Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical Activities Involving “Schedule 1” Chemicals (Including “Schedule 1” Chemicals Produced as Intermediates) During Calendar Year 2020, 77155-77157 [2020-26437]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization related to a Denied Person
by ownership, control, position of
responsibility, affiliation in the conduct
of trade or business may also be made
subject to the provisions of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not
prohibit any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the EAR where the
only items involved that are subject to
the EAR are the foreign-produced direct
product of U.S.-origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of
Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Mahan
Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali
Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa
General Trading may, at any time,
appeal this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with
the Office of the Administrative Law
Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance
with the provisions of Sections
766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard,
Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation,
Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air
General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami,
Sky Blue Bird Group, and/or Issam
Shammout may, at any time, appeal
their inclusion as a related person by
filing a full written statement in support
of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South
Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–
4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. A renewal
request may be opposed by Mahan
Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali
Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa
General Trading as provided in Section
766.24(d), by filing a written submission
with the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Enforcement,
which must be received not later than
seven days before the expiration date of
the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided
to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines,
Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa
General Trading and each related
person, and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
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This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for 180 days.
P. Lee Smith,
Performing the Non-exclusive Functions and
Duties, of the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020–26434 Filed 11–30–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 201118–0304]
RIN 0694–XC070
Impact of the Implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
on Legitimate Commercial Chemical,
Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical
Activities Involving ‘‘Schedule 1’’
Chemicals (Including ‘‘Schedule 1’’
Chemicals Produced as Intermediates)
During Calendar Year 2020
Bureau of Industry and
Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
AGENCY:
The Bureau of Industry and
Security is seeking public comments on
the impact that implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, through
the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998 and the
Chemical Weapons Convention
Regulations, has had on commercial
activities involving ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals during calendar year 2020.
The purpose of this notice of inquiry is
to collect information to assist BIS in its
preparation of the annual certification to
the Congress on whether the legitimate
commercial activities and interests of
chemical, biotechnology, and
pharmaceutical firms are harmed by
such implementation. This certification
is required under Condition 9 of Senate
Resolution 75 (April 24, 1997), in which
the Senate gave its advice and consent
to the ratification of the CWC.
DATES: Comments must be received by
December 31, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods (please
refer to RIN 0694–XC070 in all
comments and in the subject line of
email comments):
• Federal rulemaking portal (https://
www.regulations.gov). You can find this
notice by searching under its
regulations.gov docket number, which is
BIS–2020–0039;
• Email: PublicComments@
bis.doc.gov. Include RIN 0694–XC070 in
the subject line of the message.
All filers using the portal or email
should use the name of the person or
SUMMARY:
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77155
entity submitting the comments as the
name of their files, in accordance with
the instructions below. Parties
submitting business confidential
information should clearly identify the
business confidential portion at the time
of submission, file a statement justifying
nondisclosure and referring to the
specific legal authority claimed, and
also provide a non-confidential
submission.
For comments submitted
electronically containing business
confidential information, the file name
of the business confidential version
should begin with the characters ‘‘BC.’’
Any page containing business
confidential information must be clearly
marked ‘‘BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL’’
on the top of that page. The
corresponding non-confidential version
of those comments must be clearly
marked ‘‘PUBLIC.’’ The file name of the
non-confidential version should begin
with the character ‘‘P.’’ The ‘‘BC’’ and
‘‘P’’ should be followed by the name of
the person or entity submitting the
comments or rebuttal comments. Any
submissions with file names that do not
begin with a ‘‘P’’ or ‘‘BC’’ will be
assumed to be public and will be made
publicly available through https://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions on the Chemical Weapons
Convention requirements for ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals, contact Douglas Brown,
Treaty Compliance Division, Office of
Nonproliferation and Treaty
Compliance, Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Email: Douglas.Brown@bis.doc.gov. For
questions on the submission of
comments, contact Willard Fisher,
Regulatory Policy Division, Office of
Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry
and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Email: RPD2@bis.doc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In providing its advice and consent to
the ratification of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and Their
Destruction, commonly called the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or
‘‘the Convention’’), the Senate included,
in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75,
April 24, 1997), several conditions to its
ratification. Condition 9, titled
‘‘Protection of Advanced
Biotechnology,’’ calls for the President
to certify to Congress on an annual basis
that ‘‘the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
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77156
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices
firms in the United States are not being
significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and
production of, those chemicals and
toxins listed in Schedule 1.’’ On July 8,
2004, President Bush, by Executive
Order 13346, delegated his authority to
make the annual certification to the
Secretary of Commerce.
