Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. Decision and Order, 73786-73804 [2020-25528]
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Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick
Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27,616,
27,617 (1978).
This rule derives from the text of two
provisions of the CSA. First, Congress
defined the term ‘‘practitioner’’ to mean
‘‘a physician . . . or other person
licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in
which he practices . . . , to distribute,
dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a
practitioner’s registration, Congress
directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has
clearly mandated that a practitioner
possess state authority in order to be
deemed a practitioner under the CSA,
the DEA has held repeatedly that
revocation of a practitioner’s registration
is the appropriate sanction whenever he
is no longer authorized to dispense
controlled substances under the laws of
the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, 76 FR at 71,371–72;
Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR
39,130, 39,131 (2006); Dominick A.
Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51,104, 51,105 (1993);
Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11,919, 11,920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR
at 27,617.
Pursuant to the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, a ‘‘‘[p]ractitioner’
means a physician licensed to practice
medicine in all its branches . . . or
other person licensed, registered, or
otherwise lawfully permitted by the
United States or this State to distribute,
dispense, conduct research with respect
to, administer or use in teaching or
chemical analysis, a controlled
substance in the course of professional
practice or research.’’ 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 570/102(kk) (West). Illinois
law requires that ‘‘[e]very person who
manufactures, distributes, or dispenses
any controlled substances . . . . must
obtain a registration issued by the
Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation in accordance
with its rules.’’ Id. at 570/302(a).
Further, under Illinois law, the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act
authorizes the IDFPR to discipline a
practitioner holding a controlled
substance license. ‘‘A registration under
Section 303 to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense a controlled substance . . .
may be denied, refused renewal,
suspended, or revoked by the
Department of Financial and
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Professional Regulation.’’ Id. at 570/
304(a).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the
record is that Registrant currently lacks
authority to handle controlled
substances in Illinois, as his controlled
substance license is ‘‘inoperative.’’ As
already discussed, a practitioner must
hold a valid controlled substance
license to dispense a controlled
substance in Illinois. Thus, because
Registrant lacks authority to handle
controlled substances in Illinois,
Registrant is not eligible to maintain a
DEA registration. Accordingly, I order
that Registrant’s DEA registration be
revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate
of Registration No. AS2410075 issued to
Verne A. Schwager, M.D. Further,
pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(f), I hereby deny any pending
application of Verne A. Schwager, M.D.
to renew or modify this registration, as
well as any pending application of
Verne A. Schwager, M.D. for registration
in Illinois. This Order is effective
December 21, 2020.
Timothy J. Shea,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2020–25523 Filed 11–18–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. Decision and
Order
On March 5, 2018, a former Acting
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (hereinafter, DEA or
Government), issued an Order to Show
Cause and Immediate Suspension of
Registration (hereinafter, collectively
OSC) to Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D.,
(hereinafter, Respondent).
Administrative Law Judge Exhibit
(hereinafter, ALJX) 1 (Order to Show
Cause), at 1. The OSC informed
Respondent of the immediate
suspension of her Certificate of
Registration No. FG0560765 pursuant to
21 U.S.C. 824(d), because her continued
registration constituted an imminent
danger to the public health and safety.
Id. The OSC also proposed the
revocation of Respondent’s Certificate of
Registration (hereinafter, registration)
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4),
‘‘because [her] continued registration is
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inconsistent with the public interest
. . . .’’ Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f)).
I. Procedural History
Specifically, the OSC alleged that
Respondent ‘‘prescribed controlled
substances to [two] DEA confidential
source[s], Patient Y.H. [and Patient
L.G.], that [she] knew or should have
known were not for a legitimate medical
purpose, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)
and 842(a), 21 CFR 1306.04(a), and Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013.’’ OSC, at 2;
see also id. at 6. The OSC alleged that
Respondent ‘‘[was] aware that at least a
portion of the controlled substances [she
was] prescribing to Y.H. [and to L.G.]
were being sold, given to third parties,
or otherwise diverted, because Y.H. [and
L.G.] told [her] so.’’ OSC, at 2; see also
id. at 6. Additionally, the OSC alleged
that Respondent ‘‘had been falsifying
[her] medical records.’’ Id. at 9. The
OSC alleged that Respondent’s
‘‘falsification of the[ ] records violated
state law, see Fla. Stat. § 458.331(1)(m),
and further demonstrate[d] that
[Respondent] issued prescriptions for
controlled substances to Patients Y.H.
and L.G. outside the usual course of
professional practice and that these
prescriptions were beneath the standard
of care for the State of Florida, violating
both 21 CFR [1306.04(a) 1] and Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013.’’ Id.
On March 5, 2018, the former Acting
Administrator made a preliminary
finding ‘‘that [Respondent had] issued
prescriptions for controlled substances
that [she] knew were without a
legitimate medical purpose and outside
the usual course of professional
practice, which is inconsistent with the
public interest . . . .’’ Id. And that ‘‘in
light of the rampant and deadly problem
of prescription controlled substance
abuse, that [Respondent’s] continued
registration . . . would constitute an
imminent danger to the public health or
safety because of the substantial
likelihood that [she would] continue to
unlawfully prescribe controlled
substances, thereby allowing the
diversion of controlled substances
unless [her] DEA [registration was]
suspended.’’ Id. The former Acting
Administrator concluded that
Respondent’s ‘‘continued registration
. . . [would] constitute[ ] an imminent
danger to the public health and safety.’’
