Good Cause for a Continuance in Immigration Proceedings, 75925-75941 [2020-25931]

Agencies

• Executive Office for Immigration Review
• Department of Justice

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 229 (Friday, November 27, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 75925-75941]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25931]


========================================================================
Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

========================================================================


Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 229 / Friday, November 27, 2020 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 75925]]



DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Executive Office for Immigration Review

8 CFR Parts 1003 and 1240

[EOIR 19-0410; Dir. Order No. 02-2021]
RIN 1125-AB03


Good Cause for a Continuance in Immigration Proceedings

AGENCY: The Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of 
Justice.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (``Department'' or ``DOJ'') is 
proposing to define ``good cause,'' in the context of continuances, 
adjournments, and postponements, in its immigration regulations.

DATES: Written or electronic comments must be submitted on or before 
December 28, 2020. Written comments postmarked on or before that date 
will be considered timely. The electronic Federal Docket Management 
System will accept comments until midnight Eastern Time on that date.

ADDRESSES: If you wish to provide comment regarding this rulemaking, 
you must submit comments, identified by the agency name and reference 
RIN 1125-AB03 or EOIR Docket No. 198-0410, by one of the two methods 
below.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the website instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Paper comments that duplicate an electronic 
submission are unnecessary. If you wish to submit a paper comment in 
lieu of electronic submission, please direct the mail/shipment to: 
Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, Office of Policy, Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2616, Falls 
Church, VA 22041. To ensure proper handling, please reference the 
agency name and RIN 1125-AB03 or EOIR Docket No. 19-0410 on your 
correspondence. Mailed items must be postmarked or otherwise indicate a 
shipping date on or before the submission deadline.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 
2616, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone (703) 305-0289 (not a toll-free 
call).

I. Public Participation

    Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting written data, views, or arguments on all aspects of this 
rule via the one of the methods and by the deadline stated above. All 
comments must be submitted in English, or accompanied by an English 
translation. The Department also invites comments that relate to the 
economic, environmental, or federalism effects that might result from 
this rule. Comments that will provide the most assistance to the 
Department in developing these procedures will reference a specific 
portion of the rule; explain the reason for any recommended change; and 
include data, information, or authority that support such recommended 
change.
    Please note that all comments received are considered part of the 
public record and made available for public inspection at 
www.regulations.gov. Such information includes personally identifying 
information (such as your name, address, etc.) voluntarily submitted by 
the commenter. If you want to submit personally identifying information 
(such as your name, address, etc.) as part of your comment, but do not 
want it to be posted online, you must include the phrase ``PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph of your comment and 
identify what information you want redacted.
    If you want to submit confidential business information as part of 
your comment, but do not want it to be posted online, you must include 
the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph 
of your comment. You must prominently identify the confidential 
business information to be redacted within the comment. If a comment 
has so much confidential business information that it cannot be 
effectively redacted, all or part of that comment may not be posted on 
www.regulations.gov.
    Personally identifying information located as set forth above will 
be placed in the agency's public docket file, but not posted online. 
Confidential business information identified and located as set forth 
above will not be placed in the public docket file. The Departments may 
withhold from public viewing information provided in comments that they 
determine may impact the privacy of an individual or is offensive. For 
additional information, please read the Privacy Act notice that is 
available via the link in the footer of https://www.regulations.gov. To 
inspect the agency's public docket file in person, you must make an 
appointment with the agency. Please see the For Further Information 
Contact paragraph above for agency contact information.

II. Executive Summary

    The Department of Justice proposes to amend its regulations in 
title 8 to provide a clearer definition of ``good cause'' and the 
situations in which it is shown to warrant a postponement, continuance, 
or adjournment in immigration proceedings. Existing regulations do not 
provide guidance as to what qualifies as ``good cause,'' but only 
provide that ``good cause'' is the standard to be applied when 
determining whether a postponement, continuance, or adjournment is 
appropriate. Cf. 8 CFR 1003.29. This ambiguity has left the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (the ``Board'' or ``BIA'') and federal courts to 
interpret the term on a case-by-case basis. Over time, the Board has 
articulated standards applicable to continuance requests arising in 
various contexts. Some aspects of these standards, however, would 
benefit from further clarification, as the Board's case law does not 
address every context where continuance requests typically arise. 
Moreover, it would simplify matters to have the applicable standards 
for continuances located in a single regulation. To address 
continuances in a more comprehensive and systematic manner, this 
proposed rule would revise 8 CFR 1003.29 and codify standards for what 
constitutes ``good cause'' in different scenarios, including many of 
the factors the case law defines.
    First, the proposed rule at 8 CFR 1003.29(b)(1) would define ``good

[[Page 75926]]

cause'' to require the requesting party to demonstrate a particular and 
justifiable need for a continuance, and to make clear that the burden 
is on the requesting party. It would further provide that immigration 
judges should consider five specified non-exhaustive factors when 
determining whether good cause exists.
    Second, the proposed rule at 8 CFR 1003.29(b)(2) would codify 
scenarios in which ``good cause'' is not shown. These would include 
where the continuance: Would not materially affect the outcome of the 
proceedings; is requested by a party who has not demonstrated a 
likelihood of obtaining relief in a collateral matter, where such 
relief is the basis for the request; is in order to seek parole, 
deferred action, or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the 
Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''); or would cause the 
immigration court to exceed a statutory or regulatory deadline, unless 
an exception applies or the movant demonstrates good cause.
    Third, the rule would further build on the general standards 
regarding good cause and codify standards or guidelines for 
adjudicating requests for continuances in four common situations: 
Continuances related to collateral immigration applications outside of 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review's (``EOIR'') jurisdiction; 
continuances related to an alien's representation; continuances on an 
immigration judge's own motion; and continuances of a merits hearing.

III. Background

    An immigration judge ``may grant a motion for continuance for good 
cause shown.'' 8 CFR 1003.29. The ``continuance for good cause shown'' 
language was initially added to the regulations in 1987 to codify 
existing practices and to ``restate[ ] in simpler terms the 
discretionary authority of Immigration Judges to grant continuances for 
good cause shown found in 8 CFR 242.13.'' Aliens and Nationality; Rules 
of Procedure for Proceedings Before Immigration Judges, 52 FR 2931, 
2934 (Jan. 29, 1987); \1\ see also Orders To Show Cause and Warrants of 
Arrest, 28 FR 9504, 9504-05 (Aug. 30, 1963) (codifying 8 CFR 242.13 
(postponement and adjournment of hearing in exclusion proceedings)); 
Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 355-58 (BIA 1983) (discussing 
factors for consideration regarding a motion for continuance in 
exclusion proceedings).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ In 1987, the relevant regulation was codified at 8 CFR 3.27. 
See 52 FR at 2934. DOJ subsequently redesignated 8 CFR 3.27 as 8 CFR 
3.29 in 1992. See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Rules of 
Procedures, 57 FR 11568, 11569 (Apr. 6, 1992). Following the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 after the 
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 
116 Stat. 2135, EOIR's regulations were moved from chapter I of 
title 8 of the CFR to chapter V, and 8 CFR 3.29 was accordingly 
redesignated as 8 CFR 1003.29. See Aliens and Nationality; Homeland 
Security; Reorganization of Regulations, 68 FR 9824, 9830 (Feb. 28, 
2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the ``good cause'' standard has been used for over 100 
years, see, e.g., Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 376 (1901) (discussing an 
Illinois statute that authorized justices of the peace and examining 
magistrates to grant continuances ``on consent of the parties or on any 
good cause shown.'') (internal quotation marks omitted)), and is a 
standard applied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'' or the 
``Act''), INA 243(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(3) (authorizing district 
courts to, for good cause, suspend the sentence and order the release 
of an alien who has failed to comply with a removal order),\2\ the term 
does not have a settled meaning in law. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N 
Dec. 405, 412 (A.G. 2018) (comparing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (``extraordinary circumstances 
[are] a close correlate of good cause''), with Hall v. Sec'y of Health, 
Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979) (``Good cause is . 
. . not a difficult standard to meet.'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ ``Good cause'' also is used as a standard for evaluating the 
appropriateness of actions elsewhere in EOIR's regulations. See, 
e.g., 8 CFR 1003.3 (extension of briefing schedule); 8 CFR 1003.20 
(change of venue); 8 CFR 1003.25 (waiver of the presence of the 
parties).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Neither the INA nor its implementing regulations presently define 
``good cause''or how the standard may be met in immigration 
proceedings.\3\ Absent such a statutory or regulatory definition, the 
parameters of ``good cause'' for continuances have developed over time 
through case law. See, e.g., Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. 755, 759-60 
(BIA 2020) (a speculative and indefinite continuance request due to 
uncertainty surrounding when a collateral visa request will be resolved 
does not demonstrate good cause); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 
413-19 (clarifying framework for ``good cause standard'' when a 
respondent requests a continuance to pursue collateral relief); Matter 
of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009) (setting forth factors for 
consideration when determining whether there is ``good cause'' for a 
continuance so that an alien may pursue adjustment of status before the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (``USCIS'')); Matter 
of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 130, 135-38 (BIA 2009) (extending the Hashmi 
good cause framework to respondents seeking employment-based visas and 
related relief); In general, case law sets forth multi-factor balancing 
approaches to the good cause standard for motions for a continuance 
under 8 CFR 1003.29.\4\ This rule proposes to codify those parameters 
and add requirements and clarifications where needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ One provision of the INA does provide a multi-factor 
definition of ``good cause'' in the context of a district court's 
authority to suspend a criminal sentence imposed after a conviction 
of an alien for failing to take steps to execute a removal order. 
See INA 243(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(3). Although that particular 
definition is not applicable to immigration proceedings and its 
factors have little bearing on whether good cause exists for a 
continuance in such proceedings, it does demonstrate the default 
approach courts have taken when evaluating ``good cause'' as the 
relevant standard without a precise definition. See Matter of L-A-B-
R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 412-13.
    \4\ Additionally, the Attorney General has recognized that the 
same multi-factor test set forth by case law for continuances 
applies in the context of adjournments or postponements requested by 
the parties. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 407 n.1 (``The 
Board and the parties agree that the same good cause standard 
governs continuances under section 1240.6. I operate on the same 
understanding . . . .''); 8 CFR 1240.6 (``After the commencement of 
the hearing, the immigration judge may grant a reasonable 
adjournment either at his or her own instance or, for good cause 
shown, upon application by the respondent or the Service.''); see 
also 8 CFR 1240.45 (adjournments or postponements in the context of 
exclusion proceedings).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In Matter of Sibrun, the Board noted that there was little guidance 
on standards for motions to continue in immigration proceedings and 
turned to standards for continuances in federal criminal procedure at 
that time. 18 I&N Dec. at 355-356. The BIA determined that ``an alien 
at least must make a reasonable showing that the lack of preparation 
occurred despite a diligent good faith effort to be ready to proceed 
and that any additional evidence he seeks to present is probative, 
noncumulative, and significantly favorable to the alien.'' Id. The BIA 
also concluded that ``[b]are, unsupported allegations'' would not be 
sufficient to establish good cause and that the alien was responsible 
for ``specifically articulat[ing] the particular facts involved or 
evidence which he would have presented and otherwise fully explain how 
denial of his motion fundamentally changed the result reached.'' Id. at 
357.
    After Matter of Sibrun, many published decisions evaluating the 
good cause standard in immigration proceedings involved continuances to 
afford an alien with the time and opportunity to pursue collateral 
relief. See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807, 812-13 (BIA 
2012) (outlining factors for consideration in evaluating whether a 
continuance

