Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, 78880-78884 [2020-26767]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 235 (Monday, December 7, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78880-78884]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26767]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-289 and 50-320; NRC-2020-0217]


Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued 
exemptions in response to a request from Exelon Generation Company, LLC 
(Exelon, the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP) 
requirements. The exemptions eliminate the

[[Page 78881]]

requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Three Mile 
Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (TMI), based on the reduced risks 
of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a 
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.

DATES: The exemptions were issued on December 1, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2020-0217 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2020-0217. Address 
questions about Docket IDs to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-9127; 
email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the 
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each 
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first 
time that it is mentioned in this document.
     Attention: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of public documents is currently closed. You may submit your request to 
the PDR via email at [email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 
between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Theodore Smith, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6721; email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemptions are attached.

    Dated: December 1, 2020.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Bruce Watson,
Chief, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of Decommissioning, 
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 
and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. 50-289 and 50-320]

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Exemptions

I. Background

    Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon, the licensee) is the holder 
of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) Renewed 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 for Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1). Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 
(TMI-2) has a possession-only license and is currently maintained in 
accordance with the NRC-approved SAFSTOR condition known as post-
defueling monitored storage. Exelon maintains the emergency planning 
responsibilities for TMI-2, which is owned by GPU Nuclear, Inc., 
through a service agreement. These licenses are subject to the rules, 
regulations, and orders of the NRC. The licensed facilities consist of 
permanently shutdown pressurized-water reactors (PWR) located in 
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
    By letter dated June 20, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17171A151), Exelon submitted 
a certification to the NRC that it would permanently cease power 
operations at TMI-1 on or about September 30, 2019. On September 20, 
2019, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at TMI-1. By letter 
dated September 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19269E480), Exelon 
certified the permanent removal of fuel from the TMI-1 reactor vessel. 
In accordance with paragraph 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), upon the docketing of these 
certifications, the license for TMI-1 no longer authorizes operation of 
the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor 
vessel. The facility is still authorized to possess and store 
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored 
onsite in the TMI-1 spent fuel pool (SFP). A dry cask independent spent 
fuel storage installation is under construction to store the TMI-1 
spent fuel. Since the license for TMI-2 had previously been modified to 
allow possession but not operation of the facility, the certifications 
of permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel are, 
by rule, deemed to have been submitted for TMI-2. Spent fuel for TMI-2 
has already been removed from the site, though residual contamination 
and radiological materials exist.
    During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water 
through the reactor coolant system removes heat generated by the 
reactor. The reactor coolant system, operating at high temperatures and 
pressures, transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes 
converting non-radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the 
main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident 
scenarios postulated in the updated safety analysis reports for 
operating power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems, 
which could affect the fuel in the reactor core and, in the most severe 
postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of 
fission products. With the permanent cessation of operations and the 
permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessels at TMI, such 
accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, 
and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no function 
related to the storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning 
(EP) provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or 
malfunction of the reactor, reactor coolant system, or supporting 
systems are no longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have 
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no 
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a 
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for 
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP 
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning 
status of the facility, Exelon must obtain exemptions from those EP 
regulations. Only then can Exelon modify the TMI emergency plan to 
reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition of TMI.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated July 1, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19182A104), 
Exelon requested exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR part 
50 for TMI.

[[Page 78882]]

Specifically, Exelon requested exemptions from certain planning 
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for the establishment of plume 
exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear 
power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV, which establish the elements that make up the 
content of emergency plans. In letters dated October 9, 2019, and 
December 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML19282C285 and ML19344C115, 
respectively), Exelon provided supplemental information and responses 
to the NRC staff's requests for additional information concerning the 
proposed exemptions.
    The information provided by Exelon included justifications for each 
exemption requested. The exemptions requested by Exelon would eliminate 
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency 
preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR part 350 and would reduce the 
scope of onsite EP activities at TMI. The licensee stated that the 
application of all of the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E is not needed 
for adequate emergency response capability, based on the substantially 
lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of accidents still 
possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared 
to an operating facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for 
a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could challenge the 
safe storage of spent fuel at TMI, provisions exist for offsite 
agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency 
management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to 
protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, 
also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in 
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and 
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is publicly available 
at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State, 
territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a 
common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and 
decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels of government in their 
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats 
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for 
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be 
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific 
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and 
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be 
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards 
planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible 
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. 
However, the EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor 
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release 
from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly reduced. 
The reduced risk for any significant offsite radiological release is 
based on two factors. One factor is the elimination of accidents 
applicable only to an operating power reactor, resulting in fewer 
credible accident scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-
lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to 
radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the 
reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the 
radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue to decay as the 
spent fuel ages. The spent fuel will produce less heat due to 
radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a loss of 
water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and 
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR 
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML082260098), and the NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study 
of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), 
confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors 
that are bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the report, the 
risk of offsite radiological release is significantly less than for an 
operating power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for TMI have 
been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor 
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions was 
based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological 
consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective 
Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man at the exclusion 
area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-
basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from 
the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate 
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities 
to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to 
protect the health and safety of the public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at TMI, the licensee 
provided an analysis demonstrating that following permanent cessation 
of power operations at TMI-1, the radiological consequences of the 
remaining design-basis accidents with potential for offsite 
radiological release (a fuel handling accident in the Fuel Handling 
Building, where the SFP is located for TMI-1, and a fire in the Reactor 
Building with the Reactor Building Purge System in operation for TMI-2) 
will not exceed the

