinion,
the District Court noted the following: ‘‘This
text clearly indicated that Congress intended
for the CFTC to make a ‘finding of a burden
on interstate commerce caused by such
speculation’ prior to enacting position
limits.’’ 12
I support the rule’s view that the most
natural reading of Section 4a(a)(2)(A)’s
reference to paragraph (1)’s ‘‘standards’’ is
that it logically includes the ‘‘necessity’’
standard. Paragraph (1)’s requirement to
make a necessity finding, along with the
aggregation requirement, provide substantive
guidance to the Commission about when and
how position limits should be implemented.
If Congress intended to mandate that the
Commission impose position limits on all
physical commodity derivatives, there is
little reason it would have referred to
paragraph (1) and the Commission’s long
established practice of necessity findings.
Instead, Congress intended to focus the
Commission’s attention on whether position
limits should be considered for a broader set
of contracts than the legacy agricultural
contracts, but did not mandate those limits
be imposed.
Setting New Limits ‘‘As Appropriate’’
The rule determines that position limits are
necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent
the burden on interstate commerce posed by
unreasonable or unwarranted prices moves
that are attributable to excessive speculation
in 25 referenced commodity markets that
each play a crucial role in the U.S. economy.
Conversely, the rule also finds that the
contracts on which the referenced limits are
placed are the only contracts which met the
necessity finding. The rule explicitly states
that no other contracts met this test.
I am aware that there is significant
skepticism in the marketplace and among
academics as to whether position limits are
an appropriate tool to guard against
extraordinary price movements caused by
extraordinarily large position size. Some
argue there is no evidence that excessive
speculation currently exists in U.S.
derivatives markets.13 Others believe that
11 H.R.
Rep. 74–421, at 5 (1935).
F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (fn 4).
13 Testimony of Erik Haas (Director, Market
Regulation, ICE Futures U.S.) before the CFTC at 70
(Feb. 26, 2015) (‘‘We point out the makeup of these
12 887
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large and sudden price fluctuations are not
caused by hyper-speculation, but rather by
market participants’ interpretations of basic
supply and demand fundamentals.14 In
contrast, still others believe that outsized
speculative positions, however defined, may
aggravate price volatility, leading to price
run-ups or declines that are not fully
supported by market fundamentals.15
In my opinion, one thing is predominately
clear: position limits should not be viewed as
a means to counteract long-term directional
price moves. The CFTC is not a price setting
agency and we should not impede the market
from reflecting long term supply and demand
fundamentals. A case in point is palladium,
the physically-settled contract which has
seen the largest sustained price increase
recently,16 and which has also seen its
exchange-set position limit decline four
times since 2014 to what is now the smallest
limit of any contract in the referenced
contract set.17 Nevertheless, between the start
of 2018 and the end of 2019, palladium
futures prices rose 76%.18 Taking these
markets, primarily to show that any regulations
aimed at excessive speculation is a solution to a
nonexistent problem in these contracts.’’), available
at: https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@
aboutcftc/documents/file/
emactranscript022615.pdf.
¨ YU
¨ KS
14 BAHATTIN BU
¸ AHIN & JEFFREY
HARRIS, CFTC, THE ROLE OF SPECULATORS IN
THE CRUDE OIL FUTURES MARKET 1, 16–19
(2009) (‘‘Our results suggest that price changes
leads the net position and net position changes of
speculators and commodity swap dealers, with
little or no feedback in the reverse direction. This
uni-directional causality suggests that traditional
speculators as well as commodity swap dealers are
generally trend followers.’’), available at https://
www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@swaps/
documents/file/plstudy_19_cftc.pdf; Testimony of
Philip K. Verleger, Jr. before the CFTC, Aug. 5, 2009
(‘‘The increase in crude prices between 2007 and
2008 was caused by the incompatibility of
environmental regulations with the then-current
global crude supply. Speculation had nothing to do
with the price rise.’’), available at: https://
www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/
@newsroom/documents/file/hearing080509_
verleger.pdf.
15 For a discussion of studies discussing supply
and demand fundamentals and the role of
speculation, see 81 FR 96704, 96727 (Dec. 30,
2016). See, e.g., Hamilton, Causes and
Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–2008,
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity (2009);
Chevallier, Price Relationships in Crude oil Futures:
New Evidence from CFTC Disaggregated Data,
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
(2012).
16 Platinum, gold slide as dollar soars; palladium
eases off record, Reuters (Sept. 30, 2019), available
at: https://www.reuters.com/article/global-precious/
precious-platinum-gold-slide-as-dollar-soarspalladium-eases-off-record-idUSL3N26L3UV.
17 Between 2014 and 2017, the CME Group
lowered the spot month position limit in the
contract four times, from 650, to 500, to 400, to 100,
to the current limit of 50 (NYMEX regulation 40.6(a)
certifications, filed with the CFTC, 14–463 (Oct. 31,
2014), 15–145 (Apr. 14, 2015), 15–377 (Aug. 27,
2015), and 17–227 (June 6, 2017)), available at:
https://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/
sirt.aspx?Topic=ProductTermsandConditions.
18 Palladium futures were at $1,087.35 on Jan. 2,
2018 and at $1,909.30 on Dec. 31, 2019. Historical
prices available at: https://
futures.tradingcharts.com/historical/PA_/2009/0/
continuous.html.
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3485
conflicting views and facts into account, it is
clear the Commission correctly stated in its
2013 proposal, ‘‘there is a demonstrable lack
of consensus in the [academic] studies’’ as to
the effectiveness of position limits.19
With that healthy dose of skepticism, and
in strict accordance with the balance of
factors which Dodd Frank added to the CEA
for the Commission to consider, I think the
rule appropriately focuses on the time period
and contract type where position limits can
have the most positive, and the least
negative, impact—the spot month of
physically settled contracts—while also
calibrating those limits to function as just one
of many tools in the Commission’s regulatory
toolbox that can be used to promote credible,
well-functioning derivatives and cash
commodity markets.
Because of the significance of these 25 core
referenced futures contracts to the underlying
cash markets, the level of liquidity in the
contracts, as well as the importance of these
cash markets to the national economy, I think
it is appropriate for the Commission to
protect the physical delivery process and
promote convergence in these critical
commodity markets. Further, the limits
issued today are higher than in the past,
notably because the rule utilizes current
estimates of deliverable supply—numbers
which haven’t been updated since 1999.20
Taking End-Users Into Account
Perhaps more than any other area of the
CFTC’s regulations, position limits directly
affect the participants in America’s real
economy: Farmers, ranchers, energy
producers, manufacturers, merchandisers,
transporters, and other commercial end-users
that use the derivatives market as a risk
management tool to support their businesses.
I am pleased that today’s rule takes into
account many of the serious concerns that
end-users voiced in response to this
rulemaking’s proposal, and in response to the
CFTC’s previous four unsuccessful position
limits proposals.
Importantly, and in response to many
comments, this rule, for the first time,
expands the possibility for enterprise-wide
hedging,21 (including additional clarification
provided in the proposal in response to
comments), establishes an enumerated
anticipated merchandising exemption,22
eliminates the ‘‘five-day rule’’ for enumerated
hedges,23 and no longer requires the filing of
certain cash market information with the
Commission that the CFTC can obtain from
exchanges.24 Regarding enterprise-wide
hedging—otherwise known as ‘‘gross
hedging’’—the rule will provide an energy
company, for example, with increased
flexibility to hedge different units of its
business separately if those units face
different economic realities. The final rule
eliminates the requirement that exchanges
document their justifications when allowing
19 78
FR 75694 (Dec. 12, 2013).
FR 24038 (May 5, 1999).
21 Appendix B, paragraph (a).
22 Appendix A, paragraph (a)(6).
23 Preamble discussion of Exemptions from
Federal Position Limits.
24 Elimination of CFTC Form 204.
20 64
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gross hedging; clarifies that market
participants are not required to develop
written policies or procedures that set forth
when gross versus net hedging is appropriate;
and clarifies that gross hedging is permissible
for both enumerated and non-enumerated
hedges.25
With respect to cross-commodity hedging,
today’s rule completely rejects the arbitrary,
unworkable, ill-informed, and frankly,
ludicrous ‘‘quantitative test’’ from the 2013
proposal.26 That test would have required a
correlation of at least 0.80 or greater in the
spot markets prices of the two commodities
for a time period of at least 36 months in
order to qualify as a cross-hedge.27 Under
this test, longstanding hedging practices in
the electric power generation and
transmission markets would have been
prohibited. Today’s rule not only shuns this
Government-Knows-Best approach, it also
establishes new flexibility for the crosscommodity hedging exemption, allowing it to
be used in conjunction with other
enumerated hedges, such as hedges of
anticipated merchandising transactions.28
For example, an energy marketer anticipating
buying and selling jet fuel to supply airports
will be eligible for a hedge exemption in
connection with trading heating oil futures,
a commonly-used cross-commodity hedge for
jet fuel.
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Bona Fide Hedges and Coordination With
Exchanges
For those market participants who employ
non-enumerated bona fide hedging practices
in the marketplace, the final rule creates a
streamlined, exchange-focused process to
approve those requests for purposes of both
exchange-set and Federal limits. I am pleased
that commenters were generally supportive
of the proposed process. As the marketplaces
for the core referenced futures contracts
addressed by the proposal, the DCMs have
significant experience in, and responsibility
towards, a workable position limits regime.
CEA core principles require DCMs and swap
execution facilities to set position limits, or
position accountability levels, for the
contracts that they list in order to reduce the
threat of market manipulation.29 DCMs have
long administered position limits in futures
contracts for which the CFTC has not set
limits, including in certain agricultural,
energy, and metals markets. In addition, the
exchanges have been strong enforcers of their
own rules: During 2018 and 2019, CME
Group and ICE Futures US concluded 32
enforcement matters regarding position
limits.
As part of their stewardship of their own
position limits regimes, DCMs have long
granted bona fide hedging exemptions in
those markets where there are no Federal
25 Preamble discussion, Execution Summary,
section 6. Legal Standards for Exemptions from
Position Limits.
26 78 FR 75717 (Dec. 12, 2013).
27 Id.
28 Appendix A, paragraph (a)(11).
29 DCM Core Principle 5 (sec. 5 of the CEA, 7
U.S.C. 7) (implemented by CFTC regulation 38.300)
and SEF Core Principle 6 (sec. 5h of the CEA, 7
U.S.C. 7b–3) (implemented by CFTC regulation
37.600).
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limits. Today’s final rule provides what I
believe is a workable framework to utilize
exchanges’ long standing expertise in
granting exemptions that are not enumerated
by CFTC rules.30 This rule also recognizes
that the CEA does not provide the
Commission with free rein to delegate all of
the authorities granted to it under the
statute.31 The Commission itself, through a
majority vote of the five Commissioners,
retains the ability to reject an exchangegranted non-enumerated hedge request
within 10 days of the exchange’s approval.32
The Commission has successfully and
responsibly used a similar process for both
new contract listings as well as exchange rule
filings, and I am pleased to see the final rule
expand that approach to non-enumerated
hedge exemption requests that will limit the
uncertainty for bone fide commercial market
participants.
Limits on Swaps
The CEA requires the Commission to
consider limits not only on exchange-traded
futures and options, but also on
‘‘economically equivalent’’ swaps.33 Today’s
final rule provides the market with far greater
certainty on the universe of such swaps than
the previous proposed rulemakings. Prior
proposals failed to sufficiently explain what
constituted an ‘‘economically equivalent
swap,’’ thereby ensuring that compliance
with position limits was essentially
unworkable, given real-time aggregation
requirements and ambiguity over in-scope
contracts. In stark contrast, today’s rule
narrows the scope of ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ swaps to those with material
contractual specifications, terms, and
conditions that are identical to exchangetraded contracts.34 For example, in order for
a swap to be considered ‘‘economically
equivalent’’ to a physically-settled core
referenced futures contract, that swap would
also have to be physically-settled, because
settlement type is considered a material
contractual term. I believe the narrowlytailored definition included in today’s rule
will provide market participants with clarity
over those contracts subject to position
limits. I think it is prudent that the final rule
took commenters’ concerns about updating
compliance systems into account by delaying
for an additional year, beyond the general
compliance date of January 1, 2022, that is
until January 1, 2023, the imposition of
position limits on economically equivalent
swaps.
Conclusion
During my confirmation hearing in front of
the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Forestry and Nutrition on July 27, 2017, I was
asked to directly commit to finalizing a
position limits rule. My response was brief,
but unquestionable: ‘‘Yes, I commit to
support finalizing a position limits rule.’’
30 Regulation
150.9.
discussion of regulation 150.9,
including references to cases pointing out the extent
to which an agency can delegate to persons outside
of the agency.
32 Regulation 150.9(e)(6).
33 Sec. 4a(5).
34 Regulation 150.1.
31 Preamble
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Making such a commitment to a committee
of the U.S. Congress in sworn testimony is
something I take very seriously, second only
to taking my oath to defend the Constitution
of the United States. With today’s vote, I am
very pleased to have made good on that
commitment three years in the making and
am even more proud of the product with
which I was able to fulfill it.
Appendix 4—Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Rostin Behnam
Introduction
The last time we gathered as a Commission
to discuss position limits I used some of my
time to speak a bit about the award winning
movie, Ford v. Ferrari.1 At that point, we
were nearing the airing of the 92nd Academy
Awards and this action-packed drama had
earned four nominations—not to mention the
distinction of being one of the few films I
actually saw in a theater. For those of you
who have not found it in one of your
quarantine movie queues, Ford v. Ferrari tells
the true story of American car designer
Carroll Shelby and British-born driver Ken
Miles who built a race car for Ford Motor
Company—the GT40—and competed with
Enzo Ferrari’s dominating, iconic red racing
cars at the 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans.2 I used
the film and racing metaphors throughout my
speaking and written statements to highlight
serious concerns that the proposed
amendments to the CFTC rules addressing
position limits (the ‘‘Proposal’’) signified yet
one more instance where the Commission
seemed to be comfortable with deferring core,
congressionally mandated duties to others
and calling it a victory.3
We are here today to finalize the Proposal.4
In just short of nine months, we have come
to terms with life during a global pandemic
complete with economic turmoil and pockets
of historic market volatility. Amid the mere
60-day open comment period following the
Proposal’s publication in the Federal
Register (graciously extended by 16 days to
May 15th in light of the pandemic 5), on
April 20th, the price of the West Texas
Intermediate crude oil futures contract (‘‘WTI
contract’’), a key benchmark in the energy
and financial markets, experienced an
unprecedented collapse one day prior to the
last day of trading and expiration for May
delivery.6 Defying market mechanics, the
1 Statement of Dissent by Commissioner Rostin
Behnam Regarding Position Limits for Derivatives;
Proposed Rule, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/behnamstatement013020 (the
‘‘Dissent’’).
2 Ford v Ferrari, Fox Movies, https://
www.foxmovies.com/movies/ford-v-ferrari (Last
visited Oct. 13, 2020).
3 Dissent.
4 See Position Limits for Derivatives, 85 FR 11596
(Feb. 27, 2020).
5 See Press Release Number 8146–20, CFTC,
CFTC Extends Certain Comment Periods in
Response to COVID–19 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8146-20;
Extension of Currently Open Comment Periods for
Rulemakings in Response to the COVID–19
Pandemic, 85 FR 22690, 22691 (Apr. 23, 2020).
6 See Statement of Commissioner Dan M.
Berkovitz on Recent Trading in the WTI Futures
Contract before the Energy and Environmental
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price of the contract fell from $17.73 per
barrel at market open, to a closing settlement
price of negative $37.63—with the price
dropping approximately $40 in the last 20
minutes of trading.7 And, while we are still
in recovery, with great fanfare after almost 10
years, the Commission is going to establish
the position limits regime required under the
Dodd-Frank Act. I am reminded again of Ken
who, at the 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans, went
against his gut, giving way and leaving
behind a milestone in car racing that to this
day remains elusive.
If you have not seen the movie, this is a
spoiler alert: Ken did not win Le Mans in ’66.
While he was one and a half laps ahead of
two other GT40s, he was given orders to slow
down so that the three Fords in the lead
would cross the finish line in a dead heat
formation. Ken lost his well-deserved win
because the 24 Hours of Le Mans awards the
victory to the car that covers the greatest
distance in 24 hours. In the event of a tie, the
rules provided that the car that had started
farther down the grid had traveled the greater
distance. Ken’s GT 40 had started in the grid
roughly 60 feet ahead of the GT40 driven by
Bruce McLaren and Chris Amon, who were
the declared winners.8
In the film, Ken seems to accept his loss
with quiet dignity. However, in reality he
was fully aware that in many respects, he had
been robbed. From what I’ve read, Ken likely
articulated his feelings a bit more colorfully.9
The point is that bringing something across
the finish line doesn’t always equate to a
success. As detailed in my questions today,
I believe that by going against our
Congressional mandate and clear statutory
intent by overly deferring to the exchanges,
we have relinquished a claim to victory in
this final position limits rule which in many
ways has itself felt like the CFTC’s version
of the 24 hours of Le Mans. Therefore, I will
go with my gut and not be part of the
formation in supporting this final rule.
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A Long Road, But a Fast Finish
It has been nine years since the
Commission first set out to establish the
position limits regime required by
amendments to section 4a of the Commodity
Exchange Act (the ‘‘Act’’ or ‘‘CEA’’) 10 under
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.11 While
Markets Advisory Committee Meeting (May 7,
2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement050720.
7 See Bloomberg News, The 20 Minutes that Broke
the U.S. Oil Market, Bloomberg (Apr. 25, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0425/the-20-minutes-that-broke-the-u-s-oilmarket?sref=DzeLiNol.
8 Press Release, Ford Division News Bureau, For
Immediate Release at 8 (July 5, 1966), made
available in PDF at Wikipedia, the Free
Encyclopedia, 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans, at https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_24_Hours_of_Le_Mans.
9 Matthew Phelan, What’s Fact and What’s
Fiction in Ford v. Ferrari, Slate (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://slate.com/culture/2019/11/ford-v-ferrarifact-vs-fiction-le-mans-ken-miles.html.
10 See Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 FR 4752
(proposed Jan. 26, 2011) (the ‘‘2011 Proposal’’).
11 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203 sec.
737, 124 Stat. 1376, 1722–25 (2010) (the ‘‘DoddFrank Act’’).
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today’s final rule purports to respect
Congressional intent and the purpose and
language of CEA section 4a, in reality, it
pushes the bounds of reasonable
interpretation by overly deferring to the
exchanges 12 and allowing them to take the
lead in administering a position limits
regime.
In passing the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress
understood that for the derivatives markets in
physical commodities to perform optimally,
there needed to be limits on the amount of
control exerted by a single person (or persons
acting in agreement). In fact, Congress has
understood this need since at least 1936,
when it first authorized the Commission’s
predecessor to impose limits on speculative
positions in order to prevent the harms
caused by excessive speculation. In tasking
the Commission with establishing limits and
the framework around their operation,
Congress was aware of our relationship with
the exchanges, but nevertheless opted for our
experience and our expertise to meet the
policy objectives of the Act.
Last January, as the Commission voted on
the Proposal that is being finalized today, I
warned that we seemed to be pushing to go
faster and just get to the finish line, making
real-time adjustments without regard to even
trying for that ‘‘perfect lap.’’ 13 Just nine
months later, nothing has changed. If
anything, we seem to be further prioritizing
just crossing the finish line over achieving a
rule that actually follows Congressional
intent and its first order priority: Protecting
market participants from excessive
speculation.
Letting the Exchanges Make the Call
As I argued in regard to the proposal, my
principal disagreement is with the
Commission’s determination to in effect
disregard the tenets supporting the statutorily
created parallel Federal and exchange-set
position limit regime, and take a back seat
when it comes to administration and
oversight.14 Like Ken Miles, the Commission
is relinquishing a rightful lead in an act of
deference. In doing so, the Commission
claims victory for recognizing that the
exchanges are better positioned in terms of
resources, information, knowledge, and
agility, and therefore ought to take the wheel.
While this may seem like the logical move,
it ignores that even if we operate as a team,
our incentives and interests are not fully
aligned. Based on consideration of the
Commission’s mission, and Congressional
intent as evinced in the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to CEA section 4a and
elsewhere in the Act, I continue to believe
that (1) the Commission is required to
establish position limits based on its
reasoned and expert judgment within the
parameters of the Act; (2) the Commission
has not provided a rational basis for its
determination not to establish Federal limits
outside of the spot month for referenced
contracts based on commodities other than
12 Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the term
‘‘exchanges’’ throughout this statement refers to
designated contract markets (‘‘DCMs’’) and swap
execution facilities (‘‘SEFs’’).
13 Dissent.
14 Id.
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the nine legacy agricultural commodities;
and (3) the Commission’s seemingly
unlimited flexibility in deciding to (a)
significantly broaden the bona fide hedging
definition, (b) codify an expanded list of selfeffectuating enumerated bona fide hedges,
and (c) provide for exchange recognition of
non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions
with respect to Federal limits, is both
inexplicably complicated to parse and
inconsistent with Congressional intent.
Not only does the final version of the rule
fail to address these deficiencies in the
proposal, it actually goes and makes many of
these issues worse.
Ignoring a Mandate
Like the proposal, this final rule goes to
great lengths to reconcile whether CEA
section 4a(a)(2)(A) requires the Commission
to make an antecedent necessity finding
before establishing any position limit,15 with
the implication that if a necessity finding is
required, then the Commission could
rationalize imposing no limits at all. Looking
back at the record, what is necessary is that
the Commission complies with the mandate
in the Dodd-Frank Act.16 In the 2011
Proposal, the Commission provided a review
of CEA section 4a(a)—interpreting the
various provisions, giving effect to each
paragraph, acknowledging the Commission’s
own informational and experiential
limitations regarding the swaps markets at
that time, and focusing on the Commission’s
primary mission of fostering fair, open and
efficient functioning of the commodity
derivatives markets.17 Of note, ‘‘Critical to
fulfilling this statutory mandate,’’ the
Commission pronounced, ‘‘is protecting
market users and the public from undue
burdens that may result from ‘excessive
speculation.’ ’’ 18 Federal position limits, as
predetermined by Congress, are most
certainly the only means towards addressing
the burdens of excessive speculation when
such limits must address a ‘‘proliferation of
economically equivalent instruments trading
in multiple trading venues.’’ 19 Exchange-set
position limits or accountability levels
simply cannot meet the mandate.
In exercising its authority, the Commission
may evaluate whether exchange-set position
limits, accountability provisions, or other
tools for contracts listed on such exchanges
are currently in place to protect against
manipulation, congestion, and price
distortions.20 Such an evaluation—while
permissible—is just one factor for
consideration. The existence of exchange-set
limits or accountability levels, on their own,
can neither predetermine deference nor be
justified absent substantial consideration. As
I argued in my dissenting statement regarding
15 See
Final Rule at III.
Commission’s analysis in support of its
denial of a mandate misconstrues form over
substance and assumes the answer it is looking for.
The Commission seems to suggest that it is free to
ignore a Congressional mandate if it determines that
Congress is wrong about the underlying policy. See
Final Rule at III.A.
17 76 FR at 4752–4754.
18 Id. at 4753.
19 Id. at 4754–4755.
20 See 76 FR at 4755.
16 The
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the Proposal, the authority and jurisdiction of
individual exchanges are necessarily
different than that of the Commission. They
do not always have congruent interests to the
Commission in monitoring instruments that
do not trade on or subject to the rules of their
particular platform or the market participants
that trade them. They do not have the
attendant authority to determine key issues
such as whether a swap performs or affects
a significant price discovery function, or
what instruments fit into the universe of
economically equivalent swaps. They are not
permitted to define bona fide hedging
transactions or grant exemptions for purposes
of Federal position limits. It is therefore clear
that CEA section 4a, as amended by the
Dodd-Frank Act ‘‘warrants extension of
Commission-set position limits beyond
agricultural products to metals and energy
commodities.’’ 21
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‘‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’’
In spite of all of this—the foregoing
mandate; the clear Congressional intent in
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(A); and the
Commission’s real experience and expertise
(including its unique data repository)—the
Commission’s final rule only maintains
Federal non-spot month limits for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts (with
questionably appropriate modifications),
‘‘because the Commission has observed no
reason to eliminate them.’’ 22 Essentially, the
Commission concludes: ‘‘if it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it.’’ In keeping with this relatively
riskless course of action, the Commission
similarly concludes that Federal non-spot
month limits are not necessary for the
remaining 16 proposed core referenced
futures contracts identified in the Final Rule.
In so doing, the Commission ignores
Congressional intent. The Commission never
considers that Congress directed the
Commission to establish limits—not
accountability levels. The Commission’s
observation that exchange-set accountability
levels have ‘‘functioned as-intended’’ until
this point in time ignores the wider purpose
and function of aggregate position limits
established by the Commission, and is
shortsighted given the ever expanding
universe of economically equivalent
instruments trading across multiple trading
venues. As I pointed out in my dissenting
statement regarding the Proposal, it seems
odd to conclude that Congress envisioned
that its painstaking amendments to CEA
section 4a were a directive for the
Commission to check the box that the current
system is working perfectly.
Hedging on Bona Fide Hedging
Today’s Final Rule provides for
significantly broader bona fide hedging
opportunities that will be largely selfeffectuating, and the Commission defers to
the exchanges in recognizing nonenumerated bona fide hedging. While I
support enhancing the cooperation between
the Commission and the exchanges, the
Commission here is cooperating by dropping
back. The Commission’s decision to
essentially give up primary authority to
recognize non-enumerated bona fide hedges
seems both careless and inconsistent with
Congressional intent.
I raised these concerns last January when
we voted on the Position Limits Proposal.
Unfortunately, rather than retaking the lead,
the Commission further cedes authority to
the exchanges. The Proposal provided the
Commission with the authority to reject an
exchange’s grant of non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition, and provided a
window of ten business days (or two in the
case of sudden or unforeseen circumstances)
for the Commission to make this
determination. I pointed out in my dissent
that this did not give the Commission nearly
enough time or guidance to properly make a
determination. In today’s Final Rule, the
Commission actually further reduces its
ability to make an independent
determination. Now, market participants will
be able to establish positions based upon an
exchange’s non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition during the Commission’s 10-day
review period, and the Commission cannot
determine that the person holding the
position has committed a position limits
violation during the Commission’s ongoing
review or upon issuing its determination.
This reduces the Commission’s review to an
ineffectual afterthought.
Trust the Process
A clear theme in my statements regarding
our many rules over the last few years is this:
Process matters. Sharing our viewpoints with
the public matters. Following the
Administrative Procedure Act,23 and giving
the public an opportunity for meaningful
comment on our proposals, matters. We are
at our best when we involve all five
Commissioners and our many stakeholders in
the process.
I want to thank the Chairman for
consistently providing the Commissioners
with drafts of proposed and final rules 30
days in advance of an open meeting. I believe
there have only been two major exceptions
over the course of our many laps in the last
year: The position limits proposal, and the
position limits final rule. In the case of the
final rule, we did not receive a full draft until
last Friday—six days before the open
meeting. This simply is not enough time for
the Commission to engage in a fulsome
discussion of the merits of the rule, and
makes the final rule more or less a fait
accompli. Perhaps most perplexing is that we
did not receive a draft of the cost benefit
considerations until two weeks ago. This is
literally a rule where a prior iteration
resulted in a court challenge—one that the
Commission lost.24 If ever a rule required
more consideration by the Commission itself,
this would seem to be it. Instead, the
Commissioners actually had less time to
review and consider the rule than we
normally do.
When we focus on just getting to the finish
line, and do not take the time for meaningful
22 Final
Rule at II.B.2.i.
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Conclusion
Before concluding, I want to acknowledge
and thank the Commission staff who worked
on the Proposal, today’s final rule, and every
related study, matter, and undertaking to
support it for the better part of 10 years. You
were the design team, the engineers, the
production team and the pit crew. You kept
us on course at a pace set by our Chairman,
and you have performed at the top of your
field.
Back in ’66, by holding back, Ken Miles
lost the win at Le Mans, which denied him
the ‘‘Triple Crown’’ of endurance racing: The
24 Hours of Daytona, the 12 Hours of
Sebring, and the 24 Hours of Le Mans. No
driver has won all three races in the same
year,26 and Ken missed out because he was
part of a team and Ford had been good to
him.27 He committed and moved forward
without the victory that should have been his
because he was the best driver that day. I am
committed to vote and move forward, even
if it means giving up the triple crown of the
day. But I will not go against my gut.
Appendix 5—Statement of
Commissioner Dawn D. Stump
Overview
With all that has transpired in our country
and in our lives this year, it feels like ages
ago that we gathered together in person to
consider proposing amendments to update
the Commission’s rules regarding position
limits back at the end of January. At the time,
25 Final
Rule at I.G.
Raffauf, Porsche and the Triple Crown
of endurance racing, Porsche Road & Race (Dec. 7,
2018), https://www.porscheroadandrace.com/
porsche-and-the-triple-crown-of-endurance-racing/.
27 Phelan, supra note 9.
26 Martin
23 5
U.S.C. 553(b).
Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 887 F. Supp.
2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012).
24 Int’l
21 Id.
consideration and dialogue, we risk failing to
take into account everything that we should
in our rulemakings. Subsequent to the
issuance of the Position Limits Proposal,
there was a major market event resulting
from the ongoing pandemic that may have
important implications for our position limits
regime. As the NYMEX Light Sweet Crude
Oil (CL) contract, also known as the WTI
contract, neared expiration in April 2020, the
contract experienced extreme volatility, with
the market trading below zero for the first
time. The Commission received at least eight
comments that addressed this event; a
number of commenters noted that the
extreme volatility was driven by speculators.
The speculators, unable to physically deliver
upon expiration for various reasons, had no
choice but to exit the contract at whatever
price was available. Commission staff
continues to review and analyze this event,
and the rule today recognizes that the
analysis may impact the rule itself. Today’s
preamble states: ‘‘The Commission will
continue to analyze the events of April 20 to
evaluate whether any changes to the position
limits regulations may be warranted in light
of the circumstances surrounding the
volatility in the WTI contract.’’25 This begs
the question—if the Commission is currently
in the midst of this analysis, why not wait
to finalize position limits until the analysis
is complete?
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I said that there were three guideposts by
which I would evaluate that proposal: First,
is it reasonable in design? Second, is it
balanced in approach? And third, is it
workable in practice for both market
participants and for the Commission?
Since I believed the answer to each of these
questions was yes, I supported issuing the
proposal. And by and large, my belief has
been confirmed by the comments we
received from those who trade in this
country’s derivatives markets. In the months
since January, we have heard from all corners
of the marketplace—agricultural interests,
energy interests, managed fund advisors, and
dealers that provide liquidity, to name a
few—that have voiced support for the
fundamental architecture of the position
limits framework that we proposed. Their
support stands in stark contrast to the serious
concerns they had expressed about the
several previous position limit proposals put
forward by the Commission during the past
decade.
Of course, each interest had its issues with
one aspect or another in the proposal. That
is to be expected, given the varied and
sometimes divergent objectives for our
position limit rules set out in the Commodity
Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’).1 Congress has tasked
us with adopting position limits that: (1) On
the one hand, diminish, eliminate or prevent
excessive speculation in derivatives and
deter and prevent market manipulation,
squeezes, and corners; while on the other
hand, and simultaneously (2) ensuring
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide
hedgers and ensuring that the price discovery
function of the underlying market is not
disrupted and does not shift to foreign
competitors.
Reasonable minds will always differ as to
exactly where to draw the line among these
statutory objectives. But while we must
always strive for perfection, we cannot
permit that aspiration to paralyze us from
acting to improve our rule sets. The final
position limit rules before us smooth some of
the rough edges in the proposal, and they
address the areas in which I expressed some
misgivings at the time. They incorporate
valuable input we have received from the
exchanges that operate the markets and the
businesses that trade in those markets.
And above all, the final rulemaking is
reasonable in design, balanced in approach,
and workable in practice. For these reasons,
I am pleased to support it.
Bona Fide Hedging and Spread
Transactions: Policy and Process
In commenting on the proposal in January,
I noted two areas that I felt could be
improved: (1) The list of enumerated bona
fide hedging transactions and positions; and
(2) the process for reviewing hedging
transactions outside of that list. I want to
briefly address each of these concerns, in
turn.
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
The CEA prohibits the Commission from
adopting position limit rules that apply to
bona fide hedging transactions or positions,
1 CEA
Section 4a(a), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a).
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as such terms are defined by the
Commission. It gives the Commission the
authority to define the term ‘‘bona fide
hedging transactions and positions’’ to
‘‘permit producers, purchasers, sellers,
middlemen, and users of a commodity or a
product derived therefrom to hedge their
legitimate anticipated business needs . . .’’ 2
Congress thereby recognized the critical
function of our derivatives markets in
enabling those whom we all depend upon to
deliver goods and services to hedge their
risks—both risks they currently bear as well
as those they reasonably anticipate.3
The Commission’s proposal recognized
this as well, as it expanded the list of
‘‘enumerated’’ bona fide hedging transactions
that are identified in our current rules.
Positions taken as a result of these
enumerated hedging transactions constitute
bona fide hedging, and therefore are not
subject to Federal speculative position limits.
This expansion of the list of enumerated
bona fide hedges is entirely appropriate
(indeed, it is long overdue). Hedging
practices at companies that produce, process,
trade, and use agricultural, energy, and
metals commodities have become far more
sophisticated, complex, and global over time,
and the Commission’s list of enumerated
hedging practices to which its position limit
rules do not apply has failed to keep pace
with these realities.
And given Congress’ recognition of the
appropriateness of hedging legitimate
anticipated business needs,4 the proposal
also added, at my request, anticipatory
merchandising as an enumerated bona fide
hedge. There is no policy basis for
distinguishing hedging risks of anticipated
merchandising from hedging risks of other
activities in the physical supply chain.
Yet, I was concerned in January that our
proposed list of enumerated bona fide hedges
still might not be as robust as it should be.
We needed input on this question from
market participants—especially those in the
energy and metals sectors where we are
applying Federal position limits for the first
time. And that input was nearly unanimous
in recommending that hedging the risk of
unfixed-price forward transactions be added
to the list of enumerated bona fide hedges.
2 CEA
Section 4a(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1).
CEA provides that a bona fide hedging
transaction or position is one that, among other
things, ‘‘is economically appropriate to the
reduction of risks in the conduct and management
of a commercial enterprise.’’ CEA Section
4a(c)(2)(A)(ii), 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(ii). The
Commission’s policy in administering Federal
position limits in the agricultural sector over the
years has been to limit this economically
appropriate test to the hedging of price risk.
However, as set forth in the final rulemaking
release, the Commission acknowledges, consistent
with that historical policy, that price risk can be
impacted by various non-price risks.
4 CEA Section 4a(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1). See also
CEA Section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I), 7 U.S.C.
6a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (bona fide hedging transaction or
position is a transaction or position that, among
other things, ‘‘arises from the potential change in
the value of . . . assets that a person owns,
produces, manufactures, processes, or
merchandises or anticipates owning, producing,
manufacturing, processing, or merchandising . . .’’
(emphasis added)).
3 The
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Hedges of offsetting unfixed-price cash
commodity sales and purchases have
historically been recognized as an
enumerated bona fide hedge under our rules,
and that was carried over in the proposal,
too. These are hedges of risk incurred where
a market participant has both bought and
sold the underlying cash commodity at
unfixed prices. We received many comments,
though, urging us to include as an
enumerated bona fide hedge those situations
in which the purchase or sale, but not both,
is an unfixed-price forward transaction.
Some commenters asked that the historical
enumerated hedge for offsetting unfixedprice cash commodity sales and purchases be
expanded to cover unfixed-price cash
commodity sales or purchases; others asked
the Commission to create a new, stand-alone
enumerated bona fide hedge category for
these unfixed-price transactions. The final
rulemaking concludes that neither step is
necessary because, as suggested by still other
commenters, commercial market participants
may qualify for one of the enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges that will be
available, to the extent of their demonstrated
anticipated need.5
Spread Transactions
Although the treatment of spread
transactions for purposes of Federal position
limits is distinct from the treatment of bona
fide hedging transactions, I would like to take
a short detour to note an important similarity
between the two. That is, we also received
numerous comments suggesting that the
proposed definition of a spread transaction,
which would be exempt from Federal
position limits, was too narrow.
At the suggestion of commenters, the final
rulemaking adds the well-established
categories of intra-market, inter-market, and
intra-commodity spreads to the list of
defined spreads that fall outside the Federal
position limits regime. The release notes that
as a result, the spread transaction definition
captures most, if not all, spread exemptions
currently granted by exchanges and used by
market participants. The rulemaking
appropriately recognizes that these spread
positions simply do not raise the type of
concerns that position limits are intended to
address.
The Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Recognition Process
Getting the list of enumerated bona fide
hedges right is important because they are
‘‘self-effectuating’’ for purposes of Federal
position limits. In other words, a trader need
not count positions that result from
enumerated bona fide hedging transactions
towards the Federal position limits, and does
not need to apply to the Commission for
approval (although the trader still must
receive approval from the relevant exchange
to exceed exchange-set limits).
Other hedging practices, generally referred
to as ‘‘non-enumerated’’ hedges, can still be
5 These enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges
include: (1) The existing enumerated bona fide
hedge for unsold anticipated production; (2) the
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated
requirements; and (3) the new enumerated bona
fide hedge established in this rulemaking for
anticipated merchandising.
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recognized as bona fide hedging, but only
after a review process. A trader can either ask
the exchange and the Commission to
separately review and approve the proposed
non-enumerated hedging activity for
purposes of exchange and Federal limits,
respectively, or it can follow what the
rulemaking calls a ‘‘streamlined’’ process.
Under that process, if an exchange recognizes
a non-enumerated transaction as a bona fide
hedge for purposes of the exchange’s position
limits, the Commission would then review
the exchange’s bona fide hedge recognition
for application to Federal limits as well. The
Commission must notify the exchange and
market participant of any denial within 10
business days, or 2 business days in the case
of an application based on a sudden or
unforeseen increase in the trader’s bona fide
hedging needs (although that timeline can be
extended if the Commission issues a stay or
requests additional information).
In January, I expressed reservations about
whether this 10/2-day process would be
workable in practice for either market
participants or the Commission because it
appeared to be both too long and too short:
(1) Too long to be workable for market
participants that may need to take a hedge
position quickly; and (2) too short for the
Commission to meaningfully review the
relevant circumstances related to the
exchange’s recognition of the hedge as bona
fide. But while some commenters took the
‘‘too long’’ view and others took the ‘‘too
short’’ view, the majority of commenters
were generally supportive of this process.
The final rulemaking adopts the 10/2-day
process, with an adjustment recommended
by several commenters as well as participants
in a meeting of the Commission’s Energy and
Environmental Markets Advisory Committee
(‘‘EEMAC’’) 6 that discussed the position
limits proposal. That is, the final rulemaking
now provides that a trader can exceed
Federal limits based on the exchange’s
approval of the non-enumerated hedge while
the Commission is conducting its assessment.
This is not a delegation of authority to the
exchange, since the Commission will still
make the final determination whether
positions resulting from the non-enumerated
hedging transaction should count towards
Federal position limits. Thus, a trader that
exceeds Federal limits in reliance on the
initial exchange determination runs the risk
that the Commission will later deny the
requested non-enumerated hedge. In that
event, the trader will have to reduce the
position to come into compliance with limits
within a commercially reasonable period of
time.
Is it a perfect process? It is not. My
preference would have been that recognition
of non-enumerated hedges be the
responsibility of the exchanges, which are
most familiar with both their own markets
6 See, e.g., Transcript of CFTC Energy and
Environmental Markets Advisory Committee
Meeting at 103:14–17, Comment by Thomas LaSala,
CME Group (May 7, 2020) (‘‘the Commission should
permit a participant to exceed Federal position
limits during the 10-day/2-day Commission review
period of an exchange-granted exemption’’),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/
2020/06/1591218221/eemactranscript050720.pdf.
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and the hedging practices of participants in
those markets. The Commission, in turn, has
the tools it needs to monitor this process
through its routine, ongoing review of the
exchanges. But those who participate in the
markets have generally expressed the view
that this is a reasonable, balanced, and
workable process. And so, I support it.
Response to Commenter Objections
Before concluding, I would like to briefly
respond to a couple of points raised by
commenters that were critical of the
proposed position limit rules. Some
commenters argued that: (1) The
amendments to the CEA’s position limit
provisions that were enacted as part of the
Dodd-Frank Act 7 constitute a mandate for
the Commission to establish Federal position
limits without having to make an antecedent
finding that such limits are necessary to
achieve the CEA’s objectives; and (2) the
rules we are adopting improperly abdicate
Commission responsibilities with respect to
Federal position limits to the exchanges.
The Commission’s Mandate To Impose
Position Limits it Finds Are Necessary
As I read the statute, the CEA’s position
limit provisions, as amended by the DoddFrank Act, mandate the Commission to
impose position limits that it finds are
necessary. The basis for my view is set out
in detail in my Statement in support of the
proposal last January, which included an
explanatory graphic. Both of these
documents are available on the Commission’s
website for those who are interested,8 and so
I will not repeat that analysis here. Suffice it
to say, though, that I have not seen anything
in the comment letters we received that
changes my view.
The Role of the Exchanges
I fundamentally disagree with the
suggestion that the amended position limit
rules that we are adopting in any way reflect
an inappropriate reliance by the Commission
on the exchanges. My disagreement is rooted
in several considerations.
First, the CEA itself states without
limitation that it is the purpose of the CEA
to serve the public interests described in the
statute ‘‘through a system of effective selfregulation of trading facilities, clearing
systems, market participants and market
professionals under the oversight of the
Commission.’’ 9 This is an overarching
statement of purpose by Congress, and is the
lens through which all other provisions of
the CEA—including its position limit
provisions—must be interpreted. And
nothing in the amendments to those position
7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Public Law 111–203 (2010) (‘‘DoddFrank Act’’).
8 See Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump
Regarding Proposed Rule: Position Limits for
Derivatives (January 30, 2020), and Commodity
Exchange Act § 4a(a): Finding Position Limits
Necessary is a Prerequisite to the Mandate for
Establishing Such (January 30, 2020), available at
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/stumpstatement013020.
9 CEA Section 3(b), 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
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limit provisions enacted as part of the DoddFrank Act indicate otherwise.
Second, the rules we are adopting do not
delegate any authority of the Commission to
the exchanges. With respect to applications
for non-enumerated bona fide hedges in
particular, the Commission will be informed
by an exchange’s determination whether to
recognize the hedge for purposes of
exchange-set limits. But the determination
whether to do so with respect to Federal
limits is the Commission’s alone to make,
and a trader who trades in reliance on an
exchange determination risks having to
reduce the position if the Commission
subsequently disagrees with the exchange’s
determination.
Third, the exchanges know their markets.10
They have a comprehensive understanding of
the traders that participate in those markets
as well as current hedging practices in
agricultural, energy, and metals commodities.
Indeed, the expertise of the exchanges makes
them uniquely well-suited to make the initial
determination on requests for nonenumerated bona fide hedges in real-time.
Finally, I return once again to my
foundational principles: Reasonable,
balanced, and workable. A system in which
a business must put its economic needs and
risk management efforts on hold while the
Commission undertakes to learn about its
operations and hedging activities in order to
pass upon a request for a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge violates all three principles.
Conclusion
After nearly a decade of trying, we stand
on the cusp of amending the Commission’s
position limit rules, which are sorely in need
of updating. Before us is a thorough and wellreasoned final rulemaking release that
considers the extensive comments we
received, and clearly presents the
Commission’s rationale in addressing those
comments and adopting the rules in the form
that we are adopting them. The fact that this
release is before us less than nine months
after we issued the proposal—in the midst of
a pandemic, no less—is a tribute to the
dedication, perseverance, and analytical
capabilities of the professionals in the
Commission’s Division of Market Oversight,
Office of General Counsel, and Chief
Economist’s Office. Their work on this
rulemaking has been nothing short of
amazing.
My fellow Commissioners and I have each
publicly committed that we would work to
finish a position limits rulemaking. The time
has come to fulfill that commitment. The
release that staff has presented is reasonable
in design, balanced in approach, and
workable for both market participants and
the Commission. I am pleased to support it.
10 It is notable that, due to certain trading
dynamics unique to natural gas contracts, including
the existence of liquid cash-settled contracts trading
on three different exchanges, the final rulemaking
for the Federal conditional spot-month limit is
derived from the existing exchange framework that
has been in place for approximately a decade.
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Appendix 6—Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz
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I. Introduction
I dissent from today’s position limits final
rule (‘‘Final Rule’’). The Final Rule fails to
achieve the most fundamental objective of
position limits: To prevent the harms arising
from excessive speculation. It is another
disappointing chapter in the Commission’s
10-year saga to implement Congress’s
mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act to impose
speculative position limits in the energy,
metals, and agricultural markets. In a number
of instances, the Final Rule appears more
intent on limiting the actions and discretion
of the Commission than it does on actually
limiting such speculation.
As I previously observed, the proposed
rule demoted the Commission from head
coach to Monday-morning quarterback. The
Final Rule declares that the players on the
field are the referees. In this arena, the public
interest loses.
I support effective position limits to
restrain excessive speculation in physical
commodity markets, coupled with legitimate
bona fide hedge exemptions for commercial
market participants. The Final Rule,
however, fails to address excessive
speculation in several key respects:
First, the Final Rule impermissibly permits
private entities to devise new bona fide
hedge exemptions, while simultaneously
constricting the Commission’s review and
enforcement of such privately-created
exemptions.
Second, the Final Rule fails to address
trading at settlement (‘‘TAS’’) transactions.
The potential for market manipulation
through the use of TAS is well documented.
The Final Rule was a valuable but wasted
opportunity to address an important type of
transaction in many commodity markets that,
if abused, can present risks to orderly trading
and price discovery.
Third, while the Final Rule eliminates the
risk management exemptions that had been
granted to a limited number of index funds,
it also increases the non-spot month limits to
accommodate the speculative positions of
these funds in the futures markets.
Cumulatively, index funds can have a
substantial price impact and exacerbate
volatility. Their monthly position rolls can
also distort inter-month spreads. Yet the
Commission performed no assessment of the
impact of potential increases in this type of
speculation that these higher limits would
permit.1
Fourth, the Final Rule misinterprets the
Dodd-Frank Act and reverses decades of
precedent by declaring, for the first time, that
the Commission must make antecedent
necessity findings on a commodity-bycommodity basis prior to imposing Federal
speculative position limits.
II. Physical Commodity Markets Benefit
From Position Limits and Appropriate Bona
Fide Hedge Exemptions
Position limits help prevent market
manipulation and price distortion arising
1 For detailed comments on the effects of large
speculative positions of index funds, see Better
Markets Comments Letter, at 8–12 (May 15, 2020).
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from excessively large speculative positions
in futures, options, and swaps tied to
physical commodities. Section 4a of the CEA
reflects Congress’s long-standing
determination that excessive speculation in a
commodity can cause ‘‘sudden,’’
‘‘unreasonable,’’ or ‘‘unwarranted’’
fluctuations and changes in commodity
prices.2 Section 4a directs the Commission to
establish speculative position limits to
address these harms, while also providing
that such limits shall not apply to
‘‘transactions or positions which are shown
to be bona fide hedging transactions or
positions, as those terms are defined by the
Commission . . . .’’ 3
Experience from decades of limits in
agricultural commodities teaches that a
properly crafted position limits regime is an
‘‘effective prophylactic measure’’ to protect
American businesses, consumers, and market
participants that rely on physical commodity
derivatives markets.4 The parameters of an
effective position limits regime are well
established. They include: (1) Meaningful
limits on excessive speculation to help
prevent market manipulation and price
distortion; (2) recognition of bona fide
hedging activities and exemptions to permit
producers, end-users, merchants, and others
to manage their commercial risks; and (3)
clear divisions of responsibility, consistent
with the CEA, that recognize the
complimentary but distinct roles of
exchanges, the Commission, and market
participants in administering a position
limits regime.
Federal speculative position limits have
been in place to protect derivatives markets
since the 1930s. The Commission or its
predecessors adopted position limits for
grains in 1938, cotton in 1940, and soybeans
in 1951. In 1981, the Commission adopted
rules requiring exchange limits for all
commodities for which there were no Federal
limits—a rule which notably did not require
an antecedent, commodity-by-commodity
necessity finding. The Commission has also
consistently relied on exchanges to help
administer the position limits regime,
including position accountability and
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions.
These efforts, spanning over 80 years, have
helped prevent manipulation and price
distortion through a complementary system
that relies on the respective expertise of
Commission, exchange, and market
participant stakeholders. The Final Rule
discards this balance. The Final Rule relies
excessively on exchanges and market
participants to permit positions as bona fide
hedges, and in so doing impermissibly
delegates the Commission’s statutory
responsibility to determine what constitutes
a bona fide hedge.5
27
U.S.C. 6a.
U.S.C. 6a(c)(1) (emphasis added).
4 Establishment of Speculative Position Limits, 46
FR 50938 (Oct. 16, 1981).
5 ‘‘[W]hile Federal agency officials may subdelegate their decision-making authority to
subordinates absent evidence of contrary
congressional intent, they may not sub-delegate to
outside entities—private or sovereign—absent
affirmative evidence of authority to do so.’’ U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565–68 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
37
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III. Significant Flaws in the Final Rule
A. The Final Rule Permits Market
Participants To Violate Federal Speculative
Position Limits With No Prior Commission
Recognition of a Bona Fide Hedge Exemption
The Final Rule explicitly permits market
participants to violate Federal speculative
position limits with no bona fide hedge
exemption from the Commission. It
impermissibly delegates the Commission’s
statutory responsibility to define bona fide
hedging to the very market participants with
large speculative positions that section 4a is
intended to restrain, as well as to the
exchanges, who have no authority to
determine what is a hedge under Federal law.
First, the Final Rule authorizes market
participants to create their own bona fide
hedge exemptions and exceed speculative
position limits for ‘‘sudden or unforeseen
increases in their bona fide hedging needs.’’
No prior approval from the Commission or an
exchange is required to exceed the limits
established by the Commission, and market
participants may file their hedge applications
up to five days after violating the applicable
position limit. The Final Rule offers no
guardrails on what can be considered a
‘‘sudden or unforeseen’’ circumstance. In an
efficient market, all future price movements
are inherently unforeseeable; that is the
reason for hedging to begin with.6 Further, in
today’s interconnected markets, where the
speed of light is the limiting factor on the
transmission of information, sudden and
unforeseen circumstances arise virtually
every millisecond. This provision may
swallow the Final Rule.
Second, the Final Rule authorizes a market
participant to exceed Federal speculative
positon limits if an exchange permits it to
exceed the exchange’s position limits. In
other words, an exchange determination can
enable a market participant to violate Federal
limits even in the absence of a Commission
determination. Here again, the Final Rule
ignores the Commission’s statutory
responsibility to define bona fide hedging.
Exchanges have a critical role in any properly
balanced position limits regime, but they are
not authorized by the CEA to define Federal
hedge exemptions, nor are they authorized to
green-light violations of Federal position
limits.
This process for market participants to
‘‘self-recognize’’ non-enumerated hedges that
6 ‘‘The basic efficient market hypothesis positions
that the market cannot be beaten because it
incorporates all important determining information
into current share prices. Therefore, stocks trade at
the fairest value, meaning that they can’t be
purchased undervalued or sold overvalued. The
theory determines that the only opportunity
investors have to gain higher returns on their
investments is through purely speculative
investments that pose a substantial risk.’’ J. B.
Maverick, The Weak, Strong, and Semi-Strong
Efficient Market Hypotheses, Investopedia,
available at https://www.investopedia.com/ask/
answers/032615/what-are-differences-betweenweak-strong-and-semistrong-versions-efficientmarket-hypothesis.asp (updated Sept. 30, 2020).
The unpredictability of the market has long been
recognized. ‘‘If you can look into the seeds of time,
and say which grain will grow and which will not,
speak then unto me.’’ William Shakespeare,
Macbeth, Act 1, Scene 3 (1623).
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they wish had been enumerated under
Federal law undoes the existing,
Commission-led procedures that have
worked well for decades.
The Final Rule reflects a multi-year,
iterative process of notice and comment
rulemaking to comprehensively determine
which practices should constitute bona fide
hedging. Members of the public and industry
participants have enjoyed multiple
opportunities to inform the Commission on
this topic, including through additional
proposed position limits rules in 2013 and
twice in 2016. The Final Rule’s enumerated
hedges reflect the Commission’s extensive
dialogue and reasoned deliberations, and
they recognize a wide array of hedging
practices identified by commenters. To my
knowledge, the Commission is not aware of
any novel hedging practices that were not
addressed during this rulemaking process.
Commission regulations currently allow for
the recognition of non-enumerated bona fide
hedges through a 30-day, Commission-led
review process. The Commission must
recognize the requested hedge as bona fide
before a market participant can put the hedge
on the exchange and exceed position limits.
This process has worked well for decades.
The Final Rule replaces it with a new system
that allows market participants to make their
own bona fide hedge determinations and
exceed Federal position limits in advance of
any reasoned, considered evaluation by the
Commission.
1. The 10 and 2 Day Review Periods Are
Inadequate for the Commission To Consider
Applications for Exemptions After an
Exchange Determination
The Final Rule attempts to cure the
impermissible statutory delegation described
above through crammed, after-the-fact
reviews of market participants’ hedge
applications and violations of position limits
rules.
Market participants who request
prospective non-enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions from an exchange may violate
Federal speculative position limits upon
being granted the exemption. The exchange
must then forward the application and other
materials to the Commission for the
beginning of a constricted 10-day review
period.
The Commission, for its part, must
complete the difficult task of evaluating the
law, facts, and circumstances with respect to
cash market risks that have already been
incurred and commodity positions that have
already been posted on an exchange.
Commission determinations regarding the
validity of positions that have already been
entered into will be complicated by the
commercial implications involved in
unwinding such positions. Further, in the
event that the Commission determines to
deny the application, the Commission must
provide the applicant with notice and
opportunity to respond. In the case of
positions established due to ‘‘sudden or
unforeseen’’ events, the Final Rule calls for
a two-day review. This is an unrealistic and
unworkable timeframe. This fig leaf of a
‘‘review’’ cannot provide legal cover for the
impermissible delegation.
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2. The Final Rule Adopts a Policy of NonEnforcement for Position Limit Violations
Both the rule text and the preamble to the
Final Rule leave no doubt that any person
who puts on a position in excess of a position
limit prior to receiving Commission approval
of the exemption is in violation of the
speculative position limits. However, where
an application for a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge is submitted retroactively to either
an exchange or the Commission due to
‘‘sudden or unforeseen circumstances,’’ or
where an exchange has approved an
application for an exemption from the
exchange limit, the Commission limits its
ability to prosecute such violations by
declaring that, ‘‘as a matter of policy,’’ it will
not pursue an enforcement action as long as
the application was submitted in ‘‘good
faith.’’
The Final Rule does not define ‘‘good
faith.’’ Perhaps this is because the concept of
good faith traditionally is used as a safe
harbor to protect persons who reasonably
believe they are acting in compliance with
the law. For example, when exercising its
prosecutorial discretion for violations of the
swap dealer business conduct standards, the
Commission considers whether the swap
dealer attempted in ‘‘good faith’’ to follow
policies and procedures reasonably designed
to comply with the CEA and Commission
Regulations.7 This application of the good
faith doctrine is consistent with the longestablished understanding of the term.8 In
the Final Rule, however, the Commission
turns this doctrine on its head and mandates
prosecutorial discretion where a market
participant knowingly acts in violation of the
law by putting on a position in excess of the
legal limit.
Notably, the Commission describes its
position not to enforce these violations as ‘‘a
matter of policy.’’ So although this nonenforcement policy is adopted as part of this
rulemaking, it is nonetheless just that—a
statement of policy. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, ‘‘general statements of
policy,’’ or ‘‘statements issued by an agency
to advise the public prospectively of the
manner in which the agency proposes to
exercise a discretionary power,’’ are not
subject to the notice-and-comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedure
Act.9 Accordingly, the Commission may
7 See Business Conduct Standards for Swap
Dealers and Major Swap Participants With
Counterparties, 77 FR 9734, 9744, 9746, 9750 (Feb.
17, 2012).
8 See, e.g., CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., No. SACV–
171868, 2020 WL 1625808, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
12, 2020) (finding that controlling persons did not
establish good faith defense to liability under 7
U.S.C. 13b where they knowingly or recklessly
violated the CEA or were aware or should have
been aware that employees were violating the CEA,
or did not reasonably enforce system designed to
promote legal compliance) (citing Monieson v.
CFTC, 996 F.2d 852, 860–861 (7th Cir. 1993)); U.S.
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (establishing good
faith doctrine as exemption to Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule when police officer reasonably
believed conduct to be legal).
9 Nor are blanket statements of policy that
abandon an agency’s responsibility to enforce the
law constitutionally permissible. Crowley
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change this enforcement policy at any time
without engaging in a notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
Significantly, in its comment letter, the
entity with the most experience in retroactive
applications for hedge exemptions, the CME
Group, pointed out to the Commission the
importance of being able to take enforcement
action for position limit violations that have
occurred when retroactive applications are
denied. It stated:
Today at the exchange level, CME Group
considers firms to be in violation of a
position limit if they exceed a limit and the
exemption application is denied. We believe
the Commission should implement this
standard rather than permitting the proposed
grace period for denial of an exemption
application. Otherwise, market participants
with excessively large speculative positions
could exploit the grace period accompanying
an application for an exemption and
intentionally go over the applicable limit
without consequences—all the while
disrupting orderly market operations. In our
experience, the prospect of having an
application denied and being found in
violation of position limits has worked to
deter market participants from attempting to
exploit the retroactive exemption process.10
Although the Final Rule is replete with
deference to the experience of the exchanges
in implementing the position limits regime,
and creates a process specifically reliant
upon the exchange’s expertise in granting
hedge exemptions, here in the context of
enforcing violations and deterring abuse, the
Commission oddly rejects that expertise.
B. The Final Rule Fails To Address TAS
Transactions or the Historic Collapse of WTI
Crude Oil Futures
On April 20, 2020, the price of the May
futures contract for West Texas Intermediate
(‘‘WTI’’) crude oil traded on the New York
Mercantile Exchange collapsed from $17.73
per barrel at the market open to a closing
price of negative $37.63. This single-day fall
in prices of approximately $55 per barrel is
unprecedented, and was accompanied by a
massive disconnect between May crude oil
futures and the price of crude oil in the
physical market.
WTI crude oil futures are a key benchmark
in global energy markets and can impact the
overall U.S. economy. Following the WTI
event, I called upon the Commission to
determine the causes of this unprecedented
price movement and divergence from
physical markets, and to work with CME to
‘‘take whatever measures may be appropriate
to ensure that trading in the WTI futures
contract is orderly and supports convergence
of the futures and physical markets.’’ 11
Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pen˜a, 37 F.3d 671, 677
(DC Cir. 1994) (‘‘[A]n agency’s pronouncement of a
broad policy against enforcement poses special
risks that it ‘has consciously and expressly adopted
a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to
an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.’’’)
(citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4
(1985)).
10 CME Comment Letter (May 14, 2020).
11 Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz
on Recent Trading in the WTI Futures Contract
before the Energy and Environmental Markets
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Almost six months later, the Commission has
yet to complete its investigation or issue even
preliminary results. It should not take this
long for the world’s leading derivatives
regulator to understand the historic collapse
of a benchmark contract that it has overseen
for decades.
Independently of the Commission’s
investigation, public commentary following
the WTI event focused on TAS transactions
and the well-known integrity concerns
regarding TAS under certain market
conditions.12 TAS transactions represent the
purchase or sale of an underlying exchange
commodity at the closing price for that
commodity or at a specified differential.
Notably, exchange rules may permit TAS
transactions to be netted intraday against
futures positions in that commodity
established via outright purchases and sales.
Such netting could permit a trader to
establish very large long or short positions in
the outright futures contracts, while
remaining below speculative position limits
on a net basis.
The Final Rule recognizes the importance
of netting practices and rules in several
regards. For example, it prohibits the spotmonth netting of physically settled contracts
with linked cash settled contracts. The Final
Rule explains that allowing such netting
during the spot month ‘‘could lead to
disruptions in the price discovery function of
the core referenced futures contract or allow
a market participant to manipulate the price
of the core referenced futures contract.’’ The
Final Rule is silent, however, with respect to
any limitations on the netting of TAS with
outright futures.
One commenter on the Final Rule
reminded the Commission in significant
detail of the market integrity issues
associated with TAS orders.13 But even apart
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Advisory Committee Meeting (May 7, 2020),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement050720.
12 See, e.g., Matt Levine, It’s a Good Time to Cut
Dividends, Money Stuff (Apr. 29, 2020), available
at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202008-04/oil-s-plunge-below-zero-was-500-millionjackpot-for-a-few-london-traders?sref=DzeLiNol (‘‘If
you combine these two facts—a lot of TAS contracts
and not much volume around the settlement time—
you get a well-known theoretical problem. . . . The
basic pattern—agree in advance to buy (sell) stuff
at the official settlement price at some fixed future
time, and then sell (buy) a bunch of that stuff in
the minutes leading up to the official settlement
time with the effect of pushing down (up) the price
at which you are buying (selling)—is incredibly
common . . . .’’); Craig Pirrong, Streetwise Professor
Blog, WTI–WTF? Part 3: Did CLK20 Get TAS-ed?
(Apr. 30, 2020), available at https://
streetwiseprofessor.com/2020/04/.
13 Better Markets Comment Letter, at 13–14 (May
15, 2020).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
03:06 Jan 14, 2021
Jkt 253001
from the comment letters on the proposed
rule, and apart from the WTI event, the
potential for manipulation through the use of
offsetting TAS contracts has been wellknown.14 Further, the CFTC has direct
experience with this issue: it has brought two
manipulation cases where WTI TAS orders
were an integral part of the manipulative
scheme.15 Given the Commission’s
familiarity with the potential for
manipulation and disruption of the price
discovery process arising from an abuse of
the TAS order type, the failure of the Final
Rule to address in any manner these wellknown dangers to market integrity is
inexcusable.
C. The Final Rule Misconstrues the CEA by
Requiring Antecedent, Commodity-byCommodity Necessity Findings Prior to
Imposing Federal Position Limits
The Final Rule misinterprets the DoddFrank Act and reverses decades of
Commission interpretation and finds that an
antecedent, commodity-by-commodity
necessity finding is required prior to
imposing Federal speculative position limits.
The Final Rule further states that this ‘‘is the
best interpretation’’ of CEA section 4a(a)(2),
and that the Commission’s prior
interpretations are ‘‘not compelling.’’
I addressed this issue extensively in my
dissenting opinion on the proposed position
limits rule, and I reiterate those views now.16
Neither the statutory language of CEA section
4a(a)(2), nor the district court’s decision in
ISDA v. CFTC, require an antecedent
necessity finding prior to imposing position
limits. The Final Rule’s new interpretation,
14 See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, Derived Pricing:
Fragmentation, Efficiency, and Manipulation, Bauer
College of Business, University of Houston, at 10
(Jan. 14, 2019), available at https://
streetwiseprofessor.com/2020/04/ (‘‘The analysis in
Section 2 demonstrates that TAS contracts create
trading opportunities with asymmetric price
impacts. This suggests that TAS may therefore also
create opportunities for profitable trade-based
manipulation, and this is indeed the case.’’); see
also Paul Peterson, Trading at Settlement for
Agricultural Futures: Results from the First Month,
farmdoc daily (July 29, 2015), available at https://
farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2015/07/trading-atsettlement-for-agricultural-futures.html (‘‘Over the
years TAS has been associated with several efforts
to artificially influence the daily settlement price
through ‘banging the close’ and other forms of
manipulation [citations omitted].’’).
15 See In re Optiver US LLC, CFTC No. 08 Civ
6560, 2012 WL 1632613 (Apr. 19, 2012); In re Shak,
CFTC No. 14–03, 2013 WL 11069360 (Nov. 25,
2013) (consent order).
16 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan
M. Berkovitz Regarding Proposed Rule on Position
Limits for Derivatives (Jan. 30, 2020), available at
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement013020.
PO 00000
Frm 00259
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
3493
which the Commission concedes is a
‘‘change’’ from prior interpretations, is
mistaken.17
As articulated in my prior dissent, the
Final Rule’s interpretation of CEA section
4a(a)(2) ‘‘defies history and common
sense.’’ 18 Following hard on the heels of the
2008 financial crisis and the collapse of the
Amaranth hedge fund in 2006, it is
implausible that the drafters of the DoddFrank Act intended what the Commission
has now adopted. The Final Rule requires the
Commission to believe that a Congress in the
midst of the financial crisis, aware the CEA
had never been interpreted to require
predicate necessity findings for position
limits, and engaged in a historic effort to
regulate financial markets, would
nonetheless make it harder for the
Commission to impose Federal speculative
position limits. The Commission’s revisionist
legislative history is neither accurate nor
credible.
IV. Conclusion
The Final Rule departs from both legal
interpretations and policy frameworks that
have served commodity markets well for
decades.
Most significantly, the Final Rule
impermissibly delegates the authority to
recognize non-enumerated hedge
exemptions; provides farcically short review
periods for private-entity hedge
determinations; attempts to enshrine a policy
of non-enforcement for position limits
violations; fails to address the well-known
risks of TAS transactions; and reinterprets
the CEA to require antecedent necessity
findings prior to imposing Federal position
limits.
I cannot support such a flawed rule.
[FR Doc. 2020–25332 Filed 1–5–21; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
17 Significantly, however, at the Commission’s
meeting on the proposal rule, the Commission’s
Office of General Counsel clarified that a necessity
finding is required only with respect to the
Commission’s establishment of Federal position
limits. The Office of General Counsel stated that a
necessity finding was neither a prerequisite for a
Commission directive to the exchanges to establish
limits, nor prior to establishing the standards for
such limits. The Commission’s legal interpretation
in the Final Rule is identical to the interpretation
in the proposed rule in this regard as well.
18 For a detailed discussion of how the
Commission’s necessity finding misconstrues the
CEA as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, see
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M.
Berkovitz Regarding Proposed Rule on Position
Limits for Derivatives (Jan. 30, 2020), available at
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement013020b.
E:\FR\FM\14JAR2.SGM
14JAR2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 9 (Thursday, January 14, 2021)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 3236-3493]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25332]
[[Page 3235]]
Vol. 86
Thursday,
No. 9
January 14, 2021
Part II
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
17 CFR Parts 1, 15, 17, et al.
Position Limits for Derivatives; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 9 / Thursday, January 14, 2021 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 3236]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 1, 15, 17, 19, 40, 140, 150 and 151
RIN 3038-AD99
Position Limits for Derivatives
AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'' or
``CFTC'') is adopting amendments in this final rule (``Final Rule'') to
conform regulations concerning speculative position limits to the
relevant Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010
(``Dodd-Frank Act'') amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act
(``CEA''). Among other regulatory amendments, the Commission is
adopting: New and amended Federal spot-month limits for 25 physical
commodity derivatives; amended single month and all-months-combined
limits for most of the agricultural contracts currently subject to
Federal position limits; new and amended definitions for use throughout
the position limits regulations, including a revised definition of
``bona fide hedging transaction or position'' and a new definition of
``economically equivalent swaps''; amended rules governing exchange-set
limit levels and grants of exemptions therefrom; a new streamlined
process for bona fide hedging recognitions for purposes of Federal
position limits; new enumerated bona fide hedges; and amendments to
certain regulatory provisions that would eliminate Form 204 while also
enabling the Commission to leverage and receive cash-market reporting
submitted directly to the exchanges by market participants.
DATES:
Effective date: This Final Rule will become effective on March 15,
2021.
Compliance date: Compliance dates for this Final Rule shall be as
follows:
January 1, 2022 in connection with the Federal speculative
position limits for the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts
subject to Federal position limits for the first time under this Final
Rule. This compliance date also applies to any associated referenced
contracts other than economically equivalent swaps. Such swaps are
subject to a separate compliance date noted below.
January 1, 2022 in connection with an exchange's
requirements under Sec. 150.5, as adopted in this Final Rule.
January 1, 2023 in connection with Federal speculative
position limits for economically equivalent swaps, as defined under
this Final Rule.
January 1, 2023 in connection with the elimination of
previously-granted risk management exemptions described in Sec.
150.3(c), as adopted in this Final Rule.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dorothy DeWitt, Director, (202) 418-
6057, [email protected]; Rachel Reicher, Chief Counsel, (202) 418-6233,
[email protected]; Steven A. Haidar, Assistant Chief Counsel, (202)
418-5611, [email protected]; Aaron Brodsky, Senior Special Counsel,
(202) 418-5349, [email protected]; Steven Benton, Industry Economist,
(202) 418-5617, [email protected]; Lillian Cardona, Assistant Chief
Counsel, (202) 418-5012, [email protected]; Jeanette Curtis, Assistant
Chief Counsel, (202) 418-5669, [email protected]; Harold Hild, Policy
Advisor, (202) 418-5376, [email protected]; Division of Market Oversight,
in each case, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581; Michael Ehrstein,
Special Counsel, (202) 418-5957, [email protected]; Chang Jung,
Special Counsel, (202) 418-5202, [email protected]; Division of Swap
Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, in each case, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW,
Washington, DC 20581; Rachel Hayes, Trial Attorney, (816) 960-7741,
[email protected]; Division of Enforcement, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 4900 Main Street, Suite 500, Kansas City, MO 64112; or
Brigitte Weyls, Trial Attorney, (312) 596-0547, [email protected];
Division of Enforcement, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 525 West
Monroe Street, Suite 1100, Chicago, IL 60661.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Introduction
B. Executive Summary
C. Section-by-Section Summary of Final Rule
D. Effective Date and Compliance Period
E. The Commission Construes CEA Section 4a(a) To Require the
Commission To Make a Necessity Finding Before Establishing Position
Limits for Physical Commodities Other Than Excluded Commodities
F. The Commission's Use of Certain Terminology
G. Recent Volatility in the WTI Contract
H. Brief Summary of Comments Received
II. Final Rule
A. Sec. 150.1--Definitions
B. Sec. 150.2--Federal Position Limit Levels
C. Sec. 150.3--Exemptions From Federal Position Limits
D. Sec. 150.5--Exchange-Set Position Limits and Exemptions
Therefrom
E. Sec. 150.6--Scope
F. Sec. 150.8--Severability
G. Sec. 150.9--Process for Recognizing Non-Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions With Respect to Federal
Speculative Position Limits
H. Part 19 and Related Provisions--Reporting of Cash-Market
Positions
I. Removal of Part 151
III. Legal Matters
A. Interpretation of Statute Regarding Whether Necessity Finding
Is Required for Position Limits Established Pursuant to CEA 4a(a)(2)
B. Legal Standard for Necessity Finding
C. Necessity Finding as to the 25 Core Referenced Futures
Contracts
D. Necessity Finding as to Linked Contracts
E. Necessity Finding for Spot/Non-Spot Month Position Limits
IV. Related Matters
A. Cost-Benefit Considerations
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Antitrust Considerations
I. Background
A. Introduction
The Commission has long established and enforced speculative
position limits for futures contracts and options on futures contracts
on nine agricultural commodities as authorized by the CEA.\1\ These
nine agricultural commodity contracts, which have been subject to
Federal position limits for decades, are generally referred to as the
``nine legacy agricultural contracts.'' Under this Final Rule, the
Commission additionally will establish Federal speculative position
limits for certain commodity derivatives contracts associated with 16
additional commodities. The Commission refers to these 16 new
commodities and their associated commodity derivatives contracts
throughout this release as the ``non-legacy'' contracts since they are
subject to Federal position limits for the first time under this Final
Rule. Accordingly, under the Final Rule, certain commodity derivatives
contracts associated with 25 commodities are subject to Federal
position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's existing position limits regulations \2\ in
existing part 150
[[Page 3237]]
of the Commission's regulations include three components:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 17 CFR part 150. Part 150 of the Commission's regulations
establishes Federal position limits (that is, position limits
established by the Commission) on the nine legacy agricultural
contracts. The nine legacy agricultural contracts are: CBOT Corn
(and Mini-Corn) (C), CBOT Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans (and Mini-
Soybeans) (S), CBOT Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT Soybean Oil
(SO), CBOT Soybean Meal (SM), MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE), CBOT
KC Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW), and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). See 17 CFR
150.2. The Federal position limits on these agricultural contracts
are referred to as ``legacy'' limits because these contracts have
been subject to Federal position limits for decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the Commission's existing regulations establish separate
position limit levels for each of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts. These Federal position limit levels set the maximum
speculative positions in each of the nine legacy agricultural contracts
that a person may hold in the spot month, individual month, and all-
months-combined.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See 17 CFR 150.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the existing Federal position limits framework provides
exemptions to the Federal position limit levels for positions that
constitute ``bona fide hedging transactions or positions'' and for
certain ``spread or arbitrage'' positions.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See 17 CFR 150.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the Commission's existing regulations determine which
accounts and positions a person must aggregate for the purpose of
determining compliance with the Federal position limit levels.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See 17 CFR 150.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existing Federal speculative position limits function in
parallel to exchange-set position limits and/or exchange-set position
accountability required by designated contract market (``DCM'') Core
Principle 5.\6\ As a result, the nine legacy agricultural contracts are
subject to both Federal and exchange-set limits, whereas other
exchange-traded futures contracts and options on futures contracts are
subject only to DCM-set limits and/or position accountability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5); 17 CFR 38.300. Paragraph (A) of DCM Core
Principle 5 provides: To reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion (especially during trading in the
delivery month), the board of trade shall adopt for each contract of
the board of trade, as is necessary and appropriate, position
limitations or position accountability for speculators. Position
limits generally cannot be exceeded absent an exemption, whereas
position accountability allows an exchange to establish a level at
which market participants, including those participants who do not
qualify for an exemption, are required to: Provide position
information to the exchange prior to increasing a position above the
accountability level; halt further position increases; and/or reduce
positions in an orderly manner. Core Principle 6 in part 37 of the
Commission's regulations for swap execution facilities (``SEFs'')
contains similar language. 17 CFR 38.600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress amended the CEA's position
limits provisions, which since 1936 have authorized the Commission (and
its predecessor) to impose limits on speculative positions to prevent
the harms caused by excessive speculation. As discussed below, the
Commission interprets these amendments as, among other things, tasking
the Commission with establishing such position limits as it finds are
``necessary'' for the purpose of ``diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing'' excessive speculation causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity.\7\
The Commission also interprets these amendments as tasking the
Commission with establishing position limits on any ``economically
equivalent'' swaps.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1); see infra Section III.C. (discussion of
the necessity finding).
\8\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5); see also infra Section II.B.1.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission previously issued proposed and final rules in 2011
(``2011 Final Rulemaking'') to implement the provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act regarding position limits and the bona fide hedge
definition.\9\ A September 28, 2012 order of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia vacated the 2011 Final Rulemaking, with
the exception of the rule's amendments to 17 CFR 150.2.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 FR 4752 (Jan. 26, 2011)
(``2011 Proposal''); Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 76 FR
71626 (Nov. 18, 2011) (``2011 Final Rulemaking'').
\10\ Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012) (``ISDA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequently, the Commission proposed position limits regulations
in 2013 (``2013 Proposal''), in June of 2016 (``2016 Supplemental
Proposal''), and again in December of 2016 (``2016 Reproposal'').\11\
The 2016 Reproposal would have amended part 150 of the Commission's
regulations to, among other things: Establish Federal position limits
for 25 physical commodity futures contracts and their linked futures
contracts, options on futures contracts, and ``economically
equivalent'' swaps; revise the existing exemptions from such limits,
including for bona fide hedges; and establish a framework for exchanges
\12\ to recognize certain positions as bona fide hedges and thus exempt
from position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Position Limits for Derivatives, 78 FR 75680 (Dec. 12,
2013) (``2013 Proposal''); Position Limits for Derivatives: Certain
Exemptions and Guidance, 81 FR 38458 (June 13, 2016) (``2016
Supplemental Proposal''); and Position Limits for Derivatives, 81 FR
96704 (Dec. 30, 2016) (``2016 Reproposal'').
\12\ Unless indicated otherwise, the use of the term
``exchanges'' throughout this release refers to DCMs and SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, the Commission has not issued any final rulemaking based
on the 2013 Proposal, 2016 Supplemental Proposal, or 2016 Reproposal.
The 2016 Reproposal generally addressed comments received in response
to the 2013 Proposal and the 2016 Supplemental Proposal. In a separate
2016 proposed rulemaking, the CFTC also proposed, and later adopted in
2016, amendments to rules in Sec. 150.4 of the Commission's
regulations governing aggregation of positions for purposes of
compliance with Federal position limits.\13\ These aggregation rules
currently apply only to the nine legacy agricultural contracts subject
to existing Federal position limits. Going forward, these aggregation
rules will apply to all commodity derivative contracts that are subject
to Federal position limits under this Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Aggregation of Positions, 81 FR 91454 (Dec. 16, 2016)
(``Final Aggregation Rulemaking''); see 17 CFR 150.4. Under the
Final Aggregation Rulemaking, unless an exemption applies, a
person's positions must be aggregated with positions for which the
person controls trading or for which the person holds a 10% or
greater ownership interest. The Division of Market Oversight has
issued time-limited no-action relief from some of the aggregation
requirements contained in that rulemaking. See CFTC Letter No. 19-19
(July 31, 2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/download.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission published a notice of a proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register on February 27, 2020 for a new position limits
proposal (``2020 NPRM''). After reconsidering the prior proposals,
including reviewing the comments responding thereto, the Commission in
the 2020 NPRM withdrew from further consideration the 2013 Proposal,
the 2016 Supplemental Proposal, and the 2016 Reproposal.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Because the earlier proposals were withdrawn in the 2020
NPRM, comments on the earlier proposals are not part of the
administrative record with respect to the 2020 NPRM nor with respect
to this Final Rule, except where expressly referenced herein. In the
2020 NPRM, the Commission stated that commenters to the 2016
Reproposal should resubmit comments relevant to the subject
proposal; commenters who wish to reference prior comment letters
should cite those prior comment letters as specifically as possible.
(85 FR at 11597). Accordingly, this Final Rule will not discuss
comments submitted in connection with the 2016 Reproposal unless
such comments were resubmitted for the 2020 NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission intended to: (1) Recognize
differences across commodities and contracts, including differences in
commercial hedging and cash-market reporting practices; (2) focus on
commodity derivative contracts that are critical to price discovery and
distribution of the underlying commodities such that the burden of
excessive speculation in the commodity derivative contracts may have a
particularly acute impact on interstate commerce for the underling
commodities; and (3) reduce duplication and inefficiency by leveraging
existing expertise and processes at DCMs.
The public comment period for the 2020 NPRM ended May 15, 2020,\15\
and
[[Page 3238]]
the Commission received approximately 75 public comment letters.\16\
After reviewing these public comment letters, and for the general
reasons discussed in this release, the Commission is adopting the 2020
NPRM with certain modifications in this Final Rule.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Comments were originally due by April 29, 2020. Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission extended the deadline to May 15,
2020.
\16\ The Commission states ``approximately 75 relevant comment
letters'' since several commenters submitted additional, or
supplemental, comments. As a result, the total could change slightly
depending on whether one includes these supplemental comment letters
in the total. Thus, for the avoidance of doubt, the Commission uses
``approximately.'' The Commission received comments from: American
Cotton Shippers Association (``ACSA''); American Feed Industry
Association (``AFIA''); American Gas Association (``AGA''); AQR
Capital Management, LLC (``AQR''); Archer Daniels Midland (``ADM'');
AMCOT; Americans for Financial Reform (``AFR''); Arthur Dunavant
Investments (``Dunavant''); ASR Group International, Inc. (``ASR'');
Atlantic Cotton Association (``ACA''); Barnard, Chris (Individual);
Better Markets, Inc. (``Better Markets''); Cargill, Inc.
(``Cargill''); Castleton Commodities International LLC (``CCI'');
Chevron USA Inc. (``Chevron''); Choice Cotton Company, Inc.
(``Choice Cotton''); CHS Inc. (``CHS Inc.'') and CHS Hedging, LLC
(``CHS Hedging'') (collectively, ``CHS''); Citadel; CME Group Inc.
(``CME Group''); Commodity Markets Council (``CMC''); DECA Global
LLC (``DECA''); East Cotton Company (``East Cotton''); Ecom
Agroindustrial (``Ecom''); Edison Electric Institute (``EEI'') and
Electric Power Supply Association (``EPSA'') (collectively, the
``Joint Associations'' or ``EEI/EPSA''); Futures Industry
Association (``FIA''); Glencore Agriculture Limited, Glencore
Agriculture B.V. (collectively, ``Glencore''); ICE Futures U.S.
(``IFUS''); IMC Companies (``IMC''); Industrial Energy Consumers of
America; Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy (``IATP'');
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (``ICE''); International Energy
Credit Association (``IECA''); International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc. (``ISDA''); Jess Smith & Sons (``Jess Smith'');
Lawson/O'Neill Global Institutional Commodity (LOGIC) Advisors
(``Lawson/O'Neill''); Long Island Power Authority (``LIPA''); Louis
Dreyfus Company (``LDC''); Mallory Alexander International Logistics
(``Mallory Alexander''); Managed Funds Association and Alternative
Investment Management Association (collectively, the
``Associations'' or ``MFA/AIMA''); Marshal, Gerald (Independent
Trader); Matsen, Eric (Individual--Physical Commodity Risk
Management Consultant); McMeekin Cotton LLC (``McMeekin''); Memtex
Cotton Marketing, LLC (``Memtex''); Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc.
(``MGEX''); Moody Compress & Warehouse Company (``Moody Compress'');
Namoi Cotton Alliance (``Namoi''); National Cotton Council
(``NCC''); National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (``NCFC'');
National Council of Textile Organizations (``NCTO''); National
Energy & Fuels Institute (``NEFI''); National Grain and Feed
Association (``NGFA''); National Oilseed Processors Association
(``NOPA''); National Rural Electric Cooperative; Association
American Public Power Association; and American Public Gas
Association (collectively, ``NRECA''); Natural Gas Supply
Association (``NGSA''); Olam International Limited (``Olam'');
Omnicotton Inc. (``Omnicotton''); Pacific Investment Management
Company LLC (``PIMCO''); Parkdale Mills (``Parkdale''); Petroleum
Marketers Association of America (``PMAA''); Public Citizen; Robert
Rutkowski (``Rutkowski''); S. Canale Cotton Co. (``Canale Cotton'');
Shell Energy North America (US), L.P. and Shell Trading (US) Company
(collectively, ``Shell''); SIFMA Asset Management Group (``SIFMA
AMG''); Skylar Capital Management LP (``SCM''); Southern Cotton
Association (``Southern Cotton''); Southwest Ag Sourcing (``SW
Ag''); Suncor Energy Marketing Inc. and Suncor Energy USA Marketing
Inc. (collectively, ``SEMI''); Texas Cotton Association (``Texas
Cotton''); The Coalition of Physical Energy Companies; The
Commercial Energy Working Group (``CEWG''); The Walcot Trading
Company, LLC (``Walcot''); Toyo Cotton Company (``Toyo''); VLM
Commodities (``VLM''); Western Cotton Shippers Association
(``WCSA''); White Gold Cotton Marketing, LLC (``White Gold'').
\17\ The Final Rule's regulations are discussed in detail
throughout this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before addressing the specifics of the Final Rule, the Commission
outlines several themes underscoring the Commission's approach in the
Final Rule.
First, the Commission believes that any position limits regime must
take into account differences across commodities and contract types.
The existing Federal position limits regulations apply only to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts, all of which are physically-settled
futures on agricultural commodities. Limits on these nine legacy
agricultural contracts have been in place for decades, as have the
Federal rules governing both the exemptions from these Federal position
limits and the exchange-set position limits on the nine legacy
agricultural contracts. The existing framework is largely a historical
remnant of an approach that predates cash-settled futures contracts,
institutional-investor interest in commodity indexes, highly liquid
energy markets, and the Commission's jurisdiction over certain swaps.
Congress has tasked the Commission with establishing such limits as
it finds are ``necessary'' for the purpose of preventing the burdens
associated with excessive speculation causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of an underlying
commodity; and establishing limits on swaps that are ``economically
equivalent'' to any futures contracts or options on futures contracts
subject to Federal position limits. An approach that is flexible enough
to accommodate potential future, unpredictable developments in
commercial hedging practices is well-suited for the current derivatives
markets by accommodating differences in commodity types, contract
specifications, hedging practices, cash-market trading practices,
organizational structures of hedging participants, and liquidity
profiles of individual markets.
The Commission is building this flexibility into several parts of
the Final Rule, including: (1) Exchange-set limits or accountability
levels outside of the spot month for referenced contracts based on
commodities other than the nine legacy agricultural contracts; (2) the
ability for exchanges to use more than one formula when setting their
own limit levels; (3) an updated formula for Federal non-spot month
position limit levels on the nine legacy agricultural contracts that is
calibrated to recently observed open interest, which has generally
increased over time; (4) a bona fide hedging definition that is broad
enough to accommodate common commercial hedging practices, including
unfixed-price transactions as well as anticipatory hedging practices,
such as anticipatory merchandising; (5) a simplified process for market
participants to submit a single application to obtain non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions for purposes of Federal and exchange-set
position limits that are in line with common commercial hedging
practices; (6) the elimination of a restriction for purposes of Federal
position limits on holding positions during the last trading days of
the spot month; and (7) broader discretion for market participants to
measure risk in the manner most suitable for their businesses.
Second, the Final Rule establishes position limits with respect to
16 additional commodities during the spot month, for a total of 25 core
referenced futures contracts, and certain derivative contracts linked
thereto, for which the Commission finds that speculative position
limits are necessary.\18\ As described below, this necessity finding
for the 25 core referenced futures contracts is based on two
interrelated factors: (1) The importance of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts to their respective underlying cash markets,
including that they require physical delivery of the underlying
commodity; and (2) the particular importance to the national economy of
the commodities underlying the 25 contracts.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See infra Section III.C.2.
\19\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, there is an opportunity for greater collaboration between
the Commission and the exchanges within the statutorily created
parallel Federal and exchange-set position limit regimes. Given the
exchanges' obligations to carry out self-regulatory responsibilities,
resources, deep knowledge of their markets and trading practices, close
interactions with market participants, existing programs for addressing
exemption requests, and direct ability to leverage these resources to
generally act more quickly than the Commission, the Commission believes
that cooperation between the Commission and the exchanges on position
limits should not only be continued, but enhanced. For
[[Page 3239]]
example, exchanges are particularly well-positioned to: Provide the
Commission with estimates of deliverable supply in connection with
their commodity contracts that require physical delivery; recommend
limit levels for the Commission's consideration; and help administer
the program for recognizing bona fide hedges. Further, given that the
Final Rule requires exchanges to collect, and provide to the Commission
upon request, cash-market information from market participants
requesting recognition of bona fide hedges, the Commission is
eliminating the Form 204 and part of the Form 304, which market
participants with bona fide hedging positions in excess of position
limits currently file each month with the Commission to demonstrate
cash-market positions justifying such overages. Under enhanced
collaboration, the Commission will maintain its access to such
information from the exchanges, which will result in a more efficient
administrative process, in part by reducing duplication of efforts.
B. Executive Summary
This executive summary provides an overview of the key components
of the Final Rule. The summary only highlights certain aspects of the
final regulations and generally uses shorthand to summarize complex
topics. The executive summary is neither intended to be a comprehensive
recitation of the Final Rule nor intended to supplement, modify, or
replace any interpretive or other language contained herein. Section II
of this release includes a more detailed and comprehensive discussion
of all of the final regulations. The final regulations and related
appendices and guidance follow Section IV (Related Matters) of this
release.
1. Contracts Subject to Federal Speculative Position Limits
Federal position limits apply to ``referenced contracts,'' which,
as described in turn below, include: (i) 25 ``core referenced futures
contracts'' (i.e., the nine legacy agricultural contracts together with
the new 16 non-legacy contracts); (ii) futures contracts and options on
futures contracts directly or indirectly linked to a core referenced
futures contract; and (iii) ``economically equivalent swaps.''
i. Core Referenced Futures Contracts
Federal position limits under the Final Rule will apply to the
following 25 \20\ physically-settled core referenced futures contracts:
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\20\ Reference to, or discussion of, derivatives contracts
listed on IFUS, the DCM and subsidiary of ICE, will be referred to
herein as ``ICE [Commodity] [IFUS Commodity Code]'' (e.g., ICE Sugar
No. 16 (SF)). Additionally, ``CBOT'' refers to the DCM Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc.; ``CME'' refers to the DCM
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc.; ``COMEX'' refers to the DCM
Commodity Exchange, Inc.; and ``NYMEX'' refers to the DCM New York
Mercantile Exchange, Inc.
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[[Page 3240]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.000
ii. Futures Contracts and Options on Futures Contracts Linked to a Core
Referenced Futures Contract
The term ``referenced contract'' encompasses any core referenced
futures contract as well as any futures contract and any option on a
futures contract that is: (1) Directly or indirectly linked to the
price of a core referenced futures contract; or (2) directly or
indirectly linked to the price of the same commodity underlying the
applicable core referenced futures contract, for delivery at the same
location as specified in that core referenced futures
contract.22 The term ``referenced contract,'' however,
explicitly excludes location basis contracts, commodity index
contracts, contracts that are based on prices across a month (i.e.,
contracts commonly referred to as calendar month average contracts,
trade month average contracts, or balance of month contracts), outright
contracts that are based on a price reporting agency index price, swap
guarantees, and trade options that meet certain requirements.
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\21\ While the Final Rule includes Federal non-spot month limits
only for referenced cintracts on the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, the Final Rule requires exchanges to establish,
consistent with Commission standards set forth in this Final Rule,
exchange-set position limits and/or position accountability levels
in the non-spot months for the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts and for any associated referenced contracts.
\22\ For clarity, clause (2) is intended to encompass potential
physically-settled ``look-alike'' contracts that do not directly
reference a core referenced futures contract but that are
nonetheless based on the same commodity and delivery location as a
core referenced futures contract.
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iii. Economically Equivalent Swaps
The term referenced contracts also includes economically equivalent
swaps, defined as swaps with ``identical material'' contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions to a referenced contract. Swaps
in a commodity other than natural gas that have identical material
specifications, terms, and conditions to a referenced contract are
still deemed economically equivalent swaps even if they differ from the
referenced contract with respect to one or more of the following: (a)
Lot size specifications or notional amounts, (b) delivery dates
diverging by less than one calendar day for physically-settled swaps,
or (c) post-trade risk management arrangement (e.g., uncleared swaps
versus cleared futures contracts).
The same general definition applies to natural gas swaps, except
that the definition is expanded to include swaps with delivery dates
diverging from the corresponding core referenced futures contract by
less than two calendar days.
Instruments that are exempt from Commission jurisdiction or
otherwise not deemed to be swaps under the Commission's regulations
(e.g., instruments that are excluded by the CEA's ``swap'' definition
or Commission regulations as physically-settled forward contracts) are
not ``economically equivalent swaps'' even if they otherwise fall
within the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition.
2. Federal Position Limit Levels During the Spot Month
[[Page 3241]]
Federal spot month position limits apply to all 25 core referenced
futures contracts and their associated referenced contracts. The Final
Rule establishes the spot month position limit levels summarized in the
table below. Each spot month limit is set at or below 25% of
deliverable supply, as estimated using recent data provided by the DCM
listing the core referenced futures contract, and verified by the
Commission. The Federal spot month position limits apply on a futures-
equivalent basis based on the size of the unit of trading of the
relevant core referenced futures contract.
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.001
[[Page 3242]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.002
BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
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\23\ As of October 15, 2020.
\24\ The Federal spot month limit for Live Cattle adopted herein
features a step-down limit similar to the CME's existing Live Cattle
step-down exchange-set limit. The Federal spot month step-down limit
is: (1) 600 at the close of trading on the first business day
following the first Friday of the contract month; (2) 300 at the
close of trading on the business day prior to the last five trading
days of the contract month; and (3) 200 at the close of trading on
the business day prior to the last two trading days of the contract
month.
\25\ ICE technically does not have an exchange-set spot month
position limit level for ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF). However, it does
have a single-month position limit level of 1,000 contracts, which
effectively operates as a spot month position limit.
\26\ As discussed below, the NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
Federal spot month limit for cash-settled look-alike referenced
contracts will apply on a per-exchange and per-OTC swaps market
basis rather than on an aggregate basis across exchanges.
\27\ Currently, the cash-settled natural gas contracts are
subject to an exchange-set spot month position limit level of 1,000
equivalent-sized contracts per exchange. As of publication of the
Final Rule, there are three exchanges that list cash-settled natural
gas contracts: NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal. As a result, a market
participant may hold up to 3,000 equivalent-sized cash-settled
natural gas contracts under existing exchange-set limits.
The exchanges also have a conditional position limit framework
for natural gas contracts. This exchange-set conditional spot month
position limit permits up to 5,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG equivalent-
sized referenced contracts per exchange that lists such contracts,
provided that the market participant does not hold positions in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract.
\28\ The Federal spot month limit for Light Sweet Crude Oil
adopted herein features the following step-down limit: (1) 6,000
contracts as of the close of trading three business days prior to
the last trading day of the contract; (2) 5,000 contracts as of the
close of trading two business days prior to the last trading day of
the contract; and (3) 4,000 contracts as of the close of trading one
business day prior to the last trading day of the contract.
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[[Page 3243]]
i. Application of Federal Spot Month Limits to Commodities Other Than
Natural Gas
With the exception of natural gas, the Federal spot month position
limit levels apply in the aggregate across exchanges and the over-the-
counter (``OTC'') swap markets.
During the spot month, Federal position limits apply ``separately''
to physically-settled and cash-settled referenced contracts.\29\
Accordingly, during the spot month, a market participant is required to
aggregate its net physically-settled positions, and separately its net
cash-settled positions, across exchanges and the OTC swaps markets, but
may not net cash-settled referenced contracts with physically-settled
referenced contracts.
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\29\ As discussed further under Section II.B.3.vi, cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts under the Final Rule are subject to
per-exchange and per-OTC swaps market Federal position limits. As a
result, market participants are not required to aggregate their
positions in natural gas referenced contracts across different
exchanges and the OTC swaps markets but also may not net such
positions across different exchanges or the OTC swaps market.
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ii. Application of Federal Spot Month Limits to Natural Gas
For the NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (``NYMEX NG'') physically-
delivered core referenced futures contract and its associated cash-
settled referenced contracts, the Final Rule modifies the 2020 NPRM by
providing that Federal position limits apply to NYMEX NG cash-settled
referenced contracts on a per-exchange and per-OTC swaps market basis
(i.e., cash-settled positions are not aggregated across different
exchanges and the OTC swaps market).
Specifically, a market participant may hold up to 2,000 cash-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts (i.e., the NYMEX NG Federal spot
month position limit) on each exchange that lists for trading a cash-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contract as well as the OTC swap market.
Currently, three exchanges (NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal) \30\ list cash-
settled ``look-alike'' NYMEX NG referenced contracts. Thus, a market
participant is able to hold 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
futures contracts on each exchange, which is 6,000 cash-settled look-
alike NYMEX NG referenced contracts in total. In addition, a market
participant is able to hold a position of 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
equivalent-sized economically equivalent swaps in the OTC swaps markets
for a total position of 8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts across the four markets (i.e., NYMEX, IFUS, Nodal, and the
OTC swaps market).
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\30\ ``Nodal'' refers to the Nodal Exchange, LLC.
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As noted above, because Federal spot month position limit levels
apply ``separately'' to cash-settled and physically-settled referenced
contracts, a market participant further is able to hold an additional
position of 2,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts for
a total position of 10,000 NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
As discussed further below, market participants may hold additional
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts under the Final Rule's
Federal spot month conditional position limit exemption as long as the
market participant satisfies certain requirements. However, for the
avoidance of doubt, the Commission notes that the per-exchange 2,000
contract Federal spot month position limit level for cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts discussed above is not part of the Federal spot
month conditional position limit exemption but rather constitutes the
default speculative Federal spot month position limit.
3. Federal Position Limit Levels Outside of the Spot Month
Under the Final Rule, Federal position limits outside of the spot
month (``non-spot month'' position limits) apply only to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts and their associated referenced
contracts.
In contrast, referenced contracts based on the 16 core referenced
futures contracts subject to Federal position limits for the first time
under the Final Rule are only subject to Federal position limits during
the spot month, and are otherwise only subject to exchange-set limits
or position accountability outside of the spot month.
The following Federal non-spot month position limit levels,
summarized in the table below, are set at 10% of open interest for the
first 50,000 contracts, with an incremental increase of 2.5% of open
interest thereafter, and apply on a futures-equivalent basis based on
the size of the unit of trading of the relevant core referenced futures
contract:
[[Page 3244]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.003
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\31\ With the exception of the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) contract
discussed below, for each of the legacy agricultural contracts, the
single month limit is equal to the all-months-combined limit under
the Final Rule.
\32\ As of October 15, 2020.
\33\ The single month limit for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is set at
50% of the all-months-combined limit, or 5,950 contracts, as
discussed more fully below.
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4. Exchange-Set Limits and Exemptions Therefrom
i. Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
An exchange that lists a contract subject to Federal position
limits, as specified above, is required to set its own limits for such
contracts at a level that is no higher than the Federal level.
Exchanges may grant exemptions from their own limits to a level that
exceeds the applicable Federal limit, provided the exemption is self-
effectuating (e.g., an enumerated bona fide hedge or a spread that
satisfies the ``spread transaction'' definition) or provided the
exemption is recognized by the Commission for purposes of Federal
position limits (pursuant to an application submitted either directly
to the Commission under Sec. 150.3 or indirectly to the Commission
through an exchange under Sec. 150.9, as applicable). Exchanges may
grant exemptions that are not recognized by the Final Rule; however,
such exemptions must be capped at a level that is not higher than the
applicable Federal position limit level.
ii. Physical Commodity Contracts Not Subject to Federal Position Limits
For physical commodity contracts, for which no necessity finding
was supported, and which are therefore not subject to Federal position
limits, an exchange is generally required to set spot month position
limit levels at no greater than 25% of deliverable supply, but has
flexibility to submit other approaches for review by the Commission,
provided the approach results in spot month position limit levels that
are ``necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of
market manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the
underlying commodity's price or index'' and complies with all other
applicable regulations.
Outside of the spot month, an exchange has additional flexibility
to set either position limits or position accountability levels,
provided the levels are ``necessary and appropriate to reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation or price distortion of the
contract's or the underlying commodity's price or index.'' Non-
exclusive Acceptable Practices are included in new Appendix F to part
150 under the Final Rule and provide several examples of formulas that
the Commission has determined meet this standard, but an exchange has
flexibility to develop other approaches.
An exchange has flexibility to grant a variety of exemption types.
Exchanges must take into account whether the exemption results in a
position that is
[[Page 3245]]
``not in accord with sound commercial practices'' in the market for
which the exchange is considering the application, and/or ``exceed[s]
an amount that may be established and liquidated in an orderly fashion
in that market.''
5. Limits on ``Pre-Existing Positions''
As discussed above, only swaps that qualify as ``economically
equivalent swaps'' are subject to Federal position limits under the
Final Rule. However, economically equivalent swaps entered into in good
faith prior to the Final Rule's Effective Date, including both ``Pre-
Enactment Swaps,'' which are swaps entered into prior to the Dodd-Frank
Act whose terms have not expired, and ``Transition Period Swaps,''
which are swaps entered into between July 22, 2010 and the Final Rule's
effective date, are not subject to Federal position limits. Other pre-
existing positions (i.e., pre-existing positions that are futures
contracts or options on futures contracts) will be subject to the Final
Rule's Federal position limits.\34\
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\34\ However, as discussed further below, the Commission is
providing for a compliance period until January 1, 2022 for the 16
non-legacy referenced contracts that will be subject to Federal
position limits for the first time under this Final Rule. Similarly,
the Commission is providing for a compliance period for any
economically equivalent swaps, as well as in connection with the
elimination of the risk management exemption, until January 1, 2023.
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Market participants may net down their post-Effective Date
positions in commodity derivatives contracts with any pre-existing
swaps (as long as such swaps qualify as economically equivalent swaps)
for purposes of complying with non-spot month Federal position limits.
In contrast, during the spot month, market participants may not apply
these pre-existing swap positions to net down their positions so as to
avoid rendering Federal spot month position limits ineffective. The
Commission is particularly concerned about protecting the spot month in
physically-delivered futures from price distortions or potential
manipulation and consequent disruption of the hedging and price
discovery utility of the related futures contract.
6. Legal Standards for Exemptions From Federal Position Limits
i. Bona Fide Hedge Recognition
A bona fide hedging transaction or position may exceed Federal
position limits if the hedge position satisfies all three elements of
the Final Rule's ``general'' bona fide hedging definition. That is, (1)
the position represents a substitute for transactions or positions made
or to be made at a later time in a physical marketing channel
(``temporary substitute test''); (2) the position is economically
appropriate to the reduction of price risks in the conduct and
management of a commercial enterprise (``economically appropriate
test''); and (3) the position arises from the potential change in value
of actual or anticipated assets, liabilities, or services (``change in
value requirement'').
The Final Rule makes several changes to the existing bona fide
hedging definition, including those described immediately below:
First, the Commission is expanding the existing list of
``enumerated'' bona fide hedges to cover additional hedging practices,
including adding a bona fide hedge for anticipated merchandising.\35\
To provide greater certainty, the list of enumerated bona fide hedges
is now incorporated into the regulation. In contrast, in the 2020 NPRM,
this list of enumerated bona fide hedges was proposed in the form of
non-binding acceptable practices in Appendix A to part 150. While the
enumerated bona fide hedges will remain listed in Appendix A under the
Final Rule, Appendix A to part 150 is now explicitly incorporated into
Commission regulations and is part of the regulatory text rather than
acceptable practices.
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\35\ The existing definition of ``bona fide hedging transactions
and positions'' enumerates the following hedging transactions or
positions: (1) Hedges of inventory and cash commodity fixed-price
purchase contracts under 1.3(z)(2)(i)(A); (2) hedges of unsold
anticipated production under 1.3(z)(2)(i)(B); (3) hedges of cash
commodity fixed-price sales and (4) hedges of fixed price sales of
their cash products and byproducts contracts under 1.3(z)(2)(ii)(A)
and (B); (5) hedges of unfilled anticipated requirements under
1.3(z)(2)(ii)(C); (6) hedges of offsetting unfixed price cash
commodity sales and purchases under 1.3(z)(2)(iii); and (7) cross-
commodity hedges under 1.3(z)(2)(iv). The following additional
hedging practices are not enumerated in the existing regulation, but
are included as enumerated hedges in the Final Rule: (1) Hedges of
anticipated merchandising; (2) hedges by agents; (3) hedges of
anticipated royalties; (4) hedges of services; and (5) offsets of
commodity trade options.
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A person who holds a position that qualifies as a bona fide hedge
and that is one of the enumerated hedges in Appendix A to part 150 is
not required to request prior approval from the Commission to hold such
bona fide hedge position above the Federal position limit. That is, the
enumerated bona fide hedges are ``self-effectuating'' for purposes of
Federal position limits. A person with an enumerated bona fide hedge
position, however, would still need to request an exemption from the
relevant exchange for any exchange-set limits.\36\
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\36\ The processes for obtaining bona fide hedge recognitions
and non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions are summarized in
Section 7 below of this executive summary (Processes for Requesting
Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions and Spread Exemptions).
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Second, with respect to the treatment of unfixed-price forward
transactions and bona fide hedging under the Final Rule, the Commission
clarifies that a commercial market participant may qualify for one of
the Final Rule's enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges (i.e.,
enumerated bona fide hedges for unsold anticipated production, unfilled
anticipated requirements, and anticipated merchandising) with respect
to an unfixed-price forward transaction. The Commission believes that
an unfixed-price forward transaction should not preclude a commercial
market participant from qualifying for one of these enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges, because such unfixed-price forward
transactions do not give rise to outright price risk for a commercial
market participant and do not otherwise fix an outright price.
Accordingly, unfixed-price transactions do not ``fill'' or ``address''
the hedging need for which the enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges
are predicated.
The Commission notes that an unfixed-price forward transaction does
not itself allow a market participant to qualify for one of these
enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges, and that a market participant
must still satisfy the requirements of the applicable anticipatory bona
fide hedge to qualify (e.g., as an initial matter, by the commercial
market participant being able to demonstrate its anticipated unsold
production, anticipated unfilled requirements, and/or anticipated
merchandising).
Third, the Final Rule clarifies whether and when market
participants may measure risk on a gross basis rather than on a net
basis. Instead of only being permitted to hedge on a ``net basis''
except in a narrow set of circumstances, a market participant is also
able to generally hedge positions on a ``gross basis,'' provided that
the participant has done so over time in a consistent manner and is not
doing so to evade Federal position limits. Among other items, the Final
Rule differs from the 2020 NPRM in that the Final Rule: (1) Eliminates
the requirement that exchanges document their justifications when
allowing gross hedging; (2) clarifies that market participants are not
required to develop written policies or procedures that set forth when
gross
[[Page 3246]]
versus net hedging is appropriate; and (3) clarifies that gross hedging
is permissible for both enumerated and non-enumerated hedges.
Fourth, market participants are permitted to hold bona fide hedges
in excess of Federal position limits during the last five days of the
spot period (or during the time period for the spot month if less than
five days). While the Final Rule does not include a Federal restriction
on holding bona fide hedging positions in excess of Federal position
limits during the spot period, exchanges continue to have the
discretion to adopt such restrictions (commonly referred to by market
participants as the ``Five-Day Rule''), or similar restrictions, for
purposes of exchange-set limits. The Final Rule also includes guidance
on the application of spot-period restrictions, including factors for
exchanges with such restrictions to consider when determining to grant
exemptions that are not subject to any such restrictions for purposes
of their own limits.
Finally, the Final Rule modifies the ``temporary substitute test''
to require that a bona fide hedging transaction or position in a
physical commodity must always, and not just normally, be connected to
the production, sale, or use of a physical cash-market commodity.
Therefore, a market participant is generally no longer allowed to treat
positions entered into for ``risk management purposes'' \37\ as a bona
fide hedge, unless the position qualifies as either: (i) An offset of a
pass-through swap, where the offset reduces price risk attendant to the
pass-through swap executed opposite a counterparty for whom the swap
qualifies as a bona fide hedge; or (ii) a ``swap offset,'' where the
offset is used by a counterparty to reduce price risk attendant to a
swap that qualifies as a bona fide hedge and that was previously
entered into by that counterparty.
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\37\ The phrase ``risk management'' as used in this instance
refers to derivatives positions, typically held by a swap dealer,
used to offset a swap position, such as a commodity index swap, with
another entity for which that swap is not a bona fide hedge.
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ii. Spread Exemption
A transaction or position may also exceed Federal position limits
if it qualifies as a ``spread transaction,'' which includes the
following common types of spreads: Intra-market spreads; inter-market
spreads; intra-commodity spreads; inter-commodity spreads; calendar
spreads; quality differential spreads; processing spreads (such as
energy ``crack'' or soybean ``crush'' spreads); product and by-product
differential spreads; and futures-options spreads.\38\
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\38\ The Final Rule expands the 2020 NPRM's list of exempt
spread transactions by also including intra-market spreads, inter-
market spreads, and intra-commodity spreads.
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Spread exemptions may be granted using the process described in
Section 7 below of this executive summary (Processes for Requesting
Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions and Spread Exemptions).
iii. Financial Distress Exemption
This exemption allows a market participant to exceed Federal
position limits if necessary to take on the positions and associated
risk of another market participant during a potential default or
bankruptcy situation. This exemption is available on a case-by-case
basis, depending on the facts and circumstances involved.
iv. Conditional Spot Month Limit Exemption in Natural Gas
As long as a market participant holds no physically-settled NYMEX
NG contracts, the Final Rule allows that market participant to exceed
the NYMEX NG Federal spot month position limit level of 2,000 cash-
settled referenced contracts per exchange (and an additional 2,000
equivalent-sized economically equivalent OTC swaps) by holding 10,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts per DCM that lists cash-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts, as well as an additional 10,000
equivalent-sized cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG swaps.
The Final Rule clarifies that market participants may not use a spread
exemption to exceed the aforementioned conditional spot month limit for
natural gas.
7. Processes for Requesting Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions and Spread
Exemptions
i. Self-Effectuating Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
A position that complies with the bona fide hedging definition in
Sec. 150.1 and falls within one of the enumerated bona fide hedges is
self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits, provided the
market participant separately applies to the relevant exchange for an
exemption from exchange-set limits. Such market participants are no
longer required to file Form 204/304 with the Commission on a monthly
basis to demonstrate cash-market positions justifying Federal position
limit overages. Instead, the Commission will have access to cash-market
information that such market participants submit as part of their
applications to an exchange for an exemption from exchange-set limits,
typically filed on an annual basis.
ii. Bona Fide Hedges That Are Not Self-Effectuating
The Commission may consider adding to the list of enumerated bona
fide hedges at a later time, as the Commission may find appropriate.
Until that time, all bona fide hedge positions that are not enumerated
in Appendix A to part 150 must be granted pursuant to one of the
processes for requesting a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition,
as explained below.
A market participant seeking to exceed Federal position limits for
a non-enumerated bona fide hedging transaction or position is able to
choose whether to apply directly to the Commission or, alternatively,
apply indirectly to the Commission through the applicable exchange
using a new streamlined process. If applying directly to the
Commission, the market participant must also separately apply to the
relevant exchange for relief from exchange-set position limits. If
applying to an exchange using the new streamlined process, a market
participant may file an application with an exchange, generally at
least annually, which will be valid both for purposes of Federal and
exchange-set position limits.
Under this streamlined process, if the exchange determines to grant
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition for purposes of its
exchange-set position limits, the exchange must notify the Commission
and the applicant simultaneously. Then, 10 business days (or two
business days in the case of retroactive applications filed late due to
sudden or unforeseen bona fide hedging needs) after the exchange issues
such a determination, the bona fide hedge exemption may be deemed
approved for purposes of Federal position limits unless the Commission
(and not Commission staff) notifies the market participant otherwise.
That is, after the 10 (or two) business days expire, the bona fide
hedge exemption is considered approved for purposes of Federal position
limits. Under the Final Rule, once the exchange notifies the Commission
and the applicant of the exchange's determination to approve the
application, the applicant may, at its own risk, exceed Federal
position limits during the Commission's 10 business-day review period.
If the Commission determines to deny an exemption application, the
applicant will not be subject to any Federal position limits violation,
provided the
[[Page 3247]]
person filed the application in good faith and brings the position into
compliance with the applicable Federal position limit within a
commercially reasonable amount of time, as applicable.
The Final Rule also allows a market participant with sudden or
unforeseen hedging needs to file a request for a bona fide hedge
exemption within five business days after exceeding the Federal limit
(i.e., commonly referred to as a ``retroactive'' exemption
application). If the Commission denies such application, the market
participant will not be subject to a Federal position limit violation,
provided the market participant filed the application in good faith and
brings the position into compliance with the applicable Federal
position limit within a commercially reasonable amount of time, as
applicable.
Among other changes, market participants are no longer required to
file Forms 204 or 304, as applicable, with the Commission on a monthly
basis to demonstrate cash-market positions justifying position limit
overages. Under the Final Rule, the Commission will instead leverage
cash-market information submitted directly to the exchanges.
iii. Spread Exemptions
For a referenced contract on any commodity, a spread exemption is
self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits, provided
that (1) the position falls within one of the categories set forth in
the ``spread transaction'' definition, and (2) the market participant
separately applies to the applicable exchange for a spread exemption
from exchange-set position limits.\39\
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\39\ The Commission understands that certain exchanges may
distinguish between the terms ``spread,'' ``arbitrage,'' and
``straddle.'' For the purposes of the Commission's discussion and
the Final Rule in general, the Commission's use of the term
``spread'' is meant to include all of these related trading
strategies, and any Commission reference to ``spread'' rather than
``arbitrage'' or ``straddle'' is not intended to suggest a
substantive difference in meaning.
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A market participant with a spread position that does not fit
within the ``spread transaction'' definition with respect to any of the
commodities subject to Federal position limits may apply directly to
the Commission, and must also separately apply to the applicable
exchange.
8. Compliance Date and Effective Date
i. Summary
The Final Rule's effective date is March 15, 2021 (the ``Effective
Date''). This means that all aspects of the Final Rule will be
effective as of the Effective Date, including the new enumerated bona
fide hedges (e.g., anticipated merchandising) as well as the higher
Federal position limits for the nine legacy agricultural contracts.
However, as discussed below, the Commission is also providing for
compliance dates that extend beyond the Effective Date in connection
with several of the Final Rule's requirements.
The Final Rule provides market participants with a compliance date
of January 1, 2022 for purposes of compliance with the Federal position
limits for the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the first time under this Final
Rule. This compliance date also applies to any referenced contracts
(other than economically equivalent swaps, which have a separate
compliance date as discussed further below) related to these 16 non-
legacy core referenced futures contracts.
The Final Rule also provides exchanges with a compliance date of
January 1, 2022 for purposes of establishing exchange-set position
limits and provisions associated with exemptions therefrom, including
certain obligations to collect cash-market information from market
participants in connection with market participants' applications for
bona fide hedging exemptions to exchange-set limits, and to share the
same with the Commission, consistent with the requirements under the
Final Rule.
Additionally, the Final Rule provides a compliance date of January
1, 2023 with respect to (i) the elimination of previously-granted risk
management exemptions,\40\ and (ii) Federal position limits for
economically equivalent swaps.
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\40\ As discussed above in Section 6 of this executive summary
(Legal Standards for Exemptions from Federal Position Limits), the
Commission is no longer recognizing risk management exemptions as
bona fide hedges under the Final Rule.
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Because the nine legacy agricultural contracts are currently
subject to Federal position limits under the existing Federal
framework, the Final Rule does not provide a compliance date for the
new Federal position limits under the Final Rule for such contracts, or
a formal phase-in period. Therefore, such limits go into effect on the
Effective Date. Thus, as of the Effective Date, market participants
will be able to avail themselves of the Federal position limits under
the Final Rule for the nine legacy agricultural contracts, all of which
are higher than the existing Federal position limits (except for CBOT
Oats, which will maintain the existing Federal position limit levels).
However, the Commission notes that exchange-set position limits will
remain at current levels unless and until the relevant exchange submits
a rule amendment pursuant to part 40 of the Commission's regulations to
amend the relevant exchange-set position limit.
Furthermore, the Commission is delaying implementation of exchange-
set position limits on swaps since exchanges cannot view market
participants' positions in swap positions across the various places
they trade, including on competitor exchanges.\41\ However, after the
January 1, 2023 compliance date for economically equivalent swaps
(discussed above), the Commission underscores that it will enforce
Federal position limits in connection with swaps.
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\41\ In two years, the Commission will reevaluate the ability of
exchanges to establish and implement appropriate surveillance
mechanisms to implement DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle
6 with respect to swaps.
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For convenience, the Commission is providing a table below
identifying the Final Rule's Effective Date and compliance dates for
market participants and exchanges in connection with certain
obligations.
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[[Page 3248]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.004
[[Page 3249]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.005
BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
C. Section-by-Section Summary of Final Rule
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\42\As noted above, under the Final Rule the Federal position
limit levels for all of the nine legacy agricultural contracts will
increase, other than CBOT Oats. However, the Commission notes that
exchange-set position limits will remain at current levels unless
and until the relevant exchange submits a rule amendment pursuant to
part 40 of the Commission's regulations to amend the relevant
exchange-set position limit.
\43\As discussed further in this release, the Commission will no
longer recognize risk management exemptions under the Final Rule.
However, positions that are entered into based on a market
participant's previously-granted risk management exemptions will be
subject to an extended compliance date until January 1, 2023 with
respect to Federal position limits. That is, a market participant
with a previously granted risk management exemption will have a
compliance date of January 1, 2023 with respect to the elimination
of such risk management exemption.
\44\Form 204 (for all nine legacy agricultural contracts other
than cotton) and Parts I and II of Form 304 (for cotton) are
submitted by a market participant to the Commission under the
existing Federal position limits regulations in connection with
Federal enumerated bona fide hedges employed by the market
participants.
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The Commission is adopting revisions to Sec. Sec. 150.1, 150.2,
150.3, 150.5, and 150.6 and to parts 1, 15, 17, 19, 40, and 140, as
well as adding Sec. Sec. 150.8, 150.9, and Appendices A-G to part
150.\45\ Most noteworthy, the Commission is adopting the following
amendments to the foregoing rule sections, each of which, along with
all other changes in the Final Rule, is discussed in greater detail in
Section II of this release. The following summary is not intended to
provide a substantive overview of this Final Rule, but rather is
intended to provide a guide to the rule sections that address each
topic. For an overview of this Final Rule organized by topic (rather
than by section number), please see the executive summary above.
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\45\ The 2020 NPRM proposed to remove and reserve part 151. It
did not propose to amend current Sec. 150.4 dealing with
aggregation of positions for purposes of compliance with Federal
position limits, which was amended in 2016 in a prior rulemaking.
See Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91454.
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The Commission finds that Federal speculative position
limits are necessary for 25 core referenced futures contracts, and for
any futures contracts and options on futures contracts linked thereto.
The Commission adopts Federal position limits on physically-settled and
linked cash-settled futures contracts, options on futures contracts,
and ``economically equivalent swaps'' for such commodities. The 25 core
referenced futures contracts include the nine ``legacy'' agricultural
contracts currently subject to Federal position limits and 16
additional non-legacy contracts, which include: Seven additional
agricultural contracts, four energy contracts, and five metals
contracts.\46\ Federal spot and non-spot
[[Page 3250]]
month limits apply to the nine ``legacy'' agricultural contracts
currently subject to Federal position limits,\47\ and only Federal
spot-month limits apply to the additional 16 non-legacy contracts.
Outside of the spot month, these 16 non-legacy contracts are subject to
exchange-set limits and/or accountability levels if listed on an
exchange.
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\46\ The seven additional agricultural contracts that are
subject to Federal spot month limits are: CME Live Cattle (LC), CBOT
Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE Coffee C (KC), ICE FCOJ-A (OJ),
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF). The four energy
contracts that are subject to Federal spot month limits are: NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil
(HO), NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB), and NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (NG). The five metals contracts that are subject to
Federal spot month limits are: COMEX Gold (GC), COMEX Silver (SI),
COMEX Copper (HG), NYMEX Palladium (PA), and NYMEX Platinum (PL). As
discussed below, any contracts for which the Commission is adopting
Federal position limits only during the spot month are subject to
exchange-set limits and/or accountability levels outside of the spot
month.
\47\ The Commission currently sets and enforces speculative
position limits with respect to certain enumerated agricultural
products. The ``enumerated'' agricultural products refer to the list
of commodities contained in the definition of ``commodity'' in CEA
section 1a; 7 U.S.C. 1a. These agricultural products consist of the
following nine currently traded contracts: CBOT Corn (and Mini-Corn)
(C), CBOT Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans (and Mini-Soybeans) (S), CBOT
Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT Soybean Meal
(SM), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT). See 17 CFR 150.2.
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Amendments to Sec. 150.1 add or revise several
definitions for use throughout part 150, including: New definitions of
the terms ``core referenced futures contract'' (pertaining to the 25
physically-settled futures contracts explicitly listed in the
regulations) and ``referenced contract'' (pertaining to futures
contracts and options on futures contracts that have certain direct
and/or indirect linkages to the core referenced futures contracts, and
to ``economically equivalent swaps'') to be used as shorthand to refer
to contracts subject to Federal position limits; an expanded ``spread
transaction'' definition; and a ``bona fide hedging transaction or
position'' definition that is broad enough to accommodate hedging
practices in a variety of contract types, including hedging practices
that may develop over time.
Amendments to Sec. 150.2 list the 25 core referenced
futures contracts which, along with any associated referenced
contracts, are subject to Federal position limits; and specify the
Federal spot and non-spot month position limit levels. Federal spot
month position limit levels are set at or below 25 percent of estimated
deliverable supply, whereas Federal non-spot month limit levels are set
at 10% of open interest for the first 50,000 contracts of open
interest, with an incremental increase of 2.5% of open interest
thereafter.
Amendments to Sec. 150.3 specify the types of positions
for which exemptions from Federal position limit requirements may be
granted, and set forth and/or reference the processes for requesting
such exemptions, including recognitions of bona fide hedges and
exemptions for spread positions, financial distress positions, certain
natural gas positions held during the spot month, and pre-enactment and
transition period swaps. For all contracts subject to Federal position
limits, bona fide hedge exemptions listed in Appendix A to part 150 as
an enumerated bona fide hedge are self-effectuating for purposes of
Federal position limits. For non-enumerated bona fide hedges, market
participants must submit an application either directly to the
Commission under Sec. 150.3 or indirectly through an exchange for
Federal position limit purposes under new Sec. 150.9 (discussed
below).
Amendments to Sec. 150.5 refine the process, and
establish non-exclusive methodologies, by which exchanges may set
exchange-level limits and grant exemptions therefrom with respect to
futures and options on futures, including separate methodologies for
contracts subject to Federal position limits and physical commodity
derivatives not subject to Federal position limits.\48\ While the
Commission will oversee compliance with Federal position limits on
swaps, the Commission has also determined to delay the enforcement of
exchange-set position limits on swaps otherwise required in amended
Sec. 150.5 because exchanges cannot view market participants'
positions in swaps across the various places they trade, including on
competitor exchanges.\49\
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\48\ Rule Sec. 150.5 addresses exchange-set position limits and
exemptions therefrom, whereas Sec. 150.3 addresses exemptions from
Federal position limits, and Sec. 150.9 addresses a streamlined
process for recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes
of Federal position limits. Exchange rules typically refer to
``exemptions'' in connection with bona fide hedging and spread
positions, whereas the Commission uses the nomenclature
``recognition'' with respect to bona fide hedges, and ``exemption''
with respect to spreads.
\49\ With respect to exchange-set position limits on swaps, in
two years the Commission will reevaluate the ability of exchanges to
establish and implement appropriate surveillance mechanisms to
implement DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6.
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New Sec. 150.9 establishes a streamlined process for
addressing requests for bona fide hedging recognitions for purposes of
Federal position limits, and leveraging exchange expertise and
resources. This process will be used by market participants with non-
enumerated bona fide hedge positions. Under the Final Rule, market
participants can provide one application for a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge to a DCM or SEF, as applicable, and receive approval of such
request based on the same application from both the exchange for
purposes of exchange-set limits and from the Commission for purposes of
Federal position limits.
New Appendix A to part 150 contains a list of enumerated
bona fide hedges. Positions that comply with the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition in Sec. 150.1 and that are
enumerated in Appendix A may exceed Federal position limits to the
extent that all applicable requirements in part 150 are met. Persons
holding such positions enumerated in Appendix A may exceed Federal
position limits without being required to request prior approval under
Sec. 150.3 or Sec. 150.9. Positions that do not fall within any of
the enumerated hedges could still potentially be recognized as bona
fide hedging positions, provided the positions otherwise comply with
the proposed bona fide hedging definition and all other applicable
requirements, including the approval process under Sec. 150.3 or Sec.
150.9.
Amendments to part 19 and related provisions eliminate
Form 204 (and corresponding Parts I and II of Form 304 for cotton),
enabling the Commission to leverage cash-market reporting submitted
directly to the exchanges under Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9. The Final
Rule maintains Part III of Form 304, related to the cotton on-call
report.
D. Effective Date and Compliance Period
The 2020 NPRM included proposed Sec. 150.2(e), which provided that
the Federal position limit levels for the 25 core referenced futures
contracts would have a compliance date 365 days after publication of
the final position limits regulations in the Federal Register.
Additionally, proposed Sec. 150.3(c) provided that previously-granted
risk management exemptions shall not be effective after the Final
Rule's effective date.
The Commission is removing from the Final Rule the compliance date
requirements in proposed Sec. Sec. 150.2(e) and 150.3(c) and instead
addressing the effective and compliance dates together within this
Federal Register release. The Commission is making two modifications
from the 2020 NPRM relating to the effective date and compliance period
of the Final Rule.
First, as noted above in the executive summary, the Commission is
providing a general compliance date of January 1,
[[Page 3251]]
2022 for both market participants and exchanges. In contrast, the 2020
NPRM did not provide a specific date as the compliance date but rather
stated 365 days after publication in the Federal Register.\50\
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\50\ The Commission is adopting calendar dates for compliance to
provide clarity rather than the 2020 NPRM's approach of stating that
the compliance period ends 365 days after publication in the Federal
Register since the Commission believes that providing a set calendar
date provides greater clarity to market participants. Based on the
timing of the Final Rule, the Commission believes that the January
1, 2022 general compliance date will not reduce the compliance
period compared to the 2020 NPRM's approach and may provide slightly
more time prior to the commencement of the compliance period.
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This compliance date of January 1, 2022 applies to (i) the Federal
position limits set forth in Appendix E to part 150 for only the 16
non-legacy core referenced futures contracts that are subject to
Federal position limits for the first time under this Final Rule, and
(ii) exchange obligations under final Sec. 150.5. This compliance date
also applies to referenced contracts for any of the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts (other than economically equivalent swaps,
which have a separate compliance date as discussed immediately below).
In contrast, the 2020 NPRM's compliance date applied only to market
participants' compliance with the new Federal position limit levels.
However, as discussed below, the Final Rule does not provide a separate
compliance date for the nine legacy agricultural contracts since they
are already subject to existing Federal position limits.
Second, the Commission is establishing a separate compliance date
of January 1, 2023 in connection with (i) economically equivalent swaps
and (ii) the elimination of previously-granted risk management
exemptions (i.e., market participants may continue to rely on their
previously-granted risk management exemptions until January 1, 2023).
As noted above, the 2020 NPRM only had a single general compliance date
and did not provide a separate compliance date for economically
equivalent swaps or related to previously-granted risk management
exemptions.
In this section, the Commission will discuss the following related
issues: (i) Compliance with Federal position limits for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts; (ii) compliance by exchanges with Sec. 150.5
under the Final Rule and market participants' related obligation to
temporarily continue providing Forms 204/304 in connection with bona
fide hedges; (iii) exchanges' voluntary implementation of Sec. 150.9
under the Final Rule; and (iv) comments received in connection with the
compliance date proposed in the 2020 NPRM.
i. Compliance With Federal Position Limits for the Nine Legacy
Agricultural Contracts
With respect to the nine legacy agricultural contracts, the
Commission is not providing a compliance date with respect to the spot
month and non-spot month Federal position limit levels. Accordingly,
the new Federal position limit levels under the Final Rule will become
effective on the Effective Date. The nine legacy agricultural contracts
are currently subject to Federal position limits and will continue to
be subject under the Final Rule, which, as noted above, is increasing
the Federal position limit levels for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts (other than CBOT Oats, which will maintain the existing
Federal position limit levels). The Commission has determined not to
provide a separate compliance date for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts since market participants trading in these markets already
are familiar with Federal position limits and have established the
necessary monitoring and compliance oversight processes, in connection
with these legacy contracts.
With respect to exchange-set position limits, the Final Rule does
not require exchanges to increase their respective exchange-set
position limit levels. Rather, the Final Rule only requires that
exchange-set position limits are established at a level no higher than
the corresponding Federal position limits. As a result, in response to
the Final Rule, an exchange may: (1) Raise its exchange-set limits to
be as high as (or lower than) the corresponding Federal position limits
immediately on the Effective Date or anytime thereafter; (2) implement
a phase-in period where exchange-set position limits increase from
existing exchange-set levels over time; or (3) not increase the
exchange-set position limit levels at all, in each case as the exchange
may determine appropriate for its markets.
ii. Exchange Implementation of Sec. 150.5 and Market Participants'
Obligations To Continue Providing Forms 204 and 304, as Applicable, in
Connection With Federal Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
For clarity, in connection with the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, market participants may avail themselves of the new
enumerated bona fide hedges (e.g., anticipatory merchandising)
immediately upon the Effective Date (market participants will not need
to be concerned with availing themselves of bona fide hedge
recognitions for the 16 non-legacy contracts upon the Effective Date
since these contracts will have a compliance date of January 1, 2022).
To the extent that market participants seek to rely on any Federal
enumerated bona fide hedges, market participants must continue to
provide, as applicable, the Commission with Forms 204/304, which are
otherwise eliminated by the Final Rule upon the Effective Date, until
the relevant exchange that lists the applicable referenced contract
implements Sec. 150.5 under the Final Rule. As discussed below, final
Sec. 150.5 governs, among other things, exchange rules and procedures,
including (i) the exchange's collection of certain cash-market
information from market participants in connection with their bona fide
hedge applications for exchange-set limits and (ii) the exchange's
sharing of related information with the Commission. As discussed
further below, the Final Rule predicates the elimination of Forms 204/
304 on the relevant exchange's sharing of the information with the
Commission under final Sec. 150.5 (which provides for a new process
for the exchange to share data with the Commission similar to data that
the Commission previously obtained through Forms 204/304 under the
Federal framework existing prior to the Final Rule).\51\ Exchanges must
implement final Sec. 150.5 by the Final Rule's general compliance date
of January 1, 2022.
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\51\ For further discussion of the elimination of Form 204 and
Parts I and II of Form 304, see Section II.H.2, infra.
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iii. Exchange Implementation of Sec. 150.9 in Connection With the
Market Participants' Applications Through Exchanges for Non-Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges for Purposes of Federal Position Limits
As discussed above, the Final Rule establishes a streamlined
process for market participants to apply through exchanges for non-
enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of Federal position limits.
That is, a market participant may submit a single non-enumerated bona
fide hedge exemption application to an exchange for purposes of both
Federal and exchange-set position limits, and the Commission will
review, and make a determination based on, the application that the
market participant submitted to the exchange. For clarity, the
Commission notes that the Final Rule does not require exchanges to
participate in such process.
However, if an exchange chooses to do so, the Commission is
clarifying, for
[[Page 3252]]
the avoidance of doubt, that the exchange may implement this
streamlined process for non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications as
soon as the Effective Date, or anytime thereafter (or not at all). In
response to certain concerns by market participants and exchanges,
discussed immediately below, the Commission believes that, to the
extent an exchange chooses to participate in this streamlined
application process, the implementation of Sec. 150.9 soon after the
Effective Date may help ensure minimal disruption to market
participants' existing trading strategies as well as avoid having the
potentially unfeasible situation of requiring the exchanges to process
a number of non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications simultaneously
at the end of the general compliance period on January 1, 2022.
Furthermore, the Commission clarifies in Section II.G.3.iii that market
participants with existing Commission-granted non-enumerated or
anticipatory bona fide hedge recognitions in connection with the nine
legacy agricultural contracts under the existing framework are not
required to reapply to the Commission for a new recognition under the
Final Rule.
iv. Comments--Compliance Period
Generally, commenters supported the proposed compliance date,
noting that an adequate compliance period would afford sufficient time
to make necessary business adjustments (e.g., time to build compliance
systems, develop technology, train personnel, etc.).\52\ The Commission
agrees with these observations and believes that a general compliance
date of January 1, 2022, except for economically equivalent swaps and
positions based on a previously-granted risk management exemption, will
provide exchanges and market participants sufficient time to adjust
their operations and compliance and monitoring systems.
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\52\ CME Group at 8; FIA at 2-3; ISDA at 2, 8; Shell at 4; and
SIFMA AMG at 2, 9-10.
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Some commenters also requested an extended compliance date (beyond
the general compliance date) for economically equivalent swaps to
mitigate the numerous legal, operational, and compliance challenges of
implementing position limits for swaps for the first time.\53\ Unlike
exchange-listed contracts that are currently subject to either Federal
position limits or exchange-set limits, commenters noted that exchanges
do not have existing compliance and monitoring resources for
economically equivalent swaps from which to leverage. The Commission
agrees with commenters that additional time for economically equivalent
swaps is warranted, and, as discussed above, is thus delaying the
compliance date for economically equivalent swaps for an additional
year, until January 1, 2023.
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\53\ MFA/AIMA at 8; NCFC at 6; NGSA at 15-16; SIFMA AMG at 9-10;
and Citadel at 9-10.
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CME Group expressed concern that it may receive an influx of
exemption applications at the end of the compliance period, and
therefore suggested a rolling process where market participants are
grandfathered into their current exemptions, permitting them to file
for those exemptions on the same annual schedule.\54\ The Commission
believes this concern is mitigated since exchanges, at their
discretion, may implement final Sec. 150.9 as soon as the Effective
Date, which will allow exchanges to review non-enumerated bona fide
hedge applications on a rolling basis between the Effective Date and
the end of the compliance period rather than having to process a large
number of applications at once. Furthermore, as noted above, market
participants with existing Commission-granted non-enumerated or
anticipatory bona fide hedge recognitions are not required to reapply
to the Commission for a new recognition under the Final Rule.
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\54\ CME Group at 8.
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E. The Commission Construes CEA Section 4a(a) To Require the Commission
To Make a Necessity Finding Before Establishing Position Limits for
Physical Commodities Other Than Excluded Commodities
The Commission is required by ISDA to determine whether CEA section
4a(a)(2)(A) requires the Commission to find, before establishing a
position limit, that such limit is ``necessary.'' \55\ The provision
states in relevant part that ``the Commission shall'' establish
position limits ``as appropriate'' for futures contracts in physical
commodities other than excluded commodities ``[i]n accordance with the
standards set forth in'' the preexisting section 4a(a)(1).\56\ That
preexisting provision requires the Commission to establish position
limits as it ``finds are necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent''
certain enumerated burdens on interstate commerce.\57\ In the 2011
Final Rulemaking, the Commission interpreted this language as an
unambiguous mandate to establish position limits without first finding
that such limits are necessary, but with discretion to determine the
``appropriate'' levels for each.\58\ In ISDA, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia disagreed and held that section
4a(a)(2)(A) is ambiguous as to whether the ``standards set forth in
paragraph (1)'' include the requirement of an antecedent finding that a
position limit is necessary.\59\ The court vacated the 2011 Final
Rulemaking and directed the Commission to apply its experience and
expertise to resolve that ambiguity.\60\ The Commission has done so and
determines that section 4a(a)(2)(A) should be interpreted to require
that before establishing position limits, the Commission must determine
that limits are necessary.\61\ A full legal analysis is set forth infra
at Sections III.C.-E.
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\55\ ISDA, 887 F.Supp.2d at 281.
\56\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(A).
\57\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
\58\ 76 FR at 71626, 71627.
\59\ ISDA, 887 F.Supp.2d at 279-280.
\60\ Id. at 281.
\61\ See infra Section III.B.
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The Commission finds that position limits are necessary for the 25
core referenced futures contracts, including certain commodity
derivative contracts that are directly or indirectly linked to a core
referenced futures contract. The Commission's finding with respect to
the 25 core referenced futures contracts is based on two interrelated
factors: The particular importance of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts to their respective underlying cash markets, including that
they require physical delivery of the underlying commodity, and, the
commodities' particular importance to the national economy. Separately,
the Commission finds that position limits are necessary during the spot
month for all 25 core referenced futures contracts and outside of the
spot month only for the nine legacy agricultural commodity contracts
(in each instance including certain commodity derivative contracts that
are directly or indirectly linked to a core referenced futures
contract). A full discussion of the necessity findings is set forth
infra at Sections III.C.-E.
F. The Commission's Use of Certain Terminology
The Commission is aware that this Final Rule will likely be
reviewed by a diverse range of members of the public from varied
backgrounds and industries and with different levels of knowledge and
experience with derivatives markets. Furthermore, even among
experienced market participants, terminology may differ by industry,
commodity, or exchange. The Commission also recognizes that certain
[[Page 3253]]
terms commonly referenced by market participants may differ from the
technical legal terms used in the Commission's regulations and/or the
CEA.
Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, the Commission will attempt to
use terms and phrases in their ordinary, plain English sense. When
required, the Commission will explicitly identify technical or nuanced
legal/regulatory or industry ``terms of art.'' The Commission wishes to
briefly review certain terms and phrases used throughout this release
below, as follows:
Bona fide hedges. The CEA uses the legal term ``bona fide
hedging transaction or position'' in both the singular and plural. The
Commission currently defines the term in existing Sec. 1.3 in the
plural as ``bona fide hedging transactions or positions'' while the
Final Rule now incorporates the singular ``bona fide hedging
transaction or position.'' The Commission understands that most market
participants simply refer to ``bona fide hedge(s)'' (in both the
singular and the plural). Accordingly, for short hand throughout this
release, the Commission may refer to ``bona fide hedges,'' ``bona fide
hedge positions,'' ``bona fide hedge transactions,'' ``bona fide
hedges,'' ``bona fide hedging positions,'' and similar phrasing.
These terms are meant to apply as short hand and are not intended
to imply a substantive difference either with the defined legal term
``bona fide hedging transaction or position'' or with one another.
Similarly, the plural term in the existing Commission regulations
and the singular in the Final Rule, as discussed below, are not
intended to reflect a substantive difference.
Federal position limits. The Final Rule creates a new
defined term, ``speculative position limit,'' in part 150 of the
Commission's regulations to refer to the maximum position, net long or
net short, that a market participant may maintain in a referenced
contract. Throughout this release, the Commission will use as a general
term either ``position limits'' or ``Federal position limits'' to refer
to the general Federal position limits framework and related
regulations, including the defined term ``speculative position limit.''
When discussing the individual ``speculative position limit'' levels
for each commodity derivative contract, as opposed to the Final Rule's
general Federal regulatory framework, the Commission instead may refer
to the ``Federal position limit levels,'' although all these phrases
are intended to refer to the same general concept. The Commission may
also specifically refer to exchange-set position limits when referring
to the general framework, process, or specific position limit levels
established by the respective exchanges.
Exchanges. This Final Rule applies to both DCMs and SEFs.
Unless otherwise distinguished, the Commission will refer to
``exchanges'' throughout this release to refer to any relevant DCM or
SEF.
Cash-Settled and Physically-Settled. The Commission
throughout this release refers to ``cash-settled'' and ``physically-
settled'' commodity derivative contracts.
When a futures contract expires, all open futures contract
positions in such contract are settled by either: (1) Physical
delivery, which the Commission refers to as a ``physically-settled''
contract, or (2) cash settlement, which the Commission refers to as a
``cash-settled'' contract, in each case depending on the contract terms
set by the exchange. Deliveries on ``physically-settled'' futures
contracts are made through the exchange's clearinghouse, and the
delivery of the physical commodity must be consummated between the
buyer and seller per the exchange rules and contract specifications. On
the other hand, other futures contracts are ``cash-settled'' because
they do not involve the transfer of physical commodity ownership and
require that all open positions at expiration be settled by a transfer
of cash to or from the clearinghouse based upon the final settlement
price of the contracts.
The Commission further notes that some market participants may
instead use the terms ``physical-delivery'' contracts or ``financially-
settled'' contracts instead of the Commission's terms ``physically-
settled'' contracts and ``cash-settled'' contracts, respectively. The
Commission does not intend a substantive difference in meaning with the
choice of its terms.
Spread Positions. The Commission views its use of the term
``spread'' to mean the same as ``arbitrage'' or ``straddle'' as those
terms are used in CEA section 4a(a) and existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3) of
the Commission's regulations. Consistent with existing regulations, the
Commission's sole use of the term ``spread'' in this Final Rule is
intended to also capture arbitrage or straddle strategies referred to
in CEA section 4a(a) and existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3), and referring to
``spread'' rather than ``arbitrage'' or ``straddle'' is not intended to
be a substantive difference. The Commission notes that certain
exchanges may distinguish between ``spread'' and ``arbitrage''
positions for purposes of exchange exemptions, but the Commission does
not make that distinction here for purposes of its ``spread
transaction'' definition as used in this release.
Unfixed Price Forward Transactions. Throughout this
release, the Commission will use as general terms either ``unfixed
price forward transactions,'' ``unfixed price transactions,'' ``unfixed
price forward contracts,'' and/or ``unfixed price contracts'' to refer
to transactions that are either purchases or sales of a cash commodity
where the purchase or sales price, as applicable, is determined based
on the settlement price of a benchmark, such as the settlement price of
a commodity derivative contract on a certain date (e.g., the price on
the settlement date of a core referenced futures contract) or other
index price (e.g., a spot index price). Market participants may also
refer to unfixed price transactions as ``floating price'' transactions,
and the Commission does not intend a substantive difference in meaning
with the choice of these terms.
G. Recent Volatility in the WTI Contract
Several commenters noted the volatility in the NYMEX Light Sweet
Crude Oil (CL) contract, also known as the West Texas Intermediate
crude oil contract (``WTI contract''), that occurred in April 2020
(subsequent to the issuance of the 2020 NPRM) in their comments to the
2020 NPRM. Some commenters suggested that the volatility may have been
caused, in part, by excessive speculation \62\ or highly leveraged
traders,\63\ or both. Better Markets suggested that a combination of
passive exchange-traded funds,\64\ the use of trading-at-settlement
(``TAS'') orders,\65\ automated trading,\66\ and, according to Better
Markets, a lack of ``meaningful position limits,'' \67\ may have
contributed to the volatility. Other commenters suggested that this
event could have been mitigated through additional liquidity provided
by financial end users during the critical
[[Page 3254]]
time period, among other measures.\68\ Commenters also pointed to the
event to bolster arguments for and against Commission deference to
exchanges in implementing position limits.\69\ A few commenters
requested that the Commission refrain from finalizing the rule until it
better understands this event and other issues.\70\
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\62\ PMAA at 2.
\63\ NEFI at 3-4.
\64\ Better Markets at 9.
\65\ Better Markets at 13. A TAS order is an order that is
placed during the trading session but is executed at the settlement
price (or with a small price range around the settlement price).
Trading at Settlement (TAS), https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/trading-at-settlement.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2020); TRADE AT
SETTLEMENT (TAS) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS July 2020, https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures_us/TAS_FAQ.pdf (last visited Aug.
29, 2020).
\66\ Better Markets at 14-17.
\67\ Better Markets at 10.
\68\ AQR at 5-7 (``The inability of position limits themselves
to eliminate the unpredictability of commodity futures markets
highlights the importance of existing Commission and exchange
oversight of these markets and the dangers of overreliance on a
single regulatory tool to address market dynamics for which it may
not have been designed . . . [W]e encourage the Commission to
consider not only concerns around potential manipulation, but also
the potential unintended consequences of such limits and the need
for liquidity during sensitive time periods for commodity futures
markets.''); SCM at 2-3 (``This liquidity, provided by financial
trading firms and hedge funds . . ., is essential to balance, check
and smooth the otherwise uncontrollable trading that can occur when
only commercial firms and unsophisticated trading participants are
active in a market.'').
\69\ IATP suggested that the event demonstrates the problems of
Commission deference to DCMs' ``experience and capacity'' on many of
the provisions in the 2020 NPRM. See IATP at 18. Conversely, SEMI
stated that a final rule should not be overly restrictive in
response to the recent market conditions in WTI oil markets, given
that it is the exchanges that ``have the expertise, experience and
existing tools to effectively manage the orderly expiration of
futures contracts that are in the spot month under such
circumstances.'' SEMI at 13.
\70\ AFR at 3; Rutkowski at 2; IATP at 2-3.
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The Commission has been closely examining the circumstances
surrounding the volatility in the WTI contract since it occurred in
April 2020. The Commission will continue to analyze the events of April
2020 to evaluate whether any changes to the position limits regulations
may be warranted in light of the circumstances surrounding the
volatility in the WTI contract. Any proposed changes that the
Commission finds may be warranted would be subject to public comment
pursuant to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
H. Brief Summary of Comments Received
As stated previously, the Commission received approximately 75
relevant comment letters in response to the 2020 NPRM.\71\ Though
several commenters did not support the Commission adopting the 2020
NPRM and requested its withdrawal,\72\ most of the 75 comments received
generally supported the 2020 NPRM, or supported specific elements of
the 2020 NPRM. However, many of these commenters suggested
modifications to portions of the 2020 NPRM, which are discussed in the
relevant sections discussing the Final Rule below. In addition, several
commenters requested Commission action beyond the scope of the 2020
NPRM, also discussed in the relevant sections below.
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\71\ See supra, n.16.
\72\ E.g. AFR; Better Markets; IATP; Eric Matsen; NEFI; Public
Citizen; Robert Rutkowski; SCM; and VLM.
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II. Final Rule
A. Sec. 150.1--Definitions
Definitions relevant to the existing position limits regime
currently appear in both Sec. Sec. 1.3 and 150.1 of the Commission's
regulations.\73\ The Commission proposed to update and supplement the
definitions in Sec. 150.1, including moving a revised definition of
``bona fide hedging transactions and positions'' from Sec. 1.3 into
Sec. 150.1. The proposed changes were intended, among other things, to
conform the definitions to certain of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to
the CEA.\74\ Each proposed defined term is discussed in alphabetical
order below.
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\73\ 17 CFR 1.3 and 150.1, respectively.
\74\ In addition to the amendments described below, the
Commission proposed to re-order the defined terms so that they
appear in alphabetical order, rather than in a lettered list, so
that terms can be more quickly located. Moving forward, any new
defined terms would be inserted in alphabetical order, as
recommended by the Office of the Federal Register. See Document
Drafting Handbook, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives
and Records Administration, 2-31 (Revision 5, Oct. 2, 2017)
(stating, ``[i]n sections or paragraphs containing only definitions,
we recommend that you do not use paragraph designations if you list
the terms in alphabetical order. Begin the definition paragraph with
the term that you are defining.'').
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1. ``Bona Fide Hedging Transaction or Position''
i. Background--Bona Fide Hedging Transaction or Position
Under CEA section 4a(c)(1), position limits shall not apply to
transactions or positions that are shown to be bona fide hedging
transactions or positions, as such terms shall be defined by the
Commission.\75\ The Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission, for
purposes of implementing CEA section 4a(a)(2), to adopt a bona fide
hedging definition consistent with CEA section 4a(c)(2).\76\ The
existing definition of ``bona fide hedging transactions and
positions,'' which first appeared in Sec. 1.3 of the Commission's
regulations in the 1970s,\77\ is inconsistent, in certain ways
described below, with the revised statutory definition in CEA section
4a(c)(2).
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\75\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1).
\76\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2).
\77\ See, e.g., Definition of Bona Fide Hedging and Related
Reporting Requirements, 42 FR 42748 (Aug. 24, 1977). Previously, the
Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to section 404 of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-463), promulgated
a definition of bona fide hedging transactions and positions.
Hedging Definition, Reports, and Conforming Amendments, 40 FR 11560
(Mar. 12, 1975). That definition, largely reflecting the statutory
definition previously in effect, remained in effect until the newly-
established Commission defined that term. Id.
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Accordingly, and for the reasons outlined below, the Commission
proposed to remove the existing bona fide hedging definition from Sec.
1.3 and replace it with a revised bona fide hedging definition that
would appear alongside all of the other position limits related
definitions in proposed Sec. 150.1.\78\ This definition would be
applied in determining whether a position in a commodity derivative
contract is a bona fide hedge that may exceed Federal position limits
set forth in Sec. 150.2.
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\78\ In a 2018 rulemaking, the Commission amended Sec. 1.3 to
replace the sub-paragraphs that had for years been identified with
an alphabetic designation for each defined term with an alphabetized
list. See Definitions, 83 FR 7979 (Feb. 23, 2018). The bona fide
hedging definition, therefore, is now a paragraph, located in
alphabetical order, in Sec. 1.3, rather than in Sec. 1.3(z).
Accordingly, for purposes of clarity and ease of discussion, when
discussing the Commission's existing version of the bona fide
hedging definition, this release will refer to the bona fide hedging
definition in Sec. 1.3.
Further, the version of Sec. 1.3 that appears in the Code of
Federal Regulations applies only to excluded commodities and is not
the version of the bona fide hedging definition currently in effect.
The version currently in effect, the substance of which remains as
it was amended in 1987, applies to all commodities, not just to
excluded commodities. See Revision of Federal Speculative Position
Limits, 52 FR 38914 (Oct. 20, 1987). While the 2011 Final Rulemaking
amended the Sec. 1.3 bona fide hedging definition to apply only to
excluded commodities, that rulemaking was vacated, as noted
previously, by a September 28, 2012 order of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, with the exception of the rule's
amendments to 17 CFR 150.2. Although the 2011 Final Rulemaking was
vacated, the 2011 version of the bona fide hedging definition in
Sec. 1.3, which applied only to excluded commodities, has not yet
been formally removed from the Code of Federal Regulations. The
currently-in-effect version of the Commission's bona fide hedging
definition thus does not currently appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations. The closest to a ``current'' version of the definition
is the 2010 version of Sec. 1.3, which, while substantively
current, still includes the ``(z)'' denomination that was removed in
2018. The Commission proposed to address the need to formally remove
the incorrect version of the bona fide hedging definition as part of
the 2020 NPRM.
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This section of the release discusses the bona fide hedging
definition and the substantive standards for bona fide hedges. The
process for granting bona fide hedge recognitions is discussed later in
this release in connection with Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9.\79\
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\79\ See infra Section II.C. (discussing Sec. 150.3) and
Section II.G. (discussing Sec. 150.9).
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The discussion in this section is organized as follows:
i. This background section discussion;
[[Page 3255]]
ii. An overview of the existing ``general'' elements of the bona
fide hedging definition and the specific ``enumerated'' bona fide
hedges listed in the existing bona fide hedge definition;
iii. A discussion of each of the elements of the existing
``general'' bona fide hedging definition, including the (a) temporary
substitute test (and the related elimination of the risk management
exemption), (b) economically appropriate test, (c) change in value
requirement, (d) incidental test, and (e) orderly trading requirement;
iv. The treatment of unfixed-price transactions under the Final
Rule;
v. A discussion of each enumerated bona fide hedge in the Final
Rule;
vi. A discussion of the elimination of the Five-Day Rule;
vii. A discussion of the guidance on measuring risk (i.e., gross
versus net hedging);
viii. A discussion of the Final Rule's implementation of the CEA's
statutory pass-through swap and pass-through swap offset provisions;
and
ix. A discussion of the form, location, and organization of the
enumerated bona fide hedges.
ii. Overview of the Commission's Existing Bona Fide Hedging Definition
in Sec. 1.3
Paragraph (1) of the existing bona fide hedging definition in
Commission regulation Sec. 1.3 contains what is currently labeled the
``general definition'' of bona fide hedging. This ``general'' bona fide
hedging definition comprises five key elements which require that in
order for a position to be deemed a bona fide hedge for Federal
position limits, the position must:
``normally'' represent a substitute for transactions to be
made or positions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing
channel (``temporary substitute test'');
be economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in
the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise (``economically
appropriate test'');
arise from the potential change in value of (1) assets
which a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises
or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, or
merchandising, (2) liabilities which a person owns or anticipates
incurring, or (3) services which a person provides, purchases, or
anticipates providing or purchasing (``change in value requirement'');
have a purpose to offset price risks incidental to
commercial cash or spot operations (``incidental test''); and
be established and liquidated in an orderly manner
(``orderly trading requirement'').\80\
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\80\ 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed more fully below, the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to
the CEA included the first three factors in the amended CEA, but did
not include the last two factors.
Additionally, paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging definition in
existing Sec. 1.3 currently sets forth a non-exclusive list of seven
total enumerated bona fide hedges, contained in four general bona fide
hedging transaction categories, that comply with the general bona fide
hedging definition in paragraph (1). These bona fide hedge categories
that are explicitly listed in existing Sec. 1.3's bona fide hedging
definition are generally referred to as the ``enumerated'' bona fide
hedges, a term the Commission uses throughout in this release. Market
participants thus need not seek approval from the Commission of such
positions as bona fide hedges prior to exceeding limits for such
positions. Rather, market participants must simply report any such
positions on the monthly Form 204 (or Form 304 for cotton), as required
by part 19 of the Commission's existing regulations.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ 17 CFR part 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The seven existing enumerated hedges fall into the following four
categories: (1) Sales of futures contracts to hedge (i) ownership or
fixed-price cash commodity purchases and (ii) unsold anticipated
production; (2) purchases of futures contracts to hedge (i) fixed-price
cash commodity sales of the same commodity, (ii) fixed-price sales of
the cash commodity's cash products and by-products, and (iii) unfilled
anticipated requirements; (3) offsetting sales and purchases of futures
contracts to hedge offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity sales and
purchases; and (4) cross-commodity hedges.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed further below, market participants may not use either
the existing enumerated bona fide hedges for unsold anticipated
production or unfilled anticipated requirements to hedge more than
twelve-months' unsold production or unfilled requirements, respectively
(the ``twelve-month restriction''). Further, the existing enumerated
bona fide hedges for unsold production and for offsetting sales and
purchases of unfixed price transactions do not apply during the five
last trading days. Similarly, the existing enumerated bona fide hedge
for unfilled anticipated requirements has a modified version of the
Five-Day Rule and provides that during the ``five last trading days'' a
market participant may not maintain a position that exceeds the market
participant's unfilled anticipated requirement for ``that month and for
the next succeeding month.''
Paragraph (3) of the current bona fide hedging definition states
that the Commission may recognize ``non-enumerated'' bona fide hedging
transactions and positions pursuant to a specific request by a market
participant using the process described in Sec. 1.47 of the
Commission's regulations.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Amended Bona Fide Hedge Definition for Physical Commodities in
Sec. 150.1; ``General'' Elements of the Bona Fide Hedge Definition
Under the Final Rule
The Commission is adopting the proposed general elements currently
found in the bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3 that conform to
the revised statutory bona fide hedging definition in CEA section
4a(c)(2), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, and is eliminating the
general elements that do not conform.\84\ In particular, the Commission
is adopting updated versions of the temporary substitute test,
economically appropriate test, and change in value requirements that
are described below, and eliminating the incidental test and orderly
trading requirement, which are not included in the revised statutory
text. Each of these changes is discussed in more detail below.\85\
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\84\ The Commission is also making a non-substantive change to
the introductory language of Sec. 150.3 by referring in the proviso
to ``such person's transactions or positions.'' The Commission views
this as a clarifying edit, and does not intend a substantive
difference in meaning with the choice of these terms.
\85\ Bona fide hedge recognition is determined based on the
particular circumstances of a position or transaction and is not
conferred on the basis of the involved market participant alone.
Accordingly, while a particular position may qualify as a bona fide
hedge for a given market participant, another position held by that
same participant may not. Similarly, if a participant holds
positions that are recognized as bona fide hedges, and holds other
positions that are speculative, only the speculative positions would
be subject to position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Temporary Substitute Test
(1) Background--Temporary Substitute Test
The language of the temporary substitute test in the Commission's
existing bona fide hedging definition is inconsistent with the language
of the temporary substitute test that appears in the CEA, as amended by
the Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, the Commission's existing regulatory
definition currently provides that a bona fide hedging
[[Page 3256]]
position normally represents a substitute for transactions to be made
or positions to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing
channel.\86\ Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
temporary substitute test in section 4a(c)(2)(A)(i) of the CEA also
contained the word ``normally,'' so that the Commission's existing bona
fide hedging definition mirrored the previous section 4a(c)(2)(A)(i) of
the CEA prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. The word ``normally'' acted as a
qualifier for the instances in which a position must be a temporary
substitute for transactions or positions made at a later time in a
physical marketing channel. However, the Dodd-Frank Act removed that
qualifier by deleting the word ``normally'' from the temporary
substitute test in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(i).\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ 17 CFR 1.3. As noted earlier in this release, the
currently-in-effect version of the Commission's bona fide hedging
definition does not currently appear in the current Code of Federal
Regulations. The closest to a ``current'' version of the definition
is the 2010 version of Sec. 1.3, which, while substantively
current, still includes the ``(z)'' denomination that was removed in
2018. The Commission proposed to address the need to formally remove
the incorrect version of the bona fide hedging definition as part of
the 2020 NPRM. See supra n.74.
\87\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a 1987 interpretation, the Commission stated that, among other
things, the inclusion of the word ``normally'' in connection with the
pre-Dodd-Frank-Act version of the temporary substitute language
indicated that the bona fide hedging definition should not be construed
to apply only to firms using futures to reduce their exposures to risks
in the cash market.\88\ Instead, the 1987 interpretation took the view
that to qualify as a bona fide hedge, a transaction in the futures
market did not necessarily need to be a temporary substitute for a
later transaction in the cash market.\89\ In other words, that
interpretation took the view that a futures position could still
qualify as a bona fide hedging position even if it was not in
connection with the production, sale, or use of a physical commodity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ See Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Hedging
Definition, 52 FR 27195, 27196 (July 20, 1987).
\89\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission staff has previously granted so-called ``risk management
exemptions'' on such grounds. In connection with physical commodities,
the phrase ``risk management exemption'' has historically been used by
Commission staff to refer to non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions granted under Sec. 1.47 to allow swap dealers and others
to hold agricultural futures positions in excess of Federal position
limits in order to offset their positions in commodity index swaps or
related exposure.\90\ Risk management exemptions were granted outside
of the spot month, and the related swap exposure that was being offset
(i.e., hedged by the futures or options position entered into based on
the risk management exemption) was typically opposite an institutional
investor for which the swap was not a bona fide hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ As described below, due to differences in statutory
language, the phrase ``risk management exemption'' often has a
broader meaning in connection with excluded commodities than with
physical commodities. See infra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing
proposed pass-through language).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Temporary Substitute Test
As described above, the Dodd-Frank Act clearly and unambiguously
removed the word ``normally'' from the temporary substitute test in CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(A)(i), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act. As such, in
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission interpreted the Dodd-Frank Act's removal
of the word ``normally'' as reflecting Congressional statutory
direction that a bona fide hedging position in physical commodities
must always (and not just ``normally'') be in connection with the
production, sale, or use of a physical cash-market commodity.\91\ The
Commission interpreted this change to signal that the Commission should
cease to recognize ``risk management'' positions as bona fide hedges
for physical commodities, unless the positions satisfy the pass-through
swap/swap offset requirements in section 4a(c)(2)(B) of the CEA,
further discussed below.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ 85 FR at 11596.
\92\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to implement that statutory change, the Commission: (1)
Proposed a narrower bona fide hedging definition for physical
commodities in proposed Sec. 150.1 that did not include the word
``normally'' currently found in the temporary substitute regulatory
language in paragraph (1) of the existing Sec. 1.3 bona fide hedging
definition; and (2) proposed to eliminate all previously-granted risk
management exemptions that did not otherwise qualify for pass-through
treatment.\93\ Under the 2020 NPRM, any such previously-granted risk
management exemption would generally no longer apply 365 days after
publication of final position limits rules in the Federal Register.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ See final Sec. 150.3(c). See also infra Section
II.A.1.x.b. (discussing proposed pass-through language). Excluded
commodities, as described in further detail below, are not subject
to the statutory bona fide hedging definition. Accordingly, the
statutory restrictions on risk management exemptions that apply to
physical commodities subject to Federal position limits do not apply
to excluded commodities.
\94\ See infra Section II.A.1.iii.a(5) (discussing of revoking
existing risk management exemptions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Temporary Substitute Test
As proposed, the Final Rule eliminates the word ``normally'' from
the Commission's temporary substitute test and eliminates the risk
management exemption for contracts subject to Federal position limits.
However, as described below, the Final Rule is extending the compliance
date for existing risk management exemption holders.
(4) Comments--Temporary Substitute Test
Commenters were divided regarding the proposed elimination of the
risk management exemptions. Some public interest groups and the
agricultural industry supported the proposed removal of the word
``normally'' and/or the accompanying rescission of risk management
exemptions.\95\ These commenters argued that risk management positions
are harmful to the market and can adversely impact price dynamics.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ AMCOT at 1; Ecom at 1; White Gold at 1-2; Walcot at 2; East
Cotton at 2; CMC at 11 (stating that the increased limits and
allowances for pass-through exemptions will limit any potential loss
of liquidity); NCFC at 7 (noting that it supports the elimination in
light of the increased limits); NGFA at 3; LDC at 2; PMAA at 4; ACSA
at 2, 4; IMC at 2; Mallory at 1; McMeekin at 1-2; Memtex at 2;
Omnicotton at 2; NCC at 1; S Canale Cotton at 2; Texas Cotton at 2;
SW Ag at 2; Jess Smith at 2; Choice Cotton at 1; Olam at 1-2; Better
Markets at 4, 51-54 (agreeing with the proposed interpretation that
the Dodd-Frank Act requires the change and stating that the
elimination of the risk management exemption may mean very little in
light of the increased limits); ACA at 2; Moody Compress at 2; Toyo
at 2; and DECA at 1.
\96\ See, e.g., Mallory Alexander at 1; DECA at 1; Ecom at 2;
Southern Cotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; ACA at 2; IMC at 2; Olam
at 1-2; Moody Compress at 1; SW Ag at 2; East Cotton at 2; Toyo at
2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 1-2; Omnicotton at 2; Texas Cotton
at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at 1-2; and PMAA at 3-4 (arguing that
risk management positions have the potential to create significant
volatility); Better Markets at 9, 17 (noting the distortive effects
of risk management positions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters from the financial industry, ICE, and MGEX opposed the
proposed removal of ``normally'' and/or the proposed elimination of the
risk management exemption.\97\ These commenters contended that the
elimination of the risk management
[[Page 3257]]
exemption will harm the market, including by reducing liquidity,\98\
and that even though Congress removed ``normally'' from the statute,
Congress did not use the term ``always.'' \99\ One commenter opposed to
the ban claimed that the European Commission is considering revising
MiFID II \100\ to address a ``failure to include an appropriate hedge
exemption for financial risks.'' \101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ ICE at 5-8 (noting that risk management positions are non-
speculative and arguing that the pass-through provision is not an
adequate substitute for such positions); FIA at 10, 21-24; ISDA at
6; PIMCO at 5-6; SIFMA AMG at 8; MGEX at 2.
\98\ FIA at 23-24 (contending that the 2020 NPRM may harm
pension funds and create a bifurcated liquidity pool since dealers
may need to move their hedges from physically-settled to
financially-settled contracts earlier than they would otherwise);
ISDA at 6, 11; PIMCO at 5-6; and ICE at 5-6.
\99\ ISDA at 6; FIA at 21-22; and ICE at 5, 8.
\100\ According to the European Securities and Market Authority,
``MiFID is the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/
EC). It has been applicable across the European Union since November
2007. It is a cornerstone of the EU's regulation of financial
markets seeking to improve their competitiveness by creating a
single market for investment services and activities and to ensure a
high degree of harmonised protection for investors in financial
instruments.'' MiFID sets out: conduct of business and
organisational requirements for investment firms; authorisation
requirements for regulated markets; regulatory reporting to avoid
market abuse; trade transparency obligation for shares; and rules on
the admission of financial instruments to trading.''
``On 20 October 2011, the European Commission adopted a
legislative proposal for the revision of MiFID which took the form
of a revised Directive and a new Regulation. After more than two
years of debate, the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments
repealing Directive 2004/39/EC and the Regulation on Markets in
Financial Instruments, commonly referred to as MiFID II and MiFIR,
were adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union. They were published in the EU Official Journal on 12
June 2014.'' European Securities and Market Authority website at
https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir.
\101\ SIFMA AMG at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, several commenters noted that even if the Commission
finalizes the ban as proposed, the Commission should: (i) Revoke the
exemptions gradually so as to avoid disruption; \102\ (ii) clarify that
the Commission maintains the authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7) to
grant risk management exemptions in the future; \103\ and (iii) allow
exchanges to grant risk management exemptions.\104\
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\102\ ISDA at 7.
\103\ ICE at 6; FIA at 3, 22, 24; ISDA at 6-7; and IECA at 12.
\104\ FIA at 3, 22; ISDA at 6-7; and ICE at 5-6.
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(5) Discussion of Final Rule--Temporary Substitute Test
The Commission is eliminating the word ``normally'' from the
Commission's temporary substitute test and eliminating the existing
risk management exemption for contracts subject to Federal position
limits as proposed. However, as described below, the Commission is
extending the compliance date by which positions based on existing risk
management exemptions must be reduced to levels that comply with the
applicable Federal position limits. While the Commission appreciates
commenter concerns regarding the elimination of the risk management
exemption, the Commission interprets the Dodd-Frank Act's removal of
the word ``normally'' from the CEA's statutory temporary substitute
test as signaling Congressional intent to reverse the flexibility
afforded by the presence of the word ``normally'' prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act. As such, even were the Commission inclined to retain the
status quo of risk management exemptions, the Commission's statutory
interpretation prevents it from doing so.
Further, retaining such exemptions for swap intermediaries, without
regard to the purpose of their counterparties' swaps, would not only be
inconsistent with the post-Dodd-Frank Act version of the temporary
substitute test, but would also be inconsistent with the statutory
restrictions on pass-through swap offsets. In particular, the statutory
pass-through provision requires that the swap position being offset
qualify as a bona fide hedging position.\105\ Many risk management
exemptions have been used to offset swap positions that would not
qualify as bona fide hedging positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B)(i) (was executed opposite a
counterparty for which the transaction would qualify as a bona fide
hedging transaction). The pass-through swap offset language in the
Final Rule's bona fide hedging definition is discussed in greater
detail below.
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In response to the comment regarding a potential expansion of MiFID
II to accommodate activity akin to risk management exemptions, the
Commission believes that the European Commission's stated posture does
not appear to contemplate a blanket exemption for financial risks as
suggested by the commenter. Instead, the European Commission's approach
appears to be largely consistent with the narrower pass-through
approach adopted by the Commission in this Final Rule.\106\
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\106\ See MiFID II Review report on position limits and position
management (April 1, 2020), available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-156-2311_mifid_ii_review_report_position_limits.pdf. The exemption under
consideration for financial counterparties appears to be in line
with the Final Rule's pass-through provision, in that the
``exemption would apply to the positions held by that financial
counterparty that are objectively measurable as reducing risks
directly related to the commercial activities of the non-financial
entities of the group . . . . this hedging exemption should not be
considered as an additional exemption to the position limit regime
but rather as a `transfer' to the financial counterparty of the
group of the hedging exemption otherwise available to the commercial
entities of the group.'' Id. at 32-33.
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The Commission is, however, making several changes and
clarifications to address commenter concerns:
First, the Commission is extending the compliance date by which
risk management exemption holders must reduce their risk management
exemption positions to comply with Federal position limits under the
Final Rule to January 1, 2023.\107\ This provides approximately two
years beyond the Effective Date for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts.\108\ The Commission believes that this will provide
sufficient time for existing positions to roll off and/or be replaced
with positions that conform with the Federal position limits adopted in
this Final Rule, without adversely affecting market liquidity.
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\107\ For clarity, a risk management exemption holder may enter
into new positions based on, and in accordance with, its previously-
granted risk management exemption, during this compliance period,
until January 1, 2023.
\108\ For further discussion of the Final Rule's compliance and
effective dates, see Section I.D. Both existing risk management
exemptions, as discussed herein, and swap positions, will be subject
to the extended compliance data to January 1, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, including pass-through swaps and pass-through swap offsets
within the definition of a bona fide hedge will mitigate some of the
potential impact resulting from the rescission of the risk management
exemption. The Final Rule's pass-through provisions should help address
certain of the hedging needs of persons seeking to offset the risk from
swap books, allowing for sufficient liquidity in the marketplace for
both bona fide hedgers and their counterparties.
Third, although the Commission will no longer recognize risk
management positions as bona fide hedges under this Final Rule, the
Commission maintains other authorities, including the authority under
CEA section 4a(a)(7), to exempt risk management positions from Federal
position limits.
Finally, consistent with existing industry practice, exchanges may
continue to recognize risk management positions for contracts that are
not subject to Federal position limits, including for excluded
commodities.
b. Economically Appropriate Test
(1) Background--Economically Appropriate Test
The statutory and regulatory bona fide hedging definitions in
section 4a(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the CEA and in existing Sec. 1.3 of the
Commission's regulations both provide that a bona fide hedging position
must be economically
[[Page 3258]]
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of
a commercial enterprise.\109\ The Commission has, when defining bona
fide hedging, historically focused on transactions that offset price
risk.\110\
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\109\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(ii) and 17 CFR 1.3.
\110\ For example, in promulgating existing Sec. 1.3, the
Commission explained that a bona fide hedging position must, among
other things, be economically appropriate to risk reduction, such
risks must arise from operation of a commercial enterprise, and the
price fluctuations of the futures contracts used in the transaction
must be substantially related to fluctuations of the cash-market
value of the assets, liabilities or services being hedged. Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR 14832, 14833 (Mar. 16,
1977) (emphasis added). ``Value'' is generally understood to mean
price times quantity. The Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section 4a(c)(2),
which copied the economically appropriate test from the Commission's
definition in Sec. 1.3. See also 78 FR at 75702, 75703 (stating
that the core of the Commission's approach to defining bona fide
hedging over the years has focused on transactions that offset a
recognized physical price risk).
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(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Economically Appropriate Test
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed to amend the economically
appropriate prong of the bona fide hedge definition with one
clarification: Consistent with the Commission's longstanding practice
regarding what types of risk may be offset by bona fide hedging
positions in excess of Federal position limits,\111\ the Commission
made explicit in the proposed bona fide hedging definition that the
word ``risks'' refers to, and is limited to, ``price risk.'' This
proposed clarification did not reflect a change in policy, as the
Commission has a longstanding policy that hedges of non-price risk
alone cannot be recognized as bona fide hedges.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ See, e.g., 78 FR at 75709, 75710.
\112\ See supra n.109 for further discussion on the Commission's
longstanding policy regarding ``price'' risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission clarified its view that
risk must be limited to price risk for purposes of the economically
appropriate test due to the difficulty that the Commission or exchanges
may face in objectively evaluating whether a particular derivatives
position is economically appropriate to the reduction of non-price
risks. For example, the Commission or an exchange's staff can
objectively evaluate whether a particular derivatives position is an
economically appropriate hedge of a price risk arising from an
underlying cash-market transaction, including by assessing the
correlations between the risk and the derivatives position. It would be
more difficult, if not impossible, to objectively determine whether an
offset of non-price risk is economically appropriate for the underlying
risk.
Finally, the Commission requested comment on whether price risk is
attributable to a variety of factors, including political and weather
risk, and could therefore allow hedging political, weather, or other
risks, or whether price risk is something narrower in the application
of bona fide hedging.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ 85 FR at 11622.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Economically Appropriate
Test
The Commission is adopting the economically appropriate prong of
the bona fide hedge definition as proposed. However, as discussed
below, the Commission is clarifying in response to commenter requests
that while the Commission is explicitly limiting ``risks'' to ``price
risks'' as used in the economically appropriate test, the Commission
recognizes that price risk can be informed and impacted by various
other types of non-price risk.
(4) Comments--Economically Appropriate Test
The Commission received comments from market participants seeking
greater clarity with respect to the Commission's proposed reference to
``price risk'' in the context of applying the ``economically
appropriate'' test in the bona fide hedging definition. Many commenters
stated that the economically appropriate test should include offsets of
non-price risk.\114\ Other commenters stated that a variety of non-
price risk factors (i) actually affect price risk and therefore are
objective,\115\ or (ii) are simply another form of price risk and
therefore should be permitted.\116\
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\114\ MGEX at 2; NGSA at 5-6; CHS at 3; NCFC at 2; FIA at 10-11;
CMC at 3; LDC at 2; ICE at 4; IFUS at Exhibit 1 RFC (6).
\115\ FIA at 10-11 (Stating that, ``[T]he Commission should
recognize that the statutory definition of a bona fide hedging
position encompasses the reduction of all risks that affect the
value of a cash-market position, including time risk, location risk,
quality risk, execution and logistics risk, counterparty credit
risk, weather risk, sovereign risk, government policy risk (e.g., an
embargo), and any other risks that affect price. These are
objective, rather than subjective, risks that commercial enterprises
incur on a regular basis in connection with their businesses as
producers, processors, merchants handling, and users of commodities
that underlie the core referenced futures contracts'').
\116\ ADM at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, ADM stated that when market participants discuss
``risks'' such as political, weather, delivery, transportation, and
more, they are discussing the impact these factors may have on the
price.\117\ Hence the risk being hedged is price risk as influenced by
these factors.\118\ Other commenters stated that market participants
should have the flexibility to measure risk in the manner most suitable
for their business.\119\ In addition, commenters also stated they were
not opposed to ``price risk'' so long as the Commission clarified that
price risk is not static or an absolute objective measure, and
consequently that the term ``price risks'' incorporates a commercial
hedger's independent assessment of price risk.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ Id.
\118\ ADM at 5.
\119\ LDC at 2.
\120\ CMC at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, Better Markets supported the 2020 NPRM's rationale to
permit only ``price risk.'' \121\ Better Markets also suggested that
the Commission clarify that the term ``commercial enterprise'' refers
to ``solely [a] transaction or position that would be directly and
demonstrably risk reducing to `cash or spot operations' for physical
commodities underlying the contracts'' to be hedged.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ Better Markets at 52-53.
\122\ Better Markets at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, ICE, MGEX, and FIA requested that if the Commission adopts
the proposed economically appropriate prong, the Commission should
permit market participants to use the non-enumerated bona fide hedge
process to receive recognition of bona fide hedges of non-price risk on
a case-by-case basis.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ MGEX at 2; FIA at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Discussion of the Final Rule--The Bona Fide Hedging Definition's
``Economically Appropriate Test''
The Commission is adopting the economically appropriate prong of
the bona fide hedging definition as proposed, codifying existing
practice, as well as existing Sec. 1.3's treatment of price risk, by
making it explicit in the rule text that the word ``risks'' refers to,
and is limited to, ``price risk.''
The Commission emphasizes that the Final Rule is not intended to
represent a change to the Commission's existing interpretation of the
economically appropriate prong of bona fide hedging, but rather is
maintaining the application of the economically appropriate test in
connection with bona fide hedges on the nine legacy agricultural
contracts to the 16 new non-legacy core referenced futures contracts.
In promulgating existing Sec. 1.3, the Commission explained that a
bona fide hedging position must, among other things, ``be economically
appropriate to risk reduction, such risks must arise from operation of
a commercial
[[Page 3259]]
enterprise, and the price fluctuations of the futures contracts used in
the transaction must be substantially related to fluctuations of the
cash-market value of the assets, liabilities or services being
hedged.'' \124\ (emphasis added). Consistent with this longstanding
policy of the Commission to recognize hedges of price risk of an
underlying commodity position as bona fide hedges (and consistent with
the Commission's existing application of bona fide hedging to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts under the existing Federal position limit
regulations), the Commission is also clarifying further below that
price risk can be informed and impacted by various other types of
risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR 14832,
14833 (Mar. 16, 1977) (emphasis added). ``Value'' is generally
understood to mean price times quantity. The Dodd-Frank Act added
CEA section 4a(c)(2), which copied the economically appropriate test
from the Commission's definition in Sec. 1.3. See also 78 FR at
75702, 75703 (stating that the ``core of the Commission's approach
to defining bona fide hedging over the years has focused on
transactions that offset a recognized physical price risk'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Commission stated in the 2020 NPRM and continues to believe,
for any given non-price risk, such as geopolitical turmoil, weather, or
counterparty credit risks, there could be multiple commodities,
directions, and contract months which a particular market participant
may subjectively view as an economically appropriate offset for that
non-price risk. Moreover, multiple market participants faced with the
same non-price risk might take different views on which offset is the
most effective.\125\ A system of allowing for bona fide hedges based
solely by reference to such non-price risks would be difficult to
administer on a pragmatic and consistently fair basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ 85 FR at 11606.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, it also would be difficult to evaluate whether a
particular commodity derivative contract would be the proper offset as
a bona fide hedge, as defined in this Final Rule, to a potential non-
price risk, or would remove exposure to the potential change in value
to the market participant's cash positions resulting from the non-price
risk. Thus, hedging solely to protect against changes in value of non-
price risks would fall outside the category of a bona fide hedge which
offsets the ``price risk'' of an underlying commodity cash position.
However, the Commission agrees with commenters who stated that
market participants form independent economic assessments of how
different possible events might create potential risk exposures for
their business.\126\ Such risks that create or impact the price risk of
underlying cash commodities may include, but are not limited to,
geopolitical turmoil, weather, or counterparty credit risks. The
Commission recognizes that these risks can create price risks and
understands that firms may manage these potential risks to their
businesses differently and in the manner most suitable for their
business. As noted above, by limiting the economically appropriate
prong to price risk, the Commission is reiterating its historical
practice, which has applied well to the legacy agricultural contracts
for decades, to recognize hedges of price risk of an underlying
commodity position as bona fide hedges while acknowledging that price
risk may itself be impacted by non-price risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ CMC at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The foregoing discussion of price risk is limited to the question
of whether a position in a referenced contract meets the economically
appropriate test to satisfy the bona fide hedge requirements. Market
participants may thus continue to manage non-price risks in a variety
of ways, which may include participation in the futures markets or
exposure to other financial products. In fact, market participants may
decide to use futures contracts that are not subject to Federal
position limits (e.g., location basis contracts), if they determine
such contracts will help them manage non-price risks faced by their
businesses.\127\ For example, a market participant seeking to manage
risk, including non-price risk, with positions in contracts that are
not referenced contracts, such as freight or weather derivatives, would
not be subject to Federal speculative position limits and thus would
not need to comply with the economically appropriate test in connection
with such positions in non-referenced contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ The enumerated cross-commodity hedge provision adopted
herein and discussed below offers may also offer additional
flexibility to those market participants using referenced contracts
to manage risk, by allowing market participants to hedge price risk
associated with a particular commodity using a derivative contract
based on a different commodity, assuming all applicable requirements
of the cross-commodity enumerated bona fide hedge are met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To satisfy the economically appropriate test, a position must
ultimately offset the price risk of an underlying cash commodity.\128\
Non-price risk may also be a consideration in hedging decisions, but
cannot be a substitute for price risk associated with the cash
commodity underlying the derivatives position. The foregoing view
precludes the Commission from adopting commenter suggestions to permit
market participants to use the non-enumerated hedge process to receive
recognition of hedges of non-price risk on a case-by-case basis
because, while the Commission acknowledges that price risk can be
informed and impacted by non-price risk, price risk is required to
satisfy the economically appropriate test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ This view is consistent with the spirit of Better Market's
comment suggesting a focus on reducing risks associated with a cash-
market position in a physical commodity. See Better Markets at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Change in Value Requirement
(1) Background--Change in Value Requirement
CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii) and existing Sec. 1.3 include the
``change in value requirement,'' which provides that the bona fide
hedging position must arise from the potential change in the value of:
(I) Assets that a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or
merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing,
processing, or merchandising; (II) liabilities that a person owns or
anticipates incurring; or (III) services that a person provides,
purchases, or anticipates providing or purchasing.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(iii), 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Change in Value Requirement
The Commission proposed to retain the substance of the change in
value requirement in existing Sec. 1.3, with some non-substantive
technical modifications, including modifications to correct a
typographical error.\130\ Aside from the typographical error, the
proposed Sec. 150.1 change in value requirement mirrors the Dodd-Frank
Act's change in value requirement in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ The Commission proposed to replace the phrase
``liabilities which a person owns,'' which appears in the statute
erroneously, with ``liabilities which a person owes,'' which the
Commission believed was the intended wording (emphasis added). The
Commission interpreted the word ``owns'' to be a typographical
error. A person may owe on a liability, and may anticipate incurring
a liability. If a person ``owns'' a liability, such as a debt
instrument issued by another, then such person owns an asset. The
fact that assets are included in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I)
further reinforces the Commission's interpretation that the
reference to ``owns'' means ``owes.'' The Commission also proposed
several other non-substantive modifications in sentence structure to
improve clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Change in Value
Requirement
For the same reasons set out in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission is
adopting the change in value
[[Page 3260]]
requirement of the bona fide hedge definition as proposed.
(4) Comments--Change in Value Requirement
No specific comments on the change in value requirement were
received.
d. Incidental Test and Orderly Trading Requirement
(1) Background--Incidental Test and Orderly Trading Requirement
Two general requirements contained in the existing Sec. 1.3
definition of bona fide hedging position include: (I) The incidental
test and (II) the orderly trading requirement. For a position to be
recognized as a bona fide hedging position, the incidental test
requires that the purpose is to offset price risks incidental to
commercial cash, spot, or forward operations.
Under the orderly trading requirement, such position is established
and liquidated in an orderly manner in accordance with sound commercial
practices. Notably, Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act did not include the
incidental test or the orderly trading requirement in the statutory
bona fide hedging definition in CEA section 4a(c)(2).\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Incidental Test and Orderly Trading
Requirement
While the Commission proposed to maintain the substance of the
three core elements of the existing bona fide hedging definition
described above, with some modifications, the Commission also proposed
to eliminate two elements contained in the existing Sec. 1.3
definition: The incidental test and orderly trading requirement that
currently appear in paragraph (1)(iii) of the Sec. 1.3 bona fide
hedging definition.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Incidental Test and
Orderly Trading Requirement
The Commission is eliminating the incidental test and orderly
trading requirement from the bona fide hedge definition as proposed.
(4) Comments--Incidental Test and Orderly Trading Requirement
NGSA supported elimination of the incidental test and orderly
trading requirement, claiming that the changes will facilitate
hedging,\133\ while IATP and Better Markets opposed the removal of
these provisions, contending that the provisions are important for
preventing market disruption.\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ NGSA at 4.
\134\ IATP at 14-15; Better Markets at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Discussion of the Final Rule--Incidental Test and Orderly Trading
Requirement
The Commission is eliminating the incidental test and orderly
trading requirement from the bona fide hedge definition as proposed. As
noted above, neither the incidental test nor orderly trading
requirement is part of the CEA's current statutory definition of bona
fide hedge. The Commission views the incidental test as redundant
because the Commission proposed to maintain both (1) the change in
value requirement (as noted above, the reference to ``value'' in the
change in value requirement is generally understood to mean price per
unit times quantity of units) as well as (2) the economically
appropriate test (which includes the concept of the offset of price
risks in the conduct and management of, i.e., incidental to, a
commercial enterprise).
In response to IATP and Better Markets, the Commission does not
view the orderly trading requirement as needed to prevent market
disruption. The statutory bona fide hedging definition does not include
an orderly trading requirement,\135\ and the meaning of ``orderly
trading'' is unclear in the context of the OTC swap market and in the
context of permitted off-exchange transactions, such as exchange for
physicals. The elimination of the orderly trading requirement does not
diminish an exchange's obligation to prohibit any disruptive trading
practices, including a case where an exchange believes that a bona fide
hedge position may result in disorderly trading. Further, in
eliminating the orderly trading requirement from the definition in the
regulations, the Commission is not amending or modifying
interpretations of any other related requirements, including any of the
anti-disruptive trading prohibitions in CEA section 4c(a)(5),\136\ or
any other statutory or regulatory provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ The orderly trading requirement was added as a part of the
regulatory definition of bona fide hedging in 1975; see Hedging
Definition, Reports, and Conforming Amendments, 40 FR 11560 (Mar.
12, 1975). Prior to 1974, the orderly trading requirement was found
in the statutory definition of bona fide hedging position; changes
to the CEA in 1974 removed the statutory definition from CEA section
4a(3).
\136\ 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, the retention of the updated temporary substitute
test, economically appropriate test, and change in value requirement,
coupled with the elimination of the incidental test and orderly trading
requirement, should reduce uncertainty by eliminating provisions that
do not appear in the statute, and by clarifying the language of the
remaining provisions. By reducing uncertainty surrounding some parts of
the bona fide hedging definition for physical commodities, the
Commission anticipates that, as described in greater detail elsewhere
in this release, it would be easier going forward for the Commission,
exchanges, and market participants to address whether novel trading
practices or strategies may qualify as bona fide hedges.
iv. Treatment of Unfixed Price Transactions Under the Final Rule
a. Background and Summary of Commission Determination--Treatment of
Unfixed Price Transactions
The Commission has a long history of recognizing fixed-price
commitments as the basis for a bona fide hedge.\137\ While the existing
bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3 includes one enumerated hedge
that explicitly mentions ``unfixed'' prices,\138\ the availability of
this hedge is limited to circumstances where a market participant has
both an unfixed-price purchase and an unfixed-price sale on hand,
precluding a market participant with only an unfixed-price purchase or
an unfixed-price sale from qualifying for this particular enumerated
hedge. Further, the extent to which the other existing enumerated
hedges apply to unfixed-price commitments is ambiguous from the plain
reading of the text of the existing bona fide hedging definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ See, e.g., paragraphs (2)(i)(A) and (2)(ii)(A) of existing
Sec. 1.3.