Id.
1 The citation to 21 CFR 1604(a) throughout the
OSC appears to be a typographical error (as no such
regulation exists). It is clear from the surrounding
text, that where the government typed 21 CFR
1604(a), it was referring to 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The
Government also specifically notified Respondent
that was alleging violations of 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
OSC, at 2.
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Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(f) and 21
CFR 1301.36(f), the former Acting
Administrator authorized DEA Special
Agents (hereinafter, SA) and Diversion
Investigators (hereinafter, DI) serving
the OSC on Respondent to place under
seal or to remove for safekeeping all
controlled substances that Respondent
possessed pursuant to the suspended
registration. Id. The former Acting
Administrator also directed those
employees to take possession of
Respondent’s registration No.
FG0560765 and any unused
prescription forms. Id.
The OSC notified Respondent of the
right to either request a hearing on the
allegations or submit a written
statement in lieu of exercising the right
to a hearing, the procedures for electing
each option, and the consequences for
failing to elect either option. Id. at 10
(citing 21 CFR 1301.43). According to
the Government’s Notice of Service, a
member of the DEA Miami Field
Division personally served the OSC on
Respondent on March 7, 2018. ALJX 2
(Government’s Notice of Service of
OSC), at 1.
By letter dated April 3, 2018,
Respondent timely requested a hearing.
ALJX 3 (Request for a Hearing), at 1. The
matter was placed on the docket of the
Office of Administrative Law Judges and
assigned to Administrative Law Judge
Charles Wm. Dorman (hereinafter, the
ALJ). On April 6, 2018, the ALJ
established a schedule for the filing of
prehearing statements. ALJX 4 (Order
for Prehearing Statements), at 1. The
Government filed its prehearing
statement on April 20, 2018. ALJX 6
(Government’s Prehearing Statement), at
1. After requesting and receiving
additional time, Respondent filed her
Prehearing Statement on May 31, 2018.
See ALJX 7 (Unopposed Motion for
Extension of Time to File Prehearing
Statement), ALJX 8 (Order Granting
Respondent’s Motion for Extension of
Time to File Prehearing Statement), and
ALJX 9 (Respondent’s Prehearing
Statement). Thereafter, the ALJ issued
an Order denying Respondent’s motion
requesting discovery on the grounds
that Respondent failed to establish that
the documents she sought were
relevant, material, and that the denial of
access to the documents was
prejudicial. ALJX 18 (Order Denying
Respondent’s Motion to Compel
Discovery), at 4; see also ALJX 12
(Motion to Compel Discovery or in the
Alternative Issuance of Subpoena), and
ALJX 15 (Government’s Response in
Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to
Compel and Government’s Motion to
Quash Subpoena).
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On June 6, 2018, the ALJ issued a
Prehearing Ruling that, among other
things, set out 18 agreed upon
stipulations and established schedules
for the filing of additional joint
stipulations and for the hearing. ALJX
11 (Prehearing Ruling), at 3. Joint
Stipulations were filed on June 19,
2018, and on June 26, 2018, the
Respondent proposed additional
Stipulations to which the Government
had no objection. See ALJX 16 (Joint
Stipulations) and ALJX 19 (Additional
Stipulations Proposed by Respondent).
The hearing in this matter took place in
Miami, Florida and spanned three days.
See generally Transcript of Proceedings
in the Matter of Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D.
(hereinafter, Tr.). Both parties filed
posthearing briefs. See ALJX 27
(Government’s Posthearing Brief) and
ALJX 28 (Respondent’s Posthearing
Brief). The ALJ’s Recommended
Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decision (hereinafter, RD) is
dated August 31, 2018. Neither party
filed exceptions to the RD. Transmittal
Letter, at 2. I have reviewed and agree
with the procedural rulings of the ALJ
during the administration of the
hearing.
Having considered the record in its
entirety, I agree with the RD that the
record established, by substantial
evidence, that Respondent’s ‘‘continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest because of her improper
prescribing and falsification of medical
records.’’ RD, at 106. I further agree with
the RD that Respondent’s ‘‘failure to
acknowledge any wrongdoing
whatsoever’’ and her ‘‘fabrication of
documentation to cover her tracks’’
shows that she ‘‘cannot be entrusted
with the ability to continue prescribing
controlled substances.’’ Id. Moreover, I
agree with the RD that revocation is the
appropriate sanction. Id. I make the
following findings of fact.
II. Findings of Fact
A. DEA Registration
The parties stipulated that
Respondent is registered with DEA to
handle controlled substances in
schedules II through V under DEA
Certificate of Registration No.
FG0560765, at 951 North East 167th
Street, North Miami Beach, Florida
33162. ALJX 11, at 1; Tr. 9; and GX 1
(Controlled Substance Registration
Certificate). This registration expired on
September 30, 2019.2 GX 1.