[[Page 75927]]

request to await the adjudication of a U-visa application demonstrates 
good cause); Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 135-38 (applying the 
factors in Matter of Hashmi to evaluation of whether a continuance 
request to await the adjudication of an employment-based immigrant visa 
petition demonstrates good cause); Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 790 
(outlining factors for consideration in evaluating whether a 
continuance request to await the adjudication of a family-based 
immigrant visa petition demonstrates good cause). In Matter of Hashmi, 
the BIA set forth six non-exhaustive factors for determining whether 
there is good cause for a continuance to accommodate a collateral 
matter, including: The DHS response to the motion to continue; whether 
the underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; the 
respondent's statutory eligibility for adjustment of status; whether 
the respondent's application for adjustment of status merits a 
favorable exercise of discretion; the reason for the continuance; and 
any other relevant procedural factors. 24 I&N Dec. at 790.
    Specifically, in Matter of Hashmi, the respondent had requested a 
continuance so that USCIS could have additional time and opportunity to 
adjudicate the Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed on the 
respondent's behalf, which, if granted, would have rendered the 
respondent prima facie eligible for adjustment of status. See id. at 
787; see also Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653, 657 (BIA 1978) 
(stating that an immigration judge should favorably exercise discretion 
where a prima facie approvable visa petition and adjustment application 
have been submitted in the course of removal hearings), modified on 
other grounds by Matter of Arthur, 20 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1992); see 
generally INA 245(a), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) (requiring, in part, that an 
applicant be eligible to receive an immigrant visa).
    The BIA later extended the Hashmi framework to continuance requests 
related to other types of collateral proceedings, such as employment-
based visas and U-visas. See Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. at 
812-13; Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. at 757; Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N 
Dec. at 130. Notably, in Matter of Sanchez Sosa, the BIA determined 
that the movant must demonstrate that the requested continuance is 
``for a reasonable period of time.'' 25 I&N Dec. at 815.
    In Matter of L-A-B-R-, the Attorney General clarified the framework 
governing continuances to accommodate a collateral matter. 
Specifically, the Attorney General determined that where a provision 
uses the term ``good cause,'' but does not define it, immigration 
judges and the BIA should conduct a multi-factor balancing analysis. 
See 27 I&N Dec. at 413. The Attorney General stated that ``[t]he good-
cause standard [for continuances] requires consideration and balancing 
of all relevant factors in assessing a motion for continuance to 
accommodate a collateral matter'' and noted that such an approach 
``comports with both the INA and the prevailing treatment of good-cause 
standards, and has received the approval of several federal courts of 
appeals.'' Id. (collecting cases).
    The Attorney General further explained, however, that not all 
factors relevant to the ``good-cause assessment'' in the context of 
continuances should be weighted equally. Id. Rather, the adjudicator 
``must focus principally on two factors'' including ``the likelihood 
that the alien will receive the collateral relief'' and ``whether the 
relief will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings.'' 
Id. Additionally, the Attorney General directed that the adjudicator 
should consider ``whether the alien has exercised reasonable diligence 
in pursuing [collateral] relief, DHS's position on the motion, the 
length of the requested continuance, and the procedural history of the 
case.'' Id. The Attorney General elaborated that ``[i]t may also be 
appropriate to consider the length of the continuance requested, the 
number of hearings held and continuances granted previously, and the 
timing of the continuance motion . . . .'' Id. at 415. The Attorney 
General further stated that the burden to establish good cause is on 
the party seeking the continuance. See id. at 413.
    Recently, the BIA has stressed that overall prima facie eligibility 
for relief is not dispositive regarding a motion for continuance where 
other factors weigh against continuing the proceedings. See Matter of 
L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. at 758. Specifically, the BIA determined that an 
alien who had demonstrated prima facie eligibility for a U visa did not 
demonstrate good cause for a continuance where the alien did not 
exercise due diligence in applying for the U visa, DHS opposed the 
continuance, and a continuance would undermine administrative 
efficiency. See id. When evaluating administrative efficiency, the BIA 
considered the uncertainty as to when the U visa would be approved or 
become available. See id. at 759. The BIA also directed immigration 
judges to ``consider whether an alien is detained in determining the 
length and number of continuances that are appropriate'' in light of 
the alien's liberty interest and the Government's interest ``to 
reasonably limit the expense of detention.'' Id.
    Notably, almost every approach to defining ``good cause,'' in the 
context of an alien awaiting a collateral adjudication by DHS or for a 
visa to become current, highlights the importance of visa availability 
in assessing ``good cause.'' See, e.g., Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 
at 418 (``Similarly, because adjustment of status typically requires an 
immediately available visa, INA 245(a), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), good cause 
does not exist if the alien's visa priority date is too remote to raise 
the prospect of adjustment of status above the speculative level.''); 
Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 136 (``A respondent who has a prima 
facie approvable I-140 and adjustment application may not be able to 
show good cause for a continuance because visa availability is too 
remote.'').\5\ This approach comports with longstanding Board case law. 
See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982) (``In any case, 
the fact that the respondent has an approved visa petition does not 
entitle him to delay the completion of deportation proceedings pending 
availability of a visa number.''), aff'd

[[Page 75928]]

sub nom. Quintero-Martinez v. INS, 745 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(unpublished). It has also been endorsed by federal courts. See, e.g., 
Chacku v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 555 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that no good cause was shown for a continuance where the 
alien's priority date was years in advance of current visa 
availability). No case law, however, defines how close or remote visa 
availability must be to establish good cause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Although Matter of Hashmi did not address visa availability 
per se because the respondent in that case would have a visa 
immediately available upon approval of a Form I-130, the Board did 
note that statutory eligibility for adjustment of status was an 
important element to consider in evaluating a continuance request, 
see Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 792, and an immediately-
available visa at the time an adjustment of status application is 
filed is a statutory requirement to adjust status. See INA 
245(a)(3), (i)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(3), (i)(2)(B). Similarly, the 
BIA had no occasion to address visa availability in Matter of 
Sanchez Sosa because the annual statutory cap on U visas had not 
been reached at the time of the decision in June 2012, and a U visa 
appears to have been available to the respondent at that time. 
Compare INA 214(p)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1184(p)(2)(A) (establishing an 
annual limit of 10,000 U visas per fiscal year), with USCIS, Victims 
of Trafficking Form I-914 (T) and Victims of Crime Form I-918 (U) 
Visa Statistics (FY 2002-August 2012),Oct. 4, 2012, available at 
https://www.uscis.gov////USCIS//%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data//I914T-I918U-visastatistics-2012-aug.csv 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (reflecting the approval of 5825 U visa 
applications in fiscal year 2009, 10,073 U visa applications in 
fiscal year 2010, 10,088 U visa applications in fiscal year 2011, 
and 8688 U visa applications through the end of June 2012). The 
Department notes that in accordance with applicable law, USCIS 
approves no more than 10,000 principal petitions for U nonimmigrant 
status each year. Previously reported data suggesting a higher 
number of principal petition approvals may be due to system error, 
duplicate counting of replacement employment authorization 
documents, or other systems processing error. See USCIS, Number of 
Form I-198, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status By Fiscal Year, 
Quarter, and Case Status: Fiscal Years 2009-2020 Apr. 2020, 
available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/I918u_visastatistics_fy2020_qtr2.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Proposed changes

A. General Considerations

    As many stakeholders and experts have recognized, improper uses of 
continuances lead to unnecessary case delays that do not benefit a 
respondent with a valid claim,\6\ DHS, or EOIR. See, e.g., U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to 
Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and 
Operational Challenges 27, June 2017, available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (``DHS attorneys, 
experts, and other stakeholders we spoke with stated that immigration 
judges' frequent use of continuances resulted in delays and increased 
case lengths that contributed to the backlog.''). Consequently, the 
Department believes it is of critical importance to ensure that 
continuances in immigration court proceedings are granted only for 
actual good cause in a consistent and coherent manner, and it is 
proposing to amend its regulations accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ As the Supreme Court has recognized, ``[o]ne illegally 
present in the United States who wishes to remain . . . has a 
substantial incentive to prolong litigation in order to delay 
physical deportation for as long as possible.'' INS v. Rios-Pineda, 
471 U.S. 444, 450 (1985). Thus, many aliens obtain a perverse 
benefit from the delays in immigration proceedings. Nevertheless, 
unnecessary delays do harm aliens with valid claims. See Human 
Rights First, The U.S. Immigration Court: A Balooning Backlog that 
Requires Action 5, Mar. 15, 2016, available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Court-Backlog-Brief.pdf (``Some unauthorized migrants may benefit from the delays 
and remain longer in the country than they should, but those with 
legitimate grounds for relief from removal, such as many asylum 
seekers, remain in limbo for unnecessarily long periods.''') 
(quoting Institute for the Study of International Migration, 
Georgetown University, Detention and Removal: What now and What 
Next?: Report on an experts' roundtable Georgetown University, 
Washington DC, at 13 (2014)) available at https://isim.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites//2019/08/DetentionRemovalv10-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). In short, 
unnecessary delays harm the government's interest in efficient 
adjudications and the enforcement of the laws, an alien's interest 
in the timely resolution of his or her case, especially if the alien 
has a valid claim for relief, and the public's interest in the 
prompt administration of justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As neither the INA nor 8 CFR 1003.29 articulate a clear definition 
of ``good cause,'' the Board and the Attorney General have pronounced 
multi-factored tests for adjudicators to use to determine whether to 
grant or deny a motion for a continuance. See, e.g., Matter of L-N-Y-, 
27 I&N Dec. at 758; Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 413-19; Matter 
of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 130, 135-38; Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 
790; Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. at 355-58. In these decisions, the 
Board and the Attorney General sought to articulate or expound upon a 
standard by which ``good cause'' could be judged.
    The proposed rule adopts the essence of this standard while 
clarifying the instances in which a continuance would or would not be 
warranted in the exercise of discretion. Further, it retains many of 
the primary considerations of previous agency policies. For example, in 
accordance with Matter of L-A-B-R-, the proposed rule would have 
decisionmakers consider the likelihood that the alien would obtain 
collateral relief and whether the relief would materially affect the 
outcome of the proceeding as primary considerations for whether good 
cause is shown, and establishes that good cause has not been shown 
where the relief sought would not materially affect the outcome. 
Compare Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 413-19 (indicating that 
immigration judges must ``focus principally on two factors: (1) The 
likelihood that the alien will receive the collateral relief, and (2) 
whether the relief will materially affect the outcome of the removal 
proceedings[,]'' among other considerations), with 8 CFR 
1003.29(b)(2)(i) (proposed).
    The proposed rule would also establish a non-exhaustive list of 
factors for an immigration judge to consider whether a particular and 
justifiable need for a continuance has been met, using many of the 
factors applied by the Board in Matter of Hashmi and by the Attorney 
General in Matter of L-A-B-R-. Compare Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 
790 (laying out six factors, including but not limited to: (1) DHS's 
response to the motion to continue; (2) whether the underlying visa 
petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the respondent's statutory 
eligibility for adjustment of status; (4) whether the respondent's 
application for adjustment of status merits a favorable exercise of 
discretion; (5) the reason for the continuance; and (6) any other 
relevant procedural factors), and Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 
413 (``The immigration judge should also consider whether the alien has 
exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing that relief, DHS's position 
on the motion, the length of the requested continuance, and the 
procedural history of the case.''), with 8 CFR 1003.29(b)(1)(i)-(iv) 
(proposed).
    Further, the proposed rule maintains the general ``due diligence'' 
standard, as well as the movant's burden of proof, as factors for an 
immigration judge to consider. Compare Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. at 
355-57 (stating that ``an alien at least must make a reasonable showing 
that the lack of preparation occurred despite a diligent good faith 
effort to be ready to proceed and that any additional evidence he seeks 
to present is probative, noncumulative, and significantly favorable to 
the alien'' and that the alien is responsible for ``specifically 
articulat[ing] the particular facts involved or evidence which he would 
have presented, and otherwise fully explain[ing] how denial of his 
motion fundamentally changed the result reached''), with 8 CFR 
1003.29(b)(1), (b)(1)(i) (proposed).
    Also, the provision of the proposed rule which limits a good cause 
determination where the continuance relates to collateral immigration 
applications is in line with precedent stating that if visa 
availability is too remote, a continuance may not be warranted. Compare 
8 CFR 1003.29(b)(3)(i)(A), (ii) (proposed), with Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 
I&N Dec. at 418 (``Similarly, because adjustment of status typically 
requires an immediately available visa, INA Sec.  245(a), 8 U.S.C. 
1255(a), good cause does not exist if the alien's visa priority date is 
too remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status above the 
speculative level.''), Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 136 (``A 
respondent who has a prima facie approvable I-140 and adjustment 
application may not be able to show good cause for a continuance 
because visa availability is too remote.''), and Matter of Quintero, 18 
I&N Dec. at 350 (``Likewise, the immigration judge's refusal to 
continue the hearing until a visa number was available was proper 
because he may neither terminate nor indefinitely adjourn the 
proceedings in order to delay an alien's deportation.''). Thus, the 
elements of the proposed rule are grounded in previous agency rulings 
and precedents regarding continuances for good cause in immigration 
proceedings.
    In addition, the Attorney General recognized in Matter of L-A-B-R- 
that the good cause standard is often misapplied or misconstrued in 
immigration proceedings, leading to the overuse of continuances. See 27 
I&N Dec. at 411. Whereas continuances may ```promote efficient case 
management,''' see id. at 407 (quoting United States v.

