Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for the 3DRobotics Government Services 3DR-GS H520-G, 74926-74931 [2020-25661]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 227 (Tuesday, November 24, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 74926-74931]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25661]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 21

[Docket No. FAA-2020-1083]


Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for 
the 3DRobotics Government Services 3DR-GS H520-G

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT

ACTION: Notice of proposed airworthiness criteria.

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SUMMARY: The FAA announces the availability of and requests comments on 
proposed airworthiness criteria for the 3DRobotics Government Services 
Model 3DR-GS H520-G unmanned aircraft system (UAS). This document 
proposes airworthiness criteria the FAA finds to be appropriate and 
applicable for the UAS design.

DATES: Send comments on or before December 24, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2020-1083 
using any of the following methods:
    [square] Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
    [square] Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    [square] Hand Delivery of Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building

[[Page 74927]]

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    [square] Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to https://regulations.gov, including any personal information 
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket 
website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments 
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual 
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can 
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477-19478), as well as at https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hieu Nguyen, AIR-692, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Policy and Innovation Division, Small Airplane 
Standards Branch, Aircraft Certification Service, 901 Locust, Room 301, 
Kansas City, MO 64106, telephone (816) 329-4123, facsimile (816) 329-
4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested people to take part in the development 
of these airworthiness criteria by sending written comments, data, or 
views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the 
airworthiness criteria, explain the reason for any recommended change, 
and include supporting data. Comments on operational, pilot 
certification, and maintenance requirements would address issues that 
are beyond the scope of this document.
    Except for Confidential Business Information as described in the 
following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will file in the docket all comments received, as well 
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA 
personnel concerning these proposed airworthiness criteria. Before 
acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all comments received on 
or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments 
filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring delay. The FAA 
may change these airworthiness criteria based on received comments.

Confidential Business Information

    Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial 
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by 
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), 
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to 
this NPRM contain commercial or financial information that is 
customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and 
that is relevant or responsive to this notice, it is important that you 
clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page 
of your submission containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat 
such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will 
not be placed in the public docket of this notice. Submissions 
containing CBI should be sent to the individual listed under FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Any commentary that the FAA receives which 
is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public 
docket for this notice.

Background

    3DRobotics Government Services (3DR) applied to the FAA on May 1, 
2019, for a special class type certificate under Title 14, Code of 
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17(b) for the Model 3DR-GS H520-G UAS.
    The Model 3DR-GS H520-G consists of an unmanned aircraft (UA) and 
its associated elements that include communication links and the 
components that control the UA. The Model 3DR-GS H520-G UA has a 
maximum gross takeoff weight of 5 pounds. It is approximately 20 inches 
in width, 18 inches in length, and 12 inches in height. The Model 3DR-
GS H520-G UA is battery powered using electric motors for vertical 
takeoff, landing, and forward flight. The UAS may be manually operated 
or may rely on high levels of automation. The UAS may include multiple 
UA operated by a single pilot, up to a ratio of 20 UA to 1 pilot. 3DR 
anticipates operators will use the Model 3DR-GS H520-G for inspection 
or surveying of critical infrastructure. The proposed concept of 
operations for the Model 3DR-GS H520-G identifies a maximum operating 
altitude of 400 feet above ground level, a maximum cruise speed of 33 
knots (38 mph), operations within visual line of sight of the pilot, 
operations at night, and operations in sparsely populated areas. 3DR 
has not requested type certification for flight into known icing for 
the Model 3DR-GS H520-G.