2 The
fact that a registrant allows his registration
to expire during the pendency of an OSC does not
impact my jurisdiction or prerogative under the
Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA) to
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B. The Investigation
DEA opened its investigation into
Respondent after receiving information
from the North Miami Beach Police
Department that it had responded to
Respondent’s office several times due to
‘‘altercations between the staff at the
office and patients . . . [which]
appeared to be over prescriptions for
oxycodone.’’ Tr. 28.
DEA used two confidential sources
(hereinafter, CS), Y.H. and L.G., when
conducting the investigation into
Respondent. Tr. 28, 150. A DEA SA was
the DEA handler for the two
confidential sources. Tr. 150. SA would
coordinate the undercover operation,
meet with the confidential sources, give
them direction as to what DEA wanted
them to say or do, and provide them
with electronic recording devices used
to record audio and video of the
interaction between the sources and
Respondent. Tr. 151. After the
undercover operation was finished, SA
would obtain the recording devices from
the confidential sources, download the
information recorded to a DVD, and
place the DVD into evidence. Tr. 151–
53. SA would also provide a copy of the
DVD to a DEA contractor, who would
transcribe the DVD. Tr. 154. Thereafter,
SA would compare the transcript to the
recording for quality control and to
make sure the transcript was accurate.
Tr. 154–56, 163.
In November 2017, DEA executed a
search warrant on Practice Fusion, an
electronic medical record software
company, to obtain Respondent’s
patient files. Tr. 29–30. DEA compared
the obtained patient files for Y.H. and
L.G. with the recordings made by Y.H.
and L.G. and determined that there were
inaccuracies in the medical records. Tr.
30. Thereafter, DEA retained a medical
expert to review the patient files and
recorded videos. Id.
C. Government’s Case
The Government’s documentary
evidence consists primarily of video
recordings 3 and transcripts of two
confidential sources’ visits with
Respondent, and prescription records
for the two confidential sources. See GX
1–19, 22. Additionally, the Government
called five witnesses: A DI, confidential
source Y.H., confidential source L.G.,
SA and an expert, Dr. Reuben Hoch,
M.D.
DI testified about his investigationrelated actions, including his role in
adjudicate the OSC to finality. Jeffrey D. Olsen,
M.D., 84 FR 68,474 (2019).
3 Respondent’s counsel conceded that ‘‘there can
be [no] question that the video evidence is always
going to be good evidence.’’ Tr. 485.
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executing a search warrant to obtain
Respondent’s patient files. Tr. 26–42;
RD, at 5. Having read and analyzed all
of the record evidence, I agree with the
RD that DI ‘‘presented his testimony in
a professional, candid, and
straightforward manner.’’ RD, at 5. I also
agree that DI’s testimony is ‘‘sufficiently
objective, detailed, plausible, and
internally consistent’’ to be given full
credibility. Id.
Y.H. testified about her role as a
confidential source 4 during DEA’s
investigation into Respondent,
identified the recordings she made
while meeting with Respondent, and
identified the prescriptions Respondent
issued to her. Tr. 42–95. Y.H. also
testified regarding her non-recorded
interactions with the staff at
Respondent’s practice. Tr. 45–46, 52, 57.
Y.H. is a felon; however, her last
conviction occurred in 1996, and I agree
with the ALJ that it is too distant to
impact her credibility. RD, at 6; Tr. 43.
Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD
that Y.H. ‘‘presented her testimony in a
candid and straightforward manner.’’
RD, at 6. I also agree that ‘‘Y.H.’s
testimony was sufficiently objective,
detailed, plausible, and internally
consistent with other evidence of record
. . . [to] merit it as credible.’’ 5 RD, at 6.
L.G. testified about his role as a
confidential source 6 during DEA’s
investigation into Respondent,
identified the recordings he made while
meeting with Respondent, and
identified the prescriptions Respondent
issued to him. Tr. 96–145. Y.H. also
testified regarding his non-recorded
interactions with the staff at
4 Y.H. has worked for DEA as a paid confidential
source since 2002. Tr. 43.
5 The Respondent requested that the ALJ treat the
testimony of both Y.H. and L.G. as not credible and
afford their testimony no weight. RD, at 58; Tr. 487;
ALJX 28, at 13–14. In support, Respondent argued
that Y.H. and L.G. were both convicted felons who
were paid to serve as confidential sources and, as
such, they had ‘‘every incentive to . . . help the
government.’’ Tr. 486. I agree with the ALJ’s
thorough assessment of the credibility of Y.H. and
L.G. RD, at 94–95. In short, the relevant testimony
of Y.H. and L.G. with regard to their encounters
with Respondent is fully supported by the video
evidence which, as Respondent notes, ‘‘speaks for
itself.’’ ALJX 28, at 13; see also Tr. 485; RD, at 94.
I also agree with the ALJ that the unrecorded
interactions that Y.H. and L.G. had with
Respondent’s office staff and medical assistants are
irrelevant to what Respondent herself did or did not
do. See RD, at 94. As Dr. Hoch testified, it is the
physician’s responsibility to examine the patient, to
draw his or her own conclusions, and to maintain
medical records. Tr. 326, 354; RD, at 94. As such,
it is the physician’s recorded interactions with the
patients that are relevant to this case. I fully agree
with the ALJ’s determination that Y.H. and L.G. are
credible witnesses. RD, at 95.