[[Page 78883]]

limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
    With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at TMI, the licensee 
analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively impede 
any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 488 days 
(approximately 16 months) after permanent cessation of power 
operations, there would be 10 hours after the assemblies have been 
uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and 
adiabatic heat-up analysis) reaches 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the 
temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product 
release. The analysis conservatively assumed that the heat-up time 
starts when the SFP has been completely drained, although it is likely 
that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when drain 
down starts. The analysis also does not consider the period of time 
from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water inventory until 
cooling is lost.
    The NRC reviewed the licensee's justification for the requested 
exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as 
described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and 
that the exemptions should be granted 488 days after TMI-1 has 
permanently ceased power operations. An assessment of the Exelon EP 
exemptions is described in SECY-20-0041, ``Request by Exelon Generation 
Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning 
Requirements for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,'' dated May 5, 
2020 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML19311C762). The Commission approved 
the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff 
requirements memorandum to SECY-20-0041, dated July 27, 2020 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML20209A439). Descriptions of the specific exemptions 
requested by Exelon and the NRC staff's basis for granting each 
exemption are provided in SECY-20-0041. The NRC staff's detailed review 
and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions 
requested by Exelon are provided in the NRC staff's safety evaluation 
associated with this exemption (ADAMS Accession No. ML19311C762).

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, that would allow Exelon to revise the TMI Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's 
proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the 
exemptions are authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, Exelon provided an analysis that shows that 
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed 
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans 
required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection 
of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at 
TMI 488 days after TMI-1 has permanently ceased power operations.
    Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the 
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to 
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different 
sequences make significant contributions to risk. As described in 
NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 
beyond a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in 
risk. The report further concludes that the change in risk due to 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk 
is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating 
power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation 
effectiveness for the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All 
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too 
low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present 
an undue risk to the public health and safety.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions only involve EP requirements under 10 CFR 
part 50 and will allow Exelon to revise the TMI Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at TMI are not affected by the 
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in scope of 
the onsite EP activities at TMI will not adversely affect Exelon's 
ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear 
material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with common 
defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and 
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the 
risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed 
full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor 
accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section III, because TMI will be 
permanently shut down and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a 
significant offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident 
exceeding EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary and the 
risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-
design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating 
power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at TMI by 
comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to 
site-specific conditions at TMI and determined that

[[Page 78884]]

the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented at TMI. As 
indicated by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and 
more recently for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-
Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 
Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from 
SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite 
early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP 
requirements were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-
basis accident involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based 
on an adiabatic heat-up analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for 
decay heat, shows that 488 days after permanent cessation of power 
operations at TMI-1, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 
900 [deg]C is at least 10 hours after the assemblies have been 
uncovered assuming a loss of all cooling means.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such 
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heat-up of the spent 
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident 
shows that 488 days after permanent cessation of power operations at 
TMI-1, at least 10 hours would be available between the time that all 
cooling means are lost to the fuel (at which time adiabatic heat-up is 
conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a 
temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit (900 [deg]C), which is the 
temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential 
for a significant radiological release. This analysis conservatively 
does not include the period of time from the initiating event causing a 
loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified Exelon's analyses and its calculations. 
The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the 
requested exemptions to Exelon, there is no design-basis accident that 
will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA early 
phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event 
of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a 
complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, there 
will be over 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur 
and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating 
actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a 
radiological release were projected to occur under this highly unlikely 
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its 
previously granted exemptions, as it does with Exelon's requested EP 
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate 
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently 
shutdown and defueled facilities.
    Additionally, TMI committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in 
its application. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the 
SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an 
internal strategy that relies on the fire protection system with 
redundant pumps (one diesel-driven and one electric motor-driven); and 
an off-site fire truck that can take suction from the Susquehanna 
River. These strategies will continue to be required as condition 
2.c.(17), ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition,'' of the TMI-1 
Renewed Facility Operating License. Considering the very low 
probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these 
diverse strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup 
or spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite 
radiological release.
    For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of 
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special 
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the 
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated 
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the TMI facility 
488 days after permanent cessation of power operations of TMI-1.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by 
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness 
at TMI and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate 
offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and local 
government agencies using a CEMP approach in the highly unlikely event 
of a radiological emergency at TMI. Since the underlying purpose of the 
rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the 
elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal 
offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in 
the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at TMI, the 
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's 
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published in the Federal Register on September 22, 2020 (85 
FR 59565).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, Exelon's request for exemptions from certain EP requirements in 
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-20-0041, are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health 
and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security. 
Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission 
hereby grants Exelon's exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 
CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation associated with this exemption. The exemptions are 
effective as of 488 days after permanent cessation of power operations 
of TMI-1.

    Dated: December 1, 2020.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Patricia K. Holahan, Director,

    Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 2020-26767 Filed 12-4-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P