Assessments, Amendments To Address the Temporary Deposit Insurance Assessment Effects of the Optional Regulatory Capital Transitions for Implementing the Current Expected Credit Losses Methodology, 78794-78805 [2020-25830]
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78794
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 85, No. 235
Monday, December 7, 2020
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 327
RIN 3064–AF65
Assessments, Amendments To
Address the Temporary Deposit
Insurance Assessment Effects of the
Optional Regulatory Capital
Transitions for Implementing the
Current Expected Credit Losses
Methodology
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation is seeking
comment on a proposed rule that would
amend the risk-based deposit insurance
assessment system applicable to all
large insured depository institutions
(IDIs), including highly complex IDIs, to
address the temporary deposit insurance
assessment effects resulting from certain
optional regulatory capital transition
provisions relating to the
implementation of the current expected
credit losses (CECL) methodology. The
proposal would amend the assessment
regulations to remove the double
counting of a specified portion of the
CECL transitional amount or the
modified CECL transition amount, as
applicable (collectively, the CECL
transitional amounts), in certain
financial measures that are calculated
using the sum of Tier 1 capital and
reserves and that are used to determine
assessment rates for large and highly
complex IDIs. The proposal also would
adjust the calculation of the loss
severity measure to remove the double
counting of a specified portion of the
CECL transitional amounts for a large or
highly complex IDI. This proposal
would not affect regulatory capital or
the regulatory capital relief provided in
the form of transition provisions that
allow banking organizations to phase in
the effects of CECL on their regulatory
capital ratios.
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SUMMARY:
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Comments must be received no
later than January 6, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
on the proposed rule using any of the
following methods:
• Agency Website: https://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal.
Follow the instructions for submitting
comments on the agency website.
• Email: comments@fdic.gov. Include
RIN 3064–AF65 on the subject line of
the message.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may be
hand delivered to the guard station at
the rear of the 550 17th Street building
(located on F Street) on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: All comments
received, including any personal
information provided, will be posted
generally without change to https://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Scott Ciardi, Chief, Large Bank Pricing,
(202) 898–7079 or sciardi@fdic.gov;
Ashley Mihalik, Chief, Banking and
Regulatory Policy, (202) 898–3793 or
amihalik@fdic.gov; Nefretete Smith,
Counsel, (202) 898–6851 or nefsmith@
fdic.gov; Sydney Mayer, Senior
Attorney, (202) 898–3669 or smayer@
fdic.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DATES:
I. Policy Objectives
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(FDI Act) requires that the FDIC
establish a risk-based deposit insurance
assessment system.1 Pursuant to this
requirement, the FDIC first adopted a
risk-based deposit insurance assessment
system effective in 1993 that applied to
all IDIs.2 The FDIC implemented this
assessment system with the goals of
making the deposit insurance system
fairer to well-run institutions and
encouraging weaker institutions to
improve their condition, and thus,
promote the safety and soundness of
IDIs.3
In 2006, the FDIC adopted a final rule
that created different risk-based
1 12
U.S.C. 1817(b).
FR 45263 (Oct. 1, 1992).
3 As used in this proposed rule, the term ‘‘insured
depository institution’’ has the same meaning as it
is used in section 3(c)(2) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C.
1813(c)(2).
2 57
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assessment systems for large and small
IDIs that combined supervisory ratings
with other risk measures to differentiate
risk and determine assessment rates.4 In
2011, the FDIC amended the risk-based
assessment system applicable to large
IDIs to, among other things, better
capture risk at the time the institution
assumes the risk, to better differentiate
risk among large IDIs during periods of
good economic and banking conditions
based on how they would fare during
periods of stress or economic
downturns, and to better take into
account the losses that the FDIC may
incur if a large IDI fails.5
The FDIC is required by statute to set
deposit insurance assessments based on
risk, and the FDIC’s objective in setting
forth this proposal is to ensure that
banks are assessed in a manner that is
fair and accurate. The primary objective
of this proposal is to remove a double
counting issue in several financial
measures used to determine deposit
insurance assessments for large and
highly complex banks, which could
result in a deposit insurance assessment
rate for a large or highly complex bank
that does not accurately reflect the
bank’s risk to the deposit insurance
fund (DIF), all else equal. Specifically,
the proposal would amend the
assessment regulations to remove the
double counting of a portion of the
CECL transitional amounts, in certain
financial measures used to determine
deposit insurance assessments for large
and highly complex banks. In particular,
certain financial measures are
calculated by summing Tier 1 capital,
which includes the CECL transitional
amounts, and reserves, which already
reflects the implementation of CECL. As
a result, a portion of the CECL
transitional amounts is being double
counted in these measures, which in
turn affects assessment rates for large
and highly complex banks. The
proposal also would adjust the
calculation of the loss severity measure
to remove the double counting of a
4 See 71 FR 69282 (Nov. 30, 2006). Generally,
large IDIs have $10 billion or more in total assets
and small IDIs have less than $10 billion in total
assets. See 12 CFR 327.8(e) and (f). As used in this
proposed rule, the term ‘‘small bank’’ is
synonymous with ‘‘small institution,’’ the term
‘‘large bank’’ is synonymous with ‘‘large
institution,’’ and the term ‘‘highly complex bank’’
is synonymous with ‘‘highly complex institution,’’
as the terms are defined in 12 CFR 327.8.
5 See 76 FR 10672 (Feb. 25, 2011).
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portion of the CECL transitional
amounts for a large or highly complex
bank.
This proposal would amend the
deposit insurance system applicable to
large and highly complex banks only,
and it would not affect regulatory
capital or the regulatory capital relief
provided in the form of transition
provisions that allow banking
organizations to phase in the effects of
CECL on their regulatory capital ratios.6
Specifically, in calculating another
measure used to determine assessment
rates for all IDIs, the Tier 1 leverage
ratio, the FDIC would continue to apply
the CECL regulatory capital transition
provisions, consistent with the
regulatory capital relief provided to
address concerns that despite adequate
capital planning, unexpected economic
conditions at the time of CECL adoption
could result in higher-than-anticipated
increases in allowances.7
The proposed amendments to the
deposit insurance assessment system
and any changes to reporting
requirements pursuant to this proposal
would be required only while the
regulatory capital relief described above
is reflected in the regulatory reports of
banks.
II. Background
A. Deposit Insurance Assessments
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The FDIC charges all IDIs an
assessment amount for deposit
insurance equal to the IDI’s deposit
insurance assessment base multiplied
by its risk-based assessment rate.8 An
IDI’s assessment base and assessment
rate are determined each quarter based
on supervisory ratings and information
collected in the Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income (Call Report) or
the Report of Assets and Liabilities of
U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign
Banks (FFIEC 002), as appropriate.
Generally, an IDI’s assessment base
equals its average consolidated total
6 Banking organizations subject to the capital rule
include national banks, state member banks, state
nonmember banks, savings associations, and toptier bank holding companies and savings and loan
holding companies domiciled in the United States
not subject to the Federal Reserve Board’s Small
Bank Holding Company Policy Statement (12 CFR
part 225, appendix C), but exclude certain savings
and loan holding companies that are substantially
engaged in insurance underwriting or commercial
activities or that are estate trusts, and bank holding
companies and savings and loan holding companies
that are employee stock ownership plans. See 12
CFR part 3 (Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency)); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part
324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (February 14, 2019)
and 85 FR 61577 (September 30, 2020).
7 See 84 FR 4225 (February 14, 2019).
8 See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(1).
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assets minus its average tangible
equity.9
An IDI’s assessment rate is calculated
using different methods based on
whether the IDI is a small, large, or
highly complex bank.10 Large and
highly complex banks are assessed
using a scorecard approach that
combines CAMELS ratings and certain
forward-looking financial measures to
assess the risk that a large or highly
complex bank poses to the DIF.11 The
score that each large or highly complex
bank receives is used to determine its
deposit insurance assessment rate. One
scorecard applies to most large IDIs and
another applies to highly complex
banks. Both scorecards use quantitative
financial measures that are useful in
predicting a large or highly complex
bank’s long-term performance.12
As described in more detail below,
the FDIC is proposing to amend the
assessment regulations to remove the
double counting of a portion of the
CECL transitional amounts in the
calculation of the loss severity measure
and certain other financial measures
that are calculated by summing Tier 1
capital and reserves, which are used to
determine assessment rates for large and
highly complex banks.
B. The Current Expected Credit Losses
Methodology
In 2016, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) issued
Accounting Standards Update (ASU)
No. 2016–13, Financial Instruments—
Credit Losses, Topic 326, Measurement
of Credit Losses on Financial
Instruments.13 The ASU resulted in
significant changes to credit loss
accounting under U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
The revisions to credit loss accounting
9 See
12 CFR 327.5.
10 For assessment purposes, a large bank is
generally defined as an institution with $10 billion
or more in total assets, a small bank is generally
defined as an institution with less than $10 billion
in total assets, and a highly complex bank is
generally defined as an institution that has $50
billion or more in total assets and is controlled by
a parent holding company that has $500 billion or
more in total assets, or is a processing bank or trust
company. See 12 CFR 327.16(a) and (b).
11 See 12 CFR 327.16(b); see also 76 FR 10672
(Feb. 25, 2011) and 77 FR 66000 (Oct. 31, 2012).
12 See 76 FR 10688. The FDIC uses a different
scorecard for highly complex IDIs because those
institutions are structurally and operationally
complex, or pose unique challenges and risks in
case of failure. 76 FR 10695.
13 ASU 2016–13 covers measurement of credit
losses on financial instruments and includes three
subtopics within Topic 326: (i) Subtopic 326–10
Financial Instruments—Credit Losses—Overall; (ii)
Subtopic 326–20: Financial Instruments—Credit
Losses—Measured at Amortized Cost; and (iii)
Subtopic 326–30: Financial Instruments—Credit
Losses—Available-for-Sale Debt Securities.
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under GAAP included the introduction
of CECL, which replaces the incurred
loss methodology for financial assets
measured at amortized cost. For these
assets, CECL requires banking
organizations to recognize lifetime
expected credit losses and to
incorporate reasonable and supportable
forecasts in developing the estimate of
lifetime expected credit losses, while
also maintaining the current
requirement that banking organizations
consider past events and current
conditions.
CECL allowances cover a broader
range of financial assets than the
allowance for loan and lease losses
(ALLL) under the incurred loss
methodology. Under the incurred loss
methodology, the ALLL generally covers
credit losses on loans held for
investment and lease financing
receivables, with additional allowances
for certain other extensions of credit and
allowances for credit losses on certain
off-balance sheet credit exposures (with
the latter allowances presented as
liabilities).14 These exposures will be
within the scope of CECL. In addition,
CECL applies to credit losses on heldto-maturity (HTM) debt securities. ASU
2016–13 also introduces new
requirements for available-for-sale (AFS)
debt securities. The new accounting
standard requires that a banking
organization recognize credit losses on
individual AFS debt securities through
credit loss allowances, rather than
through direct write-downs, as is
currently required under U.S. GAAP.
The credit loss allowances attributable
to debt securities are separate from the
credit loss allowances attributable to
loans and leases.
C. The 2019 CECL Rule
Upon adoption of CECL, a banking
organization will record a one-time
adjustment to its credit loss allowances
as of the beginning of its fiscal year of
adoption equal to the difference, if any,
between the amount of credit loss
allowances required under the incurred
loss methodology and the amount of
credit loss allowances required under
CECL. A banking organization’s
implementation of CECL will affect its
retained earnings, deferred tax assets
14 ‘‘Other extensions of credit’’ includes trade and
reinsurance receivables, and receivables that relate
to repurchase agreements and securities lending
agreements. ‘‘Off-balance sheet credit exposures’’
includes off-balance sheet credit exposures not
accounted for as insurance, such as loan
commitments, standby letters of credit, and
financial guarantees. The FDIC notes that credit
losses for off-balance sheet credit exposures that are
unconditionally cancellable by the issuer are not
recognized under CECL.
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(DTAs), allowances, and, as a result, its
regulatory capital ratios.
In recognition of the potential for the
implementation of CECL to affect
regulatory capital ratios, on February 14,
2019, the FDIC, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and
the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board) (collectively,
the agencies) issued a final rule that
revised certain regulations, including
the agencies’ regulatory capital
regulations (capital rule),15 to account
for the aforementioned changes to credit
loss accounting under GAAP, including
CECL (2019 CECL rule).16 The 2019
CECL rule includes a transition
provision that allows banking
organizations to phase in over a threeyear period the day-one adverse effects
of CECL on their regulatory capital
ratios.
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D. The 2020 CECL Rule
As part of the efforts to address the
disruption of economic activity in the
United States caused by the spread of
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19),
on March 31, 2020, the agencies
adopted a second CECL transition
provision through an interim final
rule.17 The agencies subsequently
adopted a final rule (2020 CECL rule) on
September 30, 2020, that is consistent
with the interim final rule, with some
clarifications and adjustments related to
the calculation of the transition and the
eligibility criteria for using the 2020
CECL transition provision.18 The 2020
CECL rule provides banking
organizations that adopt CECL for
purposes of GAAP (as in effect January
1, 2020), for a fiscal year that begins
during the 2020 calendar year, the
option to delay for up to two years an
estimate of CECL’s effect on regulatory
capital, followed by a three-year
transition period (i.e., a five-year
transition period in total).19 The 2020
15 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board);
12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).
16 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019).
17 85 FR 17723 (Mar. 31, 2020).
18 See 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020).
19 A banking organization that is required to
adopt CECL under GAAP in the 2020 calendar year,
but chooses to delay use of CECL for regulatory
reporting in accordance with section 4014 of the
Coronavirus Aid Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act), is also eligible for the 2020 CECL
transition provision. The CARES Act (Pub. L. 116–
136, 4014, 134 Stat. 281 (March 27, 2020)) provides
banking organizations optional temporary relief
from complying with CECL ending on the earlier of
(1) the termination date of the current national
emergency, declared by the President on March 13,
2020 under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.) concerning COVID–19, or (2)
December 31, 2020. If a banking organization
chooses to revert to the incurred loss methodology
pursuant to the CARES Act in any quarter in 2020,
the banking organization would not apply any
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CECL rule does not replace the threeyear transition provision in the 2019
CECL rule, which remains available to
any banking organization at the time
that it adopts CECL.20
E. Double Counting of a Portion of the
CECL Transitional Amounts in Certain
Financial Measures Used To Determine
Assessments for Large and Highly
Complex Banks
An increase in a banking
organization’s allowances, including
those estimated under CECL, generally
will reduce the banking organization’s
earnings or retained earnings, and
therefore, its Tier 1 capital. For banks
electing the 2019 CECL rule, the CECL
transitional amount is the difference
between the closing balance sheet
amount of retained earnings for the
fiscal year-end immediately prior to the
bank’s adoption of CECL (pre-CECL
amount) and the bank’s balance sheet
amount of retained earnings as of the
beginning of the fiscal year in which it
adopts CECL (post-CECL amount). For
banks electing the 2020 CECL rule
transition provision, retained earnings
are increased for regulatory capital
calculation purposes by a modified
CECL transitional amount that is
adjusted to reflect changes in retained
earnings due to CECL that occur during
the first two years of the five-year
transition period. Under the 2020 CECL
rule, the change in retained earnings
due to CECL is calculated by taking the
change in reported adjusted allowances
for credit losses (AACL) 21 relative to the
first day of the fiscal year in which
CECL was adopted and applying a
scaling multiplier of 25 percent during
the first two years of the transition
period. The resulting amount is added
to the CECL transitional amount
described above. Hence, the modified
CECL transitional amount for banks
electing the 2020 CECL rule is
calculated on a quarterly basis during
the first two years of the transition
transitional amounts in that quarter but would be
allowed to apply the transitional amounts in
subsequent quarters when the banking organization
resumes use of CECL.
20 See 85 FR 61578 (Sept. 30, 2020).
21 The 2019 CECL rule defined a new term for
regulatory capital purposes, adjusted allowances for
credit losses (AACL). The meaning of the term
AACL for regulatory capital purposes is different
from the meaning of the term allowances of credit
losses (ACL) used in applicable accounting
standards. The term allowance for credit losses as
used by the FASB in ASU 2016–13 applies to both
financial assets measured at amortized cost and
AFS debt securities. In contrast, the AACL
definition includes only those allowances that have
been established through a charge against earnings
or retained earnings. Under the 2019 CECL rule, the
term AACL, rather than ALLL, applies to a banking
organization that has adopted CECL.