6 L.G. has worked as a confidential source for
DEA for about two and a half years. Tr. 96.
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Respondent’s practice. Id. at 98, 106–07,
113–14. On this topic (which I find is
irrelevant, see supra n.5), the ALJ found
that L.G.’s testimony was briefly evasive
when he did not acknowledge on cross
examination that hypothetical video
evidence of his interactions with
Respondent’s staff would have been
better evidence than L.G.’s live
testimony. RD, at 7; Tr. 133–35. The RD
found that this was relevant to L.G.’s
credibility. RD, at 7. L.G. also testified
that he was convicted of a felony in
2010 for impersonating a police officer
and was released from confinement for
that offense in 2015. Tr. 96, 119; RD, at
6. The ALJ found the felony conviction
was relevant to L.G.’s credibility. RD, at
7. However, the ALJ found, and I agree,
that the two items relevant to L.G.’s
credibility, ultimately ‘‘do not diminish
L.G.’s overall credibility.’’ RD, at 7.
Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD
that L.G. ‘‘presented his testimony in a
candid and straightforward manner.’’ Id.
I also agree that ‘‘L.G.’s testimony was
sufficiently objective, detailed,
plausible, and internally consistent with
other evidence of record . . . [to] merit
it as credible.’’ Id.
SA testified about the investigative
work he did regarding Respondent,
including his work as the handler for
both Y.H. and L.G. Tr. 150–52. SA also
testified regarding the integrity and
authentication of the video evidence
and the accompanying transcripts. Id. at
152–63. Having read and analyzed all of
the record evidence, I agree with the RD
that SA presented his testimony ‘‘in a
professional, candid, and
straightforward manner.’’ RD, at 8. I also
agree that SA’s testimony is
‘‘sufficiently objective, detailed,
plausible, and internally consistent’’ to
be given full credibility. Id.
Dr. Hoch, is Board-certified in
anesthesiology and pain medicine. Tr.
193; GX 22 (Resume of Dr. Hoch); RD,
at 8. He is the chief anesthesiologist at
the Aventura Hospital, where he is
involved in the administration of
surgical anesthesia and the management
of pain. Id. Dr. Hoch has been involved
in pain management for at least 25
years, including managing his own pain
medicine practice, working as an
interventional pain specialist at the JFK
Medical Center in Palm Beach, Florida,
and working as the Chief of the Division
of Pain Medicine at Brooklyn Hospital.
Tr. 194–95; RD, at 8. Dr. Hoch is
licensed in Florida and was accepted in
this matter (and he has been accepted in
other DEA matters) ‘‘as an expert in pain
management and prescribing controlled
substances with respect to the standard
of care for pain management in the State
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of Florida.’’ RD, at 9; see also Tr. 198,
202. Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD
that Dr. Hoch’s testimony ‘‘was
sufficiently objective, detailed,
plausible, and internally consistent . . .
[to] merit it as fully credible.’’ RD, at
10–11. Moreover, Dr. Hoch’s expert
testimony was unrebutted. Id. at 11.
D. Respondent’s Case
The Respondent’s documentary
evidence consists primarily of medical
and criminal records for the two
confidential sources, photos of the
Germeil clinic, employee resumes,7 a
list of continuing education courses
Respondent attended,8 discharge letters
for various patients 9 (not including Y.H.
or L.G.), and documents related to an
Administrative Complaint filed by the
State of Florida Department of Health
against Respondent. See RX 1–8, 11. As
for live testimony, Respondent called
two witnesses: J.F. and J.W. The main
arguments Respondent attempted to
establish through the witness testimony
were: (1) That Respondent’s positive
dispensing experience should be
considered; (2) that the Germeil clinic’s
procedures were to conduct a physical
exam at the first visit and that medical
assistants conducted pain assessments
as part of taking a patient’s vitals and
discussed the vitals (including the pain
assessment) with Respondent; and (3)
that Respondent demonstrated her
acceptance of responsibility by
instituting remedial measures. ALJX 28,
at 12–15. Notably, Respondent did not
testify in this matter.
7 Respondent’s resume indicates that Respondent
has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida
since October 2007. RX 5 (Resume of Jeanne Esther
Germeil), at 1. She has had her own medical
practice, Germeil Medical, Inc., since September
2011. Id.
8 Among other things, the CLE records show that
on October 7, 2017, Respondent completed 5 credits
in the educational activity titled ‘‘Legal & Ethical
Implications in Medicine: A physician’s Survival
Guide—Laws & Rules.’’ RX 6 (List of Respondent’s
Completed Continuing Education Courses), at 7. On
October 1, 2017, Respondent completed 8 credits in
the live educational activity titled, ‘‘Quality
Medical Record Keeping for Health Care
Professionals.’’ Id. at 9. On December 27, 2017, the
Florida Medical Association notified Respondent
that her record keeping mentor ‘‘noted that
[Respondent’s] follow-up records showed
improvement and that the recommendations made
during Phase I, for the most part, were successfully
implemented.’’ Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). The
Florida Medical Association mentioned that there
were additional suggestions for further
improvements, but that documentation was not
included in the record. Id. The CLE records also
show that Respondent took courses in prescribing
for pain in 2013. Id. at 2.