\138\ See paragraph (2)(iii) of existing Sec. 1.3 (Offsetting
sales and purchases for future delivery on a contract market which
do not exceed in quantity that amount of the same cash commodity
which has been bought and sold at unfixed prices basis different
delivery months of the contract market)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, Commission staff have previously considered the extent to
which market participants with unfixed-price commitments may qualify
for an enumerated hedge. Commission staff issued interpretive letter
12-07 in 2012 (``Staff Letter No. 12-07'') in response to a narrow
question submitted by a market participant regarding qualifying for the
existing enumerated unfilled anticipated requirements bona fide hedge
\139\ while entering into ``unfixed-
[[Page 3261]]
price transactions.'' \140\ In that interpretive letter, staff
clarified that a commercial entity may qualify for the existing
enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements even
if the commercial entity has entered into long-term, unfixed-price
supply or requirements contracts because, as staff explained, the
unfixed-price purchase contract does not ``fill'' the commercial
entity's anticipated requirements.\141\ As explained in Staff Letter
No. 12-07, the price risk of such ``unfilled'' anticipated requirements
is not offset by the unfixed-price forward contract because the price
risk remains with the commercial entity, even though the entity has
contractually assured a supply of the commodity.\142\ Instead, the
price risk continues until the unfixed-price contract's price is
fixed.\143\ Once the price is fixed on the supply contract, the
commercial entity no longer has price risk, and its derivative
position, to the extent the position is above an applicable position
limit, and unless the market participant qualifies for another
exemption (as discussed below), must be liquidated in an orderly manner
in accordance with sound commercial practices.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ Paragraph (2)(ii)(C) of existing Sec. 1.3 provides in
relevant part that the bona fide hedging definition includes
purchases which do not exceed in quantity Twelve months' unfilled
anticipated requirements of the same cash commodity for processing,
manufacturing, or feeding by the same person.
\140\ CFTC Staff Letter 12-07, issued August 16, 2012, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/CFTCStaffLetters/letters.htm, title
search ``12-07.''
\141\ CFTC Staff Letter 12-07 at 1.
\142\ CFTC Staff Letter 12-07 at 1-2. In the 2016 Reproposal,
the Commission affirmed staff's interpretation articulated in Staff
Letter No. 12-07. See 81 FR at 96750.
\143\ CFTC Staff Letter 12-07 at 2.
\144\ Id. at 2-3.
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As discussed below, the Commission is affirming this narrow
interpretation for the Final Rule--that commercial entities that enter
into unfixed-price transactions may continue to qualify for the
enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements--and
the Commission is adopting this rationale to also apply to: (1) The
existing enumerated bona fide hedge for unsold anticipated production;
\145\ and (2) the new enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated
merchandising.\146\ In other words, under this Final Rule, a commercial
market participant in the physical marketing channel that enters into
an unfixed-price transaction may qualify for one of these enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges, as long as the commercial market
participant otherwise satisfies all applicable requirements for such
anticipatory bona fide hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ For further discussion regarding the enumerated bona fide
hedge for ``unsold anticipated production,'' see Section
II.A.1.vi.d.
\146\ For further discussion regarding the new enumerated bona
fide hedge for ``anticipated merchandising,'' see Section
II.A.1.vi.f.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this section of the release, the Commission will refer to the
enumerated bona fide hedges for anticipated unfilled requirements,
anticipated unsold production, and anticipated merchandising,
collectively, as the ``anticipatory bona fide hedges.'' Additionally,
by using the term ``unfixed-price transaction,'' the Commission means a
forward contract (i.e., a firm commitment) at an open price or at a
price to be determined at a later date (for example, by reference to an
index based on the settlement price of a corresponding futures
contract).
The Commission discusses the 2020 NPRM's general treatment of
unfixed price transactions below, followed by a summary of comments and
the Commission's determination on the issue of unfixed-price
transactions generally. A more detailed discussion of each specific
enumerated hedge, including the three anticipatory bona fide hedges,
appears further below.
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Treatment of Unfixed Price Transactions
Like the bona fide hedging definition in existing Sec. 1.3, the
proposed bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 150.1 of the 2020 NPRM
included one enumerated hedge addressing unfixed-price transactions,
which required offsetting unfixed-price purchase and sale
transactions.\147\ Aside from that one enumerated bona fide hedge, the
other proposed bona fide hedges did not specify whether a market
participant with an unfixed-price transaction could qualify for a bona
fide hedge exemption, including any of the proposed anticipatory bona
fide hedges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ See proposed paragraph (a)(2) of Appendix A to part 150.
Like the existing enumerated hedge in paragraph (2)(iii) of Sec.
1.3, this proposed enumerated hedge was limited to circumstances
where a market participant has both an unfixed-price purchase and an
unfixed-price sale in hand. This specific proposed enumerated bona
fide hedge, along with all other proposed enumerated hedges, is
described in detail further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the 2020 NPRM did preliminarily and indirectly address
previous queries on the matter of unfixed-price transactions. In
particular, the 2020 NPRM addressed a petition for exemptive relief
submitted in response to the 2011 Final Rule. In that petition, the
Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms (which has since reconstituted
itself as the Commercial Energy Working Group, or ``CEWG'') requested
exemptive relief for transactions that are described by 10 examples set
forth therein as bona fide hedging transactions (``BFH
Petition'').\148\
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\148\ The Working Group BFH Petition is available at https://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/wgbfhpetition012012.pdf. In the 2013 Proposal, the Commission
provided that the transactions contemplated under the working
group's examples Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7 (scenario 1), and 8 would be
permitted under the proposed definition of bona fide hedging. In the
2020 NPRM, the Commission preliminarily determined that transactions
described in four additional CEWG examples would comply with the
proposed expanded bona fide hedging definition in the 2020 NPRM:
examples #4 (Binding, Irrevocable Bids or Offers), #5 (Timing of
Hedging Physical Transactions), #9 (Holding a cross-commodity hedge
using a physical delivery contract into the spot month) and #10
(Holding a cross-commodity hedge using a physical delivery contract
to meet unfilled anticipated requirements).
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In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission preliminarily determined that
commodity derivative positions described in two examples related to
unfixed-price transactions did not fit within any of the proposed
enumerated hedges. Specifically, the Commission preliminarily
determined that the positions described in examples #3 (unpriced
physical purchase or sale commitments) and #7 (scenario 2) (use of
physical delivery referenced contracts to hedge physical transactions
using calendar month average pricing) of the BFH Petition did not fit
within any of the proposed enumerated bona fide hedges, but that market
participants could apply for a non-enumerated exemption.\149\
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\149\ 85 FR at 11612.
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The Commission requested comment on the extent to which the
proposed enumerated bona fide hedges should encompass the types of
positions discussed in examples #3 (unpriced physical purchase or sale
commitments) and #7 (scenario 2) (use of physical delivery reference
contracts to hedge physical transactions using calendar month averaging
pricing) of the CEWG's BFH Petition.\150\
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\150\ 85 FR at 11622.
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c. Comments--Treatment of Unfixed Price Transactions
In response to the 2020 NPRM, many commenters requested the
Commission either clarify or make explicit that the proposed bona fide
hedge definition would apply to commodity derivatives contracts used to
hedge exposure to price risk arising from unfixed-price
transactions.\151\
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\151\ See, e.g., Ecom at 1; ACA at 2; CEWG at 22-24; Chevron at
11; CME Group at 8-9; DECA at 2; East Cotton at 2; Gerald Marshall
at 2; IFUS at 5-7; IMC at 2; Jess Smith at 2; LDC at 2; Mallory
Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Moody Compress 1; NCC at
1; NGFA at 7; Olam at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Shell
at 7; Southern Cotton at 2; Suncor at 7; SW Ag at 2; Toyo at 2;
Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at 2.
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[[Page 3262]]
Several commenters provided various examples in support of their
requests that the Commission recognize that unfixed price transactions
may serve as the basis for an enumerated bona fide hedge position for
purposes of Federal position limits.\152\
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\152\ CMC at 4; FIA at 16; ICE at 4-5; ACSA at 6-7; ADM at 3;
CME Group at 8-9; CEWG at 19-21.
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Comments on the treatment of unfixed price transactions often were
submitted in connection with discussions on the scope of the proposed
enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated merchandising. As discussed
further below, under the Final Rule's enumerated anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge section, many commenters requested the
Commission clarify whether the proposed enumerated hedge for
anticipated merchandising could be used to manage price risk arising
from unfixed-price physical commodity transactions.
With regards to CEWG's BFH Petition example #3 (unpriced physical
purchase or sale commitments), many commenters disagreed with the
Commission's preliminary determination in the 2020 NPRM that this type
of transaction would not qualify for an enumerated bona fide hedge.
Generally, commenters expressed the view that unfixed-price
transactions for physical commodities are a common and standard market
practice. The CEWG indicated that unfixed physical purchase or sale
commitments are routinely conducted in numerous markets and commodities
on a daily basis.\153\
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\153\ CEWG at 20 (also providing a similar example as it
submitted in the original petition which included Example #3
(unpriced physical purchase and sale commitments)).
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Similar to the BFH Petition's example #3 (unpriced physical
purchase or sale commitments), ACSA provided examples intended to
demonstrate that merchants are exposed to calendar spread and supply
price risk because they typically fulfill sales contracts by selling a
commodity for future delivery in advance of purchasing the commodity
needed to fulfill the sale.\154\ ACSA, along with other
commenters,\155\ stated that unfixed-price transactions for the
purchase or sale of the physical commodities are common, where a market
participant buys the commodity at a price that is based on (i.e., is
``indexed'' to) the settlement price of the nearby (or spot) futures
month contract and later sells the commodity at a price that is indexed
to the deferred month futures contract. ACSA and other commenters
indicated that merchants do this to ``effectively bridge the gap
between timing mismatches of supply and demand in the global
marketplace.'' \156\
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\154\ ACSA at 12-14; Several commenters concurred with ACSA
regarding exposure to calendar spread. Mallory Alexander at 2; DECA
at 2; CMC at 4; IMC at 2; Olam at 2; SW Ag at 2; White Gold at 2;
Walcot at 2.
\155\ ACSA at 4-7; CMC at 4; Mallory Alexander at 2; DECA at 2;
IMC at 2; Olam at 2; SW Ag at 2; White Gold at 2; Walcot at 2.
\156\ ACSA at 5.
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Related to the BFH Petition example #7 (scenario 2) (use of
physical delivery reference contracts to hedge physical transactions
using calendar month averaging pricing ``CMA''), commenters requested
that the Commission clarify that hedges of underlying physical
transactions that utilize CMA pricing structures fall within the
enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated merchandising.\157\ Chevron
requested the Commission clarify that commercial firms that price
commercial transactions to purchase or sell physical crude oil or
natural gas using a CMA pricing structure (whether they are solely
merchants or conduct merchant activities as part of an integrated
energy company), should receive bona fide hedge treatment for their
commodity derivative contract positions that offset the risks arising
from those CMA priced purchases or sales.\158\
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\157\ MGEX at 2; IMC at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; Walcot at 2;
White Gold at 2; Olam at 2; LDC at 1; Canale at 2; Moody Compress at
1; Gerald Marshall at 2; SW Ag at 2; DECA at 2; Chevron at 12;
Suncor at 11; CEWG at 21.
\158\ Chevron at 11.
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Similarly, other commenters asked for clarification regarding
whether the existing enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled
anticipated requirement extends to scenarios that involve unfixed-price
contracts that many electric generators enter into to address their
anticipated supply requirements.\159\ These commenters asked for
clarification that unfixed-price purchase commitments do not ``fill''
an anticipated requirement such that the market participant would be
able to still qualify for the enumerated unfilled anticipated
requirement bona fide hedge.\160\
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\159\ EPSA at 5; IECA at 8.
\160\ Id.
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d. Discussion of Final Rule--Treatment of Unfixed Price Transactions
As discussed above, the Commission is affirming and broadening the
application of the interpretation articulated in Staff Letter No. 12-
07. As a result, commercial market participants in the physical
marketing channel that enter into unfixed price transactions may
qualify for bona fide hedge treatment under the enumerated bona fide
hedges for anticipatory merchandising, anticipated unsold production,
or anticipated unfilled requirements because, as discussed below,
unfixed price transactions do not give rise to outright price risk and
do not otherwise fix an outright price.\161\
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\161\ As a result, based on this rationale, a commercial market
participant that has an unfixed-price commitment is treated the same
as a commercial market participant that has no unfixed-price
commitment for purposes of determining whether one qualifies for
these enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges.
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Consistent with Staff Letter No. 12-07, commercial market
participants in the physical marketing channel that enter into unfixed-
price transactions may continue to qualify for the enumerated bona fide
hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements for those unfixed price
transactions. Further, the Commission is broadening this rationale to
additionally include the existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
``unsold anticipated production'' \162\ and the new enumerated bona
fide hedge for anticipated merchandising.\163\ A commercial market
participant that enters into an unfixed-price transaction may qualify
for one of these enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges as long as
the commercial entity otherwise satisfies all requirements for such
anticipatory bona fide hedge, including demonstrating its anticipated
need in the physical marketing channel related to either its unsold
production, unfilled requirements, and/or merchandising, as
applicable.\164\
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\162\ For further discussion regarding the enumerated bona fide
hedge for ``unsold anticipated production,'' see Section
II.A.1.vi.d.
\163\ For further discussion regarding the new enumerated bona
fide hedge for ``anticipated merchandising,'' see Section
II.A.1.vi.f.
\164\ As such, merely entering into an unfixed-price transaction
is not alone sufficient to demonstrate compliance with one of the
enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges. The specific requirements
associated with each enumerated bona fide hedge, including each
anticipatory bona fide hedge, are described in detail further below.
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Under this Final Rule, the Commission is clarifying that a
commercial market participant may still qualify for an enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedge for an anticipated need, based on a good-
faith expectation of that need, even if the market participant has
entered into an unfixed-price transaction, since the Commission does
not deem the unfixed-price transaction to ``fill'' or ``address'' the
anticipated need. This rationale is predicated on the fact that an
unfixed-price commitment does not offset the price risk associated with
an anticipated need (i.e.,
[[Page 3263]]
anticipated unsold production, anticipated unfilled requirements, and/
or anticipated merchandising, as applicable). This is because unfixed-
price transactions do not give rise to outright price risk and
therefore do not alter the outright price risks faced by a commercial
market participant, even though the market participant has
contractually assured either a supply of the commodity (in the case of
anticipated unfilled requirements), the sale of its output (in the case
of anticipated unsold production), or the purchase or sale of the
commodity to be merchandised (in the case of anticipated
merchandising).\165\
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\165\ Consistent with the existing Federal position limits
framework, under the Final Rule, commercial market participants may
not qualify for any anticipatory bona fide hedge merely to offset
risks associated with non-commercial (i.e., financial) activities.
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In other words, a trader with an unfixed-price commitment still has
price risk related to its anticipated need until the price is fixed.
Once the price has become fixed, the market participant may no longer
avail itself of the enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedge, but may
potentially avail itself of another enumerated bona fide hedge, (such
as the bona fide hedges for fixed-price purchase contracts or for
fixed-price sales contracts, as applicable), provided all applicable
requirements of such other enumerated bona fide hedges are satisfied.
Under the Final Rule, a commercial market participant must continue
to be able to demonstrate an anticipated need related to unsold
production, unfilled requirements, and/or merchandising.
Accordingly, the Commission determines that the commercial market
participant engaged in unfixed-price transactions in the BFH Petition's
example #3 (unpriced physical purchase or sale commitments) and example
#7 (scenario 2) (use of physical delivery referenced contracts to hedge
physical transactions using calendar month average pricing) can qualify
for one of the enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges under the Final
Rule to the extent the market participant otherwise complies with the
applicable conditions of the relevant enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedge in connection with the market participant's commercial
activities.
For clarity, the Commission also underscores that under the
Commission's existing portfolio hedging policy, market participants,
including vertically-integrated firms (i.e., those firms that may
qualify as more than one of a producer; processor, manufacturer, or
utility; and/or merchandiser), may continue to manage their price risks
by utilizing more than one enumerated bona fide hedge (including more
than one anticipatory bona fide hedge).
The Commission recognizes that there are many ways in which market
participants both structure their organizations and engage in
commercial hedging practices. As such, market participants may manage
the price risk from their various commercial activities by utilizing
multiple enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions in the manner that is
most suitable to their particular circumstances. Nevertheless, for
illustrative purposes, the Commission provides a general example of how
market participants may utilize the enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges in connection with their unfixed price transactions:
For example, Producer X has the physical capacity to produce
100,000 barrels of physical WTI crude oil on an annual basis. Producer
X agrees to sell 80,000 barrels of WTI crude oil to Merchandiser Y via
a floating/unfixed-price contract in which the delivery will be priced
at the NYMEX March 2020 WTI crude oil futures final settlement price.
Producer X still does not have a buyer for its remaining 20,000
barrels, but anticipates selling all of its production, as it has in
previous years. Under this scenario, Producer X may utilize the
enumerated unsold anticipated production enumerated hedge to offset the
price risk from its unsold production, which includes both the 80,000
barrels of oil sold to Merchandiser Y at an unfixed price, as well as
the unsold 20,000 barrels.\166\ On the other hand, Merchandiser Y may
utilize the enumerated hedge for anticipated merchandising to hedge its
anticipated merchandising transactions, which include the 80,000
barrels it purchased from Producer X at an unfixed price. Because
Merchandiser Y has a history of merchandising more than 80,000 barrels
a year, and it anticipates merchandising more than 80,000 barrels in
the next twelve months, Merchandiser Y's anticipated merchandising
hedge may include the 80,000 barrels it purchased from Producer X at an
unfixed price and its remaining anticipated twelve-months'
merchandising. Separately, assuming Merchandiser Y also has crude oil
it purchased at a fixed price in a storage tank, Merchandiser Y may
also utilize the enumerated hedge for inventory and cash-commodity
fixed-price purchase contracts to hedge the price risk from those fixed
price purchases of crude oil.
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\166\ In the case where Producer X fixes the price of its sale
before delivery, while it no longer holds an anticipatory hedge,
Producer X may qualify for the enumerated hedge for fixed price
sales, assuming all applicable requirements for that hedge are
satisfied.
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In response to commenters requesting that the Commission create a
new enumerated bona fide hedge for unfixed-price transactions, the
Commission does not believe that this is necessary because, as
described above, commercial market participants may qualify for the
enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges while also entering into
unfixed-price transactions. Further, the Commission believes that it is
not suitable to create a new enumerated bona fide hedge expressly
covering all unfixed price transactions to accomplish the same since
there is an inherent difficulty in evaluating the propriety of a hedge
of an unfixed price obligation with a fixed-price futures contract as
there is basis risk until the unfixed price obligation is fixed. Given
differences among markets, creating a new enumerated bona fide hedge
for any unfixed price transaction could, under certain circumstances,
harm market integrity, enable potential market manipulation, and/or
allow excessive speculation by potentially affording bona fide hedging
treatment for speculative transactions.
For example, assume a market participant enters into an unfixed-
price sales contract (e.g., priced at a fixed differential to a
deferred month futures contract), and immediately enters into a
calendar month spread to reduce the risk of the fixed basis moving
adversely. It may not be economically appropriate to recognize as bona
fide a long futures position in the spot (or nearby) month and a short
futures position in a deferred calendar month matching the market
participant's cash delivery obligation, in the event the spot (or
nearby) month price is higher than the deferred contract month price
(referred to as backwardation, and characteristic of a spot cash market
with supply shortages), because such a calendar month futures spread
would lock in a loss. A position locking in a loss generally is not
economically appropriate to the reduction of risk, as it increases risk
by generating a loss, and such a transaction may be indicative of an
attempt--or at the very least provides inappropriate incentives--to
manipulate the spot (or nearby) futures price.\167\
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\167\ See 81 FR at 96750.
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Finally, the Commission emphasizes that to the extent that a market
participant does not qualify for an enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedge in connection with an unfixed-price transaction, the market
participant
[[Page 3264]]
could still avail itself of the process under Sec. Sec. 150.3 and
150.9 for requesting approval of non-enumerated bona fide hedges.
v. The Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge Exemptions, Generally
a. Background--Bona Fide Hedge Exemptions, Generally
As discussed earlier in this release, the list of bona fide hedges
explicitly contained in paragraph (2) of the existing bona fide hedging
definition in Sec. 1.3 of the Commission's regulations lists (or
``enumerates'') seven bona fide hedges, which are generally referred to
as the ``enumerated bona fide hedges,'' in four general categories.
These four existing categories of enumerated hedges include: (1) Sales
of futures contracts to hedge (i) ownership or fixed-price cash
commodity purchases and (ii) unsold anticipated production; (2)
purchases of futures contracts to hedge (i) fixed-price cash commodity
sales and (ii) unfilled anticipated requirements; (3) offsetting sales
and purchases of futures contracts to hedge offsetting unfixed-price
cash commodity sales and purchases; and (4) cross-commodity
hedges.\168\
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\168\ 17 CFR 1.3.
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The list of enumerated bona fide hedges found in paragraph (2) of
the existing bona fide hedging definition was developed at a time when
only agricultural commodities were subject to Federal position limits,
and has not been updated since 1987.\169\ The Commission believes, as
discussed further below, that such list is too narrow to reflect common
commercial hedging practices, including for metal and energy contracts.
Numerous market and regulatory developments have taken place since
1987, including, among other things, increased futures trading in the
metals and energy markets, the development of the swaps markets, and
the shift in trading from pits to electronic platforms. In addition,
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 \170\ and the Dodd-
Frank Act introduced various regulatory reforms, including the
enactment of position limits core principles.\171\ The Commission thus
proposed in the 2020 NPRM to update its bona fide hedging definition to
better conform to the current state of the law and to better reflect
market developments over time.
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\169\ See Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits, 52 FR
38914 (Oct. 20, 1987).
\170\ Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Public Law
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000).
\171\ See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5) and 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(6).
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b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Bona Fide Hedge Exemptions, Generally
So as not to reduce any of the clarity provided by the existing
list of enumerated bona fide hedges, the Commission proposed to
maintain the existing enumerated bona fide hedges, with some
modifications, and to expand this list.
The existing definition of ``bona fide hedging transactions and
positions'' enumerates the following hedging transactions:
a. Hedges of inventory and cash commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts;
b. hedges of cash commodity fixed-price sales
c. hedges of the cash commodity's cash products and byproducts;
d. hedges of offsetting unfixed price cash commodity sales and
purchases
e. hedges of unsold anticipated production;
f. hedges of unfilled anticipated requirements; and
g. cross-commodity hedges.
The following additional hedging practices are not enumerated in
the existing regulation, but were included in the 2020 NPRM as
additional enumerated bona fide hedges:
a. Hedges by agents;
b. short hedges of anticipated mineral royalties;
c. hedges of anticipated services;
d. offsets of commodity trade option; and
e. hedges of anticipated merchandising.
The Commission also proposed the elimination, for purposes of
Federal position limits, of both the Five-Day Rule and the twelve-month
restriction. However, under the 2020 NPRM, exchanges would be able to
establish their own five-day rule and/or twelve-month restriction, as
applicable for any or all of their respective referenced contracts.
c. Commission Determination--Bona Fide Hedge Exemptions, Generally
First, the Commission is adopting the proposed expanded list of
enumerated bona fide hedges, with the modifications described, as
applicable, in the discussions of the relevant bona fide hedges below.
Second, the Commission is adopting, as proposed, the elimination of
both the existing Five-Day Rule and the twelve-month restriction.\172\
The comments received, and the Commission's corresponding responses, in
connection with these changes are discussed further below in the
corresponding section discussing the applicable enumerated bona fide
hedge.
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\172\ As discussed further below, the Final Rule eliminates the
existing twelve-month restriction with respect to the anticipatory
unsold production and the anticipated unfilled requirements bona
fide hedges. However, the new anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge would be subject to its own twelve-month restriction.
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With respect to the treatment of the enumerated bona fide hedges
under the Final Rule, the Commission notes that positions in referenced
contracts subject to Federal position limits that meet any of the
enumerated bona fide hedges will, for purposes of Federal position
limits, be deemed to meet the bona fide hedging definition in CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(A), as well as the Commission's bona fide hedging
definition in Sec. 150.1 under the Final Rule. As a result, enumerated
bona fide hedges are self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position
limits, provided the market participant separately requests an
exemption from the applicable exchange-set limit established pursuant
to Sec. 150.5(a).\173\
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\173\ For further discussion of the exchange exemption process,
see Section II.D.3.i.b.
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The enumerated hedges are each described below, followed by a
discussion of the Five-Day Rule. When first proposed, the Commission
viewed the enumerated bona fide hedges as conforming to the general
definition of bona fide hedging ``without further consideration as to
the particulars of the case.'' \174\ Similarly, the list of enumerated
bona fide hedges under the Final Rule reflects categories of bona fide
hedges for which the Commission has determined, based on experience
over time, that no case-by-case determination or review of additional
details by the Commission is needed to determine that the position or
transaction is a bona fide hedge. This Final Rule does not foreclose
the recognition of other hedging practices as bona fide hedges, as
discussed below.
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\174\ Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR 14832
(Mar. 16, 1977).
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While the enumerated bona fide hedges adopted herein are self-
effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits,\175\ the
Commission and the exchanges will continue to exercise close oversight
over such positions to confirm that market participants' claimed
exemptions are consistent with their cash-market activity. In
particular, because all contracts subject to Federal position limits
are also subject to exchange-set limits, all traders seeking to exceed
Federal position limits must request an exemption from the relevant
exchange for purposes of the exchange
[[Page 3265]]
position limit, regardless of whether the position falls within one of
the enumerated hedges. In other words, enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions that are self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position
limits are not self-effectuating for purposes of exchange-set position
limits.
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\175\ See infra Section II.C. (discussing Sec. 150.3) and
Section II.G. (discussing Sec. 150.9).
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Exchanges have well-established programs for granting exemptions,
including, in some cases, experience granting exemptions for
anticipatory merchandising for certain traders in markets not currently
subject to Federal position limits. As discussed in greater detail
below, Sec. 150.5 as adopted herein helps ensure that such programs
conform to standards established by the Commission.\176\ The Commission
expects exchanges will continue to be thoughtful and deliberate in
granting exemptions, including anticipatory exemptions. The Commission
predicates this expectation on its decades of experience working
together with the relevant exchanges and observations generally of the
applicable exchange-traded futures markets.
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\176\ See infra Section II.D. For example, Sec. 150.5 requires,
among other things, that: Exemption applications filed with an
exchange include sufficient information to enable the exchange and
the Commission to determine whether the exchange may grant the
exemption, including an indication of whether the position qualifies
as an enumerated hedge for purposes of Federal limits and a
description of the applicant's activity in the underlying cash
markets; and the exchange provides the Commission with a monthly
report showing the disposition of all exemption applications,
including cash-market information justifying the exemption.
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The Commission and the exchanges also have a variety of other tools
designed to help prevent misuse of self-effectuating bona fide hedge
exemptions. For example, market participants who apply to an exchange
as required pursuant to Sec. 150.5 under the Final Rule are subject to
the Commission's false statements authority, which carries substantial
penalties under both the CEA and Federal criminal statutes. Similarly,
the Commission currently employs--and will continue to use under the
Final Rule--surveillance tools, special call authority, rule
enforcement reviews, and other formal and informal avenues for
obtaining additional information from exchanges and market participants
in order to distinguish between true bona fide hedging needs and
speculative trading masquerading as a bona fide hedge.
While positions that fall within the enumerated bona fide hedges,
each discussed in further detail below, are the type of positions that
comply with the bona fide hedging definition, the Commission recognizes
that there may be other positions or hedging strategies that are not
``enumerated'' that similarly could satisfy the bona fide hedge
definition.\177\ These ``non-enumerated'' bona fide hedges may be
granted today under existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48, and the
Commission can continue to recognize non-enumerated bona fide hedges
under the Final Rule. For further discussion of the recognition of non-
enumerated bona fide hedges, see infra Sections II.C. and II.G.
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\177\ See infra Section II.G. (discussing Sec. 150.9).
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With the exception of risk management positions previously
recognized as bona fide hedges, and assuming all regulatory
requirements continue to be satisfied, market participants' existing
bona fide hedging recognitions under existing Federal position limits
are grandfathered upon the Final Rule's Effective Date (i.e., bona fide
hedge exemptions that are currently recognized for purposes of Federal
position limits, other than risk management positions, will continue to
be recognized under the Final Rule).
Last, before describing each individual enumerated hedge, the
Commission also notes that it is adopting certain non-substantive,
technical changes, and such changes are intended only to provide
clarifications. For example, the Commission is making a technical
change to the bona fide hedging definition by adopting the term in the
singular tense in order to conform to the phrasing in CEA section
4a(c)(2).\178\ The Commission is also re-ordering the enumerated bona
fide hedges to place related enumerated bona fide hedges closer
together.
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\178\ The existing definition in Sec. 1.3 of the Commission's
regulations is in the plural: ``bona fide hedging transactions and
positions.'' The 2020 NPRM's proposed definition was similarly
plural.
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vi. Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge Exemptions for Physical Commodities
This Final Rule adopts the list of enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions as proposed in the 2020 NPRM, with certain amendments
discussed below.\179\
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\179\ Appendix A to part 150 lists the following enumerated bona
fide hedges: (a)(1) Hedges of Inventory and Cash Commodity Fixed-
Price Purchase Contracts; (a)(2) Hedges of Cash Commodity Fixed-
Price Sales Contracts; (a)(3) Hedges of Offsetting Unfixed Price
Cash Commodity Sales and Purchases; (a)(4) Hedges of Unsold
Anticipated Production; (a)(5) Hedges of Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements; (a)(6) Hedges of Anticipated Merchandising; (a)(7)
Hedges by Agents; (a)(8) Short Hedges of Anticipated Mineral
Royalties; (a)(9) Hedges of Anticipated Services; (a)(10) Offsets of
Commodity Trade Options; (a)(11) Cross-Commodity Hedges. As
previously mentioned, the Commission has also reorganized the order
of the list of enumerated hedges. The Final Rule reorders Appendix A
so that the bona fide hedges are listed by hedges of purchases,
sales, anticipated activities, or other new types of hedges.
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a. Hedges of Inventory and Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
(1) Background--Inventory and Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
Inventory and fixed-price cash commodity purchase contracts have
long served as the basis for a bona fide hedging position.\180\ This
bona fide hedge is enumerated in paragraph (2)(i)(A) of the existing
bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3, and recognizes as a bona
fide hedge sales of any commodity for future delivery on a contract
market which do not exceed in quantity ownership (i.e., inventory) or
fixed-price purchase of the same commodity by the same person.
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\180\ See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 6(a)(3) (1970). That statutory
definition of bona fide hedging included sales of, or short
positions in, any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the
rules of any contract market made or held by such person to the
extent that such sales or short positions are offset in quantity by
the ownership or purchase of the same cash commodity by the same
person.
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Since 2011, the Commission has included hedges of inventory and
cash commodity fixed-price purchase contracts in each of its position
limits rulemakings, with minor proposed modifications to improve
clarity.\181\
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\181\ 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75713; 76 FR at 11609.
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(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Inventory and Cash Commodity Fixed-Price
Purchase Contracts
This proposed enumerated bona fide hedge recognized that a
commercial enterprise is exposed to price risk if it has obtained
inventory in the normal course of business or has entered into a fixed-
price spot or forward purchase contract calling for delivery in the
physical marketing channel of a cash-market commodity (or a combination
of the two), and has not offset that price risk exposure (e.g., that
the market price of the inventory could decrease). In connection with
the proposed enumerated hedge, any such inventory, or a fixed-price
purchase contract, must be on hand, as opposed to a non-fixed purchase
contract or an anticipated purchase.
An appropriate hedge to offset the price risk arising from
inventory or a fixed-price purchase contract under the 2020 NPRM would
be to establish a short position in a commodity derivative contract.
The Commission also stated in the 2020 NPRM that an exchange may
require such short position holders to demonstrate the ability to
deliver against the short
[[Page 3266]]
position in order to demonstrate a legitimate purpose for holding a
position deep into the spot month.\182\
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\182\ 85 FR at 11609-11610. For example, it would not appear to
be economically appropriate to hold a short position in the spot
month of a commodity derivative contract against fixed-price
purchase contracts that provide for deferred delivery in comparison
to the delivery period for the spot month commodity derivative
contract. This is because the commodity under the cash contract
would not be available for delivery on the commodity derivative
contract.
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(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Inventory and Cash
Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase Contracts
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge of
inventory and cash commodity fixed-price purchase contracts as
proposed.
(4) Comments--Inventory and Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Purchase
Contracts
Aside from ASR, which expressed support for this enumerated hedge,
the Commission did not receive any other specific comments on this
enumerated hedge.\183\
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\183\ ASR at 2.
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b. Hedges of Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Sales Contracts
(1) Background--Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Sales Contracts
Fixed-price cash commodity sales have long served as the basis for
a bona fide hedging position.\184\ This bona fide hedge is enumerated
in paragraphs (2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the existing bona fide hedging
definition in Sec. 1.3. This enumerated bona fide hedge recognizes as
a bona fide hedging transaction or position hedges against purchases of
any commodity for future delivery on a contract market which do not
exceed in quantity: (A) The fixed price sale of the same cash commodity
by the same person; and (B) the quantity equivalent of fixed-price
sales of the cash products and by-products of such commodity by the
same person. Since 2011, the Commission has included hedges of cash
commodity fixed-price sales contracts in its position limits
rulemakings, with no substantive modifications.\185\
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\184\ See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 6a(3) (1970). That statutory
definition of bona fide hedging includes purchases of, or long
positions in, any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the
rules of any contract market made or held by such person to the
extent that such purchases or long positions are offset by sales of
the same cash commodity by the same person.
\185\ 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75824; 76 FR at 71689.
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(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Sales
Contracts
This proposed enumerated bona fide hedge made minor modifications
to the existing bona fide hedge, and recognized that a commercial
enterprise is exposed to price risk if it has entered into a spot or
forward fixed-price sales contract calling for delivery in the physical
marketing channel of a cash-market commodity, and has not offset that
price risk exposure (i.e., that the market price of a commodity might
be higher than the price of its fixed-price sales contract for that
commodity). Under the 2020 NPRM, an appropriate hedge of a fixed-price
sales contract would be to establish a long position in a commodity
derivative contract to offset such price risk.\186\
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\186\ 85 FR at 11610.
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(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Cash Commodity Fixed-Price
Sales Contracts
The Commission is adopting the enumerated hedge for hedges of cash
commodity fixed-price sales contracts as proposed.
(4) Comments--Cash Commodity Fixed-Price Sales Contracts
Aside from ASR, which expressed support for this enumerated hedge,
the Commission did not receive any other specific comments on this
enumerated hedge.\187\
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\187\ ASR at 2.
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c. Hedges of Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash Commodity Sales and
Purchases
(1) Background--Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash Commodity Sales and
Purchases
Hedges of offsetting unfixed price cash commodity sales and
purchases is currently enumerated in paragraph (2)(iii) of the existing
bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3 and is subject to the Five-
Day Rule. This enumerated hedge is the only existing enumerated hedge
that expressly recognizes hedging the price risk arising from cash
commodity unfixed-price transactions.
This enumerated bona fide hedge allows a market participant to use
commodity derivatives in excess of Federal position limits to offset an
unfixed-price cash commodity purchase coupled with an unfixed-price
cash commodity sale. Specifically, this enumerated bona fide hedge
allows for ``offsetting sales and purchases'' for future delivery on a
contract market which do not exceed in quantity that amount of the same
cash commodity which has been bought and sold by the same person at
unfixed prices basis different delivery months of the contract market.
While not part of the original regulatory bona fide hedge
definition, the Commission adopted this enumerated bona fide hedge in
1987 to ``remove any doubt'' that certain cotton and soybean crush
inter-month spreads were covered under the Commission's bona fide hedge
definition.\188\ Since 2011, the Commission has included this
enumerated bona fide hedge in each of its position limits
rulemakings.\189\
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\188\ The Commission stated when it proposed this enumerated
bona fide hedge, in particular, a cotton merchant may contract to
purchase and sell cotton in the cash market in relation to the
futures price in different delivery months for cotton, i.e., a basis
purchase and a basis sale. Prior to the time when the price is fixed
for each leg of such a cash position, the merchant is subject to a
variation in the two futures contracts utilized for price basing.
This variation can be offset by purchasing the future on which the
sales were based and selling the future on which the purchases were
based. Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits, 51 FR 31648,
31650 (Sept. 4, 1986).
\189\ 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75714; 76 FR at 71689.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash Commodity
Sales and Purchases
The Commission proposed to maintain this bona fide hedge, with a
few modifications.
The 2020 NPRM proposed to expand the existing bona fide hedge,
which currently requires the offsetting purchase and sale to be at
basis to different delivery months of the same commodity derivative
contract, to additionally permit hedges of offsetting unfixed sales and
unfixed purchases for different commodity derivative contracts in the
same commodity (e.g., Brent/WTI), regardless of whether the contracts
are in the same delivery month. This proposed change would permit the
cash commodity to be bought and sold at unfixed prices at a basis to
different commodity derivative contracts in the same commodity, even if
the commodity derivative contracts were in the same calendar month
(i.e., buy Brent in January; sell WTI in January).\190\ The Commission
proposed this change to allow a commercial enterprise to enter into the
described derivatives transactions to reduce the risk arising from
either (or both) a location differential or a time differential in
unfixed-price purchase and sale contracts in the same cash
commodity.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ 85 FR at 11608.
\191\ Id. In the case of reducing the risk of a location
differential, and where each of the underlying transactions in
separate derivative contracts may be in the same contract month, a
position in a basis contract would not be subject to position
limits, as discussed in connection with paragraph (3) of the
proposed definition of ``referenced contract.''
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[[Page 3267]]
To be eligible for this enumerated hedge, both an unfixed-price
cash commodity purchase ``and'' an offsetting unfixed-price cash
commodity sale would have to be in hand, because having both the
unfixed-price sale and purchase in hand would allow for an objective
evaluation of the hedge.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ For example, in the case of a calendar spread, having both
the unfixed-price sale and purchase in hand would set the timeframe
for the calendar month spread being used as the hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Offsetting Unfixed Price
Cash Commodity Sales and Purchases
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge for
offsetting unfixed price cash commodity sales and purchases as
proposed.
(4) Comments--Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash Commodity Sales and
Purchases
There were minimal comments on the proposed amendments to this
hedge. IFUS explicitly supported the allowance of hedges against cash
positions in the same delivery month.\193\ CMC and ACSA requested that
the Commission modify the language of this enumerated bona fide hedge
to include ``offsetting sales or purchases.''\194\ CMC and FIA stated
that because merchants often sell commodities well in advance of
purchasing them, such merchants are exposed to the exact same calendar
spread price risk as merchants that have executed both unfixed price
legs of a transaction, because any futures market calendar spread
convergence or divergence will ``affect both scenarios in exactly the
same manner.''\195\ These commenters contended that changing the
language of the enumerated hedge from ``and'' to ``or'' would allow
merchants to hedge against this exposure.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ IFUS at 4.
\194\ CMC at 4; ACSA at 6.
\195\ CMC at 4; FIA at 16.
\196\ Id.
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In addition, because this is the only existing enumerated hedge
that expressly recognizes hedging for unfixed price transactions,
several commenters cited to this hedge when requesting that the
Commission explicitly endorse that commercial transactions with
unfixed-prices may serve as the basis for, and satisfy, the bona fide
hedging definition.\197\
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\197\ The Commission's determination on the treatment of
unfixed-price transactions under this Final Rule is in Section
II.A.1.iv.
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(5) Discussion of Final Rule--Offsetting Unfixed Price Cash Commodity
Sales and Purchases
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge for
offsetting unfixed price cash commodity sales and purchases as
proposed. The Commission considered the comments requesting the
Commission to change this bona fide hedge's language from referring to
offsetting unfixed-price purchase ``and'' sale transactions (which
requires both an unfixed purchase price transaction and an unfixed sale
price transaction) to instead refer to unfixed-price purchase ``or''
sales transactions (which would require only either a single unfixed-
price purchase transaction or an unfixed-price sale transaction) to
facilitate hedging calendar spread price risk for those market
participants that have executed only one leg of an unfixed-price
physical transaction (i.e., only a physical purchase or a physical
sale).
The Commission continues to believe that the enumerated bona fide
hedge for offsetting unfixed price cash commodity sales and purchases
should continue to require both an unfixed-price cash commodity
purchase and an offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity sale. For this
particular bona fide hedge, absent either the unfixed-price purchase
leg or the unfixed-price sale leg (or absent both legs), it would be
less clear, and require a facts and circumstances analysis, to
determine how the transaction could be classified as a bona fide hedge,
that is, a transaction that reduces price risk.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ The contemplated derivative positions will offset the risk
that the difference in the expected delivery prices of the two
unfixed-price cash contracts in the same commodity will change
between the time the hedging transaction is entered and the time of
fixing of the prices on the purchase and sales cash contracts.
Therefore, the contemplated derivative positions are economically
appropriate to the reduction of risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the Final Rule, a single-sided unfixed price physical
transaction (i.e., a physical transaction involving an unfixed price
purchase or an unfixed price sale, but not both) cannot be offset with
derivatives in excess of position limits using this particular
enumerated bona fide hedge. However, a market participant with an
unfixed price purchase in the absence of an unfixed-price sale, or vice
versa, could potentially qualify for one or more of the enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges.\199\ Additionally, depending on the
facts and circumstances, a single-sided unfixed price contract could
potentially be the basis for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ Specifically, as discussed above, because the Commission
does not view an unfixed-price commitment as filling, or satisfying,
an anticipated need, market participants with unfixed-price
commitments may qualify for an enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedge, provided the market participant meets all applicable
requirements and conditions. See Section II.A.1.iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Commission acknowledges concerns from commenters that
market participants that have executed only one leg of a physical
transaction (i.e., only an unfixed-price purchase or an unfixed-price
sale) may need to hedge calendar spread price risk, the Commission
believes the Final Rule offers several avenues for hedging such
risks.\200\ For example, under the offsetting unfixed price cash
commodity sales and purchases enumerated bona fide hedge, upon fixing
the price of, or taking delivery on, the purchase contract, the owner
of the cash commodity no longer has offsetting unfixed priced
transactions, but may continue to hold the short derivative leg of the
spread as a hedge against that fixed-price purchase or as inventory
under the enumerated hedge for fixed price transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ The Final Rule also expands the ``spread transaction''
definition, so a market participant with an unfixed price purchase
or sale may also qualify for a calendar spread exemption, for
example, with one leg in the spot month. For further discussion of
the Final Rule's treatment of spread transactions, see Section
II.A.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternatively, under this Final Rule, if the market participant
fixes the price the sales contract first, he or she may continue to
hold the long derivative leg of the spread by qualifying for bona fide
hedge treatment for that long position under another enumerated bona
fide hedge. For example, a market participant who otherwise meets all
applicable requirements of one of the anticipatory bona fide hedges may
qualify for such hedge(s) regardless of whether the market participant
holds an unfixed-price purchase transaction.
d. Hedges of Unsold Anticipated Production
(1) Background--Unsold Anticipated Production
Unsold anticipated production has long served as the basis for an
enumerated bona fide hedging position.\201\ This bona fide hedge is
currently enumerated in paragraph (2)(i)(B) of the bona fide hedging
definition in existing Sec. 1.3, and is subject to the Five-Day Rule.
This
[[Page 3268]]
existing enumerated bona fide hedge includes hedges against the sales
of any commodity for future delivery on a contract market which does
not exceed in quantity twelve months' unsold anticipated production of
the same commodity by the same person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(3)(A) (1940). That statutory definition of
bona fide hedging, enacted in 1936, included the amount of such
commodity such person is raising, or in good faith intends or
expects to raise, within the next twelve months, on land (in the
United States or its Territories) which such person owns or leases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bona fide hedge of unsold anticipated production is one of two
existing enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges currently included in
Sec. 1.3, the other being unfilled anticipated requirements (discussed
further below). The unsold anticipated production bona fide hedge
allows a market participant who anticipates production, but who has not
yet produced anything, to enter into a short derivatives position in
excess of Federal position limits to hedge the price risk arising from
that anticipated production. Since 2011, the Commission has included
hedges of unsold anticipated production in each of its position limits
rulemakings, with some modifications.\202\ The regulatory text for this
existing enumerated bona fide hedge is silent about whether it applies
to unsold anticipated production that is contracted to be sold under an
unfixed-price transaction.
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\202\ 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75714; 76 FR at 71689.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Unsold Anticipated Production
The Commission proposed to maintain the existing enumerated bona
fide hedge of unsold anticipated production, with modifications as
follows. First, the Commission proposed to remove the twelve-month
restriction.\203\ Second, consistent with the treatment for the other
anticipatory bona fide hedges under the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed to eliminate the existing restrictions during the last five
days of trading (i.e., eliminate the ``Five-Day Rule'').\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ 85 FR at 11608.
\204\ For further discussion of the Five-Day rule, see Section
II.A.1.viii, Elimination of Federal Restriction Prohibiting Holding
a Bona Fide Hedge Exemption During Last Five Trading Days, the
``Five-Day Rule,'' below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Unsold Anticipated
Production
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge of unsold
anticipated production as proposed.
(4) Comments--Unsold Anticipated Production
Several commenters, including ASR, ADM, and ICE, supported
eliminating the twelve-month restriction.\205\ ASR, for example, noted
that the lifecycle of sugarcane extends beyond a twelve-month
period.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ ASR at 2; ADM at 2; ICE at 2; IECA at 2; and IFUS at 2.
\206\ ASR at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conversely, Better Markets and IATP opposed the elimination of the
twelve-month restriction.\207\ IATP stated that commercial market
participants such as storage facilities should instead use insurance
policies to manage their risks.\208\ Further, IATP stated that if the
Commission extends the duration up to 24 months, the Commission should
retain discretion to require market participants to demonstrate a
production level proportionate to the amount in excess of the Federal
position limit throughout the duration of the bona fide hedge
exemption.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ IATP at 15-17; Better Markets at 57-58.
\208\ IATP at 15-17.
\209\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Discussion of Final Rule--Unsold Anticipated Production
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge of unsold
anticipated production as proposed. This enumerated bona fide hedge
allows a market participant who anticipates production, but who has not
yet produced anything, to enter into a short derivatives position in
excess of Federal position limits to hedge the anticipated unsold
production.\210\
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\210\ Once a market participant finishes its production, the
market participant will no longer qualify for this enumerated bona
fide hedge since its production is no longer anticipatory. Instead,
its completed production is now part of its inventory. However, the
enumerated bona fide hedge for inventory and cash commodity fixed-
price purchase contracts (discussed below) would become available to
the market participant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission clarifies, as discussed above under Section
II.A.1.iv., that the enumerated bona fide hedge for unsold production
is available to a market participant who satisfies all applicable
requirements regardless of whether the market participant has entered
into an unfixed-price sales transaction in connection with its
anticipated unsold production. However, acquiring an unfixed-price
sales contract alone is not a basis for qualifying for this bona fide
hedge. Rather, under the Final Rule, entering into an unfixed-price
sales transaction will not prevent a market participant from qualifying
for the unsold anticipated production bona fide hedge.
As the Commission explains above, an unfixed-price sales commitment
does not address the bona fide hedging need related to anticipated
unsold production because the market participant's price risk to its
anticipated production has not been fixed (i.e., the unfixed-price
sales contract may fall below the cost of production). In other words,
a producer with an unfixed-price sales commitment for its production
still has an anticipated need related to its price risk until the price
of the commitment is fixed. However, once the market participant enters
into a fixed-price sales contract, the market participant no longer has
price risk that needs to be hedged (i.e., its short futures contract is
no longer necessary as a hedge for its anticipated production).
Accordingly, the market participant that enters into the fixed-
price transaction no longer has an anticipated need to hedge the price
risk associated with its unsold production (i.e., the anticipated
production is deemed to be ``sold'' by fixed-price sales transaction)
and would not qualify for this anticipated unsold production bona fide
hedge.
Consequently, if the market participant no longer qualifies for the
unsold anticipated production bona fide hedging recognition (e.g., it
has entered into a fixed-price sales contract), its derivative
position, to the extent the position is above an applicable position
limit, must be reduced in an orderly manner in accordance with sound
commercial practices. However, if the market participant entered into a
fixed-price transaction, while it could not continue to qualify for the
unsold anticipated production bona fide hedge, the market participant
may be able to qualify for the enumerated bona fide hedge for cash
commodity fixed-price sales contracts, assuming all applicable
requirements are met.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ For further discussion of the enumerated bona fide hedge
for cash commodity fixed-price sales contracts, see Section
II.A.1.vi.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Commission acknowledges the comments from Better Markets
and IATP opposing the removal of the twelve-month restriction, the
Commission believes that this twelve-month restriction may be
unsuitable in connection with additional core referenced futures
contracts with the underlying agricultural and energy commodities that
would be subject to Federal position limits for the first time under
this Final Rule since these non-legacy commodities may have longer
growth and/or production cycles than the nine legacy agricultural
contracts. The existing twelve-month restriction may thus be
unnecessarily short in comparison to the expected life of investment in
production facilities. While this enumerated bona fide hedge for unsold
production does not have an associated twelve-month restriction under
the Final Rule, the Commission notes that because all bona fide hedges
must be economically appropriate to the
[[Page 3269]]
reduction of price risk pursuant to the CEA, a market participant may
only qualify for this enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated unsold
production to the extent the market participant has a good faith
anticipation of legitimate anticipated unsold production giving rise to
such price risk.
Further, additional provisions finalized herein under the Final
Rule will help ensure that all bona fide hedges, including bona fide
hedges of unsold anticipated requirements, comport with the CEA and the
Commission's regulations, and are objectively verifiable and free from
abuse.\212\
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\212\ See infra Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9 (reporting and
recordkeeping obligations); Appendix B to part 150.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. Hedges of Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
(1) Background--Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
The existing bona fide hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements
is currently enumerated in paragraph (2)(ii)(C) of the existing bona
fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3. This bona fide hedge includes
hedges against purchases of any commodity for future delivery on a
contract market which do not exceed in quantity twelve months' unfilled
anticipated requirements of the same cash commodity for processing,
manufacturing, or feeding by the same person.
Consistent with the existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated unsold production, as discussed above, the existing bona
fide hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements is similarly subject
to the twelve-month restriction as well as a less-restrictive version
of the ``Five-Day Rule.'' With respect to the Five-Day Rule, under
existing Sec. 1.3, the unfilled anticipated requirements bona fide
hedge provides that the size of a market participant's position held
``in the five last trading days'' must not exceed the person's unfilled
anticipated requirements of the same cash commodity for that month and
for the next succeeding month.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ This is essentially a less-restrictive version of the
five-day rule, allowing a participant to hold a position during the
end of the spot period if economically appropriate, but only up to
two months' worth of anticipated requirements. The two-month
quantity limitation has long-appeared in existing Sec. 1.3 as a
measure to prevent the sourcing of massive quantities of the
underlying in a short period. 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the regulatory text in existing Sec. 1.3 is silent about
whether the bona fide hedge applies to unfilled anticipated
requirements that are contracted to be supplied under an unfixed-price
transaction or whether such unfixed-price supply transaction would
``fill'' the anticipated requirements.
As discussed above, staff previously has addressed this question
through Staff Letter No. 12-07, in which staff clarified that a
commercial entity may qualify for the existing enumerated bona fide
hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements even if the commercial
entity has entered into long-term, unfixed-price supply or requirements
contracts because, as staff explained, the unfixed-price purchase
contract does not ``fill'' the commercial entity's anticipated
requirements.\214\ As explained in Staff Letter No. 12-07, the price
risk of such ``unfilled'' anticipated requirements is not offset by the
unfixed-price forward contract because the price risk remains with the
commercial entity, even though the entity has contractually assured a
supply of the commodity. Staff Letter No. 12-07 had the practical
effect of affirming that market participants with firm commitments at
unfixed prices may still be able to avail themselves of this enumerated
anticipatory hedge for unfilled requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ CFTC Letter No. 12-07, Interpretation, Request for
guidance regarding meaning of ``unfilled anticipated requirements''
for purposes of bona fide hedging under the Commission's position
limits rules (Aug. 16, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
The Commission proposed several amendments to the unfilled
anticipated requirements bona fide hedge. First, the Commission
proposed to remove the twelve-month restriction because the Commission
recognized that market participants may have a legitimate commercial
need to hedge unfilled anticipated requirements for a period longer
than twelve months.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ See, e.g., 85 FR at 11610.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Commission proposed to remove from the regulatory text
the agricultural-specific term ``feeding,'' and to replace that word
with a reference to ``use by that person.''
Third, recognizing that utilities are not the entities who ``use''
the commodity, the Commission also proposed to add as a permissible
hedge the unfilled anticipated requirements for the contract's
underlying cash commodity for the resale by a utility to meet the
anticipated demand of its customers. This proposed provision is
analogous to the existing unfilled anticipated requirements provision
``for processing, manufacturing or use by the same person[.]'' \216\
Under this proposed new provision, however, the commodity is not for
use by the same person--that is, the utility--but rather the commodity
is for anticipated use by the utility to fulfill its obligation to
serve retail customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, consistent with the treatment for the other anticipatory
bona fide hedges under the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed to
eliminate the existing restrictions during the last five last days of
trading.
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements
The Commission is adopting the unfilled anticipated requirements
enumerated bona fide hedge as proposed.
(4) Comments--Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
Commenters supported continuing to include this bona fide hedge as
part of the Commission's amended suite of enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges.\217\ As described below, commenters also requested the
Commission clarify certain aspects of the proposed version.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ e.g., AGA at 6-7; ADM at 2; CEWG at 4; EEI and EPSA
jointly at 5; IECA at 2; NOPA at 2; NGSA at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Elimination of Requirement to Hedge Only Twelve Months' Quantity of
Unfilled Anticipated Requirements
Only a small group of commenters directly commented on the
elimination of the twelve-month restriction. ICE, IFUS, IECA, AGA, ADM
and NOPA supported eliminating the twelve-month restriction,\218\ with
ADM stating that there may be times this anticipatory hedge is needed
for ``commercial purposes beyond twelve-months.'' \219\ In contrast,
Better Markets opposed the removal of the restriction, stating that
such removal would make the hedge less reasonably verifiable and open
the hedge to potential abuse.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ AGA at 6-7, ADM at 2, NOPA at 2, IFUS at 2, ICE at 2, and
IECA at 2.
\219\ ADM at 2.
\220\ Better Markets at 58-59.
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(a) Discussion of Final Rule--Twelve-Month Restriction
After considering public comments, the Commission has determined
that the commercial need to hedge unfilled anticipated requirements for
a period longer than twelve months, along with the Commission's
experience in overseeing exemptions \221\ under this
[[Page 3270]]
enumerated bona fide hedge, suggest in favor of eliminating the twelve-
month restriction. While the Commission acknowledges the comments from
Better Markets opposing the removal of the twelve-month restriction,
the Commission notes that, a twelve-month limitation in connection with
this particular enumerated bona fide hedge may be unsuitable in
connection with commodities other than the nine legacy agricultural
commodities. For example, a processor or utility relying on the
unfilled anticipated requirements bona fide hedge has a physical limit
on processing, or energy generation, respectively, which should
generally result in relatively predictable levels of activity that will
not vary much year to year. Further, additional provisions finalized
herein will help ensure that all bona fide hedges, including hedges of
unfilled anticipated requirements, comport with the CEA and the
Commission's regulations, and are reasonably verifiable and free from
abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ The Commission and its predecessor agency, the Commodity
Exchange Authority, has decades of expertise in granting bona fide
exemptions. See 21 FR 6913 (Sep 13, 1956).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, under Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A), finalized herein, all
market participants seeking a bona fide hedge exemption for referenced
contracts subject to Federal position limits, including those market
participants with enumerated bona fide hedges that are self-
effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits, must still file
an application to the exchange requesting an exemption from the
applicable exchange-set position limits prior to exceeding the
exchange-set limits. The application for an exemption from exchange-set
limits must include information the exchange needs to determine, and
the Commission can use that information to independently determine,
whether the facts and circumstances support the exchange granting such
an exemption. The market participant must include a description of the
applicant's activity in the cash markets and swaps markets for the
commodity underlying the position for which the application is
submitted, including, but not limited to, information regarding the
offsetting cash positions.\222\ The exchange is required to take into
account whether the exemption would result in positions that would not
be in accord with sound commercial practices and whether the position
would exceed an amount that may be established and liquidated in an
orderly fashion.\223\ Accordingly, if hedging more than twelve months'
quantity of unfilled anticipated requirements would not be in accord
with sound commercial practices, or would exceed an amount that may be
established and liquidated in an orderly fashion, the exchange would be
prohibited from granting the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A).
\223\ 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even in the absence of a Federal twelve-month restriction, when
administering exchange-set limits, exchanges may, as they do today,
implement a variety of restrictions and limitations on position size to
maintain orderly markets and to fulfill their regulatory obligations.
As described in further detail below, the Commission is finalizing
guidance in paragraph (b) of Appendix B to part 150 to help exchanges
determine when any such restrictions during the spot month might be
appropriate, and when such restrictions may not be needed. For example,
consistent with the guidance in Appendix B to part 150, paragraph (b),
an exchange may consider adopting rules to require that during the
lesser of the last five days of trading (or such time period for the
spot month), such positions must not exceed the person's unfilled
anticipated requirements of the underlying cash commodity for that
month and for the next succeeding month.\224\ Depending on the specific
facts and circumstances, and particular market dynamics, any such
quantity limitation may prevent the use of long futures to source large
quantities of the underlying cash commodity. The Commission may be able
to determine that an exchange's adoption of a two-month limitation
would allow for an amount of activity that is economically appropriate
and in line with common commercial hedging practices, without
jeopardizing any statutory objectives.
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\224\ This is essentially a less-restrictive version of the
Five-Day rule, allowing a participant to hold a position during the
end of the spot period if economically appropriate, but only up to
two months' worth of anticipated requirements. The two-month
quantity limitation has long-appeared in existing Sec. 1.3 as a
measure to prevent the sourcing of massive quantities of the
underlying in a short time period. 17 CFR 1.3.
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(ii) Scope of Unfilled Anticipated Requirements and Unfixed-Price
Transactions
Commenters questioned the extent to which anticipated requirements
may be considered to be ``filled'' by unfixed-price purchase supply
contracts under the proposed enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled
anticipated requirements. COPE, IECA, EPSA and EEI requested
clarification on whether this enumerated hedge covers anticipated
requirements ``filled'' by an unfixed-price purchase contract common to
many electric generators.\225\
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\225\ COPE at 6; IECA at 7-8; EPSA and EEI jointly at 5.
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IECA recommended the Commission should either (i) adopt a broad
definition of the word ``unfilled'' that would include anticipated
requirements that are ``filled'' by unfixed-price transactions, or (ii)
expand this bona fide hedge to include both ``unfilled'' and
``unpriced'' \226\ anticipated requirements.\227\
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\226\ The Commission recognizes that market participants may
utilize different nomenclature to refer to unfixed-price contracts.
For example, some commenters may refer to these contracts as
``unpriced'' contracts, while others may refer to these physical
contracts as being at an unfixed spot index price. See FIA at 17,
31; COPE at 6.
\227\ IECA at 7-8.
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AGA also requested clarification \228\ regarding the 2020 NPRM's
statement that this bona fide hedge would recognize a position where a
utility is ``required or encouraged'' by its public utility commission
to hedge.\229\ AGA noted that while the ``required or encouraged''
language is not in the proposed regulatory text, clarification of the
scope for the exemption would result in more certainty for those
utilities in states where the public utility commission may not
directly address or require hedging activities, but instead may allow
or permit hedging for the potential benefits to customers.\230\
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\228\ AGA at 6-7.
\229\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(iii); 85 FR at 11610 (``This
would recognize a bona fide hedging position where a utility is
required or encouraged by its public utility commission to hedge'').
\230\ AGA at 6-7.
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(a) Discussion of Final Rule--Scope of Unfilled Anticipated
Requirements
Regarding the requests for clarification on the scope of the term
``unfilled'' in this enumerated hedge, the Commission clarifies that
anticipated ``unfilled'' requirements are not ``filled'' by unfixed-
price transactions. Accordingly, a market participant with a purchase
or sale of a physical commodity, entered into at an unfixed price, may
continue to avail itself of this anticipatory hedge even though the
participant has entered into a firm, albeit unfixed-price, commitment,
and provided all applicable requirements are satisfied.\231\
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\231\ The Commission clarifies that unfixed-price contracts
include physical fuel agreements for power production for security
of supply that are priced at an unfixed spot index price.
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As discussed above under Section II.A.1.iv., the Commission adopts
the interpretation of Staff Letter No. 12-07.\232\ That is, commercial
entities that
[[Page 3271]]
enter into unfixed-price transactions may continue to qualify for the
enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements as
long as the commercial entity otherwise satisfies the criteria for this
hedge. This rationale is predicated on the fact that an unfixed-price
purchase commitment does not fill an anticipated requirement in that
the market participant's price risk to the input has not been fixed.
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\232\ CFTC Staff Letter No. 12-07.
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The Commission continues to believe that unfilled anticipated
requirements are those anticipated inputs that are estimated in good
faith and that have not been filled. As such, an anticipated
requirement may be filled by fixed-price purchase commitments, holdings
of commodity inventory, or unsold anticipated production of the market
participant.\233\ Unfixed-price transactions, however, do not fill an
anticipated requirement.
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\233\ 81 FR at 96752.
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Under this anticipatory hedge, once the price is fixed on a supply
contract, the market participant holding the anticipatory hedge
position must, to the extent the position is above an applicable
Federal position limit, liquidate the position in an orderly manner in
accordance with sound commercial practices. Nevertheless, subject to
the specific facts and circumstances, the market participant at that
point may have established the basis for a different bona fide hedge
exemption to offset the price risk arising from its fixed price
exposure.
Finally, the Commission agrees with the commenters' request for
clarification that a utility qualifies for the unfilled anticipated
requirements enumerated hedge even if the utility is not ``required or
encouraged'' by its public utility commission to hedge.
f. Hedges of Anticipated Merchandising
(1) Background--Anticipated Merchandising
The existing bona fide hedge definition in Sec. 1.3 includes
enumerated bona fide hedges that recognize offsets of certain
anticipated activities,\234\ but does not currently include an
enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated merchandising. While the
Commission's 2011 Final Rule included an enumerated hedge for
anticipated merchandising, it was a narrow hedge focused on the leasing
of storage capacity,\235\ and that rulemaking was ultimately vacated.
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\234\ See, e.g., Sec. Sec. 1.3(z)(2)(i)(B) (unsold anticipated
production) and 1.3(z)(2)(ii)(C) (unfilled anticipated
requirements).
\235\ The 2011 Final Rule was the first time the Commission
recognized that in some circumstances, a market participant that
owns or leases an asset in the form of storage capacity could
establish positions to reduce the risk associated with returns
anticipated from owning or leasing that capacity. In those narrow
circumstances, the Commission found that those transactions
satisfied the statutory definition of a bona fide hedging
transaction.
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(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Anticipated Merchandising
The Commission proposed a new enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated merchandising. The proposed anticipated merchandising hedge
recognized long or short positions in commodity derivative contracts
that offset the anticipated change in value of the underlying commodity
that a person anticipates purchasing or selling.\236\
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\236\ 85 FR at 11727.
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While the proposed enumerated anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge would operate as a self-effectuating bona fide hedge, the
proposed bona fide hedge was subject to the following conditions: (1)
The position offsets the anticipated change in value of the underlying
commodity that a person anticipates purchasing or selling; (2) the
position does not exceed in quantity twelve months' of current or
anticipated purchase or sale requirements of the same cash commodity
that is anticipated to be purchased or sold; (3) the person holding the
position is a merchant handling the underlying commodity that is
subject to the anticipated merchandising hedge; (4) that such merchant
is entering into the position solely for purposes related to its
merchandising business; and (5) the person has a demonstrated history
of buying and selling the underlying commodity for its merchandising
business.\237\
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\237\ Id.
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(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Anticipated Merchandising
The Commission is adopting the anticipated merchandising enumerated
hedge as proposed, and makes certain clarifications below to respond to
specific questions from commenters summarized below.
The Commission recognizes that anticipated merchandising is a
hedging practice commonly used by some commodity market participants,
and that merchandisers play an important role in the physical supply
chain. The Commission also recognizes that the derivative transactions
utilized by commercial participants to manage such merchandising
activity are beneficial to price discovery.
(4) Comments--Anticipated Merchandising
(i) Generally
A majority of commenters strongly supported the addition of an
enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipatory merchandising.\238\ In
particular, market participants from the energy industry strongly
supported the inclusion of this enumerated hedge, subject to certain
clarifications described in detail further below.\239\ On the other
hand, Better Markets indicated that the enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedges generally, and particularly the enumerated hedge for
anticipatory merchandising, pose a regulatory avoidance risk.\240\
Better Markets expressed concern that market participants could attempt
to claim an underlying risk is anticipated in a cash commodity in order
to justify positions in referenced contracts that exceed Federal
position limits.\241\
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\238\ AGA at 1, 8; AFR at 2; Cargill at 4-6; NGSA at 2, 4; CMC
at 4-5, 7-8; ADM at 3; NCFC at 2-4; Chevron at 2, 5; Suncor at 3, 5;
IFUS at 2 (Exhibit 1 RFC 4); ICEA at 2; NGFA at 4, 7; CCI at 7-9;
ASR at 2; FIA at 16; CEWG at 14.
\239\ AGA at 8; AFR at 2; Cargill at 5-6; NGSA at 4; CMC at 5,
7; ADM at 3; NCFC at 3-4; Chevron at 5; Suncor at 5; IFUS at Exhibit
1 RFC 4; ICEA at 2; NGFA at 7; CCI at 7-9.
\240\ Better Markets at 3, 59-60 (stating that ``. . . an
identical conceptual avoidance risk continues to exist across all of
these anticipatory hedges--namely, that firms may claim an
underlying risk is anticipated in order to justify positions well
over the speculative limits in Referenced Contracts'').
\241\ Id.
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In addition to expressing support for the inclusion of this
enumerated bona fide hedge, most commenters also requested clarity or
guidance on the scope of the proposed anticipated merchandising bona
fide hedge. For example, CMC stated that the Commission must be clear
with the exchanges and the end-user community about what activity is
included in the enumerated anticipated merchandising bona fide
hedge.\242\ Similarly, Cargill and NGFA supported the addition of the
enumerated anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge, but urged the
Commission to provide more clarity on how the enumerated bona fide
hedge would be applied.\243\ Cargill and NGFA also requested that the
Commission address language that appeared in footnote 105 of the 2020
NPRM,\244\
[[Page 3272]]
which implied that certain storage hedges and hedges of assets owned or
anticipated to be owned would be evaluated through the non-enumerated
bona fide hedge process, rather than as a self-effectuating enumerated
anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge.\245\
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\242\ CMC at 5 (stating that n.105 of the 2020 NPRM casts a
significant shadow of uncertainty and that if the Commission
believes limits are necessary, it must be clear with the exchanges
and the end-user community about what activities are enumerated).
\243\ Cargill at 5-6; NGFA at 7.
\244\ 85 FR at 11612. Footnote 105 from the 2020 NPRM provided:
``Similarly, other examples of anticipatory merchandising that have
been described to the Commission in response to request for comment
on proposed rulemakings on position limits (i.e., the storage hedge
and hedges of assets owned or anticipated to be owned) would be the
type of transactions that market participants may seek through one
of the proposed processes for requesting a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition.''
\245\ Cargill at 5-6; NGFA at 7.
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(ii) Requirements for Anticipated Merchandising
(a) Requirement to Hedge Only Twelve Months' Worth of Anticipated
Requirements
Although many public comments addressed the new anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge, only a few commenters opposed the
proposed requirement to limit this hedge to only twelve months' worth
of current or anticipated purchase or sale requirements of the same
cash commodity that is anticipated to be purchased or sold. FIA opposed
the twelve-month restriction, stating that CEA section 4a(c)(2) does
not tie the validity of a bona fide hedge to the duration of the
commercial requirement being hedged.\246\ FIA also provided an example
pointing out that market participants often need hedges of anticipated
purchases or sales longer than twelve months, such as when a merchant
has a reasonable expectation of anticipated sales beyond a twelve-month
quantity.\247\
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\246\ FIA at 16-17.
\247\ Id.
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Similarly, ADM stated that anticipatory merchandising transactions
should be considered similar to ``hedges of anticipated requirements''
and therefore not subject to the twelve-month restriction.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ ADM at 3. The 2020 Proposal would remove the existing 12-
month restriction applicable to the existing enumerated hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements. See 85 FR at 11610.
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(b) Discussion of Final Rule--Twelve-Month Restriction
After considering the comments on the requirement to hedge only
twelve months' worth of anticipated requirements, the Commission is
adopting the twelve-month restriction as proposed. The Commission
continues to believe that, as stated in the 2020 NPRM, this requirement
is intended to ensure that merchants are hedging their legitimate
anticipated merchandising exposure to the value change of the
underlying commodity, while calibrating the anticipated need within a
reasonable timeframe and subject to the limitations in physical
commodity markets, such as annual production or processing
capacity.\249\ A twelve-month restriction for anticipated merchandising
is suitable in connection with contracts that are based on anticipated
activity on yet-to-be established cash positions due to the uncertainty
of forecasting such activity and, all else being equal, the increased
risk of excessive speculation on the price of a commodity the longer
the time period before the actual need arises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\249\ 85 FR at 11611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding FIA's comment opposing the twelve-month restriction based
on FIA's interpretation of CEA section 4a(c)(2), the Commission is
comfortable that hedging twelve months' or less of current or
anticipated purchase or sale requirements of the same cash commodity
that is anticipated to be purchased or sold is consistent with the CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(A)(ii) requirement that bona fide hedges be
economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and
management of a commercial enterprise.\250\ However, hedging more than
twelve months' anticipated purchase or sale requirements could in some
cases be inconsistent with that statutory requirement. Accordingly,
bona fide hedges involving more than twelve months' worth of
anticipated requirements for anticipated merchandising are best
evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the non-enumerated process
adopted herein. The Commission understands that commercial firms may
seek to manage the price risk of more than twelve months' anticipated
merchandising activities; where such situations arise, the Commission
believes a non-enumerated bona fide hedge could be appropriate.
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\250\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also considered comments that stated that the
Commission should treat the proposed anticipated merchandising bona
fide hedge similar to the other anticipatory bona fide hedges adopted
herein (i.e., the enumerated bona fide hedges for unsold anticipated
production and unfilled anticipated requirements), which are no longer
subject to the twelve-month restriction.\251\ However, the Commission
believes that the enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated
merchandising, which is a new enumerated bona fide hedge, is
distinguishable from the enumerated bona fide hedges for unsold
anticipated production and unfilled anticipated requirements, which
both have been part of the Federal position limits framework for
decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ ADM at 3.
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In particular, the Commission has determined that a twelve-month
restriction is unnecessary for bona fide hedges of unfilled anticipated
requirements and unsold anticipated production in part because
anticipated production and requirements, unlike merchandising, are
linked and subject to inherent physical limits. For example, a
processor has a physical limit on production capacity to support claims
of anticipated unsold production. Likewise, a manufacturer, processor
or utility has a physical limit on manufacturing, processing, or energy
generation, respectively, for similar reasons to tie any claim of
anticipated requirements. In each case, anticipated production or
requirements generally should result in relatively predictable levels
of activity that will not vary much year to year. In contrast, the
amount a given market participant could claim to anticipate
merchandising is potentially unlimited and less connected to physical
production capacity.\252\
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\252\ To verify market participants' bona fide hedging needs,
the Final Rule's recordkeeping requirements require persons availing
themselves of enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions to maintain
complete books and records concerning all relevant information on
their anticipated requirements, production, and merchandising
activities. See 17 CFR 150.3(d)(1). Furthermore, the Commission
notes that as part of the exemption application process under final
Sec. 150.5, persons seeking exemptions from exchange-set position
limits are required to include a description of its activities in
the cash markets and swap markets for the commodity underlying the
position for which the application is submitted.
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(iii) Request for Clarification--Meaning of ``Merchant''
Comments from energy market participants requested that the
Commission clarify the meaning of the term ``merchant'' as such term is
used in the regulatory text of the proposed anticipated merchandising
hedge.\253\ Specifically, market participants from the energy industry
expressed concern about whether the Commission would construe the term
``merchant'' such that only entities that are solely merchants, and not
engaged in other business activities, would qualify for the anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge.\254\ These commenters explained that
large energy companies with
[[Page 3273]]
vertically integrated corporate structures typically have several legal
entities that perform individual business functions, including
merchandising.\255\ As such, these commenters requested the Commission
clarify that integrated energy companies routinely engaged in
merchandising activities, as well as other activities such as
production, processing, marketing and power generation, may utilize the
enumerated hedge for anticipated merchandising in addition to other
bona fide hedges.\256\
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\253\ CMC at 5; Shell at 8; Chevron at 5-6; Suncor at 5-6; CEWG
at 15-16.
\254\ Shell at 8; Chevron at 5-6; Suncor at 5-6; CEWG at 15-16.
\255\ Id.
\256\ Id.
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(a) Discussion of Final Rule--Meaning of ``Merchant''
The Commission is adopting the term ``merchant'' in the final
anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge as proposed, but clarifies
here the intended meaning of that term.
In particular, the Commission is clarifying that the term
``merchant'' in the anticipated merchandising enumerated bona fide
hedge is not limited to those entities exclusively engaged in the
business of merchandising. Instead, the term ``merchant'' may include
physical commodity market participants that, in addition to offering or
entering into transactions solely for purposes related to their
merchandising business, may otherwise also be a producer, processor, or
commercial user of the commodity that underlies the anticipated
merchandising transaction.
The Commission's use of the term ``merchant'' is intended to
capture commercial market participants who participate in the physical
commodity market, and does not exclude such participants simply because
they have a vertically integrated corporate structure. That is, energy,
agricultural, or metal companies in the physical commodity market with
vertically-integrated or complex corporate structures are not excluded
as merchants, so long as they otherwise satisfy all applicable
requirements related to the anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge.
The condition requiring the person to be a merchant to qualify for
this enumerated hedge is consistent with the Commission's longstanding
practice of providing commercial market participants relief from
certain regulatory requirements as a way of reducing regulatory
compliance obligations that would otherwise burden a commercial market
participant's physical commodity business.
The Commission has taken a similar approach under the trade option
exemption by exempting the physically delivered commodity options
purchased by commercial users of the commodities underlying the
options. Under the trade option relief, the Commission recognized that
commercial market participants needed relief by generally exempting
qualifying commodity options from the swap requirements of the CEA and
the Commission's regulations.\257\ Unlike in the trade option
requirements, there is no requirement under the anticipated
merchandising enumerated bona fide hedge that both counterparties
qualify as merchants. The anticipated merchandising enumerated bona
fide hedge, however, is intended to generally benefit the same type of
market participants as the trade option exemption, that is, commercial
market participants who participate in the physical commodity market
for the underlying commodity being merchandised. As such, the text of
the anticipated merchandising enumerated bona fide hedge excludes a
party who is not entering into the anticipated merchandising activity
solely for commercial purposes related to its merchandising business,
but instead, to speculate on the price of the underlying commodity. For
example, non-commercial market participants who employ various
arbitrage strategies, including sometimes trading arbitrage positions
in cash commodity markets to speculate on the price of the underlying
commodity, and those market participants with highly leveraged
derivatives portfolios of non-physical commodities, would not qualify
as merchants.
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\257\ Trade Options, Final Rule, 81 FR 14966 (March 21, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission has determined that it is not necessary to
amend the regulatory text's reference to merchant to expressly include
producers or processors. As clarified above, a producer and a processor
may qualify for the anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge as a
merchant if a part of their business involves merchandising.
Furthermore, such entities that are also producers or processors may
otherwise rely on the enumerated anticipated unsold anticipated
production or unfilled anticipated requirements bona fide hedges, where
applicable. Thus, the Commission is providing these market participants
with ample flexibility to manage the price risks arising from their
anticipated merchandising activity using an expanded suite of
anticipatory bona fide hedges.
(iv) Requirement for a History of Merchandising
The Commission did not receive any specific comments on the
proposed requirement to demonstrate a history of merchandising
activity.
(a) Discussion of Final Rule--History of Merchandising Requirement
The Commission is adopting the requirement to demonstrate a history
of merchandising as proposed.
Such demonstrated history must include a history of making and
taking delivery of the underlying commodity, and a demonstrated ability
to store and move the underlying commodity.\258\ A merchandiser that
lacks the requisite history of anticipated merchandising activity could
still potentially receive bona fide hedge recognition under the non-
enumerated process, so long as the merchandiser can otherwise
demonstrate compliance with the bona fide hedging definition and other
applicable requirements, including demonstrating activities in the
physical marketing channel, including, for example, arrangements to
take or make delivery of the underlying commodity.\259\
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\258\ 85 FR at 11611.
\259\ Id.
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(v) Scope of Anticipated Merchandising Activity
In response to comments from the exchanges and market participants,
the Commission is providing further clarity on the scope of the
enumerated anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge. The Commission
discusses below certain non-exclusive types of activities that are
covered by the enumerated anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge.
(a) Request for Clarification--Unfixed-Price Contracts and Enumerated
Anticipated Merchandising Hedge
Commenters requested clarification on whether the enumerated bona
fide hedge for anticipated merchandising may be used to manage price
risk arising from unfixed-price physical commodity transactions.
Specifically, several commenters requested clarification on whether a
firm may use the anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge to manage
the risk associated with a single-sided unfixed purchase or sale at a
moment when the same firm does not have an offsetting sale or
purchase.\260\ In
[[Page 3274]]
addition to commercial market participants, ICE and CME Group also
requested that the Commission recognize single-sided hedges of unfixed-
price purchases or sales. Similar to energy market participants, ICE
noted that pricing physical energy commodity transactions at unfixed
prices is a common pricing mechanism in the energy markets.\261\ CME
Group provided a hypothetical example of a single-side floating or
unfixed-price purchase or sale to demonstrate that derivatives
positions entered into to effectuate that single-sided unfixed-price
purchase or sale would reduce the price risk arising for each
counterparty.\262\
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\260\ NCFC at 3-4; CMC at 4; IFUS at 4-5; NGSA at 6 (requesting
the Commission unambiguously recognize hedges of index-price risk
(not just fixed-price risk), noting that exchanges currently
recognize these types of hedges).
\261\ ICE at 4.
\262\ CME Group at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters requested the Commission clarify that market
participants can utilize the enumerated anticipatory merchandising
hedge to manage the price risks arising from unfixed-price
transactions.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ CEWG at 19; CMC at 8; Shell at 7-8; ACSA at 6; ICE at 5;
CME Group at 8; Ecom at 1; Southern Cotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2;
Moody Compress at 1; IMC at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; ACA at 2;
East Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; Olam at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex
at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Toyo at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; NCC at 1;
Walcot at 2; White Gold at 2.
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Other commenters suggested the Commission could create a new
enumerated bona fide hedge category solely to recognize hedges of
unfixed-price transactions.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ ACSA at 6-7; NCC at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Discussion of Final Rule--Unfixed-Price Contracts and Enumerated
Anticipated Merchandising Hedge
As discussed above under Section II.A.1.iv., the Commission is
clarifying that market participants that enter into unfixed-price
transactions may still be able to qualify for the enumerated bona fide
hedge for anticipated merchandising. In other words, a commercial
entity that enters into an unfixed-price transaction may qualify for an
anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge as long as the market
participant satisfies the other requirements, discussed above and
below, of the final anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge (e.g.,
qualifies as a merchant, demonstrates a history of merchandising and
satisfies the twelve-month restriction). This rationale is predicated
on the fact that an unfixed-price transaction does not address a
merchant's anticipated merchandising need in that the merchant's price
risk to the merchandise has not been fixed. Accordingly, a merchant may
use the anticipated merchandising hedge to manage the risk associated
with a single sided unfixed purchase or sale at a moment when the same
firm does not have an offsetting sale or purchase. The Commission's
treatment of unfixed-price transactions is discussed in more detail in
Section II.A.1.iv.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\ See Section II.A.1.iv, addressing the treatment of unfixed
price transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Commission understands market participants' desire for a
standalone exemption for unfixed-price transactions, the Commission
finds that such an exemption is unnecessary. The Commission notes that
the modified and expanded suite of enumerated bona fide hedges,
including enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges, adequately
facilitates the hedging needs of qualified commercial market
participants.
Finally, the Commission believes that the enumerated anticipated
merchandising bona fide hedge provides for ample flexibility for
hedging. Similar to the enumerated unfilled anticipated requirements
and unsold production bona fide hedges, this bona fide hedge may be
used even when the merchant simply anticipates purchasing or selling
the commodity, and even when the merchant may have yet to enter into an
unfixed-price transaction, as long as the merchant has a good faith
belief that it will enter into the anticipated merchandising
transaction.
(b) Analysis of Examples Preliminarily Recognized as Hedges of
Anticipated Merchandising in the 2020 NPRM
As discussed earlier in this release, in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission addressed several requests that had been submitted in CEWG's
BFH Petition in response to the 2011 Final Rule, to obtain exemptive
relief for several transactions described by CEWG as bona fide hedging
positions. In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission preliminarily determined
that two CEWG BFH Petition examples complied with the proposed hedge of
anticipated merchandising: Example #4 (Binding, Irrevocable Bids or
Offers); and example #5 (Timing of Hedging Physical Transactions).\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ 85 FR at 11611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, as discussed in Section II.A.1.iv., the
Commission preliminarily determined in the 2020 NPRM that the positions
described in the CEWG's BFH Petition examples #3 (unpriced physical
purchase or sale commitments) and #7 (scenario 2) (use of physical
delivery referenced contracts to hedge physical transactions using
calendar month average pricing) did not satisfy any of the proposed
enumerated hedges.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\ 85 FR at 11611-11612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Comments--Examples Preliminarily Recognized as Hedges of
Anticipated Merchandising in the 2020 NPRM
The Commission received comments supporting the Commission's
preliminary determination in the 2020 NPRM that CEWG's BFH Petition
example #4 (Binding, Irrevocable Bids or Offers) \268\ and example #5
(Timing of Hedging Physical Transactions) are permitted under the 2020
NPRM's proposed enumerated hedge for anticipated merchandising.\269\
The public comments related to examples #3 and #7 (scenario 2) are
discussed in the preamble at Section II.A.1.iv., addressing the
treatment of unfixed price transactions.
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\268\ FIA at 16. FIA supported the Commission's preliminary
determination that Examples #4 (Binding, Irrevocable Bids or Offers)
and #5 (Timing of Hedging Physical Transactions) fit within the
newly proposed anticipatory merchandising hedge.
\269\ CEWG at 19.
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(2) Discussion of Final Rule--Examples Preliminarily Recognized as
Hedges of Anticipated Merchandising in the 2020 NPRM
The Commission has considered the public's response to its
preliminary determination that several of the CEWG BFH Petition
examples fit within the 2020 NPRM. The Commission determines in this
Final Rule that BFH Petition example #4 (Binding, Irrevocable Bids or
Offers) and example #5 (Timing of Hedging Physical Transactions) comply
with the enumerated hedge for anticipated merchandising, so long as all
applicable conditions are met.
In accordance with the Commission's treatment of unfixed-price
transactions under this Final Rule, discussed in Section II.A.1.iv.,
the Commission has determined that BFH Petition examples #3 and #7
(scenario 2) are also permitted under the Final Rule, so long as the
position or transaction complies with the applicable conditions of the
enumerated anticipatory hedge.
(c) Anticipated Merchandising Includes Hedges of Anticipated Storage
and Assets Owned or Anticipated To Be Owned
Several commenters requested the Commission clarify the scope of
the proposed anticipated merchandising bona fide hedge in light of the
Commission's observation in footnote 105 of the 2020 NPRM.\270\ That
footnote stated that certain hedges of storage and
[[Page 3275]]
hedges of assets owned or anticipated to be owned would not be within
the scope of the proposed anticipated merchandising enumerated bona
fide hedge.\271\ However, the plain language of the proposed
anticipatory merchandising bona fide hedge appeared to be broad enough
to cover such activity. Commenters were thus unsure whether the
proposed enumerated anticipated merchandising hedge would apply to
storage transactions and to hedges of assets owned or anticipated to be
owned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\ Cargill at 5; CMC at 5; NGFA at 7.
\271\ 85 FR at 11612 n.105.
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Most commenters from the energy industry requested the Commission
allow for anticipated storage positions to be considered as falling
within the enumerated hedge exemption for anticipated merchandising,
contending that such hedges are recognized as bona fide hedge
exemptions by the exchanges.\272\ Chevron and Castleton requested that
the Final Rule clarify that hedges of storage may qualify for the
enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated merchandising if applicable
conditions are met.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\ NGSA at 7; CHS at 4 (requesting to include a winter
storage hedge in the list of enumerated hedges); FIA at 16, 31
(requesting to include a storage hedge as a separate enumerated
BFH); Shell at 7-8 (stating that assets used for the transport and
storage of energy are a critical part of the energy value chain,
including fuel storage tanks and pipeline assets as examples where
time spreads or location basis spreads are used to lock-in the
values of the assets. This commenter stated that with respect to
such infrastructure assets, the Commission should clarify that the
use of the hedges of anticipated storage or other physical assets is
the type of risk activity that falls within the enumerated BFH for
anticipated merchandising); Chevron at 9-11 (requesting that a final
rule clarify that hedges of storage may qualify for the enumerated
BFH for anticipated merchandising if applicable conditions are met.
In the alternative, Chevron requests the Commission identify and
clarify that storage hedges of this nature qualify for another
enumerated exemption, notably the enumerated BFH for unfilled
anticipated requirements); Suncor at 9-10 (requesting that a final
rule clarify that hedges of storage may qualify for the enumerated
BFH for anticipated merchandising if applicable conditions are met);
CCI at 7-9; and CEWG at 16-19 (requesting that the Commission
clarify that the enumerated BFH for anticipatory merchandising
applies to hedges of storage).
\273\ Chevron at 5; CCI at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the alternative, Chevron requested the Commission identify and
clarify that storage hedges of this nature qualify for another
enumerated exemption, notably the enumerated bona fide hedge for
unfilled anticipated requirements.\274\ Citadel similarly requested
recognition of offsetting positions related to anticipated changes in
the value of the underlying commodity to be stored in facilities on
lease, and up to the full storage capacity on lease, rather than only
the currently utilized level of leased capacity.\275\ Citadel argued
that storage facilities owned, but not those leased, by the merchant
would be covered by the proposed anticipated merchandising enumerated
bona fide hedge, and that such different treatment depending on whether
the facility was owned or leased did not make sense.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\ Chevron at 11.
\275\ Citadel at 9.
\276\ Id.
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(1) Discussion of Final Rule--Anticipated Merchandising Includes Hedges
of Anticipated Storage and Assets Owned or Anticipated To Be Owned
In response to public comments, the Commission determines that both
hedges of storage and hedges of assets owned or anticipated to be owned
can potentially qualify for the enumerated hedge for anticipated
merchandising if the applicable conditions are met.
In footnote 105 of the 2020 NPRM, the Commission observed that
market participants could use the non-enumerated process (rather than a
self-effectuating enumerated hedge) to receive bona fide hedge
recognition for storage hedges and hedges of assets owned or
anticipated to be owned.\277\ This observation was predicated on the
Commission's recognition that different commodities have different
storage roles, manners, and procedures. For example, the use of some
storage facilities is not exclusive to a specific commodity and not all
storage is necessarily tied to anticipated merchandising activity. As
such, the Commission believed that an analysis of facts and
circumstances under the non-enumerated bona fide hedge process would
facilitate a determination on whether to recognize hedges of storage or
assets owned or anticipated to be owned under the proposed enumerated
anticipated merchandising hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ 85 FR at 11612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has considered comments with respect to the
appropriate treatment of storage transactions and hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned under the Commission's anticipated
merchandising enumerated hedge. The Commission agrees that commercial
market participants may utilize storage hedges or hedges of assets
owned or anticipated to be owned as risk reducing practices.\278\ The
Commission believes that such risk reducing hedges may be recognized as
anticipated merchandising bona fide hedges, if all the applicable
conditions of the anticipated merchandising hedge are satisfied. The
Commission clarifies that commercial market participants in the
physical marketing channel that utilize storage hedges or hedges of
assets owned or anticipated to be owned may continue to qualify for the
anticipated merchandising enumerated bona fide hedge, whether the
commercial market participant owns or leases the storage or asset, so
long as the all other applicable requirements for the bona fide hedge
are satisfied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ CEWG at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Hedges by Agents
(1) Background--Hedges by Agents
Existing Sec. 1.3(z)(3) includes certain hedges by agents as an
example of a potential non-enumerated bona fide hedge.\279\ Since 2011,
the Commission has included an enumerated hedge for hedges by agents in
each of its position limits rulemakings.\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\ 17 CFR 1.3(z)(3) (``Such transactions and positions may
include, but are not limited to, purchases or sales for future
delivery on any contract market by an agent who does not own or who
has not contracted to sell or purchase the offsetting cash commodity
at a fixed price, provided That the person is responsible for the
merchandising of the cash position which is being offset.'').
\280\ 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75714; 76 FR at 71689.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the existing non-enumerated hedge process, the Commission has
recognized non-enumerated bona fide hedges for parties acting as agents
who had the responsibility to trade cash commodities on behalf of
another party for which such positions qualified as bona fide hedging
positions. Such agents could obtain bona fide hedge treatment to
offset, on a long or short basis, the risks arising from those
underlying cash positions. For example, this hedge has been recognized
in circumstances where a party traded or managed a farmer's,
producer's, or a government entity's inventory in the party's capacity
as agent. In such circumstances, the agent providing services in the
physical marketing channel, such as a commercial firm, did not take
ownership of the commodity and was eligible as an agent for an
exemption to hedge the risks associated with such cash positions.
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Hedges by Agents
The Commission proposed to include hedges by agents as an
enumerated hedge. The proposed hedge would grant an enumerated hedge to
an agent who (1) did not own or was not contracted to sell or purchase
the offsetting cash commodity at a fixed price, (2) was responsible for
merchandising the cash positions being offset, and (3) had a
[[Page 3276]]
contractual agreement with the person who (i) owned the commodity or
(ii) held cash-market positions being offset.
The proposed hedge of agents would substantively adopt the
Commission's existing practice under the non-enumerated process in
existing Sec. 1.3(z)(3).\281\ The Commission, however, proposed to
include hedges of agents in the list of enumerated hedges because it
preliminarily determined this was a common hedging practice and that
positions which satisfy the requirements of this enumerated hedge
conformed to the general definition of bona fide hedging without
further consideration as to the particulars of the case.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\ For example, the Commission proposed to replace the phrase
``offsetting cash commodity'' with ``contract's underlying cash
commodity'' to use language that is consistent with the other
proposed enumerated hedges.
\282\ 85 FR at 11610.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Hedges by Agents
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge for
hedges by agents as proposed.
(4) Comments--Hedges by Agents
The Commission received several comments supporting recognition of
the hedge by agents, particularly as included in an expanded list of
enumerated hedges.\283\ ASR identified hedges of agents as a type of
hedge that is of particular importance to them because it is used daily
within its business.\284\ The Commission did not receive any comments
opposed to the enumerated hedge for hedges by agents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ FIA at 16; IECA at 2; and ASR at 2.
\284\ ASR at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Discussion of Final Rule--Hedges by Agents
The Commission recognizes that agents provide important services in
the physical marketing channel across different commodity markets. For
example, in the agricultural sector, this enumerated hedge will
accommodate a common hedging practice in the cotton industry. This
hedge will be particularly useful in connection with cotton equities
purchased by a cotton merchant from a producer, which is commonly done
under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's loan program to facilitate
marketing tools for cotton producers.
Another example of when the enumerated hedge by agents adopted
herein will apply is for those agents who are in the business of
merchandising (selling) the cash grain owned by multiple warehouse
operators and forwarding the merchandising revenues back to the
warehouse operators less the agent's fees. Such agents that satisfy the
requirements of this enumerated hedge, such as not owning any cash
commodity but being responsible for merchandising the cash grain
positions of the warehouse operators pursuant to contractual
agreements, will be able to hedge the price risks arising from their
merchandising activity under those agreements as a bona fide hedge by
agents.
h. Short Hedges of Anticipated Mineral Royalties
(1) Background--Anticipated Mineral Royalties
The Commission's existing bona fide hedging definition does not
include an enumerated hedge for anticipated mineral royalties. Since
2011, the Commission has, however, included such a bona fide hedge in
each of its position limits rulemakings.\285\ While the Commission's
2011 Final Rule initially recognized the hedging of anticipated
royalties generally, each proposal since then, including the latest
2020 NPRM, has proposed that this exemption apply to: (i) Short
positions (ii) that arise from production (iii) in the context of
mineral extraction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ 81 FR at 96964; 78 FR at 75715; 76 FR at 71689. In the
2011 Final Rule, the Commission recognized anticipatory royalty
transactions as a bona fide hedge, provided the following conditions
were met: (1) The royalty or services contract arose out of the
production, manufacturing, processing, use, or transportation of the
commodity underlying the Referenced Contract; (2) The hedge's value
was ``substantially related'' to anticipated receipts or payments
from a royalty or services contract; and (3) No such position was
maintained in any physical-delivery Referenced Contract during the
last five days of trading of the Core Referenced Futures Contract in
an agricultural or metal commodity or during the spot month for
other physical-delivery contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Anticipated Mineral Royalties
The Commission proposed a new enumerated bona fide hedge for short
hedges of anticipated mineral royalties that are not currently
enumerated in existing Sec. 1.3. The proposed provision would permit
an owner of rights to a future mineral royalty to lock in the price of
anticipated mineral production by entering into a short position in a
commodity derivative contract to offset the anticipated change in value
of the mineral royalty rights that were owned by that person and arose
out of the production of a mineral commodity (e.g., oil and gas).\286\
The owner of the rights to the future mineral royalty could be a
producer, or, for example, could also be a bank that holds the relevant
royalty rights and that is financing, for example, a drilling well
operation for a producer. The Commission preliminarily believed that
this represents a common hedging practice, and that positions that
satisfied the requirements of this enumerated bona fide hedge conformed
to the general definition of bona fide hedging without further
consideration as to the particulars of the case.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ 85 FR at 11608-11609. A short position fixes the price of
the anticipated receipts, removing exposure to change in value of
the person's share of the production revenue. A person who has
issued a royalty, in contrast, has, by definition, agreed to make a
payment in exchange for value received or to be received (e.g., the
right to extract a mineral). Upon extraction of a mineral and sale
at the prevailing cash-market price, the issuer of a royalty remits
part of the proceeds in satisfaction of the royalty agreement. The
issuer of a royalty, therefore, does not have price risk arising
from that royalty agreement.
\287\ 85 FR at 11609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission proposed to limit this enumerated bona fide hedge
only to mineral royalties, noting that while royalties have been paid
for use of land in agricultural production, the Commission did not
receive any evidence of a need for a bona fide hedge recognition from
owners of agricultural production royalties.\288\ The Commission
requested comment on whether and why such an exemption might be needed
for owners of agricultural production or other royalties.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\ Id.
\289\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Anticipated Mineral
Royalties
For the reasons discussed in the NPRM, the Commission is adopting
the enumerated hedge for anticipated mineral royalties as proposed.
(4) Comments--Anticipated Mineral Royalties
The Commission did not receive any comments either opposing the
addition of an enumerated bona fide hedge for anticipated mineral
royalties or requesting modifications to the hedge as proposed.
Further, no commenters requested extending the enumerated hedge to
other types of royalties other than mineral royalties. Several
commenters expressed support for the new enumerated hedge.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\ FIA at 16; IECA at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Hedges of Anticipated Services
(1) Background--Anticipated Services
The Commission's existing bona fide hedging definition does not
include an enumerated hedge of anticipated services. Since 2011,
however, the
[[Page 3277]]
Commission has included an enumerated bona fide hedge exemption for
hedges of anticipated services in each of its position limits
rulemakings.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\ 81 FR at 96810; 78 FR at 75715. See 76 FR at 71646.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, in 1977, the Commission noted that the existence of
futures markets for both source and product commodities, such as
soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal, affords business firms
increased opportunities to hedge the value of services.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\ 42 FR 14832, 14833 (Mar. 16, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Anticipated Services
The Commission proposed a new enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated services, not currently enumerated in existing Sec. 1.3.
The proposed provision would recognize as a bona fide hedge a long or
short derivative contract position used to hedge the anticipated change
in value of receipts or payments due or expected to be due under an
executed contract for services arising out of the production,
manufacturing, processing, use, or transportation of the commodity
underlying the commodity derivative contract.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\ 85 FR at 11609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Anticipated Services
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated services as proposed.
(4) Comments--Anticipated Services
The Commission received four comments on the proposed enumerated
anticipated services bona fide hedge. ASR and FIA expressed support for
its inclusion as a new enumerated bona fide hedge.\294\ In contrast,
IATP and Better Markets urged the Commission to exclude this hedge from
the list of enumerated bona fide hedges.\295\ IATP stated that the
anticipated services bona fide hedge is ``presumably connected to
hedges of anticipated production'' and that, as a result, it views the
enumerated hedge as ``more vulnerable to deliverable supply estimate
disruption.'' \296\ IATP also contended that, absent a stronger
argument for inclusion of this enumerated bona fide hedge aside from
``such exemptions are granted by exchanges,'' the proposed bona fide
hedge of anticipated services merits greater Commission review before
being included as an enumerated bona fide hedge.\297\ Better Markets
stated that the definition was too vague, and that absent a time
limitation, the hedge could be used as a loophole for speculation.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ ASR at 2; FIA at 16.
\295\ IATP at 17; Better Markets at 58.
\296\ IATP at 17.
\297\ Id.
\298\ Better Markets at 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Discussion of the Final Rule--Anticipated Services
The Commission is adopting the enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated services as proposed.
In response to IATP, the Commission believes that hedging of
anticipated services may be useful to commercial market participants in
a variety of commonly-occurring scenarios. For example, one scenario
may be when a contract for services involves the production of a
commodity such as a risk service agreement to drill an oil well between
two companies where the risk service agreement between the parties
provides that a portion of the revenue receipts to one of the
counterparties depends on the value of the oil produced. To reduce the
risk of lower anticipated revenues resulting from an anticipated lower
price of oil, the company may enter into a short position in the NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil referenced contract.
Under this enumerated bona fide hedge of services, such a short
position fixes the price at the entry price to the commodity derivative
contract. For any decrease in price of the commodity that is the
subject of the executed contract for services, the expected receipts
from the contract for services would decline in value, but the short
commodity derivative contract position would increase in value--
offsetting the price risk from the expected receipts under contract for
services.
On the other hand, this enumerated hedge of anticipated services
may also be utilized when a contract for services involves a contract
where one of the counterparties is responsible for the cost of the
commodity used to provide the service. Such a scenario may occur when a
city contracts with a firm to provide waste management services. The
contract requires that the trucks used to transport the solid waste use
natural gas as a power source. According to the contract, the city
would pay for the cost of the natural gas used to transport the solid
waste by the waste disposal company. In the event that natural gas
prices rise, the city's waste transport expenses would rise. To
mitigate this risk, the city establishes a long position in the NYMEX
natural gas referenced contract that is equivalent to the expected use
of natural gas over the life of the service contract.
In this case, the long position fixes the exit price of the
commodity derivative contract. For any increase in the commodity that
is the subject of the executed contract for services, the payment due
or expected to be due would increase in value, but the long commodity
derivative contract would decrease in value--offsetting the price risk
from the payments under the contract for services. Under both of these
examples, the transactions meet the general requirements for a bona
fide hedging transaction and the specific provisions for hedges of
anticipated services.
Regarding comments contending that deliverable supply estimates are
more vulnerable to disruption under this hedge, the Commission does not
believe that bona fide hedges for anticipated services will impact
actual deliverable supplies. This is because this bona fide hedge
allows a market participant to hedge the anticipated change in value of
receipts or payments due or expected to be due under an executed
contract for services, and is not an alternative means of procuring or
selling the underlying commodity.
In addition, the Commission will continue to have sufficient access
to position and cash-market data to verify all exemptions granted. The
reporting and recordkeeping obligations under Sec. Sec. 150.5 and
150.9 will require exchanges to submit justifications, amendments, and
other necessary information to the Commission on a monthly basis. As
such, exchanges and the Commission will have visibility into the amount
of demand there is for a commodity in the spot month via the delivery
notices. In the rare event that an exchange observes an imbalance, it
has the ability under its rules to require the trader to reduce its
positions.
Finally, the Commission notes that a time limitation is unnecessary
because, among other things, when administering exchange-set limits,
under the Final Rule, exchanges may rely on the Commission's guidance
in Appendix B to part 150 to protect price convergence and ensure an
orderly spot period. Under the guidance in Appendix B adopted herein,
an exchange may adopt rules to impose a restriction on holding a
position in a physically delivered referenced contract during the
lesser of either the last five days of trading or the time period for
the spot month in order to limit such positions to only those that are
economically appropriate for that person's specific anticipated or real
needs.
[[Page 3278]]
j. Offsets of Commodity Trade Options
(1) Background--Offsets of Commodity Trade Options
Commodity trade options are not subject to Federal position limits
under existing regulations.\299\ Generally, a commodity trade option is
a physically-delivered commodity option purchased by commercial users
of the commodities underlying the options. In the 2016 trade options
final rule, the Commission stated that Federal position limits should
not apply to trade options.\300\ Further, in that trade options final
rule, the Commission indicated it would address the applicability of
position limits to trade options in the context of any final rulemaking
on position limits.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ See 17 CFR 32.3(c).
\300\ Trade Options, 81 FR at 14966, 14971 (Mar. 21, 2016).
Under the trade options final rule, trade options are generally
exempted from the rules otherwise applicable to swaps, subject to
the conditions enumerated in Sec. 32.3. For example, trade options
do not factor into the determination of whether a market participant
is an SD or MSP; trade options are exempt from the rules on
mandatory clearing; and trade options are exempt from the rules
related to real-time reporting of swaps transactions.
\301\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Offsets of Commodity Trade Options
The Commission proposed a new enumerated hedge for offsets of
commodity trade options not currently enumerated in Sec. 1.3. Under
the 2020 NPRM, a qualifying commodity trade option under Sec. 32.3
\302\ would be treated as a cash position, on a futures-equivalent
basis,\303\ and serve as the basis for a bona fide hedge position.
Treating qualifying commodity trade options as cash positions, either
as a cash commodity purchase or sales contract, would allow the
Commission to extend the existing enumerated hedge exemptions for cash
positions to the offsets of commodity trade options. That is, the
offsets of qualifying commodity trade options would be treated like the
enumerated hedges for cash commodity fixed-price purchase contracts or
hedges of cash commodity fixed-price sales contracts.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\ 17 CFR 32.3. In order to qualify for the trade option
exemption, Sec. 32.3 requires, among other things, that: (1) The
offeror is either (i) an eligible contract participant, as defined
in section 1a(18) of the Act, or (ii) offering or entering into the
commodity trade option solely for purposes related to its business
as a ``producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant
handling the commodity that is the subject of the'' trade option;
and (2) the offeree is offered or entering into the commodity trade
option solely for purposes related to its business as ``a producer,
processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant handling the
commodity that is the subject of the commodity'' trade option.
\303\ It may not be possible to compute a futures-equivalent
basis for a trade option that does not have a fixed strike price. As
discussed in the Section II.A.1.iv., under the Commission's existing
portfolio hedging policy, market participants may manage their price
risks by utilizing more than one enumerated bona fide hedge
(including a commodity trade option hedge and other anticipatory
bona fide hedges, if necessary based on the market participant's
applicable facts and circumstances). For example, a commodity trade
option with a fixed strike price may be converted to a futures-
equivalent basis, and, on that futures-equivalent basis, deemed a
cash commodity sale contract, in the case of a short call option or
long put option, or a cash commodity purchase contract, in the case
of a long call option or short put option.
\304\ 85 FR at 11610.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Offsets of Commodity Trade
Options
The Commission continues to believe that Federal position limits
should not apply to trade options. Thus, the Commission is adopting the
enumerated bona fide hedge for offsets of commodity trade options as
proposed, with a few clarifying, non-substantive technical edits in the
regulatory text.
(4) Comments--Offsets of Commodity Trade Options
The Commission did not receive any comments opposing the addition
of an enumerated hedge for offsets of commodity trade options. The
Commission received comments generally supporting the bona fide hedge
for offsets of commodity trade options, particularly as included in an
expanded list of enumerated bona fide hedges.\305\ NGSA stated that
defining bona fide hedging in a way that recognizes that trade options,
adjusted on a futures-equivalent basis, constitute cash commodity
purchase or sale contracts that underlie bona fide hedge positions
should ``facilitate hedging rather than restrict it.'' \306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ IECA at 1; CCI at 2; CEWG at 4; Chevron at 3; Suncor at 3;
FIA at 16; and NGSA at 4.
\306\ NGSA at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
k. Cross-Commodity Hedges
(1) Background--Cross-Commodity Hedges
The Commission has long recognized cross-commodity bona fide
hedging under paragraph (2)(iv) of the bona fide hedging definition in
existing Sec. 1.3, which has allowed cross-commodity bona fide hedging
in connection with all of the enumerated bona fide hedges included in
the existing bona fide hedge definition.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\ 42 FR 14832, 14834 (March 16, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existing enumerated cross-commodity bona fide hedge recognizes
that risk from some cash commodity price exposures can be practically
and effectively managed through commodity derivative contracts on a
related commodity. As such, positions in any of the existing enumerated
bona fide hedges may be offset by a cash position held in a different
commodity than the commodity underlying the futures contract.
The existing cross-commodity enumerated hedge, however, is subject
to two conditions. First, the fluctuations in value of the position in
the futures contract must be ``substantially related'' to the
fluctuations in value of the actual or anticipated cash position.
Second, under the cross-commodity enumerated bona fide hedge exemption,
a position may not be held in excess of the Federal position limit
during the last five trading days for that futures contract.
Cross-commodity hedging also allows market participants to hedge
the price exposure arising from the products and byproducts of a
commodity where there is no futures contract for those products or
byproducts, but there is a futures contract for the source commodity of
those products or byproducts. Since 2011, the Commission has included
an enumerated cross-commodity bona fide hedge in each of its position
limits rulemakings.\308\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\ 81 FR at 96752-96753; 78 FR at 75716; 76 FR at 71689.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Cross-Commodity Hedges
The Commission proposed to include cross-commodity hedges as an
enumerated bona fide hedge, and to expand the application of this bona
fide hedge such that it could be used to establish compliance with: (1)
Each of the proposed enumerated bona fide hedges listed in Appendix A
to part 150 except for unfilled anticipated requirements and
anticipated merchandising, which were excluded from the regulatory text
of the cross-commodity enumerated hedge; \309\ and (2) the proposed
pass-through provisions under paragraph (2) of the proposed bona fide
hedging definition discussed further below; provided, in each case,
that the position satisfied each element of the relevant enumerated
bona fide hedge.\310\ In addition, the
[[Page 3279]]
Commission also proposed to eliminate the Five-Day Rule in connection
with the proposed cross-commodity bona fide hedge (i.e., the 2020 NPRM
eliminated the restriction from holding a position in excess of the
Federal position limit under the enumerated cross-commodity bona fide
hedge during the last five days of trading).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\309\ Specifically, the 2020 NPRM allowed for cross-commodity
hedging for any of the following proposed enumerated hedges: (i)
Hedges of unsold anticipated production, (ii) hedges of offsetting
unfixed-price cash commodity sales and purchases, (iii) hedges of
anticipated mineral royalties, (iv) hedges of anticipated services,
(v) hedges of inventory and cash commodity fixed-price purchase
contracts, (vi) hedges of cash commodity fixed-price sales
contracts, (vii) hedges by agents, and (viii) offsets of commodity
trade options.
\310\ 85 FR at 11609. For example, an airline that wishes to
hedge the price of jet fuel may enter into a swap with a swap
dealer. In order to remain flat, the swap dealer may offset that
swap with a futures position, for example, in ULSD. Subsequently,
the airline may also offset the swap exposure using ULSD futures. In
this example, under the pass-through swap language of proposed Sec.
150.1, the airline would be acting as a bona fide hedging swap
counterparty and the swap dealer would be acting as a pass-through
swap counterparty. In this example, provided each element of the
enumerated hedge in paragraph (a)(5) of Appendix A, the pass-through
swap provision in Sec. 150.1, and all other regulatory requirements
are satisfied, the airline and swap dealer could each exceed limits
in ULSD futures to offset their respective swap exposures to jet
fuel. See infra Section II.A.1.c.v. (discussion of proposed pass-
through language).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed cross-commodity enumerated bona fide hedge was
conditioned on the existence of a ``substantial relationship'' between
the commodity derivative contract and the related cash commodity
position. Specifically, the fluctuations in value of the position in
the commodity derivative contract, that is, of the underlying cash
commodity of that derivative contract, were required to be
``substantially related'' \311\ to the fluctuations in value of the
actual or anticipated cash commodity position or pass-through
swap.\312\ This was intended to be a qualitative analysis, rather than
quantitative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\ See 85 FR at 11726-11727.
\312\ 85 FR at 11609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, the 2020 NPRM stated that there is a substantial
relationship between grain sorghum, which is used as a food grain for
humans or as animal feedstock, and the corn referenced contracts.
Because there is not a futures contract for grain sorghum grown in the
United States listed on a U.S. DCM,\313\ corn represents a
substantially related commodity to grain sorghum in the United
States.\314\ The 2020 NPRM noted that, in contrast, there did not
appear to be a reasonable commercial relationship between a physical
commodity, say copper, and a broad-based stock price index, such as the
S&P 500 Index, because these commodities were not reasonable
substitutes for each other in that they had very different pricing
drivers.\315\ That is, the price of a physical commodity is based on
supply and demand, whereas the stock price index is based on various
individual stock prices for different companies.\316\
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\313\ This remains true at the publication of this rulemaking.
\314\ 85 FR at 11609. Grain sorghum was previously listed for
trading on the Kansas City Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, but because of liquidity issues, grain buyers continued to
use the more liquid corn futures contract, which suggests that the
basis risk between corn futures and cash sorghum could be
successfully managed with the corn futures contract.
\315\ 85 FR at 11609.
\316\ Id.
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The 2020 NPRM also preliminarily determined that CEWG BFH Petition
example #9 (Holding a cross-commodity hedge using a physical delivery
contract into the spot month) and example #10 (Holding a cross-
commodity hedge using a physical delivery contract to meet unfilled
anticipated requirements) were permitted as cross-commodity enumerated
hedges.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ 85 FR at 11611.
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(3) Summary of the Commission Determination--Cross-Commodity Hedges
The Commission is finalizing the cross-commodity enumerated bona
fide hedge largely as proposed, with amendments to expand the ability
to use cross-commodity hedges.
(4) Comments--Cross-Commodity Hedges
Commenters generally supported the proposed cross-commodity
enumerated bona fide hedge, and a few commenters explicitly supported
the Commission's decision not to propose a quantitative test
requirement for the proposed enumerated cross-commodity bona fide
hedge.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\ ADM at 2; NGSA at 3-4; NOPA at 2; and ICE at 7. Prior
position limits proposals included a quantitative test, whereas the
2020 NPRM included a qualitative ``substantially related''
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better Markets stated that it views some cross-commodity hedges as
``appropriate, normal, and legitimate market practices,'' but claimed
that there is a potential for abuse if the bona fide hedge exemption
requires less than a ``demonstrable price relationship'' between the
two commodities.\319\ ICE recommended that the Commission include a
non-exclusive list of commonly-used cross-commodity hedges that satisfy
the ``substantially related'' requirement, which ICE believes should
include the natural gas core referenced futures contract and its linked
referenced contracts as bona fide hedges of electricity price exposure,
and vice versa.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\ Better Markets at 58.
\320\ ICE at 7.
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The majority of energy market participants commented on a separate
item: That the express language of proposed paragraph (a)(5) of
Appendix B to part 150, which sets forth the proposed cross-commodity
bona fide hedge, inappropriately failed to cover bona fide hedges for
unfilled anticipated requirements and anticipated merchandising.\321\
Chevron, Suncor, CCI, and the CEWG requested that the Commission revise
the proposed cross-commodity enumerated bona fide hedge to specifically
clarify that enumerated bona fide hedges for unfilled anticipated
requirements and anticipated merchandising may be utilized as cross-
commodity bona fide hedges in energy markets.\322\ IECA also requested
that the cross-commodity enumerated hedge include bona fide hedges of
anticipated requirements, which would capture bona fide hedges of
anticipated requirements commonly used by many electric utilities that
enter into heat-rate transactions.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\ Chevron at 8-9; Suncor at 6-8; NOPA 2; CCI at 5-9; CEWG at
10-14; NGSA at 4; ICE at 2, 4; Shell at 7-8; ADM at 2; and IECA at
8.
\322\ Chevron at 8; Suncor at 8; NOPA at 2; CCI at 5-7; CEWG at
10-14; NGSA at 4; and IECA at 8.
\323\ IECA at 7-8.
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Suncor and Chevron highlighted an internal inconsistency in the
2020 NPRM. These commenters pointed out that while the 2020 NPRM
preliminarily determined that CEWG BFH Petition Example #10 (Holding a
cross-commodity hedge using a physical delivery contract to meet
unfilled anticipated requirements) satisfies the proposed cross-
commodity hedge, the proposed cross-commodity hedge excluded unfilled
anticipated requirements.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ Chevron at 7; Suncor at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Discussion of Final Rule--Cross-Commodity Hedges
The Commission is finalizing the cross-commodity enumerated bona
fide hedge largely as proposed, with amendments to expand the ability
to use cross-commodity hedges. Specifically, the Commission is amending
the express language of the cross-commodity enumerated hedge in
Appendix B to include the enumerated hedges of unfilled anticipated
requirements and hedges of anticipated merchandising so that the cross-
commodity provision applies to all enumerated hedges adopted herein.
The 2020 NPRM excluded the enumerated bona fide hedges for unfilled
anticipated requirements and for anticipated merchandising from the
cross-commodity provision. As a result, any internal inconsistency
related to example #10 has been resolved.
Separately, as stated in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission reaffirms
that the requirement that the value fluctuations of the commodity
derivatives contract used to hedge and the value fluctuations of the
commodity
[[Page 3280]]
cash position being hedged must be ``substantially related'' is an
important factor in determining whether a cross-commodity hedge
satisfies the requirements to be a bona fide hedge. Accordingly, the
Commission believes that the ``substantially related'' requirement
sufficiently ties derivative and cash positions between two different,
but comparable, commodities that have a reasonable commercial
relationship as a result of their ability to serve as reasonable
substitutes for each other, due to, for example, similar pricing
drivers.
The Commission agrees with commenters who stated that market
participants use cross-commodity hedging to manage their price risk,
particularly when a cash commodity is not necessarily deliverable under
the terms of any derivative contract or the cash-market transactions
are not in the same commodity underlying the futures contract. For
example, an airline that uses a predictable volume of jet fuel every
month may cross hedge its anticipated jet fuel requirements with the
ultralow sulfur diesel (``ULSD'') heating oil commodity derivative
contract because there are no physically-settled jet fuel commodity
derivative contracts available. The value fluctuations in jet fuel are
substantially related to the value fluctuations in the ULSD ``HO''
futures contract.
The Commission believes that a determination of whether commodities
are ``substantially related'' for purposes of the cross-commodity bona
fide hedge depends on a facts and circumstances analysis and that the
relationship between the two is not static, as it may change over time
depending on market factors. Accordingly, the Commission's position is
not to publish a list of cross-commodity hedges satisfying the
``substantially related'' requirement at this time.
vii. Location and Regulatory Treatment of the Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
a. Background--Location and Regulatory Treatment of the Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
As noted above, the existing enumerated bona fide hedges are
explicitly incorporated in the regulatory bona fide hedging definition
in Sec. 1.3 of the Commission's regulations.
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Location and Regulatory Treatment of the
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed to move the expanded list
of the enumerated bona fide hedges from the bona fide hedging
definition in regulation Sec. 1.3 to the proposed acceptable practices
in Appendix A to part 150. The Commission stated that the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges should appear as acceptable practices in an
appendix, rather than as regulations in the regulatory bona fide
hedging definition, because each enumerated bona fide hedge represents
just one way, but not the only way, to satisfy the proposed bona fide
hedging definition and Sec. 150.3(a)(1).\325\ The Commission requested
comment on whether the list of enumerated hedges should be included in
the regulatory text or in an appendix as acceptable practices.\326\
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\325\ As discussed below, proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(1) would allow
a person to exceed position limits for bona fide hedging
transactions or positions, as defined in proposed Sec. 150.1.
\326\ 85 FR at 11622.
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c. Summary of the Commission Determination--Location and Regulatory
Treatment of the Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission has determined to incorporate the enumerated bona
fide hedges as part of the regulatory text. While the Final Rule will
maintain the enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A to part 150,
Appendix A will be incorporated into final Sec. 150.3, and therefore
under the Final Rule the enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A will
be deemed to be part of the regulatory text rather than treated as
acceptable practices.
d. Comments--Location and Regulatory Treatment of the Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
FIA and MGEX supported moving the list of enumerated bona fide
hedges to the rule text.\327\ FIA stated that ``including the list in
the regulatory text would provide market participants greater
regulatory certainty by making it clear that it could not be amended
absent notice and comment rulemaking.'' \328\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\ MGEX at 2; FIA at 15-16.
\328\ FIA at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, CMC and the Joint Associations (i.e., EEI and
EPSA) preferred keeping the enumerated hedges in Appendix A to part
150. CMC stated its understanding that an amendment to either Appendix
A or the rule text would require the same formal rulemaking
procedures.\329\ The Joint Associations based their support of Appendix
A because it allows for ``for flexibility'' in their view.\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\ CMC at 6.
\330\ EEI/EPSA at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. Discussion of Final Rule--Location and Regulatory Treatment of the
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Under the Final Rule, the enumerated bona fide hedges are
incorporated as part of the regulatory text. While the Final Rule will
maintain the enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A to part 150,
Appendix A will be incorporated in final Sec. 150.3 as positions that
are deemed to be bona fide hedges that are self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits. In other words, while the Final
Rule will maintain the enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A,
Appendix A will be deemed to be part of the regulatory text rather than
treated as acceptable practices as the Commission proposed in the 2020
NPRM.
The Commission agrees that including the enumerated bona fide
hedges as part of the regulations, rather than as acceptable practices,
provides market participants with greater regulatory certainty. To
reflect that Appendix A to part 150 is part of the regulatory text, the
Commission is amending the introductory language to the Appendix to
remove any references to acceptable practices.
In addition, while not a substantive change, the Commission has
also re-ordered the list of enumerated hedges. The Final Rule reorders
Appendix A so that the bona fide hedges are listed by hedges of
purchases, sales, anticipated activities, or other new types of hedges.
Finally, the cross-commodity hedge, which applies to all the enumerated
hedges in the appendix, is listed last.
viii. Elimination of Federal Restriction Prohibiting Holding a Bona
Fide Hedge Exemption During Last Five Trading Days, the ``Five-Day
Rule;'' Proposed Guidance in Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
a. Background--Elimination of the ``Five-Day Rule;'' Proposed Guidance
in Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
Some of the existing enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions in Sec.
1.3 include a restriction on the market participant holding a commodity
derivative contract position in excess of Federal position limits
during the last five days of trading (generally referred to as the
``Five-Day Rule''). The restriction limits the applicability of
exemptions during the last five days of trading because for many
agricultural commodity derivative contracts, those last five days of
trading coincide with the physical-delivery process. The practical
effect of the Five-Day Rule is a winnowing of the universe of market
participants who maintain large positions throughout the last five days
of trading to only those market
[[Page 3281]]
participants who actually intend to make or take delivery at the end of
the spot period. Narrowing the universe of market participants in this
way helps ensure an orderly trading environment and maintains the
integrity of the physical-delivery process for those market
participants who rely on price convergence between the cash and futures
markets during the last days of trading.
When the Commission adopted the Five-Day Rule, it believed that, as
a general matter, there was little commercial need to maintain a large
position that exceeds position limits during or through the last five
days of trading.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ Definition of Bona Fide Hedging and Related Reporting
Requirements, 42 FR 42748, 42750 (Aug. 24, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Elimination of the ``Five-Day Rule;''
Proposed Guidance in Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
The Commission proposed to eliminate the restriction on holding a
bona fide hedge exemption during the last five days of trading from all
the enumerated hedges to which such five-day rule restriction applies
under existing Sec. 1.3.\332\ Instead, under proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), exchanges could apply a restriction against holding
positions under a bona fide hedge in excess of limits during the lesser
of the last five days of trading or the time period for the spot month
in such physical-delivery contract, or otherwise limit the size of such
position. The exchanges would thus have the ability and discretion, but
not an obligation, to apply a five-day rule or similar restriction to
exemptions on any contracts subject to Federal position limits,
regardless of whether such contracts have been subject to Federal
position limits before.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\ The existing enumerated hedges limited by the Five-Day
rule are as follows: Unsold anticipated production, unfilled
anticipated requirements, offsetting sales and purchases, and cross-
commodity hedges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2020 NPRM also included guidance for exchanges on factors to
consider when applying a restriction against holding physically
delivered futures contracts into the spot month. The proposed guidance
set forth in Appendix B, paragraph (b) provided that a position held
during the spot period may still qualify as a bona fide hedging
position, provided that: (1) The position complies with the bona fide
hedging transaction or position definition; and (2) there is an
economically appropriate need to maintain such position in excess of
Federal speculative position limits during the spot period, and that
need relates to the purchase or sale of a cash commodity.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\ For example, an economically appropriate need for soybeans
would mean obtaining soybeans from a reasonable source (considering
the marketplace) that is the least expensive, at or near the
location required for the purchaser, and that such sourcing does not
cause market disruptions or prices to spike.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the guidance provided several factors the exchange
should weigh when evaluating whether a person wishing to exceed Federal
position limits should be able to do so during the spot period. For
example, whether the person: (1) Intends to make or take delivery
during that period; (2) provided materials to the exchange supporting
the waiver of the Five-Day Rule; (3) demonstrated supporting cash-
market exposure in-hand that is verified by the exchange; (4)
demonstrated that, for short positions, the delivery is feasible,
meaning that the person has the ability to deliver against the short
position; \334\ and (5) demonstrated that, for long positions, the
delivery is feasible, meaning that the person has the ability to take
delivery at levels that are economically appropriate.\335\
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\334\ That is, the person has inventory on-hand in a deliverable
location and in a condition in which the commodity can be used upon
delivery and that it represents the best sale for that inventory.
\335\ That is, the delivery comports with the person's
demonstrated need for the commodity, and the contract is the
cheapest source for that commodity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Summary of the Commission Determination--Elimination of the ``Five-
Day Rule;'' Proposed Guidance in Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
The Commission is finalizing the proposal to eliminate the
restriction on holding a bona fide hedge exemption during the last five
days of trading from all the enumerated hedges to which such Five-Day
Rule restriction applies under existing Sec. 1.3. Additionally, the
Commission has carefully considered the various comments regarding the
proposed guidance in Appendix B, paragraph (b) and has determined to
finalize the guidance, subject to several amendments and
clarifications.
The Commission discusses and addresses comments on the proposed
elimination of the Five-Day Rule immediately below, followed by a
discussion of comments on the proposed guidance further below.
d. Comments--Elimination of the ``Five-Day Rule;'' Proposed Guidance in
Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
(1) Elimination of the ``Five-Day Rule''
Several public interest commenters opposed the elimination of the
Five-Day Rule.\336\ IATP viewed allowing the exchanges to impose a
five-day rule or similar restriction as relegating the Commission's
function to merely monitoring ``DCM decisions and their consequences
for market participants and the public after the fact.'' \337\
Conversely, commercial market participants and exchanges generally
supported the proposal to eliminate the Five-Day Rule and instead
afford the exchanges the discretion whether to impose restrictions on
holding physically-delivered contracts.\338\
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\336\ IATP at 17-18; Better Markets at 61 (contending that if
the CFTC does eliminate the Five-Day rule, it should at least
formalize the proposed guidance in the rule text).
\337\ IATP at 18.
\338\ ADM at 3; Cargill at 8; CCI at 2, 9; CEWG at 4, 24;
Chevron at 3, 9; CMC at 5; CME Group at 9; ICE at 2, 8; IFUS at 2;
FIA at 3; NGFA at 9; NGSA at 2; Shell at 3; Suncor at 3, 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Discussion of the Final Rule--Elimination of the ``Five-Day Rule''
The Commission is finalizing the proposal to eliminate the
restriction on holding a bona fide hedge exemption during the last five
days of trading from all the enumerated hedges to which such Five-Day
Rule restriction applies under existing Sec. 1.3.
In place of the ``Five-Day Rule,'' the Commission is finalizing
proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), which provides that an exchange may
grant exemptions, subject to terms, conditions, or restrictions against
holding large positions in physically delivered futures contracts, as a
bona fide hedge in excess of limits during the lesser of the last five
days of trading or the time period for the spot month in such physical-
delivery contract, or otherwise limit the size of such position under
that exemption.
For the legacy agricultural contracts, the Five-Day Rule has been
an important way to help ensure that futures and cash-market prices
converge. Price convergence helps protect the integrity of the price
discovery function and facilitates an orderly delivery process, which
overlaps with the last days of trading. As stated in the 2020 NPRM,
however, a strict five-day rule may be inappropriate and unnecessary,
as the Commission expands its Federal position limits beyond the nine
legacy agricultural contracts.\339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ 85 FR at 11612.
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[[Page 3282]]
In particular, while the Commission continues to believe that the
justifications described above for the existing Five-Day Rule remain
valid for contracts subject to Federal position limits, the exchanges--
subject to Commission oversight--are better positioned to decide
whether to apply a restriction, such as the Five-Day Rule, in
connection with exemptions to their own exchange-set limits, or whether
to apply other tools that may be equally effective. This Final Rule
affords exchanges with the discretion to apply, and when appropriate,
grant exemptions subject to terms, conditions or limitations like the
Five-Day Rule (or similar restrictions) for purposes of their own
exchange-set limits. Allowing for such discretion when granting
exemptions will afford exchanges flexibility to quickly impose, modify,
or waive any such limitation as circumstances dictate. While a strict
Five-Day Rule may be inappropriate in certain circumstances, including
when applied to energy contracts that typically have a shorter spot
period than agricultural contracts,\340\ the flexible approach adopted
herein may allow for the development and implementation of additional
solutions other than a Five-Day Rule that protect convergence, while
minimizing the impact on market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\ Energy contracts typically have a three-day spot period,
whereas the spot period for agricultural contracts is typically two
weeks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This approach allows exchanges to design and tailor a variety of
limitations to protect convergence during the spot period. For example,
in certain circumstances, a smaller quantity restriction, rather than a
complete restriction on holding positions in excess of limits during
the spot period, may be effective at protecting convergence. Similarly,
exchanges currently utilize other tools to achieve similar policy
goals, such as by requiring market participants to ``step down'' the
levels of their exemptions as they approach the spot period, or by
establishing exchange-set speculative position limits that include a
similar step-down feature. Since Sec. 150.5(a) as adopted herein would
require that any exchange-set limits for contracts subject to Federal
position limits must be less than or equal to the Federal limit, any
exchange application of the Five-Day Rule, or a similar restriction,
would have the same effect as if administered by the Commission for
purposes of Federal speculative position limits, but could be
administered by the exchange in a more tailored and efficient manner.
In response to commenters who stated this approach would relegate
the Commission's functions to merely monitoring the DCMs' decisions
after the fact, the Commission points out that regardless of whether
there is a Federal Five-Day Rule, the Commission will continue to
exercise oversight over exchanges before, during, and after exchange
action relating to position limits. For example, all exchange rules,
including those establishing/modifying exchange-set position limits,
accountability levels, step downs, and five-day rules and similar
restrictions, must be submitted to the Commission in advance pursuant
to part 40 of the Commission's regulations.
Additionally, any exemption granted by an exchange from its own
position limits must meet standards established by the Commission in
Sec. 150.5(a)(ii)(C) of this Final Rule, including considering whether
the requested exemption would result in positions that would not be in
accord with sound commercial practices and/or would exceed an amount
that may be established and liquidated in an orderly fashion. Further,
any waiver of an exchange five-day rule or similar restriction should
consider the Appendix B guidance adopted herein. Additionally, the
Commission will continue to leverage its own market surveillance and
oversight functions to ensure that exchanges continue to comply with
their legal obligations, including with respect to Core Principles 2,
3, 4, and 5, among others.\341\ Finally, under Sec. 150.3(b)(6)
finalized herein, the Commission continues to have the authority to
revoke any bona fide hedge exemption.
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\341\ 7 U.S.C. 7B-3(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7B-3(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7B-
3(f)(3); 7 U.S.C. 7B-3(f)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Proposed Guidance in Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
There were several comments on the proposed guidance in Appendix B,
paragraph (b) regarding the circumstances when an exchange may grant
waivers from any exchange-set five-day rule or similar restriction. A
few commenters requested that the Commission eliminate the proposed
guidance altogether.\342\ IFUS stated that the proposed guidance is
unnecessary and should be removed, contending that the guidance
``reflects many of the considerations currently taken by [e]xchange
staff when reviewing exemptions and spot month positions.'' \343\ CME
Group expressed a similar view, stating that in lieu of the proposed
guidance, ``the Commission should allow exchanges to continue to rely
on their established market surveillance expertise and regular
interactions to make decisions around exemptions.'' \344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\ CMC at 5; CME Group at 9; IFUS at 10.
\343\ IFUS at 3.
\344\ CME Group at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most commercial market participants and Better Markets,\345\
however, did not request to eliminate the proposed guidance in Appendix
B, paragraph (b), but instead requested certain changes or
clarifications. These commenters focused on whether the guidance: (i)
Only applies to physically-settled contracts expressly designated by an
exchange as subject to a five-day rule or similar restriction; \346\
and (ii) is too prescriptive by imposing new documentation requirements
on exchanges.\347\ CME Group requested clarification on whether the
proposed guidance applies to all exemptions or only those exemptions
previously subject to a five-day rule.\348\ Several energy market
participants requested the Commission expressly clarify that the
restrictions or guidance do not apply to markets for energy commodity
derivatives.\349\ Alternatively, these energy market participants
stated that if the Commission declined to include in a final rule an
express prohibition on the application of the Five-Day Rule to energy
commodity derivative contracts, the Commission should clarify that an
exchange is not bound to apply the waiver guidance to any physically-
settled referenced contract that has not been expressly designated as
subject to the Five-Day Rule.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\ Better Markets supported the proposed guidance. Better
Markets at 46-48.
\346\ Chevron at 13-14; Suncor at 13-14; CCI at 9-10; CEWG at
25-26.
\347\ CME Group at 9.
\348\ Id.
\349\ Chevron at 13.
\350\ Chevron at 13; Suncor at 14; CCI at 9-10; CEWG at 25-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Discussion of Final Rule--Appendix B, Paragraph (b)
The Commission has carefully considered the various comments
regarding the guidance in Appendix B, paragraph (b) and has determined
to finalize the guidance, subject to several amendments and
clarifications, discussed below.
The Commission is not persuaded by requests to eliminate the
guidance based on arguments that exchanges have current market
surveillance practices or procedures to review the appropriateness of
an exemption during the relevant referenced contract's spot period. The
Commission continues to believe that the justifications described above
for the existing Five-Day Rule
[[Page 3283]]
remain valid. The Commission has determined, however, that with an
expanded list of contracts subject to Federal position limits, it is
best to provide the exchanges additional discretion when granting
exemptions to protect their markets using tools other than a Five-Day
Rule, and to supplement that discretion with guidance highlighting the
importance of the spot month to ensure price convergence and an orderly
delivery process.
For certain referenced contract markets, rather than imposing a
complete restriction on holding positions in excess of limits during
the spot period, an exchange may, when appropriate, grant an exemption
which allows exceeding the position limit by a small increment. Such
approach would be an effective way of protecting convergence while
still maintaining orderly trading. Similarly, exchanges currently
utilize other tools in administering their position limits. For
example, CME and CBOT establish certain exchange-set speculative
position limits that include a ``step down'' feature so that the
permitted position limit level is lower each day as the contract nears
its last trading days. Further, when granting position limit
exemptions, exchanges may grant such exemptions subject to a ``step
down'' level restriction as well. The Commission expects that exchanges
would closely scrutinize any participant who requests recognition
during the last five days of the spot period or in the time period for
the spot month.
The Commission clarifies that any exchange, for the purposes of
exchange-set position limits, that elects to grant an exemption subject
to terms, conditions, or limitations, that restrict the size of a
position during the time period for the spot month of a physically-
settled contract under Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H) may do so on any
referenced contract subject to Federal position limits under the Final
Rule, not just the nine legacy agricultural contracts. As such, the
Commission clarifies for the avoidance of doubt that exemptions in
energy contracts may be subject to an exchange's restriction aimed to
monitor the spot period for that energy contract.
Since price convergence and an orderly trading environment serve as
a deterrent or mitigate certain types of market manipulation schemes
such as corners and squeezes, the guidance is intended to include a
non-exclusive list of considerations the Commission expects the
exchanges to consider when determining whether to allow a position in
excess of limits throughout the spot month.
Regarding various comments contending that the proposed guidance
was too prescriptive, the Commission reiterates the appendix is not
intended to be used as a mandatory checklist. Further, the Commission
is finalizing various amendments to Appendix B, paragraph b, to respond
to commenters' requests.
First, the Commission is amending the introductory paragraph of the
guidance to clarify that under Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H) as finalized
herein, exchanges may impose restrictions on bona fide hedge exemptions
in the spot month. This discretion does not require any express
designation by the exchange.
Second, the Commission is modifying the proposed guidance to
clarify that the guidance may be used when considering either an
enumerated or non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemption. Third, the
Commission clarifies here that the guidance imposes no additional
reporting requirements on market participants as the factors described
in the guidance apply simply to the exchanges' evaluation of the
specific contract market when considering whether an exemption shall be
granted subject to any condition or limitation in the spot month.
Fourth, the Commission is eliminating the proposed factor which would
have required a market participant to provide materials to the exchange
supporting a classification of the position as a bona fide hedge. The
Commission notes that the exchange application requirements already
require market participants to provide relevant cash-market
information. In addition, the Commission is amending language
throughout the guidance to clarify that exchanges have flexibility when
considering applying the guidance. For example, the Commission is
removing proposed language that would have required the exchange to
verify the market participant's cash-market exposure. The Commission is
comfortable removing this language because the cash-market information
is already required as part of the exemption application process
described elsewhere in this release.\351\ Finally, the Commission is
making technical edits to clarify that any delivery under a physical
delivery contract is economically appropriate and the ``most
economical'' source for that commodity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\ See Sections II.D. and II.G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ix. Guidance on Measuring Risk
a. Background--Measuring Risk
In prior proposals, the Commission discussed the issue of whether
to recognize as bona fide both ``gross hedging'' and ``net hedging.''
\352\ While the Commission has previously expressed a willingness to
consider gross hedging in certain limited circumstances, such proposals
reflected the Commission's longstanding preference for net
hedging.\353\ That preference, although not stated explicitly in prior
releases, has been underpinned by a concern that unfettered recognition
of gross hedging could potentially allow for the cherry picking of
positions in a manner that subverts the position limits rules.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ 81 FR at 96747-96747.
\353\ See 81 FR at 96747 (stating that gross hedging was
economically appropriate in circumstances where ``net cash positions
do not necessarily measure total risk exposure due to differences in
the timing of cash commitments, the location of stocks, and
differences in grades or the types of cash commodity.'') See also
Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR at 14832, 14834
(Mar. 16, 1977) and Definition of Bona Fide Hedging and Related
Reporting Requirements, 42 FR 42748, 42750 (Aug. 24, 1977).
\354\ For example, using gross hedging, a market participant
could potentially point to a large long cash position as
justification for a bona fide hedge, even though the participant, or
an entity with which the participant is required to aggregate, has
an equally large short cash position. The presence of such
offsetting cash positions would result in the participant having no
net price risk to hedge. Instead, the participant created price risk
exposure to the commodity by establishing the derivative position.
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b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Measuring Risk
The Commission recognized in the 2020 NPRM that additional
flexibility to hedge on a gross basis may be warranted given that there
are myriad ways in which organizations, particularly those not
currently subject to Federal position limits, are structured and engage
in commercial hedging practices.\355\ For example, in the energy space,
it is common for market participants to use multi-line business
strategies where risks are managed by trading desk or business line
rather than on a global basis. Accordingly, in an effort to clarify its
view on this issue, the Commission proposed guidance on gross hedging
positions in paragraph (a) to Appendix B.
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\355\ See 85 FR at 11613.
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The proposed guidance provided flexibility for a person to measure
risk either on a net or gross basis, provided that: (A) The manner in
which the person measures risk is consistent over time and follows the
person's regular, historical practice (meaning the person
[[Page 3284]]
is not switching between net hedging and gross hedging on a selective
basis simply to justify an increase in the size of the person's
derivatives positions); (B) the person is not measuring risk on a gross
basis to evade the limits set forth in proposed Sec. 150.2 and/or the
aggregation rules currently set forth in Sec. 150.4; (C) the person is
able to demonstrate (A) and (B) above to the Commission and/or an
exchange upon request; and (D) an exchange that recognizes a particular
gross hedging position as a bona fide hedge pursuant to proposed Sec.
150.9 documents the justifications for doing so and maintains records
of such justifications in accordance with proposed Sec. 150.9(d).
c. Summary of the Commission Determination--Measuring Risk
The Commission is adopting the proposed guidance with modifications
and clarifications to address commenter concerns.
d. Comments--Measuring Risk
While Better Markets expressed concern that gross hedging could be
used to conduct an ``end-run'' around position limits,\356\ many other
commenters expressed support for flexibility to hedge on a net or gross
basis.\357\ Multiple commenters who expressed support for such
flexibility also requested discrete changes to the proposed guidance
and/or associated preamble, including: (i) Elimination of the
requirement that exchanges document their justifications when allowing
gross hedging; \358\ (ii) clarification that gross hedging is
permissible for both enumerated and non-enumerated hedges; \359\ and
(iii) clarification that market participants do not need to develop
procedures setting forth when gross vs. net hedging is
appropriate.\360\ Finally, IFUS requested that the Commission eliminate
the proposed guidance on the grounds that the guidance reflects
considerations currently taken by exchange staff when reviewing
exemptions.\361\
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\356\ Better Markets at 60.
\357\ ASR at 2; LDC at 2; NGSA at 3; COPE at 3; Chevron at 4;
Suncor at 4.
\358\ MGEX at 3; FIA at 14; CEWG at 4.
\359\ Chevron at 4-5; Suncor at 4-5; CCI at 4-5; CEWG at 7-10.
\360\ FIA at 14-15 (stating that risk managers decide on a case-
by-case basis whether to hedge on a net or gross basis).
\361\ IFUS at 3.
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e. Discussion of Final Rule--Measuring Risk
The Commission continues to believe that the guidance on gross
hedging is important because it will allow market participants to
measure risk in the manner most suited to their particular
circumstances, while preventing the use of gross hedging to subvert the
Federal position limits regime.\362\
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\362\ The guidance will help ensure the integrity of the
position limits regime for the reasons discussed below in response
to comments from Better Markets. The Commission thus disagrees with
IFUS that the guidance is unnecessary, but agrees with IFUS that the
proposed guidance reflects considerations currently taken by
exchange staff. In particular, the guidance is consistent in many
ways with the manner in which exchanges require their participants
to measure and report risk, which is consistent with the
Commission's requirements with respect to the reporting of risk. For
example, under Sec. 17.00(d), futures commission merchants
(``FCMs''), clearing members, and foreign brokers are required to
report certain reportable net positions, while under Sec. 17.00(e),
such entities may report gross positions in certain circumstances,
including if the positions are reported to an exchange or the
clearinghouse on a gross basis. 17 CFR 17.00. The Commission's
understanding is that certain exchanges generally prefer, but do not
require, their participants to report positions on a net basis. For
those participants that elect to report positions on a gross basis,
such exchanges require such participants to continue reporting that
way, particularly through the spot period. Such consistency is a
strong indicator that the participant is not measuring risk on a
gross basis simply to evade regulatory requirements.
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First, the Commission is eliminating proposed prong (D) of the
guidance, which provided that an exchange that recognizes a gross
position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedge pursuant to Sec. 150.9
documents the justifications for doing so. Prong (D) is unnecessary
given that the Commission and exchanges have other tools for accessing
such information. In particular, prong (C) of the guidance allows the
Commission and exchanges to request, on an as-needed basis, information
about the manner in which market participants are measuring risk.\363\
To ensure the Commission and exchanges have access to sufficient
information in light of the removal of prong (D), the Commission is
expanding prong (C) to require that a person also demonstrate, upon
request by the Commission or an exchange, justifications for measuring
risk on a gross basis. Additionally, the proposed prong (D) reference
to the non-enumerated process in Sec. 150.9 may have created confusion
regarding the applicability of the proposed gross hedging guidance to
enumerated hedges. Thus, the Commission is also revising the
introductory language of the guidance to clarify that the guidance
applies equally to enumerated and non-enumerated bona fide hedges.
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\363\ Additionally, market participants seeking exemptions
remain subject to a variety of recordkeeping requirements, including
Commission regulation Sec. 1.31, and the Commission will receive
information about all exchange-granted exemptions, including cash-
market information, via the monthly spreadsheet submission required
by Sec. 150.5(a)(4).
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Second, the Commission is clarifying that the guidance does not
require market participants to develop written policies or procedures
setting forth when gross or net hedging is appropriate. However, having
such policies or procedures may help market participants demonstrate
compliance with prongs (A), (B), and (C) of the guidance as finalized
herein.
Finally, the Commission believes the concerns regarding subversion
of position limits raised by Better Markets are already addressed by a
combination of the guardrails in prongs (A)-(C) of the guidance as well
as other Commission provisions, including some finalized herein. First,
to receive recognition as a bona fide hedge, a position must comply
with the bona fide hedging definition, regardless of whether the
underlying risk is measured on a net or gross basis. A market
participant thus may not use gross hedging to receive bona fide hedge
treatment for a speculative position,\364\ and measuring risk on a
gross basis to willfully circumvent or evade speculative position
limits would potentially run afoul of the Sec. 150.2(i)(2) anti-
evasion provision finalized herein. Similarly, market participants must
comply with the Commission's aggregation requirements regardless of
whether the participants are measuring risk on a net or gross
basis.\365\
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\364\ The introductory language to the guidance provides in
relevant part that a person's ``gross hedging positions may be
deemed in compliance . . . provided that all applicable regulatory
requirements are met, including that the position is economically
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management
of a commercial enterprise and otherwise satisfies the bona fide
hedging definition . . .''
\365\ Under Sec. 150.4, unless an exemption applies, a person's
positions must be aggregated with positions for which the person
controls trading or for which the person holds a 10% or greater
ownership interest. Commission Regulation Sec. 150.4(b) sets forth
several permissible exemptions from aggregation. See Final Rule,
Aggregation of Positions, 81 FR 91454, (December 16, 2016).
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Second, concerns about cherry-picking are addressed by the
guidance. By focusing on consistency and historical practice with
respect to the manner in which a person measures risk, the guidance
enables market participants to measure risk on a gross basis when
dictated by the nature of the exposure,\366\ but not simply when
[[Page 3285]]
utilizing gross hedging will yield a larger exposure than net hedging
or will otherwise subvert Federal position limit or aggregation
requirements. Use of gross or net hedging that is inconsistent with an
entity's historical practice, or a change from gross to net hedging (or
vice versa), could be an indication that an entity is seeking to evade
position limits regulations.\367\
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\366\ The Commission continues to believe that a gross hedge may
be a bona fide hedge in circumstances where net cash positions do
not necessarily measure total risk exposure due to differences in
the timing of cash commitments, the location of stocks, and
differences in grades or types of the cash commodity. See, e.g.,
Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR at 14834.
However, the Commission clarifies that these may not be the only
circumstances in which gross hedging may be recognized as bona fide.
Like the analysis of whether a particular position satisfies the
proposed bona fide hedge definition, the analysis of whether gross
hedging may be utilized would involve a case-by-case determination
made by the Commission and/or by an exchange using its expertise and
knowledge of its participants.
\367\ If an entity's (including a vertically-integrated
entity's) practice is to switch between net and gross hedging based
on particular circumstances, and those circumstances do not involve
evading position limits or aggregation requirements, then such
switching would not run afoul of prong (A). See Section II.B.9.
(discussing anti-evasion).
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Third, all market participants seeking to exceed Federal position
limits must request hedge exemptions at the exchange level, regardless
of whether they are measuring risk on a gross or net basis, and
regardless of whether they are seeking an enumerated or non-enumerated
exemption at the Federal level. Under the Final Rule, the exchanges
would have an opportunity to confirm whether such participants' use of
gross hedging is consistent with the proposed guidance, including by
reviewing detailed position information. The Commission will also have
access to such information through a variety of means, including:
Records maintained by market participants pursuant to Commission
regulation Sec. 1.31; the monthly spreadsheets that exchanges must
submit to the Commission under Sec. 150.5(a)(4) summarizing exchange-
granted exemptions and related cash-market information; and the ability
for the Commission to request such information directly from a market
participant pursuant to prong (C) of the gross hedging guidance.
x. Pass-Through Swap and Pass-Through Swap Offset Provisions
a. Background--Pass-Through Swap and Pass-Through Swap Offset
As the Commission has noted above, CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B) \368\
contemplates bona fide hedges that by themselves do not meet the
criteria of CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A), but that are used to offset the
swap exposure of a market participant (e.g., a dealer) to the extent
that the swap exposure does satisfy CEA section 4a(c)(2)(A) for such
market participant's counterparty (e.g., a commercial end user).\369\
The Commission believes that, in affording bona fide hedging
recognition for such offsets, Congress in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B)
intended to: (1) Encourage the provision of liquidity to commercial
entities that are hedging physical commodity price risk in a manner
consistent with the bona fide hedging definition; and (2) only
recognize risk management positions as bona fide hedges when such
positions are opposite a bona fide hedging swap counterparty.\370\ The
Commission has proposed a pass-through swap provision in each of its
position limits rulemakings since 2011.
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\368\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B).
\369\ CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B)(i) recognizes as a bona fide
hedging position a position that reduces risks attendant to a
position resulting from a swap that was executed opposite a
counterparty for which the transaction would qualify as a bona fide
hedging transaction pursuant to'' 4a(c)(2)(A). 7 U.S.C.
6a(c)(2)(B)(i). CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B)(ii) further recognizes as a
bona fide hedging position a position that ``reduce risks attendant
to a position resulting from a swap that meets the requirements of
4a(c)(2)(A). 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B)(ii).
\370\ As described above, the Commission interprets the revised
statutory temporary substitute test as limiting the Commission's
authority to recognize risk management positions as bona fide hedges
unless the position is used to offset exposure opposite a bona fide
hedging swap counterparty.
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b. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Pass-Through Swap and Pass-Through Swap
Offset
The Commission proposed to implement the statutory pass-through
swap provision in paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging definition for
physical commodities in proposed Sec. 150.1. Proposed paragraph (2)(i)
of the 2020 NPRM's bona fide hedging definition addressed a situation
where: (a) A particular swap qualifies as a bona fide hedge by
satisfying the temporary substitute test, the economically appropriate
test, and the change in value requirement under proposed paragraph (1)
of the bona fide hedging definition for one of the counterparties (the
``bona fide hedging swap counterparty''), but not for the other
counterparty; and (b) the bona fide hedge treatment ``passes through''
from the bona fide hedging swap counterparty to the other counterparty
(the ``pass-through swap counterparty''). The pass-through swap
counterparty could be an entity that provides liquidity to the bona
fide hedging swap counterparty (such as a swap dealer or a non-dealer
that offers swaps).
Under the 2020 NPRM, the pass-through of the bona fide hedge
treatment from the bona fide hedging swap counterparty to the pass-
through swap counterparty was contingent on: (1) The pass-through swap
counterparty's ability to demonstrate upon request from the Commission
and/or from an exchange that the pass-through swap is a bona fide
hedge; \371\ and (2) the pass-through swap counterparty entering into a
futures, option on a futures, or swap position in the ``same physical
commodity'' as the pass-through swap to offset and reduce the price
risk attendant to the pass-through swap.
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\371\ While the 2020 NPRM's proposed paragraph (2)(i) of the
bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 150.1 required the pass-
through swap counterparty to be able to demonstrate the bona fides
of the pass-through swap upon request, the 2020 NPRM did not
prescribe the manner by which the pass-through swap counterparty
obtains the information needed to support such a demonstration. The
2020 NPRM noted that the pass-through swap counterparty could base
such a demonstration on a representation made by the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty, and such determination may be made at the
time when the parties enter into the swap, or at some later point.
The 2020 NPRM also stated that for the bona fides to pass-through as
described above, the swap position need only qualify as a bona fide
hedging position at the time the swap was entered into.
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If the two conditions above were satisfied, then the bona fides of
the bona fide hedging swap counterparty ``pass through'' to the pass-
through swap counterparty for purposes of recognizing as a bona fide
hedge any futures position, option on futures position, or swap
position entered into by the pass-through swap counterparty to offset
the pass-through swap (i.e., to offset and reduce the risks of the swap
opposite the bona fide hedging swap counterparty). The pass-through
swap counterparty could thus exceed Federal position limits for both:
(1) The swap opposite the bona fide hedging swap counterparty, if
applicable; and (2) an offsetting futures position, option on a futures
position, or swap position in the same physical commodity, even though
any such offsetting position on its own would not qualify as a bona
fide hedge for the pass-through swap counterparty under proposed
paragraph (1) of the bona fide hedging transaction or position
definition. The Commission clarified that once the original bona fide
pass-through swap is settled, positions held under the pass-through
swap provision must be liquidated in an orderly manner in accordance
with sound commercial practices. Further, under proposed Sec.
150.3(d)(2), a pass-through swap counterparty would be required to
maintain any representation it relied on regarding the bona fide hedge
status of the swap for at least two years.
Proposed paragraph (2)(ii) of the bona fide hedging definition
addressed a situation where a market participant who qualifies as a
bona fide hedging swap counterparty (i.e., a counterparty with a
position in a previously-entered into swap that qualified, at the time
the
[[Page 3286]]
swap was entered into, as a bona fide hedge under paragraph (1)) seeks,
at some later time, to offset that bona fide hedge swap position using
a futures position, option on a futures position, or a swap in excess
of Federal position limits. Such step might be taken, for example, to
respond to a change in the bona fide hedging swap counterparty's risk
exposure in the underlying commodity.\372\ Proposed paragraph (2)(ii)
would allow such a bona fide hedging swap counterparty to use a futures
position, option on a futures position, or a swap in excess of Federal
position limits to offset the price risk of the previously-entered into
swap, even though the offsetting position itself does not qualify for
that participant as a bona fide hedge under paragraph (1).
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\372\ Examples of a change in the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty's cash-market price risk could include a change in the
amount of the commodity that the hedger will be able to deliver due
to drought, or conversely, higher than expected yield due to growing
conditions.
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The proposed pass-through exemption under paragraph (2) of the bona
fide hedging or transaction definition would only apply to the pass-
through swap counterparty's offset of the bona fide hedging swap, and/
or to the bona fide hedging swap counterparty's offset of its bona fide
hedging swap. Any further offset would not be eligible for a pass-
through exemption under paragraph (2) unless the offsetting position
itself meets paragraph (1) of the proposed bona fide hedging
definition.
The Commission stated in the 2020 NPRM that it believes the pass-
through swap provision may help mitigate some of the potential impact
resulting from the removal of the ``risk management'' exemptions that
are currently in effect.\373\
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\373\ See supra Section II.A.1.iii.a. (discussion of the
temporary substitute test).
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c. Summary of the Commission Determination--Pass-Through Swap and Pass-
Through Swap Offset; Related Recordkeeping Requirement; Cross-Commodity
Hedging Under the Pass-Through Swap Provision
The Commission is finalizing the pass-through swap and pass-through
swap offset provision of the ``bona fide hedging transaction or
position'' definition largely as proposed, with certain amendments in
response to commenters' requests discussed below:
First, the Commission is amending the 2020 NPRM's proposed
provision that would have required that the pass-through swap
counterparty demonstrate upon request that its offsetting position is
attendant to a position resulting from a bona fide hedging pass-through
swap. Instead, under the Final Rule, in order for a pass-through swap
counterparty to treat a pass-through swap offset as a bona fide hedge,
the pass-through swap counterparty must receive from the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty a written representation that the pass-
through swap qualifies as a bona fide hedge. Under the Final Rule, the
Commission is also amending the proposed regulatory text to add that
the pass-through swap counterparty may rely in good faith on such
written representation(s) made by the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty, unless the pass-through swap counterparty has information
that would cause a reasonable person to question the accuracy of the
representation.
Second, the Commission is adopting a revised paragraph (i)(B) of
the bona fide hedging transaction or position definition in Sec. 150.1
to delete the language in the pass-through swap provision that requires
the offset to be in the ``same physical commodity'' as the pass-through
swap.
d. Comments--Application of Pass-Through Swap Offset to Affiliates;
Recordkeeping; Cross-Commodity Hedging Under the Pass-Through Swap
Provision
Comments generally fell into three categories, each discussed in
turn below: (1) Application of pass-through swap offsets to affiliates;
(2) pass-through recordkeeping requirements; and (3) pass through swaps
and cross-commodity hedging.
(1) Application of Pass-Through Swap Offset to Affiliates
Commenters generally supported amending the bona fide hedge
definition in accordance with the statutory language in CEA section
4a(c)(2)(B) to include a pass-through swap and pass-through swap
offset.\374\ Some commenters requested clarification on the application
of the pass-through swap offset exemption to corporate affiliates. For
example, Shell stated that an overly strict interpretation of ``pass-
through swap counterparty'' may limit the application of the pass-
through swap offset exemption to only one entity within a corporate
structure, and such entity may not be the affiliate entity used by the
firm for its market-facing activities or to execute transactions with
exchanges to manage portfolios and position limits on an aggregated
basis.\375\ NGSA similarly requested that the Commission's
interpretation of a pass-through swap counterparty apply to affiliates
who may pass through their bona fide hedge position exemption to a
market-facing, ``treasury-affiliate'' subsidiary within a corporate
structure.\376\
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\374\ CEWG at 4; CMC at 5-6; FIA at 3; ICE at 6-7; ISDA at 12-
13; and Shell at 2, 4-5.
\375\ Shell at 4.
\376\ NGSA at 8.
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(i) Discussion of Final Rule--Application of Pass-Through Swap Offset
to Affiliates
The Commission clarifies that within a group of entities that
aggregates its positions under Sec. 150.4 \377\ (such as an aggregated
corporate group), any entity that is part of the aggregated group may
avail itself of the pass-through swap offset exemption. For example,
the pass-through swap offset provision extends to market-facing
affiliates that are part of an aggregated group pursuant to Sec.
150.4, such as treasury affiliate subsidiaries that firms commonly use
to manage market-facing activities and portfolios. In such
circumstances, recognition of a secondary pass-through swap transaction
would not be necessary among an aggregated group because an aggregated
group is treated as one person for purposes of Federal position limits.
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\377\ Aggregation of Positions, 81 FR 91454 (Dec. 16, 2016).
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Separately, in response to commenter requests to allow secondary
pass throughs (i.e., the further ``pass-through'' of a pass-through
exemption from one entity to another), the Commission clarifies that
outside the context of an aggregated group, additional positions
entered into as an offset of a pass-through swap would not be eligible
for a pass-through exemption under paragraph (2) of the bona fide
hedging definition unless the offsetting position itself meets the bona
fide hedging definition. Accordingly, the bona fides of a transaction
will not extend to a third-party through the pass-through swap
counterparty. For instance, if Producer A enters into an OTC swap with
Swap Dealer B, and the OTC swap qualifies as a bona fide hedge for
Producer A, then Swap Dealer B could be eligible for a pass-through
exemption to offset that swap in the futures market. However, if Swap
Dealer B offsets its swap opposite Producer A using an OTC swap with
Swap Dealer C, Swap Dealer C would not be eligible for a pass-through
exemption.
(2) Pass-Through Swap Provision and Recordkeeping
Commenters raised concerns with the 2020 NPRM's requirements that
the pass-through swap counterparty
[[Page 3287]]
document, and upon request, demonstrate the bona fides of the pass-
through swap.\378\ Commenters also requested that the Commission
clarify the nature of the required documentation,\379\ and/or eliminate
the required demonstration/documentation altogether, provided that the
pass-through swap counterparty has a legitimate, good-faith belief the
swap is a bona fide hedge.\380\
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\378\ Cargill at 10; FIA at 11-12; CMC at 5; Shell at 6-7; ICE
at 6-7; and ISDA at 11-12.
\379\ ICE at 6-7; Shell at 6.
\380\ Cargill at 10; CMC at 5; FIA at 11-12; and ISDA at 11-12.
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(i) Discussion of Final Rule--Pass-Through Swap Provision and
Recordkeeping
The Commission is amending the 2020 NPRM's proposed provision that
would have required that the pass-through swap counterparty demonstrate
upon request that its offsetting position is attendant to a position
resulting from a bona fide hedging pass-through swap. For the Final
Rule, the Commission is amending the pass-through swap provision's
regulatory text to clarify that in order for a pass-through swap
counterparty to treat a pass-through swap as a bona fide hedge, the
pass-through swap counterparty must receive from the bona fide hedging
swap counterparty a written representation that the pass-through swap
qualifies as a bona fide hedge. The Commission is further amending the
regulatory text to add that the pass-through swap counterparty may rely
in good faith on such written representation(s) made by the bona fide
hedging swap counterparty, unless the pass-through swap counterparty
has information that would cause a reasonable person to question the
accuracy of the representation. The Commission is adding the written
representation requirement to enable to Commission to verify that only
market participants with bona fide hedge exemptions are able to pass-
through those exemptions to their swap counterparties.
The Commission agrees with commenters who stated that the bona fide
hedging counterparty is the suitable party to determine the bona fide
hedging status of the pass-through swap. This is because the bona fide
hedging status is determined based upon the bona fide hedging
counterparty's confidential, proprietary information. The Commission
clarifies that the Commission is not requiring the bona fide hedging
counterparty to share the proprietary, confidential information upon
which it is basing its determination with its counterparties.
Similar to the 2020 NPRM, this Final Rule does not prescribe the
form or manner by which the pass-through swap counterparty obtains the
written representation. The Commission recognizes that the bona fide
hedging counterparty may make such representations on a relationship
basis through counterparty relationship documentation (e.g., through
ISDA documentation or other forms of documentation as agreed upon by
the parties) or on a transaction basis (e.g., through trade
confirmations or in other forms as agreed upon by the parties).\381\
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\381\ The Commission believes that allowing market participants
to determine the form and manner of how they will document the
written representation by the bona fide hedging counterparty and
allowing the pass-through swap counterparty to rely on such
representation addresses NRECA's comments on the pass-through swap
provision recordkeeping obligations. NRECA at 23.
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For example, if agreed to by the counterparties, the pass-through
swap counterparty may rely on a written representation made by the bona
fide hedging swap counterparty that an original pass-through swap and
any subsequent pass-through swaps entered into by and between the bona
fide hedging swap counterparty and the pass-through swap counterparty
are bona fide hedges, unless the bona fide hedging swap counterparty
provides written notice to the pass-through swap counterparty that a
particular swap is not a bona fide hedge. The Commission believes
providing market participants with flexibility recognizes
counterparties' ongoing relationships, while enabling the Commission to
verify that the pass-through swap offset reduces the risks of a bona
fide hedging swap.
The Commission considered comments requesting the elimination of
the pass-through swap provision recordkeeping requirement in Sec.
150.3(d) based on arguments that requiring this recordkeeping was not
practical. The Commission is not persuaded by those arguments as the
recordkeeping requirements assist the Commission in verifying that the
pass-through swap provision is only being utilized to offset risks
arising from bona fide hedges. Accordingly, the Commission is
finalizing the proposed pass-through swap recordkeeping requirement in
Sec. 150.3(d), subject to certain conforming changes to reflect
amendments to the pass-through swap paragraph of the bona fide hedging
definition.
Since not all swaps entered into by a commercial entity would
qualify as a bona fide hedge, the Commission declines commenters'
requests that a pass-through swap counterparty may reasonably rely
solely upon the fact that the counterparty is a commercial end user
and, absent an agreement between the counterparties, that the swap
appears to be consistent with hedges entered into by end users in the
same line of business.
(3) Comments--Pass-Through Swap Provision and Cross-Commodity Hedging
Commenters requested amending paragraph (i)(B) of the proposed bona
fide hedge definition to permit the pass-through swap provision to
apply to cross-commodity hedges by eliminating the proposed requirement
that the pass-through swap offset must be in the ``same physical
commodity'' as the pass-through swap.\382\
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\382\ FIA at 13 (quoting 85 FR at 11614); Shell at 5 (quoting 85
FR at 11614).
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(i) Discussion of Final Rule--Pass-Through Swap Provision and Cross-
Commodity Hedging
The Commission is adopting a revised paragraph (i)(B) of the bona
fide hedging transaction or position definition in Sec. 150.1 to
delete the language in the pass-through swap provision that requires
the offset to be in the ``same physical commodity'' as the pass-through
swap. The Commission's enumerated cross-commodity bona fide hedge
adopted herein thus applies to all the enumerated hedges, as well as to
the pass-through swap provision in the bona fide hedge definition. The
revised regulatory text confirms the Commission's intent to allow a
pass-through swap counterparty to utilize the pass-through swap offset
exemption when the offset itself is a cross-commodity hedge of the
underlying pass-through swap, provided that such cross-commodity hedge
meets all applicable requirements, including being substantially
related to the commodity being offset.
2. ``Commodity Derivative Contract''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Commodity Derivative Contract
The Commission proposed to create the defined term ``commodity
derivative contract'' for use throughout part 150 of the Commission's
regulations as shorthand for any futures contract, option on a futures
contract, or swap in a commodity (other than a security futures product
as defined in CEA section 1a(45)).
[[Page 3288]]
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Commodity
Derivative Contract
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``commodity
derivative contract.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as
proposed, with some non-substantive technical modifications.
These technical changes include the Final Rule's reference to
``futures contract'' rather than merely ``futures,'' and ``swap''
rather than ``swap contract'' to conform to other uses in final Sec.
150.1.\383\
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\383\ The Commission notes that these technical changes are to
conform more closely to CEA section 4a(a), which refers to
``contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery'' (7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(1) (emphasis added)), ``contracts of sale for future
delivery'' (7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added)), or similar
phraseology. Accordingly, the Commission is making the technical
change to refer to ``futures contracts'' rather than merely
``futures'' in order to more closely conform to the CEA's terms.
Similarly, CEA section 4a(a)(6) and section 1a(47) both refer to
``swap'' but not '' swap contract,'' and so the Commission is making
a similar conforming change.
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3. ``Core Referenced Futures Contract''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Core Referenced Futures Contract
The Commission proposed to create the term ``core referenced
futures contract'' as a short-hand phrase to refer to the futures
contracts listed in proposed Sec. 150.2(d) to which the Federal
position limit rules would apply.\384\ As per the ``referenced
contract'' definition described below, position limits would also apply
to any contract that is directly or indirectly linked to, or that has
certain pricing relationships with, a core referenced futures contract.
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\384\ The selection of the proposed core referenced futures
contracts is explained below in the discussions of Sec. 150.2 at
Section II.B. and the necessity finding infra at Section III.C.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Core
Referenced Futures Contract
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``core referenced
futures contract.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as
proposed.
4. ``Economically Equivalent Swap''
i. Background--Economically Equivalent Swap
The Commission's existing regulations do not currently subject
swaps to Federal position limits. Similarly, the Commission is unaware
of any exchange-set limits for swaps on any of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts. Pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(5), when the
Commission imposes position limits on futures and options on futures
pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(2), the Commission also must develop
limits ``concurrently'' and establish limits ``simultaneously'' for
``economically equivalent'' swaps ``as appropriate.'' \385\ As the
statute does not define the term ``economically equivalent,'' the
Commission must apply its expertise in construing such term, and, as
discussed further below, must do so consistent with the policy goals
articulated by Congress, including in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C) and
4a(a)(3).
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\385\ CEA section 4a(a)(5); 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5). In addition, CEA
section 4a(a)(4) separately authorizes, but does not require, the
Commission to impose Federal position limits on swaps that meet
certain statutory criteria qualifying them as ``significant price
discovery function'' swaps. 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(4). The Commission
reiterates, for the avoidance of doubt, that the definitions of
``economically equivalent'' in CEA section 4a(a)(5) and
``significant price discovery function'' in CEA section 4a(a)(4) are
separate concepts and that contracts can be economically equivalent
without serving a significant price discovery function. See 81 FR at
96736 (the Commission noting that certain commenters may have been
confusing the two definitions).
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ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Economically Equivalent Swap
The 2020 NPRM proposed a new term, ``economically equivalent
swap.'' Under the 2020 NPRM, a swap would be deemed an ``economically
equivalent swap'' with respect to a referenced contract so long as the
swap shared identical ``material'' contractual specifications, terms,
and conditions with the referenced contract, and provided that any
differences between the swap and referenced contract with respect to
the following would be disregarded: (i) Lot size or notional amount;
(ii) for a swap and relevant referenced contract that are both
physically-settled, delivery dates diverging by less than one calendar
day, except for a physically-settled natural gas swap which could
diverge by less than two calendar days; and (iii) post-trade risk
management arrangements. Because the proposed ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition referred to ``referenced contracts,'' under the 2020
NPRM's approach a swap could be deemed to be ``economically
equivalent'' to not just a core referenced futures contract, but also
to any cash-settled look alike futures contract or option on a futures
contract.\386\
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\386\ As discussed under the ``referenced contract'' definition,
the term ``referenced contract'' includes core referenced futures
contracts, linked cash-settled futures contracts, and options
thereon. For further discussion, see Section II.A.16.
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iii. Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Economically Equivalent
Swap
a. The Inclusion of Certain Swaps Within the Federal Position Limits
Framework
Many commenters generally supported the proposed definition.\387\
However, other commenters argued that swaps should not be subject to
Federal position limits at all \388\ or that subjecting swaps to
position limits would increase costs without commensurate
benefits.\389\ Nevertheless, several of these same commenters that
stated that swaps should not be subject to Federal position limits also
generally supported the proposed ``economically equivalent swap''
definition to the extent the Commission determined to include swaps
within Federal position limits.\390\ Similarly, IATP stated that it was
unclear why swaps are part of the 2020 NPRM given the Commission's
limited information on the swaps market.\391\
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\387\ E.g., AQR at 10; FIA at 2-3; NCFC at 5; Suncor at 2; SIFMA
AMG at 7; ISDA at 5; Chevron at 2; CEWG at 3; Citadel at 6.
\388\ SIFMA AMG at 6-8; IATP at 19.
\389\ CHS at 4-5; NCFC at 5; SIFMA AMG at 6-7; and ISDA at 5.
\390\ Chevron at 2; FIA at 2, 3, 5; MFA/AIMA at 3; SIFMA AMG at
7; Suncor at 2; AQR at 10-11; COPE at 3; Better Markets at 4; 31;
NCFC at 5; ISDA at 5; CEWG at 3; and Citadel at 6.
\391\ IATP at 19.
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In response to these comments, as an initial matter, the Commission
emphasizes that Congress has determined, through the Dodd-Frank Act's
amendments to CEA section 4a(a)(5), that the Commission must develop
Federal position limits for economically equivalent swaps
``concurrently,'' and must establish such limits ``simultaneously,''
with the Federal position limits for futures and options on futures.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, as a legal matter, a
swap that qualifies as ``economically equivalent'' to any referenced
contract must be included within the Federal position limits framework.
While it did not oppose the proposed definition, NCFC expressed a
similar concern with respect to the costs that the proposed definition
could impose on commercial end users and small- and mid-sized FCMs. To
mitigate these costs, NCFC suggested that any swap that qualifies for
an exception to the Commission's clearing requirement under existing
Sec. 50.50 of the Commission's regulations should not be deemed to be
an ``economically equivalent swap.'' According to NCFC, such ``swap
contracts already must meet the test `to hedge or mitigate commercial
[[Page 3289]]
risk,' and are `not used for a purpose that is in the nature of
speculation, investing, or trading,''' pursuant to Sec. 50.50.\392\
The Commission understands NCFC's concern, but believes NCFC's
alternative is unnecessary for two reasons. First, to the extent a swap
described by NCFC would ``hedge or mitigate commercial risk,'' such
swap likely would qualify for an enumerated bona fide hedge under the
Final Rule and therefore would not contribute to a commercial end-
user's net position for Federal position limits purposes.\393\ Second,
commodity swaps are not required to be cleared under the Commission's
existing regulations, so determining whether the end-user clearing
exemption applies is not necessarily a helpful proxy in determining
whether a swap is ``economically equivalent'' for purposes of CEA
section 4a(a)(5).
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\392\ NCFC at 5-6.
\393\ To the extent an FCM would not be able to qualify for a
bona fide hedge, the Commission believes that excepting such swaps
for purely financial firms would functionally have the same effect
as maintaining the risk-management exemption, which Congress,
through the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the CEA, has directed the
Commission to eliminate. See Section IV.A.4.ii.a(1) (discussing
elimination of the risk management exemption).
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b. Statutory Basis for the Commission's ``Economically Equivalent
Swap'' Definition
In promulgating the Federal position limits framework, Congress
instructed the Commission to consider several factors. First, CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B) requires the Commission when establishing Federal
position limits, to the maximum extent practicable, in its discretion,
to: (i) Diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation; (ii)
deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; (iii)
ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (iv)
ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying market is
not disrupted. Second, CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) requires the Commission
to strive to ensure that any limits imposed by the Commission will not
cause price discovery in a commodity subject to Federal position limits
to shift to trading in foreign markets.
Accordingly, any definition of ``economically equivalent swap''
must consider these statutory objectives. The Commission also
recognizes that swaps may include customized (i.e., ``bespoke'') terms
and are largely negotiated bilaterally and traded off-exchange (i.e.,
OTC). In contrast, futures contracts have standardized terms and are
generally exchange-traded or otherwise traded subject to the rules of
an exchange. As explained further below, due to these differences
between swaps and exchange-traded futures and related options, the
Commission has preliminarily determined that Congress's underlying
policy goals in CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) and (3)(B) are best achieved by
adopting a narrow definition of ``economically equivalent swap,''
compared to the broader definition of ``referenced contract.'' \394\
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\394\ The definition of ``referenced contract'' adopted herein
will incorporate cash-settled look-alike futures contracts and
related options that are either (i) directly or indirectly linked,
including being partially or fully settled on, or priced at a fixed
differential to, the price of that particular core referenced
futures contract; or (ii) directly or indirectly linked, including
being partially or fully settled on, or priced at a fixed
differential to, the price of the same commodity underlying that
particular core referenced futures contract for delivery at the same
location or locations as specified in that particular core
referenced futures contract. See infra Section II.A.16. (definition
of ``referenced contract''). The definition of ``economically
equivalent swap'' adopted herein is a type of ``referenced
contract,'' but, as discussed herein, the ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition includes a relatively narrower class of swaps
compared to other types of ``referenced contracts,'' such as look-
alike futures and options on futures contracts, for the reasons
discussed below.
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The ``referenced contract'' definition adopted in Sec. 150.1 will
include ``economically equivalent swaps,'' meaning any economically
equivalent swap is subject to Federal position limits. Thus, a swap
that is deemed economically equivalent would be required to be added
to, and could be netted against, as applicable, an entity's other
referenced contracts in the same commodity for the purpose of
determining one's aggregate positions for Federal position limits.\395\
Any swap that is not deemed economically equivalent is not a referenced
contract, and thus could not be netted with referenced contracts nor
required to be aggregated with any referenced contract for Federal
position limits purposes.
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\395\ See infra Section II.B.10. (discussion of netting).
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The Commission has determined that the ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition adopted herein supports the statutory objectives in
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(i) and (ii) by helping to prevent excessive
speculation and market manipulation, including corners and squeezes,
respectively, by: (1) Focusing on swaps that are the most economically
equivalent in every significant way to the futures contracts and
options on futures contracts for which the Commission deems position
limits to be necessary; \396\ and (2) limiting the ability of
speculators to obtain excessive positions through netting. Any swap
that meets the economically equivalent swap definition offers identical
risk sensitivity to its associated referenced contract with respect to
the underlying commodity, and thus could be used to effect a
manipulation, benefit from a manipulation, or otherwise potentially
distort prices in the same or similar manner as the associated futures
contract or option on the futures contract. The Commission further has
determined that the relatively narrow definition supports the statutory
objective in CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) by not causing price discovery to
shift to trading in foreign markets.\397\
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\396\ See infra Section III. (necessity finding).
\397\ For clarity, a swap may be eligible for treatment under
the pass-through swap provision as either a pass-through swap or a
pass-through swap offset, discussed above under the bona fide hedge
definition, and not necessarily be deemed to be an ``economically
equivalent swap'' since the pass-through swap provision focuses on
whether the swap serves as a bona fide hedge to one of the
counterparties. Similarly, status as an economically equivalent swap
is not dispositive for treatment under the pass-through swap
provision.
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c. The Definition Balances Competing Statutory Goals and Is Neither Too
Broad Nor Too Narrow
Several commenters argued that the proposed ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition was too narrow and would therefore allow
market participants to avoid Federal position limits.\398\ In
particular, CME Group and Better Markets requested the general
``referenced contract'' definition that applies to futures and options
on futures also apply to swaps.\399\ The Commission agrees with these
commenters' general concerns that the ``economically equivalent swap''
definition should not allow market participants to avoid Federal
position limits. In fact, the Commission believes that the approach
adopted in this Final Rule achieves that goal better than the approach
proposed by Better Markets and CME Group, first and foremost by
preventing parties from using netting of swaps to create large
positions in the futures market. The Final Rule's definition, compared
to the relatively broader ``referenced contract'' definition that
applies to futures and options on futures, better prevents
inappropriate netting of market participants' positions and advances
Congress's underlying policy goals in
[[Page 3290]]
CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) and (3)(B) for the following three reasons.
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\398\ CME Group at 3; NEFI at 3; Better Markets at 31-33
(generally arguing that the ``economically equivalent swap'' and
``referenced contract'' definitions should be consistent to prevent
loopholes).
\399\ CME Group at 3-4; Better Markets at 33-34 (arguing that
excluding penultimate swaps creates a technical delineation that is
largely divorced from the economic realities relating to physical
commodities underlying both contracts).
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First, as the Commission stated above, it believes that a narrow
``economically equivalent swap'' definition that focuses on swaps with
identical material terms and conditions reduces the ability of market
participants to structure tangentially-related (i.e., non-identical)
swaps simply to net down large, speculative positions in excess of
Federal position limits in futures or options on futures. Because
referenced contracts in the same commodity are generally netted,\400\
and because OTC swaps are bilaterally negotiated and customizable,
market participants could structure swaps that do not necessarily offer
identical risk or economic exposure or sensitivity simply to net down
large positions in other referenced contracts. This is less of a
concern with exchange-traded futures and related options, which are
subject to exchange rules and oversight, and which have standardized
terms, meaning they cannot be structured simply to net down large
speculative positions in core referenced futures contracts.
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\400\ See Section II.B.10. (discussing the application of
netting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission recognizes as reasonable the concerns of CME Group
and Better Markets that a relatively narrow ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition, compared to a broader definition, could enable
market participants to build excessive speculative risk exposure on one
side of the market through OTC swap transactions. As discussed herein,
the Commission is equally concerned that a broader definition similarly
would permit a market participant to acquire a large position in a core
referenced futures contract through inappropriate netting.\401\
However, the Commission believes that a broader ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition as advocated by these commenters also
would be more likely to lead to the additional harms discussed below.
Accordingly, while the Commission shares the same ultimate concerns as
CME Group and Better Markets with respect to protecting market
integrity, the Commission has determined that the relatively narrow
definition concurrently protects market integrity while also better
supporting the statutory directives in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C) and
4a(a)(3)(B) as discussed below.
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\401\ For example, a broader economically equivalent swap
definition would allow a market participant to hold a long position
in a physically-settled futures contract that exceeds the applicable
Federal position limit levels by netting down with an ``offsetting''
short OTC swap, even if the swap has a different material term than
the futures contract. That is, the ``offsetting'' short swap could
have different delivery location(s), delivery date(s), quality
differential(s), or even a different underlying commodity (depending
on how broad the definition would be) than the physically-settled
futures contract. Such an ``offsetting'' short swap would allow the
market participant to more profitably engage in--and therefore more
likely to successfully effect--a corner or squeeze in two respects.
First, the ``offsetting'' short swap would allow the market
participant to obtain a larger long futures position, thus creating
a more dominant position on the long side of the market. Second, the
``offsetting'' short swap would allow the market participant to more
easily ``dispose'' of or ``bury the corpse'' at smaller expense by
enabling the market participant to deliver the underlying physical
commodity, which the market participant received pursuant to its
long physically-settled futures positions, under more profitable
circumstances compared to the terms specified in the futures
contract. For example, the ``offsetting'' short swap could allow the
market participant to deliver the commodity (i.e., ``dispose of'' or
``bury the corpse'') at a different, more profitable (or at least
for less of a loss) delivery location and/or wait for more favorable
delivery dates with more favorable prices.
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Second, the Commission believes that the Final Rule's definition
addresses statutory objectives by focusing Federal position limits on
those swaps that pose the greatest threat for facilitating corners and
squeezes. That is, the Final rule addresses those swaps with similar
delivery dates and identical material economic terms to futures and
options on futures subject to Federal position limits while also
minimizing market impact and liquidity for bona fide hedgers for other
positions and transactions. For example, if the Commission were to
adopt a broader economically equivalent swap definition that included
delivery dates that diverge by one or more calendar days, perhaps by
several days or weeks, a liquidity provider (including a market maker
or a speculator) with a large portfolio of swaps may be more likely to
be constrained by the applicable position limits and therefore may have
incentive either to minimize its swaps activity or move its swaps
activity to foreign jurisdictions, resulting in reduced liquidity. If
there were many similarly situated market participants, the market for
such swaps could become less liquid, which in turn could harm liquidity
for bona fide hedgers. As a result, the Commission has determined that
the relatively narrow scope of the Final Rule's definition reasonably
balances the factors in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii) by
decreasing the possibility of illiquid markets for bona fide hedgers on
the one hand while, on the other hand, focusing on the prevention of
market manipulation during the most sensitive period of the spot month.
Third, the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition helps
prevent regulatory arbitrage as required by CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) and
additionally will strengthen international comity. For example, if the
Commission instead adopted a broader definition, U.S.-based swaps
activity could potentially migrate to other jurisdictions with a
narrower definition, such as the European Union (``EU''). In this
regard, the Final Rule's definition is similar in certain ways to the
EU definition for OTC contracts that are ``economically equivalent'' to
commodity derivatives traded on an EU trading venue.\402\ The
Commission's ``economically equivalent swap'' definition thus furthers
the statutory
[[Page 3291]]
goals set forth in CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C), which requires the
Commission to strive to ensure that any Federal position limits are
``comparable'' to foreign exchanges and will not cause ``price
discovery . . . to shift to trading'' on foreign exchanges.\403\
Further, market participants trading in both U.S. and EU markets should
find the Commission's and the EU's respective definitions to be
familiar, which may help reduce compliance costs for those market
participants that already have systems and personnel in place to
identify and monitor such swaps.
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\402\ See EU Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/591, 2017
O.J. (L 87). The applicable EU regulations define an OTC derivative
to be ``economically equivalent'' when it has ``identical
contractual specifications, terms and conditions, excluding
different lot size specifications, delivery dates diverging by less
than one calendar day and different post trade risk management
arrangements.'' While the Final Rule's ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition is similar, the Final Rule's definition requires
``identical material'' terms rather than merely ``identical'' terms.
Further, the Final Rule's definition excludes different ``lot size
specifications or notional amounts'' rather than referencing only
``lot size'' since swaps terminology usually refers to ``notional
amounts'' rather than to ``lot sizes.'' The Commission notes that
SIFMA AMG argued in its comment letter that the Commission should
adopt the economically equivalent swap definition proposed by the
EU. See SIFMA AMG at 7. However, while the Commission's definition
will be similar to the EU's definition, to the extent that the
Commission's definition differs from the EU's by requiring
``material identical'' rather than merely ``identical'' terms, the
Commission discusses its reasoning below.
Both the Commission's definition and the applicable EU
regulation are intended to prevent harmful netting. See European
Securities and Markets Authority, Draft Regulatory Technical
Standards on Methodology for Calculation and the Application of
Position Limits for Commodity Derivatives Traded on Trading Venues
and Economically Equivalent OTC Contracts, ESMA/2016/668 at 10 (May
2, 2016), available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016-668_opinion_on_draft_rts_21.pdf (``[D]rafting the
[economically equivalent OTC swap] definition in too wide a fashion
carries an even higher risk of enabling circumvention of position
limits by creating an ability to net off positions taken in on-venue
contracts against only roughly similar OTC positions.'').
The applicable EU regulator, the European Securities and
Markets Authority (``ESMA''), released a ``consultation paper''
discussing the status of the existing EU position limits regime and
specific comments received from market participants. According to
ESMA, no commenter, with one exception, supported changing the
definition of an economically equivalent swap (referred to as an
``economically equivalent OTC contract'' or ``EEOTC''). ESMA further
noted that for some respondents, ``the mere fact that very few EEOTC
contracts have been identified is no evidence that the regime is
overly restrictive.'' See European Securities and Markets Authority,
Consultation Paper MiFID Review Report on Position Limits and
Position Management Draft Technical Advice on Weekly Position
Reports, ESMA70-156-1484 at 46, Question 15 (Nov. 5, 2019),
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/ consultation-
paper-position-limits.
\403\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(C).
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Each element of the Final Rule's definition, including the
exclusions from the definition, and related comments, is discussed
below.
d. Scope of Identical Material Terms
Under the Final Rule's definition, only ``material'' contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions are relevant to the analysis of
whether a particular swap qualifies as an economically equivalent swap.
The definition thus does not require that a swap be identical in all
respects to a referenced contract in order to be deemed ``economically
equivalent'' to that referenced contract. Under the Final Rule,
``material'' specifications, terms, and conditions are limited to those
provisions that drive the economic value of a swap, including with
respect to pricing and risk. Examples of ``material'' provisions
include, for example: The underlying commodity, including commodity
reference price and grade differentials; maturity or termination dates;
settlement type (i.e., cash-settled versus physically-settled); and, as
applicable for physically delivered swaps, delivery specifications,
including commodity quality standards and delivery locations.\404\
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\404\ In developing its definition of an ``economically
equivalent swap,'' the Commission, based on its experience, has
determined that for a swap to be ``economically equivalent'' to a
futures or option on a futures contract, the material contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions must be identical. In making
this determination, the Commission took into account, in regards to
the economics of swaps, how a swap and a corresponding futures
contract or option on a futures contract react to certain market
factors and movements, the pricing variables used in calculating
each instrument, the sensitivities of those variables, the ability
of a market participant to gain the same type of exposures, and how
the exposures move to changes in market conditions.
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In addition, a swap that either references another referenced
contract, or incorporates by reference the other referenced contract's
terms, is deemed to share identical terms with the referenced contract
and therefore qualifies as an economically equivalent swap.\405\ Any
change in the material terms of such a swap, however, could render the
swap no longer economically equivalent for Federal position limits
purposes.
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\405\ For example, a cash-settled swap that either settles to
the pricing of a corresponding cash-settled referenced contract, or
incorporates by reference the terms of such referenced contract,
would be deemed to be economically equivalent to the referenced
contract.
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The Commission recognizes that the material swap terms noted above
are essential to determining the pricing and risk profile for swaps.
However, there may be other contractual terms that also may be
important for the counterparties in determining the pricing and
transaction risks, but that are not necessarily ``material'' for
purposes of position limits. For example, as discussed below, certain
other terms, such as clearing arrangements or governing law, may not be
material for the purpose of determining economic equivalence for
Federal position limits, but may nonetheless affect pricing and risk or
otherwise be important to the counterparties.
Accordingly, the Commission generally considers those swap
contractual terms, provisions, or terminology (e.g., ISDA terms and
definitions) that are unique to swaps (whether standardized or bespoke)
not to be material for purposes of determining whether a swap is
economically equivalent to a particular referenced contract, even
though such terms may be important when negotiating the swap or
contribute to the valuation and/or the counterparties' risk analysis.
For example, the following swap provisions or terms are generally
unique to swaps and/or otherwise not material, and therefore are not to
be dispositive for determining whether a swap is economically
equivalent: Designating business day or holiday conventions; day count
(e.g., 360 or actual); calculation agent; dispute resolution
mechanisms; choice of law; or representations and warranties.\406\
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\406\ Commodity swaps, which generally are traded OTC, are less
standardized compared to exchange-traded futures and therefore must
include these provisions in an ISDA master agreement between
counterparties. While certain provisions, for example choice of law,
dispute resolution mechanisms, or the general representations made
in an ISDA master agreement, may be important considerations for the
counterparties, the Commission would not deem such provisions
material for purposes of determining economic equivalence under the
Federal position limits framework for the same reason the Commission
would not deem a core referenced futures contract and a look-alike
referenced contract to be economically different, even though the
look-alike contract may be traded on a different exchange with
different contractual representations, governing law, holidays,
dispute resolution processes, or other provisions unique to the
exchanges. Similarly, with respect to day counts, a swap could
designate a day count that is different than the day count used in a
referenced contract but adjust relevant swap economic terms (e.g.,
relevant rates or payments, fees, basis, etc.) to achieve the same
economic exposure as the referenced contract. In such a case, the
Commission would not find such differences to be material for
purposes of determining the swap to be economically equivalent for
Federal position limits purposes.