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period. The bank reflects that modified
CECL transitional amount, which
includes 100 percent of the day-one
impact of CECL on retained earnings
plus a portion of the difference between
AACL reported in the most recent
regulatory report and AACL as of the
beginning of the fiscal year that the
banking organization adopts CECL, in
the transitional amount applied to
retained earnings in regulatory capital
calculations.22
For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule
transition provision that enter the third
year of their transition period and for
banks electing the three-year 2019 CECL
rule transition provision, banks must
calculate the transitional amount to
phase into their retained earnings for
purposes of their regulatory capital
calculations over a three-year period.
For banks electing the 2019 CECL rule,
the CECL transitional amount of is the
difference between the pre-CECL
amount of retained earnings and the
post-CECL amount of retained earnings.
For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule
that enter the third year of their
transition, the modified CECL
transitional amount is the difference
between the bank’s AACL at the end of
the second year of the transition period
and its AACL as of the beginning of the
fiscal year of CECL adoption multiplied
by 25 percent plus the CECL transitional
amount described above. The CECL
transitional amount or, at the end of the
second year of the transition period for
banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, the
modified CECL transitional amount, is
fixed and must be phased in over the
three-year transition period or the last
three years of the transition period,
respectively, on a straight-line basis, 25
percent in the first year (or third year for
banks electing the 2020 CECL rule), and
an additional 25 percent of the
transitional amount over each of the
next two years.23 At the beginning of the
22 See
85 FR 61580 (Sept. 30, 2020).
when calculating regulatory capital, a
bank electing the 2019 CECL rule transition
provision would increase the retained earnings
reported on its balance sheet by the applicable
portion of its CECL transitional amount, i.e., 75
percent of its CECL transitional amount during the
first year of the transition period, 50 percent of its
CECL transitional amount during the second year of
the transition period, and 25 percent of its CECL
transitional amount during the third year of the
transition period. A bank electing the 2020 CECL
rule transition provision would increase the
retained earnings reported on its balance sheet by
the applicable portion of its modified CECL
transitional amount, i.e., 100 percent of its modified
CECL transitional amount during the first and
second years of the transition period, 75 percent of
its CECL modified transitional amount during the
third year of the transition period, 50 percent of its
modified CECL transitional amount during the
fourth year of the transition period, and 25 percent
23 Thus,
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sixth year for banks electing the 2020
CECL rule, or the beginning of the
fourth year for banks electing the 2019
CECL rule, the electing bank would
have completely reflected in regulatory
capital the day-one effects of CECL
(plus, for banks electing the 2020 CECL
rule, an estimate of CECL’s effect on
regulatory capital, relative to the
incurred loss methodology’s effect on
regulatory capital, during the first two
years of CECL adoption).24
Certain financial measures that are
used in the scorecard to determine
assessment rates for large and highly
complex banks are calculated using both
Tier 1 capital and reserves. Tier 1
capital is reported in Call Report
Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 26, and for
banks that elect either the three-year
transition provision contained in the
2019 CECL rule or the five-year
transition provision contained in the
2020 CECL rule, Tier 1 capital includes
(due to adjustments to the amount of
retained earnings reported on the
balance sheet) the applicable portion of
the CECL transitional amount (or
modified CECL transitional amount).
For deposit insurance assessment
purposes, reserves are calculated using
the amount reported in Call Report
Schedule RC, item 4.c, ‘‘Allowance for
loan and lease losses.’’ For all banks that
have adopted CECL, this Schedule RC
line item reflects the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases.25 The
issue of double counting arises in
certain financial measures used to
determine assessment rates for large and
highly complex banks that are
calculated using both Tier 1 capital and
reserves because the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases is
included during the transition period in
both reserves and, as a portion of the
CECL or modified CECL transitional
amount, Tier 1 capital. For banks that
elect either the three-year transition
provision contained in the 2019 CECL
rule or the five-year transition provision
contained in the 2020 CECL rule, the
CECL transitional amounts, as defined
in section 301 of the regulatory capital
rules, additionally include the effect on
retained earnings, net of tax effect, of
establishing allowances for credit losses
in accordance with the CECL
methodology on HTM debt securities,
other financial assets measured at
amortized cost, and off-balance sheet
of its CECL transitional amount during the fifth year
of the transition period.
24 See 84 FR 4228 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR
61580 (Sept. 30, 2020).
25 The allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment also is reported in item
7, column A, of Call Report Schedule RI–B, Part II,
Changes in Allowances for Credit Losses.
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credit exposures as of the beginning of
the fiscal year of adoption (plus, for
banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, the
change during the first two years of the
transition period in reported AACLs for
HTM debt securities, other financial
assets measured at amortized cost, and
off-balance sheet credit exposures
relative to the balances of these AACLs
as of the beginning of the fiscal year of
CECL adoption multiplied by 25
percent). The applicable portions of the
CECL transitional amounts attributable
to allowances for credit losses on HTM
debt securities, other financial assets
measured at amortized cost, and offbalance sheet credit exposures are
included in Tier 1 capital only and are
not double counted with reserves for
deposit insurance assessment purposes.
The CECL effective dates assigned by
ASU 2016–13 as most recently amended
by ASU No. 2019–10, the optional
temporary relief from complying with
CECL afforded by the CARES Act, and
the transitions provided for under the
2019 CECL rule and 2020 CECL rule,
provide that all banks will have
completely reflected in regulatory
capital the day-one effects of CECL
(plus, if applicable, an estimate of
CECL’s effect on regulatory capital,
relative to the incurred loss
methodology’s effect on regulatory
capital, during the first two years of
CECL adoption) by December 31, 2026.
As a result, and as discussed below, the
proposed amendments to the deposit
insurance assessment system and any
changes to reporting requirements
pursuant to this proposal would be
required only while the temporary
regulatory capital relief is reflected in
the regulatory reports of banks.
III. The Proposed Rule
A. Summary
In calculating certain measures used
in the scorecard for determining deposit
insurance assessment rates for large and
highly complex banks, the FDIC is
proposing to remove the applicable
portions of the CECL transitional
amounts added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes and
attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for
investment under the transitions
provided for under the 2019 and 2020
CECL rules. Specifically, in certain
scorecard measures which are
calculated using the sum of Tier 1
capital and reserves, the FDIC would
remove a specified portion of the CECL
transitional amount (or modified CECL
transitional amount) that is added to
retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes when determining deposit
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insurance assessment rates. The FDIC is
also proposing to adjust the calculation
of the loss severity measure to remove
the double counting of a specified
portion of the CECL transitional
amounts for a large or highly complex
bank.
Absent adjustments to the calculation
of certain financial measures in the large
and highly complex bank scorecards,
the inclusion of the applicable portions
of the CECL transitional amounts added
to retained earnings for regulatory
capital purposes and attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment in regulatory
capital and the implementation of CECL
in calculating reserves will result in
temporary double counting of a portion
of the CECL transitional amounts in
select financial measures used to
determine assessment rates for large and
highly complex banks. For example, in
the denominator of the higher-risk
assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves
ratio, the applicable portions of the
CECL transitional amounts added to
retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes and attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment would be
included in Tier 1 capital, and these
portions also would be reflected in the
calculation of reserves using the
allowance amount reported in Call
Report Schedule RC, item 4.c. If left
uncorrected, this temporary double
counting could result in a deposit
insurance assessment rate for a large or
highly complex bank that does not
accurately reflect the bank’s risk to the
DIF, all else equal.
In the following simplified, stylized
example, illustrated in Table 1 below,
consider a hypothetical large bank that
has a CECL effective date of January 1,
2020, and elects a five-year transition.26
On the closing balance sheet date
immediately prior to adopting CECL
26 This stylized example is included to illustrate
the effect of the proposed rule and omits the effects
of deferred tax assets on regulatory capital
calculations, which are addressed in the agencies’
capital rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL
rule. The example reflects the first-quarter 2020
application by a hypothetical large bank (with no
purchased credit-deteriorated assets) that has
adopted the five-year CECL transition under the
2020 CECL rule and assumes that the full amount
of the CECL transitional amount is attributable to
the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases.
The example does not reflect any changes over the
course of the first quarterly reporting period in year
1 (i.e., no changes in the amounts reported on the
bank’s balance sheet between January 1 and March
31, 2020, the end of the reporting period for the first
quarter). As a consequence, the bank’s modified
CECL transitional amount as of March 31, 2020
equals its CECL transitional amount. See 12 CFR
part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part
324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (February 14, 2019)
and 85 FR 61577 (September 30, 2020).
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(i.e., December 31, 2019), the electing
bank has $1 million of ALLL and $10
million of Tier 1 capital. On the opening
balance sheet date immediately after
adopting CECL (i.e., January 1, 2020),
the electing bank has $1.2 million of
allowances for credit losses, of which
the entire $1.2 million qualifies as
AACL for regulatory capital purposes
and is attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held
for investment.27 The bank would
recognize the adoption of CECL as of
January 1, 2020, by recording an
increase in its allowances for credit
losses, and in its AACL for regulatory
capital purposes, of $200,000, with a
reduction in beginning retained
earnings of $200,000, which flows
through and results in Tier 1 capital of
$9.8 million. For each of the quarterly
reporting periods in year 1 of the five-
year transition period (i.e., 2020), the
electing bank would increase the
retained earnings reported on its
balance sheet by $200,000 for purposes
of calculating its regulatory capital
ratios, resulting in an increase in its Tier
1 capital of $200,000 to $10 million, all
else equal.28
In this example, in determining the
hypothetical large bank’s deposit
insurance assessment rate, the bank’s
Tier 1 capital of $10 million would
include the $200,000 addition to the
bank’s reported retained earnings due to
the CECL transition (entirely
attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases), and its
reserves would equal $1.2 million, the
entire amount of which is attributable to
the allowance for credit losses on loans
and leases held for investment. Its
combined Tier 1 capital and reserves
would equal $11.2 million ($10 million
plus $1.2 million), reflecting double
counting of the $200,000 applicable
portion of the bank’s CECL transitional
amount attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases.29
Under the proposal, for purposes of
calculating assessments for large and
highly complex banks, the FDIC would
subtract $200,000 from the denominator
of financial measures that sum Tier 1
capital and reserves, since the amount
of $200,000 is incorporated in both Tier
1 capital (as the applicable portion of
the CECL transitional amount in year
one of the five-year transition period)
and reserves in the denominator. The
bank’s adjusted Tier 1 capital and
reserves would equal $11 million. The
FDIC also would adjust the calculation
of the loss severity measure by
$200,000, as described below.
TABLE 1—STYLIZED EXAMPLE 1 OF FIRST-QUARTER APPLICATION OF A FIVE-YEAR CECL TRANSITION IN CALCULATING
TIER 1 CAPITAL AND RESERVES FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE ASSESSMENT PURPOSES
In thousands
Dec. 31, 2019
Reserves .................................................................................................................................................
Tier 1 Capital ..........................................................................................................................................
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (current) ....................................................................................................
Applicable Portion of the CECL Transitional Amount ............................................................................
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (proposed) ................................................................................................
$1,000 (ALLL) ........
10,000 ....................
11,000 ....................
................................
................................
Jan. 1, 2020
$1,200 (AACL).
10,000.
11,200.
200.
11,000.
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1 This stylized example reflects the first-quarter application of a hypothetical bank that has adopted a five-year CECL transition under the 2020
CECL rule and assumes that the full amount of the CECL transitional amount is attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases. The example does not reflect any changes over the course of the first quarter of 2020 (i.e., no changes in the amounts reported on the
bank’s balance sheet between January 1 and March 31, 2020, the end of the reporting period for the first quarter). As a consequence, the bank’s
modified CECL transitional amount as of March 31, 2020, equals its CECL transitional amount. This stylized example omits the effects of deferred tax assets, which are addressed in the agencies’ capital rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL rule.
This proposal would amend the
deposit insurance system applicable to
large and highly complex banks only,
and would not affect regulatory capital
or the regulatory capital relief provided
under the 2019 CECL rule or 2020 CECL
rule.30 The FDIC would continue the
application of the transition provisions
provided for under the 2019 and 2020
CECL rules to the Tier 1 leverage ratio
used in determining deposit insurance
assessment rates for all IDIs.
27 While the CECL transitional amount is
calculated using the difference between the closing
balance sheet amount of retained earnings for the
fiscal year-end immediately prior to a bank’s
adoption of CECL and the balance sheet amount of
retained earnings as of the beginning of the fiscal
year in which the bank adopts CECL, the FDIC
calculates financial measures used to determine
deposit insurance assessments using data reported
as of each quarter end.
28 Under the 2019 CECL rule, when calculating
regulatory capital ratios during the first year of an
electing bank’s CECL adoption date, the bank must
phase in 25 percent of the transitional amounts. The
bank would phase in an additional 25 percent of
the transitional amounts over each of the next two
years so that the bank would have phased in 75
percent of the day-one adverse effects of adopting
CECL during year three. At the beginning of the
fourth year, the bank would have completely
reflected in regulatory capital the day-one effects of
CECL. Under the 2020 CECL rule, the modified
CECL transitional amount is calculated on a
quarterly basis during the first two years of the
transition period. See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR
part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also
84 FR 4222 (February 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577
(September 30, 2020).
29 In this stylized example, the entirety of the
CECL transitional amount is attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and leases and
it equals the modified CECL transitional amount
during the first quarter of the transition period. The
applicable portion of the CECL transitional amounts
is the amount that is double counted in certain
financial measures used to determine deposit
insurance assessment rates and that the FDIC is
proposing to remove from those financial measures.
However, CECL transitional amounts may also
include amounts attributable to allowances for
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Temporary changes to the Call Report
forms and instructions would be
required to implement the proposed
amendments to the assessment system
to remove the double counting. These
changes would be effectuated in
coordination with the other member
entities of the Federal Financial
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Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC).31 Any changes to regulatory
reporting requirements pursuant to this
proposal would be required only while
the regulatory capital relief is reflected
in the regulatory reports of banks.
credit losses under CECL on HTM debt securities,
other financial assets measured at amortized cost,
and off-balance sheet credit exposures. Under the
proposal, in determining a large or highly complex
bank’s deposit insurance assessment rate, the FDIC
would continue to include in Tier 1 capital the
applicable portion of any CECL transitional
amounts attributable to allowances for credit losses
on items other than loans and leases held for
investment.
30 See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217
(Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR
4222 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,
2020).
31 As discussed in the section on the Paperwork
Reduction Act below, the FDIC will submit a
request for one additional temporary item on the
Call Report (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041 only) to
make the proposed adjustments described below.
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B. Adjustments to Certain Measures
Used in the Scorecard Approach for
Determining Assessments for Large and
Highly Complex Banks
The FDIC is proposing to adjust the
calculations of certain financial
measures used to determine deposit
insurance assessment rates for large and
highly complex banks to remove the
applicable portions of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained
earnings that is attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment. The FDIC is
proposing to remove this part of the
CECL transitional amounts because, for
large and highly complex banks that
have adopted CECL, the measure of
reserves used in the scorecard is the
allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases reported in Call Report Schedule
RC, item 4.c.
This amount, which would be
reported in a new line item in Schedule
RC–O only on the FFIEC 031 and FFIEC
041 versions of the Call Report, would
be removed from scorecard measures
that are calculated using the sum of Tier
1 capital and reserves, as described in
more detail below. The proposal also
would adjust the calculation of the loss
severity measure to remove the double
counting by removing the applicable
portions of the CECL transitional
amounts added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes and
attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for
investment for large and highly complex
banks.
While the FDIC recognizes that by the
anticipated effective date of any final
rule promulgated by this proposal,
numerous large and highly complex
banks will have implemented CECL and
many will have elected the transition
provided under either the 2019 CECL
rule or 2020 CECL rule, the FDIC would
not make retroactive adjustments to
prior quarterly assessments.
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1. Credit Quality Measure
The score for the credit quality
measure, applicable to large and highly
complex banks, is the greater of (1) the
ratio of criticized and classified items to
Tier 1 capital and reserves score or (2)
the ratio of underperforming assets to
Tier 1 capital and reserves score.32 The
double counting results in lower ratios
and a credit quality measure that
reflects less risk than a bank actually
poses to the DIF. The FDIC is proposing
to adjust the denominator, Tier 1 capital
and reserves, used in both ratios by
removing the applicable portions of the
32 See
12 CFR 327.16(b)(ii)(A)(2)(iv).
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CECL transitional amounts added to
retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes and attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment.