9 I note, that there are 47 pages of discharge letters
including 38 unique letters and 9 duplicates. See
RX 8 (Discharge Letters), at 14, 16, 19, 21, 24–25,
26–27, 32).
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J.F. is Respondent’s husband and the
general manager of the Germeil Medical
Clinic. Tr. 362, 390. J.F. testified
regarding his roll maintaining the
clinic’s records and regarding the
Clinic’s procedures. Id. at 362.
Concerning records, J.F. testified that,
since 2011, medical records were
contained in the Practice Fusion system
and that, early on, the Clinic had
problems with the system losing
medical records.10 Id. at 368. He also
testified that L.G. was ordered to have
a urine test performed, and that
Respondent would no longer see him as
a patient when L.G. did not comply
with the order. Tr. 376–78; RX 3 (Lab
Order for L.G. dated October 4, 2017).
On this issue, the ALJ found ‘‘[J.F.’s]
reasons why the Clinic had not issued
termination letters to Y.H. and L.G. for
failing to take urine tests to be less than
credible.’’ RD, at 12. J.F. stated that the
Clinic’s procedure for vitals included
taking blood pressure, weight, height,
and conducting a pain assessment. Tr.
372. Further, J.F. testified that he was
not present when vitals were taken, but
he made sure that the information was
entered into Practice Fusion. Id. at 372–
73. The ALJ found that J.F. lacked
credibility when he testified that he had
personal knowledge of what vitals were
taken with Y.H. and L.G., when really,
J.F. simply had to trust that the recorded
information was accurate. RD, at 12–13;
Tr. 392, 419–20. J.F. also testified
regarding the general procedures
Respondent used when seeing patients
and regarding improvements that the
Germeil Clinic had instituted in the year
prior to the hearing. Tr. 385, 387–88;
RD, at 12.
Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD
that J.F.’s testimony was not presented
in a straightforward and candid manner.
RD, at 13. Still, the RD found, and I
agree, that J.F. was generally a credible
witness. Id. The RD went on to find that
much of J.F.’s testimony was irrelevant
because he had little personal
knowledge of how Y.H. and L.G. were
treated as patients and because
Respondent did not accept
responsibility for her actions. Id. I agree.
J.W. is the office manager of the
Germeil Clinic and, in that role, he
supervises the medical assistants. Tr.
433–34, 437; see also RX 7 (Resume of
J.W.). J.W. testified concerning the office
procedures for taking a patient’s vitals
(which J.W. occasionally did himself).
Tr. 442–47. In taking vitals, a medical
10 DI testified that he has investigated at least
three clinics that used the Practice Fusion program
and he has not found that the program deletes or
omits things. Tr. 32–33.
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assistant obtains a patient’s blood
pressure, weight, height, and conducts a
preliminary pain assessment. Id. at 443.
The vitals are then provided to
Respondent who occasionally asks
questions about a patient’s pain. Tr. 445,
447, 453. Diminishing J.W.’s credibility,
the ALJ found that J.W. painted a
picture of being able to consistently
monitor (hear and observe) the medical
assistants, while they took vitals, when
he obviously had other responsibilities
as the office manager to which he had
to attend. Tr. 434, 459, 471–74.
Moreover, while J.W. testified credibly
as to the clinic’s procedures for taking
a patient’s vitals, he provided no
testimony that he observed the taking of
Y.H. or L.G.’s vitals. RD, at 14. Thus, the
RD found, and I agree, that J.W.’s
testimony does not outweigh the direct
testimony of both Y.H. and L.G.
concerning how their vitals were taken
and whether or not they were asked
about their pain.11
The ALJ found the remainder of J.W.’s
testimony to be generally credible. RD,
at 14. He testified that if Respondent
suspected that a patient was diverting
drugs, she would send the patient for a
urine drug test. Tr. 448. If the patient
did not take the urine drug test, the
patient would not be seen again until
the test is taken. Id. If the patient refuses
to take the test, the patient would be
discharged. Id. J.W. testified that since
he started in December 2016, the
Germeil Clinic had worked to reduce
patients’ wait times, spend more time
with patients, use a pain questionnaire,
and give more attention to taking vitals.
Tr. 449–50.
Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD
that J.W.’s testimony was presented in a
straightforward and candid manner. RD,
at 14. The RD went on to find that, like
J.F.’s testimony and for the same
reasons, much of J.W.’s testimony was
irrelevant to the issues in this case. Id.
Again, I agree.
E. The Standard of Care in the State of
Florida
According to the Controlled
Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA),
‘‘Except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally . . .
to . . . distribute, . . . dispense, or with
intent to . . . distribute[ ] or dispense, a
controlled substance.’’ 21 U.S.C.
11 Moreover, this testimony is irrelevant as this
matter involves Respondent’s failure to conduct
physical examinations, not her failure to collect
vitals. And as Dr. Hoch explains, Respondent’s
responsibility to conduct a physical exam cannot be
satisfied by her medical assistants. See infra n.33;
Tr. 307, 326.