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Because the Commission considers settlement type to be a material
``contractual specification, term, or condition,'' a cash-settled swap
could only be deemed to be economically equivalent to a cash-settled
referenced contract, and a physically-settled swap could only be deemed
to be economically equivalent to a physically-settled referenced
contract. However, a cash-settled swap that initially did not qualify
as ``economically equivalent'' due to no corresponding cash-settled
referenced contract (i.e., no cash-settled look-alike futures contract)
could subsequently become an ``economically equivalent swap'' if a
cash-settled futures contract market were to develop.
Commenters had various views on the treatment of cash-settled and
physically-settled swaps. First, certain commenters requested the
Commission exclude physically-settled swaps from Federal position
limits \407\ or at least clarify the class of instruments that would be
deemed to be physically-settled swaps.\408\ Second, other commenters
requested the opposite--that the Commission instead exclude cash-
settled swaps from Federal position limits.\409\ Third, Better Markets
argued that differentiating between cash-settled and physically-settled
swaps by including settlement type as a material term would
``incentivize[ ] speculative liquidity formation away from more liquid,
more transparent, and more restrictive futures exchanges and to the
swaps markets.'' \410\
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\407\ COPE at 4-5.
\408\ ICEA at 3-5; NRECA at 19-20, 27.
\409\ SIFMA AMG at 7; PIMCO at 3; and ISDA at 5.
\410\ Better Markets at 32.
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i. Treatment of Physically-Settled Swaps Under the Final Rule
Several commenters requested that the Commission exclude
physically-settled swaps from Federal position limits,\411\ or at least
clarify the scope of physically-settled swaps that would be subject to
Federal position limits.\412\ However, the Commission has determined
that doing so is inconsistent with the statutory goals in CEA section
[[Page 3292]]
4a(a)(3)(B), especially the mandates to deter corners and squeezes and
to ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers enumerated
in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii), respectively. For example,
excluding physically-settled swaps could potentially incentivize
liquidity to move from physically-settled core referenced futures
contracts to physically-settled swaps, which could both harm market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers and also enable potential manipulators
to accumulate large directional positions in physically-settled
contracts to effect a corner and squeeze more easily.
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\411\ COPE at 4-5.
\412\ IECA at 3-5; NRECA at 1, 28.
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The Commission also received several comments requesting
clarification regarding the Commission's use of the term ``physically-
settled'' swaps in the 2020 NPRM's discussion of the definition.
First, COPE opined that since the 2020 NPRM excluded trade options
from the ``referenced contract'' definition, as a result, only cash-
settled swaps would be deemed to be ``economically equivalent swaps''
for purposes of Federal position limits. The Commission confirms that
under the Final Rule, any swap that qualifies as a trade option under
Sec. 32.3 is ipso facto not subject to Federal position limits.\413\
However, the Commission does not believe this means that only cash-
settled swaps could be deemed ``economically equivalent swaps.'' For
example, it is possible that a physically-settled swap may not qualify
as a trade option, and if it were to otherwise satisfy the
``economically equivalent swap'' definition, it therefore would be
subject to Federal position limits.
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\413\ As discussed under Section II.A.16., the ``referenced
contract'' definition explicitly excludes any ``trade options that
meets the requirements of Sec. 32.3'' of the Commission's
regulations. Accordingly, a ``trade option'' is not subject to
Federal position limits under the Final Rule, even if the trade
option otherwise would satisfy the ``economically equivalent swap''
definition.
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Second, IECA and NRECA requested the Commission clarify what it
means when using language referring to a ``physically-settled swap,''
and suggested the Commission instead refer to a ``swap that allows for
physical settlement or delivery.'' \414\ IECA stated that ``using this
term in place of the term `physically-settled swaps' in the
Commission's proposed rulemaking will help to avoid confusion and
misinterpretation in the future.'' \415\ While the Commission is
adopting the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition as proposed
(which includes the reference to ``delivery date''), the Commission
agrees with IECA's statement and confirms that when the Commission
refers to ``physically-settled swaps'' for the purpose of this
definition, the Commission means a ``swap that allows for physical
settlement or delivery.'' The Commission agrees with IECA that
referring to ``swaps that allow for physical settlement or delivery''
does not alter the Commission's intended meaning and may avoid
confusion and misinterpretation.\416\ However, the Commission will
continue to refer to ``physically-settled swaps'' in this preamble
discussion because the Commission believes that changing the term for
discussion purposes herein, compared to the 2020 NPRM's preamble
discussion, could raise additional confusion. Further, the Commission
distinguishes between ``cash-settled'' and ``physically-settled''
referenced contracts throughout this preamble discussion, and using
different terms to refer to swaps also could increase confusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ IECA at 3-5; NRECA at 1, 28.
\415\ IECA at 5.
\416\ IECA at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IECA was concerned that the term ``physically-settled swap'' could
suggest that the Commission was seeking to regulate a commodity for
deferred delivery as a swap, which is otherwise excluded from the
``swap'' definition under CEA section 1a(47)(B)(ii). The Commission
confirms that neither the use of ``delivery dates'' in the definition
adopted herein nor the Commission's use of the term ``physically-
settled swaps'' for the purposes of this preamble discussion is
intended to capture instruments that are excluded from the Commission's
jurisdiction either by statute (e.g., the CEA's statutory exclusion of
the sale of a non-financial commodity for deferred shipment or delivery
that is intended to be physically-settled) \417\ or otherwise not
deemed to be swaps pursuant to the Commission's rules and regulations,
interpretations, exemption orders, or other guidance.\418\
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\417\ See CEA section 1a(47)(B)(ii).
\418\ See NRECA at 18-19. For clarity, and as requested by
NRECA, the Commission notes that these ``rules and regulations''
include the Commission's trade option rule in Sec. 32.3 as well as
the Commission's forward contract exclusion (i.e., the Brent forward
exclusion) in 55 FR 39188-92 and 77 FR 48,208, 48,246 (August 13,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRECA additionally requested the Commission clarify that the
``economically equivalent swap'' definition does not include any
``customary commercial agreement, contract or transaction entered into
as part of operations (so long as it is entered into off-facility and
not involving a financial intermediary).'' \419\ As noted, to the
extent such customary commercial agreement, contract, or transaction is
exempt or excluded from either treatment as, or from the definition of,
a ``swap'' by either statute or by the Commission's rules and
regulations, interpretations, exemption orders, or other guidance, the
Commission does not deem it to be an economically equivalent swap or
otherwise subject to Federal position limits under the Final Rule.\420\
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\419\ NRECA at 16-20.
\420\ For example, the Commission's swap definition excludes
certain capacity contracts and peaking supply contracts that qualify
as forward contracts with ``embedded volumetric optionality.'' See
Further Definition of ``Swap,'' ``Security-Based Swap,'' and
``Security-Based Swap Agreement''; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48,246. Since such instruments are
excluded from the Commission's regulatory ``swap'' definition, they
ipso facto will not be deemed to be ``economically equivalent
swaps'' for purposes of Federal position limits.
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ii. Treatment of Cash-Settled Swaps Under the Final Rule
The Commission also received several comments discussing the
treatment of cash-settled swaps under the proposed ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition. Several financial industry commenters
argued that the Final Rule should include only physically-settled swaps
and should exclude cash-settled swaps, contending that cash-settled
swaps do not affect price discovery or contribute to manipulation.\421\
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\421\ SIFMA AMG at 7; PIMCO at 3; and ISDA at 5 (PIMCO and ISDA
each believe neither cash-settled swaps nor cash-settled futures
should be subject to position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission disagrees with the commenters' request to exclude
cash-settled swaps from the final definition, as doing so could
incentivize liquidity to move from cash-settled referenced contracts to
cash-settled OTC swaps, potentially harming the liquidity in the
futures markets, including liquidity for bona fide hedgers. At the very
least, the Commission does not want to preference OTC cash-settled
swaps at the expense of corresponding exchange-traded cash-settled
futures or options on futures contracts.
In contrast, Better Markets objected to the proposed definition
because, according to Better Markets, under the 2020 NPRM cash-settled
swaps would not be able to qualify as economically equivalent to a
physically-settled core referenced futures contract.\422\ As Better
Markets commented, distinguishing between cash-settled and physically-
settled swaps and futures contracts by
[[Page 3293]]
deeming settlement type (i.e., cash-settled vs. physically-settled
settlement) to be a material term would ``incentivize[ ] speculative
liquidity formation away from more liquid, more transparent, and more
restrictive futures exchanges and to the swaps markets.'' \423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ Better Markets at 32 (stating that cash-settled swaps
would be ``essentially excluded from Federal position limits).
\423\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes Better Markets' concern is mitigated since
under the Final Rule, cash-settled swaps are subject to Federal
position limits only if there is a corresponding (i.e., ``economically
equivalent'') cash-settled futures contract or option on a futures
contract.\424\ That is, cash-settled swaps are not subject to Federal
position limits if there are no corresponding cash-settled futures
contracts or options on a futures contract. In these situations, if no
corresponding futures contract or option thereon exists, then there is
no liquidity formation in cash-settled futures and options on futures
contracts with which a cash-settled swap would be competing for
liquidity in the first place.
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\424\ The Commission notes that a swap could be deemed to be
``economically equivalent'' to any referenced contract, including
cash-settled look-alikes, and that the ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition is not limited to core referenced futures
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIA argued that cash-settled swaps should be subject to a separate
spot-month limit.\425\ However, as discussed in II.A.16.ii.a., the
Commission has determined that FIA's request to establish separate
Federal position limits for cash-settled swaps is not, as a default
rule, consistent with the statutory goals in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).
In particular, separate position limits for cash-settled swaps would
make it easier for potential manipulators to engage in market
manipulation, such as ``banging'' or ``marking'' the close, by
effectively permitting higher Federal position limits in cash-settled
referenced contracts. For example, a market participant would be able
to double its cash-settled positions by maintaining positions in both
cash-settled futures and cash-settled economically equivalent swaps
since positions in each class would not be required to be aggregated
for purposes of Federal position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\ FIA at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Commission is concerned that class limits could
impair liquidity in futures contracts or swaps, as the case may be. For
example, a market participant (including a market maker or speculator)
with a large portfolio of swaps (or futures contracts) near a
particular class limit would be assumed to have a strong preference for
executing futures contracts (or swaps) transactions in order to
maintain a swaps (or futures contracts) position below the class limit.
If there were many similarly situated market participants, the market
for such swaps (or futures contracts) could become less liquid. The
absence of class limits should decrease the possibility of illiquid
markets for referenced contracts subject to Federal position limits.
Because economically equivalent swaps and the corresponding futures
contracts and option on futures contracts are close substitutes for
each other, the absence of class limits should allow greater
integration between the economically equivalent swaps and corresponding
futures and options markets for referenced contracts and should also
provide market participants with more flexibility whether hedging,
providing liquidity or market making, or speculating.
e. Exclusions From the Definition of ``Economically Equivalent Swap''
As noted above, the Final Rule's definition provides that
differences in lot size or notional amount, delivery dates diverging by
less than one calendar day (or less than two calendar days for natural
gas), or post-trade risk management arrangements do not disqualify a
swap from being deemed ``economically equivalent'' to a particular
referenced contract.
i. Delivery Dates Diverging by Less Than One Calendar Day
The definition as it applies to commodities (other than natural
gas) encompasses swaps with delivery dates that diverge by less than
one calendar day from that of a referenced contract.\426\ As a result,
a swap with a delivery date that differs from that of a referenced
contract by one calendar day or more is not deemed economically
equivalent under the Final Rule, and such swaps are not required to be
added to, nor permitted to be netted against, any referenced contract
when calculating compliance with Federal position limits.\427\ For
example, these include contracts commonly referred to as
``penultimate'' contracts, which settle on the trading day immediately
preceding the final trading day of the corresponding core referenced
futures contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ This aspect of the proposed definition would be irrelevant
for cash-settled swaps since ``delivery date'' applies only to
physically-settled swaps.
\427\ A swap as so described that is not ``economically
equivalent'' would not be subject to a Federal speculative position
limit under the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the definition's proposed exclusion of physically-
settled penultimate swaps, Better Markets argued, among other things,
that excluding penultimate swaps ``creates technical delineations that
are largely divorced from the economic realities relating to physical
commodities underlying both contracts.'' \428\ In response, the
Commission recognizes that while a penultimate contract may be
significantly correlated to its corresponding spot-month contract, a
penultimate contract does not necessarily offer identical economic or
risk exposure to the spot-month contract, and depending on the
underlying commodity and market conditions, a market participant may
open itself up to material basis risk by moving from the spot-month
contract to a penultimate contract.\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ Better Markets at 32.
\429\ As discussed under Sections II.A.16.iii.a(2)(iii) and
II.B.3.vi.c, the Final Rule includes penultimate look-alike futures
contracts and options on futures contracts as ``referenced
contracts.'' Since futures contracts and options on futures
contracts are standardized and exchange-traded, the Commission is
less concerned about the potential for manipulation or evasion
through inappropriate netting in this context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that it is not
appropriate ex ante to permit market participants to net such
penultimate swap positions (other than natural gas) against their core
referenced futures contract positions since such positions do not
necessarily reflect equivalent economic or risk exposure. However, the
Commission underscores that under the Final Rule, a penultimate swap
still could be deemed economically equivalent to the extent that
another penultimate referenced contract exists (assuming the swap and
other referenced contract share identical material terms and the swap
otherwise satisfies the economically equivalent swap definition). For
example, if a core referenced futures contract has a corresponding
penultimate futures contract that qualifies as a referenced contract,
then a penultimate swap could be deemed economically equivalent to the
penultimate futures contract. In such cases, the penultimate swap would
be an economically equivalent swap subject to Federal position limits.
The Commission acknowledges that liquidity could shift from the
core referenced futures contract to penultimate swaps in cases where
there are no corresponding penultimate futures contracts or options
contracts (and therefore the swap would not be deemed to be an
economically equivalent swap), but the Commission
[[Page 3294]]
believes that this concern is mitigated for two reasons. First, basis
risk may exist between the penultimate swap and the referenced
contract, and so the Commission believes that a market participant is
less likely to hold a penultimate swap the greater the economic
difference compared to the corresponding referenced contract. Second,
the absence of penultimate futures contracts or options contracts may
indicate lack of appropriate penultimate liquidity to hedge or offset
one's penultimate swap position and therefore may militate against
entering into penultimate swaps. However, as discussed below, these
reasons do not necessarily apply to penultimate swaps for natural gas.
ii. Post-Trade Risk Management
The Commission is specifically excluding differences in post-trade
risk management arrangements, such as clearing or margin, in
determining whether a swap is economically equivalent. As noted above,
many commodity swaps are traded OTC and may be uncleared or cleared at
a different clearing house than the corresponding referenced
contract.\430\ Moreover, since the core referenced futures contracts,
along with futures and options on futures contracts in general, are
traded on DCMs with vertically integrated clearing houses, as a
practical matter, it is unlikely that OTC commodity swaps, which
historically have been uncleared, would share identical post-trade
clearing house or other post-trade risk management arrangements with
their associated core referenced futures contracts. However, to the
extent an OTC commodity swap does share the same clearing arrangements
as a corresponding referenced contract, the Commission does not want to
incentivize the switching of cleared swap contracts to non-cleared
status for the sake of avoiding Federal position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ Similar to the Commission's understanding of ``material''
terms, the Commission construes ``post-trade risk management
arrangements'' to include various provisions included in standard
swap agreements, including, for example: Margin or collateral
requirements, including with respect to initial or variation margin;
whether a swap is cleared, uncleared, or cleared at a different
clearing house than the applicable referenced contract; close-out,
netting, and related provisions; and different default or
termination events and conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, if differences in post-trade risk management
arrangements were sufficient to exclude a swap from economic
equivalence to a core referenced futures contract, then such an
exclusion could otherwise render ineffective the Commission's statutory
directive under CEA section 4a(a)(5) to include economically equivalent
swaps within the Federal position limits framework. Accordingly, the
Commission has determined that differences in post-trade risk
management arrangements should not prevent a swap from qualifying as
economically equivalent with an otherwise materially identical
referenced contract.\431\
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\431\ In addition, CEWG asked for clarification that the
Commission would not extend certain preamble language in the 2020
NPRM addressing the exclusion of post-trade risk management
arrangements from consideration when determining whether a swap is
economically equivalent to support a finding that such swaps are
actually off-exchange futures contracts rather than swaps. CEWG at
31. The Commission confirms that excluding post-trade risk
management arrangements from the determination that a swap is
economically equivalent does not extend to supporting a finding that
such swaps are actually off-exchange futures contracts rather than
swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Lot Size or Notional Amount
The last exclusion clarifies that differences in lot size or
notional amount do not prevent a swap from being deemed economically
equivalent to its corresponding referenced contract. The Commission's
use of ``lot size'' and ``notional amount'' refer to the same general
concept. Futures terminology usually employs ``lot size,'' and swap
terminology usually employs ``notional amount.'' Accordingly, the
Commission is using both terms to convey the same general meaning, and
in this context does not mean to suggest a substantive difference
between the two terms.
f. Economically Equivalent Natural Gas Swaps
Market dynamics in natural gas are unique in several respects
including, among other things, that ICE and NYMEX both list high volume
contracts, whereas liquidity in other commodities tends to pool at a
single DCM. As expiration approaches for natural gas contracts, volume
tends to shift from the NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract that
is physically-settled, to an ICE look-alike contract that is cash
settled. This trend reflects certain market participants' desire for
exposure to natural gas prices without having to make or take
delivery.\432\ NYMEX and ICE also list several ``penultimate'' cash-
settled referenced contracts that use the price of the physically-
settled NYMEX contract as a reference price for cash settlement on the
day before trading in the physically-settled NYMEX contract
terminates.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ In part to address historical concerns over the potential
for manipulation of physically-settled natural gas contracts during
the spot month in order to benefit positions in cash-settled natural
gas contracts, the Commission discusses later in this release that
the Final Rule will allow for a higher ``conditional'' spot month
limit in cash-settled natural gas referenced contracts under the
condition that market participants seeking to utilize such
conditional limit exit any positions in physically-settled natural
gas referenced contracts. See infra Section II.C.2.e. (proposed
conditional spot month limit exemption for natural gas).
\433\ Such penultimate contracts include: ICE's Henry Financial
Penultimate Fixed Price Futures (PHH) and options on Henry
Penultimate Fixed Price (PHE), and NYMEX's Henry Hub Natural Gas
Penultimate Financial Futures (NPG).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to recognize the existing natural gas markets, which
include active and vibrant markets in penultimate natural gas
contracts, the Final Rule includes a slightly broader economically
equivalent swap definition for natural gas so that physically-settled
swaps with delivery dates that diverge by less than two calendar days
from an associated referenced contract could still be deemed
economically equivalent and would be subject to Federal position
limits. The Commission intends for this provision to prevent and
disincentivize manipulation and regulatory arbitrage and to prevent
volume from shifting away from the NYMEX NG core referenced futures
contract to penultimate natural gas contract futures and/or penultimate
swap markets in order to avoid Federal position limits.
As noted above, the Commission is adopting a relatively narrow
``economically equivalent swap'' definition in order to prevent market
participants from inappropriately netting positions in referenced
contracts against swap positions further out on the curve. The
Commission acknowledges that liquidity could shift to penultimate swaps
as a result but believes that, with the exception of natural gas, this
concern is mitigated since there may be basis risk between the
penultimate swap and the referenced contract and lack of liquidity to
specifically hedge or offset one's penultimate swap position. However,
compared to other contracts, the Commission believes that natural gas
has a relatively liquid penultimate futures market that enables a
market participant to hedge or set-off its penultimate swap position.
The Commission believes that without the exception to the economically
equivalent swap definition for natural gas swaps, liquidity otherwise
could be incentivized to shift from the NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contract to penultimate natural gas swaps in order to avoid
Federal position limits.
CME Group stated in its comment letter that that these concerns
also may apply to other energy core referenced
[[Page 3295]]
futures contracts.\434\ As a result, the Commission intends to observe
the behavior in these other markets in response to the Final Rule, but
the Commission understands that the natural gas markets are likely the
most sensitive to these concerns based on the size of the corresponding
natural gas penultimate market. As a result, the Commission is adopting
the proposed exception for natural gas, but emphasizes that it will
continue to observe the other energy markets in order to determine the
proper course of action with respect to those markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ CME Group at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
g. Determination of Economic Equivalence
The Commission is unable to publish a list of swaps it deems to be
economically equivalent swaps because any such determination would
involve a facts and circumstances analysis, and because most physical
commodity swaps are created bilaterally between counterparties and
traded OTC. Absent a requirement that market participants identify
their economically equivalent swaps to the Commission on a regular
basis, the Commission believes that market participants are best
positioned to determine whether particular swaps share identical
material terms with referenced contracts and would therefore qualify as
``economically equivalent'' for purposes of Federal position limits.
However, the Commission understands that for certain bespoke swaps it
may be unclear whether the facts and circumstances demonstrate whether
the swap qualifies as ``economically equivalent'' with respect to a
referenced contract.
MFA/AIMA requested that the Commission facilitate compliance by
providing clearer guidance on terms that would be deemed material for
determining which swaps are ``economically equivalent.'' \435\
Similarly, NCFC requested that the Commission adopt a ``safe harbor''
under which ``demonstrable good faith compliance with respect to
inadvertent violations would not serve as the basis for an enforcement
action.'' \436\ In response, the Commission emphasizes that under the
Final Rule, a market participant will have the discretion to make such
determination as long as the market participant makes a reasonable,
good faith effort in reaching such determination. The Commission will
not pursue any enforcement action for violating Federal position limits
against such market participant with respect to such swaps positions as
long as the market participant (i) performed the necessary due
diligence and is able to provide sufficient evidence, if requested, to
support its reasonable, good faith determination that the swap is or is
not an economically equivalent swap and (ii) comes into compliance with
the applicable Federal position limits within a commercially reasonable
time, as determined by the Commission in consultation with the market
participant, and if applicable, any relevant exchange.\437\ The
Commission anticipates that this should provide a greater level of
certainty to provide market participants with the comfort they need to
enter into swap positions, in contrast to the alternative in which
market participants would be required to first submit swaps to the
Commission staff and wait for feedback before entering into swaps.\438\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ MFA/AIMA at 9.
\436\ NCFC at 6.
\437\ As noted below, the Commission reserves the authority
under the Final Rule to determine that a particular swap or class of
swaps either is or is not ``economically equivalent'' regardless of
a market participant's determination. See infra Section
II.A.4.iii.g. (discussion of commission determination of economic
equivalence). As long as the market participant made its
determination, prior to such Commission determination, using
reasonable, good faith efforts, the Commission would not take any
enforcement action for violating the Commission's position limits
regulations if the Commission's determination subsequently differs
from the determination of the market participant and the market
participant comes into compliance with the applicable Federal
position limits within a commercially reasonable time, as determined
by the Commission in consultation with the market participant, and
if applicable, any relevant exchange.
\438\ As discussed under Section II.A.16. (definition of
``referenced contract''), the Commission is including a list of
futures contracts and options on futures contracts that qualify as
referenced contracts because such contracts are standardized and
published by exchanges. In contrast, since swaps are largely
bilaterally negotiated and OTC traded, a swap could have multiple
permutations and any published list of economically equivalent swaps
would be unhelpful or incomplete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Commission will primarily rely on market participants to
initially determine whether their swaps meet the proposed
``economically equivalent swap'' definition, the Commission is adopting
paragraph (3) to the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition to
clarify that the Commission may determine on its own initiative that
any swap or class of swaps satisfies, or does not satisfy, the
economically equivalent definition with respect to any referenced
contract or class of referenced contracts. The Commission believes that
this provision will provide the ability to offer clarity to the
marketplace in cases where uncertainty exists as to whether certain
swaps would qualify (or would not qualify) as ``economically
equivalent,'' and therefore would be (or would not be) subject to
Federal position limits. Similarly, where market participants hold
divergent views as to whether certain swaps qualify as ``economically
equivalent,'' the Commission can ensure that all market participants
treat OTC swaps with identical material terms similarly, and serve as a
backstop in case market participants fail to properly treat
economically equivalent swaps as such. As noted above, the Commission
will not take any enforcement action with respect to violating the
Commission's position limits regulations if the Commission disagrees
with a market participant's determination as long as the market
participant is able to provide sufficient support to show that it made
a reasonable, good faith effort in applying its discretion.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ See supra Section II.A.4. (discussing market participants'
discretion in determining whether a swap is economically
equivalent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better Markets encouraged the release of additional guidance,
suggesting that the Commission should delegate its authority to the DMO
Director to issue guidance with respect to specific types of terms and
conditions, and noting that the proposed process for the Commission to
provide clarification is cumbersome.\440\ The Commission does not
believe such delegation is necessary since Commission staff will
continue to have the ability to offer informal guidance as well as
formal no-action relief or interpretive guidance as needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ Better Markets at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better Markets also suggested that in order to ensure market
participants conduct proper diligence, the Commission should clarify
and codify that a swap dealer must include an appendix in its
reasonably-designed policies and procedures under existing Sec. 23.601
that identifies swaps ``in any manner'' referencing commodities subject
to Federal position limits, regardless of whether the entity deems the
swap to be ``economically equivalent.'' \441\ In contrast, ISDA
believed the obligations in Sec. 23.601 impose costs that are overly
burdensome and are not commensurate with benefits.\442\ ISDA stated
that further guidance is necessary, but noted that even if further
guidance is provided, the regime would still impose unnecessary burdens
on swap dealers.\443\ ISDA requested the Commission consider including
further
[[Page 3296]]
clarification and/or interim relief for swap dealers.\444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\441\ Better Markets at 34.
\442\ ISDA at 10.
\443\ Id.
\444\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At this time, the Commission does not believe it is necessary to
provide further detail with respect to Sec. 23.601 because, as
discussed above, the Commission will defer to a market participant's
determination as long as the market participant is able to provide
sufficient support to show that it made a reasonable, good faith effort
in applying its discretion.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\ See supra Section II.A.4. (discussing market participants'
discretion in determining whether a swap is economically
equivalent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
h. Phased Implementation of Federal and Exchange-Set Limits on Swaps
As discussed under Section I.D., the Final Rule generally gives
market participants until January 1, 2022 to comply with Federal
position limits for the 16 non-legacy referenced contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the first time under the Final
Rule, and the Final Rule provides an extra year to comply with respect
to economically equivalent swaps (January 1, 2023). After such
compliance period, economically equivalent swaps will be subject to
Federal position limits. In general, commenters supported a phase-in
for such swaps.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\ MFA/AIMA at 8 (requesting an additional 6-12 months phase-
in); SIFMA AMG at 9 (requesting an additional 6-12 months); Citadel
at 9 (requesting an additional 6 months); and NGSA at 15-16
(requesting a general phase-in in order ``to avoid the risk of harm
to market recovery and to facilitate efficiency in market
participant implementation'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed further under Section II.D.4.i, final Sec. 150.5
requires exchanges to establish and enforce exchange-set limits for any
referenced contract, which includes economically equivalent swaps. The
Commission has determined to permit exchanges to delay enforcing their
respective exchange-set position limits on economically equivalent
swaps at this time. Specifically, with respect to exchange-set position
limits on swaps, the Commission notes that in two years (which
generally coincides with the compliance date for economically
equivalent swaps), the Commission will reevaluate the ability of
exchanges to establish and implement appropriate surveillance
mechanisms to implement DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6
with respect to economically equivalent swaps. However, after the swap
compliance date (January 1, 2023), the Commission underscores that it
will enforce Federal position limits in connection with OTC swaps.
In response to the Commission's proposal to allow exchanges to
delay enforcing exchange-set position limits on swaps, IATP opined that
the Commission's decision to ``[d]elay compliance with position limit
requirement [sic] to avoid imposing costs on market participants makes
it appear that the Commission is serving as a swap dealer booster,
although swaps dealers are amply resourced to provide the necessary
data to the exchanges and to the Commission. The Commission is bending
over backward to avoid requiring swaps market participants from paying
the costs of exchange trading.'' \447\ However, the Commission stated
in the same section of the 2020 NPRM that it would enforce Federal
position limits on swaps even though it would not require exchanges to
enforce position limits on swaps until the Commission determines that
exchanges have had the opportunity to access swaps data and establish
appropriate swaps oversight infrastructure.\448\ Additionally, the
Commission notes that physical commodity swaps are not subject to the
Commission's trade execution mandate to trade on exchanges, and the
Commission understands that most physical commodity swaps are traded
OTC rather than on exchanges. Accordingly, the Commission's rationale
for delaying the requirement that exchanges enforce position limits for
swaps is based on exchanges' existing capabilities and lack of insight
into the OTC swaps markets, rather than for swap dealers who will
remain subject to Federal position limits and Commission
oversight.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ IATP at 20.
\448\ The 2020 NPRM stated, ``Nonetheless, the Commission's
preliminary determination to permit exchanges to delay implementing
Federal position limits on swaps could incentivize market
participants to leave the futures markets and instead transact in
economically-equivalent swaps, which could reduce liquidity in the
futures and related options markets, although the Commission
recognizes that this concern should be mitigated by the reality that
the Commission would still oversee and enforce Federal position
limits on economically equivalent swaps.'' (emphasis added). 85 FR
at 11680.
\449\ The Commission also notes that IATP quotes from the cost-
benefits considerations section of the 2020 NPRM, and thus the
Commission's focus on benefits and costs to exchanges and market
participants in the excerpt quoted by IATP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Cross-Border Application
Several commenters opined that the Commission should address the
cross-border application of the Final Rule, including in connection
with OTC swaps.\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ FIA at 27-28; ISDA at 11; CHS at 6 (``CHS believes that
global organizations should be in a position to better understand
the Commission's approach with respect to the cross-border
application of the rules to referenced contract positions. In CHS's
view, the proposal does not address whether and how global companies
must aggregate referenced contract positions of affiliates around
the world. As part of the retooling of the position limit regime,
CHS urges the Commission to address such an application'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response, the Commission makes three observations. First, as
discussed above regarding the treatment of physically-settled swaps, if
a swap is otherwise excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction either
by statute or pursuant to the Commission's rules and regulations,
interpretations, exemption orders, or other guidance, then the swap is
not subject to Federal position limits. Accordingly, while related,
this determination is distinct from the Final Rule's position limits
framework. Second, the Final Rule provides a compliance period for
economically equivalent swaps until January 1, 2023. Accordingly, the
Commission and its staff expect to continue to discuss the status of
OTC swaps with market participants during this compliance period and
provide additional feedback as necessary based on the individual facts
and circumstances. Third, to a certain extent, some of the comments are
more related to the position limit aggregation rules in existing Sec.
150.4, which was finalized in 2016.\451\ Moreover, the 2020 NPRM did
not discuss cross-border application, which is therefore beyond the
scope of this rulemaking.
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\451\ For further discussion related to the position limits
aggregation rules, see Section II.B.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. ``Eligible Affiliate''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Eligible Affiliate
The Commission proposed to create the new defined term ``eligible
affiliate'' to be used in proposed Sec. 150.2(k). As discussed further
in connection with Sec. 150.2, an entity that qualifies as an
``eligible affiliate'' would be permitted to voluntarily aggregate its
positions, even though it is eligible for an exemption from aggregation
under Sec. 150.4(b).\452\
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\452\ See Section II.B.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Eligible
Affiliate
The Commission received no comments on this definition and is
adopting it as proposed with certain technical changes. The Commission
is making these technical changes to clarify the antecedent to the use
of ``its'' and ``such entity'' in the definition. The Commission
expects these changes will clarify the definition, but do not represent
a substantive change in the meaning.
[[Page 3297]]
6. ``Eligible Entity''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Eligible Entity
The Commission adopted a revised ``eligible entity'' definition in
the 2016 Final Aggregation Rulemaking.\453\ The Commission proposed no
further amendments to this definition, but is including the revised
definition in this Final Rule given that the definitions for part 150
are set forth or restated in Sec. 150.1, thus ensuring that all
defined terms are included. As noted above, the Commission also
proposed a non-substantive change to remove the lettering from this and
other definitions that appear lettered in existing Sec. 150.1, and to
list the definitions in alphabetical order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\ See 17 CFR 150.1(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. ``Entity''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Entity
The Commission proposed defining ``entity'' to mean ``a `person' as
defined in section 1a of the Act.'' \454\ The term ``entity,'' not
defined in existing Sec. 150.1, is used throughout proposed part 150
of the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(38).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments--Entity
The Commission received two comments that recommended clarification
of the proposed definition of ``entity.'' \455\ FIA and MGEX contended
the proposed definition of ``entity'' should not cross-reference the
definition of ``person'' in section 1a of the CEA because the CEA
defines ``person'' to include individuals (i.e., natural persons), as
well as entities.\456\ MGEX argued that the definition of ``entity''
should not apply to individuals.\457\ FIA stated that, for purposes of
the 2020 NPRM, it is unclear whether the cross-reference to the
definition of ``person'' in section 1a of the CEA is meant to be
limited to non-natural persons.\458\ If so, FIA recommended that the
Commission amend the definition of ``entity'' to refer only to the non-
natural persons listed in the definition of ``person'' under section 1a
of the CEA.\459\ Further, FIA suggested that provisions in part 150
that are applicable to both natural and non-natural persons should
refer to ``persons'' and those that apply to only non-natural persons
should refer to ``entity.'' \460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ FIA at 26; MGEX at 2.
\456\ Id.
\457\ MGEX at 2.
\458\ FIA at 26.
\459\ Id.
\460\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Entity
The Commission declines to adopt the commenters' suggestion to
carve ``individuals'' out of the proposed definition of ``entity'' or
to otherwise differentiate between ``person(s)'' and ``entity(ies)''
for purposes of part 150 of the Final Rule. The proposed definition of
``entity'' expressly included ``individuals'' and neither commenter
explained why individuals should be excluded from the definition and
why the CEA's statutory definition of ``person'' is inappropriate.
Accordingly, the Commission is adopting the definition of ``entity'' as
proposed.
8. ``Excluded Commodity''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Excluded Commodity
The phrase ``excluded commodity'' is defined in CEA section 1a(19),
but is not defined or used in existing part 150 of the Commission's
regulations. The Commission proposed including a definition of
``excluded commodity'' in part 150 that references that term as defined
in CEA section 1a(19).\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Excluded
Commodity
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``excluded
commodity.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed.
9. ``Futures-Equivalent''
i. Background--Futures-Equivalent
The phrase ``futures-equivalent'' is currently defined in existing
Sec. 150.1(f) and is used throughout existing part 150 of the
Commission's regulations to describe the method for converting a
position in an option on a futures contract to an economically
equivalent amount in a futures contract. The Dodd-Frank Act amendments
to CEA section 4a, in part, direct the Commission to apply aggregate
Federal position limits to physical commodity futures contracts and to
swap contracts that are economically equivalent to such physical
commodity futures contracts.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Futures-Equivalent
In order to aggregate positions in futures, options \462\ on
futures, and swaps for purposes of calculating compliance with the
Federal position limits set forth in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
proposed adjusting position sizes to an equivalent position based on
the size of the unit of trading of the relevant core referenced futures
contract. The phrase ``futures-equivalent'' is used for that purpose
throughout the 2020 NPRM, including in connection with the ``referenced
contract'' definition in proposed Sec. 150.1. The Commission also
proposed broadening the existing ``futures-equivalent'' definition to
include references to the proposed new term ``core referenced futures
contracts.'' Additionally, with respect to options, the proposed
``futures-equivalent'' definition also provided that a participant that
exceeds Federal position limits as a result of an option assignment
would be allowed a one-day grace period to liquidate the excess
position.
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\462\ As stated in this definition, the term ``option'' includes
an option on a futures contract and an option that is a swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Commission Determination--Futures-Equivalent
The Commission is adopting the proposed definition of ``futures-
equivalent'' with one substantive modification: In addition to the 2020
NPRM's grace period in connection with position limit overages dues to
option assignments, under the Final Rule, the one-day grace period
would also extend to an option position that exceeds Federal position
limits as a result of certain changes in the option's exposure to price
changes of the underlying referenced contract, as long as the
applicable option contract does not exceed such position limits under
the previous business day's exposure to the underlying referenced
contract. This grace period does not apply on the last day of the spot
month for the corresponding core referenced futures contract.
As discussed further below, the Final Rule also includes several
technical changes, including referring to an option's ``exposure'' to
price changes of the underlying referenced contract and eliminating
references to an option's ``risk factors'' and ``delta coefficient.''
As discussed below, the Commission believes these changes will add
flexibility in assessing exposure to price changes of an option to the
underlying futures contract and are not intended to reflect a
substantive difference.
iv. Comments--Futures-Equivalent
Several commenters supported the proposed definition, including the
one-business-day grace period related to position limit overages due to
options assignments.\463\ In addition to
[[Page 3298]]
supporting the proposed definition, CME Group and ICE both supported
expanding the proposed definition's one business day grace period to
include Federal position limit overages resulting from changes in the
option's delta coefficient, noting that such a change is consistent
with their respective exchange rules.\464\ However, CME Group noted
that exercising an in-the-money option that results in a position over
the position limit should be treated as a violation if the futures-
equivalent position was over the position limit based on both the
previous and current day's delta.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\463\ MFA/AIMA at 11; CME Group at 14; FIA at 26; and IFUS
Exhibit 1 RFC 23.
\464\ CME Group MRAN 1907-5 states that ``[i]f a position
exceeds position limits as a result of an option assignment, the
person who owns or controls such position shall be allowed one
business day to liquidate the excess position without being
considered in violation of the limits. Additionally, if, at the
close of trading, a position that includes options exceeds position
limits when evaluated using the delta factors as of that day's close
of trading, but does not exceed the limits when evaluated using the
previous day's delta factors, then the position shall not constitute
a position limit violation.'' See CME Group Market Regulation
Advisory Notice RA1907-5 (Aug. 2, 2019), available at: https://www.cmegroup.com/content/dam/cmegroup/notices/market-regulation/2019/08/RA1907-5.pdf; IFUS Rule 6.13(a) similarly provides persons
one business day to bring into position limits compliance any
position that exceeds limits due to changes in the deltas of the
options, or as the result of an option assignment.
\465\ CME Group at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIA sought clarification from the Commission on certain aspects of
the proposed definition. FIA stated that it is unclear how a spread
contract that qualifies as a referenced contract would be converted to
a futures-equivalent position.\466\ FIA also requested the Commission
clarify which calculation method applies to swaps and options that are
swaps.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\466\ FIA at 7.
\467\ FIA at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
v. Discussion of Final Rule--Futures-Equivalent
The Commission agrees with CME Group and ICE that the one-business-
day grace period also should apply to position overages in connection
with changes in the current day's option's exposure to price changes of
the underlying referenced contract (e.g., option delta coefficient).
The Commission understands that providing a one business day grace
period for these situations is consistent with existing market
practice. Further, consistent with CME Group's comment, a market
participant will not have a grace period if the market participant's
position also exceeded Federal position limits based on the previous
day's exposure (including option delta coefficient). To alleviate
concerns about delivery and to help prevent corners and squeezes, this
one-day grace period does not apply on the last trading day of the spot
month of the option's corresponding core referenced futures contract.
Additionally, the Commission is eliminating references to an
option's ``risk factor'' and ``delta co-efficient'' and instead
referring to an option's ``exposure'' to price changes of the
underlying referenced contract.
The Commission understands that the term ``exposure'' in the
present context is more commonly used by market participants.
Accordingly, the Commission believes that the reference to an option's
``exposure'' to price changes of the underlying referenced contract is
the technically correct term to use over ``risk factor'' or ``delta
coefficient,'' which are used in the existing ``futures-equivalent''
definition. However, the Commission's use of ``exposure'' here is meant
to encompass the concepts of ``risk factor'' and ``delta co-
efficient.'' As a result, the Commission believes that this change
provides flexibility, and is consistent with existing market practice
and understanding, in assessing the exposure of an option to the price
movement of futures contract and is not intended to reflect a
substantive change.
Additional technical changes include the Final Rule's reference to
``futures contract'' rather than merely ``futures'' and ``entity''
rather than ``participant'' since the former terms conform to other
uses in final Sec. 150.1. The Final Rule also makes several technical
changes in connection with the use of ``computed'' in the definition,
and these changes are meant to clarify the meaning rather than imply a
substantive change.
With respect to FIA's request for clarification regarding how a
spread contract that qualifies as a referenced contract would be
converted to a futures-equivalent position, the Commission recognizes
the inherent challenge with converting a spread contract that qualifies
as a referenced contract to a futures-equivalent position.\468\ The
Commission expects that a market participant will adjust such a spread
contract to a futures-equivalent position consistent with existing
exchange practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\ FIA at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to FIA's question regarding the calculation for swaps
and options that are swaps, subparagraph (1) of the futures-equivalent
definition applies to an option that is a swap, and subparagraph (3) of
the definition applies to a swap that is not an option.
10. ``Independent Account Controller''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Independent Account Controller
The Commission adopted a revised ``independent account controller''
definition in the 2016 Final Aggregation Rule.\469\ The Commission
proposed no further amendments to this definition, but included that
revised definition in the 2020 NPRM so that all defined terms appeared
together.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\469\ See 17 CFR 150.1(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. ``Long Position''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Long Position
The phrase ``long position'' is currently defined in Sec. 150.1(g)
to mean ``a long call option, a short put option or a long underlying
futures contract.'' The Commission proposed to update this definition
to apply to swaps and to clarify that such positions would be on a
futures-equivalent basis. This provision would thus be applicable to
options on futures and swaps such that a long position would also
include a long futures-equivalent option on futures and a long futures-
equivalent swap.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Long Position
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``long
position.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed.
12. ``Physical Commodity''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Physical Commodity
The Commission proposed to define the term ``physical commodity''
for position limits purposes. Congress used the term ``physical
commodity'' in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(A) and 4a(a)(2)(B) to mean
commodities ``other than excluded commodities as defined by the
Commission.'' \470\ The proposed definition of ``physical commodity''
thus included both exempt and agricultural commodities, but not
excluded commodities.
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\470\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)(A) and (B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Physical
Commodity
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``physical
commodity.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed.
[[Page 3299]]
13. ``Position Accountability''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Position Accountability
Existing Sec. 150.5 permits position accountability in lieu of
exchange position limits in certain cases, but does not define the term
``position accountability.'' The proposed amendments to Sec. 150.5
would allow exchanges, in some cases, to adopt position accountability
levels in lieu of, or in addition to, position limits. The Commission
proposed a definition of ``position accountability'' for use throughout
proposed Sec. 150.5 as discussed in greater detail in connection with
proposed Sec. 150.5.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Position
Accountability
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``position
accountability.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed
with some non-substantive technical changes related to the numbering
structure. The Commission is also changing the reference of ``trader''
to ``entity'' since ``entity'' is the proper defined term in Sec.
150.1 under the Final Rule while ``trader'' is not a defined term under
Sec. 150.1.
14. ``Pre-Enactment Swap''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Pre-Enactment Swap
The Commission proposed to create the defined term ``pre-enactment
swap'' to mean any swap entered into prior to enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 (July 21, 2010), the terms of which had not expired
as of the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. As discussed in
connection with proposed Sec. 150.3 later in this release, if acquired
in good faith, such swaps would be exempt from Federal position limits,
although such swaps could not be netted with post-effective date swaps
for purposes of complying with spot month Federal position limits.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Pre-Enactment
Swap
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``pre-enactment
swap.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed. For
further discussion of the treatment of pre-existing positions, see
Sections II.B.7. and II.C.7.
15. ``Pre-Existing Position''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Pre-Existing Position
The Commission proposed to create the defined term ``pre-existing
position'' to reference any position in a commodity derivative contract
acquired in good faith prior to the effective date of a final Federal
position limit rulemaking. Proposed Sec. 150.2(g) would set forth the
circumstances under which Federal position limits would apply to such
positions.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Pre-Existing
Position
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``pre-existing
position.'' The Commission is adopting the term ``pre-existing
position'' as proposed. However, the Commission did receive comments
related to the treatment of certain pre-existing positions. For further
discussion of the treatment of pre-existing positions and related
comments, see Sections II.B.7. and II.C.7.
16. ``Referenced Contracts''
i. Background--Referenced Contracts
When a futures contract expires, all open futures contract
positions in such contract are settled by physical delivery (which the
Commission refers to as ``physically-settled'' herein) or cash
settlement (which the Commission refers to as ``cash-settled'' herein),
depending on the contract terms set by the exchange. The nine legacy
agricultural contracts currently subject to Federal position limits are
all physically-settled futures contracts. Deliveries on physically-
settled futures contracts are made through the exchange's
clearinghouse, and the delivery of the physical commodity must be
consummated between the buyer and seller per the exchange rules and
contract specifications. On the other hand, other futures contracts are
``cash-settled'' because they do not involve the transfer of physical
commodity ownership and require that all open positions at expiration
be settled by a transfer of cash to or from the clearinghouse based
upon the final settlement price of the contracts.
Market participants may use the settlement price of physically
delivered futures contracts as a key benchmark to price cash-market
contracts and other derivatives, including so-called ``look-alike''
cash-settled derivatives (which could be futures, options on futures,
or swaps contracts). Look-alike cash-settled derivative contracts are
explicitly linked to the physically-settled futures contracts. A look-
alike cash-settled derivatives contract has nearly identical
specifications as its physically-settled counterpart, but rather than
calling for delivery of the underlying commodity at expiration, the
contract terms require a cash payment at expiration. Each look-alike
cash-settled derivatives contract is linked by design to its respective
physically-settled contract in that the final settlement value of the
cash-settled contract is defined as the final settlement price of the
physically-settled contract in the same commodity for the same month.
Additionally, other types of cash-settled derivatives contracts may be
similar to a look-alike, but the final settlement price of such
contracts are determined based on a basis, or differential, to the
final settlement price of the corresponding physically-settled
contract.
Existing Sec. 150.2 applies Federal position limits to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts as well as to options thereon on a
futures-equivalent basis, but the existing Federal framework does not
include provisions to apply Federal position limits to contracts that
are linked in some manner to the nine physically-settled legacy
agricultural contracts. As a result, the existing Federal position
limits do not apply to any cash-settled contracts, including both look-
alike contracts and contracts that settle at a basis or differential to
a physically-settled contract, options on such cash-settled contracts,
or swaps.\471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\ Under CEA section 1a(47)(A), an option on a swap is deemed
to be a swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Final Rule is expanding the position limits framework to
cover certain cash-settled futures contracts, options on such futures
contracts, and economically equivalent swaps, for the reasons discussed
below, the Commission is adopting the proposed defined term
``referenced contract,'' with modifications, for use throughout final
part 150 to refer to derivatives contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Referenced Contracts
The 2020 NPRM proposed a new ``referenced contract'' definition
that included:
(1) Any core referenced futures contract listed in proposed Sec.
150.2(d); (2) any other contract (futures or option on futures), on a
futures-equivalent basis with respect to a particular core referenced
futures contract, that is directly or indirectly linked to the price of
a core referenced futures contract, or
[[Page 3300]]
that is directly or indirectly linked to the price of the same
commodity underlying a core referenced futures contract (for delivery
at the same location(s)); and (3) any economically equivalent swap, on
a futures-equivalent basis.
The proposed referenced contract definition thus included look-
alike futures contracts and options on look-alike futures contracts (as
well as economically equivalent swaps with respect to such look-alike
contracts), contracts of the same commodity but different sizes (e.g.,
mini contracts), and penultimate contracts.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ A penultimate contract is a cash-settled contract in which
trading ceases one business day prior to the settlement date of the
corresponding referenced contract with which the penultimate
contract is linked. With respect to penultimate contracts, the 2020
NPRM stated that ``Federal limits would apply to all cash-settled
futures and options on futures contracts on physical commodities
that are linked in some manner, whether directly or indirectly, to
physically-settled contracts subject to Federal limits.'' Further to
this general statement, the 2020 NPRM provided a footnote example of
a penultimate contact that, because it cash-settles directly to a
core referenced futures contract, the 2020 NPRM explained would
therefore be included as a referenced contract. 85 FR at 11619.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the 2020 NPRM explicitly excluded from the
``referenced contract'' definition: (1) Commodity index contracts; (2)
location basis contracts; (3) swap guarantees; and (4) trade options
that satisfy the requirement of Sec. 32.3 of the Commission's
regulations. Further, while not in the proposed regulatory text, the
Commission indicated in the preamble to the 2020 NPRM that a contract
for which the settlement price is based on an index published by a
price reporting agency (a ``PRA index contract'') that surveys cash-
market transactions (even if the cash-market practice is to price at a
differential to a futures contract) was not deemed to be ``directly or
indirectly'' linked to a referenced contract, and thus that such PRA
index contract also was excluded from the ``referenced contract''
definition under the 2020 NPRM.\473\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ 85 FR at 11620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the 2020 NPRM, a position in a referenced contract in certain
circumstances could be netted with a position in another referenced
contract, including a core referenced futures contract, which as noted
above is a type of referenced contract under the proposed ``referenced
contract'' definition. However, to avoid evasion and undermining of the
Federal position limits framework, the 2020 NPRM prohibited the use of
non-referenced contracts to net down positions in referenced
contracts.\474\
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\474\ 85 FR at 11619. For further discussion of the Final Rule's
treatment of the netting of positions, see Section II.B.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the 2020 NPRM also stated that, in an effort to provide
clarity to market participants regarding which exchange-traded
contracts would be subject to Federal position limits, the Commission
anticipated publishing, and regularly updating, a list of such
contracts on its website. The Commission thus proposed to publish a
``CFTC Staff Workbook,'' which would provide a non-exhaustive list of
referenced contracts and may be helpful to market participants in
determining categories of contracts that would fit within the
referenced contract definition.
iii. Commission Determination--Referenced Contracts
The Commission is adopting the proposed ``referenced contract''
definition with the modification discussed below, as well as one
technical change that the Commission believes clarifies the
``referenced contract'' definition, consistent with the intent of the
2020 NPRM.\475\ Like the proposed definition, the final ``referenced
contract'' definition also includes (1) the 25 core referenced futures
contracts, (2) futures and options on futures that are directly or
indirectly linked either to (i) the price of any other core referenced
futures contract or (ii) the same commodity underlying a core
referenced futures contract,\476\ and (3) economically equivalent
swaps. Like the 2020 NPRM, the final definition also explicitly
excludes certain contract types so that these contracts may not be
netted against referenced contract positions for purposes of Federal
position limits (but also are not aggregated with referenced contract
positions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\ The Commission is providing a clarifying technical change
to the ``referenced contract'' definition in that the final
definition refers to ``an option on a futures contract'' instead of
``options on a futures contract'' as proposed by the 2020 NPRM, to
make clear the original intent of the Commission in the 2020 NPRM
that a single option would qualify as a referenced contract.
\476\ Prong (ii) encompasses physically-settled contracts that
do not directly reference a core referenced futures contract but
that are nonetheless based on the same commodity and delivery
location as the core referenced futures contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in addition to the proposed definition's exclusions of
commodity index contracts, location basis contracts, swap guarantees,
and trade options that satisfy the requirement of Sec. 32.3 of the
Commission's regulations, the Final Rule is modifying the 2020 NPRM's
definition to also exclude two additional contract types: ``outright
price reporting agency index contracts'' and ``monthly average pricing
contracts.''
This section will address the following issues, including related
comments, in the following order:
a. Cash-settled referenced contracts and contracts that are
``directly or indirectly'' linked to a core referenced futures
contract, including cash-settled and penultimate contracts;
b. Contracts explicitly excluded from the ``referenced contract''
definition; and
c. The list of referenced contracts and the related Commission
staff ``Workbook.''
The Commission is also adopting ``economically equivalent swaps,''
as proposed, as part of the final ``referenced contract'' definition.
However, the Commission addresses the final ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition in Section II.A.4.
a. Contracts That Are Directly or Indirectly Linked to a Core
Referenced Futures Contract
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Linked to a Core Referenced Futures
Contract
Paragraph (1) of the proposed referenced contract definition
provided that a contract would qualify as a referenced contract if it
is a core referenced futures contract, or, with respect to a particular
core referenced futures contract, if it is directly or indirectly
linked, including being partially or fully settled on, or priced at a
fixed differential to, the price of either (i) the core referenced
futures contract itself or (ii) the same commodity underlying the core
referenced futures contract for delivery at the same location or
locations as specified in the core referenced futures contract's
specifications. As the Commission explained in the 2020 NPRM, this
provision included a cash-settled ``look-alike'' future or an option
thereon.\477\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\ For example, the 2020 NPRM noted that ICE's Henry
Penultimate Fixed Price Future, which cash-settles directly to
NYMEX's Henry Hub Natural Gas core referenced futures contract,
would be considered a referenced contract. 85 FR at 11620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Summary of the Commission Determination--Linked to a Core
Referenced Futures Contract
The Commission is adopting as final the language in paragraph (1)
of the proposed ``referenced contract'' definition. Accordingly, under
paragraph (1) of the final ``referenced contract'' definition,
referenced contracts include a core referenced
[[Page 3301]]
futures contract, and any cash-settled futures and options on futures
that are directly or indirectly linked either to (i) the price of any
other core referenced futures contract or (ii) the same commodity
underlying a core referenced futures contract for delivery at the same
location or locations as specified in the core referenced futures
contract's specifications.\478\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\478\ Clause (ii) of this description comprises as referenced
contracts any physically-settled contracts that are linked to the
same commodity for delivery at the same location underlying a core
referenced futures contract. The Commission believes as failure to
do so could undermining this Federal position limits framework
through the creation of physically-settled look-alike contracts by
other exchanges. For example, without including clause (ii) above,
an exchange could create a physically-settled look-alike contract,
but unlike the existing core referenced futures contract, this new
contract would be outside the Federal position limits framework.
Such an outcome would clearly disadvantage the exchange with the
existing core referenced futures contract and harm liquidity for
bona fide hedgers by possibly dividing liquidity among competing
physically-settled look-alike contracts, as well as provide
significant incentives for market participants to trade contracts
that subvert this Federal position limits framework.
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Further, in response to the comments described below, the
Commission is reaffirming that penultimate futures contracts and
options thereon qualify as referenced contracts because they satisfy
paragraph (1) of the referenced contract definition under the Final
Rule.
(i) Comments--Cash-Settled Referenced Contracts
Commenters provided differing opinions as to whether linked cash-
settled futures and related options should be subject to Federal
position limits.\479\ CME Group and NEFI supported the Commission's
proposal to subject these contracts to Federal position limits.\480\
According to CME Group, absent parity between cash and physically-
settled contracts, artificial distortions on one side of the market
could occur due to manipulations on the other side of the market,
regulatory arbitrage, or liquidity drain.\481\ CME Group warned that,
ultimately, a lack of parity could undermine the statutory goals of
position limits.\482\ NEFI agreed, arguing that applying Federal
position limits to cash-settled contracts is essential to guard against
manipulation by a trader who holds positions in both physically-settled
and cash-settled contracts for the same underlying commodity.\483\
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\479\ CME Group at 3-4; FIA at 7-8; ICE at 12; ISDA at 3-5; NEFI
at 3; PIMCO at 3; and SIFMA AMG at 4-6.
\480\ CME Group at 3-4 (stating ``CME Group believes that
economically and substantively alike contracts should be accorded
the same regulatory treatment to prevent artificial distortions from
opening doors for manipulators or shifting one market's liquidity to
another. . . In this regard, as noted above, CME Group recommends
that the Commission apply similar provisions to both cash-settled
and physically settled swaps.'').
\481\ CME Group at 6.
\482\ Id.
\483\ NEFI at 3.
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Other commenters disagreed. PIMCO and SIFMA AMG contended that
cash-settled referenced contracts should not be subject to Federal
position limits at all because cash-settled contracts do not introduce
the same risk of market manipulation. They argued that subjecting cash-
settled referenced contracts to Federal position limits would reduce
market liquidity and depth in these instruments.\484\
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\484\ PIMCO at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4-6.
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ISDA argued that cash-settled contracts should not be included in
an immediate Federal position limits rulemaking, and should instead be
deferred until the Commission has adopted Federal limits with respect
to physically-delivered spot month futures contracts, and after which
the Commission should revisit Federal limits for cash-settled
contracts.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\485\ ISDA at 3-5.
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FIA and ICE suggested that Federal position limits for cash-settled
referenced contracts should apply per DCM (rather than in aggregate
across DCMs).\486\ FIA additionally suggested setting a separate
Federal spot-month position limit for economically equivalent
swaps.\487\ FIA and ICE further argued that limits for cash-settled
referenced contracts should be higher relative to Federal position
limits for physically-settled referenced contracts. They similarly
posited that cash-settled referenced contracts are ``not subject to
corners and squeezes'' and higher limits for cash-settled contracts
will `` `ensure market liquidity for bona fide hedgers.' '' \488\
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\486\ FIA at 7-8; ICE at 12.
\487\ FIA 7-8.
\488\ ICE at 3, 15 (also arguing that cash-settled limits should
apply per exchange, rather than across exchanges); FIA at 7-8; For
further discussion on the Commission's determination to generally
apply Federal position limits on an aggregate basis across
exchanges, see Section II.B.11.
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(ii) Discussion of Final Rule--Cash-Settled Reference Contracts
As a general matter, the Commission does not agree with FIA and ICE
that Federal position limits should be applied at the DCM level instead
of in the aggregate for the reasons discussed below under Section
II.B.11.\489\
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\489\ As discussed below, as an initial matter, the Commission
interprets CEA section 4a(a)(6) as requiring aggregate Federal
position limits across exchanges. However, as discussed below, the
Commission is providing an exception to this general rule for
natural gas pursuant to the Commission's exemptive authority under
CEA section 4a(a)(7). For further discussion, see Sections
II.B.3.vi. and II.B.11.
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Further, the Commission addresses FIA's contention that the
Commission should impose a separate Federal spot-month position limit
for economically equivalent swaps in further detail above under Section
II.A.4.iii.
While the Commission acknowledges commenter views to the effect
that cash-settled contracts are less susceptible to effectuating
corners and squeezes,\490\ the Commission is of the view that generally
speaking, linked cash-settled and physically-settled contracts form one
market, and thus should be subject to Federal position limits. Because
the settlement price of a physically delivered futures contract is used
as a price benchmark in many other derivative and cash-market
contracts, a change in the futures settlement price can affect the
value of a trader's overall portfolio of derivative and cash-market
positions. Accordingly, the link between physically delivered futures
and their cash-settled derivative counterparts can create incentives
for manipulation. This view is informed by the Commission's experience
overseeing derivatives markets, where the Commission has observed that
it is common for the same market participant to arbitrage linked cash-
and physically-settled contracts, and where the Commission has also
observed instances where linked cash-settled and physically-settled
contracts have been used together as part of an attempted
manipulation.\491\
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\490\ FIA at 7, stating ``Section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) directs the
Commission to set limits as appropriate `to deter and prevent market
manipulation, squeezes and corners.' '' The Commission notes that
FIA provides an example as to the effect of squeezes and corners for
cash-settled contracts--only two out of three of the points for
which the Commission should set an appropriate limit--the third
point, which is overlooked by the commenter (market manipulation) is
also a statutory objective, and for the reasons described below,
provides a basis for including cash-settled contracts within the
Federal position limits regime.
\491\ The Commission has previously found that traders with
positions in a cash-settled contract may have an incentive to
manipulate and undermine price discovery in the physically-settled
contract to which the cash-settled contract is linked. See, e.g.,
CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc. et al., No. 1:11-cv-03543 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(alleging defendants amassed sufficient quantity of physical WTI
while contemporaneously purchasing cash-settled WTI derivatives
positions on NYMEX and ICE with the intent to profit on those
positions by manipulating the price of the physically-settled WTI
contract).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applying position limits to both physically delivered futures and
linked cash-settled contracts, including their look-alike cash-settled
derivative contracts, reduces a trader's incentive and ability to
manipulate futures markets. Without position limits on
[[Page 3302]]
both types of futures contracts, traders could amass a substantial
position in the cash-settled look-alike contract and benefit their
position by manipulating the settlement price of the physically
delivered futures contracts.
Additionally, the absence of position limits on look-alike cash-
settled derivative contracts would enable traders to manipulate a
particular cash commodity price to benefit their cash-settled
derivatives position. For example, where market conditions create a
shortage of a particular commodity, that shortage should increase the
price of the commodity. If markets are functioning properly, the price
of the physically delivered futures contract will also increase. A
trader could acquire a massive long position in the look-alike cash-
settled derivative contract and profit by bidding up the cash price of
an already scarce cash commodity. Thus, the trader's cash commodity
positions would directly affect the price of the physically-settled
futures contract and its look-alike cash-settled derivative. The
trader's strategy to purchase the cash commodity and bid up its price
could cause the value of the look-alike cash-settled derivative
position to increase because of the direct links connecting all three
markets (i.e., the positions in the underlying cash commodity, the
physically-settled derivative, and the cash-settled derivative).
Accordingly, the absence of position limits in look-alike cash-settled
derivative contracts would enable traders to effectively influence and
manipulate cash prices to benefit their cash-settled derivatives
position, which could impact the price of the physically-settled
futures contract as well.
Additionally, excessive speculation in cash-settled derivative
contracts can affect the price of the physically-settled futures
contract and the underlying cash commodity and therefore harm the price
discovery function of the underlying markets. That is, futures prices
are determined by immediate cash commodity prices, and therefore the
relationship between cash and futures prices also depends, in part, on
the storage location of a particular commodity in relation to its
delivery point, and should result in the correct amount of a particular
commodity available at the delivery point. Thus, excessive speculation
in cash-settled derivative contracts can produce excessive supplies at
delivery points and a disruption of the flows of money and commodities
exchanged.\492\
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\492\ For example, manipulated ``higher'' futures contract
prices in a cash-settled futures contract can spill over into
``lower'' prices for a physically-settled futures contract through
arbitrage trades between the two futures contracts. Traders
arbitraging between the cash-settled and physically-settled futures
contracts would short the ``higher priced'' cash-settled and long
the ``lower-priced'' physically-settled futures contracts until an
equilibrium price is achieved. However, that equilibrium price may
be distorted due to the manipulation occurring in the higher priced
cash-settled contract, and as a result the physically-settled
contract would have an artificially higher price relative to the
actual cash-market price of the underlying commodity. That higher
futures contract price would then act as a false price signal to the
underlying cash commodity market, thus incentivizing owners of the
cash commodity to increase supplies at the delivery points for the
physically-settled futures contract. Accordingly, excessive
speculation in cash-settled derivative contracts can produce
excessive supplies at delivery points and a disruption of liquidity,
price discovery, and distribution of the underlying cash
commodities.
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Accordingly, the Commission considers cash-settled referenced
contracts to be generally economically equivalent to physical-delivery
contracts in the same commodity. In the absence of position limits, an
entity with positions in both the physically delivered and cash-settled
contracts may have an increased ability and an increased incentive to
manipulate one of these contracts to benefit positions in the other
contract. As such, the Commission believes that it is essential to
apply Federal position limits to cash-settled futures and options on
futures that are directly or indirectly linked to physically-settled
contracts in order to further the statutory objective in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B)(iv) to deter and prevent market manipulation.
Furthermore, the Commission has determined that including futures
contracts and options on futures contracts that are indirectly linked
to the core referenced futures contract under the ``referenced
contract'' definition will help prevent the evasion of position limits
through the creation of an economically equivalent futures contract or
option on a futures contract, as applicable, that does not directly
reference the price of the core referenced futures contract. Such
contracts that settle to the price of a referenced contract but not to
the price of a core referenced futures contract, for example, would be
indirectly linked to the core referenced futures contract.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\ As discussed above, the Commission adopted an
``economically equivalent swap'' definition that is narrower than
the class of futures contracts and option on futures contracts that
would be included as referenced contracts. For further discussion of
the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition, see Section II.A.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, a physically-settled derivative contract with a settlement
price that is based on the same underlying commodity at a different
delivery location would not be linked, directly or indirectly, to the
core referenced futures contract. By way of example, a hypothetical
physically-settled futures contract on ultra-low sulfur diesel
delivered at L.A. Harbor instead of the NYMEX ultra-low sulfur diesel
core referenced futures contract delivered in New York Harbor would not
be linked, directly or indirectly, to the core referenced futures
contract because NYMEX's ultra-low sulfur diesel futures contract does
not include L.A. Harbor as a possible delivery point. Therefore, the
contract specification price of the hypothetical physically delivered
L.A. Harbor contract would reflect the L.A. Harbor market price for
ultra-low sulfur diesel and not the NYMEX contract's price.
(iii) Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Penultimate Contracts Are
a Subset of Cash-Settled Referenced Contracts
Penultimate contracts are a type of cash-settled futures contract
(or an option thereon) that settles the day before the corresponding
physically-settled futures contract. Penultimate contracts therefore
share the same determinative attributes as the other cash-settled look-
alike referenced contracts discussed above, including the fact that the
settlement price of a penultimate contract is linked to the
corresponding physically-settled core referenced futures contract.
In response to certain commenters requesting that the Commission
exclude penultimate contracts from the 2020 NPRM's proposed
``referenced contract'' definition (discussed below), the Commission is
affirming that penultimate contracts, as a type of linked cash-settled
look-alike contracts, fall within the Final Rule's ``referenced
contract'' definition.
Commenters were split as to whether these penultimate contracts
should be included within the ``referenced contract'' definition. ICE
argued that penultimate contracts, and specifically its penultimate
cash-settled natural gas contract, should be excluded from position
limits for several reasons, including that its natural gas penultimate
contract is economically distinct from the NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contract and has no ability to impact settlement of that core
referenced futures contract.\494\ SIFMA AMG and ISDA broadly concurred
with this position.\495\ In contrast, CME Group supported the inclusion
of penultimate contracts within the definition of
[[Page 3303]]
referenced contract.\496\ As the Commission outlined above, its ``one
market'' view applies to cash-settled contracts that are linked in some
manner to physically-settled contracts. Penultimate futures contracts
(including options thereon), as a type of linked cash-settled contract,
have the same relation to their physically-settled counterparts as
discussed above for other linked cash-settled contracts. The Commission
therefore is applying Federal position limits to all of these
instruments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ ICE at 13-14.
\495\ ISDA at 9; SIFMA AMG at 10-11.
\496\ CME Group at 3-4 (arguing that ``economically and
substantively alike contracts should be accorded the same regulatory
treatment to prevent artificial distortions from opening doors for
manipulations or shifting one market's liquidity to another.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In support of its view that penultimate contracts should not be
subject to Federal position limits, ICE offered the example of the
Henry Hub LD1 (``H'') futures contract (which has an exchange-set spot-
month position limit) and the Henry Hub Penultimate (``PHH'') futures
contract (which has exchange-set position accountability), stating that
these contracts trade side-by-side, and that there has been no evidence
of a migration to the penultimate contract due to the presence of an
accountability level rather than a hard spot-month position limit.
According to ICE, this suggests that the Commission need not be
concerned about an arbitrage opportunity between the two.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ ICE at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in further support of its argument that penultimate
contracts should not be subject to Federal position limits, ICE
suggested that penultimate contracts ``empirically'' are not
economically the same as the last day contract, as demonstrated by
settlement prices.\498\ To that end, the Commission reviewed the
settlement prices of NYMEX NG (the physically settled natural gas core
referenced futures contract), H (the ICE LD1 natural gas contract cash-
settled to the NYMEX NG), and PHH (the ICE natural gas penultimate
contract cash-settled to the NYMEX NG).\499\ Contrary to the empirical
assertion made by ICE, the prices of the six near-month contracts for
each of the contracts described above settled at identical prices on
the relevant penultimate day for all contracts at all months.\500\ As
reinforced by this observation, the Commission agrees with the
commenter that the penultimate contract is tightly correlated (and
trades side-by-side) with the cash-settled contract, as well as being
demonstrated here, with the physically settled futures contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\ Id.
\499\ Commission review of these contracts as of August 4, 2020,
based on data submitted to the Commission pursuant to part 16 of the
Commission's regulations.
\500\ The six near-month contracts reviewed by the Commission
are as follows: Sep20, Oct20, Nov20, Dec20, Jan21, and Feb21, for
each of NYMEX NG, H, and PHH. The Commission does not compare the
spot-day price on the last day of trading of the NYMEX NG contract
with the penultimate PHH contract since by definition the PHH
contract settles on the penultimate day--that is, PHH settles on the
day before NYMEX NG's last day of trading and therefore there is no
PHH price to compare against the NYMEX NG price on NYMEX NG's last
day of trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, it is not in spite of this tight correlation, but rather
because of it, that the Commission considers these contracts to form
one market, and as such, raises the importance of Federal position
limits for these instruments. As noted above, the Commission believes
that Federal position limits should apply to all contracts covered by
the Final Rule's ``referenced contract'' definition, including all
varieties of linked cash-settled contracts, such as linked penultimate
contracts, given the linkages between the physically-settled contract,
the cash-settled contract (including penultimate contracts), and the
underlying cash-market commodity, and the incentives and opportunities
for market manipulation that those linkages create.
b. Exclusions From the Referenced Contract Definition
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exclusions From the Referenced Contract
Definition
In the 2020 NPRM, paragraph (3) of the proposed ``referenced
contract'' definition explicitly excluded: (1) A location basis
contract; (2) a commodity index contract; (3) a swap guarantee; and (4)
a trade option that meets the requirements of Commission regulation
Sec. 32.3. The 2020 NPRM also included guidance in proposed Appendix C
setting forth additional clarification regarding the types of contracts
that would qualify as either a location basis contract or a commodity
index contract for purposes of the proposed exclusions from the
``referenced contract'' definition.
(2) Summary of the Commission Determination--Exclusions From the
Referenced Contract Definition
The Commission is adopting paragraph (3) of the 2020 NPRM's
proposed ``referenced contract'' with the following changes. In
addition to excluding the contracts mentioned above, the Final Rule is
modifying paragraph (3) to additionally exclude ``outright price
reporting agency index contracts'' and ``monthly average pricing
contracts'' from the ``referenced contract'' definition. To the extent
a contract fits within one of the excluded contracts in paragraph (3),
such contract is not a referenced contract, is not subject to Federal
position limits, and could not be used to net down positions in
referenced contracts (but also is not required to be added to
referenced contract positions when determining compliance with Federal
position limits).
In order to clarify the types of contracts that qualify as location
basis contracts and commodity index contracts, and thus are excluded
from the ``referenced contract'' definition, the Commission also is
adopting, with modifications described below, the guidance with respect
to these instruments in Appendix C to part 150 of the Commission's
regulations. This guidance includes information to help define the
parameters of the terms ``location basis contract'' and ``commodity
index contract.'' \501\ To the extent a particular contract fits within
this guidance, such contract would not be a referenced contract, would
not be subject to Federal position limits, and could not be used to net
down positions in referenced contracts.\502\ Unlike the 2020 NPRM, the
final guidance in Appendix C will also include additional information
regarding the definition of the terms ``outright price reporting agency
index contracts'' and ``monthly average pricing contracts.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\ The Commission notes that the further definition of
parameters regarding a commodity index contract is responsive to the
Better Markets comment letter suggesting such additional
clarifications. Better Markets at 34.
\502\ See infra Section II.B.10. (discussion of netting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments on these topics, and the Commission's responses, are set
forth below.
(3) Comments--Exclusions From the Referenced Contract Definition
On balance, commenters were generally supportive of the 2020 NPRM's
proposed exclusions from the referenced contract definition.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\ AGA at 9; CHS at 2; FIA at 2; ICE at 10-11; NCFC at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Location Basis Contracts
Commenters that provided an explicit opinion about location basis
contracts were unanimously supportive of the Commission excluding such
contracts from the definition of a referenced contract.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\ AGA at 9; ICE at 10.
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[[Page 3304]]
(ii) Commodity Index Contracts
Commenters were divided, however, regarding the exclusion of
commodity index contracts. Better Markets and IATP opposed the
exclusion,\505\ while ICE and PIMCO supported it.\506\ Better Markets
concurred with the view expressed by the Commission in the 2020 NPRM
that commodity index contracts should not be permitted to net down
referenced contract positions, but in lieu of the Commission's proposal
to exclude commodity index contracts as referenced contracts, Better
Markets suggested in the alternative that the Commission adopt
individual limits for commodity index contracts for persons also
involved in physically-settled contracts on physical commodities
serving as a constituent in the applicable index.\507\ IATP cited
several studies, including one published by Better Markets, contending
that commodity index contracts have price impacts that are detrimental
to commercial hedgers.\508\ IECA stated that the passive speculation
provided by commodity index contracts is harmful to the price discovery
function of the market.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\ Better Markets at 34, 46; IATP at 7-8 (citing studies
which they believe demonstrate that commodity index trading harms
commercial hedgers).
\506\ ICE at 2; PIMCO at 5.
\507\ Better Markets at 46.
\508\ IATP at 7-8 (citing David Frenk and Wallace Turbeville,
``Commodity Index Traders: Boom and Bust in Commodity Prices,''
Better Markets, October 2011, at 15). https://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20Commodity%20Index%20Traders%20and%20Boom-Bust%20in%20Commodities%20Prices.pdf.
\509\ Industrial Energy at 3-4, suggesting a ban on natural gas
commodity index contracts, which functionally equates to a Federal
position limit of zero, or alternatively a limit to not exceed the
current percentage of the physical market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, PIMCO argued in favor of the exclusion for commodity
index contracts, contending that commodity index contracts are useful
tools for investors looking for broad-based portfolio hedging or to
take a view on price trends in the commodity markets.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\ PIMCO at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) Trade Options
All commenters offering a specific opinion regarding trade options
unanimously supported the exclusion of trade options from the
definition of referenced contract.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\ AGA at 8; CCI at 2; EPSA at 3-4; NGSA at 4; NRECA at 17;
CEWG at 4; Chevron at 3; CHS at 2; FIA at 2; NCFC at 2; NGSA at 4;
and Suncor at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iv) Swap Guarantees
Similarly, commenters supported the exclusion of swap guarantees
from the definition of reference contract.\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\ CHS at 2; FIA at 2; NCFC at 2, offering general support
for excluding swap guarantees, but not providing a specific
rationale for doing so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(v) Outright Price Reporting Agency Index Contracts
FIA and ICE further recommended that the Commission should exclude
any outright contracts whose settlement price is based on an index
published by a price reporting agency that surveys cash-market
transaction prices from the ``referenced contract'' definition.\513\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\ FIA at 6; ICE at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(vi) Monthly Average Pricing Contracts
CME Group commented that because a significant amount of commerce
is transacted on a monthly average basis, and that because monthly
average pricing contracts are calculated using the daily prices during
the contract month such that a final settlement price of a core
referenced futures contract would have the same weight as the other
twenty or more daily prices used in the monthly average price
calculation, it would be extremely unlikely for monthly average pricing
contracts to be used to manipulate or benefit from a manipulation
during the spot period. Thus, CME Group argued monthly average pricing
contracts should also be excluded from the definition of referenced
contracts.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\514\ CME Group at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(vii) Additional Basis, Differential, and Spread Contracts
ICE recommended that certain other contracts, such as additional
basis and spread contracts, should generally be excluded from the
definition of a referenced contract, even if the contracts reference a
core referenced futures contract as one component.\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\ ICE at 12; see also FIA at 4 (recommending that the spread
transaction definition should be expanded to exempt additional,
commonly used spreads). For further discussion on the ``spread
transaction'' definition, see Section II.A.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Discussion of Final Rule--Exclusions From the Referenced Contract
Definition
The Commission is finalizing as proposed the exclusions from the
referenced contract definition for location basis contracts, commodity
index contracts, swap guarantees, and trade options that meet the
requirements of Sec. 32.3. Further, as noted above, the Commission is
expanding prong (3) of the proposed referenced contract definition to
additionally exclude two other contract types: ``outright price
reporting agency index contracts'' and ``monthly average pricing
contracts.''
(i) Location Basis Contracts
The Commission has determined that, unless location basis contracts
are excluded from the ``referenced contract'' definition, speculators
would be able to net portions of their location basis contracts with
outright positions in one of the locations comprising the core
referenced futures contract, which would permit extraordinarily large
speculative positions in the outright core referenced futures
contract.\516\ For example, the 2020 NPRM explained that a large
outright position in NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) futures contracts
could not be netted down against a location basis contract that cash-
settles to the difference in price between the Gulf Coast Natural Gas
futures contract and the NYMEX NG futures contract.\517\ Absent this
exclusion, a market participant could increase its exposure in the
outright contract by using the location basis contract to net down
against its NYMEX NG futures position, thereby allowing the market
participant to further increase the outright NYMEX NG futures contract
position that would otherwise exceed the Federal position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\516\ See infra Section II.B.10. (discussion of netting).
\517\ 85 FR at 11620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While excluding location basis contracts from the referenced
contract definition would prevent the circumstance described above, it
would also mean that location basis contracts would not be subject to
Federal position limits. The Commission is comfortable with this
outcome because location basis contracts generally demonstrate minimal
volatility and are typically significantly less liquid than the core
referenced futures contracts, meaning, in the Commission's estimation,
it is less likely that a potential manipulator would be able to effect
a market manipulation using these contracts. Further, excluding
location basis contracts from the referenced contract definition may
allow commercial end-users to more efficiently hedge the cost of
commodities at their preferred location to the extent they may
frequently require the physical commodity at a location other than the
core referenced futures contract's specified contract delivery point.
(ii) Commodity Index Contracts
With respect to commodity index contracts, the Commission similarly
has
[[Page 3305]]
determined that excluding commodity index contracts from the
``referenced contract'' definition will ensure that market participants
cannot use a position in a commodity index contract to net down an
outright position in a referenced contract that was a component of the
commodity index contract.
Regarding Better Markets' and IATP's requests that the Commission
alter the proposed ``referenced contract'' definition to include
commodity index contracts (i.e., to remove commodity index contracts
from the list of excluded contracts in paragraph (3) of the
``referenced contract'' definition), the Commission notes that if it
did not exclude commodity index contracts, the Commission's rules would
allow speculators to take on massive outright positions in referenced
contracts by netting against a position in a commodity index contract,
which could lead to excessive speculation.
For example, the Commission understands that it is common for swap
dealers to enter into commodity index contracts with participants for
which the contract would not qualify as a bona fide hedging position
(e.g., with a pension fund). Failing to exclude commodity index
contracts from the referenced contract definition could enable a swap
dealer to use positions in commodity index contracts to net down
offsetting outright futures positions in the components of the index.
Additionally, this would have the effect of subverting the statutory
pass-through swap provision in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B), which is
intended to foreclose the recognition of positions entered into for
risk management purposes as bona fide hedges unless the swap dealer is
entering into positions opposite a counterparty for which the swap
position is a bona fide hedge.\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission recognizes that although excluding commodity index
contracts from the ``referenced contract'' definition would prevent the
potentially risky netting circumstance described above, it would also
mean that commodity index contracts would not be subject to Federal
position limits. The Commission concludes that this is an acceptable
outcome because the contracts comprising the index would themselves be
subject to limits, and because commodity index contracts generally tend
to exhibit low volatility since they are diversified across many
different commodities.
With respect to Better Markets', ICEA's, and PMAA's requests to
impose separate standalone, or aggregate, position limits on commodity
index contracts, the Commission does not believe doing so is useful to
the extent that the individual components of a commodity index contract
are subject to Federal position limits under the Final Rule. The
Commission also is concerned that adopting a standalone limit for a
commodity index contract could inadvertently limit transactions in
commodity derivatives contracts outside the Final Rule's scope.
Specifically, a commodity index contract may contain components that
are subject to Federal position limits, as well as additional
components that are not. If the Commission were to place standalone
limits on these commodity index contracts, it would impose de facto
constraints on commodity derivative contracts that are not intended to
be the subject to the Final Rule and for which the Commission has not
found position limits to be necessary.
(iii) Trade Options
The Commission also is finalizing, as proposed, the exclusion of
trade options that meet the requirements of Sec. 32.3 from the
definition of referenced contract. The Commission has traditionally
exempted trade options from a number of Commission requirements because
trade options are typically employed by end-users to hedge physical
risk and thus do not contribute to excessive speculation. Trade options
are not subject to position limits under current regulations, and the
proposed exclusion of trade options from the referenced contract
definition would simply codify existing practice.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\519\ In the trade options final rule, the Commission stated its
belief that Federal position limits should not apply to trade
options, and expressed an intention to address trade options in the
context of any final rulemaking on position limits. See Trade
Options, 81 FR at 14971.
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(iv) Swap Guarantees
The Commission additionally is excluding, as proposed, swap
guarantees from the ``referenced contract'' definition. In connection
with further defining the term ``swap'' jointly with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the ``Product Definition Adopting Release,''
\520\ the Commission interpreted the term ``swap'' (that is not a
``security-based swap'' or ``mixed swap'') to include a guarantee of
such swap, to the extent that a counterparty to a swap position would
have recourse to the guarantor in connection with the position.\521\
Excluding guarantees of swaps from the definition of ``referenced
contract'' will help avoid any potential confusion regarding the
application of position limits to guarantees of swaps. The Commission
understands that swap guarantees generally serve as insurance, and, in
many cases, swap guarantors guarantee the performance of an affiliate
in order to entice a counterparty to enter into a swap with such
guarantor's affiliate. As a result, the Commission believes that swap
guarantees do not contribute to excessive speculation, market
manipulation, squeezes, or corners. Furthermore, the Commission
believes that swap guarantees were not contemplated by Congress when
Congress articulated its policy goals with respect to position limits
in CEA section 4a(a).\522\ Accordingly, the Commission is finalizing
the exclusion of swap guarantees from the definition of ``referenced
contract.''
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\520\ See generally Further Definition of ``Swap,'' ``Security-
Based Swap,'' and ``Security-Based Swap Agreement''; Mixed Swaps;
Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48208 (Aug. 13,
2012) (``Product Definitions Adopting Release'').
\521\ 77 FR at 48226.
\522\ To the extent that swap guarantees may lower costs for
uncleared OTC swaps in particular by incentivizing a counterparty to
enter into a swap with the guarantor's affiliate, excluding swap
guarantees may improve market liquidity, which is consistent with
the CEA's statutory goals in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B) to ensure
sufficient liquidity for bona fide hedgers when establishing its
position limit framework.
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(v) New Exclusions from the ``Referenced Contract'' Definition--Price
Reporting Agency Index Contracts and Monthly Average Pricing Contracts
Finally, the Commission is modifying prong (3) of the proposed
``referenced contract'' definition to additionally exclude from the
Final Rule: (a) Monthly average pricing contracts and (b) outright
price reporting agency index contracts.
(a) Monthly Average Pricing Contracts
In response to commenter suggestions, the Commission is providing
non-binding guidance in Appendix C to this Final Rule to assist market
participants and exchanges in determining whether a particular contract
qualifies as a ``monthly average pricing contract,'' that the Final
Rule is excluding from the ``referenced contract'' definition.
Specifically, in response to Question 15 of the 2020 NPRM, CME Group
commented that contract types that are generally referred to in
industry nomenclature as calendar-month average (``CMA''), trade-month
average (``TMA''), and balance-of-the-month (``BALMO'') contracts
should be excluded from the list of referenced contracts and subject
solely to exchange-set position limits.\523\ CME
[[Page 3306]]
Group explains the prevalence of these contracts in the market, and
notes an example of the June 2020 monthly average contract (in which
there are 22 U.S. business days and thus 22 daily referenced prices
incorporated into the calendar month average), concluding that it is
difficult to manipulate a CMA. CME Group thus posits that excluding
CMAs would not incentivize manipulation of the underlying core
referenced futures contract.\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\ CME Group at 13.
\524\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an initial matter, the Commission's addition of the new term
``monthly average pricing contracts'' to Appendix C of this Final Rule
is intended to generally cover the types of contracts addressed in CME
Group's comments, which are generally referred to in the industry as
``CMAs,'' ``TMAs,'' and ``BALMOs.'' The Commission agrees with CME
Group's rationale. The Commission understands that because the final
settlement price of a core referenced futures contract is only one of
many pricing points that constitute that monthly average, and as such
generally has a relatively insignificant impact on such core referenced
futures contract's monthly average price, it therefore also has a
relatively insignificant impact on the settlement price of the
corresponding monthly average pricing contract. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that on balance, excluding monthly average pricing
contracts from the definition of referenced contract is consistent with
the statutory goals in CEA section 4a(a)(3), including with respect to
ensuring sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers due to: (1)
The difficulty and expense of any entity artificially moving the price
of the monthly average by manipulating one or more component prices
within the contract; and (2) the widespread use and utility of these
contracts to commercial entities to hedge their risk. The Commission
provides non-binding guidance in Appendix C of the Final Rule to assist
market participants and exchanges in determining whether a particular
contract qualifies as a ``monthly average pricing contract.''
(b) Outright Price Reporting Agency Index Contracts
The Commission is also modifying prong (3) of the proposed
``referenced contract'' definition to explicitly exclude ``outright
price reporting agency index contracts.'' ICE supported the exclusion
of such contracts in its comment letter.\525\ Further, FIA also
commented that it believed that a price reporting agency index contract
is outside the definition of a referenced contract.\526\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\525\ ICE at 10.
\526\ FIA at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission agrees with ICE and FIA and confirms this
understanding. The Commission explained in the 2020 NPRM that based on
its plain reading, the ``referenced contract'' definition excluded such
contracts because outright price reporting agency index contracts were
not ``directly or indirectly'' linked to the price of a referenced
contract.\527\ The Commission reaffirms its conclusion that an
``outright price reporting agency index contract,'' which is based on
an index published by a price reporting agency that surveys cash-market
transaction prices (even if the cash-market practice is to price at a
differential to a futures contract), is not directly or indirectly
linked to the corresponding referenced contract. The Commission is
modifying the final ``referenced contract'' definition to explicitly
exclude such contracts for the sake of regulatory certainty. Similar to
the other contracts excluded from the ``referenced contract''
definition, the Commission is providing non-binding guidance in
Appendix C of the Final Rule to assist market participants and
exchanges in determining whether a particular contract qualifies as an
``outright price reporting agency index contract'' and therefore is
excluded as a referenced contract. The Commission underscores that this
exclusion applies only to ``outright'' price reporting agency index
contracts, and that a contract that settles to the difference (i.e.,
settled at a basis) between a referenced contract and the price
reporting agency index would be directly linked, and thus would qualify
as a referenced contract, because it settles in part to the referenced
contract price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\527\ 85 FR at 11620.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the Commission stated in the preamble to the 2020 NPRM that
an outright price reporting agency index contract does not qualify as a
``referenced contract,'' the Commission does not believe that the Final
Rule's modification to explicitly exclude the term in the regulatory
definition of ``referenced contract'' represents a change in policy.
Instead, it is merely a technical change to the regulatory text to
provide regulatory clarity to market participants.
(vi) Additional Basis, Differential, and Spread Contracts
Regarding ICE's comment that additional basis, differential, and
spread contracts should generally be excluded from the ``referenced
contract'' definition,\528\ the Commission notes a heightened concern
with potential manipulation through the use of outright positions
(particularly through inappropriate netting) and spreads, compared to
location basis contracts or commodity index contracts.\529\ Notably,
and as described in greater detail above, the Commission views the
constraints on the liquidity and volatility associated with location
basis and commodity index contracts as not present to an equal degree
in other basis and spread contracts. As noted above, while excluding
location basis contracts and commodity index contracts from the
referenced contract definition could permit large outright positions in
such contracts, the Commission believes that excluding these contracts
will nonetheless prevent the potentially risky and inappropriate
netting of a core referenced futures contract described above. Further,
as stated above, the Commission believes that location basis contracts
generally demonstrate minimal volatility and are typically
significantly less liquid than the core referenced futures contracts,
meaning they would be more costly to try to use to manipulate a core
referenced futures contract. Similarly, with respect to commodity index
contracts, commodities comprising the index could themselves be subject
to Federal position limits, and commodity index contracts also
generally tend to exhibit low volatility since they are diversified
across many different commodities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\ ICE at 12, noting contracts that capture the differential
between different grades of a commodity (e.g., WTI vs. sour crude)
or between different but related commodities (e.g., a crack
differential) as examples of contracts it believes should excluded.
\529\ See 78 FR at 75696-75697.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, it is unclear from ICE's discussion what additional
contract types that ICE has in mind, other than outright price
reporting agency index contracts that the Commission discusses above,
since several of the examples provided by ICE may already be exempt
under the ``spread transaction'' definition (e.g., the spread examples
provided by ICE \530\ may qualify for a spread exemption under the
Final Rule as either a quality differential spread or an inter-
commodity spread). ICE also stated that the requirement that a spread
exemption be approved by the exchange seems unnecessary and is probably
unworkable, but did not provide any arguments as to why obtaining
exchange approval would be unnecessary.\531\
[[Page 3307]]
Additionally, the Commission notes that under the Final Rule, an
exemption for any spread that is included in the ``spread transaction''
definition is self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position
limits, and, unlike the role that exchanges may play with respect to
non-enumerated bona fide hedges in final Sec. 150.9, exchanges have no
analogous role with respect to spread exemptions for Federal position
limits purposes under the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\530\ ICE at 12.
\531\ For further discussion of the ``spread transaction''
definition, see Section II.A.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. List of Referenced Contracts
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--List of Referenced Contracts
In order to provide clarity to market participants, the Commission
proposed to publish, and anticipated regularly updating, a CFTC Staff
Workbook of Commodity Derivative Contracts under the Regulations
Regarding Position Limits for Derivatives (the ``Staff Workbook'') on
the Commission's website which would list exchange-traded products that
are subject to Federal position limits. In order to ensure that the
list remained accurate, the Commission also proposed changes to certain
provisions of part 40 of its regulations, which pertain to the
collection of position limits information through the filing of product
terms and conditions.
In particular, under existing Sec. Sec. 40.2, 40.3, and 40.4, DCMs
and SEFs must submit certain requirements related to the listing of
certain new products. Many of the required submissions include the
product's ``terms and conditions,'' as defined in Sec. 40.1(j), which
in turn includes under Sec. 40.1(j)(1)(vii) ``Position limits,
position accountability standards, and position reporting
requirements.''
The Commission proposed to expand Sec. 40.1(j)(1)(vii), which
addresses futures contracts and options contracts, to also include an
indication as to whether the submitted contract meets the ``referenced
contract'' definition in proposed Sec. 150.1. If so, proposed Sec.
40.1(j)(1)(vii) required the submission to also include the name of the
core referenced futures contract on which the submitted new product is
based.
The Commission further proposed to expand Sec. 40.1(j)(2)(vii),
which addresses swaps, to require the applicant to indicate whether the
submitted contract meets the proposed ``economically equivalent swap''
definition in Sec. 150.1. If so, proposed Sec. 40.1(j)(2)(vii)
similarly required the submission to include the name of the referenced
contract to which the swap is economically equivalent.
b. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--List of
Referenced Contracts
The Commission is adopting as final the 2020 NPRM's amendments to
part 40 of its regulations with one modification that relates to filing
the name of the referenced contract on which the new product is based.
Part 40 and the Commission's amendments pertain to the collection of
position limits information through the filing of product terms and
conditions, and the publication and regular updates of exchange-traded
contracts that are subject to Federal position limits.\532\ The
Commission notes that the Staff Workbook is intended to provide a non-
exhaustive list of exchange-traded referenced contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits. Although the Commission endeavors
to timely update this list of contracts, the omission of a contract
from the Staff Workbook does not mean that such contract is outside the
definition of a referenced contract subject to Federal position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\532\ As discussed above, the Commission will provide market
participants with reasonable, good-faith discretion to determine
whether a swap would qualify as economically equivalent for Federal
position limit purposes. Due to differences between OTC swaps and
exchange-traded futures contracts and options thereon, the Staff
Workbook would not include a list of economically equivalent swaps.
For further discussion, see supra Section II.A.4. (discussion of
economically equivalent swaps).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While proposed Sec. 40.1(j)(1)(vii) required the submitted futures
contract (or option thereon) to also include the name of the core
referenced futures contract on which the submitted new product is
based, final Sec. 40.1(j)(1)(vii) instead requires that the submitted
product includes the name of either the core referenced futures
contract or referenced contract, as applicable, on which the contract
is based. This is because, as discussed above under the ``referenced
contract'' definition, a referenced contract could be indirectly or
directly linked to another referenced contract that is not a core
referenced futures contract. For example, an options contract could be
based on a cash-settled look-alike or penultimate futures contract that
is a referenced contract rather than on the physically-settled core
referenced futures contract.
The Commission's concurrent publication of the Staff Workbook will
provide a non-exhaustive list of exchange-traded referenced contracts,
and will help market participants in determining categories of
contracts that fit within the referenced contract definition. This
effort is intended to provide clarity to market participants regarding
which exchange-traded contracts are subject to Federal position limits.
The proposed amendments to part 40 to specify new referenced
contracts generally received support.\533\ ICE noted the need for clear
guidance on how new contracts will be assessed, in order to determine
whether such contracts will be referenced contracts, and make
consistent determinations with respect to economically similar
products.\534\ Although commenters also generally supported the
publication of the Workbook, many suggested modifications, including
clarifications regarding which contracts are included as referenced
contracts, and the basis for making such determinations.\535\ The
Commission believes that the amendments to part 40 will allow the
Commission to consistently and accurately assess whether contracts
should be included within the Staff Workbook. The Commission also
believes that by providing regular updates to the Staff Workbook,
market participants will have accurate and consistent information to
assess whether such contracts are subject to Federal position limits.
Additionally, the Staff Workbook will provide a linkage between each
referenced contract, and either the core referenced futures contract or
referenced contract, as applicable, to which it is linked, to aid in
market participants' understanding of the Commission's determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\533\ AGA at 10; MFA/AIMA at 4.
\534\ ICE at 12.
\535\ AGA at 10; MFA/AIMA at 9; FIA at 6; Chevron at 14; Suncor
at 14; and CEWG at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternatively, some commenters suggested that the Staff Workbook
could include a list of all contracts Commission staff finds are not
referenced contracts,\536\ and CME Group and ICE each provided a list
of contracts they believe should be excluded from the Staff
Workbook.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\536\ FIA at 6; MFA/AIMA at 9.
\537\ CME Group at 13; ICE at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that by providing a Staff Workbook listing
core referenced futures contracts, and the referenced contracts that
are directly or indirectly related to them, the Commission is
presenting a list of contracts subject to Federal position limits in
the clearest possible fashion. Additionally, the amendments to part 40
will allow regular and accurate updates to this list.
Some commenters expressed concern that the Staff Workbook lists
contracts that are not referenced contracts,\538\ or
[[Page 3308]]
provided examples asking for clarification.\539\ One commenter
recommended that the Commission appoint a task force to develop a
comprehensive baseline list of referenced contracts listed for trading
on exchanges.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ FIA at 6; ICE at 9-12. ICE is specifically concerned that
the proposed workbook contains inconsistencies, such as including
location basis contracts and PRA/Price Index Contracts.
\539\ Chevron at 14; CEWG at 29.
\540\ CEWG at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that Commission staff (as opposed to a
taskforce) is best positioned to continually refine the Workbook
through accurate, timely updates, as aided by the additional
information required by the newly adopted amendments to part 40 under
the Final Rule.
Further, some commenters believed that the Commission should
require exchanges to publish and maintain a definitive list of
referenced contracts (other than economically equivalent swaps).\541\
While CME Group did not believe that the Commission should impose such
a requirement on exchanges, it supported coordinating with the
Commission to ensure consistency, and publishing this information on
CME Group's website.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\541\ MFA/AIMA at 7; Citadel at 4-5; SIFMA AMG at 11-12.
\542\ CME Group at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that publication of the Staff Workbook on
the www.cftc.gov website will provide a centralized location for market
participants to assess whether certain instruments are subject to
Federal position limits. Although the Commission is encouraged that
exchanges may provide redundancy in also publishing this list of core
referenced futures contracts and related referenced contracts listed
for trading on their respective exchanges, the Commission is not
adopting a requirement for exchanges to publish this information at
this time.
Finally, CME Group contended that for commodities with only spot
month limits, financially-settled futures and options contracts should
be excluded from the Staff Workbook and not subject to Federal position
limits if the final settlement/expiry of the cash-settled futures or
option occurs before the spot month period of its core referenced
futures contract begins. CME Group additionally asserted that option
contracts that exercise into physically-settled core referenced futures
contracts should be included in the Staff Workbook and subject to
Federal position limits even if final settlement/expiry of the option
occurs before spot month period begins.
The Commission agrees with both of CME Group's assertions with one
exception. While the Commission agrees that cash-settled futures
contracts and options on such futures contracts that are non-legacy
contracts (i.e., the 16 core referenced futures contracts that will not
have Federal non-spot position limits) and settle or expire prior to
when the spot month limits would become effective in the spot period
are not subject to Federal spot month position limits, such futures and
options contracts do qualify as referenced contracts based on the
settlement price being linked to a core referenced futures contract.
However, because the corresponding 16 core referenced futures contracts
are not subject to non-spot month Federal position limits, then these
cash-settled futures contracts and options contracts similarly are also
not subject to Federal position limits during the non-spot month.
Accordingly, as contracts not subject to Federal spot or non-spot month
position limits, these contracts will not be included in the Staff
Workbook, even if such contracts qualify as referenced contracts. The
Commission further agrees that options that exercise into the
physically-settled core referenced futures contract are within the
definition of referenced contract because when the options are
exercised, they become positions in the core referenced futures
contract.
The Commission is clarifying that it will publish a revised Staff
Workbook shortly after the publication of this Final Rule on the
Commission's website and before the Final Rule's Effective Date. This
revised Staff Workbook will reflect the revised ``referenced contract''
definition, clarify CME Group's discussion with respect to options
discussed in the immediately above paragraph, and generally fix any
errors identified by commenters.
17. ``Short Position''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Short Position
The Commission proposed to expand the existing definition of
``short position,'' currently defined in Sec. 150.1(h), to include
swaps and to clarify that any such positions would be measured on a
futures-equivalent basis.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Short
Position
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``short
position.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed.
18. ``Speculative Position Limit''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Speculative Position Limit
The Commission proposed to define the term ``speculative position
limit'' for use throughout part 150 of the Commission's regulations to
refer to Federal or exchange-set limits, net long or net short,
including single month, spot month, and all-months-combined limits.
This proposed definition was not intended to limit the authority of
exchanges to adopt other types of limits that do not meet the
``speculative position limit'' definition, such as a limit on gross
long or gross short positions, or a limit on holding or controlling
delivery instruments.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Speculative
Position Limit
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``speculative
position limit.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed
with some non-substantive technical changes related to the numbering
structure.
19. ``Spot Month,'' ``Single Month,'' and ``All-Months''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Spot Month, Single Month, and All Months
The Commission proposed to expand the existing definition of ``spot
month'' to: (1) Account for the fact that the proposed limits would
apply to both physically-settled and certain cash-settled contracts;
(2) clarify that the spot month for referenced contracts would be the
same period as that of the relevant core referenced futures contract;
and (3) account for variations in spot month conventions that differ by
commodity.
In particular, for the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) core referenced
futures contract, the spot month would mean the period of time
beginning at the opening of trading on the second business day
following the expiration of the regular option contract traded on the
expiring futures contract and ending when the contract expires. For the
ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) core referenced futures contract, the spot month
would mean the period of time beginning on the third-to-last trading
day of the contract month and ending when the contract expires. For the
CME Live Cattle (LC) core referenced futures contract, the spot month
would mean the period of time beginning at the close of trading on the
first business day following the first Friday of the contract month and
ending when the contract expires.
The Commission also proposed to eliminate the existing definitions
of
[[Page 3309]]
``single month'' and ``all-months'' because the definitions for those
terms would be built into the proposed definition of ``speculative
position limit'' described above.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Spot Month,
Single Month, and All Months
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``spot month'' or
the proposed elimination of the existing definitions of ``single
month'' and ``all months.'' The Commission is adopting the definition
of spot month as proposed, but with a correction to reflect the proper
spot month period for the Live Cattle (LC) core referenced futures
contract. Final Sec. 150.1 defines the spot month for the Live Cattle
(LC) core referenced futures contract as the period of time beginning
at the close of trading on the first business day following the first
Friday of the contract month and ending when the contract expires. The
Commission is eliminating the existing definitions of ``single month''
and ``all months'' as proposed. Finally, the Commission is adopting
some non-substantive technical changes related to the numbering
structure.
20. ``Spread Transaction''
i. Background--Spread Transaction, Existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3)
In existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3), the Commission exempts from Federal
position limits ``spread or arbitrage positions,'' subject to certain
restrictions, including the restriction that the spread position be
outside of the spot month.\543\ The existing regulations do not,
however, define ``spread or arbitrage positions.'' Further, under
existing regulations, spread exemptions from Federal positions limits
are self-effectuating and do not require prior Commission approval.
Rather, market participants must request spread exemptions from the
relevant exchange(s) in advance of exceeding exchange limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\543\ See 17 CFR 150.3(a)(3) (permitting spread or arbitrage
positions that are ``between single months of a futures contract
and/or, on a futures-equivalent basis, options thereon, outside of
the spot month, in the same crop year; provided, however, that such
spread or arbitrage positions, when combined with any other net
positions in the single month, do not exceed the all-months limit
set forth in Sec. 150.2.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Spread Transaction
The Commission proposed a ``spread transaction'' definition to
exempt from Federal position limits transactions normally known to the
trade as ``spreads.'' The proposed definition would explicitly include
common types of spread strategies, including: Calendar spreads; inter-
commodity spreads; quality differential spreads; processing spreads
(such as energy ``crack'' or soybean ``crush'' spreads); product or by-
product differential spreads; and futures-options spreads. The proposed
spread transaction definition would also eliminate the existing Sec.
150.3(a)(3) restrictions on spread exemptions, including the
restriction that spread positions be outside of the spot-month.
Under proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(2)(i), positions that meet the
``spread transaction'' definition would be self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits. Separately, under proposed Sec.
150.3(a)(2)(ii), the Commission would, on a case-by-case basis, be able
to exempt any other spread transaction that was not included in the
proposed spread transaction definition, but that the Commission has
determined is consistent with CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B),\544\ and
exempted, pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.3(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\544\ As noted above, CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B) provides that the
Commission shall set limits ``to the maximum extent practicable, in
its discretion--(i) to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation as described under this section; (ii) to deter and
prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; (iii) to ensure
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (iv) to
ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying market is
not disrupted.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Spread Transaction
The Commission is adopting the definition of ``spread transaction''
with certain modifications to the definition to include additional
spread types, as described below, to address commenters' views and
other considerations. The Commission is providing additional
clarification with respect to cash-and-carry exemptions as well as the
application of spread exemptions to the NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contract. The Commission is also adopting Appendix G to part
150 under the Final Rule to provide additional clarifications to market
participants in connection with the Commission's treatment of spread
exemptions under the Final Rule.
iii. Comments--Spread Transaction
Generally, commenters requested that the Commission expand or
clarify the ``spread transaction'' definition to ensure that other
commonly-used spread strategies are exempted from Federal position
limits, including: (1) Intra-market and inter-market spread positions;
\545\ (2) inter-market spread positions where the legs of the
transaction are futures contracts in the same commodity and same
calendar month or expiration; \546\ (3) inter-market spreads in which
one leg is a referenced contract and the other is a commodity
derivative contract (including an OTC swap) that is not subject to
Federal positions limits; \547\ (4) a spread between a physically-
settled position and a cash-settled position; \548\ (5) a spread
between two cash-settled contracts in the spot period, even if one leg
is not subject to Federal position limits; \549\ (6) intra-commodity
spreads (including an intra-commodity spread between two cash-settled
contracts or between the cash-settled and related physically-settled
futures contract); \550\ and (7) cash-and-carry exemptions that are
currently permitted under IFUS Rule 6.29(e).\551\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\545\ MFA/AIMA at 10; CMC at 7.
\546\ ICE at 7.
\547\ ICE at 7; FIA at 21.
\548\ CME Group at 11.
\549\ Id.
\550\ CEWG at 27; FIA at 20-21 (explaining that the intra-
commodity spread would acknowledge the link between the prices of
cash-settled and physical delivery futures involving the same
commodity). See also CEWG at 27; CCI at 2-3 (requesting an exemption
for intra-commodity spreads that are: (1) In the same class of
referenced contract, (2) across classes of referenced contracts, or
(3) across markets in referenced contracts (i.e., on different
exchanges) in the same or different calendar months); CEWG at 27
(providing proposed revisions to the ``spread transaction''
regulatory text); CME Group at 11.
\551\ FIA at 21; see also, IFUS at 7-9 (providing an example of
a cash-and-carry exemption and describing such exemption as a type
of calendar month spread where a person holds a long position in the
spot month and a short position in the second nearby contract month)
and IFUS Rule 6.29(e) (outlining its strict procedures that set the
terms by which cash-and-carry exemptions may be permitted, including
the following conditions: (i) The person seeking the exemption must
provide the cost of carrying the physical commodity, the minimum
spread differential at which it will enter into a straddle position
in order to obtain profit, and the quantity of stocks currently
owned in IFUS licensed warehouses or tank facilities; (ii) when
granted a cash and carry exemption, the person receiving the
exemption shall agree that before the price of the nearby contract
month rises to a premium to the second contract month, it will
liquidate all long positions in the nearby contract month; and (iii)
block trades may not be used to establish positions upon which a
cash and carry exemption request is based). IFUS further explained
that it has a long history of granting cash and carry exemptions for
certain warehoused contracts (specifically coffee, cocoa, and FCOJ),
and that where there are plentiful supplies, these exemptions serve
an economic purpose in the days leading up to the first notice day
and throughout the notice period, because: (1) They help maintain an
appropriate economic relationship between the nearby and next
successive contract month; (2) they allow commercial market
participants the opportunity to compete for the ownership of
certified inventories beyond the limitations of the spot-month
position limit; and (3) the holder of the exemption provides
liquidity so that traders that carry short positions into the notice
period without capability to deliver may exit their positions in an
orderly manner. According to IFUS, if the appropriate supply and
price relationship exists in a given expiry, and the exchange grants
the application, then proper application of the terms as expiry
approaches will assist in an orderly expiration. IFUS 7-9; FIA at
21.
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[[Page 3310]]
In addition, commenters requested that the Commission clarify that:
(1) The ``spread transaction'' definition is a non-exhaustive list, and
therefore, permit exchanges to grant spread exemptions that are not
covered by Sec. 150.3(a)(2) by using the streamlined process in Sec.
150.9 for recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedges; \552\ and (2) a
calendar spread would permit a market participant to net down its
positions for the purposes of Federal spot-month and single-month
limits.\553\
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\552\ ICE at 7.
\553\ Citadel at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Spread Transaction
The Commission is adopting the proposed definition of ``spread
transaction'' with certain modifications, as described below, to
address commenters' views and other considerations. First, the
Commission is expanding the definition to include additional types of
spreads. Second, the Commission is clarifying the treatment of cash-
and-carry exemptions as permissible calendar spreads and providing
additional guidance to exchanges in connection with such spreads.
Third, the Commission addresses the application of spread exemptions in
connection with the NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract. The
Commission is also providing additional guidance on the use of exempt
spread transactions in Appendix G of this Final Rule.
a. The ``Spread Transaction'' Definition Includes Several Additional
Spread Types Under the Final Rule
First, the Commission is expanding the proposed ``spread
transaction'' definition to make clear that the definition as finalized
includes intra-market, inter-market, and intra-commodity spread
positions in addition to the spread strategies listed in the proposed
definition. The final ``spread transaction'' definition will cover:
Intra-market spreads, inter-market spreads, intra-commodity spreads,
and inter-commodity spreads, including calendar spreads, quality
differential spreads, processing spreads, product or by-product
differential spreads, and futures-options spreads.\554\ The Commission
intends for the spread transaction definition to be sufficiently broad
to capture most, if not all, spread strategies currently granted by
exchanges and used by market participants. The Commission believes this
is consistent with, but provides more clarity than, its existing
approach to spread exemptions in existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3), which
broadly exempts ``spread or arbitrage positions.'' \555\
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\554\ For example, trading activity in many commodity derivative
markets is concentrated in the nearby contract month, but a hedger
may need to offset risk in deferred months where derivative trading
activity may be less active. A calendar spread trader could provide
liquidity without exposing himself or herself to the price risk
inherent in an outright position in a deferred month. Processing
spreads can serve a similar function. For example, a soybean
processor may seek to hedge his or her processing costs by entering
into a ``crush'' spread, i.e., going long soybeans and short soybean
meal and oil. A speculator could facilitate the hedger's ability to
do such a transaction by entering into a ``reverse crush'' spread
(i.e., going short soybeans and long soybean meal and oil). Quality
differential spreads, and product or by-product differential
spreads, may serve similar liquidity-enhancing functions when
spreading a position in an actively traded commodity derivatives
market such as CBOT Wheat (W) against a position in another actively
traded market, such as MGEX Wheat.
\555\ Under existing regulations, the Commission views its use
of the term ``spread'' to mean the same as ``arbitrage'' or
``straddle'' as those terms are used in CEA section 4a(a) and
existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3) of the Commission's regulations.
Consistent with existing regulations, the Commission's sole use of
the term ``spread'' in this rulemaking is intended to also capture
arbitrage or straddle strategies, and is not intended to be a
substantive change from its existing regulations. The Commission
notes that certain exchanges may distinguish between ``spread'' and
``arbitrage'' positions for purposes of exchange exemptions, but the
Commission does not make that distinction here for purposes of its
``spread transaction'' definition.
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In light of the revised ``spread transaction'' definition, the
Commission expects that most spread strategies will qualify as intra-
market, inter-market, inter-commodity, or intra-commodity spreads, and
is providing a non-exhaustive list of the most common specific types of
spread strategies that fall within those four categories. Any requests
for spread exemptions that fall outside of the spread transaction
definition are required to be submitted to the Commission in advance
pursuant to Sec. 150.3(b) of the Final Rule. Accordingly, the
Commission has determined not to allow exchanges to grant new types of
spread exemptions using the streamlined process in Sec. 150.9 for
various reasons explained below in detail under the discussion of Sec.
150.3.\556\
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\556\ See infra Section II.C.4. (discussing statutory and policy
reasons why the Commission will not permit exchanges to process
requests for spread exemptions that are not included in the ``spread
transaction'' definition using the Sec. 150.9 process).
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In addition, considering the significant number of requests for
clarification commenters submitted regarding the spread transaction
definition, the Commission is providing guidance on spread transactions
in Appendix G to part 150 of the Commission's regulations, as adopted
in this Final Rule, to address those questions and other
considerations. In particular, paragraph (a) of the guidance provides
some recommended best practices for exchanges to consider when granting
spread exemptions, especially during the spot period. Paragraph (a) of
the guidance also reminds exchanges of their existing obligations as
self-regulatory organizations, including under DCM Core Principle 5 and
SEF Core Principle 6, as applicable, to implement their exchange-set
limits and exemption granting processes in a way that (consistent with
the rules and procedures in final Sec. 150.5 adopted herein) \557\
reduces the potential threat of market manipulation or congestion.
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\557\ See infra Section II.D. (discussing exchanges' obligations
when setting exchange position limits and granting exemptions
therefrom).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, paragraph (b) of the guidance clarifies that the
following spread strategies are covered by the ``spread transaction''
definition: (1) Inter-market spread positions where the legs of the
transaction are futures contracts in the same commodity and same
calendar month or expiration; (2) spread positions in which one leg is
a referenced contract and the other is a commodity derivative contract
that is not subject to Federal positions limits (including OTC
commodity derivative contracts, but not including commodity index
contracts); \558\ (3) a spread between a physically-settled position
and a cash-settled position; (4) a spread between two cash-settled
contracts; (5) certain cash-and-carry exemptions, subject to certain
recommendations and considerations outlined in paragraph (c) of the
Commission's guidance in Appendix G of this Final Rule; and (6) spreads
that are ``legged in'' or carried out in two steps.
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\558\ To avoid subverting the Commission's policy on not
allowing self-effectuating risk management exemptions (except
through the pass-through swap provision), the spread transaction
definition would not cover a spread position in which one leg is a
referenced contract and the other leg is a commodity index contract,
as clarified in Appendix G.
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b. ``Cash-and-Carry'' Exemptions
Second, as mentioned above, paragraph (c) of the guidance
recommends certain factors for exchanges to consider when granting
cash-and-carry exemptions.\559\ The
[[Page 3311]]
Commission understands that IFUS has granted this type of calendar
spread exemption for some time, and has experience monitoring the use
of such exemptions to ensure that its market operates in a manner that
is consistent with the applicable DCM Core Principles.\560\ The
Commission has, however, previously expressed concern about these
exemptions and their impact on the spot month price for a particular
futures contract.\561\ In particular, the Commission has explained that
a large demand for delivery on cash-and-carry positions might distort
the price of the expiring futures contract upwards.\562\ This would
particularly be a concern in those commodity markets where price
discovery for the cash spot price occurred in the expiring futures
contract.\563\
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\559\ As final Appendix G provides, the spread transaction
definition in Sec. 150.1 permits transactions commonly known as
``cash-and-carry'' trades whereby a market participant enters a long
futures positions in the spot month and an equivalent short futures
position in the following month, in order to guarantee a return
that, at minimum, covers the costs of its carrying charges. With
this exemption, the market participant is able to take physical
delivery of the product in the nearby month and may redeliver the
same product in a deferred month.
\560\ See IFUS at 7-9 and ICE Futures U.S. Rule 6.29(e).
\561\ See 81 FR at 96833.
\562\ Id.
\563\ See 81 FR at 96833.
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The Commission recognizes, however, the importance of cash-and-
carry positions in the price discovery process in certain markets and
reminds exchanges of their responsibility to monitor and safeguard
against convergence issues that could arise related to the use of cash-
and-carry exemptions. Accordingly, the Commission views these
exemptions as a type of calendar spread strategy that warrants
additional guidance to encourage exchanges to have suitable safeguards
in place to ensure that they grant and monitor cash-and-carry
exemptions in a manner that is consistent with their obligation to
reduce the potential threat of market manipulation and congestion.
c. Treatment of Spread Transactions Involving NYMEX NG
Third, the Commission is providing clarification regarding the
intersection of the conditional natural gas spot month limit exemption
and spread exemptions permitted under Sec. 150.3. As set forth in
Appendix G, the Commission reinforces that a spread transaction
exemption would not cover natural gas spot month positions that exceed
the conditional natural gas spot month limit in Sec. 150.3(a)(4) of
this Final Rule. That is, a market participant cannot rely on a spread
transaction exemption to hold a spot month position that would exceed
the equivalent of 10,000 contracts of the NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
core referenced futures contract per exchange that lists a natural gas
cash-settled referenced contract. Additional discussion on the natural
gas conditional spot month limit exemption is provided further
below.\564\
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\564\ See infra Section II.B.3.vi.a. (discussing the Federal
spot-month limit for natural gas under Sec. 150.2) and Section
II.C.6 (discussing the conditional spot-month limit for natural gas
under Sec. 150.3(a)(4)).
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As discussed further below, in Sec. 150.3, the Commission is
providing an exemption from the Federal spot month position limit level
for natural gas. The natural gas conditional spot month limit exemption
allows a trader to hold up to: (1) 10,000 spot month cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts per exchange that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract (of which there are currently three--NYMEX, IFUS,
and Nodal); and (2) an additional position in cash-settled economically
equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps that has a notional amount equal to
10,000 equivalent-sized contracts; provided, that the market
participant does not hold positions in the spot month of the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract.\565\ The Commission
adopted the Federal conditional limit for natural gas in order to avoid
disrupting the well-developed, unique liquidity characteristics of the
natural gas derivatives markets, in which the cash-settled natural gas
referenced contracts, when combined, have significantly higher
liquidity than the physically-settled natural gas contracts. The
Federal conditional limit requires divestiture of the spot month
physically-settled NYMEX referenced contract due to concerns about,
among other things, fostering an environment that incentivizes traders
to manipulate the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract in
order to benefit a larger cash-settled position in natural gas (i.e.,
``bang'' or ``mark'' the close). The Commission intends for the natural
gas conditional limit's position limit levels to serve as a firm cap
for the maximum amount of cash-settled natural gas spot month positions
a trader can hold. The Commission clarifies that a person cannot
circumvent this cap using a spread transaction exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\565\ This is different from the final Federal spot month
position limits for NYMEX NG, pursuant to which a trader may hold up
to: (1) 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts per
exchange that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract; (2)
an additional position in cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX
NG OTC swaps that has a notional amount equal to 2,000 equivalent-
sized contracts; and (3) 2,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is, the Commission believes that cash-settled natural gas
positions that exceed the natural gas conditional limit in the spot
month would be unusually large and could potentially have a disruptive
effect on the physically-settled natural gas contract, including by
inhibiting convergence at expiration. Specifically, by allowing traders
to layer additional cash-settled natural gas spot month positions on
top of the maximum cash-settled natural gas spot month positions
permitted under the natural gas conditional limit, a person could amass
an extremely large cash-settled spot month position in natural gas.
This extremely large cash-settled spot month position could push prices
up for cash-settled spot month contracts vis-[agrave]-vis the
physically-settled spot month contracts. In response, arbitrageurs may
attempt to capitalize on this price discrepancy by going short the
cash-settled spot month contracts, which would have a downward pressure
on the price of these contracts, and going long on the physically-
settled spot month contracts, which would have an upward pressure on
the price of these contracts. This upward price pressure on the
physically-settled contract could potentially push the price of the
physically-settled contract away from the actual cash price for the
natural gas commodity, which could disrupt convergence upon expiration
of the physically-settled contract. As such, the Commission clarifies
that a person cannot layer a spread exemption on top of the conditional
spot month limit in natural gas and thereby circumvent the conditional
spot month limit cap.\566\
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\566\ For the avoidance of doubt, traders who avail themselves
of a spread exemption and enter into spread positions between the
physically-settled NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract during
the spot month and one or more cash-settled natural gas referenced
contracts or cross commodity contracts, are not allowed under the
Final Rule to avail themselves of the natural gas conditional limit
until they exit the above-noted spread position.
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21. ``Swap'' and ``Swap Dealer''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Swap and Swap Dealer
The Commission proposed to incorporate the definitions of ``swap''
and ``swap dealer'' as they are defined in section 1a of the Act and
Sec. 1.3 of this chapter.\567\
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\567\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(47) and 1a(49); 17 CFR 1.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Swap and Swap
Dealer
No commenter addressed the proposed definitions of ``swap'' or
``swap dealer.'' The Commission is adopting these definitions as
proposed.
[[Page 3312]]
22. ``Transition Period Swap''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Transition Period Swap
The Commission proposed to create the defined term ``transition
period swap'' to mean any swap entered into during the period
commencing after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (July 22,
2010) and ending 60 days after the publication of a final Federal
position limits rulemaking in the Federal Register. As discussed in
connection with proposed Sec. 150.3 later in this release, if acquired
in good faith, such swaps would be exempt from Federal position limits,
although such swaps could not be netted with post-effective date swaps
for purposes of complying with spot month speculative position limits.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Transition
Period Swap
No commenter addressed the proposed definition of ``transition
period swap.'' The Commission is adopting the definition as proposed,
with two modifications. The Commission is clarifying that a transition
period swap is a swap entered into during the period commencing ``on
the day of,'' rather than ``after,'' the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010 to clarify the ambiguity of the phrase ``after the
enactment.'' The Commission is also adding a phrase to clarify that the
terms of such swaps ``have not expired as of 60 days after the
publication date.'' The Commission intended to include this in the 2020
NPRM, but the language was inadvertently omitted from the proposed
definition. This modification conforms to the definition of ``pre-
enactment swap,'' which also addresses the timeframe for expiration of
a swap's terms.
23. Deletion of Sec. 150.1(i)
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Deletion of Sec. 150.1(i)
The Commission proposed to eliminate existing Sec. 150.1(i), which
includes a table specifying the ``first delivery month of the crop
year'' for certain commodities. The crop year definition had been
pertinent for purposes of the spread exemption to the individual month
limit in current Sec. 150.3(a)(3), which limits spreads to those
between individual months in the same crop year and to a level no more
than that of the all-months limit. This provision was pertinent at a
time when the single month and all-months-combined limits were
different, which is no longer the case.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Deletion of
Sec. 150.1(i)
No commenter addressed the proposed elimination of existing Sec.
150.1(i). The Commission is adopting as proposed. Now that the current
and proposed single month and all months combined limits are the same,
and now that the Commission is adopting new enumerated bona fide hedges
in Sec. 150.1 and Appendix B to part 150 as well as a new process for
granting spread exemptions in Sec. 150.3, this provision is no longer
needed.
B. Sec. 150.2--Federal Position Limit Levels
This section will address the issues related to Federal position
limit levels in final Sec. 150.2 in the following order:\568\
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\568\ In connection with the discussion of Sec. 150.2 that
appears below, for each numbered section, the Commission generally
provides a summary of the proposed approach, a brief overview of the
Commission's final determination, a summary of comments, and the
Commission's response to comments.
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(1) Background of the existing Federal position limit levels;
(2) identification of contracts subject to both Federal spot and
non-spot month position limits, and contracts subject only to Federal
spot month position limits;
(3) Federal spot month position limit levels;
(4) Federal non-spot month position limit levels;
(5) the establishment of subsequent spot month and non-spot month
position limit levels;
(6) relevant contract months;
(7) limits on ``pre-existing positions'';
(8) positions on foreign boards of trade;
(9) anti-evasion;
(10) netting and Federal position limit levels for cash-settled
referenced contracts; and
(11) ``eligible affiliates'' and position aggregation.
As part of the discussion of Federal spot month position limit
levels (noted as issue (3) above and found in Section II.B.3. below),
the Commission also will address Federal spot month position limit
levels specifically for (i) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), (ii) NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (NG), and (iii) the three wheat core referenced futures
contracts. Similarly, as part of the discussion of Federal non-spot
month position limit levels (noted as issue (4) above and found in
Section II.B.4. below), the Commission will also address Federal non-
spot month position limit levels specifically for (i) ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT) and (ii) the three wheat core referenced futures contracts.
1. Background--Existing Federal Position Limit Levels--Sec. 150.2
Federal spot month, single month, and all-months-combined position
limits currently apply to the nine physically-settled legacy
agricultural contracts listed in existing Sec. 150.2, and, on a
futures-equivalent basis, to options contracts thereon. Existing
Federal position limit levels set forth in Sec. 150.2 \569\ apply net
long or net short and are as follows:
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\569\ 17 CFR 150.2.
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[[Page 3313]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.006
While not explicitly stated in Sec. 150.2, the Commission's
practice has been to set Federal spot month position limit levels at or
below 25% of deliverable supply based on exchange estimates of
deliverable supply (``EDS'') that are verified by the Commission, and
to set Federal position limit levels outside of the spot month at 10%
of open interest for the first 25,000 contracts of open interest, with
a marginal increase of 2.5% of open interest thereafter.
2. Application of Federal Position Limits During the Spot Month and the
Non-Spot Month
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Application of Federal Position Limits
During the Spot Month and the Non-Spot Month
The 2020 NPRM imposed Federal position limits during all contract
months for the nine legacy agricultural contracts (and their associated
referenced contracts), and only during the spot month for the 16 non-
legacy core referenced futures contracts (and their associated
referenced contracts) that would be subject to Federal position limits
for the first time.\570\ For the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts (and their associated referenced contracts), the 2020 NPRM
also required that they be subject to exchange-set position limits or
position accountability outside of the spot month.\571\
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\570\ As noted in further detail in Section II.A.16., their
associated referenced contracts are also subject to Federal position
limits.
\571\ Proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(2). For existing exchange-set
position limits, see Market Resources, ICE Futures U.S. Website,
available at https://www.theice.com/futures-us/market-resources (ICE
exchange-set position limits); Position Limits, CME Group website,
available at https://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/position-limits.html; Rules and Regulations of the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange, Inc., MGEX, available at https://www.mgex.com/documents/Rulebook_051.pdf (MGEX exchange-set position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission proposed to maintain (rather than remove) Federal
non-spot month position limits for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, with the modifications described further below, because the
Commission has observed no reason to eliminate them.\572\ These non-
spot month position limits have been in place for decades, and while
the Commission proposed to modify the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels, the Commission believed that removing them entirely could
potentially result in market disruption. The Commission's position was
reinforced by the feedback it received from commercial market
participants trading the nine legacy agricultural contracts who
requested that the Commission maintain Federal position limits outside
of the spot month in order to promote market integrity.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\572\ 85 FR at 11628.
\573\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Application of Federal
Position Limits During the Spot Month and the Non-Spot Month
The Commission is adopting the approach that was proposed in the
2020 NPRM. Under the Final Rule, Federal position limits apply to all
25 core referenced futures contracts during the spot month. The 16 non-
legacy core referenced futures contracts subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final Rule are subject to Federal
position limits only during the spot month (and not outside of the spot
month). Outside of the spot month, these 16 core referenced futures
contracts are subject only to exchange-set position limits or position
accountability.
iii. Comments--Application of Federal Position Limits During the Spot
Month and the Non-Spot Month
Many commenters generally agreed with the proposed approach and
supported Federal position limits during the spot month for all 25 core
referenced futures contracts, and outside of the spot month for only
the nine legacy agricultural contracts.\574\ The Commission did not
receive any comments objecting to Federal spot month position limits
for all 25 core referenced futures contracts.
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\574\ See MGEX at 1; CHS at 2; CME Group at 2; IFUS at 2; ICE at
2, 3-4; Chevron at 2; CMC at 6; EEI at 4; FIA at 2; MFA/AIMA at 2-3;
NCFC at 4; Shell at 3; PIMCO at 4; SIFMA AMG at 4; Suncor at 2; AQR
at 2, 4-5, 7-10; CCI at 2; COPE at 4; IECA at 2; NGSA at 3; CEWG at
3; and AFIA at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, the Commission received comments expressing
concern over two related issues. First, a few commenters disagreed with
the 2020 NPRM imposing Federal non-spot month position limits on only
the nine legacy agricultural contracts.\575\ NEFI stated that ``the
proposed rule arbitrarily fails to establish limits for non-spot month
referenced energy contracts'' and stated that ``distributing limits
across all
[[Page 3314]]
months is preferable, as it would protect market convergence and mute
disruptive signals from large speculative trades.'' \576\ PMAA echoed
similar concerns by stating that there was ``no data or discussion
provided in the proposal indicating why the Commission believes limits
for non-spot months are not appropriate.'' \577\
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\575\ In addition to comments from NEFI and PMAA, which are
discussed below, AFR and Rutkowski asserted that the 2020 NPRM will
likely be ``ineffective in controlling excessive speculation'' due,
in part, to its failure to ``impose Federal position limits outside
of the current spot month for most commodities (outside of legacy
agricultural commodities).'' AFR at 2 and Rutkowski at 2.
\576\ NEFI at 3 and PMAA at 3 (with respect to energy commodity
positions, ``[h]istory has shown on a number of occasions that large
trades in non-spot months can distort markets and increase
volatility'').
\577\ PMAA at 3. PMAA also suggested that the Commission apply
the ``traditional 2.5% limit formula to energy contracts and
economically equivalent energy futures, options, and swaps in non-
spot months.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, commenters also expressed concern that, by only having
Federal non-spot month position limits for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, the Commission is relying too much on the exchanges to
address excessive speculation.\578\ In particular, commenters were
concerned about the incentives and other conflicts of interest that
exchanges may have to permit ``higher trading volumes and large numbers
of market participants'' \579\ and about the exchanges' use of position
accountability by alleging that it is a ``voluntary'' limit \580\ and
pointing to ``recent notable failures in exchange accountability
regimes.'' \581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\578\ NEFI at 3; PMAA at 3; and IATP at 10.
\579\ NEFI at 3.
\580\ Id.
\581\ IATP at 10. See also PMAA at 3 (``[u]nfortunately, the
proposal instead finds accountability limits to be sufficient to
manage speculation'').
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iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Application of Federal Position Limits
During the Spot Month and the Non-Spot Month
The Commission is adopting the approach that was proposed in the
2020 NPRM by applying Federal position limits to all 25 core referenced
futures contracts during the spot month, but only to the existing nine
legacy agricultural contracts outside of the spot month for the reasons
discussed below.
a. Response to Comments Opposing the 2020 NPRM's Approach To Subject
Only the Nine Legacy Agricultural Contracts to Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limits
The Commission has concluded that, while it may be important and,
as described below, necessary \582\ to impose Federal spot month
position limits on each core referenced futures contract, the analysis
changes with respect to the non-spot month for the following reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\582\ See infra Section III.E. (discussing necessity finding for
spot month and non-spot month position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, while the Final Rule only applies Federal position limits to
the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts during the spot
month, the Final Rule requires exchanges to establish either position
limit levels or position accountability outside of the spot month for
all such contracts.\583\ Accordingly, all 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts will be subject to either position limits or position
accountability outside of the spot month at the exchange level. Any
such exchange-set position limit and position accountability must
comply with the standards established by the Commission in final Sec.
150.5(b) including, among other things, that any such levels be
``necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the underlying
commodity's price or index.'' \584\ Exchanges are also required to
submit any rules adopting or modifying such position limit or position
accountability to the Commission in advance of implementation pursuant
to part 40 of the Commission's regulations.\585\ Additionally,
exchanges are subject to DCM Core Principle 5 or SEF Core Principle 6,
as applicable, which establish additional protections against
manipulation and congestion.\586\ These tools and legal obligations, in
conjunction with surveillance at both the exchange and Federal level,
will continue to offer strong deterrence and protection against
manipulation and disruptions outside of the spot month.\587\
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\583\ Final Sec. 150.5(b)(2).
\584\ Id.
\585\ 17 CFR part 40. Under the final ``position
accountability'' definition in Sec. 150.1, exchange accountability
rules must require a trader whose position exceeds the
accountability level to consent to: (1) Provide information about
its position to the exchange; and (2) halt increasing further its
position or reduce its position in an orderly manner, in each case
as requested by the exchange.
\586\ Commission regulation Sec. 38.300, which mirrors DCM Core
Principle 5, states: ``To reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion (especially during trading in the
delivery month), the board of trade shall adopt for each contract of
the board of trade, as is necessary and appropriate, position
limitations or position accountability for speculators. For any
contract that is subject to a position limitation established by the
Commission, pursuant to section 4a(a), the board of trade shall set
the position limitation of the board of trade at a level not higher
than the position limitation established by the Commission.'' 17 CFR
38.300 and 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5). Likewise, Commission regulation Sec.
37.600, which mirrors SEF Core Principle 6, states: ``(a) In
general. To reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion, especially during trading in the delivery month, a swap
execution facility that is a trading facility shall adopt for each
of the contracts of the facility, as is necessary and appropriate,
position limitations or position accountability for speculators. (b)
Position limits. For any contract that is subject to a position
limitation established by the Commission pursuant to section 4a(a)
of the Act, the swap execution facility shall: (1) Set its position
limitation at a level no higher than the Commission limitation; and
(2) Monitor positions established on or through the swap execution
facility for compliance with the limit set by the Commission and the
limit, if any, set by the swap execution facility.'' 17 CFR 37.600
and 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(6).
\587\ 85 FR at 11629.
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Second, in response to the concerns expressed by NEFI and PMAA that
a lack of Federal non-spot month position limits could harm market
convergence and lead to disruptive signals from large speculative
trades,\588\ the Commission reiterates that corners and squeezes, and
related convergence issues, do not occur outside of the spot month when
there is no threat of delivery.\589\ Convergence occurs during the spot
month and, specifically, at the expiration of the spot month for a
physically-settled contract. As a result, positions outside of the spot
month have minimal impact on convergence. The Commission, however,
recognizes that it is possible that unusually large positions in
contracts outside of the spot month could distort the natural spread
relationship between contract months. For example, if traders hold
unusually large positions outside of the spot month, and if those
traders exit those positions immediately before the spot month, that
could cause congestion and also affect the pricing of the spot month
contract. While such congestion or price distortion cannot be ruled
out, exchange-set position limits and position accountability function
to mitigate against such risks. Thus, the position limits framework
adopted herein is able to guard against any such possibility through
the tools and legal obligations applicable to exchanges that are
described in the prior paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\588\ NEFI at 3 and PMAA at 3.
\589\ In the case of certain commodities, it may become
difficult to exert market power via concentrated futures positions
in deferred month contracts. For example, a participant with a large
cash-market position and a large deferred futures position may
attempt to move cash markets in order to benefit that deferred
futures position. Any attempt to do so could become muted due to
general futures market resistance from multiple vested interests
present in that deferred futures month (i.e., the overall size of
the deferred contracts may be too large for one individual to
influence via cash-market activity). However, if a large position
that is accumulated over time in a particular deferred month is held
into the spot month, it is possible that such positions could form
the groundwork for an attempted corner or squeeze in the spot month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, limiting Federal non-spot month position limits to the nine
legacy agricultural commodities may limit any market disruptions that
could result
[[Page 3315]]
from adding new Federal non-spot month position limits on certain metal
and energy commodities that have never been subject to Federal position
limits.\590\
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\590\ 85 FR at 11629.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Response to Comments Regarding the Commission's Reliance on
Exchanges
In response to commenters' specific concerns about the reliance on
exchanges' position accountability, the Commission views position
accountability outside of the spot month as a more flexible alternative
to Federal non-spot month position limits.\591\ Position accountability
establishes a level at which an exchange will start investigating a
trader's current position. This will include, among other things,
asking traders additional questions regarding their strategies and
their purpose for the positions, while evaluating them under current
market conditions. If a position does not raise any concerns, the
exchange will allow the trader to exceed the accountability level. If
the position raises concerns, the exchange has the authority to
instruct the trader to stop adding to the trader's position, or to
reduce the position. Position accountability is a particularly
effective tool because it provides the exchanges with an opportunity to
intervene once a position hits a relatively low level (vis-[agrave]-vis
the level at which a Federal or an exchange position limit level would
typically be set), while still affording market participants with the
flexibility to establish a position that exceeds the position
accountability level if it is justified by the nature of the position
and market conditions. Position accountability applies to all
participants on the exchange, whether commercial or non-commercial, and
regardless of whether the relevant participant would qualify for an
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\591\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has decades of experience overseeing position
accountability implemented by exchanges, including for all 16 non-
legacy core referenced futures contracts that are not subject to
Federal position limits outside of the spot month.\592\ Based on the
Commission's experience, position accountability has functioned
effectively.\593\ Furthermore, the Commission notes that position
accountability is not the only tool available for exchanges. As noted
previously, exchanges can also utilize exchange-set position limits.
Several exchanges have set non-spot month position limits for contracts
that are not subject to Federal position limits, and all of them appear
to have functioned effectively based on the Commission's observation of
those markets.\594\
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\592\ See, e.g., 56 FR at 51687 (Oct. 15, 1991) (permitting CME
to establish position accountability for certain financial contracts
traded on CME); Speculative Position Limits--Exemptions from
Commission Rule 1.61, 57 FR 29064 (June 30, 1992) (permitting the
use of accountability for trading in energy commodity contracts);
and 17 CFR 150.5(e) (2009) (formally recognizing the practice of
accountability for contracts that met specified standards).
\593\ 85 FR at 11629.
\594\ For example, exchanges have set non-spot month position
limits for the following core referenced futures contracts, even
though such contracts currently are not subject to Federal non-spot
month position limits (and will continue to be subject only to
Federal spot month position limits under this Final Rule): (1) CME
Live Cattle (LC), which has an exchange-set single month position
limit level of 6,300 contracts, but no all-months-combined position
limit; (2) ICE FCOJ-A (OJ), which has an exchange-set single month
position limit level of 3,200 contracts and an all-months-combined
position limit level of 3,200 contracts; and (3) ICE Sugar No. 16,
which has an exchange-set single month position limit level of 1,000
contracts and an all-months-combined position limit level of 1,000
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to IATP's reference to ``recent notable failures'' in
position accountability levels, IATP appears to be referencing the
events that involve Kraft Foods Group, Inc. and Mondel[emacr]z Global
LLC with respect to the CBOT Wheat (W) contract in 2011\595\ and United
States Oil Fund, LP (``US Oil'') with respect to the WTI contract
earlier this year.\596\ With respect to CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT did not
have position accountability for that contract at that time. With
respect to the WTI contract, IATP does not describe the failure in
position accountability that occurred with respect to US Oil and how
such failure resulted in negative prices in the WTI contract.\597\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\595\ CFTC Charges Kraft Foods Group, Inc. and Mondel[emacr]z
Global LLC with Manipulation of Wheat Futures and Cash Wheat Prices
(Apr. 1, 2015), U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission website,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7150-15.
\596\ IATP at 5, 10, and 18.
\597\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to commenter concerns about the incentives of
exchanges, the Commission believes that, although exchanges may have a
financial interest in increased trading volume, whether speculative or
hedging, the Commission closely oversees the establishment,
modification, and implementation of exchange-set position limits and
position accountability. As noted above, both exchange-set position
limits and position accountability must comply with standards
established by the Commission in final Sec. 150.5(b) including, among
other things, that any such levels be ``necessary and appropriate to
reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or price distortion
of the contract's or the underlying commodity's price or index.'' \598\
Exchanges are also required to submit any rules adopting or modifying
exchange-set position limits or position accountability to the
Commission in advance of implementation, pursuant to part 40 of the
Commission's regulations.\599\ Additionally, exchanges are subject to
DCM Core Principle 5 or SEF Core Principle 6, as applicable, which
establishes additional protections against manipulation and
congestion.\600\ Furthermore, exchange-set position limits and position
accountability will be subject to rule enforcement reviews by the
Commission.\601\ Finally, the Commission notes that exchanges also have
significant financial incentives and regulatory obligations to maintain
well-functioning markets. This observation, which has been supported by
studies, is discussed in greater detail below.\602\
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\598\ Final Sec. 150.5(b)(2).
\599\ 17 CFR part 40.
\600\ 17 CFR 38.300 and 17 CFR 37.600.
\601\ The Commission conducts regular rule enforcement reviews
of each exchange's audit trail, trade practice surveillance,
disciplinary, and dispute resolution programs for ongoing compliance
with the Core Principles. See Rule Enforcement Reviews of Designated
Contract Markets, available at https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/dcmruleenf.html.
\602\ Section II.B.3.iii.b.(3)(iii) (Concern over Exchanges'
Conflict of Interest and Improper Incentives in Maintaining Their
Markets).
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3. Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
[[Page 3316]]
Under the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed applying Federal spot
month position limits to all 25 core referenced futures contracts and
any associated referenced contracts.\603\ The spot month limits would
apply separately to physically-settled and cash-settled referenced
contracts, which meant that a market participant could net positions
across physically-settled referenced contracts and separately net
positions across cash-settled referenced contracts.\604\ However, the
market participant would not be permitted to net cash-settled
referenced contracts with physically-settled referenced contracts.\605\
Proposed Sec. 150.2(e) provided that Federal spot month position limit
levels would be set forth in proposed Appendix E to part 150.\606\ The
proposed spot month position limit levels were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\603\ As described below, under the 2020 NPRM, Federal non-spot
month position limit levels would only apply to the nine legacy
agricultural contracts and their associated referenced contracts.
The 16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts and their
associated referenced contracts would be subject to Federal position
limits during the spot month, and exchange-set position limits or
position accountability outside of the spot month.
\604\ See Section II.B.10.
\605\ Id.
\606\ Proposed 150.2(e) additionally provided that market
participants would not need to comply with the Federal position
limit levels until 365 days after publication of the Final Rule in
the Federal Register. For further discussion of the Final Rule's
compliance and effective dates, see Section I.D. (Effective Date and
Compliance Period).
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.007
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\607\ As of October 15, 2020.
\608\ CBOT's existing exchange-set position limit level for CBOT
Wheat (W) is 600 contracts. However, for its May contract month,
CBOT has a variable spot month position limit level that is
dependent upon the deliverable supply that it publishes from the
CBOT's Stocks and Grain report on the Friday preceding the first
notice day for the May contract month. In the last five trading days
of the expiring futures month in May, the speculative spot month
position limit level is: (1) 600 contracts if deliverable supplies
are at or above 2,400 contracts; (2) 500 contracts if deliverable
supplies are between 2,000 and 2,399 contracts; (3) 400 contracts if
deliverable supplies are between 1,600 and 1,999 contracts; (4) 300
contracts if deliverable supplies are between 1,200 and 1,599
contracts; and (5) 220 contracts if deliverable supplies are below
1,200 contracts.
\609\ The proposed Federal spot month position limit levels for
CME Live Cattle (LC) would feature step-down limit levels similar to
the CME's existing Live Cattle (LC) step-down exchange-set limit
levels. The proposed Federal spot month step down limit level is:
(1) 600 contracts at the close of trading on the first business day
following the first Friday of the contract month; (2) 300 contracts
at the close of trading on the business day prior to the last five
trading days of the contract month; and (3) 200 contracts at the
close of trading on the business day prior to the last two trading
days of the contract month.
\610\ CME's existing exchange-set limit for Live Cattle (LC) has
the following step-down spot month position limit levels: (1) 600
contracts at the close of trading on the first business day
following the first Friday of the contract month; (2) 300 contracts
at the close of trading on the business day prior to the last five
trading days of the contract month; and (3) 200 contracts at the
close of trading on the business day prior to the last two trading
days of the contract month.
\611\ CBOT's existing exchange-set spot month position limit
level for Rough Rice (RR) is 600 contracts for all contract months.
However, for July and September, there are step-down limit levels
from 600 contracts. In the last five trading days of the expiring
futures month, the speculative spot month position limit for the
July futures month steps down to 200 contracts from 600 contracts
and the speculative position limit for the September futures month
steps down to 250 contracts from 600 contracts.
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[[Page 3317]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.008
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\612\ IFUS technically does not have an exchange-set spot month
position limit level for ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF). However, it does
have a single-month position limit level of 1,000 contracts, which
effectively operates as a spot month position limit.
\613\ NYMEX recommended implementing the following step-down
Federal spot month position limit levels with respect to its Light
Sweet Crude Oil (CL) core referenced futures contract: (1) 6,000
contracts as of the close of trading three business days prior to
the last trading day of the contract; (2) 5,000 contracts as of the
close of trading two business days prior to the last trading day of
the contract; and (3) 4,000 contracts as of the close of trading one
business day prior to the last trading day of the contract.
\614\ In Proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(4), the Commission also
proposed an exemption that provided a Federal conditional spot month
position limit for NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) (``NYMEX NG'')
that permits a market participation that does not hold any positions
in the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract to hold: (1)
10,000 NYMEX NG equivalent-sized referenced contracts per exchange
that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract; and (2) an
additional position in cash-settled economically equivalent swaps
with respect to NYMEX NG that has a notional amount equal to 10,000
contracts.
\615\ Currently, the cash-settled natural gas contracts are
subject to an exchange-set spot month position limit level of 1,000
equivalent-sized contracts per exchange. Currently, there are three
exchanges that list cash-settled natural gas contracts--NYMEX, IFUS,
and Nodal. As a result, a market participant may hold up to 3,000
equivalent-sized cash-settled natural gas contracts. The exchanges
also have a conditional position limit framework for natural gas.
The conditional position limit permits up to 5,000 cash-settled
equivalent-sized natural gas contracts per exchange that lists such
contracts, provided that the market participant does not hold a
position in the physically-settled NYMEX NG contract.
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
[[Page 3318]]
The proposed Federal spot month position limit levels for all
referenced contracts were set at 25% or less of updated EDS and were
derived from the recommendations by CME Group,\616\ IFUS,\617\ and
MGEX\618\ for each of their respective core referenced futures
contracts. Federal spot month position limit levels for any contract
with a proposed level above 100 contracts were rounded up to the
nearest 100 contracts from the exchange-recommended limit level or from
25% of updated EDS, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\616\ See Summary DSE Proposed Limits, CME Group Comment Letter
(Nov. 26, 2019), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment
file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596). CME Group formally provided
recommended Federal spot month position limit levels for each of its
core referenced futures contracts.
\617\ See IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Softs Methodology,
IFUS Comment Letter (May 14, 2019) and Reproposal--Position Limits
for Derivatives (RIN 3038-AD99) and ICE Comment Letter (Feb. 28,
2017) (attached Sept. 28, 2016 comment letter), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596 and
Proposed Rule 81 FR 96704, respectively). IFUS did not formally
provide recommended Federal spot month position limit levels for
each of IFUS's core referenced futures contracts. However, ICE had
previously recommended setting Federal spot month position limit
levels for IFUS's core referenced futures contracts at 25% of EDS in
its comment letter in connection with the 2016 Reproposal and
Commission staff also confirmed with ICE/IFUS's representatives that
ICE/IFUS's position has remained the same with respect to the
Federal spot month position limit levels since the 2016 Reproposal.
The Commission notes, however, with respect to ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT), that IFUS has submitted a supplemental comment letter
recommending that the Federal spot month position limit level be set
at 900 contracts, instead of at 25% of EDS. See IFUS--Estimated
Deliverable Supply--Cotton Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment
Letter (August 27, 2020), available at https://comments.cftc.gov
(comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
\618\ See Updated Deliverable Supply Data--Potential Position
Limits Rulemaking, MGEX Comment Letter (Aug. 31, 2018), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR
11596). MGEX did not formally provide a recommended Federal spot
month position limit level for its core referenced futures contract
(MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE)) because it was opposed to
providing a static number for the Federal spot month position limit
level that was based on a fixed formula. Instead, MGEX sought to be
able to adjust the Federal spot month position limit level based on
updated EDS figures and market conditions. However, MGEX stated that
the Federal spot month position limit level for MGEX Hard Red Spring
Wheat (MWE) should be no lower than 1,000 contracts and also
submitted calculations for setting the Federal spot month position
limit level at 25% of EDS. Furthermore, MGEX supported setting the
Federal spot month position limit level for MGEX Hard Red Spring
Wheat (MWE) at 25% of EDS level in its comment letter. MGEX at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, the existing Federal spot month
position limit levels have remained constant for decades, but the
markets have changed significantly during that time period.\619\ As a
result, some of the deliverable supply estimates on which the existing
Federal spot month position limits were originally based were decades
out of date.\620\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\619\ 85 FR at 11625.
\620\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
a. Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels Adopted as Proposed, Except
for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) and NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
The Commission is adopting the Federal spot month position limit
levels as proposed, except for modifications with respect to ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) and NYMEX NG. Specifically, the Federal spot month position
limit levels for all 25 core referenced futures contracts are set at or
below 25% of EDS, except for the cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts.
With respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), the Commission is adopting a
lower Federal spot month position limit level of 900 contracts instead
of the proposed 1,800 contracts. The reasons for this change are
discussed in Section II.B.3.v.
With respect to NYMEX NG, the Final Rule is adopting the same
Federal spot month position limit level as proposed in the 2020 NPRM,
but the Final Rule is applying the cash-settled portion of the Federal
spot month position limit for NYMEX NG separately for each exchange
that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract, as well as the
cash-settled NYMEX NG OTC swaps market, rather than on an aggregate
basis across all exchanges and the OTC swaps market as it does for each
of the other core referenced futures contracts. The reasons for this
change are discussed in Section II.B.3.vi.
(1) The Final Rule Achieves the Four Statutory Objectives in CEA
Section 4a(a)(3)(B)
Before summarizing and addressing comments below regarding the
proposed Federal spot month position limit levels, the Commission
states at the outset that the final Federal spot month position limit
levels, in conjunction with the rest of the Federal position limits
framework, will achieve the four policy objectives in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B). Namely, they will: (1) Diminish, eliminate, or prevent
excessive speculation; (2) deter and prevent market manipulation,
squeezes, and corners; (3) ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona
fide hedgers; and (4) ensure that the price discovery function of the
underlying market is not disrupted.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\621\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In achieving these four statutory objectives, the Commission first
believes that the Federal spot month position limit levels are low
enough to prevent excessive speculation and also protect price
discovery. Setting the Federal spot month position limit levels at or
below 25% of EDS is critically important because it would be difficult,
in the absence of other factors, for a market participant to corner or
squeeze a market if the participant holds less than or equal to 25% of
deliverable supply.\622\ This is because, among other things, any
potential economic gains resulting from the manipulation may be
insufficient to justify the potential costs, including the costs of
acquiring and ultimately offloading the positions used to effectuate
the manipulation.\623\ By restricting positions to a proportion of the
deliverable supply of the commodity, the Federal spot month position
limits require that no one speculator can hold a position larger than
25% of deliverable supply, reducing the possibility that a market
participant can use derivatives, including referenced contracts, to
affect the price of the cash commodity (and vice versa). Limiting a
speculative position based on a percentage of deliverable supply also
restricts a speculative trader's ability to establish a leveraged
position in cash-settled derivative contracts, reducing that trader's
incentive to manipulate the cash settlement price. Further, by
finalizing levels that are sufficiently low to prevent market
manipulation, including corners and squeezes, the levels also help
ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying market is
not disrupted, because markets that are free from corners, squeezes,
and other manipulative activity reflect fundamentals of supply and
demand, rather than artificial pressures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\622\ 85 FR at 11625-11626.
\623\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also believes that the Federal spot month position
limit levels adopted herein are high enough to ensure that there is
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers.\624\ The
[[Page 3319]]
Commission has not observed a general lack of liquidity for bona fide
hedgers in the markets for the 25 core referenced futures contracts,
which are some of the most liquid markets overseen by the
Commission.\625\ By generally increasing the existing Federal spot
month position limit levels for the nine legacy agricultural contracts
based on updated data, and by adopting Federal spot month position
limit levels that are generally equal to or higher than existing
exchange-set levels for the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts, the Commission does not expect the final Federal position
limit levels to reduce liquidity for bona fide hedgers.\626\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\624\ CEA section 4a(a)(1) requires the Commission to address
``[e]xcessive speculation . . . causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted [price] changes . . . .'' Speculative
activity that is not ``excessive'' in this manner is not a focus of
CEA section 4a(a)(1). Rather, speculative activity may generate
liquidity, including liquidity for bona fide hedgers, by enabling
market participants with bona fide hedging positions to trade more
efficiently. Setting position limits too low could result in reduced
liquidity, including for bona fide hedgers. 85 FR at 11626.
\625\ 85 FR at 11626. The Commission notes that it has observed
a brief period of illiquidity during the early part of the spot
month for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), which is discussed in Section
II.B.3.v.
\626\ Id. Eighteen of the core referenced futures contracts will
have Federal spot month position limit levels that are higher than
current exchange-set spot month position limit levels. CME Live
Cattle (LC), COMEX Gold (GC), COMEX Copper (HG), CBOT Oats (O),
NYMEX Platinum (PL), and NYMEX Palladium (PA) will have Federal spot
month position limit levels that are equal to the current exchange-
set spot month position limit levels. Finally, although currently
there is technically no exchange-set spot month position limit for
ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF), this contract is subject to a single month
position limit level of 1,000 contracts, which effectively serves as
its spot month position limit level. As a result, the Federal spot
month position limit level for ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) will
effectively be higher than its current exchange-set spot month
position limit level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Commission has previously stated that ``there is a
range of acceptable limit levels,'' \627\ and continues to believe that
is true.\628\ There is no single ``correct'' spot month position limit
level for a given contract, and it is likely that a number of limit
levels within a certain range could effectively achieve the four policy
objectives in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).\629\ The Commission believes
that the spot month position limit levels adopted herein fall within a
range of acceptable levels.\630\ This determination is based on the
Commission's experience in administering its own Federal position
limits regime, overseeing exchange-set position limits, and being
closely involved in determining the EDS figures underlying the position
limit levels, as well as the fact that the Federal spot month position
limit levels are generally set at or below 25% of EDS.\631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\627\ See, e.g., Revision of Federal Speculative Position
Limits, 57 FR 12766, 12770 (Apr. 13, 1992).
\628\ 85 FR at 11627.
\629\ Id.
\630\ Id.
\631\ The exception to this is the cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts, which is discussed in detail in Section
II.B.3.vi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Federal spot month position limit levels are
properly calibrated to account for differences between markets. For
example, the Commission considered the unique delivery mechanisms for
CME Live Cattle (LC) and the NYMEX metals core referenced futures
contracts in calibrating the Federal spot month position limit levels
for those contracts.\632\ The Commission also considered the volatility
of the EDS for COMEX Copper (HG) in determining its limit level.\633\
Furthermore, with respect to NYMEX NG, the Commission, in fine-tuning
the proposed limits, considered: the underlying natural gas
infrastructure vis-[agrave]-vis commodities underlying other energy
core referenced futures contracts; the relatively high liquidity in the
cash-settled markets; and the public comments received in response to
the 2020 NPRM.\634\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\632\ 85 FR at 11627.
\633\ Id. at 11628.
\634\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Federal Position Limit Levels Operate as Ceilings
Finally, consistent with the 2020 NPRM and the Final Rule's
position limits framework that leverages existing exchange-level
programs and expertise, the Federal position limit levels operate as
ceilings. This framework, with Federal spot month limits layered over
exchange-set limits, achieves the Commission's objectives in preventing
market manipulation, squeezes, corners, and excessive speculation while
also ensuring sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers and
avoiding a disruption of the price discovery function of the underlying
market. This is, in part, because a layered approach facilitates more
expedited responses to rapidly evolving market conditions through
exchange action. Under the Final Rule, exchanges are required to set
their own spot month position limit levels at or below the respective
Federal spot month position limit levels.\635\ They are also permitted
to adjust those levels based on market conditions as long as they are
set at or below the Federal spot month position limit levels. Exchanges
may also impose liquidity and concentration surcharges to initial
margin if they are vertically integrated with a derivatives clearing
organization.\636\ All of these exchange actions can be implemented
significantly faster than Commission action, and an immediate response
is critical in managing rapidly evolving market conditions. As a
result, by having the Federal position limit levels function as
ceilings, the position limits framework adopted in this Final Rule will
allow exchanges to lower or raise their position limit levels across a
greater range of acceptable Federal position limit levels, which will
facilitate a faster response to more varied market conditions than if
the Federal position limit levels did not operate as ceilings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\635\ Final Sec. 150.5(a). For the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, the Final Rule also requires exchanges to set their own
non-spot month position limit levels at or below the respective
Federal non-spot month position limit level. For the 16 non-legacy
core referenced futures contracts, final Sec. 150.5(b)(2) requires
exchanges to implement either position limits or position
accountability during the non-spot month for physical commodity
derivatives that are not subject to Federal position limits ``at a
level that is necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price distortion of the contract's
or the underlying commodity's price or index.''
\636\ 85 FR at 11633.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
Many commenters supported the proposed Federal spot month position
limit levels and the method by which the Commission determined those
limit levels.\637\ However, some commenters raised concerns or
otherwise commented with respect to: (1) The proposed Federal spot
month position limit levels and the methodology used to arrive at those
levels generally; (2) the Commission's review of exchanges' EDS figures
and their recommended spot month position limit levels; (3) a lack of a
phase-in for Federal spot month position limit levels; (4) the proposed
spot month position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT); (5) the
proposed spot month position limit level for NYMEX NG and other issues
relating to NYMEX NG; and (6) the issue of parity among the proposed
Federal spot month position limit levels for the three wheat core
referenced futures contracts. The Commission will discuss each of these
issues, the related comments, and the Commission's corresponding
determination in greater detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\637\ See ASR at 2; CCI at 2; Shell at 3; EEI/EPSA at 3; Suncor
at 2, CEWG at 3; COPE at 2, 4; SIFMA AMG at 3-4; MGEX at 1; 3; MFA/
AIMA at 1; AFIA at 1; CMC at 6; NGFA at 3; PIMCO at 6; CME Group at
4-6; NOPA at 1; FIA at 2; and AQR at 8-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels and the Commission's
Underlying Methodology, Generally
(1) Comments--Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels and the
Commission's Underlying Methodology, Generally
Better Markets objected to the Commission's proposed Federal spot
month position limit levels and
[[Page 3320]]
suggested that there should be a presumption that the Federal spot
month position limit levels be set at 10% of EDS, which could be
adjusted as needed.\638\ Another commenter, PMAA, requested Federal
spot month position limit levels of less than 25% of EDS, but did not
provide a specific level or a range of levels.\639\ Other commenters
believed that the proposed spot month levels were generally too high
merely because they were higher than existing levels.\640\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\638\ Better Markets at 41.
\639\ PMAA at 2.
\640\ AFR at 2 and Rutkowski at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In support of its suggestion, Better Markets claimed that,
``speculative trading has been sufficient to accommodate legitimate
hedging at currently permissible levels,'' noting that the Commission
has previously stated that ``open interest and trading volume have
reached record levels'' and ``the 25 [core referenced futures
contracts] represent some of the most liquid markets overseen by the
[CFTC].'' \641\ Better Markets also claimed that, if the Commission
conducted a study as to whether the increase in open interest for
``particular [core referenced futures contracts] would warrant lower
speculative position limits,'' those studies would have shown that
substantially lower position limit levels would be warranted.\642\
Better Markets also took issue with the Commission's 25% or less of EDS
formula as a basis for determining Federal spot month position limit
levels by stating, ``while deliverable supply must be one key measure
for constraining speculation, it is not sufficient to address all
statutory objectives for Federal position limits.'' \643\
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\641\ Better Markets at 37-38.
\642\ Id. at 38.
\643\ Id. at 37.
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(2) Discussion of Final Rule--Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
and the Commission's Underlying Methodology, Generally
The Commission declines to adopt a 10% of EDS across-the-board
Federal spot month position limit level, or a general reduction in
Federal spot month position limit levels to a level below 25% of EDS
for those core referenced futures contracts with a proposed position
limit level set at 25% of EDS.
In response to Better Markets' suggestion to adopt Federal spot
month position limit levels set at 10% of EDS, the Commission first
notes that, although Better Markets provided some arguments for why the
Commission should consider lower Federal position limit levels, Better
Markets did not provide any support for the 10% level that it
suggested, including any support for the comment letter's implication
that setting limits at or below 25% of EDS is insufficient to prevent
corners and squeezes. Likewise, PMAA did not provide any support for
adopting Federal spot month position limit levels of less than 25% of
EDS, other than claiming that a ``spot month limit of 25 percent of
deliverable supply is not sufficiently aggressive to deter excessive
speculation'' and ``prevent market manipulation.'' \644\
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\644\ PMAA at 2.
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The 25% or less of EDS formula that the Commission is utilizing,
and has utilized for many years, is a longstanding methodology that was
adopted to address corners and squeezes based on the Commission's
experience.\645\ Also, as described in detail above, the Commission
believes that the position limits framework in both the 2020 NPRM and
the Final Rule that incorporates the 25% or less of EDS formula
achieves the Commission's statutory objectives in preventing market
manipulation, squeezes, corners, and excessive speculation while also
ensuring sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers and avoiding
a disruption of the price discovery function of the underlying market.
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\645\ See e.g., Chicago Board of Trade Futures Contracts in Corn
and Soybeans; Order To Change and To Supplement Delivery
Specifications, 62 FR 60831, 60838 (Nov. 13, 1997) (``The 2,400-
contract level of deliverable supplies constitutes four times the
speculative position limit for the contract, a benchmark
historically used by the Commission's staff in analyzing the
adequacy of deliverable supplies for new contracts'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Final Rule's position limits framework further
addresses the statutory objectives of CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B) by
utilizing the Federal position limit levels as a ceiling and leveraging
the exchanges' expertise and experience in determining and adjusting
exchange-set position limit levels for their referenced contracts as
appropriate, as long as they are under the Federal position limit
levels.\646\ This exchange action can be effectuated significantly
faster than a Federal position limit level adjustment, which requires
the Commission to engage in a rulemaking process that includes a
notice-and-comment period. As a result, compared to the alternative
approaches suggested by commenters, this framework will generally
facilitate a more expedited response to a more varied set of market
conditions, because the exchanges can lower or raise their position
limit levels across a greater range of acceptable Federal position
limit levels.
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\646\ See 85 FR at 11629, 11633.
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In response to Better Markets' claim that the Federal spot month
position limit levels should not be adjusted upward as a result of the
higher open interest levels and trading volumes that exist today
because they demonstrate that there are sufficient levels of
speculation and liquidity under the current rules, the Commission first
notes that Better Markets did not provide a methodology based on open
interest and/or trading volume that the Commission should consider as
an alternative to the Commission's 25% or less of EDS approach.
Regardless, the Commission believes that EDS is the more
appropriate basis by which the Commission should adjust Federal spot
month position limit levels, rather than open interest and/or trading
volume, because the likelihood of a corner or squeeze occurring in the
spot month is more closely correlated with the percentage of
deliverable supply that a market participant controls. Corners and
squeezes are possible in the spot month only because of the imminent
prospect of making or taking delivery in the physically-settled
contract. Therefore, understanding the amount of deliverable supply in
the spot month is critically important.\647\ Accordingly, the
Commission, in consultation with the exchanges, estimated the amount of
the underlying commodity available at the specified delivery points in
the core referenced futures contract that meet the quality standards
set forth in the core referenced futures contract's terms and
conditions in order to understand the size of the relevant commodity
market underlying each core referenced futures contract. Once the
Commission determined that information in the form of an EDS figure,
the Commission was able to determine whether a Federal spot month
position limit level would advance the statutory objectives of CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B), including preventing corners and squeezes.
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\647\ Deliverable supply is the quantity of the commodity that
meets contract specifications that is reasonably expected to be
readily available to short traders and salable by long traders at
its market value in normal cash-marketing channels at the contract's
delivery points during the specified delivery period, barring
abnormal movements in interstate commerce. 17 CFR part 38, Appendix
C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A spot month position limit methodology based on open interest and/
or trading volume does not take into account the central factors that
make corners and squeezes possible (i.e., the imminent prospect of
delivery on a physically-settled contract and the deliverable supply of
an underlying
[[Page 3321]]
commodity). Also, open interest and trading volume in an expiring
physically-settled contract generally declines as the contract nears
expiration, as most traders are not looking to make or take delivery of
the underlying commodity. As a result, they would likely not provide
additional insights that would materially inform the Commission's
determination of Federal spot month position limit levels in a way that
is responsive to CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).
Furthermore, the Commission did not adjust the Federal spot month
position limit levels merely by applying a percentage to EDS. As
discussed in further detail below, the Commission proposed Federal spot
month position limit levels only after the Commission: (1) Extensively
reviewed and verified the underlying methodology for each core
referenced futures contract's EDS figure; and (2) reviewed the
recommended Federal spot month position limit levels from exchanges
that are thoroughly knowledgeable about their own respective core
referenced futures contracts' markets in order to determine whether
they advanced the policy objectives of CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B). Also,
in adopting the final Federal spot month position limit levels, the
Commission also considered comments from market participants, including
comments from the end-users of these markets.
On a related note, Better Markets and PMAA appear to have
misunderstood the proposed Federal spot month position limit levels and
the methodology on which they were based.\648\ The Commission did not
propose an across-the-board Federal level set at 25% of EDS. As noted
above, the Commission's methodology sets Federal spot month position
limit levels at or below 25% of EDS for each particular commodity.\649\
As a result, under the Final Rule, only seven of 25 core referenced
futures contracts have Federal spot month position limit levels at 25%
of EDS. With respect to the 18 remaining core referenced futures
contracts, all 18 are set below 20% of EDS, 14 are below 15% of EDS,
and eight are already below the 10% of EDS threshold recommended by
Better Markets.\650\ With respect to the petroleum core referenced
futures contracts with which PMAA is most likely concerned (i.e., NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX NYH ULSD Heating Oil (HO), and NYMEX
RBOB Gasoline (RB)), all three levels are at or below 11.16% of EDS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\648\ See Better Markets at 39-40 and PMAA at 2.
\649\ 85 FR at 11624.
\650\ For CME Live Cattle (LC) and NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil
(CL), which have step-down Federal spot month position limit levels,
these percentages were calculated using the first and highest step.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Commission Review of Exchanges' EDS Figures and Recommended Federal
Spot Month Position Limit Levels
(1) Additional Background Information--Commission Review of Exchanges'
EDS Figures and Recommended Federal Spot Month Position Limits
In connection with the 2020 NPRM, the Commission received
deliverable supply estimates and recommended Federal spot month
position limit levels from CME Group, ICE, and MGEX for their
respective core referenced futures contracts.\651\ Commission staff
reviewed these recommendations and conducted its own analysis of them
using its own experience, observations, and knowledge.\652\ This
included closely and independently assessing the EDS figures upon which
the recommended limit levels were based.\653\ In reviewing the
recommended spot month position limit levels, the Commission considered
the four policy objectives in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B) and preliminarily
determined that none of the recommended levels appeared improperly
calibrated such that they might hinder liquidity for bona fide hedgers
or invite excessive speculation, manipulation, corners, or squeezes,
including activity that could impact price discovery.\654\ As a result,
the Commission proposed to adopt each of the exchange-recommended spot
month position limit levels as Federal spot month position limit
levels.\655\
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\651\ See supra n.616, n.617, and n.618.
\652\ 85 FR at 11625.
\653\ Id. at 11625-11626.
\654\ Id. at 11625.
\655\ Id. Also, a more detailed discussion about the methodology
employed by the Commission in determining proposed Federal spot
month position limit levels can be found at 85 FR at 11625-11628.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Comments--Commission Review of Exchanges' EDS Figures and
Recommended Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received several comments concerning the
Commission's review and verification of the EDS figures and the
rationale used by the Commission in accepting the spot month position
limit levels that were recommended by exchanges.
One commenter, EPSA, supported adopting CME Group's EDS figures for
energy commodities, stating that exchanges are in the ``best position
to provide accurate and current information on the markets.'' \656\
However, other commenters expressed concerns. Better Markets commented
that the Commission failed to ``explain the means by which the DCM-
provided data was collected and later `verified' in arriving at
proposed spot month position limits, nor the dependencies of the DCM
methodologies employed to arrive at those estimates.'' \657\ Similarly,
IATP commented that the 2020 NPRM provided insufficient detail about
how the Commission concluded that the exchange-recommended spot month
position limit levels were appropriate and how the Commission
determined that the EDS figures submitted by the exchanges were
reasonable.\658\ On a related note, PMAA commented that the exchanges
should not be providing EDS figures and that the Commission instead
should ``retain exclusive discretion in determining `deliverable
supply' for the purposes of establishing speculative position limits''
and ``consult with . . . market experts when determining `deliverable
supply' and formulating limits.'' \659\ Furthermore, CME Group
recommended ``that the Commission not adopt final spot month position
limit levels at 25% of deliverable supply as a rigid formula and . . .
work with the exchange to determine an appropriate limit based on the
market dynamics.'' \660\ Likewise, MGEX commented that it
``fundamentally disagrees with the 25% formulaic calculation for the
spot month position, especially if a limit is codified by rule and does
not allow for adjustments as deliverable supply changes.'' \661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\656\ EPSA at 3.
\657\ Better Markets at 36.
\658\ IATP at 9.
\659\ PMAA at 2-3 (these market experts include governmental
entities, such as the Department of Energy's Energy Information
Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, academics,
and representatives of industries that produce, refine, process,
store, transport, market, and consume the underlying commodity).
\660\ CME Group at 5-6. Specifically, CME Group believed that
using a 25% of EDS formula ``as a fixed formula for establishing
recommended limits . . . is unsound as a matter of policy and
incompatible with the Commission's statutory authority to determine
that a specific position limit is necessary and set it at an
appropriate level.''
\661\ Updated Deliverable Supply Data--Potential Position Limits
Rulemaking, MGEX Comment Letter (Aug. 31, 2018) at 2, available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR
11596).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Better Markets also raised concerns about the incentives
of exchanges as public, for-profit enterprises, presumably, in part,
because the exchanges submitted the EDS figures, upon which the Federal
spot month position limit levels are
[[Page 3322]]
based.\662\ Specifically, Better Markets stated that exchanges ``must
balance the interests of their shareholders against the public interest
and their commercial interests in market integrity'' and, as a result,
may be incentivized to permit ``speculation--even excess speculation,''
because it ``is a key revenue driver.'' \663\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\662\ Better Markets at 22.
\663\ Id. at 22-23. Better Markets referenced CME Group Inc.'s
Form 10-K filings, which stated that ``[t]he adoption and
implementation of position limits rules . . . could have a
significant impact on our commodities business if Federal rules for
position limit management differ significantly from current
exchange-administered rules.''
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(3) Discussion of Final Rule--Commission Review of Exchanges' EDS
Figures and Recommended Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission declines to utilize a different methodology and
process for determining EDS figures and Federal spot month position
limit levels.
(i) Determination of EDS Figures
In response to comments concerning the Commission's EDS
determinations, the Commission notes that its process for reviewing and
verifying the EDS figures provided by exchanges entailed extensive
independent review and analysis of each EDS figure and its underlying
methodology, and the Commission retained exclusive discretion to
determine the reasonableness of the EDS figures. This review and
analysis by Commission staff occurred prior to the exchanges' formal
EDS submissions, during which time Commission staff verified that each
exchange's EDS figure for each commodity underlying a core referenced
futures contract was reasonable. In doing so, Commission staff
confirmed that the methodology and the data \664\ for the underlying
commodity for each core referenced futures contract reflected the
commodity characteristics \665\ described in the core referenced
futures contract's terms and conditions, while also recognizing that
more than one methodology and one set of assumptions, allowances, and
data sources could result in a reasonable EDS figure for a commodity.
In addition, Commission staff replicated the exchanges' EDS figures
using the methodology provided. For some commodities, Commission staff
also determined the reasonableness of an exchange's EDS by constructing
an alternate EDS using an alternate methodology using other available
data and comparing that internal EDS with the exchange's EDS. In some
cases, Commission staff consulted industry experts and market
participants to verify that the assumptions and allowances used by the
EDS methodology were reasonable and that the EDS figure itself was
reasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\664\ The data underlying the EDS figures are from sources that
Commission staff had determined as accurately representing the
underlying commodity. These were typically from publicly available
sources. For example, these include data published by the U.S.
Department of Energy for NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), data
published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for CBOT Soybeans
(S), data published by the Florida Department of Citrus for ICE
FCOJ-A (OJ), and data published by CME Group concerning the gold
inventories at its approved depositories for COMEX Gold (GC).
Furthermore, most data sources were also adjusted based on
interviews with market experts and market participants in order to
better reflect the actual deliverable supply by taking into
consideration the amount of time it takes to move the commodity to/
from the delivery points, quality standards, and supplies that are
not readily available due to being tied up in long-term contracts.
\665\ These characteristics are provided in the guidance in
section (b)(1)(i) of Appendix C to part 38, and include, among other
things, the commodity's quality and grade specifications, delivery
points (including storage capacity), historic storage levels,
processing capacity, and adjustments to remove supply that is
committed for long-term contracts and not available to underlie a
futures contract. The verified EDS for each commodity reflects the
quantity of the commodity that can be reasonably expected to be
readily available to short traders and salable by long traders at
its market value in normal cash-marketing channels at the contract's
delivery points during the specified delivery period, barring
abnormal movements in interstate commerce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Commission staff identified any issues during the review
process, they raised those concerns with the exchanges in order to
revise the methodologies, including the assumptions, allowances, and
data sources used therein. As a result, when the exchanges formally
submitted their EDS figures, both the EDS figures and the methodologies
underlying their calculations had been thoroughly reviewed and analyzed
by Commission staff, and some had been refined based on input from
Commission staff. The EDS figures and the methodologies used were
published in the comment section of the 2020 NPRM on the Commission's
website and have been available for review by the public.\666\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\666\ See IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Softs Methodology,
IFUS Comment Letter (May 14, 2019); Updated Deliverable Supply
Data--Potential Position Limits Rulemaking, MGEX Comment Letter
(Aug. 31, 2018); and Summary DSE Proposed Limits, CME Group Comment
Letter (Nov. 26, 2019) (CME Group also provided separate EDS
methodology submissions for each of its 18 core referenced futures
contracts, which can also be found in the comment file), all
available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed
Rule 85 FR 11596).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, for the past 10 years, commenters to previous Federal
position limits rule proposals have consistently recommended that the
EDS figures should be supplied by exchanges, given the exchanges'
expertise with their own contract markets and because of the experience
they have in producing such figures.\667\ The Commission has agreed and
continues to agree with those comments. As a result, Commission staff
has also previously worked in collaboration with the exchanges as part
of an iterative process to review and refine the methodologies,
assumptions, allowances, and data sources used in calculating the EDS
figure for each commodity underlying a core referenced futures
contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\667\ See e.g. 81 FR at 96754, n.495 (listing the commenters
that expressed the view that exchanges are best able to determine
appropriate spot month position limits and that the Commission
should defer to their expertise).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Determination of Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
In response to comments concerning the Commission's determination
of the Federal spot month position limit levels, the Commission first
notes that exchanges were invited to submit their recommended Federal
spot month position limit levels for their respective core referenced
futures contracts. In response, CME Group,\668\ ICE,\669\ and MGEX
\670\ provided recommended levels for their core referenced futures
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\668\ See supra n.616.
\669\ See supra n.617.
\670\ See supra n.618.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When deciding whether to adopt, reject, or modify the exchange-
recommended position limit levels, the Commission considered a variety
of factors, including whether the recommended level: (i) Was consistent
with the 25% or less of EDS formula, as provided in the guidance in
Appendix C to part 38; (ii) reflected changes in the EDS of the
underlying commodity and trading activity in the core referenced
futures contract; and (iii) achieved the four policy objectives in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B). Furthermore, as described in detail above, the
Commission also thoroughly reviewed the methodologies for determining
the EDS figures upon which the exchange-recommended spot month position
limit levels are based.
Finally, the Commission also considered input from market
participants concerning the EDS figures and the exchange-recommended
Federal position limit levels in recalibrating the Federal position
limit levels, as it has done for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) and NYMEX Henry
Hub Natural Gas (NG) in this Final Rule, as discussed further below.
[[Page 3323]]
(iii) Concern Over Exchanges' Conflict of Interest and Improper
Incentives in Maintaining Their Markets
In response to Better Markets' concern about the incentives of
exchanges as public, for-profit businesses, as a preliminary matter,
the Commission acknowledges that exchanges have a financial interest in
increased trading volume, whether speculative or hedging, and, as a
result, may be incentivized to increase EDS figures and recommend
higher position limit levels. However, as previously discussed, the
Commission independently assessed and verified the exchanges' EDS
estimates. Specifically, the Commission: (1) Worked closely with the
exchanges to independently verify that all EDS methodologies and
figures were reasonable; \671\ and (2) reviewed each exchange-
recommended level for compliance with the requirements established by
the Commission and/or by Congress, including those in CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B).\672\ Also, as discussed at length above, the Commission
conducted its own analysis of the exchange-recommended Federal spot
month position limit levels and determined that the levels adopted
herein: (1) Are low enough to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation and also protect price discovery; (2) are high enough to
ensure that there is sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers;
(3) fall within a range of acceptable limit levels; and (4) are
properly calibrated to account for differences between markets. Thus,
the Commission believes that the impact, if any, of such financial
incentives were sufficiently mitigated through the Commission's close
review of the methodology underlying the EDS figures, the EDS figures
themselves, and the recommended Federal position limit levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\671\ As discussed in detail above, the verification involved:
Confirming that the methodology and data for the underlying
commodity reflected the commodity characteristics described in the
core referenced futures contract's terms and conditions; replicating
exchange EDS figures using the methodology provided by the exchange;
and working with the exchanges to revise the methodologies as
needed.
\672\ See Section II.B.3.iii.b.(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also notes that exchanges have significant
incentives and obligations to maintain well-functioning markets as
self-regulatory organizations that are themselves subject to regulatory
requirements. Specifically, the DCM and SEF Core Principles, as
applicable, require exchanges to, among other things, list contracts
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation, and surveil trading
on their markets to prevent market manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the delivery or cash-settlement process.\673\ Exchanges
also have significant incentives to maintain well-functioning markets
to remain competitive with other exchanges. Market participants may
choose exchanges that are less susceptible to sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes caused by excessive speculation or
corners, squeezes, and manipulation, which could, among other things,
harm the price discovery function of the commodity derivative contracts
and negatively impact the delivery of the underlying commodity, bona
fide hedging strategies, and market participants' general risk
management.\674\ Furthermore, several academic studies, including one
concerning futures exchanges and another concerning demutualized stock
exchanges, support the conclusion that exchanges are able to both
satisfy shareholder interests and meet their self-regulatory
organization responsibilities.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\673\ 17 CFR 38.200; 17 CFR 38.250; 17 CFR 37.300; and 17 CFR
37.400.
\674\ Kane, Stephen, Exploring price impact liquidity for
December 2016 NYMEX energy contracts, n.33, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_priceimpact.pdf.
\675\ See David Reiffen and Michel A. Robe, Demutualization and
Customer Protection at Self-Regulatory Financial Exchanges, Journal
of Futures Markets, Vol. 31, 126-164, Feb. 2011 (in many
circumstances, an exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather than
member) income has a greater incentive to aggressively enforce
regulations that protect participants from dishonest agents); and
Kobana Abukari and Isaac Otchere, Has Stock Exchange Demutualization
Improved Market Quality? International Evidence, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Dec 09, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00863-y (demutualized exchanges have realized
significant reductions in transaction costs in the post-
demutualization period).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. Phase-In of Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Phase-In of Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
The 2020 NPRM did not include a phase-in mechanism in which the
Commission would gradually adjust the Federal position limit levels
over a period of time. As a result, under the 2020 NPRM, the proposed
Federal spot month position limit levels for all core referenced
futures contracts would immediately go into effect on the proposed
effective date.
b. Summary of the Commission Determination--Phase-In of Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission declines to adopt a formal phase-in for the Federal
spot month position limit levels, because it believes that the markets
would operate in an orderly fashion with the Federal position limit
levels adopted under this Final Rule. However, as a practical matter,
the Commission notes that the operative spot month position limit
levels for market participants trading in exchange-listed referenced
contracts will be the exchange-set spot month position limit levels,
which will continue to remain at their existing levels unless and until
an exchange affirmatively modifies its exchange-set spot month position
limit levels pursuant to part 40 of the Commission's regulations.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\676\ 17 CFR part 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Comments--Phase-In of Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received comments requesting that the Commission
``consider phasing in these adjustments for agricultural commodities to
assess the impacts of increasing limits on contract performance.''
\677\ CMC also noted that, ``A phased approach could provide market
participants, exchanges, and the Commission a way to build in scheduled
pauses to evaluate the effects of increased limits, thereby fostering
confidence and trust in the markets.'' \678\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\677\ AFIA at 2 and CMC at 6.
\678\ CMC at 6. Although commenters did not provide specific
details about what they meant by ``phase-in,'' the Commission
understands these comments to mean that they are requesting a
gradual, step-up increase in Federal spot month and non-spot month
position limit levels over time for agricultural core referenced
futures contracts, instead of having an abrupt change to the new
Federal position limit levels. This section only addresses the
Commission's response to commenters' request for phased-in Federal
spot month position limit levels. The Commission separately
addresses commenters' request for phased-in Federal non-spot month
position limit levels below in Section II.B.4.iv.a.(2)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Discussion of the Final Rule--Phase-In of Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
In response to comments, the Commission first notes that, although
the Federal spot month position limit levels will generally be higher
than existing Federal and/or exchange-set spot month position limit
levels, the Commission believes that the referenced contract markets
will be able to function in an orderly fashion when the final Federal
spot month position limit levels
[[Page 3324]]
go into effect.\679\ This is because, among other things, these final
Federal spot month position limit levels are supported by the updated
EDS figures and are set at or below 25% of EDS.\680\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\679\ A phase-in is unnecessary with respect to the Federal spot
month position limit level for CBOT Oats (O), because the Federal
spot month position limit level for the contract remains at the
current level.
\680\ The final Federal spot month position limit levels for
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts may exceed 25% of EDS
because the Federal spot month position limit level is being applied
separately for each exchange and OTC swaps market, but the
Commission believes that this approach will not cause any issues, in
part, because of the highly liquid nature of that particular market.
For additional details concerning the NYMEX NG market, see Section
II.B.3.vi.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, as a practical matter, the operative spot month position
limit level for market participants with respect to exchange-listed
referenced contracts is not the Federal spot month position limit
levels, but the exchange-set spot month position limit levels, which
must be set at or below the corresponding Federal spot month position
limit levels. As a result, despite the changes in the Federal spot
month position limit levels (or the imposition of a Federal spot month
position limit level for the first time) in this Final Rule, there will
be no practical impact on market participants trading in exchange-
listed referenced contracts unless and until an exchange affirmatively
modifies its exchange-set spot month position limit levels through a
rule submission to the Commission pursuant to part 40 of the
Commission's regulations.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\681\ 17 CFR part 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
v. ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Level
The Commission proposed to increase the Federal spot month position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) from the existing Federal
position limit of 300 contracts to 1,800 contracts. Like all of the
Federal spot month position limit levels, the Commission's proposed
level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) was based on Commission staff's review,
analysis, and verification of IFUS's updated EDS figure and Commission
staff's review and analysis of IFUS's initial recommended Federal spot
month position limit level.\682\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\682\ See IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Softs Methodology,
IFUS Comment Letter (May 14, 2019) and Reproposal--Position Limits
for Derivatives (RIN 3038-AD99); ICE Comment Letter (Feb. 28, 2017)
(attached Sept. 28, 2016 comment letter), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596 and
Proposed Rule 81 FR 96704, respectively). IFUS did not formally
provide recommended Federal spot month position limit levels for
each of its core referenced futures contracts. However, ICE had
previously recommended setting Federal spot month position limit
levels for IFUS's core referenced futures contracts at 25% of EDS in
its comment letter in connection with the 2016 Reproposal and
Commission staff also confirmed with ICE/IFUS's representatives that
ICE/IFUS's position has remained the same with respect to the
Federal spot month position limit levels since the 2016 Reproposal.
The Commission notes, however, with respect to ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT), IFUS submitted an updated recommended Federal spot month
position limit level recommending a Federal spot month position
limit level of 900 contracts. See IFUS--Estimated Deliverable
Supply--Cotton Methodology, August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter (August
27, 2020), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for
Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Summary of the Commission Determination--ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
In the Final Rule, the Commission is adopting a Federal spot month
position limit level of 900 contracts instead of the proposed level of
1,800 contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The reasons for this change
are based on the comments received in response to the 2020 NPRM.
c. Comments--ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
The Commission received numerous comments objecting to the higher
proposed Federal spot month position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT) in the 2020 NPRM.\683\ The commenters requested that the
Commission either maintain the current 300 contract limit level or
drastically lower the limit from the proposed 1,800 contract limit
level.\684\ In doing so, commenters argued that they disagreed with the
EDS figure for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) because it does ``not reflect the
cotton industry's historical ability to deliver the physical
commodity.'' \685\ AMCOT similarly noted that the ``methodology used in
determining the limits is flawed and lacks consideration of the
industry's intricacies including the non-fungible quality as well as
warehousing, location, and logistical challenges.'' \686\ Furthermore,
AMCOT believed that the Federal spot month position limit level ``would
likely be disruptive to orderly market flows.'' \687\ Likewise, ACSA
noted that, ``[i]n a smaller market like cotton, such a drastic
increase and high limit will cause excessive volatility and hinder
convergence in the spot month.'' \688\
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\683\ AMCOT at 1-2; ACSA at 8; Ecom at 1; Southern Cotton at 2;
NCC at 1; Mallory Alexander at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; IMC at 2; Olam
at 3; DECA at 2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2; Choice at 1; East
Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; NCC at 2;
Omnicotton at 2; Toyo at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White
Gold at 1; LDC at 1; SW Ag at 2; NCTO at 2; and Parkdale at 2.
\684\ Id.
\685\ See, e.g., ACA at 2.
\686\ AMCOT at 1.
\687\ Id.
\688\ ACSA at 8.
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In addition to the market participants, IFUS also submitted a
comment letter with respect to ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), in which it
provided an updated recommended Federal spot month position limit level
of 900 contracts.\689\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\689\ IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Cotton Methodology,
August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter (Aug. 14, 2020), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR
11596).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Discussion of Final Rule--ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Level
As a preliminary matter, and as discussed previously, the
Commission believes that there is a range of acceptable Federal
position limit levels that will achieve the objectives of CEA section
4a(a)(3)(B). Thus, the Commission acknowledges that there may be other
acceptable Federal spot month position limit levels in addition to the
proposed 1,800 contract level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). Commenters to
the 2020 NPRM suggested three alternatives to the proposed Federal spot
month position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT): (1) 300
contracts; (2) 900 contracts; or (3) a level ``drastically lower'' than
1,800 contracts. All of these alternatives are below 25% of EDS. The
Commission considered the two specifically enumerated levels (i.e., 300
contracts and 900 contracts) and the proposed 1,800 contract level, and
has determined that the 900 contract level is the most appropriate
among the three for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT).