The CWC is an international arms
control treaty that contains certain
verification provisions. In order to
implement these verification provisions,
the CWC established the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). In order to achieve
the object and purpose of the
Convention and the implementation of
its provisions, the CWC imposes certain
obligations on countries that have
ratified the Convention (i.e., States
Parties), among which are the enactment
of legislation to prohibit the production,
storage, and use of chemical weapons
and the establishment of a National
Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the
OPCW and other States Parties. The
CWC also requires each State Party to
implement a comprehensive data
declaration and inspection regime to
provide transparency and to verify that
both the public and private sectors of
the State Party are not engaged in
activities prohibited under the CWC. In
the United States, the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation
Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6701 et seq.,
implements the provisions of the CWC.
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals consist of
those toxic chemicals and precursors set
forth in the CWC ‘‘Annex on
Chemicals’’ and in ‘‘Supplement No. 1
to part 712—SCHEDULE 1
CHEMICALS’’ of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15
CFR parts 710–722). The CWC
identified these toxic chemicals and
precursors as posing a high risk to the
object and purpose of the Convention.
The CWC (Part VI of the ‘‘Verification
Annex’’) restricts the production of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals for protective
purposes to two facilities per State
Party: A single small-scale facility
(SSSF) and a facility for production in
quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year.
The CWC Article-by-Article Analysis
submitted to the Senate in Treaty Doc.
103–21 defined the term ‘‘protective
purposes’’ to mean ‘‘used for
determining the adequacy of defense
equipment and measures.’’ Consistent
with this definition and as authorized
by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
70 (December 17, 1999), which specifies
agency and departmental
responsibilities as part of the U.S.
implementation of the CWC, the
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18:11 Nov 30, 2020
Jkt 253001
Department of Defense (DOD) was
assigned the responsibility to operate
these two facilities. DOD maintains
strict controls on ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals produced at its facilities in
order to ensure accountability for such
chemicals, as well as their proper use,
consistent with the object and purpose
of the Convention. Although this
assignment of responsibility to DOD
under PDD–70 effectively precluded
commercial production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals for ‘‘protective purposes’’ in
the United States, it did not establish
any limitations on ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemical activities that are not
prohibited by the CWC.
The provisions of the CWC that affect
commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals are
implemented in the CWCR (see 15 CFR
part 712) and in the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) (see
15 CFR 742.18 and 15 CFR part 745),
both of which are administered by the
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
Pursuant to CWC requirements, the
CWCR restrict commercial production
of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals to research,
medical, or pharmaceutical purposes.
The CWCR prohibit commercial
production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
for ‘‘protective purposes’’ because such
production is effectively precluded per
PDD–70, as described above. See 15 CFR
712.2(a).
The CWCR also contain other
requirements and prohibitions that
apply to ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals and/or
‘‘Schedule 1’’ facilities. Specifically, the
CWCR:
(1) Prohibit the import of ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals from States not Party to
the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
(2) Require annual declarations by
certain facilities engaged in the
production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
in excess of 100 grams aggregate per
calendar year (i.e., declared ‘‘Schedule
1’’ facilities) for purposes not prohibited
by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1)
and (a)(2));
(3) Provide for government approval
of ‘‘declared Schedule 1’’ facilities (15
CFR 712.5(f));
(4) Require 200 days advance
notification of the establishment of new
‘‘Schedule 1’’ production facilities
producing greater than 100 grams
aggregate of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals per
calendar year (15 CFR 712.4);
(5) Provide that ‘‘declared Schedule
1’’ facilities are subject to initial and
routine inspection by the OPCW (15
CFR 712.5(e) and 716.1(b)(1));
(6) Require advance notification and
annual reporting of all imports and
exports of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals to, or
from, other States Parties to the
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Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1)
and 745.1); and
(7) Prohibit the export of ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals to States not Party to the
Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(ii)).
For purposes of the CWCR (see 15
CFR 710.1), ‘‘production of a Schedule
1 chemical’’ means the formation of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals through
chemical synthesis, as well as
processing to extract and isolate
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals. The phrase
‘‘production of a schedule 1 chemical’’
includes, in its meaning, the formation
of a chemical through chemical
reaction, including by a biochemical or
biologically mediated reaction.
‘‘Production of a Schedule 1 chemical’’
is understood, for CWCR declaration
purposes, to include intermediates, byproducts, or waste products that are
produced and consumed within a
defined chemical manufacturing
sequence, where such intermediates, byproducts, or waste products are
chemically stable and therefore exist for
a sufficient time to make isolation from
the manufacturing stream possible, but
where, under normal or design
operating conditions, isolation does not
occur.
