Workshop on GPS Jamming and Spoofing in the Maritime Environment, 75404-75405 [2020-26120]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 228 (Wednesday, November 25, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75404-75405]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-26120]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[DOT-OST-2020-0237]


Workshop on GPS Jamming and Spoofing in the Maritime Environment

AGENCY: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for 
Research and Technology (OST-R), U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT).

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

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SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to inform the public that DOT, 
through the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and 
Technology (OST-R) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), will host a 
workshop on Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming and spoofing in the 
maritime environment on December 3, 2020. The workshop will focus on:
     How positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) supports 
maritime applications;
     What happens when PNT is denied, disrupted, or manipulated 
in a maritime environment; and
     Options to reduce operational impact and increase PNT 
resiliency.
    This DOT Workshop will be held virtually and is open to the general 
public by registration only. For those who would like to attend the 
workshop, we request that you register no later than November 30, 2020. 
Please use the following link to register: https://volpe-events.webex.com/volpe-events/onstage/g.php?MTID=e8d794472bbf3089c77da9ac1c31efdc2.
    You must include:
     Name
     Organization
     Telephone number
     Mailing and email addresses
     Country of citizenship
    Several days before the workshop, an email containing the agenda, 
dial-in number, and WebEx information will be provided. DOT is 
committed to providing equal access to this workshop for all 
participants. If you need alternative formats or services because of a 
disability, please contact Elliott Baskerville (contact information 
listed below) with your request by the close of business on November 
27, 2020.
    Date and Time: December 3, 2020, from 1:00-5:00 p.m. (EST).
    Location: This workshop will be held virtually.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elliott Baskerville, Office of 
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing & Spectrum Management, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590, 202-366-
5284, [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

1. Overview

    Accurate and reliable PNT capabilities are essential for the safety 
for all modes of transportation and will become increasingly important 
for automated vessels. The primary and most recognizable PNT service 
supporting critical infrastructure is GPS. However, because GPS relies 
on signals broadcast from the satellite constellation, its signals are 
low power at the receiver and are thus vulnerable to intentional and 
unintentional disruption, such as jamming and spoofing. GPS ``jamming'' 
involves the use of a device to block or interfere with GPS signals; 
``spoofing'' is deceiving a GPS device through fake signals. Both 
phenomena undermine the reliability of GPS and may have adverse 
consequences for maritime safety and commerce.
    Jamming has long been a threat to GPS due to the weak signal power 
from the GPS satellites. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
military drills in the Baltic Sea last year, with 40,000 troops and all 
29 Nations participating, experienced GPS jamming. Spoofing was 
considered an unrealistic threat for many years because it is 
complicated to perform. However, high-profile demonstrations at the 
University of Texas that spoofed a drone and a sophisticated yacht 
brought spoofing into the public eye in 2012-2013, a little more than a 
decade after DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe 
Center) issued its report, ``Vulnerability Assessment of the 
Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning 
System'' (August 2001; available at: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/8435).
    A likely GPS spoofing attack occurred in the Black Sea in 2017, 
where over 20 ships erroneously reported their GPS positions as being 
inland at an airport. The number of separate vessels that reported the 
same false position and the characteristic jumping between the false 
and true position of the ships is strong evidence of a large-scale 
spoofing attack. More recently, incidents of GPS spoofing have been 
occurring around the world, particularly in maritime environments. The 
U.S. Government provides advisories of GPS interference through the 
Maritime Security Communications with Industry (MSCI) portal, at 
https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2020-016-various-gps-interference.
    Much of global trade is conducted by waterways, where ports are 
often congested and visibility is variable. In a maritime environment, 
GPS not only provides positioning information, but also provides inputs 
to speed, heading, steering, radar and target information, Electronic 
Chart Display Information System (ECDIS), Under Keel Clearance (UKC), 
and the Automatic Identification System (AIS). Being able to detect 
when spoofing is occurring is vital, since over 50% of all casualties 
at sea occur due to navigation issues. When GPS jamming and spoofing is 
detected, the goal is for ships to immediately switch to other 
navigation tools. It is therefore critical to use complementary PNT 
technologies to ensure PNT resiliency.
    Consistent with these concerns, on February 12, 2020, President 
Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13905, Strengthening National 
Resilience through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing Services. The goal is to foster the responsible use of PNT 
services by critical infrastructure owners and operators (including the 
transportation sector) to strengthen national resilience. E.O. 13905 
seeks to ensure that disruption or manipulation of PNT services does 
not undermine the reliability or efficiency of critical infrastructure 
by:
     Raising awareness of the extent to which critical 
infrastructure depends on PNT services;
     Ensuring that critical infrastructure can withstand 
disruption or manipulation of PNT services; and
     Engaging the public and private sectors to promote 
responsible use of PNT services.
    In accordance with Section 4(g) of E.O. 13905, DOT is conducting a 
pilot program to inform the development of the relevant PNT profile and 
research and development (R&D) opportunities. The DOT pilot program, 
led by OST-R and MARAD, is focused on addressing GPS jamming and 
spoofing impacts to maritime vessels through stakeholder engagement and 
evaluating complementary PNT technologies that can be adopted to 
mitigate the impacts during these threat scenarios. The DOT pilot 
program will be conducted through stakeholder engagement and evaluation 
of complementary PNT technologies that can be adopted to

[[Page 75405]]

mitigate the impacts during these threat scenarios.
    The purpose of the workshop, which is a key component of 
stakeholder engagement of the DOT pilot program, is to increase public 
awareness of real-world incidents of the GPS signal being jammed or 
spoofed in a maritime environment and to discuss potential options to 
detect this interference, as well as use of complementary PNT 
technologies to provide a resilient PNT capability in the maritime 
environment.

    Issued this 20th day of November, 2020, in Washington, DC.
Diana Furchtgott-Roth,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. Department 
of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2020-26120 Filed 11-24-20; 8:45 am]
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