(1) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
Should Be Above 300 Contracts
The Commission believes that it is more appropriate to raise the
Federal spot month position limit level than to maintain its existing
level of 300 contracts, as long as that level is set at or below 25% of
EDS. One reason is because the current 300 contract Federal spot month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) has been in place since
at least 1987 while the size of the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) market has
significantly increased over the years, as evidenced by the material
increases in deliverable supply and open interest.\690\
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\690\ For example, between the periods of 1994-1999 and 2015-
2018, the maximum open interest in ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) increased
from 122,989 contracts to 344,302 contracts. Also, the EDS for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) increased from 6,005 contracts to 6,948 contracts
between 2016 and 2019.
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[[Page 3325]]
A second reason why the Commission believes that it is appropriate
to raise the Federal spot month position limit level above the existing
level of 300 contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is because of
potential liquidity concerns. At 300 contracts, the Federal spot month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) would be set at 4.32% of
EDS, which would be the lowest Federal spot month position limit level,
by far, in terms of percentage of EDS among all core referenced futures
contracts.\691\ At such a low level, the Commission is concerned that
this could hamper liquidity in the market, especially if the ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) market continues to grow as it has done over the years. This
concern is supported by the Commission's observation that there has
been a lack of liquidity at the start of the spot month period in
recent years as speculative traders exited the market or reduced their
positions to the Federal spot month position limit level of 300
contracts. The Commission's observation is based on its assessment of
the daily price impact liquidity in basis points with the gauge: \692\
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\691\ CBOT KC HRS Wheat (KW) generally has the lowest Federal
spot month position limit level in terms of percentage of EDS at
6.82%, which is 58% higher than 4.32%. However, following the close
of trading on the business day prior to the last two trading days of
the contract month, CME Live Cattle (LC) has the lowest Federal spot
month position limit level in terms of percentage of EDS at 5.29%,
which is 22% higher than 4.32%.
\692\ Pi is the price of trade i. Pi* is the proxy for the
current market price (the price of the last trade,
Pi--1). Q1 is the quantity traded (the number of futures
contracts traded in trade i). See Kane, Stephen, Exploring price
impact liquidity for December 2016 NYMEX energy contracts, p.5-6,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_priceimpact.pdf.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.030
Raising the limit level above 300 contracts to a higher level, such
as 900 contracts, should help alleviate some of the liquidity problems
that market participants have experienced because they will not have to
reduce their positions to such a low level (i.e., 300 contracts).
A third reason for raising the Federal spot month position limit
level above its existing level of 300 contracts is because a 300
contract level may not provide adequate headroom under which exchanges
may set and adjust their own position limit levels, up or down, in
response to market conditions within this position limits framework.
This is an especially acute issue because, as noted above, a Federal
spot month position limit level of 300 contracts is extremely low in
terms of percentage of EDS when compared to other core referenced
futures contracts, and there is no market-based reason (e.g., higher
susceptibility for corners and squeezes) for why the level should be
set so low.
A final reason for supporting a Federal spot month position limit
level higher than 300 contracts is because IFUS, which is the exchange
that lists ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), has recommended a level higher than
300 contracts.\693\ This is significant because exchanges have deep
knowledge about their markets and are particularly well-positioned to
recommend position limit levels for the Commission's
consideration.\694\
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\693\ IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Cotton Methodology,
August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter (Aug. 14, 2020), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR
11596).
\694\ 85 FR at 11598. However, as noted before, the Commission
independently reviewed and analyzed the exchange-recommended levels,
including the EDS figures that support such levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission recognizes that the comments from the end-users of
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) unanimously requested that the Commission
consider, among other options, maintaining the 300 contract Federal
position limit level. The main justifications underlying this request
are that: (1) The ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) market is small; and (2) the
EDS figure is extremely high. In response to commenters' claim about
the size of the market, the Commission notes that the market for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) is not as small as suggested. Open interest data
indicate that the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) futures market had a larger
average notional open interest in 2019 than nine other core referenced
futures contracts.\695\ Six of these contracts have higher Federal
position limit levels in terms of percentage of EDS in this Final
Rule.\696\
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\695\ These are CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE), CBOT Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE FCOJ-A (OJ),
ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF), NYMEX Platinum (PL), and NYMEX Palladium
(PA). See Section III.C.
\696\ These are CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), ICE Cocoa
(CC), ICE FCOJ-A (OJ), ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF), and NYMEX Platinum
(PL).
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In response to commenters' issue with the EDS, the Commission notes
that the cotton merchants may have focused on too narrow of a scope in
their comment letters. The commenters appear to focus on the actual
cotton that was delivered pursuant to holding the physically-settled
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core referenced futures contract to expiration,
and they use that data as evidence that the EDS is extremely high.\697\
The Commission's EDS figures are not meant to reflect the actual
commodity delivered. Rather, as the term estimated deliverable supply
indicates, it is the quantity of the commodity that meets contract
specifications that is reasonably expected to be readily available to
short traders and salable by long traders at its market value in normal
cash-marketing channels at the contract's delivery points during the
specified delivery period, barring abnormal movements in interstate
commerce.\698\ The Commission believes that limiting a speculative
trader from controlling more than 25% of this supply, and not the
actual commodity delivered, is critical for ensuring that corners and
squeezes do not happen.\699\
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\697\ See ACSA at 7-8.
\698\ 17 CFR part 38, Appendix C.
\699\ Generally, only a small percentage of futures contracts
actually go to delivery. Basing a speculative position limit on past
deliveries for a futures contract would be far too limiting for a
speculative position limit and would not reasonably achieve the four
policy objectives of CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).
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[[Page 3326]]
Furthermore, commenters did not provide specific issues with
respect to the methodology used to determine EDS for ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT), which has been available for review by the public since the 2020
NPRM was published.\700\ As a result, the Commission believes that the
EDS for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is appropriate and reasonable based on
its review and analysis of the methodology used.\701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\700\ IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Softs Methodology,
IFUS Comment Letter (May 14, 2019), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
\701\ Specifically, the estimate took into account cotton
certified stocks, which are reported daily for the five delivery
points specified in the contract specifications, as well as the
exchange estimated deliverable stocks close to the delivery points
that are not included as certified stocks based on the USDA's Weekly
Bales Made Available to Ship (``BMAS'') Summary report. The exchange
estimated the deliverable stocks contained in or near exchange
warehouses, both certified and non-certified, during notice and
delivery periods for the futures contract. BMAS deliverable stocks
data was also adjusted to exclude cotton at locations that were far
away from the delivery points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
Should Be Below 1,800 Contracts
However, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to lower
the Federal spot month position limit for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) from
the proposed 1,800 contract level. First, as noted previously, the
Commission received an updated recommended Federal spot month position
limit level from IFUS that is lower than 1,800 contracts.\702\ Second,
although the Commission believes that there are issues with the cotton
industry commenters' justifications for lowering the Federal spot month
position limit level, the Commission still believes that their comments
are informative. Specifically, the Commission believes that the
unanimous comments from the end-users of the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core
referenced futures contract suggest that lowering the Federal spot
month position limit level from 1,800 contracts will not have a
material detrimental effect on liquidity for bona fide hedgers in the
market. All things being equal, a lower spot month position limit level
will better protect the markets against corners and squeezes, but at
the expense of a reduction in liquidity for bona fide hedgers as
positions held by speculators will be more constrained. However, in
this instance, the Commission believes that it could improve
protections against corners and squeezes without materially impacting
liquidity for bona fide hedgers by adopting a Federal spot month
position limit level that is lower than 1,800 contracts, based on the
comments received.\703\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\702\ IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Cotton Methodology,
August 2020, IFUS Comment Letter (Aug. 14, 2020), available at
https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file for Proposed Rule 85 FR
11596).
\703\ However, for the reasons discussed previously, the
Commission does not believe that lowering the Federal spot month
position limit level to 300 contracts is appropriate, given the
observed issues in liquidity during the early part of the spot month
period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
Should Be Set at 900 Contracts
Given that the Commission believes that it is preferable to set a
Federal spot month position limit level higher than 300 contracts but
lower than 1,800 contracts for the aforementioned reasons, the
Commission believes that a Federal position limit level of 900
contracts is preferable to those alternatives. Specifically, the
Commission notes that IFUS, which has deep knowledge about the ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) market and is particularly well-positioned to
recommend the position limit level for the Commission's consideration,
has recommended a Federal spot month position limit level of 900
contracts. This is also supported by commenters who requested a
``drastically lower'' Federal spot month position limit level as an
alternative to maintaining a Federal spot month position limit level of
300 contracts.
The Commission also believes that a level of 900 contracts is
sufficiently high to address concerns about a lack of liquidity. This
is, in part, because a Federal spot month position limit level of 900
contracts would result in a level that is set at 12.95% of EDS, which
would coincidentally place ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) exactly at the median
among the legacy agricultural contracts and all core referenced futures
contracts in terms of percentage of EDS. Finally, based on the comments
received and because, all things being equal, lower spot month position
limit levels provide better protection against corners and squeezes,
the Commission believes that a level of 900 contracts will provide
stronger protection against corners and squeezes without materially
impacting liquidity for bona fide hedgers vis-[agrave]-vis a level of
1,800 contracts.\704\
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\704\ The Commission recognizes that this will limit the range
through which an exchange may set and adjust its own exchange-set
position limit level. However, based on the comments received, the
Commission believes that the stronger protections against corners
and squeezes is appropriate.
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vi. NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
This section will address the following issues concerning NYMEX NG:
(i) The Federal spot month position limit level for NYMEX NG; (ii) the
conditional spot month position limit exemption for positions in
natural gas referenced contracts, which is located in final Sec.
150.3(a)(4); and (iii) NYMEX NG penultimate referenced contracts. The
Commission is addressing the latter two issues in this section in order
to allow the reader to review all discussions regarding natural gas in
one place in this Final Rule.
a. NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) Federal Spot Month Position Limit
Level
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and Additional Background Information--
NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
Under the existing Federal position limits framework, there are no
Federal position limits for NYMEX NG in either the spot month or the
non-spot month. There is, however, an exchange-set spot month position
limit for NYMEX NG, which is set at 1,000 contracts for the physically-
settled NYMEX NG contract and 1,000 contracts per exchange for cash-
settled equivalent-sized natural gas contracts. Because there are three
exchanges that list such cash-settled natural gas contracts (NYMEX,
IFUS, and Nodal), a market participant can currently hold up to 3,000
such cash-settled contracts during the spot month.
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed a Federal spot month
position limit level of 2,000 contracts for NYMEX NG. The 2,000
contract level was determined based on 25% of updated EDS and was
recommended by CME Group. Consistent with the other core referenced
futures contracts, the proposed netting and aggregation requirements
permitted a market participant to hold up to 2,000 physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts and another 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts across all exchanges and in the OTC swaps
market.\705\
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\705\ For further discussion of netting and aggregation, see
Section II.B.10. (Application of Netting and Related Treatment of
Cash-settled Referenced Contracts).
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(2) Summary of the Commission Determination--NYMEX NG Federal Spot
Month Position Limit Level
The Commission is adopting its proposed approach with respect to
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts, but is modifying its
proposed approach with respect to cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts, as discussed below.
[[Page 3327]]
(3) Comments--NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level
With respect to the proposed NYMEX NG Federal spot month position
limit level, NGSA requested that the Commission ``increase the spot
month limit on the NG Contract by recognizing the transportation
capacity available now at Henry Hub provided by displacement and the
increasing capacity which is coming from future but imminent
displacement.'' \706\ In support, NGSA noted that CME Group's EDS
figure has ``incorporated displacement into its estimate of deliverable
supply at Henry Hub for years.'' \707\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\706\ NGSA at 10-11.
\707\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MFA/AIMA, Citadel, and SIFMA AMG requested that the Commission
raise the Federal spot month position limit level for NYMEX NG
referenced contracts to at least 3,000 contracts, because the 2020 NPRM
effectively decreases the total number of exchange-traded cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts that a market participant may hold in the
spot month from the current level of 3,000 contracts to 2,000
contracts.\708\ In support of this request, MFA/AIMA argued that the
2020 NPRM ``could adversely affect the ability of traders to optimize
the proportion of physically-settled and cash-settled natural gas
contracts that they wish to hold in their portfolio.'' \709\ SIFMA AMG
argued that the 2020 NPRM ``would disrupt existing trading practices
and business models without any corresponding regulatory or policy
benefit.'' \710\
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\708\ MFA/AIMA at 11-12; Citadel at 7-8; and SIFMA AMG at 10-11
(SIFMA AMG supported the 2,000 contract limit level for physically-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts, but requested at least a
3,000 contract limit level for the cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts).
\709\ MFA/AIMA at 11-12.
\710\ SIFMA AMG at 11.
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(4) Discussion of Final Rule--NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Level
Under the Final Rule, market participants may hold up to 2,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts per exchange during the spot
month and an additional 2,000 cash-settled economically equivalent OTC
swaps, rather than being subject to an aggregate position limit level
of 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts across all
exchanges and the OTC swaps market as proposed under the 2020 NPRM.
Because there are currently three exchanges that list natural gas
referenced contracts, this will allow market participants to hold a
total of 8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts between
positions held in cash-settled futures and in cash-settled economically
equivalent OTC swaps.\711\ This is in addition to the 2,000 physically-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts a market participant may hold
during the spot month. These amendments to the proposal are reflected
in a revised Appendix E to part 150 that the Commission is adopting in
this Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\711\ 2,000 cash-settled referenced contracts multiplied by
three exchanges plus 2,000 cash-settled economically equivalent OTC
swaps equals 8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Request To Increase the Federal Spot Month Position Limit Level To
Account for Displacement
In response to NGSA's request, the Commission first notes that CME
Group provided the EDS figure that was used as a basis for determining
its exchange-recommended Federal spot month position limit level, which
the Commission ultimately used as a basis for its own proposed Federal
spot month position limit level for NYMEX NG after independently
reviewing and assessing the methodology underlying the EDS figure and
the EDS figure itself.\712\ As NGSA noted, CME Group's EDS has
``incorporated displacement into its estimate of deliverable supply at
Henry Hub for years,'' \713\ which means that the EDS figure on which
the proposed Federal spot month position limit level was based already
``recogniz[ed] the transportation capacity available now at Henry Hub
provided by displacement.'' \714\ As a result, the proposed Federal
spot month position limit level took this into account as well. With
respect to future increases in EDS based on ``future but imminent
displacement,'' \715\ in the event that this occurs, CME Group may
submit an updated EDS figure pursuant to Sec. 150.2(f), at which time
the Commission would consider whether to modify the Federal spot month
position limit level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\712\ Summary DSE Proposed Limits, CME Group Comment Letter
(Nov. 26, 2019), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment
file for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
\713\ NGSA at 11.
\714\ Id. at 10. Furthermore, CME Group's methodology for
determining EDS for NYMEX NG explicitly states, ``Additionally, the
Exchange has taken into consideration backhaul in estimating the
deliverable supply.'' New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc., Analysis
of Deliverable Supply Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures, December 2018
(Dec. 1, 2018), available at https://comments.cftc.gov (comment file
for Proposed Rule 85 FR 11596).
\715\ NGSA at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Request To Increase the Cash-Settled Federal Spot Month Position
Limit Level
As previewed above, in response to comments from MFA/AIMA, Citadel,
and SIFMA AMG, the Commission is modifying the proposed NYMEX NG
Federal spot month position limit level for cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts, so that the Federal spot month position limit
applies separately per each exchange and the OTC swaps market, rather
than across exchanges and the OTC swaps market.
The Commission believes that this modification is warranted in
order to avoid disrupting the well-developed, unique liquidity
characteristics of the natural gas derivatives markets. As detailed
below, the cash-settled natural gas market is significantly more liquid
than the physically-settled natural gas market during the spot month.
This is in contrast with typical commodity markets, in which the
physically-settled contracts are generally more liquid than the cash-
settled contracts during the spot month.\716\
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\716\ Typically, this is because the physically-settled contract
is established first and the natural formation of liquidity in the
physically-settled contract historically stays in the established
contract due to first mover advantage. More liquid markets provide
for better bid/ask spreads and can execute larger transaction sizes
without substantial effects on the price of the contract. Thus, in
the past, cash-settled look-alike contracts historically have not
been as liquid as the original physically-settled futures contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The unique nature of the natural gas markets is reflected in the
current exchange-set natural gas position limit framework, in which
market participants may hold up to 1,000 cash-settled natural gas
contracts per exchange, which can result in a position of up to 3,000
cash-settled natural gas contracts (instead of 1,000 cash-settled
natural gas contracts altogether), despite only being able to hold up
to 1,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG contracts. The Commission believes
that, absent the modification adopted herein to apply the spot month
limit to NYMEX NG on a per exchange basis, the proposed Federal spot
month position limit level could disrupt the cash-settled natural gas
markets, in part, because, as commenters have noted: (1) Market
participants would be able to hold fewer cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts (i.e., 2,000 contracts) than they were previously
permitted under the exchange-set position limit framework (i.e., 3,000
contracts); and (2) some market participants may not be able to hold
the same proportion of physically-settled to cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts that they are
[[Page 3328]]
currently able to hold if they wish to maximize their positions in
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts. The Commission also
believes that it is appropriate to maintain consistency vis-[agrave]-
vis the exchange-set position limit framework in order to minimize
disruptions, since the Commission has not observed any issues with the
exchange-set position limit framework with respect to natural gas.
Accordingly, under the Final Rule, market participants (that are
not availing themselves of the Federal spot month conditional position
limit exemption for NYMEX NG, which is discussed below) may hold up to
2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts on each exchange that
lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract (which is currently
NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal), a total position of 6,000 exchange-listed
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.\717\ Furthermore, under the
Final Rule, traders may also hold an additional position in cash-
settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps that has a notional
amount of up to 2,000 equivalent-sized contracts. The Commission is
separately permitting up to 2,000 referenced contracts in the NYMEX NG
OTC swaps market in order to avoid disruptions to that market, given
that traders may be currently participating in that market as well. As
a result, under the Final Rule, traders may hold up to a total of 8,000
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts \718\ and 2,000 physically-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.\719\
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\717\ The Commission notes that market participants are not
permitted to net cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract positions
across exchanges or the OTC swaps market for Federal spot month
position limit purposes.
\718\ 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts
multiplied by three exchanges plus 2,000 cash-settled economically
equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps equals 8,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts.
\719\ CME Group also commented that it ``objects to any
disparities in the spot-month limits and would rigorously disagree
if the Commission adopts any other disparities in treatment between
physically-settled and cash-settled contracts,'' in the context of
the proposed Federal conditional limit, which is discussed in the
section below. CME Group at 6. This comment could also be viewed as
an objection to the Final Rule's Federal spot month position limit
level for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts. The Commission
believes that the rationale set forth in this section and the
Federal conditional limit section below is responsive to CME Group's
possible concern with respect to the Final Rule's Federal spot month
position limit level for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that, as discussed further below, as an
initial legal matter, the Commission interprets CEA section 4a(a)(6) as
generally requiring aggregate Federal position limits across
exchanges.\720\ Notwithstanding the requirements of CEA section
4a(a)(6), the Commission is adopting this approach with respect to
NYMEX NG referenced contracts pursuant to its exemptive authority in
CEA section 4a(a)(7). In doing so, the Commission believes that, based
on the foregoing reasons, applying the Federal spot month position
limit level for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts separately
per exchange and the OTC swaps market does not undermine the purposes
of the Federal position limits framework pursuant to CEA section 4a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\720\ For further discussion of the Commission's aggregation and
netting rules, see Section II.B.10. (application of netting
section).
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b. NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month Conditional Position Limit Level
(1) Summary of 2020 NPRM and Additional Background Information--NYMEX
NG Federal Spot Month Conditional Position Limit Level
In addition to the proposed 2,000 contract Federal spot month
position limit level for NYMEX NG, proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(4) also
included a spot month conditional position limit exemption (``Federal
conditional limit'') from the standard Federal spot month position
limit level for NYMEX NG for market participants that do not hold a
position in the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract.\721\
The proposed Federal conditional limit would allow, during the spot
month, market participants that do not hold a position in the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract to hold: (1) Up to
10,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts per exchange that
lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract; and (2) an
additional position in cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG
OTC swaps that has a notional amount of up to 10,000 equivalent-sized
contracts. As a result, the proposed Federal conditional limit would
permit a market participant that does not hold a physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract to hold a total of 40,000 cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts (up to 10,000 contracts on each of the
three exchanges (NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal) that lists a cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract and in the OTC swaps market) during the
spot month.
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\721\ The Commission is adopting the Federal conditional limit
pursuant to its exemptive authority in CEA section 4a(a)(7). 7
U.S.C. 6a(a)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed framework for the Federal conditional limit was
derived from the existing exchange-set spot month conditional position
limit framework that has been in place for approximately a decade. This
existing conditional position limit framework permits, during the spot
month, up to 5,000 equivalent-sized cash-settled natural gas contracts
per exchange that lists a cash-settled natural gas contract, provided
that the market participant does not hold a position in the physically-
settled NYMEX NG contract.\722\ The 5,000 contract conditional spot
month position limit level equals five-times the existing exchange-set
1,000 contract spot month position limit level for the physically-
settled NYMEX NG contract.\723\ Noting the unique circumstances of the
natural gas futures markets, the Commission's proposed Federal
conditional limit level applied the same multiplier of five to its
proposed Federal spot month position limit level for the physically-
settled NYMEX NG contract in order to arrive at the 10,000 contract
Federal conditional limit level that applies for each exchange and OTC
swaps market.
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\723\ See IFUS Rule 6.20(c), NYMEX Rule 559.F, and Nodal Rule
6.5.7. The spot month for such contracts is three days. See also
Position Limits, CMG Group website, available at https://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/position-limits.html (NYMEX
position limits spreadsheet); Market Resources, IFUS website,
available at https://www.theice.com/futures-us/market-resources
(IFUS position limits spreadsheet). NYMEX rules establish an
exchange-set spot month limit of 1,000 contracts for its physically-
settled NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract and a separate
spot month limit of 1,000 contracts for its cash-settled Henry Hub
Natural Gas Last Day Financial Futures contract. IFUS's natural gas
contract is one quarter the size of the NYMEX contract. IFUS thus
has rules in place establishing an exchange-set spot month limit of
4,000 contracts (equivalent to 1,000 NYMEX NG contracts) for its
cash-settled Henry Hub LD1 Fixed Price Futures contract.
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The 2020 NPRM included the Federal conditional limit to accommodate
certain trading dynamics unique to the natural gas contracts.\724\ For
example, the Commission has observed that, as the physically-settled
NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract approaches expiration, open
interest tends to decline in NYMEX NG and tends to increase rapidly in
ICE's cash-settled Henry Hub LD1 contract.\725\ This is in contrast
with other commodities in which the physically-settled markets are more
liquid than the cash-settled markets during the spot month. These
dynamics suggest that cash-settled natural gas contracts serve an
important function for hedgers and speculators who wish to recreate
and/or hedge the physically-settled NYMEX NG contract price during the
spot month without being required to make or take
[[Page 3329]]
delivery.\726\ In addition, the Commission also proposed the
divestiture requirement in the Federal conditional limit in order to
address historical concerns over the potential for manipulation of
physically-settled natural gas contracts during the spot month in order
to benefit positions in cash-settled natural gas contracts.\727\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\724\ 85 FR at 11641.
\725\ Id.
\726\ Id.
\727\ Id.
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(2) Summary of the Commission Determination--NYMEX NG Federal Spot
Month Conditional Position Limit Level
The Commission is adopting the Federal conditional limit as
proposed.
(3) Comments--NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month Conditional Position Limit
Level
With respect to the proposed Federal conditional limit, several
commenters generally supported its adoption.\728\ COPE believed that
the proposed conditional limit ``permits market liquidity . . . without
sacrificing the benefits of position limits.''\729\ ICE supported the
Federal conditional limit, noting that ``cash-settled contracts present
a reduced potential for manipulation of the price of the physically-
settled contract.'' \730\ CME Group, on the other hand, objected to the
proposal, arguing that it could ``drain liquidity for bona fide hedgers
in the physically-settled market and could prevent physical delivery
markets from serving the price discovery function that they have long
provided'' and believed that it ``could incentivize the manipulation of
a cash commodity price in order to benefit a position in a cash-settled
contract.'' \731\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\728\ COPE at 2-3; EEI/EPSA at 4; and ICE at 13.
\729\ COPE at 2-3.
\730\ ICE at 13 (referencing a sentiment previously expressed by
the Commission).
\731\ CME Group at 6.
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A number of commenters also requested that the Federal conditional
limit levels be available to market participants that do not exit
positions in the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract during
the spot month, which would effectively establish the Federal
conditional limit level as the operative Federal spot month limit level
for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts. In support of this
request, several commenters argued that the 2020 NPRM's approach to the
Federal conditional limit would result in liquidity leaving the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract when it is needed the
most.\732\ EEI/EPSA also commented that the Federal conditional limit
framework in the 2020 NPRM is ``excessive and is an overly rigid
solution that may unnecessarily restrict legitimate trading activity.''
\733\ NGSA commented that the 2020 NPRM ``removes important hedging
optionality for physical market participants.'' \734\ Citadel argued
that the 2020 NPRM would limit flexibility and impair market efficiency
by preventing ``market participants with a meaningful position in the
cash-settled market from participating in the physically-settled
market--limiting flexibility and impairing market efficiency.'' \735\
CCI also believed that the 2020 NPRM would ``impair price discovery''
and ``negatively impact price convergence.'' \736\
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\732\ ISDA at 8; SIFMA AMG at 10-11; FIA at 7-8; NGSA at 12-14;
Citadel at 7; and CCI at 4.
\733\ EEI/EPSA at 4.
\734\ NGSA at 12.
\735\ Citadel at 7.
\736\ CCI at 4.
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Finally, ICE requested that ``the Commission revert back to the
five-time conditional limit for cash settled contracts . . . instead of
the conditional limit of 10,000 contracts in the Proposed Rule,''
because ``[a]pplying a five-time multiplier versus a hard limit, would
allow the conditional limit to track any changes in the spot month
limits over time, which in turn will reflect changes in deliverable
supply.'' \737\
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\737\ ICE at 13.
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(4) Discussion of Final Rule--NYMEX NG Federal Spot Month Conditional
Position Limit Level
(i) Availability of the Federal Conditional Limit for NYMEX NG
In response to CME Group's comment supporting the elimination of
the Federal condition limit, the Commission is concerned that
eliminating the proposed conditional limit could result in potential
market disruptions, given that a conditional limit framework for
natural gas has been in place at the exchange level for many years. For
example, eliminating the existing conditional limit structure could
restrict the positions that market participants may hold in cash-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts during the spot month, resulting
in reduced liquidity, including for commercial hedgers seeking to
offset price risks but not necessarily looking to make or take
delivery. Additionally, since it was instituted approximately a decade
ago, the exchange-set conditional limit framework has functioned
well.\738\ The Commission has not observed any of the concerns raised
by CME Group come to fruition, and the physically-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract remains highly liquid. Furthermore, as discussed
above, other commenters supported the availability of the Federal
conditional limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\738\ 85 FR at 11640.
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(ii) Federal Conditional Limit's Divestiture Requirement
In response to comments requesting that the Federal conditional
limit be available to market participants that do not exit the spot
month physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract, the Commission
first notes that the requirement that market participants exit the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract has been reflected in
exchange rulebooks for many years, in part because the requirement is
critically important to discouraging manipulation.\739\ Without this
requirement, a trader could hold up to 40,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts (or more, if additional exchanges list cash-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts in the future), which is at 500%
of EDS, and 2,000 physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts,
which is at 25% of EDS. At these levels, it may not require much
movement in the physically-settled markets to disproportionately
benefit the cash-settled holdings. As a result, the requirement to exit
the physically-settled contract is critical for reducing the market
participant's incentive to manipulate the cash settlement price by, for
example, banging-the-close or distorting physical delivery prices in
the physically-settled contract to benefit leveraged cash-settled
positions.\740\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\739\ 85 FR at 11641.
\740\ See 85 FR 11626, 11641.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to commenters' concerns about removing flexibility and
options for market participants, as well as a potential decrease in
liquidity in the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract, the
Commission notes that the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contract remains highly liquid even in spite of the implementation of
the exchange-set conditional limit framework instituted approximately a
decade ago. Also, market participants should have more flexibility and
options than before because the Federal spot month position limit level
for NYMEX NG adopted herein will now permit up to 8,000 cash-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contracts, even if the market participant holds
2,000 physically-settled NYMEX
[[Page 3330]]
NG referenced contracts.\741\ Finally, the Commission reiterates that
Federal position limit levels only apply to speculative positions and,
as a result, bona fide hedging positions will continue to be allowed to
exceed the Federal position limit levels, including the Federal
conditional limit level, from the Federal position limits
perspective.\742\
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\741\ Under the Final Rule's Federal spot month position limit
level for NYMEX NG, a trader may hold 2,000 physically-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts, 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts per exchange that lists such contracts, and 2,000 cash-
settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps. Currently, there
are three exchanges that list cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts--NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal. As a result, a trader may hold up
to 6,000 exchange-listed cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts
and 2,000 cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps,
which brings the total number of cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts a trader may hold to 8,000 under the Federal spot month
position limit level.
\742\ This also answers EEI/EPSA's request to confirm ``that a
participant may rely upon the conditional limit in the first
instance but may also utilize a hedge exemption to exceed the
conditional limit.'' EEI/EPSA at 4. However, the Commission notes
that exchanges have rarely, if ever, allowed a market participant to
exceed the exchange-set natural gas conditional limit by layering a
bona fide hedge position on top of the cash-settled natural gas
contract position permitted under the natural gas conditional limit.
Similar to this existing practice, the Commission expects that,
under the Final Rule, a market participant will rarely be permitted
to hold: (1) A bona fide hedge position in the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract while taking advantage of the
conditional limit for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts; or
(2) a bona fide hedge position in cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts on top of the maximum position permitted under the
conditional limit for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) Application of a Five-Times Multiplier for the Federal
Conditional Limit Level
The Commission clarifies that, in accordance with historical
practice, if the Federal spot month position limit level for the
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contract is updated in the
future through rulemaking, the Commission expects to simultaneously
adjust the Federal conditional limit in the same rulemaking, such that
the Federal conditional limit level is set at a multiple of five of the
new Federal spot month position limit level for NYMEX NG, provided that
the Commission does not observe any issues in the markets.
c. NYMEX NG Penultimate Referenced Contracts
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and Additional Background Information--
NYMEX NG Penultimate Referenced Contracts
With respect to NYMEX NG, the Commission proposed that penultimate
contracts, which are cash-settled contracts that settle on the trading
day immediately preceding the final trading day of the corresponding
referenced contract, are also considered referenced contracts that are
subject to Federal spot month position limits.\743\ The Commission also
proposed a slightly broader economically equivalent swap definition for
natural gas, so that swaps with delivery dates that diverge by less
than two calendar days (instead of one calendar day) from an associated
referenced contract could still be deemed economically equivalent and
therefore subject to Federal position limits. The Commission made these
adjustments to: Recognize the active and vibrant penultimate natural
gas contract markets; prevent and disincentivize manipulation and
regulatory arbitrage; and prevent volume from shifting away from non-
penultimate cash-settled NYMEX NG markets to penultimate NYMEX NG
contract futures and/or penultimate NYMEX NG swaps markets in order to
avoid Federal position limits.\744\
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\743\ Such penultimate contracts include: ICE's Henry Financial
Penultimate Fixed Price Futures (PHH) and options on Henry
Penultimate Fixed Price (PHE), and NYMEX's Henry Hub Natural Gas
Penultimate Financial Futures (NPG).
\744\ The Commission proposed a relatively narrow ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition in order to prevent market participants
from inappropriately netting positions in core referenced futures
contracts against swap positions further out on the curve. The
Commission acknowledges that liquidity could shift to penultimate
swaps as a result, but believes that, with the exception of natural
gas, this concern is mitigated since certain constraints exist that
militate against this from occurring, including basis risk between
the penultimate swap and the core referenced futures contract.
However, this constraint does not necessarily apply to the natural
gas futures markets, because natural gas has a relatively liquid
penultimate futures market that enables a market participant to
hedge or off-set its penultimate swap positions. As a result, the
Commission believes that liquidity may be incentivized to shift from
NYMEX NG to penultimate natural gas swaps in order to avoid Federal
position limits in the absence of the Commission's exception for
natural gas in the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Comments--NYMEX NG Penultimate Referenced Contracts
In response to this part of the 2020 NPRM, ICE requested ``that the
Commission continue to allow exchanges to impose spot month
accountability levels which expire during the period when spot month
limits for the Henry Hub core-referenced futures contract are in effect
and to not aggregate penultimate options into the Henry Hub LD1 cash-
settled limit.'' \745\ One of the ways in which ICE supported this
request was by claiming that, ``The Commission states that penultimate
contracts are economically the same as the last day contract, however,
empirically, this statement is not correct as settlement prices have
demonstrated.'' \746\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\745\ ICE at 14.
\746\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Discussion of Final Rule--NYMEX NG Penultimate Referenced Contracts
The Commission declines to exclude NYMEX NG penultimate contracts
from Federal position limits for the reasons set forth in this Final
Rule's section addressing ``Referenced Contract.'' \747\ In doing so,
the Commission notes, in particular, that ICE's specific assertion that
penultimate natural gas contracts are not economically the same as last
day contracts based on settlement prices runs counter to the
Commission's review of a sample of the daily settlement prices for
NYMEX NG (the physically-settled natural gas contract), ICE Henry Hub
LD1 (the ICE natural gas contract cash-settled to NYMEX NG), and ICE
Henry Hub Penultimate (the ICE penultimate natural gas contract cash-
settled to NYMEX NG).\748\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\747\ For further discussion of the Commission's determination
to include penultimate contracts within the Federal position limits
framework, see Section II.A.16.iii.a.(2)(iii).
\748\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vii. Wheat Core Referenced Futures Contracts' Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM and Additional Background Information--
Wheat Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission proposed to increase the Federal spot month position
limit levels for all three wheat core referenced futures contracts
(CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE)) from
600 contracts to 1,200 contracts. The proposed Federal limit levels
were based on the underlying EDS figures for each wheat core referenced
futures contract and CME's and MGEX's recommended Federal spot month
position limit levels of 1,200 contracts for each of their respective
wheat core referenced futures contracts.
b. Summary of the Commission Determination--Wheat Federal Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
The Commission is adopting the Federal spot month position limit
levels for all three wheat core referenced futures contracts as
proposed.
c. Comments--Wheat Federal Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received one comment, from MGEX, fully supporting
[[Page 3331]]
the 2020 NPRM's Federal spot month parity among the three wheat core
referenced futures contracts.\749\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\749\ MGEX at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
i. Background--Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission most recently updated the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels in 2011.\750\ At that time, the Commission
utilized a formula that was called the ``10/2.5% formula,'' \751\ which
calculated the Federal non-spot month position limit levels by
multiplying the first 25,000 contracts in open interest by 10% and
multiplying the remaining contracts by 2.5% and adding the two numbers
together.\752\ The 10/2.5% formula was first adopted in 1999 based on
two primary factors: Growth in open interest and the size of large
traders' positions.\753\ The existing Federal non-spot month position
limit levels that were adopted in 2011 have not been updated to reflect
changes in open interest data in over a decade.\754\
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\750\ The Commission notes that the 2011 Final Rulemaking that
adopted the most recent Federal non-spot month position limit levels
was vacated by an order of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia on September 28, 2012. However, that order did not apply
with respect to the 2011 Final Rulemaking's amendments to the
Federal non-spot month position limit levels in Sec. 150.2. ISDA,
887 F.Supp.2d 259 (2012).
\751\ See, e.g., Revision of Federal Speculative Position Limits
and Associated Rules, 64 FR at 24038 (May 5, 1999) (increasing
deferred-month limit levels based on 10% of open interest up to an
open interest of 25,000 contracts, with a marginal increase of 2.5%
thereafter). Prior to 1999, the Commission had given little credence
to the size of open interest in the contract in determining the
position limit level. Instead, the Commission's traditional standard
was to set limit levels based on the distribution of speculative
traders in the market. See, e.g., 64 FR at 24039; Revision of
Federal Speculative Position Limits and Associated Rules, 63 FR at
38525, 38527 (July 17, 1998).
\752\ For example, assume a commodity contract has an aggregate
open interest of 200,000 contracts over the past 12 month period.
Applying the 10/2.5% formula to an aggregate open interest of
200,000 contracts would yield a non-spot month position limit level
of 6,875 contracts. That is, 10% of the first 25,000 contracts would
equal 2,500 contracts (25,000 contracts x 0.10 = 2,500 contracts).
Then add 2.5% of the remaining 175,000 of aggregate open interest or
4,375 contracts (175,000 contracts x 0.025 = 4,375 contracts) for a
total non-spot month position limit level of 6,875 contracts (2,500
contracts + 4,375 contracts = 6,875 contracts).
\753\ See 64 FR at 24038. See also 63 FR at 38525, 38527 (The
1998 proposed revisions to non-spot month levels, which were
eventually adopted in 1999, were based upon two criteria: ``(1) The
distribution of speculative traders in the markets; and (2) the size
of open interest.'').
\754\ In setting the Federal non-spot month position limit
levels in 2011, the Commission used open interest data from 2009. 76
FR at 71642.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit
Levels
Proposed Sec. 150.2(e) provided that Federal non-spot month
position limit levels were set forth in proposed Appendix E to part 150
and were as follows: \755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\755\ 85 FR at 11624. As discussed above, the proposed Federal
non-spot month position limits would apply to only the nine legacy
agricultural contracts and any associated referenced contracts. All
other referenced contracts subject to Federal position limits would
be subject to Federal position limits only during the spot month, as
specified above, and would only be subject to exchange-set position
limits or position accountability levels outside of the spot month.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.009
[[Page 3332]]
In generally calculating the above levels, the Commission proposed
to maintain the existing 10/2.5% formula for non-spot month position
limit levels, but with the following limited changes: (1) The 10% rate
would apply to the first 50,000 contracts of open interest (instead of
the first 25,000 contracts); (2) the 2.5% rate would apply to open
interest above 50,000 contracts (rather than above the current level of
25,000 contracts); and (3) the modified 10/2.5% formula would apply to
updated open interest data for the applicable futures and delta-
adjusted options for the periods from July 2017 to June 2018 and July
2018 to June 2019.\756\ All Federal non-spot month position limit
levels that were calculated based on the 10/2.5% formula (i.e., all
legacy agricultural contracts, with the exception of CBOT Oats (O),
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), and the single month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)) were rounded up to the
nearest 100 contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\756\ The 12-month period yielding the higher open interest
level is selected as the basis for the Federal non-spot month
position limit level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As outlined in the table above, the proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels are generally higher than the existing Federal
non-spot month position limit levels, with the exception of CBOT Oats
(O), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), for which the
proposed limit levels would remain at existing levels. As described in
detail below, this proposed general increase is primarily due to the
increases in open interest that have occurred since the Federal non-
spot month position limit levels were last updated approximately a
decade ago.\757\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\757\ See 85 FR at 11630. The 2020 NPRM's proposed modification
to the 10/2.5% formula from 25,000 to 50,000 contracts results in a
modest increase in the Federal non-spot month position limit level
of 1,875 contracts over what the limit level would be if the 10/2.5%
formula were applied at 25,000 contracts, assuming that the market
for the core referenced futures contract has an open interest of at
least 50,000 contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
The Commission is adopting each of the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels as proposed in Sec. 150.2(e) and Appendix E to
part 150, with the exception of setting a lower single month position
limit for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The Commission will first describe the
general rationale for the final Federal non-spot month position limit
levels that are being adopted. Next, the Commission will describe the
comments it received in connection with the proposed Federal non-spot
month position limit levels. Finally, the Commission will provide
responses to such comments, including further rationale for the
Commission's position concerning the final Federal non-spot month
position limit levels.
a. Rationale for the Final Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
As explained below, the Commission believes that the final Federal
non-spot month position limit levels, in conjunction with the rest of
the Federal position limits framework, will achieve the four policy
objectives in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B). Namely, they will: (1) Diminish,
eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation; (2) deter and prevent
market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; (3) ensure sufficient
market liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (4) ensure that the price
discovery function of the underlying market is not disrupted.\758\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\758\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a preliminary matter, the Commission continues to believe that a
formula based on a percentage of open interest, such as the 10/2.5%
formula, will permit position limit levels to better reflect the
changing needs and composition of the futures markets.\759\ Open
interest is a measure of market activity that reflects the number of
contracts that are ``open'' or live, where each contract of open
interest represents both a long and a short position.\760\ The
Commission believes that limiting positions to a percentage of open
interest: (1) Helps ensure that positions are not so large relative to
observed market activity that they risk disrupting the market; (2)
allows speculators to hold sufficient contracts to provide a healthy
level of liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (3) allows for increases
in position limits and position sizes as markets expand and become more
active.\761\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\759\ 85 FR at 11630.
\760\ Id.
\761\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Modification of the 10/2.5% Formula
However, the Commission believes that the current 10/2.5% formula
should be updated based on market developments since it was adopted in
1999. As a result, the Commission proposed modifying the 10/2.5%
formula by adjusting the inflection point between the 10% rate and the
2.5% rate from 25,000 contracts to 50,000 contracts.\762\ The
Commission also proposed applying updated open interest data to the
modified 10/2.5% formula.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\762\ This results in a modest increase in the Federal non-spot
month position limit level of 1,875 contracts over what the limit
level would be if the 10/2.5% formula were applied at 25,000
contracts, assuming that the market for the core referenced futures
contract has an open interest of at least 50,000 contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is adopting these changes as proposed because: (1)
Open interest has increased significantly since the 10/2.5% formula was
originally adopted in 1999; and (2) futures market composition has
changed significantly since 1999. The Commission discusses both
developments in turn below.
(i) Increases in Open Interest
As noted in the 2020 NPRM, there has generally been a significant
increase in maximum open interest for each of the legacy agricultural
contracts (except for CBOT Oats (O)) since the existing 10/2.5% formula
was first adopted in 1999.\763\ Under the existing 10/2.5% formula,
because the 2.5% incremental increase applies after the first 25,000
contracts of open interest, limit levels with respect to contracts with
open interest above 25,000 contracts (i.e., all applicable core
referenced futures contracts other than CBOT Oats (O)) continue to
increase at the much slower rate of 2.5% rather than the 10% rate
that's applicable for the first 25,000 contracts. As a result, the
existing 10/2.5% formula has become proportionally more restrictive as
the percentage of open interest above 25,000 contracts increased.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\763\ 85 FR at 11631.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The table below provides data that describes the market environment
during the period prior to, and subsequent to, the adoption of the
existing 10/2.5% formula by the Commission in 1999. The data includes
futures contracts and the delta-adjusted options on futures open
interest.\764\ The first column of the table provides the maximum open
interest in the nine legacy agricultural contracts over the five year
period ending in 1999. The CBOT Corn (C) contract had a maximum open
interest of approximately 463,000 contracts, and the CBOT Soybeans (S)
contract had a maximum open interest
[[Page 3333]]
of approximately 227,000 contracts. The other seven contracts had
maximum open interest figures that ranged from less than 20,000
contracts for CBOT Oats (O) to approximately 172,000 for CBOT Soybean
Oil (SO). Hence, when adopting the 10/2.5% formula in 1999, the
Commission's experience in these markets was of aggregate futures and
options on futures open interest well below 500,000 contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\764\ Delta is a ratio comparing the change in the price of an
asset (a futures contract) to the corresponding change in the price
of its derivative (an option on that futures contract) and has a
value that ranges between zero and one. In-the-money call options
get closer to 1 as their expiration approaches. At-the-money call
options typically have a delta of 0.5, and the delta of out-of-the-
money call options approaches 0 as expiration nears. The deeper in-
the-money the call option, the closer the delta will be to 1, and
the more the option will behave like the underlying asset. Thus,
delta-adjusted options on futures will represent the total position
of those options as if they were converted to futures.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.010
The table also displays the maximum open interest figures for
subsequent periods up to, and including, 2018. The maximum open
interest for all legacy agricultural contracts, except for CBOT Oats
(O), generally increased over the period. By the 2015-2018 period
covered in the last column of the table, five of the contracts had
maximum open interest greater than 500,000 contracts. Also, the
contracts for CBOT Corn (C), CBOT Soybeans (S), and CBOT Hard Red
Winter Wheat (KW) saw maximum open interest increase by a factor of
four to five times the maximum open interest observed during the 1994-
1999 period when the Commission adopted the 10/2.5% formula in 1999.
As open interest has increased, the current Federal non-spot month
position limit levels have become significantly more restrictive over
time. In particular, as discussed above, because the 2.5% incremental
increase applies after the first 25,000 contracts of open interest
under the existing 10/2.5% formula, Federal non-spot month position
limit levels on legacy agricultural contracts with open interest above
25,000 contracts (i.e., all contracts other than CBOT Oats (O))
continue to increase at a much slower rate of 2.5% rather than the 10%
that applies for the first 25,000 contracts.
The existing 10/2.5% formula's inflection point of 25,000 contracts
was less of a problem in the latter part of the 1990s, for example,
when open interest in each of the nine legacy agricultural contracts
was below 500,000, and in many cases below 200,000. More recently,
however, open interest has grown above 500,000 for a majority of the
legacy agricultural contracts. The existing 10/2.5% formula has thus
become more restrictive for market participants, including, as
discussed immediately below, certain banks and dealers with positions
that may not be eligible for a bona fide hedging exemption, but who
might otherwise provide valuable liquidity to commercial firms.
(ii) Changes in Market Composition
The potentially restrictive nature of the existing Federal non-spot
month position limit levels has become more problematic over time
because dealers play a much more significant role in the market today
than at the time the Commission adopted the 10/2.5% formula. Prior to
1999, the Commission regulated physical commodity markets where the
largest participants were often large commercial interests who held
short positions. The offsetting positions were often held by small,
individual traders, who tended to be long.\765\
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\765\ Stewart, Blair, An Analysis of Speculative Trading in
Grain Futures, Technical Bulletin No. 1001, U.S. Department of
Agriculture (Oct. 1949). See also Draper, Dennis, ``The Small Public
Trader in Futures Markets'', pp. 211-269, Futures Markets:
Regulatory Issues (ed. Anne Peck, 1985): American Enterprise
Institute.
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Several years after the Commission adopted the 10/2.5% formula, the
composition of futures market participants changed as dealers began to
enter the physical commodity futures market in larger size. These
dealers, including ones affiliated with banks or large financial
institutions that are now provisionally registered and regulated as
swap dealers, sometimes held significant positions in these markets by
acting as aggregators or market makers and providing swaps to
commercial hedgers and to other market participants.\766\ The existing
10/2.5% formula has thus become particularly restrictive for dealers,
including those with positions that may not be eligible for a bona fide
hedging exemption, but
[[Page 3334]]
that might otherwise provide valuable liquidity to commercial
firms.\767\
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\766\ Staff Report on Commodity Swap Dealers & Index Traders
with Commission Recommendations, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (Sept. 2008), available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcstaffreportonswapdealers09.pdf.
\767\ The Commission notes that this issue with respect to swap
dealers is being addressed through a combination of a modification
of the 10/2.5% formula and the pass-through swap provision, the
latter of which is described in Section II.A.1.x. (Pass-Through Swap
and Pass-Through Swap Offset Provisions).
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The table below demonstrates the trend of increased dealer
participation by presenting data from the Commission's publicly
available ``Bank Participation Report'' (``BPR''), as of the December
report for 2002-2018.\768\ The table displays the number of banks
holding reportable positions for the seven futures contracts for which
Federal position limits apply and that were reported in the BPR.\769\
The report presents data for every market where five or more banks hold
reportable positions. The BPR is based on the same large-trader
reporting system database used to generate the Commission's Commitments
of Traders (``COT'') report.\770\
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\768\ Bank Participation Reports, available at https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/BankParticipationReports/index.htm.
\769\ The term ``reportable position'' is defined in Sec.
15.00(p) of the Commission's regulations. 17 CFR 15.00(p).
\770\ Commitments of Traders, available at www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/index.htm. Commitments of Traders
reports indicate that there are generally still as many large
commercial traders in the markets today as there were in the 1990s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No data was reported for the seven futures contracts in December
2002, indicating that fewer than five banks held reportable positions
at the time of the report. The December 2003 report shows that five or
more banks held reportable positions in four of the commodity futures.
The number of banks with reportable positions generally increased in
the early to mid-2000s, which included dealers that operated in the
swaps markets by acting as aggregators or market makers, providing
swaps to commercial hedgers and to other market participants while
using the futures markets to hedge their own exposures.\771\ When the
Commission adopted the 10/2.5% formula in 1999, it had limited
experience with physical commodity derivatives markets in which such
banks were significant participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\771\ Staff Report on Commodity Swap Dealers & Index Traders
with Commission Recommendations, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (Sept. 2008), available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcstaffreportonswapdealers09.pdf.
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.011
For 2003, which was the first year in the report with reported data
on the futures for these physical commodities, the BPR showed, as
displayed in the table below, that the reporting banks held modest
positions, totaling 3.4% of futures long open interest for CBOT Wheat
(W) and smaller positions in other futures. The positions displayed in
the table below increased over the next several years, generally
peaking around 2005/2006 as a percentage of the long open interest.
[[Page 3335]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.012
BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
The Commission believes that the application of the modified 10/
2.5% formula adopted herein to updated open interest data will prevent
the Federal non-spot month limits from becoming overly restrictive by
providing an appropriate increase in the non-spot month position limit
levels for most contracts to better reflect the above-described changes
in market dynamics observed since the late 1990s.
(2) Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels for CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE)
The Commission is adopting the proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels with respect to CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE). These remain at the current Federal
non-spot month position limit levels, which are 2,000 contracts for
CBOT Oats (O) and 12,000 contracts for both CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) and
MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE). These Federal non-spot month position limit
levels are higher than the levels that would have been determined using
the modified 10/2.5% formula and updated open interest data, which
would have resulted in 700 contracts for CBOT Oats (O), 11,900
contracts for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and 5,700 contracts for MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE). However, the Commission saw no reason to reduce these
Federal non-spot month position limit levels in accordance with the 10/
2.5% formula because the Commission has observed that the existing
limit levels have functioned well for these core referenced futures
contracts and the Commission believes that strictly following the 10/
2.5% formula to determine Federal non-spot month position limit levels
could harm liquidity in those markets.
(3) Single Month Position Limit Level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
The Commission is adopting a modified single month Federal position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The Commission proposed a
uniform single month and all-months-combined position limit for the ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) contract, as well as uniform single month and all-
months-combined position limits for the eight other legacy agricultural
contracts. However, in the 2020 NPRM the Commission requested comments
from the public concerning whether the Commission should adopt a lower
single month position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) compared to
the all-months-combined position limit level.\772\
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\772\ 85 FR 11637 (Request for Comment #26).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission received numerous comments from the end users of ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) in the cotton industry, including growers and
merchants, who requested that the Commission establish a lower Federal
single month position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) compared to
the all-months-combined position limit level, including establishing
the single month position limit level at 50% of the all-months-combined
position limit level.\773\ The Commission did not receive any comments
from commercial end-users opposing a lower Federal single month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) compared to the all-
months-combined position limit level. In response to the comments
received, the Commission is adopting a lower Federal single month
position limit level of 5,950 contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT),
which is 50% of the proposed Federal non-spot month position limit
level. However, the Commission is adopting the proposed all-months-
[[Page 3336]]
combined position limit level of 11,900 contracts, which is based on
the modified 10/2.5% formula. This change is discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\773\ ACSA at 2, 8; LDC at 2; Olam at 2; Ecom at 1; ACA at 2;
Canale Cotton at 2; Choice at 2; Jess Smith at 2; East Cotton at 2;
Memtex at 2; NCC at 1-2; Southern Cotton at 2-3; Texas Cotton at 2;
Toyo Cotton Co. at 2; WCSA at 2; and Omnicotton at 2.
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(4) The Final Rule's Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limits Achieve the
Four Statutory Objectives in CEA Section 4a(a)(3)(B)
As noted above, in the Final Rule, the Commission is not reducing
Federal non-spot month position limit levels for any of the legacy
agricultural contracts and will be raising them for six of the nine
such contracts in accordance with the updated open interest data and
the modified 10/2.5% formula.\774\ As a result, the Commission believes
that the final Federal non-spot month position limit levels will
generally improve liquidity for bona fide hedgers and, at the very
least, not harm liquidity compared to the status quo.
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\774\ As noted previously, the Commission is not following the
modified 10/2.5% formula for determining the single month position
limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). However, the Final Rule still
increases that limit level compared to its existing limit level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also believes that the final Federal non-spot month
position limit levels remain low enough to diminish, eliminate, or
prevent excessive speculation, and to deter and prevent market
manipulation. This is because, as discussed above, by taking into
account the amount of observed market activity through open interest,
the modified 10/2.5% formula adopted herein helps ensure, among other
things, that positions are not so large relative to observed market
activity that they risk disrupting the market.\775\ This, in turn, also
helps ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying market
is not disrupted, because markets that are free from manipulative
activity reflect fundamentals of supply and demand rather than
artificial pressures. The Commission also notes that the 10/2.5%
formula has functioned well, based on the Commission's decades of
experience administering the formula.\776\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\775\ 85 FR at 11630.
\776\ Id. at 11675.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission reiterates that the modified 10/2.5% formula
provided in this Final Rule is generally a continuation of the same
approach the Commission has taken for decades. The increased levels
adopted herein are primarily driven by utilizing updated open interest
figures. With respect to the slight modification to the 10/2.5%
formula, the Commission does not believe that the modification will
negatively impact the formula's effectiveness in ensuring that the
Federal non-spot month position limit levels remain low enough to
diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation, and to deter and
prevent market manipulation. This is because the difference between
utilizing the existing 10/2.5% formula and the modified 10/2.5% formula
results in a modest increase in Federal non-spot month position limit
level of 1,875 contracts, which is generally counterbalanced by the
increased amount of open interest that is subject to the 2.5%
rate.\777\ Additionally, the Commission has previously studied prior
increases in Federal non-spot month position limit levels and concluded
that the overall impact was modest, and that any changes in market
performance were most likely attributable to factors other than changes
in the Federal position limit rules.\778\ The Commission has since
gained additional experience which supports that conclusion, including
by monitoring amendments to position limit levels by exchanges.
Further, given the significant increases in open interest and changes
in market composition that have occurred since the 1990s, the
Commission is comfortable that the Federal non-spot month position
limit levels adopted herein will adequately address each of the policy
objectives set forth in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B), including preventing
manipulation and excessive speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\777\ When the Commission adopted the existing Federal non-spot
month position limit levels in 2011, the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels for four of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts were based on the existing 10/2.5% formula and utilized
open interest data from 2009. These were CBOT Corn (C), CBOT
Soybeans (S), CBOT Wheat (W), and CBOT Soybean Oil (SO). For those
four contracts, the ratio of Federal non-spot month position limit
level to open interest changes as follows: CBOT Corn (C) (the ratio
increases from 0.026 to 0.027); CBOT Soybeans (S) (the ratio
increases from 0.028 to 0.029); CBOT Wheat (W) (the ratio increases
from 0.029 to 0.031); and CBOT Soybean Oil (SO) (the ratio increases
from 0.030 to 0.032).
The other five legacy agricultural contracts' Federal non-spot
month position limit levels deviated from the 10/2.5% formula. The
ratio changes for these five contracts are as follows (based on 2009
open interest data): ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) (the ratio increases from
0.025 to 0.037 for the all-months-combined and decreases from 0.025
to 0.018 for the single month); CBOT Soybean Meal (SM) (the ratio
decreases from 0.038 to 0.032); CBOT Oats (O) (the ratio increases
from 0.130 to 0.291); MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE) (the ratio
decreases from 0.323 to 0.162); and CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat
(KW) (the ratio decreases from 0.113 to 0.037).
\778\ 64 FR at 24039.
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(5) Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limits as Ceilings
The Commission reiterates that, under this position limits
framework, the Federal non-spot month position limit levels serve as
ceilings. Exchanges are required to establish their own non-spot month
position limit levels with respect to the nine legacy agricultural
contracts pursuant to final Sec. 150.5(a)(1). A discussion of the
implications of this approach is provided above in Section
II.B.3.ii.a(2).
iv. Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
Most commenters did not express concerns with respect to the
proposed Federal non-spot month position limit levels and the method by
which the Commission determined those levels.\779\ However, some
commenters raised concerns with respect to: (1) The Federal non-spot
month position limit levels, generally; (2) the proposed non-spot month
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT); and (3) the issue of
partial parity for the three wheat core referenced futures contracts
with respect to their Federal non-spot month position limit levels. The
Commission will discuss each of these issues, the related comments, and
the Commission's corresponding determination in greater detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\779\ See, e.g., COPE at 2; CMC at 6; CCI at 2; and CHS at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels, Generally
(1) Comments--Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels, Generally
Several commenters raised concerns about the proposed Federal non-
spot month position limit levels generally. Two commenters, NGFA and
LDC, advocated for lowering the Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for the nine legacy agricultural contracts.\780\ NGFA stated
that the proposed increases are ``very large'' and that the Commission
should not view increasing non-spot month position limit levels as a
``tradeoff'' for eliminating the risk management exemption, but should
instead establish limits that ``will telescope down to relatively much-
smaller spot-month limits in an orderly fashion.'' \781\ LDC and
several others
[[Page 3337]]
believed that adopting lower Federal single month position limit levels
would ``prevent speculative activity from concentrating in a single
contract month and thus jeopardizing convergence.'' \782\ NGFA and LDC
also offered the following alternatives to the proposed Federal non-
spot month position limit levels: (1) Set single-month limits at some
percentage of the all-months-combined limit, such as 50%; or (2)
maintain existing single-month limits while adopting the proposed all-
months-combined limits.\783\ NGFA also offered a third alternative,
which was to adopt a phased-in approach to the higher non-spot month
position limits, ``together with very active monitoring of contract
performance, though NGFA does not favor this option.'' \784\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\780\ NGFA at 3 and LDC at 2.
\781\ NGFA at 3. NGFA also commented that, ``NGFA still is not
completely convinced that open interest is the best yardstick for
this exercise,'' because ``[a]s volume and open interest grow,
Federal non-spot limits expand correspondingly . . . which leads to
yet higher volume and open interest. . .which again prompts expanded
Federal non-spot limits . . . and so on.'' However, NGFA did not
provide any alternatives to utilizing open interest for determining
Federal non-spot month position limit levels. As discussed
previously, the Commission believes that open interest is an
appropriate means of measuring market activity for a particular
contract and that a formula based on open interest, such as the 10/
2.5% formula: (1) Helps ensure that positions are not so large
relative to observed market activity that they risk disrupting the
market; (2) allows speculators to hold sufficient contracts to
provide a healthy level of liquidity for hedgers; and (3) allows for
increases in position limits and position sizes as markets expand
and become more active. Furthermore, the Commission notes that under
the Final Rule, Federal non-spot month position limit levels do not
automatically increase with higher open interest levels. In order to
make any amendments to the Federal position limit levels, the
Commission is required to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
\782\ LDC at 2. See also e.g., Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2;
Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2;
Walcot at 2; and White Gold at 1.
\783\ NGFA at 4 and LDC at 2.
\784\ NGFA at 4. IATP also provided a similar suggestion, by
stating that, ``it is prudent to phase in new non-spot month limit
levels so that the Commission can acquire data and experience with
how the new Federal non-spot limits are working for the commercial
hedging of those legacy contracts.'' IATP at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, ISDA requested higher Federal non-spot month
position limit levels.\785\ ISDA stated that the proposed levels ``for
the legacy agricultural contracts are not high enough to provide [ ]
significant liquidity to these markets based on the experience of
market participants and anticipated growth in these markets.'' \786\
ISDA also appeared to suggest that higher levels could ``help markets
offset any liquidity that may be lost if the risk management exemption
is not retained.'' \787\ Finally, ISDA also provided a table with
suggested Federal non-spot month position limit levels that ranged from
18% to 191% higher than the proposed levels, except for CBOT Oats (O),
which remained the same.\788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\785\ ISDA at 7.
\786\ Id.
\787\ Id.
\788\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another commenter, MGEX, disagreed with the 10/2.5% formula,
stating that ``a formulaic approach is too rigid and inflexible'' and
that the ``Commission needs to be flexible in the future and should not
preclude further limits or discussion.'' \789\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\789\ MGEX at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Discussion of Final Rule--Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit
Levels, Generally
With the exception of ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), as discussed below,
the Commission declines to modify the proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels or the general methodology underlying the
determination of those levels for the remaining legacy agricultural
contracts, and also declines to adopt a phase-in for Federal non-spot
month position limit levels.
(i) Request To Generally Lower Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limits
In response to these comments, the Commission believes that the
modified 10/2.5% formula is generally an appropriate way to calculate
Federal non-spot month position limit levels. The Commission also
believes that the final non-spot month position limit levels are
supported by updated open interest data, some of which have increased
significantly since 2009.
The Commission continues to believe that a formula based on a
percentage of open interest, such as the 10/2.5% formula, is
appropriate for establishing limit levels outside of the spot month, as
discussed above and in the 2020 NPRM.\790\ The Commission believes that
limiting positions to a percentage of open interest, such as through
the 10/2.5% formula: (1) Helps ensure that positions are not so large
relative to observed market activity that they risk disrupting the
market; (2) allows speculators to hold sufficient contracts to provide
a healthy level of liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (3) allows for
increases in position limits and position sizes as markets expand and
become more active.\791\ Furthermore, the 10/2.5% formula has
functioned well for Federal non-spot month position limit purposes for
many years.\792\ Also, the Commission does not believe that the slight
modification to the 10/2.5% formula materially impacts the formula's
efficacy in determining an appropriate Federal non-spot month position
limit level as well,\793\ because the modification is modest and is
supported by the general increase in open interest among the legacy
agricultural contracts and the change in the composition of market
participants in those markets, as discussed above.\794\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\790\ See 85 FR at 11630-11633.
\791\ Id.
\792\ See id. at 11675.
\793\ The Commission notes, as discussed elsewhere in this Final
Rule, that CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), CBOT Oats
(O), and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) (single month limit only) are subject
to unique circumstances or other factors that counsel in favor of
deviating from the 10/2.5% formula.
\794\ The modification results in a modest increase in the
Federal non-spot month position limit level of 1,875 contracts over
what the limit level would be if the inflection point for the 10/
2.5% formula was set at 25,000 contracts, assuming that the market
for the core referenced futures contract has an open interest of at
least 50,000 contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Request To Generally Lower Single Month Position Limit Levels
In response to comments generally requesting lower single month
position limit levels, the Commission first acknowledges that it has
set single-month position limit levels lower than all-months-combined
position limit levels in the past. However, since the Commission set
both single month and all-months-combined levels set at the same level
in 2011, the Commission has not observed any issues with respect to the
nine legacy agricultural contracts as a result of that change.
In response to commenters' concern about possible convergence
issues from setting the single-month and all-months-combined levels set
at the same level, the Commission notes that positions in the non-spot
months have minimal impact on convergence. This is because convergence
occurs in the spot month, and, specifically, at the expiration of the
physically-settled spot month contract.\795\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\795\ The Commission, however, recognizes that it is possible
that unusually large positions in contracts outside of the spot
month could distort the natural spread relationship between contract
months. For example, if traders hold unusually large positions
outside of the spot month, and if those traders exit those positions
immediately before the spot month, that could cause congestion and
also affect the pricing of the spot month contract. While such
congestion or price distortion cannot be ruled out, exchange-set
position limits and position accountability function to mitigate
against such risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Commission notes that an important benefit of
having a single Federal non-spot month limit level for both the single-
month and all-months-combined is the ability for market participants to
enter into calendar spread transactions that would normally be
constrained by the lower single month position limit level. However,
the Commission notes that, in response to comments received, it is
adopting a lower Federal single month position limit level for ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT), the reasons for which is discussed below.
[[Page 3338]]
(iii) Request To Increase Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
In response to ISDA's comment that the proposed Federal non-spot
month position limit levels should be higher to compensate for the
proposed loss of risk management exemptions for swap dealers, the
Commission believes that any potential impact on existing risk
management exemption holders may be mitigated by the finalized pass-
through swap provision, to the extent swap dealers can utilize it.\796\
The Commission believes that this is a preferable approach to either a
hypothetical alternative formula or ISDA's own suggested Federal non-
spot month position limit levels that would allow higher limit levels
beyond those adopted in this Final Rule for all market participants.
This is because, while the pass-through swap provision adopted herein
is narrowly-tailored to enable liquidity providers to continue
providing liquidity to bona fide hedgers, higher limit levels beyond
those adopted in this Final Rule for all market participants could also
permit excessive speculation and increase the possibility of market
manipulation or harm to the underlying price discovery function.\797\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\796\ See 85 FR at 11676. See also Section II.A.1.x. (Pass-
Through Swap and Pass-Through Swap Offset Provisions).
\797\ See 85 FR at 11676.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iv) Concern With the Commission's ``Formulaic'' Approach
In response to MGEX's concern that the Commission's approach is too
formulaic and rigid, the Commission notes that the Federal non-spot
month position limit levels will operate as ceilings within a broader
Federal position limits framework in which exchanges, including MGEX,
are always free to determine their own exchange-set position limit
levels and position accountability levels below the Federal position
limit levels as they see fit based on market conditions. In fact, by
having the Federal position limit levels operate as ceilings, this
framework will enable exchanges to respond to market conditions through
a greater range of acceptable position limit levels than if the Federal
position limit levels did not operate as ceilings.
In addition, as described further below, the Commission has
deviated from the 10/2.5% formula with respect to CBOT Oats (O), ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) (single month only), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE) based on the unique circumstances concerning those core
referenced futures contracts. Furthermore, the Commission also notes
that this Final Rule does not ``preclude further limits or
discussion.'' \798\ The Commission is also continually monitoring
market conditions to evaluate whether different Federal position limit
levels may be warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\798\ MGEX at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(v) Request To Implement a Phase-In Period
The Commission declines to adopt a formal phase-in period for
Federal non-spot month position limits, in which the Commission
gradually implements the Federal non-spot month position limit levels
over a period of time. The Commission believes that the markets will
operate in an orderly fashion with the Federal position limit levels
adopted under this Final Rule, because the final Federal non-spot month
position limit levels are supported by increased open interest and are
generally set pursuant to the modified 10/2.5% formula, which, as
discussed above, achieves the policy objectives set forth in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).\799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\799\ A phase-in is not necessary with respect to the Federal
non-spot month position limit levels for CBOT Oats (O), KC HRW Wheat
(KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), because the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels will remain at the current levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, as noted in the Federal spot month position limit level
phase-in discussion above, as a practical matter, the Commission
emphasizes that the operative non-spot month position limit levels for
a market participant trading in exchange-listed referenced contracts is
not the Federal non-spot month position limit levels, but the exchange-
set non-spot month position limit levels. As a result, despite the
changes in the Federal non-spot month position limit levels in this
Final Rule, there will be no practical impact on market participants
trading in exchange-listed referenced contracts unless and until an
exchange affirmatively modifies its exchange-set non-spot month
position limit levels through a rule submission to the Commission
pursuant to part 40 of the Commission's regulations.\800\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\800\ 17 CFR part 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Level
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and Additional Background Information--ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Level
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed to increase both the
Federal single month and all-months-combined position limit levels for
ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) from the existing Federal level of 5,000
contracts to 11,900 contracts by applying the updated open interest
data into the proposed modified 10/2.5% formula. The Commission also
solicited comments asking whether the Commission should consider
lowering the Federal single month position limit level to a percentage
of the Federal all-months-combined position limit level for ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT), and if so, what percentage of the all-months-combined
position limit level should be used.\801\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\801\ 85 FR at 11637 (Request for Comment #26).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Comments--ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Non-Spot Month Position
Limit Level
In response to the 2020 NPRM, numerous commenters from the cotton
industry, including growers and merchants, requested that the
Commission ``maintain its single-month limit, particularly for smaller
markets like cotton,'' \802\ or, in the alternative, set a Federal
single month position limit level of 50% of the all-months-combined
limit (i.e., 5,950 contracts).\803\ In support, commenters also noted
that the proposed non-spot month position limit level for ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT) was ``not in line with historical limits.'' \804\ One
commenter also stated, ``Experience with modern trading has shown a
propensity by speculators to focus too heavily on the nearest futures
contract, leaving later months with poor liquidity from time to time.''
\805\ In contrast, ISDA argued that the proposed Federal non-spot month
position limit levels, including that for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), were
too low and asserted that the level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) should be
increased to 24,000 contracts to make up for the elimination of the
risk management exemption.\806\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\802\ See e.g., East Cotton at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Choice at 2;
Canale Cotton at 2; Ecom at 1; Olam at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Toyo
Cotton at 2; Walcot Trading at 2; White Gold at 2; and NCTO at 2.
See also ACA at 2; Gerald Marshall at 1-2; Jess Smith at 2; LDC at
2; Mallory Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2; MemTex at 2; Moody
Compress at 2; Parkdale at 2; Southern Cotton at 2-3; SW Ag at 2;
and ACSA at 8.
\803\ ACSA at 8; LDC at 2; and Olam at 2. The following
commenters also supported ACSA's comment letter: ACA at 2; Ecom at
1; East Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; IMC at 2; Mallory Alexander at
2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Moody Compress at 2; Omnicotton at 2;
Canale Cotton at 2; SW Ag at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Toyo Cotton at 2;
Walcot at 2; and White Gold at 2.
\804\ AMCOT at 1-2 and Parkdale at 2.
\805\ Gerald Marshall at 2.
\806\ ISDA at 7 (providing specific alternative levels).
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(3) Discussion of Final Rule--ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Level
The Commission is adopting the proposed all-months-combined
position limit level of 11,900 contracts, but is
[[Page 3339]]
adopting a modified single month position limit level of 5,950
contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT).
The Commission is adopting the proposed 11,900 contract Federal
all-months-combined position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
because, as discussed earlier, the Commission believes that a formula
based on a percentage of open interest--specifically the modified 10/
2.5% formula--is an appropriate tool for establishing limits outside of
the spot month. However, the Commission does not believe that it is
appropriate to raise either the Federal single month or all-months-
combined position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) to 24,000
contracts as suggested by ISDA, because the open interest levels do not
support such a drastic increase and there is no other reason to deviate
so significantly upward from the modified 10/2.5% formula.\807\
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\807\ The Commission acknowledges ISDA's comment that the
proposed Federal non-spot month position limit levels should be
higher to compensate for the proposed loss of risk management
exemptions for swap dealers. However, as noted previously, the
Commission believes that any potential impact on existing risk
management exemption holders may be mitigated by the pass-through
swap provision adopted herein, and that this is a preferable and
more tailored approach than increasing the non-spot month position
limit levels for all market participants.
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On the other hand, the Commission believes that it is appropriate
to adopt a lower Federal single month position limit level at this
time. As noted in the Commission's request for comment in the 2020
NPRM, the Commission believed that there could be concerns with respect
to the Federal single month position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2
(CT), especially from the commercial end-users of the core referenced
futures contract.\808\ In response to the Commission's request for
comment, the Commission received approximately 25 comment letters from
the cotton industry (out of approximately 75 comment letters on the
2020 NPRM from all commenters) unanimously requesting a lower Federal
single month position limit level compared to the Federal all-months-
combined position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The Commission
believes that these unanimous comments from the commercial end-users of
the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core referenced futures contract are
informative, because they suggest that lowering the 2020 NPRM's Federal
single month position limit level from the proposed 11,900 contract
level to either the existing 5,000 contract level or a 5,950 contract
level (which is 50% of the all-months-combined position limit level of
11,900 contracts) may not have a material detrimental effect on
liquidity for bona fide hedgers in the market.
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\808\ 85 FR 11637 (Request for Comment #26).
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All things being equal, a lower single month position limit level
will better protect the markets against manipulation and price
distortion,\809\ but at the expense of reduced liquidity for bona fide
hedgers. However, in this instance, in light of the comments received,
the Commission believes that it could improve protections against
manipulation and price distortion without materially impacting
liquidity for bona fide hedgers by adopting a lower Federal single
month position limit level of either 5,000 contracts or 5,950
contracts. Of these two suggested levels, the Commission believes that
it is more appropriate to adopt the 5,950 contract level over the
existing 5,000 contract level to account, in part, for the increase in
open interest levels since the single month position limit level of
5,000 contracts was adopted in 2011.\810\
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\809\ Specifically, the Commission is referring to the price
distortion that could be caused by a speculative trader who, after
amassing a large position during the non-spot month, exits the
entire position immediately before the spot month.
\810\ The maximum open interest for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) was
197,191 contracts in 2009, 161,582 contracts in 2011, and 324,952
contracts in 2019.
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d. Wheat Core Referenced Futures Contracts' Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Levels
(1) Summary of the 2020 NPRM and Additional Background Information--
Wheat Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
There are three wheat contracts: CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE). Currently, the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels for all three are set at 12,000 contracts. This
has been referred to as ``full wheat parity.''
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed ``partial wheat parity''
by increasing the Federal non-spot month position limit level for CBOT
Wheat (W) from 12,000 contracts to 19,300 based on the application of
the modified 10/2.5% formula and updated open interest levels, while
maintaining the existing levels of 12,000 contracts for CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW) and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE). The 12,000 contract Federal non-
spot month position limit levels for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE) are above the levels that would be calculated based on
the application of the modified 10/2.5% formula and recent open
interest levels, which would be 11,900 contracts for CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW) and 5,700 contracts for MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE).
The Commission proposed partial wheat parity between CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW) and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) at 12,000 contracts for two
reasons. First, both contracts provide exposure to hard red wheats. As
a result, the Commission believed that drastically decreasing the
Federal non-spot month position limit level for MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE)
vis-[agrave]-vis CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) by following the 10/2.5%
formula could impose liquidity costs on the MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) market
and harm bona fide hedgers, which could further harm liquidity for bona
fide hedgers in the related CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) market.\811\ Second,
the existing Federal non-spot month position limit levels for CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW) and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) appear to have functioned well,
and the Commission saw no market-based reason to reduce those levels
based on recent open interest data.\812\
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\811\ 85 FR at 11633.
\812\ Id. at 11632.
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(2) Comments--Wheat Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received several comments concerning the proposed
Federal non-spot month position limit levels with respect to the three
wheat core referenced futures contracts. One commenter, MGEX, stated
that it ``supports maintaining partial wheat parity by keeping the
existing non-spot month limits for [MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE)] and CBOT KC
Hard Red Wheat at 12,000.'' \813\ Another commenter agreed ``with the
increase in the non-spot month for CBOT Wheat (W).'' \814\
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\813\ MGEX at 3.
\814\ MFA/AIMA at 12.
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However, other commenters requested that the Federal non-spot month
position limit level for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) be at least the same as
CBOT Wheat (W) (i.e., raise it to 19,300 contracts).\815\ In support,
commenters contended that the ``physical market for the wheat crop that
is deliverable under [CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)] is much larger than the
wheat crop that is deliverable under [CBOT Wheat (W)].'' \816\ Also,
commenters stated that the ``characteristics of the physical wheat that
is deliverable under [CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)] is more similar to the
global wheat crop than the wheat that is deliverable under [CBOT Wheat
[[Page 3340]]
(W)].'' \817\ As a result, commenters stated that, ``[CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW)] may be important for hedging for many market participants.''
\818\ Similarly, MFA/AIMA stated that ``open interest data and supply
data published by the USDA for hard red winter wheat, which is the
underlying commodity for [CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)], would also justify
an increase in the [CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)] non-spot month limit.''
\819\
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\815\ SIFMA AMG at 3-4; ISDA at 12; PIMCO at 4-5; MFA/AIMA at
12; and Citadel at 6-7.
\816\ PIMCO at 4. See also ISDA at 12 and SIFMA AMG at 3-4.
\817\ SIFMA AMG at 3. See also ISDA at 12 and PIMCO at 4.
\818\ SIFMA AMG at 4. See also ISDA at 12.
\819\ MFA/AIMA at 12. See also Citadel at 6-7.
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(3) Discussion of Final Rule--Wheat Federal Non-Spot Month Position
Limit Levels
The Commission declines to raise the proposed 12,000 contract
Federal non-spot month position limit level for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW)
to match the final Federal non-spot month position limit level of CBOT
Wheat (W) at 19,300 contracts.
First, as noted earlier, the Federal non-spot month position limit
level for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) is already set higher, albeit
slightly, than the limit level calculated under the updated open
interest figure and 10/2.5% formula, which, as discussed previously, is
a formula that the Commission believes is generally proper for
determining Federal non-spot month position limit levels.\820\ Raising
the Federal non-spot month position limit level for CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW) to 19,300 contracts would be a drastic increase over the existing
level that is not supported by the 10/2.5% formula or by the
Commission's observations of how that market has functioned under the
12,000 contract Federal non-spot month position limit level. As a
result, the Commission is concerned that this could result in excessive
speculation and increase the possibility of market manipulation or harm
to the underlying price discovery function with respect to that
contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\820\ 85 FR at 11630.
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Second, the Commission believes that maintaining partial wheat
parity between CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) is
appropriate because the commodities underlying both of those wheat core
referenced futures contracts are hard red wheats that, together,
represent the majority of the wheat grown in both the United States and
Canada, which results in those markets being closely intertwined.\821\
This is in contrast with CBOT Wheat (W), which typically sees
deliveries of soft white wheat varieties (even though it allows for
delivery of hard red wheat).\822\
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\821\ Id. at 11632.
\822\ Id.
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Finally, the Commission reiterates that bona fide hedging positions
will continue to be allowed to exceed the Federal position limit
levels. Intermarket spreading is also permitted as well, which should
address any concerns over the potential for loss of liquidity in the
spread trades among the three wheat core referenced futures contracts
during the non-spot months.\823\
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\823\ Id. at 11633.
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5. Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month Limit Levels
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month Limit
Levels
Unlike in previous iterations of the position limit rules, the 2020
NPRM did not require the Commission to periodically review and revise
EDS figures or adjust the Federal spot month position limit
levels.\824\ Instead, under proposed Sec. 150.2(f), an exchange
listing a core referenced futures contract would be required to provide
EDS figures only if requested by the Commission. Proposed Sec.
150.2(j) delegated the authority to make such requests to the Director
of the Division of Market Oversight.\825\ The 2020 NPRM also allowed
exchanges to voluntarily submit EDS figures to the Commission at any
time, and encouraged them to do so.\826\ When submitting EDS figures,
exchanges would be required to provide a description of the methodology
used to derive the EDS figures, as well as all data and data sources
used to calculate the estimate, so that the Commission could verify
that the EDS figures are reasonable.\827\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\824\ See e.g., 81 FR at 96769-96771.
\825\ 85 FR at 11633.
\826\ Id. at 11633-11634.
\827\ Id. at 11634.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, the 2020 NPRM also did not require the Commission to
periodically review the open interest data and update the non-spot
month position limit levels for the legacy agricultural core referenced
futures contracts, unlike in previous iterations of the position limit
rules.\828\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\828\ See e.g., 81 FR at 96769, 96771-96773.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Subsequent Spot and Non-
Spot Month Limit Levels
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(f) as proposed and will not
include a formal mechanism to periodically renew or revise EDS figures
or otherwise review and update the Federal spot month or non-spot month
position limit levels. The Commission is also adopting the delegation
provision in Sec. 150.2(j) as proposed.\829\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\829\ The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed
Sec. 150.2(j).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Comments--Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month Limit Levels
The Commission received several comments concerning updates to the
Federal position limit levels, with commenters requesting that the
Commission periodically review the levels and revise them if
appropriate.\830\ One commenter was concerned that the Federal position
limit levels could become too high over time,\831\ while the rest were
concerned that the levels could become too low.\832\ In addition, CME
Group also suggested that exchanges should update the EDS figures
``every two years [and] . . . DCMs should be provided the opportunity
to submit data voluntarily to the Commission on a more frequent
basis.'' \833\
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\830\ MFA/AIMA at 5 (``the Commission should direct exchanges to
periodically monitor the proposed new position limit levels'');
PIMCO at 6 (``we urge the CFTC to include . . . a mandatory
requirement to regularly (and at least annually) review and update
limits as markets grow and change''); SIFMA AMG at 10 (the Final
Rule should require ``that the Commission regularly consult with
exchanges and review and adjust position limits when it is necessary
to do so based on relevant market factors''); ISDA at 10 (``the
Commission must regularly convene and consult with exchanges on
deliverable supply and, if appropriate, propose notice and comment
rulemaking to adjust limit levels''); and IATP at 16-17 (the
Commission should engage in ``an annual review of position limit
levels to give [commercial hedgers] legal certainty over that
period'' and also retain ``the authority to revise position limits .
. . if data monitoring and analysis show that those annual limit
levels are failing to prevent excessive speculation and/or various
forms of market manipulation'').
\831\ IATP at 16-17.
\832\ MFA/AIMA at 5-6; PIMCO at 6; SIFMA AMG at 10; and ISDA at
10.
\833\ CME Group at 5.
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iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month Limit
Levels
The Commission declines to implement a periodic, predetermined
schedule to review Federal position limits because the Commission
believes that it is more appropriate to retain flexibility for both the
exchanges and the Commission itself in updating the Federal position
limit levels.
Reviewing and adjusting the Federal spot month position limit
levels requires the Commission to review, among other things, updated
EDS figures for the core referenced futures contracts. Having worked
closely with
[[Page 3341]]
exchanges to analyze and independently verify the methodology
underlying the EDS figures and the EDS figures themselves, the
Commission recognizes that estimating deliverable supply can be a time
and resource consuming process for both the exchanges and the
Commission.\834\ Furthermore, periodic, predetermined review intervals
may not always align with market changes or other events resulting in
material changes to deliverable supply that would warrant adjusting
Federal spot month position limit levels. As a result, the Commission
believes that it would be more efficient, timely, and effective to
review the EDS figure and the Federal position limit level for a core
referenced futures contract if warranted by market conditions,
including changes in the underlying cash market, which the Commission
and exchanges continually monitor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\834\ 85 FR at 11633.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reviewing and adjusting the Federal non-spot month position limit
levels requires the Commission to review, among other things, open
interest data for the relevant core referenced futures contracts.
Unlike EDS figures, open interest is easily obtainable because it is
regularly updated by the exchanges. As a result, the output of the 10/
2.5% formula can be quickly calculated. However, the Commission does
not believe that it is appropriate to update the Federal non-spot month
position limit levels separately from the Federal spot month position
limit levels. The Commission has historically reviewed all of the
Federal position limit levels--spot month and non-spot month--together
for a particular contract because all months of a particular contract
are part of the same market. As a result, updating both the spot and
non-spot month position limits levels at the same time provides a
holistic and integrated position limit regime for each commodity
contract because the limits are based upon updated data covering the
same or overlapping time period.
Final Sec. 150.2(f) provides flexibility and authority for the
Commission to be able to request an updated EDS figure, along with the
methodology and underlying data, for a core referenced futures contract
whenever market conditions suggest that a change in Federal position
limit levels may be warranted. The exchanges are also encouraged to
submit such information at any time as well under final Sec.
150.2(f).\835\ Once the Commission receives the updated EDS figures,
then the Commission can undertake the appropriate review and analysis
of the EDS figures and any additional information, such as exchange
recommendations, to adjust the Federal spot month position limit
levels, if necessary, through rulemaking. At that time, the Commission
would also review the open interest data for the core referenced
futures contract and undertake the necessary analysis to ensure that
the Federal non-spot month position limit levels are set at appropriate
levels as well.
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\835\ In providing an updated EDS figure, exchanges should
consult the guidance concerning estimating deliverable supply set
forth in section (b)(1)(i) (``Estimating Deliverable Supplies'') of
17 CFR part 38, Appendix C.
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Finally, the Commission notes that, under this position limits
framework, the exchanges always have the freedom to set their exchange-
set position limit levels lower than the Federal position limit levels.
Adjusting the Federal position limit levels necessarily requires the
Commission to engage in rulemaking with notice-and-comment, which can
take a significant amount of time.\836\ Thus, an exchange may adjust
its exchange-set position limit levels lower in response to market
conditions, while waiting for the Commission to adjust the Federal
position limit levels.\837\
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\836\ Market participants may petition the Commission to adjust
Federal position limit levels, subject to the Commission's notice-
and-comment rulemaking, under existing Sec. 13.1, which provides
that any ``person may file a petition with . . . the Commission . .
. for the issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule of general
application.''
\837\ However, an exchange cannot set its exchange-set position
limit levels above the Federal position limit levels, even if market
conditions may warrant raising the levels. Thus, in order to allow
market participants to hold positions higher than the Federal
position limit levels (absent an exemption), the Commission would
need to raise the Federal position limit levels through rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Relevant Contract Month
Proposed Sec. 150.2(c) clarified that the spot month and single
month for any given referenced contract is determined by the spot month
and single month of the core referenced futures contract to which that
referenced contract is linked.
The Commission did not receive any comments and is adopting as
proposed. Final Sec. 150.2(c) requires that referenced contracts be
linked to the core referenced futures contract in order to be netted
for position limit purposes.
For example, for the NYMEX NY Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO) core
referenced futures contract, the spot month period starts at the close
of trading three business days prior to the last trading day of the
contract. The spot month period for the NYMEX NY Harbor ULSD Financial
(MPX) futures referenced contract would thus start at the same time--
the close of trading three business days prior to the last trading day
of the core referenced futures contract.
7. Limits on ``Pre-Existing Positions''
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Pre-Existing Positions
Under proposed Sec. 150.2(g)(1) Federal spot month position limits
applied to ``pre-existing positions, other than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps,'' each defined in proposed Sec. 150.1.
Accordingly, Federal spot month position limits would not apply to any
pre-existing positions in economically equivalent swaps. The 2020 NPRM
defined ``pre-existing positions'' in proposed Sec. 150.1 as positions
established in good faith prior to the effective date of a final
Federal position limits rulemaking.
In contrast, proposed Sec. 150.2(g)(2) provided that Federal non-
spot month limits would not apply to pre-existing positions, including
pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps, if acquired in good
faith prior to the effective date of such limit. However, other than
pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps, any pre-existing
positions held outside the spot month would be attributed to such
person if the person's position is increased after the effective date
of a final Federal position limits rulemaking.
The 2020 NPRM's disparate treatment of pre-existing positions
during and outside the spot month was predicated on the concern that
failing to apply spot month limits to such pre-existing positions could
result in a large, preexisting position either intentionally or
unintentionally causing a disruption to the price discovery function of
the core referenced futures contract as positions are rolled into the
spot month. In contrast, outside the spot month, large, pre-existing
positions may have a relatively less disruptive effect given that
physical delivery occurs only during the spot month.
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Pre-Existing Positions
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(g)(1) as proposed, and is
adopting Sec. 150.2(g)(2) with the following two changes:
First, the Commission is amending proposed Sec. 150.2(g)(2) to
provide that non-spot month limits shall apply to pre-existing
positions, other than pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps.
As noted above, proposed Sec. 150.2(g)(2) in the 2020 NPRM exempted
pre-existing positions from the Final Rule's Federal non-spot month
position limits. However, as discussed below, the nine legacy
agricultural
[[Page 3342]]
contracts currently are subject to the Commission's existing non-spot
month position limits, and the Commission did not intend to exclude
existing non-spot month positions in the nine legacy agricultural
contracts that would otherwise qualify as ``pre-existing positions''
under the Final Rule. As discussed, the other 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures contracts that are subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final Rule are not subject to
Federal non-spot month position limits and therefore proposed Sec.
150.2(g)(2) would not have applied to these contracts in any event.
The Commission based the language in proposed Sec. 150.2(g) on
similar language found in the 2016 Reproposal, which imposed Federal
non-spot month position limits on all of the proposed core referenced
futures contracts (as opposed to only on the nine legacy agricultural
contracts under the Final Rule). In the context of the 2016 Reproposal,
the Commission believed it made sense to exempt pre-existing positions
in non-spot months in core referenced futures contracts that would have
been subject to Federal position limits for the first time under the
2016 Reproposal. However, as noted above, such core referenced futures
contracts that are subject to Federal position limits for the first
time under the Final Rule are not subject to Federal non-spot month
position limits. Accordingly, the Commission is modifying Sec.
150.2(g) so that pre-existing positions in the nine legacy agricultural
contracts remain subject to Federal non-spot month position limits
under the Final Rule, as the Commission had originally intended.
Second, since the Commission is clarifying that pre-existing
positions in the nine legacy agricultural contracts, other than pre-
enactment swaps and transition period swaps, are subject to Federal
non-spot month position limits under the Final Rule, the language in
proposed Sec. 150.2(g)(2) that would attribute to a person any
increase in their non-spot month positions after the effective date of
the Final Rule's non-spot month limits is no longer necessary. The
Commission is therefore removing this language from final Sec.
150.2(g)(2).
iii. Comments--Pre-Existing Positions
Commenters generally supported proposed Sec. 150.2(g), although
several commenters asked for additional clarity.\838\ MGEX and FIA both
argued that the provision could be simplified by creating only two
categories: ``pre-existing swaps'' (exempt from all spot/non-spot
Federal position limits) and ``pre-existing futures'' (exempt from all
non-spot Federal position limits, provided there is no increase in such
non-spot positions), stating that relying upon the proposed relief as
structured will be ``operationally challenging'' for market
participants.\839\ MGEX and FIA also requested that the Commission
clarify that a market participant is not required to rely upon the
exemption so that its pre-existing positions could be netted, as
applicable, with the market participant's other referenced
contracts.\840\ ISDA encouraged the Commission to provide that the
Final Rule's new Federal position limits do not apply to any pre-
existing positions, whether in futures contracts or swaps.\841\
Finally, CHS encouraged the Commission to adopt a ``safe harbor''
provision where participants could demonstrate a ``good-faith'' effort
at compliance so ``inadvertent'' violations would not trigger possible
enforcement action.\842\
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\838\ MGEX at 4; FIA at 9; ISDA at 8.
\839\ FIA at 8-9; MGEX at 4.
\840\ MGEX at 3-4; FIA at 8-9, 18-19.
\841\ ISDA at 2, 8.
\842\ CHS at 5.
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iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Pre-Existing Positions
As stated in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission believes that the
absence of spot-month limits on pre-existing positions, other than pre-
existing swaps and transition period swaps, could render the Federal
spot month position limits ineffective. Failure to apply spot month
limits to such pre-existing positions, particularly for the 16
commodities that are not currently subject to Federal position limits
and where market participants may have pre-existing positions in excess
of the spot-month position limits adopted herein, could result in a
large, pre-existing position either intentionally or unintentionally
causing a disruption to the price discovery function of the core
referenced futures contract as positions are rolled into the spot
month.\843\ The Commission is particularly concerned about protecting
the spot month in physically delivered futures contracts from price
distortions or manipulation that would disrupt the hedging and price
discovery utility of the futures contract.\844\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\843\ 85 FR at 11634.
\844\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to non-spot month position limits, only the nine
legacy agricultural contracts are currently subject to such limits
under the existing Federal position limits framework and will continue
to be subject to Federal non-spot month position limits under the Final
Rule. The Commission did not intend in the 2020 NPRM to exclude such
pre-existing positions in the nine legacy agricultural contracts from
non-spot month limits. Accordingly, for the Final Rule the Commission
is modifying final Sec. 150.2(g)(2) to make clear that Federal non-
spot month position limits do apply to these pre-existing positions.
However, as noted above, the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts that are subject to Federal position limits for the first
time under this Final Rule are not subject to Federal non-spot month
position limits and so are not affected by the Commission's change in
final Sec. 150.2(g)(2).
The Commission agrees with MGEX's and FIA's comments that pre-
existing positions can be netted. The Commission confirms that market
participants may continue to net their pre-existing positions, as
applicable, with market participants' post-effective date referenced
contract positions. In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission made explicit in
proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(5) that market participants would be permitted
to net pre-existing swap positions with post-effective date referenced
contract positions (to the extent such pre-existing swap positions
qualify as ``economically equivalent swaps'' under the Final
Rule).\845\ The Commission adopted this clarification in final Sec.
150.3(a)(5) for the avoidance of doubt. The Commission believes this
explicit clarification with respect to swaps is helpful to market
participants since swaps are subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under this Final Rule and since it may not otherwise be
clear whether a market participant could net a pre-enactment swap or
transition period swap given that such pre-enactment and transition
period swaps are exempt from Federal position limits under final Sec.
150.3(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\845\ Pre-existing swap positions (i.e., pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps) would otherwise be exempt from Federal
position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Commission similarly intended that market participants
also would be able to net pre-existing futures contracts and option on
futures contracts against post-effective date positions. The Commission
did not feel such a clarification was necessary since futures contracts
and options thereon have been subject to the existing Federal position
limits framework. Accordingly, for the avoidance of doubt, the
Commission is affirming that market participants may continue to net
pre-existing futures contracts and option on
[[Page 3343]]
futures contracts with post-effective date positions in referenced
contracts.
In response to ISDA's request for clarification, the Commission
notes that Federal non-spot month position limits will apply to pre-
existing positions in the nine legacy agricultural contracts (but not
to the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts). However, for
the reasons articulated above, Federal position limits will apply
during the spot month for futures contracts and options on futures
contracts for all 25 core referenced futures contracts, other than pre-
enactment swaps and transition period swaps.
While the Commission is not adopting a ``safe harbor'' provision,
it is providing a transition period, as requested by CHS,\846\ so that
market participants will have until January 1, 2022 (or January 1, 2023
for economically-equivalent swaps or positions relying on the risk-
management exemption) to comply with the Final Rule. The Commission
believes this will provide sufficient time for market participants to
implement and test new systems and processes that have been established
to comply with the Final Rule.
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\846\ CHS at 5.
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8. Positions on Foreign Boards of Trade
i. Background
CEA section 4a(a)(6)(B) directs the Commission to establish limits
on the aggregate number of positions in contracts based upon the same
underlying commodity that may be held by any person across contracts
traded on a foreign board of trade (``FBOT'') with respect to a
contract that settles against any price of at least one contract listed
for trading on a registered entity.\847\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\847\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(6)(B). The CEA's definition of ``registered
entity'' includes DCMs and SEFs. 7 U.S.C. 1a(40).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Foreign Boards of Trade
Proposed Sec. 150.2(h) applied the proposed Federal position
limits to a market participant's aggregate positions in referenced
contracts executed on a DCM or SEF and on, or pursuant to the rules of,
an FBOT, provided that (1) the referenced contracts settle against a
price of a contract listed for trading on a DCM or SEF and (2) the FBOT
makes such contract available in the United States through ``direct
access.'' \848\ In other words, a market participant's positions in
referenced contracts listed on a DCM or SEF and on an FBOT registered
to provide direct access would collectively have to stay below the
Federal position limit for the relevant core referenced futures
contract.
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\848\ Commission regulation Sec. 48.2(c) defines ``direct
access'' to mean an explicit grant of authority by an FBOT to an
identified member or other participant located in the United States
to enter trades directly into the trade matching system of the FBOT.
17 CFR 48.2(c).
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iii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Foreign Boards of Trade
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(h) as proposed.
iv. Comments--Foreign Boards of Trade
The Commission received comments from CEWG, Chevron, and Suncor
regarding proposed Sec. 150.2(h) and its possible effects with respect
to certain contracts listed on ICE Futures Europe (``IFEU'') that are
price-linked to the energy core referenced futures contracts.\849\ Each
of the commenters expressed concern that the extension of the proposed
Federal position limits regime to referenced contracts listed for
trading on IFEU could have unintended consequences, such as: (1)
Requiring U.S.-based market participants to comply with potentially
conflicting requirements of multiple regulators and position limits
regimes; and (2) incentivizing foreign regulators to extend their reach
into the Commission's jurisdictional markets.\850\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\849\ CEWG at 28-29; Chevron at 15-16; Suncor at 14-15.
\850\ CEWG at 28; Chevron at 16; Suncor at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chevron and Suncor requested that the Commission reconsider what
they perceive to be the potential regulatory conflicts and burdens that
could be imposed on market participants who transact referenced
contracts listed on IFEU, and adopt a policy of substituted compliance
to minimize such conflicts.\851\ CEWG recommended that the Commission
adopt an approach based on substituted compliance with respect to
referenced contracts listed on FBOTs similar to that adopted for swaps
under CEA section 2(i).\852\
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\851\ Chevron at 16; Suncor at 15.
\852\ CEWG at 29.
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v. Discussion of Final Rule--Foreign Boards of Trade
As stated above, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(h) as
proposed. As stated in the 2020 NPRM,\853\ CEA section 4a(a)(6)(B)
requires the Commission to establish limits on the aggregate number or
amount of positions in contracts based upon the same underlying
commodity that may be held by any person across certain contracts
traded on an FBOT with linkages to a contract traded on a registered
entity. Final Sec. 150.2(h) simply codifies requirements set forth in
CEA section 4a(a)(6)(B), and will lessen regulatory arbitrage by
eliminating a potential loophole whereby a market participant could
accumulate positions on certain FBOTs in excess of limits in referenced
contracts.\854\
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\853\ 85 FR at 11634.
\854\ In addition, CEA section 4(b)(1)(B) prohibits the
Commission from permitting an FBOT to provide direct access to its
trading system to its participants located in the United States
unless the Commission determines, in regards to any FBOT contract
that settles against any price of one or more contracts listed for
trading on a registered entity, that the FBOT (or its foreign
futures authority) adopts position limits that are comparable to the
position limits adopted by the registered entity. 7 U.S.C.
6(b)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, the Commission believes that Sec. 150.2(h) is
consistent with the goal set forth in CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) to ensure
that liquidity does not move to foreign jurisdictions or place U.S.
exchanges at a competitive disadvantage to foreign competitors. If the
Commission did not attribute positions held in referenced contracts on
FBOTs, the Commission inadvertently could incentivize market
participants to shift trading and liquidity in referenced contracts to
FBOTs in order to avoid Federal position limits.
9. Anti-Evasion
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Anti-Evasion
Pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking authority in section 8a(5)
of the CEA,\855\ the Commission proposed Sec. 150.2(i), which was
intended to deter and prevent a number of potential methods of evading
Federal position limits. The proposed anti-evasion provision provided:
(1) A commodity index contract and/or location basis contract, which
would otherwise be excluded from the proposed referenced contract
definition, would be considered a referenced contract subject to
Federal position limits if used to willfully circumvent position
limits; (2) a bona fide hedge recognition or spread exemption would no
longer apply if used to willfully circumvent speculative position
limits; and (3) a swap contract used to willfully circumvent
speculative position limits would be deemed an economically equivalent
swap, and thus a referenced contract, even if the swap does not meet
the economically equivalent swap definition set forth in proposed Sec.
150.1.
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\855\ 7 U.S.C. 12a(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Anti-Evasion
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(i) as proposed with
conforming changes that reflect revisions to the ``referenced
contract'' definition adopted herein in
[[Page 3344]]
which the Final Rule additionally is excluding ``monthly average
pricing contracts'' and ``outright price reporting agency index
contracts'' from the ``referenced contract'' definition.\856\ A
discussion of these conforming changes appears immediately below,
followed by a summary of the comments, which addressed different
aspects of the proposed anti-evasion provision.
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\856\ See supra Section II.A.16.iii.b. (explanation of proposed
exclusions from the ``referenced contract'' definition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Discussion of Conforming Changes--Anti-Evasion
The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 150.2(i)(1), which
addressed evasion of Federal position limits by using commodity index
contracts and location basis contracts, to also cover monthly average
pricing contracts and outright price reporting agency index contracts.
This change is needed to conform the anti-evasion provision to the
``referenced contract'' definition adopted herein. In particular, while
the 2020 NPRM would exclude commodity index contracts and location
basis contracts from the ``referenced contract'' definition, the Final
Rule excludes those contracts as well as monthly average pricing
contracts and outright price reporting agency index contracts from the
``referenced contract definition.'' \857\
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\857\ See Section II.A.16.iii.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because contracts that are excluded from the final ``referenced
contract'' definition are not subject to Federal position limits, the
Commission intends that final Sec. 150.2(i)(1) will prevent a
potential loophole whereby a market participant who has reached its
limits could otherwise utilize these contract types to willfully
circumvent or evade speculative position limits. For example, a market
participant could purchase a commodity index contract in a manner that
allowed the participant to exceed limits when taking into account the
weighting in the component commodities of the index contract. The Final
Rule also will avoid creating what could otherwise be similar potential
loopholes with respect to monthly average pricing contracts, outright
price reporting agency index contracts, and location basis contracts.
Additionally, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(i)(2) as
proposed. This provision provides that a bona fide hedge recognition or
spread exemption will no longer apply if used to willfully circumvent
speculative position limits. This provision is intended to help ensure
that bona fide hedge recognitions and spread exemptions are granted and
utilized in a manner that comports with the CEA and Commission
regulations, and that the ability to obtain bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions does not become an avenue for market
participants to inappropriately exceed speculative position limits.
The Commission is also adopting Sec. 150.2(i)(3) as proposed.
Under this provision, a swap contract used to willfully circumvent
speculative position limits is deemed an economically equivalent swap,
and thus a referenced contract, even if the swap does not meet the
economically equivalent definition set forth in final Sec. 150.1. This
provision is intended to deter and prevent the structuring of a swap in
order to willfully evade speculative position limits.
iii. Comments--Anti-Evasion
Several commenters stated that the anti-evasion provision is
prudent, but would be difficult to apply in practice, in part due to
the subjective ``willful circumvention'' standard.\858\ FIA recommended
that, instead, the anti-evasion analysis should be based on the
presence of ``deceit, deception, or other unlawful or illegitimate
activity'' so market participants will be better equipped to evaluate
the surrounding facts and circumstances in making an evasion
determination.\859\ FIA further expressed that, because markets evolve,
it is inadvisable to consider ``historical practices behind the market
participant and transaction in question.'' \860\ FIA also asked the
Commission to confirm that it is not evasion for a market participant
to consider ``costs or regulatory burdens, including the avoidance
thereof,'' if that participant has a legitimate business purpose for a
transaction.\861\
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\858\ SIFMA AMG at 7, n.16 (noting that the anti-evasion
provision makes the application of the proposed ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition less clear because it incorporates a
subjective measure of intent); see also FIA at 25 (questioning how a
participant would distinguish a strategy that minimizes position
size with an evasive strategy); Better Markets at 33 (describing the
anti-evasion provision as a ``useful deterrent,'' but noting that
the willful circumvention standard would be difficult to meet and
partially turns on the Commission's consideration of the legitimate
business purpose analysis).
\859\ FIA at 25-26.
\860\ Id.
\861\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific to swaps, ISDA encouraged the Commission to expressly
acknowledge and confirm that an out-of-scope swap transaction would not
be considered evasion under any set of circumstances.\862\ FIA
recommended that, for structured swaps, the anti-evasion analysis
should ask whether the swap serves the market participant's commercial
needs or objectives.\863\ Finally, FIA suggested that the Final Rule
should provide an automatic safe harbor from a retroactive evasion
determination for all swaps entered into prior to the compliance
date.\864\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\862\ ISDA at 5, n.7
\863\ FIA at 25.
\864\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Anti-Evasion
The Final Rule's anti-evasion provision is not intended to capture
a trading strategy merely because the strategy may result in a smaller
position size for purposes of position limits. Instead, the anti-
evasion provision is intended to deter and prevent cases of willful
evasion of speculative position limits, the specifics of which the
Commission may be unable to anticipate. The Federal position limit
requirements adopted herein will apply during the spot month for all
referenced contracts subject to Federal position limits, while non-spot
month Federal position limit requirements will only apply for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts. Under this framework, and because the
threat of corners and squeezes is the greatest in the spot month, the
Commission anticipates that it may focus its attention on anti-evasion
activity during the spot month.
The determination of whether particular conduct is intended to
circumvent or evade requires a facts and circumstances analysis. In
interpreting these anti-evasion rules, the Commission is guided by its
interpretations of anti-evasion provisions appearing elsewhere in the
Commission's regulations, including the interpretation of the anti-
evasion rules that the Commission adopted in its rulemakings to further
define the term ``swap'' and to establish a clearing requirement under
section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA.\865\
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\865\ See Further Definition of ``Swap, ``Security-Based Swap,''
and ''Security-Based Swap Agreement;'' Mixed Swaps; Security-Based
Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48208, 48297-48303 (Aug. 13,
2012); Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the
CEA, 77 FR 74284, 74317-74319 (Dec. 13, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, consistent with those interpretations, in evaluating
whether conduct constitutes evasion, the Commission will consider,
among other things, the extent to which the person lacked a legitimate
business purpose for structuring the transaction in that particular
manner. For example, an analysis of how a swap was structured could
reveal that a person or persons crafted derivatives transactions,
structured entities, or conducted
[[Page 3345]]
themselves in a manner without a legitimate business purpose and with
the intent to willfully evade position limits by structuring one or
more swaps such that such swap(s) would not meet the ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition in final Sec. 150.1.
In response to FIA's comment that the Commission should confirm
that it is not evasion for a market participant with a legitimate
business purpose for a transaction to consider ``costs or regulatory
burdens,\866\ the Commission acknowledges that it fully expects that a
person acting for legitimate business purposes within its respective
industry will naturally consider a multitude of costs and benefits
associated with different types of financial transactions, entities or
instruments, including the applicable regulatory obligations.\867\ As
stated in a prior rulemaking, a person's specific consideration of, for
example, costs or regulatory burdens, including the avoidance thereof,
is not, in and of itself, dispositive that the person is acting without
a legitimate business purpose in a particular case.\868\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\866\ FIA at 25.
\867\ See 77 FR at 48301.
\868\ See 77 FR at 74319.
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In response to FIA's comment \869\ that an anti-evasion analysis of
a structured swap should evaluate whether the transaction serves the
market participant's commercial needs or objectives, as stated in the
2020 NPRM, the Commission will view legitimate business purpose
considerations on a case-by-case basis in conjunction with all other
relevant facts and circumstances. Additionally, the Commission
disagrees with FIA's comment \870\ that an historical practices inquiry
is inadvisable. Because transactions and instruments are regularly
structured, and entities regularly formed, in a particular way and for
various, often times multiple, reasons, the Commission believes it is
essential that all relevant facts and circumstances be considered,
including historical practices.\871\ While historical practice is a
factor the Commission will consider as part of its facts and
circumstances analysis, it is not dispositive in determining whether
particular conduct constitutes evasion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\869\ FIA at 25.
\870\ Id. at 25-26.
\871\ See 77 FR at 48302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of its facts and circumstances analysis, the Commission
will look at factors such as the historical practices behind the market
participant and transaction in question. For example, with respect to
Sec. 150.2(i)(2) (i.e., bona fide hedges or spreads used to evade),
the Commission is adopting guidance in Appendix B to part 150 with
respect to gross versus net hedging. As discussed elsewhere in this
release, the Commission believes that measuring risk on a gross basis
to willfully circumvent or evade speculative position limits would
potentially run afoul of Sec. 150.2(i)(2).\872\ Use of gross or net
hedging that is inconsistent with an entity's historical practice, or a
change from gross to net hedging (or vice versa), could be an
indication that an entity is seeking to evade position limits
regulations.\873\ With respect to Sec. 150.2(i)(3) (i.e., swaps used
to evade), the Commission will consider whether a market participant
has a history of structuring its swaps one way, but then starts
structuring its swaps a different way around the time the participant
risked exceeding a speculative position limit as a result of its swap
position, such as by modifying the delivery date or other material
terms and conditions such that the swap no longer meets the definition
of an ``economically equivalent swap.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\872\ See Section II.A.1.ix.
\873\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with interpretive language in prior rulemakings
addressing evasion,\874\ when determining whether a particular activity
constitutes willful evasion, the Commission will consider the extent to
which the activity involves deceit, deception, or other unlawful or
illegitimate activity. Although it is likely that fraud, deceit, or
unlawful activity will be present where willful evasion has occurred,
the Commission disagrees with FIA's comment \875\ that these factors
should be a prerequisite to an evasion finding. A position that does
not involve fraud, deceit, or unlawful activity could still lack a
legitimate business purpose or involve other indicia of evasive
activity. The presence or absence of fraud, deceit, or unlawful
activity is one fact the Commission will consider when evaluating a
person's activity. That said, the final anti-evasion provision does
require willfulness, i.e. ``scienter.'' In response to commenters \876\
who expressed concern regarding the practical application of this
intent standard, the Commission will interpret ``willful'' consistently
with how the Commission has done so in the past, i.e., that acting
either intentionally or with reckless disregard constitutes acting
``willfully.'' \877\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\874\ See 77 FR at 48297-48303; 77 FR at 74317-74319.
\875\ FIA at 25.
\876\ SIFMA AMG at 7, n.16; see also FIA at 25; Better Markets
at 33.
\877\ See In re Squadrito, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ] 25,262 (CFTC Mar. 27, 1992) (adopting
definition of ``willful'' in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486
U.S. 128 (1987)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In determining whether a transaction has been entered into or
structured willfully to evade position limits, the Commission will not
consider the form, label, or written documentation as dispositive. The
Commission also is not requiring a pattern of evasive transactions as a
prerequisite to prove evasion, although such a pattern may be one
factor in analyzing whether evasion has occurred. In instances where
one party willfully structures a transaction to evade but the other
counterparty does not, Sec. 150.2(i) will apply to the party who
willfully structured the transaction to evade.
Further, entering into transactions that qualify for the forward
exclusion from the swap definition, standing alone, shall not be
considered evasive. However, in circumstances where a transaction does
not, in fact, qualify for the forward exclusion, the transaction may or
may not be evasive depending on an analysis of all relevant facts and
circumstances.
The Commission declines to adopt ISDA's request \878\ to carve out-
of-scope swap transactions from the anti-evasion provision. This
request was unsupported and did not address whether an out-of-scope
swap could be used to evade position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\878\ ISDA at 5, n.7.
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Finally, the Commission declines to adopt FIA's request \879\ that
all swaps entered into prior to the compliance date be granted an
automatic safe harbor from a retroactive finding of evasion. This
change is unnecessary given that under final Sec. 150.3, pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps will not be subject to Federal
position limits at all during or outside the spot month.\880\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\879\ FIA at 25.
\880\ See final Sec. 150.3(a)(5).
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10. Application of Netting and Related Treatment of Cash-Settled
Referenced Contracts
i. Background
Under the existing Federal framework, Federal position limits apply
only to the nine legacy agricultural contracts, which are all
physically-settled. However, existing part 150 does not include the
equivalent concept of a ``referenced contract,'' and therefore existing
Federal position limits do not apply to any cash-settled look-alike
contracts as they would under the Final Rule. Accordingly, the issue of
netting across look-alike contracts that may be located across
[[Page 3346]]
different exchanges is not addressed under the existing framework.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Netting and Related Treatment of Cash-
Settled Referenced Contracts
Under the 2020 NPRM, the referenced contract definition in proposed
Sec. 150.1 included, among other things, (i) cash-settled contracts
that are linked, either directly or indirectly, to a core referenced
futures contract, and (ii) ``economically equivalent swaps.'' \881\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\881\ See Section II.A.16. (discussion of the proposed
referenced contract definition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 150.2(a) provided that during the spot month,
Federal position limits would apply ``separately'' to physically
delivered referenced contracts and cash-settled referenced contracts.
Under the 2020 NPRM, positions in a physically-settled core referenced
futures contract would not be required to be added to, nor permitted to
be netted down by, positions in corresponding cash-settled referenced
contracts (and vice-versa).
Proposed Sec. 150.2(b), in contrast, provided that during the non-
spot months, including the single month and all-months-combined,
Federal position limits would apply in the aggregate to both
physically-delivered referenced contracts and cash-settled referenced
contracts. This meant that for the purposes of determining whether a
market participant complies with the Federal non-spot month position
limits, a person's physically-settled and cash-settled referenced
contract positions would be added together and could net against each
other.
Under both proposed Sec. Sec. 150.2(a) and (b), positions in
referenced contracts would be aggregated across exchanges for purposes
of determining one's net position for Federal position limit purposes.
iii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Netting and Related
Treatment of Cash-Settled Referenced Contracts
The Commission is finalizing Sec. 150.2(a) and (b) of the 2020
NPRM as proposed.\882\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\882\ As discussed above, the Commission is making an exception
for natural gas referenced contracts to the general netting rules
discussed below. For further discussion on the Final Rule's
treatment of natural gas referenced contracts, see Section
II.B.3.vi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. Comments--Netting and Related Treatment of Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
PIMCO, SIFMA AMG, and ISDA contended that cash-settled referenced
contracts should not be subject to Federal position limits at all
because cash-settled contracts do not introduce the same risk of market
manipulation. They argued that subjecting cash-settled referenced
contracts to Federal position limits would reduce market liquidity and
depth in these instruments.\883\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\883\ PIMCO at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4-7; ISDA at 3-5. These entities
did not specifically argue that cash-settled contracts should be
excluded from the ``referenced contract'' definition, but rather in
general that such instruments should not be subject to Federal
position limits. The Commission noted that this is technically a
different argument since cash-settled instruments could be exempt
from position limits while still technically qualifying as
``referenced contracts,'' but the end result is the same as a
practical matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIA and ICE argued that limits for cash-settled referenced
contracts should be higher relative to Federal position limits for
physically-settled referenced contracts. They similarly argued that
cash-settled referenced contracts are ``not subject to corners and
squeezes'' and will `` `ensure market liquidity for bona fide hedgers.'
'' \884\ FIA and ICE further suggested that Federal position limits for
cash-settled referenced contracts should apply per DCM (rather than in
aggregate across DCMs).\885\ FIA additionally suggested setting a
separate Federal spot-month position limit for economically equivalent
swaps.\886\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\884\ ICE at 3, 15 (also arguing that cash-settled limits should
apply per exchange, rather than across exchanges); FIA at 7-8.
\885\ FIA at 7-8; ICE at 13.
\886\ FIA 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, CME Group supported the Commission's approach for
spot-month parity for physically-settled and cash-settled referenced
contracts across all commodity markets. CME Group explained that absent
such parity, one side of the market could be vulnerable to: Artificial
distortions from manipulations on the other side of the market;
regulatory arbitrage; and liquidity drain to the other side of the
market.\887\ CME Group warned that, ultimately, a lack of parity could
undermine the statutory goals of position limits.\888\ NEFI agreed,
arguing similarly that ``this move is essential to guard against
manipulation by a trader who holds positions in both physically-settled
and cash-settled contracts for the same underlying commodity.'' \889\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\887\ CME Group at 3-4.
\888\ Id. at 6.
\889\ NEFI at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
v. Discussion of Final Rule--Netting and Related Treatment of Cash-
Settled Referenced Contracts
The Commission is finalizing Sec. Sec. 150.2(a) and (b) as
proposed. Under final Sec. 150.2(a), Federal spot month limits apply
to physical-delivery referenced contracts ``separately'' from Federal
spot month limits applied to cash-settled referenced contracts, meaning
that during the spot month, positions in physically-settled contracts
may not be netted with positions in linked cash-settled contracts but
also are not required to be added to linked cash-settled contracts for
the purposes of determining compliance with Federal position limits.
Specifically, all of a trader's positions (long or short) in a given
physically-settled referenced contract (across all exchanges and OTC as
applicable) \890\ are netted and subject to the spot month limit for
the relevant commodity, and all of such trader's positions in any cash-
settled referenced contracts (across all exchanges and OTC as
applicable) linked to such physically-settled core referenced futures
contract are netted and independently (rather than collectively along
with the physically-settled positions) subject to the Federal spot
month limit for that commodity.\891\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\890\ In practice, the only physically-settled referenced
contracts subject to the Final Rule will be the 25 core referenced
futures contracts, none of which are listed on multiple DCMs,
although there could potentially be physically-settled OTC swaps
that would satisfy the ``economically equivalent swap'' definition
and therefore would also qualify as referenced contracts. For
further discussion on economically equivalent swaps, see Section
II.A.4.
\891\ Consistent with CEA section 4a(a)(6), this would include
positions across exchanges. However, for the reasons discussed in
Section II.B.3.vi., the Commission is exercising its exemptive
authority under CEA section 4a(a)(7) to provide an exception for
natural gas to the general aggregation rule in CEA section 4a(a)(6).
As discussed above, the Commission has concluded that the natural
gas market is well-established with contracts that currently trade
across several exchanges, and is relatively liquid with significant
open interest. Accordingly, the Commission is exercising its
judgment to establish Federal position limits on a per-exchange (and
OTC as applicable) basis in order to maintain the status quo rather
than risk disturbing the existing natural gas market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, a position in a commodity contract that is not a
referenced contract, and therefore is not subject to Federal position
limits, as a consequence, cannot be netted with positions in referenced
contracts for purposes of Federal position limits.\892\ For example, a
swap that is not a referenced contract because it does not meet the
economically equivalent swap definition could not be netted with
positions in a referenced contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\892\ Proposed Appendix C to part 150 provides guidance
regarding the referenced contract definition, including that the
following types of contracts are not deemed referenced contracts,
meaning such contracts are not subject to Federal position limits
and cannot be netted with positions in referenced contracts for
purposes of Federal position limits: Location basis contracts;
commodity index contracts; swap guarantees; trade options that meet
the requirements of 17 CFR 32.3; monthly average pricing contracts;
and outright price reporting agency index contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 3347]]
Allowing the netting of linked physically-settled and cash-settled
contracts during the spot month could lead to disruptions in the price
discovery function of the core referenced futures contract or allow a
market participant to manipulate the price of the core referenced
futures contract. Absent separate spot month position limits for
physically-settled and cash-settled contracts, the spot month position
limit would be rendered ineffective, as a participant could maintain
large positions in excess of limits in both the physically-settled
contract and the linked cash-settled contract, enabling the participant
to disrupt the price discovery function as the contracts go to
expiration by taking large opposite positions in the physically-settled
core referenced futures and cash-settled referenced contracts, or
potentially allowing a participant to effect a corner or squeeze.\893\
Consistent with current and historical practice, the Federal position
limits adopted herein apply to positions throughout each trading
session (i.e., on an intra-day basis during each trading session), as
well as at the close of each trading session.\894\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\893\ For example, absent such a restriction in the spot month,
a trader could stand for 100 percent of deliverable supply during
the spot month by holding a large long position in the physical-
delivery contract along with an offsetting short position in a cash-
settled contract, which effectively would corner the market.
\894\ See, e.g., Elimination of Daily Speculative Trading
Limits, 44 FR 7124, 7125 (Feb. 6, 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the comments from PIMCO, SIFMA AMG, and ISDA that
cash-settled referenced contracts should not be subject to position
limits at all because such contracts do not introduce the same risk of
market manipulation, as discussed above under Section II.A.16.iii.a.,
the Commission has concluded that cash-settled referenced contracts
should be subject to Federal position limits since they form one market
with their corresponding physically-settled core referenced futures
contracts.\895\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\895\ For further discussion, see Section II.A.16.iii.a(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to ISDA's recommendation that the Final Rule only
include physically-settled referenced contracts and that the Commission
apply Federal position limits on cash-settled referenced contracts at a
later time, the Commission notes that as discussed under Section I.D.,
the Final Rule will be subject to a general compliance period until
January 1, 2022. During this period, exchanges may choose to implement
exchange-set position limits that provide for a different phased-in
approach for cash-settled versus physically-settled referenced
contracts as the exchanges may find appropriate for their respective
markets. Additionally, the compliance period will be further extended
until January 1, 2023 for economically equivalent swaps and positions
held in reliance on a risk-management exemption, which in each case the
Commission notes include mostly cash-settled positions. Accordingly, as
a practical matter, many cash-settled contracts will be subject to a
longer compliance period. However, as discussed further above under
Section II.A.16.iii.a, the Commission has determined that it is
appropriate to include cash-settled referenced contracts in Federal
position limits under this Final Rule.\896\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\896\ For further discussion of the Commission's rationale for
including cash-settled referenced contracts under the Final Rule,
see Section II.A.16.iii.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIA and ICE similarly argued that cash-settled referenced contracts
should be subject to higher Federal position limits compared to the
physically-settled core referenced futures contracts. Their arguments
were predicated, in part, on their conclusions that market participants
cannot use cash-settled contracts to effect a corner or squeeze.\897\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\897\ FIA at 7; ICE at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission declines to adopt higher Federal position limits for
cash-settled referenced contracts for several reasons. First, as an
initial matter, the Commission acknowledges that preventing corners and
squeezes is a crucial focus of the Commission. However, in response to
FIA's and ICE's arguments that cash-settled referenced contracts should
be subject to higher Federal position limits compared to physically-
settled futures contracts because cash-settled contracts cannot be used
to effect a corner or squeeze, the Commission notes that there are
other forms of manipulation, such as ``banging'' or ``marking'' the
close, that cash-settled referenced contracts can effect, and the
Commission emphasizes that it endeavors to prevent all such market
manipulation, consistent with CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii).\898\ While
CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) specifically references corners and
squeezes, the CEA section also references ``manipulation'' generally,
and neither FIA nor ICE recognized the existence of other types of
market manipulation, such as ``banging'' the close, in their analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\898\ For further discussion, see Sections II.A.16.,
II.A.4.iii.d(2), and II.B.10.iv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Commission believes that FIA's and ICE's arguments for
higher Federal position limits for cash-settled referenced contracts is
intrinsically related to the comments from PIMCO, SIFMA AMG, and ISDA
discussed above arguing that cash-settled referenced contracts should
not be subject to Federal position limits at all. That is, the higher
the Federal position limits for cash-settled referenced contracts that
FIA or ICE recommend establishing, the closer, as a practical matter,
it is to having no Federal position limits for cash-settled referenced
contracts.\899\ As a result, the Commission believes that its general
rationale for including cash-settled referenced contracts within the
Federal position limits framework similarly supports parity between
cash-settled and physically-settled referenced contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\899\ See Section II.A.16.iii.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the Commission generally agrees with the reasons articulated
in the comments from CME Group and NEFI that it is appropriate to
establish spot-month parity for physically-settled and cash-settled
referenced contracts across all commodity markets. While FIA argued
that higher position limits for cash-settled referenced contracts could
ensure liquidity for bona fide hedgers,\900\ the Final Rule has
established the Federal position limit levels in general for the 25
core referenced futures contracts (including increases for many of the
nine legacy agricultural contracts) and has expanded the enumerated
bona fide hedges and streamlined the related application process under
final Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9 in order to ensure sufficient
liquidity for bona fide hedgers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\900\ FIA at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIA and ICE similarly argued that market participants should not be
required to aggregate cash-settled positions across all exchanges but
rather should be subject to a disaggregated Federal position limit that
applies per-exchange. In other words, as the Commission understands
FIA's and ICE's request, if the Federal position limit is 1,000
contracts, FIA and ICE believe that a market participant should be able
to hold 1,000 cash-settled referenced contracts per exchange rather
than being required to aggregate positions across all exchanges. Under
this approach, a long position of 1,000 contracts on Exchange A would
not be aggregated with a long position of 1,000 contracts on Exchange
B. However, under this approach, a long position on Exchange A also
would not net with a short position on Exchange B.
ICE specifically argued that a single, aggregate Federal position
limit for all
[[Page 3348]]
referenced contracts across exchanges may make it difficult for an
exchange to launch a new referenced contract since the hypothetical new
referenced contract would be aggregated with an existing referenced
contract for purposes of Federal position limits.\901\ According to
ICE, establishing new exchanges and/or new contracts is made more
difficult under the Commission's aggregated approach, since it is
purportedly more difficult to attract sufficient liquidity to establish
a sustainable exchange or contract.\902\ ICE also references the
Commission's obligations under CEA section 15 to consider the public
interest and antitrust laws.\903\ ICE recommends a more flexible
approach to allow an exchange to develop its own liquidity and
establish its own limits, even for similar or look-alike cash-settled
referenced contracts, to help develop robust and liquid markets while
protecting against excessive speculation.\904\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\901\ ICE at 12-13.
\902\ ICE at 12-13.
\903\ Id.
\904\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to FIA and ICE, as discussed immediately below, the
Commission believes that, as a general matter, establishing aggregate
limits across exchanges promotes competition and innovation while also
better addressing the statutory goals in CEA section 4a(a)(3) as
compared to ICE's request to establish disaggregated, per-exchange
position limits. However, before discussing the Commission's underlying
policy rationale supporting aggregate Federal position limits, the
Commission has determined that as an initial legal matter that CEA
section 4a(a)(6)(B) requires the Commission to establish the
``aggregate number or amount of positions . . . that maybe held by any
person . . . for each month across . . . contracts listed by [DCMs] . .
. .'' (emphasis added).\905\ While ICE cites CEA section 15 in its
comment letter, ICE does not address CEA section 4a(a)(6)'s requirement
that the Commission generally must establish aggregate position limits
across exchanges. Accordingly, in addition to the policy rationale
discussed immediately below, the Commission further has determined that
the Final Rule's requirement to aggregate positions across exchanges
does not on its face violate CEA section 15.\906\
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\905\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(6); CEA 4a(a)(6).
\906\ See Section IV.D. As discussed elsewhere in this release,
the Commission is exercising its exemptive authority pursuant to CEA
Section 4a(a)(7) to establish an exception to this rule in
connection with, and based on the particular circumstances of the
natural gas market. See Section II.B.3.iv (discussing natural gas).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, the Commission also believes it is appropriate to
aggregate positions across exchanges for Federal position limit
purposes for the same general reasons that the Commission has
determined both to include cash-settled referenced contracts within the
Federal position limits framework and also to maintain parity for
Federal position limit levels between physically-settled and cash-
settled referenced contracts. For example, applying a per-exchange
Federal position limit, rather than aggregating across exchanges,
effectively increases the applicable Federal position limit.
Accordingly, the Commission likewise believes it generally is
inappropriate to permit per-exchange Federal position limits for cash-
settled referenced contracts.
In response to ICE's concern regarding liquidity formation and that
aggregating cash-settled positions across exchanges would harm
competitiveness and innovation by making it more difficult to attract
enough liquidity to become sustainable on an ongoing basis,\907\ the
Commission believes that to the extent Federal position limit levels
under the Final Rule have been correctly calibrated, the Federal
position limits framework should promote--or at least not
disincentivize--liquidity formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\907\ ICE at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, ICE's proposal to allow Federal position limits to apply
on a disaggregated, per-exchange basis risks dividing liquidity among
several liquidity pools, which itself could harm liquidity for bona
fide hedgers and reduce price discovery. The Commission also observes
that, as a practical matter, ICE's request to disaggregate positions
across exchanges would significantly increase the applicable position
limit (possibly by a multiple of two or three--or more--depending on
the number of exchanges that list referenced contracts). Consequently,
if the Commission assumes, in arguendo, that Federal position limit
levels are reasonably calibrated under the Final Rule, then applying a
per-exchange limit by definition would increase the potential risks of
excessive speculation and possible manipulation as market participants
are permitted to hold larger directional positions in referenced
contracts. Moreover, to the extent Federal position limits under this
Final Rule are not reasonably calibrated to ensure necessary liquidity
for bona fide hedgers, then the Commission, as a general matter, would
prefer to address the lack of liquidity by adjusting the Federal
position limit levels to appropriate levels rather than applying
Federal position limits on a per-exchange basis for the reasons
discussed in the paragraphs above and as discussed in the paragraph
immediately below.
Last, the Commission believes that ICE's approach could actually
harm innovation since under ICE's rationale, Federal position limit
levels would need to be set lower than the Federal levels adopted
herein. For example, if the Commission were to allow disaggregated
netting across exchanges as a general rule, then it would likely lead
to increased excessive speculation and possible manipulation, as
discussed above.
Accordingly, in order to avoid the threat of excessive speculation
and manipulation, the Commission would be obligated to set Federal
position limits sufficiently low in order to compensate for a per-
exchange position limit disaggregated approach. However if the
Commission were to establish Federal position limits sufficiently low
to prevent these concerns from happening, then innovation could be
adversely affected since it means that the concomitant lower Federal
position limit levels likely would make it difficult for exchanges to
develop sufficient liquidity for a new product--unless other competing
exchanges offered linked contracts to add sufficient liquidity to the
market. In such a case, the success of any new product offered by the
initial exchange could be dependent upon competing exchanges offering
competing look-alike contracts to allow for sufficient liquidity. In
contrast, the Commission believes that the Final Rule's approach to
make the full aggregated Federal position limit available to the
contract is more responsive to the needs of the market compared to a
disaggregated approach, and the Commission believes that the Final
Rule's aggregated approach promotes innovation and competition in the
marketplace. Accordingly, the Commission does not believe that applying
netting on an aggregate basis harms competition and innovation. Rather,
the Commission believes its approach supports healthy competition and
innovation while ICE's approach could harm liquidity and innovation.
While the Commission believes the above rationale generally
applies, the Commission notes that for the reasons discussed in Section
II.B.3.vi., the Commission is exercising its exemptive authority under
CEA section 4a(a)(7) to provide an exception for natural gas to the
general aggregation rule in CEA section 4a(a)(6). The Commission does
[[Page 3349]]
not believe that the rationale above necessarily applies to the natural
gas market. As discussed above, the natural gas market has existing
natural gas commodity derivatives contracts that are well-established
with liquidity, trading, and open interest currently across several
exchanges. Accordingly, the Commission is exercising its judgment to
establish Federal position limits on a per-exchange basis in order to
maintain the status quo rather than risk disturbing the structure of
the existing natural gas market, which could harm liquidity for bona
fide hedgers or price discovery.
In response to FIA's suggestion that economically equivalent swaps
should be subject to separate Federal spot-month position limits, as
discussed under Section II.A.4.iii., the Commission does not believe
doing so would be appropriate.\908\ As discussed above, the Commission
believes that establishing separate class position limits for futures
contracts and swaps could harm liquidity formation while establishing a
single Federal position limit promotes integration between the futures
and swaps markets.
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\908\ FIA 7-8.
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11. ``Eligible Affiliates'' and Position Aggregation
i. Background
In 2016, the Commission amended Sec. 150.4 to adopt new rules
governing the aggregation of positions for purposes of compliance with
Federal position limits.\909\ These aggregation rules currently apply
only to the nine legacy agricultural contracts previously subject to
Federal position limits, but now will also apply to the 16 new
contracts subject to Federal position limits for the first time under
this Final Rule. Under the existing aggregation rules, unless an
exemption applies, all of the positions held and trading done by the
person must be aggregated with positions for which the person controls
trading or for which the person holds a 10% or greater ownership
interest. DMO has issued time-limited no-action relief through August
12, 2022 (``NAL 19-19'') from some of the aggregation requirements
contained in that rulemaking.\910\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\909\ See 81 FR at 91454.
\910\ See CFTC Letter No. 19-19 (July 31, 2019), available at
https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/download. NAL 19-19 extends NAL 17-37
and provides an additional three-year period of no-action relief
from compliance with certain position aggregation requirements under
Commission Regulation 150.4 by streamlining the compliance
requirements that must be satisfied for a person or entity to rely
on an exemption from aggregation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Eligible Affiliates and Position
Aggregation
Proposed Sec. 150.2(k) addressed entities that would qualify as an
``eligible affiliate'' as defined in proposed Sec. 150.1. Under the
proposed definition, an ``eligible affiliate'' would include certain
entities that, among other things, are required to aggregate their
positions under Sec. 150.4 and that do not claim an exemption from
aggregation. There may be certain entities that would be eligible for
an exemption from aggregation, but that prefer to aggregate rather than
disaggregate their positions (such as when aggregation would result in
advantageous netting of positions with affiliated entities). Proposed
Sec. 150.2(k) intended to address such a circumstance by making clear
that an ``eligible affiliate'' may opt to aggregate its positions even
though it is eligible to disaggregate.
iii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Eligible Affiliates and
Position Aggregation
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.2(k) as proposed.
iv. Comments--Eligible Affiliates and Position Aggregation
Although the Commission did not receive any comments on this
provision, it received a number of comments related to position
aggregation in general. These commenters urged the Commission to amend
the Federal position limits aggregation rules in existing Sec. 150.4
by codifying existing NAL 19-19.\911\ Some commenters further requested
that the Commission revisit certain aspects of NAL 19-19 and the
aggregation rules, such as the threshold ownership percentage set forth
in existing Sec. 150.4 that triggers the requirement to aggregate
positions or rely upon an exemption.\912\ Conversely, IATP argued that
before applying the existing aggregation rules, and accompanying
exemptions, to additional commodities, the Commission should study
whether the existing exemptions from aggregation have resulted in
increased speculation.\913\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\911\ FIA at 28; ISDA at 11; PIMCO at 6; CMC at 12-13; and SIFMA
AMG at 2, 9.
\912\ CMC at 12-13; FIA at 28.
\913\ IATP at 18-19.
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v. Discussion of Final Rule--Eligible Affiliates and Position
Aggregation
The Commission declines to codify NAL 19-19 \914\ in this
rulemaking since NAL 19-19's relief from some of the aggregation
requirements contained in 2016 Final Aggregation Rulemaking \915\
continues to apply until August 12, 2022. DMO extended this relief for
three years to provide sufficient time to ``evaluate whether the relief
granted is hindering Commission staff's ability to conduct
surveillance; assess the impact of the relief; and consider long-term
solutions that must, appropriately, be implemented by a notice and
comment rulemaking.'' \916\ Accordingly, the Commission believes it is
appropriate to first monitor the application of the existing position
aggregation requirements before considering amendments to those
aggregation requirements, and the Commission will address the
aggregation rules, including whether to codify NAL 19-19, as needed,
after this Final Rule goes into effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\914\ See CFTC Letter No. 19-19 (July 31, 2019), available at
https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/download.
\915\ 81 FR 91454 (December 16, 2016).
\916\ See CFTC Letter No. 19-19 at 4.
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C. Sec. 150.3--Exemptions From Federal Position Limits
1. Background--Existing Sec. Sec. 150.3, 1.47, and 1.48--Exemptions
From Federal Position Limits
Existing Sec. 150.3(a), which pre-dates the Dodd-Frank Act, lists
positions that may, under certain circumstances, exceed Federal
position limits, including: (1) Bona fide hedging transactions, as
defined in the current bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3; and
(2) spread or arbitrage positions, subject to certain conditions.\917\
Existing Sec. 150.3(b) provides that the Commission or certain
Commission staff may make a ``call'' to demand certain information from
exemption holders so that the Commission can effectively oversee the
use of such exemption. Section Sec. 150.3(b) also provides that any
such call may request information relating to positions owned or
controlled by that person, trading done pursuant to that exemption, the
futures, options or cash-market positions that support the claimed
exemption, and the relevant business relationships supporting a claim
of exemption.\918\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\917\ 17 CFR 150.3(a).
\918\ 17 CFR 150.3(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current bona fide hedge definition in existing Sec. 1.3
requires applicants who wish to receive bona fide hedging recognition
and exceed Federal position limits to apply for non-enumerated bona
fide hedges under Sec. 1.47 and to apply for anticipatory bona fide
hedges under Sec. 1.48 of the Commission's existing regulations. Under
Sec. 1.47, persons seeking recognition by the Commission of a non-
[[Page 3350]]
enumerated bona fide hedging transaction or position must file certain
initial statements with the Commission at least 30 days in advance of
the date that such transaction or position would be in excess of
Federal position limits.\919\ Similarly, persons seeking recognition by
the Commission of certain anticipatory bona fide hedges must submit
their application 10 days in advance of the date that such transactions
or positions would be in excess of Federal position limits.\920\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\919\ 17 CFR 1.47.
\920\ 17 CFR 1.48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to spread exemptions, the Commission's authority and
existing regulation for exempting certain spread positions can be found
in CEA section 4a(a)(1) and existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3) of the
Commission's regulations. In particular, CEA section 4a(a)(1)
authorizes the Commission to exempt from Federal position limits
transactions ``normally known to the trade as 'spreads' or 'straddles'
or 'arbitrage.''' Similarly, in existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3), the
Commission exempts ``spread or arbitrage positions,'' and allows such
exemptions to be self-effectuating for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts currently subject to Federal position limits. The Commission
does not specify a formal process, in Sec. 150.3(a)(3), for granting
spread exemptions.\921\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\921\ Since 1938, the Commission (then known as the Commodity
Exchange Commission) has recognized the use of spread positions to
facilitate liquidity and hedging. See Notice of Proposed Order in
the Matter of Limits on Position and Daily Trading in Grain for
Future Delivery, 3 FR 1408 (June 14, 1938).
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2. Overview of Proposed Sec. 150.3, Commenters' Views, and the
Commission's Final Rule Determination
This section provides a brief overview of proposed Sec. 150.3,
commenters' general views, and the Commission's determination. The
Commission will summarize and address each sub-section of Sec. 150.3
in greater detail further below. The Commission proposed several
changes to Sec. 150.3. First, the Commission proposed to update Sec.
150.3 to conform to the proposed bona fide hedging definition in Sec.
150.1 (described above) and the new streamlined process in proposed
Sec. 150.9 for recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedging positions
(described further below). The Commission also proposed to amend Sec.
150.3 to include new exemption types not explicitly listed in existing
Sec. 150.3, including: (i) Exemptions for financial distress
situations; (ii) conditional exemptions for certain spot month
positions in cash-settled natural gas contracts; and (iii) exemptions
for pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps.\922\ Proposed
Sec. 150.3(b)-(g) respectively addressed: Non-enumerated bona fide
hedge and spread exemption requests submitted directly to the
Commission; previously-granted risk management exemptions to Federal
position limits; exemption-related recordkeeping and reporting
requirements; the aggregation of accounts; and the delegation of
certain authorities to the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\922\ The Commission revised Sec. 150.3(a) in 2016, relocating
the independent account controller aggregation exemption from Sec.
150.3(a)(4) in order to consolidate it with the Commission's
aggregation requirements in Sec. 150.4(b)(4). See Final Aggregation
Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91489-91490.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most substantive comments on proposed Sec. 150.3 relate to the
spread transaction exemption in proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(2) and to the
natural gas conditional position limit exemption in proposed Sec.
150.3(a)(4), as described in detail below and under the discussion of
Sec. 150.2, above.\923\ In addition, one commenter expressed general
support for the Commission's proposed approach to recognizing
exemptions under Sec. 150.3.\924\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\923\ See supra Section II.B.3.vi.a. (discussing the spot-month
limit for natural gas).
\924\ See CMC at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has determined to adopt Sec. 150.3 largely as
proposed, with certain modifications and clarifications in response to
commenters' views and other considerations, as described in detail
below.
3. Section 150.3(a)(1)--Exemption for Bona Fide Hedging Transaction or
Position
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exemption for Bona Fide Hedging
Transaction or Position
First, under proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(1)(i), a bona fide hedging
transaction or position that falls within one of the proposed
enumerated hedges set forth in proposed Appendix A to part 150,
discussed above, would be self-effectuating for purposes of Federal
position limits. A market participant thus would not be required to
request Commission approval prior to exceeding Federal position limits
for such transaction or position. However, this does not affect a
market participant's obligations under proposed Sec. 150.5(a) and
under the relevant exchange's rules and thus, the market participant
would be required to request a bona fide hedge exemption from the
relevant exchange for purposes of exchange-set limits established
pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.5(a), and submit required cash-market
information to the exchange as part of that request.\925\ The
Commission also proposed to allow the existing enumerated anticipatory
bona fide hedges (some of which are not currently self-effectuating,
and must be approved by the Commission, under existing Sec. 1.48) to
be self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits (and thus
would not require prior Commission approval).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\925\ See infra Section II.D.3. See also 85 FR at 11644
(proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, under proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(1)(ii), for positions in
referenced contracts that do not satisfy one of the proposed enumerated
hedges in Appendix A, (i.e., non-enumerated bona fide hedges), a market
participant must request approval from the Commission either directly,
or indirectly through an exchange, prior to exceeding Federal position
limits. Such exemptions thus would not be self-effectuating and a
market participant in such cases would have one of the following two
options for requesting such a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition: (1) Apply directly to the Commission in accordance with
Sec. 150.3(b) (described below), and, separately, also apply to an
exchange pursuant to exchange rules established under proposed Sec.
150.5(a); \926\ or (2) apply through an exchange pursuant to proposed
Sec. 150.9 for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition that could
ultimately be valid both for purposes of Federal and exchange-set
position limit requirements, unless the Commission (and not staff,
which would not have delegated authority) denies the application within
a limited period of time.\927\ As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, market
participants relying on enumerated or non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions would no longer have to file the monthly Form 204/304 with
supporting cash-market information.\928\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\926\ See infra Section II.D.3. (discussion of proposed Sec.
150.5).
\927\ See infra Section II.G. (discussion of proposed Sec.
150.9).
\928\ See infra Section II.H.2. (discussion of the proposed
elimination of Form 204).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Exemption for Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions
The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed Sec.
150.3(a)(1). As such, the Commission is finalizing Sec. 150.3(a)(1)
with a few grammatical and organizational changes to improve
readability. The Commission is also finalizing the introductory text in
Sec. 150.3(a) with a clarification that ``each'' of a person's
transactions or positions must satisfy at least one of the
[[Page 3351]]
exemptions in Sec. 150.3(a) in order to exceed Federal limits. None of
the technical revisions are intended to change the substance of
proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(1).
4. Section 150.3(a)(2)--Spread Exemptions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Spread Exemptions
Under proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(2)(i), a spread position would be
self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits, provided
that the position fits within at least one of the types of spread
strategies listed in the ``spread transaction'' definition in proposed
Sec. 150.1,\929\ and provided further that the market participant
separately requests a spread exemption from the relevant exchange's
limits established pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.5(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\929\ See supra Section II.A.20. (proposed definition of
``spread transaction'' in Sec. 150.1, which would cover: Intra-
market, inter-market, intra-commodity, or inter-commodity spreads,
including calendar spreads, quality differential spreads, processing
spreads (such as energy ``crack'' or soybean ``crush'' spreads),
product or by-product differential spreads, and futures-options
spreads.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(2)(ii), for a spread strategy that
does not meet the ``spread transaction'' definition in proposed Sec.
150.1, a market participant must apply for a spread exemption directly
from the Commission in accordance with proposed Sec. 150.3(b). The
market participant must also receive a notification of the approved
spread exemption under proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(4) before exceeding the
Federal speculative position limits for that spread position. The
Commission thus did not propose a process akin to Sec. 150.9 for
spreads that do not meet the proposed ``spread transaction''
definition.
ii. Comments--Spread Exemptions
Several commenters advocated for the Commission to expand the
proposed Sec. 150.9 process, which would allow exchanges to process
applications for non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions for purposes
of both Federal and exchange limits, to also allow exchanges to grant
``non-enumerated'' spread exemptions for spread positions that do not
meet the ``spread transaction'' definition.\930\ Commenters also
requested that the Commission provide an explanation for why the
Commission would not expand Sec. 150.9 to cover ``non-enumerated''
spread exemptions.\931\ Finally, commenters requested that market
participants be able to apply for spread exemptions on a late or
retroactive basis the same way they would be permitted to apply for
bona fide hedge exemptions within five days of exceeding Federal
position limits under proposed Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9.\932\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\930\ See MFA/AIMA at 10; FIA at 21; Citadel at 8-9; ISDA at 9;
ICE at 7-8 (suggesting that if the list of spread positions in the
spread transaction definition is determined to be an exhaustive
list, then the Commission should permit additional flexibility for
an exchange to grant additional spread exemptions--that are not
covered in the spread transaction definition--using the proposed
Sec. 150.9 process).
\931\ See MFA/AIMA at 10.
\932\ See ICE at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Spread Exemptions
The Commission has determined to adopt Sec. 150.3(a)(2) with non-
substantive revisions to address technical edits or improve
readability. For the reasons discussed immediately below, the
Commission has determined not to expand Sec. 150.3(a)(2) as requested
by commenters to allow market participants to apply to exchanges for
``non-enumerated'' spread exemptions that are not covered in the
``spread transaction'' definition in Sec. 150.1.
First, as discussed above,\933\ the Commission has determined to
expand the ``spread transaction'' definition so that it covers most, if
not all, of the most common spread exemptions used by market
participants. With this expansion, the Commission expects that most
spread exemption requests will fall within the scope of the ``spread
transaction'' definition. Accordingly, the Commission expects that most
spread exemptions will thus be self-effectuating for purposes of
Federal position limits. Also, the Commission expects that any spread
exemption requests falling outside of the ``spread transaction''
definition are likely to be novel exemption requests that the
Commission--and not exchanges--should review, considering certain
statutory considerations in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B). As explained
immediately below, the Commission cannot authorize exchanges to conduct
this analysis because exchanges would lack clear standards for
assessing whether a particular spread position satisfies the
requirements of the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\933\ See supra Section II.A.20. (discussing changes to expand
the spread transaction definition).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, bona fide hedge recognitions and spread exemptions are
subject to different legal standards. That is, under CEA section
4a(a)(c)(2), Congress provided clear criteria to the Commission for
determining what constitutes a bona fide hedging transaction or
position. In turn, the Commission has defined in detail the term bona
fide hedging transaction or position in Sec. 150.1. As a result, under
final Sec. 150.9, the Commission is permitting exchanges to evaluate
applications for non-enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of
exchange-set limits in accordance with the same clear criteria used by
the Commission.
In contrast, the CEA does not include clear criteria for granting
spread exemptions. Instead, CEA section 4a(a)(1) generally permits the
Commission to exempt ``transactions normally known to the trade as
``spreads'' or ``straddles'' or ``arbitrage'' from position limits
\934\ and requires the Commission to administer Federal position limits
in a manner that comports with certain policy considerations in CEA
section 4a(a)(3)(B).\935\ Analyzing novel spread exemption requests in
accordance with these general principles requires the Commission to use
its judgment to conduct a highly fact-specific analysis. And, in the
absence of any detailed statutory or regulatory criteria, the
Commission is not comfortable, at this time, with leveraging an
exchange's analysis and determination with respect to novel spread
exemption requests. As such, the Commission has determined that the
Commission should conduct a direct review of any spread exemptions that
do not meet the ``spread transaction'' definition, and the Commission
thus will not expand Sec. 150.9 to cover spreads because exchanges
would lack clear standards for assessing whether a particular spread
position satisfies the requirements of the CEA. In the future, the
Commission may, however, consider developing regulatory criteria for
spread exemptions such that novel spread exemptions could be considered
through a more streamlined process, such as Sec. 150.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\934\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
\935\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, unlike for certain bona fide hedge recognitions as
discussed below, the Commission has determined not to permit
retroactive applications for spread exemptions or other exemptions
permitted under this Sec. 150.3(a). The Commission believes that the
Federal position limits framework adopted herein provides sufficient
flexibility through expanded speculative limits, and a clear,
comprehensive set of exemptions, most of which are self-effectuating
and thus do not require prior Commission approval. As such, the
Commission believes that market participants will be able to identify
their exemption needs based on these clear regulatory requirements and
apply for
[[Page 3352]]
all such exemptions ahead of time. In addition, the Commission believes
that allowing retroactive spread exemptions and other types of
retroactive exemptions (such as the financial distress or conditional
natural gas spot month exemption) could potentially be harmful to the
market as these types of strategies may involve non-risk-reducing or
speculative activity that should be evaluated prior to a person
exceeding Federal position limits.
5. Section 150.3(a)(3)--Financial Distress Exemptions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Financial Distress Exemptions
Proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(3) would allow for a financial distress
exemption in certain situations, including the potential default or
bankruptcy of a customer or a potential acquisition target. For
example, in periods of financial distress, such as a customer default
at an FCM or a potential bankruptcy of a market participant, it may be
beneficial for a financially-sound market participant to take on the
positions and corresponding risk of a less stable market participant,
and in doing so, exceed Federal speculative position limits. Pursuant
to authority delegated under Sec. Sec. 140.97 and 140.99, Commission
staff previously granted exemptions in these types of situations to
avoid sudden liquidations required to comply with a position
limit.\936\ Such sudden liquidations could otherwise potentially hinder
statutory objectives, including by reducing liquidity, disrupting price
discovery, and/or increasing systemic risk.\937\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\936\ See, e.g., CFTC Press Release No. 5551-08, CFTC Update on
Efforts Underway to Oversee Markets, (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5551-08.
\937\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed exemption would be available for the positions of ``a
person, or related persons,'' meaning that a financial distress
exemption request should be specific to the circumstances of a
particular person, or to persons affiliated with that person, and not a
more general request by a large group of unrelated people whose
financial distress circumstances may differ from one another. The
proposed exemption would be granted on a case-by-case basis in response
to a request submitted to the Commission pursuant to Sec. 140.99, and
would be evaluated based on the specific facts and circumstances of a
particular person or a related person or persons. Any such financial
distress position would not be a bona fide hedging transaction or
position unless it otherwise met the substantive and procedural
requirements set forth in proposed Sec. Sec. 150.1, 150.3, and 150.9,
as applicable.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Financial
Distress Exemptions
The Commission did not receive any substantive comments on proposed
Sec. 150.3(a)(3), although one commenter expressed general support for
the financial distress exemption.\938\ As such, the Commission has
determined to finalize Sec. 150.3(a)(3) as proposed, for the reasons
discussed above and in the 2020 NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\938\ CCI at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Section 150.3(a)(4)--Conditional Spot Month Exemption in Natural Gas
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Conditional Spot Month Exemption in
Natural Gas
Certain natural gas contracts are currently subject to exchange-set
position limits, but not Federal position limits.\939\ In the 2020
NPRM, the Commission proposed applying Federal position limits to
certain natural gas contracts for the first time by including the
physically-settled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (``NYMEX NG'') contract
as a core referenced futures contract listed in proposed Sec.
150.2(d). The Commission also proposed, consistent with existing
exchange practice, establishing a conditional spot month exemption for
Federal position limit purposes that would permit larger positions
during the spot month for cash-settled natural gas referenced contracts
so long as the market participant held no physically-settled NYMEX NG.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\939\ Some examples include natural gas contracts that use the
NYMEX NG futures contract as a reference price, such as ICE's Henry
Financial Penultimate Fixed Price Futures (PHH), options on Henry
Penultimate Fixed Price (PHE), Henry Basis Futures (HEN) and Henry
Swing Futures (HHD), NYMEX's E-mini Natural Gas Futures (QG), Henry
Hub Natural Gas Last Day Financial Futures (HH), and Henry Hub
Natural Gas Financial Calendar Spread (3 Month) Option (G3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Conditional Spot Month
Exemption in Natural Gas
For the Final Rule, the Commission is adopting the conditional spot
month exemption in natural gas, as proposed. The Commission discusses
this conditional spot month exemption, as well as other issues in
connection with NYMEX NG, above under the discussion of Sec.
150.2.\940\ The Commission is discussing all the issues related to the
NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract, including this conditional
spot month exemption, together in one place in this release for the
reader's convenience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\940\ See supra Section II.B.3.vi.a. (discussing the Federal
spot-month limit for natural gas).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Section 150.3(a)(5)--Exemption for Pre-Enactment Swaps and
Transition Period Swaps
i. Background and Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exemption for Pre-Enactment
Swaps and Transition Period Swaps
Currently, swaps are not subject to the existing Federal position
limits framework, and the Commission is unaware of any exchange-set
limits on swaps with respect to any of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts.
In order to promote a smooth transition to compliance for swaps,
which were not previously subject to Federal speculative position
limits, in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission proposed to exempt pre-
enactment swaps and transition period swaps from Federal position
limits. Proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(5) provided that Federal position
limits would not apply to positions acquired in good faith in any pre-
enactment swaps or in any transition period swaps, in either case as
defined by Sec. 150.1.\941\ Under the 2020 NPRM, any pre-enactment
swap or transition period swap would be exempt from Federal position
limits--even if the swap would qualify as an economically equivalent
swap under the 2020 NPRM. This proposed exemption would be self-
effectuating and would not require a market participant to request
relief from the Commission.
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\941\ ``Pre-enactment swap'' would mean any swap entered into
prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (July 21, 2010),
the terms of which have not expired as of the date of enactment of
that Act.
``Transition period swap'' would mean a swap entered into during
the period commencing after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 (July 21, 2010), and ending 60 days after the publication in
the Federal Register of final amendments to this part implementing
section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the terms of which have
not expired as of 60 days after the publication date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For purposes of complying with the proposed Federal non-spot month
limits, the 2020 NPRM would also allow both pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps (to the extent such swaps qualify as
``economically equivalent swaps'') to be netted with post-Effective
Date commodity derivative contracts. The 2020 NPRM did not permit such
positions to be netted during the spot month so as to avoid rendering
spot month limits ineffective. Specifically, the Commission explained
that it was particularly concerned about protecting the spot month in
physically-delivered futures contracts from price distortions or
manipulation to protect against
[[Page 3353]]
disrupting the hedging and price discovery utility of the futures
contract.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Exemption for
Pre-Enactment Swaps and Transition Period Swaps
The Commission did not receive any comments specifically addressing
the exemption for pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps
addressed in proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(5). The Commission is adopting
Sec. 150.3(a)(5) as proposed with certain limited grammatical and
technical changes that are not intended to reflect a change in the
substantive meaning. For comments generally related to the exemption
for pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps, please refer to
the discussion of pre-existing positions in general and comments
thereto, in Sec. 150.2(g) above,\942\ and Sec. 150.5(a)(3)(ii)
below.\943\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\942\ See supra Section II.B.7. (discussing Sec. 150.2 Federal
position limits on pre-existing positions).
\943\ See infra Section II.D.3. (discussing Sec. 150.5
requirements for exchange limits on pre-existing positions in a non-
spot month).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Section 150.3(b)--Application for Relief and Removal of Existing
Commission Application Processes
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Application for Relief and Removal of
Existing Commission Application Processes
The Commission proposed two avenues for a market participant to
request a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition: Sec. 150.3(b),
described below, which would allow market participants to apply
directly to the Commission; and Sec. 150.9, which, as described in
detail further below, would allow market participants to apply to
exchanges for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemption for purposes
of both Federal and exchange limits.\944\ The Commission proposed to
remove its existing processes for applying for such exemptions under
Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48. The Commission also proposed to remove
existing Sec. 140.97, which delegates to the Director of the Division
of Enforcement or his designee authority regarding requests for
classification of positions as bona fide hedges under existing
Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48.\945\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\944\ See infra Section II.G.
\945\ 17 CFR 140.97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission explained that it did not intend
the proposed replacement of Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 to have any
bearing on bona fide hedges previously recognized under those
provisions. With the exception of certain recognitions for risk
management positions discussed below, positions that were previously
recognized as bona fide hedges under Sec. Sec. 1.47 or 1.48 would
continue to be recognized, provided such positions continue to meet the
statutory bona fide hedging definition and all other existing and
proposed requirements.
With respect to a Sec. 150.3(b) application for a bona fide hedge
recognition, the Commission proposed that such application must
include: (i) A description of the position in the commodity derivative
contract for which the application is submitted, including the name of
the underlying commodity and the position size; (ii) information to
demonstrate why the position satisfies CEA section 4a(c)(2) and the
definition of bona fide hedging transaction or position in proposed
Sec. 150.1, including ``factual and legal analysis;'' (iii) a
statement concerning the maximum size of all gross positions in
derivative contracts for which the application is submitted (in order
to provide a view of the true footprint of the position in the market);
(iv) information regarding the applicant's activity in the cash markets
and the swaps markets for the commodity underlying the position for
which the application is submitted; \946\ and (v) any other information
that may help the Commission determine whether the position meets the
requirements of CEA section 4a(c)(2) and the definition of bona fide
hedging transaction or position in Sec. 150.1.\947\
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\946\ The Commission stated that it would expect applicants to
provide cash-market data for at least the prior year.
\947\ For example, the Commission may, in its discretion,
request a description of any positions in other commodity derivative
contracts in the same commodity underlying the commodity derivative
contract for which the application is submitted. Other commodity
derivative contracts could include other futures contracts, option
on futures contracts, and swaps (including OTC swaps) positions held
by the applicant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, under the 2020 NPRM, a market participant would be
required to apply to the Commission using the application process in
Sec. 150.3(b) for exemptions for any spread positions that do not meet
the proposed ``spread transaction'' definition. With respect to a Sec.
150.3(b) application for a spread exemption, the Commission proposed
that such application must include: (i) A description of the spread
transaction for which the exemption application is submitted; \948\
(ii) a statement concerning the maximum size of all gross positions in
derivative contracts for which the application is submitted; and (iii)
any other information that may help the Commission determine whether
the position is consistent with CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\948\ The nature of such description would depend on the facts
and circumstances, and different details may be required depending
on the particular spread.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(2), the Commission (or Commission
staff pursuant to delegated authority proposed in Sec. 150.3(g)) could
request additional information from the applicant and would provide the
applicant with ten business days to respond. Under proposed Sec.
150.3(b)(3) and (4), the applicant, however, could not exceed Federal
position limits unless it receives a notice of approval from the
Commission or from Commission staff pursuant to delegated authority
proposed in Sec. 150.3(g)--with one exception. That is, due to
demonstrated sudden or unforeseen increases in a person's bona fide
hedging needs, the person could request a recognition of a bona fide
hedging transaction or position within five business days after the
person established the position that exceeded the Federal speculative
position limit.\949\
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\949\ Where a person requests a bona fide hedge recognition
within five business days after exceeding Federal position limits,
such person would be required to demonstrate that they encountered
sudden or unforeseen circumstances that required them to exceed
Federal position limits before submitting and receiving approval of
their bona fide hedge application. These applications submitted
after a person has exceeded Federal position limits should not be
habitual and would be reviewed closely. If the Commission reviews
such application and finds that the position does not qualify as a
bona fide hedge, then the applicant would be required to bring its
position into compliance within a commercially reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission in consultation with the applicant and
the applicable DCM or SEF. If the applicant brings the position into
compliance within a commercially reasonable time, then the applicant
would not be considered to have violated the position limits rules.
Further, any intentional misstatements to the Commission, including
statements to demonstrate why the bona fide hedging needs were
sudden and unforeseen, would be a violation of sections 6(c)(2) and
9(a)(2) of the Act. 7 U.S.C. 9(2) and 13(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this proposed process, market participants would be
encouraged to submit their requests for bona fide hedge recognitions
and spread exemptions as early as possible since proposed Sec.
150.3(b) would not set a specific timeframe within which the Commission
must make a determination for such requests. Further, under the 2020
NPRM, all approved bona fide hedge recognitions and spread exemptions
would need to be renewed if there are any changes to the information
submitted as part of the request, or upon request by the Commission or
Commission staff.\950\
[[Page 3354]]
Finally, under proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(6), the Commission (and not
staff) could revoke or modify any bona fide hedge recognition or spread
exemption at any time if the Commission determines that the bona fide
hedge recognition or spread exemption, or portions thereof, are no
longer consistent with the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements.\951\
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\950\ See proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(5). Currently, the Commission
does not require automatic updates to bona fide hedge applications,
and does not require applications or updates thereto for spread
exemptions, which are self-effectuating. Consistent with current
practices, under proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(5), the Commission would
not require automatic annual updates to bona fide hedge and spread
exemption applications; rather, updated applications would only be
required if there are changes to information the requestor initially
submitted or upon Commission request. This approach is different
than the proposed streamlined process in Sec. 150.9, which would
require automatic annual updates to such applications, which is more
consistent with current exchange practices. See, e.g., CME Rule 559.
\951\ This proposed authority to revoke or modify a bona fide
hedge recognition or spread exemption would not be delegated to
Commission staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission noted that it anticipates that
most market participants would utilize the streamlined process set
forth in proposed Sec. 150.9 rather than the process proposed in Sec.
150.3(b) because: Exchanges would generally be able to make an initial
determination more efficiently than Commission staff; and market
participants are likely already familiar with the proposed processes
set forth in Sec. 150.9 (which are intended to leverage the processes
currently used by exchanges to address requests for exemptions from
exchange-set limits). Nevertheless, proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(1) and (2)
clarify that market participants could request non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions and spread exemptions that do not meet the ``spread
transaction'' definition directly from the Commission. After receiving
any approval of a bona fide hedge recognition or spread exemption from
the Commission under proposed Sec. 150.3(b), the market participant
would still be required to request a bona fide hedge recognition or
spread exemption from the relevant exchange for purposes of exchange-
set limits established pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.5(a).
ii. Comments--Application for Relief and Removal of Existing Commission
Application Processes
The Commission received one comment on proposed Sec. 150.3(b)
requesting that the Commission remove the requirement proposed in Sec.
150.3(b)(1)(i)(B) that an applicant provide a ``factual and legal
analysis'' as part of an exemption application for a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge.\952\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\952\ CME Group at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Application for Relief and Removal of
Existing Commission Application Processes
The Commission has determined to finalize its proposal to remove
existing Sec. Sec. 1.47, 1.48, and 140.97.\953\ The Commission has
also determined to finalize Sec. 150.3(b) largely as proposed but with
the following modifications in response to commenters and other
considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\953\ Although Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 are currently reflected
in the Code of Federal Regulations (``CFR'') as ``[Reserved]'',
Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 that existed prior to the 2011 Final
Rulemaking are currently in effect. The 2011 Final Rulemaking
removed and reserved Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48. However, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in ISDA subsequently
vacated the 2011 Final Rulemaking on September 28, 2012. As a
result, Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 that existed prior to the 2011
Final Rulemaking went back into effect, though they were not
recodified in the CFR. This Final Rule removes Sec. Sec. 1.47 and
1.48 as they are currently in effect (i.e., as they existed prior to
the 2011 Final Rulemaking) and leaves those two sections reserved in
the CFR. As this action does not result in a change to the currently
codified CFR, there is no corresponding amendment in the regulatory
text of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, the information required to be submitted as part of the
Sec. 150.3(b) application is necessary to allow the Commission to
evaluate whether the applicant's position satisfies the requirements in
Sec. 150.3(b)(1), as applicable. The Commission has determined to
modify the requirement, as it appears in both Sec. 150.3(b) and Sec.
150.9(c), that an applicant provide a ``factual and legal analysis'' as
part of its non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemption application. As
explained further below, in proposing this requirement, the Commission
did not intend to require that applicants engage legal counsel to
complete their applications for non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions. Rather, the purpose of this proposed requirement was to
ensure that applicants explain their hedging strategies and provide
sufficient information to demonstrate why a particular position
satisfies the bona fide hedge definition in proposed Sec. 150.1 and
CEA section 4a(c)(2).\954\ Accordingly, the Commission has revised
Sec. 150.3(b)(1)(i)(B) to replace the requirement to provide ``factual
and legal'' analysis with the requirement that an applicant provide:
(1) An explanation of the hedging strategy, including a statement that
the applicant's position complies with the applicable requirements of
the bona fide hedge definition, and (2) information that demonstrates
why the position satisfies the applicable requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\954\ See supra Section II.G.5. (providing a more detailed
discussion of this requirement as it appears in Sec. 150.9(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is also making several other clarifications to Sec.
150.3(b). First, in Sec. 150.3(b)(3)(ii)(C), the Commission proposed
that, for a retroactive application submitted to the Commission after a
person has already exceeded Federal position limits, the Commission
would not hold an applicant accountable for a position limits violation
during the period of the Commission's review, nor once the Commission
has issued its determination. The Commission is revising this provision
to clarify that the Commission ``will not pursue an enforcement
action'' in these circumstances. The Commission is also revising this
provision to clarify that the provision applies so long as the
applicant submitted its application in good faith and, if required, the
applicant brings its position below the Federal position limits. This
revision is simply intended to make explicit an implicit presumption
that the applicant should have a reasonable and good faith basis for
determining that its position meets the requirements of Sec. 150.3(b)
and for submitting the retroactive application. This requirement is
also intended to deter the filing of frivolous retroactive exemption
applications. Finally, the Commission is making a few technical
revisions to clarify that this section is referring to the retroactive
application provisions in Sec. 150.3(b)(3)(ii), and to correct a
cross-reference in this paragraph to correctly reference paragraph
Sec. 150.3(b)(3)(ii)(B).
In addition, the Commission is modifying proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(5)
to clarify that an applicant who received its original approval of a
recognition of a non-enumerated bona fide hedge or spread exemption
through the Commission's Sec. 150.3(b) process is required to submit a
renewal application if there are any ``material'' changes to the
original application, but is not required to submit a renewal
application as a result of circumstances involving any minor or non-
substantive changes to the information underlying the original
application. If a market participant using the Sec. 150.3(b) process
has any questions regarding what qualifies as a material change to the
original application, the Commission encourages the market participant
to contact DMO staff for guidance on a case-by-case basis.
Next, the Commission is revising its revocation authority under
Sec. 150.3(b)(6) to expressly require that the Commission provide a
person with an opportunity to respond after the Commission notifies
such person that
[[Page 3355]]
the Commission believes their transactions or positions no longer
satisfy the bona fide hedge definition or spread exemption
requirements, as applicable. The Commission is also revising Sec.
150.3(b)(6) to clarify that the Commission will discuss with the
applicant and consult with the relevant exchange when determining what
is a commercially reasonable amount of time for the applicant to bring
its position below the Federal position limits. The Commission also
reorganized this section to improve readability.
Finally, the Commission made several grammatical and technical
changes to Sec. 150.3(b) that are not intended to change the substance
of the remaining sections, unless discussed above.
9. Section 150.3(c)--Previously-Granted Risk Management Exemptions
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Previously-Granted Risk Management
Exemptions
As discussed above, the Commission previously recognized, as bona
fide hedges under Sec. 1.47, certain risk-management positions in
physical commodity futures and/or option on futures contracts held
outside of the spot month that were used to offset the risk of
commodity index swaps and other related exposures, but that did not
represent substitutes for transactions or positions to be taken in a
physical marketing channel.\955\ However, the 2020 NPRM interpreted the
Dodd-Frank Act amendments to the CEA as eliminating the Commission's
authority to grant such relief unless the position satisfies the pass-
through provision in CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B).\956\ Accordingly, to
ensure consistency with the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission proposed
that it would not recognize further risk management positions as bona
fide hedges, unless the position otherwise satisfies the requirements
of the pass-through provisions.\957\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\955\ See supra Section II.A.1.iii. (discussing the temporary
substitute test and risk management exemption under Sec. 150.1).
\956\ Id.
\957\ 85 FR at 11641.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Commission proposed in Sec. 150.3(c) that such
previously-granted exemptions shall not apply after the effective date
of a final Federal position limits rulemaking implementing the Dodd-
Frank Act. Proposed Sec. 150.3(c) used the phrase ``positions in
financial instruments'' to refer to such commodity index swaps and
related exposure, and would have the effect of revoking the ability to
use previously-granted risk management exemptions once the limits
proposed in Sec. 150.2 go into effect.
ii. Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Previously-Granted Risk
Management Exemptions
The Commission has addressed any comments on risk management
exemptions in the discussion of Sec. 150.1 above.\958\ As discussed
above, to ensure consistency with the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission
will not recognize risk management positions as bona fide hedges under
the Final Rule, unless the position otherwise satisfies the
requirements of the Final Rule's pass-through swap provisions.\959\
Consequently, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.3(c) largely as
proposed, which provides that such previously-granted risk management
exemptions issued pursuant to Sec. 1.47 shall no longer be
recognized.\960\ However, the Final Rule is also providing for a
compliance date of January 1, 2023 with respect to the elimination of
the risk management exemption by which risk management exemption
holders must reduce their risk management exemption positions to comply
with Federal position limits under the Final Rule.\961\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\958\ See supra Section II.A.1.iii (discussing risk management
exemptions and comments received in greater detail).
\959\ See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing the proposed pass-
through swap provisions).
\960\ Under this Final Rule, however, exchanges may continue to
grant risk management exemptions (that do not otherwise meet the
bona fide hedge definition in Sec. 150.1) up to the applicable
Federal position limit.
\961\ See supra Section I.D. (discussing the effective and
compliance dates).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 150.3(c) uses the phrase ``positions in financial
instruments'' to refer to such commodity index swaps and related
exposure and would have the effect of revoking the ability to use
previously-granted risk management exemptions once the Final Rule's
Federal position limits in Sec. 150.2 become effective. However, the
Final Rule will also include an extended compliance date until January
1, 2023 with respect to positions entered into upon reliance of an
existing risk management exemption.\962\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\962\ Id.
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The Final Rule also deletes the sentence in proposed Sec.
150.3(c), which stated that nothing in Sec. 150.3(c) shall preclude
the Commission, a DCM, or SEF from recognizing a bona fide hedging
transaction or position for the former holder of such a risk management
exemption if the position complies with the definition of bona fide
hedging transaction or position under this part, including appendices
hereto. This sentence was intended to clarify what has been explained
above--risk management exemptions that meet the pass-through swap
provisions are permitted under the Final Rule.\963\ The Commission has
determined that this sentence is unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\963\ See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing the proposed pass-
through language).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is making several technical changes to proposed
Sec. 150.3(c), including to clarify that the provision covers risk
management exemptions previously granted by the Commission or by
Commission staff. The Commission also reorganized Sec. 150.3(c) to
improve readability.
10. Section 150.3(d)--Recordkeeping
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Recordkeeping
Proposed Sec. 150.3(d) would establish recordkeeping requirements
for persons who claim any exemption under proposed Sec. 150.3.
Proposed Sec. 150.3(d) is intended to help ensure that any person who
claims any exemption permitted under proposed Sec. 150.3 could
demonstrate compliance with the applicable requirements by providing
all relevant records to support the claim of a particular exemption.
That is, under proposed Sec. 150.3(d)(1), any persons claiming an
exemption would be required to keep and maintain complete books and
records concerning all details of their related cash, forward, futures,
options on futures, and swap positions and transactions, including
anticipated requirements, production and royalties, contracts for
services, cash commodity products and by-products, cross-commodity
hedges, and records of bona fide hedging swap counterparties.
Proposed Sec. 150.3(d)(2) would address recordkeeping requirements
related to the pass-through swap provision in the proposed definition
of bona fide hedging transaction or position in proposed Sec.
150.1.\964\ Under proposed Sec. 150.3(d)(2), a pass-through swap
counterparty, as contemplated by proposed Sec. 150.1, that relies on a
representation received from a bona fide hedging swap counterparty that
a swap qualifies in good faith as a bona fide hedging position or
transaction under proposed Sec. 150.1, would be required to: (i)
Maintain any written representation for at least two years following
the expiration of the swap; and (ii) furnish the representation to the
Commission upon request.
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\964\ See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussion of proposed pass-
through swap provision).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments--Recordkeeping
Several commenters requested clarification that the recordkeeping
[[Page 3356]]
requirements in proposed Sec. 150.3(d)(1) would not impose an
additional recordkeeping obligation on commercial end-users beyond the
records that are kept in the normal course of business and are typical
for the relevant industry.\965\
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\965\ Cope at 5-6; EEI/EPSA at 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, commenters recommended that the Commission delete the
pass-through swap recordkeeping requirements in proposed Sec.
150.3(d)(2).\966\ Commenters were concerned that the pass-through swap
provision in Sec. 150.1 places all compliance burdens on the pass-
through swap counterparty offering the swap, and not on the bona fide
hedging counterparty using the swap.\967\ Commenters expressed that
this recordkeeping provision would require the pass-through swap
counterparty to maintain records of each representation made by the
bona fide hedging counterparty on a trade-by-trade basis--a practice
commenters view as onerous and unnecessary.\968\ Commenters suggested
that the Commission will have access to records from anyone availing
themselves of any exemption from speculative limits, and thus does not
need the additional recordkeeping requirement in proposed Sec.
150.3(d)(2).\969\ One commenter also requested that the Commission
clarify that the pass-through swap counterparty can rely on the bona
fide hedging counterparty's good faith representation that a record of
an agreement or confirmation of the transaction containing the bona
fide hedge pass-through representation would satisfy the record
retention requirements set forth in proposed Sec. 150.3(d)(2).\970\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\966\ Cargill at 6; Shell at 6.
\967\ Id.
\968\ Shell at 7; CMC at 5.
\969\ COPE at 5-6.
\970\ Shell at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Recordkeeping
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.3(d), for the
reasons stated in the 2020 NPRM, with certain clarifications discussed
below.
First, the Commission clarifies that the recordkeeping requirements
in Sec. 150.3(d)(1) are not intended to impose any additional
recordkeeping obligations on market participants beyond the records
they are required to keep in the normal course of business. The
Commission notes, however, that, consistent with the general
recordkeeping obligations in Commission regulation 1.31, and as
explained in the 2020 NPRM, Sec. 150.3(d)(1) is intended to capture
records market participants should be maintaining with respect to each
of their exemptions from Federal position limits. The Commission is
revising Sec. 150.3(d)(1) to clarify that market participants that
avail themselves of exemptions under this section are required to keep
the relevant ``books and records'' of ``each of their exemptions'' and
any related position or transaction information for such applications,
including any books and records market participants create for related
``merchandising activity'' or other relevant aspects of a particular
exemption (including the items listed in Sec. 150.3(d)(1)), as
applicable.
Next, regarding the pass-through swap recordkeeping requirements,
in Sec. 150.2(d)(2), the Commission intended for this requirement to
be an extension of market participants' existing obligations to
maintain swap data records under Part 45 and regulatory records under
Sec. 1.31.\971\ That is, under Sec. 150.1, the Commission has revised
paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging transaction or position
definition to require that a pass-through swap counterparty receive a
written representation from its bona fide hedging swap counterparty
that the swap ``qualifies as a bona fide hedging transaction or
position'' pursuant to paragraph (1) of the definition of a bona fide
hedging transaction or position in Sec. 150.1 in order for the pass-
through swap to qualify as a bona fide hedge. The pass-through swap
counterparty may rely in good faith on such written representation from
the bona fide hedging swap counterparty, unless the pass-through swap
counterparty has information that would cause a reasonable person to
question the accuracy of the representation. Thus, the recordkeeping
requirements in Sec. 150.3(d)(2) are intended to capture any
``written'' record created for purposes of making such demonstration.
The Commission provides additional explanation above on how a pass-
through swap counterparty can demonstrate good faith reliance.\972\ For
the avoidance of doubt, the Commission is revising Sec. 150.3(d)(2) to
clarify that a person relying on the pass-through swap provision is
required to maintain any records created for purposes of demonstrating
a good faith reliance on that provision in accordance with Sec. 150.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\971\ 17 CFR 1.31(a)-(b).
\972\ See supra Section II.A.1.x. (discussing the pass-through
swap provision in greater detail).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also clarifies that, pursuant to the swap
recordkeeping requirements in Sec. 45.2(b) \973\ and the general
recordkeeping requirements in Sec. 1.31,\974\ the bona fide hedging
swap counterparty to the pass-through swap is required to maintain a
record of such pass-through swap. The Commission considers any written
representation the bona fide hedging swap counterparty provides to the
pass-through swap counterparty as being part of the full, complete, and
systematic records that the bona fide hedging swap counterparty is
required to keep pursuant to Sec. 45.2(b), with respect to each pass-
through swap to which it is a counterparty. The bona fide hedging swap
counterparty is required to keep such records according to the form and
duration requirements of Sec. 1.31. Such records are also subject to
the inspection and production requirements of both Sec. 1.31(d) \975\
and Sec. 45.2(h).\976\ As such, the Commission reminds bona fide
hedging swap counterparties to a pass-through swap that they are
responsible for maintaining an accurate and true record of any written
representations they make to the pass-through swap counterparty
regarding the bona fides of the pass-through swap. Further, any such
records and written representations that a bona fide hedging swap
counterparty makes may, upon request, be filed with the Commission as
part of an inspection, pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.31(d) and 45.2(h), and
would be subject to the Commission's prohibition regarding false
statements in section 6(c)(2) of the Act, as well as any other
applicable provisions regarding false information.\977\
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\973\ 17 CFR 45.2(b) (requiring that all non-swap dealer/non-
major swap participant counterparties keep full, complete, and
systematic records, together with all pertinent data and memoranda,
with respect to each swap in which they are a counterparty).
\974\ 17 CFR 1.31 (regulatory records, retention, and production
requirements).
\975\ 17 CFR 1.31(d) (requirement for a records entity, as
defined in Sec. 1.31(a), to produce or make accessible for
inspection all regulatory records).
\976\ 17 CFR 45.2(h) (swap record inspection requirements).
\977\ 7 U.S.C. 9(2) (prohibition on making a false or misleading
statement of material fact to the Commission); see also 7 U.S.C.
9(4) (general enforcement authority of the Commission).
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11. Section 150.3(e)--Call for Information
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Call for Information
The Commission proposed to move existing Sec. 150.3(b), which
currently allows the Commission or certain Commission staff to make
calls to demand certain information regarding positions or trading, to
proposed
[[Page 3357]]
Sec. 150.3(e), with some technical modifications.
Together with the recordkeeping provision of proposed Sec.
150.3(d), proposed Sec. 150.3(e) should enable the Commission to
monitor the use of exemptions from speculative position limits and help
to ensure that any person who claims any exemption permitted by
proposed Sec. 150.3 can demonstrate compliance with the applicable
requirements.
ii. Comments and Summary of Commission Determination--Call for
Information
The Commission did not receive comments on proposed Sec. 150.3(e).
Accordingly, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.3(e) with one
grammatical edit that is not intended to reflect a substantive change
to this section.
12. Section 150.3(f)--Aggregation of Accounts
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Aggregation of Accounts
Proposed Sec. 150.3(f) would clarify that entities required to
aggregate under Sec. 150.4 would be considered the same person for
purposes of determining whether they are eligible for a bona fide hedge
recognition under Sec. 150.3(a)(1).\978\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\978\ See 17 CFR 150.4 (providing the Commission's existing
aggregation requirements for Federal position limits); See also
supra Section II.B.11. (discussing eligible affiliates and position
aggregation requirements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Comments and Summary of Commission Determination--Aggregation of
Accounts
The Commission did not receive comments on proposed Sec. 150.3(f).
Accordingly, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.3(f) as
proposed.\979\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\979\ The Commission did receive general comments on position
aggregation discussing existing no-action relief in connection with
the position aggregation requirement in existing Sec. 150.4. For a
discussion on comments received in connection with existing staff
no-action relief for position aggregation requirements, see supra
Section II.B.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Section Sec. 150.3(g)--Delegation of Authority
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Delegation of Authority
Proposed Sec. 150.3(g) would delegate authority to the Director of
the Division of Market Oversight to: Grant financial distress
exemptions pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(3); request additional
information with respect to an exemption request pursuant to proposed
Sec. 150.3(b)(2); determine, in consultation with the exchange and
applicant, a commercially reasonable amount of time for a person to
bring its positions within the Federal position limits pursuant to
proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(3)(ii)(B); make a determination whether to
recognize a position as a bona fide hedging transaction or to grant a
spread exemption pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(4); and to request
that a person submit additional application information or updated
materials or renew their request pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.3(b)(2)
or (5). This proposed delegation would enable the Division of Market
Oversight to act quickly in the event of financial distress and in the
other circumstances described above.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Delegation of
Authority
The Commission did not receive comments on proposed 150.3(g).
Accordingly, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.3(g) with one
technical edit to correct a punctuation error, which is not intended to
reflect a change in the substance of this section.
14. Request for a New Exemption in Sec. 150.3(a) for Certain Energy
Utility Entities
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM and Comments--New Exemption for Certain
Energy Utility Entities
Although the 2020 NPRM did not include a new exemption explicitly
applicable to certain energy utility entities, it did include a request
for comment regarding the possibility of such an exemption.\980\ In
response, NRECA (which encompasses several not-for-profit energy
associations) \981\ along with other commenters,\982\ requested that
the Commission use its authority in CEA section 4a(a)(7) to exempt
certain not-for-profit electric and natural gas utility entities (``NFP
Energy Entities'') from position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\980\ See 85 FR at 11642.
\981\ NRECA at 3-14.
\982\ See IECA at 5; LIPA at 1; NFPEA at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These commenters (in particular, NRECA) argued that Congress did
not intend for the Commission's position limits regime to apply to
commercial market participants engaged in hedging and mitigating
commercial risk, such as the NFP Energy Entities.\983\ The commenters
also provided several reasons why the Commission's position limits
regulatory regime is incongruous with the operations of NFP Energy
Entities, including that NFP Energy Entities: (a) Operate on a not-for-
profit basis; (b) have unique public service obligations to provide
reliable, affordable utility services to residential, commercial, and
industrial customers; (c) have governance structures with oversight by
elected or appointed government officials or cooperative members/
consumers; (d) do not engage in speculative trading in derivatives
markets; and (e) enter into energy commodity swaps and trade options
only to hedge or mitigate commercial risk arising from ongoing business
operations.\984\ NRECA expressed concern that the effort required for
NFP Energy Entities to analyze and identify every transaction as non-
speculative would be purely academic and would unnecessarily increase
the cost of electricity, natural gas and other fuels for generation for
American consumers and businesses served by the NFP Energy
Entities.\985\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\983\ NRECA at 19.
\984\ Id.
\985\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Discussion of the Commission Determination--New Exemption for
Certain Energy Utility Entities
The Commission has considered these comments and believes that many
of the concerns raised by NFP Energy Entities are addressed through the
Final Rule's pass-through swap provision and the expanded list of
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions. That is, the Commission believes
that most, if not all, of the hedging needs of NFP Energy Entities will
be considered enumerated, self-effectuating bona fide hedges that will
not be subject to Federal position limits. Further, NFP Energy Entity
counterparties that are not bona fide hedgers would receive pass-
through bona fide hedging treatment for any swaps with NFP Energy
Entities, or any offsetting positions as a result of such swaps with
NFP Energy Entities. This expanded flexibility should significantly
alleviate the compliance burdens and cost concerns voiced by NFP Energy
Entities.
The Commission recommends that NFP Energy Entities assess the
impact of the Final Rule on their operations, and if needed, pursue the
requested exemption separate from this Final Rule. The Commission also
believes that the extended compliance date for the Final Rule of
January 1, 2022 in connection with the Federal position limits for the
16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts, and the further
extended compliance date of January 1, 2023 for swaps that are subject
to Federal position limits under the Final Rule, should give commenters
and the Commission sufficient time to
[[Page 3358]]
continue to discuss this request if necessary.
D. Sec. 150.5--Exchange-Set Position Limits and Exemptions Therefrom
For the avoidance of confusion, this discussion of Sec. 150.5
addresses exchange-set limits and exemptions therefrom, not Federal
position limits. For a discussion of the proposed processes by which an
exemption may be recognized for purposes of Federal position limits,
please see the discussion of proposed Sec. 150.3 above and Sec. 150.9
below.\986\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\986\ See supra Section II.C. (discussing Sec. 150.3 exemptions
from Federal position limits). See also infra Section II.G.
(discussing the Sec. 150.9 streamlined process for recognizing non-
enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of both exchange and
Federal position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Background--Existing Requirements for Exchange-Set Position Limits
i. Applicable DCM and SEF Core Principles
Under DCM Core Principle 5, a DCM shall adopt for each contract, as
is necessary and appropriate, position limitations or position
accountability for speculators. In addition, for any contract that is
listed on a DCM and subject to a Federal position limit, the DCM must
establish exchange-set limits for such contract no higher than the
Federal limit level.\987\ Finally, DCMs are required to monitor their
markets and enforce compliance with their rules.\988\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\987\ See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5).
\988\ See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, under SEF Core Principle 6, a SEF that is a trading
facility must adopt for each contract, as is necessary and appropriate,
position limitations or position accountability for speculators.\989\
Such SEF must also, for any contract that is listed on the SEF and
subject to a Federal position limit, establish exchange-set limits for
such contract no higher than the Federal limit.\990\ Finally, such SEF
must monitor positions established on or through the SEF for compliance
with the limit set by the Commission and the limit, if any, set by the
SEF.\991\ Beyond these and other statutory and certain specified
Commission requirements, unless otherwise determined by the Commission,
DCM Core Principle 1 and SEF Core Principle 1 afford DCMs and SEFs,
respectively, ``reasonable discretion'' in establishing the manner in
which they comply with the core principles.\992\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\989\ See 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(6).
\990\ Id.
\991\ Id.
\992\ See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(1) and 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current regulatory provisions governing exchange-set position
limits and exemptions therefrom appear in Sec. 150.5.\993\ To align
Sec. 150.5 with statutory changes made by the Dodd-Frank Act,\994\ and
with other changes in the 2020 NPRM,\995\ the Commission proposed a new
version of Sec. 150.5. This new proposed Sec. 150.5 would generally
afford exchanges the discretion to decide how best to set limit levels
and grant exemptions from such limits in a manner that best reflects
their specific markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\993\ 17 CFR 150.5.
\994\ While existing Sec. 150.5 on its face only applies to
contracts that are not subject to Federal position limits, DCM Core
Principle 5, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, and SEF Core
Principle 6, establish requirements both for contracts that are, and
are not, subject to Federal position limits. 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5) and 7
U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(6).
\995\ Significant changes discussed herein include the process
set forth in proposed Sec. 150.9 and revisions to the bona fide
hedging definition proposed in Sec. 150.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Existing Sec. 150.5
As noted above, existing Sec. 150.5 pre-dates the Dodd-Frank Act
and addresses the establishment of DCM-set position limits for all
contracts not subject to Federal position limits under existing Sec.