Request for Comments
In order to assist in determining
whether the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are
significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and
production of, ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
as described in this notice, BIS is
seeking public comments on any effects
that implementation of the CWC,
through the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act of 1998
and the CWCR, has had on commercial
activities involving ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals during calendar year 2020. To
allow BIS to properly evaluate the
significance of any harm to commercial
activities involving ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals, public comments submitted
in response to this notice of inquiry
should include both a quantitative and
qualitative assessment of the impact of
the CWC on such activities.
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to
one of the addresses indicated in this
notice and in accordance with the
instructions provided herein. BIS will
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices
consider all comments received on or
before December 31, 2020.
Matthew S. Borman,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2020–26437 Filed 11–30–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A–570–133]
Certain Metal Lockers and Parts
Thereof From the People’s Republic of
China: Postponement of Preliminary
Determination in the Less-Than-FairValue Investigation
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
DATES: Applicable December 1, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Laurel LaCivita or Patrick Barton, AD/
CVD Operations, Office III, Enforcement
and Compliance, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue
NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone:
(202) 482–4243 or (202) 482–0012,
respectively.
AGENCY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On July 29, 2020, the Department of
Commerce (Commerce) initiated a lessthan-fair-value (LTFV) investigation of
imports of certain metal lockers and
parts thereof (metal lockers) from the
People’s Republic of China (China).1
Currently, the preliminary
determination is due no later than
December 16, 2020.
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Postponement of Preliminary
Determination
Section 733(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended (the Act), requires
Commerce to issue the preliminary
determination in an LTFV investigation
within 140 days after the date on which
Commerce initiated the investigation.
However, section 733(c)(1)(A)(b)(1) of
the Act permits Commerce to postpone
the preliminary determination until no
later than 190 days after the date on
which Commerce initiated the
investigation if: (A) The petitioner
makes a timely request for a
postponement; or (B) Commerce
concludes that the parties concerned are
1 See Certain Metal Lockers and Parts Thereof
from the People’s Republic of China: Initiation of
Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation, 85 FR 47343
(August 5, 2020).
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cooperating, that the investigation is
extraordinarily complicated, and that
additional time is necessary to make a
preliminary determination. Under 19
CFR 351.205(e), the petitioner must
submit a request for postponement 25
days or more before the scheduled date
of the preliminary determination and
must state the reasons for the request.
Commerce will grant the request unless
it finds compelling reasons to deny the
request.
On November 20, 2020, the
petitioners 2 submitted a timely request
that Commerce postpone the
preliminary determination in the LTFV
investigation.3 The petitioners state that
a postponement is necessary to provide
Commerce with adequate time to collect
and analyze questionnaire responses
from Zhejiang Xingyi Metal Products
Co., Ltd. (Zhejiang Xingyi) and
Hangzhou Xline Machinery &
Equipment Co., Ltd. (Hangzhou Xline),
review data to identify deficiencies, and
to fully investigate the extent to which
Zhejiang Xingyi and Hangzhou Xline
have engaged in less-than-fair-value
sales of the subject merchandise based
on a comprehensive preliminary
record.4
For the reasons stated above and
because there are no compelling reasons
to deny the request, Commerce, in
accordance with section 733(c)(1)(A) of
the Act, is postponing the deadline for
the preliminary determination by 50
days (i.e., 190 days after the date on
which this investigation was initiated).
As a result, Commerce will issue its
preliminary determination no later than
February 4, 2020. In accordance with
section 735(a)(1) of the Act and 19 CFR
351.210(b)(1), the deadline for the final
determination of this investigation will
continue to be 75 days after the date of
the preliminary determination, unless
postponed at a later date.
This notice is issued and published
pursuant to section 733(c)(2) of the Act
and 19 CFR 351.205(f)(1).
Dated: November 24, 2020.
Jeffrey I. Kessler,
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and
Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2020–26488 Filed 11–30–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
2 The petitioners are List Industries, Inc.; Penco
Products, Inc.; DeBourgh Manufacturing Co.; and
Tennsco LLC (collectively, the petitioners).
3 See Petitioners’ Letter, ‘‘Certain Metal Lockers
and Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of
China—Petitioners’ Request to Postpone
Preliminary Determination,’’ dated November 20,
2020.
4 Id. at 2.
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77157
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A–570–051]
Certain Hardwood Plywood Products
From the People’s Republic of China:
Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review; 2017–2018
Enforcement and Compliance
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce
(Commerce) determines that certain
producers and exporters of certain
hardwood plywood products (hardwood
plywood) from the People’s Republic of
China (China) made sales of the subject
merchandise at prices below normal
value (NV) during the period of review
(POR), June 23, 2017 through December
31, 2018.