2. Concentration Measure
For large banks, the concentration
measure is the higher of (1) the ratio of
higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and
reserves or (2) the growth-adjusted
portfolio concentration measure. The
growth-adjusted portfolio concentration
measure includes the ratio of
concentration levels for several loan
portfolios to Tier 1 capital and reserves.
For highly complex banks, the
concentration measure is the highest of
three measures: (1) The ratio of higherrisk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves,
(2) the ratio of top 20 counterparty
exposures to Tier 1 capital and reserves,
or (3) the ratio of the largest
counterparty exposure to Tier 1 capital
and reserves.33
The double counting results in lower
ratios and a concentration measure that
reflects less risk than a bank actually
poses to the DIF. The FDIC is proposing
to adjust the denominator, Tier 1 capital
and reserves, used in each of these
ratios by removing the applicable
portions of the CECL transitional
amounts added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes and
attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for
investment.
3. Loss Severity Measure
The loss severity measure estimates
the relative magnitude of potential
losses to the DIF in the event of an IDI’s
failure.34 In calculating this measure,
the FDIC applies a standardized set of
assumptions based on historical failures
regarding liability runoffs and the
recovery value of asset categories to
simulate possible losses to the FDIC,
reducing capital and assets until the
Tier 1 leverage ratio declines to 2
percent. The double counting results in
a greater reduction of assets during the
capital reduction phase and therefore a
lower resolution value of assets at the
time of failure, which in turn results in
a higher loss severity measure that
reflects more risk than a bank actually
poses to the DIF. The FDIC is proposing
to adjust the calculation of the capital
adjustment in the loss severity measure
to remove the double counting of the
applicable portion of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained
33 See
Appendix A to subpart A of 23 CFR 327.
D to subpart A of 12 CFR 327
describes the calculation of the loss severity
measure.
34 Appendix
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earnings for regulatory capital purposes
and attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held
for investment for both large and highly
complex banks.35
Question 1: The FDIC invites
comment on its proposal to amend the
assessment regulations to remove the
double counting of a part of the CECL
transitional amounts due to the
inclusion of this amount in certain
financial measures used to determine
deposit insurance assessments for large
and highly complex banks, which could
arise when banks elect the transition
provision contained in either the 2019
CECL rule or the 2020 CECL rule.
C. Other Conforming Amendments to
the Assessment Regulations
The FDIC is proposing to make
conforming amendments to the FDIC’s
assessment regulations to effectuate the
adjustments described above. These
conforming amendments would ensure
that the proposed adjustments to the
financial measures used to calculate a
large or highly complex bank’s
assessment rate are properly
incorporated into the assessment
regulations.
D. Proposed Regulatory Reporting
Changes
A bank electing a transition under
either the 2019 CECL rule or the 2020
CECL rule must indicate its election to
use the 3-year 2019 or the 5-year 2020
CECL transition provision in Call Report
Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 2.a. In
addition, such an electing bank must
report the applicable portions of the
transitional amounts under the 2019
CECL rule or the 2020 CECL rule in the
affected Call Report items during the
transition period. For example, an
electing bank would add the applicable
portion of the CECL transitional amount
(or the modified CECL transitional
amount) when calculating the amount of
retained earnings it would report in
Schedule RC–R, Part I, item 2, of the
Call Report.36
35 The loss severity measure is an average loss
severity ratio for the three most recent quarters of
data available. It is anticipated that any temporary
reporting changes effectuated pursuant to this
proposal would be implemented no earlier than the
first applicable reporting period following the
anticipated effective date of any final rule
promulgated by this proposal. As such, the FDIC
would adjust the calculation of the loss severity
measure to remove the double counting of the
specified portion of the CECL transitional amounts
for one of the three quarters averaged in the first
reporting period following the effective date, for
two of the three quarters averaged in the second
reporting period following the effective date, and
for all three quarters averaged in all subsequent
reporting periods, as applicable.
36 See 84 FR 4227 and 85 FR 17726.
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In calculating certain measures used
in the scorecard approach for
determining deposit insurance
assessments for large and highly
complex banks, the FDIC is proposing to
remove a specified portion of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained
earnings under the transitions provided
for under the 2020 and 2019 CECL rules.
Specifically, in certain measures used in
the scorecard approach for determining
assessments for large and highly
complex banks, the FDIC would remove
the applicable portion of the CECL
transitional amount (or modified CECL
transitional amount) added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes
(Call Report Schedule RC–R, Part I, Item
2), attributable to the allowance for
credits losses on loans and leases held
for investment and included in the
amount reported on the Call Report
balance sheet in Schedule RC, item 4.c.
However, large and highly complex
banks that have elected a CECL
transition provision do not currently
report these specific portions of the
CECL transitional amounts in the Call
Report. Thus, implementing the
proposed amendments to the risk-based
deposit insurance assessment system
applicable to large and highly complex
banks would require temporary changes
to the reporting requirements applicable
to the Call Report and its related
instructions. These reporting changes
would be proposed and effectuated in
coordination with the other member
entities of the FFIEC. As previously
described, any changes to reporting
requirements for large and highly
complex banks pursuant to this
proposal would be required only while
the temporary relief is reflected in
banks’ regulatory reports.
E. Expected Effects
The proposed rule would remove the
applicable portions of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes
and attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held
for investment from certain financial
measures used in the scorecards that
determine deposit insurance assessment
rates for large and highly complex
banks. Absent the proposed rule, this
amount would be temporarily double
counted and could result in a deposit
insurance assessment rate for a large or
highly complex bank that does not
accurately reflect the bank’s risk to the
DIF, all else equal. Furthermore, the
double counting inherent in the
regulation could result in inequitable
deposit insurance assessments, as a
large or highly complex bank that has
not yet implemented CECL or that does
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not utilize a transition provision could
pay a higher or lower assessment rate
than a bank that has implemented CECL
and utilizes a transition provision, even
if both banks pose equal risk to the DIF.
The FDIC estimates that the majority of
large and highly complex banks are
currently paying a lower rate as a direct
result of the double counting. However,
the FDIC also estimates that a few banks
are currently paying a higher rate than
they otherwise would pay if the issue of
double counting is corrected. The FDIC
estimates that the rate these latter banks
are paying is higher by only a de
minimis amount, and occurs where the
double counting on the loss severity
measure more than offsets the effect of
double counting on the other scorecard
measures that are calculated using the
sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.
Based on FDIC data as of June 30,
2020, the FDIC estimates that this
double counting could be resulting in
approximately $55 million in annual
foregone assessment revenue, or 0.048
percent of the DIF balance as of that
date. This estimate includes the
majority of large and highly complex
banks that are paying a lower rate due
to the double counting and the banks
paying a higher rate, compared to if the
issue of double counting is corrected.
The FDIC expects this estimated amount
of foregone assessment revenue to
increase in the near-term as additional
large and highly complex banks adopt
CECL, to the extent those large and
highly complex banks elect to apply a
transition. This amount also may
increase in the near term as large and
highly complex banks electing the 2020
CECL rule include in their modified
CECL transitional amounts an estimate
of CECL’s effect on regulatory capital,
relative to the incurred loss
methodology’s effect on regulatory
capital, during the first two years of
CECL adoption. As of June 30, 2020, the
FDIC estimates that 101 of 138 large and
highly complex banks had implemented
CECL, and that 94 had elected a
transition provided under either the
2019 CECL rule or the 2020 CECL rule.
As banks phase out the transitional
amounts over time, the assessment
effect also would decline. As described
previously, the optional temporary relief
from CECL afforded by the CARES Act,
and the transitions provided for under
the 2019 CECL rule and 2020 CECL rule,
provide that all banks will have
completely reflected in regulatory
capital the day-one effects of CECL
(plus, if applicable, an estimate of
CECL’s effect on regulatory capital,
relative to the incurred loss
methodology’s effect on regulatory
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capital, during the first two years of
CECL adoption) by December 31, 2026,
thereby eliminating the double counting
effects from the scorecard for large and
highly complex banks. These above
estimates are subject to uncertainty
given differing CECL implementation
dates and the option for large and highly
complex banks to choose between the
transitions offered under the 2019 CECL
rule or the 2020 CECL rule, or to
recognize the full impact of CECL on
regulatory capital upon implementation.
The proposed rule could pose some
additional regulatory costs for large and
highly complex banks that elect a
transition under either the 2019 CECL
rule or the 2020 CECL rule associated
with changes to internal systems or
processes, or changes to reporting
requirements. It is the FDIC’s
understanding that banks already
calculate the portion of the CECL
transitional amount (or modified CECL
transitional amount) added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes
that is attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held
for investment, for internal purposes. As
such, the FDIC anticipates that the
proposed addition of this temporary
item to the Call Report would not
impose significant additional burden
and any additional costs are likely to be
de minimis.
F. Alternatives Considered
The FDIC considered the reasonable
and possible alternatives described
below. The FDIC is required by statute
to set deposit insurance assessments
based on risk, and the FDIC’s objective
in setting forth the current proposal is
to ensure that banks are assessed in a
manner that is fair and accurate. On
balance, the FDIC believes the current
proposal would adjust for double
counting of the applicable portion of the
CECL transitional amounts attributable
to allowances for credit losses on loans
and leases held for investment in certain
financial measures used to determine
deposit insurance assessment rates for
large and highly complex banks in the
most appropriate, accurate, and
straightforward manner.
One alternative would be to leave in
place the current assessment
regulations. Under this alternative, the
applicable portions of the CECL
transitional amounts would be
automatically and fully included in both
retained earnings as reported for
regulatory capital purposes (affecting
Tier 1 capital) and reserves, resulting in
double counting of the applicable
portions of these transitional amounts
attributable to allowances for credit
losses on loans and leases held for
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investment in certain financial measures
that are used to determine deposit
insurance assessment rates for large and
highly complex banks. As a result, a
large or highly complex bank could pay
a deposit insurance assessment rate that
does not accurately reflect the bank’s
risk to the DIF, all else equal.
Furthermore, this double counting
could result in inequitable deposit
insurance assessments, as a large or
highly complex bank that has not yet
implemented CECL or that does not
utilize a transition provision could pay
a higher or lower assessment rate than
a bank that has implemented CECL and
utilizes a transition provision, even if
both banks pose equal risk to the DIF.
Based on data as of June 30, 2020, the
DIF would receive approximately $55
million less annual income than it
would have received but for the double
counting of parts of the CECL
transitional amounts in the scorecard.
The FDIC also considered a second
alternative, using a proxy measure based
on existing data items on the Call Report
to remove the effect of double counting
on a large or highly complex bank’s
deposit insurance assessments.
Specifically, the FDIC could use the
difference between retained earnings
reported on Schedule RC (item 26.a.)
and Schedule RC–R (Part I, item 2.) to
approximate the amount double
counted. This proxy, however, would
provide an estimate of the applicable
portion of the full CECL transitional
amount (or modified CECL transitional
amount) rather than the applicable
portion of the CECL transitional amount
(or modified CECL transitional amount)
added retained earnings for regulatory
capital purposes and attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment, which is the
amount the current proposal would
remove from certain financial measures
used to determine deposit insurance
assessment rates for large and highly
complex banks. This proxy would
include the CECL transitional amounts
attributable to establishing allowances
for credit losses under CECL on loans
and leases held for investment through
a charge against retained earnings as of
the adoption date of CECL as well as the
amounts attributable to establishing, in
the same manner as of the same date,
allowances for credit losses under CECL
on HTM debt securities, other financial
assets measured at amortized cost, and
off-balance sheet credit exposures. Since
the proxy could result in the FDIC
reducing Tier 1 capital and reserves by
an amount that is greater than the
amount double counted, it could harm
banks with large reserves for HTM debt
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securities, other financial assets
measured at amortized cost, and offbalance sheet credit exposures by
inflating such a bank’s credit quality
and concentration measures in the
scorecards for large and highly complex
banks. As a result, the proxy could
result in the FDIC applying an
adjustment amount that is different from
the actual applicable portion of a bank’s
CECL transitional amount (or modified
CECL transitional amount) that was
added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes and is
attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for
investment. Thus, applying such an
adjustment amount could result in a
deposit insurance assessment rate that
does not accurately reflect a large or
highly complex bank’s risk to the DIF,
all else equal. The amount by which the
proxy measure might differ from the
applicable portion of a bank’s CECL
transitional amount (or modified CECL
transitional amount) added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes
that is attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held
for investment would vary by bank.
While this amount may not be
significant in most cases, the FDIC
expects that using the proxy would
generally result in higher assessments
for most banks.
Furthermore, as described above, it is
the FDIC’s understanding that banks
already calculate the applicable portion
of the CECL transitional amount (or
modified CECL transitional amount)
added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes and
attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for
investment, for internal purposes, and
as such, the FDIC anticipates that the
proposed addition of this temporary
item to the Call Report would not
impose significant additional burden.
The FDIC believes that temporarily
collecting this item on the Call Report
and using this item to adjust for double
counting of a portion of the CECL
transitional amounts in certain financial
measures used to determine deposit
insurance assessments for large and
highly complex banks would ensure
that banks are assessed in a manner that
is fair and accurate, all else equal.
Question 2: The FDIC invites
comment on the reasonable and possible
alternatives described in this proposed
rule. What are other reasonable and
possible alternatives that the FDIC
should consider?
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78801
G. Comment Period, Effective Date, and
Application Date
The FDIC is issuing this proposal with
a 30-day comment period. Following the
comment period, the FDIC expects to
issue a final rule with an effective date
of April 1, 2021, and applicable to the
second quarterly assessment period of
2021 (i.e., April 1–June 30, 2021). The
30-day comment period, along with the
expected effective date and the
proposed application date, would
ensure that the temporary effects of the
double counting of the applicable
portions of the CECL transitional
amounts in select financial measures
used in the scorecard approach for
determining assessments for large and
highly complex banks are corrected,
beginning with the second quarterly
assessment period of 2021.
IV. Request for Comment
The FDIC is requesting comment on
all aspects of the notice of proposed
rulemaking, in addition to the specific
requests for comment above.
V. Administrative Law Matters
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),
5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., generally requires
an agency, in connection with a
proposed rule, to prepare and make
available for public comment an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the impact of a proposed rule
on small entities.37 However, a
regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required if the agency certifies that the
rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) has
defined ‘‘small entities’’ to include
banking organizations with total assets
of less than or equal to $600 million.38
Certain types of rules, such as rules of
particular applicability relating to rates,
corporate or financial structures, or
practices relating to such rates or
structures, are expressly excluded from
the definition of ‘‘rule’’ for purposes of
37 5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.
SBA defines a small banking organization
as having $600 million or less in assets, where an
organization’s ‘‘assets are determined by averaging
the assets reported on its four quarterly financial
statements for the preceding year.’’ See 13 CFR
121.201 (as amended, effective August 19, 2019). In
its determination, the SBA ‘‘counts the receipts,
employees, or other measure of size of the concern
whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and
foreign affiliates.’’ 13 CFR 121.103. Following these
regulations, the FDIC uses a covered entity’s
affiliated and acquired assets, averaged over the
preceding four quarters, to determine whether the
covered entity is ‘‘small’’ for the purposes of RFA.
38 The
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on which the regulations are published
in final form, with certain exceptions,
including for good cause.41 The
requirements of RCDRIA will be
considered as part of the overall
rulemaking process, and the FDIC
invites comments that will further
inform its consideration of RCDRIA.
the RFA.39 Because the proposed rule
relates directly to the rates imposed on
IDIs for deposit insurance and to the
deposit insurance assessment system
that measures risk and determines each
bank’s assessment rate, the proposed
rule is not subject to the RFA.
Nonetheless, the FDIC is voluntarily
presenting information in this RFA
section.
Based on Call Report data as of June
30, 2020, the FDIC insures 5,075
depository institutions, of which 3,665
are defined as small entities by the
terms of the RFA.40 The proposed rule,
however, would apply only to
institutions with $10 billion or greater
in total assets. Consequently, small
entities for purposes of the RFA will
experience no significant economic
impact should the FDIC implement the
proposal in a final rule.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act
Section 302(a) of the Riegle
Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act (RCDRIA)
requires that the Federal banking
agencies, including the FDIC, in
determining the effective date and
administrative compliance requirements
of new regulations that impose
additional reporting, disclosure, or other
requirements on IDIs, consider,
consistent with principles of safety and
soundness and the public interest, any
administrative burdens that such
regulations would place on depository
institutions, including small depository
institutions, and customers of
depository institutions, as well as the
benefits of such regulations. In addition,
section 302(b) of RCDRIA requires new
regulations and amendments to
regulations that impose additional
reporting, disclosures, or other new
requirements on IDIs generally to take
effect on the first day of a calendar
quarter that begins on or after the date
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) states that no agency may
conduct or sponsor, nor is the
respondent required to respond to, an
information collection unless it displays
a currently valid Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) control number.42
The FDIC’s OMB control numbers for its
assessment regulations are 3064–0057,
3064–0151, and 3064–0179. The
proposed rule does not revise any of
these existing assessment information
collections pursuant to the PRA and
consequently, no submissions in
connection with these OMB control
numbers will be made to the OMB for
review. However, the proposed rule
affects the agencies’ current information
collections for the Call Report (FFIEC
031 and FFIEC 041, but not FFIEC 051).