Discussion

    The FAA establishes airworthiness criteria to ensure the safe 
operation of aircraft in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 44701(a) and 44704. 
UAS are type certificated by the FAA as special class aircraft for 
which airworthiness standards have not been established by regulation. 
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17(b), the airworthiness standards 
for special class aircraft are those the FAA finds to be appropriate 
and applicable to the specific type design.
    The applicant has proposed a design with constraints upon its 
operations and an unusual design characteristic: The pilot is remotely 
located. The FAA developed existing airworthiness standards to 
establish an appropriate level of safety for each product and its 
intended use. The FAA's existing airworthiness standards did not 
envision aircraft with no pilot in the cockpit and the technologies 
associated with that capability.
    The FAA has reviewed the proposed design and assessed the potential 
risk to the National Airspace System. The FAA considered the size of 
the proposed aircraft, its maximum airspeed and altitude, and 
operational limitations to address the number of unmanned aircraft per 
operator and to address operations in which the aircraft would operate 
beyond the visual line of sight of the pilot. These factors allowed the 
FAA to assess the potential risk the aircraft could pose to other 
aircraft and to human beings on the ground. Using these parameters, the 
FAA developed airworthiness criteria to address those potential risks 
to ensure the aircraft remains reliable, controllable, safe, and 
airworthy.
    The proposed criteria focus on mitigating hazards by establishing 
safety outcomes that must be achieved, rather than by establishing 
prescriptive requirements that must be met. This is in contrast to many 
current airworthiness standards, used to certificate traditional 
aircraft systems, which prescribe specific indicators and instruments 
for a pilot in a cockpit that would be inappropriate for UAS. The FAA 
finds that the proposed criteria are appropriate and applicable for the 
UAS design, based on the intended operational concepts for the UAS as 
identified by the applicant.
    The FAA selected the particular airworthiness criteria proposed by 
this notice for the following reasons:

[[Page 74928]]

    General: In order to determine appropriate and applicable 
airworthiness standards for UAS as a special class of aircraft, the FAA 
determined that the applicant must provide information describing the 
characteristics and capabilities of the UAS and how it will be used.
    UAS.001 Concept of Operations: To assist the FAA in identifying and 
analyzing the risks and impacts associated with integrating the 
proposed UAS design into the National Airspace System, the applicant 
would be required to submit a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The 
proposed criteria would require the applicant's CONOPS to identify the 
intended operational concepts for the UAS and describe the UAS and its 
operation. The information in the CONOPS would determine parameters and 
extent of testing, as well as operating limitations that will be placed 
in the UAS Flight Manual.
    Design and Construction: The FAA selected the design and 
construction criteria in this section to address airworthiness 
requirements where the flight testing demonstration alone may not be 
sufficient to demonstrate an appropriate level of safety.
    UAS.100 Control Station: The control station, which is located 
separately from the UA, is a unique feature to UAS. As a result, no 
regulatory airworthiness standards exist that directly apply to this 
part of the system. The FAA based some of the proposed criteria on 
existing regulations that address the information that must be provided 
to a pilot in the cockpit of a manned aircraft, and modified them as 
appropriate to this UAS. Thus, to address the risks associated with 
loss of control of the UAS, the applicant would be required to design 
the control station to provide the pilot with the information necessary 
for continued safe flight and operation. The proposed criteria contain 
the specific minimum types of information the FAA finds are necessary 
for this requirement; however, the applicant must determine whether 
additional parameters are necessary.
    UAS.110 Software: Software for manned aircraft is certified under 
the regulations applicable to systems, equipment, and installations 
(e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2510, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309). There are two 
regulations that specifically prescribe airworthiness standards for 
software: Engine airworthiness standards (Sec.  33.28) and propeller 
airworthiness standards (Sec.  35.23). The proposed UAS software 
criteria was based on these regulations and tailored for the risks 
posed by UAS software.
    UAS.115 Cyber Security: The location of the pilot separate from the 