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841(a)(1). The CSA’s implementing
regulations state that a lawful controlled
substance order or prescription is one
that is ‘‘issued for a legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner
acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.’’ 21 CFR
1306.04(a).
During the prehearing conference on
June 6, 2018, the parties stipulated that
Respondent ‘‘is presently’’ licensed in
the State of Florida as a Medical Doctor.
Dr. Hoch presented unrebutted
testimony regarding the usual course of
professional practice and the applicable
standard of care for a Florida physician
when prescribing controlled substances.
Dr. Hoch explained that Florida
Administrative Code, Rule 64B8–9.013,
Standards for the Use of Controlled
Substances for the Treatment of Pain,
lays out a physician’s responsibilities
when prescribing controlled substances
for pain management.12 RD, at 9; Tr.
203–05. Dr. Hoch acknowledged that
Florida Administrative Code § 64B8–
9.013 13 provides guidelines rather than
black-and-white rules, but he further
acknowledged that those guidelines are
authoritative regarding a physician’s
standard of care in Florida. RD, at 9; Tr.
272, 280–81. The Florida Code states
that ‘‘[t]he Board will not take
disciplinary action against a physician
for failing to adhere strictly to the
provisions of these standards, if good
cause is shown for such deviation.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(1)(f) (West
2020).
According to Dr. Hoch, that regulation
requires that a doctor: Take a complete
medical history and conduct a physical
examination 14 before issuing a
prescription for a controlled substance;
develop a written treatment plan;
discuss the risks and benefits of
controlled substances with a patient;
12 Moreover, the parties stipulated that ‘‘a Florida
licensed physician must follow the standards and
rules set forth by the Florida Department of Health,
Standards of Practice of Medical Doctors. ALJX 16,
at 1; Tr. 10. The parties further stipulated that
‘‘Florida Administrative Code, Rule 64B8–9.013,
Standards for the Use of Controlled Substances for
the Treatment of Pain, applies to a Florida licensed
[p]hysician dispensing controlled substances.’’ Id.
13 The relevant portions of Florida Administrative
Code § 64B8–9.013 have not been amended at any
time during the relevant time period in this matter.
14 The Florida Code does not define what
constitutes a physical exam and does not
necessarily require that a physician conduct a
physical examination of a patient each time the
patient presents for an appointment. RD, at 50; Tr.
289. However, Dr. Hoch opined that the standard
of care requires a physician to perform a physical
examination in certain circumstances including
before first prescribing a controlled substance,
when the patient requests a higher dose of
controlled substances, presents with new symptoms
or complaints, has a new diagnosis, or has not been
seen for a period of months. See Tr. 290, 341–42,
345–46.
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and maintain complete and accurate
records with respect to a patient. RD, at
9; Tr. 205–06, 338. Additionally, a
physician is required to conduct a
periodic review of the course of
treatment provided to a patient. RD, at
50; Tr. 337–38.
Further, a physician’s medical records
must also meet the standards set forth
in Florida Administrative Code Rule
64B8–9.003 15 and Florida Statute
§ 458.331(1)(m).16 Under the Florida
Administrative Code, ‘‘[a] licensed
physician shall maintain patient
medical records . . . with sufficient
detail to clearly demonstrate why the
course of treatment was undertaken.’’
Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.003(2)
(West 2020). The regulation also states
that physician’s ‘‘medical record shall
contain sufficient information to
identify the patient, support the
diagnosis, justify the treatment and
document the course and results of
treatment accurately, by including, at a
minimum, patient histories;
examination results; test results; records
of drugs prescribed . . . .’’ Id. at
9.003(3). The Florida Statute provides
that the ‘‘following acts constitute
grounds for denial of a license or
disciplinary action . . .: [f]ailing to keep
legible . . . medical records . . . that
justify the course of treatment of the
patient, including, but not limited to,
patient histories; examination results;
test results; records of drugs prescribed,
dispensed, or administered; and reports
of consultations and hospitalizations.’’
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.331(1)(m) (West
2020).
The Florida Administrative Code
provides the following standards and
record keeping requirements, see Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013 (West
2020):
—‘‘A complete medical history and physical
examination must be conducted and
documented in the medical record.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(a) (West
2020). A Florida physician ‘‘is required to
keep accurate and complete records to
include . . . [t]he complete medical
history and a physical examination,
including history of drug abuse or
dependence, as appropriate.’’ Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(f)(1) (West 2020).
—‘‘The written treatment plan shall state
objectives that will be used to determine
treatment success, such as pain relief and
improved physical and psychosocial
function . . . .’’ Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–
9.013(3)(b) (West 2020). A Florida
physician ‘‘is required to keep accurate and
15 The relevant portions of Florida Administrative
Code § 64B8–9.003 have not been amended at any
time during the relevant time period in this matter.
16 Florida Statute § 458.331(1)(m) has not been
amended at any time during the relevant time
period in this matter.
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complete records . . . [on t]reatment
objectives.’’ Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–
9.013(3)(f)(4) (West 2020).