The agencies’ OMB control numbers for
the Call Reports are: OCC OMB No.
1557–0081; Board OMB No. 7100–0036;
and FDIC OMB No. 3064–0052.
Proposed changes to the Call Report
forms and instructions will be
addressed in a separate Federal Register
notice.
D. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act 43 requires the Federal
banking agencies to use plain language
in all proposed and final rulemakings
published in the Federal Register after
January 1, 2000. The FDIC invites your
comments on how to make this
proposed rule easier to understand. For
example:
• Has the FDIC organized the material
to suit your needs? If not, how could the
material be better organized?
• Are the requirements in the
proposed regulation clearly stated? If
not, how could the regulation be stated
more clearly?
• Does the proposed regulation
contain language or jargon that is
unclear? If so, which language requires
clarification?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the regulation
easier to understand?
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 327
Bank deposit insurance, Banks,
Banking, Savings associations.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation proposes to amend 12 CFR
part 327 as follows:
PART 327—ASSESSMENTS
1. The authority citation for part 327
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1813, 1815, 1817–19,
1821.
2. In Appendix A to Subpart A, amend
the table under section heading, ‘‘VI.
Description of Scorecard Measures,’’ by:
■ a. Redesignating footnotes 2 as 3, 3 as
4, 4 as 5, and 5 as 7;
■ b. Adding a new footnote 2 after
various measures described in the table;
and
■ c. Adding a new footnote 6 after
‘‘Potential Losses/Total Domestic
Deposits (Loss Severity Measure).
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
■
Appendix A to Subpart A of Part 327—
Method To Derive Pricing Multipliers
and Uniform Amount
*
*
*
*
*
VI. DESCRIPTION OF SCORECARD MEASURES
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Scorecard measures 1
Description
*
*
Concentration Measure for Large
Insured depository institutions
(excluding Highly Complex Institutions).
*
*
*
*
The concentration score for large institutions is the higher of the following two scores:
39 5
U.S.C. 601.
Call Report data, June 30, 2020.
41 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
5 U.S.C. 553(d).
5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
40 FDIC
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5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).
5 U.S.C. 804(2).
5 U.S.C. 808(2).
12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
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12 U.S.C. 4802(b).
42 4 U.S.C. 3501–3521.
43 12 U.S.C. 4809.
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*
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 235 / Monday, December 7, 2020 / Proposed Rules
VI. DESCRIPTION OF SCORECARD MEASURES—Continued
Scorecard measures 1
Description
(1) Higher-Risk Assets/Tier 1
Capital and Reserves 2.
(2) Growth-Adjusted Portfolio
Concentrations 2.
*
*
Concentration Measure for Highly
Complex Institutions.
(1) Higher-Risk Assets/Tier 1
Capital and Reserves 2.
(2) Top 20 Counterparty Exposure/Tier 1 Capital and Reserves 2.
(3) Largest Counterparty Exposure/Tier 1 Capital and Reserves 2.
*
*
Credit Quality Measure ...................
(1) Criticized and Classified
Items/Tier 1 Capital and Reserves 2.
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(2) Underperforming Assets/
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves 2.
*
*
Balance Sheet Liquidity Ratio .........
Potential Losses/Total Domestic
Deposits (Loss Severity Measure) 6.
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Sum of construction and land development (C&D) loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans
(funded and unfunded), nontraditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk
securitizations divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed description of the
ratio.
The measure is calculated in the following steps:
*
*
*
*
Concentration score for highly complex institutions is the highest of the following three scores:
*
Sum of C&D loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded and unfunded), nontraditional
mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed description of the measure.
Sum of the 20 largest total exposure amounts to counterparties divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. The
total exposure amount is equal to the sum of the institution’s exposure amounts to one counterparty (or
borrower) for derivatives, securities financing transactions (SFTs), and cleared transactions, and its
gross lending exposure (including all unfunded commitments) to that counterparty (or borrower). A
counterparty includes an entity’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are affiliates of each other are
treated as exposures to one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure excludes all counterparty
exposure to the U.S. Government and departments or agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States. The exposure amount for derivatives,
including OTC derivatives, cleared transactions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of derivative contracts, must be calculated using the methodology set forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any
reduction for collateral other than cash collateral that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies
the requirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and (iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The
exposure amount associated with SFTs, including cleared transactions that are SFTs, must be calculated using the standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR 324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and
SFT exposures, the exposure amount to central counterparties must also include the default fund contribution.3
The largest total exposure amount to one counterparty divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. The total exposure amount is equal to the sum of the institution’s exposure amounts to one counterparty (or borrower) for derivatives, SFTs, and cleared transactions, and its gross lending exposure (including all unfunded commitments) to that counterparty (or borrower). A counterparty includes an entity’s own affiliates. Exposures to entities that are affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to one counterparty
(or borrower). Counterparty exposure excludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and
departments or agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally guaranteed by the full faith and
credit of the United States. The exposure amount for derivatives, including OTC derivatives, cleared
transactions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of derivative contracts, must be calculated
using the methodology set forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral other than
cash collateral that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies the requirements of 12 CFR
324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and (iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The exposure amount associated
with SFTs, including cleared transactions that are SFTs, must be calculated using the standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR 324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures, the exposure
amount to central counterparties must also include the default fund contribution.3
*
*
*
*
*
The credit quality score is the higher of the following two scores:
Sum of criticized and classified items divided by the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves. Criticized and
classified items include items an institution or its primary federal regulator have graded ‘‘Special Mention’’ or worse and include retail items under Uniform Retail Classification Guidelines, securities, funded
and unfunded loans, other real estate owned (ORE), other assets, and marked-to-market counterparty
positions, less credit valuation adjustments.4 Criticized and classified items exclude loans and securities
in trading books, and the amount recoverable from the U.S. government, its agencies, or governmentsponsored enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions.
Sum of loans that are 30 days or more past due and still accruing interest, nonaccrual loans, restructured
loans (including restructured 1–4 family loans), and ORE, excluding the maximum amount recoverable
from the U.S. government, its agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions, divided by a sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.
*
*
*
*
*
Sum of cash and balances due from depository institutions, federal funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to resell, and the market value of available for sale and held to maturity agency securities (excludes agency mortgage-backed securities but includes all other agency securities issued by
the U.S. Treasury, U.S. government agencies, and U.S. government-sponsored enterprises) divided by
the sum of federal funds purchased and repurchase agreements, other borrowings (including FHLB) with
a remaining maturity of one year or less, 5 percent of insured domestic deposits, and 10 percent of uninsured domestic and foreign deposits.5
Potential losses to the DIF in the event of failure divided by total domestic deposits. Appendix D describes
the calculation of the loss severity measure in detail.
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 235 / Monday, December 7, 2020 / Proposed Rules
VI. DESCRIPTION OF SCORECARD MEASURES—Continued
Scorecard measures 1
Description
Market Risk Measure for Highly
Complex Institutions.
*
*
(2) Market Risk Capital/Tier 1
Capital.
*
The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three scores:
*
*
Market risk capital divided by Tier 1 capital.7
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1 The
FDIC retains the flexibility, as part of the risk-based assessment system, without the necessity of additional notice-and-comment rulemaking, to update the minimum and maximum cutoff values for all measures used in the scorecard. The FDIC may update the minimum and
maximum cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio in order to maintain an approximately similar distribution of
higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio scores as reported prior to April 1, 2013, or to avoid changing the overall amount of assessment revenue collected. 76 FR 10672, 10700 (February 25, 2011). The FDIC will review changes in the distribution of the higher-risk assets
to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio scores and the resulting effect on total assessments and risk differentiation between banks when determining
changes to the cutoffs. The FDIC may update the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio more frequently than
annually. The FDIC will provide banks with a minimum one quarter advance notice of changes in the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to
Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio with their quarterly deposit insurance invoice.
2 The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital
regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and
84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.
3 SFTs include repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, security lending and borrowing, and margin lending transactions,
where the value of the transactions depends on market valuations and the transactions are often subject to margin agreements. The default fund
contribution is the funds contributed or commitments made by a clearing member to a central counterparty’s mutualized loss sharing arrangement. The other terms used in this description are as defined in 12 CFR part 324, subparts A and D, unless defined otherwise in 12 CFR part
327.
4 A marked-to-market counterparty position is equal to the sum of the net marked-to-market derivative exposures for each counterparty. The
net marked-to-market derivative exposure equals the sum of all positive marked-to-market exposures net of legally enforceable netting provisions
and net of all collateral held under a legally enforceable CSA plus any exposure where excess collateral has been posted to the counterparty.
For purposes of the Criticized and Classified Items/Tier 1 Capital and Reserves definition a marked-to-market counterparty position less any
credit valuation adjustment can never be less than zero.
5 Deposit runoff rates for the balance sheet liquidity ratio reflect changes issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its December 2010 document, ‘‘Basel III: International Framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards, and monitoring,’’ https://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs188.pdf.
6 The applicable portions of the CECL transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes will be removed from the calculation of the loss severity measure.
7 Market risk is defined in 12 CFR 324.202.
*
*
*
*
*
3. In Appendix C to Subpart A, revise
the text under section heading, ‘‘I.
Concentration Measures,’’ to read as
follows:
■
Appendix C to Subpart A of Part 327—
Description of Concentration Measures
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I. Concentration Measures
The concentration score for large banks is
the higher of the higher-risk assets to Tier 1
capital and reserves score or the growthadjusted portfolio concentrations score.1 The
concentration score for highly complex
institutions is the highest of the higher-risk
assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves score, the
Top 20 counterparty exposure to Tier 1
capital and reserves score, or the largest
counterparty to Tier 1 capital and reserves
score.2 The higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital
1 For the purposes of this Appendix, the term
‘‘bank’’ means insured depository institution.
2 As described in Appendix A to this subpart, the
applicable portions of the current expected credit
loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on
loans and leases held for investment and added to
retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes
pursuant to the regulatory capital regulations, as
they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR
part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR
61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14,
2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1
capital and reserves throughout the large and highly
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and reserves ratio and the growth-adjusted
portfolio concentration measure are
described herein.
*
*
*
*
*
4. In Appendix D to Subpart A, revise
the text under section heading,
‘‘Appendix D to Subpart A of Part 327—
Description of the Loss Severity
Measure,’’ to add a new footnote 3. The
revision and addition read as follows:
■
Appendix D to Subpart A of Part 327—
Description of the Loss Severity
Measure
The loss severity measure applies a
standardized set of assumptions to an
institution’s balance sheet to measure
possible losses to the FDIC in the event of an
institution’s failure. To determine an
institution’s loss severity rate, the FDIC first
applies assumptions about uninsured deposit
and other unsecured liability runoff, and
growth in insured deposits, to adjust the size
and composition of the institution’s
liabilities. Assets are then reduced to match
any reduction in liabilities.1 The institution’s
complex bank scorecards, including in the ratio of
Higher-Risk Assets to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves,
the Growth-Adjusted Portfolio Concentrations
Measure, the ratio of Top 20 Counterparty Exposure
to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, and the Ratio of
Largest Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and
Reserves.
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asset values are then further reduced so that
the Leverage ratio reaches 2 percent.2 3 In
both cases, assets are adjusted pro rata to
preserve the institution’s asset composition.
Assumptions regarding loss rates at failure
for a given asset category and the extent of
secured liabilities are then applied to
estimated assets and liabilities at failure to
determine whether the institution has
enough unencumbered assets to cover
domestic deposits. Any projected shortfall is
divided by current domestic deposits to
obtain an end-of-period loss severity ratio.
The loss severity measure is an average loss
severity ratio for the three most recent
quarters of data available.
*
*
*
*
*
5. In Appendix E to subpart A, amend
Table E.2 by:
■ a. Redesignating footnote 1 after
‘‘Credit Quality Measure’’ as 2;
■ b. Adding a new footnote 1; and
■
*
*
*
*
*
applicable portions of the current expected
credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional
amounts attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for investment and
added to retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital
regulations, as they may be amended from time to
time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part
324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and 84 FR 4222
(Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the
calculation of the loss severity measure.
3 The
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c. Adding footnote 2 after ‘‘Market
Risk Measure for Highly Complex
Institutions’’.
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
■
TABLE E.2—EXCLUSIONS FROM CERTAIN RISK MEASURES USED TO CALCULATE THE ASSESSMENT RATE FOR LARGE OR
HIGHLY COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS
Scorecard measures 1
Description
Exclusions
*
*
Credit Quality Measure 2 ................
*
*
*
The credit quality score is the higher of the following two scores:
*
*
*
*
Market Risk Measure for Highly
Complex Institutions 2.
*
*
*
The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three
scores:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1 The
applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital
regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and
84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves throughout the large and highly complex bank scorecards, including in the ratio of Higher-Risk Assets to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the Growth-Adjusted Portfolio Concentrations Measure, the
ratio of Top 20 Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the Ratio of Largest Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the ratio of Criticized and Classified Items to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, and the ratio of Underperforming Assets to Tier 1 Capital and
Reserves. All of these ratios are described in appendix A of this subpart.
2 The credit quality score is the greater of the criticized and classified items to Tier 1 capital and reserves score or the underperforming assets
to Tier 1 capital and reserves score. The market risk score is the weighted average of three scores—the trading revenue volatility to Tier 1 capital score, the market risk capital to Tier 1 capital score, and the level 3 trading assets to Tier 1 capital score. All of these ratios are described in
appendix A of this subpart and the method of calculating the scores is described in appendix B of this subpart. Each score is multiplied by its respective weight, and the resulting weighted score is summed to compute the score for the market risk measure. An overall weight of 35 percent
is allocated between the scores for the credit quality measure and market risk measure. The allocation depends on the ratio of average trading
assets to the sum of average securities, loans and trading assets (trading asset ratio) as follows: (1) Weight for credit quality score = 35 percent
* (1—trading asset ratio); and, (2) Weight for market risk score = 35 percent * trading asset ratio. In calculating the trading asset ratio, exclude
from the balance of loans the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program.
(a) Description of the loss severity measure. The loss severity measure applies a standardized set of assumptions to an institution’s balance
sheet to measure possible losses to the FDIC in the event of an institution’s failure. To determine an institution’s loss severity rate, the FDIC first
applies assumptions about uninsured deposit and other liability runoff, and growth in insured deposits, to adjust the size and composition of the
institution’s liabilities. Exclude total outstanding borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks under the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility
from short-and long-term secured borrowings, as appropriate. Assets are then reduced to match any reduction in liabilities. Exclude from an institution’s balance of commercial and industrial loans the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program. In the
event that the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program exceeds the balance of commercial and industrial
loans, exclude any remaining balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program first from the balance of all other loans, up to
the total amount of all other loans, followed by the balance of agricultural loans, up to the total amount of agricultural loans. Increase cash balances by outstanding loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program that exceed total outstanding borrowings from Federal Reserve
Banks under the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, if any. The institution’s asset values are then further reduced so that the Leverage Ratio reaches 2 percent. In both cases, assets are adjusted pro rata to preserve the institution’s asset composition. Assumptions regarding
loss rates at failure for a given asset category and the extent of secured liabilities are then applied to estimated assets and liabilities at failure to
determine whether the institution has enough unencumbered assets to cover domestic deposits. Any projected shortfall is divided by current domestic deposits to obtain an end-of-period loss severity ratio. The loss severity measure is an average loss severity ratio for the three most recent quarters of data available. The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable
to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR
61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the calculation of the loss severity measure.
*
*
*
*
*
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, on November 17,
2020.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020–25830 Filed 12–4–20; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 6714–01–P
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2020–1110; Project
Identifier MCAI–2020–01003–T]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus
Canada Limited Partnership (Type
Certificate Previously Held by C Series
Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP);
Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
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The FAA proposes to
supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2019–23–15, which applies to certain
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership
Model BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–
1A11 airplanes. AD 2019–23–15
requires revising the existing
maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to incorporate new or more
restrictive airworthiness limitations.