UA requires a continuous wireless connection (command and control link) 
with the UA for the pilot to monitor and control it. Because the 
purpose of this link is to control the aircraft, this makes the UAS 
susceptible to cyber security threats in a unique way.
    The current regulations for the certification of systems, 
equipment, and installations (e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2510, 25.1309, 
27.1309, and 29.1309) do not adequately address potential security 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by unauthorized access to 
aircraft systems, data buses, and services. For manned aircraft, the 
FAA therefore issues special conditions for particular designs with 
network security vulnerabilities.
    To address the risks to the UAS associated with intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions, the applicant would be required 
to design the UAS's systems and networks to protect against intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions and mitigate potential adverse 
effects. The FAA based the language for the proposed criteria on 
recommendations in the final report dated August 22, 2016, from the 
Aircraft System Information Security/Protection (ASISP) working group, 
under the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Although the 
recommendations pertained to manned aircraft, the FAA has reviewed the 
report and determined the recommendations are also appropriate for UAS. 
The wireless connections used by UAS make these aircraft susceptible to 
the same cyber security risks, and therefore require similar criteria, 
as manned aircraft.
    UAS.120 Contingency Planning: The location of the pilot and the 
controls for the UAS, separate from the UA, is a unique feature to UAS. 
As a result, no regulatory airworthiness standards exist that directly 
apply to this feature of the system.
    To address the risks associated with loss of communication between 
the pilot and the UA, and thus the pilot's inability to control the UA, 
the proposed criteria would require that the UAS be designed to 
automatically execute a predetermined action. Because the pilot needs 
to be aware of the particular predetermined action the UA will take 
when there is a loss of communication between the pilot and the UA, the 
proposed criteria would require that the applicant identify the 
predetermined action in the UAS Flight Manual. The proposed criteria 
would also include requirements for preventing takeoff when quality of 
service is inadequate.
    UAS.125 Lightning: Because of the size and physical limitations of 
this UAS, it would be unlikely that this UAS would incorporate 
traditional lightning protection features. To address the risks that 
would result from a lightning strike, the proposed criteria would 
require an operating limitation in the UAS Flight Manual that prohibits 
flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning. The proposed 
criteria would also allow design characteristics to protect the UAS 
from lightning as an alternative to the prohibition.
    UAS.130 Adverse Weather Conditions: Because of the size and 
physical limitations of this UAS, adverse weather such as rain, snow, 
and icing pose a greater hazard to the UAS than to manned aircraft. For 
the same reason, it would be unlikely that this UAS would incorporate 
traditional protection features from icing. The FAA based the proposed 
criteria on the icing requirements in 14 CFR 23.2165(b) and (c), and 
applied them to all of these adverse weather conditions. The proposed 
criteria would allow design characteristics to protect the UAS from 
adverse weather conditions. As an alternative, the proposed criteria 
would require an operating limitation in the UAS Flight Manual that 
prohibits flight into known adverse weather conditions, and either also 
prevent inadvertent flight into adverse weather or provide a means to 
detect and to avoid or exit adverse weather conditions.
    UAS.135 Critical Parts: The proposed criteria for critical parts 
are substantively the same as that in Sec.  27.602, with changes to 
reflect UAS terminology and failure condition.
    Operating Limitations and Information: Similar to manned aircraft, 
the FAA determined that the UAS applicant must provide airworthiness 
instructions, operating limitations, and flight and performance 
information necessary for the safe operation and continued operational 
safety of the UAS.
    UAS.200 Flight Manual: The proposed criteria for the UAS Flight 
Manual are substantively the same as that in Sec.  23.2620, with minor 
changes to reflect UAS terminology.
    UAS.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: The proposed 
criteria for the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) are 
substantively the same as that in Sec.  23.1529, with minor changes to 
reflect UAS terminology.
    Testing: Traditional certification methodologies for manned 
aircraft are based on design requirements verified at