—‘‘The physician shall discuss the risks and
benefits of the use of controlled substances
with the patient.’’ Fla. Admin. Code r.
64B8–9.013(3)(c) (West 2020). A Florida
physician ‘‘is required to keep accurate and
complete records to include . . .
[d]iscussion of risks and benefits.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(f)(5) (West
2020).
—‘‘[T]he physician shall review the course of
treatment and any new information about
the etiology of the pain. Continuation or
modification of therapy shall depend on
the physician’s evaluation of the patient’s
progress. If treatment goals are not being
achieved, despite medication adjustments,
the physician shall reevaluate the
appropriateness of continued treatment.’’
Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(d)
(West 2020). A Florida physician ‘‘is
required to keep accurate and complete
records to include . . . [p]eriodic reviews.
Records must remain current, maintained
in an accessible manner, readily available
for review . . . .’’ Fla. Admin. Code r.
64B8–9.013(3)(f)(10) (West 2020).
Dr. Hoch explained that the basic rule
of thumb for medical documentation is
a ‘‘SOAP’’ note. RD, at 51; Tr. 212. The
‘‘S’’ is a patient’s subjective complaint;
the ‘‘O’’ is the doctor’s objective
findings based on a physical
examination; ‘‘A’’ is the doctor’s
assessment or impression or the
diagnosis of the condition the doctor is
treating; and the ‘‘P’’ is the plan where
a doctor explains why a particular
treatment has been selected. RD, at 51;
Tr. 212. He testified that the plan is the
most important part of the
documentation because it allows a
doctor to explain ‘‘why [she’s] doing
what [she’s] doing . . . [and] detail [her]
decision-making.’’ Tr. 212. Dr. Hoch
explained that it is a doctor’s
responsibility to maintain patients’
records. RD, at 50; Tr. 354.
The Florida Administrative Code
provides that ‘‘[p]hysicians should be
diligent in preventing the diversion of
drugs for illegitimate purposes.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(1)(d) (West
2020). Dr. Hoch explained that, in
Florida, ‘‘it is a very big responsibility
for prescribing physicians to be
concerned about diversion.’’ Tr. 224.
When a patient tells a doctor that he or
she is diverting his or her controlled
substances that statement ‘‘is a very big
red flag that has to be addressed at that
moment.’’ RD, at 51; Tr. 224–25. In fact,
Dr. Hoch stated that if a patient tells a
doctor that he or she is selling or giving
away controlled substances, ‘‘that’s sort
of a deal breaker . . . .’’ 17 Tr. 351.
17 Dr. Hoch’s meaning by ‘‘deal breaker’’ is
clarified by the totality of his testimony. Tr. 351. He
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Therefore, in accordance with Dr.
Hoch’s testimony and the record as a
whole, I find that the standard of care
in Florida requires that a physician stop
writing prescriptions for a patient
following statements from the patient
that are consistent with diversion. See
Tr. 256–57.
F. The Florida Department of Health
Complaint
The parties stipulated that
Respondent’s license to practice
medicine has never been suspended or
revoked by the State of Florida, Board
of Medicine. ALJX 19 (Additional Joint
Stipulations Proposed by Respondent),
at 1.
On January 20, 2017, the Florida
Department of Health issued an
Administrative Complaint (hereinafter,
Complaint) against Respondent.
Respondent’s Exhibit (RX) 11 (Records
from the Florida Administrative
Complaint against Respondent), at 16–
24. The Complaint alleged, among other
things, that Respondent’s medical
treatment of a patient M.N.,18 between
July 2013, and August 2015, ‘‘fell below
the prevailing professional standard of
care,’’ that she ‘‘prescribed controlled
substances inappropriately . . . , ’’ and
that she ‘‘failed to adequately create or
maintain medical records that justified
[the] amount and/or type of controlled
substances she prescribed’’ in violation
of Florida Statute Section 458.331(1)(m)
and Florida Administrative Code Rule
64B8–9.003. Id. at 20, 22–23. The facts
alleged in support of the Complaint are
that Respondent: Continued prescribing
controlled substances to her patient
upon learning that the patient was
sharing another person’s pain
medication; failed to obtain a medical
history; failed to list a chief complaint
or history of present illness; recorded
the patient’s vitals only one time; and
did not have the patient sign a pain
medication contract. Id. at 17–18, 21.
Based on the alleged violations, the
Complaint sought ‘‘permanent
testified that if he had a patient that admitted to
diversion, he would not write another prescription
for that patient. Tr. 256–57. Similarly, the Florida
Administrative Complaint makes clear that the
Florida Department of Health’s position is that
practitioners should ‘‘discontinue prescribing
scheduled medications after learning that the
patient [engaged in diversion].’’ RX 11, at 19. I also
note that Respondent’s Posthearing states,
‘‘[Respondent] knows that she should not have
issued the prescription for Y.H. and L.G. after they
made statements consistent with diversion . . . she
had a duty to investigate . . . [and] should have
refused to give the prescription[s] and sent them for
drug testing immediately.’’ ALJX 28, at 15.
18 There are no allegations of improper
prescribing in this proceeding relevant to patient
M.N.; however, this Complaint is relevant for other
reasons as described herein.