Since the FAA issued AD 2019–23–15,
the FAA has determined that new or
more restrictive airworthiness
limitations are necessary. This proposed
AD would require revising the existing
maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to incorporate new or more
restrictive airworthiness limitations.
The FAA is proposing this AD to
SUMMARY:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 235 (Monday, December 7, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 78794-78805]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25830]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 235 / Monday, December 7, 2020 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 78794]]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 327
RIN 3064-AF65
Assessments, Amendments To Address the Temporary Deposit
Insurance Assessment Effects of the Optional Regulatory Capital
Transitions for Implementing the Current Expected Credit Losses
Methodology
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is seeking comment
on a proposed rule that would amend the risk-based deposit insurance
assessment system applicable to all large insured depository
institutions (IDIs), including highly complex IDIs, to address the
temporary deposit insurance assessment effects resulting from certain
optional regulatory capital transition provisions relating to the
implementation of the current expected credit losses (CECL)
methodology. The proposal would amend the assessment regulations to
remove the double counting of a specified portion of the CECL
transitional amount or the modified CECL transition amount, as
applicable (collectively, the CECL transitional amounts), in certain
financial measures that are calculated using the sum of Tier 1 capital
and reserves and that are used to determine assessment rates for large
and highly complex IDIs. The proposal also would adjust the calculation
of the loss severity measure to remove the double counting of a
specified portion of the CECL transitional amounts for a large or
highly complex IDI. This proposal would not affect regulatory capital
or the regulatory capital relief provided in the form of transition
provisions that allow banking organizations to phase in the effects of
CECL on their regulatory capital ratios.
DATES: Comments must be received no later than January 6, 2021.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments on the proposed rule using any of
the following methods:
Agency Website: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal. Follow the instructions for submitting comments on the agency
website.
Email: [email protected]. Include RIN 3064-AF65 on the
subject line of the message.
Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivery: Comments may be hand delivered to the guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street building (located on F
Street) on business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Public Inspection: All comments received, including any
personal information provided, will be posted generally without change
to https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Ciardi, Chief, Large Bank
Pricing, (202) 898-7079 or [email protected]; Ashley Mihalik, Chief,
Banking and Regulatory Policy, (202) 898-3793 or [email protected];
Nefretete Smith, Counsel, (202) 898-6851 or [email protected]; Sydney
Mayer, Senior Attorney, (202) 898-3669 or [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Policy Objectives
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) requires that the FDIC
establish a risk-based deposit insurance assessment system.\1\ Pursuant
to this requirement, the FDIC first adopted a risk-based deposit
insurance assessment system effective in 1993 that applied to all
IDIs.\2\ The FDIC implemented this assessment system with the goals of
making the deposit insurance system fairer to well-run institutions and
encouraging weaker institutions to improve their condition, and thus,
promote the safety and soundness of IDIs.\3\
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\1\ 12 U.S.C. 1817(b).
\2\ 57 FR 45263 (Oct. 1, 1992).
\3\ As used in this proposed rule, the term ``insured depository
institution'' has the same meaning as it is used in section 3(c)(2)
of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2).
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In 2006, the FDIC adopted a final rule that created different risk-
based assessment systems for large and small IDIs that combined
supervisory ratings with other risk measures to differentiate risk and
determine assessment rates.\4\ In 2011, the FDIC amended the risk-based
assessment system applicable to large IDIs to, among other things,
better capture risk at the time the institution assumes the risk, to
better differentiate risk among large IDIs during periods of good
economic and banking conditions based on how they would fare during
periods of stress or economic downturns, and to better take into
account the losses that the FDIC may incur if a large IDI fails.\5\
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\4\ See 71 FR 69282 (Nov. 30, 2006). Generally, large IDIs have
$10 billion or more in total assets and small IDIs have less than
$10 billion in total assets. See 12 CFR 327.8(e) and (f). As used in
this proposed rule, the term ``small bank'' is synonymous with
``small institution,'' the term ``large bank'' is synonymous with
``large institution,'' and the term ``highly complex bank'' is
synonymous with ``highly complex institution,'' as the terms are
defined in 12 CFR 327.8.
\5\ See 76 FR 10672 (Feb. 25, 2011).
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The FDIC is required by statute to set deposit insurance
assessments based on risk, and the FDIC's objective in setting forth
this proposal is to ensure that banks are assessed in a manner that is
fair and accurate. The primary objective of this proposal is to remove
a double counting issue in several financial measures used to determine
deposit insurance assessments for large and highly complex banks, which
could result in a deposit insurance assessment rate for a large or
highly complex bank that does not accurately reflect the bank's risk to
the deposit insurance fund (DIF), all else equal. Specifically, the
proposal would amend the assessment regulations to remove the double
counting of a portion of the CECL transitional amounts, in certain
financial measures used to determine deposit insurance assessments for
large and highly complex banks. In particular, certain financial
measures are calculated by summing Tier 1 capital, which includes the
CECL transitional amounts, and reserves, which already reflects the
implementation of CECL. As a result, a portion of the CECL transitional
amounts is being double counted in these measures, which in turn
affects assessment rates for large and highly complex banks. The
proposal also would adjust the calculation of the loss severity measure
to remove the double counting of a
[[Page 78795]]
portion of the CECL transitional amounts for a large or highly complex
bank.
This proposal would amend the deposit insurance system applicable
to large and highly complex banks only, and it would not affect
regulatory capital or the regulatory capital relief provided in the
form of transition provisions that allow banking organizations to phase
in the effects of CECL on their regulatory capital ratios.\6\
Specifically, in calculating another measure used to determine
assessment rates for all IDIs, the Tier 1 leverage ratio, the FDIC
would continue to apply the CECL regulatory capital transition
provisions, consistent with the regulatory capital relief provided to
address concerns that despite adequate capital planning, unexpected
economic conditions at the time of CECL adoption could result in
higher-than-anticipated increases in allowances.\7\
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\6\ Banking organizations subject to the capital rule include
national banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks, savings
associations, and top-tier bank holding companies and savings and
loan holding companies domiciled in the United States not subject to
the Federal Reserve Board's Small Bank Holding Company Policy
Statement (12 CFR part 225, appendix C), but exclude certain savings
and loan holding companies that are substantially engaged in
insurance underwriting or commercial activities or that are estate
trusts, and bank holding companies and savings and loan holding
companies that are employee stock ownership plans. See 12 CFR part 3
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)); 12 CFR part 217
(Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (February 14,
2019) and 85 FR 61577 (September 30, 2020).
\7\ See 84 FR 4225 (February 14, 2019).
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The proposed amendments to the deposit insurance assessment system
and any changes to reporting requirements pursuant to this proposal
would be required only while the regulatory capital relief described
above is reflected in the regulatory reports of banks.
II. Background
A. Deposit Insurance Assessments
The FDIC charges all IDIs an assessment amount for deposit
insurance equal to the IDI's deposit insurance assessment base
multiplied by its risk-based assessment rate.\8\ An IDI's assessment
base and assessment rate are determined each quarter based on
supervisory ratings and information collected in the Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) or the Report of Assets
and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC
002), as appropriate. Generally, an IDI's assessment base equals its
average consolidated total assets minus its average tangible equity.\9\
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\8\ See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(1).
\9\ See 12 CFR 327.5.
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An IDI's assessment rate is calculated using different methods
based on whether the IDI is a small, large, or highly complex bank.\10\
Large and highly complex banks are assessed using a scorecard approach
that combines CAMELS ratings and certain forward-looking financial
measures to assess the risk that a large or highly complex bank poses
to the DIF.\11\ The score that each large or highly complex bank
receives is used to determine its deposit insurance assessment rate.
One scorecard applies to most large IDIs and another applies to highly
complex banks. Both scorecards use quantitative financial measures that
are useful in predicting a large or highly complex bank's long-term
performance.\12\
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\10\ For assessment purposes, a large bank is generally defined
as an institution with $10 billion or more in total assets, a small
bank is generally defined as an institution with less than $10
billion in total assets, and a highly complex bank is generally
defined as an institution that has $50 billion or more in total
assets and is controlled by a parent holding company that has $500
billion or more in total assets, or is a processing bank or trust
company. See 12 CFR 327.16(a) and (b).
\11\ See 12 CFR 327.16(b); see also 76 FR 10672 (Feb. 25, 2011)
and 77 FR 66000 (Oct. 31, 2012).
\12\ See 76 FR 10688. The FDIC uses a different scorecard for
highly complex IDIs because those institutions are structurally and
operationally complex, or pose unique challenges and risks in case
of failure. 76 FR 10695.
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As described in more detail below, the FDIC is proposing to amend
the assessment regulations to remove the double counting of a portion
of the CECL transitional amounts in the calculation of the loss
severity measure and certain other financial measures that are
calculated by summing Tier 1 capital and reserves, which are used to
determine assessment rates for large and highly complex banks.
B. The Current Expected Credit Losses Methodology
In 2016, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued
Accounting Standards Update (ASU) No. 2016-13, Financial Instruments--
Credit Losses, Topic 326, Measurement of Credit Losses on Financial
Instruments.\13\ The ASU resulted in significant changes to credit loss
accounting under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
The revisions to credit loss accounting under GAAP included the
introduction of CECL, which replaces the incurred loss methodology for
financial assets measured at amortized cost. For these assets, CECL
requires banking organizations to recognize lifetime expected credit
losses and to incorporate reasonable and supportable forecasts in
developing the estimate of lifetime expected credit losses, while also
maintaining the current requirement that banking organizations consider
past events and current conditions.
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\13\ ASU 2016-13 covers measurement of credit losses on
financial instruments and includes three subtopics within Topic 326:
(i) Subtopic 326-10 Financial Instruments--Credit Losses--Overall;
(ii) Subtopic 326-20: Financial Instruments--Credit Losses--Measured
at Amortized Cost; and (iii) Subtopic 326-30: Financial
Instruments--Credit Losses--Available-for-Sale Debt Securities.
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CECL allowances cover a broader range of financial assets than the
allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) under the incurred loss
methodology. Under the incurred loss methodology, the ALLL generally
covers credit losses on loans held for investment and lease financing
receivables, with additional allowances for certain other extensions of
credit and allowances for credit losses on certain off-balance sheet
credit exposures (with the latter allowances presented as
liabilities).\14\ These exposures will be within the scope of CECL. In
addition, CECL applies to credit losses on held-to-maturity (HTM) debt
securities. ASU 2016-13 also introduces new requirements for available-
for-sale (AFS) debt securities. The new accounting standard requires
that a banking organization recognize credit losses on individual AFS
debt securities through credit loss allowances, rather than through
direct write-downs, as is currently required under U.S. GAAP. The
credit loss allowances attributable to debt securities are separate
from the credit loss allowances attributable to loans and leases.
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\14\ ``Other extensions of credit'' includes trade and
reinsurance receivables, and receivables that relate to repurchase
agreements and securities lending agreements. ``Off-balance sheet
credit exposures'' includes off-balance sheet credit exposures not
accounted for as insurance, such as loan commitments, standby
letters of credit, and financial guarantees. The FDIC notes that
credit losses for off-balance sheet credit exposures that are
unconditionally cancellable by the issuer are not recognized under
CECL.
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C. The 2019 CECL Rule
Upon adoption of CECL, a banking organization will record a one-
time adjustment to its credit loss allowances as of the beginning of
its fiscal year of adoption equal to the difference, if any, between
the amount of credit loss allowances required under the incurred loss
methodology and the amount of credit loss allowances required under
CECL. A banking organization's implementation of CECL will affect its
retained earnings, deferred tax assets
[[Page 78796]]
(DTAs), allowances, and, as a result, its regulatory capital ratios.
In recognition of the potential for the implementation of CECL to
affect regulatory capital ratios, on February 14, 2019, the FDIC, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) (collectively, the
agencies) issued a final rule that revised certain regulations,
including the agencies' regulatory capital regulations (capital
rule),\15\ to account for the aforementioned changes to credit loss
accounting under GAAP, including CECL (2019 CECL rule).\16\ The 2019
CECL rule includes a transition provision that allows banking
organizations to phase in over a three-year period the day-one adverse
effects of CECL on their regulatory capital ratios.
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\15\ 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part
324 (FDIC).
\16\ 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019).
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D. The 2020 CECL Rule
As part of the efforts to address the disruption of economic
activity in the United States caused by the spread of coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19), on March 31, 2020, the agencies adopted a
second CECL transition provision through an interim final rule.\17\ The
agencies subsequently adopted a final rule (2020 CECL rule) on
September 30, 2020, that is consistent with the interim final rule,
with some clarifications and adjustments related to the calculation of
the transition and the eligibility criteria for using the 2020 CECL
transition provision.\18\ The 2020 CECL rule provides banking
organizations that adopt CECL for purposes of GAAP (as in effect
January 1, 2020), for a fiscal year that begins during the 2020
calendar year, the option to delay for up to two years an estimate of
CECL's effect on regulatory capital, followed by a three-year
transition period (i.e., a five-year transition period in total).\19\
The 2020 CECL rule does not replace the three-year transition provision
in the 2019 CECL rule, which remains available to any banking
organization at the time that it adopts CECL.\20\
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\17\ 85 FR 17723 (Mar. 31, 2020).
\18\ See 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020).
\19\ A banking organization that is required to adopt CECL under
GAAP in the 2020 calendar year, but chooses to delay use of CECL for
regulatory reporting in accordance with section 4014 of the
Coronavirus Aid Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), is
also eligible for the 2020 CECL transition provision. The CARES Act
(Pub. L. 116-136, 4014, 134 Stat. 281 (March 27, 2020)) provides
banking organizations optional temporary relief from complying with
CECL ending on the earlier of (1) the termination date of the
current national emergency, declared by the President on March 13,
2020 under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
concerning COVID-19, or (2) December 31, 2020. If a banking
organization chooses to revert to the incurred loss methodology
pursuant to the CARES Act in any quarter in 2020, the banking
organization would not apply any transitional amounts in that
quarter but would be allowed to apply the transitional amounts in
subsequent quarters when the banking organization resumes use of
CECL.
\20\ See 85 FR 61578 (Sept. 30, 2020).
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E. Double Counting of a Portion of the CECL Transitional Amounts in
Certain Financial Measures Used To Determine Assessments for Large and
Highly Complex Banks
An increase in a banking organization's allowances, including those
estimated under CECL, generally will reduce the banking organization's
earnings or retained earnings, and therefore, its Tier 1 capital. For
banks electing the 2019 CECL rule, the CECL transitional amount is the
difference between the closing balance sheet amount of retained
earnings for the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the bank's
adoption of CECL (pre-CECL amount) and the bank's balance sheet amount
of retained earnings as of the beginning of the fiscal year in which it
adopts CECL (post-CECL amount). For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule
transition provision, retained earnings are increased for regulatory
capital calculation purposes by a modified CECL transitional amount
that is adjusted to reflect changes in retained earnings due to CECL
that occur during the first two years of the five-year transition
period. Under the 2020 CECL rule, the change in retained earnings due
to CECL is calculated by taking the change in reported adjusted
allowances for credit losses (AACL) \21\ relative to the first day of
the fiscal year in which CECL was adopted and applying a scaling
multiplier of 25 percent during the first two years of the transition
period. The resulting amount is added to the CECL transitional amount
described above. Hence, the modified CECL transitional amount for banks
electing the 2020 CECL rule is calculated on a quarterly basis during
the first two years of the transition period. The bank reflects that
modified CECL transitional amount, which includes 100 percent of the
day-one impact of CECL on retained earnings plus a portion of the
difference between AACL reported in the most recent regulatory report
and AACL as of the beginning of the fiscal year that the banking
organization adopts CECL, in the transitional amount applied to
retained earnings in regulatory capital calculations.\22\
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\21\ The 2019 CECL rule defined a new term for regulatory
capital purposes, adjusted allowances for credit losses (AACL). The
meaning of the term AACL for regulatory capital purposes is
different from the meaning of the term allowances of credit losses
(ACL) used in applicable accounting standards. The term allowance
for credit losses as used by the FASB in ASU 2016-13 applies to both
financial assets measured at amortized cost and AFS debt securities.
In contrast, the AACL definition includes only those allowances that
have been established through a charge against earnings or retained
earnings. Under the 2019 CECL rule, the term AACL, rather than ALLL,
applies to a banking organization that has adopted CECL.