[[Page 74929]]

the component level by inspection, analysis, demonstration, or test. 
Due to the difference in size and complexity, the FAA determined 
testing methodologies that demonstrate reliability at the aircraft 
(UAS) level, in addition to the design and construction criteria 
identified in this proposal, will achieve the same safety objective. 
The proposed testing criteria in sections UAS.300 through UAS.320 
utilize these methodologies.
    UAS.300 Durability and Reliability: The FAA intends the proposed 
testing criteria in this section to cover key design aspects and 
prevent unsafe features at an appropriate level tailored for this UAS. 
The proposed durability and reliability testing would require the 
applicant to demonstrate safe flight of the UAS across the entire 
operational envelope and up to all operational limitations, for all 
phases of flight and all aircraft configurations. The UAS would only be 
certificated for operations within the limitations, and for flight over 
the maximum population density, as demonstrated by test. The proposed 
criteria would require that all flights during the testing be completed 
with no failures that result in a loss of flight, loss of control, loss 
of containment, or emergency landing outside of the operator's recovery 
zone.
    For some aircraft design requirements imposed by existing 
airworthiness standards (e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2135, 23.2600, 25.105, 
25.125, 27.141, 27.173, 29.51, 29.177) the aircraft must not require 
exceptional piloting skill or alertness. These rules recognize that 
pilots have varying levels of ability and attention. In a similar 
manner, the proposed criteria would require that the durability and 
reliability flight testing be performed by a pilot with average skill 
and alertness.
    Flight testing will be used to determine the aircraft's ability to 
withstand flight loads across the range of operating limits and the 
flight envelope. Because small UAS may be subjected to significant 
ground loads when handled, lifted, carried, loaded, maintained, and 
transported physically by hand, the proposed criteria would require 
that the aircraft used for testing endure the same worst-case ground 
loads as those the UAS will experience in operation after type 
certification.
    UAS.305 Probable Failures: The FAA intends the proposed testing 
criteria to evaluate how the UAS functions after failures that are 
probable to occur. The applicant will test the UAS by inducing certain 
failures and demonstrating that the failure will not result in a loss 
of containment or control of the UA. The proposed criteria contain the 
minimum types of failures the FAA finds are probable; however, the 
applicant must determine the probable failures related to any other 
equipment that will be addressed for this requirement.
    UAS.310 Capabilities and Functions: The proposed criteria for this 
section address the minimum capabilities and functions the FAA finds 
are necessary in the design of the UAS and would require the applicant 
to demonstrate these capabilities and functions by test. Due to the 
location of the pilot and the controls for UAS, separate from the UA, 
communication between the pilot and the UA is significant to the 
design. Thus, the proposed criteria would require the applicant to 
demonstrate the capability of the UAS to regain command and control 
after a loss. As with manned aircraft, the electrical system of the UAS 
must have a capacity sufficient for all anticipated loads; the proposed 
criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate this by test.
    The proposed criteria contain functions that would allow the pilot 
to command the UA to deviate from its flight plan or from its pre-
programmed flight path. For example, in the event the pilot needs to 
deconflict the airspace, the UA must be able to respond to pilot inputs 
that override any pre-programming.
    In the event an applicant requests approval for certain features, 
such as geo-fencing or external cargo, the proposed criteria contain 
requirements to address the associated risks. The proposed criteria in 
this section would also require design of the UAS to safeguard against 
an unintended discontinuation of flight or release of cargo, whether by 
human action or malfunction.
    UAS.315 Fatigue: The FAA intends the proposed criteria in this 
section to address the risks from reduced structural integrity and 
structural failure due to fatigue. The proposed criteria would require 
the applicant to establish an airframe life limit and demonstrate that 
loss of flight or loss of control due to structural failure will be 
avoided throughout the operational life of the UA. These proposed 
criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate this by test, while 
maintaining the UA in accordance with the ICA.
    UAS.320 Verification of Limits: This section would evaluate 
structural safety and address the risks associated with inadequate 
structural design. While the proposed criteria in UAS.300 address 
testing to demonstrate that the UAS structure adequately supports 
expected loads throughout the flight and operational envelopes, the 
proposed criteria in this section would require an evaluation of the 
performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA with a 
factor of safety.

Proposed Airworthiness Criteria

    The FAA proposes to establish the following airworthiness criteria 
for type certification of the 3DR Model H520-G. The FAA proposes that 
compliance with the following would mitigate the risks associated with 
the proposed design and Concept of Operations appropriately and would 
provide an equivalent level of safety to existing rules:

General

UAS.001 Concept of Operations

    The applicant must define and submit to the FAA a concept of 
operations (CONOPS) proposal describing the Unmanned Aircraft System 
(UAS) operation in the National Airspace System for which certification 
is requested. The CONOPS proposal must include, at a minimum, a 
description of the following information.
    (a) The intended type of operations;
    (b) Unmanned aircraft (UA) specifications;
    (c) Meteorological conditions;
    (d) Operators, pilots, and personnel responsibilities;
    (e) Control station and support equipment;
    (f) Command, control, and communication functions; and
    (g) Operational parameters, such as population density, geographic 
operating boundaries, airspace classes, launch and recovery area, 
congestion of proposed operating area, communications with air traffic 
control, line of sight, and aircraft separation.