DATES: Applicable December 1, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kabir Archuletta, AD/CVD Operations,
Office V, Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington,
DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–2593.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
AGENCY:
Background
Commerce is conducting an
administrative review of the
antidumping duty order on hardwood
plywood from China in accordance with
section 751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended (the Act).1 On February 7,
2020, Commerce published in the
Federal Register the Preliminary Results
of this administrative review.2 On June
29, 2020, we received case briefs from
Linyi Chengen Import and Export Co.,
Ltd. (Chengen), the sole mandatory
respondent in this review,3 and Canusa
Wood Products Ltd. a/k/a Canusa Wood
Products Limited, Richmond
International Forest Products LLC,
Taraca Pacific Inc., and Concannon
Corp. (collectively, the Importers
Coalition).4 On June 30, 2020, we
1 See Certain Hardwood Plywood Products from
the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
and Antidumping Duty Order, 83 FR 504 (January
4, 2018) (Order).
2 See Certain Hardwood Plywood Products from
the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and
Rescission of Review, In Part 2017–2018, 85 FR
7270 (February 7, 2020) (Preliminary Results).
3 See Chengen’s Letter, ‘‘Hardwood Plywood
Products from the People’s Republic of China: Case
Brief,’’ dated June 29, 2020.
4 See Importers Coalition’s Letter,
‘‘Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty
Order on Plywood Products from the People’s
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 231 (Tuesday, December 1, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77155-77157]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26437]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 201118-0304]
RIN 0694-XC070
Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) on Legitimate Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and
Pharmaceutical Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals (Including
``Schedule 1'' Chemicals Produced as Intermediates) During Calendar
Year 2020
AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security is seeking public comments
on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and
the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations, has had on commercial
activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals during calendar year
2020. The purpose of this notice of inquiry is to collect information
to assist BIS in its preparation of the annual certification to the
Congress on whether the legitimate commercial activities and interests
of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are harmed by such
implementation. This certification is required under Condition 9 of
Senate Resolution 75 (April 24, 1997), in which the Senate gave its
advice and consent to the ratification of the CWC.
DATES: Comments must be received by December 31, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(please refer to RIN 0694-XC070 in all comments and in the subject line
of email comments):
Federal rulemaking portal (https://www.regulations.gov).
You can find this notice by searching under its regulations.gov docket
number, which is BIS-2020-0039;
Email: [email protected]. Include RIN 0694-XC070
in the subject line of the message.
All filers using the portal or email should use the name of the
person or entity submitting the comments as the name of their files, in
accordance with the instructions below. Parties submitting business
confidential information should clearly identify the business
confidential portion at the time of submission, file a statement
justifying nondisclosure and referring to the specific legal authority
claimed, and also provide a non-confidential submission.
For comments submitted electronically containing business
confidential information, the file name of the business confidential
version should begin with the characters ``BC.'' Any page containing
business confidential information must be clearly marked ``BUSINESS
CONFIDENTIAL'' on the top of that page. The corresponding non-
confidential version of those comments must be clearly marked
``PUBLIC.'' The file name of the non-confidential version should begin
with the character ``P.'' The ``BC'' and ``P'' should be followed by
the name of the person or entity submitting the comments or rebuttal
comments. Any submissions with file names that do not begin with a
``P'' or ``BC'' will be assumed to be public and will be made publicly
available through https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions on the Chemical Weapons
Convention requirements for ``Schedule 1'' chemicals, contact Douglas
Brown, Treaty Compliance Division, Office of Nonproliferation and
Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Email: [email protected]. For questions on the
submission of comments, contact Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy
Division, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In providing its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction,
commonly called the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or ``the
Convention''), the Senate included, in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res.
75, April 24, 1997), several conditions to its ratification. Condition
9, titled ``Protection of Advanced Biotechnology,'' calls for the
President to certify to Congress on an annual basis that ``the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
[[Page 77156]]
firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1.'' On July 8, 2004, President
Bush, by Executive Order 13346, delegated his authority to make the
annual certification to the Secretary of Commerce.
The CWC is an international arms control treaty that contains
certain verification provisions. In order to implement these
verification provisions, the CWC established the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In order to achieve the object
and purpose of the Convention and the implementation of its provisions,
the CWC imposes certain obligations on countries that have ratified the
Convention (i.e., States Parties), among which are the enactment of
legislation to prohibit the production, storage, and use of chemical
weapons and the establishment of a National Authority to serve as the
national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other
States Parties. The CWC also requires each State Party to implement a
comprehensive data declaration and inspection regime to provide
transparency and to verify that both the public and private sectors of
the State Party are not engaged in activities prohibited under the CWC.