\22\ See 85 FR 61580 (Sept. 30, 2020).
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For banks electing the 2020 CECL rule transition provision that
enter the third year of their transition period and for banks electing
the three-year 2019 CECL rule transition provision, banks must
calculate the transitional amount to phase into their retained earnings
for purposes of their regulatory capital calculations over a three-year
period. For banks electing the 2019 CECL rule, the CECL transitional
amount of is the difference between the pre-CECL amount of retained
earnings and the post-CECL amount of retained earnings. For banks
electing the 2020 CECL rule that enter the third year of their
transition, the modified CECL transitional amount is the difference
between the bank's AACL at the end of the second year of the transition
period and its AACL as of the beginning of the fiscal year of CECL
adoption multiplied by 25 percent plus the CECL transitional amount
described above. The CECL transitional amount or, at the end of the
second year of the transition period for banks electing the 2020 CECL
rule, the modified CECL transitional amount, is fixed and must be
phased in over the three-year transition period or the last three years
of the transition period, respectively, on a straight-line basis, 25
percent in the first year (or third year for banks electing the 2020
CECL rule), and an additional 25 percent of the transitional amount
over each of the next two years.\23\ At the beginning of the
[[Page 78797]]
sixth year for banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, or the beginning of
the fourth year for banks electing the 2019 CECL rule, the electing
bank would have completely reflected in regulatory capital the day-one
effects of CECL (plus, for banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, an
estimate of CECL's effect on regulatory capital, relative to the
incurred loss methodology's effect on regulatory capital, during the
first two years of CECL adoption).\24\
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\23\ Thus, when calculating regulatory capital, a bank electing
the 2019 CECL rule transition provision would increase the retained
earnings reported on its balance sheet by the applicable portion of
its CECL transitional amount, i.e., 75 percent of its CECL
transitional amount during the first year of the transition period,
50 percent of its CECL transitional amount during the second year of
the transition period, and 25 percent of its CECL transitional
amount during the third year of the transition period. A bank
electing the 2020 CECL rule transition provision would increase the
retained earnings reported on its balance sheet by the applicable
portion of its modified CECL transitional amount, i.e., 100 percent
of its modified CECL transitional amount during the first and second
years of the transition period, 75 percent of its CECL modified
transitional amount during the third year of the transition period,
50 percent of its modified CECL transitional amount during the
fourth year of the transition period, and 25 percent of its CECL
transitional amount during the fifth year of the transition period.
\24\ See 84 FR 4228 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61580 (Sept. 30,
2020).
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Certain financial measures that are used in the scorecard to
determine assessment rates for large and highly complex banks are
calculated using both Tier 1 capital and reserves. Tier 1 capital is
reported in Call Report Schedule RC-R, Part I, item 26, and for banks
that elect either the three-year transition provision contained in the
2019 CECL rule or the five-year transition provision contained in the
2020 CECL rule, Tier 1 capital includes (due to adjustments to the
amount of retained earnings reported on the balance sheet) the
applicable portion of the CECL transitional amount (or modified CECL
transitional amount). For deposit insurance assessment purposes,
reserves are calculated using the amount reported in Call Report
Schedule RC, item 4.c, ``Allowance for loan and lease losses.'' For all
banks that have adopted CECL, this Schedule RC line item reflects the
allowance for credit losses on loans and leases.\25\ The issue of
double counting arises in certain financial measures used to determine
assessment rates for large and highly complex banks that are calculated
using both Tier 1 capital and reserves because the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases is included during the transition period in
both reserves and, as a portion of the CECL or modified CECL
transitional amount, Tier 1 capital. For banks that elect either the
three-year transition provision contained in the 2019 CECL rule or the
five-year transition provision contained in the 2020 CECL rule, the
CECL transitional amounts, as defined in section 301 of the regulatory
capital rules, additionally include the effect on retained earnings,
net of tax effect, of establishing allowances for credit losses in
accordance with the CECL methodology on HTM debt securities, other
financial assets measured at amortized cost, and off-balance sheet
credit exposures as of the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption
(plus, for banks electing the 2020 CECL rule, the change during the
first two years of the transition period in reported AACLs for HTM debt
securities, other financial assets measured at amortized cost, and off-
balance sheet credit exposures relative to the balances of these AACLs
as of the beginning of the fiscal year of CECL adoption multiplied by
25 percent). The applicable portions of the CECL transitional amounts
attributable to allowances for credit losses on HTM debt securities,
other financial assets measured at amortized cost, and off-balance
sheet credit exposures are included in Tier 1 capital only and are not
double counted with reserves for deposit insurance assessment purposes.
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\25\ The allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held
for investment also is reported in item 7, column A, of Call Report
Schedule RI-B, Part II, Changes in Allowances for Credit Losses.
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The CECL effective dates assigned by ASU 2016-13 as most recently
amended by ASU No. 2019-10, the optional temporary relief from
complying with CECL afforded by the CARES Act, and the transitions
provided for under the 2019 CECL rule and 2020 CECL rule, provide that
all banks will have completely reflected in regulatory capital the day-
one effects of CECL (plus, if applicable, an estimate of CECL's effect
on regulatory capital, relative to the incurred loss methodology's
effect on regulatory capital, during the first two years of CECL
adoption) by December 31, 2026. As a result, and as discussed below,
the proposed amendments to the deposit insurance assessment system and
any changes to reporting requirements pursuant to this proposal would
be required only while the temporary regulatory capital relief is
reflected in the regulatory reports of banks.
III. The Proposed Rule
A. Summary
In calculating certain measures used in the scorecard for
determining deposit insurance assessment rates for large and highly
complex banks, the FDIC is proposing to remove the applicable portions
of the CECL transitional amounts added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes and attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held for investment under the
transitions provided for under the 2019 and 2020 CECL rules.
Specifically, in certain scorecard measures which are calculated using
the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves, the FDIC would remove a
specified portion of the CECL transitional amount (or modified CECL
transitional amount) that is added to retained earnings for regulatory
capital purposes when determining deposit insurance assessment rates.
The FDIC is also proposing to adjust the calculation of the loss
severity measure to remove the double counting of a specified portion
of the CECL transitional amounts for a large or highly complex bank.
Absent adjustments to the calculation of certain financial measures
in the large and highly complex bank scorecards, the inclusion of the
applicable portions of the CECL transitional amounts added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes and attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for investment in
regulatory capital and the implementation of CECL in calculating
reserves will result in temporary double counting of a portion of the
CECL transitional amounts in select financial measures used to
determine assessment rates for large and highly complex banks. For
example, in the denominator of the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital
and reserves ratio, the applicable portions of the CECL transitional
amounts added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes and
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases
held for investment would be included in Tier 1 capital, and these
portions also would be reflected in the calculation of reserves using
the allowance amount reported in Call Report Schedule RC, item 4.c. If
left uncorrected, this temporary double counting could result in a
deposit insurance assessment rate for a large or highly complex bank
that does not accurately reflect the bank's risk to the DIF, all else
equal.
In the following simplified, stylized example, illustrated in Table
1 below, consider a hypothetical large bank that has a CECL effective
date of January 1, 2020, and elects a five-year transition.\26\ On the
closing balance sheet date immediately prior to adopting CECL
[[Page 78798]]
(i.e., December 31, 2019), the electing bank has $1 million of ALLL and
$10 million of Tier 1 capital. On the opening balance sheet date
immediately after adopting CECL (i.e., January 1, 2020), the electing
bank has $1.2 million of allowances for credit losses, of which the
entire $1.2 million qualifies as AACL for regulatory capital purposes
and is attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases held for investment.\27\ The bank would recognize the adoption
of CECL as of January 1, 2020, by recording an increase in its
allowances for credit losses, and in its AACL for regulatory capital
purposes, of $200,000, with a reduction in beginning retained earnings
of $200,000, which flows through and results in Tier 1 capital of $9.8
million. For each of the quarterly reporting periods in year 1 of the
five-year transition period (i.e., 2020), the electing bank would
increase the retained earnings reported on its balance sheet by
$200,000 for purposes of calculating its regulatory capital ratios,
resulting in an increase in its Tier 1 capital of $200,000 to $10
million, all else equal.\28\
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\26\ This stylized example is included to illustrate the effect
of the proposed rule and omits the effects of deferred tax assets on
regulatory capital calculations, which are addressed in the
agencies' capital rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL rule.
The example reflects the first-quarter 2020 application by a
hypothetical large bank (with no purchased credit-deteriorated
assets) that has adopted the five-year CECL transition under the
2020 CECL rule and assumes that the full amount of the CECL
transitional amount is attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases. The example does not reflect any changes
over the course of the first quarterly reporting period in year 1
(i.e., no changes in the amounts reported on the bank's balance
sheet between January 1 and March 31, 2020, the end of the reporting
period for the first quarter). As a consequence, the bank's modified
CECL transitional amount as of March 31, 2020 equals its CECL
transitional amount. See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217
(Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (February 14,
2019) and 85 FR 61577 (September 30, 2020).
\27\ While the CECL transitional amount is calculated using the
difference between the closing balance sheet amount of retained
earnings for the fiscal year-end immediately prior to a bank's
adoption of CECL and the balance sheet amount of retained earnings
as of the beginning of the fiscal year in which the bank adopts
CECL, the FDIC calculates financial measures used to determine
deposit insurance assessments using data reported as of each quarter
end.
\28\ Under the 2019 CECL rule, when calculating regulatory
capital ratios during the first year of an electing bank's CECL
adoption date, the bank must phase in 25 percent of the transitional
amounts. The bank would phase in an additional 25 percent of the
transitional amounts over each of the next two years so that the
bank would have phased in 75 percent of the day-one adverse effects
of adopting CECL during year three. At the beginning of the fourth
year, the bank would have completely reflected in regulatory capital
the day-one effects of CECL. Under the 2020 CECL rule, the modified
CECL transitional amount is calculated on a quarterly basis during
the first two years of the transition period. See 12 CFR part 3
(OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 324 (FDIC). See also 84
FR 4222 (February 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577 (September 30, 2020).
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In this example, in determining the hypothetical large bank's
deposit insurance assessment rate, the bank's Tier 1 capital of $10
million would include the $200,000 addition to the bank's reported
retained earnings due to the CECL transition (entirely attributable to
the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases), and its reserves
would equal $1.2 million, the entire amount of which is attributable to
the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for
investment. Its combined Tier 1 capital and reserves would equal $11.2
million ($10 million plus $1.2 million), reflecting double counting of
the $200,000 applicable portion of the bank's CECL transitional amount
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and
leases.\29\
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\29\ In this stylized example, the entirety of the CECL
transitional amount is attributable to the allowance for credit
losses on loans and leases and it equals the modified CECL
transitional amount during the first quarter of the transition
period. The applicable portion of the CECL transitional amounts is
the amount that is double counted in certain financial measures used
to determine deposit insurance assessment rates and that the FDIC is
proposing to remove from those financial measures. However, CECL
transitional amounts may also include amounts attributable to
allowances for credit losses under CECL on HTM debt securities,
other financial assets measured at amortized cost, and off-balance
sheet credit exposures. Under the proposal, in determining a large
or highly complex bank's deposit insurance assessment rate, the FDIC
would continue to include in Tier 1 capital the applicable portion
of any CECL transitional amounts attributable to allowances for
credit losses on items other than loans and leases held for
investment.
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Under the proposal, for purposes of calculating assessments for
large and highly complex banks, the FDIC would subtract $200,000 from
the denominator of financial measures that sum Tier 1 capital and
reserves, since the amount of $200,000 is incorporated in both Tier 1
capital (as the applicable portion of the CECL transitional amount in
year one of the five-year transition period) and reserves in the
denominator. The bank's adjusted Tier 1 capital and reserves would
equal $11 million. The FDIC also would adjust the calculation of the
loss severity measure by $200,000, as described below.
Table 1--Stylized Example \1\ of First-Quarter Application of a Five-Year CECL Transition in Calculating Tier 1
Capital and Reserves for Deposit Insurance Assessment Purposes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In thousands Dec. 31, 2019 Jan. 1, 2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserves............................... $1,000 (ALLL)...................... $1,200 (AACL).
Tier 1 Capital......................... 10,000............................. 10,000.
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (current).. 11,000............................. 11,200.
Applicable Portion of the CECL ................................... 200.
Transitional Amount.
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves (proposed). ................................... 11,000.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This stylized example reflects the first-quarter application of a hypothetical bank that has adopted a five-
year CECL transition under the 2020 CECL rule and assumes that the full amount of the CECL transitional amount
is attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases. The example does not reflect any
changes over the course of the first quarter of 2020 (i.e., no changes in the amounts reported on the bank's
balance sheet between January 1 and March 31, 2020, the end of the reporting period for the first quarter). As
a consequence, the bank's modified CECL transitional amount as of March 31, 2020, equals its CECL transitional
amount. This stylized example omits the effects of deferred tax assets, which are addressed in the agencies'
capital rule, the 2019 CECL rule, and the 2020 CECL rule.
This proposal would amend the deposit insurance system applicable
to large and highly complex banks only, and would not affect regulatory
capital or the regulatory capital relief provided under the 2019 CECL
rule or 2020 CECL rule.\30\ The FDIC would continue the application of
the transition provisions provided for under the 2019 and 2020 CECL
rules to the Tier 1 leverage ratio used in determining deposit
insurance assessment rates for all IDIs.
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\30\ See 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR
part 324 (FDIC). See also 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019) and 85 FR 61577
(Sept. 30, 2020).
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Temporary changes to the Call Report forms and instructions would
be required to implement the proposed amendments to the assessment
system to remove the double counting. These changes would be
effectuated in coordination with the other member entities of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).\31\ Any
changes to regulatory reporting requirements pursuant to this proposal
would be required only while the regulatory capital relief is reflected
in the regulatory reports of banks.
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\31\ As discussed in the section on the Paperwork Reduction Act
below, the FDIC will submit a request for one additional temporary
item on the Call Report (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041 only) to make the
proposed adjustments described below.
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[[Page 78799]]
B. Adjustments to Certain Measures Used in the Scorecard Approach for
Determining Assessments for Large and Highly Complex Banks
The FDIC is proposing to adjust the calculations of certain
financial measures used to determine deposit insurance assessment rates
for large and highly complex banks to remove the applicable portions of
the CECL transitional amounts added to retained earnings that is
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases
held for investment. The FDIC is proposing to remove this part of the
CECL transitional amounts because, for large and highly complex banks
that have adopted CECL, the measure of reserves used in the scorecard
is the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases reported in Call
Report Schedule RC, item 4.c.
This amount, which would be reported in a new line item in Schedule
RC-O only on the FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041 versions of the Call Report,
would be removed from scorecard measures that are calculated using the
sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves, as described in more detail below.
The proposal also would adjust the calculation of the loss severity
measure to remove the double counting by removing the applicable
portions of the CECL transitional amounts added to retained earnings
for regulatory capital purposes and attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held for investment for large and
highly complex banks.
While the FDIC recognizes that by the anticipated effective date of
any final rule promulgated by this proposal, numerous large and highly
complex banks will have implemented CECL and many will have elected the
transition provided under either the 2019 CECL rule or 2020 CECL rule,
the FDIC would not make retroactive adjustments to prior quarterly
assessments.
1. Credit Quality Measure
The score for the credit quality measure, applicable to large and
highly complex banks, is the greater of (1) the ratio of criticized and
classified items to Tier 1 capital and reserves score or (2) the ratio
of underperforming assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves score.\32\ The
double counting results in lower ratios and a credit quality measure
that reflects less risk than a bank actually poses to the DIF. The FDIC
is proposing to adjust the denominator, Tier 1 capital and reserves,
used in both ratios by removing the applicable portions of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes and attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans
and leases held for investment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See 12 CFR 327.16(b)(ii)(A)(2)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Concentration Measure
For large banks, the concentration measure is the higher of (1) the
ratio of higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves or (2) the
growth-adjusted portfolio concentration measure. The growth-adjusted
portfolio concentration measure includes the ratio of concentration
levels for several loan portfolios to Tier 1 capital and reserves.
For highly complex banks, the concentration measure is the highest
of three measures: (1) The ratio of higher-risk assets to Tier 1
capital and reserves, (2) the ratio of top 20 counterparty exposures to
Tier 1 capital and reserves, or (3) the ratio of the largest
counterparty exposure to Tier 1 capital and reserves.\33\
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\33\ See Appendix A to subpart A of 23 CFR 327.