Design and Construction

UAS.100 Control Station

    The control station must be designed to provide the pilot with all 
information required for continued safe flight and operation. This 
information includes, at a minimum, the following:
    (a) Alerts, such as an alert following the loss of the command and 
control (C2) link and function.
    (b) The status of all critical parameters for all energy storage 
systems.
    (c) The status of all critical parameters for all propulsion 
systems.
    (d) Flight and navigation information as appropriate, such as 
airspeed, heading, altitude, and location.
    (e) C2 link signal strength, quality, or status.

UAS.110 Software

    To minimize the existence of errors, the applicant must:

[[Page 74930]]

    (a) Verify by test all software that may impact the safe operation 
of the UAS;
    (b) Utilize a configuration management system that tracks, 
controls, and preserves changes made to software throughout the entire 
life cycle; and
    (c) Implement a problem reporting system that captures and records 
defects and modifications to the software.

UAS.115 Cyber Security

    (a) UAS equipment, systems, and networks, addressed separately and 
in relation to other systems, must be protected from intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions that may result in an adverse 
effect on the security or airworthiness of the UAS. Protection must be 
ensured by showing that the security risks have been identified, 
assessed, and mitigated as necessary.
    (b) When required by paragraph (a) of this section, procedures and 
instructions to ensure security protections are maintained must be 
included in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA).

AS.120 Contingency Planning

    (a) The UAS must be designed so that, in the event of a loss of the 
C2 link, the UA will automatically and immediately execute a safe 
predetermined flight, loiter, landing, or termination.
    (b) The applicant must establish the predetermined action in the 
event of a loss of the C2 link and include it in the UAS Flight Manual.
    (c) The UAS Flight Manual must include the minimum performance 
requirements for the C2 data link defining when the C2 link is degraded 
to a level where remote active control of the UA is no longer ensured. 
Takeoff when the C2 link is degraded below the minimum link performance 
requirements must be prevented by design or prohibited by an operating 
limitation in the UAS Flight Manual.

UAS.125 Lightning

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the UAS 
must have design characteristics that will protect the UAS from loss of 
flight or loss of control due to lightning.
    (b) If the UAS has not been shown to protect against lightning, the 
UAS Flight Manual must include an operating limitation to prohibit 
flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning activity.

UAS.130 Adverse Weather Conditions

    (a) For purposes of this section, ``adverse weather conditions'' 
means rain, snow, and icing.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the UAS 
must have design characteristics that will allow the UAS to operate 
within the adverse weather conditions specified in the CONOPS without 
loss of flight or loss of control.
    (c) For adverse weather conditions for which the UAS is not 
approved to operate, the applicant must develop operating limitations 
to prohibit flight into known adverse weather conditions and either:
    (1) Develop operating limitations to prevent inadvertent flight 
into adverse weather conditions; or
    (2) Provide a means to detect any adverse weather conditions for 
which the UAS is not certificated to operate and show the UAS's ability 
to avoid or exit those conditions.

UAS.135 Critical Parts

    (a) A critical part is a part, the failure of which could result in 
a loss of flight or unrecoverable loss of UAS control.
    (b) If the type design includes critical parts, the applicant must 
establish a critical parts list. The applicant must develop and define 
mandatory maintenance instructions or life limits, or a combination of 
both, to prevent failures of critical parts. Each of these mandatory 
actions must be included in the Airworthiness Limitations Section of 
the ICA.

Operating Limitations and Information

UAS.200 Flight Manual

    The applicant must provide a UAS Flight Manual with each UAS.
    (a) The UAS Flight Manual must contain the following information:
    (1) UAS operating limitations;
    (2) UAS normal and emergency operating procedures;
    (3) Performance information;
    (4) Loading information; and
    (5) Other information that is necessary for safe operation because 
of design, operating, or handling characteristics.
    (b) Those portions of the UAS Flight Manual containing the 
information specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section 
must be approved by the FAA.

UAS.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

    The applicant must prepare ICA for the UAS in accordance with 
Appendix A to Part 23, as appropriate, that are acceptable to the FAA. 
The ICA may be incomplete at type certification if a program exists to 
ensure their completion prior to delivery of the first UAS or issuance 
of a standard airworthiness certificate, whichever occurs later.