150.2 (aside from certain major foreign currencies).\996\ First,
existing Sec. 150.5(a) authorizes DCMs to set different limits for
different contracts and contract months, and permits DCMs to grant
exemptions from DCM-set limits for spreads, straddles, or arbitrage
trades. Existing Sec. 150.5(b) provides a limited set of methodologies
for DCMs to use in establishing initial limit levels, including
separate maximum spot-month limit levels for physical-delivery
contracts and cash-settled contracts,\997\ as well as separate non-spot
month limits for tangible commodities (other than energy),\998\ and for
energy products and non-tangible commodities, including
financials.\999\ Existing Sec. 150.5(c) provides guidelines for how
DCMs may adjust their speculative initial levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\996\ Existing Sec. 150.5(a) states that the requirement to set
position limits shall not apply to futures or option contract
markets on major foreign currencies, for which there is no legal
impediment to delivery and for which there exists a highly liquid
cash market. 17 CFR 150.5(a).
\997\ See 17 CFR 150.5(b)(1) (providing that, for physical
delivery contracts, the spot month limit level must be no greater
than one-quarter of the estimated spot month deliverable supply,
calculated separately for each month to be listed, and for cash
settled contracts, the spot month limit level must be no greater
than necessary to minimize the potential for manipulation or
distortion of the contract's or the underlying commodity's price).
\998\ See 17 CFR 150.5(b)(2) (providing that individual non-spot
or all-months-combined levels must be no greater than 1,000
contracts for tangible commodities other than energy products).
\999\ See 17 CFR 150.5(b)(3) (providing that individual non-spot
or all-months-combined levels must be no greater than 5,000
contracts for energy products and nontangible commodities, including
contracts on financial products).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, existing Sec. 150.5(d) addresses bona fide hedging
exemptions from DCM-set limits, including an exemption application
process, providing that exchange-set speculative position limits shall
not apply to bona fide hedging positions as defined by a DCM in
accordance with the definition of bona fide hedging transactions and
positions for excluded commodities in Sec. 1.3. Existing Sec.
150.5(d) also addresses factors for DCMs to consider in recognizing
bona fide hedging exemptions (or position accountability), including
whether such positions ``are not in accord with sound commercial
practices or exceed an amount which may be established and liquidated
in an orderly fashion.'' \1000\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1000\ See 17 CFR 150.5(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an alternative to exchange-set position limits set in accordance
with the provisions described above, existing Sec. 150.5(e) permits a
DCM, in certain circumstances, to submit for Commission approval a rule
requiring traders ``to be accountable for large positions'' (or
position accountability levels). That is, under certain circumstances,
the DCM would require traders to, upon request, provide information
about their position to the exchange, and/or consent to halt further
increasing a position if so ordered by the exchange.\1001\ Among other
things, this provision includes open interest and volume-based
parameters for determining when DCMs may do so.\1002\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1001\ 17 CFR 150.5(e).
\1002\ 17 CFR 150.5(e)(1)-(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, existing Sec. 150.5(f) provides that DCM speculative
position limits adopted pursuant to Sec. 150.5 shall not apply to
certain positions acquired in good faith prior to the effective date of
such limits or to a person that is registered as an FCM or as a floor
broker under the CEA except to the extent that transactions made by
such person are made on behalf of, or for the account or benefit of,
such person.\1003\ This provision also provides that in addition to the
express exemptions specified in Sec. 150.5, a DCM may propose such
other exemptions from the requirements of Sec. 150.5 as are consistent
with the purposes of Sec. 150.5, and submit such rules for Commission
review.\1004\ Finally, existing Sec. 150.5(g) addresses aggregation of
positions for which a person directly or indirectly controls trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1003\ 17 CFR 150.5(f).
\1004\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 3359]]
2. Overview of the 2020 NPRM, Commenters' Views, and Commission Final
Rule Determination--Exchange-Set Position Limits and Exemptions
Therefrom
This section provides a brief overview of proposed Sec. 150.5,
commenters' general views, and the Commission's determination. The
Commission will summarize and address each sub-section of Sec. 150.5
in greater detail further below.
Pursuant to CEA sections 5(d)(1) and 5h(f)(1), the Commission
proposed a new version of Sec. 150.5.\1005\ Proposed Sec. 150.5 is
intended to allow DCMs and SEFs to set limit levels and grant
exemptions in a manner that best accommodates activity particular to
their markets, while promoting compliance with DCM Core Principle 5 and
SEF Core Principle 6. Proposed Sec. 150.5 is also intended to ensure
consistency with other changes proposed herein, including the process
for exchanges to administer applications for non-enumerated bona fide
hedge exemptions for purposes of Federal position limits proposed in
Sec. 150.9.\1006\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1005\ While proposed Sec. 150.5 included references to swaps
and SEFs, the proposed rule would initially only apply to DCMs, as
requirements relating to exchange-set limits on swaps would be
phased in at a later time.
\1006\ To avoid confusion created by the parallel Federal and
exchange-set position limit frameworks, the Commission clarifies
that proposed Sec. 150.5 deals solely with exchange-set position
limits and exemptions therefrom, whereas proposed Sec. 150.9 deals
solely with a streamlined process for the Commission to recognize
non-enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of Federal position
limits by leveraging exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 150.5 contains two main sub-sections, with each sub-
section addressing a different category of contract: (i) Sec. 150.5(a)
proposed rules governing exchange-set limits for referenced contracts
subject to Federal position limits; and (ii) Sec. 150.5(b) proposed
rules governing exchange-set limits for physical commodity derivative
contracts that are not subject to Federal position limits.
Notably, with respect to exchange-set limits on swaps, the
Commission proposed to delay compliance with DCM Core Principle 5 and
SEF Core Principle 6, as compliance would otherwise be impracticable,
and, in some cases, impossible, at this time. In the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission explained that this delay was based largely on the fact that
exchanges cannot view positions in OTC swaps across the various places
they are trading, including on competitor exchanges.
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.5 largely as
proposed, with certain modifications and clarifications in response to
commenters and other considerations, as discussed below.
The Commission will oversee swaps in connection with compliance
with Federal position limits under the Final Rule. The Commission has
also determined to delay compliance for the requirement for exchanges
to set position limits on swaps at this time. Specifically, with
respect to exchange-set position limits on swaps, the Commission notes
that in two years, the Commission will reevaluate the ability of
exchanges to establish and implement appropriate surveillance
mechanisms with respect to swaps and to implement DCM Core Principle 5
and SEF Core Principle 6, as applicable.
The Commission believes that delayed implementation of exchange-set
position limits on swaps at this time is not inconsistent with the
statutory objectives outlined in section 4a(a)(3) of the CEA for
several reasons. First, as explained above, at this time, it would be
impracticable and, in some cases, impossible for exchanges to comply
with any requirement for establishing exchange-set limits on swaps.
Next, the Commission is adopting in this Final Rule Federal position
limits on economically equivalent swaps, which the Commission will
monitor. These factors, coupled with the Commission's existing ability
to surveil swap exposure across markets in a manner that at this time
would be impracticable for the exchanges, will help ensure that the
Commission meets its statutory obligations. Accordingly, while Sec.
150.5 as finalized herein will apply to DCMs and SEFs, the Final Rule's
requirements associated with exchange oversight of swaps, including
with respect to exchange-set position limits, will be enforced at a
later time. In other words, upon the compliance date, exchanges must
comply with final Sec. 150.5 only with respect to futures and options
on futures traded on DCMs.
3. Section 150.5(a)--Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity
Derivative Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits Set Forth in
Sec. 150.2
The following section discusses the 2020 NPRM, comments received,
and the Commission's final determination with respect to each sub-
section of Sec. 150.5(a), which addresses exchange-set position limits
on contracts that are subject to Federal position limits.
i. Section Sec. 150.5(a)(1)--Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits on
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits on
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
Proposed Sec. 150.5(a) would apply to all contracts subject to the
Federal position limits proposed in Sec. 150.2 and, among other
things, is intended to help ensure that exchange-set limits do not
undermine the Federal position limits framework. Under proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(1), for any contract subject to a Federal limit, DCMs and,
ultimately, SEFs, would be required to establish exchange-set limits
for such contracts. Consistent with DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6, the exchange-set limit levels on such contracts, whether
cash-settled or physically-settled, and whether during or outside the
spot month, would have to be no higher than the level specified for the
applicable referenced contract in proposed Sec. 150.2. An exchange
would be free to set position limits that are lower than the Federal
limit. An exchange would also be permitted to adopt position
accountability levels that are lower than the Federal position limits,
in addition to any exchange-set position limits it adopts that are
equal to or less than the Federal position limits.
b. Comments--Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits on Contracts Subject
to Federal Position Limits
With respect to requirements for exchange-set limits under proposed
Sec. 150.5(a)(1), some commenters expressed concern that if an
exchange determines to set a position limit for a particular contract
significantly below the Federal position limit for that contract, then
market participants could be restricted in their ability to provide
liquidity, hedge activity, and otherwise pursue their trading
objectives.\1007\ ISDA recommended that to the extent that an exchange
determines to set position limits significantly below Federal position
limits, CFTC staff, through its exchange examination process, should
make transparent the exchange's reasoning and analysis underlying any
lower position limits.\1008\ Likewise, SIFMA AMG encouraged the
Commission to require exchanges to explain and justify any exchange-set
limits that are below Federal position limits, and to work
[[Page 3360]]
with exchanges to ensure that exchange limits do not discourage
liquidity.\1009\
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\1007\ ISDA at 11; SIFMA AMG at 4.
\1008\ ISDA at 11.
\1009\ SIFMA AMG at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Discussion of Final Rule--Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits on
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.5(a)(1) as proposed. In
response to comments on Sec. 150.5(a)(1) requesting that the
Commission require transparency into exchanges' reasoning for when they
set limits well below Federal position limits, the Commission believes
market participants already have sufficient transparency under part 40
of the Commission's regulations. When exchanges seek to implement rules
to establish new or amended exchange-set limits, exchanges are required
to submit those rules through the Commission's part 40 process, and the
rules are made publicly available on the CFTC's website.\1010\
Exchanges are also required to post such submissions on their own
websites.\1011\
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\1010\ See CFTC Industry Filings available at https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/IndustryFilings/index.htm.
\1011\ See 17 CFR 40.2(a)(3)(vi), 40.3(a)(9), 40.5(a)(6),
40.6(a)(2).
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Further, regarding the request that the Commission work with
exchanges on exchange-set limits that are below Federal position
limits, exchanges are permitted to establish exchange-set limits in a
manner that is most appropriate for their own marketplaces and in a
manner that allows them to comply with the applicable DCM and SEF core
principles. The Commission views this process as a business and
compliance decision that is best left in the discretion of each
exchange. However, pursuant to DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6, exchanges must implement exchange-set position limits in a
manner that reduces market manipulation and congestion.
ii. Section 150.5(a)(2)--Exemptions to Exchange-Set Limits for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exemptions to Exchange-Set Limits for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
Under the 2020 NPRM, Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii) would permit exchanges
to grant exemptions from exchange-set limits according to the
guidelines outlined below.
First, if such exemptions from exchange-set limits conform to the
types of exemptions that may be granted for purposes of Federal
position limits under proposed sections: (1) 150.3(a)(1)(i) (enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions), (2) 150.3(a)(2)(i) (spread exemptions
that meet the ``spread transaction'' definition in Sec. 150.1), (3)
150.3(a)(4) (exempt conditional spot month positions in natural gas),
or (4) 150.3(a)(5) (pre-enactment and transition period swaps), then
the level of the exemption may exceed the applicable Federal position
limit under proposed Sec. 150.2. Because the proposed exemptions
listed in the four provisions above are self-effectuating for purposes
of Federal position limits, exchanges may grant such exemptions
pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(i) without prior Commission
approval.
Second, if such exemptions from exchange-set limits conform to the
exemptions from Federal position limits that may be granted under
proposed Sec. Sec. 150.3(a)(1)(ii) (non-enumerated bona fide hedges)
and 150.3(a)(2)(ii) (spread positions that do not meet the ``spread
transaction'' definition in proposed Sec. 150.1), then the level of
the exemption may exceed the applicable Federal position limit under
proposed Sec. 150.2, provided that the exemption for purposes of
Federal position limits is first approved in accordance with proposed
Sec. 150.3(b) or, in the case of non-enumerated bona fide hedges,
Sec. 150.9, as applicable.
Third, if such exemptions conform to the exemptions from Federal
position limits that may be granted under proposed Sec. 150.3(a)(3)
(financial distress positions), then the level of the exemption may
exceed the applicable Federal position limit under proposed Sec.
150.2, provided that the Commission has first issued a letter or other
notice approving such exemption pursuant to a request submitted under
Sec. 140.99.\1012\
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\1012\ Under the 2020 NPRM, requests for exemptions for
financial distress positions would be submitted directly to the
Commission (or delegated staff) for consideration, and any approval
of such exemption would be issued in the form of an exemption letter
from the Commission (or delegated staff) pursuant to Sec. 140.99.
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Finally, for purposes of exchange-set limits only, under the 2020
NPRM, exchanges may grant exemption types that are not listed in Sec.
150.3(a). However, in such cases, the exemption level would have to be
capped at the level of the applicable Federal position limit, so as not
to undermine the Federal position limits framework, unless the
Commission has first approved such exemption for purposes of Federal
position limits pursuant to Sec. 140.99 or proposed Sec. 150.3(b).
The 2020 NPRM also explained that exchanges that wish to offer
exemptions from their own limits other than the types listed in
proposed Sec. 150.3(a) could also submit rules for the Commission's
review, pursuant to part 40, allowing for such exemptions. The
Commission would carefully review any such exemption types for
compliance with applicable standards, including any statutory
requirements \1013\ and Commission regulations.\1014\
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\1013\ For example, an exchange would not be permitted to adopt
rules allowing for risk management exemptions for positions in
physical commodities that exceed Federal limits because the
Commission interprets the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to CEA section
4a(c)(2) as prohibiting risk management exemptions in such
commodities (unless such position is considered a pass-through swap
under paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging definition in Sec.
150.1). See supra Section II.A.1. (discussing of the temporary
substitute test, risk-management exemptions, and the pass-through
swap provision).
\1014\ For example, as discussed below, proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(C) would require that exchanges consider whether the
requested exemption would result in positions that are not in accord
with sound commercial practices in the relevant commodity derivative
market and/or would not exceed an amount that may be established and
liquidated in an orderly fashion in that market.
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Under proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(1), exchanges that wish to
grant exemptions from their own limits would have to require traders to
file an application. The 2020 NPRM explained that, generally, exchanges
would have flexibility to establish the application process as they see
fit, but subject to the requirements discussed below, including the
requirement that the exchange collect cash-market and swaps market
information from the applicant.
For all exemption types, exchanges would have to generally require
that such applications be filed in advance of the date such position
would be in excess of the limits. However, under proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(B) and (C), exchanges would be given the discretion to
adopt rules allowing traders to file retroactive applications for bona
fide hedges within five business days after a trader established such
position so long as the applicant demonstrates a sudden and unforeseen
increase in its hedging needs. Further, under proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), if the exchange denies a retroactive application,
it would require that the applicant bring its position into compliance
with exchange-set limits within a commercially reasonable amount of
time (as determined by the exchange). Finally, pursuant to proposed
Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(5), neither the Commission nor the exchange
would enforce a position limits violation for such retroactive
applications.
Proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(B) provided that an exchange would
require that a trader reapply for the exemption granted
[[Page 3361]]
under proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2) at least annually so that the exchange
and the Commission can closely monitor exemptions for contracts subject
to Federal position limits, and to help ensure that the exchange and
the Commission remain aware of the trader's activities.
Proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(C) would authorize an exchange to
deny, limit, condition, or revoke any exemption request in accordance
with exchange rules,\1015\ and would set forth a principles-based
standard for doing so. Specifically, under proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(C), exchanges would be required to take into account:
(i) Whether granting the exemption request would result in a position
that is ``not in accord with sound commercial practices'' in the market
in which the DCM is granting the exemption; and (ii) whether granting
the exemption request would result in a position that would ``exceed an
amount that may be established or liquidated in an orderly fashion in
that market.'' The 2020 NPRM explained that exchanges' evaluation of
exemption requests against these standards would be a facts and
circumstances determination.
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\1015\ Currently, DCMs review and set exemption levels annually
based on the facts and circumstances of a particular exemption and
the market conditions at that time. As such, a DCM may decide to
deny, limit, condition, or revoke a particular exemption, typically,
if the DCM determines that certain conditions have changed and
warrant such action. This may happen if, for example, there are
droughts, floods, embargoes, trade disputes, or other events that
cause shocks to the supply or demand of a particular commodity and
thus impact the DCM's disposition of a particular exemption.
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The 2020 NPRM further explained that activity may reflect ``sound
commercial practice'' for a particular market or market participant but
not for another market or market participant. Similarly, activity may
reflect ``sound commercial practice'' outside the spot month, but not
in the spot month. Further, activity with manipulative intent or
effect, or that has the potential or effect of causing price distortion
or disruption, would be inconsistent with ``sound commercial
practice,'' even if it is common practice among market participants.
While an exemption granted to an individual market participant may
reflect ``sound commercial practice'' and may not ``exceed an amount
that may be established or liquidated in an orderly fashion in that
market,'' the 2020 NPRM clarified that the Commission expects exchanges
to also evaluate whether the granting of a particular exemption type to
multiple participants could have a collective impact on the market in a
manner inconsistent with ``sound commercial practice'' or in a manner
that could result in a position that would ``exceed an amount that may
be established or liquidated in an orderly fashion in that market.''
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission explained that it understands that
the above-described parameters for exemptions from exchange-set limits
are generally consistent with current practice among DCMs. Bearing in
mind that proposed Sec. 150.5(a) would apply to contracts subject to
Federal position limits, the Commission proposed codifying such
parameters, as they would establish important, minimum standards needed
for exchanges to administer, and the Commission to oversee, a robust
program for granting exemptions from exchange-set limits in a manner
that does not undermine the Federal position limits framework. Proposed
Sec. 150.5(a) also would afford exchanges the ability to generally
oversee their programs for granting exemptions from exchange-set limits
as they see fit, including to establish different application processes
and requirements to accommodate the unique characteristics of different
contracts.
Finally, proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D) would permit an
exchange, in its discretion, to require a person relying on an
exchange-granted exemption (for contracts subject to Federal position
limits) to exit or limit the size of any position in excess of
exchange-set limits during the lesser of the last five days of trading
or the time period for the spot month in a physical-delivery contract.
The Commission has traditionally referred to such requirements as a
``Five-Day Rule.''
b. Comments--Exemptions to Exchange-Set Limits for Contracts Subject to
Federal Position Limits
With respect to permitted exemptions from exchange-set limits under
proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2), CMC requested that the Commission clarify
that each exchange has discretion to determine what information is
required of applicants when applying for a spread exemption from
exchange-set limits, and that an exchange is not responsible for
monitoring the use of spread positions for purposes of Federal position
limits.\1016\
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\1016\ CMC at 7.
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In addition, regarding the retroactive application provision in
proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(5), CME Group recommended that the
Commission should implement a standard that permits exchanges to impose
position limits violations in cases where a person has exceeded Federal
position limits and filed a late or retroactive application that the
exchange then denies.\1017\
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\1017\ See CME Group at 10 (explaining that today at the
exchange level, CME Group considers firms to be in violation of a
position limit if the firms exceed a limit and the exemption
application is denied. CME Group believes the Commission should
implement this standard, rather than permitting the proposed grace
period for denial of an exemption application. CME Group explains
that, otherwise, market participants with excessively large
speculative positions could exploit the grace period accompanying an
application for an exemption and intentionally go over the
applicable limit without consequences--all the while disrupting
orderly market operations. In CME Group's experience, the prospect
of having an application denied and being found in violation of
position limits has worked to deter market participants from
attempting to exploit the retroactive exemption process).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also received several comments regarding the
provision that allows exchanges to impose a Five-Day Rule in proposed
Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D). In particular, commenters requested that the
Commission expressly clarify that the Five-Day Rule does not apply to
markets for energy commodity derivatives.\1018\ Commenters also
requested clarification about whether, in cases where an exchange opts
not to apply the Five-Day Rule, the Commission expects the exchange to
follow the waiver guidance in proposed Appendix B, or whether the
exchange can simply take no further action.\1019\
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\1018\ Chevron at 13; Suncor at 12.
\1019\ CCI at 9-10; CEWG at 25-26. See also supra Section
II.A.1.viii. (explaining Appendix B, which provides guidance the
Commission believes exchanges should consider when determining
whether to apply the Five-Day Rule restriction).
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Exemptions to Exchange-Set Limits for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.5(a)(2) largely
as proposed and with the clarifications and modifications, described
below, in response to commenters and other considerations.
Regarding comments on application information exchanges are
required to collect under Sec. 150.5(a)(2), as explained in the 2020
NPRM, the Commission is providing exchanges great flexibility to create
an application process for exemptions from exchange-set limits as they
see fit. This means an exchange has discretion to determine what
information is required of applicants applying for a spread exemption,
or any other exemption from exchange-set limits, except for instances
where the exchange is processing a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
application
[[Page 3362]]
in accordance with the application requirements of Sec. 150.9. The
Commission is making one modification to clarify the Commission's
posture when reviewing exchange-granted exemptions. In proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A), the Commission proposed to require exchanges to
collect sufficient information for the exchange to determine and the
Commission to ``verify'' that the facts and circumstances demonstrate
that the exchange may grant the exemption. In final Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A), the Commission is revising this provision to make
clear that the Commission will conduct an independent evaluation of any
application it reviews to ``determine'' (not verify) whether the facts
and circumstances demonstrate that the exchange may grant the
exemption.
Further, regarding monitoring spread exemptions, exchanges are
required to administer and monitor their position limits and any
exemptions therefrom in accordance with DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF
Core Principle 6, as applicable. To the extent, however, that an
exchange grants an inter-market spread exemption where part of the
spread position is executed on another exchange or OTC, although an
exchange is not responsible for monitoring a trader's position on other
exchanges or OTC, an exchange should request information from the
spread exemption applicant about the entire composition of the spread
position so that the exchange is best informed about whether to grant
the exemption. Ultimately, the person relying on the spread exemption
is responsible for monitoring for compliance with the applicable
Federal position limits. The Commission reminds market participants
that an approved exemption does not preclude the Commission from
finding that a person has otherwise disrupted or manipulated the
market.
Next, regarding comments on the retroactive application provision
in proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A)(5), the Commission believes that
exchanges are in the best position to determine whether to pursue
enforcement actions for violations of exchange-set limits. Accordingly,
the Commission has determined to revise this provision so that
exchanges have discretion to determine whether to impose a position
limits violation for any retroactive exemption request for exchange-set
limits that the exchange ultimately denies. The Commission, however,
retains its position that the Commission will not pursue a position
limits violation in those circumstances, provided that the application
was submitted in good faith and the applicant brings its position
within the DCM or SEF's speculative position limits within a
commercially reasonable time, as determined by the DCM or SEF.\1020\
This revision is simply intended to make explicit an implicit
presumption that the applicant should have a reasonable and good faith
basis for determining that its position meets the requirements of Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A) and for submitting the retroactive application.
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\1020\ The Commission notes that, under Section 4a(e) of the
Act, the Commission could pursue violations of exchange position
limit rules; however, the Commission, as a matter of policy, will
not pursue such violations so long as the conditions of Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(E) are met.
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Next, regarding various comments on the provision that allows
exchanges to impose the Five-Day Rule, or a similar requirement, in
proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D), for the avoidance of doubt, the
Commission reiterates that exchanges are not required to impose the
Five-Day Rule. Further, the Commission is adopting Appendix B and
Appendix G to provide guidance for exchanges to consider when
determining whether to impose the Five-Day Rule or similar requirements
in the spot period with respect to bona fide hedge exemptions or spread
exemptions, respectively.\1021\ The Final Rule permits exchanges to
determine whether any such restriction on trading in the spot period is
necessary given the facts and circumstances of a particular exemption
request. Further, when an exchange determines not to impose the Five-
Day Rule or similar requirement for an approved exemption, it is not
obligated to take any additional steps. The Commission has revised
Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H) to make these points clear.
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\1021\ See supra Sections II.A.1.viii. (discussing Appendix B)
and II.A.20 (discussing Appendix G). See also infra Appendices B and
G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission is making various non-substantive technical
and grammatical changes to Sec. 150.5(a)(2) to improve readability.
The Commission has also updated the outline numbering of Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii). These changes are not intended to change the substance
of this section.
iii. Section 150.5(a)(3)--Exchange-Set Limits on Pre-Existing Positions
for Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exchange-Set Limits on Pre-Existing
Positions for Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission recognized that the proposed
Federal position limits framework may result in certain ``pre-existing
positions'' being subject to speculative position limits, even though
the positions predated the adoption of such limits. So as not to
undermine the Federal position limits framework during the spot month,
and to minimize disruption outside the spot month, proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(3) would require that during the spot month, for contracts
subject to Federal position limits, exchanges impose limits no larger
than Federal levels on ``pre-existing positions,'' other than for pre-
enactment swaps and transition period swaps. However, outside the spot
month, an exchange would not be required to impose limits on any such
position, provided the position is acquired in good faith consistent
with the ``pre-existing position'' definition of proposed Sec. 150.1,
and provided further that if the person's position is increased after
the effective date of the limit, such pre-existing position (other than
pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps) along with the
position increased after the effective date, would be attributed to the
person. This provision is consistent with the proposed treatment of
pre-existing positions for purposes of Federal position limits set
forth in proposed Sec. 150.2(g), and was intended to prevent spot-
month limits from being rendered ineffective.
That is, not subjecting pre-existing positions to spot-month
position limits could result in a large, pre-existing position either
intentionally or unintentionally causing a disruption as it is rolled
into the spot month, and the Commission was particularly concerned
about protecting the spot month in physical-delivery futures from
corners and squeezes. Outside of the spot month, however, concerns over
corners and squeezes may be less acute.
b. Comments--Exchange-Set Limits on Pre-Existing Positions for
Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
The Commission addressed comments on pre-existing positions under
its discussion of Sec. 150.2(g)(2) above.\1022\
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\1022\ See supra Section II.B.7. (further discussing limits on
pre-existing positions).
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[[Page 3363]]
c. Discussion of Final Rule--Exchange-Set Limits on Pre-Existing
Positions for Contracts Subject to Federal Position Limits
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.5(a)(3) with two modifications
to conform to the changes made to Sec. 150.2(g)(2), described below.
First, the Commission is amending Sec. 150.5(a)(3)(ii) to clarify
that non-spot month limits shall apply to pre-existing positions, other
than pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps. As discussed
above in Section II.B.7., the Commission did not intend in the 2020
NPRM to exclude existing non-spot month positions in the nine legacy
agricultural contracts that would otherwise qualify as ``pre-existing
positions.'' As discussed, the other 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts that are subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under the Final Rule are not subject to Federal non-spot
month position limits and therefore proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(3)(ii)
would not have applied to these contracts in any event.\1023\
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\1023\ See supra Section II.B.7. (discussing Sec. 150.2 Federal
position limits on pre-existing positions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Commission is eliminating the language in proposed
Sec. 150.5(a)(3)(ii) that would attribute to a person any increase in
their position after the effective date of the non-spot month limit.
This language is no longer necessary since final Sec. 150.5(a)(3)(ii)
clarifies that pre-existing positions, other than pre-enactment swaps
and transition period swaps, are subject to non-spot month limits.
For further discussion on pre-existing positions in general and
comments thereto, please refer to Sec. Sec. 150.2(g).\1024\
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\1024\ Id.
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iv. Section 150.5(a)(4)--Monthly Report Detailing Exemption
Applications for Contracts Subject to Federal Limits
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Monthly Report Detailing Exemption
Applications for Contracts Subject to Federal Limits
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission explained that it seeks a balance
between having sufficient information to oversee the exchange-granted
exemptions, and not burdening exchanges with excessive periodic
reporting requirements. The Commission thus proposed under Sec.
150.5(a)(4) to require one monthly report by each exchange providing
certain information about exchange-granted exemptions for contracts
that are subject to Federal position limits. Certain exchanges already
voluntarily file these types of monthly reports with the Commission,
and proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(4) would standardize such reports for all
exchanges that process applications for bona fide hedges, spread
exemptions, and other exemptions from exchange-set limits for contracts
that are subject to Federal position limits. The proposed report would
provide information regarding the disposition of any application to
recognize a position as a bona fide hedge (both enumerated and non-
enumerated) or to grant a spread or other exemption, including any
renewal, revocation of, or modification to the terms and conditions of,
a prior recognition or exemption.\1025\
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\1025\ Under the 2020 NPRM, in the monthly report, exchanges may
elect to list new recognitions or exemptions, and modifications to
or revocations of prior recognitions and exemptions each month.
Alternatively, exchanges may submit cumulative monthly reports
listing all active recognitions and exemptions (i.e., including
exemptions that are not new or have not changed).
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As specified under proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(4), the report would
provide certain details regarding any application to recognize a bona
fide hedging position, or grant a spread exemption or other exemption,
including: The effective date and expiration date of any recognition or
exemption; any unique identifier assigned to track the application or
position; identifying information about the applicant; the derivative
contract or positions to which the application pertains; the maximum
size of the commodity derivative position that is recognized or
exempted by the exchange (including any ``walk-down'' requirements);
\1026\ any size limitations the exchange sets for the position; and a
brief narrative summarizing the applicant's relevant cash-market
activity.
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\1026\ An exchange could determine to recognize as a bona fide
hedge or spread exemption all, or a portion, of the commodity
derivative position for which an application has been submitted,
provided that such determination is made in accordance with the
requirements of proposed Sec. 150.5 and is consistent with the Act
and the Commission's regulations. In addition, an exchange could
require that a bona fide hedging position or spread position be
subject to ``walk-down'' provisions that require the trader to scale
down its positions in the spot month in order to reduce market
congestion as needed based on the facts and circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to any unique identifiers to be included in the
proposed monthly report, the exchange's assignment of a unique
identifier would assist the Commission's tracking process. Accordingly,
the Commission suggested that, as a ``best practice,'' the exchange's
procedures for processing bona fide hedging position and spread
exemption applications contemplate the assignment of such unique
identifiers.\1027\ The proposed report would also be required to
specify the maximum size and/or size limitations by contract month and/
or type of limit (e.g., spot month, single month, or all-months-
combined), as applicable. The proposed monthly report would be a
critical element of the Commission's surveillance program by
facilitating the Commission's ability to track bona fide hedging
positions and spread exemptions approved by exchanges. The proposed
monthly report would also keep the Commission informed as to the manner
in which an exchange is administering its application procedures, the
exchange's rationale for permitting large positions, and relevant cash-
market activity. The Commission expected that exchanges would be able
to leverage their current exemption processes and recordkeeping
procedures to generate such reports.
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\1027\ The unique identifier could apply to each of the bona
fide hedge or spread exemption applications that the exchange
receives, and, separately, each type of commodity derivative
position that the exchange wishes to recognize as a bona fide hedge
or spread exemption.
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In certain instances, information included in the proposed monthly
report may prompt the Commission to request records required to be
maintained by an exchange. For example, the Commission proposed that,
for each derivative position that an exchange wishes to recognize as a
bona fide hedge, or any revocation or modification of such recognition,
the report would include a concise summary of the applicant's activity
in the cash markets and swaps markets for the commodity underlying the
position. The Commission explained that it expects that this summary
would focus on the facts and circumstances upon which an exchange based
its determination to recognize a bona fide hedge, to grant a spread
exemption, or to revoke or modify such recognition or exemption. In
light of the information provided in the summary, or any other
information included in the proposed monthly report regarding the
position, the Commission may request the exchange's complete record of
the application. The Commission also explained that it expects that it
would only need to request such complete records in the event that it
noticed an issue that could cause market disruptions.
Proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(4) would require an exchange, unless
instructed otherwise by the Commission, to submit such monthly reports
according to the form and manner requirements the Commission specifies.
In order to facilitate the processing of such reports,
[[Page 3364]]
and the analysis of the information contained therein, the Commission
would establish reporting and transmission standards. The 2020 NPRM
would also require that such reports be submitted to the Commission
using an electronic data format, coding structure, and electronic data
transmission procedures specified on the Commission's Forms and
Submissions page of its website.
b. Comments--Monthly Report Detailing Exemption Applications for
Contracts Subject to Federal Limits
With respect to the monthly reporting requirement in proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(4), ICE requested that the Commission clarify that the monthly
report is only required to capture positions that are subject to
Federal position limits and does not apply to other exchange-set non-
enumerated exemptions.\1028\ ICE also requested that the Commission
codify when the monthly reports are required to be submitted, and that
any regular reports can be made at the discretion of the
exchange.\1029\ Other commenters expressed that they prefer that the
Commission not specify a particular day each month as a deadline for
exchanges to submit their monthly reports pursuant to Sec.
150.5(a)(4).\1030\ Finally, ICE requested that the Commission clarify
how factual and legal justifications for exemptions should be provided
in the monthly report, and the level of granularity required.\1031\
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\1028\ ICE at 14.
\1029\ Id.
\1030\ CME Group at 14; IFUS at 13.
\1031\ ICE at 14.
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Monthly Report Detailing Exemption
Applications for Contracts Subject to Federal Limits
The Commission is finalizing Sec. 150.5(a)(4) as proposed, with
minor technical revisions. The Commission clarifies, as stated in the
proposed and final regulation text, that the monthly reporting
requirement only applies to exemptions an exchange grants for contracts
that are subject to Federal position limits. Further, in consideration
of comments and the Commission's past with collecting voluntary monthly
reports from exchanges, the Commission has determined not to prescribe
a particular day of the month or monthly deadline for exchanges to
submit the monthly reports. Rather, the Commission defers to exchanges
on the best timing for submitting their reports so long as the reports
are submitted on a monthly basis in accordance with Sec. 150.5(a)(4).
Finally, the Commission clarifies that Sec. 150.5(a)(4) does not
require exchanges to provide factual and legal analysis in the monthly
report. The monthly report is intended to give the Commission a
snapshot of all exemptions the exchange has granted from exchange-set
limits for contracts that are subject to Federal position limits. The
Commission's expectation is that in circumstances when it needs
additional information on the exchange's analysis for a particular
exemption application, it will work with the exchange to obtain such
additional information.
4. Section 150.5(b)--Requirements and Acceptable Practices for
Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity Derivative Contracts in a Physical
Commodity That Are Not Subject to the Limits Set Forth in Sec. 150.2
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity
Derivative Contracts in a Physical Commodity Not Subject to the Limits
Set Forth in Sec. 150.2
Under proposed Sec. 150.5(b), for physical commodity derivative
contracts that are not subject to Federal position limits, whether
cash-settled or physically-settled, exchanges would be subject to
flexible standards for setting exchange limits during the contract's
spot month and non-spot month.
During the spot month, under proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(1)(i),
exchanges would be required to establish position limits, and such
limits would have to be set at a level that is no greater than 25
percent of deliverable supply. As described in detail in connection
with the proposed Federal spot-month limits described above, it would
be difficult, in the absence of other factors, for a participant to
corner or squeeze a market if the participant holds less than or equal
to 25 percent of deliverable supply, and the Commission has long used
deliverable supply as the basis for spot month position limits due to
concerns regarding corners, squeezes, and other settlement-period
manipulative activity.\1032\
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\1032\ See supra Section II.B. (discussing proposed Sec.
150.2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission recognized, however, that there
may be circumstances where an exchange may not wish to use the 25%
formula, including, for example, if the contract is cash-settled, does
not have a measurable deliverable supply, or if the exchange can
demonstrate that a different parameter is better suited for a
particular contract or market.\1033\ Accordingly, proposed Sec.
150.5(b)(1) would afford exchanges the ability to submit to the
Commission alternative potential methodologies for calculating spot
month limit levels, provided that the limits are set at a level that is
``necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the underlying
commodity's price or index.'' This standard has appeared in existing
Sec. 150.5 since its adoption in connection with spot-month limits on
cash-settled contracts.
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\1033\ Guidance for calculating deliverable supply can be found
in Appendix C to part 38. 17 CFR part 38, Appendix C.
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As noted above, existing Sec. 150.5 includes separate parameters
for spot-month limits in physical-delivery contracts and for cash-
settled contracts, but does not include flexibility for exchanges to
consider alternative parameters. In an effort to both simplify the
regulation and provide the ability for exchanges to consider multiple
parameters that may be better suited for certain products, the
Commission proposed the above standard as a principles-based
requirement for both cash-settled and physically-settled contracts
subject to proposed Sec. 150.5(b).
Outside of the spot month, where, historically, attempts at certain
types of market manipulation is generally less of a concern, proposed
Sec. 150.5(b)(2)(i) would allow exchanges to choose between position
limits or position accountability for physical commodity contracts that
are not subject to Federal position limits. While exchanges would be
permitted to decide whether to use limit levels or accountability
levels for any such contract, under either approach, the exchange would
have to set a level that is ``necessary and appropriate to reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation or price distortion of the
contract's or the underlying commodity's price or index.''
To help exchanges efficiently demonstrate compliance with this
standard for physical commodity contracts outside of the spot month,
the Commission proposed separate acceptable practices for exchanges
that wish to adopt non-spot month position limits and exchanges that
wish to adopt non-spot month accountability.\1034\ For
[[Page 3365]]
exchanges that choose to adopt non-spot month position limits, rather
than position accountability, proposed paragraph (a)(1) to Appendix F
of part 150 would set forth non-exclusive acceptable practices. Under
that provision, an exchange would be deemed in compliance with proposed
Sec. 150.5(b)(2)(i) if the exchange sets non-spot limit levels for
each contract subject to Sec. 150.5(b) at a level no greater than: (1)
The average of historical position sizes held by speculative traders in
the contract as a percentage of the contract's open interest; \1035\
(2) the spot month limit level for the contract; (3) 5,000 contracts
(scaled up proportionally to the ratio of the notional quantity per
contract to the typical cash-market transaction if the notional
quantity per contract is smaller than the typical cash-market
transaction, or scaled down proportionally if the notional quantity per
contract is larger than the typical cash-market transaction); \1036\ or
(4) 10% of open interest in that contract for the most recent calendar
year up to 50,000 contracts, with a marginal increase of 2.5% of open
interest thereafter.\1037\ When evaluating average position sizes held
by speculative traders, the Commission expected exchanges: (i) To be
cognizant of speculative positions that are extraordinarily large
relative to other speculative positions, and (ii) to not consider any
such outliers in their calculations.
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\1034\ The acceptable practices in Appendix F to part 150 of the
2020 NPRM reflected non-exclusive methods of compliance.
Accordingly, the language of these proposed acceptable practices,
used the word ``shall'' not to indicate that the acceptable practice
is a required method of compliance, but rather to indicate that in
order to satisfy the acceptable practice, a market participant must
(i.e., shall) establish compliance with that particular acceptable
practice.
\1035\ For example, if speculative traders in a particular
contract typically make up 12 percent of open interest in that
contract, the exchange could set limit levels no greater than 12
percent of open interest.
\1036\ Under the 2020 NPRM, for exchanges that choose to adopt a
non-spot month limit level of 5,000 contracts, this level assumes
that the notional quantity per contract is set at a level that
reflects the size of a typical cash-market transaction in the
underlying commodity. However, if the notional quantity of the
contract is larger/smaller than the typical cash-market transaction
in the underlying commodity, then the DCM must reduce/increase the
5,000 contract non-spot month limit until it is proportional to the
notional quantity of the contract relative to the typical cash-
market transaction. These required adjustments to the 5,000-contract
metric are intended to avoid a circumstance where an exchange could
allow excessive speculation by setting excessively large notional
quantities relative to typical cash-market transaction sizes. For
example, if the notional quantity per contract is set at 30,000
units, and the typical observed cash-market transaction is 2,500
units, the notional quantity per contract would be 12 times larger
than the typical cash-market transaction. In that case, the non-spot
month limit would need to be 12 times smaller than 5,000 (i.e., at
417 contracts.). Similarly, if the notional quantity per contract is
1,000 contracts, and the typical observed cash-market transaction is
2,500 units, the notional quantity per contract would be 2.5 times
smaller than the typical cash-market transaction. In that case, the
non-spot month limit would need to be 2.5 times larger than 5,000,
and would need to be set at 12,500 contracts.
\1037\ In connection with the proposed Appendix F to part 150
acceptable practices, open interest should be calculated by
averaging the month-end open positions in a futures contract and its
related option contract, on a delta-adjusted basis, for all months
listed during the most recent calendar year.
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These proposed parameters have largely appeared in existing Sec.
150.5 for many years in connection with either initial or subsequent
levels.\1038\ The Commission was of the view that these parameters
would be useful, flexible standards to carry forward as acceptable
practices. For example, the Commission expected that the 5,000-contract
acceptable practice would be a useful benchmark for exchanges because
it would allow them to establish limits and demonstrate compliance with
Commission regulations in a relatively efficient manner, particularly
for new contracts that have yet to establish open interest. Similarly,
for purposes of exchange-set limits on physical commodity contracts
that are not subject to Federal position limits, the Commission
proposed to maintain the baseline 10/2.5 percent formula as an
acceptable practice. Because these parameters are simply acceptable
practices, exchanges may, after evaluation, propose higher limits or
accountability levels.
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\1038\ 17 CFR 150.5(b) and (c). Proposed Sec. 150.5(b) would
address physical commodity contracts that are not subject to Federal
position limits.
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Along those lines, the Commission recognized that other parameters
may be preferable and/or just as effective, and was open to considering
alternative parameters submitted pursuant to part 40 of the
Commission's regulations, provided, at a minimum, that the parameter
complies with Sec. 150.5(b)(2)(i). The Commission encouraged exchanges
to submit potential new parameters to Commission staff in draft form
prior to submitting them under part 40.
For exchanges that choose to adopt position accountability, rather
than limits, outside of the spot month, proposed paragraph (a)(2) of
Appendix F to part 150 would set forth a non-exclusive acceptable
practice that would permit such exchanges to comply with proposed Sec.
150.5(b)(2)(i) by adopting rules establishing ``position
accountability'' as defined in proposed Sec. 150.1. ``Position
accountability'' would mean rules that the exchange submits to the
Commission pursuant to part 40 that require a trader, upon request by
the exchange, to consent to: (i) Provide information to the exchange
about their position, including, but not limited to, information about
the nature of the positions, trading strategies, and hedging
information; and (ii) halt further increases to their position or to
reduce their position in an orderly manner.\1039\
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\1039\ While existing Sec. 150.5(e) includes open-interest and
volume-based limitations on the use of position accountability, the
Commission opted not to include such limitations in the 2020 NPRM.
Under the 2020 NPRM, if an exchange submitted a part 40 filing
seeking to adopt position accountability, the Commission would
determine on a case-by-case basis whether such rules are consistent
with the Act and the Commission's regulations. The Commission did
not want to use one-size-fits-all volume-based limitations for
making such determinations.
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Proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(3) addressed a circumstance where multiple
exchanges list contracts that are substantially the same, including
physically-settled contracts that have the same underlying physical
commodity and delivery location, or cash-settled contracts that are
directly or indirectly linked to a physically-settled contract. Under
proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(3), exchanges listing contracts that are
substantially the same in this manner must either adopt ``comparable''
limits for such contracts, or demonstrate to the Commission how the
non-comparable levels comply with the standards set forth in proposed
Sec. 150.5(b)(1) and (2). Such a determination also must address how
the levels are necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat
of market manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the
underlying commodity's price or index. Proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(3) would
apply equally to cash-settled and physically-settled contracts, and to
limits during and outside of the spot month, as applicable.\1040\
Proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(3) was intended to help ensure that position
limits established on one exchange would not jeopardize market
integrity or otherwise harm other markets. Further, proposed Sec.
150.5(b)(3) would be consistent with the Commission's proposed approach
to generally apply equivalent Federal position limits to linked
contracts, including linked contracts listed on multiple
exchanges.\1041\
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\1040\ For reasons discussed elsewhere in the 2020 NPRM, this
provision would not apply to natural gas contracts. See supra
Section II.C.6. (discussion of proposed conditional spot month
exemption in natural gas).
\1041\ See supra Section II.A.16. (discussion of the proposed
referenced contract definition and linked contracts).
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Finally, under proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(4), exchanges would be
permitted to grant exemptions from any limits established under
proposed Sec. 150.5(b). As noted, proposed Sec. 150.5(b) would apply
to physical commodity contracts not subject to Federal position limits;
thus, exchanges would be given flexibility to
[[Page 3366]]
grant exemptions in such contracts, including exemptions for both
intra-market and inter-market spread positions,\1042\ as well as other
exemption types (including risk management exemptions) not explicitly
listed in proposed Sec. 150.3.\1043\ However, such exchanges must
require that traders apply for the exemption. In considering any such
application, the exchanges would be required to consider whether the
exemption would result in a position that would not be in accord with
``sound commercial practices'' in the market for which the exchange is
considering the application, and/or would ``exceed an amount that may
be established and liquidated in an orderly fashion in that market.''
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\1042\ See Appendix G (providing additional guidance on spread
exemptions).
\1043\ As noted above, proposed Sec. 150.3 would allow for
several exemption types, including: Bona fide hedging positions;
certain spreads; financial distress positions; and conditional spot
month limit exemption positions in natural gas.
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While exchanges would be subject to the requirements of Sec.
150.5(a) and (b) described above, such proposed requirements are not
intended to limit the discretion of exchanges to utilize other tools to
protect their markets. Among other things, an exchange would have the
discretion to: Impose additional restrictions on a person with a long
position in the spot month of a physical-delivery contract who stands
for delivery, takes that delivery, and then re-establishes a long
position; establish limits on the amount of delivery instruments that a
person may hold in a physical-delivery contract; and impose such other
restrictions as it deems necessary to reduce the potential threat of
market manipulation or congestion, to maintain orderly execution of
transactions, or for such other purposes consistent with its
responsibilities.
ii. Comments--Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity Derivative Contracts in
a Physical Commodity Not Subject to the Limits Set Forth in Sec. 150.2
Better Markets recommended revisions for proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(2)
if the Commission decides to finalize the proposed approach to only
implement spot month limits on contracts that are not subject to
Federal position limits.\1044\ Proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(2) requires
exchanges to have either non-spot month position limits or
accountability levels, as necessary and appropriate, to reduce
manipulation and price distortions for contracts that are not subject
to limits in Sec. 150.2. Better Markets' recommendation goes a step
further and would require exchanges to set position limits and position
accountability levels outside of the spot month to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price distortion and the potential for
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes.\1045\
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\1044\ Better Markets at 47-48.
\1045\ Id.
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Exchange-Set Limits on Commodity
Derivative Contracts in a Physical Commodity Not Subject to the Limits
Set Forth in Sec. 150.2
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.5(b), as proposed, with a few
technical or grammatical revisions to improve readability and the
following explanation. Of note, the Commission is revising the
beginning of Sec. 150.5(b)(1) to clarify that this section applies to
exchange-set limits on cash-settled and physically-settled commodity
derivative contracts in a physical commodity that are not subject to
the Federal position limits set forth in Sec. 150.2. Although this
point is made clear in the preamble and the introductory title of Sec.
150.5(b), the Commission has added the additional clarification for the
avoidance of any confusion.
In response to comments from Better Markets, and as explained in
detail earlier in this release, the Commission believes that outside
the spot month, either exchange-set position limits or exchange-set
accountability levels will be sufficient for exchanges to reduce the
potential threat of market manipulation and price distortions and
manage fluctuations and changes in their markets.\1046\ Accordingly,
the Commission has determined to finalize the position limits and
accountability requirements as proposed.
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\1046\ See supra Section II.B.2.iv. (providing a detailed
discussion of the Commission's extensive experience monitoring
position accountability levels, which have been effective at
exchanges).
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5. Section 150.5(c)--Requirements for Security Futures Products
i. Background and Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Requirements for Security
Futures Products
As the Commission has previously noted, security futures products
and security options may serve economically equivalent or similar
functions to one another.\1047\ Therefore, when the Commission
originally adopted position limits regulations for security futures
products in part 41, it set levels that were generally comparable to,
although not identical with, the limits that applied to options on
individual securities.\1048\ The Commission has pointed out that
security futures products may be at a competitive disadvantage if
position limits for security futures products vary too much from those
of security options.\1049\ As a result, the Commission in 2019 adopted
amendments to the position limitations and accountability requirements
for security futures products, noting that one goal was to provide a
level regulatory playing field with security options.\1050\ The
Commission proposed Sec. 150.5(c), therefore, to include a cross-
reference clarifying that for security futures products, position
limitations and accountability requirements for exchanges are specified
in Sec. 41.25.\1051\ This would allow the Commission to take into
account the position limits regime that applies to security options
when considering position limits regulations for security futures
products.
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\1047\ See Position Limits and Position Accountability for
Security Futures Products, 83 FR at 36799, 36802 (July 31, 2018).
\1048\ Id. See also Listing Standards and Conditions for Trading
Security Futures Products, 66 FR at 55078, 55082 (Nov. 1, 2001)
(explaining the Commission's adoption of position limits for
security futures products).
\1049\ See 83 FR at 36802.
\1050\ See Position Limits and Position Accountability for
Security Futures Products, 84 FR at 51005, 51009 (Sept. 27, 2019).
\1051\ See 17 CFR 41.25. Rule Sec. 41.25 establishes conditions
for the trading of security futures products.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Requirements
for Security Futures Products
The Commission did not receive comments on Sec. 150.5(c) and is
adopting this section as proposed.
6. Section 150.5(d)--Rules on Aggregation
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Rules on Aggregation
As noted earlier in this release, the Commission adopted in 2016
final aggregation rules under Sec. 150.4 that apply to all contracts
subject to Federal position limits. The Commission recognized that with
respect to contracts not subject to Federal position limits, market
participants may find it burdensome if different exchanges adopt
different aggregation standards. Accordingly, under proposed Sec.
150.5(d), all DCMs, and, ultimately, SEFs, that list any physical
commodity derivatives, regardless of whether the contract is subject to
Federal position limits, would be required to adopt position
aggregation rules for such contracts that
[[Page 3367]]
conform to Sec. 150.4.\1052\ Exchanges that list excluded commodities
would be encouraged to also adopt position aggregation rules that
conform to Sec. 150.4. Aggregation policies that otherwise vary from
exchange to exchange would increase the administrative burden on a
trader active on multiple exchanges, as well as increase the
administrative burden on the Commission in monitoring and enforcing
exchange-set position limits.
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\1052\ Under Sec. 150.4, unless an exemption applies, a
person's positions must be aggregated with positions for which the
person controls trading or for which the person holds a 10% or
greater ownership interest. Commission Regulation Sec. 150.4(b)
sets forth several exemptions from aggregation. See Final
Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91454. The Division of Market
Oversight has issued time-limited no-action relief from some of the
aggregation requirements contained in that rulemaking. See CFTC
Letter No. 19-19 (July 31, 2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/download.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Rules on
Aggregation
The Commission did not receive comments on Sec. 150.5(d) and is
adopting this section as proposed.
7. Section 150.5(e)--Requirements for Submissions to the Commission
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Requirements for Submissions to the
Commission
Proposed Sec. 150.5(e) reflects that, consistent with the
definition of ``rule'' in existing Sec. 40.1, any exchange action
establishing or modifying exchange-set position limits or exemptions
therefrom, or position accountability, in any case pursuant to proposed
Sec. 150.5(a), (b), (c), or Appendix F to part 150, would qualify as a
``rule'' and must be submitted to the Commission as such pursuant to
part 40 of the Commission's regulations. Such rules would also include,
among other things, parameters used for determining position limit
levels, and policies and related processes setting forth parameters
addressing, among other things, which types of exemptions are
permitted, the parameters for the granting of such exemptions, and any
exemption application requirements.
Proposed Sec. 150.5(e) further provides that exchanges would be
required to review regularly\1053\ any position limit levels
established under proposed Sec. 150.5 to ensure the level continues to
comply with the requirements of those sections. For example, in the
case of Sec. 150.5(b), exchanges would be expected to ensure the
limits comply with the requirement that limits be set ``at a level that
is necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the underlying
commodity's price or index.'' Exchanges would also be required to
update such levels as needed, including if the levels no longer comply
with the proposed rules.
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\1053\ Under the 2020 NPRM, an acceptable, regular review regime
would consist of both a periodic review and an event-specific review
(e.g., in the event of supply and demand shocks such as
unanticipated shocks to supply and demand of the underlying
commodity, geo-political shocks, and other events that may result in
congestion and/or other disruptions).
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ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Requirements
for Submissions to the Commission
The Commission did not receive comments on Sec. 150.5(e) and is
adopting this section with a few non-substantive revisions to address
grammatical issues and improve the readability and organization of the
section. These revisions are not intended to change the substance of
this section.
8. Section 150.5(f)--Delegation of Authority to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Delegation of Authority to the Director of
the Division of Market Oversight
The Commission proposed to delegate its authority, pursuant to
proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(4)(ii), to the Director of the Commission's
Division of Market Oversight, or such other employee(s) that the
Director may designate from time to time, to provide instructions
regarding the submission of information required to be reported by
exchanges to the Commission on a monthly basis, and to determine the
manner, format, coding structure, and electronic data transmission
procedures for submitting such information.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Delegation of
Authority to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight
The Commission did not receive comments on Sec. 150.5(f) and is
adopting this section as proposed.
9. Commission Enforcement of Exchange-Set Limits
As discussed throughout this Final Rule, the framework for
exchange-set limits operates in conjunction with the Federal position
limits framework. The Futures Trading Act of 1982 gave the Commission,
under CEA section 4a(5) (since re-designated as section 4a(e)), the
authority to directly enforce violations of exchange-set, Commission-
approved speculative position limits in addition to position limits
established directly by the Commission.\1054\ Since 2008, it has also
been a violation of the Act for any person to violate an exchange
position limit rule certified to the Commission by such exchange
pursuant to CEA section 5c(c)(1).\1055\ Thus, under CEA section 4a(e),
it is a violation of the Act for any person to violate an exchange
position limit rule certified to or approved by the Commission,
including to violate any subsequent amendments thereto, and the
Commission has the authority to enforce those violations.
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\1054\ See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Public Law 97-444, 96
Stat. 2299-30 (1983).
\1055\ See CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, Food, Conservation
and Energy Act of 2008, Public Law 110-246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18,
2008) (also known as the ``Farm Bill'') (amending CEA section 4a(e),
among other things, to assure that a violation of exchange-set
position limits, regardless of whether such position limits have
been approved by or certified to the Commission, would constitute a
violation of the Act that the Commission could independently
enforce). See also Federal Speculative Position Limits for
Referenced Energy Contracts and Associated Regulations, 75 FR at
4144, 4145 (Jan. 26, 2010) (summarizing the history of the
Commission's authority to directly enforce violations of exchange-
set speculative position limits).
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The Commission did not receive comments on its authority to enforce
exchange-set position limits.
E. Sec. 150.6--Scope
Existing Sec. 150.6 provides that nothing in this part shall be
construed to affect any provisions of the CEA relating to manipulation
or corners nor to relieve any contract market or its governing board
from responsibility under the CEA to prevent manipulation and
corners.\1056\
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\1056\ 17 CFR 150.6. The Commission notes that while existing
Sec. 150.6 references ``section 5(4) of the [CEA]'' no such CEA
section currently exists. The Final Rule instead references section
5(d)(4) of the CEA.
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1. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Scope
Proposed Sec. 150.6 was intended to make clear that fulfillment of
specific part 150 requirements alone does not necessarily satisfy other
obligations of an exchange. Proposed Sec. 150.6 provided that part 150
of the Commission's regulations would only be construed as having an
effect on position limits set by the Commission or an exchange
including any associated recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
Proposed Sec. 150.6 provided further that nothing in part 150 would
affect any other provisions of the CEA or Commission regulations
including those relating to actual or attempted manipulation, corners,
squeezes, fraudulent or deceptive conduct, or to prohibited
[[Page 3368]]
transactions. For example, proposed Sec. 150.5 would require DCMs,
and, ultimately, SEFs, to impose and enforce exchange-set speculative
position limits. The fulfillment of the requirements of Sec. 150.5
alone would not satisfy any other legal obligations under the CEA or
Commission regulations applicable to exchanges to prevent manipulation
and corners. Likewise, a market participant's compliance with position
limits or an exemption thereto would not confer any type of safe harbor
or good faith defense to a claim that the participant had engaged in an
attempted or perfected manipulation.
Further, the proposed amendments were intended to help clarify that
Sec. 150.6 would apply to: Regulations related to position limits
found outside of part 150 of the Commission's regulations (e.g.,
relevant sections of part 1 and part 19); and recordkeeping and
reporting regulations associated with speculative position limits.
2. Comments and Discussion of Final Rule--Scope
The Commission received no comments on proposed Sec. 150.6 and is
adopting as proposed.
As the Commission explained in the 2020 NPRM, position limits are
meant to diminish, eliminate, and prevent excessive speculation and to
deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners. The
Commission stresses that nothing in the Final Rule's revisions to part
150 would impact the anti-disruptive, anti-cornering, and anti-
manipulation provisions of the CEA and Commission regulations,
including but not limited to CEA sections 6(c) or 9(a)(2) regarding
manipulation, CEA section 4c(a)(5) regarding disruptive practices
including spoofing, or sections 180.1 and 180.2 of the Commission's
regulations regarding manipulative and deceptive practices. It may be
possible for a trader to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the prices
of futures contracts or the underlying commodity with a position that
is within the Federal position limits. It may also be possible for a
trader holding a bona fide hedge, as recognized by the Commission or an
exchange, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the markets. The
Commission would not consider it a defense to a charge under the anti-
manipulation provisions of the CEA or the regulations that a trader's
position was within position limits.
F. Sec. 150.8--Severability
Final Sec. 150.8 provides that should any provision(s) of part 150
be declared invalid, including the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, all remaining provisions of part 150 shall not be
affected to the extent that such remaining provisions, or the
application thereof, can be given effect without the invalid
provisions.
The Commission did not receive comments on proposed Sec. 150.8,
and is adopting it as proposed.
G. Sec. 150.9--Process for Recognizing Non-Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedging Transactions or Positions With Respect to Federal Speculative
Position Limits
1. Background--Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or
Positions
The Commission's authority and existing processes for recognizing
bona fide hedges can be found in CEA section 4a(c), and Sec. Sec. 1.3,
1.47, and 1.48 of the Commission's regulations.\1057\ In particular,
CEA section 4a(c)(1) provides that no CFTC rule issued under CEA
section 4a(a) applies to ``transactions or positions which are shown to
be bona fide hedging transactions or positions.'' \1058\ Under the
existing definition of ``bona fide hedging transactions and positions''
in Sec. 1.3,\1059\ paragraph (1) provides the Commission's general
definition of bona fide hedging transactions or positions; paragraph
(2) provides a list of enumerated bona fide hedging positions that,
generally, are self-effectuating, and must be reported (along with
supporting cash-market information) to the Commission monthly on Form
204 after the positions are taken; \1060\ and paragraph (3) provides a
procedure for market participants to seek recognition from the
Commission for non-enumerated bona fide hedging positions. Under
paragraph (3), any person that seeks a Commission recognition of a
position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedge must apply to the
Commission in advance of taking on the position, and pursuant to the
processes outlined in Sec. 1.47 (30 days in advance for non-enumerated
bona fide hedges) or Sec. 1.48 (10 days in advance for enumerated
anticipatory hedges), as applicable.
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\1057\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c); 17 CFR 1.3, 1.47, and 1.48.
\1058\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1).
\1059\ As described above, the Commission is moving an amended
version of the bona fide hedging definition from Sec. 1.3 to Sec.
150.1. See supra Section II.A.1. (discussion of Sec. 150.1).
\1060\ As described below, the Commission is eliminating Form
204 and relying instead on the cash-market information submitted to
exchanges pursuant to Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9. See infra Section
II.H. (discussion of amendments to part 19).
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For the nine legacy agricultural contracts currently subject to
Federal position limits, the Commission's current process for
recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedge positions exists in parallel
with exchange processes for granting exemptions from exchange-set
limits, as described below. The exchange processes for granting
exemptions vary by exchange, and generally do not mirror the
Commission's processes.\1061\ Thus, when requesting a non-enumerated
bona fide hedging position recognition, currently market participants
must submit two applications--one application submitted to the
Commission in accordance with Sec. 1.47 for purposes of compliance
with Federal position limits, and another application submitted to the
relevant exchange in accordance with the exchange's rules for purposes
of exchange-set position limits.
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\1061\ As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, exchanges typically use
one application process to grant all exemption types, whereas the
Commission has different processes for different bona fide hedge
exemption types. That is, the Commission currently has different
processes for permitting enumerated bona fide hedges and for
recognizing positions as non-enumerated bona fide hedges or
anticipatory bona fide hedges. Generally, for bona fide hedges
enumerated in paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedge definition in
Sec. 1.3, no formal process is required by the Commission. Instead,
such enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions are self-effectuating
and Commission staff reviews monthly reporting of cash-market
positions on existing Form 204 and part 17 position data to monitor
such positions. Requests for recognitions of non-enumerated bona
fide hedging positions and for certain enumerated anticipatory bona
fide hedge positions, as explained above, must be submitted to the
Commission pursuant to the processes in existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and
1.48 of the regulations, as applicable. Further, exchanges generally
do not require the submission of monthly cash-market information;
instead, they generally require exemption applications to include
cash-market information supporting positions that exceed the limits,
to be filed prior to exceeding a position limit, and to be updated
on an annual basis. On the other hand, the Commission has various
monthly reporting requirements under Form 204 and part 17 of the
Commission's regulations as described above.
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2. Overview of the 2020 NPRM, Comments, and the Commission's
Determination
Generally, the Commission is adopting Sec. 150.9 largely as
proposed, but with certain clarifications and modifications to address
commenters' views and other considerations. This section provides an
overview of, and addresses general comments regarding, proposed Sec.
150.9. Further below, the Commission summarizes each sub-section of
Sec. 150.9 and comments relevant to that sub-section, and provides a
more detailed discussion of the Commission's determination and any
changes to each sub-section of Sec. 150.9.
i. General Overview of the 2020 NPRM
The Commission proposed Sec. 150.9 to establish a new framework
whereby a
[[Page 3369]]
market participant seeking a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition
could file one application with an exchange to receive a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognition for purposes of both exchange-set limits
and Federal position limits.\1062\ The proposed framework was intended
to be independent of, and serve as an alternative to, the Commission's
process for reviewing exemption requests under proposed Sec. 150.3.
The proposed framework was also intended to help: (1) Streamline the
process by which non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications are
addressed; (2) minimize disruptions by leveraging existing exchange-
level processes with which many market participants are already
familiar; \1063\ and (3) reduce inefficiencies created when market
participants are required to comply with different Federal and
exchange-level processes.
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\1062\ Alternatively, under the proposed framework, a trader
could submit a request directly to the Commission pursuant to
proposed Sec. 150.3(b). A trader that submitted such a request
directly to the Commission for purposes of Federal position limits
would have to separately request an exemption from the applicable
exchange for purposes of exchange-set limits. As discussed earlier
in this release, the Commission proposed to separately allow for
enumerated hedges and spreads that meet the ``spread transaction''
definition to be self-effectuating. See supra Section II.C.
(discussing proposed Sec. 150.3).
\1063\ In particular, the Commission recognizes that, in the
energy and metals spaces, market participants are familiar with
exchange application processes and are not familiar with the
Commission's processes since, currently, there are no Federal
position limits for those commodities.
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In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission emphasized that proposed Sec.
150.9 would serve as a separate, self-contained process that is related
to, but independent of, the proposed regulations governing: (1) The
process in proposed Sec. 150.3 for traders to apply directly to the
Commission for a bona fide hedge recognition; and (2) exchange
processes for establishing exchange-set limits and granting exemptions
therefrom in proposed Sec. 150.5. The Commission also emphasized that
proposed Sec. 150.9 would serve as a voluntary process that exchanges
could implement to provide additional flexibility for their market
participants to file one non-enumerated bona fide hedge application
with an exchange to receive a recognition for purposes of both
exchange-set limits and Federal speculative position limits. Finally,
the 2020 NPRM made clear that an exchange's determination to recognize
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge in accordance with proposed Sec.
150.9 with respect to exchange-set limits would serve to inform the
Commission's own decision as to whether to recognize the exchange's
determination for purposes of Federal speculative position limits set
forth in proposed Sec. 150.2, and would not be a substitute for the
Commission's determination.
Under the proposed procedural framework, an exchange's
determination to recognize a non-enumerated bona fide hedge in
accordance with proposed Sec. 150.9 with respect to exchange-set
limits would serve to inform the Commission's own decision as to
whether to recognize the exchange's determination for purposes of
Federal position limits set forth in proposed Sec. 150.2. Among other
conditions, the exchange would be required to base its determination on
standards that conform to the Commission's own standards for
recognizing bona fide hedges for purposes of Federal position limits.
Further, the exchange's determination with respect to its own
position limits and application process would be subject to Commission
review and oversight. These requirements were proposed to facilitate
the Commission's independent review and determination by ensuring that
any bona fide hedge recognized by an exchange for purposes of exchange-
set limits in accordance with proposed Sec. 150.9 conforms to the
Commission's standards. For a given referenced contract, proposed Sec.
150.9 would allow a person to exceed Federal position limits if the
exchange listing the contract recognized the position as a bona fide
hedge with respect to exchange-set limits, unless the Commission denies
or stays the application within ten business days (or two business days
for applications, including retroactive applications, filed due to
sudden or unforeseen circumstances) (the ``10/2-day review''). Under
the 2020 NPRM, if the Commission does not intervene during that 10/2-
day review period, then the exemption would be deemed approved for
purposes of Federal position limits. The Commission provides a more
detailed discussion of each sub-section of proposed Sec. 150.9 further
below.
ii. General Comments--Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or
Positions, Generally
Generally, the majority of commenters supported the Commission's
proposed approach in Sec. 150.9.\1064\ In particular, one commenter
expressed that Sec. 150.9 represents a ``fair and balanced''
approach,\1065\ and another commenter expressed that Sec. 150.9 offers
an ``efficient and timely process for hedgers to obtain permission to
mitigate their risk.'' \1066\ On the other hand, certain commenters
opposed the streamlined process in Sec. 150.9 and requested that the
Commission reduce or eliminate the role of exchanges in processing non-
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions.\1067\
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\1064\ ICE at 8; CCI at 2; IECA at 1-2; NGFA at 9; MGEX at 4;
AGA at 11; CME Group at 7; FIA at 2; CMC at 10-11; EPSA at 6-7;
Suncor at 2; COPE at 4; Shell at 3-4; and CEWG at 3; See also ASR at
3 (noting that proposed Sec. 150.9 effectively leverages existing
exchange frameworks).
\1065\ Suncor at 2.
\1066\ COPE at 4.
\1067\ Rutkowski at 1; AFR at 2; IECA at 2-3; Public Citizen at
2-3; NEFI at 4; Better Markets at 3, 62; IATP at 13-14; NEFI at 4;
and PMAA at 4 (noting a concern that non-enumerated bona fide hedges
would be granted outside of the notice and comment rulemaking
process).
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In particular, certain commenters expressed concerns regarding the
proposed role of exchanges in Sec. 150.9. That is, certain commenters
were concerned that the streamlined approach in proposed Sec. 150.9
would create conflicts of interest for exchanges (which commenters note
are for-profit entities) where exchanges could benefit from granting
non-compliant non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions to boost
trading volume and profits.\1068\ Other commenters expressed concern
that Sec. 150.9 delegates too much discretion to exchanges to
determine what qualifies as a non-enumerated bona fide hedge without
well-defined criteria, and that such discretion could lead to an
unlimited universe of new non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions
that could adversely impact
[[Page 3370]]
markets.\1069\ Finally, several commenters shared the view that Sec.
150.9 would erode the Commission's authority over exchange-granted
exemptions, and that the Commission should retain all authority to
grant non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions.\1070\
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\1068\ Rutkowski at 1; see also AFR at 2 (stating concerns that
proposed Sec. 150.9 would be ineffective at controlling speculation
due, in part, to the substantially increased flexibility of
exchanges and market participants to determine whether positions
qualify for bona fide hedge exemptions or to propose and institute
new non-enumerated hedge exemptions, despite clear conflicts posed
by exchanges' incentive to directly profit from trading volume);
IECA at 2-3 and NEFI at 4 (stating that proposed Sec. 150.9 would
perpetuate a concern, raised by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act, that
exchanges may be motivated by profit to allow broad hedge exemptions
that may include non-commercial market participants); Public Citizen
at 2-3 (stating that proposed Sec. 150.9 puts for-profit exchanges
in the driver's seat of making decisions on granting exemptions, and
that customer incentive programs offered by exchanges to increase
trading volumes would undermine the exchanges' efforts to determine
hedge exemptions; arguing that certain exchanges have experienced
difficulty in ``cooperating'' with current laws and regulations,
thus casting doubt on their ability to enforce the proposed rule;
and arguing that no additional authority should be granted to CME
pending resolution of CFTC v. Byrnes, Case. No. 13-cv-01174 (SDNY)
(alleging a violation of internal firewalls and sales of
confidential trading information to an outside broker). Regarding
Public Citizen's comment on CFTC v. Byrnes, the Commission notes
that this case has been resolved and is not a condition precedent to
this Final Rule.
\1069\ PMAA at 4; see also Better Markets at 63 (arguing that
the standards for exchanges to grant non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions are too flexible and lack meaningful constraints).
\1070\ PMAA at 4 (noting a concern that non-enumerated bona fide
hedges would be granted outside of the notice and comment rulemaking
process); IATP at 13-14; NEFI at 4.
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions, Generally--General Concerns and Comments on
Sec. 150.9
First, the Commission reiterates, as stated in the 2020 NPRM, that
an exchange's determination to recognize a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge in accordance with proposed Sec. 150.9 with respect to exchange-
set limits would serve to inform the Commission's decision whether to
recognize such position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedge for
purposes of Federal position limits set forth in proposed Sec. 150.2.
The Commission is not delegating or ceding its authority to exchanges
to make the determination for purposes of Federal position limits to
recognize a position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedge for
applications submitted under Sec. 150.9. In that regard, the
exchange's determination to recognize a bona fide hedge with respect to
exchange-set limits established under Sec. 150.5 is not a substitute
for the Commission's independent review of, and determination with
respect to, non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications submitted
pursuant to Sec. 150.9.
As described in detail below, under Sec. 150.9 as adopted herein,
exchanges that elect to review non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications under Sec. 150.9 are required to establish and maintain
standards and processes for such review, approved by the Commission
pursuant to Sec. 40.5. Section 150.9 requires, among other things,
that the exchanges base their determinations on standards that conform
to the Commission's own standards for recognizing bona fide hedges for
purposes of Federal position limits. The Final Rule also requires an
exchange to directly notify the Commission of any determinations to
recognize a non-enumerated bona fide hedge for purposes of exchange-set
limits, and, upon such notification, the Commission will make its
determination as to such applications for purposes of Federal position
limits. The Commission also reserves authority to, at a later date and
after providing an opportunity to respond, revoke a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition that is approved through the Sec. 150.9 process
and require a participant to lower its position below the Federal
position limit level within a commercially reasonable time if the
Commission finds that the position no longer meets the bona fide hedge
definition in Sec. 150.1.
In response to general concerns that Sec. 150.9 would create
conflicts of interest for exchanges, the Commission does not believe
that Sec. 150.9 creates incentives for exchanges to grant non-
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions in order to boost trading volume
and profits.\1071\ On the contrary, the Commission believes there are
several requirements and obligations that incentivize and require
exchanges to implement Sec. 150.9 in a manner that protects their
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1071\ See generally supra Sections II.B.2.iv.b. and II.G.2.
(discussing studies that indicate that exchanges are incentivized to
maintain market integrity).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, under Sec. 150.9, exchanges may only grant non-enumerated
bona fide hedges that meet the Commission's bona fide hedging
definition, and each non-enumerated bona fide hedge approved by an
exchange for purposes of its own limits is separately and independently
reviewed by the Commission for purposes of Federal position limits.
Next, under Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G) finalized herein, exchanges
are required to consider whether approving a particular exemption
request would result in positions that would not be in accord with
sound commercial practices in the relevant commodity derivatives market
and/or whether the position resulting from an approved exemption would
exceed an amount that may be established and liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market.\1072\
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\1072\ See infra Final Rule Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G).
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Finally, under DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6,
exchanges are accountable for administering position limits in a manner
that reduces the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion.\1073\ The Commission believes that these requirements,
working in concert, provide sufficient guardrails to mitigate any
potential conflicts of interest for exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1073\ See 17 CFR 37.600 and 38.300.
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Further, the Commission does not agree that Sec. 150.9 improperly
delegates discretion to exchanges or erodes the Commission's authority
over exchanges and the non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition
process because, as discussed above, the Commission is not delegating
its decision-making authority with respect to the granting of bona fide
hedge recognitions for purposes of Federal position limits. Rather, the
Commission is allowing exchanges to offer traders the opportunity to
submit their applications for a bona fide hedge recognition pursuant to
a consolidated review process under which the Commission will conduct
its own review and make an independent determination for purposes of
Federal speculative position limits.
The Commission has thus determined to adopt Sec. 150.9 largely as
proposed, but with certain modifications and clarifications, as
described further below, to address commenters' views and other
considerations. The following discussions summarize each sub-section of
proposed Sec. 150.9, as well as comments received and the Commission's
final determination with respect to each sub-section of Sec. 150.9.
3. Section 150.9(a)--Approval of Exchange Rules Related to the
Application Submission Process for Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Approval of Rules
Proposed Sec. 150.9(a) would require an exchange to have rules,
adopted pursuant to the existing rule-approval process in Sec. 40.5 of
the Commission's regulations, that establish standards and processes in
accordance with proposed Sec. 150.9 as described below. The Commission
would review such rules to ensure that the exchange's standards and
processes for recognizing bona fide hedges for its own exchange-set
limits conform to the Commission's standards and processes for
recognizing bona fide hedges for Federal position limits.
ii. Comments--Approval of Exchange Rules Related to the Application
Submission Process for Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging Transactions or
Positions
Although the Commission did not receive comments directly about the
requirements under proposed Sec. 150.9(a), the Commission did receive
comments related to when an exchange could start implementing Sec.
150.9, which is contingent on the exchange having approved rules in
place. That is, several commenters recommended a phased implementation
for starting the Sec. 150.9 process to avoid a concentration of non-
enumerated bona fide hedge applications at one time.\1074\
[[Page 3371]]
Commenters suggested starting the process either six months prior to
the effective date or permitting phased compliance for six months after
the effective date of the Final Rule.
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\1074\ See ICE at 9; IFUS at 7; CMC at 12; Shell at 4; FIA at
18; Chevron at 16; and CEWG at 27. See also CME Group at 8
(supporting a 12-month compliance date, but suggesting that the
Commission work with exchanges to implement a rolling process where
market participants are ``grandfathered into current exchange
approved exemptions they hold today, permitting them to file for
those exemptions on the same annual schedule'').
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Approval of Exchange Rules Related to
the Application Submission Process for Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Transactions or Positions
The Commission is finalizing Sec. 150.9(a) with the clarifications
and rewording changes described below. As explained in the Proposal,
the Commission's pre-approval of an exchange's standards and process
for review of non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications ensures that
the exchange's determination is based on the Commission's applicable
standards and process, allowing the Commission to leverage off exchange
determinations in conducting the Commission's own, independent review.
While the Commission has determined, as described above, to extend
the compliance period with respect to certain obligations under this
Final Rule,\1075\ exchanges may start, but are not required, to
implement and begin processing non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications under Sec. 150.9 as early as the Effective Date of the
Final Rule.\1076\ The Commission reminds exchanges that, to implement
Sec. 150.9, they will first need to submit new or amended rules to the
Commission, pursuant to the existing rule-approval process in Sec.
40.5 (which could take up to 45-90 days or longer, as agreed to by the
exchange) before they exchanges can begin processing applications under
Sec. 150.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1075\ See supra Section I.D. (discussing the effective and
compliance dates for the Final Rule).
\1076\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission clarifies that market participants with
existing Commission-granted non-enumerated or anticipatory bona fide
hedge recognitions (other than risk management exemptions) are not
required to reapply to the Commission for a new recognition under the
Final Rule. That is, if the Commission previously issued a non-
enumerated or anticipatory bona fide hedge recognition for one of the
nine legacy agricultural contracts pursuant to existing Sec. 1.47 or
Sec. 1.48, as applicable, a market participant is not required, under
the Final Rule, to reapply to the Commission for such recognition
pursuant to final Sec. 150.3 or Sec. 150.9.
In addition, the Commission is making a technical change by
rewording Sec. 150.9(a) to clarify that exchanges must seek approval,
using the Commission's rule approval process in existing Sec. 40.5, to
implement their rules establishing application processes under Sec.
150.9.
4. Section 150.9(b)--Prerequisites for an Exchange To Recognize Non-
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges in Accordance With This Section
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Prerequisites for an Exchange To Recognize
Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Proposed Sec. 150.9(b) set forth conditions that would require an
exchange-recognized bona fide hedge to conform to the corresponding
definitions and standards the Commission uses in proposed Sec. Sec.
150.1 and 150.3 for purposes of the Federal position limits regime.
Proposed Sec. 150.9(b) would require the exchange to meet the
following conditions: (i) The exchange lists the applicable referenced
contract for trading; (ii) the position is consistent with both the
definition of bona fide hedging transaction or position in proposed
Sec. 150.1 and existing CEA section 4a(c)(2); and (iii) the exchange
does not recognize as bona fide hedges any positions that include
commodity index contracts and one or more referenced contracts,
including exemptions known as risk management exemptions.\1077\
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\1077\ The Commission finds that financial products are not
substitutes for positions taken or to be taken in a physical
marketing channel. Thus, the offset of financial risks arising from
financial products would be inconsistent with the definition of bona
fide hedging transactions or positions for physical commodities in
proposed Sec. 150.1. See supra Section II.A.1. (discussion of the
temporary substitute test and risk-management exemptions).
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ii. Comments and Summary of Commission Determination--Prerequisites for
an Exchange To Recognize Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed Sec.
150.9(b) and is finalizing this section as proposed, for reasons stated
above with respect to Sec. 150.9(b), and with only minor grammatical
edits to change certain words to a singular tense.
5. Section 150.9(c)--Application Process
Proposed Sec. 150.9(c) set forth the information and
representations that the exchange, at a minimum, would be required to
obtain from applicants as part of the Sec. 150.9 application process.
Proposed Sec. 150.9(c) would permit exchanges to rely upon their
existing application forms and processes in making such determinations,
provided that they collect the information outlined below. The
following sections summarize each sub-section of proposed Sec.
150.9(c) as well as comments received and the Commission's
determination on each sub-section.
i. Section 150.9(c)(1)--Required Information for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedging Positions
a. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Required Information for Non-Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedging Positions
With respect to bona fide hedging positions in referenced
contracts, proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(1) would require that any
application include: (i) A description of the position in the commodity
derivative contract for which the application is submitted (which would
include the name of the underlying commodity and the position size);
(ii) information to demonstrate why the position satisfies CEA section
4a(c)(2) and the definition of bona fide hedging transaction or
position in proposed Sec. 150.1, including ``factual and legal
analysis;'' (iii) a statement concerning the maximum size of all gross
positions in derivative contracts for which the application is
submitted (in order to provide a view of the true footprint of the
position in the market); (iv) information regarding the applicant's
activity in the cash markets for the commodity underlying the position
for which the application is submitted; \1078\ and (v) any other
information the exchange requires, in its discretion, to enable the
exchange and the Commission to determine whether such position should
be recognized as a bona fide hedge.\1079\
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\1078\ The Commission expects that exchanges would require
applicants to provide cash-market data for at least the prior year.
\1079\ Under proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(iv) and (v), exchanges,
in their discretion, could request additional information as
necessary, including information for cash-market data similar to
what is required in the Commission's existing Form 204. See infra
Section II.H.2. (discussion of Form 204 and amendments to part 19).
Exchanges could also request a description of any positions in other
commodity derivative contracts in the same commodity underlying the
commodity derivative contract for which the application is
submitted. Other commodity derivatives contracts could include other
futures contracts, option on futures contracts, and swaps (including
OTC swaps) positions held by the applicant.
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In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission noted that exchanges would not
need to require the identification of a hedging need against a
particular identified
[[Page 3372]]
category, but that the requesting party must satisfy all applicable
requirements in proposed Sec. 150.9, including demonstrating with a
factual and legal analysis that a position would fit within the bona
fide hedge definition. The 2020 NPRM was not intended to require the
hedging party's books and records to identify the particular type of
hedge being applied.
b. Comments--Required Information for Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedging
Positions
The Commission received few comments related to the application
requirements exchanges must implement under proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(1).
Some commenters requested that the Commission remove the requirement
that the exchange applications implemented under proposed Sec.
150.9(c)(1)(ii) require a ``factual and legal analysis'' from
applicants.\1080\ Another commenter requested that the Commission
clarify any additional factors exchanges should consider when granting
non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications pursuant to proposed Sec.
150.9.\1081\
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\1080\ CME Group at 10 (noting its concern that this requirement
could be interpreted as requiring applicants to engage legal counsel
to complete their applications. CME Group stated that by way of
background, CME Group exchanges have never required detailed legal
or economic analysis to demonstrate compliance with regulatory
requirements. Instead, CME Group requires the applicant to explain
its strategy, and CME Group considers and analyzes this explanation
using the exchange's expertise. CME Group recommends that the CFTC
instead require an applicant to ``explain its strategy and state
that it complies with the regulatory requirements for a bona fide
hedge exemption without having to provide a legal analysis.'' The
exchange can solicit additional information from the applicant as
needed.) and CMC at 11 (providing that, in the alternative, the
Commission could clarify that exchanges or the Commission might
request legal analyses at their discretion, which may be in the form
of analysis provided by in-house counsel).
\1081\ See ISDA at 9 (requesting that the final rule include
factors exchanges should consider, such as ``sound commercial
practices'' or ``necessary and appropriate to reduce potential
threat of market manipulation'').
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Required Information for Non-Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedging Positions
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.9(c)(1), with certain
revisions and clarifications, explained below. The information required
to be submitted as part of the application is necessary to allow the
exchange and the Commission to evaluate whether the applicant's hedging
position satisfies the bona fide hedge definition in proposed Sec.
150.1 and CEA section 4a(c)(2).
The Commission is making one modification to clarify the
Commission's posture when reviewing non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications under the Sec. 150.9 process. In proposed Sec.
150.9(c)(1) the Commission proposed to require exchanges to collect
sufficient information for the exchange to determine and the Commission
to ``verify'' that the facts and circumstances demonstrate that the
exchange may recognize a position as a bona fide hedge. In final Sec.
150.9(c)(1), the Commission is revising this provision to make clear
that the Commission will conduct an independent evaluation of any
application it reviews to ``determine'' (not verify) whether the facts
and circumstances demonstrate that the exchange may recognize the
position as a bona fide hedge. Likewise, the Commission is also
revising final Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(v), to require that exchanges collect
any other information they deem necessary to ``determine'' (not
``verify'' as proposed) whether a particular position meets the bona
fide hedge definition. The term ``determine'' more accurately describes
the exchange's responsibility to conduct an independent evaluation of
each application, as opposed to a verification, as proposed.
In final Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(ii), the Commission is modifying the
requirement from proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(ii) that exchanges request
a ``factual and legal'' analysis from applicants for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions. In proposing this requirement, the
Commission did not intend for exchanges to require that applicants
engage legal counsel to complete their applications for non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognitions. Rather, the purpose of this proposed
provision was to ensure that applicants provide an explanation and
information that sufficiently demonstrates why a particular position
qualifies as bona fide hedge, as defined in Sec. 150.1 and CEA section
4a(c)(2). Instead of requiring a ``factual and legal analysis,'' the
Commission has revised Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(ii) in the Final Rule
accordingly so that an applicant must provide an explanation of the
hedging strategy, including a statement that the applicant's position
complies with the applicable requirements of the bona fide hedge
definition, and information to demonstrate why the position satisfies
the applicable requirements. This revision is intended to clarify that
the applicant is not required to provide a detailed legal analysis or
engage legal counsel to complete their application. Rather, the
applicant must provide: (1) A simple explanation or description of the
hedging strategy (and include a statement that the strategy complies
with the bona fide hedge definition requirements); and (2) the relevant
information that shows why or how the strategy meets the bona fide
hedge definition requirements. The exchange can then consider this
explanation and information in light of its expertise with the relevant
market in performing its own analysis.
Also, under Sec. 150.9(c)(1), regarding the request that the
Commission provide additional factors that exchanges should consider
when granting non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions, the
Commission believes that the requirements under final Sec. 150.9(c)
provide sufficient criteria for exchanges to consider when evaluating
applications. As stated in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission believes the
information an exchange is required to collect under Sec. 150.9(c) is
sufficient for the exchange and the Commission to determine whether a
particular transaction or position satisfies the definition of bona
fide hedging transaction for purposes of Federal position limits. The
Commission further highlights that, under final Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(v),
an exchange has the authority to collect any additional information
that, in its discretion, would help it assess whether to approve a
request for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition. Further, in
response to ISDA's request, an exchange is required by Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G) to consider some of the factors ISDA recommended
when determining whether to grant an exemption, including whether the
approval of an exemption would result in positions that are in accord
with sound commercial practices, among other considerations.\1082\ In
summary, the Commission believes that the final regulations strike the
proper balance by providing sufficient guidance to the exchanges for
their review and determination in the context of exchange-set limits,
while preserving the exchanges' discretionary authority to determine
what types of additional information, if any, to collect.
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\1082\ See supra Section II.D.3. (addressing other factors
exchanges must consider, under Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G), when
granting exemptions for contracts that are subject to Federal
position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the revisions and explanations above, the Commission
is adding the word ``needed'' to Sec. 150.9(c)(1) to clarify that
exchanges may collect all information needed to conduct their analysis
of a particular application.
[[Page 3373]]
ii. Section 150.9(c)(2)--Timing of Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
a. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Timing of Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
The Commission did not propose to prescribe timelines (e.g., a
specified number of days) for exchanges to review applications because
the Commission believed that exchanges are in the best position to
determine how to best accommodate the needs of their market
participants. Rather, under proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(2), an applicant
must submit its application in advance of exceeding the applicable
Federal position limits for any given referenced contract.
However, the 2020 NPRM would permit a person to submit a bona fide
hedge application within five days after the person has exceeded
Federal speculative limits (commonly referred to as retroactive
applications) if such person exceeds the limits due to ``demonstrated
sudden or unforeseen increases in its bona fide hedging needs.'' Where
an applicant claims a sudden or unforeseen increase in its bona fide
hedging needs, the 2020 NPRM would require exchanges to require that
the person provide materials demonstrating that the person exceeded the
Federal speculative limit due to sudden or unforeseen circumstances.
Further, in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission cautioned exchanges that
applications submitted after a person has exceeded Federal position
limits should not be habitual and would be reviewed closely. Finally,
if the Commission found that the position did not qualify as a bona
fide hedge, then the applicant would be required to bring its position
into compliance, and could face a position limits violation if it did
not reduce the position within a commercially reasonable time.
b. Comments--Timing of Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge Application
The Commission received several comments regarding the retroactive
application provision in proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(ii). CME preferred
allowing retroactive application exemptions that are not limited to
circumstances involving sudden/unforeseen increases in bona fide
hedging needs.\1083\ Instead, CME Group recommended that the Commission
(i) allow retroactive applications regardless of the circumstances, and
(ii) impose a position limits violation upon an applicant if the
exchange denies the retroactive application.\1084\ ICE recommended that
the Commission permit retroactive exemptions for other types of
exemptions (including spread exemptions and pass-through-swap
exemptions) as well as for position limit overages that occur as a
result of operational or incidental issues where the applicant did not
intend to evade position limits.\1085\ Finally, IFUS supported the
retroactive application provision as it was proposed.\1086\ IFUS noted
that it follows a similar approach under its existing rules.\1087\
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\1083\ CME Group at 9-10 (explaining that in its experience,
position limit violations ``often occur unintentionally due to
operational or administrative oversight, not because the market
participant needed to enter into a hedge quickly in response to
changing market conditions'' and that over the past three years, CME
Group has received at least 49 retroactive exemption applications to
address some type of administrative oversight issue); See also CMC
at 11 (agreeing with CME Group), and FIA at 18 (recommending the
Commission allow retroactive exemptions within five business days
for any reason).
\1084\ CME Group at 9-10 (explaining that without the threat of
a potential position limits violation, market participants could
exploit the retroactive provision and intentionally exceed position
limits without consequences--``all while disrupting orderly market
operations.'' According to CME Group, the prospect of having an
application denied and being found in violation of position limits
has worked to deter market participants from attempting to exploit
the retroactive exemption process).
\1085\ ICE at 10.
\1086\ IFUS at 13-14.
\1087\ Id.
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Timing of Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge
Application
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.9(c) largely as proposed, with
certain modifications and clarifications to reflect commenters' views
and other considerations. First, the Commission is revising Final Rule
Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(i) so that it is consistent with changes the
Commission is making to Sec. 150.9(e)(3), discussed further
below.\1088\ As explained below, under Final Rule Sec.
150.9(e)(3),\1089\ applicants may elect (at their own risk) \1090\ to
exceed Federal position limits after an exchange notifies the
Commission of the exchange's approval of the application for purposes
of exchange-set limits,\1091\ and during the Commission's 10-day review
period. This is a change from the 2020 NPRM under which a person would
be required to wait until the Commission's 10-day review period expired
before exceeding Federal position limits. Proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(i)
was drafted in a manner that reflects this proposed requirement.
Accordingly, the Commission is revising Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(i) to clarify
that an applicant may exceed Federal position limits after receiving a
notice of approval from the relevant designated contract market or swap
execution facility.
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\1088\ See infra Section II.G.7. (discussing when a person may
exceed Federal position limits).
\1089\ Id.
\1090\ See infra Section II.G.7.ii. (explaining that an
applicant bears the risk that the Commission could deny the
application and require the person to bring their position into
compliance with Federal position limits).
\1091\ The Commission clarifies, for the avoidance of doubt,
that an exchange approval of a non-enumerated bona fide hedge (for
purposes of exchange limits) issued under Sec. 150.9 is not a
Commission approval of the non-enumerated bona fide hedge.
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Next, the Commission has determined not to expand the retroactive
application provision in Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(ii) to be available in any
circumstances (i.e., not just for sudden or unforeseen hedging needs)
or for other exemption types. The Final Rule provides broad flexibility
to market participants in the form of various exemptions from Federal
position limits. In particular, this Final Rule significantly expands
the list of self-effectuating enumerated bona fide hedges available to
market participants,\1092\ provides an expansive spread transaction
exemption provision,\1093\ and provides new exemptions for relief for
financial distress positions and conditional spot month limits for
certain natural gas positions.\1094\ This Final Rule also grants
additional flexibility for market participants to exceed Federal
position limits during the pendency of the Commission's review of the
application. Given these additional enhancements to the Federal
position limits framework for bona fide hedges and other exemptions,
the Commission expects that there will be a limited number of non-
enumerated bona fide hedge requests submitted through the Sec. 150.9
process and that it is reasonable to expect that market participants
will be able to file any such non-enumerated bona fide hedge requests
ahead of needing to exceed limits.
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\1092\ See supra Section II.A.1. (discussing the expanded list
of enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A).
\1093\ See supra Section II.A.20. (discussing the expanded
spread transaction definition in Sec. 150.1).
\1094\ See supra Section II.C.5-6. (discussing the financial
distress exemption and the conditional spot month limit exemption in
natural gas).
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The Commission is willing to permit the limited exception for
retroactive applications that occur due to sudden or unforeseen bona
fide hedging needs, as described above. Otherwise, market participants
would be penalized and prevented from assuming appropriate hedges even
though their hedging need arises from circumstances beyond their
[[Page 3374]]
control. Beyond that exception, the Commission believes that market
participants are able, and should be required, to file timely
applications. The Commission believes this is particularly true for
trading strategies that are not enumerated bona fide hedges and thus
may involve some element of non-risk reducing activity. Expanding the
exception beyond bona fide hedging needs that arise due to sudden or
unforeseen circumstances may dis-incentivize market participants from
properly monitoring their hedging activities and filing exemption
applications in a timely manner.
iii. Section 150.9(c)(3)--Renewal of Applications for Non-Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
a. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Renewal of Applications for Non-Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
Proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(3) would require that the exchange require
persons with approved non-enumerated bona fide hedges that were
previously granted pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.9 to reapply to the
exchange at least on an annual basis by updating their original
applications. Proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(3) would also require that the
exchange require applicants to receive a notice of approval of the
renewal from the exchange prior to exceeding the applicable position
limit.
b. Comments--Renewal of Applications for Non-Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
Several commenters requested a clarification that an applicant (i)
would only be subject to the Commission's 10/2-day review process in
Sec. 150.9(e) (described below) for initial applications for non-
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions, and (ii) would not be subject
to such review for annual renewal applications, unless the facts and
circumstances materially change from those presented in the initial
application.\1095\
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\1095\ CEWG at 27; MGEX at 3; CME Group at 8; FIA at 17; ICE at
9; and IFUS at 7 (further requesting that if a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge is granted, a participant should be able to treat similar
positions as bona fide hedges so long as they re-apply to the
exchange through the annual renewal process).
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Renewal of Applications for Non-Enumerated
Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.9(c)(3) with modifications to
clarify that the Commission's review and determination conducted under
final Sec. 150.9(e) is required only for initial applications for non-
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions. The Commission is also
clarifying that, except as provided below, renewals of previously-
approved non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications are not required
to be submitted to the Commission under Sec. 150.9, and need only be
submitted to and approved by the relevant exchange at least on an
annual basis for the applicant to continue relying on such recognition
for purposes of Federal position limits. Such renewal application
serves the purpose of confirming that the facts and circumstances
underlying the original application approved by the Commission remain
operative. However, if the facts and circumstances underlying a renewal
application are materially different than the initial application, then
such application should be treated as a new request that should be
submitted through the Sec. 150.9 process and subject to the
Commission's 10/2-day review process in Sec. 150.9(e).
iv. Section 150.9(c)(4)--Exchange Revocation Authority
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exchange Revocation Authority
Proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(4) would require that an exchange retain
its authority to limit, condition, or revoke, at any time, any
recognition previously issued pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.9, for any
reason, including if the exchange determines that the recognition is no
longer consistent with the bona fide hedge definition in proposed Sec.
150.1 or section 4a(c)(2) of the Act.
b. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Exchange
Revocation Authority
The Commission did not receive comments on proposed Sec.
150.9(c)(4) and is finalizing this section as proposed.
6. Section 150.9(d)--Recordkeeping
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Recordkeeping
Proposed Sec. 150.9(d) would require exchanges to maintain
complete books and records of all activities relating to the processing
and disposition of applications in a manner consistent with the
Commission's existing general regulations regarding
recordkeeping.\1096\ Such records would need to include: All
information and documents submitted by an applicant in connection with
its application; records of oral and written communications between the
exchange and the applicant in connection with the application; and
information and documents in connection with the exchange's analysis
of, and action on, such application. Exchanges would also be required
to maintain any documentation submitted by an applicant after the
disposition of an application, including, for example, any reports or
updates the applicant files with the exchange.
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\1096\ Requirements regarding the keeping and inspection of all
books and records required to be kept by the Act or the Commission's
regulations are found at Sec. 1.31. 17 CFR 1.31. DCMs are already
required to maintain records of their business activities in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 1.31 and Sec. 38.951. 17
CFR 38.951.
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ii. Comments--Recordkeeping
The Commission received one comment regarding exchange
recordkeeping requirements under proposed Sec. 150.9. NGSA requested
that any exchange recordkeeping/reporting requirements that apply to
the proposed Sec. 150.9 process do not require matching applicants'
hedge positions to their underlying cash positions on a one-to-basis,
but should instead allow for recordkeeping/reporting of positions on an
aggregate basis.\1097\
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\1097\ See NGSA at 9 (noting that allowing matching on an
aggregate basis would accommodate the practical needs of many market
participants to hedge their risks on a portfolio basis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Recordkeeping
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.9(d) as proposed, and with
only one minor grammatical edit to change the term ``designated
contract market'' to the correct possessive tense. The Commission also
clarifies here, in response to comments, that the Sec. 150.9(d)
recordkeeping requirements do not prescribe the manner in which
exchanges record how they match applicants' bona fide hedge positions
to applicants' underlying cash positions. Rather, final Sec.
150.9(c)(1)(iv) requires that an exchange collect the necessary
information regarding an applicant's cash-market activity and
offsetting cash positions, and final Sec. 150.9(d) simply requires the
exchange to keep a record of such application materials and information
collected. However, an exchange's records should be sufficient to
demonstrate that any approved non-enumerated bona fide hedges meet the
requirements of Sec. 150.9(b). The Commission also reiterates, as
explained in the 2020 NPRM, that exchanges are required to store and
produce records pursuant to existing Sec. 1.31,\1098\ and will
[[Page 3375]]
be subject to requests for information pursuant to other applicable
Commission regulations, including, for example, existing Sec.
38.5.\1099\
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\1098\ Consistent with existing Sec. 1.31, the Commission
expects that these records would be readily available during the
first two years of the required five-year recordkeeping period for
paper records, and readily accessible for the entire five-year
recordkeeping period for electronic records. In addition, the
Commission expects that records required to be maintained by an
exchange pursuant to this section would be readily accessible during
the pendency of any application, and for two years following any
disposition that did not recognize a derivative position as a bona
fide hedge.
\1099\ See 17 CFR 38.5 (requiring, in general, that upon request
by the Commission, a DCM must file responsive information with the
Commission, such as information related to its business, or a
written demonstration of the DCM's compliance with one or more core
principles).
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7. Section 150.9(e)--Process for a Person To Exceed Federal Position
Limits
The following discussion summarizes proposed Sec. 150.9(e),
comments received, and the Commission's determination according to each
sub-section, or a combination of certain subsections, of Sec.
150.9(e).
i. Section 150.9(e)(1)-(2)--Notification to the Commission and
Notification Requirements
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Notification to the Commission and
Notification Requirements
Under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(1), once an exchange recognizes a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge with respect to its own exchange-set
position limits established pursuant to Sec. 150.5(a), the exchange
would be required to notify the Commission concurrently with the
approval notice it provides to the applicant. Under proposed Sec.
150.9(e)(2), such notification to the Commission would need to include
a copy of the application and any supporting materials, as well as
certain basic information, outlined in Sec. 150.9(e)(2)(i)-(vi), about
the exemption. The exchange would only be required to provide this
notice to the Commission with respect to its initial (and not renewal)
determination for a particular application.
b. Comments--Notification to the Commission and Notification
Requirements
While proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(1) would require an exchange to
notify the Commission upon making an initial determination to recognize
a non-enumerated bona fide hedge, that rule would not require the
exchange to notify the public of any such determination. Commenters
submitted several general requests related to the publication of non-
enumerated bona fide hedges and the future expansion of the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A to the proposed regulatory
text in the 2020 NPRM. Specifically, certain commenters requested that
exchanges be required to publicize approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions so that market participants are aware of the types
of recognitions they can receive.\1100\
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\1100\ See COPE at 5 (noting that such notice should provide
market participants the facts upon which the recognition is based,
and would save the Commission from repeatedly processing requests
for the same hedging strategy); FIA at 15, 19 (requesting that
exchanges be required to publish anonymized descriptions of non-
enumerated hedging recognitions granted by the exchange); EPSA at 5-
7.
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Notification to the Commission and
Notification Requirements
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.9(e)(1)-(2) as
proposed. While the Final Rule does not require exchanges to publicize
approved non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions, an exchange may
elect, in its discretion, to provide such a list. The Commission
understands, however, that in the past, exchanges and market
participants have raised concerns that publicizing information about
approved non-enumerated bona fide hedges could divulge confidential
information (such as trade secrets, intellectual property, the market
participant's identity or position).\1101\
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\1101\ See 81 FR at 96824.
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To the extent that an exchange elects to publicize descriptions of
approved non-enumerated bona fide hedges, the Commission cautions that
any such data published should not disclose the identity of, or
confidential information about, the applicant. Rather, any published
summaries are expected to be general (generic facts and circumstances).
While the decision whether to publicize descriptions of approved non-
enumerated bona fide hedges is at the discretion of the exchange, the
exchange remains subject to all applicable laws and regulations
(including exchange bylaws) governing the protection of confidential
trade and trader information. The Commission also cautions exchanges to
make clear that any descriptions or lists of approved non-enumerated
bona fide hedges they elect to publish are for informational purposes
only and do not bestow any rights upon applicants to a claim that a
particular strategy is a non-enumerated bona fide hedge simply because
it aligns with a published example or description provided by the
exchange.
ii. Section 150.9(e)(3)-(4)--Exceeding Federal Speculative Position
Limits and the Commission's 10/2-Day Review Process
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Exceeding Federal Speculative Position
Limits and the Commission's 10/2-Day Review Process
Under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(3), a person could exceed Federal
position limits ten business days after the exchange notifies the
Commission in accordance with proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(2) that the
exchange has approved the non-enumerated bona fide hedge application
for purposes of exchange limits, provided that the Commission does not
notify the exchange or applicant that the Commission has determined to
stay or deny the application during its ten-day review.
Under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(4), if a person exceeds Federal
position limits due to sudden or unforeseen bona fide hedging needs and
then files a retroactive application pursuant to proposed Sec.
150.9(c)(2)(ii), then such application would be deemed approved by the
Commission two business days after the exchange issues the required
notification, provided that the Commission does not notify the exchange
or applicant that the Commission has determined to stay or deny the
application during its two-day review.
Under the 2020 NPRM, once those ten (or two) business days have
passed, the person could rely on the bona fide hedge recognition both
for purposes of exchange-set and Federal position limits, with the
certainty that the Commission (and not Commission staff) would only
revoke that determination in the limited circumstances set forth in
proposed Sec. 150.9(f)(1) and (2) described further below.
b. Comments--Exceeding Federal Speculative Position Limits and the
Commission's 10/2-Day Review Process
The bulk of the comments the Commission received on proposed Sec.
150.9 relate to the Commission's proposed ten-day or two-day period for
reviewing a non-enumerated bona fide hedge application after an
exchange has already approved the application for purposes of the
exchange-set limits (as noted above,\1102\ the 10/2-day review). In
particular, the Commission received several comments on the sufficiency
of the proposed review periods, including that the Commission's
proposed 10/2-
[[Page 3376]]
day review period is: (1) Too long; \1103\ (2) too short; \1104\ and
(3) just right.\1105\
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\1102\ See supra Section II.G.
\1103\ ADM at 6 (suggesting a five/one business day review
period); ICE at 9 (explaining that the 10-day review period would
impose unnecessary burdens and delay and create uncertainty for
market participants); IFUS at 14 (explaining that the 10-day review
period potentially conflicts with the exchange's spot-month
exemption review process, as contracts could expire before the
review period ends, and noting that a two day review, although not
ideal, is preferred); NGFA at 9 (suggesting a two-business-day
review period).
\1104\ IATP at 13-14 (contending that the 10/2-day review period
would burden an under-resourced Commission); Better Markets at 3, 63
(asserting that, under proposed Sec. 150.9, it is impossible for
Commission staff to, within the prescribed amount of time: review
and collect additional information on non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications; draft orders; receive the Chairman's approval for a
seriatim process; and secure the necessary Commissioner votes).
\1105\ CME Group at 7 (also agreeing that a timeline for
exchanges' review of applications should not be prescribed).
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In addition, several commenters suggested that the Commission
permit applicants to exceed Federal position limits during the
Commission's ten-day review period (which occurs after an exchange
issues its approval with respect to exchange-set limits).\1106\
Commenters also suggested that rather than the CFTC reviewing each non-
enumerated bona fide hedge exemption application after each exchange
determination, the CFTC should monitor exchanges at a higher level
(such as through the rule enforcement review process).\1107\
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\1106\ ADM at 6; ICE at 9; IFUS at 7; CME Group at 7-8
(explaining that exchanges have ``strong incentives to grant
exemptions only after careful review'' because they have statutory
obligations to prevent manipulation); CMC at 12 (noting that it is
currently unclear whether an applicant can enter into a position
during the Commission's 10/2-day review).
\1107\ ICE at 9; IFUS at 7 (questioning whether it is necessary
for the Commission to routinely review each non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application); CEWG at 26-27 (suggesting an annual exchange
rule enforcement review process instead of the 10/2-day review).
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Exceeding Federal Speculative Position
Limits and the Commission's 10/2-Day Review Process
The Commission is adopting Sec. 150.9(e)(3)-(4) with certain
revisions and clarifications as discussed below.
First, regarding general comments on the length of the Commission's
10/2-day review periods, the Commission acknowledges commenters'
concerns regarding whether the Commission will have enough time to
review and act on non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications. However,
the Commission will continue to develop internal processes and systems
to respond to Sec. 150.9 applications as needed and within those
timeframes. In addition, the Sec. 150.9 process enables the Commission
to leverage the exchange's review and analysis, which would serve to
inform the Commission's own review. The Commission believes that this
streamlined approach will reduce the amount of time required for the
Commission's review each application.
In addition, regarding comments suggesting that the 10/2-day review
periods are too long and will impose unnecessary delays on market
participants, and the request that market participants be able to
exceed Federal position limits during the Commission's 10-day review,
the Commission is revising proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(3) to provided
additional flexibility. Under Sec. 150.9(e)(3), applicants may elect
to exceed Federal position limits once they receive a notice of
approval from the relevant exchange and during the Commission's 10-day
review period, but will do so at their own risk.
That is, if an applicant exceeds Federal position limits before the
Commission's 10-day review period ends, the applicant bears market risk
for that position, in that the Commission could, in accordance with
Sec. 150.9(e)(6) described below, deny the application for purposes of
Federal position limits and require the applicant to bring its position
back into compliance with the Federal position limits within a
commercially reasonable amount of time, as determined by the Commission
in consultation with the relevant exchange and applicant. As discussed
below in connection with Sec. 150.9(e)(6), in these circumstances
where an applicant is required to lower its position, as a matter of
policy, the Commission will not pursue an enforcement action against
the applicant so long as the application was filed in good faith
(meaning the applicant and exchange have a reasonable and good faith
basis for determining that the position meets the requirements of Sec.
150.9(b)) and the applicant brings its position into compliance within
a commercially reasonable amount of time.
Further, regarding general comments that the length of the 10/2-day
review period is too long, the Commission believes allowing applicants
to exceed Federal position limits during the Commission's ten-day
review period addresses many commenter concerns. As described above,
the Final Rule also affords applicants the ability to file retroactive
applications in certain limited circumstances, and to hold positions
above Federal position limits during the Commission's two-day review of
such retroactive application. The Commission believes that these
avenues adequately accommodate market participants' needs to hedge in a
timely manner, and are well-balanced with the Commission's need to
maintain adequate oversight of non-enumerated bona fide hedge
applications through its limited 10/2-day review periods.
Furthermore, the Commission would consider it to be a reasonable
and helpful practice if exchanges elect to provide information to the
Commission on non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications as the
exchange is considering such applications. That is, the Commission
would find it helpful to receive an advance courtesy copy of any Sec.
150.9 applications the exchange receives. The exchange is not, however,
required to provide such advance copies, and would not be required to
obtain an opinion on such applications from the Commission before
making its determination. Rather, providing such application
information as the exchange receives it could facilitate a more rapid
Commission evaluation of Sec. 150.9 applications. This would help
facilitate additional regulatory certainty for market participants and
would aid the Commission in its review of applications processed under
Sec. 150.9.
Also, while commenters requested that the Commission should not
review each non-enumerated bona fide hedge application, the Commission
is of the view that it must review each application in order to conform
to the legal limits on what an agency may delegate to persons outside
the agency.\1108\ Under the new model finalized herein, the Commission
will be informed by the exchanges' determinations to make the
Commission's own determination for purposes of Federal position limits
before the 10/2-day review period expires. Accordingly, the Commission
will retain its decision-making authority with respect to the Federal
position limits and provide legal certainty to market participants of
their determinations.
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\1108\ In U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit held
``that, while Federal agency officials may sub-delegate their
decision-making authority to subordinates absent evidence of
contrary congressional intent, they may not sub-delegate to outside
entities--private or sovereign--absent affirmative evidence of
authority to do so.'' U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565-
68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, there are
three circumstances that the agency may ``delegate'' its authority
to an outside party because they do not involve sub-delegation of
decision-making authority: (1) Establishing a reasonable condition
for granting Federal approval; (2) fact gathering; and (3) advice
giving. Id. at 568.
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Finally, in Sec. 150.9(e)(3) and (4), the Commission is making one
technical correction to clarify that a person may exceed Federal
position limits or rely on
[[Page 3377]]
an approved retroactive application after the 10/2-day review period,
as applicable, unless the Commission notifies the person and relevant
exchange that it has determined to stay or deny the application,
pursuant to Sec. 150.9(e)(5) or (e)(6). In the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission only referred to its stay authority in Sec. 150.9(e)(5),
discussed in detail below. However, as clarified in the Final Rule, the
Commission could also notify the applicant and exchange of its
determination to deny the application for purposes of Federal position
limits under Sec. 150.9(e)(6), also discussed below. This change is a
technical correction and does not change the substance of Sec.
150.9(e)(3) or (4).
iii. Section 150.9(e)(5)--Commission Stay of Pending Applications and
Requests for Additional Information
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Commission Stay of Pending Applications
and Requests for Additional Information
Under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(5), the Commission could stay a non-
enumerated bona fide hedge application that an exchange has approved,
pursuant to Sec. 150.9(e)(2), for purposes of exchange-set limits.
Under the 2020 NPRM, if, during the ten (or two) business day timeframe
in Sec. 150.9(e)(3) or (4), the Commission notifies the exchange and
applicant that the Commission (and not staff) has determined to stay
the application, the applicant would not be able to rely on the
exchange's approval of the application for purposes of exceeding
Federal position limits, unless the Commission approves the application
after further review. The proposed stay provision did not include a
time limitation on the duration of a Commission stay.
Separately, under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(5), the Commission (or
Commission staff) could request additional information from the
exchange or applicant in order to evaluate the application, and the
exchange and applicant would have an opportunity to provide the
Commission with any supplemental information requested to continue the
application process. Any such request for additional information by the
Commission (or staff), however, would not stay or toll the ten (or two)
business day application review period.
b. Comments--Commission Stay of Pending Applications and Requests for
Additional Information
With respect to instances where the Commission has stayed an
exchange-granted non-enumerated bona fide hedge application or elects
to review a previously approved-application, several commenters
requested that the Commission limit the duration of its review period,
which was unlimited in the 2020 NPRM.\1109\
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\1109\ ICE at 9; FIA at 18; CME Group at 7 (suggesting that the
Commission's stay or review of an application should not exceed 30
calendar days); IFUS at 15 (noting that any Commission stay will
almost certainly conflict with IFUS procedures for reviewing
exemptions in the spot month, where certain exemptions may be in
effect for less than 10 days).
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Commission Stay of Pending Applications
and Requests for Additional Information
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.9(e)(5) with
certain modifications and clarifications in response to commenters and
other considerations.
In response to commenters' requests, the Commission is modifying
its stay authority under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(5). Under the Final
Rule, any Commission stay issued pursuant to Sec. 150.9(e)(5) will be
limited to 45 days. The Commission has a long history of conducting
other extensive regulatory reviews within a 45-day period.\1110\ The
Commission has found that this timeframe provides sufficient time for
the Commission to conduct an adequate review while also providing
certainty to market participants that the review will not be
indefinite.
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\1110\ See 17 CFR 40.3 and 40.5 (providing the Commission's 45-
day review period for new product and rule approval applications).
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The Commission is also clarifying in final Sec. 150.9(e)(5) that
if the Commission stays a pending application where the applicant has
not yet exceeded Federal position limits, then the applicant may not
exceed Federal position limits until the Commission issues a final
determination. Further, if the Commission stays a pending application
and the applicant has already exceeded Federal position limits (either
during the Commission's 10-day review period or as part of a
retroactive application), then the applicant may continue to maintain
its position unless the Commission notifies the designated contract
market or swap execution facility and the applicant otherwise, pursuant
to Sec. 150.9(e)(6).
In addition to the changes above, the Commission is making several
technical edits to improve readability, none of which impact the
substance of the section.
iv. Section 150.9(e)(6)--Commission Determination for Applications
During the 10/2-Day Review
The following discussion addresses Sec. 150.9(e)(6), which deals
with any Commission determinations that are issued for pending
applications and during the Commission's 10/2-day review.
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Commission Determination for Applications
During the 10/2-Day Review
Under proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(6), if the Commission determined that
an application does not meet the conditions set forth in proposed Sec.
150.9(b), the Commission would notify the exchange and the applicant
and provide an opportunity for the applicant to respond. After doing
so, the Commission could, in its discretion, deny the application for
purposes of Federal position limits, and require the person to reduce
the position within a commercially reasonable amount of time, as
determined by the Commission in consultation with the applicant and the
exchange.
In such a case, the applicant would not be subject to any finding
of a position limits violation during the Commission's review of a
pending application or after the Commission makes its determination. A
person would also not be subject to a violation if they already
exceeded Federal position limits and filed a retroactive application,
and the Commission then determined that the bona fide hedge is not
approved for purposes of Federal position limits. In either case, the
2020 NPRM provided that the Commission would not find that the person
had committed a position limits violation so long as the person brings
the position into compliance within a commercially reasonable time.
b. Comments--Commission Determination for Applications During the 10/2-
Day Review
Commenters requested that the Commission allow traders sufficient
time to exit a position if the Commission denies an exchange-approved
non-enumerated bona fide hedge application before the end of the 10/2-
day review period.\1111\
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\1111\ CMC at 12 (requesting a commercially reasonably amount of
time to exit positions); ADM at 6 (requesting, in addition, that the
Commission consult exchanges on what is a commercially reasonable
amount of time for an applicant to exit a position); CME Group at 7-
8.
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[[Page 3378]]
c. Discussion of Final Rule--Commission Determination for Applications
During the 10/2-Day Review
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.9(e)(6) with
certain modifications and clarifications in response to commenters and
other considerations.
First, for the avoidance of doubt and in response to comments, the
Commission clarifies and reiterates how it will handle any
determination to deny an application under final Sec. 150.9(e)(6).
Generally, if the Commission denies an application under Sec.
150.9(e)(6), and the applicant consequently is required to reduce its
position below the applicable Federal position limit, the Commission
will allow the applicant a commercially reasonable amount of time to do
so. The Commission will determine the commercially reasonable amount of
time in consultation with the relevant exchange and the applicant. The
Commission intends for the applicant and the relevant exchange to have
input regarding what amount of time is sufficient.
Further, the Commission is clarifying for final Sec. 150.9(e)(6)
that it expects all applicants to submit their applications in good
faith. As part of that good faith submission, the Commission expects
each applicant will have a reasonable basis for determining that the
purported non-enumerated bona fide hedge meets the requirements of
Sec. 150.9(b). Accordingly, the Commission is revising Sec.
150.9(e)(6) to clarify that the Commission will not pursue an
enforcement action for a position limits violation for the applicant
holding the position if the applicant exceeds Federal position limits
during the 10/2-day review and the Commission subsequently determines
to deny the application, so long as: (1) The application was submitted
to the exchange pursuant to Sec. 150.9 in good faith, and (2) if
required, the applicant reduces its positions within a commercially
reasonable amount of time.
In addition, the Commission is making several non-substantive
clarifications to final Sec. 150.9(e)(6). The Commission is clarifying
that this section deals with any Commission determination issued for
pending applications during the 10/2-day review period (as opposed to
Commission determinations issued under Sec. 150.9(f) after the 10/2-
day review period). The Commission is also adding language to clarify
that the Commission must notify the applicant and relevant exchange of
any determination within the 10/2-day review period. In addition, the
Commission is adding language to clarify that Sec. 150.9(e)(6) is not
limited to Commission denials of applications; rather, the Commission
could also determine to issue an approval with certain conditions or
limitations that may be different from the approval issued by the
exchange for purposes of exchange-set limits. Finally, the Commission
is making various non-substantive technical and organizational changes
to make the section more readable.
v. Section 150.9(e)--Recognition of Additional Enumerated Bona Fide
Hedges
a. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Recognition of Additional Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
Proposed Appendix A to the Final Rule identified each of the
enumerated bona fide hedges, and under the 2020 NPRM, the Commission's
recognition of a non-enumerated bona fide hedge, pursuant to Sec.
150.3 or Sec. 150.9, would not add new bona fide hedges to the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A.
b. Comments--Recognition of Additional Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Commenters requested that the Commission codify a path to move
commonly granted non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions to the
list of enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions in Appendix A.\1112\
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\1112\ See MGEX at 4; EPSA at 5-7; COPE at 5; FIA at 19 (noting
that the process should be subject to the notice and comment
rulemaking process); ICE at 10; and IFUS at 7 (requesting that such
process also require Commission staff to provide an annual report to
the Commission recommending non-enumerated bona fide hedges that
should be enumerated).
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c. Discussion of Final Rule--Recognition of Additional Enumerated Bona
Fide Hedges
The Commission has determined to finalize the approach as proposed.
Regarding a path forward for the Commission to expand the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges to include certain non-enumerated bona fide
hedges that are commonly granted, the Commission notes that it has an
existing rulemaking process (which requires public notice and comment)
to accomplish this. The Commission also clarifies, for the avoidance of
doubt, that it remains open to expanding the list of enumerated hedges,
as appropriate, but that the Commission would be required to do so
under its existing rulemaking process subject to public notice and
comment. Market participants are welcome to request that the Commission
take up future rulemakings to amend the list of enumerated bona fide
hedges.\1113\
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\1113\ Market participants may petition the Commission to expand
the list of enumerated bona fide hedges under existing Sec. 13.1,
which provides that any ``person may file a petition with . . . the
Commission . . . for the issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule of
general application.''
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8. Section 150.9(f)--Commission Revocation of an Approved Application
i. Summary of 2020 NPRM--Commission Revocation of an Approved
Application
Proposed Sec. 150.9(f) set forth the limited circumstances under
which the Commission would revoke a previously-approved non-enumerated
bona fide hedge recognition granted pursuant to proposed Sec. 150.9.
First, under proposed Sec. 150.9(f)(1), if an exchange limits,
conditions, or revokes its recognition of a non-enumerated bona fide
hedge that was previously approved under Sec. 150.9, then such bona
fide hedge would also be deemed limited, conditioned, or revoked for
purposes of Federal position limits.
Next, under proposed Sec. 150.9(f)(2), if the Commission
determines that an application that has been approved or deemed
approved by the Commission is no longer consistent with the applicable
sections of the Act and the Commission's regulations, the Commission
could revoke the non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition and/or
require the person to reduce its position within a commercially
reasonable time, or otherwise come into compliance.
Under proposed Sec. 150.9(f)(2), if the Commission makes such
determination, it would need to first notify the person holding the
position and provide them with an opportunity to respond. The
Commission would also provide a notification briefly explaining the
nature of the issues raised and the regulatory provision with which the
position is inconsistent. If the Commission requires the person to
reduce the position, the Commission would allow the person a
commercially reasonable amount of time to do so, as determined by the
Commission in consultation with the applicable exchange and applicant.
Finally, under the 2020 NPRM, the Commission would not find that the
person has committed a position limit violation so long as the person
comes into compliance within the commercially reasonable time.
[[Page 3379]]
ii. Comments--Commission Revocation of an Approved Application
Commenters' views on proposed Sec. 150.9(f) tended to overlap with
their views on the Commission's determination authority under Sec.
150.9(e)(6) (discussed above). In particular, commenters requested that
the Commission allow traders sufficient time to exit a position if the
Commission revokes a previously approved non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition.\1114\ Commenters also requested that the Commission
further clarify that an applicant will not be penalized for relying on
an approved non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition if the
Commission later revokes such approval after the 10/2-day review
period.\1115\
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\1114\ CMC at 12 (requesting a commercially reasonable amount of
time to exit positions); ADM at 6 (requesting, in addition, that the
Commission consult exchanges on what is a commercially reasonably
amount of time for an applicant to exit a position).
\1115\ CMC at 12; ADM at 6.
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iii. Discussion of Final Rule--Commission Revocation of an Approved
Application
The Commission has determined to finalize Sec. 150.9(f) with
certain modifications and clarifications in response to commenters and
other considerations.
First, under the Final Rule, if the Commission limits, conditions,
or revokes a previously approved non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition under Sec. 150.9(f)(2), and the applicant consequently is
required to reduce its position below the applicable Federal position
limit, the Commission will allow the applicant a commercially
reasonable amount of time to do so. The Commission will determine the
commercially reasonable amount of time in consultation with the
relevant exchange and the applicant. The Commission intends for the
applicant and the relevant exchange to have input regarding what amount
of time is sufficient.
Further, if the Commission limits, conditions, or revokes a
previously approved non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition under
Sec. 150.9(f)(2), the Commission will not pursue an enforcement action
for a position limits violation for the person holding the position in
excess of Federal position limits so long as the person: (1) Submitted
its application pursuant to Sec. 150.9 in good faith,\1116\ and (2) if
required, reduces the position within a commercially reasonable amount
of time as determined by the Commission in consultation with the person
and the relevant exchange.
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\1116\ See supra Section II.G.7. (providing additional
discussion of the premise that a person submit their Sec. 150.9
application in good faith).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is revising the title of final Sec. 150.9(f) to
clarify that this section is limited to revocations of non-enumerated
bona fide hedges previously approved by the Commission. The Commission
is also adding language to final Sec. 150.9(f)(2)(i) (consistent with
language in Sec. 150.9(f)(1)) to clarify that, in addition to revoking
a previously-granted non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition, the
Commission could alternatively determine to limit or condition a
previously-granted recognition. The Commission believes that there
could be circumstances where it would not need to completely revoke a
previously-granted recognition, but instead may determine a less
drastic measure is more appropriate to enable a market participant to
achieve compliance with the applicable requirements. Finally, the
Commission is revising Sec. 150.9(f)(2)(iii) to include the same
language that it added to Sec. 150.9(e)(6) to explicitly make clear an
underlying premise that the Commission will not pursue Federal position
limits violations so long as any applications are filed in good faith.
Finally, the Commission is making a number of technical and grammatical
corrections in Sec. 150.9(f) that are not substantive revisions.
In addition to the clarifications and modifications above, the
Commission would like to reiterate the following explanations and
guidance from the 2020 NPRM. The Commission expects for persons to be
able to rely on non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions granted
pursuant to Sec. 150.9 with the certainty that the final determination
would only be limited, conditioned, or revoked in very limited
circumstances. The Commission expects that it (and not Commission
staff) would only exercise such authority under rare circumstances
where the disposition of an application has resulted, or is likely to
result, in price anomalies, threatened manipulation, actual
manipulation, market disruptions, or disorderly markets. The Commission
also expects that any action compelling a market participant to reduce
its position pursuant to Sec. 150.9(f)(2) would be a rare Commission
action, and such action is not delegated to Commission staff. In
determining requirements for a person to reduce a position, the
Commission may consult the person and relevant exchange, and may also
consider factors such as current market conditions and the protection
of price discovery in the market. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt,
the Commission expects that its exercise of its authorities under Sec.
150.9(f)(2) would not be subject to the requirements of CEA section
8a(9), that is, the Commission would not be compelled to find that a
CEA section 8a(9) emergency condition exists prior to requiring that a
market participant reduce certain positions.
9. Section 150.9(g)--Delegation of Authority to the Director of the
Division of Market Oversight
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Delegation of Authority to the Director of
the Division of Market Oversight
The Commission proposed to delegate certain of its authorities
under proposed Sec. 150.9 to the Director of the Commission's Division
of Market Oversight, or such other employee(s) that the Director may
designate from time to time. Proposed Sec. 150.9(g)(1) would delegate
the Commission's authority, in Sec. 150.9(e)(5), to request additional
information from the exchange and applicant.
The Commission did not propose, however, to delegate its authority,
in proposed Sec. 150.9(e)(5) and (6) to stay or deny a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge application. The Commission also did not delegate its
authority in proposed Sec. 150.9(f)(2) to revoke a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge recognition granted pursuant to Sec. 150.9, or to require
an applicant to reduce its positions or otherwise come into compliance.
The Commission stated that if an exchange's disposition of an
application raises concerns regarding consistency with the CEA,
presents novel or complex issues, or requires remediation, then the
Commission (and not Commission staff) would make the final
determination, after taking into consideration any supplemental
information provided by the exchange or the applicant.
As with all authorities delegated by the Commission to staff, under
the 2020 NPRM, the Commission would maintain the authority to consider
any matter which has been delegated. The Commission stated in the 2020
NPRM that it intended to closely monitor staff administration of the
proposed processes for granting non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions.
ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Delegation of
Authority to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight
The Commission did not receive comments on proposed Sec. 150.9(g).
The Commission is finalizing Sec. 150.9(g) with one revision to
reorganize certain text to improve readability. This update is not
[[Page 3380]]
intended to change the substance of this section.
H. Part 19 and Related Provisions--Reporting of Cash-Market Positions
1. Background
Key reports currently used for purposes of monitoring compliance
with Federal position limits include Form 204 \1117\ and Parts I and II
of Form 304,\1118\ known collectively as the ``series `04'' reports.
Under existing Sec. 19.01, market participants that hold bona fide
hedging positions in excess of limits for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts currently subject to Federal position limits must justify
such overages by filing the applicable report each month: Form 304 for
cotton, and Form 204 for the other commodities.\1119\ These reports
are: Generally filed after exceeding the Federal position limit; show a
snapshot of such trader's cash positions on one given day each month;
and are used by the Commission to determine whether a trader has
sufficient cash positions to justify futures and options on futures
positions above the speculative limits.
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\1117\ CFTC Form 204: Statement of Cash Positions in Grains,
Soybeans, Soybean Oil, and Soybean Meal, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@forms/documents/file/cftcform204.pdf (existing Form 204).
\1118\ CFTC Form 304: Statement of Cash Positions in Cotton,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@forms/documents/file/cftcform304.pdf (existing Form 304). Parts I and II of Form 304
address fixed-price cash positions used to justify cotton positions
in excess of Federal position limits. As described below, Part III
of Form 304 addresses unfixed-price cotton ``on-call'' information,
which is not used to justify cotton positions in excess of limits,
but rather to allow the Commission to prepare its weekly cotton on-
call report.
\1119\ 17 CFR 19.01.
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The existing series `04 reports are both duplicative of, and
inconsistent with, the processes market participants use to report
cash-market information to the exchanges. When granting exemptions from
their own limits, exchanges do not use a monthly cash-market reporting
framework akin to the `04 reports. Instead, exchanges generally require
market participants who wish to exceed exchange-set limits, including
for bona fide hedging positions, to submit an annual exemption
application form in advance of exceeding the limits.\1120\ Such
applications are typically updated annually and generally include a
month-by-month breakdown of cash-market positions for the previous year
supporting any position-limits overages during that period.\1121\
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\1120\ See, e.g., ICE Rule 6.29 and CME Rule 559.
\1121\ For certain physically-delivered agricultural contracts,
some exchanges may require that spot month exemption applications be
renewed several times a year for each spot month, rather than
annually.
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2. Elimination of Form 204 and Cash-Reporting Elements of Form 304
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Elimination of Form 204 and Cash-Reporting
Elements of Form 304
The Commission proposed to eliminate existing Form 204. The
Commission also proposed to eliminate Parts I and II of existing Form
304, which request information on cash-market positions for cotton akin
to the information requested in Form 204.\1122\ As discussed in the
2020 NPRM, the Commission believed that eliminating these forms would
reduce duplicative reporting requirements for market participants
without hindering the Commission's ability to access cash-market
information, which the exchanges would be required to collect and
provide to the Commission under proposed Sec. Sec. 150.3, 150.5, and
150.9.\1123\
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\1122\ Part III of Form 304, which addresses cotton-on-call, is
discussed below.
\1123\ 78 FR at 11694, 11655-11656.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For a market participant accustomed to filing series `04 reports
the 2020 NPRM would result in a slight change in practice. Under the
2020 NPRM, such participant's bona fide hedge recognitions could still
be self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits, provided
that the market participant also separately applies for a bona fide
hedge exemption from exchange-set limits established pursuant to
proposed Sec. 150.5(a), discussed above, and provided further that the
participant submits the requisite cash-market information to the
exchange as required by proposed Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A).
ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Elimination of Form 204
and Cash-Reporting Elements of Form 304
The Commission has carefully considered the comments received and
is eliminating existing Form 204 and Parts I and II of existing Form
304 as proposed.
iii. Comments--Elimination of Form 204 and Cash-Reporting Elements of
Form 304
Numerous commenters supported the elimination of the Form 204 and
Parts I and II of the Form 304.\1124\ In particular, several commenters
supported the proposed streamlined process that eliminates duplicative
reporting requirements to both the Commission and the exchanges.\1125\
ISDA additionally recommended that the Commission rely on its special
call authority and relevant exchange authority to request additional
information on an as-need basis.\1126\
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\1124\ See, e.g., ACSA at 3; AMCOT at 2-3; ACA at 3; Canale
Cotton at 3; Cargill at 9-10; CCI at 2; CEWG at 4; Chevron at 3; CHS
at 2, 6; CMC at 12; COPE at 3-4; DECA at 2; East Cotton at 3; Ecom
at 1; EEI at 7; EPSA at 7; FIA at 3; IMC at 3; ISDA at 9-10; Jess
Smith at 3; LDC at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2-3;
Memtex at 2-3; Moody Compress at 2; Namoi at 1; NCFC at 2; Olam at
3; Omnicotton at 2-3; Parkdale at 2; SEMI at 3; Shell at 4; SCA at
3; SW Ag at 2-3; Texas Cotton at 2-3; Toyo at 2-3; Walcot at 3; WCSA
at 3; White Gold at 2-3.
\1125\ See, e.g., Cargill at 9-10; CCI at 2; CEWG at 4; COPE at
3-4; ISDA at 10.
\1126\ ISDA at 10.
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Three commenters opposed the elimination of the series `04 reports.
In particular, AFR and Rutkowski expressed concern that eliminating
Form 204 will delegate position limit oversight and enforcement
responsibilities to the exchanges.\1127\ These commenters contended
that the exchanges are financially disincentivized from imposing limits
on speculation because the exchanges profit from trading volume.\1128\
Similarly, Better Markets also opposed the elimination of the series
`04 reports, contending that Federal law provides more substantial
deterrents for misreporting information on a form provided to Federal
agencies such as the Commission.\1129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1127\ AFR at 2-3; Rutkowski at 2.
\1128\ Id.
\1129\ Better Markets at 59-60.
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Better Markets also commented that the reporting changes would
increase the industry's overall reporting burdens because market
participants would have to report information to multiple
exchanges.\1130\ Better Markets suggested that the Commission should
instead ``ensure that all cash positions reporting is automated'' and
``amenable to aggregation'' in order to provide such information to the
exchanges.\1131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1130\ Id. at 59.
\1131\ Id. at 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Elimination of Form 204 and Cash-
Reporting Elements of Form 304
The Commission is eliminating Form 204 and Sections I and II of
existing Form 304, as proposed. For the reasons described below and as
discussed in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission believes that the
elimination of these forms will reduce duplication and inefficiency
resulting from market participants submitting cash-market information
to both the Commission and the exchanges under the existing
framework.\1132\ As described below, under the approach
[[Page 3381]]
adopted herein, the Commission will receive any necessary information
related to market participants' recognized bona fide hedges by
leveraging existing expertise and processes at the exchanges, as well
as information that market participants will be required to submit to
exchanges under the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1132\ 85 FR at 11694.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission finds comments that the elimination of the series
`04 reports would require the Commission to delegate authority to the
exchanges to be misplaced for several reasons. First, by eliminating
the series `04 reports, the Commission is not delegating any oversight
or enforcement responsibilities to the exchanges. The CEA establishes
the statutory framework under which the Commission operates.\1133\ Even
without the series `04 reports, the Commission will continue to
administer the CEA to monitor and protect the derivatives markets,
market users, and the public from fraud, manipulation, and other
abusive practices that are prohibited by the CEA and Commission
regulations. The Commission will continue to do so through its market
surveillance program,\1134\ rule enforcement reviews,\1135\ and other
regulatory tools. The Commission will also continue to investigate and
prosecute persons who violate the CEA and Commission regulations in
connection with derivatives trading on exchanges and related conduct in
cash-market commodities.\1136\
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\1133\ See 7 U.S.C. 2(a)(1).
\1134\ CFTC Market Surveillance Program, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission website, available at https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/MarketSurveillance/CFTCMarketSurveillanceProgram/index.htm#P5_912. The Commission's Market Surveillance Program is
responsible for collecting market data and position information from
registrants and large traders, and for monitoring the daily
activities of large traders, key price relationships, and relevant
supply and demand factors in a continuous review for potential
market problems. Id.
\1135\ The Commission conducts regular rule enforcement reviews
of each exchange's audit trail, trade practice surveillance,
disciplinary, and dispute resolution programs for ongoing compliance
with the Core Principles. See Rule Enforcement Reviews of Designated
Contract Markets, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission website,
available at https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/dcmruleenf.html.
\1136\ Enforcement, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
website, available at https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Enforcement/OfficeofDirectorEnforcement.html.
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Second, the elimination of Form 204 and the cash-market reporting
portions of Form 304 will not hinder the Commission's access to the
cash-market information needed for the Commission to effectuate its
oversight and enforcement responsibilities. Instead, the Commission is
ensuring that it will continue to have access to sufficient cash-market
information by adopting several reporting and recordkeeping
requirements in final Sec. Sec. 150.3, 150.5, and 150.9.\1137\ In
particular, under Sec. 150.5, an exchange will be required to collect
applications, which must be updated at least on an annual basis, for
purposes of granting bona fide hedge recognitions from exchange-set
limits for contracts subject to Federal position limits,\1138\ and for
recognizing bona fide hedging positions for purposes of Federal
position limits.\1139\ Among other things, each application will be
required to include: (1) Information regarding the applicant's activity
in the cash markets for the underlying commodity; and (2) any other
information to enable the exchange and the Commission to determine
whether the exchange may recognize such position as a bona fide
hedge.\1140\ Additionally, consistent with existing industry practice
for certain exchanges, exchanges will be required to file monthly
reports to the Commission showing, among other things, for all bona
fide hedges (whether enumerated or non-enumerated), a concise summary
of the applicant's activity in the cash markets.\1141\
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\1137\ As discussed earlier in this Final Rule, Final Sec.
150.9 also includes reporting and recordkeeping requirements
pertaining to spread exemptions. Those requirements will not be
discussed again in this Section of the Final Rule, which addresses
cash-market reporting in connection with bona fide hedges.
\1138\ See Final Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A).
\1139\ As discussed above in connection with Final Sec. 150.9,
market participants who wish to request a bona fide hedge
recognition under Sec. 150.9 will not be required to file such
applications with both the exchange and the Commission. They will
only file the applications with the exchange, which will then be
subject to recordkeeping requirements in Final Sec. 150.9(d), as
well as Final Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9 requirements to provide
certain information to the Commission on a monthly basis and upon
demand.
\1140\ See Final Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G).
\1141\ See Final Sec. 150.5(a)(4).
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Collectively, final Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9 will provide the
Commission with the same substantive information from monthly reports
about all recognitions granted for purposes of contracts subject to
Federal position limits, including cash-market information supporting
the applications, and annual information regarding all month-by-month
cash-market positions used to support a bona fide hedging recognition.
These reports will help the Commission determine whether any person who
claims a bona fide hedging position can demonstrate satisfaction of the
relevant requirements. This information will also help the Commission
perform market surveillance in order to detect and deter manipulation
and abusive trading practices in physical commodity markets.
While the Commission will no longer receive the monthly snapshot
data currently included on the series `04 reports, the Commission will
have broad access, at any time, to the cash-market information
described above, as well as any other data or information exchanges
collect as part of their application processes.\1142\ This will include
any updated application forms and periodic reports that exchanges may
require applicants to file regarding their positions. To the extent
that the Commission observes market activity or positions that warrant
further investigation, Sec. 150.9 will also provide the Commission
with access to any supporting or related records the exchanges will be
required to maintain.\1143\
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\1142\ See, e.g., Final Sec. 150.9(d) (requiring that all such
records, including cash-market information submitted to the
exchange, be kept in accordance with the requirements of Sec.
1.31), and Final Sec. 19.00(b) (requiring, among other things, all
persons exceeding speculative position limits who have received a
special call to file any pertinent information as specified in the
call).
\1143\ See Final Sec. 150.9(d).
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Furthermore, the Final Rule will not impact the Commission's
existing provisions for gathering information through special calls
relating to positions exceeding limits and/or to reportable positions.
As discussed further below, under the Final Rule, all persons exceeding
the Federal position limits set forth in final Sec. 150.2, as well as
all persons holding or controlling reportable positions pursuant to
Sec. 15.00(p)(1), must file any pertinent information as instructed in
a special call.\1144\
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\1144\ See Final Sec. 19.00(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to commenter concerns that elimination of the series
`04 reports may increase reliance on exchanges which may lack
incentives to impose position limits, the Commission does not view the
question of whether exchanges impose speculative position limits in
this context as a matter of incentives. Even with the elimination of
the series `04 reports, exchanges will be under statutory and
regulatory obligations, as they are today, to establish speculative
position limits for all contracts subject to Federal position
limits.\1145\ Additionally, as discussed above, the Commission does not
believe that exchanges generally lack proper incentives to maintain the
integrity of their markets; to the contrary, they are subject to
various statutory core principles and regulatory obligations
[[Page 3382]]
that require them to maintain integrity in their markets.\1146\
Further, exchanges will remain subject to regulatory oversight and
enforcement responsibilities required for DCMs by CEA section 5(d) and
part 38 of the Commission's regulations and for SEFs by CEA section 5h
and part 37 of the Commission's regulations.\1147\ Specifically,
several existing Commission regulations in parts 38 and 37 require
exchanges to monitor for violations of exchange-set position
limits,\1148\ and detect and prevent manipulation, price distortions
and, where possible, disruptions of the physical-delivery or cash-
settlement process.\1149\
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\1145\ See 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5) and Sec. 150.5(a).
\1146\ For further discussion, see Section II.B.3.iii.b(3)(iii)
(addressing comments from Better Markets related to conflicts-of-
interest).
\1147\ See 7 U.S.C. 7(d); 17 CFR 38; 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f); 17 CFR
37.
\1148\ See 17 CFR 38.251(d); 17 CFR 37.205(b).
\1149\ See 17 CFR 38.251(a); 17 CFR 37.205(a).
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In response to Better Markets' concern that eliminating the '04
reports will reduce deterrents for misreporting, the Commission
believes that the false reporting provision in Section 9(a)(4) of the
CEA, which makes it a felony to make any false statements to an
exchange, is sufficient to deter market participants from misreporting
cash-market information to exchanges.\1150\
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\1150\ 7 U.S.C. 13(a)(4). The Commission has not hesitated to
impose severe penalties on market participants that mislead
exchanges about cash positions. See, e.g., In the Matter of EMF
Financial Products LLC, CFTC Docket No. 10-02, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission website, available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/5751-09 (imposing a $4,000,000
civil monetary penalty on a firm that misled an exchange about the
firm's cash positions in treasury futures). See also supra Section
II.D.9. (discussing Commission enforcement of exchange-set position
limits).
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Further, the Commission disagrees with Better Markets' concerns
about increased burdens. Given that market participants are currently
required both to file the series `04 reports with the Commission, and
to submit cash-market information to the exchanges, eliminating the
series `04 reports will reduce burdens on market participants.\1151\ In
fact, the Commission did not receive any comments opposing the
elimination of the series `04 reports from traders who currently have
an obligation to file such forms. While the Commission supports
streamlined and automated reporting requirements whenever possible,
Better Markets has not identified any practicable method or program
that would permit the automated reporting of the kinds of disparate
cash-market information currently reflected in Forms 204 and 304.
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\1151\ See infra Section IV.A.5.iii. (discussing the benefits of
elimination of Form 204 and amendment of Form 304).
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In addition to the justifications for eliminating the series `04
reports described above, the Commission has also determined that Form
204, including the timing and procedures for its filing, is inadequate
for the reporting of cash-market positions relating to certain energy
contracts, which will be subject to Federal position limits for the
first time under the Final Rule. For example, when compared to
agricultural contracts, energy contracts generally expire more
frequently, have a shorter delivery cycle, and have significantly more
product grades. The information required by Form 204, as well as the
timing and procedures for its filing, reflects the way agricultural
contracts trade, but is inadequate for purposes of reporting cash-
market information involving energy contracts.
Finally, the Commission understands that the exchanges maintain
regular dialogue with their participants regarding cash-market
positions, and that it is common for exchange surveillance staff to
make informal inquiries of market participants, including if the
exchange has questions about market events or a participant's use of an
exemption or recognition. The Commission encourages exchanges to
continue this practice. Similarly, the Commission anticipates that its
own staff will engage in dialogue with market participants, either
through the use of informal conversations or, in limited circumstances,
via special call authority.
3. Changes to Parts 15 and 19 To Implement the Elimination of Form 204
and Portions of Form 304
i. Background--Changes to Parts 15 and 19 To Implement the Elimination
of Form 204 and Portions of Form 304
The market and large-trader reporting rules are contained in parts
15 through 21 of the Commission's regulations. Collectively, these
reporting rules effectuate the Commission's market and financial
surveillance programs by enabling the Commission to gather information
concerning the size and composition of the commodity derivative markets
and to monitor and enforce any established speculative position limits,
among other regulatory goals.
ii. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Changes to Parts 15 and 19 To Implement
the Elimination of Form 204 and Portions of Form 304
To effectuate the proposed elimination of Form 204 and the cash-
market reporting components of Form 304, the Commission proposed to
eliminate: (a) Existing Sec. 19.00(a)(1), which requires persons
holding reportable positions which constitute bona fide hedging
positions to file a Form 204; and (b) existing Sec. 19.01, which,
among other things, sets forth the cash-market information required on
Forms 204 and 304.\1152\ Based on the proposed elimination of existing
Sec. Sec. 19.00(a)(1) and 19.01 and Form 204, the Commission proposed
conforming technical changes to remove related reporting provisions
from: (i) The ``reportable position'' definition in Sec. 15.00(p);
(ii) the list of ``persons required to report'' in Sec. 15.01; and
(iii) the list of reporting forms in Sec. 15.02.
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\1152\ 17 CFR 19.01.
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iii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Changes to
Parts 15 and 19 To Implement the Elimination of Form 204 and Portions
of Form 304
The Commission did not receive any comments on the conforming
changes to parts 15 and 19 that implement the elimination of Form 204
and Sections I and II of Form 304, and is adopting the changes as
proposed.
4. Special Calls
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Special Calls
Notwithstanding the proposed elimination of the series `04 reports,
the Commission did not propose to make any significant substantive
changes to information requirements relating to positions exceeding
limits and/or to reportable positions. Accordingly, in proposed Sec.
19.00(b), the Commission proposed that all persons exceeding the
proposed limits set forth in Sec. 150.2, as well as all persons
holding or controlling reportable positions pursuant to Sec.
15.00(p)(1), must file any pertinent information as instructed in a
special call. This proposed provision is similar to existing Sec.
19.00(a)(3), but would require any such person to file the information
as instructed in the special call, rather than to file the information
on a series `04 report.\1153\
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\1153\ 17 CFR 19.00(a)(3).
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The Commission also proposed to add language to existing Sec.
15.01(d) to clarify that persons who have received a special call are
deemed ``persons required to report'' as defined in Sec. 15.01.\1154\
The Commission proposed this change to clarify an existing requirement
found in Sec. 19.00(a)(3), which requires persons holding or
controlling positions that are reportable
[[Page 3383]]
pursuant to Sec. 15.00(p)(1) who have received a special call to
respond.\1155\ The proposed changes to part 19 operate in tandem with
the proposed additional language for Sec. 15.01(d) to reiterate the
Commission's existing special call authority without creating any new
substantive reporting obligations. Finally, proposed Sec. 19.03
delegated authority to issue such special calls to the Director of the
Division of Enforcement, and proposed Sec. 19.03(b) delegated to the
Director of the Division of Enforcement the authority in proposed Sec.
19.00(b) to provide instructions or to determine the format, coding
structure, and electronic data transmission procedures for submitting
data records and any other information required under part 19.
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\1154\ 17 CFR 15.01.
\1155\ 17 CFR 19.00(a)(3).
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ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Special Calls
The Commission did not receive any comments on these changes and is
adopting the changes to Sec. Sec. 15.01(d), Sec. 19.00(b), and
19.03(b) as proposed.
5. Form 304 Cotton On-Call Reporting
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Form 304 Cotton On-Call Reporting
With the proposed elimination of the cash-market reporting portions
of Form 304 as described above, Form 304 would be used exclusively to
collect the information needed to publish the Commission's weekly
cotton on-call report, which shows the quantity of unfixed-price cash
cotton purchases and sales that are outstanding against each cotton
futures month.\1156\ While the Commission did not propose to eliminate
the cotton on-call portions of Form 304, or to stop publishing the
cotton on-call report, the Commission did request comment about the
implications of doing so.\1157\
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\1156\ Cotton On-Call, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
website, available at https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CottonOnCall/index.htm (weekly report).
\1157\ Specifically, the Commission requested comments on the
following issues: To what extent, and for what purpose, do market
participants and others rely on the information contained in the
Commission's weekly cotton on-call report; Whether publication of
the cotton on-call report creates any informational advantages or
disadvantages, and/or otherwise impact competition in any way;
Whether the Commission should stop publishing the cotton on-call
report, but continue to collect, for internal use only, the
information required in Part III of Form 304 (Unfixed-Price Cotton
``On-Call''); Or alternatively, whether the Commission should stop
publishing the cotton on-call report and also eliminate the Form 304
altogether, including Part III. See 85 FR at 11657.
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In addition to requesting comment regarding continued collection of
the Form 304 and publication of the cotton-on-call report, the
Commission proposed a number of technical changes to the Form 304.
Under the 2020 NPRM, the requirements pertaining to that report would
remain in proposed Sec. Sec. 19.00(a) and 19.02, with minor
modifications to existing provisions. In particular, the Commission
proposed to update cross references (including to renumber Sec.
19.00(a)(2) as Sec. 19.00(a)) and to clarify and update the procedures
and timing for the submission of Form 304. Specifically, proposed Sec.
19.02(b) would require that each Form 304 report be made weekly, dated
as of the close of business on Friday, and filed not later than 9 a.m.
Eastern Time on the third business day following that Friday using the
format, coding structure, and electronic data transmission procedures
approved in writing by the Commission. The Commission also proposed
some modifications to the Form 304 itself, including conforming and
technical changes to the organization, instructions, and required
identifying information.\1158\
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\1158\ Among other things, the proposed changes to the
instructions would clarify that traders must identify themselves on
Form 304 using their Public Trader Identification Number, in lieu of
the CFTC Code Number required on previous versions of Form 304. This
change will help Commission staff to connect the various reports
filed by the same market participants. This release includes a
representation of the final Form 304, which is to be submitted in an
electronic format published pursuant to this Final Rule, either via
the Commission's web portal or via XML-based, secure FTP
transmission.
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ii. Summary of the Commission Determination--Form 304 Cotton On-Call
Reporting
The Commission has determined to maintain the status quo as
proposed by not eliminating the cotton on-call portions (currently Part
III) of the Form 304, and by continuing to publish the cotton on-call
report. The Commission is also adopting the proposed technical changes
described above.
iii. Comments--Form 304 Cotton On-Call Reporting
Commenters were divided on the questions posed by the Commission on
whether to retain Part III of the Form 304 and to continue publishing
the weekly cotton on-call report.
CMC, along with numerous commenters from the cotton industry,
believed the Commission should eliminate Form 304 in its entirety and
stop publishing the cotton on-call report.\1159\ For example, Namoi and
ACSA both argued that the cotton on-call report allows market
participants to see proprietary cash-market information for every other
participant in the cotton market, which among other things, creates an
opportunity for speculators to profit by trading against this publicly
disclosed unfixed-price positions.\1160\ Additionally, Namoi and ACSA
each highlighted that the Commission does not collect or publish
similar information for any other commodities.\1161\ ACSA also argued
that the cotton on-call report causes competitive harm to the U.S.
cotton industry because, according to ACSA, foreign mills believe that
the report imposes risks and costs and are therefore more likely to
purchase cotton from outside of the United States in order to avoid
completing Part III of Form 304.\1162\ The NCTO suggested that textile
mills are particularly harmed when speculators trade against the cash-
market positions disclosed in the cotton on-call report because textile
mills purchase the majority of their cotton on call.\1163\
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\1159\ ACA at 3; ACSA at 3, 9-11; Cargill at 10; CMC at 12; East
Cotton at 3; McMeekin at 2-3; Namoi at 1-2; Omnicotton at 2-3; Texas
Cotton at 2-3; Toyo at 2-3; Walcot at 3; and White Gold at 2.
\1160\ Namoi at 1-2; ACSA at 9-11.
\1161\ Namoi at 1-2.
\1162\ ACSA at 9-11.
\1163\ NCTO at 1-2.
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Conversely, several commenters, including other cotton industry
members, stated that the Commission should continue to collect the
information required by Form 304 and to publish the cotton on-call
report.\1164\ For example, Glencore argued that discontinuing the
report would reduce transparency, open the market to more manipulation,
and harm smaller participants due to asymmetrical information.\1165\
Similarly, AMCOT argued that without the report, large participants,
who account for a significant amount of the cotton bought or sold on
call, would have an informational advantage over small producers who
have less visibility into a large portion of the cotton market.\1166\
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\1164\ VLM Comment Text; Eric Matsen Comment Text; AMCOT at 2-3;
Gerald Marshall at 3; Lawson/O'Neill at 1; Glencore at 2; and
Dunavant at 1.
\1165\ Glencore at 2; Dunavant at 1.
\1166\ AMCOT at 2.
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iv. Discussion of Final Rule--Form 304 Cotton On-Call Reporting
After reviewing the comments discussed above, the Commission has
decided to retain the cotton on-call portions (currently Section III)
of existing Form 304 and to continue publishing its weekly cotton on-
call report. Because the comments from cotton industry firms were
divided, and
[[Page 3384]]
because the cotton on-call report has been a part of the cotton market
for more than 80 years, the Commission believes that it would be
imprudent to eliminate the report based solely on the information
provided in the comment letters, which do not include any concrete
data, studies, or quantifiable financial harms. The Commission further
notes that continued publication of the cotton on-call report will not
change the existing dynamics of the cotton market.
In the future, the Commission may solicit comments to determine
whether the cotton on-call report continues to benefit the market and
whether the report hinders the competitiveness of U.S. firms in the
global cotton market. The Commission may seek input from cotton market
participants in the form of additional comments, data, studies, or
information about specific financial harms that would warrant
discontinuing the report. The Commission emphasizes that it remains
open to continuing to discuss this important issue with market
participants and to receive additional data and information that may
more concretely demonstrate the competitive harms discussed by
commenters above.
6. Proposed Technical Changes to Part 17
i. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Proposed Technical Changes to Part 17
Part 17 of the Commission's regulations addresses reports by
reporting markets, FCMs, clearing members, and foreign brokers.\1167\
The Commission proposed to amend existing Sec. 17.00(b), which
addresses information to be furnished by FCMs, clearing members, and
foreign brokers, to delete certain provisions related to position
aggregation, because those provisions have become duplicative of
aggregation provisions that were adopted in Sec. 150.4 in the 2016
Final Aggregation Rulemaking.\1168\ The Commission also proposed to add
a new provision, Sec. 17.03(i), which delegates certain authority
under Sec. 17.00(b) to the Director of the Office of Data and
Technology.\1169\
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\1167\ 17 CFR part 17.
\1168\ See Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91455.
Specifically, the Commission proposes to delete paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) from Sec. 17.00(b). 17 CFR 17.00(b).
\1169\ Under Sec. 150.4(e)(2), which was adopted in the 2016
Final Aggregation Rulemaking, the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight is delegated authority to, among other things, provide
instructions relating to the format, coding structure, and
electronic data transmission procedures for submitting certain data
records. 17 CFR 150.4(e)(2). A subsequent rulemaking changed this
delegation of authority from the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight to the Director of the Office of Data and Technology, with
the concurrence of the Director of the Division of Enforcement. See
82 FR at 28763 (June 26, 2017). The proposed addition of Sec.
17.03(i) would conform Sec. 17.03 to that change in delegation.
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ii. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Proposed
Technical Changes to Part 17
The Commission did not receive any comments addressing these
changes and is adopting these technical changes as proposed.
I. Removal of Part 151
1. Summary of the 2020 NPRM--Removal of Part 151
Finally, the Commission proposed to remove and reserve part 151 in
response to its vacatur by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia,\1170\ as well as in light of the proposed revisions to part
150 that conform part 150 to the amendments made to CEA section 4a by
the Dodd-Frank Act.
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\1170\ See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying discussion.
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2. Comments and Summary of the Commission Determination--Removal of
Part 151
The Commission did not receive any comments regarding these changes
and is adopting these conforming changes as proposed.
III. Legal Matters
This section of the release sets forth certain legal determinations
by the Commission that underlie the determinations regarding the
specifics of the Final Rule set forth previously in this preamble, as
well as the reasons for those legal determinations and consideration of
relevant comments. Specifically, Part A sets forth the Commission's
determination that, in a rulemaking pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(2),
the Commission must find position limits to be ``necessary'' within the
meaning of paragraph 4a(a)(1). Part B sets forth the Commission's
interpretation of the criteria for finding position limits to be
necessary within the meaning of the statute. Part C sets forth the
Commission's necessity findings for the 25 core referenced futures
contracts. Part D sets forth the Commission's necessity finding for
futures contracts and options on futures contracts linked to a core
referenced futures contract. Finally, Part E sets forth the
Commission's necessity finding for spot and non-spot months.
A. Interpretation of Statute Regarding Whether Necessity Finding Is
Required for Position Limits Established Pursuant to CEA Section
4a(a)(2)
1. The Commission's Preliminary Interpretation in the 2020 NPRM
In the 2020 NPRM the Commission considered whether CEA section 4a,
as amended, requires the Commission to issue Federal position limits
for all physical commodities other than excluded commodities without
making its own antecedent finding that such position limits are
necessary. This was in response to ISDA, in which the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the CEA was ambiguous in
that respect. Specifically, the court held that where CEA section
4a(a)(2) (``paragraph 4a(a)(2)'') states that the Commission shall
issue such position limits ``[i]n accordance with the standards set
forth in paragraph (1),'' \1171\ it is unclear whether the
``standards'' include the requirement in paragraph (1) of CEA section
4a(a) (``paragraph 4a(a)(1)'') that the Commission establish such
limits as it ``finds are necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent''
specified burdens on interstate commerce.\1172\ In the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission preliminarily determined that paragraph 4a(a)(2) should be
interpreted as incorporating the necessity requirement of paragraph
4a(a)(1).\1173\ For the Final Rule, the Commission herein adopts that
determination as final, along with the reasoning set forth in the 2020
NPRM.
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\1171\ Paragraph 4a(a)(1) of the CEA states, in relevant part:
``Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale
of such commodity for future delivery made on or subject to the
rules of contract markets or derivatives transaction execution
facilities, or swaps that perform or affect a significant price
discovery function with respect to registered entities causing
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary burden on
interstate commerce in such commodity. For the purpose of
diminishing, eliminating, or preventing such burden, the Commission
shall, from time to time, after due notice and opportunity for
hearing, by rule, regulation, or order, proclaim and fix such limits
on the amounts of trading which may be done or positions which may
be held by any person, including any group or class of traders,
under contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market or derivatives
transaction execution facility, or swaps traded on or subject to the
rules of a designated contract market or a swap execution facility,
or swaps not traded on or subject to the rules of a designated
contract market or a swap execution facility that performs a
significant price discovery function with respect to a registered
entity as the Commission finds are necessary to diminish, eliminate,
or prevent such burden.''
\1172\ Paragraphs 4a(a)(1) and 4a(a)(2)(A); ISDA, 887 F. Supp.
2d at 280-81.
\1173\ 85 FR at 11659.
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[[Page 3385]]
The Commission's preliminary determination was based on a number of
considerations, set forth in detail in the 2020 NPRM.\1174\ Consistent
with the district court's instructions,\1175\ the Commission based its
determination both on analysis of the CEA's statutory language and on
application of the Commission's experience and expertise to relevant
facts and policy concerns.\1176\ Among the most important factual and
policy concerns relied upon by the Commission in the 2020 NPRM were:
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\1174\ Id. at 11659-11661.
\1175\ The court directed the Commission, on remand, to resolve
the ambiguity not by ``rest[ing] simply on its parsing of the
statutory language'' but by ``bring[ing] its experience and
expertise to bear in light of the competing interests at stake.'' 85
FR at 11659, quoting ISDA, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
\1176\ 85 FR at 11659-11661.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Absent the necessity-finding requirement, the language of
paragraph 4a(a)(2) would evidently require the imposition of some level
of position limits for a physical commodity even if limits at any level
would be likely to do more harm than good, including with respect to
public interests specifically identified in paragraph 4a(a)(1) and
elsewhere in section 4a or the CEA generally.\1177\ In addition to
being inconsistent with the thrust of section 4a taken as a whole, this
approach makes little sense as a matter of policy.\1178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1177\ Id. at 11659, citing as examples CEA sections 5,
4a(a)(2)(C), and 4a(a)(3)(B).
\1178\ Id. at 11660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(A) requires that position limits be set
``as appropriate.'' At a minimum, this language requires the Commission
to use its best judgment in determining the levels at which position
limits are set. In addition, there is authority from case law that the
word ``appropriate'' in a regulatory statute requires agencies to take
into account the costs of regulation, if only in a rough or approximate
way, and that consideration may preclude the considered action if the
costs are highly disproportionate.\1179\ The statute thus allows for
the possibility that, in establishing position limit levels for some
commodities or contracts, the Commission, in its judgment, may
determine that the optimal level is no limit at all. This possibility
does not harmonize with a requirement to impose limits for all physical
commodities, but is consistent with a requirement to impose limits
where they are necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1179\ See Michigan v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 2699, 2707-08, 2711 (2015)
(agency could not disregard major costs under statute requiring that
regulation be ``appropriate,'' but use of this word did not require
formal cost-benefit analysis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Requiring position limits without a necessity finding would be a
``sea change'' in derivatives regulation since it would involve a shift
from Federal limits on a small number of agricultural commodities to
limits on all physical commodities.\1180\ The Commission was skeptical
that Congress would have made such a change through ambiguous
language.\1181\ The Commission noted that there are currently over
1,200 listed futures contracts on physical commodities and that there
is no indication that Congress had concerns about, or even considered,
all of them.\1182\ To the contrary, the legislative history suggests
that enactment of paragraph 4a(a)(2) was driven, in part, by studies of
potential excessive speculation in a small number of particularly
important commodities.\1183\ This history is consistent with an
interpretation of the statute as requiring position limits for
commodities where controlling excessive speculation is most important,
absent statutory language that unambiguously requires limits for all
commodities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1180\ 85 FR at 11660.
\1181\ Id.
\1182\ Id.
\1183\ 85 FR at 1160 (discussing Congressional staff studies of
potential excessive speculation in oil, natural gas, and wheat).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. A necessity finding allows the Commission to apply its
experience and expertise to impose position limits where they are
likely to do the most good, taking into consideration the fact that
even well-crafted position limits create compliance costs and
potentially may have a negative effect on liquidity and forms of
speculation that benefit the market.\1184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1184\ 85 FR at 11660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission recognized that it was proposing
to change its interpretation regarding whether paragraph 4a(a)(2)
incorporates a requirement to find position limits necessary.\1185\ The
Commission noted that, in the preamble to the 2011 Final Rulemaking as
well as the Commission's subsequent position limits proposals,\1186\
the Commission had interpreted paragraph 4a(a)(2) to mandate the
imposition of position limits without the need for a necessity
finding.\1187\ As part of its preliminary determinations in the 2020
NPRM that the CEA does require a necessity finding, the Commission
explained in detail why the reasons it had previously given for the
``mandate'' approach do not compel that interpretation of the statute.
Taken as a whole, such reasons are insufficiently persuasive to
outweigh the factors that favor a necessity finding.\1188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1185\ Id. at 11658.
\1186\ See supra Section I.A.
\1187\ 85 FR at 11658.
\1188\ 85 FR at 11661-64. CEA Section 4a(a)(2), which was
enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, directs the Commission to
``establish'' limits on positions. The Commission does not interpret
this directive to apply to the nine legacy agricultural contracts
included in the list of core referenced futures contracts because
they are already subject to Federal position limits that have
existed for decades based on prior necessity findings pursuant to
CEA Section 4a(a)(1). Nevertheless, as discussed infra at Section
III.C, the Commission has determined that such limits are necessary.
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2. Comments on the Commission's Preliminary Interpretation in the 2020
NPRM and Commission Responses
In response to the Commission's preliminary interpretation provided
in the 2020 NPRM, a number of commenters stated that the Commission
must make a necessity finding before establishing position limits under
paragraph 4a(a)(2).\1189\ These commenters generally asserted that this
result was required by the language of the statute, although they did
not provide a detailed analysis of that language beyond that set forth
in the 2020 NPRM.\1190\ Some commenters also asserted that a necessity
finding is important to avoid imposing unwarranted costs on market
participants, a position consistent with the policy concerns that
entered into the Commission's preliminary determination that paragraph
4a(a)(2) requires a necessity finding.\1191\
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\1189\ E.g., Citadel at 2; EEI at 2-3; ISDA at 3; MFA/AIMA at 1,
14; SIFMA AMG at 1-2.
\1190\ Id.
\1191\ E.g., EEI at 3.
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A number of other commenters stated that the statute does not
require a necessity finding for the establishment of position limits
pursuant to paragraph 4a(a)(2).\1192\ These commenters made the
following points:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1192\ E.g., AFR at 1; Better Markets at 3-4, 64; IATP at 4;
NEFI at 2-3.
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a. Some commenters asserted that the language of paragraph 4a(a)(2)
requires the Commission to establish position limits for all physical
commodities without first determining that limits are necessary.\1193\
Commenters making this point emphasized the language of subparagraph
4a(a)(2)(A) stating that the Commission ``shall'' impose position
limits on physical commodities and the
[[Page 3386]]
language of subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(B) referring to position limits
``required'' by subparagraph 4a(a)(2)(A).\1194\ However, while these
words are suggestive of a mandatory requirement of some kind, they do
not dictate the conclusion that paragraph 4a(a)(2) requires position
limits across-the-board without a necessity finding, and to conclude
otherwise would contradict the holding in ISDA that the statutory text
is ambiguous.\1195\ The requirements of paragraph 4a(a)(2) are subject
to the condition that position limits be imposed ``[i]n accordance with
the standards set forth in paragraph [4a(a)(1)].'' The meaning of that
text, and specifically the meaning of ``the standards,'' is the primary
issue for the Commission to resolve here. For reasons explained above
and in the 2020 NPRM, these standards are best interpreted as including
the paragraph 4a(a)(1) necessity requirement.\1196\
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\1193\ E.g., Better Markets at 64 (incorporating by reference
amicus brief by Senators Levin et al. in the ISDA litigation). The
statute applies to all physical commodities ``other than excluded
commodities.'' 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2). The Commission here refers to
``all physical commodities'' for purposes of brevity only, and does
not mean to imply that the statute covers excluded commodities.
\1194\ E.g., Better Markets at 64; NEFI at 1. Better Markets
stated that the Commission should adopt the legal views set forth in
the amicus brief filed by certain U.S. Senators in the ISDA case.
Better Markets at 64. However, in ISDA, the district court stated
that ``[g]iven the fundamental ambiguities in the statute,'' it was
``not persuaded by their arguments.'' ISDA, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
\1195\ ISDA, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
\1196\ Other arguments against a necessity requirement made by
commenters based on the statutory wording have previously been
addressed in the 2020 NPRM. Compare Better Markets at 64
(incorporating by reference amicus brief by Senators Levin et al. in
the ISDA litigation) with 85 FR at 11661-64.
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b. Some commenters asserted that the legislative history of
paragraph 4a(a)(2) supports imposing limits on all physical commodities
without requiring a necessity finding.\1197\ Among the points
emphasized by commenters were that (1) certain bill language that
ultimately became paragraph 4a(a)(2) evolved from using the permissive
word ``may'' to the mandatory word ``shall''; and (2) the House
Committee on Agriculture voted out a predecessor bill containing
language similar to that of paragraph 4a(a)(2), and there are
indications that members of the committee viewed this language as
requiring limits for all physical commodities.\1198\ In the view of the
Commission, neither of these points is sufficient to resolve the
ambiguity in the language of paragraph 4a(a)(2) or dictate the
conclusion that the statute mandates position limits without a
necessity finding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1197\ E.g., Better Markets at 64 (incorporating by reference
amicus brief by Senators Levin et al. in the ISDA litigation).
\1198\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to the first point, there is no question that the final
version of paragraph 4a(a)(2) states that the Commission ``shall''
impose position limits. But, as explained above, this mandatory
language is explicitly subject to a requirement that limits be imposed
in accordance with the standards of paragraph 4a(a)(1), and that
condition is ambiguous. The commenters' second point was addressed in
detail in the 2020 NPRM.\1199\ Briefly, the House Committee on
Agriculture bill described by commenters was never approved by the full
House of Representatives.\1200\ Its language on position limits was
included in the Dodd-Frank Act, but discussion of this language in the
floor debate and conference committee report did not characterize it as
requiring limits for all physical commodities.\1201\ And nothing in the
legislative history specifies that the word ``standards'' in paragraph
4a(a)(2) excludes the paragraph 4a(a)(1) necessity requirement. As a
result, the legislative history, taken as a whole, does not resolve the
ambiguity in the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1199\ 85 FR at 11663.
\1200\ Id.
\1201\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Some commenters asserted that to require a necessity finding
construes the Dodd-Frank Act's amendment to section 4a as narrowing the
Commission's power to impose position limits, which is implausible as
an interpretation given the overall thrust of the Dodd-Frank Act and
the legislative history of paragraph 4a(a)(2).\1202\ However, the CEA
already required the Commission to find position limits necessary
before the Dodd-Frank Act, so continuing to require such a finding is
not a new constraint on the Commission.\1203\ And, even with a
necessity requirement, paragraph 4a(a)(2) imposes an important new duty
on the Commission: to affirmatively proceed to establish position
limits for physical commodities where limits are necessary, within a
specified period of time, including as to economically equivalent
swaps, and to report to Congress on the effects of those limits, if
any.\1204\ So the Commission's preliminary interpretation of the
statute is consistent with legislative history indicating that Congress
wanted the Commission to take action on the subject of position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1202\ E.g. AFR at 1.
\1203\ See paragraph 4a(a)(1). The House Committee on
Agriculture summarized this provision as giving the government ``the
power, after due notice and opportunity for hearing and a finding of
a burden on interstate commerce caused by such speculation, to fix
and proclaim limits on futures trading . . .'' H.R. Rep. No. 421,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935), stated more specifically in the
statutory text as authority to diminish, eliminate, or prevent
burdens that are ``undue and unnecessary.'' Public Law 74-675
section 5.
\1204\ See paragraphs 4a(a)(2) and 4a(a)(5), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2),
6a(a)(5); Public Law 111-203 Sec. 719(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Some commenters asserted that a necessity finding creates
unnecessary administrative obstacles to establishing position
limits.\1205\ In the view of the Commission, any extra needed
administrative activity is a reasonable tradeoff for the flexibility
and public policy benefits of imposing position limits only where they
are economically justified as an efficient means of addressing the
concerns Congress expressed in section 4a(a)(1). One commenter went
further and suggested that a requirement to find necessity could make
implementation and enforcement of position limits ``nigh to
impossible.'' \1206\ However, that commenter premised this assertion on
a different necessity standard, that the Commission is not adopting in
this rulemaking.\1207\ In the view of the Commission, the necessity
standard it is adopting herein is both consistent with the statute and
workable in practice, as demonstrated by the necessity findings below.
The workability of the Commission's standard is supported by a
commenter who was opposed to a requirement to find necessity but
nevertheless acknowledged that the necessity standard preliminarily
adopted in the 2020 NPRM is ``unlikely to limit the CFTC's practical
ability to impose Federal position limits.'' \1208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1205\ E.g., Better Markets at 4.
\1206\ IATP at 5.
\1207\ Id. IATP assumed the use of a necessity standard, which
it attributed to an industry group, requiring the Commission to,
among other things, ``determine the likelihood that a specific limit
would curtail excessive speculation in a specific market.'' Id. The
Commission has determined that the statute does not require that. 85
FR at 11664-66 and infra.
\1208\ Better Markets at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters who opposed a necessity-finding requirement also set
forth a number of justifications for broad use of Federal position
limits without asserting specifically that these concerns require
limits for all physical commodities or justify imposing limits without
finding them to be necessary. For example, commenters pointed out that
unjustified volatility in derivatives markets can have negative
consequences for price discovery and hedging in related non-financial
markets.\1209\ The Commission agrees with this point and agrees that
preventing these consequences is the major reason why the CEA provides
for position limits.\1210\ However, this observation does not justify
limits for all physical commodities since (a) the importance of the
link between derivatives markets and associated cash markets can vary
for
[[Page 3387]]
different commodities; and (b) good policy requires consideration of
the costs and burdens associated with position limits as well as their
potential preventative effects.\1211\ These points are discussed
further in sections of this release dealing with the Commission's legal
standard for necessity, necessity findings, and consideration of costs
and benefits pursuant to CEA section 15(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1209\ Id. at 25-29.
\1210\ See Congressional finding in first sentence of paragraph
4a(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1).
\1211\ In reaching this conclusion, the Commission draws upon
its experience and expertise in considering costs and benefits
before promulgating a rule, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 19(a). The
Commission believes that such consideration (which need not be
mathematical) leads to better outcomes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters opposed to a necessity-finding requirement also asserted
that exchanges cannot always be relied upon to establish optimal
position limits since they may benefit from revenue generated from high
levels of speculation, including, in some instances, high levels of
speculation by individual market participants.\1212\ To the extent that
this is so, it is a reason for Congress to authorize, and the
Commission to implement, position limits where needed. But it is not a
reason to apply them to physical commodities across the board for the
reasons just stated: The importance of unjustified volatility in
derivatives markets for the non-financial economy can vary, and
position limits have associated costs and burdens. Moreover, as
discussed earlier in the preamble, exchanges are subject to statutory
and regulatory obligations to establish position limits or position
accountability and must do so in accordance with standards established
by the Commission. Further, any incentives for exchanges to impose
suboptimal position limits are reduced because an exchange that leaves
itself open to an enhanced risk of excessive speculation, manipulation,
or other forms of unjustified pricing is likely to lose business from
traders seeking a stable market that reflects fundamental
conditions.\1213\
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\1212\ Better Markets at 22-24.
\1213\ See supra Section II.B.2.iv.b., for additional discussion
of exchange incentives and related statutory and regulatory
obligations to maintain market integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Commission Determination
Having reviewed the comments and further considered the issue, the
Commission has determined that the interpretation of paragraph 4a(a)(2)
as incorporating the requirement of paragraph 4a(a)(1) to find position
limits necessary before imposing them is the best interpretation of the
statute, and the Commission adopts this interpretation as its
interpretation under the Final Rule. This determination is based on the
reasons set forth above and in the relevant portion of the 2020
NPRM.\1214\ The Commission further recognizes that this determination
is a change from the Commission's earlier interpretation of paragraph
4a(a)(2) as not requiring a necessity finding. The Commission has
determined that the reasons previously given for such an interpretation
of paragraph 4a(a)(2) are not compelling for the reasons stated above
and in the relevant portion of the 2020 NPRM.\1215\ The specifics of
what the term ``necessary'' means in this context are discussed in the
next section, followed by the Commission's final necessity finding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1214\ 85 FR at 11658-61.
\1215\ Id. at 11661-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Legal Standard for Necessity Finding
For the reasons discussed above, paragraph 4a(a)(2) requires the
Commission to establish position limits to the extent they are
``necessary'' to ``diminish, eliminate, or prevent'' the burden on
interstate commerce in a commodity from ``sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price'' of the commodity
caused by excessive speculation in futures contracts (and options
thereon) or swaps.\1216\ In the 2020 NPRM the Commission preliminarily
interpreted this requirement and preliminarily reached several
conclusions about what sort of necessity finding the statute requires.
This section of the preamble (1) reviews the preliminary conclusions
set forth in the 2020 NPRM with some additional clarification and
elaboration; \1217\ (2) reviews and evaluates important points made in
comments regarding the CEA's statutory standard for finding necessity;
and (3) sets forth the Commission's conclusions for this Final Rule on
the legal standard for finding position limits to be necessary within
the meaning of CEA section 4a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1216\ The first sentence of paragraph 4a(a)(1) is a
Congressional finding that ``excessive speculation in any
commodity'' under futures contracts or certain swaps ``causing
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
price of such commodity'' is ``an undue and unnecessary burden on
interstate commerce in such commodity.'' 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1). The
second sentence of paragraph 4a(a)(1), referring back to the burden
on interstate commerce found in the first sentence, states that the
Commission shall establish such position limits ``as the Commission
finds are necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent such
burden.'' Id.
\1217\ Certain points relevant to the legal standard for
necessity that were made in a number of different sections of the
NPRM are integrated into the discussion of the legal standard here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Preliminary Legal Standard for Necessity in 2020 NPRM
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission reached a number of conclusions:
First, the CEA does not require the Commission to determine whether
excessive speculation in general may create a risk of sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of a
commodity or whether position limits are an effective tool for
controlling or preventing these potential effects.\1218\ Section
4a(a)(1) of the CEA contains a Congressional finding that ``[e]xcessive
speculation . . . causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in . . . price . . . is an undue and unnecessary
burden on interstate commerce in such commodity'' and prescribes
position limits for the purpose of ``diminishing, eliminating, or
preventing'' that burden.\1219\ The analysis in the 2020 NPRM accepted
those premises as established by Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1218\ 85 FR at 11664.
\1219\ See Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Hunt, 592 F.2d
1211, 1215 (7th Cir. 1979) (``Congress concluded that excessive
speculation in commodity contracts for future delivery can cause
adverse fluctuations in the price of a commodity, and authorized the
Commission to restrict the positions held or trading done by any
individual person or by certain groups of people acting in
concert.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the word ``necessary'' has a spectrum of legal meanings
from absolute physical necessity to merely useful or convenient.\1220\
The 2020 NPRM explained that it is unlikely Congress intended either
extreme.\1221\ The Commission preliminarily determined in the 2020 NPRM
that the necessity requirement is best interpreted as a directive to
establish position limits where they are economically justified as an
efficient mechanism to advance the Congressional goal of preventing
undue burdens on commerce in an underlying commodity caused by
excessive speculation in the associated futures or swaps markets.\1222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1220\ 85 FR at 11664.
\1221\ Id.
\1222\ Id. at 11665.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this approach, the Commission explained, position limits are
necessary where diminishing, eliminating, or preventing burdens on
commerce in a commodity caused by excessive speculation in the
associated derivatives market is likely to offer the greatest benefits
to the cash market for the commodity and the economy, and not where the
benefit of controlling or preventing such burdens is likely to be less
significant or to be accompanied by disproportionate costs or negative
consequences, including negative
[[Page 3388]]
consequences with respect to Congress's stated purpose, to prevent the
burdens of sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes
in price that burden interstate commerce.\1223\ For example, it may be
that for a given commodity, high levels of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuation or unwarranted changes in the price of a commodity would
have little overall impact on commerce in the cash commodity market or
the national economy. If the burdens or negative economic consequences
associated with position limits for that commodity, as discussed in the
Commission's consideration of costs and benefits, are out of proportion
to the likely economic benefits of position limits, it would be
unwarranted to impose them.\1224\ However, there are markets in which
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price
of a commodity caused by excessive speculation would have significantly
negative effects on the cash commodity market or the broader economy.
Even if such disruptions would be unlikely due to the particular
characteristics of the relevant derivatives market, the Commission may
nevertheless determine that position limits are necessary as a
prophylactic measure given the potential magnitude or impact of the
unlikely event.\1225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1223\ 85 FR at 11665.
\1224\ Id.
\1225\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's proposed test in the 2020 NPRM thus focused on the
Congressional purpose implicit in the finding in the first sentence of
paragraph 4a(a)(1): Protecting the cash commodity markets from such
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
price. The Commission specified that this standard cannot be determined
by a mathematical formula, but requires judgment by the Commission,
taking into account available facts but also based on the Commission's
experience and expertise.\1226\ The Commission further specified that
this standard includes consideration of costs and benefits under CEA
section 15(a), insofar as the Commission is required by that section to
consider the costs and benefits of its discretionary choices.\1227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1226\ 85 FR at 11665.
\1227\ Id. For further discussion of the cost-benefit
implications of the Commission's necessity finding with respect to
the 25 core referenced futures contracts, see infra Section IV.A.2.
For further discussion of the cost-benefit implications of Federal
position limits in light of existing exchange-set limits, see infra
Section IV.A.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In applying this necessity standard in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission identified two primary factors to be used in identifying
commodities where using position limits in derivatives markets to
control or prevent injury to the underlying commodity market would be
most valuable:
The first primary factor is the importance of the derivatives
market for a commodity to the operation of the market for the cash
commodity itself.\1228\ Examples of links between derivatives markets
and cash markets that exemplify this factor include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1228\ 85 FR at 11665, 11666.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. The extent to which volatility in the derivatives market is
likely to result in sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes in the price in the cash commodity market including, in
particular, the extent to which participants in the cash market rely on
the derivatives market as a price discovery mechanism. This includes
the use of futures prices for pricing cash-market transactions and the
use of futures prices for planning purposes, such as when farmers
decide what crops to plant or manufacturers estimate the cost of inputs
to their production processes.\1229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1229\ 85 FR at 11665, 11666.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The extent to which participants in the cash market use the
derivatives market for hedging.\1230\ The second primary factor
specified in the 2020 NPRM is the importance of the underlying
commodity to the economy as a whole.\1231\ In the view of the
Commission, evidence demonstrating either one of these primary factors
is sufficient to establish that position limits are necessary. This is
so because each primary factor identifies circumstances that present an
undue risk that disruptions to derivatives markets for a commodity will
have consequences for industries that produce and use the relevant
commodity and, ultimately, the general public that invests in and is
employed by those industries and purchases their end-products.\1232\
Thus, each of the primary factors relates to the statutory objective of
diminishing, eliminating, or preventing undue and unnecessary burdens
on interstate commerce in a commodity arising from excessive
speculation in associated derivatives contracts. Of course, to the
extent that both factors are present, a necessity finding will be
strengthened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1230\ Id. at 11666.
\1231\ Id. at 11665, 11666.
\1232\ See Id. at 11664, fn. 471, 11666-11670 (giving examples
as part of necessity finding).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission emphasized that a necessity
determination cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula, though data
may of course be highly relevant. To the extent that the primary
factors identified by the Commission cannot be directly measured, the
Commission, in the exercise of its judgment, may look to market data or
qualitative information that correlates with these factors for guidance
in applying them.\1233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1233\ See discussion in findings section below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to futures contracts and options contracts linked to
core referenced futures contracts, the Commission determined that
position limits are necessary for linked contracts because such
position limits are likely to make position limits for core referenced
futures contracts more effective in preventing manipulation and other
sources of sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes
in the price in the underlying commodity.\1234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1234\ 85 FR at 11619-11620. See also supra at Section
II.A.16.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's preliminary necessity finding in the 2020 NPRM
also took into consideration economic differences between derivatives
positions held during spot months and those held during other months
that affect the extent to which position limits are an efficient
mechanism for controlling or preventing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price in underlying
commodities. Specifically, the Commission stated that corners and
squeezes can occur only during the spot month.\1235\ Thus, certain
important sources of sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes in the price are present only during the spot month. While the
fact that certain types of disruptions in a given market may be
unlikely is not dispositive of the necessity question,\1236\ the
Commission judged that the impossibility of corners and squeezes in
non-spot months diminished the likelihood of excessive speculation
causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in
the price in underlying commodities to such an extent as to reduce the
benefit of position limits for those months below the point where, in
the Commission's judgment, position limits would be justified under the
necessity standard.\1237\ Nevertheless, the Commission did not rescind
existing non-spot month limits for legacy
[[Page 3389]]
agricultural contracts, because it did not observe problems that would
give a reason to eliminate them at this time.\1238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1235\ 85 FR at 11629.
\1236\ Id. at 11665.
\1237\ 85 FR at 11628. The Commission also believes that the
relevant benefits and burdens indicate that no level of new non-
spot-month limits is ``appropriate'' as that term is used in Section
4a(a)(2)(A). See discussion at Section IV.A.6.iii.b.
\1238\ 85 FR at 11628. Specifics of the Commission's findings
with regard to the need for limits during spot and non-spot months
are in the 2020 NPRM at 85 FR 11596, 11628, and supra at Sections
II.B.3. and II.B.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Comments and Commission Responses
Relatively few commenters addressed the substance of the
Commission's legal interpretation of what CEA section 4a requires in
order for the Commission to determine that position limits are
necessary for a particular commodity or contract. Major points made by
commenters, and the Commission's evaluation of these points include:
a. Several commenters stated that the necessity finding must be
``robust and data-driven.'' \1239\ The Commission agrees that the
agency is required to consider available data, to the extent that it is
relevant, in determining whether to establish position limits. At the
same time, the Commission interprets the statute as requiring it to
exercise judgment regarding the need for position limits where data is
not available. The statute does not specify the use of any particular
methodology, quantitative or otherwise, in determining whether position
limits are necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1239\ E.g. ISDA at 3; SIFMA AMG at 2. See also MFA/AIMA at 4
(advocating for individualized necessity findings based on detailed
analyses for each contract).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Commission must implement CEA section 4a in a
fashion consistent with the finding regarding excessive speculation and
its effects on commerce in the first sentence of paragraph 4a(a)(1) and
the directive in paragraph 4a(a)(2) that the Commission ``shall''
promptly establish position limits for physical commodities, albeit
subject to the necessity-finding requirement. These provisions imply
that the Commission must act on position limits, even if available data
is imperfect, so long as it has a reasonable basis for determining
limits to be necessary. Other language of CEA section 4a further
supports the conclusion that Congress intended the Commission to
consider available data but also to exercise judgment in establishing
position limits. For example, paragraph 4a(a)(2) requires that limits
be established ``as appropriate,'' which implies consideration of a
broad range of relevant factors, but subject to the reasonable exercise
of subjective judgment.\1240\ Similarly, paragraph 4a(a)(3)(B) lists
policy objectives for position limits that the Commission must achieve
``to the maximum extent possible'' but specifies that the Commission
must do this ``in its discretion.'' The Commission also believes it is
better policy to interpret ``as necessary'' to permit flexibility in
response to imperfect available data, so long as there is a reasonable
basis for its decisions.\1241\ Such flexibility may facilitate
achieving the objectives of the statute, whether by determining that
position limits either are necessary or not necessary in particular
circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1240\ See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.C. 743, 752 (2015).
\1241\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. One commenter, MGEX, supported the Commission's general approach
of focusing on the relationship between the derivatives market and the
underlying commodity in making necessity determinations.\1242\ This
commenter stated, ``As the Commission appropriately points out, it is
important to focus on derivatives that are vital to price discovery and
distribution of the underlying commodity so that any excessive
speculation may have a small impact.'' \1243\ The Commission agrees
with that statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1242\ MGEX at 1.
\1243\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. One commenter, Citadel, asserted that the statute required a
different test for a finding of necessity than that used by the
Commission.\1244\ According to this commenter, for each commodity
subject to position limits, the Commission must establish ``when and
how holding a large position in a given commodity could allow a market
participant to exert undue market power or influence.'' \1245\ The
commenter criticized the Commission for relying on the role core
referenced futures contracts play in price discovery and the fact that
they require physical delivery.\1246\ According to the commenter, the
Commission proposed position limits on certain commodities ``based
merely on their size or importance'' and ``did not explain why size or
importance, without more'' justifies position limits.\1247\ The
commenter expressed concern that the Commission's standard could set a
precedent for the establishment of position limits for additional
commodities in the future without adequate justification and therefore
could reduce investor participation in commodity markets in a fashion
that would impair the use of those markets for risk management and
commercial decision making.\1248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1244\ Citadel at 2-4. Somewhat similar views have been
expressed by other commenters in earlier phases of the Commission's
efforts to promulgate a position limits rule under paragraph
4a(a)(2). See, e.g., IATP at 5 (describing views of ISDA/SIFMA AMG
in connection with ISDA litigation).
\1245\ Citadel at 2.
\1246\ Id.
\1247\ Id.
\1248\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission disagrees with Citadel's interpretation of the CEA
section 4a necessity requirement and criticism of the Commission's
interpretation for several reasons, most of which have been stated
previously.
i. The statutory language does not state a requirement to make the
particular findings Citadel claims are necessary. To the contrary, it
includes a Congressional finding that excessive speculation can cause
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price
that are a burden on interstate commerce in commodities. The Commission
is required to establish position limits in light of that finding, and
neither Congress nor the Commission have ever required the sort of
showing Citadel suggests here with respect to individual
commodities.\1249\ It is not reasonable to surmise that Congress
intended Citadel's test to apply without saying so, particularly under
the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments, which reflect a Congressional intent,
or at least expectation, that the position limits regime be expanded.