In the United States, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6701 et seq., implements the provisions of the
CWC.
``Schedule 1'' chemicals consist of those toxic chemicals and
precursors set forth in the CWC ``Annex on Chemicals'' and in
``Supplement No. 1 to part 712--SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS'' of the Chemical
Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR parts 710-722). The CWC
identified these toxic chemicals and precursors as posing a high risk
to the object and purpose of the Convention.
The CWC (Part VI of the ``Verification Annex'') restricts the
production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals for protective purposes to two
facilities per State Party: A single small-scale facility (SSSF) and a
facility for production in quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year. The
CWC Article-by-Article Analysis submitted to the Senate in Treaty Doc.
103-21 defined the term ``protective purposes'' to mean ``used for
determining the adequacy of defense equipment and measures.''
Consistent with this definition and as authorized by Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 70 (December 17, 1999), which specifies agency
and departmental responsibilities as part of the U.S. implementation of
the CWC, the Department of Defense (DOD) was assigned the
responsibility to operate these two facilities. DOD maintains strict
controls on ``Schedule 1'' chemicals produced at its facilities in
order to ensure accountability for such chemicals, as well as their
proper use, consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
Although this assignment of responsibility to DOD under PDD-70
effectively precluded commercial production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals
for ``protective purposes'' in the United States, it did not establish
any limitations on ``Schedule 1'' chemical activities that are not
prohibited by the CWC.
The provisions of the CWC that affect commercial activities
involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals are implemented in the CWCR (see 15
CFR part 712) and in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (see
15 CFR 742.18 and 15 CFR part 745), both of which are administered by
the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Pursuant to CWC
requirements, the CWCR restrict commercial production of ``Schedule 1''
chemicals to research, medical, or pharmaceutical purposes. The CWCR
prohibit commercial production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals for
``protective purposes'' because such production is effectively
precluded per PDD-70, as described above. See 15 CFR 712.2(a).
The CWCR also contain other requirements and prohibitions that
apply to ``Schedule 1'' chemicals and/or ``Schedule 1'' facilities.
Specifically, the CWCR:
(1) Prohibit the import of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals from States not
Party to the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
(2) Require annual declarations by certain facilities engaged in
the production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in excess of 100 grams
aggregate per calendar year (i.e., declared ``Schedule 1'' facilities)
for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1) and
(a)(2));
(3) Provide for government approval of ``declared Schedule 1''
facilities (15 CFR 712.5(f));
(4) Require 200 days advance notification of the establishment of
new ``Schedule 1'' production facilities producing greater than 100
grams aggregate of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals per calendar year (15 CFR
712.4);
(5) Provide that ``declared Schedule 1'' facilities are subject to
initial and routine inspection by the OPCW (15 CFR 712.5(e) and
716.1(b)(1));
(6) Require advance notification and annual reporting of all
imports and exports of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to, or from, other
States Parties to the Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1) and
745.1); and
(7) Prohibit the export of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to States not
Party to the Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and (b)(1)(ii)).
For purposes of the CWCR (see 15 CFR 710.1), ``production of a
Schedule 1 chemical'' means the formation of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals
through chemical synthesis, as well as processing to extract and
isolate ``Schedule 1'' chemicals. The phrase ``production of a schedule
1 chemical'' includes, in its meaning, the formation of a chemical
through chemical reaction, including by a biochemical or biologically
mediated reaction. ``Production of a Schedule 1 chemical'' is
understood, for CWCR declaration purposes, to include intermediates,
by-products, or waste products that are produced and consumed within a
defined chemical manufacturing sequence, where such intermediates, by-
products, or waste products are chemically stable and therefore exist
for a sufficient time to make isolation from the manufacturing stream
possible, but where, under normal or design operating conditions,
isolation does not occur.
Request for Comments
In order to assist in determining whether the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and production of, ``Schedule 1''
chemicals as described in this notice, BIS is seeking public comments
on any effects that implementation of the CWC, through the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and the CWCR, has had on
commercial activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals during
calendar year 2020. To allow BIS to properly evaluate the significance
of any harm to commercial activities involving ``Schedule 1''
chemicals, public comments submitted in response to this notice of
inquiry should include both a quantitative and qualitative assessment
of the impact of the CWC on such activities.
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to one of the addresses indicated in
this notice and in accordance with the instructions provided herein.
BIS will
[[Page 77157]]
consider all comments received on or before December 31, 2020.
Matthew S. Borman,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2020-26437 Filed 11-30-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P