[[Page 75929]]

Tanner, 544 F.3d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 2008)), the overuse of continuances 
undercuts their purpose and leads to the unnecessary delay of 
immigration proceedings, see id. at 411. By articulating a clearly-
defined good cause standard, the Department believes that it will be 
less likely to be misapplied or misconstrued.
    Finally, an amorphous standard invites inconsistent practices among 
immigration judges and inconsistent results among similarly-situated 
aliens. EOIR currently has over 500 immigration judges see EOIR, 
Immigration Judge Hiring (Oct. 2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download (last visited Nov. 18, 
2020), and currently there is no consistent practice among them 
regarding many types of frequently-requested continuances. Thus, aliens 
and their representatives seeking similar types of continuances--e.g., 
time to seek representation or preparation time--often receive varying 
decisions on both the length and number of continuances they receive 
based upon each individual immigration judge's own personal 
understanding of good cause. Further, the current--and comparatively 
inefficient--case-by-case nature of determining good cause, the lack of 
a clear definition of the term, and its consideration through an open-
ended and largely subjective lens by immigration judges, and the 
necessarily interlocutory posture for addressing continuances that were 
incorrectly granted, all make the subject of good cause for a 
continuance ripe for rulemaking. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 244 
(2001) (observing that agency ``is not required continually to revisit 
`issues that may be established fairly and efficienctly in a single 
rule making proceeding''' (quoting Hecker v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 
467 (1983))); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 
2010) (``An agency may exercise discretion categorically, by 
regulation, and is not limited to making discretionary decisions one 
case at a time under open-ended standards.'').
    For these reasons and concerns, the Department proposes, within its 
authority and discretion, a new rule more clearly defining when 
continuances are warranted in immigration court proceedings--and when 
such requests warrant denial in the exercise of discretion--because it 
believes it is of critical importance to ensure that continuances are 
granted only for actual good cause in a consistent and coherent manner.
    While federal courts have discussed current 8 CFR 1003.29, no 
federal court has limited the reading of the current regulation to one 
specific interpretation of ``good cause'' or ruled out particular 
interpretations of that term as inconsistent with the INA. In fact, 
courts have, when discussing whether good cause existed, often cited 
the Department's existing frameworks favorably. See, e.g., Toure v. 
Barr, 926 F.3d 403, 407-08 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing and using both 
the Matter of L-A-B-R- and Hashmi frameworks); Flores v. Holder, 779 
F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing and using the Hashmi factors); 
Ferreira v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(discussing and using the Board-proposed factors from Hashmi and 
Rajah).
    Even where courts have considered their own multi-factor tests, 
those courts have not expressly indicated that their framework is 
intended to be the only way to analyze whether good cause exists, 
indicating instead that ``there are no bright-line rules . . . .'' Cui 
v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 2008). See also, e.g., Ahmed 
v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009); Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 
89, 92-93 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, all courts continue to maintain the 
general proposition that although certain factors may be considered, 
``[t]he decision to grant or deny the continuance is within `the sound 
discretion of the judge and will not be overturned except on a showing 
of clear abuse','' indicating that decisions evaluating good cause do 
not purport to make definitive interpretations that would otherwise 
leave no room for agency discretion. Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1012 (quoting 
Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2008)); see 
also C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2019); Cruz Rendon 
v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010). In short, no court has 
proclaimed a definitive and comprehensive interpretation of when good 
cause exists under 8 CFR 1003.29.

B. The Proposed Rule

    In Matter of L-A-B-R-, the Attorney General recognized that the 
``good cause'' standard is often misapplied in immigration proceedings, 
resulting in the overuse of continuances. See 27 I&N Dec. at 411 (``The 
overuse of continuances in the immigration courts is a significant and 
recurring problem.''). Continuances are an ``important management tool 
for adjudicators,'' intended to promote efficiency by allowing for more 
time in a case where ``it [would] be wasteful and inefficient to plow 
ahead immediately'' due to certain developments in the case, such as 
illness of a key participant. Id. at 407. However, the overuse of 
continuances undermines their purpose and may result in needless delay 
of immigration proceedings. See id. at 411 (``Far from being minor 
procedural matters, unnecessary continuances undermine the detailed 
statutory and regulatory scheme established under the INA.'').
    Additionally, the Attorney General recognized that good cause 
imposes a clear limitation on the immigration judge's discretion. Id. 
at 407 (stating that ``[t]he good-cause standard is not a mere 
formality that permits immigration judges to grant continuances for any 
reason or no reason at all.''). The ``good cause'' standard provides 
``an important check on immigration judges' authority that reflects the 
public interest in expeditious enforcement of the immigration laws, as 
well as the tendency of unjustified continuances to undermine the 
proper functioning of our immigration system.'' Id. at 406.
    In light of the unnecessary delays caused by the improper use of 
continuances, the past misinterpretations and misapplications of the 
``good cause'' standard with respect to continuances, and the limiting 
effect of good cause on an immigration judge's discretion, the 
Department proposes a clearer, more uniform standard to be applied when 
considering good cause for continuances in immigration proceedings. 
Under the proposed rule, good cause generally could be shown when a 
party demonstrates a particular and justifiable need for a continuance. 
The proposed rule would provide immigration judges and the BIA with a 
clear standard by which to determine whether a continuance is warranted 
based on good cause. The Department proposes to place this standard in 
8 CFR 1003.29, which contains the current ``good cause'' provision.
    Paragraph (a) of the proposed rule's changes to 8 CFR 1003.29 would 
expand upon the language of the current regulation, permitting an 
immigration judge to grant a motion for a continuance for good cause 
shown, provided that the requirements of paragraph (b) are met and that 
the continuance would not cause the adjudication of an asylum 
application by an immigration judge to exceed 180 days in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances. Paragraph (b) of 8 CFR 1003.29, as 
proposed, would provide the minimum standard that must be met in order 
for good cause to exist to grant a motion for a continuance. Consistent 
with current practice, the proposed standard would make clear that the 
burden of demonstrating good cause is

[[Page 75930]]

on the party who is requesting that the court take action or that the 
court excuse a prior action. See id.; see also Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 
I&N Dec. at 413 (``In assessing these factors, the immigration judge 
should also remain mindful that as the party seeking the continuance, 
the alien bears the burden of establishing good cause.'').
    The proposed standard would require that, to establish good cause, 
a requesting party must be able to offer a particular reason for his or 
her request under the ``particular . . . need for the continuance'' 
requirement of paragraph (b). This requirement would codify the 
specificity contemplated by the existing good cause framework. See 
Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. at 357 (``[T]he alien must specifically 
articulate the particular facts involved or evidence which he would 
have presented . . . . Finally, all three reasons which counsel 
advances suffer a common defect: They are but bare, unsupported 
allegations lacking the required specific articulation of 
particularized facts and evidence.''). In other words, a party who 
seeks an action that requires a demonstration of good cause would be 
required to show a specific basis for the requested action and not 
merely a generalized desire.
    In addition, the proposed standard would require that, to establish 
good cause, a requesting party's reason for making the request must be 
``justifiable.'' Whether a reason for a request is ultimately 
justifiable would depend on specific fairness and efficiency 
considerations at issue in the particular context, see Matter of L-N-Y-
, 27 I&N Dec. at 759 (``Considering and balancing the relevant primary 
and secondary factors in this case, we agree with the Immigration Judge 
that there was no `good cause' to continue the respondent's proceedings 
to further await the adjudication of his U nonimmigrant visa 
petition.''). The immigration judge should lay out such considerations 
on the record, keeping with current practices. See, e.g., id. at 757-
60. Thus, although the proposed definition would set forth a generally 
applicable standard for good cause in the context of continuances, 
adjournments, and postponements (collectively ``continuances'' \7\), an 
immigration judge's or the BIA's determination of whether or not an 
action is justifiable would ultimately be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 412 (``I conclude that 
under 8 CFR 1003.29, immigration courts should continue to apply a 
multifactor test to assess whether good cause exists for a continuance 
for a collateral proceeding . . . .''). Further, the justifiability 
requirement would be in keeping with existing practice. See, e.g., id. 
at 415 (``Because a delay in an immigration proceeding imposes a burden 
on the immigration judge, DHS, and other aliens pursuing prompt 
hearings, the respondent seeking to avoid a disposition must 
demonstrate that he has a well-founded justification for such 
relief.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The regulations use the terms continuances, adjournments, 
and postponements largely interchangeably, and the same ``good 
cause'' standard governs both continuances under 8 CFR 1003.29 and 
postponements and adjournments under 8 CFR 1240.6 and 1240.45. 
Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 407 n.1. To eliminate any 
residual confusion, the proposed rule consolidates the location of 
this standard into one regulation, 8 CFR 1003.29, and makes 
conforming edits to 8 CFR 1240.6 and 1240.45 accordingly. Further, 
the proposed rule is not intended to define good cause as it is used 
in any other context outside of 8 CFR 1003.29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, in some instances, an alien remains eligible for relief 
even after a removal order has been entered, see e.g., 8 CFR 
214.14(c)(1)(ii), or removal has been effectuated, see e.g., Matter of 
L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. at 760 (``Moreover, as the Immigration Judge noted, 
the respondent may continue to pursue his U visa, even after he is 
removed.''). See also Garcia v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 19-01265, 
2019 WL 7290556, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2019) (unpublished) (``The 
governing regulations anticipate that petitioners for U-visas may not 
be present in the United States when their petitions are adjudicated or 
could be removed from the United States during the pendency of the 
petitions.''); accord Alvarez-Espino v. Barr, 959 F.3d 813, 818 (7th 
Cir. 2020) (``USCIS will process the [U visa] application whether or 
not Alvarez-Espino has a final order of removal against him. . . . 
Because Alvarez-Espino can continue to pursue every immigration benefit 
he seeks, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion 
for remand or for a continuance.''). In such instances, the mere 
conceivability of relief prior to the issuance of a removal order would 
hardly establish good cause for delaying the proceedings, because no 
continuance would be necessary to preserve the alien's ability to 
pursue the collateral matter with another agency. Thus, an alien in 
such circumstances could not demonstrate a particular and justifiable 
need for the continuance because the alien could continue to pursue 
whatever collateral matter he seeks regardless of whether the 
continuance is granted.
    To demonstrate good cause for a continuance under the proposed 
rule, an alien who seeks a continuance would first have to clearly 
specify his or her reason for requesting it. See Matter of Sibrun, 18 
I&N Dec. at 357 (``[T]he alien must specifically articulate the 
particular facts involved or evidence which he would have presented . . 
. .''). Next, the alien would have to show that the continuance is 
warranted by a particular and justifiable need. See id. at 356-57 
(``Second, for purposes of appeal, even where an alien has made this 
minimum required showing, an immigration judge's decision denying the 
motion for continuance will not be reversed unless the alien 
establishes that that denial caused him actual prejudice and harm and 
materially affected the outcome of his case.''); cf. Matter of Garcia-
Reyes, 19 I&N Dec. 830, 832 (BIA 1988) (no good cause for a continuance 
to demonstrate rehabilitation when ``[t]here was no showing that the 
respondent was eligible for any form of relief from deportation for 
which rehabilitation would be relevant'').
    With over 1.2 million cases currently pending, EOIR, Pending Cases, 
New Cases, and Total Completions (July 14, 2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download (last visited Nov. 18, 
2020), it is imperative that the Department ensures that immigration 
cases are completed in a timely manner. See also EOIR, Memorandum from 
the Attorney General to the EOIR, Renewing Our Commitment to the Timely 
and Efficient Adjudication of Immigration Cases to Serve the National 
Interest, at 2 (Dec. 5, 2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1041196/download (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (``The timely 
and efficient conclusion of cases serves the national interest. 
Unwarranted delays and delayed decision making do not.''). Because 
continuances place stress on one of EOIR's scarcest resources--docket 
time--and in light of the growing pressures created by new cases driven 
by continued influxes of illegal immigration, the Department believes 
it is essential to ensure that continuances are used properly and in a 
consistent manner. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address 
Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges (June 1, 2017) at 
27, 68, 69 available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2020) (``DHS attorneys, experts, and other 
stakeholders we spoke with stated that immigration judges' frequent use 
of continuances resulted in delays and increased case lengths that 
contributed

[[Page 75931]]