The Commission also notes that Citadel set forth its proposed standard
for necessity in just a few sentences and did not spell out what sort
of data would be needed to comply with it in practice and how such data
would be used.\1250\ If there were any evidence that Congress intended
Citadel's approach, or if a case could be made that the Commission
should prefer it, such specifics would have been readily available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1249\ The Commission has made similar determinations in
connection with requirements for DCMs to impose position limits or
position accountability levels by DCM rule. E.g., Establishment of
Speculative Position Limits, 46 FR 50938, 50940 (Oct. 16, 1981)
(``it appears that the capacity of any contract market to absorb the
establishment and liquidation of large speculative positions in an
orderly manner is related to the relative size of such positions,
i.e., the capacity of the market is not unlimited''). See also 2020
NPRM, 85 FR at 11665-11666 (Commission has repeatedly found that all
markets in physical commodities are ``susceptible to the burdens of
excessive speculation'' because they ``have a finite ability to
absorb the establishment and liquidation of large speculative
positions in an orderly manner,'' but this characteristic of these
markets is not sufficient to establish that limits are necessary
within the meaning of paragraph 4a(a)(1) for all physical
commodities).
\1250\ Citadel at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 3390]]
ii. The Congressional finding at the beginning of paragraph
4a(a)(1) makes clear that Congress's primary concern was the effect of
excessive speculation in derivatives markets on the related cash
markets for the associated commodities. The Commission's focus on the
role the core referenced futures contracts play in price discovery and
hedging and the importance of certain commodities to the economy as a
whole therefore is directly responsive to the statutory purpose of
position limits. The Commission's focus on hedging and price discovery
is further supported by CEA section 3, which sets forth the purpose of
the CEA. Subsection 3(a) contains a Congressional finding that the
transactions subject to the CEA serve a ``national public interest'' by
providing a means for ``managing and assuming price risks'' (i.e.,
hedging and supporting hedging) ``discovering prices'' and
``disseminating pricing information.'' Subsection 3(b) states that the
purpose of the CEA, among other things, is to ``serve the public
interests'' described in subsection 3(a).\1251\ The Commission's focus
is thus consistent with the Congressional intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1251\ 7 U.S.C. 5(a), (b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's consideration of the size of the futures market
for the core referenced futures contracts also is consistent with the
statutory purpose. As explained below,\1252\ contracts with a large
volume of trading, generally speaking, are contracts that are likely to
be heavily used for price discovery and hedging by participants in the
cash market. It is rational to conclude that position limits are
unnecessary for contracts that play little role in price discovery or
for commodities that have a lesser economic footprint. In addition,
imposing position limits based on the size or importance of futures
markets is a rational way to avoid imposing compliance costs related to
position limits on futures contracts and related options contracts that
are relatively inactive or otherwise a minor part of the market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1252\ See infra Section III. (discussing necessity finding).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. As for Citadel's claim that the Commission's standard for
necessity will set a precedent for imposing position limits on
additional commodities in the future without adequate justification, if
the Commission were to establish additional position limits in the
future, it would need to justify that decision through reasoned
decision making in a new rulemaking, which would be subject to public
comment and judicial review to the same extent as other rules.
iv. Citadel's concern with adequate investor participation in the
derivatives markets applies to varying degrees with respect to all
position limits. The Commission has considered such effects, including
on liquidity and bona fide hedging, throughout this rulemaking,
including in its consideration of costs and benefits and in connection
with the determination of position limit levels.\1253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1253\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B)(iii) (position limits should be
set at level that ensures sufficient market liquidity for bona fide
hedgers to the maximum extent practicable in the discretion of the
Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. One commenter, IATP, endorsed a dissenting Commissioner's
criticism of the necessity standard set forth in the 2020 NPRM.\1254\
The criticism was to the effect that the standard ``boils down'' to the
assertion that the core referenced futures contracts are large and
critically important to the underlying cash markets.\1255\ However, for
reasons set forth above and in the 2020 NPRM, this is an incomplete
characterization of the Commission's standard. Moreover, as also
explained above and in the 2020 NPRM, importance to the cash market is
a criterion for necessity that flows directly from the statutory
purpose and, for reasons explained in the necessity findings section,
the amount of trading in a contract, generally speaking, is likely to
correlate with factors relevant to the statutory purpose, including use
of the contract for price discovery and hedging.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1254\ IATP at 4 (quoting dissenting statement of Commissioner
Berkovitz).
\1255\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While critical of the Commission's standard, IATP was even more
critical of a standard like that proposed by Citadel that would require
the Commission to ``determine the likelihood that a specific limit
would curtail excessive speculation in a specific market.'' \1256\
According to IATP, such a standard, in combination with a requirement
to avoid undue costs, would make implementation of position limits
``nigh to impossible.'' \1257\ However, whether or not such a standard
is possible to apply, the Commission has determined that the statute
does not require it, and that the Commission's approach to the
necessity finding is the one most consistent with the statutory
language and purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1256\ IATP at 5. IATP did not refer specifically to Citadel's
comment but to similar concepts in connection with the ISDA
litigation.
\1257\ IATP at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Many commenters asserted that necessity findings needed to be
made for each contract or commodity subject to position limits.\1258\
The Commission agrees with this interpretation of the statute, subject
to a number of clarifications and provisos.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1258\ E.g., ISDA at 3 (necessity determination must be made
``in connection with any specific position limits that are
adopted''); PIMCO at 3 (necessity determination should be made on a
``commodity-by-commodity and product-by-product basis''); MFA/AIMA
at 4 (advocating ``for individualized necessity findings based on
detailed analyses for each contract . . . including a more specific
necessity finding for each contract'').
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i. While the Commission must find position limits necessary for
each contract, it may do so based on different criteria for different
types of contracts so long as the criteria are reasonable and
consistent with the Commission's overall interpretation of the
necessity provision. For example, as described above, the Commission
has determined that, where limits are necessary for a core referenced
futures contract, position limits for contracts linked to the core
referenced futures contract are also necessary to enable position
limits on the associated core referenced futures contract to function
as intended.\1259\
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\1259\ For further discussion on contracts linked to core
referenced futures contracts, see Sections II.A.16. and III.D.
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ii. The statute does not require a necessity finding for
economically equivalent swaps for which position limits are required
pursuant to paragraph 4a(a)(5) of the CEA.\1260\ While a necessity
finding is required for position limits established under paragraph
4a(a)(2) because the Commission must apply ``the standards set forth in
paragraph [4a(a)(1)],'' no similar language appears in paragraph
4a(a)(5). To the contrary, paragraph 4a(a)(5)(A) states that position
limits for economically equivalent swaps must be established
``[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this section.'' Moreover,
the statute requires the Commission to develop position limits for
economically equivalent swaps ``concurrently'' with position limits
established under paragraph 4a(a)(2), and establish those limits
``simultaneously'' with those established under paragraph
4a(a)(2).\1261\ The necessity finding provision of paragraph 4a(a)(1)
therefore does not apply to economically equivalent swaps. Rather, when
position limits are necessary under paragraph 4a(a)(2), the requirement
to establish them for economically equivalent swaps is automatically
triggered under CEA section 4a(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1260\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5).
\1261\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to being compelled by the statutory language, this is a
reasonable
[[Page 3391]]
interpretation of the statute in policy terms because Congress could
reasonably have determined that the necessity finding for position
limits for futures contracts (and options thereon) carries over to
economically equivalent swaps by virtue of the fact that they are
economically equivalent.\1262\ The Commission notes that, while
paragraph 4a(a)(5) does not require the Commission to make a necessity
finding for economically equivalent swaps, it requires the Commission
to make policy judgments with respect to such swaps in connection with
the definition of what swaps are economically equivalent and the
requirement that limit levels be established ``as appropriate.'' \1263\
The relevant discussion with respect to the determination of what swaps
that are deemed to be ``economically equivalent swaps'' is set forth
elsewhere in this preamble.\1264\
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\1262\ Some commenters stated that the statute requires a
necessity finding for swaps. E.g., ISDA at 4. The Commission
generally agrees with this position for swaps, but not for
economically equivalent swaps for the reasons stated herein.
\1263\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5)(A), (B).
\1264\ See Section II.A.4.
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e. Some commenters asked the Commission to clarify that it finds
position limits not to be necessary for futures contracts other than
the referenced contracts specified in the rule.\1265\ The Commission
agrees that, for commodities falling within the scope of this
rulemaking, i.e., ``physical commodities other than excluded
commodities'' for which position limits are required by paragraph
4a(a)(2), the Commission has determined that position limits are
necessary only for the 25 core referenced futures contracts and any
associated referenced contracts on futures contracts or options on
futures contracts, but not for other futures contracts or options on
futures contracts.\1266\ As with any rulemaking, the necessity
determinations made in connection with this rule may change in the
future based on market developments, new information or analysis, or
changes in Commission policy.
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\1265\ E.g. SIFMA AMG at 5 (``spot month limits should apply
only to physically settled futures contracts (i.e., the core
referenced futures contracts), and the Commission should not make
any determinations on, or adopt final rules applicable to,
financially settled futures at this time.''); ISDA at 4 (stating
that the Commission should start with final rules only for
physically-settled contracts during the spot month.)
\1266\ As discussed above, while economically equivalent swaps
are encompassed within the ``referenced contract'' definition, such
swaps are subject to Federal position limits pursuant to 7 U.S.C.
6a(a)(5) and therefore are not subject to a necessity determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Commission Determination Regarding Necessity Standard
For these reasons and those set forth in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission adopts the interpretation of ``necessity'' set forth in the
2020 NPRM and clarified and elaborated upon here.
C. Necessity Finding as to the 25 Core Referenced Futures Contracts
1. Introduction
This Final Rule imposes Federal position limits on 25 core
referenced futures contracts, any futures contracts or options on
futures contracts directly or indirectly linked to the core referenced
futures contracts, and any economically equivalent swaps. As discussed
above, the Commission bases its necessity analysis on the following
propositions reflected in the text of CEA section 4a(a)(1). First, that
excessive speculation in derivatives markets can cause sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of an
underlying commodity. Second, that such price fluctuations and changes
are an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce in that
commodity. Third, that position limits can diminish, eliminate, or
prevent that burden. With these propositions established by Congress,
the Commission makes a further determination of whether it is necessary
to use position limits, Congress's prescribed tool to address those
burdens on interstate commerce, in light of the facts and
circumstances.
The Commission finds that position limits on the 25 core referenced
futures contracts identified in the 2020 NPRM are necessary to prevent
the economic burdens on interstate commerce associated with excessive
speculation causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes in the price of the commodities underlying these
contracts.\1267\ As in the 2020 NPRM, this necessity determination is
based on two interrelated factors: The importance of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts to their respective underlying cash
markets, including that they require physical delivery of the
underlying commodity; and the particular importance to the national
economy of the commodities underlying the 25 core referenced futures
contracts. The Commission analyzes both factors in turn below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1267\ See supra Section III.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Importance of the 25 Core Referenced Futures Contracts to Their
Respective Underlying Cash Markets
a. Link Between the Derivatives Market and Its Underlying Cash-Market
As explained in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission has determined that
position limits are necessary for physical commodities only where there
exists a physically-settled futures contract for two reasons. First,
physical settlement establishes a direct link between the futures
market and the cash market since futures contracts, while normally
closed out by offset, may be settled by delivery of the commodity
itself. This link helps to force convergence between futures contract
settlement prices and cash-market prices by ensuring that futures
prices in the delivery period reflect supply and demand in the cash-
market, whereas cash-settled futures contracts do not provide a direct
link because physical-delivery is not an option.\1268\ As a result, in
many circumstances, commercial participants use physically-settled
futures contracts for price discovery. Illustrative of this point, at
the May 2020 public meeting of the Commission's Energy and
Environmental Markets Advisory Committee, an industry representative
discussing application of position limits to power markets observed,
``In futures markets, where physically-settled contracts are
established, such as natural gas or crude oil, these physical contracts
effectively serve as the most important price discovery tool for the
spot market at baseload supply and demand for the delivery month is
managed with the physical futures or physical deals linked to it.''
\1269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1268\ See 85 FR at 11667. Many participants rely on the
possibility of settlement by physical delivery to foster convergence
at expiration of the futures contract. Id. Because of imperfect
contract design or other factors, the convergence mechanism does not
always work as hoped in practice. Id. at 11676, fn. 575. Such
malfunctions are considered to be a public policy concern because
bona fide hedgers and other participants seek to hedge cash-market
prices with futures contract prices. Id. at 11667.
\1269\ See Transcript of Committee Meeting at 46:19-47:06,
Comment by Nodal Exchange, Inc., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Energy and Environmental Markets Advisory Committee
(2020), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020/06/1591218221/eemactranscript050720.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, physically-settled contracts may be at risk of corners and
squeezes, because the settlement mechanism of the contract requires
participants with short positions to deliver the underlying commodity
at expiration.\1270\ Physical
[[Page 3392]]
settlement therefore may increase the sources of the risk of sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of the
underlying commodity arising from excessive speculation.\1271\ Applying
position limits to commodities where there is a physically-settled core
referenced futures contract therefore is consistent with the
Commission's interpretation of the paragraph 4a(a)(1) necessity
requirement as directing the Commission to impose limits where they are
most likely to be an efficient mechanism for achieving the statutory
objectives.\1272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1270\ 85 FR at 11672. For example, based on its general
experience, the Commission recognizes that if the underlying
commodity is ``cornered'' and the participant with the short
position does not already have the commodity to deliver, then the
short participant must exit its position through an offsetting long
position. As a consequence, the participant will likely have to bid
up the price of the futures contract to exit the market, thus
``squeezing'' the short to pay a higher price for the offsetting
long position. Conversely, for a cash-settled contract, a market
participant who has cornered the cash market for an underlying
commodity cannot squeeze someone who is short the cash-settled
futures contract because the short does not have to acquire the
underlying commodity to make delivery to the long in a cash-settled
contract.
\1271\ See 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(3)(B)(ii) (identifying deterrence and
prevention of corners and squeezes as one of the objectives of
position limits required by 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(2)).
\1272\ See ISDA at 3-4 (suggesting that the Commission
``finalize the proposed Federal position limits rules only for
physically delivered spot month futures contracts, in the first
phase . . . as the Commission finds are necessary to . . . prevent
[e]xcessive speculation . . . .'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The 25 Core Referenced Futures Contracts Are Used for Hedging and
Price Discovery
In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission presented information supporting
its determination that the proposed 25 core referenced futures
contracts are used extensively for hedging and price discovery, thus
establishing a close link between the markets for these futures
contracts and commerce in the relevant commodities.\1273\ The
Commission's conclusions on this point are further supported by
comments discussing the use of particular core referenced futures
contracts for hedging and price discovery, or discussing more generally
the use of futures contracts for hedging and price discovery in the
context of the Commission's proposed rule.\1274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1273\ 85 FR at 11666-71.
\1274\ See, e.g., ASR at 1 (stating that ICE Sugar No. 11 and
ICE Sugar No. 16 are commonly used by commercial participants for
hedging.); NGSA at 12 (``Physical market participants currently
hedge Henry Hub price risk through both physically settled and
financially-settled futures contracts.''); Cargill at 2
(``Commercial end-users . . . rely on the futures and derivatives
markets to perform vital functions including price discovery and
risk management related to significant physical commodity
origination, production and processing, transportation, purchasing
and sales, among other things.''); EEI/EPSA at 2 (``The Joint
Associations members are not financial entities. Rather, they are
physical commodity market participants that rely on futures and
swaps to hedge and mitigate their commercial risk.''); ADM at 2
(``Many . . . [futures] transactions are critical elements of risk
management, price discovery and hedging while also playing a role in
the acquisition of physical commodities.''); CMC at 1 (noting that
commercial participants ``use futures markets to hedge risk
exposures related to commercial activities in physical
commodities.''); DECA at 2 (``The [Cotton] CT contract plays an
indispensable role in the global cotton ecosystem and it is needed
to provide price discovery for all market participants.''); AFIA at
2 (``As commercial end-users, AFIA's members prioritize the need for
[futures] markets to work well for their primary function of price
discovery and risk management.); NGFA at 2 (``The NGFA's member
firms are bona fide hedgers who hedge physical commodity risk and
depend on futures markets for price discovery and risk
management.''); ACSA at 5 (``. . . the futures delivery process is
essential to maintaining functioning agricultural markets, price
discovery, and convergence.''); PMAA at 1 (``For decades, petroleum
marketers have been utilizing oil and refined product futures
markets for their hedging needs to protect customers from volatility
and price spikes. Well-functioning markets are critical to commodity
price discovery.''); CCI at 3 (``In addition to covering timing
differentials in commodity prices, intra-commodity spreads perform
an important function in energy markets by, among other things,
promoting price discovery and convergence as well as providing
liquidity for priced-linked, physically-settled and cash-settled
Referenced Contracts in the same underlying commodity during the
spot month as market participants manage their risks across
markets.''). See also NFP Electric Associations, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule on Position Limits for Derivatives and Aggregation of
Positions (July 3, 2014), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=59934&SearchText= (noting that the ``[energy]
markets . . . provide commercial risk management opportunities and
achieve price convergence between futures and cash-market prices for
the benefit of commercial hedgers and their counterparties.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 25 core referenced futures contracts also serve as key
benchmarks for use in pricing cash-market and other transactions.\1275\
For example, NYMEX NY Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB) is the main benchmark
used for pricing gasoline in the U.S. petroleum products market, a huge
physical market with total U.S. refinery capacity of approximately 9.5
million barrels per day of gasoline.\1276\ Similarly, the NYMEX NY
Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO) contract is the main benchmark used for
pricing the distillate products market, which includes diesel fuel,
heating oil, and jet fuel.\1277\ The utility of the price discovery
function for these futures contracts is thus impactful for commercial
participants regardless of whether they are actively trading in the
futures market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1275\ See, e.g., USDA Economic Research Service, Contracts,
Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of
Agricultural Commodities, Agricultural Economic Report No. 837, at 6
(Nov. 2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/41702/14700_aer837_1_.pdf?v.=41061 (one-third of all U.S. agricultural
production is produced under contracts using pricing formulas
determined by reference to futures prices); see also Paul Peterson,
Fixing Prices and Fixing Markets, farmdoc daily (4): 118, Department
of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign (June 25, 2014), https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/06/fixing-prices-and-fixing-markets.html (explaining that
futures markets provide price discovery for cash grain spot markets
and how price discovery through negotiated prices has diminished
over time).
\1276\ See 85 FR at 11669.
\1277\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also evidence that the 25 core referenced futures
contracts are the physically-settled contracts in physical commodities
traded on U.S. exchanges that, by and large, are most used for hedging
and price discovery by cash-market participants. Unfortunately, the
Commission does not have information that permits a direct comparative
measurement of the extent to which each of the actively traded futures
contracts is used for hedging and price discovery. However, available
statistics from exchanges show that the 25 core referenced futures
contracts, with the partial exception of CBOT Oats (O), a legacy
contract, are the most actively traded physically-settled contracts in
physical commodities, as measured by open interest and trading volume.
As discussed in detail further below, the most actively traded futures
contracts will usually be the contracts that are most used for hedging
and price discovery.
[[Page 3393]]
To follow up on the discussion of trading activity in the 2020
NPRM,\1278\ the Commission analyzed average total open interest \1279\
and average notional open interest \1280\ for all physically-settled
futures contracts for the period between January 2019 and December
2019.\1281\ From that data, the Commission assessed the 30 largest
physically-settled contracts in terms of average total open interest
and average notional open interest for comparison.\1282\ These 30
contracts comprised the 25 core referenced futures contracts, and the
five physically-settled physical commodity contracts with the next-
highest amounts of average total open interest and average notional
open interest. As shown in the tables below, there is a significant
drop in open interest between CBOT Oats (O), which has the lowest open
interest of the core referenced futures contracts, and CME Random
Length Lumber (LBS), which is the 27th largest physically-settled
futures contract and has the second highest open interest of the five
contracts not selected from the group of 30 contracts.\1283\
Specifically, average total open interest in CBOT Oats (O) (5,630 OI)
is almost twice the size of average total open interest in CME Random
Length Lumber (LBS) (3,025 OI).\1284\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1278\ See id. at 11666, 11668-70.
\1279\ Open interest refers to the total number of outstanding
futures contracts that have not been offset at the end of the
trading day.
\1280\ Notional value means the value of average open interest
without adjusting for delta in options.
\1281\ The 25 core referenced futures contract are all long-
standing, established contracts. Generally speaking, for purposes of
this Final Rule, the Commission focused on mature contract markets
with at least five years of reported open interest and volume. For
example, the Commission notes that the ICE Canola Futures (RS) and
NYMEX WTI Houston Crude Oil Futures (HCL) contracts appear to have
characteristics similar to those which the Commission has found
support a necessity finding, but these contracts are both much
newer, and the Commission finds that this militates against finding
a position limit necessary until their respective markets mature
further. The Commission may consider a position limit necessary for
one or both in the future, as it revisits these issues from time to
time as required by statute.
\1282\ As discussed in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission also
analyzed FIA end of month open interest data for December 2019 and
FIA 12-month total trading volume data (January 2019 through
December 2019) and reached the same conclusion as discussed herein.
See 85 FR at 11670.
\1283\ Many commenters suggested that the Commission's final
rule should demonstrate that position limits are necessary on a
``commodity-by-commodity basis'' as supported by empirical evidence
or data. See, e.g. PIMCO at 3; ISDA at 3; SIFMA AMG at 2; MFA/AIMA
at 4. As discussed in Section III.B.2.a., supra, the Commission
agrees that the agency is required to consider relevant data, where
available, in determining whether to establish position limits. The
Commission however notes that the CEA does not specify the use of
any particular methodology, quantitative or otherwise, in
determining whether position limits are necessary.
\1284\ During the period January 1, 2019 through December 31,
2019, the NYMEX Loop Crude Oil Storage (LPS) futures contract had
higher open interest than four of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts and the remaining largest contracts that were not
selected, as shown in the chart below. The Commission, however,
notes that the contract is a capacity allocation contract, which
gives the buyer of the contract the legal right to store crude oil
at a storage facility in Louisiana for a specified calendar month.
The Commission further notes that the contract is a newer one, has
fewer reportable traders, and significantly lower average daily
trading volume (NYMEX Loop Crude Oil Storage (LPS) 131 Vol.) and
average notional value than any of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts during this same period. In addition, open interest in the
contract has dropped precipitously between January 1, 2020 and
September 30, 2020. The Commission finds that all of these reasons
militate against finding a position limit necessary for this
contract until its market matures further. The Commission may
consider a position limit necessary for this contract in the future,
as it revisits these issues from time to time as required by
statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the exception of CBOT Oats (O),\1285\ as shown in the tables
below, the average notional open interest values for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are all substantially larger and more
valuable than the five contracts that were not selected. Specifically,
outstanding futures average notional values range from approximately $
33 billion for CBOT Corn (C) to approximately $ 80 million for CBOT
Oats (O), with the other core referenced futures contracts on
agricultural commodities all falling somewhere in between.\1286\
Outstanding futures average notional values of the core referenced
futures contracts on metal commodities range from approximately $ 80
billion in the case of COMEX Gold (GC), to approximately $ 3.6 billion
in the case of NYMEX Platinum (PL), with the other metals core
referenced futures contracts all falling somewhere in between.\1287\
With regard to energy commodities, futures average notional values
range from $ 116.7 billion in the case of NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil
(CL) to $ 28.3 billion in the case of NYMEX NY Harbor RBOB Gasoline
(RB).\1288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1285\ See supra Section II.B.1. (discussing CBOT Oats (O)
legacy contract status).
\1286\ Calculations are based on data submitted to the
Commission pursuant to part 16 of the Commission's regulations.
\1287\ Id.
\1288\ Id.
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[[Page 3394]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.013
In addition to open interest and notional value, the Commission
analyzed average daily trading volume \1290\ for the period January 1,
2019 through December 31, 2019 and notes that trading volume on the 25
core referenced futures contracts is also generally larger than trading
volume on the five contracts that were not selected. For example, the
CBOT Corn (C) and CBOT Soybean (S) contracts trade over 409,000 and
211,000 contracts respectively per day.\1291\ The COMEX Gold (GC)
contract trades approximately 343,288 contracts daily.\1292\ The NYMEX
Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL) contract, which is the world's most liquid
and actively traded crude oil contract, trades nearly 1.2 million
contracts a day, and the NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) contract
trades on average approximately 409,480 contracts daily.\1293\ In
contrast, the CME Random Length Lumber (LBS), CBOT Ethanol (EH), COMEX
Aluminum (ALI), and NYMEX Mont Belvieu Spot Ethylene In-Well (MBE)
contracts, which were not selected, trade approximately 645, 315, 123,
and 15.7 contracts respectively per day.\1294\
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\1289\ Id.
\1290\ Daily trading volume represents the total quantity of
futures contracts traded within a day.
\1291\ Calculations are based on data submitted to the
Commission pursuant to part 16 of the Commission's regulations.
\1292\ Id.
\1293\ Id.
\1294\ Id. The average daily trading volume for CBOT Oats (O)
(645.04 Vol) is approximately the same as the average daily trading
volume for CME Random Length Lumber (LBS) (645.56 Vol), which is the
largest contract in terms of volume of the five contracts that were
not selected. While the average daily trading volume for ICE Sugar
No. 16 (SF) (307.32 Vol), which is the smallest of the 25 core
contracts in terms of volume, is less than the average daily trading
volume for both CME Random Length Lumber (LBS) (645.56 Vol) and CBOT
Ethanol (EH) (315.7 Vol), the Commission notes that many commercial
participants frequently use both ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) and ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) together for hedging and price discovery because the
underlying commodity is the same for both contracts. See infra
Section III.C.5. (discussing the ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) and ICE Sugar
No. 11 (SB) contracts).
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[[Page 3395]]
There are a number of reasons to expect that, generally speaking,
the most actively traded futures contracts will usually be the
contracts that are most used for hedging and price discovery. First, it
is generally accepted that successful futures contracts usually require
active market participation by hedgers as well as speculators.\1295\ It
is therefore reasonable to expect that some significant proportion of
the activity in the most active futures contracts will normally consist
of hedging and not solely consist of purely speculative trading. In
addition, the most active futures contracts are likely to be the most
liquid, at least most of the time. Such contracts are likely to be
heavily relied upon as sources of price information because their
prices reflect the collective opinion of more traders and are therefore
likely to be a more accurate representation of the underlying cash-
market price conditions.\1296\ While the correlation between the
magnitude of trading activity and use of a contract for hedging and
price discovery is likely imperfect, it provides reason to expect that
the 25 core referenced futures contracts are, on the whole, the
physically-settled contracts in physical commodities traded on U.S.
exchanges that are most used for hedging and price discovery. This is
particularly true given the very large gap in activity levels between
most of the 25 core referenced futures contracts and physically-settled
contracts not included as core referenced futures contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1295\ See, e.g., Holbrook Working, Futures Trading and Hedging,
43 a.m. Econ. Rev. 314, 319-320 (June 1953), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811346?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents. See
also William L. Silber, Innovation, Competition, and New Contract
Design in Futures Markets, 1 J. of Futures Markets 129, 131 (Summer
1981), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/fut.3990010205.
\1296\ See, e.g., 85 FR at 11669, fn. 522-523. See generally
William L. Silber, The Economic Role of Financial Futures, in
Futures Markets: Their Economic Role 83, 89-90 (A. Peck ed., Am.
Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y Rsch. 1985), https://legacy.farmdoc.illinois.edu/irwin/archive/books/Futures-Economic/Futures-Economic_chapter2.pdf (discussing the price discovery and
hedging functions of futures markets).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Conclusion Regarding Importance of the 25 Core Referenced Futures
Contracts to Their Respective Underlying Cash Markets
Based on the information set forth in the NPRM and supplemented
here, the Commission concludes that the importance of the 25 core
referenced futures contracts to their respective underlying cash
markets supports the conclusion that position limits are necessary for
these contracts.
3. Importance of the Commodities Underlying the 25 Core Referenced
Futures Contracts to the National Economy
With respect to the second factor, importance of the cash commodity
to the U.S. economy as a whole, the 2020 NPRM set forth information
demonstrating that each of the 25 core referenced futures contracts is
important to the U.S. economy in various ways.\1297\ Many of the 25
core referenced futures contracts involve commodities that are among
the most important physical commodities for the U.S. economy, among
those commodities for which physically-settled contracts are traded on
U.S. exchanges.\1298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1297\ See 85 FR at 11666-11671.
\1298\ See, e.g., 85 FR at 11668 (discussing agricultural
commodities and their downstream uses), id. at 11669-70 (discussing
energy contracts).
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For example, in the agricultural sector, three of the top five
commodities in the United States, as measured by cash receipts,
underlie core referenced futures contracts, including cattle, corn, and
soybeans.\1299\ An additional commodity that underlies several core
referenced contracts, wheat, is in the top ten.\1300\ Primary energy
commodities that underlie core referenced futures contracts,
specifically crude oil and natural gas, account for over half of U.S.
energy production.\1301\ Two additional core referenced futures
contracts in the energy space, NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil
(HO) and NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB), relate, in turn, to
commodities that are among the most widely used byproducts of crude
oil.\1302\
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\1299\ USDA Economic Research Service, Cash receipts by State,
commodity ranking and share of U.S. total, 2019 Nominal (current
dollars), https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17843.
\1300\ Id.
\1301\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy
Review, Primary Energy Production by Source, Table 1.2 (last updated
Sept. 2020), https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec1_5.pdf.
\1302\ See, e.g., U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S.
petroleum flow, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/flow/petroleum.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, based on the information set forth in the NPRM and
supplemented here, the importance of the underlying commodity to the
national economy supports the conclusion that position limits are
necessary for the 25 core referenced futures contracts.
4. Commodity Indices
As an independent check on its selection of core referenced futures
contracts, the Commission has compared its list with the lists of
commodities included in several widely-tracked third-party commodity
indices: The Bloomberg Commodity Index, the S&P GSCI index, and the
Rogers International Commodity Index. Based on the criteria used to
create these indices, inclusion of a commodity in the index is an
indication that the commodity is important to the world or U.S.
economy, and that futures prices for the commodity are considered to be
an important source of price information. In particular, Bloomberg
states that it selects commodities for its Bloomberg Commodity Index
that in its view are ``sufficiently significant to the world economy to
merit consideration,'' that are ``tradeable through a qualifying
related futures contract'' and that generally are the ``subject of at
least one futures contract that trades on a U.S. exchange.'' \1303\
Similarly, S&P's GSCI index is, among other things, ``designed to
reflect the relative significance of each of the constituent
commodities to the world economy.'' \1304\ Likewise, the Rogers
International Commodity Index ``represents the value of a basket of
commodities consumed in the global economy'' that are ``tracked via
futures contracts on 38 different exchange-traded physical
commodities'' and that ``aims to be an effective measure of the price
action of raw materials not just in the United States but also around
the world.'' \1305\
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\1303\ The Bloomberg Commodity Index Methodology, Bloomberg, at
16-17 (Jan. 2020), https://data.bloomberglp.com/professional/sites/10/BCOM-Methodology.pdf.
\1304\ S&P GSCI Methodology, S&P Dow Jones Indices, at 8 (May
2020), https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/commodities/sp-gsci/#overview.
\1305\ The RICI Handbook, The Guide to the Rogers International
Commodity Index, at 4-5 (Aug. 2020), https://www.rogersrawmaterials.com/documents/RICIHndbk_01.31.19.pdf.
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Applying these criteria, Bloomberg, S&P, and Rogers have all deemed
eligible for inclusion in their indices lists of commodities that
overlap significantly with the Commission's 25 core referenced futures
contracts. In particular, Bloomberg, S&P, and Rogers include 17, 15,
and 22 contracts respectively per index of the 25 contracts selected by
the Commission.\1306\ Independent index
[[Page 3396]]
providers thus appear to have arrived at similar conclusions to the
Commission's necessity finding regarding the relative importance of
certain commodity markets for the economy and price discovery. The
indices, taken individually or as a whole, support the Commission's
conclusion that position limits are necessary for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts.
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\1306\ The 17 Bloomberg contracts are ICE Coffee C (KC), COMEX
Copper (HG), CBOT Corn (and Mini-Corn) (C), ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT),
COMEX Gold (GC), NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), CME
Live Cattle (LC), NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG), NYMEX New York
Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB), COMEX Silver (SI), CBOT Soybeans (and
Mini-Soybeans) (S), CBOT Soybean Meal (SM), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO),
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), CBOT Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT KC HRW
Wheat (KW), and NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL). See https://data.bloomberglp.com/professional/sites/10/BCOM-Methodology.pdf.
The 15 S&P GSCI contracts are ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE Coffee C (KC),
CBOT Corn (and Mini-Corn) (C), ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), COMEX Gold
(GC), NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), CME Live Cattle
(LC), NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG), NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB
Gasoline (RB), COMEX Silver (SI), CBOT Soybeans (and Mini-Soybeans)
(S), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), CBOT Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT KC
HRW Wheat (KW), and NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL). See S&P GSCI
Methodology, S&P Dow Jones Indices, at 26 (May 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/commodities/sp-gsci/#overview. The
22 Rogers contracts are ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE Coffee C (KC), COMEX
Copper (HG), CBOT Corn (and Mini-Corn) (C), ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT),
COMEX Gold (GC), NYMEX New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), CME
Live Cattle (LC), NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG), CBOT Oats (O),
ICE FCOJ-A (OJ), NYMEX Palladium (PA), NYMEX Platinum (PL), NYMEX
New York Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB), CBOT Rough Rice (RR), COMEX
Silver (SI), CBOT Soybeans (and Mini-Soybeans) (S), ICE Sugar No. 11
(SB), CBOT Wheat (and Mini-Wheat) (W), CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW), MGEX
Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE), and NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL).
See https://www.rogersrawmaterials.com/weight.asp.
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5. Comments on Proposed Necessity Finding for Core Referenced Futures
Contracts
While some commenters asserted that position limits are mandatory
for all physical commodities, no commenter argued that the necessity
finding should apply to any particular contract other than the 25 core
referenced futures contracts.\1307\
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\1307\ E.g., NEFI at 2 (supporting Federal position limits for
all 25 core referenced futures contracts, but stating that the list
is too limited because it included only four energy contracts and
that Congress imposed a clear mandate to establish limits on all
commercially-traded energy derivatives); Better Markets at 64.
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Only one commenter advocated that the Commission remove commodities
from the proposed list of 25 core referenced futures contracts. That
commenter, IFUS, objected to imposing Federal position limits on its
Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract.\1308\ IFUS argued that the Sugar No. 11
(SB) contract does not have ``a major significance to U.S. interstate
commerce'' because the contract prices the physical delivery of raw
cane sugar for more than 30 delivery points around the world and only a
de minimis amount of the raw sugar represented by the contract can be
imported into the U.S. under U.S. sugar tariff-rate quotas.\1309\ In
addition, IFUS stated that the Commission's necessity finding does not
establish that ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) is used for price discovery for
sugar produced and consumed in the United States.\1310\
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\1308\ IFUS at 3. The ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) ``contract prices
the physical delivery of raw cane sugar free-on-board the receiver's
vessel to a port within the country of origin of the sugar.'' See
Sugar No. 11 Futures Product Specs, Intercontinental Exchange
website, available at https://www.theice.com/products/23/Sugar-No-11-Futures. The United States is one of the delivery points for the
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract because U.S. origin raw cane sugar is
one of the 29 deliverable origins under the contract. Id.
\1309\ IFUS at 3-4.
\1310\ IFUS at Exhibit 1, No. 52.
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The Commission has considered the comments and is adopting the list
of the 25 core referenced futures contracts as proposed, including
incorporating the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract as a core referenced
futures contract. In response to IFUS' comment, the Commission
recognizes that ``Sugar No. 11 (SB) is primarily an international
benchmark.'' \1311\ The Commission, however, disagrees with IFUS'
comment that the Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract does not have a major
significance to U.S. interstate commerce or play a role in price
discovery for sugar produced and consumed in the United States.\1312\
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\1311\ 85 FR at 11668, fn. 507.
\1312\ The Commission notes that IFUS did not object to the
inclusion of ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) as a core referenced futures
contract in the 2020 NPRM. The ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) ``contract
prices physical delivery of US-grown (or foreign origin with duty
paid by deliverer) raw cane sugar at one of five U.S. refinery ports
as selected by the receiver.'' See Sugar No. 16 Futures Product
Specs, Intercontinental Exchange website, available at https://www.theice.com/products/914/Sugar-No-16-Futures. The same commodity,
raw centrifugal cane sugar based on 96 degrees average polarization,
underlies both ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) and ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contracts. Id. See also Sugar No. 11 Futures Product Specs,
Intercontinental Exchange website, available at https://www.theice.com/products/23/Sugar-No-11-Futures. Both contracts also
trade on IFUS in units of 112,000 pounds per contract. Id.
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For several reasons, the Commission finds that the ICE Sugar No. 11
(SB) contract has sufficient connection to the domestic sugar market to
warrant Federal position limits. First, USDA data reflects that roughly
one-quarter of the annual U.S. raw sugar supply is imported.\1313\
While U.S. imports may be a small percentage of the total sugar
represented by open interest in the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract,
U.S. imports still account for a significant percentage of the total
U.S. raw sugar supply. As described below, Commission data suggests
that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract is used for price discovery and
hedging within the United States. Thus, when the contract is being used
by commercial participants for price discovery or hedging in the
domestic raw sugar market, it is therefore reasonable to expect that
any sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
global price of raw sugar could impose significant disruptions or harms
to the domestic raw sugar markets. Because the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract represents a material portion of the U.S. sugar market, the
Commission determines that it is necessary to include it as a core
referenced futures contract to protect against any sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes, which could result in
undue burdens on the U.S. economy. Additionally, as further discussed
below, since the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract represents a material
portion of the U.S. raw sugar supply, the Commission concludes that
disruptions to this contract potentially could harm both the price
discovery process for the domestic sugar markets as well as the
physical delivery of the underlying commodity.
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\1313\ USDA Economic Research Service, Sugar and Sweeteners
Yearbook Tables, World Production, Supply, and Distribution, at
Table 1 (July 19, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/sugar-and-sweeteners-yearbook-tables. For example, between 2009 and
2019, the United States has imported between 22.7% and 28.6% of its
raw sugar from other countries. Id. In 2019, the United States
imported approximately 3 million metric tons of sugar from other
countries whose sugar is deliverable under the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
contract. See USDA, U.S. Sugar Monthly Import and Re-Exports, Final
Report, Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 2019), https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/fy_2019_final_sugar_report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract is listed on IFUS, a DCM
registered with the Commission that lists derivatives contracts for
trading by U.S. participants in the United States, among others. Data
reported to the Commission through Form 102s reflects that domestic
firms account for approximately 20% of commercial market participants
and 65%-70% of the non-commercial market participants trading in the
ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract.\1314\ This data supports the
Commission's finding that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract is ``used
for price discovery and hedging within the United States.'' \1315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1314\ See also ASR at 1 (stating that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB)
and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) contracts are commonly used by commercial
participants for hedging).
\1315\ 85 FR at 11668, fn. 507.
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Finally, as the Commission noted in the 2020 NPRM, the Commission
believes that the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF)
contracts together ``[a]s a pair'' are ``crucial tools for risk
management and for ensuring reliable pricing.'' \1316\ The Commission's
view is informed by the fact that both ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) and ICE
Sugar No. 16 (SF) call for delivery of the same size and quality of raw
cane sugar, with the
[[Page 3397]]
former contract calling for delivery from 29 different country origins
of growth, including the United States, and the latter contract calling
for delivery of domestic origin.\1317\ This implies that there is
likely to be a common group of market participants trading in both
contracts. Based on its experience in other markets, the Commission
understands that U.S. firms may utilize both contract markets to hedge
cash positions and offset other related risks even if their inventories
cannot be delivered against both contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1316\ Id.
\1317\ See ICE Sugar No. 16 Futures Product Specs,
Intercontinental Exchange website, available at https://www.theice.com/products/914/Sugar-No-16-Futures; see also Sugar No.
11 Futures Product Specs, Intercontinental Exchange website,
available at https://www.theice.com/products/23/Sugar-No-11-Futures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In that regard and as discussed above in Section III.C.2.b, the
Commission analyzed average open interest and average notional values
for ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) and ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) for the period
January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019. Specifically, average open
interest in ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) (947,198 OI) is more than 100 times
the size of average open interest in ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) (8,485
OI).\1318\ Similarly, the average notional value for ICE Sugar No. 11
(SB) ($13,535,036,765 Notional OI) is roughly 54 times greater than the
average notional value for ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) ($250,447,669 Notional
OI).\1319\ In terms of average trading volume for the same time period,
the ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract trades approximately 146,077
contracts per day, whereas the ICE Sugar No. 16 (SF) contract trades
approximately 307 contracts per day.\1320\ Accordingly, the Commission
believes, and the data supports, that U.S. commercial participants use
the more-liquid ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB) contract to hedge domestically
sourced raw sugar or domestic inventories and for price discovery for
sugar produced and consumed in the United States. \1321\
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\1318\ Calculations are based on data submitted to the
Commission pursuant to part 16 of the Commission's regulations and
does not include delta adjusted option on futures contracts.
\1319\ Id.
\1320\ Id.
\1321\ USDA data reflects that each year, U.S. commercial firms
hold over 1 million metric tons of raw sugar as inventory (after
accounting for all imports, production, and use during the year).
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6. Commission Determination
For the reasons stated in the 2020 NPRM and further discussed here,
the Commission finds that position limits are necessary for the 25 core
referenced futures contracts.
D. Necessity Finding as to Linked Contracts
The Commission finds that position limits on futures and options on
futures contracts that are linked to core referenced futures contracts
are necessary to enable position limits to function effectively for
commodities where position limits have been found to be necessary in
connection with the relevant core referenced futures contracts. As
explained in detail above at Section II.A.16, due to the nature of the
linkages specified in the definition of ``referenced contract'' in
Sec. 150.1, and the resulting possibilities for arbitrage, contracts
linked to core referenced futures contracts, including cash-settled
linked contracts, function together with the linked core referenced
futures contract as part of one market.\1322\ As a result, without
position limits on such linked contracts, excessive speculative
positions in these contracts can affect associated core referenced
futures contracts and cash commodity markets in a variety of ways that
undermine the effectiveness of position limits on the core contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1322\ For further discussion of referenced contracts and linked
contracts, see supra Section II.A.16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, large positions in linked contracts can serve as a
vehicle for profiting from manipulation of the prices of core
referenced futures contracts and cash commodities.\1323\ Conversely,
excessive speculation that artificially affects the price of a linked
contract can distort pricing, liquidity, and delivery in the market for
the core referenced futures contract and cash commodity to which the
contract is linked.\1324\ Finally, physically-settled indirectly linked
contracts, if not subject to position limits, can serve as a vehicle
for evasion through the creation of contracts that are economically
equivalent to core referenced futures contracts.\1325\
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\1323\ Id. (discussing the use of linked contracts to manipulate
prices of physically-settled contracts and the use of cash-market
transactions to affect prices of physically-settled futures
contracts and their linked counterparts).
\1324\ Id.
\1325\ See supra Section II.A.16. (discussing referenced
contracts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission therefore finds that position limits for futures
contracts and options on futures contracts that are linked to core
referenced futures contracts are necessary within the meaning of
paragraph 4a(a)(1) where limits are necessary for the associated core
referenced futures contracts.
E. Necessity Finding for Spot/Non-Spot Month Position Limits
As discussed above in Section II.B.2. and in the 2020 NPRM, the
Commission preliminarily determined that Federal position limits should
only apply to spot month positions except with respect to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts, where non-spot month position Federal
position limits have been in place for many years. As discussed above,
the Commission is adopting this aspect of the rule as proposed.
Consistent with this policy determination, the Commission finds that
position limits are necessary during all months for the nine legacy
agricultural contracts. The Commission further finds that position
limits are necessary only during the spot month for the 16 non-legacy
core referenced futures contracts and unnecessary outside of the spot
month.\1326\
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\1326\ At least one commenter asked to Commission to explicitly
clarify this point, see ISDA at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission makes this necessity finding for substantially the
reasons set forth above, including in responses to comments on the
spot/non-spot month issue. Briefly, certain potential sources of sudden
or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in commodity prices
caused by excessive speculation, particularly corners, squeezes, and
certain convergence problems, are associated primarily with large
positions held during spot months.\1327\ And, to the extent that these
problems may arise in prior months, they are mitigated by exchange
policies including exchange-set position limits and position
accountability.\1328\ As a result, even if position limits may have
benefits outside the spot month, restricting Federal position limits to
spot months for most commodities is consistent with the Commission's
interpretation of the paragraph 4a(a)(1) necessity requirement as
directing the Commission to impose position limits where they are most
economically justified as an efficient mechanism for achieving the
statutory objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1327\ See supra Section II.B.2. (discussing Final Rule
provisions).
\1328\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission similarly finds position limits in non-spot months
to be necessary for the legacy agricultural contracts for substantially
the reasons discussed above.\1329\ These limits were put in place
pursuant to past statutory necessity findings and have been in place
for decades without the Commission observing problems that
[[Page 3398]]
would give reasons to remove them.\1330\ And they are generally
supported by many market participants.\1331\ Because no commenters
argued that the Commission should eliminate Federal non-spot month
position limits for the nine legacy agricultural contracts and because
these limits have been in existence for decades, the Commission
believes that it would be imprudent to eliminate them absent any
specific reason in support thereof, particularly insofar as maintaining
them, by definition, will result in no new costs or burdens. The
Commission further notes that maintaining non-spot month limits for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts will not change the existing
dynamics of these markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1329\ See supra Section II.B.2. (discussing Final Rule
provisions).
\1330\ Id.
\1331\ Id. The Commission notes that while ISDA did not
specifically address the nine legacy agricultural contracts, it
suggested that the Commission ``should finalize the proposed Federal
position limits rules only for physically delivered spot month
futures contracts, in the first phase.'' See ISDA at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is therefore satisfied that these limits remain an
efficient mechanism for achieving the objectives of CEA section 4a.
IV. Related Matters
A. Cost-Benefit Considerations
1. Introduction
Section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'' or ``Act'')
requires the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') to
consider the costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a
regulation under the CEA.\1332\ Section 15(a) further specifies that
the costs and benefits shall be evaluated in light of five broad areas
of market and public concern: (1) Protection of market participants and
the public; (2) efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of
futures markets; (3) price discovery; (4) sound risk management
practices; and (5) other public interest considerations (collectively,
the ``section 15(a) factors'').\1333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1332\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
\1333\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission interprets section 15(a) to require the Commission
to consider only those costs and benefits of its changes that are
attributable to the Commission's discretionary determinations (i.e.,
changes that are not otherwise required by statute) compared to the
existing status quo baseline requirements. For this purpose, the status
quo requirements, which serve as the baseline for the consideration of
the costs and benefits of the regulations adopted in this final
position limits rulemaking (``Final Rule''), include the CEA's
statutory requirements as well as any applicable existing Commission
regulations.\1334\ As a result, any changes to the Commission's
regulations that are required by the CEA or other applicable statutes
are not deemed to be discretionary changes for purposes of discussing
related costs and benefits of the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1334\ This cost-benefit consideration section is divided into
seven parts, including this introductory section, with respect to
any applicable CEA or regulatory provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission anticipates that the Final Rule will affect market
participants differently depending on their business models and scale
of participation in the commodity contracts that are covered by the
Final Rule.\1335\ The Commission also anticipates that the Final Rule
may result in ``programmatic'' costs to some market participants.
Generally, affected market participants may incur increased costs
associated with developing or revising, implementing, and maintaining
compliance functions and procedures. Such costs might include those
related to the monitoring of positions in the relevant referenced
contracts; related filing, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements;
and the costs of changes to information technology systems.
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\1335\ For example, the Final Rule could result in increased
costs to market participants who may need to adjust their trading
and hedging strategies to ensure that their aggregate positions do
not exceed Federal position limits, particularly those who will be
subject to Federal position limits for the first time (i.e., those
who may trade contracts for which there are currently no Federal
position limits). On the other hand, existing costs could decrease
for those existing market participants whose positions would fall
below the new Federal position limits and therefore such market
participants would not be required to adjust their trading
strategies and/or apply for exemptions from the limits, particularly
if the Final Rule improves market liquidity or other metrics of
market health. Similarly, for those market participants who would
become subject to the Federal position limits, general costs would
be lower to the extent such market participants can leverage their
existing compliance infrastructure in connection with existing
exchange position limit regimes, relative to those market
participants that do not currently have such systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has determined that it is not feasible to quantify
the costs or benefits with reasonable precision and instead has
identified and considered the costs and benefits qualitatively.\1336\
The Commission believes that, for many of the costs and benefits,
quantification is not feasible with reasonable precision, because
quantification requires understanding all market participants' business
models, operating models, cost structures, and hedging strategies,
including an evaluation of the potential alternative hedging or
business strategies that could be adopted under the Final Rule.
Further, while Congress has tasked the Commission with establishing
such Federal position limits as the Commission finds are ``necessary,''
some of the benefits, such as mitigating or eliminating manipulation or
excessive speculation, may be very difficult or infeasible to quantify.
These benefits, moreover, will likely manifest over time and be
distributed over the entire market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1336\ With respect to the Commission's analysis under its
discussion of its obligations under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(``PRA''), the Commission has endeavored to quantify certain costs
and other burdens imposed on market participants related to
collections of information as defined by the PRA. See generally
Section IV.B. (discussing the Commission's PRA determinations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these limitations, to inform its consideration of costs
and benefits of the Final Rule, the Commission in its discretion relies
on: (1) Its experience and expertise in regulating the derivatives
markets; (2) information gathered through public comment letters \1337\
and meetings with a broad range of market participants; and (3) certain
Commission data, such as the Commission's Large Trader Reporting System
and data reported to swap data repositories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1337\ While the general themes contained in comments submitted
in response to prior proposals informed this rulemaking, the
Commission withdrew the 2013 Proposal, the 2016 Supplemental
Proposal, and the 2016 Reproposal. See supra Section I.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission considers the benefits and costs discussed below in
the context of international markets, because market participants and
exchanges subject to the Commission's jurisdiction for purposes of
position limits may be organized outside of the United States; some
industry leaders typically conduct operations both within and outside
the United States; and market participants may follow substantially
similar business practices wherever located. Where the Commission does
not specifically refer to matters of location, the discussion of
benefits and costs below refers to the effects of the Final Rule on all
activity subject to it, whether by virtue of the activity's physical
location in the United States or by virtue of the activity's connection
with, or effect on, U.S. commerce under CEA section 2(i).\1338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1338\ 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission sought comments on all aspects of the cost and
benefit considerations in the 2020 NPRM, including: (1) Identification
and assessment of any costs and benefits not discussed in the 2020
NPRM; (2) data and any other information to assist or otherwise inform
the Commission's
[[Page 3399]]
ability to quantify or qualify the costs and benefits of the 2020 NPRM;
and (3) substantiating data, statistics, and any other information to
support positions posited by comments with respect to the Commission's
consideration of costs and benefits.\1339\ The Commission also
requested specific comments regarding its considerations of the
benefits and costs of proposed Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9, as well as
comments on whether a Commission-administered exemption process, such
as the process in proposed Sec. 150.3, would promote more consistent
and efficient decision-making or whether an alternative to proposed
Sec. 150.9 would result in a superior cost-benefit profile.\1340\
Last, the Commission requested comment on all aspects of the
Commission's discussion of the 15(a) factors for the 2020 NPRM.\1341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1339\ 85 FR 11671, 11698.
\1340\ 85 FR 11693.
\1341\ 85 FR 11700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission identifies and discusses the costs and benefits of
the Final Rule organized conceptually by topic, and certain topics may
generally correspond with a specific regulatory section. The
Commission's discussion is organized as follows: (1) This introduction
discussion section; (2) a discussion of the Commission's necessity
finding with respect to the 25 core referenced futures contracts that
are subject to the Federal position limits framework; (3) the Federal
position limit levels (final Sec. 150.2), and the definitions of
``referenced contract'' and ``economically equivalent swap''; (4) the
Commission's exemptions from Federal position limits (final Sec.
150.3), including the Federal bona fide hedging definition (final Sec.
150.1); (5) the streamlined process for the Commission to recognize
non-enumerated bona fide hedges (final Sec. 150.9) and to grant other
exemptions for purposes of Federal position limits (final Sec. 150.3)
and related reporting changes to part 19 of the Commission's
regulations; (6) the exchange-set position limits framework and
exchange-granted exemptions thereto (final Sec. 150.5); and (7) the
section 15(a) factors.
2. Costs and Benefits of Commission's Necessity Finding for the 25 Core
Referenced Futures Contracts With Respect to Liquidity and Market
Integrity and Resulting Impact on Market Participants and Exchanges
Rather than discussing the general costs and benefits of the
Federal position limits framework in this section, the Commission will
instead address the potential costs and benefits resulting from the
Commission's necessity finding with respect to the 25 core referenced
futures contracts.\1342\ The discussion in this section begins with an
overview of the Commission's Federal position limits framework in part
one followed by an overview of the Commission's interpretation of the
criteria for finding position limits necessary within the meaning of
CEA section 4a(a)(1) in part two. An overview of the Commission's
necessity finding for the 25 core referenced futures contracts, linked
``referenced contracts,'' and spot/non-spot month position limits is
discussed in part three. Finally, part four includes a discussion of
the potential costs and benefits of the Commission's necessity finding
for the 25 core referenced futures contracts with respect to (a) the
liquidity and integrity of the futures and related options markets; and
(b) market participants and exchanges.
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\1342\ This Section does not address the cost-benefit
implications for imposing position limits on futures contracts and
options thereon that are directly or indirectly linked to a core
referenced futures contract. That discussion is below in Section
IV.A.4. Further, this Section does not address the cost-benefit
implications for maintaining non-spot month position limits on the
nine legacy agricultural contracts. The Commission is of the view
that the Final Rule should not have any cost-benefit consideration
impacts due to the existence of Federal non-spot month position
limits on the nine legacy agricultural commodities since the
Commission is maintaining the status quo with respect to the
existence of such limits for those contracts. As a result, the
Commission does not expect there to be a change with respect to the
costs and benefits of its approach by simply finding that Federal
position limits continue to be necessary during the non-spot months
for the nine legacy agricultural commodities. However, with the
exception of CBOT Oats (O), CBOT KC HRS Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS
Wheat (MWE), the final rule will result in higher non-spot month
position limit levels for the remaining legacy agricultural
commodities. See infra Section IV.A.4. (addressing the costs and
benefits of generally increased non-spot month position limit levels
for the legacy agricultural contracts).
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i. Federal Position Limits Framework
The Commission currently enforces and sets Federal spot and non-
spot month position limits only for futures and options on futures
contracts on the nine legacy agricultural commodities.\1343\ The Final
Rule expands the scope of commodity derivative contracts subject to the
Commission's existing Federal position limits framework \1344\ to
include (a) futures contracts and options on futures contracts on 16
additional contracts during the spot month only, for a total of 25 core
referenced futures contracts,\1345\ (b) futures contracts and options
on futures contracts directly or indirectly linked to one of the 25
core referenced futures contracts, and (c) swaps that are
``economically equivalent'' to certain referenced contracts.\1346\
Under this Final Rule, Federal non-spot month position limits will
continue to apply only to futures and options on futures on the nine
legacy agricultural commodities. As discussed above in Section
III.B.2., while economically equivalent swaps are encompassed within
the ``referenced contract'' definition, such swaps are subject to
Federal position limits pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(5) and therefore
not subject to a necessity determination. The cost-benefit implications
of the Commission's ``economically equivalent swap'' definition are
discussed further below.
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\1343\ The nine legacy agricultural contracts currently subject
to Federal spot and non-spot month limits are: CBOT Corn (C), CBOT
Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans (S), CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO),
CBOT Soybean Meal (SM), MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE), ICE Cotton
No. 2 (CT), and CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW).
\1344\ 17 CFR 150.2. Because the Commission had not yet
implemented the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the CEA regarding
position limits, except with respect to aggregation (see generally
Final Aggregation Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91454) and the vacated 2011
Position Limits Rulemaking's amendments to 17 CFR 150.2 (see ISDA,
887 F. Supp. 2d 259 (2012)), the existing baseline or status quo
consisted of the provisions of the CEA relating to position limits
immediately prior to effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments
to the CEA and the relevant provisions of existing parts 1, 15, 17,
19, 37, 38, 140, and 150 of the Commission's regulations, subject to
the aforementioned exceptions.
\1345\ The 16 new products that are subject to Federal spot
month position limits for the first time include seven agricultural
(CME Live Cattle (LC), CBOT Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE
Coffee C (KC), ICE FCOJ-A (OJ), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), and ICE Sugar
No. 16 (SF)), four energy (NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX
New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), NYMEX New York Harbor RBOB
Gasoline (RB), NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)), and five metals
(COMEX Gold (GC), COMEX Silver (SI), COMEX Copper (HG), NYMEX
Palladium (PA), and NYMEX Platinum (PL)) contracts.
\1346\ See supra Section II.A.4. (defining the term
``economically equivalent swap'' for purposes of the Federal
position limits framework under the Final Rule).
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ii. The Commission's Interpretation of Section 4a
As previously discussed, the Commission interprets CEA section 4a
to require that the Commission make an antecedent ``necessity'' finding
that establishing Federal position limits is ``necessary'' to diminish,
eliminate, or prevent certain burdens on interstate commerce with
respect to the physical commodities in question.\1347\ As the statute
does not define the term ``necessary,'' the Commission must apply its
expertise in construing this term, and, as discussed further below,
must do so consistent with the policy
[[Page 3400]]
goals articulated by Congress, including in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C)
and 4a(a)(3), as noted throughout this discussion of the Commission's
cost-benefit considerations.\1348\
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\1347\ See supra Section III.B. (discussing legal standard for
necessity finding).
\1348\ In promulgating the position limits framework, Congress
instructed the Commission to consider several factors: First, CEA
section 4a(a)(3) requires the Commission when establishing position
limits, to the maximum extent practicable, in its discretion, to (i)
diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation; (ii) deter
and prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; (iii) ensure
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and (iv) ensure
that the price discovery function of the underlying market is not
disrupted. Second, CEA section 4a(a)(2)(C) requires the Commission
to strive to ensure that any limits imposed by the Commission will
not cause price discovery in a commodity subject to position limits
to shift to trading on a foreign exchange.
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Under this Final Rule, the Commission is establishing position
limits on 25 core referenced futures contracts \1349\ and any futures
contracts or options on futures contracts directly or indirectly linked
to the core referenced futures contracts,\1350\ on the basis that
position limits on such contracts are ``necessary'' to achieve the
purposes of the CEA. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission
analyzed (1) the importance of these contracts to the operation of the
underlying cash commodity market, including that they require physical
delivery; and (2) the importance of the underlying commodity to the
economy as a whole.\1351\ As discussed above, the Commission is of the
view that evidence demonstrating one or both of these factors is
sufficient to establish that position limits are necessary because each
factor relates to the statutory objective identified in paragraph
4a(a)(1).\1352\ As a result, the Commission has concluded that it must
exercise its judgment in light of facts and circumstances, including
its experience and expertise, in determining whether Federal position
limit levels are economically justified.\1353\
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\1349\ See supra Section III.C. (discussing necessity finding
for the 25 core referenced futures contracts).
\1350\ See supra Section III.D. (discussing necessity finding
for linked contracts).
\1351\ See supra Section III.B. (discussing and adopting legal
standard for necessity finding in 2020 NPRM).
\1352\ Id.
\1353\ Id.
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iii. The Commission's Necessity Finding
With respect to the first factor of the Commission's necessity
analysis, the Commission focused on physically-settled futures
contracts because they perform an important price discovery function
for many cash-market participants and may be affected by corners and
squeezes, which can occur near the expiration of these contracts,
compared to cash-settled contracts.\1354\ Based on the above
discussion, the Commission determined that the 25 core referenced
futures contracts are important to their respective underlying cash
markets because they (1) are the physically-settled contracts in
physical commodities traded on U.S. exchanges that are the most used
for hedging and price discovery by commercial participants, as measured
by open interest, notional value, and trading volume; and (2) serve as
key benchmarks for use in pricing cash-market and other
transactions.\1355\ Upon consideration of the second factor, as
discussed in further detail above, the Commission has determined that
the cash markets underlying the 25 core referenced futures contracts
are all, to varying degrees, vitally important to the U.S. economy
because many of the commodities underlying the 25 contracts are among
the most important physical commodities, as measured by production and
use, for commodities for which physically-settled futures contracts are
traded on U.S. exchanges.\1356\ For these reasons, the Commission finds
that position limits are necessary for the 25 core referenced futures
contracts to achieve the purposes of the CEA.\1357\
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\1354\ See supra Section III.C.2.a. (discussing the link between
the derivatives markets and underlying cash-markets).
\1355\ See supra Section III.C.2.b. (discussing the Commission's
determination that the 25 core referenced futures contracts are used
extensively for hedging and price discovery, thus establishing a
close link between both markets).
\1356\ See supra Section III.C.3. (discussing second factor of
necessity analysis).
\1357\ See supra Section III.C. (discussing necessity finding
for 25 core referenced futures contracts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted previously, the Commission has determined that position
limits for futures and options on futures contracts that are linked to
core referenced futures contracts are necessary within the meaning of
paragraph 4a(a)(1) because such position limits are likely to make
position limits for core referenced futures contracts more effective in
preventing manipulation and other sources of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of the underlying
commodity.\1358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1358\ See supra Section III.D. (discussing necessity finding
for linked contracts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the Commission has determined that position limits are
necessary during all months for the nine legacy agricultural contracts,
where non-spot month Federal position limits have been in place for
decades, and only necessary during the spot month for the 16 additional
core referenced futures contracts.\1359\ Specifically, the Commission
found that certain potential sources of sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in commodity prices caused by
excessive speculation, particularly corners, squeezes, and certain
convergence problems, are associated primarily with large positions
held during spot months.\1360\ And, to the extent that these problems
may arise in prior months, they are mitigated by exchange policies
including exchange-set position limits and position
accountability.\1361\ As a result, even if position limits may have
benefits outside the spot month, restricting Federal position limits to
spot months for most commodities is consistent with the Commission's
interpretation of the CEA section 4a(a)(1) necessity requirement as
directing the Commission to impose position limits where they are
economically justified as an efficient mechanism for achieving the
statutory objectives.
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\1359\ See supra Section III.E. (discussing necessity finding
for spot/non-spot month position limits).
\1360\ See supra Section III.C.2.a. (discussing link between
derivatives market and cash markets).
\1361\ See supra Section III.E. (discussing necessity finding
for spot/non-spot month position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission similarly found position limits in non-spot months
to be necessary for the nine legacy agricultural contracts for the
reasons previously stated above.\1362\ Briefly, these limits were put
in place pursuant to past statutory necessity findings and have been in
place for decades without the Commission observing problems or concerns
by market participants that would give reasons to remove them.\1363\
For these reasons, the Commission has determined that it would be
imprudent to eliminate them absent any specific reason in support
thereof.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1362\ Id.
\1363\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. Potential Costs and Benefits of the Commission's Necessity Finding
for the 25 Core Referenced Futures Contracts
In this section, the Commission will discuss potential costs and
benefits resulting from the Commission's necessity finding with respect
to: (1) The liquidity and integrity of the futures and related options
markets; and (2) market participants and exchanges. The Commission
discusses each factor in turn below.
a. Potential Impact of the Scope of the Commission's Necessity Findings
on Market Liquidity and Integrity
The Commission has determined that the 25 core referenced futures
contracts included in its necessity finding are
[[Page 3401]]
among the most liquid physical commodity contracts, as measured by open
interest and trading volume,\1364\ and, therefore, imposing positions
limits on these contracts may impose costs on market participants by
constraining liquidity because a trader may be prevented from trading
due to a position limit reducing liquidity on the other side of the
contract. However, to the extent that the nine legacy agricultural
contracts already are subject to existing Federal position limits, the
Final Rule does not represent a change to the status quo baseline
(although, as noted below, the applicable Federal position limits will
increase under the Final Rule for most of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts and the associated costs and benefits are discussed
thereunder). Nonetheless, the Commission believes that any potential
harmful effect on liquidity will be muted, as a result of the generally
high levels of open interest and trading volumes of the respective 25
core referenced futures contracts. This is so because, all other things
being equal, large, liquid markets tend to have more participants and
tend to be less concentrated. As a result, in such markets, if position
limits on some occasion restrict trading by one or a small number of
large traders, it is highly likely that other traders will be
participating in the market in sufficient volume for the purpose of
providing liquidity on reasonable terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1364\ See supra Section III.C.2.b. (discussing average open
interest and average daily trading volume for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts for the period January 1, 2019 through December
31, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has determined that, as a general matter, focusing
on the 25 core referenced futures contracts may benefit market
integrity since these contracts generally are amongst the largest
physically-settled contracts with respect to relative levels of open
interest and trading volumes.\1365\ The Commission therefore believes
that excessive speculation or potential market manipulation in such
contracts is more likely to affect additional market participants and
therefore potentially more likely to cause an undue and unnecessary
burden (e.g., potential harm to market integrity or liquidity) on
interstate commerce. Because each core referenced futures contract is
physically-settled, as opposed to cash-settled, the Final Rule focuses
on preventing corners and squeezes in those contracts where such market
manipulation could cause significant harm in the price discovery
process for their respective underlying commodities.\1366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1365\ Id.
\1366\ The Commission must also make this determination in light
of its limited available resources and responsibility to allocate
taxpayer resources in an efficient manner to meet the goals of CEA
section 4a(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(1), and the CEA generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Commission recognizes that market participants may engage
in market manipulation through cash-settled futures contracts and
options on futures contracts, the Commission has determined that
focusing on the physically-settled core referenced futures contracts
will benefit market integrity by reducing the risk of corners and
squeezes in particular. In addition, not imposing position limits on
additional commodities may foster non-excessive speculation, leading to
better prices and more efficient resource allocation in these
commodities. This may ultimately benefit commercial end users and
possibly be passed on to the general public in the form of better
pricing. As noted above, the scope of the Commission's necessity
finding with respect to the 25 core referenced futures contracts allows
the Commission to focus on those contracts that, in general, the
Commission recognizes as having particular importance in the price
discovery process for their respective underlying commodities as well
as potentially acute economic burdens that would arise from excessive
speculation causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes in the commodity prices underlying these contracts.\1367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1367\ See supra Section III.C.2.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the extent the Commission did not include additional commodities
in its necessity finding, those markets will not receive the benefits
intended from the Final Rule's Federal position limits framework. It is
conceivable that this could entice bad actors to turn to those markets
for illegal schemes. On the other hand, markets outside the 25 core
referenced futures contracts are not left totally exposed. Some of the
potential harms to market integrity associated with not including
additional commodities within the Federal position limits framework
could be mitigated to an extent by exchanges, which can use tools other
than position limits, such as margin requirements or position
accountability at lower levels than the Federal position limits adopted
in the Final Rule, to defend against certain market behavior.
Further, burdens related to potential market manipulation for
markets outside the 25 core referenced futures contracts may be
mitigated through exchanges also establishing exchange-set position
limits. Under final Sec. 150.5(a) and (b), exchanges are required to
adopt exchange-set position limits both (i) for contracts subject to
Federal position limits and (ii) during the spot month for physical
commodity contracts not subject to Federal position limits.\1368\ Final
Sec. 150.5(b) also requires exchanges to adopt position limits or
position accountability outside the spot month for those physical
commodity contracts not subject to Federal position limits outside of
the spot month.
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\1368\ As discussed earlier in this release, final Sec.
150.5(a) requires exchange-set limits for contracts subject to
Federal limits to be no higher than the Federal limit. Final Sec.
150.5(b)(1) requires exchanges to establish position limits for
spot-month contracts in physical commodities that are not subject to
Federal position limits at a level that is ``necessary and
appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or
price distortion of the contract's or the underlying commodity's
price or index.'' See supra Section II.D. (discussing Final Sec.
150.5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exchange-set position limits, including amendments to existing
limits, are reviewed by Commission staff via submissions under part 40
of the Commission's regulations, and must meet standards established by
the Commission, including in Sec. Sec. 150.1 and 150.5.\1369\ While
the review of exchange-set limits is focused on the adequacy of the
exchange-set position limit to minimize the potential for manipulation,
it isn't reviewed considering all of the CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)
factors as Federal position limits require. Thus, exchange-set limits
may be set at a more restrictive level than a Federal speculative
position limit might be set for the same contract if it were subject to
Federal limits and therefore may have higher compliance and liquidity
costs than Federal limits on the same contract for periods of time.
Exchange limits may be updated much faster and more frequently than
Federal limits can be updated.\1370\ Therefore, any added compliance
and liquidity costs may only be realized in the short-term relative to
any compliance and liquidity costs from a Federal limit on the same
contract.
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\1369\ Further, as part of the submission process, exchanges are
encouraged to determine exchange-set limits based on the guidance in
Appendix C to part 38 (``Demonstration of compliance that a contract
is not readily susceptible to manipulation''). See 17 CFR part 38,
Appendix C. Appendix C provides guidance on calculating deliverable
supply for physical commodity contracts based on the terms and
conditions of the futures contract and also refers to part 150 for
specific information regarding the establishment of speculative
position limits including exchange-set speculative position limits.
\1370\ Exchanges can self-certify amendments to exchange-set
limits under Sec. 40.6. Federal position limits are updated only
through the rulemaking process.
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[[Page 3402]]
Although the Commission does not find that exchange-set limits
render Federal position limits unnecessary for the 25 core referenced
futures contracts and associated markets, due to their overall
importance, these tools do diminish the potential costs of refraining
from imposing Federal position limits outside of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts. Bad actors may also be deterred by the Commission's
anti-manipulation authority and the Commission's authority to purse
violations of exchange-set limits.\1371\
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\1371\ See, e.g., In the Matter of Sukarne SA de CV, CFTC No.
20-60, 2020 WL 5701586 (Sept. 18, 2020) (imposing a $35,000 civil
monetary penalty for a one-day violation of exchange-set position
limits in CME live cattle futures).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Potential Impact of the Scope of the Commission's Necessity Findings
on Market Participants and Exchanges
The Commission acknowledges that the Final Rule's Federal position
limits framework could impose certain administrative, logistical,
technological, and financial burdens on exchanges and market
participants, especially with respect to developing or expanding
compliance systems and the adoption of monitoring policies.\1372\ The
Commission, however, believes that these burdens will be mostly
incremental as many of the fixed costs have already been incurred by
exchanges and market participants. For example, exchanges are currently
required to comply with comparable requirements such as calculating
average daily trading volume. Further, market participants are required
to comply with existing requirements such as existing Federal position
limits and exchange-set limits and accountability levels.\1373\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1372\ See, e.g., ISDA at 4 (``new Federal position limits
rulemaking will involve significant compliance costs and burdens . .
. that the CFTC can mitigate . . . by starting with final rules only
for physically-delivered spot month futures contracts in a first
phase.'').
\1373\ See NFPEA at 6 and 14 (explaining that the Federal
position limits framework would ``place unnecessary regulatory
burdens and costs on the NFP Energy Entities, without providing the
Commission with useful or usable information about speculators,
speculative transactions or speculative positions'' and asserting
that ``[t]here is no regulatory benefit in terms of reducing the
burdens of excessive speculation on CFTC-regulated markets to
balance against the costs and burdens for NFP Energy Entities (on-
speculators) to study, understand and apply the Commission's
Speculative Position Limits rules to their transactions and
positions''). See also supra Section II.C.14.i. (discussing NFPEA's
request for an exemption from the Federal position limits framework
and how the Final Rule addresses many of the concerns raised by
NFPEA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission further believes that these potential burdens are
mitigated by (1) the compliance date of January 1, 2022 in connection
with the Federal position limits for the 16 non-legacy core referenced
futures contracts, and (2) the compliance date of January 1, 2023 for
both (a) economically equivalent swaps that are subject to Federal
position limits under the Final Rule and (b) the elimination of
previously-granted risk management exemptions (i.e., market
participants may continue to rely on their previously-granted risk
management exemptions until January 1, 2023).\1374\ These delayed
compliance deadlines should mitigate compliance costs by permitting the
update and build out of technological and compliance systems more
gradually. They may also reduce the burdens on market participants not
previously subject to position limits, who will have a longer period of
time to determine whether they may qualify for certain bona fide
hedging recognitions or other exemptions, and to possibly alter their
trading or hedging strategies.\1375\ Further, the delayed compliance
dates will reduce the burdens on exchanges, market participants, and
the Commission by providing each with more time to resolve
technological and other challenges for compliance with the new
regulations. In turn, the Commission anticipates that the extra time
provided by the delayed compliance dates will result in more robust
systems for market oversight, which should better facilitate the
implementation of the Final Rule and avoid unnecessary market
disruptions while exchanges and market participants prepare for its
implementation. However, the delayed compliance deadlines will extend
the time it will take to realize the benefits identified above.
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\1374\ See supra Section I.D. (discussing effective date and
compliance date of the Final Rule).
\1375\ Commenters on the Commission's notice of a proposed
rulemaking for a new position limits proposal issued on February 27,
2020 (``2020 NPRM'') and prior proposals have requested a sufficient
phase-in period. See supra Section I.D.iv. (discussing comments
regarding compliance period of Final Rule); see also 81 FR at 96815
(implementation timeline).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This January 1, 2022 compliance date also applies to exchange
obligations under final Sec. 150.5, and market participants' related
obligation to temporarily continue providing Forms 204/304 in
connection with bona fide hedges. Furthermore, with respect to
exchanges' implementation of Sec. 150.9, the Commission is clarifying
that exchanges may choose to implement the streamlined process for non-
enumerated bona fide hedge applications as soon as the Final Rule's
effective date,\1376\ or anytime thereafter (or not at all).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1376\ The Final Rule's effective date is March 15, 2021 (the
``Effective Date'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME expressed concern that it may receive an influx of exemption
applications at the end of the compliance period, and therefore
suggested a rolling process where market participants are grandfathered
into their current exemptions, permitting them to file for those
exemptions on the same annual schedule.\1377\ ISDA urged the Commission
to recognize the burdens associated with implementing a new set of
rules, and adopt a phase-in to minimize market disruptions and
increases in compliance costs.\1378\ As noted above, the Commission
seeks to alleviate the compliance burdens on exchanges associated with
the Final Rule by providing for a compliance date of January 1, 2022
for exchanges with respect to their obligations under Sec. 150.5. The
Commission believes CME's concern is mitigated since exchanges, at
their discretion, may implement final Sec. 150.9 as soon as the
Effective Date, which will allow exchanges to review non-enumerated
bona fide hedges on a rolling basis between the Effective Date and the
end of the compliance period rather than having to process a large
number of applications at once. Furthermore, market participants with
existing Commission-granted non-enumerated or anticipatory bona fide
hedge recognitions are not required to reapply to the Commission for a
new recognition under the Final Rule. The delayed compliance should
better facilitate the implementation of the Final Rule by preventing
unnecessary market disruptions and reducing the burdens on exchanges,
market participants, and the Commission by providing each with more
time to resolve technological and other challenges for compliance with
the new regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1377\ CME Group at 8.
\1378\ ISDA at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2020 NPRM did not provide a specific date as the compliance
date but rather stated ``365 days after publication . . . in the
Federal Register,'' and did not provide a separate compliance date for
economically equivalent swaps or related to previously-granted risk
management exemptions. In response, several commenters requested the
that Commission further extend the compliance date for swaps to provide
market participants additional time to identify which swaps would be
deemed economically equivalent to a referenced contract, refine their
compliance
[[Page 3403]]
systems, and manage other operational and administrative
challenges.\1379\ These commenters generally stressed that burdens
related to economically equivalent swaps may be greater than related
futures contracts and options thereon.\1380\ The Commission generally
agrees with commenters that additional time would reduce burdens
associated with establishing compliance and monitoring systems, and has
therefore extended the compliance date for economically equivalent
swaps until January 1, 2023. Because the Commission understands that
risk management positions tend to also involve OTC swap positions, the
Commission believes that having the same compliance date as
economically equivalent swaps in connection with the elimination of the
risk management exemption would similarly reduce burdens.
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\1379\ MFA/AIMA at 8; NCFC at 6; NGSA at 15-16; SIFMA AMG at 9-
10; and Citadel at 9.
\1380\ Id.
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3. Federal Position Limit Levels (Final Sec. 150.2)
i. General Approach
Existing Sec. 150.2 establishes Federal position limit levels that
apply net long or net short to futures and, on a futures-equivalent
basis, to options on futures contracts on nine legacy physically-
settled agricultural contracts.\1381\ The Commission has previously set
separate Federal position limits for: (i) The spot month, and (ii) a
single month and all-months-combined (i.e., ``non-spot months'').\1382\
For the existing spot month Federal position limit levels, the contract
levels are based on, among other things, 25% or lower of the estimated
deliverable supply (``EDS'').\1383\ For the existing non-spot month
position limit levels, the levels are generally set at 10% of open
interest for the first 25,000 contracts of open interest, with a
marginal increase of 2.5% of open interest thereafter (the ``10/2.5%
formula'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1381\ The nine legacy agricultural contracts subject to
existing Federal spot and non-spot month position limits were: CBOT
Corn (C), CBOT Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans (S), CBOT Wheat (W), CBOT
Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT Soybean Meal (SM), MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat
(MWE), ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), and CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat
(KW).
\1382\ For clarity, limits for single and all-months-combined
apply separately. However, the Commission previously has applied the
same limit levels to the single month and all-months-combined.
Accordingly, the Commission will discuss the single and all-months
limits, i.e., the non-spot month limits, together.
\1383\ See supra Section II.B.1--Existing Sec. 150.2
(discussing that establishing spot month levels at 25% or less of
EDS is consistent with past Commission practices).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.2 revises and expands the existing Federal position
limits framework as follows. First, during the spot month, Sec. 150.2:
(i) Subjects 16 additional core referenced futures contracts and their
associated referenced contracts to Federal spot month position limits,
which are based on, among other things, the Commission's existing
approach of establishing limit levels at 25% or lower of EDS, for a
total of 25 core referenced futures contracts (and their associated
referenced contracts) subject to Federal spot month position limits
(i.e., the nine legacy agricultural contracts plus the 16 additional
contracts); \1384\ and (ii) updates the existing spot month levels for
the nine legacy agricultural contracts based on, among other things,
revised EDS.\1385\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1384\ The 16 new products that are subject to Federal spot
month position limits for the first time include seven agricultural
(CME Live Cattle (LC), CBOT Rough Rice (RR), ICE Cocoa (CC), ICE
Coffee C (KC), ICE FCOJ-A (OJ), ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB), and ICE Sugar
No. 16 (SF)), four energy (NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL), NYMEX
NY Harbor ULSD Heating Oil (HO), NYMEX NY Harbor RBOB Gasoline (RB),
and NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)), and five metals (COMEX Gold
(GC), COMEX Silver (SI), COMEX Copper (HG), NYMEX Palladium (PA),
and NYMEX Platinum (PL)) contracts.
\1385\ The Final Rule maintains the current spot month limits on
CBOT Oats (O).
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Second, for non-spot month position limit levels, final Sec. 150.2
revises the 10/2.5% formula so that: (i) The incremental 2.5% increase
takes effect after the first 50,000 contracts of open interest, rather
than after the first 25,000 contracts under the existing rule (the
``marginal threshold level''); and (ii) the limit levels are calculated
by applying the updated 10/2.5% formula to open interest data for the
two 12-month periods from July 2017 to June 2018 and July 2018 to June
2019 of the applicable futures contracts and delta-adjusted options on
futures contracts.\1386\ The 12-month period yielding the higher limit
is selected as the non-spot month limit for that legacy agricultural
commodity.
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\1386\ As discussed below, for most of the legacy agricultural
commodities, this results in a higher non-spot month limit. However,
the Commission is not changing the non-spot month limits for either
CBOT Oats (O) or MGEX Hard Red Spring Wheat (MWE) based on the
revised open interest since this would result in a reduction of non-
spot month limits from 2,000 to 700 contracts for CBOT Oats (O) and
12,000 to 5,700 contracts for MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE). Similarly, the
Commission also is maintaining the current non-spot month limit for
CBOT KC Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW). Furthermore, the Commission is
adopting a separate single month position limit level of 5,950
contracts for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT). The all-months-combined
position limit level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) is set at 11,900
contracts, based on the modified 10/2.5% formula and updated open
interest figures.
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Third, the final Federal position limits framework expands to cover
(i) any cash-settled futures and related options on futures contracts
directly or indirectly linked to any of the 25 proposed physically-
settled core referenced futures contracts as well as (ii) any
economically equivalent swaps.
For spot month positions, the Federal position limits in final
Sec. 150.2 apply separately, net long or short, to cash-settled
referenced contracts and to physically-settled referenced contracts in
the same commodity. This results in a separate net long/short position
for each category so that cash-settled contracts in a particular
commodity are netted with other cash-settled contracts in that
commodity, and physically-settled contracts in a given commodity are
netted with other physically-settled contracts in that commodity; a
cash-settled contract and a physically-settled contract may not be
netted with one another during the spot month. Outside the spot month,
cash and physically-settled contracts in the same commodity are netted
together to determine a single net long/short position.
Fourth, final Sec. 150.2 subjects pre-existing positions, other
than pre-enactment swaps and transition period swaps, to Federal
position limits during the spot month and non-spot months.
In setting the Federal position limit levels, the Commission seeks
to advance the enumerated statutory objectives with respect to position
limits in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).\1387\ The Commission recognizes that
relatively high Federal position limit levels may be more likely to
support some of the statutory goals and less likely to advance others.
For instance, a relatively higher Federal position limit level may be
more likely to benefit market liquidity for hedgers or ensure that the
price discovery of the underlying market is not disrupted, but may be
less likely to benefit market integrity by being less effective at
diminishing, eliminating, or preventing excessive speculation or at
deterring and preventing market manipulation, corners, and squeezes. In
particular, setting relatively high Federal position limit levels may
result in excessively large speculative positions and/or increased
volatility, especially during speculative showdowns (when two market
participants disagree about the proper market price and trade
aggressively in large quantities
[[Page 3404]]
expressing their view causing the market price to be volatile), which
may cause some market participants to retreat from the commodities
markets due to perceived decreases in market integrity. In turn, fewer
market participants may result in lower liquidity levels for hedgers
and harm to the price discovery function in the underlying markets.
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\1387\ See supra Sections II.B.3.ii.a(1) and II.B.4.iii.a(4)
(further discussing the CEA's statutory objectives for the Federal
position limits framework).
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Conversely, setting a relatively lower Federal position limit level
may be more likely to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive
speculation, but may also limit the availability of certain hedging
strategies, adversely affect levels of liquidity, and increase
transaction costs.\1388\ Additionally, setting Federal position limits
too low may cause non-excessive speculation to exit a market, which
could reduce liquidity, cause ``choppy'' \1389\ prices and reduced
market efficiency, and increase option premia to compensate for the
more volatile prices. The Commission in its discretion has nevertheless
endeavored to set Federal position limit levels, to the maximum extent
practicable, to benefit the statutory goals identified by Congress.
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\1388\ For example, relatively lower Federal position limits may
adversely affect potential hedgers by reducing liquidity. In the
case of reduced liquidity, a potential hedger may face unfavorable
spreads and prices, in which case the hedger must choose either to
delay implementing its hedging strategy and hope for more favorable
spreads in the near future or to choose immediate execution (to the
extent possible) at a less favorable price.
\1389\ ``Choppy'' prices often refer to illiquidity in a market
where transacted prices bounce between the bid and the ask prices.
Market efficiency may be harmed in the sense that transacted prices
might need to be adjusted for the bid-ask bounce to determine the
fundamental value of the underlying contract.
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As discussed above, the contracts that are subject to the Federal
position limits adopted in the Final Rule are currently subject to
either Federal or exchange-set position limits (or both). To the extent
that the Federal position limit levels in final Sec. 150.2 are higher
than the existing Federal position limit levels for either the spot or
non-spot month, market participants currently trading these contracts
could engage in additional trading under the Federal position limit
levels in final Sec. 150.2 that otherwise would be prohibited under
existing Sec. 150.2.\1390\ On the other hand, to the extent an
exchange--set position limit level is lower than its corresponding
Federal position limit level in final Sec. 150.2, the Federal position
limit does not affect market participants since market participants are
required to comply with the lower exchange--set position limit level
(to the extent that the exchanges maintain their current levels).\1391\
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\1390\ For the spot month, all the legacy agricultural contracts
other than CBOT Oats (O) have higher Federal position limit levels.
For the non-spot months, all the legacy agricultural contracts other
than CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), and CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW), have higher Federal position limit levels.
\1391\ While the Final Rule generally either increases or
maintains the Federal position limits for both the spot months and
non-spot months compared to existing Federal position limits, where
applicable, and exchange limits, the Federal spot month position
limit level for COMEX Copper (HG) is below the existing exchange-set
level. Accordingly, market participants may have to change their
trading behavior with respect to COMEX Copper (HG), which could
impose compliance and transaction costs on these traders, to the
extent their existing trading exceeds the lower Federal spot month
position limit levels.
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ii. Spot Month Levels
The Commission is maintaining 25% of EDS as a ceiling for Federal
spot month position limits, except for cash-settled NYMEX Henry Hub
Natural Gas (``NYMEX NG'') referenced contracts, which is discussed
below. Based on the Commission's experience overseeing Federal position
limits for decades, and overseeing exchange-set position limits
submitted to the Commission pursuant to part 40 of the Commission's
regulations, none of the Federal spot month position limit levels
listed in final Appendix E of part 150 of the Commission's regulations:
(i) Are so low as to reduce liquidity for bona fide hedgers or disrupt
the price discovery function of the underlying market; \1392\ or (ii)
so high as to invite excessive speculation, manipulation, corners, or
squeezes because, among other things, any potential economic gains
resulting from the manipulation may be insufficient to justify the
potential costs, including the costs of acquiring, and ultimately
offloading, the positions used to effect the manipulation.\1393\
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\1392\ The Federal spot month position limit levels adopted in
the Final Rule are set at, or higher than, existing Federal spot
month position limit levels (for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts) or at, or higher than, existing exchange-set spot month
position limit levels (for the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts). As a result, the Commission does not believe that
liquidity will be reduced with respect to the core referenced
futures contracts and their associated referenced contracts.
Consequently, the Commission also believes that the Federal spot
month position limit levels will be less burdensome on market
participants. See AFIA at 1.
\1393\ This is driven primarily by the Federal spot month
position limit levels being set at or below 25% of EDS.
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The Commission considered alternative Federal spot month position
limit levels provided by Better Markets, which requested a standard
Federal spot month position limit level of 10% of EDS, which could be
adjusted as needed.\1394\ The Commission believes that this across-the-
board approach fails to take into account the differences between the
core referenced futures contracts and could result in material costs to
certain types of referenced contracts without concomitant benefits. For
example, the Commission has determined to set the Federal spot month
position limit levels for eight core referenced futures contracts below
10% of EDS. Raising the levels to 10% of EDS for some of these
contracts could increase the risk of market manipulation. As an
example, raising the Federal position limit level to 10% of EDS would
result in an increase of approximately 46% over the proposed and final
Federal spot month position limit level for CBOT KC HRS Wheat (KW). The
Commission believes that, despite the increased potential for market
manipulation, this would result in a negligible improvement in
liquidity, because the level for CBOT KC HRS Wheat (KW) is being set as
a ceiling within the Federal position limits framework.
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\1394\ Better Markets at 41. Other commenters, such as PMAA and
AFR, generally suggested lowering Federal spot month position limit
levels. However, neither provided specific levels or a formula for
determining alternative levels. As a result, the Commission is
unable to engage in a cost-benefit analysis with respect to their
suggestions.
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On the other end of the spectrum, for some core referenced futures
contracts with proposed and final Federal position limit levels higher
than 10% of EDS, decreasing the levels to 10% of EDS could have a
material negative impact on liquidity. For example, this would result
in a reduction in the Federal spot month position limit levels by
approximately 60% for the seven core referenced futures contracts for
which the Commission is adopting a Federal spot month position limit
level of 25% of EDS.\1395\ This could cause a significant decrease in
liquidity in those markets, as speculative traders may not be of
sufficient size and quantity to take the other side of bona fide
hedgers' positions. This may impact the price discovery function and
hedging utility of those contracts because hedgers could not transact
at better prices provided by the presence of the speculative traders.
Furthermore, it could severely restrict the breadth of exchange-set
spot month position limit levels that an exchange may set, which would
provide less
[[Page 3405]]
flexibility to the exchanges to respond to rapidly changing market
conditions.
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\1395\ The seven such core referenced futures contracts are: (1)
MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE); (2) ICE Cocoa (CC); (3) ICE Coffee C (KC); (4)
ICE FCOJ-A (OJ); (5) ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB); (6) ICE Sugar No. 16
(SF); and (7) NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NYMEX NG).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also considered PMAA's statement that ``the spot-
month limit of 25 percent of deliverable supply is not sufficiently
aggressive to deter excessive speculation.'' \1396\ However, PMAA
provides no defined alternative for the Commission to consider, which
makes it difficult to compare the costs and benefits of PMAA's
suggested approach. Nonetheless, the Commission acknowledges that, as a
general principle, lowering position limit levels may decrease the
likelihood of excessive speculation.\1397\ However, that may come at
the cost of liquidity for bona fide hedgers. The Commission notes that
PMAA's suggestion would apply to only seven of the 25 core referenced
futures contracts that have Federal spot month position limit levels
set at 25% of EDS in the Final Rule.\1398\ The others are all set well
below 25% of EDS, with the highest being 19.29% of EDS for CBOT Oats
(O). For all core referenced futures contracts, including ones that
have Federal spot month position limit levels set at 25% of EDS, the
Commission reviewed the methodology underlying the EDS figures and the
Federal spot month position limit levels, and determined that they
advance the objectives of CEA section 4a(a)(3), including preventing
excessive speculation and manipulation, while also ensuring sufficient
market liquidity for bona fide hedgers. Finally, the Final Rule's
position limits framework also leverages the exchanges' expertise and
ability to quickly set and adjust their exchange-set spot month
position limits at any level lower than the Federal spot month position
limit levels in response to market conditions, which relieves some of
the potential costs of setting the Federal spot month position limit
levels at 25% of EDS (i.e., a higher likelihood of excessive
speculation compared to lower levels) for the seven core referenced
futures contracts discussed above.
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\1396\ PMAA at 2.
\1397\ However, based on the Commission's past experience in
setting Federal speculative position limits, the Commission notes
that it is very unlikely that there will be excessive speculation if
the Federal spot month position limit level is set at 25% or less of
EDS.
\1398\ The seven such core referenced futures contracts are: (1)
MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE); (2) ICE Cocoa (CC); (3) ICE Coffee C (KC); (4)
ICE FCOJ-A (OJ); (5) ICE Sugar No. 11 (SB); (6) ICE Sugar No. 16
(SF); and (7) NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NYMEX NG).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also considered CME Group's recommendation with
respect to the non-CME Group-listed core referenced futures contracts
``that the Commission not adopt final spot month position limit levels
at 25% of deliverable supply as a rigid formula and, based on the
factors previously described above, work with the exchange to determine
an appropriate limit based on the market dynamics previously
described.'' \1399\ CME Group commented that, ``[t]aking an across-the-
board approach by setting a Federal limit at the full 25 percent of
deliverable supply could have a significant negative impact on many
markets across all asset classes. . . . For example, setting a uniform
and high Federal limit without regard to the unique characteristics of
a particular contract market can encourage exchanges to set limits for
competitive reasons rather than for regulatory purposes . . . [and]
that perverse incentive structure could lead to a race to the bottom
and undermine the statutory goals of deterring manipulation and
excessive speculation through position limits.'' \1400\ The Commission
agrees that mechanically applying a Federal spot month position limit
level of 25% of EDS can undermine the statutory goals of CEA section
4a(a)(3). However, in proposing the Federal spot month position limit
levels, the Commission did not mechanically apply 25% of EDS as a rigid
formula for the non-CME Group-listed core referenced futures contracts.
Instead, as it did for the CME Group-listed core referenced futures
contracts, the Commission reviewed the methodology underlying the EDS
figures and the Federal spot month position limit levels, and
determined that they advance the objectives of CEA section 4a(a)(3),
including preventing excessive speculation and manipulation, while also
ensuring sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers. The
Commission also considered the Federal spot month position limit levels
in the context of the Final Rule's position limits framework, which
leverages the exchanges' expertise and ability to quickly set and
adjust their exchange-set spot month position limits at any level lower
than the Federal spot month position limit levels in response to market
conditions, which relieves some of the potential costs of setting the
Federal spot month position limit levels at 25% of EDS. Furthermore,
the Commission considered comments received in response to the 2020
NPRM before finalizing the Federal spot month position limit levels.
This is evidenced in the changes to the Federal spot month position
limit levels with respect to NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) and ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT), the latter of which is set at 12.95% of EDS in the
Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1399\ CME Group at 5. CME considered the following factors:
contract specifications, market participation, physical market
fundamentals, delivery process, convergence, market liquidity,
volatility, market participant concentration, and market participant
feedback.
\1400\ CME Group at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also recognizes comments from Better Markets and
NEFI, which state that exchanges have incentives to maximize
shareholder profits, which could be accomplished by, among other
things, maximizing trading.\1401\ One way exchanges could spur trading
in the context of setting Federal spot month position limit levels in
this rulemaking is by taking steps to ensure that the Federal spot
month position limit levels are set as high as possible by providing
higher EDS figures and recommending higher Federal spot month position
limit levels. A potential cost of extremely high Federal spot month
position limit levels is harm to market integrity through excessive
speculation and manipulation. However, the Commission believes that
these costs are mitigated through a number of mechanisms. First, the
Commission independently assessed and verified the exchanges' EDS
estimates, which included: (1) Working closely with the exchanges to
independently verify that all EDS methodologies and figures are
reasonable; \1402\ and (2) reviewing each exchange-recommended level
for compliance with the requirements established by the Commission and/
or by Congress, including those in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B).\1403\
Second, the Commission conducted its own analysis of the exchange-
recommended Federal spot month position limit levels and determined
that the levels adopted herein are: (1) Low enough to diminish,
eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation and also protect price
discovery; (2) high enough to ensure that there is sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers; (3) fall within a range of acceptable
limit levels; and (4) are properly calibrated to account for
differences between markets. Third, the Commission notes that exchanges
have significant incentives and obligations to maintain well-
functioning markets as self-regulatory organizations that are
themselves subject to regulatory requirements. Specifically, the DCM
and
[[Page 3406]]
SEF Core Principles require exchanges to, among other things, list
contracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation, and surveil
trading on their markets to prevent market manipulation, price
distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash-settlement
process.\1404\ Fourth, exchanges also have significant incentives to
maintain well-functioning markets to remain competitive with other
exchanges. Market participants may choose exchanges that are less
susceptible to sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes caused by corners, squeezes, and manipulation, which could,
among other things, harm the price discovery function of the commodity
derivative contracts and negatively impact the delivery of the
underlying commodity, bona fide hedging strategies, and market
participants' general risk management.\1405\ In addition, several
academic studies, including one concerning futures exchanges and
another concerning demutualized stock exchanges, support the conclusion
that exchanges are able to both satisfy shareholder interests and meet
their self-regulatory organization responsibilities.\1406\ Finally, the
Commission itself conducts general market oversight through, among
other things, its own surveillance program to ensure well-functioning
markets.
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\1401\ Better Markets at 22-23; NEFI at 3.
\1402\ As discussed in detail in Section II.B.3.iii.b., the
verification involved: confirming that the methodology and data for
the underlying commodity reflected the commodity characteristics
described in the core referenced futures contract's terms and
conditions; replicating exchange EDS figures using the methodology
provided by the exchange; and working with the exchanges to revise
the methodologies as needed.
\1403\ See supra Section II.B.3.ii.a(1).
\1404\ 17 CFR 38.200; 17 CFR 38.250; 17 CFR 37.300; and 17 CFR
37.400.
\1405\ Kane, Stephen, Exploring price impact liquidity for
December 2016 NYMEX energy contracts, n.33, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission website, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_priceimpact.pdf.
\1406\ See David Reiffen and Michel A. Robe, Demutualization and
Customer Protection at Self-Regulatory Financial Exchanges, Journal
of Futures Markets, Vol. 31, 126-164 (in many circumstances, an
exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather than member) income has
a greater incentive to aggressively enforce regulations that protect
participants from dishonest agents); and Kobana Abukari and Isaac
Otchere, Has Stock Exchange Demutualization Improved Market Quality?
International Evidence, Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, Dec 09, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00863-y
(demutualized exchanges have realized significant reductions in
transaction costs in the post-demutualization period).
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a. NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NYMEX NG) Cash-Settled Referenced
Contracts
Based on comments received \1407\ and based on the existing
exchange-set practices with respect to the NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contract and its associated cash-settled referenced contracts,
the Commission is permitting market participants to hold a position in
cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts up to the Federal spot month
position limit level of 2,000 referenced contracts per exchange and
another position in cash-settled economically equivalent NYMEX NG OTC
swaps that has a notional amount of up to 2,000 equivalent-sized
contracts. This is: (i) A modification from the proposed Federal spot
month position limit level for NYMEX NG referenced contracts, in which
market participants would be able to hold only 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX
NG referenced contracts aggregated between all exchanges and the OTC
swaps market; but (ii) a continuation of the existing exchange-set spot
month position limit framework that has been in place for over a
decade. The Commission believes that this modification from the 2020
NPRM will, relative to the proposed approach, help minimize liquidity
costs for market participants trading in both cash and physically-
settled natural gas derivatives markets, in which the markets for cash-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts is significantly more liquid than
the market for the physically-settled NYMEX NG core referenced futures
contract during the spot month. This is, in part, because this
modification will continue to allow existing market participants ``to
optimize the proportion of physically-settled and cash-settled natural
gas contracts that they wish to hold.'' \1408\ Finally, although the
Commission acknowledges that market participants may hold an aggregate
position in the cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts that is in
excess of 25% of EDS, the Commission does not believe that this will
lead to excessive speculation and volatility in the natural gas
markets, because of the highly liquid nature of the cash-settled
natural gas markets and the Commission's experience in overseeing the
exchange-set framework with respect to cash-settled natural gas
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1407\ See MFA/AIMA at 11-12; Citadel at 7-8; and SIFMA AMG at
10-11.
\1408\ MFA/AIMA at 11-12.
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b. ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
The Commission also modified the Federal spot month position limit
level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) by adopting a level of 900 contracts,
instead of 1,800 contracts as proposed. The Commission is adopting the
level of 900 contracts based on its analysis of the alternatives
suggested by bona fide hedgers using the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) core
referenced futures contract.\1409\ The Commission received two defined
alternatives to the proposed level of 1,800 contracts--300 contracts
and 900 contracts. Specifically, based on those comments, the
Commission believes that it could further improve protections against
corners and squeezes without materially sacrificing liquidity for bona
fide hedgers by reducing the Federal spot month position limit level
from the proposed 1,800 contracts to 900 contracts. However, the
Commission believes that retaining the existing Federal spot month
limit level of 300 contracts may cause concerns about adequate
liquidity, especially because it would be the lowest Federal spot month
position limit level, by far, in terms of percent of EDS, among all
core referenced futures contracts, and the Commission has observed
illiquidity during the early part of the spot month.\1410\
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\1409\ AMCOT at 1-2; ACSA at 8; Ecom at 1; Southern Cotton at 2;
NCC at 1; Mallory Alexander at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; IMC at 2; Olam
at 3; DECA at 2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2; Choice at 1; East
Cotton at 2; Jess Smith at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; NCC at 2;
Omnicotton at 2; Toyo at 2; Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White
Gold at 1; LDC at 1; SW Ag at 2; NCTO at 2; Parkdale at 2; and
IFUS--Estimated Deliverable Supply--Cotton Methodology, August 2020,
IFUS Comment Letter (Aug. 14, 2020).
\1410\ At 300 contracts, the Federal spot month position limit
level for ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT) would be set at 4.32% of EDS. CBOT
KC HRS Wheat (KW) generally has the lowest Federal spot month
position limit level in terms of percentage of EDS at 6.82%, which
is 58% higher than 4.32%. However, following the close of trading on
the business day prior to the last two trading days of the contract
month, CME Live Cattle (LC) has the lowest Federal spot month
position limit level in terms of percentage of EDS at 5.29%, which
is 22% higher than 4.32%.
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iii. Levels Outside of the Spot Month
a. The 10/2.5% Formula
The Commission has determined that the existing 10/2.5% formula
generally has functioned well for the existing nine legacy agricultural
contracts, and has successfully benefited the markets by taking into
account the competing goals of facilitating both liquidity formation
and price discovery, while also protecting the markets from harmful
market manipulation and excessive speculation. However, since the
existing Federal non-spot month position limit levels are based on open
interest levels from 2009 (except for CBOT Oats (O), CBOT Soybeans (S),
and ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT), for which existing levels are based on the
respective open interest from 1999), the Commission is revising the
levels based on the periods from July 2017 to June 2018 and July 2018
to June 2019 to reflect the general increases in open interest \1411\
that have
[[Page 3407]]
occurred over time in the nine legacy agricultural contracts (other
than CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), and CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW)).\1412\
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\1411\ The Commission notes that NGFA commented ``NGFA still is
not completely convinced that open interest is the best yardstick
for this exercise,'' because ``[a]s volume and open interest grow,
Federal non-spot limits expand correspondingly . . . which leads to
yet higher volume and open interest . . . which again prompts
expanded Federal non-spot limits . . . and so on.'' However, NGFA
did not provide any alternatives to utilizing open interest for
determining Federal non-spot month position limit levels. As
discussed previously in the Final Rule, the Commission believes that
open interest is an appropriate way of measuring market activity for
a particular contract and that a formula based on open interest,
such as the 10/2.5% formula: (1) Helps ensure that positions are not
so large relative to observed market activity that they risk
disrupting the market; (2) allows speculators to hold sufficient
contracts to provide a healthy level of liquidity for hedgers; and
(3) allows for increases in position limits and position sizes as
markets expand and become more active. Furthermore, the Commission
notes that under the Final Rule, Federal non-spot month position
limit levels do not automatically increase with higher open interest
levels. In order to make any amendments to the Federal position
limit levels, the Commission is required to engage in notice-and-
comment rulemaking.
\1412\ For most of the legacy agricultural commodities, this
results in a higher non-spot month limit. However, the Commission is
not changing the non-spot month limits for either CBOT Oats (O) or
MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE) based on the revised open interest since this
would result in a reduction of non-spot month limits from 2,000 to
700 contracts for CBOT Oats (O) and 12,000 to 5,700 contracts for
MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE). Similarly, the Commission also is maintaining
the current non-spot month limit for CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW). See
supra Section II.B.4.--Federal Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
for further discussion.
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Since the increase for most of the Federal non-spot position limits
is predicated on the increase in open interest, as reflected in the
revised data reviewed by the Commission, the Commission believes that
the increases may enhance, or at least should maintain, general
liquidity, which the Commission believes may benefit those with bona
fide hedging positions, and commercial end users in general. On the
other hand, the Commission believes that many market participants,
especially commercial end users, generally accept that the existing
Federal non-spot month position limit levels for the nine legacy
agricultural commodities function well, including promoting liquidity
and facilitating bona fide hedging in the respective markets. As a
result, the Final Rule may in some cases result in higher Federal non-
spot month position limits, which could increase speculation without
achieving any concomitant benefits of increased liquidity for bona fide
hedgers compared to the status quo.
The Commission also recognizes that there could be potential costs
to keeping the existing 10/2.5% formula (even if revised to reflect
current open interest levels) compared to alternative formulae that
would result in even higher Federal position limit levels. First, while
the 10/2.5% formula may have reflected ``normal'' observed market
activity through 1999 when the Commission adopted it, there have been
changes in the markets themselves and the entities that participate in
those markets. When adopting the 10/2.5% formula in 1999, the
Commission's experience in these markets reflected aggregate futures
and options open interest well below 500,000 contracts, which no longer
reflects market reality.\1413\ As the nine legacy agricultural
contracts (with the exception of CBOT Oats (O)) all have open interest
well above 25,000 contracts, and in some cases above 500,000 contracts,
the existing formula may act as a negative constraint on liquidity
formation relative to the higher revised formula. Further, if open
interest continues to increase over time, the Commission anticipates
that the existing 10/2.5% formula could impose even greater marginal
costs on bona fide hedgers by potentially constraining liquidity
formation (i.e., as the open interest of a commodity contract
increases, a greater relative proportion of the commodity's open
interest is subject to the 2.5% limit level rather than the initial 10%
limit). In turn, this may increase costs to commercial firms, which may
be passed to the public in the form of higher prices.
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\1413\ See 64 FR at 24038, 24039 (May 5, 1999). As discussed in
the preamble, the data show that by the 2015-2018 period, five of
the nine legacy agricultural contracts had maximum open interest
greater than 500,000 contracts. The contracts for CBOT Corn (C),
CBOT Soybeans (S), and CBOT KC HRW Wheat (KW) saw increased maximum
open interest by a factor of four to five times the maximum open
interest during the years leading up to the Commission's adoption of
the 10/2.5% formula in 1999. Similarly, the contracts for CBOT
Soybean Meal (SM), CBOT Soybean Oil (SO), CBOT Wheat (W), and MGEX
HRS Wheat (MWE) saw increased maximum open interest by a factor of
three to four times. See supra Section II.B.4., Federal Non-Spot
Month Position Limit Levels, for further discussion.
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Further, to the extent there may be certain liquidity constraints,
the Commission has determined that this potential concern could be
mitigated, at least in part, by the Final Rule's change to increase the
marginal threshold level from 25,000 contracts to 50,000 contracts,
which the Commission believes should provide an appropriate increase in
the Federal non-spot month position limit levels for most contracts to
better reflect the general increase observed in open interest across
futures markets. The Commission acknowledges that, as an alternative,
the Commission could have adopted a marginal threshold level above
50,000 contracts, but notes that each increase of 25,000 contracts in
the marginal threshold level would only increase the permitted non-spot
month level by 1,875 contracts (i.e., (10% of 25,000 contracts)-(2.5%
of 25,000 contracts) = 1,875 contracts). The Commission has observed
based on current data that changing the marginal threshold to 50,000
contracts could benefit several market participants per legacy
agricultural commodity who otherwise would bump up against the non-spot
month position limit levels based on the status quo threshold of 25,000
contracts. As a result, the Commission has determined that changing the
marginal threshold level could result in marginal benefits and costs
for many of the legacy agricultural commodities, but the Commission
acknowledges the change is relatively minor compared to revising the
existing 10/2.5% formula based on updated open interest data.
Second, the Commission recognizes that an alternative formula that
allows for higher Federal non-spot month position limit levels,
compared to the existing 10/2.5% formula, could benefit liquidity and
market efficiency by creating a framework that is more conducive to the
larger liquidity providers that have entered the market over
time.\1414\ Compared to when the Commission first adopted the 10/2.5%
formula, today there are relatively more large non-commercial traders,
such as banks, managed money traders, and swap dealers, which generally
hold long positions and act as aggregators or market makers that
provide liquidity to short positions (e.g., commercial hedgers).\1415\
These dealers also function in the swaps market and use the futures
market to hedge their exposures. Accordingly, to the extent that larger
non-commercial market makers and liquidity providers have entered the
market--particularly to the extent they are able to take offsetting
positions to commercial short interests--a hypothetical alternative
formula that would permit higher Federal non-spot month position limit
levels might provide greater market liquidity, and possibly increased
market efficiency, by allowing for greater market-making
activities.\1416\
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\1414\ See supra Section II.B.4., Federal Non-Spot Month
Position Limit Levels, for further discussion.
\1415\ Id.
\1416\ For example, the Commission is aware of several market
makers that either have left particular commodity markets, or
reduced their market making activities. See, e.g., McFarlane, Sarah,
Major Oil Traders Don't See Banks Returning to the Commodity Markets
They Left, The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 28, 2017), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/major-oil-traders-dont-see-banks-returning-to-the-commodity-markets-they-left-1490715761?mg=prod/com-wsj (describing how ``Morgan Stanley sold its oil trading and
storage business . . . and J.P. Morgan unloaded its physical
commodities business . . . .''); Decambre, Mark, Goldman Said to
Plan Cuts to Commodity Trading Desk: WSJ (Feb. 5, 2019), available
at https://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-said-to-plan-cuts-to-commodity-trading-desk-wsj-2019-02-05 (describing how Goldman Sachs
``plans on making cuts within its commodity trading platform . . .
.'').
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[[Page 3408]]
However, the Commission believes that any purported benefits
related to a hypothetical alternative formula, or a suggested
alternative such as the one provided by ISDA,\1417\ that would allow
for higher Federal non-spot month position limits would be minimal at
best. Liquidity providers are still able to maintain, and possibly
increase, market making activities under the Final Rule since the
Federal non-spot month position limits are generally still increasing
under the existing 10/2.5% formula to reflect the increase in open
interest. Further, to the extent that the Final Rule's elimination of
the risk management exemption could theoretically force liquidity
providers to reduce their trading activities, the Commission believes
that certain liquidity-providing activity of the existing risk
management exemption holders may still be permitted under the Final
Rule, either as a result of the pass-through swap provision or because
of the general increase in limits based on the revised open interest
levels.\1418\ Furthermore, bona fide hedgers and end-users generally
have not requested a revised formula to allow for significantly higher
Federal non-spot month position limits. The Commission also recognizes
an additional benefit to market integrity of the Final Rule compared to
a hypothetical alternative formula: While the Commission believes that
the pass-through swap provision is narrowly-tailored to enable
liquidity providers to continue providing liquidity to bona fide
hedgers, in contrast, an alternative formula that would allow higher
limit levels for all market participants would potentially permit
increased excessive speculation and increase the probability of market
manipulation or harm the underlying price discovery function.\1419\
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\1417\ ISDA at 7.
\1418\ See supra Sections II.A.1.x. (discussing pass-through
swap provision), II.B.4.iii.a(1)(i) (discussing increases in open
interest); see also NCFC at 7 (stating that NCFC is ``confident that
the substantial increase in the overall speculative position limits
and allowances for pass-through swaps will limit any potential loss
of liquidity'' that might be associated with the elimination of the
risk management exemption).
\1419\ See Section II.B.4.iv.a(2)(iii).
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Additionally, some \1420\ have voiced general concern that
permitting increased Federal non-spot month limits in the nine legacy
agricultural contracts (at any level), especially in connection with
commodity indices, could disrupt price discovery and result in a lack
of convergence between futures and cash prices, resulting in increased
costs to end users, which ultimately could be borne by the public. The
Commission has not seen data demonstrating this causal connection, but
acknowledges arguments to that effect.\1421\
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\1420\ AMCOT at 1-2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2; Jess Smith
at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; Walcot at
2; White Gold at 2; LDC at 2; Southern Cotton at 2-3; and Better
Markets at 44-48.
\1421\ IECA expressed similar concerns with respect to commodity
index funds. IECA at 4 (stating that a June 2009 bipartisan report
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee for Investigation concluded
that the ``activities of commodity index traders, in the aggregate,
constituted `excessive speculation,' '' and that index funds have
caused an ``unwarranted burden on commerce.''). The Commission notes
that one of the concerns that prompted the 2008 moratorium on
granting risk management exemptions was a lack of convergence
between futures and cash prices in wheat. Some at the time
hypothesized that perhaps commodity index trading was a contributing
factor to the lack of convergence, and, some have argued that this
could harm price discovery since traders holding these positions may
not react to market fundamentals, thereby exacerbating any problems
with convergence. However, the Commission has determined for various
reasons that risk management exemptions did not lead to the lack of
convergence since the Commission understands that many commodity
index traders vacate contracts before the spot month and therefore
would not influence convergence between the spot and futures price
at expiration of the contract. Further, the risk-management
exemptions granted prior to 2008 remain in effect, yet the
Commission is unaware of any significant convergence problems
relating to commodity index traders at this time. Additionally,
there did not appear to be any convergence problems between the
period when Commission staff initially granted risk management
exemptions and 2007. Instead, the Commission believes that the
convergence issues that started to occur around 2007 were due to the
contract specification underpricing the option to store wheat for
the long futures holder making the expiring futures price more
valuable than spot wheat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, if the Final Rule's Federal non-spot position limits are too
high for a commodity, the Final Rule might be less effective in
deterring excessive speculation and market manipulation for that
commodity's market. Conversely, if the Commission's Federal position
limit levels are too low for a commodity, the Final Rule could unduly
constrain liquidity for bona fide hedgers or result in a diminished
price discovery function for that commodity's underlying market. In
either case, the Commission would view these as costs imposed on market
participants. However, to the extent the Commission's Federal non-spot
month position limit levels could be too high, the Commission believes
these costs could be mitigated because exchanges would potentially be
able to establish lower non-spot month position limit levels.\1422\
Moreover, these concerns may be mitigated further to the extent that
exchanges use other tools for protecting markets aside from position
limits, such as establishing position accountability levels below
Federal position limit levels or imposing liquidity and concentration
surcharges to initial margin if vertically integrated with a
derivatives clearing organization. Further, as discussed below, the
Commission is maintaining current Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for CBOT Oats (O), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), and CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW), which otherwise would be lower based on current open interest
levels for these contracts.
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\1422\ The Commission notes that several commenters, including
Better Markets, stated that exchanges may have financial incentives
to increase trading volume, which could incentivize exchanges to set
the highest possible exchange-set position limit levels. See, e.g.,
Better Markets at 22-24, 46-47. While the Commission acknowledges
that this is the case, the Commission also believes that such costs
are sufficiently mitigated through exchange statutory and regulatory
obligations, the Commission's oversight of the exchanges, and the
exchanges' own financial incentives to maintain well-functioning
markets. This is discussed more in depth in Sections II.B.2.iv.b and
III.B.3.iii.b(3)(iii).
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b. Setting a Lower Single Month Position Limit Level for ICE Cotton No.
2 (CT)
The Commission is adopting a single month position limit level of
5,950 contracts, which is 50% of the proposed level of 11,900
contracts, which, in turn, was based on the modified 10/2.5% formula.
This was in response to numerous comments from end-users suggesting
that the Commission set the single month position limit level lower
than the all-months-combined position limit level.\1423\
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\1423\ E.g., LDC at 2; Moody Compress at 1; ACA at 2; Jess Smith
at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Mallory Alexander at 2; Walcot at
2; and White Gold at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that there could be a benefit to setting the
single month position limit level lower than the all-months-combined
position limit level, because it could help diminish excessive
speculation or prevent price distortions if traders hold unusually
large positions in contracts outside of the spot month and those
traders simultaneously exit those positions immediately before the spot
month.
However, the Commission acknowledges that there could be a cost to
adopting a single month limit that is half of the all-months-combined
position limit levels. Specifically, it
[[Page 3409]]
would restrict a speculative trader's ability to take opposite
positions to bona fide hedgers by, for example, entering into calendar
spread transactions that would normally provide liquidity to bona fide
hedgers. Thus, by adopting the lower single month limit, liquidity in
deferred month contracts would be reduced because the speculative
trader would not be able to hold positions in excess of the single
month limit. Nonetheless, the Commission believes that, based on the
unanimous comments from the end-users of the ICE Cotton No. 2 (CT)
contract requesting a lower single month position limit level, such
costs may not materially negatively impact liquidity for bona fide
hedgers.
c. Exceptions to the 10/2.5% Formula for CBOT Oats (O), MGEX Hard Red
Spring Wheat (MWE), and CBOT Kansas City Hard Red Winter Wheat (KW)
Based on the Commission's experience since 2011 with Federal non-
spot month position limit levels for the MGEX HRS Wheat (``MWE'') and
CBOT KC HRW Wheat (``KW'') core referenced futures contracts, the
Commission is maintaining the Federal non-spot month position limit
levels for MWE and KW at the existing level of 12,000 contracts, rather
than reducing them to the lower level that would result from applying
the proposed updated 10/2.5% formula. Maintaining the status quo for
the MWE and KW Federal non-spot month position limit levels results in
partial wheat parity between those two wheat contracts, but not with
CBOT Wheat (``W''), which increases to 19,300 contracts under the Final
Rule.
The Commission believes that this benefits the MWE and KW markets
since the two species of wheat are similar to one another; accordingly,
decreasing the Federal non-spot month position limit levels for MWE
could impose liquidity costs on the MWE market and harm bona fide
hedgers, which could further harm liquidity for bona fide hedgers in
the KW market. On the other hand, although commenters requested raising
the Federal non-spot month position limit level for KW to match the
level for W,\1424\ the Commission has determined not to raise the
Federal non-spot month position limit levels for KW and for MWE as well
to the Federal non-spot month position limit level for W. This is
because the limit level for W appears to be extraordinarily large in
comparison to open interest in KW and MWE markets, and the limit levels
for both the KW and the MWE contracts are already larger than the limit
levels would be based on the 10/2.5% formula. While W is a potential
substitute for KW and MWE, it is not similar to the same extent that
MWE and KW are to one another, and so the Commission has determined
that partial wheat parity outside of the spot month will maintain
liquidity and price discovery while not unnecessarily inviting
excessive speculation or potential market manipulation in the MWE and
KW markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1424\ SIFMA AMG at 3-4; ISDA at 12; PIMCO at 4-5; MFA/AIMA at
12; and Citadel at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, based on the Commission's experience since 2011 with the
Federal non-spot month speculative position limit for CBOT Oats (O),
the Commission is maintaining the limit level at the current 2,000
contracts level, rather than reducing it to the lower level that would
result from applying the updated 10/2.5% formula based on current open
interest. The Commission has determined that there is no evidence of
potential market manipulation or excessive speculation, and so there
would be no perceived benefit to reducing the Federal non-spot month
position limit for the CBOT Oats (O) contract, while reducing the level
could impose liquidity costs.
iv. Subsequent Spot and Non-Spot Month Position Limit Levels
The Commission received several comments concerning updates to the
Federal position limit levels, with commenters requesting that the
Commission periodically review the levels and revise them if
appropriate.\1425\ One commenter was concerned that the Federal
position limit levels could become too high over time,\1426\ while the
rest were concerned that the levels could become too low.\1427\ In
addition, CME Group also suggested that exchanges should update the EDS
figures ``every two years [and] . . . DCMs should be provided the
opportunity to submit data voluntarily to the Commission on a more
frequent basis.'' \1428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1425\ MFA/AIMA at 5 (stating that ``the Commission should
direct exchanges to periodically monitor the proposed new position
limit levels''); PIMCO at 6 (urging the CFTC ``to include . . . a
mandatory requirement to regularly (and at least annually) review
and update limits as markets grow and change''); SIFMA AMG at 10
(suggesting the Final Rule should require ``that the Commission
regularly consult with exchanges and review and adjust position
limits when it is necessary to do so based on relevant market
factors''); ISDA at 10 (stating that ``the Commission must regularly
convene and consult with exchanges on deliverable supply and, if
appropriate, propose notice and comment rulemaking to adjust limit
levels''); and IATP at 16-17 (proposing that the Commission should
engage in ``an annual review of position limit levels to give
[commercial hedgers] legal certainty over that period'' and also
retain ``the authority to revise position limits . . . if data
monitoring and analysis show that those annual limit levels are
failing to prevent excessive speculation and/or various forms of
market manipulation'').
\1426\ IATP at 16-17.
\1427\ MFA/AIMA at 5-6; PIMCO at 6; SIFMA AMG at 10; and ISDA at
10.
\1428\ CME Group at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission recognizes that there may be costs if Federal
position limit levels become too high or low over time. For example,
levels that become too high may permit excessive speculation; levels
that become too low may negatively impact liquidity. However, the
Commission believes that the Final Rule's position limits framework,
which utilizes Federal position limit levels as ceilings and allows
exchange-set position limits to operate under that ceiling, will
mitigate such potential costs. Specifically, because the Federal
position limits are utilized as ceilings, this framework will enable
exchanges to respond to market conditions through a greater range of
acceptable exchange-set position limit levels than if the Federal
position limit levels did not operate as ceilings. Furthermore, because
such exchange actions can be effectuated significantly faster than
modifying Federal position limits, the Final Rule's position limits
framework is able to quickly respond to rapidly evolving market
conditions through exchange-action as well.\1429\
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\1429\ Furthermore, the Commission notes that updating EDS
figures and Federal position limit levels is a resource-intensive
endeavor for both the Commission and the exchanges. Also, periodic,
predetermined review intervals may not always align with market
changes or other events resulting in material changes to deliverable
supply that would warrant adjusting Federal spot month position
limit levels. As a result, the Commission believes that it would be
more efficient, timely, and effective to review the EDS figure and
the Federal position limit level for a core referenced futures
contract if warranted by market conditions, including changes in the
underlying cash market, which the Commission and exchanges
continually monitor.
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v. Phase-In of Federal Position Limit Levels
The Commission received comments requesting that the Commission
``consider phasing in these adjustments for agricultural commodities to
assess the impacts of increasing limits on contract performance.''
\1430\ CMC also noted that, ``[a] phased approach could provide market
participants, exchanges, and the Commission a way to build in scheduled
pauses to evaluate the effects of increased limits, thereby fostering
confidence and trust in the markets.'' \1431\
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\1430\ AFIA at 2; CMC at 6.
\1431\ CMC at 6. Although commenters did not provide specific
details about what they meant by ``phase-in,'' the Commission
understands these comments to mean that they are requesting a
gradual, step-up increase in Federal spot month and non-spot month
position limit levels over time for agricultural core referenced
futures contracts, instead of having the new Federal position limit
levels apply all at once.
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[[Page 3410]]
The Commission acknowledges that there could be some benefit in
implementing a formal, gradual phase-in for the Federal position limit
levels, because this could allow the Commission to more incrementally
assess whether there are any issues with respect to the referenced
contract markets.\1432\ However, the Commission believes that the
position limits framework that is implemented in the Final Rule
effectively provides a similar, but more flexible result. Specifically,
market participants will still be subject to the exchange-set spot
month position limit levels even after the Final Rule's Federal spot
month position limit levels go into effect. The existing exchange-set
position limit levels are lower than the corresponding Federal levels
as adopted in this Final Rule for most core referenced futures
contracts \1433\ and, unless and until exchanges affirmatively modify
their exchange-set spot month position limit levels pursuant to part 40
of the Commission's regulations,\1434\ the operative spot month
position limit levels for market participants trading exchange-listed
referenced contracts will be the exchange-set ones. So, if an exchange
deems it appropriate to maintain its existing exchange-set position
limit levels and does not choose to adopt the new applicable Federal
speculative position limit level as the new exchange-set speculative
limit for any relevant referenced contract listed on its exchange, then
there will be no practical change from the status quo for market
participants from a position limits perspective. If the exchange
believes that it is appropriate to raise its exchange-set spot month
position limit levels either up to the Federal position limit levels or
lower levels as it deems appropriate, then the exchange may do so in a
way that is tailored for each referenced contract (including through a
phased-in approach) and that is informed by the exchange's knowledge of
each market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1432\ As a preliminary matter, the Commission believes that the
referenced contract markets will be able to function in an orderly
fashion when the final Federal position limit levels go into effect.
This is because, among other things, the final Federal spot month
position limit levels are supported by the updated EDS figures and
are set at or below 25% of EDS, and the final Federal non-spot month
position limit levels are supported by increased open interest and
are generally set pursuant to the modified 10/2.5% formula. The
three core referenced futures contracts that do not strictly follow
the 10/2.5% formula in the non-spot month (i.e., CBOT KC HRW Wheat
(KW), MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), and CBOT Oats (O)) do not require any
phase-in period, because they remain at existing Federal and
exchange-set non-spot month position limit levels.
\1433\ Nineteen of the core referenced futures contracts will
have Federal spot month position limit levels that are higher than
current exchange-set spot month position limit levels. COMEX Copper
(HG), CBOT Oats (O), NYMEX Platinum (PL), and NYMEX Palladium (PA)
will have Federal spot month position limit levels that are equal to
the current exchange-set spot month position limit levels. The last
two steps of the Federal spot month step-down position limit levels
for CME Live Cattle (LC) are equal to the corresponding last two
steps of exchange-set spot month step-down position limit levels.
Finally, although currently there is technically no exchange-set
spot month position limit for ICE Sugar No. 16, this contract is
subject to a single month position limit level of 1,000 contracts,
which effectively serves as its spot month position limit level. As
a result, the Federal spot month position limit level for ICE Sugar
No. 16 will effectively be higher than its current exchange-set spot
month position limit level.
\1434\ 17 CFR part 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A further benefit to the Final Rule's position limits framework
over a federally-mandated phase-in is that exchanges have greater
flexibility (relative to the Commission) to quickly modify exchange-set
levels, including modifying any phase-in levels, to respond to sudden
and changing market conditions.
vi. Core Referenced Futures Contracts and Linked Referenced Contracts;
Netting
The definitions of the terms ``core referenced futures contract''
and ``referenced contract'' set the scope of contracts to which Federal
position limits apply. As discussed above, by applying the Federal
position limits to ``referenced contracts,'' the Final Rule expands the
Federal position limits beyond the 25 physically-settled ``core
referenced futures contracts'' listed in final Appendix E to part 150
by also including any cash-settled and physically-settled ``referenced
contracts'' linked thereto, as well as swaps that meet the
``economically equivalent swap'' definition in final Sec. 150.1 and
thus qualify as ``referenced contracts.'' \1435\
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\1435\ As discussed in the preamble, the position limits
framework also applies to physically-settled swaps that qualify as
economically equivalent swaps. However, the Commission believes that
physically-settled economically equivalent swaps would be few in
number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Referenced Contracts
The Commission has determined that including futures contracts and
options thereon that are ``directly'' or ``indirectly linked'' to the
core referenced futures contracts, including cash-settled contracts,
under the definition of ``referenced contract'' in final Sec. 150.1
helps prevent the evasion of Federal position limits--especially during
the spot month--through the creation of a financially equivalent
contract that references the price of a core referenced futures
contract, or of the commodity underlying a core referenced futures
contract. The Commission has determined that this benefits market
integrity and potentially reduces costs to market participants that
otherwise could result from market manipulation.
The Commission also recognizes that including cash-settled
contracts within the final Federal position limits framework may impose
additional compliance costs on market participants and exchanges.
Further, the Federal position limits--especially outside the spot
month--may not provide all of the benefits discussed above with respect
to market integrity and manipulation because there is no physical
delivery outside the spot month and therefore there is reduced concern
for corners and squeezes. However, to the extent that there is
manipulation or price distortion involving such non-spot, cash-settled
contracts, the Commission's authority to regulate and oversee futures
and related options on futures markets (other than through establishing
Federal position limits) may also be effective in uncovering or
preventing manipulation or distortion, especially in the non-spot cash
markets, and may result in relatively lower compliance costs incurred
by market participants. Similarly, the Commission acknowledges that
exchange oversight could provide similar benefits to market oversight
and prevention of market manipulation, but with lower costs imposed on
market participants--given the exchanges' deep familiarity with their
own markets and their ability to tailor a response to a particular
market disruption--compared to Federal position limits.
The ``referenced contract'' definition in final Sec. 150.1 also
includes ``economically equivalent swap,'' and, for the reasons
discussed below, includes a narrower set of swaps compared to the set
of futures contracts and options thereon that would be, under the
``referenced contract'' definition, captured as either ``directly'' or
``indirectly linked'' to a core referenced futures contract.\1436\
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\1436\ See infra Section IV.A.3.vi.e. (discussing economically
equivalent swaps).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. List of Referenced Contracts \1437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1437\ Appendix C of the Final Rule provides staff guidance to
assist market participants and exchanges in determining whether a
particular contract qualifies as a referenced contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's publication of the Staff Workbook is intended to
provide a non-exhaustive list of exchange-traded
[[Page 3411]]
referenced contracts that are subject to Federal position limits.
Although the Commission expects to timely update this list of
contracts, the omission of a contract from the Staff Workbook does not
mean that such contract is outside the definition of a referenced
contract subject to Federal position limits.
Additionally, the Staff Workbook will provide a linkage between
each referenced contract, and either the core referenced futures
contract or referenced contract, as applicable to which it is linked,
to aid in market participants' understanding of the Commission's
determination.
Although some commenters believed that the Commission should
require exchanges to publish and maintain a definitive list of
referenced contracts (other than economically equivalent swaps) \1438\
the Commission believes that the centralized publication of this
Workbook creates efficiency by providing market participants a known
access location, and minimizes costs by not requiring redundant
publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1438\ MFA/AIMA at 7; Citadel at 4-5; SIFMA AMG at 11-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's concurrent publication of the Staff Workbook
provides a non-exhaustive list of exchange-traded referenced contracts,
and will help market participants in determining categories of
contracts that fit within the referenced contract definition. This
effort is intended to provide clarity to market participants regarding
which exchange-traded contracts are subject to Federal position limits.
c. Netting and Related Treatment of Cash-Settled Referenced Contracts
Under paragraph (1) of the final ``referenced contract''
definition, referenced contracts include a core referenced futures
contract, and any cash-settled futures contracts and options on futures
contacts that are directly or indirectly linked to a physically-settled
core referenced futures contract.
PIMCO and SIFMA AMG contended that cash-settled referenced
contracts should not be subject to Federal position limits at all
because cash-settled contracts do not introduce the same risk of market
manipulation. They argued that subjecting cash-settled referenced
contracts to Federal position limits would increase transaction costs
and reduce market liquidity and depth in these instruments.\1439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1439\ PIMCO at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4-7. These entities did not
specifically argue that cash-settled contracts should be excluded
from the ``referenced contract'' definition; rather, they contended
that in general such instruments should not be subject to Federal
position limits. The Commission notes that this is technically a
different argument since cash-settled instruments could be exempt
from position limits but still qualify as ``referenced contracts.''
Nevertheless, the practical result is the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISDA argued that cash-settled contracts should not be included in
an immediate Federal position limits rulemaking, and should instead be
deferred until the Commission has adopted Federal limits with respect
to physically-delivered spot month futures contracts, and after which
the Commission should revisit Federal limits for cash-settled
contracts.\1440\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1440\ ISDA at 3-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIA and ICE argued that limits for cash-settled referenced
contracts should be higher relative to Federal position limits for
physically-settled referenced contracts. They similarly argued that
cash-settled referenced contracts are ``not subject to corners and
squeezes'' and will `` `ensure market liquidity for bona fide hedgers.'
'' \1441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1441\ ICE at 3, 15 (also arguing that cash-settled limits
should apply per exchange, rather than across exchanges); FIA at 7-
8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, CME supported the Commission's approach for spot-month
parity for physically-settled and cash-settled referenced contracts
across all commodity markets. CME explained that absent such parity,
one side of the market could be vulnerable to artificial distortions
from manipulations on the other side of the market, regulatory
arbitrage, and liquidity drain to the other side of the market.\1442\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1442\ CME Group at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that its parity approach, including parity
with respect to the size of the Federal position limits for both cash-
settled and physically-settled contracts, benefits market integrity,
liquidity, and price discovery by not providing skewed incentives to a
market participant to favor one group of contracts over the other, or
providing avenues for manipulation that this rulemaking seeks to avoid.
The Commission is also generally adopting Federal position limits
on an aggregated, instead of on a per-DCM basis.\1443\ FIA and ICE
suggested that Federal position limits for cash-settled referenced
contracts should apply per DCM (rather than in the aggregate across
DCMs).\1444\ The Commission views DCM-based limits as restrictive and
costly for the most innovative DCMs, as DCM-based limits would
necessarily represent a smaller volume of contracts available than
would an aggregated limit. By making the full aggregated Federal
position limit available to the contract that is most responsive to the
needs of the market, the Commission believes that this provides a
market-wide benefit by promoting innovation and competition in the
marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1443\ The Commission is permitting market participants to hold
a position in cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts up to the
Federal spot month position limit on a per exchange basis. This is
discussed more in depth in Section IV.A.3.ii.a.
\1444\ FIA at 7-8; ICE at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Final Rule permits market participants to net positions outside
the spot month in linked physically-settled and cash-settled referenced
contracts, but during the spot month market participants may not net
their positions in cash-settled referenced contracts against their
positions in physically-settled referenced contracts. The Commission
believes that final Sec. 150.2(a) and (b) benefits liquidity formation
and bona fide hedgers outside the spot months since the netting rules
facilitate the management of risk on a portfolio basis for liquidity
providers and market makers. In turn, improved liquidity may benefit
bona fide hedgers and other end users by facilitating their hedging
strategies and reducing related transaction costs (e.g., improving
execution timing and reducing bid-ask spreads). On the other hand, the
Commission recognizes that allowing such netting could increase
transaction costs and harm market integrity by allowing for a greater
possibility of market manipulation since market participants and
speculators can maintain larger gross positions outside the spot month.
However, the Commission has determined that such potential costs may be
mitigated since concerns about corners and squeezes generally are less
acute outside the spot month given there is no physical delivery
involved, and because there are tools other than Federal position
limits for preventing and deterring other types of manipulation,
including banging the close, such as exchange-set limits and
accountability and surveillance both at the exchange and Federal level.
Moreover, prohibiting the netting of physical and cash positions
during the spot month should benefit bona fide hedgers as well as price
discovery of the underlying markets since market makers and speculators
are not able to maintain a relatively large position in the physical
markets by netting it against its positions in the cash markets.\1445\
While
[[Page 3412]]
this may increase compliance and transaction costs for speculators, it
may benefit some bona fide hedgers and end users. It may also impose
costs on exchanges, including increased surveillance and compliance
costs and lost fees related to the trading that such market makers or
speculators otherwise might engage in absent Federal position limits or
with the ability to net their physical and cash positions.
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\1445\ Otherwise, a market participant could maintain large,
offsetting positions in excess of limits in both the physically-
settled and cash-settled contract, which might harm market integrity
and price discovery and undermine the Federal position limits
framework. For example, absent such a restriction in the spot month,
a trader could stand for over 100% of deliverable supply during the
spot month by holding a large long position in the physical-delivery
contract along with an offsetting short position in a cash-settled
contract, which effectively would corner the market.
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d. Exclusions From the ``Referenced Contract'' Definition
Although the ``referenced contract'' definition in final Sec.
150.1 includes linked contracts, it explicitly excludes location basis
contracts,\1446\ commodity index contracts, swap guarantees, trade
options that satisfy Sec. 32.3 of the Commission's regulations,\1447\
outright price reporting agency index contracts, and monthly average
pricing contracts.
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\1446\ ICE further recommended that additional basis and spread
contracts be excluded from the referenced contract definition. ICE
at 10-11. The Commission has determined not to exclude these
additional contracts from the referenced contract definition, as,
among other reasons discussed further above, the Commission views
the constraints on the liquidity and volatility associated with
other excluded contracts as not present to an equal degree in basis
and spread contracts proposed to be excluded by ICE.
\1447\ 17 CFR 32.3.
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First, the ``referenced contract'' definition explicitly excludes
location basis contracts, which are contracts that reflect the
difference between two delivery locations or quality grades of the same
commodity.\1448\ The Commission believes that excluding location basis
contracts from the ``referenced contract'' definition benefits market
integrity by preventing a trader from obtaining an extraordinarily
large speculative position in the commodity underlying the referenced
contract. Absent this exclusion, a market participant could increase
its exposure in the commodity underlying the referenced contract by
using the location basis contract to net down against its position in a
referenced contract, and then further increase its position in the
referenced contract that would otherwise be restricted by position
limits. Similarly, the Commission believes that the exclusion of
location basis contracts reduces hedging costs for hedgers and
commercial end-users, as they are able to more efficiently hedge the
cost of commodities at their preferred location without the risk of
possibly hitting a position limits ceiling or incurring compliance
costs related to applying for a bona fide hedge recognition related to
such position.\1449\
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\1448\ The term ``location basis contract'' generally means a
derivative that is cash-settled based on the difference in price,
directly or indirectly, of (1) a core referenced futures contract;
and (2) the same commodity underlying a particular core referenced
futures contract at a different delivery location than that of the
core referenced futures contract. See Appendix C to final part 150.
For clarity, a core referenced futures contract may have
specifications that include multiple delivery points or different
grades (i.e., the delivery price may be determined to be at par, a
fixed discount to par, or a premium to par, depending on the grade
or quality). The above discussion regarding location basis contracts
is referring to delivery locations or quality grades other than
those contemplated by the applicable core referenced futures
contract.
\1449\ AGA agrees that the exclusion of location basis contracts
from the ``referenced contract'' definition creates certain netting
benefits and may allow commercial end-users to more efficiently
hedge the cost of commodities at a preferred location. AGA at 9. In
general, AGA supported all of the proposed exclusions from the
``referenced contract'' definition in the 2020 NPRM, as it believes
that market participants benefit from clear rules and definitions
that help prevent ``potential disagreement leading to increased
transaction costs, potential loss of liquidity, and compliance
strategies that generally make the markets less efficient.'' Id.
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Excluding location basis contracts from the ``referenced contract''
definition also could impose costs for market participants that wish to
trade location basis contracts since, as noted, such contracts are not
subject to Federal position limits and thus could be more easily
subject to manipulation by a market participant that obtained an
excessively large position. However, the Commission believes such costs
are mitigated because location basis contracts generally demonstrate
less volatility and are less liquid than the core referenced futures
contracts, meaning the Commission believes that it would be an
inefficient method of manipulation (i.e., too costly to implement and
therefore, the Commission believes that the probability of manipulation
is low). Further, excluding location basis contracts from the
``referenced contract'' definition is consistent with existing market
practice since the market treats a contract on one grade or delivery
location of a commodity as different from another grade or delivery
location. Accordingly, to the extent that this exclusion is consistent
with current market practice, any benefits or costs already may have
been realized.
Second, the Commission has concluded that excluding commodity index
contracts from the ``referenced contract'' definition benefits market
integrity by preventing speculators from using a commodity index
contract to net down an outright position in a referenced contract that
is a component of the commodity index contract, which would allow the
speculator to take on large outright positions in the referenced
contracts and therefore result in increased speculation, undermining
the Federal position limits framework.\1450\ However, the Commission
believes that this exclusion could impose costs on market participants
that trade commodity index contracts since, as noted, such contracts
are not subject to Federal position limits and thus could be more
easily subject to manipulation by a market participant that obtained an
excessively large position. The Commission believes such costs would be
mitigated because the commodities comprising the index are themselves
subject to limits, and because commodity index contracts generally tend
to exhibit low volatility since they are diversified across many
different commodities. Further, the Commission believes that it is
possible that excluding commodity index contracts from the definition
of ``referenced contract'' could result in some trading shifting to
commodity index contracts, which may reduce liquidity in exchange-
listed core referenced futures contracts, harm pre-trade transparency
and the price discovery process in the futures markets, and depress
open interest (as volumes shift to index positions, which would not
count toward open interest calculations). However, the Commission
believes that the probability of this occurring is low because the
Commission believes that using commodity index contracts is an
[[Page 3413]]
inefficient means of obtaining exposure to a specific commodity.
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\1450\ Further, the Commission believes that prohibiting the
netting of a commodity index position with a referenced contract is
required by its interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to
the CEA's definition of ``bona fide hedging transaction or
position.'' The Commission interprets the amended CEA definition to
eliminate the Commission's ability to recognize risk management
positions as bona fide hedges or transactions. See infra Section
IV.A.4, Exemptions from Federal Position Limits--Bona Fide Hedging
Recognitions, Spread and Other Exemptions (Final Sec. Sec. 150.1
and 150.3), for further discussion. In this regard, the Commission
has observed that it is common for swap dealers to enter into
commodity index contracts with participants for which the contract
would not qualify as a bona fide hedging position (e.g., with a
pension fund). Failing to exclude commodity index contracts from the
``referenced contract'' definition could enable a swap dealer to use
positions in commodity index contracts as a risk management hedge by
netting down its offsetting outright futures positions in the
components of the index. Permitting this type of risk management
hedge would subvert the statutory pass-through swap language in CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(B), which the Commission interprets as prohibiting
the recognition of positions entered into for risk management
purposes as bona fide hedges unless the swap dealer is entering into
positions opposite a counterparty for which the swap position is a
bona fide hedge.
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Third, the Commission's determination to exclude trade options from
the referenced contract definition is consistent with the historical
practice of the Commission, in which it has exempted a number of trade
options from Commission requirements. This exclusion benefits end-users
who hedge their physical risk through these instruments, yet do not
contribute to excessive speculation.
Fourth, the Commission's exclusion of swap guarantees from the
referenced contract definition will help avoid any potential confusion
regarding the application of position limits to guarantees of swaps.
The Commission understands that swap guarantees generally serve as
insurance, and, in many cases, swap guarantors guarantee the
performance of an affiliate in order to entice a counterparty to enter
into a swap with such guarantor's affiliate. As a result, the
Commission believes that swap guarantees do not contribute to excessive
speculation, market manipulation, squeezes, or corners. Furthermore,
the Commission believes that swap guarantees were not contemplated when
Congress articulated its policy goals in CEA section 4a(a).\1451\
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\1451\ To the extent that swap guarantees may lower costs for
uncleared OTC swaps in particular by incentivizing a counterparty to
enter into a swap with the guarantor's affiliate, excluding swap
guarantees may benefit market liquidity, which is consistent with
the CEA's statutory goals in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B) to ensure
sufficient liquidity for bona fide hedgers when establishing its
position limit framework.
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Fifth, the Final Rule reaffirms the Commission's determination that
an outright price reporting agency index contract does not qualify as a
``referenced contract.'' \1452\ To provide market participants clarity
regarding this determination, the Commission modified the regulatory
text of the ``referenced contract'' definition in final Sec. 150.1 to
explicitly exclude the term ``outright price reporting agency index
contracts.'' \1453\ The exclusion of outright price reporting agency
index contracts from the ``referenced contract'' definition benefits
market participants through clarity and mitigation of costs, such as
costs to monitor positions for aggregation and other compliance
purposes. The Commission believes that this exclusion maintains market
integrity as it would be costly to employ these contracts to circumvent
position limits.
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\1452\ As explained in the preamble to the Final Rule, the
Commission has concluded that an ``outright price reporting agency
index contract,'' which is based on an index published by a price
reporting agency that surveys cash-market transaction prices (even
if the cash-market practice is to price at a differential to a
futures contract), is not directly or indirectly linked to the
corresponding referenced contract. See supra Section
II.A.16.iii.b(4)(v) (discussing new exclusions from the ``referenced
contract'' definition).
\1453\ The Commission does not believe this technical change to
the regulatory text represents a change in policy. See supra Section
II.A.16.
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Finally, the Commission has concluded that excluding ``monthly
average pricing contracts'' \1454\ from the ``referenced contract''
definition benefits market integrity by ensuring sufficient market
liquidity for bona fide hedgers due to: (1) The difficulty and expense
of any entity artificially moving the price of the monthly average by
manipulating one or more component prices within the contract; and (2)
the widespread use of these contracts by, and their utility to,
commercial entities in hedging their risk. As with the outright price
reporting agency index contracts, this exclusion benefits market
participants to the extent it mitigates costs to monitor positions for
aggregation and other compliance purposes.
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\1454\ The definition of the new term ``monthly average pricing
contracts'' in Appendix C of this Final Rule is intended to cover
the types of contracts generally referred to in the industry as
calendar-month average, trade-month average, and balance-of-the-
month contracts. See supra Section II.A.16.iii.b(4)(v) (discussing
new exclusions from the ``referenced contract'' definition).
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e. Economically Equivalent Swaps
The existing Federal position limits framework does not include
Federal position limit levels on swaps. The Dodd-Frank Act added CEA
section 4a(a)(5), which requires that when the Commission imposes
Federal position limits on futures contracts and options on futures
contracts pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(2), the Commission also
establish limits simultaneously for ``economically equivalent'' swaps
``as appropriate.'' \1455\ As the statute does not define the term
``economically equivalent,'' the Commission is applying its expertise
in construing such term consistent with the policy goals articulated by
Congress, including in CEA sections 4a(a)(2)(C) and 4a(a)(3) as
discussed below.
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\1455\ CEA section 4a(a)(5); 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(5). In addition, CEA
section 4a(a)(4) separately authorizes, but does not require, the
Commission to impose Federal position limits on swaps that meet
certain statutory criteria qualifying them as ``significant price
discovery function'' swaps. 7 U.S.C. 6a(a)(4). The Commission
reiterates, for the avoidance of doubt, that the definitions of
``economically equivalent'' in CEA section 4a(a)(5) and
``significant price discovery function'' in CEA section 4a(a)(4) are
separate concepts and that contracts can be economically equivalent
without serving a significant price discovery function.
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Specifically, under the Commission's definition of ``economically
equivalent swap'' set forth in final Sec. 150.1, a swap generally
qualifies as economically equivalent with respect to a particular
referenced contract so long as the swap shares ``identical material''
contract specifications, terms, and conditions with the referenced
contract. Further, any differences between the swap and referenced
contract with respect to the following are disregarded for purposes of
determining whether the swap qualifies as economically equivalent: (i)
Lot size or notional amount; (ii) for a natural gas swap and a
referenced contract that are both physically-settled, delivery dates
diverging by less than two calendar days, and for any other swap and
referenced contract that are both physically-settled, delivery dates
diverging by less than one calendar day; \1456\ and (iii) post-trade
risk-management arrangements.\1457\
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\1456\ As discussed below, the definition of ``economically
equivalent swap'' with respect to natural gas referenced contracts
contains the same terms, except that it includes delivery dates
diverging by less than two calendar days.
\1457\ See supra Section II.A.4. (further discussing the
Commission's definition of ``economically equivalent swap'').
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As discussed in turn below, the Commission believes that the Final
Rule's definition of ``economically equivalent swaps'' benefits (1)
market integrity by protecting against excessive speculation and
potential manipulation and (2) market liquidity by not favoring OTC or
foreign markets over domestic markets. Additionally, (3) the Commission
will discuss the costs and benefits related to the Final Rule's
economically equivalent swap definition's treatment of natural gas
swaps; and (4) the Commission will address the several proposed
alternative definitions included in commenter letters.
As discussed further below, with respect to exchange-set position
limits on swaps, the Commission proposed to delay compliance with DCM
Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6, as compliance would
otherwise be impracticable, and, in some cases, impossible, at this
time. In the 2020 NPRM, the Commission explained that this delay was
based largely on the fact that exchanges cannot view positions in OTC
swaps across the various places they are trading, including on
competitor exchanges. The Commission is maintaining this approach to
permit exchanges to delay compliance with respect to exchange-set
position limits on swaps, although the Commission emphasizes, for the
avoidance of doubt, that it will monitor and enforce swaps for
compliance with Federal position limits subject to the compliance dates
[[Page 3414]]
discussed above.\1458\ However, the Commission notes that in two years,
the Commission will reevaluate the ability of exchanges to establish
and implement appropriate surveillance mechanisms to implement DCM Core
Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6 with respect to swaps.
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\1458\ For discussion of the relevant compliance dates for the
Final Rule, see supra Section I.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Benefits and Costs Related to Market Integrity
The Commission believes that the final economically equivalent swap
definition benefits market integrity in two ways. First, the final
definition protects against excessive speculation and potential market
manipulation by limiting the ability of speculators to obtain excessive
positions through netting. As explained above, under the Final Rule,
market participants may net positions across linked referenced
contracts, including positions across linked referenced contracts in
economically equivalent swaps and futures.\1459\ Accordingly, a more
inclusive ``economically equivalent'' definition that would encompass
additional swaps (e.g., swaps that may differ in their ``material''
terms or physically-settled swaps with delivery dates that diverge by
one day or more) could make it easier for market participants to
inappropriately net down against their referenced futures contracts by
allowing market participants to structure swaps that do not necessarily
offer identical risk or economic exposure or sensitivity as the linked
futures contract, but which could still be netted under the Final
Rules. In such a hypothetical case, a market participant could enter
into an OTC swap with a maturity that differs by days or even weeks in
order to net down a position in a referenced contract, enabling the
market participant to hold an even greater position in the referenced
contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1459\ See supra Section II.B.10. (discussing netting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, applying Federal position limits to swaps that share
identical ``material'' terms with their corresponding referenced
contracts benefits market integrity by preventing market participants
from escaping the position limits framework merely by altering non-
material terms, such as holiday conventions. On the other hand, the
Commission recognizes that such a narrow ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition could impose costs on the marketplace by possibly
permitting excessive speculation since market participants would not be
subject to Federal position limits if they were to enter into swaps
that may have different material terms (e.g., penultimate swaps to the
extent a penultimate futures contract or options contract does not
exist to which a penultimate swap could possibly be deemed to be
``economically equivalent'' and therefore subject to the applicable
Federal position limits) \1460\ but may nonetheless be sufficiently
correlated to their corresponding referenced contract. In this case, it
is possible that there may be potential for excessive speculation,
market manipulation, or it is possible that market participants could
leave the futures markets for the swaps markets, which could introduce
new costs to commercial market participants due to reduced market
liquidity or disruptions to the price discovery function.\1461\
Nonetheless, to the extent that swaps currently are not subject to
Federal position limit levels, such potential costs would remain
unchanged compared to the status quo.
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\1460\ Or, in the case of natural gas referenced contracts,
which would potentially include penultimate swaps as economically
equivalent swaps, a swap with a maturity of less than one day away
from the penultimate swap. See supra Sections II.A.4.iii.f. and
II.B.3.vi. (discussing natural gas swaps).
\1461\ The Commission acknowledges that liquidity could shift to
penultimate swaps, which would impose costs on price discovery and
market efficiency in the futures markets, in cases where there are
no corresponding penultimate futures contracts or options contracts
(and therefore the swap would not be deemed to be an economically
equivalent swap), but the Commission believes that this concern is
mitigated for two reasons. First, basis risk may exist between the
penultimate swap and the referenced contract, and so the Commission
believes that a market participant is less likely to hold a
penultimate swap the greater the economic difference compared to the
corresponding referenced contract. Second, the absence of
penultimate futures contracts or options contracts may indicate lack
of appropriate penultimate liquidity to hedge or offset one's
penultimate swap position and therefore may militate against
entering into penultimate swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the relatively narrow final definition benefits market
integrity, and reduces associated compliance and implementation costs,
by permitting exchanges, market participants, and the Commission to
focus resources on those swaps that pose the greatest threat for
facilitating corners and squeezes--that is, those swaps with
substantially identical delivery dates and identical material economic
terms to futures and options on futures subject to Federal position
limits. While swaps that have different material terms than their
corresponding referenced contracts, including different delivery dates,
may potentially be used for engaging in market manipulation, the final
definition benefits market integrity by allowing exchanges and the
Commission to focus on the most sensitive period of the spot month,
including with respect to the Commission's and exchanges' various
surveillance and enforcement functions. To the extent market
participants would be able to use swaps that fall outside the scope of
the final definition to effect market manipulation, such potential
costs would remain unchanged from the status quo since no swaps are
currently covered by existing Federal position limits. The Commission
however acknowledges that its narrow economically equivalent swap
definition may introduce possible burdens to market integrity--as the
form of an opportunity cost--since fewer swaps are covered under the
Federal position limits compared to the alternative in which the
Commission adopted a broader definition.
Further, the Final Rule's delayed compliance with respect to the
establishment and enforcement of exchange-set limits on swaps benefits
exchanges by facilitating exchanges' ability to establish surveillance
and compliance systems. As noted above, exchanges currently lack
sufficient data regarding individual market participants' open swap
positions since exchanges cannot view positions in OTC swaps across the
various places they are trading, including competitor exchanges, which
means that requiring exchanges to establish oversight over market
participants' positions currently could impose substantial costs and
also may be impractical to achieve.\1462\
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\1462\ SIFMA AMG agrees with the Commission's assessment,
stating that ``[s]ince the exchanges do not have visibility into OTC
swaps markets, market participants and the CFTC would be responsible
for implementing position limits on swaps without the benefit of the
exchanges' extensive experience in monitoring and applying position
limits for exchange-listed contracts.'' SIFMA AMG at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, the Commission has determined that allowing exchanges
delayed compliance with respect to swaps reduces unnecessary costs.
Nonetheless, the Commission's determination to permit exchanges to
delay implementing Federal position limits on swaps could incentivize
market participants to leave the futures markets and instead transact
in economically-equivalent swaps, which could reduce liquidity in the
futures and related options markets. However, the Commission emphasizes
that the Commission will oversee and enforce compliance with Federal
position limits for economically equivalent swaps, which should
mitigate the concern related to incentivizing futures contracts and
related options on futures contracts to move trading and related
liquidity to
[[Page 3415]]
the OTC swaps markets. With respect to exchange-set position limits on
swaps, the Commission notes that in two years, the Commission will
reevaluate the ability of exchanges to establish and implement
appropriate surveillance mechanisms to implement position limits for
economically equivalent swaps at the exchange level.\1463\
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\1463\ In response to the 2020 NPRM's proposal to permit
exchanges to delay oversight and enforcement of exchanges' position
limit rules on economically equivalent swaps, IATP stated that
``[d]elaying compliance with position limit requirement [sic] to
avoid imposing costs on market participants makes it appear that the
Commission is serving as a swap dealer booster, although swap
dealers are amply resourced to provide the necessary data to the
exchanges and to the Commission. The Commission is bending over
backward to avoid requiring swaps market participants from paying
the costs of exchange trading.'' However, the Commission emphasizes
that the Commission will still implement, oversee, and enforce
Federal position limits on swaps. As a result, the proposed delayed
enforcement of exchange-set position limits is designed to reduce
costs imposed on exchanges rather than swap dealers, which will be
subject to Federal position limits under the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, while futures contracts and options thereon are
subject to clearing and exchange oversight, economically equivalent
swaps may be transacted bilaterally off-exchange (i.e., OTC swaps). As
a result, it is relatively easy to create customized OTC swaps that may
be highly correlated to its corresponding futures (or options)
contract, which would allow the market participant to create an
exposure in the underlying commodity similar to the referenced
contract's exposure. Due to the relatively narrow ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition, the Commission believes that it may be
possible for market participants to attempt to avoid Federal position
limits by entering into such OTC swaps.\1464\ While such swaps may not
be perfectly correlated to their corresponding referenced contracts,
market participants may find this risk acceptable in order to avoid
Federal position limits. An increase in OTC swaps at the expense of
futures contracts and options on futures contracts may impose costs on
market integrity due to lack of exchange oversight. If liquidity were
to move from futures exchanges to the OTC swaps markets, non-dealer
commercial entities may face increased transaction costs and widening
spreads, as swap dealers gain market power in the OTC market relative
to centralized exchange trading. The Commission is unable to quantify
the costs of these potential harms. However, while the Commission
acknowledges these potential costs, such costs to those contracts that
already have limits (including Federal and/or exchange-set position
limits) on them already may have been realized in the marketplace
because swaps are not subject to Federal position limits under the
status quo.
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\1464\ In contrast, since futures contracts and options on
futures contracts are created by exchanges and submitted to the
Commission for either self-certification or approval under part 40
of the Commission's regulations, a market participant would not be
able to customize an exchange-traded futures contract or option on
futures contract.
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Lastly, under the Final Rule, market participants are able to
determine whether a particular swap satisfies the definition of
``economically equivalent swap,'' as long as market participants make a
reasonable, good faith effort in reaching their determination and are
able to provide sufficient evidence, if requested, to support a
reasonable, good faith effort.\1465\ The Commission anticipates that
this flexibility will benefit market integrity by providing a greater
level of certainty to market participants, in contrast to the
alternative in which market participants would be required to first
submit swaps to the Commission staff and wait for feedback or approval.
On the other hand, the Commission also recognizes that not having the
Commission explicitly opine on whether a swap would qualify as
economically equivalent could cause market participants to avoid
entering into such swaps.\1466\ In turn, this could lead to less
efficient hedging strategies if the market participant is forced to
turn to the futures markets (e.g., a market participant may choose to
transact in the OTC swaps markets for various reasons, including
liquidity, margin requirements, or simply better familiarity with ISDA
and swap processes over exchange-traded futures). However, as noted
below, the Commission reserves the right to declare whether a swap or
class of swaps is or is not economically equivalent, and a market
participant could petition, or request informally, that the Commission
make such a determination, although the Commission acknowledges that
there could be costs associated with this, including delayed timing and
monetary costs.
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\1465\ See supra Section II.A.4.g (discussing market
participants' discretion in determining whether a swap is
economically equivalent). Regarding the obligations of swap dealers
to monitor position limits, ISDA commented that the requirements
imposed by Sec. 23.601 are burdensome and requested additional
guidance regarding same. ISDA at 10. The Commission believes it is
unnecessary to provide further detail with respect to Sec. 23.601
because, as discussed above and in the preamble, the Commission will
defer to a market participant's determination as long as the market
participant is able to provide sufficient support to show that it
made a reasonable, good faith effort in applying its discretion.
Furthermore, the Commission is not adopting any amendments to Sec.
23.601, so the baseline status quo in connection with Sec. 23.601
is unchanged under the Final Rule. See supra Section II.A.4.g.
\1466\ For example, NRECA believes that a standardized reference
source to confirm whether a particular swap is subject to Federal
position limits would benefit market participants: ``Because the
Commission has determined not to codify its interpretations and
other guidance, or to establish a single reference source for
assistance in confirming `swap/not-a-swap' distinction, the two
counterparties to a bilateral off-facility energy transaction must
make the `swap/not-a-swap' determination without the benefit of
standardized rules or product definitions. Although the terms of
many off-facility, bilateral energy commodity transactions are
highly-customized, other such transactions may be many iterations
closer to futures contract `look-alikes,' that is, to referenced
contracts. If such a transaction is (or may be) a `swap,' such a
swap would then also need to be evaluated to determine whether it
was `economically equivalent' under the Speculative Position Limits
Rules.'' NRECA at 18; see also CEWG at 30-31.
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Further, the Commission recognizes that requiring market
participants to conduct reasonable due diligence and maintain related
records also could impose new compliance costs. Additionally, the
Commission recognizes that certain market participants could assert
that an OTC swap is (or is not) ``economically equivalent'' depending
upon whether such determination benefits the market participant. In
such a case, market participants could theoretically subvert the intent
of the Federal position limits framework, although the Commission
believes that such potential costs would be mitigated due to the
Commission's surveillance functions and authority to declare that a
particular swap or class of swaps either does or does not qualify as
economically equivalent.
(2) The Final Definition Could Increase Benefits or Costs Related to
Market Liquidity and Price Discovery
First, the final economically equivalent swap definition could
benefit market liquidity by being, in general, less disruptive to the
swaps markets, which in turn may reduce the potential for disruption
for the price discovery function compared to a possible alternative,
broader definition. For example, if the Commission were to adopt an
alternative to its final ``economically equivalent swap'' definition
that encompassed a broader range of swaps by including, for example,
delivery dates that diverge by one or more calendar days--perhaps by
several days or weeks--a market participant (including speculators)
with a large portfolio of swaps could more easily bump up against the
applicable position limits and therefore would have an incentive either
to reduce its
[[Page 3416]]
swaps activity or move its swaps activity to foreign jurisdictions. If
there were many similarly situated market participants, the market for
such swaps could become less liquid, which in turn could harm liquidity
for bona fide hedgers as large liquidity providers could move to other
markets.
Second, the final definition could benefit market liquidity by
being sufficiently narrow to reduce incentives for liquidity providers
to move to foreign jurisdictions, such as the European Union
(``EU'').\1467\ Additionally, the Commission believes that proposing a
definition similar to that used by the EU will benefit international
comity.\1468\ Further, market participants trading in both U.S. and EU
markets would find the final definition to be familiar, which may help
reduce compliance costs for those market participants that already have
systems and personnel in place to identify and monitor such swaps. As
discussed by SIFMA AMG, ``[m]any market participants are active in
markets and products that are regulated by the CFTC and EU authorities.
Having different definitions would be costly for firms, since they
would have to build out different compliance functions, and inefficient
for markets.'' \1469\ As noted above, any differences between the Final
Rule's ``economically equivalent swap'' and the EU's corresponding
definition by the addition of the ``material'' qualifier should lead to
the benefits identified in the above discussion, along with the
corresponding costs.
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\1467\ In this regard, the final definition is similar in
certain ways to the EU definition for OTC contracts that are
``economically equivalent'' to commodity derivatives traded on an EU
trading venue. The applicable European regulations define an OTC
derivative to be ``economically equivalent'' when it has ``identical
contractual specifications, terms and conditions, excluding
different lot size specifications, delivery dates diverging by less
than one calendar day and different post trade risk management
arrangements.'' While the Commission's final definition is similar,
the Commission's final definition requires ``identical material''
terms rather than simply ``identical'' terms. Further, the
Commission's final definition excludes different ``lot size
specifications or notional amounts'' rather than referencing only
``lot size'' since swaps terminology usually refers to ``notional
amounts'' rather than to ``lot sizes.'' See EU Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2017/591, 2017 O.J. (L 87).
\1468\ Both the Commission's definition and the applicable EU
regulation are intended to prevent harmful netting. See European
Securities and Markets Authority, Draft Regulatory Technical
Standards on Methodology for Calculation and the Application of
Position Limits for Commodity Derivatives Traded on Trading Venues
and Economically Equivalent OTC Contracts, ESMA/2016/668 at 10 (May
2, 2016), available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016-668_opinion_on_draft_rts_21.pdf (``[D]rafting the
[economically equivalent OTC swap] definition in too wide a fashion
carries an even higher risk of enabling circumvention of position
limits by creating an ability to net off positions taken in on-venue
contracts against only roughly similar OTC positions.'')
The applicable EU regulator, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (``ESMA''), recently released a ``consultation paper''
discussing the status of the existing EU position limits regime and
specific comments received from market participants. According to
ESMA, no commenter, with one exception, supported changing the
definition of an economically equivalent swap (referred to as an
``economically equivalent OTC contract'' or ``EEOTC''). ESMA further
noted that for some respondents, ``the mere fact that very few EEOTC
contracts have been identified is no evidence that the regime is
overly restrictive.'' See European Securities and Markets Authority,
Consultation Paper MiFID Review Report on Position Limits and
Position Management Draft Technical Advice on Weekly Position
Reports, ESMA70-156-1484 at 46, Question 15 (Nov. 5, 2019),
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/ consultation-
paper-position-limits.
\1469\ SIFMA AMG at 6-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) The Final Definition Could Create Costs or Benefits Related to
Market Liquidity for the Natural Gas Market
SIFMA AMG commented that ``financially-settled penultimate day
expiry products in natural gas should be excluded from limits to the
same extent as penultimate day expiry contracts for each of the other
24 core referenced futures contracts. To introduce a change from
existing exchange practice (under which these financially-settled
penultimate day contracts are out of scope) could introduce an
otherwise avoidable disruption to trading during the closing days of
the natural gas contract month, with no corresponding benefits to
market oversight or integrity.'' \1470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1470\ SIFMA AMG at 11. For the purpose of this comment, even
though SIFMA AMG refers generally to ``financially-settled
penultimate'' contracts in natural gas, the Commission assumes it is
referring to penultimate cash-settled economically equivalent swaps
since penultimate futures contracts and options on futures contracts
are included under the ``referenced contract'' definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in greater detail in the preamble, the Commission
recognizes that the market dynamics in natural gas are unique in
several respects, including the fact that unlike with respect to other
core referenced futures contracts, for natural gas, relatively liquid
spot-month and penultimate cash-settled futures exist.\1471\ However,
in contrast to SIFMA AMG's comment, the Commission has determined that
creating an exception to the proposed ``economically equivalent swap''
definition for natural gas benefits market liquidity by not
unnecessarily favoring existing natural gas penultimate contracts over
spot contracts. The Commission is especially sensitive to potential
market manipulation in the natural gas markets since market
participants--to a significantly greater extent compared to the other
core referenced futures contracts that are included in the Final Rule--
regularly trade in both the physically-settled core referenced futures
contract and the cash-settled look-alike referenced contracts that are
penultimate contracts. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that a
slightly broader definition of ``economically equivalent swap'' to
encompass penultimate natural gas swaps uniquely benefits the natural
gas markets by helping to deter and prevent manipulation of a
physically-settled contract to benefit a related cash-settled contract,
including penultimate positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1471\ See supra Section II.A.4.iii.f. (discussing economically
equivalent natural gas swaps).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Alternatives to the ``Economically Equivalent Swap'' Definition
Several commenters provided alternative approaches to the 2020
NPRM's proposed ``economically equivalent swap'' definition.
First, SIFMA AMG argued that the Commission should not impose
Federal position limits on swaps at all, and that the proposed Federal
position limits were ``unnecessary and would in fact impose cost
burdens . . . that are not commensurate with any of the suggested
benefits . . . .'' \1472\ Similarly, CHS stated that ``[t]here is
little doubt, from CHS's perspective, that including economically
equivalent swaps as `referenced contracts' for position limit purposes
will result in a material burden for (a) commercial end-users and (b)
small to mid-sized FCMs that focus on the needs of grain and energy
hedgers, which are referred to as `Commodity-Focused FCMs'. The costs
of compliance on such participants will likely be large and time-
consuming, and possibly entail some risk of operational error arising
out of the implementation process.'' \1473\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1472\ SIFMA AMG at 6-7. Additional commenters similarly argued
that subjecting swaps to position limits is unnecessary and would
increase costs without commensurate benefits. E.g., CHS at 5; NCFC
at 5; and ISDA at 5.
\1473\ CHS at 4. See also NCFC at 5 (similarly stating that
``[t]he costs of compliance on such participants will likely be
large and time-consuming, and possibly entail some risk of
operational error arising out of the implementation process.''). CHS
further stated, ``[w]ith respect to commercial end-users, absent
additional Commission guidance CHS believes that the burdens will
take the form of (a) determining which types of swaps will be deemed
to be economically equivalent swaps, (b) making significant and
costly modifications to systems to identify and track transactions
for reporting purposes, (c) developing tools for swaps aggregation
purposes (or manually conducting such tasks if such a tool is not
readily available to be interpolated into existing systems) and (d)
determining intra-day positions when addressing economically
equivalent swaps, which will require real-time system reporting and
real-time exception alerts, among other things . . . . In these
respects, CHS asks the Commission to be mindful and more fully
address the costs and benefits applicable to commercial end-users
and Commodity-Focused FCMs, and to provide more clarity regarding
the scope of referenced contracts. As a guide, CHS urges the
Commission to maintain as narrow a definition of `referenced
contract' as possible. CHS also urges the Commission, both in the
context of market participants generally and commercial end-users
and Commodity-Focused FCMs particularly, to address CHS's
recommendations in the following section.'' Id. at 4-5. NCFC
similarly stated that ``NCFC believes any Federal speculative
position limits rule should not unduly burden commercial end-users
who utilize derivatives markets for economically appropriate risk
management activities.'' NCFC at 7.
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[[Page 3417]]
However, as discussed above, the Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section
4a(a)(5), which explicitly requires that the Commission impose Federal
position limits on swaps that are ``economically equivalent'' to the
futures contracts and options on futures contracts subject to Federal
position limits, and that the Commission establish limits
simultaneously for ``economically equivalent'' swaps. Accordingly, from
the perspective of this cost-benefit discussion, the question is not
whether the Final Rule should encompass swaps at all, but only the
extent to which swaps should be incorporated as ``economically
equivalent'' pursuant to CEA section 4a(a)(5). Nonetheless, the
Commission recognizes that subjecting economically equivalent swaps to
Federal position limits could impose the compliance costs referenced
above by CHS and others. However, to the extent that the Final Rule
adopts a narrow ``economically equivalent swap'' definition, the
Commission anticipates these costs should be mitigated compared to
alternative definitions, while simultaneously satisfying the statutory
requirement under CEA section 4a(a)(5).
Second, CME and Better Markets both suggested that the general
``referenced contract'' definition that applies to futures contracts
and options on futures contracts should also apply to swaps, rather
than the narrower ``economically equivalent swap'' definition.
Similarly, NEFI argued that the narrower ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition could allow for easy avoidance of Federal position
limits.\1474\ The Commission discusses the possible costs and benefits
of the Final Rule's narrow definition versus this proposed alternative
of a broader definition throughout this cost-benefit discussion of
economically equivalent swaps, and the reasons discussed by the
Commission throughout this section similarly apply in response to
CME's, Better Markets', and NEFI's proposed alternative to establish a
broader ``economically equivalent swap'' definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1474\ NEFI at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, SIFMA AMG argued that while it opposed including swaps
within the Final Rule, to the extent the Commission determines to
include swaps within the Final Rule, that, in the alternative, at least
cash-settled swaps should be excluded from the economically equivalent
swap definition since these types of swaps ``have not historically been
the source of manipulative corners, squeezes, or other disruptions
related to physical commodity prices, and SIFMA AMG does not believe
limits on these products would be necessary to further deter and
prevent this type of trading activity.'' \1475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1475\ SIFMA AMG at 7. SIFMA AMG further argued that ``imposing
spot month limits only on physically-settled futures contracts would
avoid such confusion, and more importantly, would adequately address
the products of greatest concern and would serve to reduce
compliance costs and related burdens (i.e., technology builds,
personnel allocation, training, etc.) for the Commission and market
participants by allowing the Commission to observe the impact of
limits for physically-settled futures prior to evaluating whether to
extend limits to a broader scope of derivatives products.'' SIFMA
AMG at 5-6.
PIMCO and ISDA similarly argue that neither cash-settled swaps
nor futures contracts should be subject to position limits. PIMCO at
3; ISDA at 5 (arguing that position limits on cash-settled
referenced contracts, whether futures contracts or swaps, ``impose a
level of cost and complexity in implementation that does not
correspond to any identified regulatory or policy benefit of such
limits.'') AQR similarly argued that the ``opportunity or ability to
use a swap to squeeze or corner an underlying physical commodity is
extremely remote and thus extension of position limits to swaps
would likely not be merited based on an analysis of the costs and
benefits of such action.'' AQR at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Commission believes that SIFMA AMG's proposed
alternative to exclude all cash-settled swaps ex ante would impose
liquidity costs for bona fide hedgers since excluding all cash-settled
swaps could incentivize liquidity to move from corresponding cash-
settled referenced contracts to cash-settled OTC swaps, potentially
harming the liquidity in the futures markets, including liquidity for
bona fide hedgers. This could also harm price discovery if significant
liquidity and trading migrates from the exchange-traded futures markets
to the more opaque OTC swaps markets. For example, as noted above, if
liquidity were to move from futures exchanges to the OTC swaps markets,
non-dealer commercial entities may face increased transaction costs and
widening spreads, as swap dealers gain market power in the OTC market
relative to centralized exchange trading. The Commission is unable to
quantify the costs of these potential harms.\1476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1476\ However, while the Commission acknowledges these
potential costs, such costs to the nine legacy agricultural
contracts may already have been realized because their corresponding
swaps are not subject to Federal position limits under the status
quo. Nonetheless, the Commission also recognizes that certain of the
16 non-legacy core referenced futures contracts that would be
subject to Federal position limits for the first time under the
Final Rule may have larger, more liquid swaps markets than the nine
legacy agricultural contracts, and therefore potentially larger
concomitant benefits and/or costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Commission notes that CEA section 4a(a)(3) does
not merely refer to corners and squeezes, but also refers to
``manipulation'' generally. Accordingly, the Commission believes that
the Final Rule will better benefit market integrity to the extent that
cash-settled swaps would be subject to the Final Rule by helping to
prevent other forms of manipulation, such as ``banging'' or ``marking''
the close.
Fourth, in contrast to the alternative posited by SIFMA AMG
immediately above in which the Commission would exclude all cash-
settled swaps, Better Markets believed that the Final Rule's exclusion
of certain cash-settled swaps could actually impose costs on liquidity
formation. Better Markets thus proposed an alternative where settlement
type (i.e., cash-settled versus physically-settled) was not considered
to be a ``material'' difference and therefore cash-settled swaps could
be deemed to be ``economically equivalent'' to core referenced futures
contracts, which are all physically-settled. Better Markets argued that
the 2020 NPRM's economically equivalent definition ``essentially
excludes'' cash-settled swaps from Federal position limits because
cash-settled swaps would not be able to qualify as economically
equivalent to a physically-settled core referenced futures
contract.\1477\ As Better Markets commented, distinguishing between
cash-settled and physically-settled swaps and futures contracts by
deeming settlement type (i.e., cash-settled vs. physically-settled
settlement) to be a material term would ``incentivize[ ] speculative
liquidity formation away from more liquid, more transparent, and more
restrictive futures exchanges and to the swaps markets.'' \1478\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1477\ Better Markets at 32.
\1478\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Commission does not believe that the treatment of
cash-settled swaps under the Final Rule imposes such costs, at least to
the extent assumed by Better Markets. The
[[Page 3418]]
Commission believes Better Markets' concern is mitigated since under
the Final Rule cash-settled swaps are subject to Federal position
limits only if there is a corresponding (i.e., ``economically
equivalent'') cash-settled futures contract or option on a futures
contract.\1479\ That is, cash-settled swaps are free from Federal
position limits if there are no corresponding cash-settled futures
contracts or options on futures contracts. In these situations, if no
corresponding futures contract or option thereon exists, then there is
no liquidity formation in cash-settled futures contracts and options on
futures contracts with which a cash-settled swap would be competing for
liquidity in the first place.\1480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1479\ The Commission notes that a swap could be deemed to be
``economically equivalent'' to any referenced contract, including
cash-settled look-alikes, and that the ``economically equivalent
swap'' definition is not limited to core referenced futures
contracts.
\1480\ In contrast to Better Markets, AQR noted that any
``extension of position limits to swaps risks negatively impacting
commercial hedgers by reducing market liquidity, increasing
transaction costs, and increasing commodity market volatility. While
the Commission cannot entirely avoid those risks if compelled to
impose such limits, the proposed approach to economically equivalent
swaps may mitigate them in ways that allow the Commission to fully
discharge its statutory obligation without unnecessarily restricting
market activity.'' AQR at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth, FIA proposed an alternative in which cash-settled
economically equivalent swaps would be subject to a separate (higher)
Federal spot-month position limit levels compared to their
corresponding referenced contracts, and FIA argued that its proposed
alternative would benefit innovation and competition between
exchanges.\1481\ However, the Commission believes that establishing
separate (or higher) position limits for economically equivalent swaps
could impose liquidity costs and burden market integrity and price
discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1481\ FIA at 7-8. The Commission generally addresses FIA's
argument about innovation and competition in the preamble above
under Section II.B.10.v.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In particular, separate position limits for cash-settled swaps
would make it easier for potential manipulators to engage in market
manipulation, such as ``banging'' or ``marking'' the close, by
effectively permitting higher Federal position limits in cash-settled
referenced contracts. For example, a market participant would be able
to double its cash-settled positions by maintaining positions in both
cash-settled futures and cash-settled economically equivalent swaps
since under FIA's proposed alternative positions in each contract type,
that is futures contracts (including options thereon) and swaps, would
be subject to their own separate position limits for purposes of
Federal position limits.
Furthermore, imposing position limits separately on economically
equivalent swaps and futures contracts (and options thereon) as
requested under FIA's proposed alternative would mean that market
participants would not be able to net their economically equivalent
swaps with their futures positions. In contrast, the absence of
separate Federal position limits for economically equivalent swaps
means that market participants are able to net economically equivalent
swaps with other referenced contracts, i.e., futures contracts against
swaps. The Commission also recognizes that netting could permit larger
speculative positions in futures markets for market participants who
did not previously have bona fide hedge exemptions, but who have
positions in swaps in the same commodity that could be netted against
futures contracts in the same commodity. This observation might seem to
be at cross-purposes with the relatively narrow ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition. However, the Commission is concerned that
separate position limits for swaps could impair liquidity in futures
contracts or swaps, as the case may be. For example, a market
participant (including a market maker or speculator) with a large
portfolio of swaps (or futures contracts) near the applicable position
limit would be assumed to have a strong preference for executing
futures contracts (or swaps) transactions in order to maintain a swaps
(or futures contracts) position below the applicable position limit. If
there were many similarly situated market participants, the market for
such swaps (or futures contracts) could become less liquid, which could
burden market efficiency and impose higher trading costs for bona fide
hedgers. The absence of separate position limits for swaps should
decrease the possibility of illiquid markets for referenced contracts
subject to Federal position limits. Because economically equivalent
swaps and the corresponding futures contracts and options on futures
contracts are close substitutes for each other, the absence of separate
position limits should allow greater integration between the
economically equivalent swaps and corresponding futures and options
markets for referenced contracts, which should benefit price discovery,
and should also provide market participants with more flexibility
whether hedging, providing liquidity or market making, or speculating,
which should benefit market efficiency and price discovery.
Sixth, COPE alternatively requested that the Commission explicitly
exclude physically-settled swaps, or at least provide specific examples
of the contracts intended to be included.\1482\ While the Commission
provides greater clarity in the corresponding preamble discussion
above,\1483\ the Commission has determined that excluding all
physically-settled swaps ex ante is inconsistent with the statutory
goals in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B), especially the requirements to deter
corners and squeezes and to ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona
fide hedgers enumerated in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii),
respectively. For example, excluding physically-settled swaps could
potentially incentivize liquidity to move from physically-settled core
referenced futures contracts to physically-settled swaps, which could
impose costs both on market liquidity for bona fide hedgers and also on
market integrity by enabling potential manipulators to accumulate large
directional positions in physically-settled contracts to effect a
corner and squeeze more easily. This could additionally harm price
discovery as liquidity and trading would move from the more transparent
exchange-traded futures contracts and options thereon to the more
opaque OTC swaps markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1482\ COPE at 4-5.
\1483\ See Section II.A.4.iii.d(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seventh, NCFC stated that it ``appreciate[s] that CFTC proposed a
narrow definition of an economically equivalent swap under a Federal
position limits regime. Likewise, we do not object to an inclusion of
such swaps in theory since our members use them for legitimate hedging
purposes. However, NCFC continues to be concerned with the operational
difficulties, burdens, and costs for commercial end users and small- to
mid-sized FCMs that focus on the needs of agricultural hedgers of
including swaps for position limit purposes. The costs of compliance on
such participants will likely be large and time-consuming, and possibly
entail some risk of operational error arising out of the implementation
process.'' \1484\ As a result, NCFC suggested, as an alternative to the
2020 NPRM's approach, that the Final Rule exclude from a commercial
end-user's Federal position limits those agricultural commodity swaps
that are transacted by invoking the ``End-User Exemption to Mandatory
Clearing'' rule.\1485\
[[Page 3419]]
According to NCFC, those swap contracts already must meet the test ``to
hedge or mitigate commercial risk,'' and are ``not used for a purpose
that is in the nature of speculation, investing, or trading,'' as
outlined in Sec. 50.50 of the Commission's regulations, and therefore,
by definition, these contracts should not be subject to end-user
Federal speculative position limits.\1486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1484\ NCFC at 5.
\1485\ Id.
\1486\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission understands NCFC's concern, but believes NCFC's
alternative is unnecessary for two reasons. First, to the extent a swap
described by NCFC would ``hedge or mitigate commercial risk,'' the
Commission believes that the costs described by NCFC are mitigated
since such swap likely would qualify for an enumerated bona fide hedge
under the Final Rule and therefore would not contribute to a commercial
end-user's net position for Federal position limits purposes.\1487\
Second, the Commission believes the purported benefits related to
NCFC's alternative are limited since physical commodity swaps are not
required to be cleared under the Commission's existing regulations, so
determining whether the end-user clearing exemption applies is not
necessarily a helpful proxy in determining whether a swap is
``economically equivalent'' or not for purposes of CEA section
4a(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1487\ To the extent an FCM would not be able to qualify for a
bona fide hedge, the Commission believes that excepting such swaps
for purely financial firms would functionally have the same effect
as maintaining the risk-management exemption, which Congress,
through the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the CEA, has directed the
Commission to eliminate. See Section II.A.4.iii. Nonetheless, to the
extent that NCFC's comment is limited to small- and medium-sized
FCMs, the Commission does not believe that such FCMs generally will
violate the Federal position limit levels based on the Commission's
understanding of existing market dynamics and positions held by
market participants under the status quo, and therefore costs should
be comparatively mitigated for small- and medium-sized FCMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vii. Pre-Existing Positions
Final Sec. 150.2(g) imposes Federal position limits on ``pre-
existing positions'' \1488\--other than pre-enactment swaps and
transition period swaps--during both the spot month and non-spot month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1488\ Final Sec. 150.1 defines ``pre-existing position'' to
mean ``any position in a commodity derivative contract acquired in
good faith prior to the effective date'' of any applicable position
limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that final Sec. 150.2(g) benefits market
integrity since pre-existing positions (other than pre-enactment and
transition period swaps) that exceed spot-month limits could result in
market or price disruptions as positions are rolled into the spot
month.\1489\ The Commission recognizes some costs and benefits
associated with final Sec. 150.2(g)(2) may have already been realized
given that the nine legacy agricultural contracts are already subject
to the Federal non-spot month position limits. Therefore, exchanges and
market participants should not incur any significant new costs to
comply with Sec. 150.2(g)(2), and will likely continue to benefit from
market integrity as a result of the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1489\ The Commission is particularly concerned about protecting
the spot month in physical-delivery futures from corners and
squeezes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the 2020 NPRM, FIA and MGEX suggested that the
Commission alternatively restructure the provision to include just two
categories, ``pre-existing swaps'' and ``pre-existing futures,''
because the variability of exemptive relief could create operational
challenges for market participants.'' \1490\ Although the Commission
did not adopt the terms ``pre-existing swaps'' and ``pre-existing
futures'' for the Final Rule as FIA and MGEX suggested, the practical
effect is that final Sec. 150.2(g) creates two categories--(1) pre-
existing futures contracts (including options thereon), which are
subject to both the spot month and non-spot month Federal position
limits; and (2) pre-existing swaps, which are not subject to such
limits. Furthermore, to offset the operational challenges or other
burdens associated with final Sec. 150.2(g), the Commission is
delaying the compliance date to January 1, 2022 in connection with the
Federal position limits for the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts, and further delaying the compliance date to January 1, 2023
for swaps that are subject to Federal position limits under the Final
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1490\ FIA at 8-9; MGEX at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
viii. Anti-Evasion
Final Sec. 150.2(i) provides that, if used to willfully circumvent
or evade speculative position limits: (1) A commodity index contract,
monthly average pricing contract, outright price reporting contract,
and/or a location basis contract will be considered to be a referenced
contract; (2) a bona fide hedging transaction or position recognition
or spread exemption will no longer apply; and (3) a swap will
considered to be an economically equivalent swap even if it does not
meet the economically equivalent swap definition set forth in Sec.
150.1. This provision serves to deter and prevent a number of potential
methods of evading Federal position limits, the specifics of which the
Commission may not be able to anticipate. Like the Federal position
limits it supports, Sec. 150.2(i) helps to protect market integrity by
preventing excessive speculation and market manipulation. However, the
Commission also recognizes possible costs to market participants due to
uncertainty under the Final Rule's anti-evasion provision since it may
be difficult for market participants to determine, as a bright-line
matter, whether their positions and trading strategies represent
legitimate avoidance of position limits or instead represent malfeasant
evasive practices.\1491\ As a result, the lack of a bright-line
standard could potentially impose liquidity costs as market
participants may instead choose to engage in less efficient trading
strategies in order to err cautiously to avoid engaging in potentially
``evasive'' behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1491\ SIFMA AMG at 7, n.16 (noting that the anti-evasion
provision makes the application of the proposed ``economically
equivalent swap'' definition less clear because it incorporates a
subjective measure of intent); see also FIA at 25 (questioning how a
participant would distinguish a strategy that minimizes position
size with an evasive strategy); Better Markets at 33 (describing the
anti-evasion provision as a ``useful deterrent,'' but noting that
the willful circumvention standard would be difficult to meet and
partially turns on the Commission's consideration of the legitimate
business purpose analysis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an alternative to the ``willfully'' standard, FIA recommended
that the anti-evasion analysis be based on the presence of ``deceit,
deception, or other unlawful or illegitimate activity.'' \1492\ Because
a position that does not involve fraud or deceit can still involve
other indicia of evasive activity, the proposed alternative would be
less effective in protecting market integrity to the extent it failed
to capture evasive activity. Further, the incorporation of a standard
other than ``willful'' would create confusion to market participants by
resulting in divergent standards among Commission rulemakings
concerning evasion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1492\ FIA at 25-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Exemptions From Federal Position Limits--Bona Fide Hedging
Recognitions, Spread and Other Exemptions (Final Sec. Sec. 150.1 and
150.3)
i. Background
The Final Rule provides for several exemptions that, subject to
certain conditions, permit a trader to exceed the applicable Federal
position limit set forth in final Sec. 150.2. Specifically, Sec.
150.3 generally maintains but modifies, as discussed below, the two
existing Federal exemptions that include (1) bona fide hedging
positions and (2) spread positions. Final Sec. 150.3 also includes new
Federal exemptions
[[Page 3420]]
for certain conditional spot month positions in natural gas, financial
distress positions, and pre-enactment and transition period swaps.