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The double counting results in lower ratios and a concentration
measure that reflects less risk than a bank actually poses to the DIF.
The FDIC is proposing to adjust the denominator, Tier 1 capital and
reserves, used in each of these ratios by removing the applicable
portions of the CECL transitional amounts added to retained earnings
for regulatory capital purposes and attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held for investment.
3. Loss Severity Measure
The loss severity measure estimates the relative magnitude of
potential losses to the DIF in the event of an IDI's failure.\34\ In
calculating this measure, the FDIC applies a standardized set of
assumptions based on historical failures regarding liability runoffs
and the recovery value of asset categories to simulate possible losses
to the FDIC, reducing capital and assets until the Tier 1 leverage
ratio declines to 2 percent. The double counting results in a greater
reduction of assets during the capital reduction phase and therefore a
lower resolution value of assets at the time of failure, which in turn
results in a higher loss severity measure that reflects more risk than
a bank actually poses to the DIF. The FDIC is proposing to adjust the
calculation of the capital adjustment in the loss severity measure to
remove the double counting of the applicable portion of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes and attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans
and leases held for investment for both large and highly complex
banks.\35\
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\34\ Appendix D to subpart A of 12 CFR 327 describes the
calculation of the loss severity measure.
\35\ The loss severity measure is an average loss severity ratio
for the three most recent quarters of data available. It is
anticipated that any temporary reporting changes effectuated
pursuant to this proposal would be implemented no earlier than the
first applicable reporting period following the anticipated
effective date of any final rule promulgated by this proposal. As
such, the FDIC would adjust the calculation of the loss severity
measure to remove the double counting of the specified portion of
the CECL transitional amounts for one of the three quarters averaged
in the first reporting period following the effective date, for two
of the three quarters averaged in the second reporting period
following the effective date, and for all three quarters averaged in
all subsequent reporting periods, as applicable.
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Question 1: The FDIC invites comment on its proposal to amend the
assessment regulations to remove the double counting of a part of the
CECL transitional amounts due to the inclusion of this amount in
certain financial measures used to determine deposit insurance
assessments for large and highly complex banks, which could arise when
banks elect the transition provision contained in either the 2019 CECL
rule or the 2020 CECL rule.
C. Other Conforming Amendments to the Assessment Regulations
The FDIC is proposing to make conforming amendments to the FDIC's
assessment regulations to effectuate the adjustments described above.
These conforming amendments would ensure that the proposed adjustments
to the financial measures used to calculate a large or highly complex
bank's assessment rate are properly incorporated into the assessment
regulations.
D. Proposed Regulatory Reporting Changes
A bank electing a transition under either the 2019 CECL rule or the
2020 CECL rule must indicate its election to use the 3-year 2019 or the
5-year 2020 CECL transition provision in Call Report Schedule RC-R,
Part I, item 2.a. In addition, such an electing bank must report the
applicable portions of the transitional amounts under the 2019 CECL
rule or the 2020 CECL rule in the affected Call Report items during the
transition period. For example, an electing bank would add the
applicable portion of the CECL transitional amount (or the modified
CECL transitional amount) when calculating the amount of retained
earnings it would report in Schedule RC-R, Part I, item 2, of the Call
Report.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See 84 FR 4227 and 85 FR 17726.
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[[Page 78800]]
In calculating certain measures used in the scorecard approach for
determining deposit insurance assessments for large and highly complex
banks, the FDIC is proposing to remove a specified portion of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained earnings under the transitions
provided for under the 2020 and 2019 CECL rules. Specifically, in
certain measures used in the scorecard approach for determining
assessments for large and highly complex banks, the FDIC would remove
the applicable portion of the CECL transitional amount (or modified
CECL transitional amount) added to retained earnings for regulatory
capital purposes (Call Report Schedule RC-R, Part I, Item 2),
attributable to the allowance for credits losses on loans and leases
held for investment and included in the amount reported on the Call
Report balance sheet in Schedule RC, item 4.c.
However, large and highly complex banks that have elected a CECL
transition provision do not currently report these specific portions of
the CECL transitional amounts in the Call Report. Thus, implementing
the proposed amendments to the risk-based deposit insurance assessment
system applicable to large and highly complex banks would require
temporary changes to the reporting requirements applicable to the Call
Report and its related instructions. These reporting changes would be
proposed and effectuated in coordination with the other member entities
of the FFIEC. As previously described, any changes to reporting
requirements for large and highly complex banks pursuant to this
proposal would be required only while the temporary relief is reflected
in banks' regulatory reports.
E. Expected Effects
The proposed rule would remove the applicable portions of the CECL
transitional amounts added to retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes and attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans
and leases held for investment from certain financial measures used in
the scorecards that determine deposit insurance assessment rates for
large and highly complex banks. Absent the proposed rule, this amount
would be temporarily double counted and could result in a deposit
insurance assessment rate for a large or highly complex bank that does
not accurately reflect the bank's risk to the DIF, all else equal.
Furthermore, the double counting inherent in the regulation could
result in inequitable deposit insurance assessments, as a large or
highly complex bank that has not yet implemented CECL or that does not
utilize a transition provision could pay a higher or lower assessment
rate than a bank that has implemented CECL and utilizes a transition
provision, even if both banks pose equal risk to the DIF. The FDIC
estimates that the majority of large and highly complex banks are
currently paying a lower rate as a direct result of the double
counting. However, the FDIC also estimates that a few banks are
currently paying a higher rate than they otherwise would pay if the
issue of double counting is corrected. The FDIC estimates that the rate
these latter banks are paying is higher by only a de minimis amount,
and occurs where the double counting on the loss severity measure more
than offsets the effect of double counting on the other scorecard
measures that are calculated using the sum of Tier 1 capital and
reserves.
Based on FDIC data as of June 30, 2020, the FDIC estimates that
this double counting could be resulting in approximately $55 million in
annual foregone assessment revenue, or 0.048 percent of the DIF balance
as of that date. This estimate includes the majority of large and
highly complex banks that are paying a lower rate due to the double
counting and the banks paying a higher rate, compared to if the issue
of double counting is corrected. The FDIC expects this estimated amount
of foregone assessment revenue to increase in the near-term as
additional large and highly complex banks adopt CECL, to the extent
those large and highly complex banks elect to apply a transition. This
amount also may increase in the near term as large and highly complex
banks electing the 2020 CECL rule include in their modified CECL
transitional amounts an estimate of CECL's effect on regulatory
capital, relative to the incurred loss methodology's effect on
regulatory capital, during the first two years of CECL adoption. As of
June 30, 2020, the FDIC estimates that 101 of 138 large and highly
complex banks had implemented CECL, and that 94 had elected a
transition provided under either the 2019 CECL rule or the 2020 CECL
rule. As banks phase out the transitional amounts over time, the
assessment effect also would decline. As described previously, the
optional temporary relief from CECL afforded by the CARES Act, and the
transitions provided for under the 2019 CECL rule and 2020 CECL rule,
provide that all banks will have completely reflected in regulatory
capital the day-one effects of CECL (plus, if applicable, an estimate
of CECL's effect on regulatory capital, relative to the incurred loss
methodology's effect on regulatory capital, during the first two years
of CECL adoption) by December 31, 2026, thereby eliminating the double
counting effects from the scorecard for large and highly complex banks.
These above estimates are subject to uncertainty given differing CECL
implementation dates and the option for large and highly complex banks
to choose between the transitions offered under the 2019 CECL rule or
the 2020 CECL rule, or to recognize the full impact of CECL on
regulatory capital upon implementation.
The proposed rule could pose some additional regulatory costs for
large and highly complex banks that elect a transition under either the
2019 CECL rule or the 2020 CECL rule associated with changes to
internal systems or processes, or changes to reporting requirements. It
is the FDIC's understanding that banks already calculate the portion of
the CECL transitional amount (or modified CECL transitional amount)
added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes that is
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases
held for investment, for internal purposes. As such, the FDIC
anticipates that the proposed addition of this temporary item to the
Call Report would not impose significant additional burden and any
additional costs are likely to be de minimis.
F. Alternatives Considered
The FDIC considered the reasonable and possible alternatives
described below. The FDIC is required by statute to set deposit
insurance assessments based on risk, and the FDIC's objective in
setting forth the current proposal is to ensure that banks are assessed
in a manner that is fair and accurate. On balance, the FDIC believes
the current proposal would adjust for double counting of the applicable
portion of the CECL transitional amounts attributable to allowances for
credit losses on loans and leases held for investment in certain
financial measures used to determine deposit insurance assessment rates
for large and highly complex banks in the most appropriate, accurate,
and straightforward manner.
One alternative would be to leave in place the current assessment
regulations. Under this alternative, the applicable portions of the
CECL transitional amounts would be automatically and fully included in
both retained earnings as reported for regulatory capital purposes
(affecting Tier 1 capital) and reserves, resulting in double counting
of the applicable portions of these transitional amounts attributable
to allowances for credit losses on loans and leases held for
[[Page 78801]]
investment in certain financial measures that are used to determine
deposit insurance assessment rates for large and highly complex banks.
As a result, a large or highly complex bank could pay a deposit
insurance assessment rate that does not accurately reflect the bank's
risk to the DIF, all else equal. Furthermore, this double counting
could result in inequitable deposit insurance assessments, as a large
or highly complex bank that has not yet implemented CECL or that does
not utilize a transition provision could pay a higher or lower
assessment rate than a bank that has implemented CECL and utilizes a
transition provision, even if both banks pose equal risk to the DIF.
Based on data as of June 30, 2020, the DIF would receive approximately
$55 million less annual income than it would have received but for the
double counting of parts of the CECL transitional amounts in the
scorecard.
The FDIC also considered a second alternative, using a proxy
measure based on existing data items on the Call Report to remove the
effect of double counting on a large or highly complex bank's deposit
insurance assessments. Specifically, the FDIC could use the difference
between retained earnings reported on Schedule RC (item 26.a.) and
Schedule RC-R (Part I, item 2.) to approximate the amount double
counted. This proxy, however, would provide an estimate of the
applicable portion of the full CECL transitional amount (or modified
CECL transitional amount) rather than the applicable portion of the
CECL transitional amount (or modified CECL transitional amount) added
retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes and attributable to
the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for
investment, which is the amount the current proposal would remove from
certain financial measures used to determine deposit insurance
assessment rates for large and highly complex banks. This proxy would
include the CECL transitional amounts attributable to establishing
allowances for credit losses under CECL on loans and leases held for
investment through a charge against retained earnings as of the
adoption date of CECL as well as the amounts attributable to
establishing, in the same manner as of the same date, allowances for
credit losses under CECL on HTM debt securities, other financial assets
measured at amortized cost, and off-balance sheet credit exposures.
Since the proxy could result in the FDIC reducing Tier 1 capital and
reserves by an amount that is greater than the amount double counted,
it could harm banks with large reserves for HTM debt securities, other
financial assets measured at amortized cost, and off-balance sheet
credit exposures by inflating such a bank's credit quality and
concentration measures in the scorecards for large and highly complex
banks. As a result, the proxy could result in the FDIC applying an
adjustment amount that is different from the actual applicable portion
of a bank's CECL transitional amount (or modified CECL transitional
amount) that was added to retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes and is attributable to the allowance for credit losses on
loans and leases held for investment. Thus, applying such an adjustment
amount could result in a deposit insurance assessment rate that does
not accurately reflect a large or highly complex bank's risk to the
DIF, all else equal. The amount by which the proxy measure might differ
from the applicable portion of a bank's CECL transitional amount (or
modified CECL transitional amount) added to retained earnings for
regulatory capital purposes that is attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held for investment would vary by
bank. While this amount may not be significant in most cases, the FDIC
expects that using the proxy would generally result in higher
assessments for most banks.
Furthermore, as described above, it is the FDIC's understanding
that banks already calculate the applicable portion of the CECL
transitional amount (or modified CECL transitional amount) added to
retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes and attributable to
the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for
investment, for internal purposes, and as such, the FDIC anticipates
that the proposed addition of this temporary item to the Call Report
would not impose significant additional burden. The FDIC believes that
temporarily collecting this item on the Call Report and using this item
to adjust for double counting of a portion of the CECL transitional
amounts in certain financial measures used to determine deposit
insurance assessments for large and highly complex banks would ensure
that banks are assessed in a manner that is fair and accurate, all else
equal.
Question 2: The FDIC invites comment on the reasonable and possible
alternatives described in this proposed rule. What are other reasonable
and possible alternatives that the FDIC should consider?
G. Comment Period, Effective Date, and Application Date
The FDIC is issuing this proposal with a 30-day comment period.
Following the comment period, the FDIC expects to issue a final rule
with an effective date of April 1, 2021, and applicable to the second
quarterly assessment period of 2021 (i.e., April 1-June 30, 2021). The
30-day comment period, along with the expected effective date and the
proposed application date, would ensure that the temporary effects of
the double counting of the applicable portions of the CECL transitional
amounts in select financial measures used in the scorecard approach for
determining assessments for large and highly complex banks are
corrected, beginning with the second quarterly assessment period of
2021.
IV. Request for Comment
The FDIC is requesting comment on all aspects of the notice of
proposed rulemaking, in addition to the specific requests for comment
above.
V. Administrative Law Matters
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
generally requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to
prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis that describes the impact of a proposed rule on
small entities.\37\ However, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required if the agency certifies that the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) has defined ``small
entities'' to include banking organizations with total assets of less
than or equal to $600 million.\38\ Certain types of rules, such as
rules of particular applicability relating to rates, corporate or
financial structures, or practices relating to such rates or
structures, are expressly excluded from the definition of ``rule'' for
purposes of
[[Page 78802]]
the RFA.\39\ Because the proposed rule relates directly to the rates
imposed on IDIs for deposit insurance and to the deposit insurance
assessment system that measures risk and determines each bank's
assessment rate, the proposed rule is not subject to the RFA.
Nonetheless, the FDIC is voluntarily presenting information in this RFA
section.
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\37\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\38\ The SBA defines a small banking organization as having $600
million or less in assets, where an organization's ``assets are
determined by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly
financial statements for the preceding year.'' See 13 CFR 121.201
(as amended, effective August 19, 2019). In its determination, the
SBA ``counts the receipts, employees, or other measure of size of
the concern whose size is at issue and all of its domestic and
foreign affiliates.'' 13 CFR 121.103. Following these regulations,
the FDIC uses a covered entity's affiliated and acquired assets,
averaged over the preceding four quarters, to determine whether the
covered entity is ``small'' for the purposes of RFA.
\39\ 5 U.S.C. 601.
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Based on Call Report data as of June 30, 2020, the FDIC insures
5,075 depository institutions, of which 3,665 are defined as small
entities by the terms of the RFA.\40\ The proposed rule, however, would
apply only to institutions with $10 billion or greater in total assets.
Consequently, small entities for purposes of the RFA will experience no
significant economic impact should the FDIC implement the proposal in a
final rule.
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\40\ FDIC Call Report data, June 30, 2020.
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B. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
Section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act (RCDRIA) requires that the Federal banking agencies,
including the FDIC, in determining the effective date and
administrative compliance requirements of new regulations that impose
additional reporting, disclosure, or other requirements on IDIs,
consider, consistent with principles of safety and soundness and the
public interest, any administrative burdens that such regulations would
place on depository institutions, including small depository
institutions, and customers of depository institutions, as well as the
benefits of such regulations. In addition, section 302(b) of RCDRIA
requires new regulations and amendments to regulations that impose
additional reporting, disclosures, or other new requirements on IDIs
generally to take effect on the first day of a calendar quarter that
begins on or after the date on which the regulations are published in
final form, with certain exceptions, including for good cause.\41\ The
requirements of RCDRIA will be considered as part of the overall
rulemaking process, and the FDIC invites comments that will further
inform its consideration of RCDRIA.
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\41\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
5 U.S.C. 553(d).
5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3).
5 U.S.C. 804(2).
5 U.S.C. 808(2).
12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
12 U.S.C. 4802(b).
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C. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) states that no agency may
conduct or sponsor, nor is the respondent required to respond to, an
information collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) control number.\42\ The FDIC's OMB control
numbers for its assessment regulations are 3064-0057, 3064-0151, and
3064-0179. The proposed rule does not revise any of these existing
assessment information collections pursuant to the PRA and
consequently, no submissions in connection with these OMB control
numbers will be made to the OMB for review. However, the proposed rule
affects the agencies' current information collections for the Call
Report (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041, but not FFIEC 051). The agencies' OMB
control numbers for the Call Reports are: OCC OMB No. 1557-0081; Board
OMB No. 7100-0036; and FDIC OMB No. 3064-0052. Proposed changes to the
Call Report forms and instructions will be addressed in a separate
Federal Register notice.