to the backlog. . . . Our analysis . . . showed that the use of 
continuances has grown over time and that, on average, cases that 
experience more continuances take longer to complete. . . . We also 
found that the percentage of completed cases which had multiple 
continuances increased . . . and that, on average, cases with multiples 
continuances took longer to complete than cases with no or fewer 
continuances.'').
    The Department does not foresee circumstances under which a 
continuance would be justifiable if an alien is unlikely to receive the 
collateral relief requested or, if granted, the collateral relief would 
not materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings, and these 
two factors would continue to serve as important considerations for 
adjudicators.\8\ See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 413.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ ``As with any balancing analysis requiring consideration of 
multiple factors, a respondent's strength on certain factors may 
compensate for a weaker showing on others.'' Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 
I&N Dec. at 417. For example, ``[a] respondent who makes a 
compelling case that he will receive collateral relief and 
successfully adjust status may receive a continuance even if, for 
instance, he has already received previous continuances.'' Id. 
However, ``because the respondent's likelihood of success in the 
collateral matter is paramount, a truly weak showing on that front 
may be dispositive.'' Id. Additionally, ``[i]n some cases, it will 
be impossible or too uncertain that the respondent will succeed in 
the collateral proceeding itself.'' Id. Consistent with the idea 
that a ``compelling'' case that an alien will receive collateral 
relief may warrant a continuance, Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 
417, the Department proposes to apply a ``clear and convincing'' 
evidentiary standard in assessing whether a respondent has made a 
sufficient showing of the likelihood of obtaining collateral relief 
in order to obtain a continuance based on a collateral matter. Such 
a standard recognizes that neither a prima facie showing of 
eligibility for relief, Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I&N Dec. at 757-58, nor 
the mere conceivability of possible relief, Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 
I&N Dec. at 414, is dispositive regarding whether a continuance 
should be granted. It is also consistent with the statutory standard 
for eligibility for one of the most common collateral matters 
arising in immigration proceedings, a request to continue the case 
of an alien who has married a United States citizen or lawful 
permanent resident while in removal proceedings in order to await 
the adjudication of an immigrant visa petition based on the 
marriage. See INA 245(e), 8 U.S.C. 1255(e) (requiring proof by 
``clear and convincing evidence'' of a bona fide marriage during 
removal proceedings between an alien and a United States citizen or 
lawful permanent resident in order for the alien to avoid having to 
reside outside the United States for two years before the immigrant 
visa petition can be approved).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, a continuance would most likely not be justifiable solely 
because a collateral matter ``could conceivably provide relief from 
removal.'' Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 414. Indeed, if this were 
the standard for good cause, then every continuance request for a 
collateral matter would demonstrate good cause, because most such 
requests posit at least a theoretical possibility of obtaining relief. 
The standard in proposed paragraph (b)(2)(i) comports with the recent 
direction of the Attorney General that motions for continuances should 
be granted only sparingly. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 407 
(asserting that, in the course of ordinary litigation, the burden 
placed on proceedings ``counsels against continuances except for 
compelling reasons'') (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983)). 
Although these two factors are important, most continuance requests to 
allow for collateral matters allege a likelihood of obtaining the 
collateral relief, and nearly all such requests posit that the 
collateral matter would materially impact the proceedings--otherwise 
there would be no need to seek the collateral matter. Thus, the 
proposed rule notes that although these two factors are significant, 
adjudicators should also consider other factors: ``(i) The amount of 
time the movant has had to prepare for the hearing and whether the 
movant has exercised due diligence to ensure preparedness for that 
hearing; (ii) The length and purpose of the requested continuance, 
including whether the reason for the requested continuance is dilatory 
or contrived; (iii) Whether the motion is opposed and the basis for the 
opposition, though the opponent does not bear the burden of 
demonstrating an absence or lack of good cause; (iv) Implications for 
administrative efficiency; and (v) Any other relevant factors for 
consideration.'' Compare id., with Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 
413 (``The immigration judge should also consider whether the alien has 
exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing that relief, DHS's position 
on the motion, the length of the requested continuance, and the 
procedural history of the case.'').
    A continuance would most likely not be justifiable where the alien 
``appears to be seeking interim relief as a way of delaying the 
ultimate disposition of the case'' or has not taken practicable 
measures to proceed at the scheduled hearing, such as ``pursuing 
collateral relief in advance of the noticed hearing date.'' Matter of 
L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 413. A continuance would also not likely be 
justifiable where the alien expresses an intention to file for 
collateral relief at a future date or where the alien has unreasonably 
delayed filing for collateral relief. Id. at 416. Through the proposed 
rule, the Department indicates that, subject to an exception, a request 
for a continuance in order to later apply for a visa generally would 
not constitute good cause. To the contrary, an alien should generally 
exercise diligence in any activity that forms the basis of the 
continuance request, and a lack of such diligence undermines a putative 
showing of good cause. Cf. Mazariegos-Paiz v. Holder, 734 F.3d 57, 66 
(1st Cir. 2013) (``Parties have an obligation to exercise due diligence 
in marshaling evidence. Viewed in this light, the IJ's denial of the 
petitioner's mid-trial request for a continuance was not an abuse of 
discretion.''); Perez-Mirachal v. Att'y Gen., 275 F. App'x 141, 144 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (``We conclude that the Immigration Judge did 
not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. At 
the time the motion for continuance was filed, Perez-Mirachal had not 
yet filed any motions challenging his conviction in the criminal 
court.''); Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. at 357-58 (``Accordingly, we 
find that counsel has failed to establish that after more than 3 months 
of representing the applicant she reasonably could not have been 
prepared to proceed . . . .'').
    The proposed rule also would clarify that seeking collateral action 
in the form of an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is solely 
within the purview of DHS and is beyond the authority of the 
immigration judge to grant, does not warrant continuing the 
proceedings. See 8 CFR 1003.29(b)(2)(ii). There is no need to continue 
a case in order to seek parole, deferred action, or the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by DHS, because such actions are far beyond 
the authority of an immigration judge to grant and may be granted by 
DHS at any time regardless of whether immigration proceedings are 
pending. See also Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 19 (BIA 2017) 
(``The role of the Immigration Courts and the Board is to adjudicate 
whether an alien is removable and eligible for relief from removal in 
cases brought by the DHS. We lack the authority to review the DHS's 
decision to institute proceedings, which involves the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.'') (citing Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 
284 (BIA 1998)), overruled by Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 
(A.G. 2018); \9\ see,

[[Page 75932]]

e.g., Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 (``Furthermore, since the 
respondent can request deferred action status at any stage in the 
proceedings, the immigration judge did not err in refusing to adjourn 
the hearing to allow him to pursue that relief.''); cf. Matter of 
Yazdani, 17 I&N Dec. 626, 630 (BIA 1981) (same). Since the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the DHS, it follows that in considering administrative closure, an 
immigration judge cannot review whether an alien falls within the DHS's 
enforcement priorities or will actually be removed from the United 
States. See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 (stating that 
``deferred action status is a function of the District Director's 
prosecutorial authority,'' which neither Immigration Judges nor the 
Board can review); cf. Matter of P-C-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 432, 434 (BIA 
1991) (stating that the likelihood that an alien will be deported is 
not a factor to be considered in a bond determination), overruled on 
other grounds by Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); 
Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 505 (BIA 1980) (``Once 
deportation proceedings are commenced, the immigration judge must order 
deportation if the evidence supports the charge.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Matter of Castro-Tum itself has been abrogated within the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits, though it continues to apply to 
immigration proceedings outside those circuits. See Romero v. Barr, 
937 F.3d 282, 292-94 (4th Cir. 2019); Morales v. Barr, 963 F.3d 629, 
639-40 (7th Cir. 2020). The Department also recently proposed 
rulemaking to codify the principle, consistent with both Matter of 
Castro-Tum and other regulations, that immigration judges and 
appellate immigration judges lack free-floating authority to 
administratively close cases. See Appellate Procedures and 
Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative 
Closure, 85 FR 52491, 52503-04 (Aug. 26, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the Department remains committed to ensuring that 
adjudicators follow statutory directives, including relevant timelines 
reflecting clear Congressional expectations that certain types of cases 
would be adjudicated within clear time parameters. See, e.g., INA 
208(d)(5)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) (stating that ``in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative adjudication 
of the asylum application, not including administrative appeal, shall 
be completed within 180 days after the date an application is filed''). 
To that end, the proposed rule would clarify that good cause is not 
established when a continuance request would cause an immigration court 
to exceed a statutory or regulatory adjudication deadline, unless the 
request meets any exception to those deadlines.
    The proposed rule also addresses common contexts for continuance 
requests in order to provide adjudicators with clearer standards and 
guidance. For instance, the proposed rule discusses continuances based 
on collateral immigration applications, proposing that ``a continuance 
request to allow an alien or a petitioner to apply for an immigrant 
visa or to wait for an immigrant visa for which the alien is the 
beneficiary to become available'' generally would not demonstrate good 
cause.
    This default standard is in line with the current framework, which 
provides that because adjustment of status generally requires an 
immediately available visa, good cause does not exist if the alien's 
priority date or visa eligibility is too remote. See, e.g., Matter of 
L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 418 (``Similarly, because adjustment of status 
typically requires an immediately available visa, INA 245(a), 8 U.S.C. 
1255(a), good cause does not exist if the alien's visa priority date is 
too remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status above the 
speculative level.''); Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 (``[T]he 
fact that the respondent has an approved visa petition does not entitle 
him to delay the completion of deportation proceedings pending 
availability of a visa number.'').
    Notwithstanding the general rule, the Department recognizes there 
may be situations in which it is appropriate to continue a case to 
await the adjudication of an immigrant visa petition by USCIS. 
Consequently, the proposed rule contains an exception that may 
establish good cause. To fall within the exception, the motion for a 
continuance would need to satisfy the three elements of that exception. 
Id.
    First, the proposed rule requires the approval of the visa 
application or petition to provide ``an immediately-available visa to 
the alien'' or ``a visa to the alien with a priority date six months or 
less from the immediate action application date provided in the Visa 
Bulletin published by the Department of State for the month in which 
the continuance request is made,'' in recognition that an application 
for adjustment of status generally requires an immediately available 
visa at the time an application is filed. See, e.g., INA 245(a)(3), 
(i)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(3), (i)(2)(B).
    Acknowleding that certain circumstances the likelihood of an 
immigrant visa being available is no longer remote or speculative, even 
if it is not quite immediately available. Case law has not defined how 
near or remote visa availability should be to support a finding of good 
cause, however. Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 418 (``Similarly, 
because adjustment of status typically requires an immediately 
available visa, INA 245(a), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), good cause does not exist 
if the alien's visa priority date is too remote to raise the prospect 
of adjustment of status above the speculative level.''); Matter of 
Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 136 (``A respondent who has a prima facie 
approvable I-140 and adjustment application may not be able to show 
good cause for a continuance because visa availability is too 
remote.''); Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 (``In any case, the 
fact that the respondent has an approved visa petition does not entitle 
him to delay the completion of deportation proceedings pending 
availability of a visa number.''). Consequently, individual 
adjudicators may take different views regarding how remote is too 
remote to warrant a continuance, which in turn may lead to inconsistent 
results for otherwise similarly-situated aliens. Thus, the proposed 
rule would establish a clear, uniform boundary for remoteness based on 
the Visa Bulletin published every month by the Department of State. See 
22 CFR 42.51(b) (providing for the allocation of immigrant visa numbers 
by the Department of State). Although the priority dates in the Visa 
Bulletin do not always move at predictable intervals, the Department 
believes that using a date six months or less from the priority date 
reflected in the Visa Bulletin for filing visa applications \10\ for 
the month in which the continuance request is made represents the 
clearest and most appropriate boundary for assessing remoteness for 
purposes of determining whether good cause exists. In particular, using 
a date no later than six months after the priority date calculated by 
the Department of State ``justifying immediate action in the 
application process,'' see, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Visa 
Bulletin for September 2020, No. 38 vol. X, available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2020/visa-bulletin-for-september-2020.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2020), as 
the cutoff for assessing remoteness strikes the right balance between 
providing a reasonable opportunity for an alien to obtain visa-based 
relief and avoiding indeterminate

[[Page 75933]]

delays based on visas that may not be current for a significant period 
of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The Visa Bulletin contains two charts of priority dates for 
each broad category of visas, family-based and employment-based. 
See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Visa Bulletin for September 
2020, No. 38 vol. X, available at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2020/visa-bulletin-for-september-2020.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). The first chart 
lists final action dates, i.e., visas with a priority date earlier 
than the date on the final action chart are available. The second 
chart reflects dates for filing visa applications within a timeframe 
justifying immediate action in the application process. The dates in 
the second chart are generally later than the first, and applicants 
for immigrant visas who have a priority date earlier than the 
application date in the second chart may assemble and submit 
required documents to the Department of State's National Visa 
Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, to establish good cause for a continuance related to an 
immigrant visa, an alien would need to demonstrate a prima facie 
eligibility for that visa and, if applicable, for adjustment of status 
and any necessary waiver(s) based on the visa approval, including 
establishing reason, as a matter of discretion, for adjustment of 
status and granting of any necessary waivers. This requirement is in 
line with the Department's past frameworks, which considered ``whether 
the underlying visa petition [wa]s prima facie approvable.'' Matter of 
L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 414 (``Three of the five main good-cause 
factors enumerated in Hashmi and Rajah pertained to the likelihood of 
these efforts' success: `whether the underlying visa petition is prima 
facie approvable[.]' ''); see also Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. at 130 
(citing the factors in Matter of Hashmi, including prima facie 
approvability of the underlying visa petition, in assessing whether a 
continuance is warranted to await the adjudication of a pending 
employment-based visa petition); Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. at 790 
(``In determining whether to continue proceedings to afford the 
respondent an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status premised on 
a pending visa petition, a variety of factors may be considered, 
including . . . whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie 
approvable[.]'').
    Third, to establish good cause for a continuance related to an 
immigrant visa, the request must establish that the immigration judge 
has jurisdiction over any application for adjustment of status, 
including any necessary waivers in conjunction with that application, 
based on approval of the underlying visa. This requirement recognizes 
both the futility and the waste of scarce resources associated with 
continuing a case for an issue over which an immigration judge 
ultimately lacks any authority to provide relief, as well as the 
reality, discussed supra, that many forms of relief remain available to 
aliens even if their removal proceedings have concluded. See, e.g., 
Alvarez-Espino, 959 F.3d at 818 (``USCIS will process the [U-visa] 
application whether or not Alvarez-Espino has a final order of removal 
against him. . . . Because Alvarez-Espino can continue to pursue every 
immigration benefit he seeks [outside of removal proceedings], the 
Board did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for remand or 
for a continuance.'').
    The Board has previously recognized that many reasons militate 
against granting a motion to reopen based on an underlying application 
over which an immigration judge and the Board lack jurisdiction:

    As a practical matter, Immigration Judges and the Board have 
limited and finite adjudicative and administrative resources, and 
those resources are best allocated to matters over which we do have 
jurisdiction. Among the costs of reopening final proceedings in 
cases such as the one before us, where we have no [authority] over 
the underlying relief requested, are the practical and 
administrative difficulties associated with maintaining open cases 
that would rely on outside considerations and would become part of 
already-crowded dockets. Immigration Judges, for example, would be 
required to schedule and oversee matters over which they play no 
substantive role, because the cases would once again be on their 
docket. If the application is ultimately denied, the Immigration 
Judge is placed in the position of having to enter a further order 
or decision that simply sets forth information provided by others, 
assuming such information is actually provided to the Immigration 
Judge in a timely manner. There would be nothing to preclude the 
respondent from filing an appeal to the Board from such an order, 
unnecessarily adding to our pending case load, and despite the fact 
that we would have no review authority over aspects of that 
decision.