Final Sec. 150.1 sets forth the definitions for which positions may
qualify as a ``bona fide hedging transaction or position'' and for
``spread transaction.'' \1493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1493\ The Commission currently defines this term in existing
Sec. 1.3 in the plural as ``bona fide hedging transactions or
positions'' while the Final Rule defines it in the singular ``bona
fide hedging transaction or position.'' See supra Section I.E.
(discussing use of certain terminology). This discussion sometimes
refers to the ``bona fide hedging transaction or position''
definition as ``bona fide hedges,'' ``bona fide hedging,'' or ``bona
fide hedge positions.'' For the purpose of this discussion, the
terms have the same meaning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Bona Fide Hedging Definition; Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges; and
Guidance on Spot Month Hedge Exemption Restrictions and Measuring Risk
The Commission is adopting several amendments to the bona fide
hedge definition. First, the Commission is revising some of the general
elements of the ``bona fide hedging transaction or position''
definition in final Sec. 150.1 to conform the Commission's regulatory
definition to the statutory bona fide hedge definition in CEA section
4a(c), as amended by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act. As discussed in
greater detail in the preamble, the Final Rule (1) revises the
temporary substitute test, consistent with the Commission's
understanding of the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to section 4a of the
CEA, to no longer recognize as bona fide hedges certain risk management
positions; (2) revises the economically appropriate test to make
explicit that the position must be economically appropriate to the
reduction of ``price risk''; and (3) eliminates the incidental test and
orderly trading requirement, which the Dodd-Frank Act did not include
in section 4a of the CEA. The Commission believes that these amendments
to the existing general elements of the regulatory definition include
non-discretionary changes that are required by Congress's amendments to
section 4a of the CEA, or in the case of the incorporation of ``price
risk,'' do not represent a change from the status quo baseline. The
Commission is also amending the bona fide hedge definition to conform
to the CEA's statutory definition, by adding a provision for positions
that qualify as pass-through swaps and pass-through swap offsets.\1494\
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\1494\ As discussed in Section II.A.--Sec. 150.1--Definitions
of the preamble, the existing definition of ``bona fide hedging
transactions and positions'' appears in existing Sec. 1.3 of the
Commission's regulations; the revised definition of this term, in
singular form, now appears in Sec. 150.1.
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Second, the Commission is maintaining the distinction between
enumerated and non-enumerated bona fide hedges but is (1) moving the
location of the enumerated bona fide hedges, which will remain part of
the regulatory text, from the existing definition of ``bona fide
hedging transactions and positions'' currently found in Commission
regulation Sec. 1.3 to final Appendix A in part 150; \1495\ and (2)
expanding the list of enumerated hedges, which will continue to be
self-effectuating for Federal position limit purposes, thereby not
requiring prior Commission approval.
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\1495\ For the avoidance of doubt, Appendix A will still be
incorporated as part of the Commission's regulations under the Final
Rule. In contrast, the 2020 NPRM had proposed to make Appendix A
Acceptable Practices.
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Third, the Commission is proposing guidance in Appendix B with
respect to (i) whether an entity may measure risk on a net or gross
basis for purposes of determining its bona fide hedge positions, and
(ii) factors exchanges could consider when applying a restriction on an
exemption against holding a position under a bona fide hedge or spread
transaction exemption in excess of limits during the lesser of the last
five days of trading or the time period for the spot month in a
physically-delivered contract, or otherwise limit the size of such
position.
The Commission expects that these modifications related to bona
fide hedging will primarily benefit physical commodity commercial
market participants, as well as their counterparties. CEA section
4a(c)(1) directs the Commission to exclude bona fide hedge positions
from any Federal position limits framework. Further, the Commission
believes that, generally, recognizing bona fide hedges supports all
section 15(a) factors under this cost-benefit discussion. For example,
recognizing bona fide hedges encourages participation in the futures
markets by commercial market participants.\1496\ Increasing
participation from different types of market participants, including
commercial market participants: (i) protects the legitimate commercial
activity of cash-market participants,\1497\ (ii) increases
competitiveness, and (iii) supports the financial integrity of futures
markets. Further, increased participation and competitiveness will
benefit price discovery. Finally, an expanded list of enumerated bona
fide hedges supports sound risk management practices by commercial
market participants and their counterparties, which may result in
indirect benefits to commodity end users or the public.\1498\
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\1496\ NFPEA at 6 (stating that ``Congress intended the
Commission to protect end-users' continued access to cost-effective
commercial risk management tools, and did not intend to burden end-
users with unnecessary regulatory compliance obligations'').
\1497\ AGA expressed its support of an expanded list of
enumerated hedges by stating that, ``consistent with the mandate of
the CEA, any speculative position limits regime adopted by the CFTC
must be established in a way that allows commercial end-users, such
as natural gas utilities, to continue to enter into bona fide hedges
to manage, hedge and mitigate the commercial risks of their natural
gas distribution business in a non-burdensome and cost-effective
manner on behalf of customers.'' AGA at 2.
\1498\ In expressing overall support for the proposed definition
of bona fide hedging transaction or position in the 2020 NPRM, CME
Group noted that the Commission's recognition of a wider range of
commercial hedging practices generally reflects Congress's intent
not to unduly burden bona fide hedgers. CME Group at 9.
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Recognizing an expanded list of enumerated bona fide hedges, which
are self-effectuating and do not require prior approval from the
Commission, will mitigate related compliance costs for those contract
markets that will be newly subject to Federal position limits under the
Final Rule. This is in comparison to an alternative scenario in which a
narrow set of available enumerated hedges would have required market
participants to obtain prior approval before availing themselves of an
exemption for Federal position limit purposes.
The Commission notes that this section will discuss the substantive
exemptions for Federal position limit purposes while the next section
will discuss the process for the Commission or exchanges, as
applicable, to grant exemptions and bona fide hedge recognitions.
a. Bona Fide Hedging Definition
(1) Elimination of Risk Management Exemptions; Addition of the Pass-
Through Swap
Exemption
The Commission is eliminating the word ``normally'' from the bona
fide hedge definition's temporary substitute test and, as a result,
prohibiting recognition, as bona fide hedges, of risk management
positions in physical commodity derivatives subject to Federal
speculative position limits. This amendment conforms the regulatory
bona fide hedging definition with the Commission's interpretation that
the removal of the word ``normally'' from the CEA's section 4a(c)(2)
statutory temporary substitute test by the Dodd-Frank Act signaled
Congressional intent
[[Page 3421]]
to cease recognizing ``risk management'' positions as bona fide hedges
for physical commodities.
Additionally, in accordance with CEA section 4a(c)(2)(B), the
Commission is, however, expanding the bona fide hedging definition to
also include as a bona fide hedge any position that qualifies as a
pass-through swap/swap offset, discussed further below.\1499\ The
Commission believes that including pass-through swaps and pass-through
swap offsets within the definition of a bona fide hedge will mitigate
some of the potential impact resulting from the rescission of the risk
management exemption,\1500\ and the Commission discusses the costs and
benefits related to the pass-through swap provision further below.
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\1499\ See infra Section IV.A.4.ii.a(2). The existing bona fide
hedging definition in Sec. 1.3 requires that a position must
``normally'' represent a substitute for transactions or positions
made at a later time in a physical marketing channel (i.e., the
``temporary substitute test''). The Dodd-Frank Act amended the
temporary substitute language that previously appeared in the
statute by removing the word ``normally'' from the phrase normally
``represents a substitute for transactions made or to be made or
positions taken or to be taken at a later time in a physical
marketing channel.'' 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(i). The Commission
interprets this change as reflecting Congressional direction that a
bona fide hedging position in physical commodities must always (and
not just ``normally'') be in connection with the production, sale,
or use of a physical cash-market commodity.
Previously, the Commission stated that, among other things, the
inclusion of the word ``normally'' in connection with the pre-Dodd-
Frank-Act version of the temporary substitute language indicated
that the bona fide hedging definition should not be construed to
apply only to firms using futures to reduce their exposures to risks
in the cash market, and that to qualify as a bona fide hedge, a
transaction in the futures market did not need to be a temporary
substitute for a later transaction in the cash market. See
Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Hedging Definition, 52 FR at
27195, 27196 (Jul. 20, 1987). In other words, that 1987
interpretation took the view that a futures position could still
qualify as a bona fide hedging position even if it was not in
connection with the production, sale, or use of a physical
commodity. Accordingly, based on the Commission's interpretation of
the revised statutory definition of bona fide hedging in CEA section
4a(c)(2), risk-management hedges would not be recognized under the
Commission's bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 150.1.
\1500\ See, e.g., ICE at 5-6 (contending that eliminating risk
management exemptions could make it less efficient and more
expensive for commercial end-users to hedge risks and that pass-
through exemption is an inadequate substitution); ISDA at 6-7
(arguing that the elimination of the risk management exemptions will
result in increased costs for ``tailored over-the-counter financial
products, . . . will cause some dealers to exit the business and
will in any event lead to decreases in liquidity in the underlying
futures markets, with a corresponding increase in volatility.'');
see also supra Section II.A.1.iii.a(4) (discussing elimination of
the risk management exemptions).
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As discussed below, the Final Rule's pass-through provisions should
help address certain of the hedging needs of persons seeking to offset
the risk from swap books, allowing for sufficient liquidity in the
marketplace for both bona fide hedgers and their counterparties.
Accordingly, under the Final Rule, market participants with positions
that do not otherwise satisfy the bona fide hedging definition or
qualify for another exemption are no longer able to rely on recognition
of such risk-reducing techniques as bona fide hedges. Market
participants who provide liquidity to commercial market participants
and have obtained or requested a risk management exemption under the
existing definition, and who do not qualify for a pass-through swap
offset, may resort to other hedging strategies. These other hedging
strategies may result in increased costs for these liquidity providers
for those activities that are not eligible for the bona fide hedge
treatment.
The Commission recognizes the possible liquidity costs as a result
of eliminating risk management exemptions. Specifically, the Commission
considered the risk that dealers who approach or exceed the Federal
position limit may decide to pull back on providing liquidity,
including to bona fide hedgers, due to the exclusion of risk management
positions from the bona fide hedge definition. However, the Commission
considered the risk of possible reduced liquidity against various
factors and believes that the potential cost of reduced liquidity will
be mitigated for several reasons.
First, the Final Rule extends the compliance date by which risk
management exemption holders must reduce their positions to comply with
Federal position limits under the Final Rule to January 1, 2023. This
delay provides sufficient time for existing positions to roll off and/
or be replaced with positions that conform with the Federal position
limits adopted in this Final Rule.
Second, for the nine legacy agricultural contracts, the Final Rule
generally sets Federal non-spot month position limit levels higher than
existing non-spot limits, which may enable additional dealer activity
described above.\1501\ The remaining non-legacy 16 core referenced
futures contracts will not be subject to non-spot month Federal
position limits and will remain subject to existing exchange-set limits
or accountability levels outside of the spot month, which does not
represent a change from the status quo. The generally higher levels
with respect to the nine legacy agricultural contracts, and the
exchanges' flexible accountability regimes with respect to the new 16
core referenced futures contracts, should mitigate at least some
potential costs related to the prohibition on recognizing risk
management positions as bona fide hedges.
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\1501\ See infra Section II.B.4. (discussing non-spot month
limit levels). Final Sec. 150.2 generally increases position limits
for non-spot months for contracts that currently are subject to the
Federal position limits framework other than for CBOT Oats (O), CBOT
KC HRW Wheat (KW), and MGEX HRS Wheat (MWE), for which the
Commission is maintaining existing levels.
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Third, the Final Rule may improve market competitiveness and reduce
transaction costs. As noted above, existing holders of the risk
management exemption, and the levels permitted thereunder, are
currently confidential, and the Commission is no longer granting new
risk management exemptions to potential new liquidity providers.
Accordingly, by eliminating the risk management exemption, the Final
Rule benefits the public and strengthens market integrity by improving
market transparency since certain dealers are no longer able to
maintain the grandfathered risk management exemption while other
dealers lack this ability under the status quo. While the Commission
believes that the risk management exemption may allow dealers to
provide additional market making activities, which benefits market
liquidity and may result in lower prices for end-users, as noted above,
the potential costs resulting from removing the risk management
exemption may be mitigated by the Final Rule's revised position limit
levels that reflect current EDS for spot month levels and current open
interest and trading volume for non-spot month levels. Therefore, the
Commission believes that existing risk management exemption holders
should be able to continue providing liquidity to bona fide hedgers,
but acknowledges that some may not to the same degree as under the
exemption. However, the Commission believes that any potential harm to
liquidity should be mitigated.
Further, the spot month and non-spot month levels, which generally
are higher than the status quo, together with the elimination of the
risk management exemptions that benefit only certain dealers, may
enable new liquidity providers to enter the markets on a level playing
field with the existing risk management exemption holders. With the
possibility of additional liquidity providers, the framework may
strengthen market integrity by decreasing concentration risk
potentially posed by too few market makers. However, the benefits to
market liquidity the Commission described above may be muted since this
analysis is predicated, in part, on the
[[Page 3422]]
understanding that dealers are the predominant large traders. Data in
the Commission's Supplementary COT and its underlying data indicate
that risk-management exemption holders are not the only large
participants in these markets--large commercial firms also hold large
positions in such commodities.
Fourth, although the Commission will no longer recognize risk
management positions as bona fide hedges under this Final Rule, the
Commission maintains other authorities, including the authority under
CEA section 4a(a)(7), to exempt risk management positions from Federal
position limits.
Fifth, consistent with existing industry practice, exchanges may
continue to recognize risk management positions for contracts that are
not subject to Federal position limits, including for excluded
commodities.
Finally, as discussed immediately below, the Commission believes
the recognition of pass-through swaps and pass-through swap offsets
could mitigate, to some extent, the costs to the market in general, or
to specific market participants, resulting from the risk management
exemption's elimination.\1502\
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\1502\ NCFC concurs that ``the substantial increase in the
overall speculative position limits and allowances for pass-through
swaps will limit any potential loss of liquidity'' that may result
from the elimination of the risk management exemption. NCFC at 7.
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(2) Pass-Through Swaps and Pass-Through Swap Offsets
The revised bona fide hedging definition, consistent with the Dodd-
Frank Act's changes to CEA section 4a(c)(2), permits the recognition as
bona fide hedges of futures and options on futures positions that
offset pass-through swaps entered into by dealers and other liquidity
providers (the ``pass-through swap counterparty'') \1503\ opposite bona
fide hedging swap counterparties (the ``bona fide hedge
counterparty''), as long as: (1) The pass-through swap counterparty
receives from the bona fide hedging swap counterparty a written
representation that the pass-through swap qualifies as a bona fide
hedge; and (2) the pass-through swap counterparty enters into a futures
or option on a futures position or a swap position to offset and reduce
the price risk attendant to the pass-through swap.\1504\ Accordingly, a
subset of risk management exemption holders and transactions they enter
into could continue to benefit from an exemption, and potential
counterparties could benefit from the liquidity they provide, as long
as the position being offset qualifies as a bona fide hedge for the
bona fide hedge counterparty.
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\1503\ Such pass-through swap counterparties are typically swap
dealers providing liquidity to bona fide hedgers.
\1504\ See paragraph (2)(i) of the proposed bona fide hedging
definition. Of course, if the pass-through swap qualifies as an
``economically equivalent swap,'' then the pass-through swap
counterparty does not need to rely on the pass-through swap
provision since it may be able to offset its long (or short)
position in the economically equivalent swap with the corresponding
short (or long) position in the futures or option on futures
position or on the opposite side of another economically equivalent
swap.
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The Commission has determined that any resulting costs or benefits
related to the proposed pass-through swap exemption are a result of
Congress's amendments to CEA section 4a(c) rather than the Commission's
discretionary action. On the other hand, the Commission's discretionary
action to require the pass-through swap counterparty to receive and
maintain a written representation from the bona fide hedging swap
counterparty that the pass-through swap qualifies as a bona fide
hedging position causes the swap counterparty to incur marginal
recordkeeping costs.\1505\ The Commission considered comments
requesting the elimination of the pass-through swap provision
recordkeeping requirement in Sec. 150.3(d) based on arguments that
requiring this recordkeeping was not practical.\1506\ The Commission is
not persuaded by those arguments as the recordkeeping requirements
assist the Commission in verifying that the pass-through swap provision
is only being utilized to offset risks arising from bona fide hedges.
Accordingly, the Commission is finalizing the proposed pass-through
swap recordkeeping requirement in Sec. 150.3(d), subject to certain
conforming changes to reflect amendments to the pass-through swap
paragraph of the bona fide hedging definition.
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\1505\ To the extent that the pass-through swap counterparty is
a swap dealer or major swap participant, it already may be subject
to similar recordkeeping requirements under Sec. 1.31 and part 23
of the Commission's regulations. As a result, such costs may already
have been realized.
\1506\ Cargill at 10; EEI/EPSA at 7-8; FIA at 11-12; CMC at 5;
Shell at 6-7; ICE at 6-7; ISDA at 11-12.
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Since not all swaps entered into by a commercial entity may qualify
as a bona fide hedge, the Commission declines commenters' requests that
a pass-through swap counterparty may reasonably rely solely upon the
fact that the counterparty is a commercial end user and, absent an
agreement between the counterparties, that the swap appears to be
consistent with hedges entered into by end users in the same line of
business. The Commission, however, is amending the regulatory text to
provide flexibility and avoid a prescriptive requirement that would
otherwise cause additional costs or burdens.
Instead, the Final Rule provides that the pass-through swap
counterparty (i.e., the swap dealer) may rely in good faith on a
written representation made by its bona fide hedging swap counterparty,
unless the pass-through swap counterparty has information that would
cause a reasonable person to question the accuracy of the
representation. The Commission is adding the written representation
requirement to enable the Commission to verify that only market
participants with bona fide hedge exemptions are able to pass-through
those exemptions to their swap dealer counterparties. To avoid a
prescriptive requirement that would incur additional costs to market
participants, the Final Rule does not prescribe the form or manner by
which the pass-through swap counterparty obtains the written
representation. The Commission recognizes that such flexibility would
allow for the bona fide hedging counterparty to make such
representations on a relationship basis through counterparty
relationship documentation (e.g., through ISDA documentation) or on a
transaction basis (e.g., through trade confirmations or in other forms
as agreed upon by the parties), based on the most cost efficient manner
for the market participants.
The Final Rule's pass-through swap provision, consistent with the
Dodd-Frank Act's changes to CEA section 4a(c)(2), also addresses a
situation where a participant who qualifies as a bona fide hedging swap
counterparty (i.e., a participant with a position in a previously-
entered into swap that qualified, at the time the swap was entered
into, as a bona fide hedging position under the revised definition)
seeks, at some later time, to offset that swap position.\1507\ Such
step might be taken, for example, to respond to a change in the
participant's risk exposure in the underlying commodity. As a result, a
participant could use futures contracts or options on futures contracts
in excess of Federal position limits to offset the price risk of a
previously-entered into swap, which would allow the participant to
exceed Federal position limits using either new futures or options on
futures or swap positions that reduce the risk of the original swap.
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\1507\ See paragraph (2)(ii) of the ``bona fide hedging
transaction or position'' definition in Sec. 150.1.
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The Commission expects the pass-through swap provision to
facilitate
[[Page 3423]]
dynamic hedging by market participants. The Commission recognizes that
a significant number of market participants use dynamic hedging to more
effectively manage their portfolio risks. Therefore, this provision may
increase operational efficiency. In addition, by permitting dynamic
hedging, a greater number of dealers should be better able to provide
liquidity to the market, as these dealers will be able to more
effectively manage their risks by entering into pass-through swaps with
bona fide hedgers as counterparties. Moreover, market participants are
not precluded from using swaps that are not ``economically equivalent
swaps'' for such risk management purposes since swaps that are not
deemed to be ``economically equivalent'' to a referenced contract are
not subject to the Commission's position limits framework.
(3) Limiting ``Risk'' to ``Price'' Risk; Elimination of the Incidental
Test and Orderly Trading Requirement
The bona fide hedging definition's ``economically appropriate
test'' set out in final Sec. 150.1 explicitly provides that only
hedges that offset price risks can be recognized as bona fide hedging
transactions or positions. The Commission does not believe that this
particular change imposes any new costs or benefits, as it is
consistent with both the existing bona fide hedging definition \1508\
as well as the Commission's longstanding policy.\1509\ Nonetheless, the
Commission realizes that hedging occurs for more types of risks than
price (e.g., volumetric hedging) and hedging solely to protect against
changes in value of non-price risks would fall outside the category of
a bona fide hedge, which offsets the ``price risk'' of an underlying
commodity cash position.
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\1508\ The existing bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 1.3
provides that ``no transactions or positions shall be classified as
bona fide hedging unless their purpose is to offset price risks
incidental to commercial cash or spot operations.'' (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the definition in final Sec. 150.1 merely
moves this requirement to the definition's revised ``economically
appropriate test'' requirement.
\1509\ For example, in promulgating existing Sec. 1.3, the
Commission explained that a bona fide hedging position must, among
other things, ``be economically appropriate to risk reduction, such
risks must arise from operation of a commercial enterprise, and the
price fluctuations of the futures contracts used in the transaction
must be substantially related to fluctuations of the cash-market
value of the assets, liabilities or services being hedged.'' Bona
Fide Hedging Transactions or Positions, 42 FR at 14832, 14833 (Mar.
16, 1977). The Dodd-Frank Act added CEA section 4a(c)(2), which
copied the ``economically appropriate test'' from the Commission's
definition in Sec. 1.3. See also 78 FR at 75702, 75703.
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In response to commenters, the Commission clarifies in the preamble
that price risk can be informed and impacted by various other types of
risks.\1510\ The Commission agrees with commenters who stated that
market participants form independent economic assessments of how
different risks (including, but not limited to, geopolitical, turmoil,
weather, or counterparty) might create or impact the price risk of
underlying commodities.\1511\ The Commission recognizes these risks can
create price risks and understands that firms may manage these
potential risks to their businesses differently and in the manner most
suitable for their business. By limiting the economically appropriate
prong to price risk, the Commission is reiterating its historical
practice (which has adequately applied to the legacy agricultural
contracts for decades) to recognize hedges of price risk of an
underlying commodity position as bona fide hedges while acknowledging
that price risk may itself be impacted by non-price risks. Market
participants may continue to manage non-price risks in a variety of
ways, which may include participation in the futures markets or
exposure to other financial products. In fact, market participants may
decide to use futures contracts that are not subject to Federal
position limits, if they determine such contracts will help them manage
non-price risks faced by their businesses.
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\1510\ See supra Section II.A.1.iii.b (discussing economically
appropriate test); Cargill at 3.
\1511\ See, e.g., CMC at 3.
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Alternatively, commenters suggested that the Commission permit
market participants to use the non-enumerated hedge process to receive
recognition of hedges of non-price risk on a case-by-case basis.\1512\
The Commission is precluded from adopting this alternative in light of
its view that price risk is required to satisfy the CEA's economically
appropriate test. Further, the Commission is unaware of commercial
market participants historically seeking non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition for non-price risk in the spot month.
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\1512\ MGEX at 2; FIA at 11.
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The Commission further implements Congress's Dodd-Frank Act
amendments that did not include in the statutory bona fide hedge
definition the incidental test and orderly trading requirement by
eliminating those elements from to the Commission's regulatory
definition. As discussed in the preamble, the Commission believes that
these changes do not represent a change in policy or regulatory
requirement. As a result, the Commission does not identify any costs or
benefits related to these changes.
b. Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
The Commission maintains, and incorporates in final Sec. 150.3, a
list of enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix A to part 150 of the
Commission's regulations that includes: (i) All of the existing
enumerated hedges; and (ii) additional enumerated bona fide hedges. The
Commission reinforces that hedging practices not otherwise listed may
still be deemed, on a case-by-case basis, to comply with the proposed
bona fide hedging definition (i.e., non-enumerated bona fide hedges).
As discussed further below, the enumerated bona fide hedges in Appendix
A are ``self-effectuating'' for purposes of Federal position limit
levels. This is expected to help in ensuring timely hedging and
therefore reduce compliance costs associated with seeking an
exemption.\1513\
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\1513\ For example, AGA expressed support for the Commission's
proposal to recognize anticipatory merchandising as an enumerated
hedge because it promotes liquidity. AGA at 8. AGA stated that
``[a]bsent such an enumerated hedge, there would be a piecemeal
approach to permitting such hedges which could reduce liquidity,
raise costs, and create undue risks for gas utilities, without any
regulatory benefits toward the Commission's goal to reduce excessive
speculative activities.'' Id.
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(1) Treatment of Unfixed Price Transactions
As discussed in the preamble, the Commission has long recognized
fixed-price commitments as the basis for a bona fide hedge.\1514\ Under
existing Sec. 1.3, only one enumerated hedge explicitly mentions
``unfixed price,'' and its availability is limited to circumstances
where a market participant has both an unfixed-price purchase and an
unfixed-price sale on hand (precluding a market participant with only
an unfixed-price purchase or an unfixed price sale from qualifying for
this particular enumerated hedge).\1515\ In 2012, Commission staff
issued interpretive letter 12-07 (``Staff Letter 12-07''), which
clarified that a commercial entity may qualify for the existing
enumerated bona fide hedge for unfilled anticipated requirements even
if the commercial entity has entered into long-term, unfixed-price
supply or requirements contracts because, as staff explained, the
unfixed-price purchase
[[Page 3424]]
contract does not ``fill'' the commercial entity's anticipated
requirements.\1516\
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\1514\ See supra Section I.
\1515\ See, e.g., paragraphs (2)(i)(A) and 2(ii)(A) of existing
Sec. 1.3.
\1516\ CFTC Staff Letter 12-07 at 1, issued August 16, 2012,
https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/CFTCStaffLetters/letters.htm,
title search ``12-07.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Final Rule affirms and broadens the application of the
interpretation provided in Staff Letter No. 12-07. As a result,
commercial market participants with unfixed price transactions may
qualify for bona fide hedge treatment under the enumerated bona fide
hedges for anticipatory merchandising, anticipated unsold production,
or anticipated unfilled requirements.\1517\ The Commission clarifies
that a commercial market participant that enters into an unfixed-price
transaction will not be precluded from qualifying for one of these
anticipatory enumerated bona fide hedges as long as the commercial
entity otherwise satisfies all requirements for such anticipatory bona
fide hedge, including demonstrating its anticipated need in the
physical marketing channel related to either its unsold production,
unfilled requirements, and/or merchandising, as applicable.\1518\ As
such, merely entering into an unfixed-price transaction is not alone
sufficient to demonstrate compliance with one of the enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges.
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\1517\ See supra Section II.A.1.iv (discussing treatment of
unfixed price transactions).
\1518\ The specific requirements associated with each enumerated
bona fide hedge, including each anticipatory bona fide hedge, are
described in detail further below.
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The same costs and benefits described above with respect to an
expanded list of enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions also apply to
such recognition based on unfixed-price transactions. The Commission's
treatment of unfixed price transactions under the Final Rule will
benefit physical commodity commercial market participants. As discussed
previously, CEA section 4a(c)(1) directs the Commission to exclude bona
fide hedge positions from any Federal position limits framework. In
accordance with CEA section 4a(c)(1), the Commission's treatment of
unfixed price transactions entered into by commercial market
participants protects the legitimate commercial activity of cash-market
participants,\1519\ thereby encouraging participation in the futures
markets by commercial market participants. Additionally, bona hedge
treatment for qualified unfixed price transactions benefits the public
by allowing commercial market participants to more effectively and
predictably hedge their price risks, thus controlling costs that might
be passed on to the public.\1520\ However, to the extent the Commission
currently allows exemptions related to unfixed-price transactions, the
costs and benefits already may be realized by market participants and
may not represent a change from the status quo baseline.
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\1519\ See Cargill at 6 (stating that the Commission should
recognize unfixed price transactions as they are ``fundamental to
price risk management and routinely used by firms to manage risk'').
\1520\ CEWG at 18 (discussing storage hedges, stating that
``(``[n]ot allowing commercial energy firms to utilize these
industry-standard hedges on an enumerated basis because they are
``anticipatory'' in nature or viewed as a form of
``merchandising''--or both--could result in storage assets being
underutilized, which could increase volatility in physical and
financial markets for energy commodities that ultimately could
translate into higher costs for consumers'').
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Alternatively, several commenters requested that the Commission
create a new enumerated bona fide hedge for unfixed-price transactions
or amend the existing enumerated bona fide hedge for offsetting unfixed
purchase and sales.\1521\ The Commission does not believe that this is
necessary since, as described above, commercial market participants may
continue to both qualify for anticipatory bona fide hedges while also
entering into unfixed-price transactions. Further, the Commission
believes that neither of these alternatives is suitable because there
is an inherent difficulty in evaluating the propriety of a hedge of an
unfixed price obligation with a fixed-price futures contract due to the
basis risk that exists until the unfixed price obligation is fixed.
Given differences among markets, creating a new enumerated bona fide
hedge for any unfixed price transaction could, under certain
circumstances, impose costs on market integrity, including by enabling
potential market manipulation and/or allowing excessive speculation by
potentially affording bona fide hedging treatment for speculative
transactions. To the extent that a market participant does not qualify
for an enumerated bona fide hedge in connection with an unfixed-price
transaction, the Commission believes that any potential harms or costs
to that market participant would be mitigated because the participant
could still avail itself of the process under Sec. Sec. 150.3 and
150.9 for non-enumerated bona fide hedges.\1522\
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\1521\ See, e.g., Ecom at 1; ACA at 2; CEWG at 19-21; Chevron at
11; CME Group at 8-9; DECA at 2; East Cotton at 2; Gerald Marshall
at 2; IFUS at 5-7; IMC at 2; Jess Smith at 2; LDC at 2; Mallory
Alexander at 2; McMeekin at 2; Memtex at 2; Moody Compress 1; NCC at
1; NGFA at 7; Olam at 2; Omnicotton at 2; Canale Cotton at 2; Shell
at 7; Southern Cotton at 2; Suncor at 7; SW Ag at 2; Toyo at 2;
Texas Cotton at 2; Walcot at 2; White Gold at 2.
\1522\ One commenter maintains that reliance on the non-
enumerated bona fide hedge process for management of unpriced
physical purchase or sale commitments ``will impose procedural
hurdles, uncertainty, and additional costs on a critically important
function of the supply chain in the U.S. economy.'' CEWG at 21.
Another commenter stated that imposing a burden on commercial end
users with unpriced physical purchase or sale commitments to rely on
the non-enumerated hedge exemption process is contrary to the intent
and language of the CEA. Cargill at 6. These concerns, however, are
mitigated because, under the Final Rule, commercial market
participants with unfixed price transactions may qualify for bona
fide hedge treatment under the enumerated bona fide hedges for
anticipatory merchandising, anticipated unsold production, or
anticipated unfilled requirements.
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(2) Elimination of the Five-Day Rule
The Final Rule eliminates the existing restriction on holding
certain enumerated bona fide hedges during the last five days of
trading under existing Sec. 1.3. Instead, under final Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H), the exchanges have discretion to determine, for
purposes of their own exchange-granted exemptions (for contracts
subject to Federal position limits), whether to apply a restriction
against holding positions in excess of limits during the lesser of the
last five days of trading or the time period for the spot month in such
physical-delivery contract (the ``Five-Day Rule''). Under final Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(H), exchanges are able to establish their own Five-Day
Rule, or otherwise limit the size of positions. The exchanges would
thus have the ability and discretion, but not an obligation, to apply a
five-day Rule or similar restriction to exemptions on any contracts
subject to Federal position limits, regardless of whether such
contracts have been subject to Federal position limits before.\1523\
The Commission has determined that exchanges are well-informed with
respect to their respective markets, and well-positioned to make a
determination with respect to imposing the Five-Day Rule in connection
with recognizing bona fide hedges for their respective commodity
contracts.
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\1523\ The Commission is adopting Appendix B and Appendix G of
this Final Rule to provide guidance for exchanges to consider when
determining whether to impose the Five-Day Rule or similar
requirements on bona fide hedge exemptions and spread exemptions,
respectively.
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In general, the Commission believes that, on the one hand, limiting
a trader's ability to establish a position in this manner by requiring
the Five-Day Rule could result in increased costs related to
operational inefficiencies, as a trader may believe that holding a
position late into the spot period is necessary for the bona fide hedge
position. On the other hand, the Commission believes that price
convergence may be particularly sensitive to potential market
manipulation or excessive speculation during the spot period.
Accordingly, the Commission believes that the
[[Page 3425]]
determination to not impose the Five-Day Rule with respect to any of
the enumerated bona fide hedges for Federal purposes, but to instead
rely on exchanges' determinations with respect to exchange-granted
exemptions, helps to better optimize these considerations. The
Commission notes there is a potential cost to market integrity and
price convergence since the Five-Day Rule is being eliminated as a
blanket Federal requirement from some enumerated hedges while the
exchanges will now have guidance from the Commission to consider when
choosing whether to grant a position limits exemption subject to a
five-day rule or similar restriction.\1524\ Under this new framework,
however, the Commission will continue to leverage its own market
surveillance and oversight functions to ensure that exchanges continue
to comply with their legal obligations, including with respect to Core
Principles 2, 3, 4, and 5, among others.\1525\ With an expanded list of
contracts subject to Federal position limits, it is best to provide the
exchanges additional discretion to protect their markets using tools
other than a five-day rule, and to supplement that discretion with
guidance highlighting the importance of the spot month to ensure price
convergence and an orderly delivery process. Finally, the Commission
believes a concern over oversight is also mitigated by the fact that
the exchanges have an economic incentive to ensure that price
convergence occurs with their respective contracts since commercial
end-users would be less willing to use such contracts for hedging
purposes if price convergence failed to occur in such contracts as they
may generally desire to hedge cash-market prices with futures
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1524\ Better Markets at 61 (discussing elimination of the Five-
Day Rule and Appendix B guidance by stating that '' the CFTC
proposes to abolish the rule for enumerated hedges, over-relying
instead--and again--on the judgment of the exchanges to determine
whether to apply the Five-Day Rule, or apply and grant fact specific
waivers'').
\1525\ Core Principle 4, 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(3); 7 U.S.C.7b-3(f)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is also adopting guidance in Appendix B to part 150
on factors for the exchanges to consider when granting an exemption
subject to a restriction against holding physically delivered futures
contracts into the spot month. In response to some commenters who
stated that the proposed guidance was too prescriptive and would result
in additional burdens,\1526\ the Commission clarifies and reiterates
the appendix is not intended to be used as a mandatory checklist. The
Commission, however, has determined it is helpful to provide the
exchanges with guidance highlighting the importance of the spot month
to ensure price convergence and an orderly delivery process. Since
price convergence and an orderly trading environment serve as a
deterrent to mitigate certain types of market manipulation schemes such
as corners and squeezes, the guidance is intended to include a non-
exclusive list of considerations the Commission expects the exchanges
to consider when determining whether to allow a position in excess of
limits throughout the spot month. The Commission does not expect the
guidance to impose additional burdens on the exchanges, as the
exchanges currently have in place market surveillance practices or
procedures to review the appropriateness of an exemption during the
relevant referenced contract's spot period. The guidance is intended to
supplement that existing process.
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\1526\ Cargill at 9; CME Group at 9 (stating that the ``CME
Group believes the proposed guidance could be interpreted to cause
unnecessary burden and costs to market participants. The guidance
appears to create a formal process for firms to provide information
outlined in the Appendix as part of their bona fide hedge exemption
applications, but the Proposal does not seem to consider this
additional burden in its cost analysis'').
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As discussed in the preamble, the guidance does not impose any
additional reporting requirements on market participants, and the
factors described in the guidance apply simply to the exchanges'
evaluation of the specific contract market when considering whether an
exemption shall be granted subject to any condition or limitation in
the spot month. Finally, the Commission is making certain amendments to
the guidance to ensure that the factors maintain a flexible approach,
particularly where existing exchange application requirements already
require market participants to provide relevant cash-market
information.
c. Guidance for Measuring Risk
The Commission is issuing guidance in paragraph (a) of final
Appendix B to part 150 on whether positions may be hedged on either a
gross or net basis. Under the guidance, among other things, a trader
may measure risk on a gross basis if that approach is consistent with
the trader's historical practice and is not intended to evade
applicable limits. The key cost associated with allowing gross hedging
is that it may provide opportunity for hidden speculative trading or
for cherry picking of positions in a manner that subverts positions
limits.\1527\
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\1527\ For example, using gross hedging, a market participant
could potentially point to a large long cash position as
justification for a bona fide hedge, even though the participant, or
an entity with which the participant is required to aggregate, has
an equally large short cash position that would result in the
participant having no net price risk to hedge as the participant had
no price risk exposure to the commodity prior to establishing such
derivative position. Instead, the participant created price risk
exposure to the commodity by establishing the derivative position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such risk is mitigated to a certain extent by the guidance's
provisos that the trader does not switch between net hedging and gross
hedging in order to evade limits and that the trader must demonstrate,
upon request by the Commission or an exchange, the justifications for
measuring risk on a gross basis.\1528\ By focusing on consistency and
historical practice with respect to the manner in which a person
measures risk, the guidance enables market participants to measure risk
on a gross basis when dictated by the nature of the exposure, but not
simply when utilizing gross hedging will yield a larger exposure than
net hedging, or will otherwise subvert Federal position limit or
aggregation requirements. However, the Commission also recognizes that
there are myriad ways in which organizations are structured and engage
in commercial hedging practices, including the use of multi-line
business strategies in certain industries that are subject to Federal
position limits for the first time under this Final Rule and for which
net hedging could impose significant costs or be operationally
unfeasible.\1529\
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\1528\ The proposed guidance on gross hedging positions in the
2020 NPRM provided that an exchange document the justifications for
recognizing a gross position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
pursuant to Sec. 150.9. Several commenters alternatively requested
elimination of that requirement as imposing unnecessary burdens
directly on exchanges and indirectly on market participants. See
CEWG at 4; FIA at 14; and MGEX at 3. Because the Commission and
exchanges have other tools for accessing such information, the
Commission eliminated that requirement from the guidance in Appendix
B of this Final Rule. Under final Sec. 150.3(b)(2) and (e) and
final Sec. 150.9(e)(5), and (g), the Commission has access to any
information related to the applicable exemption request, and
therefore concludes that eliminating this requirement does not
result in any related costs and benefits.
\1529\ FIA stated that ``the recommendation to implement
specific policies and procedures governing gross and net hedging has
the potential to create unnecessary, unintended and burdensome
conflicts with other company policies, such as accounting policies,
with little or no measurable benefit.'' FIA at 15. The Final Rule
clarifies that the guidance does not require market participants to
develop written policies or procedures setting forth when gross or
net hedging is appropriate.
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[[Page 3426]]
iii. Spread Exemptions
Under existing Sec. 150.3, certain spread exemptions are self-
effectuating. Specifically, existing Sec. 150.3 allows for ``spread or
arbitrage positions'' that are ``between single months of a futures
contract and/or, on a futures-equivalent basis, options thereon,
outside of the spot month, in the same crop year; provided, however,
that such spread or arbitrage positions, when combined with any other
net positions in the single month, do not exceed the all-months limit
set forth in Sec. 150.2.'' \1530\
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\1530\ 17 CFR 150.3. CEA section 4a(a)(1) provides the
Commission with authority to exempt from position limits
transactions ``normally known to the trade'' as ``spreads'' or
``straddles'' or ``arbitrage'' or to fix limits for such
transactions or positions different from limits fixed for other
transactions or positions.
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Final Sec. Sec. 150.1 and 150.3 amend the existing spread position
exemption for Federal position limits by (i) listing, in the spread
transaction definition, specific types of spread exemptions that are
self-effectuating for purposes of Federal limits and that may be
granted by an exchange; (ii) creating a process that requires a person
to apply for spread exemptions (that are not listed in the spread
transaction definition) directly with the Commission pursuant to final
Sec. 150.3; \1531\ and (iii) providing guidance on the types of spread
positions that meet the spread transaction definition in a new Appendix
G to part 150 under the Final Rule. In addition, final Sec. 150.3
permits spread exemptions outside the same crop year and/or during the
spot month.\1532\
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\1531\ The ``spread transaction'' definition lists the most
common types of spread positions: intra-market spread, inter-market
spread, intra-commodity spread, or inter-commodity spread, including
a calendar spread, quality differential spread, processing spread,
product or by-product differential spread, or futures-option spread.
Final Sec. 150.3(b) also permits market participants to apply to
the Commission for other spread transactions.
\1532\ As discussed under final Sec. 150.3, spread exemptions
identified in the proposed ``spread transaction'' definition in
final Sec. 150.1 are self-effectuating, similar to the status quo,
and do not represent a change to the status quo baseline. The
related costs and benefits, particularly with respect to requesting
exemptions with respect to spreads other than those identified in
the proposed ``spread transaction'' definition, are discussed under
the respective sections below.
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In connection with the spread exemption provisions, the Commission
is relaxing the prohibition for contracts during the same crop year
and/or the spot month so that market participants may receive spread
exemptions outside the same crop year and/or during the spot month.
There may be benefits that result from permitting these types of spread
exemptions. For example, the Commission believes that permitting spread
exemptions in different crop years or during the spot month may
potentially improve price discovery and provide market participants
with the ability to use additional strategies involving spread
positions, which may reduce hedging costs.
As in the inter-market wheat example discussed below, the spread
relief, which is not limited to the same crop year, may better link
prices between two markets (e.g., the price of MGEX wheat futures and
the price of CBOT wheat futures). Put another way, permitting spread
exemptions outside the same crop year may enable pricing in two
different but related markets for substitute goods to be more highly
correlated, which benefits market participants with a price exposure to
the underlying protein content in wheat generally, rather than that of
a particular commodity.
However, the Commission also recognizes certain potential costs to
permitting spread exemptions during the spot month, particularly to
extend into the last five days of trading. This feature could raise the
risk of allowing participants in the market at a time in the contract
where only those interested in making or taking delivery should be
present. When a contract goes into expiration, open interest and
trading volume naturally decrease, as traders not interested in making
or taking delivery roll their positions into deferred calendar months.
The presence of large spread positions, normally tied to large
liquidity providers so close to the expiration of a futures contract,
could lead to disruptions in the price discovery function of the
contract by disrupting the futures/cash price convergence. This could
lead to increased transaction costs and harm the hedging utility for
end-users of the futures contract, which could lead to higher costs
passed on to consumers.
However, the Commission believes that these concerns are mitigated,
as spread exemptions will not be self-effectuating for purposes of
exchange-set position limits. Accordingly, exchanges will continue to
apply their expertise in overseeing and maintaining the integrity of
their markets. For example, an exchange could: Refuse to grant a spread
exemption if the exchange determines that the exemption is inconsistent
with the requirements of Sec. 150.5(a) or harmful to its markets;
require a market participant to reduce its positions; or implement a
five-day rule for spread exemptions, as discussed above.\1533\ The
Commission has also provided guidance to exchanges in a new Appendix G
to support exchange analysis of whether to grant a particular spread
exemption and to remind exchanges of their oversight obligations when
granting spread exemptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1533\ See supra Section II.A.1.viii. (discussing the Five-Day
Rule).
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Generally, the Commission finds that, by allowing speculators to
execute inter-market and intra-market spreads, speculators are able to
hold a greater amount of open interest in underlying contract(s), and
therefore, bona fide hedgers may benefit from any increase in market
liquidity. Spread exemptions may also lead to better price continuity
and price discovery if market participants who seek to provide
liquidity (for example, through entry of resting orders for spread
trades between different contracts) receive a spread exemption, and
thus would not otherwise be constrained by a position limit.
For clarity, the Commission has identified the following two
examples of spread positions that could benefit from the spread
exemptions permitted by this Final Rule:
Reverse crush spread in soybeans on the CBOT subject to an
inter-market spread exemption. In the case where soybeans are processed
into two different products, soybean meal and soybean oil, the crush
spread is the difference between the combined value of the products and
the value of soybeans. There are two actors in this scenario: The
speculator and the soybean processor. The spread's value approximates
the profit margin from actually crushing (or mashing) soybeans into
meal and oil. The soybean processor may want to lock in the spread
value as part of its hedging strategy, establishing a long position in
soybean futures and short positions in soybean oil futures and soybean
meal futures, as substitutes for the processor's expected cash-market
transactions (the long position hedges the purchase of the anticipated
inputs for processing and the short position hedges the sale of the
anticipated soybean meal and oil products). On the other side of the
processor's crush spread, a speculator takes a short position in
soybean futures against long positions in soybean meal futures and
soybean oil futures. The soybean processor may be able to lock in a
higher crush spread because of liquidity provided by such a speculator
who may need to rely upon a spread exemption. In this example, the
speculator is accepting basis risk represented by the crush spread, and
the speculator is providing liquidity to the soybean processor. The
crush spread positions may result in greater correlation between the
futures prices of
[[Page 3427]]
soybeans on the one hand and those of soybean oil and soybean meal on
the other hand, which means that prices for all three products may move
up or down together in a more correlated manner.
Wheat spread subject to inter-market spread exemptions.
There are two actors in this scenario: The speculator and the wheat
farmer. In this example, a farmer growing hard wheat would like to
reduce the price risk of her crop by shorting a MGEX wheat futures.
There, however, may be no hedger, such as a mill, that is immediately
available to trade at a desirable price for the farmer. There may be a
speculator willing to offer liquidity to the hedger; however, the
speculator may wish to reduce the risk of an outright long position in
MGEX wheat futures through establishing a short position in CBOT wheat
futures (soft wheat). Such a speculator, who otherwise would have been
constrained by a position limit at MGEX and/or CBOT, may seek
exemptions from MGEX and CBOT for an inter-market spread, that is, for
a long position in MGEX wheat futures and a short position in CBOT
wheat futures of the same maturity. As a result of the exchanges
granting an inter-market spread exemption to such a speculator, who
otherwise may be constrained by limits, the farmer might be able to
transact at a higher price for hard wheat than might have existed
absent the inter-market spread exemptions. Under this example, the
speculator is accepting basis risk between hard wheat and soft wheat,
reducing the risk of a position on one exchange by establishing a
position on another exchange, and potentially providing liquidity to a
hedger. Further, spread transactions may aid in price discovery
regarding the relative protein content for each of the hard and soft
wheat contracts.
iv. Conditional Spot Month Exemption Positions in Natural Gas
Final Sec. 150.3(a)(4) provides a new Federal conditional spot
month position limit exemption for cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contracts. The conditional exemption permits traders to acquire
positions up to 10,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts (the
Federal spot month limit in final Sec. 150.2 for cash-settled NYMEX NG
is 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts per exchange and
another 2,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts in the OTC
swaps market) per exchange that lists a cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract, along with an additional position in cash-settled
economically equivalent NYMEX NG OTC swaps that has a notional amount
of up to 10,000 equivalent-sized contracts, as long as such person does
not also hold positions in the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contract.\1534\
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\1534\ The NYMEX NG contract is the only natural gas contract
included as a core referenced futures contract under the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NYMEX, IFUS, and Nodal currently have rules in place establishing a
conditional spot month limit exemption of up to 5,000 equivalent-sized
cash-settled natural gas contracts per exchange, provided that the
market participant does not hold any physically-settled natural gas
contracts. Finalizing the conditional limit exemption for NYMEX NG
enables the NYMEX NG referenced contract market to continue to operate
as it has under the existing exchange-set conditional limit exemption
framework, which the Commission notes has functioned well based on its
observation over the past decade. Removing the conditional limit
exemption will result in reduced liquidity, including for commercial
hedgers seeking to offset price risks but not necessarily looking to
make or take delivery, due to the significantly lower positions a
market participant would be able to hold in the cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contracts.
Several commenters suggested removing the NYMEX NG conditional
limit exemption's requirement to divest all holdings in the physically-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contract.\1535\ The Commission believes
that this could result in significant costs to the market by
encouraging manipulation of the physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced
contract to benefit a large position in the cash-settled NYMEX NG
referenced contract available through the conditional limit exemption.
Specifically, without this divestiture requirement, a trader could hold
up to 40,000 cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts and 2,000
physically-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts. At these levels, it
may not require much movement in the physically-settled markets to
disproportionately benefit the cash-settled holdings. As a result, the
requirement to exit the physically-settled contract is critical for
reducing a market participant's incentive to manipulate the cash
settlement price by, for example, banging-the-close or distorting
physical delivery prices in the physically-settled contract to benefit
leveraged cash-settled positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1535\ ISDA at 8; SIFMA AMG at 10-11; FIA at 7-8; NGSA at 12-14;
Citadel at 7; CCI at 4; EEI/EPSA at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME commented that the conditional limit exemption for NYMEX NG
could ``incentivize the manipulation of a cash commodity price in order
to benefit a position in a cash-settled contract.'' \1536\ The
Commission notes that the conditional limit exemption does provide for
a substantial increase in a trader's cash-settled position, but the
core requirement that a trader must divest out of the physically-
settled NYMEX NG referenced contract during the spot month period is
intended to address and reduce the incentive for a trader to manipulate
the physically-settled NYMEX NG core referenced futures contract to
benefit a position in the cash-settled NYMEX NG referenced contracts.
Furthermore, based on its experience in monitoring the NYMEX NG market
since the conditional limit exemption was adopted, the Commission has
not observed any market manipulations attributable to a trader
utilizing the conditional limit exemption. That said, the Commission is
aware of instances where traders violated the conditional exemption by
holding or trading in the physically-settled NYMEX NG core referenced
futures contracts. The exchanges also detected and took corrective
action against those traders. The Commission will continue to closely
monitor natural gas trader positions across exchanges and work with the
exchanges to ensure the CME Group's concerns continue to be addressed
to protect the market participants and the public and defend the
financial integrity and price discovery function of the NYMEX NG core
referenced futures contract.\1537\
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\1536\ CME Group at 6.
\1537\ See IFUS Rule 6.20(c) and NYMEX Rule 559.F. See, e.g.,
Nodal Rulebook Appendix C (equivalent rule of Nodal).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the Commission has heeded natural gas traders' concerns
about disrupting market practices and harming liquidity in the cash-
settled contract, which could increase the cost of hedging and possibly
prevent convergence between the physical delivery futures and cash
markets.\1538\ While a trader with a position in the physically-settled
NYMEX NG referenced contract may incur costs associated with
liquidating that position in order to meet the conditions of the
Federal exemption, such costs are incurred outside of the Final Rule,
as the trader would have to do so as a condition of the exchange-level
[[Page 3428]]
exemption under current exchange rules.\1539\
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\1538\ See 81 FR at 96862, 96863.
\1539\ See IFUS Rule 6.20(c) and NYMEX Rule 559.F. See, e.g.,
Nodal Rulebook Appendix C (equivalent rules of Nodal).
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v. Financial Distress Exemption
Final Sec. 150.3(a)(3) provides an exemption for certain financial
distress circumstances, including the default of a customer, affiliate,
or acquisition target of the requesting entity that may require the
requesting entity to take on, in short order, the positions of another
entity. In codifying the Commission's historical practice, the Final
Rule accommodates transfers of positions from financially distressed
firms to financially secure firms. The disorderly liquidation of a
position threatens price impacts that may harm the efficiency and price
discovery function of markets, and Sec. 150.3(a)(3) makes it less
likely that positions are prematurely or needlessly liquidated. The
Commission has determined that costs related to filing and
recordkeeping are negligible. The Commission cannot accurately estimate
how often this exemption may be invoked because emergency or distressed
market situations are unpredictable and dependent on a variety of firm
and market-specific factors as well as general macroeconomic
indicators.\1540\ The Commission, nevertheless, believes that emergency
or distressed market situations that might trigger the need for this
exemption are infrequent, and that codifying this historical practice
adds transparency to the Commission's oversight responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1540\ See 81 FR at 96862, 96863.
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vi. Pre-Enactment and Transition Period Swaps Exemption
Final Sec. 150.3(a)(5) provides an exemption from position limits
for positions acquired in good faith in any ``pre-enactment swap,'' or
in any ``transition period swap,'' in either case as defined in final
Sec. 150.1. A person relying on this exemption may net such positions
with post-effective date commodity derivative contracts for the purpose
of complying with any non-spot month speculative positions limits, but
may not net against spot month positions. This exemption is self-
effectuating, and the Commission believes that Sec. 150.3(a)(5)
benefits both individual market participants by lessening the impact of
the Federal position limits in final Sec. 150.2, and market liquidity
in general as liquidity providers initially will not be forced to
reduce or exit their positions.
Final Sec. 150.3(a)(5) benefits price discovery and convergence by
prohibiting large traders seeking to roll their positions into the spot
month from netting down positions in the spot-month against their pre-
enactment swap or transition period swap. The Commission acknowledges
that, on its face, including a ``good-faith'' requirement in final
Sec. 150.3(a)(5) could hypothetically diminish market integrity since
determining whether a trader has acted in ``good faith'' is inherently
subjective and could result in disparate treatment among traders, where
certain traders may assert a more aggressive position in order to seek
a competitive advantage over others. The Commission believes the risk
of any such unscrupulous trader or exchange is mitigated since
exchanges are still subject to Commission oversight and to DCM Core
Principles 4 (``prevention of market disruption'') and 12 (``protection
of markets and market participants''), among others. The Commission has
determined that market participants who voluntarily employ this
exemption also incur negligible recordkeeping costs.
5. Process for the Commission or Exchanges To Grant Exemptions and Bona
Fide Hedge Recognitions for Purposes of Federal Position Limits (Final
Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9) and Related Changes to Part 19 of the
Commission's Regulations
Existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 set forth the process for market
participants to apply to the Commission for recognition of certain bona
fide hedges for purposes of Federal position limits, and existing Sec.
150.3 set forth the types of spread exemptions a person can rely on for
purposes of Federal position limits. Under existing Commission
practices, spread exemptions and certain enumerated bona fide hedges
are generally self-effectuating and do not require market participants
to apply to the Commission for purposes of Federal position limits.
Market participants are currently, however, required to file Form 204
monthly reports \1541\ to justify certain position limit overages.
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\1541\ In the case of cotton, market participants currently file
the relevant portions of Form 304.
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Further, for those bona fide hedges for which market participants
are required to apply to the Commission, existing regulations and
market practice require market participants to apply both to the
Commission for purposes of Federal position limits and also to the
relevant exchanges for purposes of exchange-set limits. The Commission
has determined that this dual application process creates
inefficiencies for market participants.
Final Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9, taken together, make several
changes to the process of acquiring bona fide hedge recognitions and
spread exemptions for Federal position limits purposes. Final
Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9 maintain certain elements of the status quo
while also adopting certain changes to facilitate the exemption
process.\1542\
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\1542\ In this section the Commission discusses the costs and
benefits related to the application process for these exemptions and
bona fide hedge recognitions. For a discussion of the costs and
benefits related to the scope of the exemptions and bona fide hedge
recognitions, see supra Section IV.A.4.
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First, with respect to the proposed enumerated bona fide hedges,
final Sec. 150.3 maintains the status quo by providing that those
enumerated bona fide hedges that currently are self-effectuating for
the nine legacy agricultural contracts will continue to remain self-
effectuating for the nine legacy agricultural contracts for purposes of
Federal position limits.\1543\ Similarly, the enumerated bona fide
hedges for the additional 16 contracts that are newly subject to
Federal position limits (i.e., those contracts other than the nine
legacy agricultural contracts) also are self-effectuating for purposes
of Federal position limits.
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\1543\ Final Sec. 150.3(a)(1)(i). Under the status quo, market
participants must apply to the Commission for recognition of certain
enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges. The Final Rule also makes
these enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges self-effectuating for
the nine legacy agricultural contracts.
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Second, for recognition of any non-enumerated bona fide hedge in
connection with any referenced contract, market participants are
required to apply either directly to the Commission under final Sec.
150.3 or through an exchange that adheres to certain requirements under
final Sec. 150.9. The Commission notes that existing regulations
require market participants to apply to the Commission for recognition
of non-enumerated bona fide hedges, and so the Final Rule does not
represent a change to the status quo in this respect for the nine
legacy agricultural contracts.
Third, final Sec. 150.3 maintains the status quo by providing that
the most common spread exemptions for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts remain self-effectuating. Similarly, these common spread
exemptions also are self-effectuating for the additional 16 contracts
that are newly subject to Federal position limits. These common spread
exemptions are listed in the
[[Page 3429]]
``spread transaction'' definition under final Sec. 150.1.\1544\
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\1544\ Final Sec. 150.1 defines ``spread transaction'' to
include an intra-market spread, inter-market spread, intra-commodity
spread, or inter-commodity spread, including a calendar spread,
quality differential spread, processing spread, product or by-
product differential spread, or futures-option spread.
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Fourth, for any spread exemption not listed in the ``spread
transaction'' definition, market participants are required to apply
directly to the Commission under final Sec. 150.3. There is no
exception for the nine legacy agricultural products, nor are market
participants permitted to apply through an exchange under final Sec.
150.9 for these types of spread exemptions.\1545\
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\1545\ As discussed below, the Final Rule also eliminates the
Form 204 and the equivalent portions of the Form 304.
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The Commission anticipates that most--if not all--market
participants will utilize the exchange-centric process set forth in
final Sec. 150.9 with respect to applying for recognition of non-
enumerated bona fide hedges, rather than applying directly to the
Commission under Sec. 150.3. Market participants are likely already
familiar with the processes set forth in Sec. 150.9, which is intended
to leverage the processes currently in place at the exchanges for
addressing requests for bona fide hedge recognitions from exchange-set
limits. In the sections below, the Commission will discuss the costs
and benefits related to both processes.
i. Process for Requesting Exemptions and Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions
Directly From the Commission (Final Sec. 150.3)
Under existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48, and existing Sec. 150.3,
the processes for obtaining a recognition of a bona fide hedge or for
relying on a spread exemption, are similar in some respects and
different in other respects than the approach adopted in final Sec.
150.3. Existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 require market participants
seeking recognition of non-enumerated bona fide hedges and enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges, respectively, for purposes of Federal
position limits to apply directly to the Commission for prior approval.
In contrast, existing non-anticipatory enumerated bona fide hedges
and spread exemptions are self-effectuating, which means that market
participants are not required to submit any information to the
Commission for prior approval, although such market participants must
subsequently file Form 204 or Form 304 each month in order to describe
their cash-market positions and justify their bona fide hedge position.
There currently is no codified Federal process related to financial
distress exemptions or natural gas conditional spot month exemptions.
Final Sec. 150.3 provides a process for market participants to
apply directly to the Commission for recognition of non-enumerated bona
fide hedges or spread exemptions not included in the ``spread
transaction'' definition in final Sec. 150.1, which in each case would
not be self-effectuating under the Final Rule. Under final Sec. 150.3,
any person seeking Commission recognition of these types of bona fide
hedges or spread exemptions (as opposed to applying for recognition of
non-enumerated bona fide hedges using the exchange-centric process
under proposed Sec. 150.9 described below) are required to submit a
request directly to the Commission and to provide information similar
to what is currently required under existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and
1.48.\1546\
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\1546\ For bona fide hedges and spread exemptions, this
information includes: (i) A description of the position in the
commodity derivative contract (including the name of the underlying
commodity and the derivative position size) or of the spread
position for which the application is submitted; (ii) an explanation
of the hedging strategy, including a statement that the position
complies with the applicable requirements for, and the definition
of, a bona fide hedging transaction or position, and information to
demonstrate why the position satisfies such requirements and
definition; (iii) a statement concerning the maximum size of all
gross positions in commodity derivative contracts for which the
application is submitted; (iv) for bona fide hedges, a description
of the applicant's activity in the cash markets and swaps markets
for the commodity underlying the position for which the application
is submitted, including information regarding the offsetting cash
positions; and (v) any other information that may help the
Commission determine whether the position meets the applicable
requirements for a bona fide hedge position or spread transaction.
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a. Existing Bona Fide Hedges That Currently Require Prior Submission to
the Commission Under Existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 for the Nine
Legacy Agricultural Contracts
Under the Final Rule, the Commission maintains the distinction
between enumerated bona fide hedges and non-enumerated bona fide hedges
in final Sec. 150.3: (1) Enumerated bona fide hedges continue to be
self-effectuating; (2) enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges are now
self-effectuating, so market participants no longer need to apply to
the Commission for recognition; and (3) non-enumerated bona fide hedges
still require market participants to apply for recognition. Market
participants that choose to apply directly to the Commission for a bona
fide hedge recognition (i.e., for non-enumerated bona fide hedges) are
subject to an application process that generally is similar to what the
Commission currently administers for the non-enumerated bona fide
hedges and the enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges.\1547\
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\1547\ As noted above, under the existing framework, market
participants are not required to apply for any type of bona fide
hedge recognition or spread exemption from the Commission for any of
the additional 16 contracts that are newly subject to Federal
position limits (i.e., those contracts other than the nine legacy
agricultural contracts); rather, under the existing framework, such
market participants must apply to the exchanges for bona fide hedge
recognitions or exemptions for purposes of exchange-set position
limits. Accordingly, to the extent that market participants do not
need to apply to the Commission in connection with any of the
additional 16 contracts, the Final Rule does not impose additional
costs or benefits compared to the status quo.
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With respect to enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts, for which market participants
currently are required to apply to the Commission for recognition for
Federal position limit purposes, the Commission anticipates that the
Final Rule will benefit market participants by making such hedges self-
effectuating.\1548\ As a result, market participants will no longer be
required to spend time and resources applying to the Commission.
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\1548\ As noted above, since market participants do not need to
apply to the Commission for bona fide hedge recognition for any of
the additional 16 contracts that are newly subject to Federal
position limits, the Commission's proposal does not result in any
additional costs or benefits to the extent such bona fide hedge
recognitions are self-effectuating.
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Further, for these enumerated anticipatory hedges, existing Sec.
1.48 requires market participants to submit either an initial or
supplemental application to the Commission 10 days prior to entering
into the bona fide hedge that would cause the hedger to exceed Federal
position limits.\1549\ Under existing Sec. 1.48, a market participant
could proceed with its proposed bona fide hedge if the Commission does
not notify a market participant otherwise within the specific 10-day
period. Under the Final Rule, because bona fide hedgers can implement
enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges without filing an application
with the Commission for approval and waiting the requisite 10 days,
they may be able to implement their hedging strategy more efficiently
with reduced cost and risk. The
[[Page 3430]]
Commission acknowledges that making such bona fide hedges more
efficient to obtain could increase the possibility of excess
speculation since anticipatory exemptions are theoretically more
difficult to substantiate compared to the other existing enumerated
bona fide hedges.
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\1549\ Under the Commission's existing regulations, non-
anticipatory enumerated bona fide hedges are self-effectuating, and
market participants do not have to file any applications for
recognition under existing Commission regulations. However, existing
Commission regulations require bona fide hedgers to file with the
Commission monthly Form 204 (or Form 304 in connection with ICE
Cotton No. 2 (CT)) reports discussing their underlying cash
positions in order to substantiate their bona fide hedge positions.
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However, the Commission has gained significant experience over the
years with bona fide hedging practices in general, and with enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedging practices in particular, and the
Commission has determined that making such hedges self-effectuating
should not increase the risk of excessive speculation or market
manipulation compared to the status quo.
For non-enumerated bona fide hedges, existing Sec. 1.47 requires
market participants to submit (i) initial applications to the
Commission 30 days prior to the date the market participant would
exceed the applicable position limits and (ii) supplemental
applications (i.e., applications for a market participant that desires
to exceed the bona fide hedge amount provided in the person's previous
Commission filing) 10 days prior for Commission approval, and market
participants can proceed with their proposed bona fide hedges if the
Commission does not intervene within the specific time (e.g., either 10
days or 30 days).
Final Sec. 150.3 similarly requires market participants that elect
to apply directly to the Commission (as opposed to applying through an
exchange pursuant to final Sec. 150.9) for a recognition of a non-
enumerated bona fide hedge for any of the 25 core referenced futures
contracts to apply to the Commission prior to exceeding Federal
position limits. Final Sec. 150.3 does not, however, prescribe a
certain time period by which a bona fide hedger must apply or by which
the Commission must respond. The Commission anticipates that the Final
Rule benefits bona fide hedgers by enabling them, in many cases, to
generally implement their hedging strategies sooner than the existing
30-day or 10-day waiting period, as applicants will have access to an
expanded list of enumerated hedges (which don't require prior
Commission approval), a new streamlined process for applying through
exchanges for non-enumerated hedges, increased position limits, and, as
discussed here, a more flexible approach for applying directly to the
Commission for a non-enumerated hedge. Considering these factors, the
Commission believes that, ultimately, hedging-related costs would
likely decrease. However, the Commission believes that there could also
be circumstances in which the overall process for applying directly to
the Commission could take longer than the existing timelines under
Sec. 1.47, which could increase hedging-related costs if a bona fide
hedger is compelled to wait longer, compared to existing Commission
practices, before executing its hedging strategy.
On the other hand, the Commission also recognizes that there could
be potential costs to bona fide hedgers if, under the Final Rule, they
are forced either to enter into less effective bona fide hedges, or to
wait to implement their hedging strategy, as a result of the potential
uncertainty that could result from Sec. 150.3 not requiring the
Commission to respond within a certain amount of time. However, the
Commission believes this concern is mitigated since market participants
will likely also have the option to apply for a non-enumerated bona
fide hedge under final Sec. 150.9. As explained further below, final
Sec. 150.9(e)(3) is a streamlined process whereby a market participant
in receipt of a notice of approval from the relevant exchange may
elect, at its own risk, to exceed Federal position limits during the
Commission's review period, which is limited to 10 (or 2) days under
Sec. 150.9.\1550\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1550\ See supra Section II.G.7. (discussing when a person may
exceed Federal position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This concern is also mitigated to the extent market participants
utilize the Sec. 150.3 process that permits a market participant that
demonstrates a ``sudden or unforeseen'' increase in its bona fide
hedging needs to enter into a bona fide hedge without first obtaining
the Commission's prior approval, as long as the market participant
submits a retroactive application to the Commission within five
business days of exceeding the applicable position limit. The
Commission believes this ``five-business day retroactive exemption''
benefits bona fide hedgers compared to existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and
1.48, which require Commission prior approval, since hedgers that
qualify to exercise the five-business day retroactive exemption are
also likely facing more acute hedging needs--with potentially
commensurate costs if required to wait. This provision also leverages,
for Federal position limit purposes, existing exchange practices for
granting retroactive exemptions from exchange-set limits.
On the other hand, the proposed five-business day retroactive
exemption could harm market liquidity and bona fide hedgers if the
applicable exchange or the Commission were to not approve the
retroactive request, and the Commission subsequently required
liquidation of the position in question. As a result, such possibility
could cause market participants to either enter into smaller bona fide
hedge positions than they otherwise would, or cause the bona fide
hedger to delay entering into its hedge, in either case potentially
causing bona fide hedgers to incur increased hedging costs.
However, the Commission believes this concern is partially
mitigated since proposed Sec. 150.3 requires the purported bona fide
hedger to exit its position in a ``commercially reasonable time,''
which the Commission believes should partially mitigate any costs
incurred by the market participant compared to either an alternative
that would require the bona fide hedger to exit its position
immediately, or the status quo where the market participant either is
unable to enter into a hedge at all without Commission prior approval.
b. Spread Exemptions and Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Final Sec. 150.3 imposes a new requirement for Federal position
limit purposes for market participants to (1) apply either directly to
the Commission pursuant to Sec. 150.3 or indirectly through an
exchange pursuant to final Sec. 150.9 for any non-enumerated bona fide
hedge; and (2) to apply directly to the Commission pursuant to Sec.
150.3 for any spread exemptions not identified in the proposed ``spread
transaction'' definition (the Commission notes that a market
participant may not apply indirectly through an exchange for spread
exemptions for Federal position limit purposes).\1551\ As noted above,
common spread exemptions (i.e., those identified in the definition of
``spread transaction'' in final Sec. 150.1) remain self-effectuating
for the nine legacy agricultural products, and also are self-
effectuating for the 16 additional core referenced futures
contracts.\1552\
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\1551\ As discussed below, for spread exemptions not identified
in the proposed ``spread transaction'' definition in Sec. 150.3,
market participants are required to apply directly to the Commission
under Sec. 150.3 and are not able to apply under Sec. 150.9.
\1552\ Existing Sec. 150.3(a)(2) does not specify a formal
process for granting either spread exemptions or non-anticipatory
enumerated bona fide hedges that are consistent with CEA section
4a(a)(1), so, in practice, spread exemptions and non-anticipatory
enumerated bona fide hedges have been self-effectuating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The baseline is the status quo under existing Sec. 150.3(a)(3),
which provides that certain spread exemptions are self-effectuating for
purposes of Federal position limits. As noted above, Sec. 150.3 is
also the baseline for non-enumerated bona fide hedges. The final rule
[[Page 3431]]
maintains the status quo with respect to spread exemptions that meet
the ``spread transaction definition'' for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts as such spread exemptions will continue to be self-
effectuating. The final rule also maintains the status quo for any non-
enumerated bona fide hedge in one of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts by requiring an applicant to receive prior approval, and
similarly requiring prior approval for such non-enumerated bona fide
hedges for the additional 16 contracts that are newly subject to
Federal position limits.\1553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1553\ The Commission discusses the costs and benefits related
to the process for non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions with
respect to the nine legacy agricultural products in the above
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission concludes that there is a change to the status quo
baseline with respect to the 16 non-legacy core referenced futures
contracts to the extent that they will be subject to Federal position
limits for the first time under the Final Rule. However, since the most
common spread exemptions will be ``self-effectuating'' for Federal
purposes, market participants will not need to do anything new,
compared to the status quo, under the Final Rule in connection with
self-effectuating spread exemptions. Accordingly, as a practical
matter, the Commission does not believe that the Final Rule will impose
any new costs or benefits with respect to the 16 non-legacy core
referenced futures products related to the Final Rule's treatment of
these self-effectuating spread exemptions since market participants
will not need to do anything differently compared to the status quo
(i.e., market participants will still need to obtain exchange approval
of any spread exemption for purposes of exchange-set position limits,
but will not be required to do anything for Federal purposes in
connection with self-effectuating spread exemptions).
Alternatively, several commenters advocated for the Commission to
expand the proposed Sec. 150.9 process to also allow exchanges to
grant ``non-enumerated'' spread exemptions for spread positions that do
not meet the ``spread transaction'' definition.\1554\ As more fully
explained in the preamble, the Commission determined not to expand
Sec. 150.9 for two primary reasons.\1555\ First, most of the more
common spread exemptions used by market participants fall within the
scope of the Final Rule's expanded ``spread transaction'' definition
and are self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits.
Spread exemption requests that fall outside of the ``spread
transaction'' definition are likely to be novel exemption requests that
require Commission review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1554\ See MFA/AIMA at 10; FIA at 21; Citadel at 8-9; ISDA at 9;
ICE at 7-8.
\1555\ See supra Sections II.G.4., II.G.5.
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Second, bona fide hedge recognitions and spread transactions are
subject to different legal standards under CEA section 4a(a). Because
CEA section 4a(a)(c)(2) provides clear criteria to the Commission for
determining what constitutes a bona fide hedging transaction or
position, the Commission has defined in detail the term ``bona fide
hedging transaction or position'' in Sec. 150.1. As a result, the
Commission is permitting exchanges to evaluate applications for non-
enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of exchange-set limits in
accordance with the same clear criteria used by the Commission. In
contrast, CEA section 4(a)(a)(1) does not include clear criteria to the
Commission for the granting of spread exemptions and requires the
Commission to use its judgment to conduct a fact-specific analysis of
novel spread exemption requests. Because exchanges would lack clear
standards for assessing whether a particular spread position satisfies
the requirements of the CEA, the Commission currently is uncomfortable
with leveraging an exchange's analysis and determination with respect
to novel spread exemption requests and believes that such an
alternative could impose costs on risk management practices due to
possible inconsistent treatment of such exemption requests across
exchanges as well as potential uncertainty due to lack of a clear
statutory standard.
To the extent market participants are required to obtain prior
approval for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge or spread exemption for
any of the additional 16 contracts that are newly subject to Federal
position limits, the Commission recognizes that Sec. 150.3 imposes
costs on market participants who are now required to spend time and
resources submitting applications to the Commission or an exchange, or
both, as applicable, for prior approval of exemptions for Federal
position limit purposes.\1556\ Further, compared to the status quo in
which the proposed new 16 contracts are not subject to Federal position
limits, the process in Sec. 150.3 could increase uncertainty since
market participants are required to seek prior approval and wait for an
undetermined amount of time for a Commission response. As a result,
such uncertainty could cause market participants to either enter into
smaller spread or bona fide hedging positions or do so at a later time.
In either case, this could cause market participants to incur
additional costs and/or implement less efficient hedging strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1556\ The Commission's Paperwork Reduction Act analysis
identifies some of these information collection burdens in greater
specificity. See infra Section IV.B.3.ii.c. (discussing in greater
detail the cost and benefits related to spread exemptions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Commission believes that final Sec. 150.3's framework
is familiar to market participants that currently apply to the
Commission for bona fide exemptions for the nine legacy agricultural
products, which should serve to reduce costs for some market
participants associated with obtaining recognition of a bona fide hedge
or spread exemption from the Commission for Federal position limits for
those market participants.\1557\
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\1557\ The Commission anticipates that the application process
in Sec. 150.3(b) could slightly reduce compliance-related costs,
compared to the status quo application process to the Commission
under existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48, because Sec. 150.3
provides a single, standardized process for all bona fide hedge and
spread exemption requests that is slightly less complex--and more
clearly laid out in the proposed regulations--than the Commission's
existing application processes. Nonetheless, since the Commission
anticipates that most market participants would apply directly to
exchanges for bona fide hedges when provided the option under Sec.
150.9, the Commission believes that most market participants would
incur the costs and benefits discussed thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that this analysis also applies to the nine
legacy agricultural contracts for spread exemptions that are not listed
in the proposed ``spread transaction'' definition and therefore also
requires market participants to apply to the Commission for these types
of spread exemptions for the first time for the nine legacy
agricultural products. However, because the Commission has determined
that most spread transactions are self-effectuating (especially for the
nine legacy agricultural contracts based on the Commission's
experience), the Commission believes that Sec. 150.3 imposes only
small costs with respect to spread exemptions for both the nine legacy
agricultural contracts as well as the additional 16 contracts that are
newly subject to Federal position limits.\1558\
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\1558\ ICE requested that market participants be able to apply
for spread exemptions on a late or retroactive basis the same way
they would be permitted to apply for bona fide hedge exemptions
within five days of exceeding Federal position limits under proposed
Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9. ICE at 8. The Commission has determined
not to permit late retroactive applications for spread exemptions
under Sec. 150.3(a) because the Commission believes that the Final
Rule provides sufficient flexibility to allow market participants to
identify their exemption needs and submit timely applications. See
supra Section II.C.4.iii. The Commission further believes that
allowing retroactive spread exemptions (and other types of
retroactive exemptions) could potentially be harmful to the market,
as these types of strategies may involve non-risk-reducing or
speculative activity that should be evaluated prior to a person
exceeding Federal position limits. Id.
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[[Page 3432]]
While the Commission has years of experience granting and
monitoring spread exemptions and enumerated and non-enumerated bona
fide hedges for the nine legacy agricultural contracts, as well as
overseeing exchange processes for administering exemptions from
exchange-set limits on such commodities, the Commission does not have
the same level of experience or comfort administering bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions for the additional 16 contracts that
are subject to the Federal position limits and the new exemption
processes for the first time. Accordingly, the Commission recognizes
that permitting enumerated bona fide hedges and spread exemptions
identified in the ``spread transaction'' definition for these
additional 16 contracts might not provide the purported benefits, or
could result in increased costs, compared to the nine legacy
agricultural products.
The Commission also believes that Sec. 150.3 benefits market
participants by providing them the option to choose the process for
applying for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge (i.e., either directly
with the Commission or, alternatively, through the exchange-centric
process discussed under Sec. 150.9 below) for the additional 16
contracts that are newly subject to Federal position limits that are
more efficient given the market participants' unique facts,
circumstances, and experience.\1559\ If a market participant chooses to
apply through an exchange for Federal position limits pursuant to final
Sec. 150.9, the market participant receives the added benefit of not
being required to also submit another application directly to the
Commission. The Commission anticipates that most market participants
would apply directly to exchanges for non-enumerated bona fide hedges,
pursuant to the streamlined process Sec. 150.9, as explained below, in
which case the Commission believes that most market participants would
incur the costs and benefits discussed thereunder. The Commission also
believes that this analysis applies with respect to non-enumerated bona
fide hedges for the nine legacy agricultural contracts.
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\1559\ As noted above, market participants seeking spread
exemptions not listed in the proposed ``spread transaction''
definition in Sec. 150.1 are required to apply directly with the
Commission under Sec. 150.3 and are not permitted to apply under
Sec. 150.9. The Commission recognizes that these types of spread
exemptions are difficult to analyze compared to either the spread
exemptions identified in Sec. 150.1 or bona fide hedges in general.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined to require market
participants to apply directly to the Commission. Further, compared
to the spread exemptions identified in final Sec. 150.1, the
Commission anticipates relatively few requests, and so does not
believe the application requirement will impose a large aggregate
burden across market participants.
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c. Exemption-Related Recordkeeping
Final Sec. 150.3(d) requires persons who avail themselves of any
of the foregoing exemptions to maintain complete books and records
concerning all details of each of their exemptions and any related
position, and to make such records available to the Commission upon
request under Sec. 150.3(e).
Several commenters recommended that the Commission delete the pass-
through swap recordkeeping requirements in proposed Sec. 150.3(d)(2)
based on concerns it would place all compliance burdens on the pass-
through swap counterparty offering the swap rather than the bona fide
hedging counterparty.\1560\ Commenters further expressed concerns the
proposed provision would be burdensome to the extent it would require
the pass-through swap counterparty to maintain records of each
representation made by the bona fide hedging counterparty on a trade-
by-trade basis.\1561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1560\ Cargill at 6; Shell at 6.
\1561\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission intended Sec. 150.3(d)(2) to be an extension of
market participants' existing obligations to maintain regulatory
records under part 45 and Sec. 1.31. As discussed above, the revised
``bona fide hedging transaction or position'' definition in final Sec.
150.1 requires that a pass-through swap counterparty receive a written
representation from its bona fide hedging swap counterparty in order
for the pass-through swap to qualify as a bona fide hedge.\1562\ In
light of that, final Sec. 150.3(d)(2) requires a person relying on the
pass-through swap provision to maintain any records created for
purposes of demonstrating a good faith reliance on that provision in
accordance with Sec. 150.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1562\ See supra at Section II.A.1.x.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These recordkeeping requirements benefit market integrity by
providing the Commission with the necessary information to monitor the
use of exemptions from speculative position limits and help to ensure
that any person who claims any exemption permitted by Sec. 150.3 can
demonstrate compliance with the applicable requirements. The Commission
does not expect these requirements to impose significant new costs on
market participants, as these requirements are in line with existing
Commission and exchange-level recordkeeping obligations.
d. Exemption Renewals
Consistent with existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48, with respect to
any Commission-recognized bona fide hedge or Commission-granted spread
exemption pursuant to final Sec. 150.3, the Commission does not
require a market participant to reapply annually to the
Commission.\1563\ The Commission believes that this reduces burdens on
market participants but also recognizes that not requiring market
participants to annually reapply to the Commission ostensibly could
harm market integrity since the Commission will not directly receive
updated information with respect to particular bona fide hedgers or
exemption holders prior to the trader exceeding the applicable Federal
position limits.
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\1563\ As discussed below, with respect to exchange-set limits
under Sec. 150.5 or the exchange process for Federal position
limits under Sec. 150.9, market participants are required to
annually reapply to exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Commission believes that any potential harm is
mitigated since the Commission, unlike exchanges, has access to
aggregate market data, including positions held by individual market
participants. Further, Sec. 150.3 requires a market participant to
submit a new application if any material information changes, or upon
the Commission's request. In addition, the Commission will receive
information about any annual renewals of such requests made to an
exchange (for purposes of exchange-set limits) through the monthly
exchange reports required under Sec. 150.5(a)(4). On the other hand,
market participants benefit by not being required to annually submit
new applications, which the Commission believes reduces compliance
costs.
e. Exemptions for Financial Distress and Conditional Natural Gas
Positions
Final Sec. 150.3 codifies the Commission's existing informal
practice with respect to exemptions for financial distress and existing
industry practice with respect to the conditional spot month limit
exemption positions in natural gas. The same costs and benefits
described above with respect to applications for bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions also apply to these exemptions.
However, to the extent the Commission currently allows exemptions
related to financial distress, the Commission has determined that the
costs and benefits with respect to the related application
[[Page 3433]]
process already may be recognized by market participants.
ii. Process for Market Participants To Apply to an Exchange for Non-
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions for Purposes of Federal
Position Limits (Final Sec. 150.9) and Related Changes to Part 19 of
the Commission's Regulations
Final Sec. 150.9 provides a framework whereby a market participant
could avoid the existing dual application process described above and,
instead, file one application with an exchange to receive a non-
enumerated bona fide hedging recognition, which as discussed previously
is not self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position limits. Under
this process, a person is allowed to exceed the Federal position limit
levels following an exchange's review and approval of an application
for a bona fide hedge recognition, provided that the Commission during
its review does not notify the exchange otherwise within a certain
period of time thereafter. Market participants who do not elect to use
the process in final Sec. 150.9 for purposes of Federal position
limits are required to request relief both directly from the Commission
under Sec. 150.3, as discussed above, and also apply to the relevant
exchange, consistent with existing practices.\1564\
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\1564\ As noted above, the Commission anticipates that most, if
not all, market participants will use Sec. 150.9, rather than Sec.
150.3, where permitted.
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a. Final Sec. 150.9--Establishment of General Exchange Process
Pursuant to final Sec. 150.9, exchanges that elect to process
these applications are required to file new rules or rule amendments
with the Commission under Sec. 40.5 of the Commission's regulations
and obtain from applicants all information to enable the exchange and
the Commission to determine that the facts and circumstances support a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition. Also, final Sec.
150.9(e)(1) requires exchanges to provide real-time notification to the
Commission of each initial determination to recognize a non-enumerated
bona fide hedging transaction or position. The Commission believes that
exchanges' existing practices generally are consistent with the
requirements of Sec. 150.9, and, therefore, exchanges will only incur
marginal costs, if any, to modify their existing practices to comply.
Similarly, the Commission anticipates that establishing uniform,
standardized exemption processes across exchanges benefits market
participants by reducing compliance costs. On the other hand, the
Commission recognizes that exchanges that wish to participate in the
processing of applications with the Commission under Sec. 150.9 are
required to expend resources to establish a process consistent with the
Final Rule. However, to the extent exchanges have similar procedures,
such benefits and costs may already have been realized by market
participants and exchanges.
The Commission believes that there are significant benefits to the
Sec. 150.9 process that will be largely realized by market
participants. The Commission has determined that the use of a single
application to process both exchange and Federal position limits
exemptions benefits market participants and exchanges by simplifying
and streamlining the process. For applicants seeking recognition of a
non-enumerated bona fide hedge, Sec. 150.9 should reduce duplicative
efforts, because applicants are saved the expense of applying in
parallel to both an exchange and the Commission for relief from
exchange-set position limits and Federal position limits, respectively.
Because many exchanges already possess similar application processes
with which market participants are likely accustomed, compliance costs
should be decreased in the form of reduced application-production time
by market participants and reduced response time by exchanges.\1565\
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\1565\ The Commission has previously estimated the combined
annual burden hours for submitting applications under both
Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 to be 42 hours. See infra Section IV.B.
(Paperwork Reduction Act) and 85 FR 11596, 11700 (Feb. 27, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, in connection with the recognition of bona fide
hedges for Federal position limit purposes, current practices set forth
in existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 require market participants to
differentiate between (i) enumerated non-anticipatory bona fide hedges
that are self-effectuating, and (ii) enumerated anticipatory bona fide
hedges and non-enumerated bona fide hedges for which market
participants must apply to the Commission for prior approval. Under the
Final Rule, the Commission's application processes no longer
distinguish among different types of enumerated bona fide hedges (e.g.,
anticipatory versus non-anticipatory enumerated bona fide hedges), and
therefore, do not require exchanges to have separate processes for
enumerated anticipatory positions under Sec. 150.9. The Final Rule
also eliminates the requirement for bona fide hedgers to file Form 204
or the relevant portions of Form 304, as applicable, with respect to
any bona fide hedge, whether enumerated or non-enumerated.\1566\ The
Commission expects this to benefit market participants by providing a
more efficient and less complex process that is consistent with
existing practices at the exchange-level.\1567\
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\1566\ See supra Section II.H.2. (discussing changes to part 19
eliminating Form 204 and portions of Form 304).
\1567\ See infra Section IV.A.5.iii. for discussion related to
changes to part 19 regarding the provision of information by market
participants, noting that the elimination of Form 204 by the Final
Rule reduces the burden hours estimates by 300 annual aggregate
burden hours.
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On the other hand, the Commission recognizes that Sec. 150.9
imposes new costs related to non-enumerated bona fide hedges for the
additional 16 contracts that are newly subject to Federal position
limits. Under final Sec. 150.9(c), market participants are now
required to submit applications, including information to demonstrate
why a particular position qualifies as bona fide hedge, as defined in
Sec. 150.1 and CEA section 4a(c)(2), to receive prior approval for
Federal position limits purposes.\1568\ However, since the Commission
understands that exchanges already require market participants to
submit applications and receive prior approval under exchange-set
limits for all types of bona fide hedges, the Commission does not
believe Sec. 150.9 imposes any additional incremental costs on market
participants beyond those already incurred under exchanges' existing
processes.\1569\ Accordingly, the
[[Page 3434]]
Commission believes that any costs already may have been realized by
market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1568\ One commenter requested that the Commission provide
additional factors that exchanges should consider when granting non-
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions. ISDA at 9. As discussed
more fully in the preamble, the Commission believes that the final
regulations strike a reasonable tradeoff by providing sufficient
guidance to the exchanges for their review and determination in the
context of exchange limits, while preserving the exchanges'
discretionary authority to determine what types of additional
information, if any, to collect. See supra Section II.G.5.
(discussing final Sec. 150.9(c)).
\1569\ Under the 2020 NPRM, proposed Sec. 150.9(c)(1)(ii) would
have required exchanges to request a ``factual and legal'' analysis
from applicants for non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions. 85
FR 11638. Two commenters expressed concern that the proposed
requirement could be interpreted as requiring applications to engage
legal counsel to complete their applications, which would result in
additional costs to market participants. See CME Group at 10 and CMC
at 11. The Commission did not intend for exchanges to require that
applicants engage legal counsel to complete their applications for
non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions. Final Sec.
150.9(c)(1)(ii), instead of requiring a ``factual and legal
analysis,'' requires an applicant to provide ``an explanation of the
hedging strategy,'' including a statement that the position complies
with the applicable requirements of the bona fide hedge definition,
and information to demonstrate why the position satisfies the
applicable requirements. See supra Section II.G.5. (discussing final
Sec. 150.9(c)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the Commission believes that employing a concurrent
process with exchanges that are self-regulatory organizations
responsible for overseeing non-enumerated bona fide hedges executed on
their platforms and that are not self-effectuating for Federal position
limits purposes benefits market integrity by ensuring that market
participants are appropriately relying on such bona fide hedges and not
entering into such positions in order to attempt to manipulate the
market or evade position limits. However, to the extent that exchange
oversight, consistent with Commission standards and DCM core
principles, already exists, such benefits may already be realized.
b. Final Sec. 150.9--Exchange Expertise, Market Integrity, and
Commission Oversight
For non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions that require the
Commission's prior approval, the Final Rule provides a framework that
utilizes existing exchange resources and expertise so that fair access
and liquidity are promoted at the same time market manipulations,
squeezes, corners, and other conduct that would disrupt markets are
deterred and prevented.\1570\ Final Sec. 150.9 builds on existing
exchange processes, which the Commission believes strengthens the
ability of the Commission and exchanges to monitor markets and trading
strategies while reducing burdens on both the exchanges, which
administer the process, and market participants, who utilize the
process. For example, exchanges are familiar with their market
participants' commercial needs, practices, and trading strategies, and
already evaluate hedging strategies in connection with setting and
enforcing exchange-set position limits.\1571\ Accordingly, exchanges
should be able to readily identify bona fide hedges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1570\ See CME Group at 7 (stating that the Sec. 150.9
streamlined process would wisely leverage exchanges' long history of
reviewing hedging approaches and applying those approaches to
specific facts and circumstances, and would thereby advance the
statutory goal of allowing commercial parties to ``hedge their
legitimate anticipated business needs'' without imposing any undue
burden in doing so).
\1571\ For a discussion on the history of exemptions, see 78 FR
at 75703-75706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For these reasons, the Commission has determined that allowing
market participants to apply through an exchange under Sec. 150.9,
rather than directly to the Commission as required under existing Sec.
1.47, is likely to be more efficient than if the Commission itself
initially had to review and approve all applications. The Commission
considers the increased efficiency in processing applications under
Sec. 150.9 as a benefit to bona fide hedgers and liquidity providers.
By having the availability of the exchange's analysis and view of the
markets, the Commission is better informed in its review of the market
participant and its application, which in turn may further benefit
market participants in the form of administrative efficiency and
regulatory consistency. However, the Commission recognizes additional
costs for exchanges required to create and submit real-time notices
under final Sec. 150.9(e). In particular, commenters voiced concerns
that the Commission's review of each non-enumerated bona fide hedge
application could impose significant burdens on exchanges, market
participants, and the Commission.\1572\ To the extent exchanges already
provide similar notice to the Commission or to market participants, or
otherwise are required to notify the Commission under certain
circumstances, such benefits and costs already may have been realized.
In addition, the Commission expects that, due to the expanded list of
enumerated hedges and other exemptions available to market participants
as well as the higher Federal limits in the Final Rule, there will be a
manageable amount of non-enumerated bona fide hedges that exchanges and
the Commission will review through the new streamlined process. The
Commission also reiterates that Sec. 150.9 is an optional process that
exchanges and market participants may elect to use in lieu of utilizing
the traditional process of requesting non-enumerated bona fide hedges
directly from the Commission under Sec. 150.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1572\ IFUS at 52 (stating that the ``exemption-by-exemption
review of exchange decisions is a novel and significant departure
from the longstanding process for the implementation of the position
limits regime, imposes substantial burdens on the Commission and the
exchanges, and decreases regulatory certainty for market
participants regarding the status of an exemption''). See also ICE
at 9 (questioning ``whether it is necessary for the Commission to
routinely review each non-enumerated determination by the exchange''
and asserting that the Sec. 150.9 10-day review process ``imposes
unnecessary burdens and delays on market participants'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, to the extent exchanges become more involved
with respect to review and oversight of market participants' bona fide
hedges and spread exemptions, exchanges could incur additional costs.
However, as noted, the Commission believes most of the costs have been
realized by exchanges under current market practice.
At the same time, the Commission also recognizes that this aspect
of the Final Rule could hypothetically harm market integrity. Absent
other provisions, since exchanges profit from increased activity, an
exchange could hypothetically seek a competitive advantage by offering
excessively permissive exemptions, which could allow certain market
participants to utilize non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions to
engage in excessive speculation or to manipulate market prices. If an
exchange engaged in such activity, other market participants would
likely face greater costs through increased transaction fees, including
forgoing trading opportunities resulting from market prices moving
against market participants and/or preventing the market participant
from executing at its desired prices, which may also further lead to
inefficient hedging.
However, the Commission believes that these hypothetical costs are
unfounded since under final Sec. 150.9 the Commission reviews the
applications submitted by market participants for bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions for Federal position limits. The
Commission emphasizes that Sec. 150.9 is not providing exchanges with
an ability to recognize a bona fide hedge or grant an exemption for
Federal position limit purposes in lieu of a Commission review.\1573\
Rather, Sec. 150.9(e) and (f) require an exchange to provide the
Commission with notice of the disposition of any application for
purposes of exchange limits concurrently with the notice the exchange
provides to the applicant, and the Commission will have 10 business
days to make its determination for Federal position limits purposes
(although, in connection with ``sudden or unforeseen increases'' in
bona fide hedging needs, as discussed in connection with final Sec.
150.3, Sec. 150.9 requires the Commission to make its determination
within two business days). Each non-enumerated bona fide hedge approved
by an exchange for purposes of its own limits is separately and
independently reviewed by the Commission for purposes of Federal
position limits. Finally, under DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core
Principle 6, exchanges are accountable for administering position
limits in a manner that reduces the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion. The Commission believes that these
[[Page 3435]]
requirements, working in concert, provide sufficient protection against
any potential harm to market integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1573\ See supra Section II.G. (discussing Commission
determination of non-enumerated bona fide hedge applications
submitted under Sec. 150.9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, the Commission also recognizes that there could
be potential costs to bona fide hedgers if, under the Final Rule, they
wait up to 10 business days for the Commission to complete its review
after the exchange's initial review--especially compared to the status
quo for the 16 commodities that are subject to Federal position limits
for the first time under the Final Rule and currently are not required
to receive the Commission's prior approval. As a result, the Commission
recognizes that a market participant could incur costs by waiting
during the 10 business day period, or be required to enter into a less
efficient hedge, which would harm liquidity.\1574\ However, the
Commission believes this concern is mitigated since, under final Sec.
150.9(e)(3), a market participant in receipt of a notice of approval
from the relevant exchange may elect, at its own risk, to exceed
Federal position limits during the Commission's 10-day review
period.\1575\
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\1574\ See ICE at 9 (requesting that the Commission permit a
``market participant to engage in hedging up to the requested
exemption limit while waiting for approval'').
\1575\ See supra Sections II.G.7. (discussing when a person may
exceed Federal position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, final Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(i), similar to final Sec. 150.3,
permits a market participant that demonstrates a ``sudden or
unforeseen'' increase in its bona fide hedging needs to enter into a
bona fide hedge without first obtaining the Commission's prior
approval, as long as the market participant submits a retroactive
application to the Commission within five business days of exceeding
the applicable position limit.\1576\ In turn, the Commission only has
two business days (as opposed to the default 10 business days) to
complete its review for Federal purposes. The Commission believes this
retroactive application exemption benefits bona fide hedgers compared
to existing Sec. 1.47, which requires Commission prior approval, since
hedgers that qualify to exercise the retroactive exemption are also
likely facing more acute hedging needs--with potentially commensurate
costs if required to wait. Absent the retroactive application
exemption, market participants would be penalized and prevented from
assuming appropriate hedges even though their hedging need arises from
circumstances beyond their control. This provision also leverages, for
Federal position limit purposes, existing exchange practices for
granting retroactive exemptions from exchange-set limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1576\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, the retroactive application exemption could harm
market liquidity and bona fide hedgers since the Commission is able to
require a market participant to exit its position if the exchange or
the Commission does not approve of the retroactive request. Such
uncertainty could cause market participants to either enter into
smaller bona fide hedge positions than it otherwise would, or could
cause the bona fide hedger to delay entering into its hedge, in either
case potentially causing bona fide hedgers to incur increased hedging
costs. However, the Commission believes this concern is partially
mitigated since Sec. 150.9 requires the purported bona fide hedger to
exit its position in a ``commercially reasonable time,'' which the
Commission believes should partially mitigate any costs incurred by the
market participant compared to either an alternative that would require
the bona fide hedger to exit its position immediately, or the status
quo where the market participant is unable to enter into a hedge at all
without Commission approval.
As discussed in the preamble, the Commission received and
considered two comments recommending a broader retroactive application
exemption: (1) CME recommended that the Commission allow retroactive
applications regardless of the circumstances and impose a position
limits violation on an applicant in the event the exchange denies its
application; and (2) ICE recommended that the Commission permit
retroactive exemptions for other types of exemptions, as well as for
position limit overages that occur as a result of operational or
incidental issues where the applicant did not intend to evade position
limits.\1577\ An expansion of this exception beyond bona fide hedge
needs that arise due to sudden or unforeseen circumstances could
disincentivize market participants from properly monitoring their
hedging activities and filing applications in a timely manner. Because
the Final Rule provides broad flexibility to market participants in the
form of various exemptions, among other enhancements to the Federal
position limits framework for bona fide hedges and other exemptions,
the Commission determined not to expand the retroactive application
provision in Sec. 150.9(c)(2)(ii).\1578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1577\ See supra Section II.G.5.iii.b. (citing CME Group at 9-10
and ICE at 10).
\1578\ See supra Section II.G.5.ii. (discussing final Sec.
150.9(c)(2)(i)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While existing Sec. 1.47 does not require market participants to
annually reapply for certain bona fide hedges, final Sec. 150.9(c)(3)
requires market participants to reapply at least annually with
exchanges to maintain previously-approved non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognition for purposes of Federal position limits. Several
commenters requested the Commission to clarify that an applicant is
subject to the Commission's 10/2-day review process in Sec. 150.9(e)
only for initial applications for non-enumerated bona fide hedges, and
is not subject to such review for annual renewal applications unless
the facts and circumstances materially change from those presented in
the initial application. As discussed in the preamble, market
participants are only subject to the Commission's 10/2-day review
process for their initial applications for non-enumerated bona fide
hedges unless there are material changes to their initial application.
The Commission recognizes that requiring market participants to
reapply annually could impose additional costs on those that are not
currently required to do so. However, the Commission believes that this
is consistent with industry practice with respect to exchange-set
limits and that market participants are familiar with exchanges'
exemption processes, which should reduce related costs.\1579\ Further,
the Commission believes that market integrity is strengthened by
ensuring that exchanges receive updated trader information that may be
relevant to the exchange's oversight.\1580\ However, to the extent any
of these benefits and costs reflects current market practice, they
already may have been realized by exchanges and market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1579\ See infra Section IV.A.6. (discussing final Sec. 150.5).
\1580\ In contrast, the Commission, unlike exchanges, has access
to aggregate market data, including positions held by individual
market participants, and so the Commission has determined that
requiring market participants to apply annually under final Sec.
150.3, absent any changes to their application, does not benefit
market integrity to the same extent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission anticipates additional costs for exchanges required
to create and submit certain notifications and monthly reports. Final
Sec. 150.9(e)(1) requires exchanges to provide real-time notification
to the Commission of each initial determination to recognize a bona
fide hedging transaction or position.\1581\
[[Page 3436]]
Final Sec. 150.5(a)(4) requires exchanges to provide monthly reports
with necessary information in the form and manner required by the
Commission. The exchange-to-Commission monthly report for contracts
subject to Federal speculative position limits in final Sec.
150.5(a)(4) further details the exchange's disposition of a market
participant's application for recognition of a bona fide hedge position
or spread exemption as well as the related position(s) in the
underlying cash markets and swaps markets.\1582\ The Commission
believes that such reports provide greater transparency by facilitating
the tracking of these positions by the Commission and further assist
the Commission in ensuring that a market participant's activities
conform to the exchange's rules and to the CEA. The combination of the
``real-time'' exchange notification and exchanges' provision of monthly
reports to the Commission under final Sec. Sec. 150.9(e)(1) and
150.5(a)(4), respectively, provides the Commission with enhanced
surveillance tools on both a ``real-time'' and a monthly basis to
ensure compliance with the requirements of the Final Rule. However, to
the extent exchanges already provide similar notice to the Commission,
or otherwise are required to notify the Commission under certain
circumstances, such benefits and costs already may have been realized.
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\1581\ In addition to submitting a copy of any exchange-approved
non-enumerated bona fide hedge application to the Commission under
Sec. 150.9(e), an exchange may, on a voluntary basis, send the
Commission an advance courtesy copy of the non-enumerated bona fide
hedge application when the exchange first receives it from the
applicant. For purposes of the cost-benefit considerations, we
expect this to be a de minimis burden on an exchange that elects to
provide the courtesy copy to the Commission. In addition, we expect
that providing the courtesy copy could facilitate a more rapid
Commission evaluation of applications submitted under Sec. 150.9,
help facilitate additional regulatory certainty for market
participants, and aid the Commission in its review of applications
processed under Sec. 150.9.
\1582\ In response to concerns from ICE that proposed Sec.
150.5(a)(4) may be overly burdensome and redundant, the Commission
clarified that the monthly report is required to capture only
positions that are subject to Federal position limits (as opposed to
other exchange-set non-enumerated exemptions), exchanges have
discretion as to the best timing for submitting their reports so
long as they are submitted on a monthly basis, and exchanges need
not include factual and legal analysis in the monthly report. See
supra Section II.D.3.iv. (discussing Sec. 150.5(a)(4)).
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c. Final Sec. 150.9(d)--Recordkeeping
Final Sec. 150.9(d) requires exchanges to maintain complete books
and records of all activities relating to the processing and
disposition of any applications, including applicants' submission
materials,\1583\ and determination documents.\1584\ The Commission
believes that this benefits market integrity and Commission oversight
by ensuring that pertinent records are readily accessible, as needed by
the Commission. However, the Commission acknowledges that such
requirements impose costs on exchanges. Nonetheless, to the extent that
exchanges are already required to maintain similar records, such costs
and benefits already may be realized.\1585\
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\1583\ One commenter requested that Sec. 150.9 allow exchanges
to maintain records of applicants' positions on an aggregate basis,
as opposed to requiring an exchange to match applicants' bona fide
hedge positions to their underlying cash positions on a one-to-one
basis. NGSA at 9. In the preamble, the Commission noted that final
Sec. 150.9(d) does not prescribe the manner in which exchanges
record application materials and information--it simply requires
exchanges to keep a record of application materials and information
collected. See supra Section II.G.6.iii.
\1584\ Moreover, consistent with existing Sec. 1.31, the
Commission expects that these records will be readily accessible
until the termination, maturity, or expiration date of the bona fide
hedge recognition or exempt spread position and during the first two
years of the subsequent five-year retention period.
\1585\ The Commission believes that exchanges that process
applications for recognition of bona fide hedging transactions or
positions and/or spread exemptions currently maintain records of
such applications as required pursuant to other existing Commission
regulations, including existing Sec. 1.31. The Commission, however,
also believes that final Sec. 150.9(d) may impose additional
recordkeeping obligations on such exchanges. The Commission
estimates that each exchange electing to administer the processes
will likely spend five (5) hours annually to comply with the
recordkeeping requirement of final Sec. 150.9(d) and thus will
incur minimal costs compared to the status quo. See generally
Section IV.B. (discussing the Commission's PRA determinations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Final Sec. 150.9(f)--Commission Revocation of Previously Approved
Applications
The Commission acknowledges that there may be costs to market
participants if the Commission revokes a previously-approved non-
enumerated hedge recognition for Federal purposes under final Sec.
150.9(f). Specifically, market participants could incur costs to unwind
trades or reduce positions if the Commission required the market
participant to do so under final Sec. 150.9(f)(2).
However, the potential cost to market participants is mitigated
under final Sec. 150.9(f) since the Commission provides a commercially
reasonable time for a person to come back into compliance with the
Federal position limits, which the Commission believes should mitigate
transaction costs to exit the position and allow a market participant
the opportunity to potentially execute other hedging strategies.
e. Final Sec. 150.9--Commodity Indexes and Risk Management Exemptions
Final Sec. 150.9(b) prohibits exchanges from recognizing as a bona
fide hedge any positions that include commodity index contracts and one
or more referenced contracts, including exemptions known as risk
management exemptions. The Commission recognizes that this prohibition
could alter trading strategies that currently use commodity index
contracts as part of an entity's risk management program. Although
there likely is a cost to change risk management strategies for
entities that currently rely on a bona fide hedge recognition for
positions in commodity index contracts, as discussed above, the
Commission believes that such financial products are not substitutes
for positions in a physical market and therefore do not satisfy the
statutory requirement for a bona fide hedge under section 4a(c)(2) of
the Act.\1586\ In addition, the Commission further posits that this
cost may be reduced or mitigated by the proposed increase in Federal
position limit levels set forth in final Sec. 150.2, or by the
implementation of the pass-through swap provision of the bona fide
hedge definition in final Sec. 150.1.\1587\
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\1586\ See supra Section III.C.4. (discussing commodity
indices); see supra Section IV.A.4.ii.a(1) (discussing elimination
of the risk management exemption).
\1587\ See supra Section IV.A.4.b.i(1) (discussing the pass-
through swap exemption).
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iii. Related Changes to Part 19 of the Commission's Regulations
Regarding the Provision of Information by Market Participants
Under existing regulations, the Commission relies on Form 204
\1588\ and Form 304,\1589\ known collectively as the ``series `04''
reports, to monitor for compliance with Federal position limits. Prior
to the amendments to part 19 in the Final Rule, market participants
that held bona fide hedging positions in excess of Federal position
limits for the nine legacy agricultural contracts had to justify such
overages by filing the applicable report (Form 304 for cotton and Form
204 for the other eight legacy commodities) each month.\1590\ The
[[Page 3437]]
Commission has used these reports to determine whether a trader had
sufficient cash positions to justify purported bona fide hedges
positions using futures and options on futures positions above the
applicable Federal position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1588\ CFTC Form 204: Statement of Cash Positions in Grains,
Soybeans, Soybean Oil, and Soybean Meal, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@forms/documents/file/cftcform204.pdf (existing Form 204).
\1589\ CFTC Form 304: Statement of Cash Positions in Cotton,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission website, available at
https://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@forms/documents/file/cftcform304.pdf (existing Form 204). Parts I and II of Form 304
address fixed-price cash positions used to justify cotton positions
in excess of Federal position limits. As described below, Part III
of Form 304 addresses unfixed price cotton ``on-call'' information,
which is not used to justify cotton positions in excess of limits,
but rather to allow the Commission to prepare its weekly cotton on-
call report.
\1590\ 17 CFR 19.01.
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As discussed above, with respect to bona fide hedging positions,
the Commission is adopting a streamlined approach, under final
Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9, to cash-market reporting that reduces
duplication between the Commission and the exchanges. Generally, the
Commission is adopting amendments to part 19 and related provisions in
part 15 that: (i) Eliminate Form 204; and (ii) amend the Form 304, in
each case to remove any cash-market reporting requirements. Under the
Final Rule, the Commission instead relies on cash-market reporting
submitted directly to the exchanges, pursuant to final Sec. Sec. 150.5
and 150.9,\1591\ or requests cash-market information through a special
call.\1592\
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\1591\ See supra Section II.G.ii.3. (discussing final Sec.
150.9). As discussed above, leveraging existing exchange application
processes should avoid duplicative Commission and exchange
procedures and increase the speed by which position limit exemption
applications are addressed. For purposes of Federal position limits,
the cash-market reporting regime discussed in this section of the
release only pertains to bona fide hedges, not to spread exemptions,
because the Commission has not traditionally relied on cash-market
information when reviewing requests for spread exemptions.
\1592\ See final Sec. 19.00(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cash-market and swap-market reporting elements of Sec. Sec.
150.5 and 150.9 discussed above are largely consistent with current
market practices with respect to exchange-set limits and thus should
not result in any new costs.\1593\ The Final Rule's elimination of Form
204 and the cash-market reporting segments of the Form 304 eliminate
the reporting burden and associated costs.\1594\ Market participants
should realize significant benefits by being able to submit cash-market
reporting to one entity--the exchanges--instead of having to comply
with duplicative reporting requirements between the Commission and
applicable exchange, or implement new Commission processes for
reporting cash-market data for market participants who will be newly
subject to position limits.\1595\ Further, market participants are
generally already familiar with exchange processes for reporting and
recognizing bona fide hedging exemptions, which is an added benefit,
especially for market participants that are newly subject to Federal
position limits.
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\1593\ See, e.g., CME Rule 559 and ICE Rule 6.29.
\1594\ Based on revised estimates of the current collections of
information under existing part 19, the Commission estimates that
the Final Rule reduces the collections of information in part 19 by
600 reports and by 300 annual aggregate burden hours since the Final
Rule eliminates Form 204. See infra Section IV.B. (Paperwork
Reduction Act) and 85 FR 11596, 11700 (Feb. 27, 2020).
\1595\ The Commission has noted that certain commodity markets
are subject to Federal position limits for the first time. In
addition, the existing Form 204 would be inadequate for reporting of
cash-market positions relating to certain energy contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the first time under the
Final Rule.
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Further, these changes do not impact the Commission's existing
provisions for gathering information through special calls relating to
positions exceeding limits and/or to reportable positions. Accordingly,
as discussed above, the Commission requires that all persons exceeding
the Federal position limits set forth in final Sec. 150.2, as well as
all persons holding or controlling reportable positions pursuant to
existing Sec. 15.00(p)(1), must file any pertinent information as
instructed in a special call.\1596\ The Commission acknowledges that,
on its face, not obtaining the cash-market position information in the
form of a series `04 report could hypothetically result in some
increase in speculation; however, as set out above, this risk is
mitigated by the Commission's special call authority and by the
requirements that the exchanges receive this information under
Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9, as applicable. The Commission in turn would
be able to receive this information from the applicable exchange. Final
Sec. 19.00(a)(3) is similar to existing Sec. 19.00(a)(3), but
requires any such person to file the information as instructed in the
special call, rather than to file a series `04 report.\1597\ The
Commission believes that relying on its special call authority is less
burdensome for market participants than the existing Forms 204 and 304
reporting costs, as special calls are discretionary requests for
information whereas the series `04 reporting requirements are a
monthly, recurring reporting burden for market participants. While
collecting this data monthly would permit the Commission to analyze the
bona fide hedges in a time series, which may be helpful in
understanding trends in hedging techniques, the Commission will have
access to this same data from the exchanges and could do the same
analysis if required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1596\ See final Sec. 19.00(b).
\1597\ 17 CFR 19.00(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission received one comment addressing the purported
burdens that would accompany elimination of the cash-market reporting
forms. Better Markets, for example, argued that eliminating these
series `04 forms would impose additional reporting burdens on market
participants by requiring participants to report cash-market
information to multiple exchanges, and suggested that the Commission
should instead ``ensure that all cash positions reporting is
automated'' and ``amenable to aggregation'' in order to provide such
information to the exchanges.\1598\ The Commission disagrees with
Better Markets' concerns about increased reporting burdens and
criticism of the existing reporting infrastructure for the reasons
discussed above.\1599\ However, as noted above, eliminating the `04
forms will reduce burdens on market participants.\1600\
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\1598\ Better Markets at 59-60.
\1599\ See supra Section H.2.iii.-iv. (discussing Better
Markets' comments and the Commission's responses thereto).
\1600\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Separately, ACSA argued for the elimination of Form 304 in its
entirety.\1601\ ACSA asserted that Part III of Form 304, which is used
to prepare the Commission's cotton on-call report, causes competitive
harm to the U.S. cotton industry because the report divulges one market
participant's proprietary information to another market participant
and, according to ACSA, foreign mills believe that the report imposes
risks and costs and are therefore more likely to purchase cotton from
outside of the United States in order to avoid completing Part III of
Form 304.\1602\
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\1601\ ACSA at 9-11.
\1602\ See id.; see also NCTO at 1-2 (arguing against
publication of the cotton-on-call report and that textile mills are
particularly harmed when speculators trade against the cash-market
positions disclosed in the cotton on-call report because textile
mills purchase the majority of their cotton on call).
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As discussed in detail above at Section II.H.5.iv, the Commission
believes that the cotton on-call report contributes to efficient price
discovery,\1603\ and that continued publication of the cotton on-call
report will not change the existing dynamics of the cotton market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1603\ See, e.g., Glencore at 2. One commenter stated that it is
difficult to see the benefit in limiting transparency in the cotton
market and that cotton on-call report is useful and necessary
because it allows market participants to identify market
composition. Dunavant at 1. Similarly, another commenter stated that
discontinuation of the cotton on-call report would widen the
informational divide between large and small market participants
while providing no benefits to the public or price discovery. Gerald
Marshall at 3.
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6. Exchange-Set Position Limits (Final Sec. 150.5)
i. Introduction
Existing Sec. 150.5 addresses exchange-set position limits on
contracts not
[[Page 3438]]
subject to Federal position limits under existing Sec. 150.2, and sets
forth different standards for DCMs to apply in setting limit levels
depending on whether the DCM is establishing limit levels: (1) On an
initial or subsequent basis; (2) for cash-settled or physically-settled
contracts; and (3) during or outside the spot month.
In contrast, for physical commodity derivatives, final Sec.
150.5(a) and (b): (1) Expands existing Sec. 150.5's framework to also
cover contracts subject to Federal position limits under final Sec.
150.2; (2) simplifies the existing standards that DCMs apply when
establishing exchange-set position limits; and (3) provides non-
exclusive acceptable practices for compliance with those
standards.\1604\ Additionally, final Sec. 150.5(d) requires DCMs to
adopt aggregation rules that conform to existing Sec. 150.4.\1605\
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\1604\ See 17 CFR 150.2. Existing Sec. 150.5 addresses only
contracts not subject to Federal position limits under existing
Sec. 150.2 (aside from certain major foreign currency contracts).
To avoid confusion created by the parallel Federal and exchange-set
position limit frameworks, the Commission clarifies that final Sec.
150.5 deals solely with exchange-set position limits and exemptions
therefrom, whereas final Sec. 150.9 deals solely with the process
for purposes of Federal position limits.
\1605\ See 17 CFR 150.4.
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As a general matter, one factor (in addition to more specific
factors discussed throughout this Final Rule's cost-benefit
considerations) affecting the costs and benefits of the Federal
position limits established by this Final Rule is the fact that
exchanges, for many years, have had in place spot month position limits
for all of the core referenced contracts and non-spot month limits for
all of the nine legacy agricultural contracts.\1606\ Under final Sec.
150.5(a) and (b), exchanges will be required to adopt exchange-set
position limits both (i) for contracts subject to Federal position
limits and (ii) during the spot month for physical commodity contracts
not subject to Federal position limits. Exchanges also will be required
to adopt position limits or position accountability outside the spot
month for those physical commodity contracts not subject to non-spot
month Federal position limits, although the specifics may change with
evolving market conditions and regulatory requirements.\1607\ Exchange-
set position limits, broadly speaking, have much the same effect as
Federal position limits since both restrict the size of speculative
positions market participants may hold.\1608\ Moreover, there is
significant interaction between Federal position limits and exchange-
set position limits. In particular, CEA section 5(d)(5)(B) provides
that, for contracts where the Commission has established a position
limit, exchange-set position limits must be set at a level no higher
than the Federal limit.\1609\ In addition, where both the Commission
and an exchange have position limits in place for a contract, final
Sec. 150.5(a)(2) puts constraints on exemptions from the exchange-set
limit that are tied to the Commission's position limits in ways
described in detail in Section II.D.3, above. As a result, the costs
and benefits considered by the Commission, to a considerable extent,
are jointly attributable to Federal and exchange-set position limits.
The Commission does not have information that would permit a
quantitative evaluation of the extent to which this is true.
Qualitatively, where position limits overlap, a greater attribution of
costs and benefits to the Federal limits appears appropriate to the
extent that Federal limits trigger exchange-set limits pursuant to CEA
section 5(d)(5)(B). However, this is less true if an exchange elects to
impose position limits that are more stringent than the Federal limits
for particular contracts.\1610\
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\1606\ See Section II.D, supra, CME Group, Position Limits,
https://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/position-limits.html;
IFUS, Market Resources, Position Limits & Reporting, https://www.theice.com/futures-us/market-resources; CEA section 5(d)(5)(A)
(requiring position limits or accountability); existing Sec. 150.5;
final Sec. 150.5(a). This is generally true with the exception of
ICE Sugar No. 16, which is only subject to exchange-set single month
and all-months-combined position limits. However, the single month
position limit effectively acts as the spot month position limits
for this contract.
\1607\ See supra Section II.D; see also CEA section 5(d)(5);
final Sec. 150.5(a).
\1608\ See ICE Futures U.S. at 3 (``There is no apparent benefit
provided by adding a Federal position limit and guidance'' to ICE's
procedures for position limits and exemptions to such limits.)
\1609\ See also final Sec. 150.5(a)(1).
\1610\ For example, exchanges sometimes reduce position limit
levels in response to particular market conditions. See, e.g., ICE
Futures U.S. at 3, n.3 (describing a reduction in spot month
position limit for cocoa in March of 2020 in response to potential
impact of disruptions to normal business conditions on ability of
market participants to submit cocoa for grading). In addition, an
exchange could routinely set a lower position limit based on its
judgment of what is necessary to prevent manipulation or other
problems or based on the preferences of important participants in
its market.
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Despite the overlap in the effects of Federal and exchange-set
position limits, there are a number of distinctive features of Federal
position limits. Most importantly, as noted above, for contracts where
Federal position limits are established, they establish a ceiling on
positions that can be held, both as a matter of law under CEA section
5(d)(5)(B) and as a matter of practicality since market participants
must comply with Federal limits no matter what the level of exchange-
set limits. In addition, while exchanges can share information to some
extent, the Commission regulates trading on all exchanges and therefore
is generally in a position to better monitor and enforce compliance
with position limits across more than one exchange, for example in
connection with positions in a core referenced futures contract in one
exchange and a linked cash-settled look-alike referenced contract on
another exchange.
There are other differences as well. Even where the Commission and
an exchange set the same numerical position limit for a contract, final
Sec. 150.5(a)(2) allows for the possibility that there may be some
differences in the exemptions allowed.\1611\ And Federal position
limits established pursuant to paragraph CEA section 4a(a)(2) are
subject to a statutory requirement to achieve, to the maximum extent
practicable, the multiple policy objectives set forth in subparagraph
4a(a)(3)(B) of the CEA. By contrast, exchanges have a narrower
statutory mandate to adopt position limits or position accountability
to ``reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion.'' \1612\ Finally, Federal position limits create compliance
costs beyond those attributable to exchange-set position limits since
market participants will need to establish systems to ensure compliance
with Federal requirements. However, some compliance costs, for example
keeping track of position levels, may be common to both forms of
position limits.\1613\
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\1611\ See supra Section II.D.
\1612\ CEA section 5(d)(5)(A), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5)(A). However, the
statutory policy objectives for Federal position limits may
indirectly affect exchange-set limits where Federal limits set a
ceiling for exchange-set limits pursuant to CEA section 5(d)(5)(B),
7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5)(B).
\1613\ See supra Section III.B.2.c.ii; see also COPE at 3 (rule
does not require market participants to create recordkeeping system
to track data solely for purpose of filing forms with the Commission
although some additions to existing tracking effort will be
required).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exchange-set position limits for contracts and commodities not
subject to Federal position limits also affect the costs and benefits
of Federal position limits, and, in particular, of the Commission's
finding that position limits are necessary only for the 25 CRFCs and
contracts linked to them.\1614\
[[Page 3439]]
The Commission also has concluded that the existence of exchange-set
limits and position accountability (discussed further below) mitigates
the effects of not establishing Federal position limits for other
commodity derivatives contracts.\1615\
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\1614\ For information on exchange-set position limits and
position accountability for contracts and commodities not subject to
Federal position limits, see, e.g., CME Group, Position Limits,
https://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/position-limits.html;
IFUS, Market Resources, Position Limits & Reporting, https://www.theice.com/futures-us/market-resources; CEA section 5(d)(5)(A)
(requiring position limits or accountability); existing Sec. 150.5;
final Sec. 150.5(b).
\1615\ See infra Section IV.A.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Physical Commodity Derivative Contracts Subject to Federal Position
Limits Under the Final Rule (Final Sec. 150.5(a))
a. Exchange-Set Position Limits and Related Exemption Process
For contracts subject to Federal position limits under the Final
Rule, final Sec. 150.5(a)(1) requires DCMs to establish exchange-set
limits no higher than the level set by the Commission. This is not a
new requirement, and merely restates the applicable requirement in DCM
Core Principle 5.\1616\
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\1616\ See Commission regulation Sec. 38.300 (restating DCMs'
statutory obligations under the CEA 5(d)(5), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(5)).
Accordingly, the Commission will not discuss any costs or benefits
related to this proposed change since it merely reflects an existing
regulatory and statutory obligation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.5(a)(2) authorizes DCMs to grant exemptions from
such limits and is generally consistent with current industry practice.
The Commission has determined that codifying such practice establishes
important, minimum standards needed for DCMs to administer--and the
Commission to oversee--an effective and efficient program for granting
exemptions to exchange-set limits in a manner that does not undermine
the Federal position limits framework.\1617\
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\1617\ This standard is substantively consistent with current
market practice. See, e.g., CME Rule 559 (providing that CME will
consider, among other things, the ``applicant's business needs and
financial status, as well as whether the positions can be
established and liquidated in an orderly manner . . .'') and ICE
Rule 6.29 (requiring a statement that the applicant's ``positions
will be initiated and liquidated in an orderly manner . . .''). This
standard is also substantively similar to existing Sec. 150.5's
standard and is not intended to be materially different. See
existing Sec. 150.5(d)(1) (an exemption may be limited if it would
not be ``in accord with sound commercial practices or exceed an
amount which may be established and liquidated in orderly
fashion.'') 17 CFR 150.5(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In particular, Sec. 150.5(a)(2) protects market integrity and
prevents exchange-granted exemptions from undermining the Federal
position limits framework by requiring DCMs to either conform their
exemptions to the type the Commission would grant under final
Sec. Sec. 150.3 or 150.9, or to cap the exemption at the applicable
Federal position limit level and to assess whether an exemption request
would result in a position that is ``not in accord with sound
commercial practices'' or would ``exceed an amount that may be
established or liquidated in an orderly fashion in that market.''
Absent other factors, this element of the Final Rule could
potentially increase compliance costs for traders since each DCM could
establish different exemption-related rules and practices. However, to
the extent that rules and procedures currently differ across exchanges,
any compliance-related costs and benefits for traders may already be
realized. Similarly, absent other provisions, a DCM could
hypothetically seek a competitive advantage by offering excessively
permissive exemptions, which could allow certain market participants to
utilize exemptions in establishing sufficiently large positions to
engage in excessive speculation and to manipulate market prices.
However, final Sec. 150.5(a)(2) mitigates these risks by requiring
that exemptions that do not conform to the types the Commission may
grant under final Sec. 150.3 cannot exceed final Sec. 150.2's
applicable Federal position limit unless the Commission has first
approved such exemption. Moreover, before a DCM could permit a new
exemption category, final Sec. 150.5(e) requires a DCM to submit rules
to the Commission allowing for such exemptions, allowing the Commission
to ensure that the proposed exemption type would be consistent with
applicable requirements, including with the requirement that any
resulting positions would be ``in accord with sound commercial
practices'' and may be ``established and liquidated in an orderly
fashion.''
Final Sec. 150.5(a)(2) additionally requires traders to re-apply
to the exchange at least annually for the exchange-level exemption. The
Commission recognizes that requiring traders to re-apply annually could
impose additional costs on traders that are not currently required to
do so. However, the Commission believes this is industry practice among
existing market participants, who are likely already familiar with
DCMs' exemption processes.\1618\ This familiarity should reduce related
costs, and the Final Rule should strengthen market integrity by
ensuring that DCMs receive updated information related to a particular
exemption.
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\1618\ As noted above, the Commission believes this requirement
is consistent with current market practice. See, e.g., CME Rule 559
and ICE Rule 6.29. While ICE Rule 6.29 merely requires a trader to
``submit to [ICE Exchange] a written request'' without specifying
how often a trader must reapply, the Commission understands from
informal discussions between Commission staff and ICE that traders
must generally submit annual updates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission received various comments pertaining to Sec.
150.5(a)(2). CMC requested that the Commission clarify that each
exchange has discretion to determine what information is required of
applicants when applying for a spread exemption from exchange-set
limits.\1619\ As noted in the 2020 NRPM, exchanges have discretion to
determine what information is required of applicants applying for a
spread exemption, or any other exemption from exchange-set limits,
except for instances where the exchange is processing a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge applications in accordance with the applications
requirements of Sec. 150.9.\1620\ This flexibility permits exchanges
to further mitigate costs and/or burdens associated with the exemption
process by adopting protocols that leverage existing processes with
which their participants are already familiar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1619\ CMC at 7.
\1620\ 85 FR 11644 (explaining that exchanges have flexibility
to establish the application process as they see fit).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CMC also requested that the Commission clarify that an exchange is
not responsible for monitoring the use of spread positions for purposes
of Federal position limits.\1621\ Exchanges are required to administer
and monitor their position limits and any exemptions therefrom in
accordance with DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6, as
applicable.\1622\ For an inter-market spread exemption where part of
the spread position is executed on another exchange or over the
counter, exchanges are encouraged to request information from the
spread exemption applicant about the entire composition of the spread
position.\1623\ Even though an exchange is not responsible for
monitoring a trader's position on other exchanges, it is beneficial to
the exchange to obtain this information so it is best informed about
whether to grant the exemption. The Commission notes while an exchange
may incur costs through requesting information from (or providing
information to) another exchange, these costs already may have been
realized by exchanges to the extent they reflect existing market
practice. Similarly, such information sharing benefits market
integrity, but such benefits likewise already may have been realized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1621\ CMC at 7.
\1622\ See supra Section II.D.3.ii.c.
\1623\ See id.
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Final Sec. 150.5(a)(4) requires a DCM to provide the Commission
with certain monthly reports regarding the disposition of any exemption
[[Page 3440]]
application, including the recognition of any position as a bona fide
hedge, the exemption of any spread transaction or other position, the
revocation or modification or previously granted recognitions or
exemptions, or the rejection of any application, as well as certain
related information similar to the information that applicants must
provide the Commission under final Sec. 150.3 or an exchange under
final Sec. 150.9, including underlying cash-market and swap-market
information related to bona fide hedge positions. The Commission
generally recognizes that this monthly reporting requirement could
impose additional costs on exchanges, although the Commission also has
determined that this requirement would assist with the Commission's
oversight functions and therefore benefit market integrity. The
Commission discusses this proposed requirement in greater detail in its
discussion of final Sec. 150.9.\1624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1624\ See supra Section IV.A.5.b.ii. (discussing monthly
exchange-to-Commission report in final Sec. 150.5(a)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, while existing Sec. 150.5(d) does not explicitly address
whether traders should request an exemption prior to taking on its
position, final Sec. 150.5(a)(2), in contrast, explicitly authorizes
(but does not require) DCMs to permit traders to file a retroactive
exemption request due to ``demonstrated sudden or unforeseen increases
in its bona fide hedging needs,'' but only within five business days
after the trade and as long as the trader provides a supporting
explanation.\1625\ As noted above, these provisions are largely
consistent with existing market practice, and to this extent, the
benefits and costs already may have been realized by DCMs and market
participants.
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\1625\ Certain exchanges currently allow for the submission of
exemption requests up to five business days after the trader
established the position that exceeded a limit in certain
circumstances. See, e.g., CME Rule 559 and ICE's ``Guidance on
Position Limits'' (Mar. 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Pre-Existing Positions
Final Sec. 150.5(a)(3) requires DCMs to impose exchange-set
position limits on ``pre-existing positions,'' other than pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps.\1626\ The Commission believes that
this approach benefits market integrity since pre-existing positions
that exceed spot-month limits could result in market or price
disruptions as positions are rolled into the spot month.\1627\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1626\ Final Sec. 150.1 defines ``pre-existing position'' to
mean ``any position in a commodity derivative contract acquired in
good faith prior to the effective date'' of any applicable position
limit.
\1627\ The Commission is particularly concerned about protecting
the spot month in physical-delivery futures from corners and
squeezes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is alleviating the burden associated with final
150.5(a)(3) by delaying the compliance date to allow exchanges
sufficient time to implement the Final Rule.
iii. Physical Commodity Derivative Contracts Not Subject to Federal
Position Limits Under the Final Rule (Final Sec. 150.5(b))
a. Spot Month Limits and Related Acceptable Practices
For cash-settled contracts during the spot month, existing Sec.
150.5 sets forth the following qualitative standard: exchange-set
limits should be ``no greater than necessary to minimize the potential
for market manipulation or distortion of the contract's or underling
commodity's price.'' However, for physically-settled contracts,
existing Sec. 150.5 provides a one-size-fits-all parameter that
exchange limits must be no greater than 25% of EDS.
In contrast, the standard for setting spot month limit levels for
physical commodity derivative contracts not subject to Federal position
limits set forth in final Sec. 150.5(b)(1) does not distinguish
between cash-settled and physically-settled contracts, and instead
requires DCMs to apply the existing Sec. 150.5 qualitative standard to
both.\1628\ The Commission also provides a related, non-exclusive
acceptable practice that deems exchange-set position limits for both
cash-settled and physically-settled contracts subject to Sec. 150.5(b)
to be in compliance if the limits are no higher than 25% of the spot-
month EDS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1628\ Final Sec. 150.5(b)(1) requires DCMs to establish
position limits for spot-month contracts at a level that is
``necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the underlying
commodity's price or index.'' Existing Sec. 150.5 also
distinguishes between ``levels at designation'' and ``adjustments to
levels,'' although each category similarly incorporates the
qualitative standard for cash-settled contracts and the 25% metric
for physically-settled contracts. Final Sec. 150.5(b) eliminates
this distinction. The Commission intends the final Sec. 150.5(b)(1)
standard to be substantively the same as the existing Sec. 150.5
standard for cash-settled contracts, except that under final Sec.
150.5(b)(1), the standard applies to physically-settled contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applying the existing Sec. 150.5 qualitative standard and non-
exclusive acceptable practice in final 150.5(b)(1), rather than a one-
size-fits-all regulation, to both cash-settled and physically-settled
contracts during the spot month is expected to enhance market integrity
by permitting a DCM to establish a more tailored, product-specific
approach by applying other parameters that may take into account the
unique liquidity and other characteristics of the particular market and
contract, which is not possible under the one-size-fits-all 25% of EDS
parameter set forth in existing Sec. 150.5. While the Commission
recognizes that the existing 25% of EDS parameter has generally worked
well, the Commission also recognizes that there may be circumstances
where other parameters may be preferable and just as effective, if not
more, including, for example, if the contract is cash-settled or does
not have a reasonably accurate measurable deliverable supply, or if the
DCM can demonstrate that a different parameter would better promote
market integrity or efficiency for a particular contract or market.
On the other hand, the Commission recognizes that final Sec.
150.5(b)(1) could adversely affect market integrity by theoretically
allowing DCMs to establish excessively high position limits in order to
gain a competitive advantage, which also could harm the integrity of
other markets that offer similar products.\1629\ However, the
Commission believes these potential risks are mitigated since (i) final
Sec. 150.5(e) requires DCMs to submit proposed position limits to the
Commission, which will review those rules for compliance with Sec.
150.5(b), including to ensure that the proposed limits are ``in accord
with sound commercial practices'' and that they may be ``established
and liquidated in an orderly fashion''; and (ii) final Sec.
150.5(b)(3) requires DCMs to adopt position limits for any new contract
at a ``comparable'' level to existing contracts that are substantially
similar (i.e., ``look-alike contracts'') on other exchanges unless the
exchange listing the new contracts demonstrates to the satisfaction of
Commission staff, in their product filing with the Commission, how its
levels comply with the requirements of Sec. 150.5(b)(1) and (2).
Moreover, this latter requirement also may reduce the amount of time
and effort needed for the DCM and Commission staff to assess proposed
limits for any new contract that competes with another DCM's existing
contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1629\ Since the existing Sec. 150.5 framework already applies
the proposed qualitative standard to cash-settled spot-month
contracts, any new risks resulting from the proposed standard would
occur only with respect to physically-settled contracts, which are
currently subject to the one-size-fits-all 25% EDS parameter under
the existing framework.
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[[Page 3441]]
b. Non-Spot Month Limits/Accountability Levels and Related Acceptable
Practices
Existing Sec. 150.5 provides one-size-fits-all levels for non-spot
month contracts and allows for position accountability after a
contract's initial listing only for those contracts that satisfy
certain trading thresholds.\1630\ In contrast, for contracts outside
the spot-month, final Sec. 150.5(b)(2) requires DCMs to establish
either position limits or position accountability levels that satisfy
the same proposed qualitative standard discussed above for spot-month
contracts.\1631\ For DCMs that establish position limits, final
Appendix F to part 150 sets forth related acceptable practices that
provide non-exclusive parameters that are generally consistent with
existing Sec. 150.5's parameters for non-spot month contracts.\1632\
For DCMs that establish position accountability, Sec. 150.1's
definition of ``position accountability'' provides that a trader must
reduce its position upon a DCM's request, which is generally consistent
with existing Sec. 150.5's framework, but does not distinguish between
trading volume or contract type, like existing Sec. 150.5. While DCMs
are provided the ability to decide whether to use limit levels or
accountability levels for any such contract, under either approach, the
DCM has to set a level that is ``necessary and appropriate to reduce
the potential threat of market manipulation or price distortion of the
contract's or the underlying commodity's price or index.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1630\ As noted above, in establishing the specific metric,
existing Sec. 150.5 distinguishes between ``levels at designation''
and ``adjustments to [subsequent] levels.'' Final Sec. 150.5(b)(2)
eliminates this distinction and applies the qualitative standard for
all non-spot month position limit and accountability levels.
\1631\ DCM Core Principle 5 requires DCMs to establish either
position limits or accountability for speculators. See Commission
regulation Sec. 38.300 (restating DCMs' statutory obligations under
the CEA 5(d)(5)). Accordingly, inasmuch as final Sec. 150.5(b)(2)
requires DCMs to establish position limits or accountability, the
Final Rule does not represent a change to the status quo baseline
requirements.
\1632\ Specifically, the acceptable practices in final Appendix
F to part 150 provides that DCMs are deemed to comply with final
Sec. 150.5(b)(2)(i) qualitative standard if they establish non-spot
limit levels no greater than any one of the following: (1) Based on
the average of historical positions sizes held by speculative
traders in the contract as a percentage of open interest in that
contract; (2) the spot month limit level for that contract; (3)
5,000 contracts (scaled up proportionally to the ratio of the
notional quantity per contract to the typical cash-market
transaction if the notional quantity per contract is smaller than
the typical cash-market transaction, or scaled down proportionally
if the notional quantity per contract is larger than the typical
cash-market transaction); or (4) 10% of open interest in that
contract for the most recent calendar year up to 50,000 contracts,
with a marginal increase of 2.5% of open interest thereafter.
These parameters have largely appeared in existing Sec. 150.5
for many years in connection with non-spot month limits, either for
levels at designation, or for subsequent levels, with certain
revisions. For example, while existing Sec. 150.5(b)(3) has
provided a limit of 5,000 contracts for energy products, existing
Sec. 150.5(b)(2) provides a limit of 1,000 contracts for physical
commodities other than energy products. The acceptable practice
parameters in final Appendix F create a uniform standard of 5,000
contracts for all physical commodities. The Commission expects that
the 5,000 contract acceptable practice, for example, is a useful
rule of thumb for exchanges because it allows them to establish
limits and demonstrate compliance with Commission regulations in a
relatively efficient manner, particularly for new contracts that
have yet to establish open interest. The spot month limit level
under item (2) above is a new parameter for non-spot month
contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter alternatively recommended that Sec. 150.5(b)(2)
should require exchanges to set position limits and position
accountability levels outside of the spot month at levels that reduce
the potential threat of market manipulation or price distortion and the
potential for sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes.\1633\ For the reasons more fully discussed below, the
Commission believes that outside the spot-month, either exchange-set
position limits or exchange-set accountability levels are sufficient
for exchanges to reduce these potential threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1633\ Better Markets at 47-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 150.5(b)(2) benefits market efficiency by
authorizing DCMs to determine whether position limits or accountability
is best-suited outside of the spot month based on the DCM's knowledge
of its markets. For example, position accountability could improve
liquidity compared to position limits since liquidity providers may be
more willing or able to participate in markets that do not have hard
limits. As discussed above, DCMs are well-positioned to understand
their respective markets, and best practices in one market may differ
in another market, including due to different market participants or
liquidity characteristics of the underlying commodities. For DCMs that
choose to establish position limits, the Commission believes that
applying the final Sec. 150.5 qualitative standard to contracts
outside the spot-month benefits market integrity by permitting a DCM to
establish a more tailored, product-specific approach by applying other
tools that may take into account the unique liquidity and other
characteristics of the particular market and contract, which is not
possible under the existing Sec. 150.5 specific parameters for non-
spot month contracts. While the Commission recognizes that the existing
parameters may have been well-suited to market dynamics when initially
promulgated, the Commission also recognizes that open interest may have
changed for certain contracts subject to final Sec. 150.5(b), and open
interest will likely continue to change in the future (e.g., as new
contracts may be introduced and as supply and/or demand may change for
underlying commodities). In cases where open interest has not
increased, the exchange may not need to change existing limit levels.
But, for contracts where open interest has increased, the exchange is
able to raise its limits to facilitate liquidity consistent with an
orderly market. However, the Commission reiterates that the specific
parameters in the acceptable practices set forth in final Appendix F to
part 150 are merely non-exclusive examples, and an exchange is be able
to establish higher (or lower) limits, provided the exchange submits
its proposed limits to the Commission under final Sec. 150.5(e) and
explains how its proposed limits satisfy the qualitative standard and
are otherwise consistent with all applicable requirements.
The Commission, however, recognizes that final Sec. 150.5(b)(2)
could adversely affect market integrity by potentially allowing DCMs to
establish position accountability levels rather than position limits,
regardless of whether the contract exceeds the volume-based thresholds
provided in existing Sec. 150.5. However, final Sec. 150.5(e)
requires DCMs to submit any proposed position accountability rules to
the Commission for review, and the Commission will determine on a case-
by-case basis whether such rules satisfy regulatory requirements,
including the proposed qualitative standard. Similarly, in order to
gain a competitive advantage, DCMs could theoretically set excessively
high accountability (or position limit) levels, which also could
potentially adversely affect markets with similar products. However,
the Commission believes these risks are mitigated since (i) final Sec.
150.5(e) requires DCMs to submit proposed position accountability (or
limits) to the Commission, which will review those rules for compliance
with Sec. 150.5(b), including to ensure that the exchange's proposed
accountability levels (or limits) are ``necessary and appropriate to
reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or price
distortion'' of the contract or underlying commodity; and (ii) final
Sec. 150.5(b)(3) requires DCMs to adopt position limits for any new
contract at a ``comparable'' level to existing contracts that are
substantially similar on other exchanges unless the exchange listing
the new
[[Page 3442]]
contracts demonstrates to the satisfaction of Commission staff, in
their product filing with the Commission, how its levels comply with
the requirements of Sec. 150.5(b)(1) and (2).
c. Exchange-Set Limits on Economically Equivalent Swaps
As discussed above, swaps that qualify as ``economically equivalent
swaps'' are subject to the Federal position limits framework. However,
the Commission has determined to permit exchanges to delay enforcing
their respective exchange-set position limits on economically
equivalent swaps at this time. Specifically, with respect to exchange-
set position limits on swaps, the Commission notes that in two years
(which generally coincides with the compliance date for economically
equivalent swaps), the Commission will reevaluate the ability of
exchanges to establish and implement appropriate surveillance
mechanisms to implement DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6.
However, after the swap compliance period (January 1, 2023), the
Commission underscores that it will enforce Federal position limits in
connection with OTC swaps.
Nonetheless, the Commission's determination to permit exchanges to
delay implementing exchange-set position limits on swaps could
incentivize market participants to leave the futures markets and
instead transact in economically equivalent swaps, which could reduce
liquidity in the futures and related options markets, which could also
increase transaction and hedging costs. Delaying position limits on
swaps therefore could harm market participants, especially end-users
that do not transact in swaps, if many participants were to shift
trading from the futures to the swaps markets. In turn, end-users could
pass on some of these increased costs to the public at large.\1634\
However, the Commission believes that these concerns are mitigated to
the extent the Commission still oversees and enforces Federal position
limits even if the exchanges are not be required to do so.
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\1634\ On the other hand, the Commission has not seen any
shifting of liquidity to the swaps markets--or general attempts at
market manipulation or evasion of Federal position limits--with
respect to the nine legacy core referenced futures contracts, even
though swaps currently are not subject to Federal or exchange
position limits.
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iv. Position Aggregation
Final Sec. 150.5(d) requires all DCMs that list physical commodity
derivative contracts to apply aggregation rules that conform to
existing Sec. 150.4, regardless of whether the contract is subject to
Federal position limits under Sec. 150.2.\1635\ The Commission
believes final Sec. 150.5(d) benefits market integrity in several
ways. First, a harmonized approach to aggregation across exchanges that
list physical commodity derivative contracts prevents confusion that
could result from divergent standards between Federal position limits
under Sec. 150.2 and exchange-set limits under Sec. 150.5(b). As a
result, final Sec. 150.5(d) provides uniformity, consistency, and
reduced administrative burdens for traders who are active on multiple
trading venues and/or trade similar physical contracts, regardless of
whether the contracts are subject to Sec. 150.2's Federal position
limits. Second, a harmonized aggregation policy eliminates the
potential for DCMs to use excessively permissive aggregation policies
as a competitive advantage, which would impair the effectiveness of the
Commission's aggregation policy and position limits framework. Third,
since, for contracts subject to Federal position limits, final Sec.
150.5(a) requires DCMs to set position limits at a level not higher
than that set by the Commission under final Sec. 150.2, differing
aggregation standards could effectively lead to an exchange-set limit
that is higher than that set by the Commission. Accordingly,
harmonizing aggregation standards reinforces the efficacy and intended
purpose of final Sec. Sec. 150.2 and 150.5 and existing Sec. 150.4 by
eliminating DCMs' ability to circumvent the applicable Federal
aggregation and position limits rules.
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\1635\ The Commission adopted final aggregation rules in 2016
under existing Sec. 150.4, which applies to contracts subject to
Federal position limits under Sec. 150.2. See Final Aggregation
Rulemaking, 81 FR at 91454. Under the Final Aggregation Rulemaking,
unless an exemption applies, a person's positions must be aggregated
with positions for which the person controls trading or for which
the person holds a 10% or greater ownership interest. The Division
of Market Oversight has issued time-limited no-action relief from
some of the aggregation requirements contained in that rulemaking.
See CFTC Letter No. 19-19 (July 31, 2019), available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-19/download. Commission regulation Sec.
150.4(b) sets forth several permissible exemptions from aggregation.
The Commission, outside the Final Rule, will separately consider
comments related to the Final Aggregation Rulemaking and
codification of NAL 19-19.
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To the extent a DCM currently is not applying the Federal
aggregation rules in existing Sec. 150.4, or similar exchange-based
rules, final Sec. 150.5(d) could impose costs with respect to market
participants trading referenced contracts for the 16 new commodities
that are subject to Federal position limits for the first time. Market
participants are required to update their trading and compliance
systems to ensure they comply with the new aggregation rules.
7. Section 15(a) Factors \1636\
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\1636\ The discussion here covers the Final Rule amendments that
the Commission has identified as being relevant to the areas set out
in section 15(a) of the CEA: (i) Protection of market participants
and the public; (ii) efficiency, competitiveness, and financial
integrity of futures markets; (iii) price discovery; (iv) sound risk
management practices; and (v) other public interest considerations.
For amendments that are not specifically addressed, the Commission
has not identified any effects.
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i. Protection of Market Participants and the Public
A chief purpose of speculative position limits is to preserve the
integrity of derivatives markets for the benefit of commercial
interests, producers, and other end- users that use these markets to
hedge risk and of consumers that consume the underlying commodities. As
discussed above, the Commission believes that the final position limits
regime operates to deter excessive speculation and manipulation, such
as corners and squeezes, which might impair the contract's price
discovery function and liquidity for bona fide hedgers--and ultimately,
protects the integrity and utility of the commodity markets for the
benefit of both producers and consumers.
The Commission is including 25 core referenced futures contracts,
as well as any referenced contracts directly or indirectly linked
thereto, within the final Federal position limits framework. In
selecting the 25 core referenced futures contracts, the Commission
analyzed (1) the importance of these contracts to the operation of the
underlying cash commodity market, including that they require physical
delivery; and (2) the importance of the underlying commodity to the
economy as a whole. As discussed above, the Commission is of the view
that evidence demonstrating one or both of these factors is sufficient
to establish that position limits are necessary because each factor
relates to the statutory objective identified in CEA section
4a(a)(1).\1637\
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\1637\ See supra Section III.C. (discussing the necessity
findings as to the 25 core referenced futures contacts).
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Of particular importance in the Commission's position limit regime
are the limits on the spot month, because the Commission believes that
deterring and preventing manipulative behaviors, such as corners and
squeezes, is more urgent during this period. The spot month position
limits are designed, among other things, to deter and prevent corners
and squeezes, as spot months are more susceptible to such activities
[[Page 3443]]
than non-spot months, as well as promote a more orderly liquidation
process at expiration.\1638\ By restricting derivatives positions to a
proportion of the deliverable supply of the commodity, the spot month
position limits reduce the possibility that a market participant can
use derivatives to affect the price of the cash commodity (and vice
versa).\1639\ Limiting a speculative position based on a percentage of
deliverable supply also restricts a speculative trader's ability to
establish a leveraged position in cash-settled derivative contracts,
diminishing that trader's incentive to manipulate the cash settlement
price. As the Commission has determined in the preamble, excessive
speculation or manipulation during the spot month may cause sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of the
commodities underlying these contracts.\1640\ In this way, the
Commission believes that the limits in the Final Rule benefit market
participants that seek to hedge the spot price of a commodity at
expiration, and benefit consumers who are able to purchase underlying
commodities for which prices are determined by fundamentals of supply
and demand, rather than influenced by excessive speculation,
manipulation, or other undue and unnecessary burdens on interstate
commerce.
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\1638\ See supra Sections II.A.19 and II.B.3.iii.
\1639\ See supra Section II.B.3.iii.
\1640\ See supra Section III.C. (discussing the necessity
finding).
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The Commission believes that the Final Rule's Commission and
exchange-centric processes for granting exemptions from Federal
position limits, including non-enumerated bona fide hedging
recognitions, help ensure the hedging utility of the derivatives
markets for commercial end-users.
First, the Final Rule allows exchanges to leverage existing
processes and their knowledge of their own markets, including
participant positions and activities, along with their knowledge of the
underlying commodity cash market, which should allow for more timely
review of exemption applications than if the Commission were to conduct
such initial application reviews. This benefits the public by allowing
producers and end-users of a commodity to more efficiently and
predictably hedge their price risks, thus controlling costs that might
be passed on to the public.
Second, exchanges may be better-suited than the Commission to
leverage their knowledge of their own markets, including participant
positions and activities, along with their knowledge of the underlying
commodity cash market, in order to recognize whether an applicant
qualifies for an exemption and what the level for that exemption should
be. This benefits market participants and the public by helping assure
that exemption levels are set in a manner that meets the risk
management needs of the applicant without negatively impacting the
derivative and cash market for that commodity.
Third, allowing for self-effectuating spread exemptions for
purposes of Federal position limits could improve liquidity in all
months for a listed contract or across commodities, benefitting hedgers
by providing tighter bid-ask spreads for out-right trades. Furthermore,
traders using spreads can arbitrage price discrepancies between
calendar months within the same commodity contract or price
discrepancies between commodities, helping ensure that futures prices
more accurately reflect the underlying market fundamentals for a
commodity.
Lastly, the Commission will review each application for bona fide
hedge recognitions (other than those bona fide hedges that would be
self-effectuating under the Final Rule), but the Final Rule allows the
Commission to also leverage the exchange's knowledge and experience of
its own markets and market participants discussed above for market
participants that applies to the Commission by first submitting the
application for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemption to the
exchange for purposed of exchange-set limits under final Sec. 150.9.
Similarly, the Commission will review each application for a spread
exemption that is not covered by the spread transaction definition and
therefore is not self-effectuating for purposes of Federal position
limits.
The Commission also understands that there are costs to market
participants and the public to setting position limit levels that are
too high or too low. If the levels are set too high, there's greater
risk of excessive speculation, which may harm market participants and
the public. Further, to the extent that the limits are set at such a
level that even without these proposed exemptions, the probability of
nearing or breaching such levels may be negligible for most market
participants, benefits associated with such exemptions may be reduced.
Conversely, if the limits are set too low, transaction costs for
market participants who are near or above the limit will rise as they
transact in other instruments with higher transaction costs to obtain
their desired level of speculative positions. Additionally, limits that
are too low could incentivize speculators to leave the market and be
unavailable to provide liquidity for hedgers, resulting in ``choppy''
prices. It is also possible for limits that are set too low to harm
market efficiency because the views of some speculators might not be
reflected fully in the price formation process.
In setting the final Federal position limit levels, the Commission
considered these factors in order to implement to the maximum extent
practicable, as it finds necessary in its discretion, to apply the
position limits framework articulated in CEA section 4a(a) to set
Federal position limits to protect market integrity and price
discovery, thereby benefiting market participants and the public.
ii. Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of Futures
Markets
Position limits help to prevent market manipulation or excessive
speculation that may unduly influence prices at the expense of the
efficiency and integrity of markets. The Final Rule's expansion of the
Federal position limits regime to 25 core referenced futures contracts
(e.g., the existing nine legacy agricultural contracts and the 16 new
contracts) enhances the buffer against excessive speculation
historically afforded exclusively to the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, improving the financial integrity of those markets.
Moreover, the limits in final Sec. 150.2 may promote market
competitiveness by preventing a trader from gaining too much market
power in the respective markets.
Also, in the absence of position limits, market participants may be
deterred from participating in a particular market if the market
participants perceive that there is a participant with an unusually
large speculative position exerting what they believe is unreasonable
market power. A lack of participation may harm liquidity, and
consequently, may harm market efficiency.
On the other hand, traders who find position limits overly
constraining may seek to trade in substitute instruments in order to
meet their demand for speculative instruments. The substitute
instruments could be futures contracts or swaps that are similar to or
highly correlated with their corresponding core referenced futures
contracts (but not otherwise deemed to be referenced contracts). They
could also be trade options or other forward contracts. These traders
may also decide to not trade beyond the Federal speculative position
limit.
[[Page 3444]]
Trading in substitute instruments may be less effective than
trading in referenced contracts. For example, the trading of futures
contracts has strong safeguards since futures contracts are by
definition exchange-traded, which includes (1) the posting of initial
and variation margin and (2) credit reviews and guarantees by futures
commission merchants. These safeguards protect the integrity of futures
markets but are generally not required for forward transactions, which
are generally not traded on exchanges or centrally cleared. Forward
contract nonperformance may result in dislocations in the physical
marketing channel, which may lead to higher prices for consumers and
end users and otherwise impose burdens on commerce. Further, with the
use of substitute instruments, futures prices might not fully reflect
all the speculative demand to hold the futures contract, because
substitute instruments may not fully influence prices the same way that
trading directly in the futures contract does. Thus, market efficiency
and price discovery might be harmed, too.
The Commission believes that focusing on the 25 core referenced
futures contracts (included any referenced contracts linked thereto),
which generally have high levels of open interest and trading volume
and/or have been subject to existing Federal position limits for many
years, should, in general, be less disruptive for the respective
derivatives markets, which in turn may reduce the potential for
disruption for the price discovery function of the underlying commodity
markets as compared to including less liquid contracts (only to the
extent that the Commission is able to make the requisite necessity
finding for such contracts).
Finally, the Commission believes that eliminating certain risk
management positions as bona fide hedges, coupled with the increased
non-spot month limit levels for most of the nine legacy agricultural
contracts, will foster competition among swap dealers by subjecting all
market participants, including all swap dealers, to the same non-spot
month limit rather than limited staff-granted risk management
exemptions. Accommodating risk management activity by additional
entities with higher position limit levels may also help lessen the
concentration risk potentially posed by a few commodity index traders
holding exemptions that are not available to competing market
participants.
iii. Price Discovery
As discussed above, market manipulation may result in artificial or
distorted prices.\1641\ Similarly, excessive speculation may result in
``sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
price of such commodity.'' \1642\ Position limits may help to prevent
the price discovery function of the underlying commodity markets from
being disrupted.\1643\ Also, in the absence of position limits, market
participants might elect to trade less as a result of a perception that
the market pricing does not reflect market forces, as a consequence of
what they perceive is the exercise of too much market power by a
concentration of several or one larger speculator. This reduced trading
may result in a reduction in liquidity, which may have a negative
impact on price discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1641\ See supra Section II.A.16. (discussing the referenced
contract definition).
\1642\ See supra Section III.A. (discussing the necessity
finding).
\1643\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, imposing position limits raises the concerns
that liquidity and price discovery may be diminished, because certain
market segments, i.e., speculative traders, are restricted. For certain
commodities, the Final Rule sets the levels of position limits at
increased levels, to avoid harming liquidity that may be provided by
speculators that would establish large positions, while restricting
speculators from establishing extraordinarily large positions. The
Commission further believes that the bona fide hedging recognition and
exemption processes will foster liquidity and potentially improve price
discovery by making it more efficient for market participants to apply
for bona fide hedging recognitions and spread exemptions.
In addition, position limits may serve as a prophylactic measure
that reduces market volatility due to a participant otherwise engaging
in large quantity trades in a short time interval that induce price
impacts that interfere with price discovery. In particular, spot month
position limits make it more difficult to mark the close of a futures
contract to possibly benefit other contracts that settle on the closing
futures price. Marking the close harms markets by spoiling convergence
between futures prices and spot prices at expiration and by damaging
price discovery.
iv. Sound Risk Management Practices
The Final Rule promotes sound risk management practices by
providing exemptions for bona fide hedgers to hedge their corresponding
risk. In addition, the Commission crafted the Final Rule to ensure
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers to the maximum extent
practicable, e.g., by: (1) Creating a bona fide hedging definition that
is broad enough to accommodate common commercial hedging practices,
including anticipatory hedging, for a variety of commodity types; (2)
maintaining the status quo with respect to existing bona fide hedge
recognitions and spread exemptions that will remain self-effectuating
and make additional bona fide hedges and spreads self-effectuating
(i.e., certain anticipatory hedging); (3) providing additional ability
for a streamlined process where market participants can make a single
submission to an exchange in which the exchange and Commission will
each review applications for non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions for purposes of Federal and exchange-set limits that are
in line with commercial hedging practices; and (4) allowing for a
conditional spot month limit exemption in natural gas.
To the extent that monitoring for position limits requires market
participants to create internal risk limits and evaluate position size
in relation to the market, position limits may also provide an
incentive for market participants to engage in sound risk management
practices. Further, sound risk management practices will be promoted by
the Final Rule to allow for market participants to measure risk in the
manner most suitable for their business (i.e., net versus gross hedging
practices), rather than having to conform their hedging programs to a
one-size-fits-all standard that may not be suitable for their risk
management needs. Finally, generally increasing non-spot month limit
levels for the nine legacy agricultural contracts to levels that
reflect observed levels of trading activity, based on recent data
reviewed by the Commission, should allow swap dealers, liquidity
providers, market makers, and others who have risk management needs,
but who are not hedging a physical commercial, to soundly manage their
risks.
v. Other Public Interest
The Commission has not identified any additional public interest
considerations related to the costs and benefits of this Final Rule.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
1. Overview
Certain provisions of the Final Rule amend or impose new
``collection of information'' requirements as that term
[[Page 3445]]
is defined under the Paperwork Reduction Act (``PRA'').\1644\ An agency
may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,
a collection of information unless it displays a valid control number
from the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB''). The Final Rule
modifies the following existing collections of information previously
approved by OMB and for which the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(``Commission'') has received control numbers: (i) OMB control number
3038-0009 (Large Trader Reports), which generally covers Commission
regulations in parts 15 through 21; (ii) OMB control number 3038-0013
(Aggregation of Positions), which covers Commission regulations in part
150; \1645\ and (iii) OMB control number 3038-0093 (Provisions Common
to Registered Entities), which covers Commission regulations in part
40.
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\1644\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
\1645\ Currently, OMB control number 3038-0013 is titled
``Aggregation of Positions.'' The Commission is renaming the OMB
control number ``Position Limits'' to better reflect the nature of
the information collections covered by that OMB control number.
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The Commission requested that OMB approve and revise OMB control
numbers 3038-0009, 3038-0013, and 3038-0093 in accordance with 44
U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
2. Commission Reorganization of OMB Control Numbers 3038-0009 and 3038-
0013
The Commission requested two non-substantive changes so that all
collections of information related solely to the Commission's position
limit requirements are consolidated under one OMB control number.\1646\
First, the Commission is transferring collections of information under
part 19 (Reports by Persons Holding Bona Fide Hedge Positions and By
Merchants and Dealers in Cotton) related to position limit requirements
from OMB control number 3038-0009 to OMB control number 3038-0013.
Second, the modified OMB control number 3038-0013 is renamed as
``Position Limits.'' This renaming change is non-substantive and allows
for all collections of information related to the Federal position
limits requirements, including exemptions from speculative position
limits and related large trader reporting, to be housed in one
collection.
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\1646\ The Commission notes that certain collections of
information under OMB control number 3038-0093 relate to several
Commission regulations in addition to the Commission's final
position limits framework. As a result, the collections of
information discussed herein under this OMB control number 3038-0093
are not being consolidated under OMB control number 3038-0013.
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A single collection makes it easier for market participants to know
where to find the relevant position limits PRA burdens. The remaining
collections of information under OMB control number 3038-0009 cover
reports by various entities under parts 15, 17, and 21 \1647\ of the
Commission's regulations, while OMB control number 3038-0013 holds
collections of information arising from parts 19 and 150.
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\1647\ As noted above, OMB control number 3038-0009 generally
covers Commission regulations in parts 15 through 21. However, it
does not cover Sec. Sec. 16.02, 17.01, 18.04, or 18.05, which are
under OMB control number 3038-0103. 78 FR at 69200 (transferring
Sec. Sec. 16.02, 17.01, 18.04, and 18.05 to OMB Control Number
3038-0103).
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As discussed in Section 3 below, this non-substantive
reorganization results in: (i) A decreased burden estimate under
control number 3038-0009 due to the transfer of the collection of
information arising from obligations in part 19; and (ii) a
corresponding increase of the amended part 19 burdens under control
number 3038-0013. However, as discussed further below, the collection
of information and burden hours arising from revised part 19 that is
transferred to OMB control number 3038-0013 is less than the existing
burden estimate under OMB control number 3038-0009 since the Final Rule
amends existing part 19 by eliminating existing Form 204 and certain
parts of Form 304 and the reporting burdens related thereto. As a
result, market participants will see a net reduction of collections of
information and burden hours under revised part 19.
3. Collections of Information
The Final Rule amends existing regulations, and creates new
regulations, concerning speculative position limits. Among other
amendments, the Final Rule includes: (1) New and amended Federal spot-
month limits for the 25 core referenced futures contracts; (2) amended
Federal non-spot limits for the nine legacy agricultural contracts
subject to existing Federal position limits; (3) amended rules
governing exchange-set limit levels and grants of exemptions therefrom;
(4) an amended process for requesting certain spread exemptions and
non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions for purposes of Federal
position limits directly from the Commission; (5) a new streamlined
process for recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedge positions from
Federal limit requirements; and (6) amendments to part 19 and related
provisions that eliminate certain reporting obligations that require
traders to submit a Form 204 and Parts I and II of Form 304.
Specifically, the Final Rule amends parts 15, 17, 19, 40, and 150
of the Commission's regulations to implement the revised Federal
position limits framework. The Final Rule also transfers an amended
version of the ``bona fide hedging transactions or positions''
definition from existing Sec. 1.3 to final Sec. 150.1, and removes
Sec. Sec. 1.47, 1.48, and 140.97. The Final Rule revises existing
collections of information covered by OMB control number 3038-0009 by
amending part 19,\1648\ along with conforming changes to part 15, in
order to narrow the scope of who is required to report under part
19.\1649\
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\1648\ See supra Section IV.B.2 (discussing the transfer of
information collection under part 19 from OMB control number 3038-
0009 to 3038-0013).
\1649\ As noted above, the Commission accomplishes this by
eliminating existing Form 204 and Parts I and II of Form 304.
Additionally, changes to part 17, covered by OMB control number
3038-0009, make conforming amendments to remove certain duplicative
provisions and associated information collections related to
aggregation of positions, which are in existing Sec. 150.4. These
conforming changes do not impact the burden estimates of OMB control
number 3038-0009.
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Furthermore, the Final Rule's amendments to part 150 revise
existing collections of information covered by OMB control number 3038-
0013, including new reporting and recordkeeping requirements related to
the application and request for relief from Federal position limit
requirements submitted to exchanges. Finally, the Final Rule amends
part 40 to incorporate a new reporting obligation into the definition
of ``terms and conditions'' in Sec. 40.1(j) and results in a revised
existing collection of information covered by OMB control number 3038-
0093.
i. OMB Control Number 3038-0009--Large Trader Reports; Part 19--Reports
by Persons Holding Bona Fide Hedge Positions and by Merchants and
Dealers in Cotton
Under OMB control number 3038-0009, the Commission currently
estimates that the collections of information related to existing part
19, including Form 204 and Form 304, collectively known as the ``series
`04'' reports, have a combined annual burden hours of 1,553 hours.
Under existing part 19, market participants that hold bona fide hedging
positions in excess of position limits for the nine legacy agricultural
contracts subject to existing Federal position limits must file a
monthly report on Form 204 (or Parts I and II of Form 304 for cotton).
These reports show a snapshot of traders' cash
[[Page 3446]]
positions on one given day each month, and are used by the Commission
to determine whether a trader has sufficient cash positions to justify
futures and options on futures positions above the applicable Federal
position limits in existing Sec. 150.2.
The Final Rule amends part 19 to remove these reporting obligations
associated with Form 204 and Parts I and II of Form 304. As discussed
under final Sec. 150.9 below, the Commission has determined to
eliminate these forms because the Commission will still receive
adequate information to carry out its market and financial surveillance
programs since its amendments to Sec. Sec. 150.5 and 150.9 enable the
Commission to obtain the necessary information from the exchanges. To
effect these changes to traders' reporting obligations, the Commission
is eliminating (i) existing Sec. 19.00(a)(1), which requires the
applicable persons to file a Form 204; and (ii) existing Sec. 19.01,
which among other things, sets forth the cash-market information
required to be submitted on Forms 204 and 304.\1650\ The Commission is
maintaining Part III of Form 304, which requests information on
unfixed-price ``on call'' purchases and sales of cotton and which the
Commission utilizes to prepare its weekly cotton on-call report.\1651\
The Commission is also maintaining its existing special call authority
under part 19.
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\1650\ As noted above, the amendments to part 19 affect certain
provisions of part 15 and Sec. 17.00. Based on the elimination of
Form 204 and Parts I and II of Form 304, as discussed above, the
Commission is adopting conforming technical changes to remove
related reporting provisions from (i) the ``reportable position''
definition in Sec. 15.00(p); (ii) the list of ``persons required to
report'' in Sec. 15.01; and (iii) the list of reporting forms in
Sec. 15.02. These conforming amendments to part 15 do not impact
the existing burden estimates.
\1651\ The Commission is adopting a conforming technical change
to Part III of Form 304 to require traders to identify themselves on
the Form 304 using their Public Trader Identification Number, in
lieu of the CFTC Code Number required on previous versions of the
Form 304. However, the Commission has determined that this does not
result in any change to its existing PRA estimates with respect to
the collections of information related to Part III of Form 304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The supporting statement for the current active information
collection request for part 19 under OMB control number 3038-0009
\1652\ states that in 2014: (i) 135 reportable traders filed the series
`04 reports (i.e., Form 204 and Form 304 in the aggregate), (ii)
totaling 3,105 series `04 reports, for a total of (iii) 1,553 burden
hours.\1653\ However, based on more current and recent 2019 submission
data, the Commission has revised its existing estimates slightly higher
for the series `04 reports under part 19:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1652\ See ICR Reference No: 201906-3038-008.
\1653\ 3,105 Series '04 submissions x 0.5 hours per submission =
1,553 aggregate burden hours for all submissions. The Commission
notes that it has estimated that it takes approximately 20 minutes
to complete a Form 204 or 304. However, in order to err
conservatively, the Commission now uses a figure of 30 minutes.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14JA21.014
Accordingly, based on the above revised estimates, the Commission
is revising its estimate of the current collections of information
under existing part 19 to reflect that approximately 105 reportable
traders \1654\ file a total of 3,460 responses annually \1655\
resulting in an aggregate annual burden of 1,730
hours.1656 1657 The Final Rule reduces the current OMB
control number 3038-0009 by these revised burden estimates under part
19 as they will be transferred to OMB control number 3038-0013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1654\ 55 Form 304 reports + 50 Form 204 reports = 105
reportable traders.
\1655\ 2,860 Form 304s + 600 Form 204s = 3,460 total annual
series '04 reports.
\1656\ 3,460 series `04 reports x 0.5 hours per report = 1,730
annual aggregate burden hours.
\1657\ These revised estimates result in an increased estimate
under existing part 19 of 355 series '04 reports submitted by
traders (3,460 estimated series '04 reports-3,105 submissions from
the Commission's previous estimate = an increase of 355 response
difference); an increase of 177 aggregate burden hours across all
respondents (1,730 aggregate burden hours-1,553 aggregate burden
hours from the Commission's previous estimate = an increase of 177
aggregate burden hours); and a decrease of 30 respondent traders
(105 respondents-135 respondents from the Commission's previous
estimate = a decrease of 30 respondents).
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With respect to the overall collections of information transferred
to OMB control number 3038-0013 based on the Commission's revised part
19 estimate, the Commission estimates that the Final Rule reduces the
collections of information in part 19 by 600 reports \1658\ and by 300
annual aggregate burden hours since the Final Rule eliminates Form 204,
as discussed above.\1659\ The Commission does not expect a change in
the number of reportable traders that are required to file Part III of
Form 304.\1660\ Thus, the Commission continues to expect approximately
55 weekly Form 304 reports, for an annual total of 2,860 reports \1661\
for an aggregate total of 1,430 burden hours, which information
collection burdens will be transferred to OMB control number 3038-
0013.\1662\
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\1658\ 50 monthly Form 204 reports x 12 months = 600 total
annual reports.
\1659\ 600 Form 204 reports x 0.5 burden hours per report = 300
aggregate annual burden hours.
\1660\ Since the Final Rule eliminates Parts I and II of Form
304, amended Form 304 only refers to existing Part III of that form.
\1661\ 55 weekly Form 304 reports x 52 weeks = 2,860 total
annual Form 304 reports.
\1662\ 2,860 Form 304 reports x 0.5 burden hours per report =
1,430 aggregate annual burden hours.
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In addition, the Commission is maintaining its authority to issue
special calls for information to any person claiming an exemption from
speculative Federal position limits. While the position limits
framework expands to traders in the 25 core referenced futures contacts
(an increase from the existing nine legacy agricultural products), the
position limit levels themselves are also generally higher. The higher
position limit levels result in a smaller universe of traders who may
exceed the position limits and thus be subject to a special call for
information on their large position(s). Taking into account the higher
limits
[[Page 3447]]
and smaller universe of traders who will likely exceed the position
limits, the Commission estimates that it is likely to issue a special
call for information to four reportable traders. The Commission
estimates that it will take approximately five hours to respond to a
special call. The Commission therefore estimates that industry will
incur a total of 20 aggregate annual burden hours.\1663\
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\1663\ Four possible reportable traders x 5 hours each = 20
aggregate annual burden hours.
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ii. OMB Control Number 3038-0013--Aggregation of Positions (Renaming
``Position Limits'')
a. Introduction; Bona Fide Hedge Recognition and Exemption Process
The Final Rule amends the existing process for market participants
to apply to obtain an exemption or recognition of a bona fide hedge
position. Currently, the ``bona fide hedging transaction or position''
definition appears in existing Sec. 1.3. Under existing Sec. Sec.
1.47 and 1.48, a market participant must apply directly to the
Commission to obtain a bona fide hedge recognition in accordance with
Sec. 1.3 for Federal position limit purposes.
Final Sec. Sec. 150.3 and 150.9 establish an amended process for
obtaining a bona fide hedge exemption or recognition, which includes:
(i) A new bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 150.1, (ii) a new
process administered by the exchanges in final Sec. 150.9 for
recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedging positions for Federal
limit requirements, and (iii) an amended process to apply directly to
the Commission for certain spread exemptions or for recognition of non-
enumerated bona fide hedging positions in final Sec. 150.3. Final
Sec. 150.3 also includes new exemption types not explicitly listed in
existing Sec. 150.3.
The Commission has previously estimated the combined annual burden
hours for submitting applications under both Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48
to be 42 hours.\1664\ The Final Rule largely maintains the existing
process where market participants may apply directly to the Commission,
although the Commission expects market participants to predominantly
rely on the streamlined process to obtain recognition of their non-
enumerated bona fide hedging positions for purposes of Federal position
limit requirements. Enumerated bona fide hedge positions remain self-
effectuating, which means that market participants do not need to apply
to the Commission for purposes of Federal position limits, although
market participants still need to apply to an exchange for recognition
of bona fide hedge positions for purposes of exchange-set position
limits. The Commission expects market participants to rely on the
streamlined exchange process because all the contracts that are now
subject to Federal position limits are already subject to exchange-set
limits. Thus, most market participants are likely to already be
familiar with an exchange-administered process, as adopted under Sec.
150.9. Familiarity with an exchange-administered process will result in
operational efficiencies, such as completing one application for non-
enumerated bona fide hedge requests for both Federal and exchange-set
limits and thus a reduced burden on market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1664\ The supporting statement for a previous information
collection request, ICR Reference No: 201808-3038-003, for OMB
control number 3038-0013, estimated that seven respondents would
file the Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 submissions, and that each
respondent would file two submissions for a total of 14 annual
submissions, requiring 3 hours per response, for a total of 42
burden hours for all respondents.
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As previously discussed, the Final Rule moves the ``bona fide hedge
transaction or position'' definition to final Sec. 150.1. The Final
Rule maintains the distinction between enumerated and non-enumerated
bona fide hedges, and market participants are required to apply for
recognition of non-enumerated bona fide hedge positions either directly
from the Commission pursuant to Sec. 150.3 or through an exchange-
centric process under Sec. 150.9.\1665\ The Commission does not
believe that this amendment has any PRA impacts since it is maintaining
the status quo in which enumerated bona fide hedges are self-
effectuating while requiring traders to apply to the Commission or an
exchange for recognition of non-enumerated bona fide hedge positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1665\ Currently, in order to determine whether a futures or an
option on futures as a bona fide hedge, either (1) the position in
question must qualify as an enumerated bona fide hedge, as defined
in existing Sec. 1.3, or (2) the trader must file a statement with
the Commission, pursuant to existing Sec. 1.47 (for non-enumerated
bona fide hedges) and/or existing Sec. 1.48 (for enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges). The Commission does not expect this
change to have any PRA impacts.
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b. Sec. 150.2 Speculative Limits
Under final Sec. 150.2(f), upon request from the Commission, DCMs
listing a core referenced futures contract are required to supply to
the Commission deliverable supply estimates for each core referenced
futures contract listed at that DCM. DCMs are only required to submit
estimates if requested to do so by the Commission on an as-needed
basis. When submitting estimates, DCMs are required to provide a
description of the methodology used to derive the estimate, as well as
any statistical data supporting the estimate. Appendix C to part 38
sets forth guidance regarding estimating deliverable supply.
Submitting deliverable supply estimates upon demand from the
Commission for contracts subject to Federal position limits is a new
reporting obligation for DCMs. The Commission estimates that six DCMs
will be required to submit initial deliverable supply estimates. The
Commission estimates that it will request each DCM that lists a core
referenced futures contract to file one initial report for each core
reference futures contract it lists on its market. Such requests from
the Commission will result in one initial submission for each of the 25
core referenced futures contracts. The Commission further estimates
that it will take 20 hours to complete and file each report for a total
annual burden of 500 hours for all respondents.\1666\ Accordingly, the
changes to Sec. 150.2(f) result in an initial, one-time increase to
the current burden estimates of OMB control number 3038-0013 of 25
submissions across six respondent DCMs for the initial number of
submissions for the 25 core referenced futures contracts and an
initial, one-time burden of 500 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1666\ 20 initial hours x 25 core referenced futures contracts =
500 one-time, aggregate burden hours. While there is an initial
annual submission, the Commission does not expect to require the
exchanges to resubmit the supply estimates on an annual basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Sec. 150.3 Exemptions From Federal Position Limit Requirements
Market participants may currently apply directly to the Commission
for recognition of certain bona fide hedges under the process set forth
in existing Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48. There is no existing process that
is codified under the Commission's regulations for spread exemptions or
other exemptions included under final Sec. 150.3.
Final Sec. 150.3(a) specifies the circumstances in which a trader
could exceed Federal position limits.\1667\ With respect to non-
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions and spread exemptions not
identified in the proposed ``spread transaction'' definition in Sec.
150.1, final Sec. 150.3(b) provides a process for market participants
to request such non-
[[Page 3448]]
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions or spread exemptions directly
from the Commission (as previously noted, both enumerated bona fide
hedges and spread exemptions identified in the proposed ``spread
transaction'' definition are self-effectuating and do not require a
market participant to submit an exemption request to the Commission).
Final Sec. 150.3(b), (d), and (e) sets forth exemption-related
reporting and recordkeeping requirements that impact the current burden
estimates in OMB control number 3038-0013.\1668\ The collection of
information under final Sec. 150.3(b), (d) and (e) is necessary for
the Commission to determine whether to recognize a trader's position
qualifies for one of the exemptions from Federal position limit
requirements listed in Sec. 150.3(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1667\ Final Sec. 150.3(b) includes (1) recognitions of bona
fide hedges under Sec. 150.3(b); (2) spread exemptions under Sec.
150.3(b); (3) financial distress positions a person could request
from the Commission under Sec. 140.99(a)(1); and (4) exemptions for
certain natural gas positions held during the spot month. Final
Sec. 150.3(b) also exempts pre-enactment and transition period
swaps. The enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions and spread
exemptions identified in the proposed ``spread transaction''
definition in Sec. 150.1 are self-effectuating.
\1668\ Final Sec. 150.3(f) clarifies the implications on
entities required to aggregate accounts under Sec. 150.4, and Sec.
150.3(g) provides for delegation of certain authorities to the
Director of the Division of Market Oversight. The changes to
Sec. Sec. 150.3(f) and 150.3(g) do not impact the current estimates
for these OMB control numbers. Also, the Final Rule reminds persons
of the relief provisions in Sec. 140.99, covered by OMB control
number 3038-0049, which does not impact the burden estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.3(b) establishes application filing requirements
and recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are similar to
existing requirements for bona fide hedge recognitions under existing
Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48. Although these requirements in final Sec.
150.3 are new for market participants seeking spread exemptions (which
are currently self-effectuating), the filing, recordkeeping, and
reporting requirements in Sec. 150.3(b) are otherwise familiar to
market participants that have requested certain bona fide hedging
recognitions from the Commission under existing regulations.
The Commission estimates that very few or no traders will request
recognition of a non-enumerated bona fide hedge, and any traders that
do would likely prefer the streamlined process in final Sec. 150.9
(discussed further below) rather than applying directly to the
Commission under final Sec. 150.3(b). Similarly, the Commission
estimates that very few or no traders will submit a request for a
spread exemption since the Commission has determined that the most
common spread exemptions are included in the ``spread transaction''
definition and therefore are self-effectuating and do not need
Commission approval for purposes of Federal position limits. The
Commission expects that traders are likely to rely on the Sec.
150.3(b) process when dealing with a spread transaction or non-
enumerated bona fide hedge position that poses a novel or complex
question under the Commission's rules. Particularly when the exchanges
have not recognized a particular hedging strategy as a non-enumerated
bona fide hedge previously, the Commission expects market participants
to seek more regulatory clarity under Sec. 150.3(b). In the event a
trader submits such request under Sec. 150.3, the Commission estimates
that traders would file one request per year for a total of one annual
request for all respondents. The Commission further estimates that in
such situation, it would take 20 hours to complete and file each
report, for a total of 20 aggregate annual burden hours for all
traders.
Final Sec. 150.3(d) establishes recordkeeping requirements for
persons who claim any exemptions or relief under Sec. 150.3. Section
150.3(d) should help to ensure that if any person claims any exemption
permitted under Sec. 150.3 such exemption holder can demonstrate
compliance with the applicable requirements as follows:
First, under Sec. 150.3(d)(1), any person claiming an exemption is
required to keep and maintain complete books and records concerning
certain details.\1669\ Section 150.3(d)(1) establishes recordkeeping
requirements for any person relying on an exemption permitted under
final Sec. 150.3(a). Under Sec. 150.3(d), the Commission estimates
that 425 traders will create five records each, per year, for a total
of 2,125 annual records for respondents. The Commission further
estimates that it will take one hour to comply with the recordkeeping
requirement of Sec. 150.3(d)(1) for a total of five aggregate annual
burden hours for each trader.
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\1669\ The requirement includes all details of related cash,
forward, futures, options on futures, and swap positions and
transactions (including anticipated requirements, production,
merchandising activities, royalties, contracts for services, cash
commodity products and by-products, cross-commodity hedges, and
records of bona fide hedging swap counterparties).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, under Sec. 150.3(d)(2), a pass-through swap counterparty,
as defined by Sec. 150.1, that relies on a written representation
received from a bona fide hedging swap counterparty that the swap
qualifies in good faith as a ``bona fide hedging position or
transaction,'' as defined under Sec. 150.1, is required to: (i)
Maintain the relevant books and records of any such written
representation for at least two years following the expiration of the
swap; and (ii) furnish any books and records of such written
representation to the Commission upon request. Section 150.3(d)(2)
creates a new recordkeeping obligation for certain persons relying on
the pass-through swap representations, and the Commission estimates
that 425 traders will be requested to maintain the required records.
The Commission estimates that each trader will maintain at least five
records per year for a total of 2,125 aggregate annual records for all
respondents. The Commission further estimates that it will take one
hour to comply with the recordkeeping requirement of Sec. 150.3(d) for
a total of five annual burden hours for each trader and 2,125 aggregate
annual burden hours for all traders.
The Commission is moving existing Sec. 150.3(b), which currently
allows the Commission or certain Commission staff to make special calls
to demand certain information regarding persons claiming exemptions, to
final Sec. 150.3(e), with some modifications to include swaps.\1670\
Together with the recordkeeping provision of Sec. 150.3(d), Sec.
150.3(e) should enable the Commission to monitor the use of exemptions
from speculative position limits and help to ensure that any person who
claims any exemption permitted by Sec. 150.3 can demonstrate
compliance with the applicable requirements. The Commission's existing
collection under existing Sec. 150.3 estimated that the Commission
issues two special calls per year for information related to
exemptions, and that each response to a special call for information
takes 3 burden hours to complete. This includes two burden hours to
fulfill reporting requirements and one burden hour related to
recordkeeping for an aggregate total for all respondents of six annual
burden hours, broken down into four aggregate annual burden hours for
reporting and two aggregate annual burden hours for
recordkeeping.\1671\
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\1670\ Final Sec. 150.3(e) refers to commodity derivative
contracts, whereas existing Sec. 150.3(b) refers to futures and
options on futures. The change results in the inclusion of swaps.
\1671\ The special call authority under part 19 and the special
call authority discussed under Sec. 150.3 are similar in nature;
however, part 19 applies to special calls regarding bona fide hedge
recognitions and related underlying cash-market positions while the
special calls under Sec. 150.3 applies to the other exemptions
under Sec. 150.3.
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The Commission estimates that Sec. 150.3(e) imposes information
collection burdens related to special calls by the Commission on
approximately 18 additional respondents, for an estimated 20 special
calls per year.\1672\ The Commission
[[Page 3449]]
estimates that these 20 market participants will provide one submission
per year to respond to the special call for a total of 20 annual
submissions for all respondents. The Commission estimates it will take
a market participant approximately 10 hours to complete a response to a
special call. Therefore, the Commission estimates responses to special
calls for information will take an aggregate total of 200 burden hours
for all traders.\1673\ The Commission notes that it is also maintaining
its special call authority for reporting requirements under part 19
discussed above.
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\1672\ 2 respondents subject to special calls under existing
Sec. 150.3 + 18 additional respondents under final Sec. 150.3 = 20
total respondents. The Commission estimates, at least during the
initial implementation period, that it is likely to issue more
special calls for information to monitor compliance with position
limits, particularly in the commodity markets that will now be
subject to Federal position limits for the first time.
\1673\ 20 special calls x 10 burden hours per call = 200 total
burden hours.
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d. Sec. 150.5 Exchange-Set Limits and Exemptions
Amendments to Sec. 150.5 refine the process, and establish non-
exclusive methodologies, by which exchanges may set exchange-level
limits and grant exemptions therefrom, including separate methodologies
for setting limit levels for contracts subject to Federal position
limits (Sec. 150.5(a)) and physical commodity derivatives not subject
to Federal position limits (Sec. 150.5(b)).\1674\ In compliance with
part 40 of the Commission's regulations, exchanges currently have
policies and procedures in place to address exemptions from exchange-
set limits through their rulebooks. The Commission expects that the
exchanges will accordingly update their rulebooks, both to conform to
new requirements and to incorporate the additional contracts that are
subject to Federal position limits for the first time into their
process for setting exchange-level limits and exemptions therefrom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1674\ Final Sec. 150.5 addresses exchange-set position limits
and exemptions therefrom, whereas final Sec. 150.9 addresses
Federal position limits and a streamlined process for purposes of
Federal position limits where an applicant may apply through an
exchange to the Commission for recognition of an non-enumerated bona
fide hedge for purposes of Federal position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The collections of information related to amended rulebooks under
part 40 are covered by OMB control number 3038-0093. Separately, the
collections of information related to applications for exemptions from
exchange-set limits are covered by OMB control number 3038-0013.
Under final Sec. 150.5(a)(1), for any contract subject to a
Federal position limit, DCMs and, ultimately, SEFs, will be required to
establish exchange-set position limits for such contracts. Under final
Sec. 150.5(a)(2), exchanges that wish to grant exemptions from
exchange-set limits on commodity derivative contracts subject to
Federal position limits must require traders to file an application
that shows a request for a bona fide hedge recognition or exemption
conforms to a type that may be granted under final Sec. 150.3(a)(1)-
(4). Exchanges must require that such exchange-set limit exemption
applications be filed in advance of the date such position would be in
excess of the limits, but exchanges have the discretion to adopt rules
allowing traders to file bona fide hedging applications within five
business days after a trader took on such position due to sudden or
unforeseen increases in the trader's bona fide hedging needs. Final
Sec. 150.5(a)(2) also provides that exchanges must require that the
trader reapply for the exemption at least annually. Final Sec.
150.5(a)(4) requires each exchange to provide a monthly report showing
the disposition of any exemption application, including the recognition
of any position as a bona fide hedge, the exemption of any spread
transaction, the renewal, revocation, or modification of a previously
granted recognition or exemption, or the rejection of any
application.\1675\
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\1675\ Additionally, each report should include the following
details: (A) The date of disposition; (B) The effective date of the
disposition; (C) The expiration date of any recognition or
exemption; (D) Any unique identifier(s) the designated contract
market or swap execution facility may assign to track the
application, or the specific type of recognition or exemption; (E)
If the application is for an enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position, the name of the enumerated bona fide
hedging transaction or position listed in Appendix A to this part;
(F) If the application is for a spread transaction listed in the
spread transaction definition in Sec. 150.1, the name of the spread
transaction as it is listed in Sec. 150.1; (G) The identity of the
applicant; (H) The listed commodity derivative contract or
position(s) to which the application pertains; (I) The underlying
cash commodity; (J) The maximum size of the commodity derivative
position that is recognized by the designated contract market or
swap execution facility as a bona fide hedging transaction or
position, specified by contract month and by the type of limit as
spot month, single month, or all-months-combined, as applicable; (K)
Any size limitations or conditions established for a spread
exemption or other exemption; and (L) For a bona fide hedging
transaction or position, a concise summary of the applicant's
activity in the cash markets and swaps markets for the commodity
underlying the commodity derivative position for which the
application was submitted.
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These collections of information related to exemptions from
exchange-set limits are necessary to ensure that such exchange-set
limits comply with Commission regulations, including that exchange
limits are no higher than the applicable Federal level; to establish
minimum standards needed for exchanges to administer the exchange's
position limits framework; and to enable the Commission to oversee an
exchange's exemptions process to ensure it does not undermine the
Federal position limits framework. In addition, the Commission will use
the information to confirm that exemptions are granted and renewed in
accordance with the types of exemptions that may be granted under final
Sec. 150.3(a)(1)-(4).
The Commission estimates under final Sec. 150.5(a) that 425
traders will submit applications to claim spread exemptions and bona
fide hedge recognitions from exchange-set position limits on commodity
derivatives contracts subject to Federal position limits set forth in
Sec. 150.2. The Commission estimates that each trader on average will
submit five applications to an exchange each year for a total of 2,125
applications for all respondents. The Commission further estimates that
it will take two hours to complete and file each application for a
total of 10 annual burden hours for each trader and 4,250 aggregate
burden hours for all traders.\1676\
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\1676\ To increase efficiency and reduce duplicative efforts,
the Final Rule permits an exchange to have a single process in place
that allows market participants to request non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions from both Federal and exchange-set position
limits at the same time. The Commission believes that under a single
process, the estimated burdens under final Sec. 150.5(a) discussed
in this section for exemptions from exchange-set limits includes the
burdens under the Federal limit exemption process for non-enumerated
bona fide hedges under final Sec. 150.9 discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission estimates under final Sec. 150.5(a)(4) that six
exchanges will provide monthly reports for an annual total of 72
monthly reports for all exchanges.\1677\ The Commission further
estimates that it will take five hours to complete and file each
monthly report for a total of 60 annual burden hours for each exchange
and 360 annual burden hours for all exchanges.\1678\
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\1677\ 6 exchanges x 12 months = 72 total monthly reports per
year.