Testing

UAS.300 Durability and Reliability

    The UAS must be designed to be durable and reliable commensurate to 
the maximum population density specified in the operating limitations. 
The durability and reliability must be demonstrated by flight test in 
accordance with the requirements of this section and completed with no 
failures that result in a loss of flight, loss of control, loss of 
containment, or emergency landing outside the operator's recovery area.
    (a) Once a UAS has begun testing to show compliance with this 
section, all flights for that UA must be included in the flight test 
report.
    (b) Tests must include an evaluation of the entire flight envelope 
across all phases of operation and must address, at a minimum, the 
following:
    (1) Flight distances;
    (2) Flight durations;
    (3) Route complexity;
    (4) Weight;
    (5) Center of gravity;
    (6) Density altitude;
    (7) Outside air temperature;
    (8) Airspeed;
    (9) Wind;
    (10) Weather;
    (11) Operation at night, if requested;
    (12) Energy storage system capacity; and
    (13) Aircraft to pilot ratio.
    (c) Tests must include the most adverse combinations of the 
conditions and configurations in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (d) Tests must show a distribution of the different flight profiles 
and routes representative of the type of operations identified in the 
CONOPS.
    (e) Tests must be conducted in conditions consistent with the 
expected environmental conditions identified in the CONOPS, including 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) and High Intensity Radiated Fields 
(HIRF).
    (f) Tests must not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.
    (g) Any UAS used for testing must be subject to the same worst-case 
ground handling, shipping, and transportation loads as those allowed in 
service.
    (h) Any UAS used for testing must be maintained and operated in 
accordance with the ICA and UAS Flight Manual. No maintenance beyond 
the intervals established in the ICA will be allowed to show compliance 
with this section.
    (i) If cargo operations or external-load operations are requested, 
tests must show, throughout the flight envelope and with the cargo or 
external-load at the most critical combinations of weight and center of 
gravity, that--

[[Page 74931]]

    (1) the UA is safely controllable and maneuverable; and
    (2) the cargo or external-load are retainable and transportable.

UAS.305 Probable Failures

    The UAS must be designed such that a probable failure will not 
result in a loss of containment or control of the UA. This must be 
demonstrated by test.
    (a) Probable failures related to the following equipment, at a 
minimum, must be addressed.
    (1) Propulsion systems;
    (2) C2 link;
    (3) Global Positioning System (GPS);
    (4) Critical flight control components with a single point of 
failure;
    (5) Control station; and
    (6) Any other equipment identified by the applicant.
    (b) Any UAS used for testing must be operated in accordance with 
the UAS Flight Manual.
    (c) Each test must occur at the critical phase and mode of flight, 
and at the highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio.

UAS.310 Capabilities and Functions

    (a) All of the following required UAS capabilities and functions 
must be demonstrated by test:
    (1) Capability to regain command and control of the UA after the C2 
link has been lost.
    (2) Capability of the electrical system to power all UA systems and 
payloads.
    (3) Ability for the pilot to safely discontinue the flight.
    (4) Ability for the pilot to dynamically re-route the UA.
    (5) Ability to safely abort a takeoff.
    (6) Ability to safely abort a landing and initiate a go-around.
    (b) The following UAS capabilities and functions, if requested for 
approval, must be demonstrated by test:
    (1) Continued flight after degradation of the propulsion system.
    (2) Geo-fencing that contains the UA within a designated area, in 
all operating conditions.
    (3) Positive transfer of the UA between control stations that 
ensures only one control station can control the UA at a time.
    (4) Capability to release an external cargo load to prevent loss of 
control of the UA.
    (5) Capability to detect and avoid other aircraft and obstacles.
    (c) The UAS must be designed to safeguard against inadvertent 
discontinuation of the flight and inadvertent release of cargo or 
external-load.

UAS.315 Fatigue

    The structure of the UA must be shown to be able to withstand the 
repeated loads expected during its service life without failure. A life 
limit for the airframe must be established, demonstrated by test, and 
included in the ICA.

UAS.320 Verification of Limits

    The performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA 
within the flight envelope described in the UAS Flight Manual must be 
demonstrated at a minimum of 5% over maximum gross weight with no loss 
of control or loss of flight.

    Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on November 16, 2020.
Patrick R. Mullen,
Manager, Small Airplane Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-25661 Filed 11-23-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P