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\42\ 4 U.S.C. 3501-3521.
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D. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act \43\ requires the Federal
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final
rulemakings published in the Federal Register after January 1, 2000.
The FDIC invites your comments on how to make this proposed rule easier
to understand. For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ 12 U.S.C. 4809.
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Has the FDIC organized the material to suit your needs? If
not, how could the material be better organized?
Are the requirements in the proposed regulation clearly
stated? If not, how could the regulation be stated more clearly?
Does the proposed regulation contain language or jargon
that is unclear? If so, which language requires clarification?
Would a different format (grouping and order of sections,
use of headings, paragraphing) make the regulation easier to
understand?
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 327
Bank deposit insurance, Banks, Banking, Savings associations.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation proposes to amend 12 CFR part 327 as follows:
PART 327--ASSESSMENTS
0
1. The authority citation for part 327 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1813, 1815, 1817-19, 1821.
0
2. In Appendix A to Subpart A, amend the table under section heading,
``VI. Description of Scorecard Measures,'' by:
0
a. Redesignating footnotes 2 as 3, 3 as 4, 4 as 5, and 5 as 7;
0
b. Adding a new footnote 2 after various measures described in the
table; and
0
c. Adding a new footnote 6 after ``Potential Losses/Total Domestic
Deposits (Loss Severity Measure).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Appendix A to Subpart A of Part 327--Method To Derive Pricing
Multipliers and Uniform Amount
* * * * *
VI. Description of Scorecard Measures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scorecard measures \1\ Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
Concentration Measure for Large Insured The concentration score for large institutions is the higher of the
depository institutions (excluding following two scores:
Highly Complex Institutions).
[[Page 78803]]
(1) Higher-Risk Assets/Tier 1 Sum of construction and land development (C&D) loans (funded and
Capital and Reserves \2\. unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded and unfunded), nontraditional
mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans, and higher-risk securitizations
divided by Tier 1 capital and reserves. See Appendix C for the
detailed description of the ratio.
(2) Growth-Adjusted Portfolio The measure is calculated in the following steps:
Concentrations \2\.
* * * * * * *
Concentration Measure for Highly Concentration score for highly complex institutions is the highest of
Complex Institutions. the following three scores:
(1) Higher-Risk Assets/Tier 1 Sum of C&D loans (funded and unfunded), higher-risk C&I loans (funded
Capital and Reserves \2\. and unfunded), nontraditional mortgages, higher-risk consumer loans,
and higher-risk securitizations divided by Tier 1 capital and
reserves. See Appendix C for the detailed description of the measure.
(2) Top 20 Counterparty Exposure/ Sum of the 20 largest total exposure amounts to counterparties divided
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves \2\. by Tier 1 capital and reserves. The total exposure amount is equal to
the sum of the institution's exposure amounts to one counterparty (or
borrower) for derivatives, securities financing transactions (SFTs),
and cleared transactions, and its gross lending exposure (including
all unfunded commitments) to that counterparty (or borrower). A
counterparty includes an entity's own affiliates. Exposures to
entities that are affiliates of each other are treated as exposures to
one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure excludes all
counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and departments or
agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally guaranteed by
the full faith and credit of the United States. The exposure amount
for derivatives, including OTC derivatives, cleared transactions that
are derivative contracts, and netting sets of derivative contracts,
must be calculated using the methodology set forth in 12 CFR
324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral other than cash
collateral that is all or part of variation margin and that satisfies
the requirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii) and (iii) and
324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The exposure amount associated
with SFTs, including cleared transactions that are SFTs, must be
calculated using the standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR
324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures, the exposure
amount to central counterparties must also include the default fund
contribution.\3\
(3) Largest Counterparty Exposure/ The largest total exposure amount to one counterparty divided by Tier 1
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves \2\. capital and reserves. The total exposure amount is equal to the sum of
the institution's exposure amounts to one counterparty (or borrower)
for derivatives, SFTs, and cleared transactions, and its gross lending
exposure (including all unfunded commitments) to that counterparty (or
borrower). A counterparty includes an entity's own affiliates.
Exposures to entities that are affiliates of each other are treated as
exposures to one counterparty (or borrower). Counterparty exposure
excludes all counterparty exposure to the U.S. Government and
departments or agencies of the U.S. Government that is unconditionally
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States. The
exposure amount for derivatives, including OTC derivatives, cleared
transactions that are derivative contracts, and netting sets of
derivative contracts, must be calculated using the methodology set
forth in 12 CFR 324.34(b), but without any reduction for collateral
other than cash collateral that is all or part of variation margin and
that satisfies the requirements of 12 CFR 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(1)(ii)
and (iii) and 324.10(c)(4)(ii)(C)(3) through (7). The exposure amount
associated with SFTs, including cleared transactions that are SFTs,
must be calculated using the standardized approach set forth in 12 CFR
324.37(b) or (c). For both derivatives and SFT exposures, the exposure
amount to central counterparties must also include the default fund
contribution.\3\
* * * * * * *
Credit Quality Measure................. The credit quality score is the higher of the following two scores:
(1) Criticized and Classified Items/ Sum of criticized and classified items divided by the sum of Tier 1
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves \2\. capital and reserves. Criticized and classified items include items an
institution or its primary federal regulator have graded ``Special
Mention'' or worse and include retail items under Uniform Retail
Classification Guidelines, securities, funded and unfunded loans,
other real estate owned (ORE), other assets, and marked-to-market
counterparty positions, less credit valuation adjustments.\4\
Criticized and classified items exclude loans and securities in
trading books, and the amount recoverable from the U.S. government,
its agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises, under guarantee or
insurance provisions.
(2) Underperforming Assets/Tier 1 Sum of loans that are 30 days or more past due and still accruing
Capital and Reserves \2\. interest, nonaccrual loans, restructured loans (including restructured
1-4 family loans), and ORE, excluding the maximum amount recoverable
from the U.S. government, its agencies, or government-sponsored
enterprises, under guarantee or insurance provisions, divided by a sum
of Tier 1 capital and reserves.
* * * * * * *
Balance Sheet Liquidity Ratio.......... Sum of cash and balances due from depository institutions, federal
funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell, and
the market value of available for sale and held to maturity agency
securities (excludes agency mortgage-backed securities but includes
all other agency securities issued by the U.S. Treasury, U.S.
government agencies, and U.S. government-sponsored enterprises)
divided by the sum of federal funds purchased and repurchase
agreements, other borrowings (including FHLB) with a remaining
maturity of one year or less, 5 percent of insured domestic deposits,
and 10 percent of uninsured domestic and foreign deposits.\5\
Potential Losses/Total Domestic Potential losses to the DIF in the event of failure divided by total
Deposits (Loss Severity Measure) \6\. domestic deposits. Appendix D describes the calculation of the loss
severity measure in detail.
[[Page 78804]]
Market Risk Measure for Highly Complex The market risk score is a weighted average of the following three
Institutions. scores:
* * * * * * *
(2) Market Risk Capital/Tier 1 Market risk capital divided by Tier 1 capital.\7\
Capital.
* * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The FDIC retains the flexibility, as part of the risk-based assessment system, without the necessity of
additional notice-and-comment rulemaking, to update the minimum and maximum cutoff values for all measures
used in the scorecard. The FDIC may update the minimum and maximum cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to
Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio in order to maintain an approximately similar distribution of higher-risk
assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio scores as reported prior to April 1, 2013, or to avoid changing
the overall amount of assessment revenue collected. 76 FR 10672, 10700 (February 25, 2011). The FDIC will
review changes in the distribution of the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio scores and
the resulting effect on total assessments and risk differentiation between banks when determining changes to
the cutoffs. The FDIC may update the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves
ratio more frequently than annually. The FDIC will provide banks with a minimum one quarter advance notice of
changes in the cutoff values for the higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio with their
quarterly deposit insurance invoice.
\2\ The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital regulations, as they may be
amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and
84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves.
\3\ SFTs include repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, security lending and borrowing, and
margin lending transactions, where the value of the transactions depends on market valuations and the
transactions are often subject to margin agreements. The default fund contribution is the funds contributed or
commitments made by a clearing member to a central counterparty's mutualized loss sharing arrangement. The
other terms used in this description are as defined in 12 CFR part 324, subparts A and D, unless defined
otherwise in 12 CFR part 327.
\4\ A marked-to-market counterparty position is equal to the sum of the net marked-to-market derivative
exposures for each counterparty. The net marked-to-market derivative exposure equals the sum of all positive
marked-to-market exposures net of legally enforceable netting provisions and net of all collateral held under
a legally enforceable CSA plus any exposure where excess collateral has been posted to the counterparty. For
purposes of the Criticized and Classified Items/Tier 1 Capital and Reserves definition a marked-to-market
counterparty position less any credit valuation adjustment can never be less than zero.
\5\ Deposit runoff rates for the balance sheet liquidity ratio reflect changes issued by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision in its December 2010 document, ``Basel III: International Framework for liquidity risk
measurement, standards, and monitoring,'' https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf.
\6\ The applicable portions of the CECL transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit losses on
loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes will be
removed from the calculation of the loss severity measure.
\7\ Market risk is defined in 12 CFR 324.202.
* * * * *
0
3. In Appendix C to Subpart A, revise the text under section heading,
``I. Concentration Measures,'' to read as follows:
Appendix C to Subpart A of Part 327--Description of Concentration
Measures
I. Concentration Measures
The concentration score for large banks is the higher of the
higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves score or the
growth-adjusted portfolio concentrations score.\1\ The concentration
score for highly complex institutions is the highest of the higher-
risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves score, the Top 20
counterparty exposure to Tier 1 capital and reserves score, or the
largest counterparty to Tier 1 capital and reserves score.\2\ The
higher-risk assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves ratio and the
growth-adjusted portfolio concentration measure are described
herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For the purposes of this Appendix, the term ``bank'' means
insured depository institution.
\2\ As described in Appendix A to this subpart, the applicable
portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL)
transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for credit losses
on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory
capital regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12
CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30,
2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum
of Tier 1 capital and reserves throughout the large and highly
complex bank scorecards, including in the ratio of Higher-Risk
Assets to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the Growth-Adjusted Portfolio
Concentrations Measure, the ratio of Top 20 Counterparty Exposure to
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, and the Ratio of Largest Counterparty
Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
4. In Appendix D to Subpart A, revise the text under section heading,
``Appendix D to Subpart A of Part 327--Description of the Loss Severity
Measure,'' to add a new footnote 3. The revision and addition read as
follows:
Appendix D to Subpart A of Part 327--Description of the Loss Severity
Measure
The loss severity measure applies a standardized set of
assumptions to an institution's balance sheet to measure possible
losses to the FDIC in the event of an institution's failure. To
determine an institution's loss severity rate, the FDIC first
applies assumptions about uninsured deposit and other unsecured
liability runoff, and growth in insured deposits, to adjust the size
and composition of the institution's liabilities. Assets are then
reduced to match any reduction in liabilities.\1\ The institution's
asset values are then further reduced so that the Leverage ratio
reaches 2 percent.2 3 In both cases, assets are adjusted
pro rata to preserve the institution's asset composition.
Assumptions regarding loss rates at failure for a given asset
category and the extent of secured liabilities are then applied to
estimated assets and liabilities at failure to determine whether the
institution has enough unencumbered assets to cover domestic
deposits. Any projected shortfall is divided by current domestic
deposits to obtain an end-of-period loss severity ratio. The loss
severity measure is an average loss severity ratio for the three
most recent quarters of data available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
\3\ The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss
methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the
allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for investment
and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital purposes
pursuant to the regulatory capital regulations, as they may be
amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR
part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14,
2019)), will be removed from the calculation of the loss severity
measure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
5. In Appendix E to subpart A, amend Table E.2 by:
0
a. Redesignating footnote 1 after ``Credit Quality Measure'' as 2;
0
b. Adding a new footnote 1; and
[[Page 78805]]
0
c. Adding footnote 2 after ``Market Risk Measure for Highly Complex
Institutions''.
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Table E.2--Exclusions From Certain Risk Measures Used To Calculate the Assessment Rate for Large or Highly
Complex Institutions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scorecard measures \1\ Description Exclusions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
Credit Quality Measure \2\............. The credit quality score is the higher of .........................
the following two scores:
* * * * * * *
Market Risk Measure for Highly Complex The market risk score is a weighted average .........................
Institutions \2\. of the following three scores:
* * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The applicable portions of the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts
attributable to the allowance for credit losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained
earnings for regulatory capital purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital regulations, as they may be
amended from time to time (12 CFR part 3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and
84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be removed from the sum of Tier 1 capital and reserves throughout the large
and highly complex bank scorecards, including in the ratio of Higher-Risk Assets to Tier 1 Capital and
Reserves, the Growth-Adjusted Portfolio Concentrations Measure, the ratio of Top 20 Counterparty Exposure to
Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the Ratio of Largest Counterparty Exposure to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, the
ratio of Criticized and Classified Items to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves, and the ratio of Underperforming
Assets to Tier 1 Capital and Reserves. All of these ratios are described in appendix A of this subpart.
\2\ The credit quality score is the greater of the criticized and classified items to Tier 1 capital and
reserves score or the underperforming assets to Tier 1 capital and reserves score. The market risk score is
the weighted average of three scores--the trading revenue volatility to Tier 1 capital score, the market risk
capital to Tier 1 capital score, and the level 3 trading assets to Tier 1 capital score. All of these ratios
are described in appendix A of this subpart and the method of calculating the scores is described in appendix
B of this subpart. Each score is multiplied by its respective weight, and the resulting weighted score is
summed to compute the score for the market risk measure. An overall weight of 35 percent is allocated between
the scores for the credit quality measure and market risk measure. The allocation depends on the ratio of
average trading assets to the sum of average securities, loans and trading assets (trading asset ratio) as
follows: (1) Weight for credit quality score = 35 percent * (1--trading asset ratio); and, (2) Weight for
market risk score = 35 percent * trading asset ratio. In calculating the trading asset ratio, exclude from the
balance of loans the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program.
(a) Description of the loss severity measure. The loss severity measure applies a standardized set of
assumptions to an institution's balance sheet to measure possible losses to the FDIC in the event of an
institution's failure. To determine an institution's loss severity rate, the FDIC first applies assumptions
about uninsured deposit and other liability runoff, and growth in insured deposits, to adjust the size and
composition of the institution's liabilities. Exclude total outstanding borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks
under the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility from short-and long-term secured borrowings, as
appropriate. Assets are then reduced to match any reduction in liabilities. Exclude from an institution's
balance of commercial and industrial loans the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck
Protection Program. In the event that the outstanding balance of loans provided under the Paycheck Protection
Program exceeds the balance of commercial and industrial loans, exclude any remaining balance of loans
provided under the Paycheck Protection Program first from the balance of all other loans, up to the total
amount of all other loans, followed by the balance of agricultural loans, up to the total amount of
agricultural loans. Increase cash balances by outstanding loans provided under the Paycheck Protection Program
that exceed total outstanding borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks under the Paycheck Protection Program
Liquidity Facility, if any. The institution's asset values are then further reduced so that the Leverage Ratio
reaches 2 percent. In both cases, assets are adjusted pro rata to preserve the institution's asset
composition. Assumptions regarding loss rates at failure for a given asset category and the extent of secured
liabilities are then applied to estimated assets and liabilities at failure to determine whether the
institution has enough unencumbered assets to cover domestic deposits. Any projected shortfall is divided by
current domestic deposits to obtain an end-of-period loss severity ratio. The loss severity measure is an
average loss severity ratio for the three most recent quarters of data available. The applicable portions of
the current expected credit loss methodology (CECL) transitional amounts attributable to the allowance for
credit losses on loans and leases held for investment and added to retained earnings for regulatory capital
purposes pursuant to the regulatory capital regulations, as they may be amended from time to time (12 CFR part
3, 12 CFR part 217, 12 CFR part 324, 85 FR 61577 (Sept. 30, 2020), and 84 FR 4222 (Feb. 14, 2019)), will be
removed from the calculation of the loss severity measure.
* * * * *
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, on November 17, 2020.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-25830 Filed 12-4-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P