    Matter of Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. 103, 110-11 (BIA 2009).\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The Department notes that in Singh v. Holder, 771 F.3d 647 
(9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that the Board possessed sua 
sponte authority to reopen a proceeding involving an application 
over which it lacked jurisdiction and to effectively grant a stay of 
removal, notwithstanding its decision in Matter of Yauri. See Singh, 
771 F.3d at 652. Singh, however, did not address the Board's 
determination in Yauri that it would not exercise its discretion--
even with its sua sponte authority--to reopen cases involving 
applications over which it lacked authority. Compare id. at 653 
(``Because the BIA denied Singh's motion only for lack of authority, 
we grant the petition and remand to the BIA.''), with Matter of 
Yauri, 25 I&N Dec. at 110 (``Finally, and separately from any 
question of jurisdiction, with regard to untimely or number-barred 
motions to reopen, we conclude that sua sponte reopening of 
exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings pending a third 
party's adjudication of an underlying application that is not itself 
within our [authority] ordinarily would not be warranted as a matter 
of discretion.'')). Singh also did not address the availability of a 
stay of removal from DHS in circumstances in which DHS has sole 
authority over the application at issue. See generally 8 CFR 241.6. 
Singh is binding only within the Ninth Circuit, and its 
jurisdictional holding regarding the Board is inapplicable to the 
proposed rule. Moreover, the Department does not find its reasoning 
persuasive enough to graft onto the proposed rule so as to establish 
immigration judge authority to indefinitely stay removal 
proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the Board recognized that these considerations may be 
different for pending proceedings, it did so, in part, with the 
understanding that the Department would engage in rulemaking on the 
issue, which the proposed rule now does. Id. at 111 n.8. Consequently, 
it did not purport to settle the issue of the appropriateness of 
continuances in situations in which the immigration judge lacks 
jurisdiction over the underlying application. Id. (``Thus, while we 
acknowledge the arguments raised surrounding the question whether 
proceedings can or should be continued when an arriving alien's 
adjustment application is pending with the USCIS, our decision in this 
case does not resolve that issue.''). Moreover, as the Board noted, an 
alien with an application pending before DHS may request a stay of 
removal, if necessary, to await the adjudication of a collateral 
application. See id. at 112; 8 CFR 241.6(a). The potential availability 
of a stay of removal from DHS further diminishes any need to keep 
immigration proceedings open in circumstances in which an immigration 
judge or the Board can take no action on a collateral application.
    Allowing immigration judges to continue cases for applications over 
which they lack jurisdiction--and, thus, for which they can take no 
action other than to continue proceedings for an uncertain and unknown 
amount of time--is also tantamount to granting either deferred action, 
an indefinite continuance, an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, or 
an indefinite stay of proceedings, especially because there is no 
prohibition on an alien filing repeated applications. Such action is 
contrary to established case law. See Matter of Silva-Rodriguez, 20 I&N 
Dec. 448, 449-50 (BIA 1992) (undue delay by an immigration judge may 
frustrate or circumvent statutory purpose of prompt immigration 
proceedings); Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 (an immigration 
judge ``may neither terminate nor indefinitely adjourn the proceedings 
in order to delay an alien's deportation'' and ``[o]nce deportation 
proceedings have been initiated by the District Director, the 
immigration judge may not review the wisdom of the District Director's 
action, but must execute his duty to determine whether the deportation 
charge is sustained by the requisite evidence in an expeditious 
manner.''); Matter of Roussis, 18 I&N Dec. 256, 258 (BIA 1982) (``It 
has long been held that when enforcement officials . . . choose to 
initiate proceedings against an alien and to prosecute those 
proceedings to a conclusion, the immigration judge is obligated to 
order deportation if the evidence supports a finding of deportability 
on the ground charged.''); see also Matter of Yazdani, 17 I&N Dec. 626, 
630 (BIA 1991) (``However, so long as the enforcement officials . . . 
choose

[[Page 75934]]

to initiate proceedings against an alien and to prosecute those 
proceedings to a conclusion, the immigration judge and the Board must 
order deportation if the evidence supports a finding of deportability 
on the ground charged.''). It also infringes on DHS's authority to 
enforce the immigration laws, see generally INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
1103(a)(1), and DHS's prosecutorial discretion to determine which cases 
should proceed and which ones should be terminated or paused for a 
significant amount of time. See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 
(``Consequently, the prosecutorial discretion exercised in granting 
deferred action status is committed exclusively to [now DHS] 
enforcement officials. . . . Inasmuch as deferred action status is a 
function of the District Director's prosecutorial authority, neither 
the immigration judge nor the Board may grant such status or review a 
decision of the District Director to deny it.''); cf. Lopez-Telles v. 
INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977) (``Rather, these decisions 
plainly hold that the immigration judge is without discretionary 
authority to terminate deportation proceedings so long as enforcement 
officials . . . choose to initiate proceedings against a deportable 
alien and prosecute those proceedings to a conclusion. The immigration 
judge is not empowered to review the wisdom of the [now DHS] in 
instituting the proceedings. . . . This division between the functions 
of the immigration judge and those of [now DHS] enforcement officials 
is quite plausible and has been undeviatingly adhered to by the [now 
DHS].'').
    In short, the Department finds that the practical resource concerns 
associated with reopening proceedings for applications over which an 
immigration judge lacks jurisdiction apply equally to continuance 
requests in the same circumstances and that those concerns outweigh any 
minimal potential benefit to an alien in seeking a stay of pending 
proceedings from an immigration judge, particularly because aliens may 
seek a stay of removal from DHS if necessary.\12\ Cf. Matter of Yauri, 
25 I&N Dec. at 111 (``Given our lack of jurisdiction over this category 
of adjustment applications, and because a process exists for requesting 
a stay from the DHS, the administrative and practical costs of 
reopening weigh heavily in our discretionary analysis.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The Department notes that an immigration judge's decision 
is generally subject to appeal, 8 CFR 1003.1(b)(3), that the current 
median time to decide a typical appeal is 323 days, see Appellate 
Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; 
Administrative Closure, 85 FR 52491, 52508 n.39 (Aug. 26, 2020), and 
that most aliens who are not in custody during their removal 
proceedings are not immediately detained by DHS once those 
proceedings conclude. Thus, even without a continuance from an 
immigration judge, most, if not all, aliens will have ample time to 
obtain a decision on any collateral application before even needing 
to seek a stay of removal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule discusses other restrictions related to this 
general rule for immigrant visas and the noted exception. For instance, 
the approval of a visa petition or application contemplated in the 
general rule and the exception does not include interim relief, prima 
facie determinations, parole, deferred action, bona fide determinations 
or any similar dispositions short of final approval of the visa 
application or petition because these are examples of disposition[s] 
short of final approval that do not demonstrate good cause. These 
restrictions are in line with the general admonition against 
continuances based on relief that is speculative. See, e.g., Matter of 
L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 418 (``Similarly, because adjustment of status 
typically requires an immediately available visa, INA 245(a), 8 U.S.C. 
1255(a), good cause does not exist if the alien's visa priority date is 
too remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status above the 
speculative level.''); Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. at 350 (``[T]he 
fact that the respondent has an approved visa petition does not entitle 
him to delay the completion of deportation proceedings pending 
availability of a visa number'').
    Further, the proposed rule would also provide that an immigration 
judge may not grant a continuance to an alien in removal proceedings 
based on a visa application or petition based on a marriage entered 
into during any pending administrative or judicial proceedings 
regarding the alien's right to be admitted or remain in the United 
States, including during the pending removal proceedings, unless the 
alien establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the marriage 
was entered into in good faith and in accordance with the laws of the 
place where the marriage took place and the marriage was not entered 
into for the purpose of procuring the alien's admission as an immigrant 
and no fee or other consideration was given (other than a fee or other 
consideration to an attorney for assistance in preparation of a lawful 
petition) for the filing of the petition or application. This 
restriction, which reflects the statutory prohibition in section 245(e) 
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1255(e), on granting adjustment of status based on 
marriages entered into during immigration proceedings unless the alien 
establishes, inter alia, that the marriage was entered into in good 
faith, also adheres to precedent regarding the need to establish prima 
facie eligibility for relief in order to obtain a continuance for a 
collateral matter related to that relief. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 
I&N Dec. at 413-18; cf. Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I&N Dec. 253, 256 
(BIA 2002) (``[A] properly filed motion to reopen may be granted, in 
the exercise of discretion, to provide an opportunity to pursue an 
application for adjustment where . . . the motion presents clear and 
convincing evidence indicating a strong likelihood that the 
respondent's marriage is bona fide . . . .''), modified on other 
grounds by Matter of Lamus-Pava, 25 I&N Dec. 61 (BIA 2009). It would 
further acknowledge that potential fraud or dilatory tactics go to the 
viability of the visa petition and the ultimate discretionary 
consideration of any subsequent application, such that a continuance 
may be unwarranted because the relief is too speculative or even 
prohibited outright. See Matter of Hashmi, 34 I&N Dec. at 792 (``If 
other visa petitions filed on the respondent's behalf have been denied, 
those petitions and the USCIS's determinations could also be presented 
and considered. These prior filings or other evidence of potential 
fraud or dilatory tactics may impact the viability of the visa petition 
underlying the motion.''); see also Pedreros v. Keisler, 503 F.3d 162, 
166 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding no abuse of discretion when a continuance 
was denied because there was ``no basis to conclude that the denial of 
the I-130 petition had any likelihood of being overturned on appeal''); 
Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 552 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that 
there was no abuse of discretion when a continuance was denied for the 
adjudication of a second visa petition when the first ``stemm[ed] from 
a marriage that had already been determined to lack bona fides'').
    In addition to the general rule and exception regarding 
continuances based on immigrant visa applications or petitions, the 
proposed rule contains a similar general rule and exception for non-
immigrant visas, such as a U visa, premised on similar concerns. A 
continuance request to apply for a non-immigrant visa or to wait for a 
non-immigrant visa to become available, including any applicable 
waiver, would not demonstrate good cause unless the receipt of the non-
immigrant visa, including any applicable waiver, vitiates or would 
vitiate all grounds of removability with which the alien has been 
charged and the alien demonstrates that final approval of the visa 
application or petition and receipt

[[Page 75935]]

of the actual visa, including approval and receipt of any applicable 
waiver, has occurred or will occur within six months of the request for 
a continuance. As with continuance requests based on immigrant visas, 
the receipt of interim relief, prima facie determinations, parole, 
deferred action, bona fide determinations or any similar dispositions 
short of approval of the actual visa application or petition would not 
constitute receipt of the actual visa or evidence that the actual visa 
will be received within six months of the request for a continuance. 
These provisions also align with the general admonition against 
continuances to await collateral matters that are speculative or 
remote. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 418.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ As discussed supra, Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 
807, had no occasion to consider the impact of the remoteness of a 
non-immigrant visa on the alien's continuance request. The other 
factors considered by the Board in Matter of Sanchez Sosa in 
determining the appropriateness of a continuance to await a non-
immigrant visa are generally subsumed within the proposed rule. 
Accordingly, the proposed rule does not deviate from Matter of 
Sanchez Sosa, but rather clarifies it in the context of non-
immigrant visas whose availability is remote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule also would address continuance requests regarding 
discrete collateral non-visa adjudications by DHS--e.g., the 
adjudication of an asylum application filed with DHS by an alien who 
has been determined to be a genuine unaccompanied alien child in 
proceedings pursuant to section 208(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(3)(C), the adjudication of a Form I-751 waiver filed with DHS 
under Matter of Stowers, 22 I&N Dec. 605 (BIA 1999),\14\ or the 
adjudication of an application for Temporary Protected Status (``TPS'') 
by an alien in removal proceedings at the time a country is designated 
for TPS unless the charging document, if established, would render the 
alien ineligible for TPS, 8 CFR 1244.7(d). In these circumstances, DHS 
has initial jurisdiction over the application at issue for an alien in 
immigration proceedings, and if DHS does not grant it, it can be 
renewed before the immigration judge. Consequently, an immigration 
judge may grant such a continuance if (A) the alien has been found 
removable as charged; (B) the alien has established prima facie 
eligibility for the underlying benefit; (C) the alien has provided 
evidence that the application has been filed with DHS and remains 
pending with DHS; (D) DHS has initial jurisdiction over the application 
at issue even for an alien in immigration proceedings; (E) there are no 
other applications pending before the immigration judge; and (F) the 
non-approval of the application would transfer jurisdiction to the 
immigration judge to review and adjudicate the application. This part 
of the proposed rule would not only recognize the existence of various 
applications over which DHS and the Department share jurisdiction, but 
also that DHS exercises initial jurisdiction even while the alien is in 
removal proceedings before the Department, and it promotes the 
efficient movement of cases on EOIR's docket. It also exemplifies a 
situation where ``an impending factual development [would] alter the 
course of the case,'' such that it would be ``wasteful and inefficient 
to plow ahead immediately.'' Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 407. If 
an alien has established prima facie eligibility for a non-visa benefit 
application over which DHS has original jurisdiction, but which may be 
renewed before an immigration judge if not approved by DHS, then the 
Department has an interest in having the non-visa benefit adjudicated 
before proceeding on its own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Aliens who receive lawful permanent resident status on a 
conditional basis pursuant to section 216 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
1186a, are required to file a petition on Form I-751 to remove the 
conditions within two years of the anniversary of obtaining that 
status. INA 216(d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1186a(d)(2)(A). Aliens who cannot 
meet the petition requirements may file for a waiver of them under 
certain circumstances, which is also filed on Form I-751. Id.; 
1186a(c)(4). DHS has initial jurisdiction over the waiver 
application, and if DHS does not approve it, it may be renewed 
before an immigration judge. Longstanding Board case law holds that 
where an alien is prima facie eligible for a Form I-751 waiver, the 
alien's proceedings should be continued to allow DHS to adjudicate 
it. See Matter of Stowers, 22 I&N at 613-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule also addresses another context for continuance 
requests, those related to matters of an alien's representation. Nearly 
two-thirds of all respondents in removal proceedings have 
representation, and nearly ninety percent of those seeking asylum have 
representation, see EOIR, Current Representation Rates (Apr. 15, 2020), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062991/download; 
thus, it is important for the Department to ensure that representation 
does not undermine the orderly procedure of the immigration courts and 
is not a hindrance to fair and timely adjudications. Moreover, just as 
a criminal defendant ``may not manipulate his right to counsel to 
undermine the orderly procedure of the courts or subvert the 
administration of justice,'' United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199, 
201 (7th Cir. 1985), so, too, an alien in civil immigration proceedings 
cannot manipulate his statutory right to counsel at no expense to the 
government, INA 292, 8 U.S.C. 1362, or any associated due process 
rights recognized by circuit courts to delay proceedings or subvert the 
administration of justice by immigration courts, cf. Gomez-Medina v. 
Holder, 687 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (``There is also a strong 
interest in not allowing manipulations of the [immigration] system in 
order to cause delay.''); United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 96 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.) (``[T]he right to counsel cannot be 
insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in 
courts of justice, and deprive such courts of the exercise of their 
inherent powers to control the same. The public has a strong interest 
in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice; the 
public's interest in the dispensation of justice that is not 
unreasonably delayed has great force.'' (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). To that end, the proposed rule would lay out 
six contexts for guiding adjudicators in determining whether a 
continuance related to representation establishes good cause.
    First, the proposed rule provides, ``[a]n immigration judge is not 
required to grant a continuance to any alien in removal proceedings to 
secure representation if the time period described in section 239(b)(1) 
of the [INA] has elapsed and the alien has failed to secure counsel.'' 
Second, an immigration judge, would be able to, in his or her 
discretion, grant one continuance for not more than 30 days to allow an 
alien to secure representation if the date of the alien's initial 
hearing occurs less than 30 days after the Notice to Appear's service 
date and the alien demonstrates that dilidgence in seeking 
representation since that date. Consistent with section 239(b) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229(b), those two proposed provisions contemplate that 
the Act already grants respondents a reasonable amount of time to 
secure counsel prior to the first hearing, but that additional time may 
be necessary in discrete instances.\15\ Cf. Hidalgo-Disla v.