\1678\ 5 hours per monthly report x 12 months = 60 hours per
year for each exchange. 60 annual hours x 6 exchanges = 360
aggregate annual hours for all exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.5(b) requires exchanges, for physical commodity
derivatives that are not subject to Federal position limits, to set
limits during the spot month and to set either limits or accountability
outside of the spot month. Under Sec. 150.5(b)(3), where multiple
exchanges list contracts that are substantially the same, including
physically-settled contracts that have the same underlying commodity
and delivery location, or cash-settled contracts that are directly or
indirectly linked to a physically-settled contract, the exchange must
either adopt ``comparable'' limits for such contracts, or demonstrate
to the Commission how
[[Page 3450]]
the non-comparable levels comply with the standards set forth in Sec.
150.5(b)(1) and (2). Such a determination also must address how the
levels are necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of
market manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the
underlying commodity's price or index. Final Sec. 150.5(b)(3) is
intended to help ensure that position limits established on one
exchange do not jeopardize market integrity or otherwise harm other
markets. This provision may also improve the efficiency with which
exchanges adopt limits on newly-listed contracts that compete with an
existing contract listed on another exchange and help reduce the amount
of time and effort needed for Commission staff to assess the new limit
levels. Further, Sec. 150.5(b)(3) is consistent with the Commission's
determination to generally apply equivalent Federal position limits to
linked contracts, including linked contracts listed on multiple
exchanges.
The Commission estimates that under Sec. 150.5(b)(3), six
exchanges will make submissions to demonstrate to the Commission how
the non-comparable levels comply with the standards set forth in Sec.
150.5(b)(1) and (2). The Commission estimates that each exchange on
average will make three submissions each year for a total of 18
submissions for all exchanges. The Commission further estimates that it
will take 10 hours to complete and file each submission for a total of
18 annual burden hours for each exchange and 180 burden hours for all
exchanges.\1679\
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\1679\ 18 estimated annual submissions x 10 burden hours per
submission = 180 aggregate annual burden hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.5(b)(4) permits exchanges to grant exemptions from
any exchange limit established for physical commodity contracts not
subject to Federal position limits. To grant such exemptions, exchanges
must require traders to file an application to show whether the
requested exemption from exchange-set limits is in accord with sound
commercial practices in the relevant commodity derivative market and/or
that may be established and liquidated in an orderly fashion in that
market. This collection of information is necessary to confirm that any
exemptions granted from exchange limits on physical commodity contracts
not subject to Federal position limits do not pose a threat of market
manipulation or congestion, and maintains orderly execution of
transactions. The Commission estimates that 200 traders will submit one
application each year and that each application will take approximately
two hours to complete, for an aggregate total of 400 burden hours per
year for all traders.
Final Sec. 150.5(e) reflects that, consistent with the definition
of ``rule'' in existing Sec. 40.1, any exchange action establishing or
modifying position limits or exemptions therefrom, or position
accountability, in any case pursuant to Sec. 150.5(a), (b), or (c),
including related guidance in Appendices F or G, to part 150, qualifies
as a ``rule'' and must be submitted to the Commission pursuant to part
40 of the Commission's regulations. Final Sec. 150.5(e) further
provides that exchanges are required to review regularly any position
limit levels established under Sec. 150.5 to ensure the level
continues to comply with the requirements of those sections. The
Commission estimates under Sec. 150.5(e) that six exchanges will
submit revised rulebooks to satisfy their compliance obligations under
part 40. The Commission estimates that each exchange on average will
make one initial revision of its rulebook to reflect the new position
limit framework for a total of six applications for all exchanges. The
Commission further estimates that it will take 30 hours to revise a
rulebook for a total of 30 annual burden hours for each exchange and
180 burden hours for all exchanges.\1680\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1680\ 6 initial applications x 30 burden hours = 180 initial
aggregate burden hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This collection of information is necessary to ensure that the
exchanges' rulebooks reflect the most up-to-date rules and requirements
in compliance with the position limits framework. The information is
used to confirm that exchanges are complying with their requirements to
regularly review any position limit levels established under Sec.
150.5.
e. Sec. 150.9 Exchange Process for Bona Fide Hedge Recognitions From
Federal Position Limits
Final Sec. 150.9 establishes a new streamlined process in which a
trader could apply through an exchange to request a non-enumerated bona
fide hedging recognition for purposes of Federal position limits. As
part of the process, final Sec. 150.9 creates certain recordkeeping
and reporting obligations on the market participant and the exchange,
including: (i) An application to request non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognitions, which the trader submits to the exchange and which the
exchange subsequently provides to the Commission if the exchange
approves the application for purposes of exchange-set limits; (ii) a
notification to the Commission and the applicant of the exchange's
determination for purposes of exchange limits regarding the trader's
request for recognition of a bona fide hedge or spread exemption; (iii)
and a requirement to maintain full, complete and systematic records for
Commission review of the exchange's decisions. The Commission believes
that the exchanges that will elect to process applications for non-
enumerated bona fide hedging exemptions under Sec. 150.9(a) already
have similar processes for the review and disposition of such exemption
applications in place through their rulebooks for purposes of exchange-
set position limits.
Accordingly, the estimated burden on an exchange to comply with
final Sec. 150.9 will be less burdensome because the exchanges may
leverage their existing policies and procedures to comply with the
Final Rule. The Commission estimates that six exchanges will elect to
process applications for non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions
that satisfy the Federal position limit requirements under final Sec.
150.9, and will be required to file amended rulebooks pursuant to part
40 of the Commission's regulations. The Commission bases its estimate
on the number of exchanges that have submitted similar rules to the
Commission in the past.
Final Sec. 150.9(c) requires a trader to submit an application
with certain information to enable the exchange to determine whether it
should recognize a position as a bona fide hedge for purposes of
exchange-set position limits. Each applicant will need to reapply to
the exchange for its non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition at
least on an annual basis by updating its original application. The
Commission expects that traders will benefit from the streamlined
framework established under final Sec. 150.9 because traders may
submit one application to obtain a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition for purposes of both exchange-set and Federal position
limits, as opposed to submitting separate applications to the
Commission for Federal position limit purposes and separate
applications to an exchange for exchange limit purposes.\1681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1681\ The Commission believes the collections of information
set forth above are necessary for the exchange to process requests
for recognition of non-enumerated bona fide hedges for purposes of
exchange-set position limits, and separately, if applicable, for the
Commission to make its determination for purposes of Federal
position limits. The information is used by the exchange to
determine, and the Commission to review and determine, whether the
facts and circumstances demonstrate it is appropriate to recognize a
position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedging transaction or
position.
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[[Page 3451]]
Accordingly, the estimated burden for traders requesting non-
enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions from exchange-set limits under
Sec. 150.5(a) will subsume the burden estimates in connection with
final Sec. 150.9 for requesting non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition's from Federal position limits since the Commission
believes exchanges will combine the two processes (i.e., any trader who
applies through an exchange under final Sec. 150.9 for a non-
enumerated bona fide hedge for Federal position limits purposes also
will be deemed to be applying at the same time under final Sec.
150.5(a) for exchange position limits purposes and thus it would not be
appropriate to distinguish between the two for PRA purposes).
Accordingly, the Commission anticipates that six exchanges each will
receive only one application for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge
recognition under final Sec. 150.9 for a total of six aggregate annual
applications for all exchanges; however, as noted above, this amount is
included in the Commission's estimate in connection with final Sec.
150.5(a).\1682\ Specifically, as discussed above in connection with
final Sec. 150.5(a), the Commission estimates under final Sec. Sec.
150.5(a) and 150.9(a) that 425 traders will submit applications to
claim exemptions and/or bona fide hedge recognitions for contracts
subject to Federal position limits as set forth in Sec. 150.2.\1683\
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\1682\ As discussed above, the process and estimated burdens
under final Sec. 150.9 do not apply to Sec. 150.5(b) because final
Sec. 150.5(b) applies to those physical commodity contracts that
are not subject to Federal position limits (as opposed to final
Sec. 150.5(a), which applies to those contracts subject to Federal
position limits). As a result, a trader that would use the process
established under Sec. 150.5(b) for exchange-set limits will not
need to apply under final Sec. 150.9 since the traders would not
need a bona fide hedge recognition or an exemption from Federal
position limits.
\1683\ As discussed in connection with final Sec. 150.5(a)
above, the Commission estimates that each trader on average will
make five applications each year for a total of 2,125 applications
across all exchanges. The Commission further estimates that, for
final Sec. Sec. 150.5(a) and 150.9(a), taken together, it will take
two hours to complete and file each application for a total of 10
annual burden hours for each trader and 4,250 aggregate annual
burden hours for all traders (2,125 total annual applications x two
burden hours per application = 4,250 aggregate annual burden hours).
The Commission anticipates that compared to final Sec. 150.5(a),
fewer traders will apply under final Sec. 150.9 since final Sec.
150.9 applies only to non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognitions
for Federal purposes. In comparison, while final Sec. 150.5
encompasses these same applications for non-enumerated bona fide
hedge recognitions (but for the purpose of exchange-set limits),
final Sec. 150.5(a) also includes enumerated bona fide hedge
applications along with spread exemption requests. The Commission's
estimate of 4,250 aggregate annual burden hours encompasses all such
requests from all traders. However, for the sake of clarity, the
Commission anticipates that six exchanges each will receive one
application per year for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge under
final Sec. 150.9 (for a total of six applications across all
exchanges); as noted, this burden is included in the Commission's
estimate of 425 respondents in connection with its estimate under
final Sec. 150.5(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.9(d) requires exchanges to keep full, complete, and
systematic records, including all pertinent data and memoranda, of all
activities relating to the processing of such applications and the
disposition thereof. In addition, as provided for in final Sec.
150.9(g) and existing Sec. 1.31, the Commission may, in its
discretion, at any time, review the exchange's records retained
pursuant to final Sec. 150.9(d) or request additional information
pursuant to Sec. 150.9(e)(5). The recordkeeping requirement is
necessary for the Commission to review the exchanges' processes,
retention of records, and compliance with requirements established and
implemented under this section.
Final Sec. 150.9(d) creates a new recordkeeping obligation
consistent with the standards in existing Sec. 1.31.\1684\ The
Commission estimates that six exchanges will each create one record in
connection with final Sec. 150.9 each year for a total of six annual
records for all respondents. The Commission further estimates that it
will take five hours to comply with the recordkeeping requirement of
Sec. 150.9(d) for a total of five annual burden hours for each
exchange and 30 aggregate annual burden hours across all exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1684\ Consistent with existing Sec. 1.31, the Commission
expects that these records will be readily available during the
first two years of the required five-year recordkeeping period for
paper records, and readily accessible for the entire five-year
recordkeeping period for electronic records. In addition, the
Commission expects that records required to be maintained by an
exchange pursuant to this section will be readily accessible during
the pendency of any application, and for two years following any
disposition that did not recognize a derivative position as a bona
fide hedge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Sec. 150.9(d) allows the Commission to inspect such books
and records.\1685\ In the event the Commission exercises its authority
to inspect such books and records, it estimates that the Commission
will conduct an inspection of two exchanges per year and each exchange
will incur four hours to make its books and records available to the
Commission for review for a total of eight aggregate annual burden
hours for the two estimated respondent exchanges.\1686\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1685\ Final Sec. 150.9(d)(1) requires the exchange to keep
full, complete, and systematic records, which include all pertinent
data and memoranda, of all activities relating to the processing of
such applications and the disposition thereof. This requirement
working in concert with Sec. 1.31 allows the Commission to inspect
any such records. Separately, under Sec. 150.9(e)(5), if the
Commission determines additional information is required to conduct
its review, then it would notify the exchange and the relevant
market participant of any issues identified and provide them with an
opportunity to provide supplemental information.
\1686\ 2 exchanges per year subject to a Commission inspection x
4 hours per inspection request = 8 aggregate annual burden hours for
all exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under final Sec. 150.9(e), an exchange needs to provide an
applicant and the Commission with notice of any approved application of
an exchange's determination to recognize bona fide hedges with respect
to its own position limits for purposes of exceeding the Federal
position limits. The notification requirement is necessary to inform
the Commission of the details of the type of bona fide hedge
recognitions being granted. The information is used to keep the
Commission informed as to the manner in which an exchange administers
its application procedures, and the exchange's rationale for permitting
large positions.
The Commission estimates that under final Sec. 150.9(e), six
exchanges will submit notifications of approved application of an
exchange's determination to recognize non-enumerated bona fide hedges
for purposes of exceeding the Federal position limits. The Commission
estimates that each exchange on average will make two notifications:
One notification each to the applicant trader and to the Commission
each year for a total of 12 notices for all exchanges. The Commission
further estimates that it will take 0.5 hours to complete and file each
notification for a total of one annual burden hour for each exchange
and six burden hours for all exchanges.\1687\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1687\ Twelve notices for all exchanges x 0.5 hours per notice =
six total burden hours across all exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to submitting a copy of any exchange-approved non-
enumerated bona fide hedge application to the Commission under Sec.
150.9(e), the preamble clarifies that an exchange may, on a voluntary
basis, send the Commission an advance courtesy copy of the non-
enumerated bona fide hedge application when the exchange first receives
it from the applicant. Although this advance courtesy copy would be a
voluntary submission, it is still considered a new information
collection under the PRA. However, the Commission believes there is no
corresponding burden for this filing because the Commission considers
this practice to be in the ordinary course of business as it is usual
and customary for exchanges to provide the Commission with advance
copies of various filings under other Commission
[[Page 3452]]
regulations.\1688\ In the event that this practice is not considered
usual and customary, the Commission estimates that the burden of such
filing will be de minimis and take less than five minutes for an
exchange to send an application to the Commission, if the exchange
elects to do so (less than 30 total minutes in the aggregate across all
exchanges: 6 exchanges x 1 advance copy x less than 5 minutes = less
than 30 minutes).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1688\ For example, exchanges have frequently submitted advance
courtesy copies of new rule filings and product filings to the
Commission under the part 40 regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. OMB Control Number 3038-0093--Provisions Common to Registered
Entities
a. Sec. 150.9(a)
Under final Sec. 150.9(a), exchanges that would like for their
market participants to be able to exceed Federal position limits based
on a non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition granted by the exchange
with respect to its own limits must maintain rules that establish
processes consistent with the provisions of final Sec. 150.9 and must
seek approval of such rules from the Commission pursuant to Sec. 40.5
of the Commission's regulations. The collection of information is
necessary to capture the new non-enumerated bona fide hedge process in
the exchanges' rulebook, which is subject to Commission approval. The
information is used to assess the process put in place by each exchange
submitting amended rulebooks.
The Commission has previously estimated the combined annual burden
hours for both Sec. Sec. 40.5 and 40.6 to be 7,000 hours.\1689\ Upon
implementation of final Sec. 150.9, the Commission estimates that six
exchanges will each make one initial Sec. 40.5 rule filing per year
for a total of six one-time initial submissions for all exchanges. The
Commission further estimates that the exchanges will employ a
combination of in-house and outside legal and compliance counsel to
update existing rulebooks and it will take 25 hours to complete and
file each rule for a total 25 one-time burden hours for each exchange
and 150 one-time burden hours for all exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1689\ The supporting statement for the current active
information collection request, ICR Reference No: 201503-3038-002,
for OMB control number 3038-0013, estimated that seven respondents
would file the Sec. Sec. 1.47 and 1.48 reports, and that each
respondent would file two reports for a total of 14 annual
responses, requiring three hours per response, for a total of 42
burden hours for all respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires that agencies
consider whether the rules they propose will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and, if so,
provide a regulatory flexibility analysis respecting the impact.\1690\
A regulatory flexibility analysis or certification typically is
required for ``any rule for which the agency publishes a general notice
of proposed rulemaking pursuant to'' the notice-and-comment provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(b).\1691\ The
requirements related to the Final Rule fall mainly on registered
entities, exchanges, FCMs, swap dealers, clearing members, foreign
brokers, and large traders. The Commission has previously determined
that registered DCMs, FCMs, swap dealers, major swap participants,
eligible contract participants, SEFs, clearing members, foreign brokers
and large traders are not small entities for purposes of the RFA.\1692\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1690\ 44 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\1684\ 5 U.S.C. 601(2), 603-05.
\1692\ See Policy Statement and Establishment of Definitions of
``Small Entities'' for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
47 FR 18618-19, (Apr. 30, 1982) (DCMs, FCMs, and large traders)
(``RFA Small Entities Definitions''); Opting Out of Segregation, 66
FR 20740-20743, (Apr. 25, 2001) (eligible contract participants);
Position Limits for Futures and Swaps; Final Rule and Interim Final
Rule, 76 FR 71626, 71680, (Nov. 18, 2011) (clearing members); Core
Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78
FR 33476, 33548, (Jun. 4, 2013) (SEFs); A New Regulatory Framework
for Clearing Organizations, 66 FR 45604, 45609, (Aug. 29, 2001)
(DCOs); Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77
FR 2613, Jan. 19, 2012, (swap dealers and major swap participants);
and Special Calls, 72 FR 50209, (Aug. 31, 2007) (foreign brokers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, while the requirements under this rulemaking may impact
nonfinancial end users, the Commission notes that position limits
levels apply only to large traders. Accordingly, the Chairman, on
behalf of the Commission, hereby certifies, on behalf of the
Commission, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the actions taken herein
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. The Chairman made the same certification in the 2013
Proposal,\1693\ the 2016 Supplemental Proposal,\1694\ the 2016
Reproposal,\1695\ and the 2020 NPRM.\1696\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1693\ See 2013 Proposal, 78 FR at 75784.
\1694\ See 2016 Supplemental Proposal, 81 FR at 38499.
\1695\ See 2016 Reproposal, 81 FR at 96894.
\1696\ See 2020 NPRM, 85 FR at 11708.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Antitrust Considerations
Section 15(b) of the CEA requires the Commission to take into
consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws
and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achieving the
purposes of the CEA, in issuing any order or adopting any Commission
rule or regulation.\1697\ The Commission believes that the public
interest to be protected by the antitrust laws is generally to protect
competition. In the Proposal, the Commission requested comments on
whether: (1) The proposed rules could be anticompetitive; (2) there are
other less anticompetitive means of deterring and preventing price
manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity; and (3)
requiring DCOs to impose initial margin surcharges in lieu of imposing
position limits is feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1697\ 7 U.S.C. 19(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission does not anticipate that the position limits regime
that it is adopting today will result in anticompetitive behavior. To
the contrary, the Commission believes that the relatively high position
limit levels (coupled with the numerous exemptions from position limits
adopted as part of this rulemaking) do not establish any barriers to
entry or competitive restraints. As noted above, the Commission
encouraged comments from the public on any aspect of the rulemaking
that may have the potential to be inconsistent with the antitrust laws
or be anticompetitive in nature. The Commission received two (2)
comments asserting that the proposed rule may be anticompetitive.
ICE commented that it has concerns regarding the potential
anticompetitive aspects of the Commission's approach to aggregation of
contracts across all exchanges rather than on a per exchange
basis.\1698\ In particular, ICE asserted that the aggregation of
referenced contracts across all exchanges by the Commission fails to
comply with the requirements of Section 15(b) of the CEA that requires
the Commission take into consideration the public interest to be
protected by the antitrust laws and endeavor to take the least
anticompetitive means of achieving the purposes of the CEA.\1699\ ICE
noted that an aggregated Federal position limit, across all exchanges,
may make it very difficult for an exchange to launch a new contract or
that would be aggregated with an existing contract for position limit
purposes. In addition, ICE also indicated that launching a new exchange
may even be more difficult given the aggregate approach to position
limits across exchanges. The underlying
[[Page 3453]]
basis for ICE's assertion is that aggregation may potentially reduce
the ability of a new exchange or new contract to attract enough
liquidity to become sustainable. ICE argued that a more flexible
approach to aggregation of positions that allows each exchange to
develop its own liquidity (and establish its own limits), even for
similar or look-alike contracts, would better advance the goals of
developing robust and liquid markets while providing adequate means to
protect against excessive speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1698\ ICE at 12.
\1699\ ICE believes that this is particularly true for cash-
settled contracts and for other contracts outside of the delivery
month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, FIA commented that the Commission's aggregation of
position limits across exchanges in connection with financially-settled
reference contracts ``will reduce innovation and competition between
exchanges because any new proposed financially-settled referenced
futures contracts will have to share the same liquidity pool with
existing financially-settled referenced futures contracts, including
economically-equivalent swaps.'' \1700\ Instead, FIA argued that
position limits should be established per designated contract spot
month limits for financially-settled referenced contracts and a
separate spot month limit should be established for economically-
equivalent swaps in order to enhance competition, innovation and
liquidity for bona fide hedgers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1700\ FIA at p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an initial legal matter, the Commission interprets CEA section
4a(a)(6) to generally require aggregated Federal position limits across
exchanges. CEA section 4a(a)(6) requires the Commission to ``establish
limits . . . on the aggregate number or amount of positions . . .
across--(A) contracts listed by designated contract markets . . . .''
Accordingly, even if the Commission were to grant ICE's claim in
arguendo of possible anti-competitive affects, the requirement in CEA
section 4a(a)(6) that Federal position limits should apply in the
aggregate across exchanges is dispositive for the Commission's approach
under the Final Rule.\1701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1701\ As discussed in the preamble to this release, however,
the Commission is making an exception under its exemptive authority
for position limits in CEA section 4a(a)(7) for the NYMEX NG
referenced contracts, which will be subject to a per-exchange
position limit level, based on the unique liquidity characteristics
of the natural gas markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated above in Section II.B.10 of the preamble, the Commission
disagrees with comments by ICE and FIA asserting that generally the
aggregation of cash-settled positions across exchanges would impair
competition and provide a barrier to financial innovation. Both
commenters essentially advocate for a disaggregated Federal position
limit that applies on a per-exchange basis based on the notion that
this will promote and attract greater liquidity to the markets
regardless of the potential for manipulation and/or market disruption.
In contrast to these commenters' concerns, the Commission submits that
in general an aggregate position limit framework across exchanges
should promote, not prohibit, competition and therefore enhance
liquidity formation.\1702\ The ability to apply the Federal position
limits framework on a disaggregated basis would also significantly
increase position limits so that the potential risk of excessive
speculation and manipulation would become a much greater concern to the
Commission based on the ability of market participants to hold larger
positions in the aggregate across exchanges. Therefore, under the
approach supported by ICE and FIA, the Commission would be required to
re-adjust Federal position limits to a much lower level, potentially
impacting liquidity and future financial innovation. The Commission
also asserts that the application of the Federal position limit levels
across exchanges promotes innovation and competition in the marketplace
because the full aggregate position limit level is available for market
participants regardless of the particular trading venue/exchange,
which, by definition, promotes greater competition and significant
price discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1702\ The Commission believes that permitting Federal position
limits to apply on a disaggregated, per-exchange basis also has the
potential to further divide liquidity among several liquidity pools,
which could make accessing liquidity for bona fide hedgers more
difficult and reduce price discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted in the 2020 NPRM and the preamble of this adopting
release,\1703\ the Commission is aware that exchanges may also have
conflicting and competing interests in connection with the adoption of
exchange position limits and accountability levels. Additionally, the
final rules with respect to exchange-set position limits require any
new commodity derivative contract to establish limits at a
``comparable'' level to existing contracts that are substantially
similar (i.e., ``look-alike contracts'') on other exchanges unless the
exchange listing the new contract demonstrates to the satisfaction of
Commission staff, in its product filing with the Commission, how its
levels comply with the requirements of Sec. 150.5(b)(1) and (2). This
requirement could potentially provide competitive advantages to the
``first mover'' exchange since such exchange could effectively
establish the position limit for all other exchanges that seek to list
and trade substantially similar contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1703\ See 85 FR 11596, 11677 at fn. 576; see also Section II.G.
(discussing the Sec. 150.9 process and the role of the exchanges)
and Section II.B.2 (discussing the role of exchanges in connection
with non-spot month limits under Sec. 150.2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Commission acknowledges these competitive concerns,
the Commission believes that these concerns are mitigated because (i)
an exchange is required to submit any proposed position limits to the
Commission under part 40 of the Commission's regulations and (ii) an
exchange is required pursuant to Sec. 150.5(b) to set limits that are
necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or the underlying
commodity's price or index. In addition, for those commodity derivative
contracts that are subject to a Federal speculative position limit
under Sec. 150.2, the limit set by the exchange can be no higher than
Federal speculative position limit specified in Sec. 150.2. The
Commission believes that exchanges have significant incentives to
maintain well-functioning markets to remain competitive with other
exchanges. Market participants may choose exchanges that are less
susceptible to sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted
changes caused by excessive speculation or corners, squeezes, and
manipulation, which could, among other things, harm the price discovery
function of the commodity derivative contracts and negatively impact
the delivery of the underlying commodity, bona fide hedging strategies,
and market participants' general risk management.\1704\ Furthermore,
several academic studies, including one concerning futures exchanges
and another concerning demutualized stock exchanges, support the
conclusion that exchanges are able to both satisfy shareholder
interests and meet their self-regulatory organization
responsibilities.\1705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1704\ Kane, Stephen, Exploring price impact liquidity for
December 2016 NYMEX energy contracts, n.33, available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_priceimpact.pdf.
\1705\ See David Reiffen and Michel A. Robe, Demutualization and
Customer Protection at Self-Regulatory Financial Exchanges, Journal
of Futures Markets, Vol. 31, 126-164, Feb. 2011 (in many
circumstances, an exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather than
member) income has a greater incentive to aggressively enforce
regulations that protect participants from dishonest agents); and
Kobana Abukari and Isaac Otchere, Has Stock Exchange Demutualization
Improved Market Quality? International Evidence, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Dec 09, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-019-00863-y (demutualized exchanges have realized
significant reductions in transaction costs in the post-
demutualization period).
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[[Page 3454]]
The Commission has determined that the position limit rules adopted
today serve the regulatory purpose of the CEA ``to deter and prevent
price manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity.''
\1706\ In addition, the Commission notes that the adopted position
limit rules implement additional purposes and policies set forth in
section 4a(a) of the CEA.\1707\ The Commission has considered the
rulemaking and related comments to determine whether it is
anticompetitive, and continues to believe that the position limits
rulemaking will not result in any unreasonable restraint of trade or
impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading in the markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1706\ Section 3(b) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
\1707\ 7 U.S.C. 7a(a) (burdens on interstate commerce; trading
or position limits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Regulatory Text and Related Appendices
List of Subjects
17 CFR Part 1
Agricultural commodity, Agriculture, Brokers, Committees, Commodity
futures, Conflicts of interest, Consumer protection, Definitions,
Designated contract markets, Directors, Major swap participants,
Minimum financial requirements for intermediaries, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Swap dealers, Swaps.
17 CFR Part 15
Brokers, Commodity futures, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swaps.
17 CFR Part 17
Brokers, Commodity futures, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swaps.
17 CFR Part 19
Commodity futures, Cottons, Grains, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Swaps.
17 CFR Part 40
Commodity futures, Procedural rules, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
17 CFR Part 140
Authority delegations (Government agencies), Conflict of interests,
Organizations and functions (Government agencies).
17 CFR Part 150
Bona fide hedging, Commodity futures, Cotton, Grains, Position
limits, Referenced Contracts, Swaps.
17 CFR Part 151
Bona fide hedging, Commodity futures, Cotton, Grains, Position
limits, Referenced Contracts, Swaps.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR chapter I as follows:
PART 1--GENERAL REGULATIONS UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
0
1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 6e, 6f, 6g,
6h, 6i, 6k, 6l, 6m, 6n, 6o, 6p, 6r, 6s, 7, 7a-1, 7a-2, 7b, 7b-3, 8,
9, 10a, 12, 12a, 12c, 13a, 13a-1, 16, 16a, 19, 21, 23, and 24
(2012).
Sec. 1.3 [Amended]
0
2. In Sec. 1.3, remove the definition of the term ``bona fide hedging
transactions and positions for excluded commodities''.
PART 15--REPORTS--GENERAL PROVISIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 15 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2, 5, 6a, 6c, 6f, 6g, 6i, 6k, 6m, 6n, 7,
7a, 9, 12a, 19, and 21, as amended by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
0
4. In Sec. 15.00, revise paragraph (p)(1) to read as follows:
Sec. 15.00 Definitions of terms used in parts 15 to 19, and 21 of
this chapter.
* * * * *
(p) * * *
(1) For reports specified in parts 17 and 18 and in Sec. 19.00(a)
and (b) of this chapter, any open contract position that at the close
of the market on any business day equals or exceeds the quantity
specified in Sec. 15.03 in either:
(i) Any one futures of any commodity on any one reporting market,
excluding futures contracts against which notices of delivery have been
stopped by a trader or issued by the clearing organization of the
reporting market; or
(ii) Long or short put or call options that exercise into the same
futures contract of any commodity, or other long or short put or call
commodity options that have identical expirations and exercise into the
same commodity, on any one reporting market.
* * * * *
0
5. In Sec. 15.01, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 15.01 Persons required to report.
* * * * *
(d) Persons, as specified in part 19 of this chapter, who:
(1) Are merchants or dealers of cotton holding or controlling
positions for future delivery in cotton that equal or exceed the amount
set forth in Sec. 15.03; or
(2) Are persons who have received a special call from the
Commission or its designee under Sec. 19.00(b) of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
6. Revise Sec. 15.02 to read as follows:
Sec. 15.02 Reporting forms.
Forms on which to report may be obtained from any office of the
Commission or via https://www.cftc.gov. Listed below are the forms to
be used for the filing of reports. To determine who shall file these
forms, refer to the Commission rule listed in the column opposite the
form number.
[[Page 3455]]
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PART 17--REPORTS BY REPORTING MARKETS, FUTURES COMMISSION
MERCHANTS, CLEARING MEMBERS, AND FOREIGN BROKERS
0
7. The authority citation for part 17 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2, 6a, 6c, 6d, 6f, 6g, 6i, 6t, 7, 7a, and
12a.
0
8. In Sec. 17.00, revise paragraph (b) introductory text to read as
follows:
Sec. 17.00 Information to be furnished by futures commission
merchants, clearing members and foreign brokers.
* * * * *
(b) Interest in or control of several accounts. Except as otherwise
instructed by the Commission or its designee and as specifically
provided in Sec. 150.4 of this chapter, if any person holds or has a
financial interest in or controls more than one account, all such
accounts shall be considered by the futures commission merchant,
clearing member, or foreign broker as a single account for the purpose
of determining special account status and for reporting purposes.
* * * * *
0
9. In Sec. 17.03, add paragraph (i) to read as follows:
Sec. 17.03 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Office of
Data and Technology or the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight.
* * * * *
(i) Pursuant to Sec. 17.00(b), and as specifically provided in
Sec. 150.4 of this chapter, the authority shall be designated to the
Director of the Office of Data and Technology to instruct a futures
commission merchant, clearing member, or foreign broker to consider
otherwise than as a single account for the purpose of determining
special account status and for reporting purposes all accounts one
person holds or controls, or in which the person has a financial
interest.
0
10. Revise part 19 to read as follows:
PART 19--REPORTS BY PERSONS HOLDING REPORTABLE POSITIONS IN EXCESS
OF POSITION LIMITS, AND BY MERCHANTS AND DEALERS IN COTTON
Sec.
19.00 Who shall furnish information.
19.01 [Reserved]
19.02 Reports pertaining to cotton on call purchases and sales.
19.03 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of
Enforcement.
19.04-19.10 [Reserved]
Appendix A to Part 19--Form 304
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 6g, 6c(b), 6i, and 12a(5).
Sec. 19.00 Who shall furnish information.
(a) Persons filing cotton-on-call reports. Merchants and dealers of
cotton holding or controlling positions for future delivery in cotton
that are reportable pursuant to Sec. 15.00(p)(1)(i) of this chapter
shall file CFTC Form 304.
(b) Persons responding to a special call. All persons: Exceeding
speculative position limits under Sec. 150.2 of this chapter; or
holding or controlling positions for future delivery that are
reportable pursuant to Sec. 15.00(p)(1) of this chapter and who have
received a special call from the Commission or its designee shall file
any pertinent information as instructed in the special call. Filings in
response to a special call shall be made within one business day of
receipt of the special call unless otherwise specified in the call.
Such filing shall be transmitted using the format, coding structure,
and electronic data submission procedures approved in writing by the
Commission.
Sec. 19.01 [Reserved]
Sec. 19.02 Reports pertaining to cotton on call purchases and sales.
(a) Information required. Persons required to file CFTC Form 304
reports under Sec. 19.00(a) shall file CFTC Form 304 reports showing
the quantity of call cotton bought or sold on which the price has not
been fixed, together with the respective futures on which the purchase
or sale is based. As used herein, call cotton refers to spot cotton
bought or sold, or contracted for purchase or sale at a price to be
fixed later based upon a specified future.
(b) Time and place of filing reports. Each CFTC Form 304 report
shall be made weekly, dated as of the close of business on Friday, and
filed not later than 9 a.m. Eastern Time on the third business day
following that Friday using the format, coding structure, and
electronic data transmission procedures approved in writing by the
Commission.
[[Page 3456]]
Sec. 19.03 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division
of Enforcement.
(a) The Commission hereby delegates, until it orders otherwise, the
authority in Sec. 19.00(b) to issue special calls to the Director of
the Division of Enforcement, or such other employee or employees as the
Director may designate from time to time.
(b) The Commission hereby delegates, until it orders otherwise, to
the Director of the Division of Enforcement, or such other employee or
employees as the Director may designate from time to time, the
authority in Sec. 19.00(b) to provide instructions or to determine the
format, coding structure, and electronic data transmission procedures
for submitting data records and any other information required under
this part.
(c) The Director of the Division of Enforcement may submit to the
Commission for its consideration any matter which has been delegated in
this section.
(d) Nothing in this section prohibits the Commission, at its
election, from exercising the authority delegated in this section.
Sec. Sec. 19.04--19.10 [Reserved]
Appendix A to Part 19--Form 304
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
PART 40--PROVISIONS COMMON TO REGISTERED ENTITIES
0
11. The authority citation for part 40 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 7, 7a, 8 and 12, as amended by
Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Public Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
0
12. In Sec. 40.1, revise paragraphs (j)(1)(vii) and (j)(2)(vii) to
read as follows:
Sec. 40.1 Definitions.
* * * * *
(j) * * *
(1) * * *
(vii) Speculative position limits, position accountability
standards, and position reporting requirements, including an indication
as to whether the contract meets the definition of a referenced
contract as defined in Sec. 150.1 of this chapter, and, if so, the
name of either the core referenced futures contract or other referenced
contract upon which the new referenced contract submitted under this
part 40 is based.
* * * * *
(2) * * *
(vii) Speculative position limits, position accountability
standards, and position reporting requirements, including an indication
as to whether the contract meets the definition of economically
equivalent swap as defined in Sec. 150.1 of this chapter, and, if so,
the name of either the core referenced futures contract or referenced
contract, as applicable, to which the swap submitted under this part 40
is economically equivalent.
* * * * *
PART 140--ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE COMMISSION
0
13. The authority citation for part 140 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2(a) (12), 12a, 13(c), 13(d), 13(e), and
16(b).
Sec. 140.97 [Removed and Reserved]
0
14. Remove and reserve Sec. 140.97.
PART 150--LIMITS ON POSITIONS
0
15. The authority citation for part 150 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6a, 6c, 6f, 6g, 6t, 12a, and
19, as amended by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
0
16. Revise Sec. 150.1 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.1 Definitions.
As used in this part--
Bona fide hedging transaction or position means a transaction or
position in commodity derivative contracts in a physical commodity,
where:
(1) Such transaction or position:
(i) Represents a substitute for transactions made or to be made, or
positions taken or to be taken, at a later time in a physical marketing
channel;
(ii) Is economically appropriate to the reduction of price risks in
the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise; and
(iii) Arises from the potential change in the value of--
(A) Assets which a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes,
or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing,
processing, or merchandising;
(B) Liabilities which a person owes or anticipates incurring; or
(C) Services that a person provides or purchases, or anticipates
providing or purchasing; or
(2) Such transaction or position qualifies as a:
(i) Pass-through swap and pass-through swap offset pair. Paired
positions of a pass-through swap and a pass-through swap offset, where:
(A) The pass-through swap is a swap position entered into by one
person for which the swap would qualify as a bona fide hedging
transaction or position pursuant to paragraph (1) of this definition
(the bona fide hedging swap counterparty) that is opposite another
person (the pass-through swap counterparty);
(B) The pass-through swap offset:
[[Page 3464]]
(1) Is a futures contract position, option on a futures contract
position, or swap position entered into by the pass-through swap
counterparty; and
(2) Reduces the pass-through swap counterparty's price risks
attendant to the pass-through swap; and
(C) With respect to the pass-through swap offset, the pass-through
swap counterparty receives from the bona fide hedging swap counterparty
a written representation that the pass-through swap qualifies as a bona
fide hedging transaction or position pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
definition, and the pass-through swap counterparty may rely in good
faith on such written representation, unless the pass-through swap
counterparty has information that would cause a reasonable person to
question the accuracy of the representation; or
(ii) Offset of a bona fide hedger's qualifying swap position. A
futures contract position, option on a futures contract position, or
swap position entered into by a bona fide hedging swap counterparty
that reduces price risks attendant to a previously-entered-into swap
position that qualified as a bona fide hedging transaction or position
at the time it was entered into for that counterparty pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this definition.
Commodity derivative contract means any futures contract, option on
a futures contract, or swap in a commodity (other than a security
futures product as defined in section 1a(45) of the Act).
Core referenced futures contract means a futures contract that is
listed in Sec. 150.2(d).
Economically equivalent swap means, with respect to a particular
referenced contract, any swap that has identical material contractual
specifications, terms, and conditions to such referenced contract.
(1) Other than as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, for
the purpose of determining whether a swap is an economically equivalent
swap with respect to a particular referenced contract, the swap shall
not be deemed to lack identical material contractual specifications,
terms, and conditions due to different lot size specifications or
notional amounts, delivery dates diverging by less than one calendar
day, or different post-trade risk management arrangements.
(2) With respect to any natural gas referenced contract, for the
purpose of determining whether a swap is an economically equivalent
swap to such referenced contract, the swap shall not be deemed to lack
identical material contractual specifications, terms, and conditions
due to different lot size specifications or notional amounts, delivery
dates diverging by less than two calendar days, or different post-trade
risk management arrangements.
(3) With respect to any referenced contract or class of referenced
contracts, the Commission may make a determination that any swap or
class of swaps satisfies, or does not satisfy, this economically
equivalent swap definition.
Eligible affiliate means an entity with respect to which another
person:
(1) Directly or indirectly holds either:
(i) A majority of the equity securities of such entity, or
(ii) The right to receive upon dissolution of, or the contribution
of, a majority of the capital of such entity;
(2) Reports its financial statements on a consolidated basis under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or International Financial
Reporting Standards, and such consolidated financial statements include
the financial results of such entity; and
(3) Is required to aggregate the positions of such entity under
Sec. 150.4 and does not claim an exemption from aggregation for such
entity.
Eligible entity means a commodity pool operator; the operator of a
trading vehicle which is excluded, or which itself has qualified for
exclusion from the definition of the term ``pool'' or ``commodity pool
operator,'' respectively, under Sec. 4.5 of this chapter; the limited
partner, limited member or shareholder in a commodity pool the operator
of which is exempt from registration under Sec. 4.13 of this chapter;
a commodity trading advisor; a bank or trust company; a savings
association; an insurance company; or the separately organized
affiliates of any of the above entities:
(1) Which authorizes an independent account controller
independently to control all trading decisions with respect to the
eligible entity's client positions and accounts that the independent
account controller holds directly or indirectly, or on the eligible
entity's behalf, but without the eligible entity's day-to-day
direction; and
(2) Which maintains:
(i) Only such minimum control over the independent account
controller as is consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities to the
managed positions and accounts, and necessary to fulfill its duty to
supervise diligently the trading done on its behalf; or
(ii) If a limited partner, limited member or shareholder of a
commodity pool the operator of which is exempt from registration under
Sec. 4.13 of this chapter, only such limited control as is consistent
with its status.
Entity means a ``person'' as defined in section 1a of the Act.
Excluded commodity means an ``excluded commodity'' as defined in
section 1a of the Act.
Futures-equivalent means:
(1)(i) An option contract, whether an option on a futures contract
or an option that is a swap, which has been:
(A) Adjusted by an economically reasonable and analytically
supported exposure to price changes of the underlying referenced
contract that has been computed for that option contract as of the
previous day's close or the current day's close or computed
contemporaneously during the trading day, and
(B) Converted to an economically equivalent amount of an open
position in the underlying referenced contract.
(ii) An entity is allowed one business day to liquidate an amount
of the position that is in excess of speculative position limits
without being considered in violation of the speculative position
limits if such excess position results from:
(A) A position that exceeds speculative position limits as a result
of an option contract assignment; or
(B) A position that includes an option contract that exceeds
speculative position limits when the applicable option contract is
adjusted by an economically reasonable and analytically supported
exposure to price changes of the underlying referenced contract as of
that business day's close of trading, as long as the applicable option
contract does not exceed such speculative position limits when
evaluated using the previous business day's exposure to the underlying
referenced contract. This paragraph (B) shall not apply if such day
would be the last trading day of the spot month for the corresponding
core referenced futures contract.
(2) A futures contract which has been converted to an economically
equivalent amount of an open position in a core referenced futures
contract; and
(3) A swap which has been converted to an economically equivalent
amount of an open position in a core referenced futures contract.
Independent account controller means a person:
(1) Who specifically is authorized by an eligible entity, as
defined in this section, independently to control trading decisions on
behalf of, but without the day-to-day direction of, the eligible
entity;
(2) Over whose trading the eligible entity maintains only such
minimum control as is consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities
for managed
[[Page 3465]]
positions and accounts to fulfill its duty to supervise diligently the
trading done on its behalf or as is consistent with such other legal
rights or obligations which may be incumbent upon the eligible entity
to fulfill;
(3) Who trades independently of the eligible entity and of any
other independent account controller trading for the eligible entity;
(4) Who has no knowledge of trading decisions by any other
independent account controller; and
(5) Who is:
(i) Registered as a futures commission merchant, an introducing
broker, a commodity trading advisor, or an associated person of any
such registrant, or
(ii) A general partner, managing member or manager of a commodity
pool the operator of which is excluded from registration under Sec.
4.5(a)(4) of this chapter or Sec. 4.13 of this chapter, provided that
such general partner, managing member or manager complies with the
requirements of Sec. 150.4(c).
Long position means, on a futures-equivalent basis, a long call
option, a short put option, a long underlying futures contract, or a
swap position that is equivalent to a long futures contract.
Physical commodity means any agricultural commodity as that term is
defined in Sec. 1.3 of this chapter or any exempt commodity as that
term is defined in section 1a of the Act.
Position accountability means any bylaw, rule, regulation, or
resolution that:
(1) Is submitted to the Commission pursuant to part 40 of this
chapter in lieu of, or along with, a speculative position limit, and
(2) Requires an entity whose position exceeds the accountability
level to consent to:
(i) Provide information about its position to the designated
contract market or swap execution facility; and
(ii) Halt increasing further its position or reduce its position in
an orderly manner, in each case as requested by the designated contract
market or swap execution facility.
Pre-enactment swap means any swap entered into prior to enactment
of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (July 21, 2010), the terms of which have
not expired as of the date of enactment of that Act.
Pre-existing position means any position in a commodity derivative
contract acquired in good faith prior to the effective date of any
bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution that specifies a speculative
position limit level or a subsequent change to that level.
Referenced contract means:
(1) A core referenced futures contract listed in Sec. 150.2(d) or,
on a futures-equivalent basis with respect to a particular core
referenced futures contract, a futures contract or an option on a
futures contract, including a spread, that is either:
(i) Directly or indirectly linked, including being partially or
fully settled on, or priced at a fixed differential to, the price of
that particular core referenced futures contract; or
(ii) Directly or indirectly linked, including being partially or
fully settled on, or priced at a fixed differential to, the price of
the same commodity underlying that particular core referenced futures
contract for delivery at the same location or locations as specified in
that particular core referenced futures contract; or
(2) On a futures-equivalent basis, an economically equivalent swap.
(3) The definition of referenced contract does not include a
location basis contract, a commodity index contract, any guarantee of a
swap, a trade option that meets the requirements of Sec. 32.3 of this
chapter, any outright price reporting agency index contract, or any
monthly average pricing contract.
Short position means, on a futures-equivalent basis, a short call
option, a long put option, a short underlying futures contract, or a
swap position that is equivalent to a short futures contract.
Speculative position limit means the maximum position, either net
long or net short, in a commodity derivative contract that may be held
or controlled by one person absent an exemption, whether such limits
are adopted for:
(1) Combined positions in all commodity derivative contracts in a
particular commodity, including the spot month futures contract and all
single month futures contracts (the spot month and all single month
futures contracts, cumulatively, ``all-months-combined'');
(2) Positions in a single month of commodity derivative contracts
in a particular commodity other than the spot month futures contract
(``single month''); or
(3) Positions in the spot month of commodity derivative contacts in
a particular commodity. Such a limit may be established under Federal
regulations or rules of a designated contract market or swap execution
facility. For referenced contracts other than core referenced futures
contracts, single month means the same period as that of the relevant
core referenced futures contract.
Spot month means:
(1) For physical-delivery core referenced futures contracts, the
period of time beginning at the earlier of:
(i) The close of business on the trading day preceding the first
day on which delivery notices can be issued by the clearing
organization of a contract market or
(ii) The close of business on the trading day preceding the third-
to-last trading day and ending when the contract expires, except as
follows:
(A) For the ICE Futures U.S. Sugar No. 11 (SB) core referenced
futures contract, the spot month means the period of time beginning at
the opening of trading on the second business day following the
expiration of the regular option contract traded on the expiring
futures contract and ending when the contract expires;
(B) For the ICE Futures U.S. Sugar No. 16 (SF) core referenced
futures contract, the spot month means the period of time beginning on
the third-to-last trading day of the contract month and ending when the
contract expires; and
(C) For the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Live Cattle (LC) core
referenced futures contract, the spot month means the period of time
beginning at the close of trading on the first business day following
the first Friday of the contract month and ending when the contract
expires; and
(2) For referenced contracts other than core referenced futures
contracts, the spot month means the same period as that of the relevant
core referenced futures contract.
Spread transaction means an intra-market spread, inter-market
spread, intra-commodity spread, or inter-commodity spread, including a
calendar spread, quality differential spread, processing spread,
product or by-product differential spread, or futures-option spread.
Swap means ``swap'' as that term is defined in section 1a of the
Act and as further defined in Sec. 1.3 of this chapter.
Swap dealer means ``swap dealer'' as that term is defined in
section 1a of the Act and as further defined in Sec. 1.3 of this
chapter.
Transition period swap means a swap entered into during the period
commencing on the day of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
(July 21, 2010), and ending 60 days after the publication in the
Federal Register of final amendments to this part implementing section
737 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the terms of which have not expired
as of 60 days after the publication date.
0
17. Revise Sec. 150.2 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.2 Federal speculative position limits.
(a) Spot month speculative position limits. For physical-delivery
referenced contracts and, separately, for cash-settled referenced
contracts, no person
[[Page 3466]]
may hold or control positions in the spot month, net long or net short,
in excess of the levels specified by the Commission.
(b) Single month and all-months-combined speculative position
limits. For any referenced contract, no person may hold or control
positions in a single month or in all-months-combined (including the
spot month), net long or net short, in excess of the levels specified
by the Commission.
(c) Relevant contract month. For purposes of this part, for
referenced contracts other than core referenced futures contracts, the
spot month and any single month shall be the same as those of the
relevant core referenced futures contract.
(d) Core referenced futures contracts. Federal speculative position
limits apply to referenced contracts based on the following core
referenced futures contracts:
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(e) Establishment of speculative position limit levels. The levels
of Federal speculative position limits are fixed by the Commission at
the levels listed in appendix E to this part.
(f) Designated contract market estimates of deliverable supply.
Each designated contract market listing a core referenced futures
contract shall supply to the Commission an estimated spot month
deliverable supply upon request by the Commission, and may supply such
estimates to the Commission at any other time. Each estimate shall be
accompanied by a description of the methodology used to derive the
estimate and any statistical data supporting the estimate, and shall be
submitted using the format and procedures approved in writing by the
Commission. A designated contract market should use the guidance
regarding deliverable supply in appendix C to part 38 of this chapter.
(g) Pre-existing positions--(1) Pre-existing positions in a spot
month. A spot month speculative position limit established under this
section shall apply to pre-existing positions, other than pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps.
[[Page 3468]]
(2) Pre-existing positions in a non-spot month. A single month or
all-months-combined speculative position limit established under this
section shall apply to pre-existing positions, other than pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps.
(h) Positions on foreign boards of trade. The speculative position
limits established under this section shall apply to a person's
combined positions in referenced contracts, including positions
executed on, or pursuant to the rules of, a foreign board of trade,
pursuant to section 4a(a)(6) of the Act, provided that:
(1) Such referenced contracts settle against any price (including
the daily or final settlement price) of one or more contracts listed
for trading on a designated contract market or swap execution facility
that is a trading facility; and
(2) The foreign board of trade makes available such referenced
contracts to its members or other participants located in the United
States through direct access to its electronic trading and order
matching system.
(i) Anti-evasion provision. For the purposes of applying the
speculative position limits in this section, if used to willfully
circumvent or evade speculative position limits:
(1) A commodity index contract, monthly average pricing contract,
outright price reporting agency index contract, and/or a location basis
contract shall be considered to be a referenced contract;
(2) A bona fide hedging transaction or position recognition or
spread exemption shall no longer apply; and
(3) A swap shall be considered to be an economically equivalent
swap.
(j) Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of
Market Oversight. (1) The Commission hereby delegates, until it orders
otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight or such
other employee or employees as the Director may designate from time to
time, the authority in paragraph (f) of this section to request
estimated spot month deliverable supply from a designated contract
market and to provide the format and procedures for submitting such
estimates.
(2) The Director of the Division of Market Oversight may submit to
the Commission for its consideration any matter which has been
delegated in this section.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits the Commission, at its
election, from exercising the authority delegated in this section.
(k) Eligible affiliates and aggregation. For purposes of this part,
if an eligible affiliate meets the conditions for any exemption from
aggregation under Sec. 150.4, the eligible affiliate may choose to
utilize that exemption, or it may opt to be aggregated with its
affiliated entities.
0
18. Revise Sec. 150.3 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.3 Exemptions.
(a) Positions which may exceed limits. A person may exceed the
speculative position limits set forth in Sec. 150.2 to the extent that
all applicable requirements in this part are met, provided that such
person's transactions or positions each satisfy one of the following:
(1) Bona fide hedging transactions or positions. Positions that
comply with the bona fide hedging transaction or position definition in
Sec. 150.1, and are:
(i) Enumerated in appendix A to this part; or
(ii) Approved as non-enumerated bona fide hedging transactions or
positions in accordance with paragraph (b)(4) of this section or Sec.
150.9.
(2) Spread transactions. Transactions that:
(i) Meet the spread transaction definition in Sec. 150.1; or
(ii) Do not meet the spread transaction definition in Sec. 150.1,
but have been approved by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (b)(4)
of this section.
(3) Financial distress positions. Positions of a person, or a
related person or persons, under financial distress circumstances, when
exempted by the Commission from any of the requirements of this part in
response to a specific request made pursuant to Sec. 140.99(a)(1) of
this chapter, where financial distress circumstances include, but are
not limited to, situations involving the potential default or
bankruptcy of a customer of the requesting person or persons, an
affiliate of the requesting person or persons, or a potential
acquisition target of the requesting person or persons.
(4) Conditional spot month limit exemption positions in natural
gas. Spot month positions in natural gas cash-settled referenced
contracts that exceed the spot month speculative position limit set
forth in Sec. 150.2, provided that:
(i) Such positions do not exceed the futures-equivalent of 10,000
NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas core referenced futures contracts per
designated contract market that lists a cash-settled referenced
contract in natural gas;
(ii) Such positions do not exceed the futures-equivalent of 10,000
NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas core referenced futures contracts in
economically equivalent swaps in natural gas; and
(iii) The person holding or controlling such positions does not
hold or control positions in spot month physical-delivery referenced
contracts in natural gas.
(5) Pre-enactment and transition period swaps exemption. The
speculative position limits set forth in Sec. 150.2 shall not apply to
positions acquired in good faith in any pre-enactment swap or any
transition period swap, provided however that a person may net such
positions with post-effective date commodity derivative contracts for
the purpose of complying with any non-spot month speculative position
limit.
(b) Application for relief. Any person with a position in a
referenced contract seeking recognition of such position as a bona fide
hedging transaction or position in accordance with paragraph (a)(1)(ii)
of this section, or seeking an exemption for a spread position in
accordance with paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) of this section, in each case for
purposes of Federal speculative position limits set forth in Sec.
150.2, may apply to the Commission in accordance with this section.
(1) Required information. The application shall include the
following information:
(i) With respect to an application for recognition of a bona fide
hedging transaction or position:
(A) A description of the position in the commodity derivative
contract for which the application is submitted, including but not
necessarily limited to, the name of the underlying commodity and the
derivative position size;
(B) An explanation of the hedging strategy, including a statement
that the position complies with the requirements of section 4a(c)(2) of
the Act and the definition of bona fide hedging transaction or position
in Sec. 150.1, and information to demonstrate why the position
satisfies such requirements and definition;
(C) A statement concerning the maximum size of all gross positions
in commodity derivative contracts for which the application is
submitted;
(D) A description of the applicant's activity in the cash markets
and swaps markets for the commodity underlying the position for which
the application is submitted, including, but not necessarily limited
to, information regarding the offsetting cash positions; and
(E) Any other information that may help the Commission determine
whether the position satisfies the requirements of section 4a(c)(2) of
the Act and the definition of bona fide
[[Page 3469]]
hedging transaction or position in Sec. 150.1.
(ii) With respect to an application for a spread exemption:
(A) A description of the spread position for which the application
is submitted;
(B) A statement concerning the maximum size of all gross positions
in commodity derivative contracts for which the application is
submitted; and
(C) Any other information that may help the Commission determine
whether the position is consistent with section 4a(a)(3)(B) of the Act.
(2) Additional information. If the Commission determines that it
requires additional information in order to determine whether to
recognize a position as a bona fide hedging transaction or position or
to grant a spread exemption, the Commission shall:
(i) Notify the applicant of any supplemental information required;
and
(ii) Provide the applicant with ten business days in which to
provide the Commission with any supplemental information.
(3) Timing of application. (i) Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(3)(ii) of this section, a person seeking relief in accordance with
this section must apply to the Commission and receive a notice of
approval of such application prior to the date that the position for
which the application was submitted would be in excess of the
applicable Federal speculative position limit set forth in Sec. 150.2;
(ii) Due to demonstrated sudden or unforeseen increases in its bona
fide hedging needs, a person may apply for recognition of a bona fide
hedging transaction or position within five business days after the
person established the position that exceeded the applicable Federal
speculative position limit.
(A) Any application filed pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this
section must include an explanation of the circumstances warranting the
sudden or unforeseen increases in bona fide hedging needs.
(B) If an application filed pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of
this section is denied, the person must bring its position within the
Federal speculative position limits within a commercially reasonable
time, as determined by the Commission in consultation with the
applicant and the applicable designated contract market or swap
execution facility.
(C) If an application filed pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of
this section is denied, the Commission will not pursue an enforcement
action for a position limits violation for the person holding the
position during the period of the Commission's review nor once the
Commission has issued its determination so long as the application was
submitted in good faith and the person brings its position within the
Federal speculative position limits within a commercially reasonable
time in accordance with paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.
(4) Commission determination. After a review of any application
submitted under paragraph (b) of this section and any supplemental
information provided by the applicant, the Commission will determine,
with respect to the transaction or position for which the application
is submitted, whether to recognize all or a specified portion of such
transaction or position as a bona fide hedging transaction or position
or whether to exempt all or a specified portion of such spread
transaction, as applicable. The Commission shall notify the applicant
of its determination, and an applicant may exceed Federal speculative
position limits set forth in Sec. 150.2, or in the case of
applications filed pursuant to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section,
the applicant may rely upon the Commission's determination, upon
receiving a notice of approval.
(5) Renewal of application. With respect to any application
approved by the Commission pursuant to this section, a person shall
renew such application if there are any material changes to the
information provided in the original application pursuant to paragraph
(b)(1) of this section or upon request by the Commission.
(6) Commission revocation or modification. If the Commission
determines, at any time, that a recognized bona fide hedging
transaction or position is no longer consistent with section 4a(c)(2)
of the Act or the definition of bona fide hedging transaction or
position in Sec. 150.1, or that a spread exemption is no longer
consistent with section 4a(a)(3)(B) of the Act, the Commission shall:
(i) Notify the person holding such position;
(ii) Provide an opportunity for the applicant to respond to such
notification; and
(iii) Issue a determination to revoke or modify the bona fide hedge
recognition or spread exemption for purposes of Federal speculative
position limits and, as applicable, require the person to reduce the
derivative position within a commercially reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission in consultation with the applicant and the
applicable designated contract market or swap execution facility, or
otherwise come into compliance. This notification shall briefly specify
the nature of the issues raised and the specific provisions of the Act
or the Commission's regulations with which the position or application
is, or appears to be, inconsistent.
(c) Previously-granted risk management exemptions. To the extent
that exemptions previously granted under Sec. 1.47 of this chapter or
by a designated contract market or a swap execution facility are for
the risk management of positions in financial instruments, including
but not limited to index funds, such exemptions shall no longer apply
as of January 1, 2023.
(d) Recordkeeping. (1) Persons who avail themselves of exemptions
under this section shall keep and maintain complete books and records
concerning all details of each of their exemptions, including relevant
information about related cash, forward, futures contracts, option on
futures contracts, and swap positions and transactions (including
anticipated requirements, production, merchandising activities,
royalties, contracts for services, cash commodity products and by-
products, cross-commodity hedges, and records of bona fide hedging swap
counterparties) as applicable, and shall make such books and records
available to the Commission upon request under paragraph (e) of this
section.
(2) Any person that relies on a written representation received
from another person that a swap qualifies as a pass-through swap under
paragraph (2) of the definition of bona fide hedging transaction or
position in Sec. 150.1 shall keep and make available to the Commission
upon request the relevant books and records of such written
representation, including any books and records that the person intends
to use to demonstrate that the pass-through swap is a bona fide hedging
transaction or position, for a period of at least two years following
the expiration of the swap.
(3) All books and records required to be kept pursuant to this
section shall be kept in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 1.31
of this chapter.
(e) Call for information. Upon call by the Commission, the Director
of the Division of Enforcement, or the Director's delegate, any person
claiming an exemption from speculative position limits under this
section shall provide to the Commission such information as specified
in the call relating to: the positions owned or controlled by that
person; trading done pursuant to the claimed exemption; the commodity
derivative contracts or cash-market
[[Page 3470]]
positions which support the claimed exemption; and the relevant
business relationships supporting a claimed exemption.
(f) Aggregation of accounts. Entities required to aggregate
accounts or positions under Sec. 150.4 shall be considered the same
person for the purpose of determining whether they are eligible for an
exemption under paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section with
respect to such aggregated account or position.
(g) Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of
Market Oversight. (1) The Commission hereby delegates, until it orders
otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight, or such
other employee or employees as the Director may designate from time to
time:
(i) The authority in paragraph (a)(3) of this section to provide
exemptions in circumstances of financial distress;
(ii) The authority in paragraph (b)(2) of this section to request
additional information with respect to a request for a bona fide
hedging transaction or position recognition or spread exemption;
(iii) The authority in paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(B) of this section to,
if applicable, determine a commercially reasonable amount of time
required for a person to bring its position within the Federal
speculative position limits;
(iv) The authority in paragraph (b)(4) of this section to determine
whether to recognize a position as a bona fide hedging transaction or
position or to grant a spread exemption; and
(v) The authority in paragraph (b)(2) or (5) of this section to
request that a person submit updated materials or renew their request
with the Commission.
(2) The Director of the Division of Market Oversight may submit to
the Commission for its consideration any matter which has been
delegated in this section.
(3) Nothing in this section prohibits the Commission, at its
election, from exercising the authority delegated in this section.
0
19. Revise Sec. 150.5 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.5 Exchange-set speculative position limits and exemptions
therefrom.
(a) Requirements for exchange-set limits on commodity derivative
contracts subject to Federal speculative position limits set forth in
Sec. 150.2--(1) Exchange-set limits. For any commodity derivative
contract that is subject to a Federal speculative position limit under
Sec. 150.2, a designated contract market or swap execution facility
that is a trading facility shall set a speculative position limit no
higher than the level specified in Sec. 150.2.
(2) Exemptions to exchange-set limits. A designated contract market
or swap execution facility that is a trading facility may grant
exemptions from any speculative position limits it sets under paragraph
(a)(1) of this section in accordance with the following:
(i) Exemption levels. An exemption that conforms to an exemption
the Commission identified in:
(A) Sections 150.3(a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(i), (a)(4) and (a)(5) may be
granted at a level that exceeds the level of the applicable Federal
limit in Sec. 150.2;
(B) Sections 150.3(a)(1)(ii) and (a)(2)(ii) may be granted at a
level that exceeds the level of the applicable Federal limit in Sec.
150.2, provided the exemption is first approved in accordance with
Sec. 150.3(b) or 150.9, as applicable;
(C) Section 150.3(a)(3) may be granted at a level that exceeds the
level of the applicable Federal limit in Sec. 150.2, provided that, a
division of the Commission has first approved such exemption pursuant
to a request submitted under Sec. 140.99(a)(1) of this chapter; and
(D) An exemption of the type that does not conform to any of the
exemptions identified in Sec. 150.3(a) must be granted at a level that
does not exceed the applicable Federal limit in Sec. 150.2 and that
complies with paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(G) of this section, unless the
Commission has first approved such exemption pursuant to Sec. 150.3(b)
or pursuant to a request submitted under Sec. 140.99(a)(1).
(ii) Application for exemption from exchange-set limits. With
respect to a designated contract market or swap execution facility that
is a trading facility that elects to grant exemptions under paragraph
(a)(2)(i) of this section:
(A) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section,
the designated contract market or swap execution facility shall require
an entity to file an application requesting such exemption in advance
of the date that such position would be in excess of the limits then in
effect. Such application shall include any information needed to enable
the designated contract market or swap execution facility and the
Commission to determine whether the facts and circumstances demonstrate
that the designated contract market or swap execution facility may
grant an exemption. Any application for a bona fide hedging transaction
or position shall include a description of the applicant's activity in
the cash markets and swaps markets for the commodity underlying the
position for which the application is submitted, including, but not
limited to, information regarding the offsetting cash positions.
(B) The designated contract market or swap execution facility may
adopt rules that allow a person, due to demonstrated sudden or
unforeseen increases in its bona fide hedging needs, to file an
application to request a recognition of a bona fide hedging transaction
or position within five business days after the person established the
position that exceeded the applicable exchange-set speculative position
limit.
(C) The designated contract market or swap execution facility must
require that any application filed pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B)
of this section include an explanation of the circumstances warranting
the sudden or unforeseen increases in bona fide hedging needs.
(D) If an application filed pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of
this section is denied, the applicant must bring its position within
the designated contract market or swap execution facility's speculative
position limits within a commercially reasonable time as determined by
the designated contract market or swap execution facility.
(E) The Commission will not pursue an enforcement action for a
position limits violation for the person holding the position during
the period of the designated contract market or swap execution
facility's review nor once the designated contract market or swap
execution facility has issued its determination, so long as the
application was submitted in good faith and the applicant brings its
position within the designated contract market or swap execution
facility's speculative position limits within a commercially reasonable
time as determined by the designated contract market or swap execution
facility.
(F) The designated contract market or swap execution facility shall
require, for any such exemption granted, that the entity re-apply for
the exemption at least annually;
(G) The designated contract market or swap execution facility:
(1) May, in accordance with the designated contract market or swap
execution facility's rules, deny any such application, or limit,
condition, or revoke any such exemption, at any time after providing
notice to the applicant, and
(2) Shall consider whether the requested exemption would result in
positions that would not be in accord with sound commercial practices
in the relevant commodity derivative market and/or that would exceed an
amount
[[Page 3471]]
that may be established and liquidated in an orderly fashion in that
market; and
(H) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(G) of this section, the
designated contract market or swap execution facility may grant
exemptions, subject to terms, conditions, or limitations, that require
a person to exit any referenced contract positions in excess of
position limits during the lesser of the last five days of trading or
the time period for the spot month in such physical-delivery contract,
or to otherwise limit the size of such position during that time
period. Designated contract markets and swap execution facilities may
refer to paragraph (b) of appendix B or appendix G to part 150, for
guidance regarding the foregoing, as applicable.
(3) Exchange-set limits on pre-existing positions--(i) Pre-existing
positions in a spot month. A designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading facility shall require compliance
with spot month exchange-set speculative position limits for pre-
existing positions in commodity derivative contracts other than pre-
enactment swaps and transition period swaps.
(ii) Pre-existing positions in a non-spot month. A single month or
all-months-combined speculative position limit established under
paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall apply to any pre-existing
positions in commodity derivative contracts, other than pre-enactment
swaps and transition period swaps.
(4) Monthly reports detailing the disposition of each exemption
application. (i) For commodity derivative contracts subject to Federal
speculative position limits, the designated contract market or swap
execution facility shall submit to the Commission a report each month
showing the disposition of any exemption application, including the
recognition of any position as a bona fide hedging transaction or
position, the exemption of any spread transaction or other position,
the renewal, revocation, or modification of a previously granted
recognition or exemption, and the rejection of any application, as well
as the following details for each application:
(A) The date of disposition;
(B) The effective date of the disposition;
(C) The expiration date of any recognition or exemption;
(D) Any unique identifier(s) the designated contract market or swap
execution facility may assign to track the application, or the specific
type of recognition or exemption;
(E) If the application is for an enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position, the name of the enumerated bona fide hedging
transaction or position listed in appendix A to this part;
(F) If the application is for a spread transaction listed in the
spread transaction definition in Sec. 150.1, the name of the spread
transaction as it is listed in Sec. 150.1;
(G) The identity of the applicant;
(H) The listed commodity derivative contract or position(s) to
which the application pertains;
(I) The underlying cash commodity;
(J) The maximum size of the commodity derivative position that is
recognized by the designated contract market or swap execution facility
as a bona fide hedging transaction or position, specified by contract
month and by the type of limit as spot month, single month, or all-
months-combined, as applicable;
(K) Any size limitations or conditions established for a spread
exemption or other exemption; and
(L) For a bona fide hedging transaction or position, a concise
summary of the applicant's activity in the cash markets and swaps
markets for the commodity underlying the commodity derivative position
for which the application was submitted.
(ii) The designated contract market or swap execution facility
shall submit to the Commission the information required by paragraph
(a)(4)(i) of this section:
(A) As specified by the Commission on the Forms and Submissions
page at www.cftc.gov; and
(B) Using the format, coding structure, and electronic data
transmission procedures approved in writing by the Commission.
(b) Requirements for exchange-set limits on commodity derivative
contracts in a physical commodity that are not subject to the limits
set forth in Sec. 150.2--(1) Exchange-set spot-month limits. For any
physical commodity derivative contract that is not subject to a Federal
speculative position limit under Sec. 150.2, a designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is a trading facility shall set
a speculative position limit as follows:
(i) Spot month speculative position limit levels. For any commodity
derivative contract subject to paragraph (b) of this section, a
designated contract market or swap execution facility that is a trading
facility shall establish speculative position limits for the spot month
no greater than 25 percent of the estimated spot month deliverable
supply, calculated separately for each month to be listed.
(ii) Additional sources for compliance. Alternatively, a designated
contract market or swap execution facility that is a trading facility
may submit rules to the Commission establishing spot month speculative
position limits other than as provided in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this
section, provided that each limit is set at a level that is necessary
and appropriate to reduce the potential threat of market manipulation
or price distortion of the contract's or the underlying commodity's
price or index.
(2) Exchange-set limits or accountability outside of the spot
month--(i) Non-spot month speculative position limit or accountability
levels. For any commodity derivative contract subject to paragraph (b)
of this section, a designated contract market or swap execution
facility that is a trading facility shall adopt either speculative
position limits or position accountability outside of the spot month at
a level that is necessary and appropriate to reduce the potential
threat of market manipulation or price distortion of the contract's or
the underlying commodity's price or index.
(ii) Additional sources for compliance. A designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is a trading facility may refer
to the non-exclusive acceptable practices in paragraph (b) of appendix
F of this part to demonstrate to the Commission compliance with the
requirements of paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section.
(3) Look-alike contracts. For any newly listed commodity derivative
contract subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is substantially
the same as an existing contract listed on a designated contract market
or swap execution facility that is a trading facility, the designated
contract market or swap execution facility that is a trading facility
listing such newly listed contract shall adopt spot month, individual
month, and all-months-combined speculative position limits comparable
to those of the existing contract. Alternatively, if such designated
contract market or swap execution facility seeks to adopt speculative
position limits that are not comparable to those of the existing
contract, such designated contract market or swap execution facility
shall demonstrate to the Commission how the levels comply with
paragraphs (b)(1) and/or (b)(2) of this section.
(4) Exemptions to exchange-set limits. A designated contract market
or swap execution facility that is a trading facility may grant
exemptions from any
[[Page 3472]]
speculative position limits it sets under paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of
this section in accordance with the following:
(i) An entity seeking an exemption shall be required to apply to
the designated contract market or swap execution facility for any such
exemption from its speculative position limit rules; and
(ii) A designated contract market or swap execution facility that
is a trading facility may deny any such application, or limit,
condition, or revoke any such exemption, at any time after providing
notice to the applicant. Such designated contract market or swap
execution facility shall consider whether the requested exemption would
result in positions that would not be in accord with sound commercial
practices in the relevant commodity derivative market and/or would
exceed an amount that may be established and liquidated in an orderly
fashion in that market.
(c) Requirements for security futures products. For security
futures products, speculative position limits and position
accountability requirements are specified in Sec. 41.25 of this
chapter.
(d) Rules on aggregation. For commodity derivative contracts in a
physical commodity, a designated contract market or swap execution
facility that is a trading facility shall have aggregation rules that
conform to Sec. 150.4.
(e) Requirements for submissions to the Commission. In order for a
designated contract market or swap execution facility that is a trading
facility to adopt speculative position limits and/or position
accountability pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of this section and/or
to elect to offer exemptions from any such levels pursuant to such
paragraphs, the designated contract market or swap execution facility
shall submit to the Commission pursuant to part 40 of this chapter
rules establishing such levels and/or exemptions. To the extent that a
designated contract market or swap execution facility adopts
speculative position limit levels, such part 40 submission shall also
include the methodology by which such levels are calculated. The
designated contract market or swap execution facility shall review such
speculative position limit levels regularly for compliance with this
section and update such speculative position limit levels as needed.
(f) Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of
Market Oversight--(1) Commission delegations. The Commission hereby
delegates, until it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division
of Market Oversight, or such other employee or employees as the
Director may designate from time to time, the authority in paragraph
(a)(4)(ii) of this section to provide instructions regarding the
submission to the Commission of information required to be reported,
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, by a designated
contract market or swap execution facility, to specify the manner for
submitting such information on the Forms and Submissions page at
www.cftc.gov, and to determine the format, coding structure, and
electronic data transmission procedures for submitting such
information.
(2) Commission consideration of delegated matter. The Director of
the Division of Market Oversight may submit to the Commission for its
consideration any matter which has been delegated in this section.
(3) Commission authority. Nothing in this section prohibits the
Commission, at its election, from exercising the authority delegated in
this section.
0
20. Revise Sec. 150.6 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.6 Scope.
This part shall only be construed as having an effect on
speculative position limits set by the Commission or by a designated
contract market or swap execution facility, including any associated
recordkeeping and reporting regulations in this chapter. Nothing in
this part shall be construed to relieve any designated contract market,
swap execution facility, or its governing board from responsibility
under section 5(d)(4) of the Act to prevent manipulation and corners.
Further, nothing in this part shall be construed to affect any other
provisions of the Act or Commission regulations, including, but not
limited to, those relating to actual or attempted manipulation,
corners, squeezes, fraudulent or deceptive conduct, or to prohibited
transactions.
Sec. 150.7 [Reserved]
0
21. Add reserved Sec. 150.7.
0
22. Add Sec. 150.8 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.8 Severability.
If any provision of this part, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances, is held invalid, such invalidity shall not
affect the validity of other provisions or the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances that can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
0
23. Add Sec. 150.9 to read as follows:
Sec. 150.9 Process for recognizing non-enumerated bona fide hedging
transactions or positions with respect to Federal speculative position
limits.
For purposes of Federal speculative position limits, a person with
a position in a referenced contract seeking recognition of such
position as a non-enumerated bona fide hedging transaction or position,
in accordance with Sec. 150.3(a)(1)(ii), shall apply to the
Commission, pursuant to Sec. 150.3(b), or apply to a designated
contract market or swap execution facility in accordance with this
section. If such person submits an application to a designated contract
market or swap execution facility in accordance with this section, and
the designated contract market or swap execution facility, with respect
to its own speculative position limits established pursuant to Sec.
150.5(a), recognizes the person's position as a non-enumerated bona
fide hedging transaction or position, then the person may also exceed
the applicable Federal speculative position limit for such position in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. The designated contract
market or swap execution facility may approve such applications only if
the designated contract market or swap execution facility complies with
the conditions set forth in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section.
(a) Approval of rules. The designated contract market or swap
execution facility must maintain rules that establish application
processes and conditions for recognizing bona fide hedging transactions
or positions consistent with the requirements of this section, and must
seek approval of such rules from the Commission pursuant to Sec. 40.5
of this chapter.
(b) Prerequisites for a designated contract market or swap
execution facility to recognize a bona fide hedging transaction or
position in accordance with this section. (1) The designated contract
market or swap execution facility lists the applicable referenced
contract for trading;
(2) The position meets the definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in section 4a(c)(2) of the Act and the
definition of bona fide hedging transaction or position in Sec. 150.1;
and
(3) The designated contract market or swap execution facility does
not recognize as a bona fide hedging transaction or position any
position involving a commodity index contract and one or more
referenced contracts, including exemptions known as risk management
exemptions.
(c) Application process. The designated contract market or swap
[[Page 3473]]
execution facility's application process meets the following
conditions:
(1) Required application information. The designated contract
market or swap execution facility requires the applicant to provide,
and can obtain from the applicant, all information needed to enable the
designated contract market or swap execution facility and the
Commission to determine whether the facts and circumstances demonstrate
that the designated contract market or swap execution facility may
recognize a position as a bona fide hedging transaction or position,
including the following:
(i) A description of the position in the commodity derivative
contract for which the application is submitted, including but not
limited to, the name of the underlying commodity and the derivative
position size;
(ii) An explanation of the hedging strategy, including a statement
that the position complies with the requirements of section 4a(c)(2) of
the Act and the definition of bona fide hedging transaction or position
in Sec. 150.1, and information to demonstrate why the position
satisfies such requirements and definition;
(iii) A statement concerning the maximum size of all gross
positions in commodity derivative contracts for which the application
is submitted;
(iv) A description of the applicant's activity in the cash markets
and the swaps markets for the commodity underlying the position for
which the application is submitted, including, but not limited to,
information regarding the offsetting cash positions; and
(v) Any other information the designated contract market or swap
execution facility requires, in its discretion, to determine that the
position complies with paragraph (b)(2) of this section, as applicable.
(2) Timing of application. (i) Except as provided in paragraph
(c)(2)(ii) of this section, the designated contract market or swap
execution facility requires the applicant to submit an application and
receive a notice of approval of such application from the designated
contract market or swap execution facility prior to the date that the
position for which such application was submitted would be in excess of
the applicable Federal speculative position limits.
(ii) A designated contract market or swap execution facility may
adopt rules that allow a person, due to demonstrated sudden or
unforeseen increases in its bona fide hedging needs, to file an
application with the designated contract market or swap execution
facility to request a recognition of a bona fide hedging transaction or
position within five business days after the person established the
position that exceeded the applicable Federal speculative position
limit.
(A) The designated contract market or swap execution facility must
require that any application filed pursuant to paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of
this section include an explanation of the circumstances warranting the
sudden or unforeseen increases in bona fide hedging needs.
(B) If an application filed pursuant to paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of
this section is denied by the designated contract market, swap
execution facility, or Commission, the applicant must bring its
position within the applicable Federal speculative position limits
within a commercially reasonable time as determined by the Commission
in consultation with the applicant and the applicable designated
contract market or swap execution facility.
(C) The Commission will not pursue an enforcement action for a
position limits violation for the person holding the position during
the period of the designated contract market, swap execution facility,
or Commission's review nor once a determination has been issued, so
long as the application was submitted in good faith and the person
complies with paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(B) of this section.
(3) Renewal of applications. The designated contract market or swap
execution facility requires each applicant to reapply with the
designated contract market or swap execution facility to maintain such
recognition at least on an annual basis by updating the initial
application, and to receive a notice of extension of the original
approval from the designated contract market or swap execution facility
to continue relying on such recognition for purposes of Federal
speculative position limits. If the facts and circumstances underlying
a renewal application are materially different than the initial
application, the designated contract market or swap execution facility
is required to treat such application as a new request submitted
through the Sec. 150.9 process and subject to the Commission's 10/2-
day review process in paragraph (e) of this section.
(4) Exchange revocation authority. The designated contract market
or swap execution facility retains its authority to limit, condition,
or revoke, at any time after providing notice to the applicant, any
bona fide hedging transaction or position recognition for purposes of
the designated contract market or swap execution facility's speculative
position limits established under Sec. 150.5(a), for any reason as
determined in the discretion of the designated contract market or swap
execution facility, including if the designated contract market or swap
execution facility determines that the position no longer meets the
conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, as applicable.
(d) Recordkeeping. (1) The designated contract market or swap
execution facility keeps full, complete, and systematic records, which
include all pertinent data and memoranda, of all activities relating to
the processing of such applications and the disposition thereof. Such
records include:
(i) Records of the designated contract market's or swap execution
facility's recognition of any derivative position as a bona fide
hedging transaction or position, revocation or modification of any such
recognition, or the rejection of an application;
(ii) All information and documents submitted by an applicant in
connection with its application, including documentation and
information that is submitted after the disposition of the application,
and any withdrawal, supplementation, or update of any application;
(iii) Records of oral and written communications between the
designated contract market or swap execution facility and the applicant
in connection with such application; and
(iv) All information and documents in connection with the
designated contract market or swap execution facility's analysis of,
and action(s) taken with respect to, such application.
(2) All books and records required to be kept pursuant to this
section shall be kept in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 1.31
of this chapter.
(e) Process for a person to exceed Federal speculative position
limits on a referenced contract--(1) Notification to the Commission.
The designated contract market or swap execution facility must submit
to the Commission a notification of each initial determination to
recognize a bona fide hedging transaction or position in accordance
with this section, concurrently with the notice of such determination
the designated contract market or swap execution facility provides to
the applicant.
(2) Notification requirements. The notification in paragraph (e)(1)
of this section shall include, at a minimum, the following information:
(i) Name of the applicant;
(ii) Brief description of the bona fide hedging transaction or
position being recognized;
[[Page 3474]]
(iii) Name of the contract(s) relevant to the recognition;
(iv) The maximum size of the position that may exceed Federal
speculative position limits;
(v) The effective date and expiration date of the recognition;
(vi) An indication regarding whether the position may be maintained
during the last five days of trading during the spot month, or the time
period for the spot month; and
(vii) A copy of the application and any supporting materials.
(3) Exceeding Federal speculative position limits on referenced
contracts. A person may exceed Federal speculative position limits on a
referenced contract after the designated contract market or swap
execution facility issues the notification required pursuant to
paragraph (e)(1) of this section, unless the Commission notifies the
designated contract market or swap execution facility and the applicant
otherwise, pursuant to paragraph (e)(5) or (6) of this section, before
the ten business day period expires.
(4) Exceeding Federal speculative position limits on referenced
contracts due to sudden or unforeseen circumstances. If a person files
an application for a recognition of a bona fide hedging transaction or
position in accordance with paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section, then
such person may rely on the designated contract market or swap
execution facility's determination to grant such recognition for
purposes of Federal speculative position limits two business days after
the designated contract market or swap execution facility issues the
notification required pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section,
unless the Commission notifies the designated contract market or swap
execution facility and the applicant otherwise, pursuant to paragraph
(e)(5) or (6) of this section, before the two business day period
expires.
(5) Commission stay of pending applications and requests for
additional information. The Commission may stay an application that
requires additional time to analyze, and/or may request additional
information to determine whether the position for which the application
is submitted meets the conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of this
section. The Commission shall notify the applicable designated contract
market or swap execution facility and the applicant of a Commission
determination to stay the application and/or request any supplemental
information, and shall provide an opportunity for the applicant to
respond. The Commission will have an additional 45 days from the date
of the stay notification to conduct the review and issue a
determination with respect to the application. If the Commission stays
an application and the applicant has not yet exceeded Federal
speculative position limits, then the applicant may not exceed Federal
speculative position limits unless the Commission approves the
application. If the Commission stays an application and the applicant
has already exceeded Federal speculative position limits, then the
applicant may continue to maintain the position unless the Commission
notifies the designated contract market or swap execution facility and
the applicant otherwise, pursuant to paragraph (e)(6) of this section.
(6) Commission determination for pending applications. If, during
the Commission's ten or two business day review period in paragraphs
(e)(3) and (4) of this section, the Commission determines that a
position for which the application is submitted does not meet the
conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, the Commission
shall:
(i) Notify the designated contract market or swap execution
facility and the applicant within ten or two business days, as
applicable, after the designated contract market or swap execution
facility issues the notification required pursuant to paragraph (e)(1)
of this section;
(ii) Provide an opportunity for the applicant to respond to such
notification;
(iii) Issue a determination to deny the application, or limit or
condition the application approval for purposes of Federal speculative
position limits and, as applicable, require the person to reduce the
derivatives position within a commercially reasonable time, as
determined by the Commission in consultation with the applicant and the
applicable designated contract market or swap execution facility, or
otherwise come into compliance; and
(iv) The Commission will not pursue an enforcement action for a
position limits violation for the person holding the position during
the period of the Commission's review nor once the Commission has
issued its determination, so long as the application was submitted in
good faith and the person complies with any requirement to reduce the
position pursuant to paragraph (e)(6)(iii) of this section, as
applicable.
(f) Commission revocation of applications previously approved. (1)
If a designated contract market or a swap execution facility limits,
conditions, or revokes any recognition of a bona fide hedging
transaction or position for purposes of the respective designated
contract market's or swap execution facility's speculative position
limits established under Sec. 150.5(a), then such recognition will
also be deemed limited, conditioned, or revoked for purposes of Federal
speculative position limits.
(2) If the Commission determines, at any time, that a position that
has been recognized as a bona fide hedging transaction or position for
purposes of Federal speculative position limits is no longer consistent
with section 4a(c)(2) of the Act or the definition of bona fide hedging
transaction or position in Sec. 150.1, the following applies:
(i) The Commission shall notify the person holding the position and
the relevant designated contract market or swap execution facility.
After providing such person and such designated contract market or swap
execution facility an opportunity to respond, the Commission may, in
its discretion, limit, condition, or revoke its determination for
purposes of Federal speculative position limits and require the person
to reduce the derivatives position within a commercially reasonable
time as determined by the Commission in consultation with such person
and such designated contract market or swap execution facility, or
otherwise come into compliance;
(ii) The Commission shall include in its notification a brief
explanation of the nature of the issues raised and the specific
provisions of the Act or the Commission's regulations with which the
position or application is, or appears to be, inconsistent; and
(iii) The Commission will not pursue an enforcement action for a
position limits violation for the person holding the position during
the period of the Commission's review, nor once the Commission has
issued its determination, provided the person submitted the application
in good faith and reduces the position within a commercially reasonable
time, as determined by the Commission in consultation with such person
and the relevant designated contract market or swap execution facility,
or otherwise comes into compliance.
(g) Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division of
Market Oversight--(1) Commission delegations. The Commission hereby
delegates, until it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division
of Market Oversight, or such other employee or employees as the
Director may designate from time to time, the authority to request
additional information, pursuant to paragraph (e)(5) of this section,
from the applicable designated contract market or swap execution
facility and applicant.
[[Page 3475]]
(2) Commission consideration of delegated matter. The Director of
the Division of Market Oversight may submit to the Commission for its
consideration any matter which has been delegated in this section.
(3) Commission authority. Nothing in this section prohibits the
Commission, at its election, from exercising the authority delegated in
this section.
0
24. Add appendices A through G to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 150--List of Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
Pursuant to Sec. 150.3(a)(1)(i), positions that comply with the
bona fide hedging transaction or position definition in Sec. 150.1
and that are enumerated in this appendix A may exceed Federal
speculative position limits to the extent that all applicable
requirements in this part are met. A person holding such positions
enumerated in this appendix A may exceed Federal speculative
position limits for such positions without requesting prior approval
under Sec. 150.3 or Sec. 150.9. A person holding such positions
that are not enumerated in this appendix A must request and obtain
approval pursuant to Sec. 150.3 or Sec. 150.9 prior to exceeding
the applicable Federal speculative position limits--unless such
positions qualify for the retroactive approval process, and the
person seeks retroactive approval in accordance with Sec. 150.3 or
Sec. 150.9.
The enumerated bona fide hedges do not state the exclusive means
for establishing compliance with the bona fide hedging transaction
or position definition in Sec. 150.1 or with the requirements of
Sec. 150.3(a)(1).
(a) Enumerated hedges--(1) Hedges of inventory and cash
commodity fixed-price purchase contracts. Short positions in
commodity derivative contracts that do not exceed in quantity the
sum of the person's ownership of inventory and fixed-price purchase
contracts in the commodity derivative contracts' underlying cash
commodity.
(2) Hedges of cash commodity fixed-price sales contracts. Long
positions in commodity derivative contracts that do not exceed in
quantity the sum of the person's fixed-price sales contracts in the
commodity derivative contracts' underlying cash commodity and the
quantity equivalent of fixed-price sales contracts of the cash
products and by-products of such commodity.
(3) Hedges of offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity sales and
purchases. Both short and long positions in commodity derivative
contracts that do not exceed in quantity the amount of the commodity
derivative contracts' underlying cash commodity that has been both
bought and sold by the same person at unfixed prices:
(i) Basis different delivery months in the same commodity
derivative contract; or
(ii) Basis different commodity derivative contracts in the same
commodity, regardless of whether the commodity derivative contracts
are in the same calendar month.
(4) Hedges of unsold anticipated production. Short positions in
commodity derivative contracts that do not exceed in quantity the
person's unsold anticipated production of the commodity derivative
contracts' underlying cash commodity.
(5) Hedges of unfilled anticipated requirements. Long positions
in commodity derivative contracts that do not exceed in quantity the
person's unfilled anticipated requirements for the commodity
derivative contracts' underlying cash commodity, for processing,
manufacturing, or use by that person, or for resale by a utility as
it pertains to the utility's obligations to meet the unfilled
anticipated demand of its customers for the customer's use.
(6) Hedges of anticipated merchandising. Long or short positions
in commodity derivative contracts that offset the anticipated change
in value of the underlying commodity that a person anticipates
purchasing or selling, provided that:
(i) The positions in the commodity derivative contracts do not
exceed in quantity twelve months' of current or anticipated purchase
or sale requirements of the same cash commodity that is anticipated
to be purchased or sold; and
(ii) The person is a merchant handling the underlying commodity
that is subject to the anticipatory merchandising hedge, and that
such merchant is entering into the position solely for purposes
related to its merchandising business and has a demonstrated history
of buying and selling the underlying commodity for its merchandising
business.
(7) Hedges by agents. Long or short positions in commodity
derivative contracts by an agent who does not own or has not
contracted to sell or purchase the commodity derivative contracts'
underlying cash commodity at a fixed price, provided that the agent
is responsible for merchandising the cash positions that are being
offset in commodity derivative contracts and the agent has a
contractual arrangement with the person who owns the commodity or
holds the cash-market commitment being offset.
(8) Hedges of anticipated mineral royalties. Short positions in
a person's commodity derivative contracts offset by the anticipated
change in value of mineral royalty rights that are owned by that
person, provided that the royalty rights arise out of the production
of the commodity underlying the commodity derivative contracts.
(9) Hedges of anticipated services. Short or long positions in a
person's commodity derivative contracts offset by the anticipated
change in value of receipts or payments due or expected to be due
under an executed contract for services held by that person,
provided that the contract for services arises out of the
production, manufacturing, processing, use, or transportation of the
commodity underlying the commodity derivative contracts.
(10) Offsets of commodity trade options. Long or short positions
in commodity derivative contracts that do not exceed in quantity, on
a futures-equivalent basis, a position in a commodity trade option
that meets the requirements of Sec. 32.3 of this chapter. Such
commodity trade option transaction, if it meets the requirements of
Sec. 32.3 of this chapter, may be deemed, for purposes of complying
with this paragraph (a)(10) of this appendix A, as either a cash
commodity purchase or sales contract as set forth in paragraph
(a)(1) or (2) of this appendix A, as applicable.
(11) Cross-commodity hedges. Positions in commodity derivative
contracts described in paragraph (2) of the bona fide hedging
transaction or position definition in Sec. 150.1 or in paragraphs
(a)(1) through (10) of this appendix A may also be used to offset
the risks arising from a commodity other than the cash commodity
underlying the commodity derivative contracts, provided that the
fluctuations in value of the cash commodity underlying the commodity
derivative contracts, shall be substantially related to the
fluctuations in value of the actual or anticipated cash commodity
position or a pass-through swap.
(b) [Reserved]
Appendix B to Part 150--Guidance on Gross Hedging Positions and
Positions Held During the Spot Period
(a) Guidance on gross hedging positions. (1) A person's gross
hedging positions may be deemed in compliance with the bona fide
hedging transaction or position definition in Sec. 150.1, whether
enumerated or non-enumerated, provided that all applicable
regulatory requirements are met, including that the position is
economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct
and management of a commercial enterprise and otherwise satisfies
the bona fide hedging definition in Sec. 150.1, and provided
further that:
(i) The manner in which the person measures risk is consistent
and follows historical practice for that person;
(ii) The person is not measuring risk on a gross basis to evade
the speculative position limits in Sec. 150.2 or the aggregation
rules in Sec. 150.4; and
(iii) The person is able to demonstrate compliance with
paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii) of this appendix, including by
providing justifications for measuring risk on a gross basis, upon
the request of the Commission and/or of a designated contract
market, including by providing information regarding the entities
with which the person aggregates positions.
(b) Guidance regarding positions held during the spot period.
The regulations governing exchange-set speculative position limits
and exemptions therefrom under Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(D) provide that
designated contract markets and swap execution facilities
(``exchanges'') may impose restrictions on bona fide hedging
transaction or position exemptions to require the person to exit any
such positions in excess of limits during the lesser of the last
five days of trading or the time period for the spot month in such
physical-delivery contract, or otherwise limit the size of such
position. This guidance is intended to provide factors the
Commission believes exchanges should consider when determining
whether to impose a five-day rule or similar restriction but is not
intended to be used as a mandatory checklist. The exchanges may
consider whether:
[[Page 3476]]
(1) The position complies with the bona fide hedging transaction
or position definition in Sec. 150.1, whether enumerated or non-
enumerated;
(2) There is an economically appropriate need to maintain such
position in excess of Federal speculative position limits during the
spot period for such contract, and such need relates to the purchase
or sale of a cash commodity; and
(3) The person wishing to exceed Federal position limits during
the spot period:
(i) Intends to make or take delivery during that time period;
(ii) Has the ability to take delivery for any long position at
levels that are economically appropriate (i.e., the delivery
comports with the person's demonstrated need for the commodity and
the contract is the most economical source for that commodity);
(iii) Has the ability to deliver against any short position
(i.e., has inventory on hand in a deliverable location and in a
condition in which the commodity can be used upon delivery and that
delivery against futures contracts is economically appropriate, as
it is the best sales option for that inventory).
Appendix C to Part 150--Guidance Regarding the Definition of Referenced
Contract
This appendix C provides guidance regarding the ``referenced
contract'' definition in Sec. 150.1, which provides in paragraph
(3) of the definition of referenced contract that the term
referenced contract does not include a location basis contract, a
commodity index contract, a swap guarantee, a trade option that
meets the requirements of Sec. 32.3 of this chapter, a monthly
average pricing contract, or an outright price reporting agency
index contract. The term ``referenced contract'' is used throughout
part 150 of the Commission's regulations to refer to contracts that
are subject to Federal position limits. A position in a contract
that is not a referenced contract is not subject to Federal position
limits, and, as a consequence, cannot be netted with positions in
referenced contracts for purposes of Federal position limits. This
guidance is intended to clarify the types of contracts that would
qualify as a location basis contract, commodity index contract,
monthly average pricing contract, or outright price reporting agency
index contract.
Compliance with this guidance does not diminish or replace, in
any event, the obligations and requirements of any person to comply
with the regulations provided under this part, or any other part of
the Commission's regulations. The guidance is for illustrative
purposes only and does not state the exclusive means for a contract
to qualify, or not qualify, as a referenced contract as defined in
Sec. 150.1, or to comply with any other provision in this part.
(a) Guidance. (1) As provided in paragraph (3) of the
``referenced contract'' definition in Sec. 150.1, the following
types of contracts are not deemed referenced contracts, meaning such
contracts are not subject to Federal position limits and cannot be
netted with positions in referenced contracts for purposes of
Federal position limits: location basis contracts; commodity index
contracts; swap guarantees; trade options that meet the requirements
of Sec. 32.3 of this chapter; monthly average pricing contracts;
and outright price reporting agency index contracts.
(2) Location basis contract. For purposes of the referenced
contract definition in Sec. 150.1, a location basis contract means
a commodity derivative contract that is cash-settled based on the
difference in:
(i) The price, directly or indirectly, of:
(A) A particular core referenced futures contract; or
(B) A commodity deliverable on a particular core referenced
futures contract, whether at par, a fixed discount to par, or a
premium to par; and
(ii) The price, at a different delivery location or pricing
point than that of the same particular core referenced futures
contract, directly or indirectly, of:
(A) A commodity deliverable on the same particular core
referenced futures contract, whether at par, a fixed discount to
par, or a premium to par; or
(B) A commodity that is listed in appendix D to this part as
substantially the same as a commodity underlying the same core
referenced futures contract.
(3) Commodity index contract. For purposes of the referenced
contract definition in Sec. 150.1, a commodity index contract means
an agreement, contract, or transaction that is based on an index
comprised of prices of commodities that are not the same or
substantially the same, and that is not a location basis contract, a
calendar spread contract, or an intercommodity spread contract as
such terms are defined in this guidance, where:
(i) A calendar spread contract means a cash-settled agreement,
contract, or transaction that represents the difference between the
settlement price in one or a series of contract months of an
agreement, contract, or transaction and the settlement price of
another contract month or another series of contract months'
settlement prices for the same agreement, contract, or transaction;
and
(ii) An intercommodity spread contract means a cash-settled
agreement, contract, or transaction that represents the difference
between the settlement price of a referenced contract and the
settlement price of another contract, agreement, or transaction that
is based on a different commodity.
(4) Monthly average pricing contract means a contract that
satisfies one of the following:
(i) The contract's price is calculated based on the equally-
weighted arithmetic average of the daily prices of the underlying
referenced contract for the entire corresponding calendar month or
trade month, as applicable; or
(ii) In determining the price of such contract, the component
daily prices, in the aggregate, during the spot month of the
underlying referenced contract comprise no more than 40 percent of
such contract's weighting.
(5) Outright price reporting agency index contract means any
outright commodity derivative contract whose settlement price is
based solely on an index published by a price reporting agency that
surveys cash-market transaction prices, provided, however, that this
term does not include any commodity derivative contract that settles
at a basis, or differential, between a referenced contract and a
price reporting agency index.
(b) [Reserved]
Appendix D to Part 150--Commodities Listed as Substantially the Same
for Purposes of the Term ``Location Basis Contract'' as Used in the
Referenced Contract Definition
The following table lists each relevant core referenced futures
contract and associated commodities that are treated as
substantially the same as a commodity underlying a core referenced
futures contract for purposes of the term ``location basis
contract'' as such term is used in the referenced contract
definition under Sec. 150.1, and as such term is discussed in
appendix C to this part.
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
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Appendix E to Part 150--Speculative Position Limit Levels
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Step-down spot month limits apply to positions net long or
net short as follows: 600 contracts at the close of trading on the
first business day following the first Friday of the contract month;
300 contracts at the close of trading on the business day prior to
the last five trading days of the contract month; and 200 contracts
at the close of trading on the business day prior to the last two
trading days of the contract month.
\2\ For persons that are not availing themselves of the Sec.
150.3(a)(4) conditional spot month limit exemption in natural gas,
the 2,000 contract spot month speculative position limit level
applies to: (1) the physically-settled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas
(NG) core referenced futures contract and any other physically-
settled contract that qualifies as a referenced contract to NYMEX
Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) under the definition of ``referenced
contract'' under Sec. 150.1, in the aggregate across all exchanges
listing a physically-settled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG)
referenced contract and the OTC swaps market, net long or net short;
and (2) the cash-settled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) referenced
contracts, net long or net short, on a per-exchange basis for each
exchange that lists one or more cash-settled NYMEX Henry Hub Natural
Gas (NG) referenced contract(s) rather than aggregated across such
exchanges. Further, an additional 2,000 contract limit, net long or
net short, applies across all cash-settled economically equivalent
NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (NG) OTC swaps.
\3\ Step-down spot month limits apply to positions net long or
net short as follows: 6,000 contracts at the close of trading three
business days prior to the last trading day of the contract; 5,000
contracts at the close of trading two business days prior to the
last trading day of the contract; and 4,000 contracts at the close
of trading one business day prior to the last trading day of the
contract.
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
Appendix F to Part 150--Guidance on, and Acceptable Practices in,
Compliance With the Requirements for Exchange-Set Limits and Position
Accountability on Commodity Derivative Contracts
The following are guidance and acceptable practices for
compliance with Sec. 150.5. Compliance with the acceptable
practices and guidance does not diminish or replace, in any event,
the obligations and requirements of the person to comply with the
other regulations provided under this part. The acceptable practices
and guidance are for illustrative purposes only and do not state the
exclusive means for establishing compliance with Sec. 150.5.
(a) Acceptable practices for compliance with Sec.
150.5(b)(2)(i) regarding exchange-set limits or accountability
outside of the spot month. A designated contract market or swap
execution facility that is a trading facility may satisfy Sec.
150.5(b)(2)(i) by complying with either of the following acceptable
practices:
(1) Non-spot month speculative position limits. For any
commodity derivative contract subject to Sec. 150.5(b), a
designated contract market or swap execution facility that is a
trading facility sets individual single month or all-months-combined
levels no greater than any one of the following:
(i) The average of historical position sizes held by speculative
traders in the contract as a percentage of the average combined
futures and delta-adjusted option month-end open interest for that
contract for the most recent calendar year;
(ii) The level of the spot month limit for the contract;
(iii) 5,000 contracts (scaled-down proportionally to the
notional quantity per contract relative to the typical cash-market
transaction if the notional quantity per contract is larger than the
typical cash-market transaction, and scaled up proportionally to the
notional quantity per contract relative to the typical cash-market
transaction if the notional quantity per contract is smaller than
the typical cash-market transaction); or
(iv) 10 percent of the average combined futures and delta-
adjusted option month-end open interest in the contract for the most
recent calendar year up to 50,000 contracts, with a marginal
increase of 2.5 percent of open interest thereafter.
(2) Non-spot month position accountability. For any commodity
derivative contract subject to Sec. 150.5(b), a designated contract
market or swap execution facility that is a trading facility adopts
position accountability, as defined in Sec. 150.1.
(b) [Reserved]
[[Page 3482]]
Appendix G to Part 150--Guidance on Spread Transaction Exemptions
Granted for Contracts that are Subject to Federal Speculative Position
Limits
Positions that comply with Sec. 150.3(a)(2)(i) or (ii) may
exceed Federal speculative position limits, provided that the entity
separately requests a spread transaction exemption from the relevant
exchange's position limits established pursuant to proposed Sec.
150.5(a). The following provides guidance to exchanges and market
participants on the use of spread transaction exemptions granted
pursuant to Sec. 150.5(a). Exchanges and market participants may
also consider this guidance for purposes of spread transaction
exemptions granted pursuant to Sec. 150.5(b). The following
guidance includes recommendations for exchanges and market
participants to consider when granting or relying on spread
transaction exemptions for positions that include referenced
contracts that are subject to Federal speculative position limits.
(a) General guidance on spread transaction exemptions for
referenced contracts. (1) When granting spread transaction
exemptions pursuant to Sec. 150.5(a), an exchange should:
(i) Collect sufficient information from the market participant
to be able to:
(A) Understand the spread strategy, consistent with Sec.
150.5(a)(2)(ii)(A); and
(B) Verify that there is a material economic relationship
between the legs of the spread transaction, consistent with the
requirement in Sec. 150.5(a)(2)(ii)(G) to grant exemptions in
accordance with sound commercial practices;
(ii) Consider whether granting the spread transaction exemption
would, to the maximum extent practicable:
(A) Ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers;
and
(B) Not unduly reduce the effectiveness of Federal speculative
position limits to:
(1) Diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation;
(2) Deter and prevent market manipulations, squeezes, and
corners; and
(3) Ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted;
(iii) Consider implementing safeguards to ensure that when
granting spread transaction exemptions, especially during the spot
period, the exchange is able to comply with all statutory and
regulatory obligations, including the requirements of:
(A) DCM Core Principle 2 and SEF Core Principle 2, as
applicable, to, among other things, prohibit abusive trading
practices on its markets by members and market participants, and
prohibit any other manipulative or disruptive trading practices
prohibited by the Act or Commission regulations;
(B) DCM Core Principle 4 and SEF Core Principle 4, as
applicable, to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the delivery or cash-settlement process through
market surveillance, compliance, and enforcement practices and
procedures;
(C) DCM Core Principle 5 and SEF Core Principle 6, as
applicable, to implement exchange-set position limits in a manner
that reduces the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion; and
(D) DCM Core Principle 12, as applicable, to protect markets and
market participants from abusive practices committed by any party,
including abusive practices committed by a party acting as an agent
for a participant; and to promote fair and equitable trading on the
contract market;
(iv) Ensure that any spread exemption transaction does not
impede convergence or facilitate the formation of artificial prices;
and
(v) Provide a cap or limit on the maximum size of all gross
positions permitted under the spread transaction exemption.
(2) The Commission reminds market participants that when
utilizing a spread transaction exemption, compliance with Federal
speculative position limits or an exemption thereto does not confer
any type of safe harbor or good faith defense to a claim that the
participant has engaged in an attempted or perfected manipulation or
willfully circumvented or evaded speculative position limits,
consistent with the Commission's anti-evasion provision in Sec.
150.2(i).
(b) Guidance on transactions permitted under the spread
transaction definition. (1) The Commission understands that market
participants are generally familiar with the meaning of intra-market
spreads, inter-market spreads, intra-commodity spreads, and inter-
commodity spreads, as those terms are used in the spread transaction
definition in Sec. 150.1. However, for the avoidance of confusion,
the Commission provides the following descriptions of such spread
strategies to assist exchanges in their analysis of whether a spread
position complies with the spread transaction definition. The
Commission generally understands that the following spread
strategies are typically defined as follows:
(i) Intra-market spread means a long (short) position in one or
more commodity derivative contracts in a particular commodity, or
its products or by-products, and a short (long) position in one or
more commodity derivative contracts in the same, or similar,
commodity, or its products or by-products, on the same designated
contract market or swap execution facility.
(ii) Inter-market spread means a long (short) position in one or
more commodity derivative contracts in a particular commodity, or
its products or by-products, at a particular designated contract
market or swap execution facility and a short (long) position in one
or more commodity derivative contracts in that same, or similar,
commodity, or its products or by-products, away from that particular
designated contract market or swap execution facility.
(iii) Intra-commodity spread means a long (short) position in
one or more commodity derivatives contracts in a particular
commodity, or its product or by-products, and a short (long)
position in one or more commodity derivative contracts in the same,
or similar, commodity, or its products or by-products.
(iv) Inter-commodity spread means a long (short) position in one
or more commodity derivatives contracts in a particular commodity,
or its product or by-products, and a short (long) position in one or
more commodity derivative contracts in a different commodity or its
products or by-products.
(2) The following is a non-exhaustive list of spread strategies
that comply with the spread transaction definition in Sec. 150.1:
(i) An inter-market spread transaction in which the legs of the
transaction are futures contracts in the same, or similar commodity,
or its products or its by-products, and same calendar month or
expiration;
(ii) A spread transaction in which one leg is a referenced
contract, as defined in Sec. 150.1, and the other leg is a
commodity derivative contract, as defined in Sec. 150.1, that is
not a referenced contract (including over-the-counter commodity
derivative contracts);
(iii) A spread transaction between a physically-settled contract
and a cash-settled contract;
(iv) A spread transaction between two cash-settled contracts;
and
(v) Spread transactions that are ``legged in,'' that is, carried
out in two steps, or alternatively are ``combination trades,'' that
is, all components of the spread are executed simultaneously or
contemporaneously.
(3) A spread transaction exemption cannot be used to exceed the
conditional spot month limit exemption, in Sec. 150.3(a)(4), for
positions in natural gas.
(4) The spread transaction definition does not include a single
cash-settled agreement, contract or transaction that, by its terms
and conditions:
(i) Simply represents the difference (or basis) between the
settlement price of a referenced contract and the settlement price
of another contract, agreement, or transaction (whether or not a
referenced contract), and
(ii) Does not comprise separate long and short positions.
(5) The spread transaction definition does not include a spread
position involving a commodity index contract and one or more
referenced contracts.
(c) Guidance on cash-and-carry exemptions. The spread
transaction definition in Sec. 150.1 would permit transactions
commonly known as ``cash-and-carry'' trades whereby a market
participant enters a long futures position in the spot month and an
equivalent short futures position in the following month, in order
to guarantee a return that, at minimum, covers the costs of its
carrying charges, such as the cost of financing, insuring, and
storing the physical inventory until the next expiration (including
insurance, storage fees, and financing costs, as well as other costs
such as aging discounts that are specific to individual
commodities). With this exemption, the market participant is able to
take physical delivery of the product in the nearby month and may
redeliver the same product in a deferred month. When determining
whether to grant, and when monitoring, cash-and-carry spread
transaction exemptions, the exchange should consider:
(1) Implementing safeguards to require a market participant
relying on such an exemption to reduce its position below the
speculative Federal position limit within a timely manner once
market prices no longer permit entry into a full carry transaction;
[[Page 3483]]
(2) Implementing safeguards that require market participants to
liquidate all long positions in the nearby contract month before the
price of the nearby contract month rises to a premium to the second
(2nd) contract month; and
(3) Requiring market participants that seek to rely on such
exemption to:
(i) Provide information about their expected cost of carrying
the physical commodity, and the quantity of stocks currently owned
in exchange-licensed warehouses or tank facilities; and
(ii) Agree that before the price of the nearby contract month
rises to a premium to the second (2nd) contract month, the market
participant will liquidate all long positions in the nearby contract
month.
PART 151 [REMOVED AND RESERVED]
0
27. Under the authority of section 8a(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act,
7 U.S.C. 12a(5), remove and reserve part 151.
Issued in Washington, DC, on November 12, 2020, by the
Commission.
Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.
Note: The following appendices will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
Appendices to Position Limits for Derivatives--Commission Voting
Summary, Chairman's Statement, and Commissioners' Statements
Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary
On this matter, Chairman Tarbert and Commissioners Quintenz and
Stump voted in the affirmative. Commissioners Behnam and Berkovitz
voted in the negative.
Appendix 2--Statement of Support of Chairman Heath P. Tarbert
I am very proud to bring to a final vote the Commission's rule
on speculative position limits. Like my fellow Commissioners and so
many who have held these seats before us, I promised during my
confirmation hearing that I would work to finalize this rule. So to
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, to the
market participants who rely on futures markets, and to the American
people, I am pleased to say--promise made, promise kept.
Today, we are removing a cloud that has hung over both the CFTC
and the derivatives markets for a decade. Market participants,
particularly Americans who need these markets to hedge the risks
inherent in their businesses, will finally have regulatory
certainty.
Long Journey of Position Limits
Ralph Waldo Emerson is quoted as saying ``Life is a journey, not
a destination.'' Lucky for him, his journey did not involve position
limits. This rule has been one of the most difficult undertakings in
CFTC history.
The Commission has issued five position limits proposals over
the past 10 years. The first was adopted in 2011, but vacated by the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before it took
effect. One proposal issued in 2013, and two more in 2016, were
never finalized. All told, those four proposals received thousands
of comments from the public--the vast majority of which objected to
the proposals for good reason. Much ink was spilled, and many trees
were felled over those proposals.
Finally, the Commission issued its fifth position limits
proposal in January of this year. Today we will finalize that rule.
But it is important to note we are not completely rejecting prior
attempts. Instead, we build on the good from previous proposals
while recognizing and fixing their shortcomings.
Any position limits rule involves a balancing act. To paraphrase
a famous saying--You can please some of the people all the time, and
all the people some of the time, but--as is certainly the case with
position limits--you can't please all the people all the time.
That is especially true given the three things the Commission is
tasked with balancing for position limits:
1. Whether position limits on a particular contract are more
helpful than harmful;
2. which positions should be subject to the limits and which
should not; and
3. at what levels position limits should be set to allow for
liquid markets but not excessive speculation.
Recognizing Dead Ends
Prior position limits proposals ultimately failed because they
were unable to strike the correct balance on these three points.
First, prior proposals were based on a plausible, but ultimately
unsupportable, interpretation--``the mandate.'' The mandate would
mean there is no balancing test; instead, all futures would be
subject to Federal limits. Given the wide range of futures in our
markets, this approach would require the CFTC to evaluate thousands
of contracts. It also would necessitate limits on everything--
regardless of the benefits those limits would bring or the burdens
they would impose.
Second, prior proposals failed to recognize all the ways that
participants use futures markets to hedge price risks. Agricultural,
energy, and metal futures markets are a vital to American
businesses, which is why Congress explicitly excluded bona fide
hedging positions from position limits. Reading the term bona fide
hedging too broadly risks inviting the wolf of speculative activity
into the market wearing sheep's clothing. Reading it too narrowly
creates the possibility of locking out the businesses that need
these markets to manage their risks. And taking away that ability to
manage risk jeopardizes economic growth.
As a result, the Commission's prior proposals were too
restrictive on what constitutes bona fide hedging. They threw up too
many roadblocks for businesses to access futures markets.
Ultimately, an overly rigid interpretation of bona fide hedging
stood in the way of finalizing a position limits rule.
Finally, prior proposals set limits that were both too low and
too rigid. Those limits did not balance the need for liquidity and
price discovery against the risks of excessive speculation, which is
the real mandate of Congress. The proposed limits were frozen in
time, not budging from limits last updated as far back as 1999.
Getting Back on the Right Path
Recognizing the missteps of the past yields a path to success.
Unlike prior position limits proposals that garnered a library of
negative comment letters, this proposal is overwhelmingly supported
by businesses and trade groups across many facets of our real
economy.
There are several differences that will let today's rule succeed
where others failed.
First, the rule recognizes the limits of limits. Position limits
are one method to combat corners and squeezes, but that does not
mean they are the singular tool that should always be deployed.
Position limits are like a medicine that can help cure a disease,
but also carries potential side effects. That is why Congress told
us to use them only when ``necessary.'' The necessity finding is
like a doctor's prescription--someone needs to evaluate the risks of
the disease against the side effects.
In addition, the rule takes into account market participants'
needs. As I have always said, position limits is the rare case where
the exception is as important as the rule. Today's rule lays out a
robust set of enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions to ensure that
participants in the physical commodity markets can access the
futures markets. Building on the proposal, we have added clarity
around unfixed price transactions and storage.
The rule also acknowledges the different ways people access the
markets. We have streamlined the process for pass-through swap
exemptions, making it easier for dealers to provide liquidity to
commercial users in the swaps market. And the rule clarifies that
someone can take a position during the Commission's 10-day review
period of an exchange-granted, non-enumerated exemption. In short,
we have built a robust set of enumerated exemptions and a workable
non-enumerated exemption process.
The rule also strikes a balance with respect to the limits
themselves. The January proposal included significant increases to
spot and non-spot limits for the legacy agricultural products. Many
commenters were concerned about these increases, particularly for
non-spot limits.
The level of the non-spot limits in the final rule are a
function of the significant growth in the market and the long delay
in making adjustments. Open interest in many of the legacy grains
contracts has doubled or tripled since we last updated position
limits, reflecting the usefulness of these contracts as a benchmark
for cash market transactions and faith in CFTC-regulated markets.
The non-spot limits we are adopting are the same percentage of
today's open interest as the 2011 limits were compared to open
interest back then. Our markets have grown tremendously, and we
cannot expect them to be subject to the same limits they were 10
years ago.
It is important to remember that Federal position limits are a
ceiling, not a floor.
[[Page 3484]]
Exchanges have their own limits, which can be no higher than what we
specify. And exchanges can calibrate those limits quickly to account
for issues with deliverable supply or other cash market issues. As
we have seen play out over the past decade, the CFTC has a difficult
time adjusting position limits. Therefore, exchange-set limits are a
way to fine tune position limits on a particular market within the
outer bounds of the Federal limits. Similar to the process for
granting non-enumerated exemptions, we are leveraging the knowledge
of the exchanges as well as their ability to act more nimbly to
respond to market needs.
Arriving at the Destination
Some of my colleagues may see these features of the final rule
as a flaw. While there are significant departures from prior
proposals, after four failed attempts, that departure is exactly
what we need. The flexibility in the necessity finding, the
exemption process, and the adjusted limits are what make this rule
workable. Otherwise, we are just repeating past mistakes and hoping
for a different result--the very definition of insanity.
So let me conclude by saying that we have come a long way. Today
we have reached the end of an arduous journey. We have learned from
our mistakes and adjusted our approach. We have balanced the
interests of all the participants in these markets--some of which
are in diametric opposition to one another. Most importantly, we
have crafted a workable and flexible system. The rule sets hard
limits, but leverages the flexibility of exchanges to adjust for a
particular market. The rule recognizes the variety of ways that
businesses use these markets to hedge their risks, while recognizing
how vital it is to have a method to address the unknown unknowns.
And the rule acknowledges that position limits are not always
necessary and sets out a solid methodology for determining when they
are.
I again want to thank the CFTC staff and my fellow Commissioners
for their tireless commitment to finishing this journey. I look
forward to voting in favor of this final rule.
Appendix 3--Supporting Statement of Commissioner Brian Quintenz
I am pleased to support the agency's revitalized approach to
position limits. The rulemaking finalized today follows four
proposals since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act \1\ and is, by
far, the strongest of them all. I commend Chairman Tarbert for his
leadership in completing this rulemaking. I am very pleased that
today's final rule echoes the key policy points I outlined in my
remarks before the 2018 Commodity Markets Council State of the
Industry Conference.\2\ The new position limits regime will provide
commercial market participants with sufficient flexibility to hedge
their risks efficiently and will promote liquidity and price
discovery.
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\1\ 76 FR 4752 (Jan. 26, 2011); 78 FR 75680 (Dec. 12, 2013); 81
FR 38458 (June 13, 2016) (``supplemental proposal''); and 81 FR
96704 (Dec. 30, 2016). The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) addresses
position limits in Section (Sec.) 4a (7 U.S.C. 6a).
\2\ Remarks of Commissioner Brian Quintenz before the CMC State
of the Industry 2018 Conference, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz5.
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Today's rule promotes flexibility, certainty, and market
integrity for end-users--farmers, ranchers, energy producers,
transporters, processors, manufacturers, merchandisers, and all who
use physically-settled derivatives to risk manage their exposure to
physical goods. The rule includes an expansive list of enumerated
and self-effectuating bona fide hedge exemptions and spread
exemptions, and a streamlined, exchange-centered process to
adjudicate non-enumerated bona fide hedge exemption requests. I am
pleased that the rule seriously considered the usability of hedging
exemptions, and I thank Commissioner Stump for her leadership on
that point.
In contrast to the Commission's failed proposed rulemakings in
2011, 2013, and 2016, this rule is the most true to the CEA in many
significant respects. It requires, as has long been the Commission's
practice, a necessity finding before imposing limits. It includes
economically equivalent swaps. And, perhaps most importantly, it
balances the interests among promoting liquidity, deterring
manipulation, and ensuring the price discovery function of the
underlying market is not disrupted.\3\ The confluence of these
factors occurs most acutely in the spot month for physically-settled
contracts. In the spot month, price convergence is exceptionally
vulnerable to potential manipulation or disruption due to outsized
positions. By establishing position limits for non-legacy contracts
only in the spot month, the rule elegantly balances the
countervailing policy interests enumerated in the statute.
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\3\ Sec. 4a(a)(3).
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Responding to the Public's Concerns
Through staff's serious consideration of over 70 public
comments, the final rule significantly improves on what appears in
the proposal. Examples of modifications based on public comment
include considerations of gross hedging, price risk, the pass-
through swap exemption, spot month limits for natural gas and
cotton, a special non-spot single-month limit for cotton, spread
exemptions, and the Commission's review of exchange-granted non-
enumerated hedge exemptions.
With regard to enumerated bona fide hedges, the final rule took
into account several suggestions from commenters. The proposed
enumerated hedges were already a significant improvement upon
previously proposed hedge exemptions (for example, eliminating a
mandatory ``five-day rule'' \4\ and no longer conditioning cross-
commodity hedging on a needlessly rigid quantitative test). Now,
under the final rule, the enumerated hedges will be even more
practical. For example, the final rule makes clear that a hedger
with only an unfixed-price cash commodity sale or purchase, but not
an offsetting pair, may rely on one of the three anticipatory
hedges, provided that the other elements of such hedge are also met,
even though the hedger is ineligible to elect the hedge for a pair
of unfixed-price sale and purchase transactions.\5\ The final rule
also makes clear that the new anticipatory merchandising hedge can
be used both by integrated energy firms and by firms that limit
their business to merchandising. Furthermore, the final rule permits
the anticipatory merchandising hedge to now be used in connection
with storage hedges.
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\4\ Previous versions of enumerated hedges had required a hedger
to eliminate positions in excess of position limits during the last
five days of the spot month.
\5\ Preamble discussion of Exemptions from Federal Position
Limits. The hedge for a pair of offsetting unfixed-price
transactions is described in Appendix B, paragraph (a)(3), and the
anticipatory hedges are described in Appendix B, paragraphs (a)(4)-
(6).
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I support the final rule's determination to delay by two years
two important elements that will require significant changes in the
marketplace: The imposition of position limits on swaps economically
equivalent to the referenced futures contracts and the required
unwinding of previously elected risk management exemptions.\6\ It is
prudent to allow for additional time for financial entities to
adjust to these significant new policies.
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\6\ Whereas the general compliance date for the final rule is
January 1, 2022, the compliance date for these two items is January
1, 2023.
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Necessity Finding
Today's rule correctly premises new limits on a finding that
they are necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent the burden on
interstate commerce from extraordinary price movements caused by
excessive speculation (``necessity finding'') in specific contracts,
as Congress has long required in the CEA and its legislative
precursors since 1936.\7\ I am pleased that the rule complies with
the District Court's ruling in the ISDA-position limits litigation:
That the Commission must decide whether Section 4a of the CEA
mandates the CFTC set new limits or only permits the CFTC to set
such limits pursuant to a necessity finding.\8\ As the District
Court noted, ``the Dodd-Frank amendments do not constitute a clear
and unambiguous mandate to set position limits.'' \9\ I agree with
the rule's determination that, when read together, paragraphs (1)
and (2) of Section 4a demand a necessity finding.
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\7\ Sec. 4a(1).
\8\ ISDA et al. v. CFTC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259, 278 and 283-84
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2012).
\9\ Id. at 280.
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Section 4a(a)(2)(A) states that the Commission shall establish
limits ``in accordance with the standards set forth in paragraph (1)
of this subsection.'' \10\ Paragraph (1) establishes the
Commission's
[[Page 3485]]
authority to, ``proclaim and fix such limits on the amounts of
trading . . . as the Commission finds are necessary to diminish,
eliminate or prevent [the] burden'' on interstate commerce caused by
unreasonable or unwarranted price moves associated with excessive
speculation. This language dates back almost verbatim to legislation
passed in 1936, in which Congress directed the CFTC's precursor to
make a necessity finding before imposing position limits. The
Congressional report accompanying the CEA from the 74th Congress
includes the following directive, ``[Section 4a of the CEA] gives
the Commodity Exchange Commission the power, after due notice and
opportunity for hearing and a finding of a burden on interstate
commerce caused by such speculation, to fix and proclaim limits on
futures trading . . .'' \11\ In its ISDA opinion, the District Court
noted the following: ``This text clearly indicated that Congress
intended for the CFTC to make a `finding of a burden on interstate
commerce caused by such speculation' prior to enacting position
limits.'' \12\
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\10\ Sec. 4a(a)(2)(A) (``In accordance with the standards set
forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection and consistent with the
good faith exception cited in subsection (b)(2), with respect to
physical commodities other than excluded commodities as defined by
the Commission, the Commission shall by rule, regulation, or order
establish limits on the amount of positions, as appropriate, other
than bona fide hedge positions, that may be held by any person with
respect to contracts of sale for future delivery or with respect to
options on the contracts or commodities traded on or subject to the
rules of a designated contract market.'')
\11\ H.R. Rep. 74-421, at 5 (1935).
\12\ 887 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (fn 4).
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I support the rule's view that the most natural reading of
Section 4a(a)(2)(A)'s reference to paragraph (1)'s ``standards'' is
that it logically includes the ``necessity'' standard. Paragraph
(1)'s requirement to make a necessity finding, along with the
aggregation requirement, provide substantive guidance to the
Commission about when and how position limits should be implemented.
If Congress intended to mandate that the Commission impose
position limits on all physical commodity derivatives, there is
little reason it would have referred to paragraph (1) and the
Commission's long established practice of necessity findings.
Instead, Congress intended to focus the Commission's attention on
whether position limits should be considered for a broader set of
contracts than the legacy agricultural contracts, but did not
mandate those limits be imposed.
Setting New Limits ``As Appropriate''
The rule determines that position limits are necessary to
diminish, eliminate, or prevent the burden on interstate commerce
posed by unreasonable or unwarranted prices moves that are
attributable to excessive speculation in 25 referenced commodity
markets that each play a crucial role in the U.S. economy.
Conversely, the rule also finds that the contracts on which the
referenced limits are placed are the only contracts which met the
necessity finding. The rule explicitly states that no other
contracts met this test.
I am aware that there is significant skepticism in the
marketplace and among academics as to whether position limits are an
appropriate tool to guard against extraordinary price movements
caused by extraordinarily large position size. Some argue there is
no evidence that excessive speculation currently exists in U.S.
derivatives markets.\13\ Others believe that large and sudden price
fluctuations are not caused by hyper-speculation, but rather by
market participants' interpretations of basic supply and demand
fundamentals.\14\ In contrast, still others believe that outsized
speculative positions, however defined, may aggravate price
volatility, leading to price run-ups or declines that are not fully
supported by market fundamentals.\15\
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\13\ Testimony of Erik Haas (Director, Market Regulation, ICE
Futures U.S.) before the CFTC at 70 (Feb. 26, 2015) (``We point out
the makeup of these markets, primarily to show that any regulations
aimed at excessive speculation is a solution to a nonexistent
problem in these contracts.''), available at: https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/emactranscript022615.pdf.
\14\ BAHATTIN B[Uuml]Y[Uuml]K[Scedil]AHIN & JEFFREY HARRIS,
CFTC, THE ROLE OF SPECULATORS IN THE CRUDE OIL FUTURES MARKET 1, 16-
19 (2009) (``Our results suggest that price changes leads the net
position and net position changes of speculators and commodity swap
dealers, with little or no feedback in the reverse direction. This
uni-directional causality suggests that traditional speculators as
well as commodity swap dealers are generally trend followers.''),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/plstudy_19_cftc.pdf; Testimony of Philip K. Verleger, Jr.
before the CFTC, Aug. 5, 2009 (``The increase in crude prices
between 2007 and 2008 was caused by the incompatibility of
environmental regulations with the then-current global crude supply.
Speculation had nothing to do with the price rise.''), available at:
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/hearing080509_verleger.pdf.
\15\ For a discussion of studies discussing supply and demand
fundamentals and the role of speculation, see 81 FR 96704, 96727
(Dec. 30, 2016). See, e.g., Hamilton, Causes and Consequences of the
Oil Shock of 2007-2008, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity (2009);
Chevallier, Price Relationships in Crude oil Futures: New Evidence
from CFTC Disaggregated Data, Environmental Economics and Policy
Studies (2012).
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In my opinion, one thing is predominately clear: position limits
should not be viewed as a means to counteract long-term directional
price moves. The CFTC is not a price setting agency and we should
not impede the market from reflecting long term supply and demand
fundamentals. A case in point is palladium, the physically-settled
contract which has seen the largest sustained price increase
recently,\16\ and which has also seen its exchange-set position
limit decline four times since 2014 to what is now the smallest
limit of any contract in the referenced contract set.\17\
Nevertheless, between the start of 2018 and the end of 2019,
palladium futures prices rose 76%.\18\ Taking these conflicting
views and facts into account, it is clear the Commission correctly
stated in its 2013 proposal, ``there is a demonstrable lack of
consensus in the [academic] studies'' as to the effectiveness of
position limits.\19\
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\16\ Platinum, gold slide as dollar soars; palladium eases off
record, Reuters (Sept. 30, 2019), available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/global-precious/precious-platinum-gold-slide-as-dollar-soars-palladium-eases-off-record-idUSL3N26L3UV.
\17\ Between 2014 and 2017, the CME Group lowered the spot month
position limit in the contract four times, from 650, to 500, to 400,
to 100, to the current limit of 50 (NYMEX regulation 40.6(a)
certifications, filed with the CFTC, 14-463 (Oct. 31, 2014), 15-145
(Apr. 14, 2015), 15-377 (Aug. 27, 2015), and 17-227 (June 6, 2017)),
available at: https://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=ProductTermsandConditions.
\18\ Palladium futures were at $1,087.35 on Jan. 2, 2018 and at
$1,909.30 on Dec. 31, 2019. Historical prices available at: https://futures.tradingcharts.com/historical/PA_/2009/0/continuous.html.
\19\ 78 FR 75694 (Dec. 12, 2013).
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With that healthy dose of skepticism, and in strict accordance
with the balance of factors which Dodd Frank added to the CEA for
the Commission to consider, I think the rule appropriately focuses
on the time period and contract type where position limits can have
the most positive, and the least negative, impact--the spot month of
physically settled contracts--while also calibrating those limits to
function as just one of many tools in the Commission's regulatory
toolbox that can be used to promote credible, well-functioning
derivatives and cash commodity markets.
Because of the significance of these 25 core referenced futures
contracts to the underlying cash markets, the level of liquidity in
the contracts, as well as the importance of these cash markets to
the national economy, I think it is appropriate for the Commission
to protect the physical delivery process and promote convergence in
these critical commodity markets. Further, the limits issued today
are higher than in the past, notably because the rule utilizes
current estimates of deliverable supply--numbers which haven't been
updated since 1999.\20\
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\20\ 64 FR 24038 (May 5, 1999).
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Taking End-Users Into Account
Perhaps more than any other area of the CFTC's regulations,
position limits directly affect the participants in America's real
economy: Farmers, ranchers, energy producers, manufacturers,
merchandisers, transporters, and other commercial end-users that use
the derivatives market as a risk management tool to support their
businesses. I am pleased that today's rule takes into account many
of the serious concerns that end-users voiced in response to this
rulemaking's proposal, and in response to the CFTC's previous four
unsuccessful position limits proposals.
Importantly, and in response to many comments, this rule, for
the first time, expands the possibility for enterprise-wide
hedging,\21\ (including additional clarification provided in the
proposal in response to comments), establishes an enumerated
anticipated merchandising exemption,\22\ eliminates the ``five-day
rule'' for enumerated hedges,\23\ and no longer requires the filing
of certain cash market information with the Commission that the CFTC
can obtain from exchanges.\24\ Regarding enterprise-wide hedging--
otherwise known as ``gross hedging''--the rule will provide an
energy company, for example, with increased flexibility to hedge
different units of its business separately if those units face
different economic realities. The final rule eliminates the
requirement that exchanges document their justifications when
allowing
[[Page 3486]]
gross hedging; clarifies that market participants are not required
to develop written policies or procedures that set forth when gross
versus net hedging is appropriate; and clarifies that gross hedging
is permissible for both enumerated and non-enumerated hedges.\25\
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\21\ Appendix B, paragraph (a).
\22\ Appendix A, paragraph (a)(6).
\23\ Preamble discussion of Exemptions from Federal Position
Limits.
\24\ Elimination of CFTC Form 204.
\25\ Preamble discussion, Execution Summary, section 6. Legal
Standards for Exemptions from Position Limits.
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With respect to cross-commodity hedging, today's rule completely
rejects the arbitrary, unworkable, ill-informed, and frankly,
ludicrous ``quantitative test'' from the 2013 proposal.\26\ That
test would have required a correlation of at least 0.80 or greater
in the spot markets prices of the two commodities for a time period
of at least 36 months in order to qualify as a cross-hedge.\27\
Under this test, longstanding hedging practices in the electric
power generation and transmission markets would have been
prohibited. Today's rule not only shuns this Government-Knows-Best
approach, it also establishes new flexibility for the cross-
commodity hedging exemption, allowing it to be used in conjunction
with other enumerated hedges, such as hedges of anticipated
merchandising transactions.\28\ For example, an energy marketer
anticipating buying and selling jet fuel to supply airports will be
eligible for a hedge exemption in connection with trading heating
oil futures, a commonly-used cross-commodity hedge for jet fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ 78 FR 75717 (Dec. 12, 2013).
\27\ Id.
\28\ Appendix A, paragraph (a)(11).
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Bona Fide Hedges and Coordination With Exchanges
For those market participants who employ non-enumerated bona
fide hedging practices in the marketplace, the final rule creates a
streamlined, exchange-focused process to approve those requests for
purposes of both exchange-set and Federal limits. I am pleased that
commenters were generally supportive of the proposed process. As the
marketplaces for the core referenced futures contracts addressed by
the proposal, the DCMs have significant experience in, and
responsibility towards, a workable position limits regime. CEA core
principles require DCMs and swap execution facilities to set
position limits, or position accountability levels, for the
contracts that they list in order to reduce the threat of market
manipulation.\29\ DCMs have long administered position limits in
futures contracts for which the CFTC has not set limits, including
in certain agricultural, energy, and metals markets. In addition,
the exchanges have been strong enforcers of their own rules: During
2018 and 2019, CME Group and ICE Futures US concluded 32 enforcement
matters regarding position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ DCM Core Principle 5 (sec. 5 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7)
(implemented by CFTC regulation 38.300) and SEF Core Principle 6
(sec. 5h of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7b-3) (implemented by CFTC regulation
37.600).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of their stewardship of their own position limits
regimes, DCMs have long granted bona fide hedging exemptions in
those markets where there are no Federal limits. Today's final rule
provides what I believe is a workable framework to utilize
exchanges' long standing expertise in granting exemptions that are
not enumerated by CFTC rules.\30\ This rule also recognizes that the
CEA does not provide the Commission with free rein to delegate all
of the authorities granted to it under the statute.\31\ The
Commission itself, through a majority vote of the five
Commissioners, retains the ability to reject an exchange-granted
non-enumerated hedge request within 10 days of the exchange's
approval.\32\ The Commission has successfully and responsibly used a
similar process for both new contract listings as well as exchange
rule filings, and I am pleased to see the final rule expand that
approach to non-enumerated hedge exemption requests that will limit
the uncertainty for bone fide commercial market participants.
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\30\ Regulation 150.9.
\31\ Preamble discussion of regulation 150.9, including
references to cases pointing out the extent to which an agency can
delegate to persons outside of the agency.
\32\ Regulation 150.9(e)(6).
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Limits on Swaps
The CEA requires the Commission to consider limits not only on
exchange-traded futures and options, but also on ``economically
equivalent'' swaps.\33\ Today's final rule provides the market with
far greater certainty on the universe of such swaps than the
previous proposed rulemakings. Prior proposals failed to
sufficiently explain what constituted an ``economically equivalent
swap,'' thereby ensuring that compliance with position limits was
essentially unworkable, given real-time aggregation requirements and
ambiguity over in-scope contracts. In stark contrast, today's rule
narrows the scope of ``economically equivalent'' swaps to those with
material contractual specifications, terms, and conditions that are
identical to exchange-traded contracts.\34\ For example, in order
for a swap to be considered ``economically equivalent'' to a
physically-settled core referenced futures contract, that swap would
also have to be physically-settled, because settlement type is
considered a material contractual term. I believe the narrowly-
tailored definition included in today's rule will provide market
participants with clarity over those contracts subject to position
limits. I think it is prudent that the final rule took commenters'
concerns about updating compliance systems into account by delaying
for an additional year, beyond the general compliance date of
January 1, 2022, that is until January 1, 2023, the imposition of
position limits on economically equivalent swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Sec. 4a(5).
\34\ Regulation 150.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
During my confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Committee
on Agriculture, Forestry and Nutrition on July 27, 2017, I was asked
to directly commit to finalizing a position limits rule. My response
was brief, but unquestionable: ``Yes, I commit to support finalizing
a position limits rule.'' Making such a commitment to a committee of
the U.S. Congress in sworn testimony is something I take very
seriously, second only to taking my oath to defend the Constitution
of the United States. With today's vote, I am very pleased to have
made good on that commitment three years in the making and am even
more proud of the product with which I was able to fulfill it.
Appendix 4--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rostin Behnam
Introduction
The last time we gathered as a Commission to discuss position
limits I used some of my time to speak a bit about the award winning
movie, Ford v. Ferrari.\1\ At that point, we were nearing the airing
of the 92nd Academy Awards and this action-packed drama had earned
four nominations--not to mention the distinction of being one of the
few films I actually saw in a theater. For those of you who have not
found it in one of your quarantine movie queues, Ford v. Ferrari
tells the true story of American car designer Carroll Shelby and
British-born driver Ken Miles who built a race car for Ford Motor
Company--the GT40--and competed with Enzo Ferrari's dominating,
iconic red racing cars at the 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans.\2\ I used
the film and racing metaphors throughout my speaking and written
statements to highlight serious concerns that the proposed
amendments to the CFTC rules addressing position limits (the
``Proposal'') signified yet one more instance where the Commission
seemed to be comfortable with deferring core, congressionally
mandated duties to others and calling it a victory.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Statement of Dissent by Commissioner Rostin Behnam Regarding
Position Limits for Derivatives; Proposed Rule, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/behnamstatement013020 (the
``Dissent'').
\2\ Ford v Ferrari, Fox Movies, https://www.foxmovies.com/movies/ford-v-ferrari (Last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
\3\ Dissent.
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We are here today to finalize the Proposal.\4\ In just short of
nine months, we have come to terms with life during a global
pandemic complete with economic turmoil and pockets of historic
market volatility. Amid the mere 60-day open comment period
following the Proposal's publication in the Federal Register
(graciously extended by 16 days to May 15th in light of the pandemic
\5\), on April 20th, the price of the West Texas Intermediate crude
oil futures contract (``WTI contract''), a key benchmark in the
energy and financial markets, experienced an unprecedented collapse
one day prior to the last day of trading and expiration for May
delivery.\6\ Defying market mechanics, the
[[Page 3487]]
price of the contract fell from $17.73 per barrel at market open, to
a closing settlement price of negative $37.63--with the price
dropping approximately $40 in the last 20 minutes of trading.\7\
And, while we are still in recovery, with great fanfare after almost
10 years, the Commission is going to establish the position limits
regime required under the Dodd-Frank Act. I am reminded again of Ken
who, at the 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans, went against his gut, giving
way and leaving behind a milestone in car racing that to this day
remains elusive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Position Limits for Derivatives, 85 FR 11596 (Feb. 27,
2020).
\5\ See Press Release Number 8146-20, CFTC, CFTC Extends Certain
Comment Periods in Response to COVID-19 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8146-20; Extension of Currently
Open Comment Periods for Rulemakings in Response to the COVID-19
Pandemic, 85 FR 22690, 22691 (Apr. 23, 2020).
\6\ See Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz on Recent
Trading in the WTI Futures Contract before the Energy and
Environmental Markets Advisory Committee Meeting (May 7, 2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement050720.
\7\ See Bloomberg News, The 20 Minutes that Broke the U.S. Oil
Market, Bloomberg (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-25/the-20-minutes-that-broke-the-u-s-oil-market?sref=DzeLiNol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you have not seen the movie, this is a spoiler alert: Ken did
not win Le Mans in '66. While he was one and a half laps ahead of
two other GT40s, he was given orders to slow down so that the three
Fords in the lead would cross the finish line in a dead heat
formation. Ken lost his well-deserved win because the 24 Hours of Le
Mans awards the victory to the car that covers the greatest distance
in 24 hours. In the event of a tie, the rules provided that the car
that had started farther down the grid had traveled the greater
distance. Ken's GT 40 had started in the grid roughly 60 feet ahead
of the GT40 driven by Bruce McLaren and Chris Amon, who were the
declared winners.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Press Release, Ford Division News Bureau, For Immediate
Release at 8 (July 5, 1966), made available in PDF at Wikipedia, the
Free Encyclopedia, 1966 24 Hours of Le Mans, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_24_Hours_of_Le_Mans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the film, Ken seems to accept his loss with quiet dignity.
However, in reality he was fully aware that in many respects, he had
been robbed. From what I've read, Ken likely articulated his
feelings a bit more colorfully.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Matthew Phelan, What's Fact and What's Fiction in Ford v.
Ferrari, Slate (Nov. 18, 2019), https://slate.com/culture/2019/11/ford-v-ferrari-fact-vs-fiction-le-mans-ken-miles.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The point is that bringing something across the finish line
doesn't always equate to a success. As detailed in my questions
today, I believe that by going against our Congressional mandate and
clear statutory intent by overly deferring to the exchanges, we have
relinquished a claim to victory in this final position limits rule
which in many ways has itself felt like the CFTC's version of the 24
hours of Le Mans. Therefore, I will go with my gut and not be part
of the formation in supporting this final rule.
A Long Road, But a Fast Finish
It has been nine years since the Commission first set out to
establish the position limits regime required by amendments to
section 4a of the Commodity Exchange Act (the ``Act'' or ``CEA'')
\10\ under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010.\11\ While today's final rule purports to respect
Congressional intent and the purpose and language of CEA section 4a,
in reality, it pushes the bounds of reasonable interpretation by
overly deferring to the exchanges \12\ and allowing them to take the
lead in administering a position limits regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 FR 4752 (proposed
Jan. 26, 2011) (the ``2011 Proposal'').
\11\ The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Public Law 111-203 sec. 737, 124 Stat. 1376, 1722-25 (2010)
(the ``Dodd-Frank Act'').
\12\ Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the term
``exchanges'' throughout this statement refers to designated
contract markets (``DCMs'') and swap execution facilities
(``SEFs'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In passing the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress understood that for the
derivatives markets in physical commodities to perform optimally,
there needed to be limits on the amount of control exerted by a
single person (or persons acting in agreement). In fact, Congress
has understood this need since at least 1936, when it first
authorized the Commission's predecessor to impose limits on
speculative positions in order to prevent the harms caused by
excessive speculation. In tasking the Commission with establishing
limits and the framework around their operation, Congress was aware
of our relationship with the exchanges, but nevertheless opted for
our experience and our expertise to meet the policy objectives of
the Act.
Last January, as the Commission voted on the Proposal that is
being finalized today, I warned that we seemed to be pushing to go
faster and just get to the finish line, making real-time adjustments
without regard to even trying for that ``perfect lap.'' \13\ Just
nine months later, nothing has changed. If anything, we seem to be
further prioritizing just crossing the finish line over achieving a
rule that actually follows Congressional intent and its first order
priority: Protecting market participants from excessive speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Dissent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Letting the Exchanges Make the Call
As I argued in regard to the proposal, my principal disagreement
is with the Commission's determination to in effect disregard the
tenets supporting the statutorily created parallel Federal and
exchange-set position limit regime, and take a back seat when it
comes to administration and oversight.\14\ Like Ken Miles, the
Commission is relinquishing a rightful lead in an act of deference.
In doing so, the Commission claims victory for recognizing that the
exchanges are better positioned in terms of resources, information,
knowledge, and agility, and therefore ought to take the wheel. While
this may seem like the logical move, it ignores that even if we
operate as a team, our incentives and interests are not fully
aligned. Based on consideration of the Commission's mission, and
Congressional intent as evinced in the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to
CEA section 4a and elsewhere in the Act, I continue to believe that
(1) the Commission is required to establish position limits based on
its reasoned and expert judgment within the parameters of the Act;
(2) the Commission has not provided a rational basis for its
determination not to establish Federal limits outside of the spot
month for referenced contracts based on commodities other than the
nine legacy agricultural commodities; and (3) the Commission's
seemingly unlimited flexibility in deciding to (a) significantly
broaden the bona fide hedging definition, (b) codify an expanded
list of self-effectuating enumerated bona fide hedges, and (c)
provide for exchange recognition of non-enumerated bona fide hedge
exemptions with respect to Federal limits, is both inexplicably
complicated to parse and inconsistent with Congressional intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not only does the final version of the rule fail to address
these deficiencies in the proposal, it actually goes and makes many
of these issues worse.
Ignoring a Mandate
Like the proposal, this final rule goes to great lengths to
reconcile whether CEA section 4a(a)(2)(A) requires the Commission to
make an antecedent necessity finding before establishing any
position limit,\15\ with the implication that if a necessity finding
is required, then the Commission could rationalize imposing no
limits at all. Looking back at the record, what is necessary is that
the Commission complies with the mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act.\16\
In the 2011 Proposal, the Commission provided a review of CEA
section 4a(a)--interpreting the various provisions, giving effect to
each paragraph, acknowledging the Commission's own informational and
experiential limitations regarding the swaps markets at that time,
and focusing on the Commission's primary mission of fostering fair,
open and efficient functioning of the commodity derivatives
markets.\17\ Of note, ``Critical to fulfilling this statutory
mandate,'' the Commission pronounced, ``is protecting market users
and the public from undue burdens that may result from `excessive
speculation.' '' \18\ Federal position limits, as predetermined by
Congress, are most certainly the only means towards addressing the
burdens of excessive speculation when such limits must address a
``proliferation of economically equivalent instruments trading in
multiple trading venues.'' \19\ Exchange-set position limits or
accountability levels simply cannot meet the mandate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Final Rule at III.
\16\ The Commission's analysis in support of its denial of a
mandate misconstrues form over substance and assumes the answer it
is looking for. The Commission seems to suggest that it is free to
ignore a Congressional mandate if it determines that Congress is
wrong about the underlying policy. See Final Rule at III.A.
\17\ 76 FR at 4752-4754.
\18\ Id. at 4753.
\19\ Id. at 4754-4755.
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In exercising its authority, the Commission may evaluate whether
exchange-set position limits, accountability provisions, or other
tools for contracts listed on such exchanges are currently in place
to protect against manipulation, congestion, and price
distortions.\20\ Such an evaluation--while permissible--is just one
factor for consideration. The existence of exchange-set limits or
accountability levels, on their own, can neither predetermine
deference nor be justified absent substantial consideration. As I
argued in my dissenting statement regarding
[[Page 3488]]
the Proposal, the authority and jurisdiction of individual exchanges
are necessarily different than that of the Commission. They do not
always have congruent interests to the Commission in monitoring
instruments that do not trade on or subject to the rules of their
particular platform or the market participants that trade them. They
do not have the attendant authority to determine key issues such as
whether a swap performs or affects a significant price discovery
function, or what instruments fit into the universe of economically
equivalent swaps. They are not permitted to define bona fide hedging
transactions or grant exemptions for purposes of Federal position
limits. It is therefore clear that CEA section 4a, as amended by the
Dodd-Frank Act ``warrants extension of Commission-set position
limits beyond agricultural products to metals and energy
commodities.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See 76 FR at 4755.
\21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``If it ain't broke, don't fix it''
In spite of all of this--the foregoing mandate; the clear
Congressional intent in CEA section 4a(a)(3)(A); and the
Commission's real experience and expertise (including its unique
data repository)--the Commission's final rule only maintains Federal
non-spot month limits for the nine legacy agricultural contracts
(with questionably appropriate modifications), ``because the
Commission has observed no reason to eliminate them.'' \22\
Essentially, the Commission concludes: ``if it ain't broke, don't
fix it.'' In keeping with this relatively riskless course of action,
the Commission similarly concludes that Federal non-spot month
limits are not necessary for the remaining 16 proposed core
referenced futures contracts identified in the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Final Rule at II.B.2.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In so doing, the Commission ignores Congressional intent. The
Commission never considers that Congress directed the Commission to
establish limits--not accountability levels. The Commission's
observation that exchange-set accountability levels have
``functioned as-intended'' until this point in time ignores the
wider purpose and function of aggregate position limits established
by the Commission, and is shortsighted given the ever expanding
universe of economically equivalent instruments trading across
multiple trading venues. As I pointed out in my dissenting statement
regarding the Proposal, it seems odd to conclude that Congress
envisioned that its painstaking amendments to CEA section 4a were a
directive for the Commission to check the box that the current
system is working perfectly.
Hedging on Bona Fide Hedging
Today's Final Rule provides for significantly broader bona fide
hedging opportunities that will be largely self-effectuating, and
the Commission defers to the exchanges in recognizing non-enumerated
bona fide hedging. While I support enhancing the cooperation between
the Commission and the exchanges, the Commission here is cooperating
by dropping back. The Commission's decision to essentially give up
primary authority to recognize non-enumerated bona fide hedges seems
both careless and inconsistent with Congressional intent.
I raised these concerns last January when we voted on the
Position Limits Proposal. Unfortunately, rather than retaking the
lead, the Commission further cedes authority to the exchanges. The
Proposal provided the Commission with the authority to reject an
exchange's grant of non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition, and
provided a window of ten business days (or two in the case of sudden
or unforeseen circumstances) for the Commission to make this
determination. I pointed out in my dissent that this did not give
the Commission nearly enough time or guidance to properly make a
determination. In today's Final Rule, the Commission actually
further reduces its ability to make an independent determination.
Now, market participants will be able to establish positions based
upon an exchange's non-enumerated bona fide hedge recognition during
the Commission's 10-day review period, and the Commission cannot
determine that the person holding the position has committed a
position limits violation during the Commission's ongoing review or
upon issuing its determination. This reduces the Commission's review
to an ineffectual afterthought.
Trust the Process
A clear theme in my statements regarding our many rules over the
last few years is this: Process matters. Sharing our viewpoints with
the public matters. Following the Administrative Procedure Act,\23\
and giving the public an opportunity for meaningful comment on our
proposals, matters. We are at our best when we involve all five
Commissioners and our many stakeholders in the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to thank the Chairman for consistently providing the
Commissioners with drafts of proposed and final rules 30 days in
advance of an open meeting. I believe there have only been two major
exceptions over the course of our many laps in the last year: The
position limits proposal, and the position limits final rule. In the
case of the final rule, we did not receive a full draft until last
Friday--six days before the open meeting. This simply is not enough
time for the Commission to engage in a fulsome discussion of the
merits of the rule, and makes the final rule more or less a fait
accompli. Perhaps most perplexing is that we did not receive a draft
of the cost benefit considerations until two weeks ago. This is
literally a rule where a prior iteration resulted in a court
challenge--one that the Commission lost.\24\ If ever a rule required
more consideration by the Commission itself, this would seem to be
it. Instead, the Commissioners actually had less time to review and
consider the rule than we normally do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When we focus on just getting to the finish line, and do not
take the time for meaningful consideration and dialogue, we risk
failing to take into account everything that we should in our
rulemakings. Subsequent to the issuance of the Position Limits
Proposal, there was a major market event resulting from the ongoing
pandemic that may have important implications for our position
limits regime. As the NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil (CL) contract,
also known as the WTI contract, neared expiration in April 2020, the
contract experienced extreme volatility, with the market trading
below zero for the first time. The Commission received at least
eight comments that addressed this event; a number of commenters
noted that the extreme volatility was driven by speculators. The
speculators, unable to physically deliver upon expiration for
various reasons, had no choice but to exit the contract at whatever
price was available. Commission staff continues to review and
analyze this event, and the rule today recognizes that the analysis
may impact the rule itself. Today's preamble states: ``The
Commission will continue to analyze the events of April 20 to
evaluate whether any changes to the position limits regulations may
be warranted in light of the circumstances surrounding the
volatility in the WTI contract.''\25\ This begs the question--if the
Commission is currently in the midst of this analysis, why not wait
to finalize position limits until the analysis is complete?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Final Rule at I.G.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
Before concluding, I want to acknowledge and thank the
Commission staff who worked on the Proposal, today's final rule, and
every related study, matter, and undertaking to support it for the
better part of 10 years. You were the design team, the engineers,
the production team and the pit crew. You kept us on course at a
pace set by our Chairman, and you have performed at the top of your
field.
Back in '66, by holding back, Ken Miles lost the win at Le Mans,
which denied him the ``Triple Crown'' of endurance racing: The 24
Hours of Daytona, the 12 Hours of Sebring, and the 24 Hours of Le
Mans. No driver has won all three races in the same year,\26\ and
Ken missed out because he was part of a team and Ford had been good
to him.\27\ He committed and moved forward without the victory that
should have been his because he was the best driver that day. I am
committed to vote and move forward, even if it means giving up the
triple crown of the day. But I will not go against my gut.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Martin Raffauf, Porsche and the Triple Crown of endurance
racing, Porsche Road & Race (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.porscheroadandrace.com/porsche-and-the-triple-crown-of-endurance-racing/.
\27\ Phelan, supra note 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix 5--Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump Overview
With all that has transpired in our country and in our lives
this year, it feels like ages ago that we gathered together in
person to consider proposing amendments to update the Commission's
rules regarding position limits back at the end of January. At the
time,
[[Page 3489]]
I said that there were three guideposts by which I would evaluate
that proposal: First, is it reasonable in design? Second, is it
balanced in approach? And third, is it workable in practice for both
market participants and for the Commission?
Since I believed the answer to each of these questions was yes,
I supported issuing the proposal. And by and large, my belief has
been confirmed by the comments we received from those who trade in
this country's derivatives markets. In the months since January, we
have heard from all corners of the marketplace--agricultural
interests, energy interests, managed fund advisors, and dealers that
provide liquidity, to name a few--that have voiced support for the
fundamental architecture of the position limits framework that we
proposed. Their support stands in stark contrast to the serious
concerns they had expressed about the several previous position
limit proposals put forward by the Commission during the past
decade.
Of course, each interest had its issues with one aspect or
another in the proposal. That is to be expected, given the varied
and sometimes divergent objectives for our position limit rules set
out in the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'').\1\ Congress has tasked
us with adopting position limits that: (1) On the one hand,
diminish, eliminate or prevent excessive speculation in derivatives
and deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners;
while on the other hand, and simultaneously (2) ensuring sufficient
market liquidity for bona fide hedgers and ensuring that the price
discovery function of the underlying market is not disrupted and
does not shift to foreign competitors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CEA Section 4a(a), 7 U.S.C. 6a(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reasonable minds will always differ as to exactly where to draw
the line among these statutory objectives. But while we must always
strive for perfection, we cannot permit that aspiration to paralyze
us from acting to improve our rule sets. The final position limit
rules before us smooth some of the rough edges in the proposal, and
they address the areas in which I expressed some misgivings at the
time. They incorporate valuable input we have received from the
exchanges that operate the markets and the businesses that trade in
those markets.
And above all, the final rulemaking is reasonable in design,
balanced in approach, and workable in practice. For these reasons, I
am pleased to support it.
Bona Fide Hedging and Spread Transactions: Policy and Process
In commenting on the proposal in January, I noted two areas that
I felt could be improved: (1) The list of enumerated bona fide
hedging transactions and positions; and (2) the process for
reviewing hedging transactions outside of that list. I want to
briefly address each of these concerns, in turn.
Enumerated Bona Fide Hedges
The CEA prohibits the Commission from adopting position limit
rules that apply to bona fide hedging transactions or positions, as
such terms are defined by the Commission. It gives the Commission
the authority to define the term ``bona fide hedging transactions
and positions'' to ``permit producers, purchasers, sellers,
middlemen, and users of a commodity or a product derived therefrom
to hedge their legitimate anticipated business needs . . .'' \2\
Congress thereby recognized the critical function of our derivatives
markets in enabling those whom we all depend upon to deliver goods
and services to hedge their risks--both risks they currently bear as
well as those they reasonably anticipate.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ CEA Section 4a(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1).
\3\ The CEA provides that a bona fide hedging transaction or
position is one that, among other things, ``is economically
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management
of a commercial enterprise.'' CEA Section 4a(c)(2)(A)(ii), 7 U.S.C.
6a(c)(2)(A)(ii). The Commission's policy in administering Federal
position limits in the agricultural sector over the years has been
to limit this economically appropriate test to the hedging of price
risk. However, as set forth in the final rulemaking release, the
Commission acknowledges, consistent with that historical policy,
that price risk can be impacted by various non-price risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's proposal recognized this as well, as it
expanded the list of ``enumerated'' bona fide hedging transactions
that are identified in our current rules. Positions taken as a
result of these enumerated hedging transactions constitute bona fide
hedging, and therefore are not subject to Federal speculative
position limits. This expansion of the list of enumerated bona fide
hedges is entirely appropriate (indeed, it is long overdue). Hedging
practices at companies that produce, process, trade, and use
agricultural, energy, and metals commodities have become far more
sophisticated, complex, and global over time, and the Commission's
list of enumerated hedging practices to which its position limit
rules do not apply has failed to keep pace with these realities.
And given Congress' recognition of the appropriateness of
hedging legitimate anticipated business needs,\4\ the proposal also
added, at my request, anticipatory merchandising as an enumerated
bona fide hedge. There is no policy basis for distinguishing hedging
risks of anticipated merchandising from hedging risks of other
activities in the physical supply chain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ CEA Section 4a(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1). See also CEA
Section 4a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I), 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (bona fide
hedging transaction or position is a transaction or position that,
among other things, ``arises from the potential change in the value
of . . . assets that a person owns, produces, manufactures,
processes, or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing,
manufacturing, processing, or merchandising . . .'' (emphasis
added)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, I was concerned in January that our proposed list of
enumerated bona fide hedges still might not be as robust as it
should be. We needed input on this question from market
participants--especially those in the energy and metals sectors
where we are applying Federal position limits for the first time.
And that input was nearly unanimous in recommending that hedging the
risk of unfixed-price forward transactions be added to the list of
enumerated bona fide hedges.
Hedges of offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity sales and
purchases have historically been recognized as an enumerated bona
fide hedge under our rules, and that was carried over in the
proposal, too. These are hedges of risk incurred where a market
participant has both bought and sold the underlying cash commodity
at unfixed prices. We received many comments, though, urging us to
include as an enumerated bona fide hedge those situations in which
the purchase or sale, but not both, is an unfixed-price forward
transaction. Some commenters asked that the historical enumerated
hedge for offsetting unfixed-price cash commodity sales and
purchases be expanded to cover unfixed-price cash commodity sales or
purchases; others asked the Commission to create a new, stand-alone
enumerated bona fide hedge category for these unfixed-price
transactions. The final rulemaking concludes that neither step is
necessary because, as suggested by still other commenters,
commercial market participants may qualify for one of the enumerated
anticipatory bona fide hedges that will be available, to the extent
of their demonstrated anticipated need.\5\
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\5\ These enumerated anticipatory bona fide hedges include: (1)
The existing enumerated bona fide hedge for unsold anticipated
production; (2) the existing enumerated bona fide hedge for
anticipated requirements; and (3) the new enumerated bona fide hedge
established in this rulemaking for anticipated merchandising.
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Spread Transactions
Although the treatment of spread transactions for purposes of
Federal position limits is distinct from the treatment of bona fide
hedging transactions, I would like to take a short detour to note an
important similarity between the two. That is, we also received
numerous comments suggesting that the proposed definition of a
spread transaction, which would be exempt from Federal position
limits, was too narrow.
At the suggestion of commenters, the final rulemaking adds the
well-established categories of intra-market, inter-market, and
intra-commodity spreads to the list of defined spreads that fall
outside the Federal position limits regime. The release notes that
as a result, the spread transaction definition captures most, if not
all, spread exemptions currently granted by exchanges and used by
market participants. The rulemaking appropriately recognizes that
these spread positions simply do not raise the type of concerns that
position limits are intended to address.
The Non-Enumerated Bona Fide Hedge Recognition Process
Getting the list of enumerated bona fide hedges right is
important because they are ``self-effectuating'' for purposes of
Federal position limits. In other words, a trader need not count
positions that result from enumerated bona fide hedging transactions
towards the Federal position limits, and does not need to apply to
the Commission for approval (although the trader still must receive
approval from the relevant exchange to exceed exchange-set limits).
Other hedging practices, generally referred to as ``non-
enumerated'' hedges, can still be
[[Page 3490]]
recognized as bona fide hedging, but only after a review process. A
trader can either ask the exchange and the Commission to separately
review and approve the proposed non-enumerated hedging activity for
purposes of exchange and Federal limits, respectively, or it can
follow what the rulemaking calls a ``streamlined'' process. Under
that process, if an exchange recognizes a non-enumerated transaction
as a bona fide hedge for purposes of the exchange's position limits,
the Commission would then review the exchange's bona fide hedge
recognition for application to Federal limits as well. The
Commission must notify the exchange and market participant of any
denial within 10 business days, or 2 business days in the case of an
application based on a sudden or unforeseen increase in the trader's
bona fide hedging needs (although that timeline can be extended if
the Commission issues a stay or requests additional information).
In January, I expressed reservations about whether this 10/2-day
process would be workable in practice for either market participants
or the Commission because it appeared to be both too long and too
short: (1) Too long to be workable for market participants that may
need to take a hedge position quickly; and (2) too short for the
Commission to meaningfully review the relevant circumstances related
to the exchange's recognition of the hedge as bona fide. But while
some commenters took the ``too long'' view and others took the ``too
short'' view, the majority of commenters were generally supportive
of this process.
The final rulemaking adopts the 10/2-day process, with an
adjustment recommended by several commenters as well as participants
in a meeting of the Commission's Energy and Environmental Markets
Advisory Committee (``EEMAC'') \6\ that discussed the position
limits proposal. That is, the final rulemaking now provides that a
trader can exceed Federal limits based on the exchange's approval of
the non-enumerated hedge while the Commission is conducting its
assessment. This is not a delegation of authority to the exchange,
since the Commission will still make the final determination whether
positions resulting from the non-enumerated hedging transaction
should count towards Federal position limits. Thus, a trader that
exceeds Federal limits in reliance on the initial exchange
determination runs the risk that the Commission will later deny the
requested non-enumerated hedge. In that event, the trader will have
to reduce the position to come into compliance with limits within a
commercially reasonable period of time.
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\6\ See, e.g., Transcript of CFTC Energy and Environmental
Markets Advisory Committee Meeting at 103:14-17, Comment by Thomas
LaSala, CME Group (May 7, 2020) (``the Commission should permit a
participant to exceed Federal position limits during the 10-day/2-
day Commission review period of an exchange-granted exemption''),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020/06/1591218221/eemactranscript050720.pdf.
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Is it a perfect process? It is not. My preference would have
been that recognition of non-enumerated hedges be the responsibility
of the exchanges, which are most familiar with both their own
markets and the hedging practices of participants in those markets.
The Commission, in turn, has the tools it needs to monitor this
process through its routine, ongoing review of the exchanges. But
those who participate in the markets have generally expressed the
view that this is a reasonable, balanced, and workable process. And
so, I support it.
Response to Commenter Objections
Before concluding, I would like to briefly respond to a couple
of points raised by commenters that were critical of the proposed
position limit rules. Some commenters argued that: (1) The
amendments to the CEA's position limit provisions that were enacted
as part of the Dodd-Frank Act \7\ constitute a mandate for the
Commission to establish Federal position limits without having to
make an antecedent finding that such limits are necessary to achieve
the CEA's objectives; and (2) the rules we are adopting improperly
abdicate Commission responsibilities with respect to Federal
position limits to the exchanges.
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\7\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Public Law 111-203 (2010) (``Dodd-Frank Act'').
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The Commission's Mandate To Impose Position Limits it Finds Are
Necessary
As I read the statute, the CEA's position limit provisions, as
amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, mandate the Commission to impose
position limits that it finds are necessary. The basis for my view
is set out in detail in my Statement in support of the proposal last
January, which included an explanatory graphic. Both of these
documents are available on the Commission's website for those who
are interested,\8\ and so I will not repeat that analysis here.
Suffice it to say, though, that I have not seen anything in the
comment letters we received that changes my view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump Regarding
Proposed Rule: Position Limits for Derivatives (January 30, 2020),
and Commodity Exchange Act Sec. 4a(a): Finding Position Limits
Necessary is a Prerequisite to the Mandate for Establishing Such
(January 30, 2020), available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/stumpstatement013020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Role of the Exchanges
I fundamentally disagree with the suggestion that the amended
position limit rules that we are adopting in any way reflect an
inappropriate reliance by the Commission on the exchanges. My
disagreement is rooted in several considerations.
First, the CEA itself states without limitation that it is the
purpose of the CEA to serve the public interests described in the
statute ``through a system of effective self-regulation of trading
facilities, clearing systems, market participants and market
professionals under the oversight of the Commission.'' \9\ This is
an overarching statement of purpose by Congress, and is the lens
through which all other provisions of the CEA--including its
position limit provisions--must be interpreted. And nothing in the
amendments to those position limit provisions enacted as part of the
Dodd-Frank Act indicate otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ CEA Section 3(b), 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the rules we are adopting do not delegate any authority
of the Commission to the exchanges. With respect to applications for
non-enumerated bona fide hedges in particular, the Commission will
be informed by an exchange's determination whether to recognize the
hedge for purposes of exchange-set limits. But the determination
whether to do so with respect to Federal limits is the Commission's
alone to make, and a trader who trades in reliance on an exchange
determination risks having to reduce the position if the Commission
subsequently disagrees with the exchange's determination.
Third, the exchanges know their markets.\10\ They have a
comprehensive understanding of the traders that participate in those
markets as well as current hedging practices in agricultural,
energy, and metals commodities. Indeed, the expertise of the
exchanges makes them uniquely well-suited to make the initial
determination on requests for non-enumerated bona fide hedges in
real-time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ It is notable that, due to certain trading dynamics unique
to natural gas contracts, including the existence of liquid cash-
settled contracts trading on three different exchanges, the final
rulemaking for the Federal conditional spot-month limit is derived
from the existing exchange framework that has been in place for
approximately a decade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, I return once again to my foundational principles:
Reasonable, balanced, and workable. A system in which a business
must put its economic needs and risk management efforts on hold
while the Commission undertakes to learn about its operations and
hedging activities in order to pass upon a request for a non-
enumerated bona fide hedge violates all three principles.
Conclusion
After nearly a decade of trying, we stand on the cusp of
amending the Commission's position limit rules, which are sorely in
need of updating. Before us is a thorough and well-reasoned final
rulemaking release that considers the extensive comments we
received, and clearly presents the Commission's rationale in
addressing those comments and adopting the rules in the form that we
are adopting them. The fact that this release is before us less than
nine months after we issued the proposal--in the midst of a
pandemic, no less--is a tribute to the dedication, perseverance, and
analytical capabilities of the professionals in the Commission's
Division of Market Oversight, Office of General Counsel, and Chief
Economist's Office. Their work on this rulemaking has been nothing
short of amazing.
My fellow Commissioners and I have each publicly committed that
we would work to finish a position limits rulemaking. The time has
come to fulfill that commitment. The release that staff has
presented is reasonable in design, balanced in approach, and
workable for both market participants and the Commission. I am
pleased to support it.
[[Page 3491]]
Appendix 6--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz
I. Introduction
I dissent from today's position limits final rule (``Final
Rule''). The Final Rule fails to achieve the most fundamental
objective of position limits: To prevent the harms arising from
excessive speculation. It is another disappointing chapter in the
Commission's 10-year saga to implement Congress's mandate in the
Dodd-Frank Act to impose speculative position limits in the energy,
metals, and agricultural markets. In a number of instances, the
Final Rule appears more intent on limiting the actions and
discretion of the Commission than it does on actually limiting such
speculation.
As I previously observed, the proposed rule demoted the
Commission from head coach to Monday-morning quarterback. The Final
Rule declares that the players on the field are the referees. In
this arena, the public interest loses.
I support effective position limits to restrain excessive
speculation in physical commodity markets, coupled with legitimate
bona fide hedge exemptions for commercial market participants. The
Final Rule, however, fails to address excessive speculation in
several key respects:
First, the Final Rule impermissibly permits private entities to
devise new bona fide hedge exemptions, while simultaneously
constricting the Commission's review and enforcement of such
privately-created exemptions.
Second, the Final Rule fails to address trading at settlement
(``TAS'') transactions. The potential for market manipulation
through the use of TAS is well documented. The Final Rule was a
valuable but wasted opportunity to address an important type of
transaction in many commodity markets that, if abused, can present
risks to orderly trading and price discovery.
Third, while the Final Rule eliminates the risk management
exemptions that had been granted to a limited number of index funds,
it also increases the non-spot month limits to accommodate the
speculative positions of these funds in the futures markets.
Cumulatively, index funds can have a substantial price impact and
exacerbate volatility. Their monthly position rolls can also distort
inter-month spreads. Yet the Commission performed no assessment of
the impact of potential increases in this type of speculation that
these higher limits would permit.\1\
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\1\ For detailed comments on the effects of large speculative
positions of index funds, see Better Markets Comments Letter, at 8-
12 (May 15, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, the Final Rule misinterprets the Dodd-Frank Act and
reverses decades of precedent by declaring, for the first time, that
the Commission must make antecedent necessity findings on a
commodity-by-commodity basis prior to imposing Federal speculative
position limits.
II. Physical Commodity Markets Benefit From Position Limits and
Appropriate Bona Fide Hedge Exemptions
Position limits help prevent market manipulation and price
distortion arising from excessively large speculative positions in
futures, options, and swaps tied to physical commodities. Section 4a
of the CEA reflects Congress's long-standing determination that
excessive speculation in a commodity can cause ``sudden,''
``unreasonable,'' or ``unwarranted'' fluctuations and changes in
commodity prices.\2\ Section 4a directs the Commission to establish
speculative position limits to address these harms, while also
providing that such limits shall not apply to ``transactions or
positions which are shown to be bona fide hedging transactions or
positions, as those terms are defined by the Commission . . . .''
\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 7 U.S.C. 6a.
\3\ 7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(1) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Experience from decades of limits in agricultural commodities
teaches that a properly crafted position limits regime is an
``effective prophylactic measure'' to protect American businesses,
consumers, and market participants that rely on physical commodity
derivatives markets.\4\ The parameters of an effective position
limits regime are well established. They include: (1) Meaningful
limits on excessive speculation to help prevent market manipulation
and price distortion; (2) recognition of bona fide hedging
activities and exemptions to permit producers, end-users, merchants,
and others to manage their commercial risks; and (3) clear divisions
of responsibility, consistent with the CEA, that recognize the
complimentary but distinct roles of exchanges, the Commission, and
market participants in administering a position limits regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Establishment of Speculative Position Limits, 46 FR 50938
(Oct. 16, 1981).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal speculative position limits have been in place to
protect derivatives markets since the 1930s. The Commission or its
predecessors adopted position limits for grains in 1938, cotton in
1940, and soybeans in 1951. In 1981, the Commission adopted rules
requiring exchange limits for all commodities for which there were
no Federal limits--a rule which notably did not require an
antecedent, commodity-by-commodity necessity finding. The Commission
has also consistently relied on exchanges to help administer the
position limits regime, including position accountability and
enumerated bona fide hedge exemptions.
These efforts, spanning over 80 years, have helped prevent
manipulation and price distortion through a complementary system
that relies on the respective expertise of Commission, exchange, and
market participant stakeholders. The Final Rule discards this
balance. The Final Rule relies excessively on exchanges and market
participants to permit positions as bona fide hedges, and in so
doing impermissibly delegates the Commission's statutory
responsibility to determine what constitutes a bona fide hedge.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``[W]hile Federal agency officials may sub-delegate their
decision-making authority to subordinates absent evidence of
contrary congressional intent, they may not sub-delegate to outside
entities--private or sovereign--absent affirmative evidence of
authority to do so.'' U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565-
68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Significant Flaws in the Final Rule
A. The Final Rule Permits Market Participants To Violate Federal
Speculative Position Limits With No Prior Commission Recognition of
a Bona Fide Hedge Exemption
The Final Rule explicitly permits market participants to violate
Federal speculative position limits with no bona fide hedge
exemption from the Commission. It impermissibly delegates the
Commission's statutory responsibility to define bona fide hedging to
the very market participants with large speculative positions that
section 4a is intended to restrain, as well as to the exchanges, who
have no authority to determine what is a hedge under Federal law.
First, the Final Rule authorizes market participants to create
their own bona fide hedge exemptions and exceed speculative position
limits for ``sudden or unforeseen increases in their bona fide
hedging needs.'' No prior approval from the Commission or an
exchange is required to exceed the limits established by the
Commission, and market participants may file their hedge
applications up to five days after violating the applicable position
limit. The Final Rule offers no guardrails on what can be considered
a ``sudden or unforeseen'' circumstance. In an efficient market, all
future price movements are inherently unforeseeable; that is the
reason for hedging to begin with.\6\ Further, in today's
interconnected markets, where the speed of light is the limiting
factor on the transmission of information, sudden and unforeseen
circumstances arise virtually every millisecond. This provision may
swallow the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``The basic efficient market hypothesis positions that the
market cannot be beaten because it incorporates all important
determining information into current share prices. Therefore, stocks
trade at the fairest value, meaning that they can't be purchased
undervalued or sold overvalued. The theory determines that the only
opportunity investors have to gain higher returns on their
investments is through purely speculative investments that pose a
substantial risk.'' J. B. Maverick, The Weak, Strong, and Semi-
Strong Efficient Market Hypotheses, Investopedia, available at
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032615/what-are-differences-between-weak-strong-and-semistrong-versions-efficient-market-hypothesis.asp (updated Sept. 30, 2020). The unpredictability
of the market has long been recognized. ``If you can look into the
seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not,
speak then unto me.'' William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 1, Scene 3
(1623).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Final Rule authorizes a market participant to exceed
Federal speculative positon limits if an exchange permits it to
exceed the exchange's position limits. In other words, an exchange
determination can enable a market participant to violate Federal
limits even in the absence of a Commission determination. Here
again, the Final Rule ignores the Commission's statutory
responsibility to define bona fide hedging. Exchanges have a
critical role in any properly balanced position limits regime, but
they are not authorized by the CEA to define Federal hedge
exemptions, nor are they authorized to green-light violations of
Federal position limits.
This process for market participants to ``self-recognize'' non-
enumerated hedges that
[[Page 3492]]
they wish had been enumerated under Federal law undoes the existing,
Commission-led procedures that have worked well for decades.
The Final Rule reflects a multi-year, iterative process of
notice and comment rulemaking to comprehensively determine which
practices should constitute bona fide hedging. Members of the public
and industry participants have enjoyed multiple opportunities to
inform the Commission on this topic, including through additional
proposed position limits rules in 2013 and twice in 2016. The Final
Rule's enumerated hedges reflect the Commission's extensive dialogue
and reasoned deliberations, and they recognize a wide array of
hedging practices identified by commenters. To my knowledge, the
Commission is not aware of any novel hedging practices that were not
addressed during this rulemaking process.
Commission regulations currently allow for the recognition of
non-enumerated bona fide hedges through a 30-day, Commission-led
review process. The Commission must recognize the requested hedge as
bona fide before a market participant can put the hedge on the
exchange and exceed position limits. This process has worked well
for decades. The Final Rule replaces it with a new system that
allows market participants to make their own bona fide hedge
determinations and exceed Federal position limits in advance of any
reasoned, considered evaluation by the Commission.
1. The 10 and 2 Day Review Periods Are Inadequate for the Commission To
Consider Applications for Exemptions After an Exchange Determination
The Final Rule attempts to cure the impermissible statutory
delegation described above through crammed, after-the-fact reviews
of market participants' hedge applications and violations of
position limits rules.
Market participants who request prospective non-enumerated bona
fide hedge exemptions from an exchange may violate Federal
speculative position limits upon being granted the exemption. The
exchange must then forward the application and other materials to
the Commission for the beginning of a constricted 10-day review
period.
The Commission, for its part, must complete the difficult task
of evaluating the law, facts, and circumstances with respect to cash
market risks that have already been incurred and commodity positions
that have already been posted on an exchange. Commission
determinations regarding the validity of positions that have already
been entered into will be complicated by the commercial implications
involved in unwinding such positions. Further, in the event that the
Commission determines to deny the application, the Commission must
provide the applicant with notice and opportunity to respond. In the
case of positions established due to ``sudden or unforeseen''
events, the Final Rule calls for a two-day review. This is an
unrealistic and unworkable timeframe. This fig leaf of a ``review''
cannot provide legal cover for the impermissible delegation.
2. The Final Rule Adopts a Policy of Non-Enforcement for Position Limit
Violations
Both the rule text and the preamble to the Final Rule leave no
doubt that any person who puts on a position in excess of a position
limit prior to receiving Commission approval of the exemption is in
violation of the speculative position limits. However, where an
application for a non-enumerated bona fide hedge is submitted
retroactively to either an exchange or the Commission due to
``sudden or unforeseen circumstances,'' or where an exchange has
approved an application for an exemption from the exchange limit,
the Commission limits its ability to prosecute such violations by
declaring that, ``as a matter of policy,'' it will not pursue an
enforcement action as long as the application was submitted in
``good faith.''
The Final Rule does not define ``good faith.'' Perhaps this is
because the concept of good faith traditionally is used as a safe
harbor to protect persons who reasonably believe they are acting in
compliance with the law. For example, when exercising its
prosecutorial discretion for violations of the swap dealer business
conduct standards, the Commission considers whether the swap dealer
attempted in ``good faith'' to follow policies and procedures
reasonably designed to comply with the CEA and Commission
Regulations.\7\ This application of the good faith doctrine is
consistent with the long-established understanding of the term.\8\
In the Final Rule, however, the Commission turns this doctrine on
its head and mandates prosecutorial discretion where a market
participant knowingly acts in violation of the law by putting on a
position in excess of the legal limit.
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\7\ See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants With Counterparties, 77 FR 9734, 9744, 9746, 9750
(Feb. 17, 2012).
\8\ See, e.g., CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., No. SACV-171868, 2020
WL 1625808, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2020) (finding that
controlling persons did not establish good faith defense to
liability under 7 U.S.C. 13b where they knowingly or recklessly
violated the CEA or were aware or should have been aware that
employees were violating the CEA, or did not reasonably enforce
system designed to promote legal compliance) (citing Monieson v.
CFTC, 996 F.2d 852, 860-861 (7th Cir. 1993)); U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)
(establishing good faith doctrine as exemption to Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule when police officer reasonably believed conduct to
be legal).
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Notably, the Commission describes its position not to enforce
these violations as ``a matter of policy.'' So although this non-
enforcement policy is adopted as part of this rulemaking, it is
nonetheless just that--a statement of policy. As the Supreme Court
has recognized, ``general statements of policy,'' or ``statements
issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner
in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power,''
are not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act.\9\ Accordingly, the Commission may
change this enforcement policy at any time without engaging in a
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
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\9\ Nor are blanket statements of policy that abandon an
agency's responsibility to enforce the law constitutionally
permissible. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pe[ntilde]a, 37 F.3d
671, 677 (DC Cir. 1994) (``[A]n agency's pronouncement of a broad
policy against enforcement poses special risks that it `has
consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so
extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities.''') (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833
n.4 (1985)).
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Significantly, in its comment letter, the entity with the most
experience in retroactive applications for hedge exemptions, the CME
Group, pointed out to the Commission the importance of being able to
take enforcement action for position limit violations that have
occurred when retroactive applications are denied. It stated:
Today at the exchange level, CME Group considers firms to be in
violation of a position limit if they exceed a limit and the
exemption application is denied. We believe the Commission should
implement this standard rather than permitting the proposed grace
period for denial of an exemption application. Otherwise, market
participants with excessively large speculative positions could
exploit the grace period accompanying an application for an
exemption and intentionally go over the applicable limit without
consequences--all the while disrupting orderly market operations. In
our experience, the prospect of having an application denied and
being found in violation of position limits has worked to deter
market participants from attempting to exploit the retroactive
exemption process.\10\
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\10\ CME Comment Letter (May 14, 2020).
Although the Final Rule is replete with deference to the
experience of the exchanges in implementing the position limits
regime, and creates a process specifically reliant upon the
exchange's expertise in granting hedge exemptions, here in the
context of enforcing violations and deterring abuse, the Commission
oddly rejects that expertise.
B. The Final Rule Fails To Address TAS Transactions or the Historic
Collapse of WTI Crude Oil Futures
On April 20, 2020, the price of the May futures contract for
West Texas Intermediate (``WTI'') crude oil traded on the New York
Mercantile Exchange collapsed from $17.73 per barrel at the market
open to a closing price of negative $37.63. This single-day fall in
prices of approximately $55 per barrel is unprecedented, and was
accompanied by a massive disconnect between May crude oil futures
and the price of crude oil in the physical market.
WTI crude oil futures are a key benchmark in global energy
markets and can impact the overall U.S. economy. Following the WTI
event, I called upon the Commission to determine the causes of this
unprecedented price movement and divergence from physical markets,
and to work with CME to ``take whatever measures may be appropriate
to ensure that trading in the WTI futures contract is orderly and
supports convergence of the futures and physical markets.'' \11\
[[Page 3493]]
Almost six months later, the Commission has yet to complete its
investigation or issue even preliminary results. It should not take
this long for the world's leading derivatives regulator to
understand the historic collapse of a benchmark contract that it has
overseen for decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz on Recent
Trading in the WTI Futures Contract before the Energy and
Environmental Markets Advisory Committee Meeting (May 7, 2020),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement050720.
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Independently of the Commission's investigation, public
commentary following the WTI event focused on TAS transactions and
the well-known integrity concerns regarding TAS under certain market
conditions.\12\ TAS transactions represent the purchase or sale of
an underlying exchange commodity at the closing price for that
commodity or at a specified differential. Notably, exchange rules
may permit TAS transactions to be netted intraday against futures
positions in that commodity established via outright purchases and
sales. Such netting could permit a trader to establish very large
long or short positions in the outright futures contracts, while
remaining below speculative position limits on a net basis.
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\12\ See, e.g., Matt Levine, It's a Good Time to Cut Dividends,
Money Stuff (Apr. 29, 2020), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-04/oil-s-plunge-below-zero-was-500-million-jackpot-for-a-few-london-traders?sref=DzeLiNol (``If you combine
these two facts--a lot of TAS contracts and not much volume around
the settlement time--you get a well-known theoretical problem. . . .
The basic pattern--agree in advance to buy (sell) stuff at the
official settlement price at some fixed future time, and then sell
(buy) a bunch of that stuff in the minutes leading up to the
official settlement time with the effect of pushing down (up) the
price at which you are buying (selling)--is incredibly common . . .
.''); Craig Pirrong, Streetwise Professor Blog, WTI-WTF? Part 3: Did
CLK20 Get TAS-ed? (Apr. 30, 2020), available at https://streetwiseprofessor.com/2020/04/.
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The Final Rule recognizes the importance of netting practices
and rules in several regards. For example, it prohibits the spot-
month netting of physically settled contracts with linked cash
settled contracts. The Final Rule explains that allowing such
netting during the spot month ``could lead to disruptions in the
price discovery function of the core referenced futures contract or
allow a market participant to manipulate the price of the core
referenced futures contract.'' The Final Rule is silent, however,
with respect to any limitations on the netting of TAS with outright
futures.
One commenter on the Final Rule reminded the Commission in
significant detail of the market integrity issues associated with
TAS orders.\13\ But even apart from the comment letters on the
proposed rule, and apart from the WTI event, the potential for
manipulation through the use of offsetting TAS contracts has been
well-known.\14\ Further, the CFTC has direct experience with this
issue: it has brought two manipulation cases where WTI TAS orders
were an integral part of the manipulative scheme.\15\ Given the
Commission's familiarity with the potential for manipulation and
disruption of the price discovery process arising from an abuse of
the TAS order type, the failure of the Final Rule to address in any
manner these well-known dangers to market integrity is inexcusable.
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\13\ Better Markets Comment Letter, at 13-14 (May 15, 2020).
\14\ See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, Derived Pricing: Fragmentation,
Efficiency, and Manipulation, Bauer College of Business, University
of Houston, at 10 (Jan. 14, 2019), available at https://streetwiseprofessor.com/2020/04/ (``The analysis in Section 2
demonstrates that TAS contracts create trading opportunities with
asymmetric price impacts. This suggests that TAS may therefore also
create opportunities for profitable trade-based manipulation, and
this is indeed the case.''); see also Paul Peterson, Trading at
Settlement for Agricultural Futures: Results from the First Month,
farmdoc daily (July 29, 2015), available at https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2015/07/trading-at-settlement-for-agricultural-futures.html (``Over the years TAS has been associated
with several efforts to artificially influence the daily settlement
price through `banging the close' and other forms of manipulation
[citations omitted].'').
\15\ See In re Optiver US LLC, CFTC No. 08 Civ 6560, 2012 WL
1632613 (Apr. 19, 2012); In re Shak, CFTC No. 14-03, 2013 WL
11069360 (Nov. 25, 2013) (consent order).
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C. The Final Rule Misconstrues the CEA by Requiring Antecedent,
Commodity-by-Commodity Necessity Findings Prior to Imposing Federal
Position Limits
The Final Rule misinterprets the Dodd-Frank Act and reverses
decades of Commission interpretation and finds that an antecedent,
commodity-by-commodity necessity finding is required prior to
imposing Federal speculative position limits. The Final Rule further
states that this ``is the best interpretation'' of CEA section
4a(a)(2), and that the Commission's prior interpretations are ``not
compelling.''
I addressed this issue extensively in my dissenting opinion on
the proposed position limits rule, and I reiterate those views
now.\16\ Neither the statutory language of CEA section 4a(a)(2), nor
the district court's decision in ISDA v. CFTC, require an antecedent
necessity finding prior to imposing position limits. The Final
Rule's new interpretation, which the Commission concedes is a
``change'' from prior interpretations, is mistaken.\17\
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\16\ See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz
Regarding Proposed Rule on Position Limits for Derivatives (Jan. 30,
2020), available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement013020.
\17\ Significantly, however, at the Commission's meeting on the
proposal rule, the Commission's Office of General Counsel clarified
that a necessity finding is required only with respect to the
Commission's establishment of Federal position limits. The Office of
General Counsel stated that a necessity finding was neither a
prerequisite for a Commission directive to the exchanges to
establish limits, nor prior to establishing the standards for such
limits. The Commission's legal interpretation in the Final Rule is
identical to the interpretation in the proposed rule in this regard
as well.
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As articulated in my prior dissent, the Final Rule's
interpretation of CEA section 4a(a)(2) ``defies history and common
sense.'' \18\ Following hard on the heels of the 2008 financial
crisis and the collapse of the Amaranth hedge fund in 2006, it is
implausible that the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act intended what
the Commission has now adopted. The Final Rule requires the
Commission to believe that a Congress in the midst of the financial
crisis, aware the CEA had never been interpreted to require
predicate necessity findings for position limits, and engaged in a
historic effort to regulate financial markets, would nonetheless
make it harder for the Commission to impose Federal speculative
position limits. The Commission's revisionist legislative history is
neither accurate nor credible.
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\18\ For a detailed discussion of how the Commission's necessity
finding misconstrues the CEA as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, see
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz Regarding
Proposed Rule on Position Limits for Derivatives (Jan. 30, 2020),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstatement013020b.
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IV. Conclusion
The Final Rule departs from both legal interpretations and
policy frameworks that have served commodity markets well for
decades.
Most significantly, the Final Rule impermissibly delegates the
authority to recognize non-enumerated hedge exemptions; provides
farcically short review periods for private-entity hedge
determinations; attempts to enshrine a policy of non-enforcement for
position limits violations; fails to address the well-known risks of
TAS transactions; and reinterprets the CEA to require antecedent
necessity findings prior to imposing Federal position limits.
I cannot support such a flawed rule.
[FR Doc. 2020-25332 Filed 1-5-21; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P