[[Page 75936]]

INS, 52 F.3d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding an immigration judge's 
decision to proceed with a hearing after providing an alien 26 days to 
seek counsel was not erroneous and dismissing as frivolous an appeal 
asserting that it was); Ghajar v. INS, 652 F.2d 1347, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 
1981) (``Ghajar's assertion that she was denied due process because she 
was not granted a second continuance to allow her attorney further time 
to prepare for the deportation hearing is without merit. . . . One full 
month elapsed between the date of the show cause order and the date on 
which the hearing ultimately took place. . . . The immigration judge 
did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a second 
continuance.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ These proposed rule also adopts a feature of a prior 
regulation that governed immigration court proceedings for 
approximately 30 years and limited aliens to one continuance to seek 
representation unless ``sufficient cause'' for more time was shown. 
See 8 CFR 242.13 (1986) (``A continuance of the hearing for the 
purpose of allowing the respondent to obtain representation shall 
not be granted more than once, unless sufficient cause for the 
granting of more time is shown.''). No reason was given for 
departing from that limitation in the mid-1980s, and there is no 
indication that it was unworkable. See Aliens and Nationality; Rules 
of Proceedings Before Immigration Judges, 50 FR 51693 (Dec. 19, 
1985) and 52 FR 2931 (Jan. 29, 1987) (proposing and then finalizing, 
without substantive discussion, a change to the language in 8 CFR 
242.13 to eliminate the general limitation of only one continuance 
for an alien to seek representation). Moreover, in light of the 
subsequent enactment of section 239(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
1229(b)(3), the Department believes returning to a variation of the 
prior system best effectuates the intent and purpose of the 
representation-related provisions of the Act by recognizing that the 
Act grants a reasonable amount of time to secure representation but 
that additional time may be necessary in limited circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Indeed, nothing in that part of the Act prohibits ``the Attorney 
General from proceeding against an alien pursuant to section 240 [8. 
U.S.C. 1229a] if the time period described in paragraph (1) [i.e. ten 
days between the service of a Notice to Appear and the first hearing] 
has elapsed and the alien has failed to secure counsel.'' INA 
239(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(3). Thus, although aliens possess a 
statutory right to representation at no expense to the government, see 
INA 292, 8 U.S.C. 1362, that right is qualified by Congress's further 
determination that a period of ten days after an alien has been served 
with a Notice to Appear is a sufficient time to allow the alien to seek 
such representation before the intial hearing date in removal 
proceedings, see INA 239(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b). Although Congress's 
determination in INA 239(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(3), may have been 
overlooked in litigation regarding the denial of further continuances 
for an alien to seek representation, the Department declines to ignore 
the clear statutory text of that section in the instant NPRM.
    Currently, aliens in removal proceedings generally have ample time 
to seek representation if they exercise diligence.\16\ For a detained 
case, the median time between service of the NTA on an alien and filing 
it with an immigration court is 11 days and the median time between the 
receipt of the NTA by an immigration court and the first hearing is 27 
days; for a non-detained case, the comparable medians are 41 and 226 
days, respectively. Thus, most aliens already have a reasonable and 
realistic amount of time to obtain representation. Cf. Matter of C-B-, 
25 I&N Dec. 888, 889-90 (BIA 2015) (aliens should receive a fair 
opportunity to secure counsel).\17\ Nevertheless, the Department 
recognizes that in limited circumstances, an alien exercising diligence 
may need additional time.\18\ Thus, if an alien's hearing occurs less 
than 30 days after the service of the Notice to Appear, and the alien 
demonstrates that he or she was diligent in securing counsel, the 
proposed rule provides that a continuance of up to 30 days may be 
warranted.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The Department recognizes that not all aliens will obtain 
representation even though they have ample time to seek it. For 
example, some aliens do not secure representation because they do 
not wish to pay the fee charged by a potential representative. Cf. 
Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (``It would 
be nonsensical to recognize a constitutional entitlement to a 
continuance based on counsel's withdrawal when petitioners 
themselves are responsible for the withdrawal [due to failing to pay 
counsel].''). Further, many representatives, due to ethical or 
professional responsibility obligations, will not take cases of 
aliens who are ineligible for any relief or protection from removal 
(e.g., an alien with an aggravated felony drug trafficking 
conviction who has no fear of persecution or torture in his or her 
home country) because they do not wish to charge money for 
representation when representation will not affect the outcome of 
the proceeding. These situations illustrate only that some aliens 
may not ultimately secure counsel for reasons common to issues of 
representation in all civil cases--i.e., the cost of the 
representation and the strength of the case--not that aliens do not 
generally have ample time to seek representation. See United States 
v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1995) (``Although 
Torres-Sanchez expressed some frustration over his attempt to obtain 
counsel, that frustration, in our view of the record, stemmed from 
his realization that he faced the inevitable consequence of 
deportation, not from a lack of opportunity to retain counsel. In 
any event, the mere inability to obtain counsel does not constitute 
a violation of due process.'').
    \17\ The Board has not defined what a reasonable and realistic 
amount of time is for purposes of obtaining representation, and the 
respondent in Matter of C-B- was given only eight days between the 
issuance of an NTA and his first hearing, in apparent contravention 
of section 239(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(1). See Matter of 
C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. at 889. Nevertheless, Matter of C-B- cannot be 
interpreted to contradict the Act, and the Act clearly indicates 
that 10 days between the service of an NTA and the first hearing is 
a sufficient amount of time to obtain representation. See INA 
239(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229(b)(3). Accordingly, the proposed rule is 
not in tension with Matter of C-B- and does not deviate from 
recognizing the statutory parameters for providing time for a 
respondent to obtain representation.
    \18\ The rule does not countenance additional time, however, in 
situations where an alien initially chooses to proceed without 
counsel and then belatedly reconsiders that decision after being 
found removable. See Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(``We cannot require the IJ to postpone a proceeding every time a 
party believes that the hearing is going badly, and, as a result, 
seeks to re-think his or her decision to forego representation.'').
    \19\ There is no current, consistent practice among immigration 
judges regarding either the number or length of continuances to seek 
representation. Accordingly, the proposed rule would also 
standardize motions practice in this area based on a recognition 
that most aliens have already received a significant amount of time 
to seek counsel prior to their first hearing but that in discrete 
instances, additional time may be necessary. Such standardization 
will benefit both practitioners and adjudicators by making 
procedural expectations both clear and consistent across all cases 
in removal proceedings. It will also ensure that aliens are not 
dilatory in seeking representation. Moreover, the Department 
believes an additional continuance of up to 30 days constitutes a 
reasonable amount of additional time for diligent aliens to continue 
seeking representation, because it would give a diligent alien 
potentially up to 40 days total to seek representation after being 
served with an NTA, which is in line with the minimum median total 
amount of time currently, 38 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, the proposed rule would provide that good cause may not be 
found on the basis of a representative's assertion that his or her 
workload or obligations in other cases prevent preparation because 
professional responsibility obligations require that representatives do 
not take on no more cases than they can handle. See Operating Policies 
and Procedures Memorandum (OPPM) 17-01, Continuances (Jul. 31, 2017) at 
5-6 (``In addition, frequent or multiple requests for additional 
preparation time based on a practitioner's workload concerns related to 
large numbers of other pending cases should be rare and warrant careful 
review.''). The regulations already require representatives to provide 
competent and diligent representation for their clients, and it would 
not constitute good cause if a representative is not abiding by those 
requirements. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.102(o) (deeming the failure to 
provide competent representation to a client grounds for discipline), 
1003.102(q) (deeming the failure to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client grounds for discipline).
    Fourth, under the proposed rule, an immigration judge will not be 
permitted to grant more than one continuance in removal proceedings for 
preparation time that is separate from the normal preparation time 
between hearings. Further, any such continuance solely for preparation 
may be granted prior to pleading to the allegations and charges in a 
Notice to Appear, but will not be granted for more than 14 days. This 
proposed rule recognizes that a significant amount of preparation time 
is already built into immigration proceedings, especially between a 
master calendar hearing and an individual merits hearing. See, e.g.,

[[Page 75937]]

Paris-Mendez v. Barr, 814 F. App'x 247, 250 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(unpublished) (``First, [respondent's] counsel decided not to prepare 
for an individualized hearing on September 20, 2016 until a few days 
prior, when she had five months to do so. Clearly, this did not justify 
a continuance.''); Islam v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 748 F. App'x 961, 963 
(11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (``The morning of Islam's removal 
hearing, attorney Zubaida Iqbal moved for a continuance on the ground 
that she had been hired the day before and needed time to prepare, but 
Iqbal had entered a notice of appearance in Islam's proceeding [two 
months earlier] and represented him at his bond hearing. And Iqbal's 
motion to continue was identical to the one she filed before Islam's 
bond hearing. The immigration judge did not abuse his discretion by 
refusing to further delay Islam's removal hearing when Iqbal failed to 
appear at the hearing or to explain in her motion why a continuance was 
necessary when she was familiar with Islam's case and the documents 
relating to his applications for relief.''); Aguilar Delgado v. 
Gonzales, 139 F. App'x 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (``The 
agency did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance, however, 
as it had given him fourteen months from his initial hearing where he 
appeared with counsel to prepare his case, and Aguilar Delgado chose to 
fire his attorney immediately preceding the hearing.'').
    Consistent with an attorney's ethical duties of competence and 
diligence, 8 CFR 1003.102(o) and (q), additional time for putative and 
generalized ``preparation'' contributes to unnecessary delay and raises 
questions about the true purpose of the requested delay. Moreover, many 
instances of an alleged lack of preparation are actually due to the 
respondent's behavior, and the withholding of information by a 
respondent from his or her representative leading to that 
representative's lack of preparedness does not demonstrate good cause. 
See, e.g., Paris-Mendez, 814 F. App'x at 250-51 (``Second, with respect 
to the assertion that the petitioner's counsel learned for the first 
time on the morning of the hearing that the petitioner identified 
himself as a Jehovah's Witness and that he allegedly suffered 
persecution in Mexico because of his religion, it is puzzling that the 
petitioner's counsel was so informed at the last minute, when she had 
previously helped the petitioner with completing his Form I-589 . . . 
.''); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 185 F. App'x 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished) (``Moreover, it was Ahmed's fault that his new attorney 
was not prepared. He hired her just before the hearing and did not 
inform her that the INS had revoked his visa.''); see also Ghajar v. 
INS, 652 F.2d at 1348-49 (``Ghajar's assertion that she was denied due 
process because she was not granted a second continuance to allow her 
attorney further time to prepare for the deportation hearing is without 
merit'').
    Nevertheless, the Department recognizes that in rare cases, an 
attorney may need additional time to prepare to plead to the charges in 
the NTA, and the proposed rule would allow a continuance of up to 14 
days to do that.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The proposed rule recognizes that substantial preparation 
time is already built into the current framework of immigration 
proceedings. For example, an attorney who contests charges of 
removability may be given time to brief the charges or the case may 
be set for a hearing on the charges, and the proposed rule does not 
limit the time immigration judges allow for briefing schedules or 
the scheduling of hearings related to contested charges of 
removability. Accordingly, representatives who contest grounds of 
removability will likely have additional time to address the 
charges, though that time will not fall under the rubric of a 
continuance for attorney preparation. Similarly, the normal time 
between a master calendar hearing and an individual merits hearing 
should provide an attorney ample time for preparation, as the 
attorney will have already presented a prima facie case for relief 
in order to obtain a merits hearing date in the first instance. 
There is no current, consistent practice among immigration judges 
regarding either the number or length of so-called ``attorney prep'' 
continuances. Accordingly, the proposed rule would also standardize 
motions practice in this area based on a recognition that the 
natural procedural progression of a case already contains a 
significant amount of built-in preparation time, that most typical 
preparatory activities--e.g., writing briefs, contesting 
removability, filing applications or motions to terminate 
proceedings, and assembling evidence--occur during this time and 
outside of a court hearing, and that representatives may submit 
written pleadings and applications for relief without the need for a 
hearing to do so. Such standardization will benefit both 
practitioners and adjudicators by making procedural expectations 
both clear and consistent across all cases in removal proceedings. 
It will also ensure that hearing time is not wasted considering 
activities that are normally performed during the time between 
scheduled hearings and that representatives do not engage in 
dilatory tactics simply to prolong proceedings as much as possible. 
Although the current framework already contains substantial 
preparation time for either contesting removability or pursuing an 
application for relief, the Department nevertheless recognizes that 
it cannot account for every single scenario in which an attorney may 
allege a need for preparation time. Accordingly, in rare cases 
outside of the typical scenarios outlined above, the proposed rule 
recognizes an immigration judge's ability to grant an additional 
continuance for attorney preparation time of up to 14 days, which is 
a reasonable amount of time for a diligent and competent attorney to 
assess an issue beyond those otherwise contemplated in this proposed 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fifth, the proposed rule would provide that good cause will not be 
found due to a representative's scheduling conflict in another court if 
that conflict that existed at the time the immigration judge scheduled 
the hearing in open court and the representative did not raise it at 
the time. This change supports the standard that a practitioner's 
workload must be controlled and managed so that each matter can be 
handled competently, 8 CFR 1003.102(q). If the representative's 
scheduling conflict in another court arises after the immigration 
hearing in removal proceedings was scheduled, an immigration judge may 
grant a continuance (of no more than 14 days) only if that conflict 
involves the court appointment of a representative to a case and the 
immigration judge was notified of the conflict in a timely manner.
    The proposed rule recognizes that in certain jurisdictions 
representatives may be appointed as criminal defense attorneys through 
a panel process in furtherance of a criminal defendant's constitutional 
right to representation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3006A. Understanding that 
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants outweigh the 
inconvenience to the civil nature of immigration proceedings occasioned 
by a scheduling conflict and that criminal trials, especially of 
detained defendants, generally take precedence over civil proceedings, 
see, e.g., United States Courts, FAQs: Filing a Case, https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case#faq-When-will-the-court-reach-a-decision-in-my-case? (last visited Nov. 5, 2020) (the scheduling of 
criminal cases is assigned a higher priority than the scheduling of 
civil cases in federal court), the proposed rule would contain an 
exception such that good cause may be found for a conflict that arises 
after an immigration hearing is scheduled due to the appointment of a 
respondent's representative in a criminal case, provided that the 
attorney timely notifies the immigration court of the conflict.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The proposed rule also recognizes that attorneys may also 
be appointed in discrete types of civil proceedings, e.g. habeas 
proceedings. Accordingly, the rule is not limited to appointments in 
criminal cases and contains an exception for a conflict arising due 
to a subsequent appointment in any type of case, provided that the 
attorney timely notifies the immigration court of the conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule recognizes the disregard shown to immigration 
courts by practitioners who either misleadingly inform the immigration 
judge that they do not have a conflict when scheduling a future hearing 
or take on cases in other courts after the immigration court hearing 
has been scheduled knowing that a conflict exists. Such disregard for 
the time of an immigration judge and the resources of the immigration 
court

[[Page 75938]]

does not demonstrate good cause.\22\ Sixth, if the respondent's 
representative fails to appear for a scheduled hearing, the proposed 
rule would provide that the immigration judge may grant a continuance 
of no more than 14 days. This provision recognizes that, while 
representatives are expected to attend their clients' hearings, see id. 
1003.102(l), 1003.102(o), 1003.102(q), 1003.102(r), a respondent should 
not necessarily be penalized for his or her representative's failure to 
appear. Therefore, a continuance in these instances may be warranted, 
though it should be only for a limited duration of 14 days to ensure 
that an alien's case does not become stale due to any undue delay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ The proposed rule recognizes that cases are sometimes 
scheduled outside of open court. In such situations, the limitation 
on good cause due to a scheduling conflict by a representative 
outlined in the proposed rule would not apply, though any 
continuance request in such a situation would still have to 
affirmatively demonstrate good cause. Moreover, the representative 
would need to file the continuance request within 14 days of the 
issuance of the scheduling notice by the immigration court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would also address continuances made on an 
immigration judge's own motion. In doing so, it would recognize that 
although there are multiple circumstances in which an immigration judge 
should continue a case on his or her own motion, those circumstances 
are closely circumscribed and should generally be rare. It also 
recognizes that the good cause standard ``plainly confines the 
discretion of immigration judges to grant continuances . . . [r]ather 
than giving `unfettered discretion to grant or deny a continuance.' '' 
Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. at 407 (quoting Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 
1014). Thus, the proposed rule would generally preclude an immigration 
judge from granting a continuance on his or her own motion except in 
clearly-specified circumstances.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ These circumstances would include those in which a 
continuance is required pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.47; there is evidence 
of serious illness of the alien, representative, or immigration 
judge, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent 
of the alien, representative, or immigration judge; the immigration 
judge is otherwise absent and no other immigration judge is 
available to preside over the hearing; there are technical 
difficulties with the immigration court's computer, recording 
system, or video teleconferencing system that prevent the case from 
being heard or recorded; the Department of Homeland Security or the 
Department of Health and Human Services fails to produce a detained 
alien for the hearing; an interpreter is necessary for the hearing, 
but is unavailable or unqualified; the record of proceedings is 
unavailable; the respondent did not appear at a hearing due to 
detention by a law enforcement entity, or due to a deficient notice 
and service of a new notice of hearing can correct the deficiency; 
the immigration judge began a hearing but was unable to complete it 
due to no fault of the parties; the court is closed for hearings at 
the time of the hearing; or unforeseen exceptional or extraordinary 
circumstances beyond the control of the alien, the alien's 
representative, government counsel, or the immigration judge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All of these enumerated reasons are obvious instances where it 
would be unreasonable or impossible for an immigration judge to proceed 
with a hearing and, thus, warrant a continuance. See, e.g., Matter of 
L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N at 407 (``There are times when the prudent use of 
continuances may advance the efficient enforcement of the immigration 
laws. . . . When a key participant falls ill, for instance, . . . it 
can be wasteful and inefficient to plow ahead immediately.'') (emphasis 
added); cf. Matter of W-A-F-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 880, 882-83 (BIA 2016) 
(holding that where DHS seeks to re-serve a respondent to effect a 
notice to appear that was defective under the regulatory requirements 
for serving minors under the age of 14, a continuance should be granted 
for that purpose).
    Additionally, this list includes a catch-all provision providing 
authority for an immigration judge to sua sponte continue a case in 
situations in which unforeseen exceptional or extraordinary 
circumstances \24\ beyond the control of the alien, the alien's 
representative, government counsel, or the immigration judge arise. The 
Department recognizes that no regulation can account for every possible 
scenario in which a continuance may be appropriate notwithstanding the 
provisions outlined in the proposed rule and that in rare cases, a 
continuance may be warranted for reasons wholly beyond the control of 
the parties and the immigration judge. Consequently, the proposed rule 
provides a catch-all mechanism for an immigration judge to grant a 
continuance in such rare circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The use of ``unforeseen exceptional or extraordinary 
circumstances'' as a standard for rare scenarios not falling into 
any other category is not intended to reflect statutory or 
regulatory definitions of those terms used in other contexts. See, 
e.g., INA 240(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(e)(1); 8 CFR 1208.4(a)(5). 
Rather, it reflects the rare nature of such fact patterns that would 
warrant a continuance notwithstanding any other regulatory 
provision. Thus, this standard could warrant a continuance 
notwithstanding other provisions in truly rare or unique situations 
where an attorney faced a genuinely unforeseeable workload issue or 
a respondent faced an atypical need for additional time to obtain 
counsel (e.g., prior counsel has engaged in unethical or 
unprofessional behavior preventing the respondent from obtaining new 
counsel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the proposed rule discusses continuances of merits 
hearings, including merits hearings on applications for relief or 
protection and merits hearings on contested charges of removability. 
Under the proposed rule, continuances of merits hearings are strongly 
disfavored, and should only be granted in specific circumstances or 
upon motion by either party. Accord EOIR OPPM 17-01 (``Such [merits] 
hearings are typically scheduled far in advance, which provides ample 
opportunity for preparation time, and often involve interpreters or 
third-party witnesses whose schedules have been carefully accommodated. 
Moreover, slots for individual merits hearings cannot be easily filled 
by other cases, especially if the decision to continue the hearing is 
made close in time to the scheduled date. Although some continuances of 
individual merits hearings are unavoidable, especially in situations 
involving an unexpected illness or death, the continuance of an 
individual merits hearing necessarily has a significant adverse ripple 
effect on the ability to schedule other hearings across an immigration 
judge's docket. Thus, such a request should be reviewed very carefully, 
especially if it is made close in time to the hearing.'').
    The proposed rule contemplates that, following the scheduling of a 
merits hearing, parties have ample time to prepare for the hearing and 
that they should be ready to proceed at that date. If a motion for a 
continuance were granted in such an instance, the need to reschedule 
would unnecessarily delay the adjudication of the respondent's case. 
While there are circumstances in which a continuance is warranted, the 
proposed rule would embody a primary desire to not continue merits 
hearings. To do so would be to unduly disregard EOIR's mission of 
adjudicating cases expeditiously and efficiently, as well as to 
potentially undermine consideration of an application for relief for an 
alien whose case is already prepared for the hearing and whose evidence 
may otherwise go stale during any continuance. Accordingly, the 
proposed rule would note that continuances of merits hearings should 
only be granted in compelling circumstances outlined in the proposed 
rule, including unforeseen exceptional or extraordinary circumstances 
based on a motion by either party, and should be granted for no more 
than 30 days. An additional continuance of that length is a reasonable 
amount of time to address the issue that necessitated the continuance 
while also ensuring that evidence does not go stale or that the 
parties' preparation for the merits hearing is not otherwise vitiated.

[[Page 75939]]

V. Regulatory Requirements

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Department has reviewed this regulation in accordance with the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)) and has determined that 
this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. The proposed rule would not regulate ``small 
entities'' as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6). Only 
individuals, rather than entities, are placed in immigration 
proceedings, and only immigration judges, not entities, adjudicate 
requests for continuances.

B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year, and it will not significantly or 
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed 
necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995.

C. Congressional Review Act

    This rule is not a major rule as defined by section 804 of the 
Congressional Review Act. 5 U.S.C. 804. This rule will not result in an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; a major increase 
in costs or prices; or significant adverse effects on competition, 
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of 
United States-based companies to compete with foreign-based companies 
in domestic and export markets.

D. Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563

    The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of 
Management and Budget (``OMB'') has determined that this proposed rule 
is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866. It will neither result in an annual effect on 
the economy greater than $100 million nor adversely affect the economy 
or sectors of the economy. It does not pertain to entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs, nor does it raise novel legal or policy 
issues. It does not create inconsistencies or interfere with actions 
taken by other agencies. Accordingly, this rule is not a significant 
regulatory action subject to review by OMB pursuant to Executive Order 
12866.
    Executive Order 13563 directs agencies to assess all costs and 
benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is 
necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, public health, and safety 
effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 
emphasizes the importance of using the best available methods to 
quantify costs and benefits, reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and 
promoting flexibility. The Department certifies that this regulation 
has been drafted in accordance with the principles of Executive Order 
13563.
    The proposed rule would provide additional clarity for adjudicators 
across many issues arising from the most types of requests for a 
continuance in immigration proceedings. Although the proposed 
regulation would provide clearer guidance for adjudicators in 
considering continuance requests, it does not change the nature or 
scope of the role of an immigration judge during immigration 
proceedings. Immigration judges are already trained to consider all 
relevant legal issues in assessing a request for a continuance, and the 
proposed rule does not propose any changes that would make adjudicating 
such requests more challenging than they currently are. If anything, 
the proposed rule would make adjudicating motions for a continuance 
easier and more efficient by providing clearer standards than the 
current, amorphous ``good cause'' standard. Accordingly, the Department 
does not expect the proposed changes to increase the adjudication time 
for immigration court proceedings.
    The Department notes that the proposed changes may result in fewer 
continuances being granted; but, because such requests are inherently 
fact-specific, because there may be multiple reasons behind a 
continuance request, and because the Department does not granularly 
track multiple bases for a continuance, the Department cannot quantify 
precisely the expected decrease. Moreover, the denial of a continuance 
says little about the ultimate outcome of an alien's proceedings which 
depends on particular facts and an individual alien's eligibility for 
relief or protection, including relief that may be granted even after 
proceedings have concluded. Thus, the impact of the proposed rule on 
the outcomes of particular cases cannot be modeled with any degree of 
precision. Nevertheless, in general, the Department expects the 
proposed rule to result in fewer continuances which would enhance the 
efficiency of immigration proceedings in the aggregate, benefit aliens 
with valid claims who would otherwise have to wait longer to receive 
relief or protection, and vindicate the government and the public's 
interests in the prompt administration of justice. Similarly, a 
reduction in multiple, lengthy continuances may also provide some 
benefit to attorneys, particularly pro bono attorneys, who would not 
need to commit to representation for several years if the hearing 
process worked more efficiently. See, e.g., Human Rights First, The 
U.S. Immigration Court at 5 (``In a February 2016 survey conducted by 
Human Rights First of 24 pro bono coordinators at many of the nation's 
major law firms, nearly 75 percent of pro bono professionals indicated 
that delays at the immigration court are a significant or very 
significant negative factor in their ability to take on a pro bono case 
for legal representation before the court.''). Thus, for the reasons 
explained above, the expected costs of this proposed rule are likely to 
be de minimis, whereas the benefits to all parties, though not 
precisely quantifiable, are significant.

E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    This rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6 of 
Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule does not have 
sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a 
federalism summary impact statement.

F. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    This rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) 
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

G. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule does not propose new or revisions to existing 
``collection[s] of information'' as that term is defined under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 44 U.S.C. chapter 
35, and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320.

List of Subjects

8 CFR Part 1003

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, Legal 
Services, Organization and functions (Government agencies).

8 CFR Part 1240

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens.


[[Page 75940]]


    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, and by the 
authority vested in the Director, Executive Office for Immigration 
Review, by the Attorney General Order Number 4910-2020, the Department 
proposes to amend chapter V of title 8 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations

PART 1003--EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

    1. The authority citation for part 1003 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 6 U.S.C. 521; 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 
1154, 1155, 1158, 1182, 1226, 1229, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1231, 
1254a, 1255, 1324d, 1330, 1361, 1362; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 1746; sec. 
2 Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1950; 3 CFR, 19491953 Comp., p. 1002; section 
203 of Pub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2196-200; sections 1506 and 1510 
of Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1527-29, 1531-32; section 1505 of Pub. 
L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-326 to -328.


0
2. Revise Sec.  1003.29 to read as follows:


Sec.  1003.29  Continuances.

    (a) Subject to paragraph (b), the immigration judge may grant a 
motion for continuance for good cause shown, provided that nothing in 
this section shall authorize a continuance that causes the adjudication 
of an asylum application by an immigration judge to exceed 180 days in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances, consistent with section 
208(d)(5)(iii) of the Act and 8 CFR 1003.10(b).
    (b) (1) In general. Subject to paragraphs (2) through (6), good 
cause is shown when a movant demonstrates a particular and justifiable 
need for the continuance. To determine whether good cause has been 
established, an immigration judge should consider the following non-
exhaustive list of factors:
    (i) The amount of time the movant has had to prepare for the 
hearing and whether the movant has exercised due diligence to ensure 
preparedness for that hearing;
    (ii) The length and purpose of the requested continuance, including 
whether the reason for the requested continuance is dilatory or 
contrived;
    (iii) Whether the motion is opposedand the basis for the 
opposition, though the opponent does not bear the burden of 
demonstrating an absence or lack of good cause;
    (iv) Implications for administrative efficiency; and
    (v) Any other relevant factors for consideration.
    (2) Good cause not shown. (i) Good cause for a continuance is not 
shown when the continuance would not materially affect the outcome of 
removal proceedings or, for a continuance request based on a collateral 
matter, when the alien has not demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence a likelihood of obtaining relief on the collateral matter.
    (ii) A request for a continuance in order to seek parole, deferred 
action, or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by DHS does not 
demonstrate good cause.
    (iii) A request for a continuance that would cause an immigration 
court to exceed a statutory or regulatory adjudication deadline does 
not demonstrate good cause unless the request meets the standard of any 
statutory or regulatory exception to the deadline.
    (3) Continuances of removal proceedings related to collateral 
immigration applications. (i) Subject to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this 
section, a continuance request to allow an alien or a petitioner to 
apply for an immigrant visa or to wait for an immigrant visa for which 
the alien is the beneficiary to become available does not demonstrate 
good cause unless:
    (A) (1) The approval of the visa application or petition provides 
or would provide an immediately-available visa to the alien, or
    (2) The approval of the visa application or petition provides or 
would provide a visa to the alien with a priority date six months or 
less from the immediate action application date provided in the Visa 
Bulletin published by the Department of State for the month in which 
the continuance request is made;
    (B) The alien has demonstrated prima facie eligibility for the 
underlying visa and, if applicable, for adjustment of status and any 
necessary waiver(s) based on the approval of that visa, including 
establishing that the alien would warrant adjustment of status and any 
necessary waiver(s) as a matter of discretion; and
    (C) The immigration judge has jurisdiction over any application for 
adjustment of status, including any necessary waiver(s) in conjunction 
with that application, based on approval of the underlying visa.
    (ii) (A) For purposes of paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section, 
approval of a visa petition or application does not include interim 
relief, prima facie determinations, parole, deferred action, bona fide 
determinations or any similar dispositions short of final approval of 
the visa application or petition. The seeking of any of these 
dispositions or of any disposition short of final approval of the visa 
application or petition does not demonstrate good cause.
    (B) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section, an 
immigration judge may not grant a continuance to an alien in removal 
proceedings based on a visa application or petition based on a marriage 
entered into during any pending administrative or judicial proceedings 
regarding the alien's right to be admitted or remain in the United 
States, including during the pending removal proceedings, unless the 
alien establishes by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction 
of the immigration judge that the marriage was entered into in good 
faith and in accordance with the laws of the place where the marriage 
took place and the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of 
procuring the alien's admission as an immigrant and no fee or other 
consideration was given (other than a fee or other consideration to an 
attorney for assistance in preparation of a lawful petition) for the 
filing of the petition or application.
    (iii) Subject to paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of this section, a 
continuance request to apply for a non-immigrant visa or to wait for a 
non-immigrant visa to become available, including any applicable 
waiver, in removal proceedings does not demonstrate good cause unless
    (A) Receipt of the non-immigrant visa, including any applicable 
waiver, vitiates or would vitiate all grounds of removability with 
which the alien has been charged; and
    (B) The alien demonstrates that final approval of the visa 
application or petition and receipt of the actual visa, including 
approval and receipt of any applicable waiver, has occurred or will 
occur within six months of the request for a continuance.
    (iv) For purposes of paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of this section, the 
receipt of interim relief, prima facie determinations, parole, deferred 
action, bona fide determinations or any similar dispositions short of 
approval of the actual visa application or petition does not constitute 
receipt of the actual visa or evidence that the actual visa will be 
received within six months of the request for a continuance
    (v) An immigration judge may grant a continuance in removal 
proceedings to await the adjudication of a non-visa application by DHS 
over which DHS has initial jurisdiction in the following circumstances:
    (A) The alien has been found removable as charged;
    (B) The alien has established prima facie eligibility for the 
underlying benefit;

[[Page 75941]]

    (C) The alien has provided evidence that the application has been 
filed with DHS and remains pending with DHS;
    (D) DHS has initial jurisdiction over the application at issue even 
for an alien in immigration proceedings;
    (E) There are no other applications pending before the immigration 
judge; and
    (F) The non-approval of the application would transfer jurisdiction 
to the immigration judge to review and adjudicate the application.
    (4) Continuances related to an alien's representation. (i) Subject 
to paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section, an immigration judge is not 
required to grant a continuance to any alien in removal proceedings to 
secure representation if the time period described in section 239(b)(1) 
of the Act has elapsed and the alien has failed to secure counsel.
    (ii) In the immigration judge's discretion, an immigration judge 
may grant one continuance to an alien in removal proceedings to secure 
representation if the date of the alien's initial hearing occurs less 
than 30 days after the date the alien was served with a Notice to 
Appear and the alien demonstrates that the alien has been diligent in 
seeking representation since that date. Such a continuance shall be for 
a reasonable period of time but shall not exceed 30 days.
    (iii) Because representatives are presumed to take on no more cases 
than they can handle in accordance with professional responsibility 
obligations of diligence and competence, a representative's assertions 
about his or her workload or obligations in other cases do not 
constitute good cause.
    (iv) An immigration judge shall grant no more than one continuance 
in removal proceedings to an alien or his representative for 
preparation time, separate from the normal preparation time between 
hearings. Such a continuance may be granted solely for preparation 
prior to pleading to the allegations and charges in a Notice to Appear. 
Such continuance shall be granted for no more than 14 days.
    (v) A representative's scheduling conflict in another court that 
existed at the time the immigration judge scheduled the hearing in 
removal proceedings for which the representative seeks a continuance 
and that the representative did not disclose at the time the hearing 
was scheduled does not constitute good cause, unless the immigration 
judge scheduled the case outside of open court. An immigration judge 
may grant a continuance due to a representative's scheduling conflict 
in another court arising after the immigration hearing in removal 
proceedings was scheduled in open court, but only if it involves the 
court appointment of a representative to a case and the immigration 
judge was notified of the conflict in a timely manner. Such continuance 
shall be granted for no more than 14 days. A representative requesting 
a continuance of a hearing scheduled outside of open court due to a 
scheduling conflict in another court that existed at the time the 
immigration court hearing notice was issued must file a motion for a 
continuance with 14 days of the issuance of the immigration court 
hearing notice.
    (vi) Upon motion by a respondent in removal proceedings, an 
immigration judge may grant a continuance of no more than 14 days in a 
case in which the respondent's representative failed to appear for a 
scheduled hearing.
    (5) Continuances on an immigration judge's own motion. An 
immigration judge may not grant a continuance on his or her own motion, 
except in the following circumstances:
    (i) A continuance is required pursuant to Sec.  1003.47;
    (ii) There is evidence of serious illness of the alien or serious 
illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien;
    (iii) There is evidence of serious illness or death of the alien's 
representative or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or 
parent of the alien's representative;
    (iv) There is a serious illness of the immigration judge or serious 
illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the immigration 
judge;
    (v) The immigration judge is absent and no other immigration judge 
is available to preside over the hearing;
    (vi) There are technical difficulties with the immigration court's 
computer, recording system, or video teleconferencing system that 
prevent the case from being heard or recorded;
    (vii) The Department of Homeland Security or the Department of 
Health and Human Services fails to produce a detained alien for the 
hearing;
    (viii) An interpreter is necessary for the hearing and either an 
interpreter is unavailable or the interpreter present is unqualified;
    (ix) The record of proceedings is unavailable;
    (x) The respondent did not appear at a hearing because the 
respondent was detained by a law enforcement entity;
    (xi) The respondent did not appear at a hearing due to a deficient 
notice and service of a new notice of hearing can correct the 
deficiency;
    (xii) The immigration judge began a hearing but was unable to 
complete it due to no fault of the parties;
    (xiii) The court is closed at the time of the hearing; or
    (xiv) Unforeseen exceptional or extraordinary circumstances beyond 
the control of the alien, the alien's representative, government 
counsel, or the immigration judge require a continuance.
    (6) Continuances of merits hearings. A continuance of a merits 
hearing on an alien's application for relief or protection from removal 
or a merits hearing on a contested charge of removability prior to or 
on the date of the hearing is strongly disfavored. Such continuances 
should only be granted in circumstances otherwise listed in paragraphs 
(b)(4)(v), (vi), or, upon motion by either party, paragraph (b)(5) of 
this section, and should be granted for no more than 30 days.

PART 1240--PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE REMOVABILITY OF ALIENS IN THE 
UNITED STATES

    3. The authority for part 1240 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1182, 1186a, 1186b, 1225, 1226, 
1227, 1228, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1252 note, 1361, 1362; secs. 202 
and 203, Pub. L. 105-100 (111 Stat. 2160, 2193); sec. 902, Pub. L. 
105-277 (112 Stat. 2681).
    4. Revise Sec.  1240.6 to read as follows:


Sec.  1240.6  Postponement and adjournment of hearing.

    Adjournments in removal proceedings are governed by the provisions 
of 8 CFR 1003.29(b).
    5. Revise Sec.  1240.45 to read as follows:


Sec.  1240.45  Postponement and adjournment of hearing.

    Adjournments in deportation proceedings are governed by the 
provisions of 8 CFR 1003.29(b).

James R. McHenry III,
Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of 
Justice.
[FR Doc. 2020-25931 Filed 11-25-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-30-P