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revocation or suspension of
Respondent’s license, restriction of
practice, imposition of an
administrative fine, issuance of a
reprimand’’ and/or other lesser
penalties against Respondent. RX 11, at
24.
On February 8, 2017, Respondent
signed a Settlement Agreement to settle
the matters alleged in the Complaint. Id.
at 6–15. Although Respondent neither
admitted nor denied the allegations in
the Complaint, she did admit that if the
allegations were proven, they ‘‘would
constitute violations of Chapter 458,
Florida Statutes.’’ Id. at 7. The
Settlement Agreement (as amended by
the Florida Board of Medicine
(hereinafter, State Board) pursuant to
the Final Order, dated April 21, 2017)
required Respondent to pay a fine of
$10,000, reimburse $2,895.21 in costs,
take four classes within a year, have a
risk manager evaluate her medical
practice, and comply with the risk
manager’s recommendations for
improvements. Id. at 1–2, 6–15.
Additionally the Settlement Agreement
stated that ‘‘[i]n the future, Respondent
shall not violate Chapter 456, 458 or
893, Florida Statutes, or the rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, or any
other state or federal law, rule, or
regulation relating to the practice or the
ability to practice medicine . . . .’’ Id.
at 12.
G. Allegation of Improper Prescribing to
Y.H.
Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD and
find that the record contains substantial
evidence that Respondent improperly
prescribed controlled substances to Y.H.
without a legitimate medical purpose,
beneath the standard of care and outside
the usual course of professional
practice. RD, at 68, 71, and 73. Y.H.
visited in the capacity as a confidential
source for DEA a total of eight times
between March 3, 2016, and January 25,
2017. Tr. 43–44; RX 1.19 Y.H.’s first
encounter with Respondent was on
March 22, 2016. RX 1, at 30. According
to the patient records, Y.H.’s chief
complaint during the first visit was, ‘‘I
just came to hav[e] some pain meds. I
am not function [sic.] w/o pain
meds. . . . I share oxycodone 30 mg. I
had 2 MVA and a bad slip[ ] about 2
19 No
videos or transcripts of Y.H.’s earlier visits
with Respondent were introduced in this matter.
However, based on Y.H.’s credible testimony and
the opinion of Dr. Hoch, I find that Respondent did
not document or conduct a physical examination of
Y.H. during any of her eight visits with Y.H. Tr. 92,
338–39. Respondent presented no evidence to
demonstrate that a physical examination was
conducted.
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years ago. I’d like flexeril as well.’’ RX
1, at 30. Y.H.’s last three visits with
Respondent, and the prescriptions
resulting therefrom, presented as
evidence in this case—September 8,
2016, October 12, 2016, and January 25,
2017.
1. Y.H.’s September 8, 2016 Visit
On September 8, 2016, Y.H. visited
Respondent in her capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the
instructions given to her by her DEA
handler. Tr. 43–44. During the visit,
Y.H. wore a recording device that
provided both audio and visual
recordings of the office visit and she
activated the device when she began
interactions with Respondent. Id. at 44.
As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent approximately ten
minutes with Y.H. GX 2 (Video
Recording from September 8,
Encounter). The vast majority of that
time was spent discussing Y.H.’s
sexuality and upcoming wedding. GX 3
(Transcript of Recording from
September 8, Encounter), at 4–14.
During the visit, there was no
discussion regarding the amount of
Y.H.’s pain. See generally GX 3. Further,
Y.H. testified that she was not asked to
describe her pain levels by any member
of Respondent’s staff. Tr. 45, 87–88. The
only discussion that occurred regarding
pain occurred when Y.H. seemingly
could not remember the location of her
pain. GX 3, at 3
CS: I don’t know. It’s hurting my back.
Germeil: Uh—! 20
CS: Oh! I forgot. It’s not my back—it’s my
neck.
Germeil: Uh
CS: It’s my back and my neck. Yeah, ‘cause
[VOICES OVERLAP] 21
Germeil: So, it’s not on your shoulder but [U/
I]
CS: No. Not at all [U/I].
Id. After seemingly not knowing the
location of her pain, Y.H. requested
additional pills. ‘‘Doc, remember last
month you were going to give me one
twenty (120)—for the Oxy’s, but you
didn’t, and you told Josh to tell me this
month you’d give me one forty (140).’’
Id. at 10. After requesting additional
pills, Y.H. informed Respondent that
20 Throughout the transcripts of the video
recorded encounters (GXs 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13), the
transcriber used ellipses to depict pauses in the
conversation. I have removed these and replaced
them with dashes to prevent confusion between
pauses and omissions of word from the quotations.
Where they would have appeared at the beginning
or end of a line, I have omitted them altogether.
21 Bracketed text that describes the mechanics of
the conversation between the confidential sources
and Respondent, appear in the original transcript.
Examples include, [VOICES OVERLAP], [U/I]
which stands for unintelligible (Tr. 155, 159–60),
[STUDDERS], and [WHISPERING].
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she had been giving, even selling, some
of her pills to her brother. Id. at 17, 19.
CS: Okay, [my brother] is coming and he has
to get pills because last month
Germeil: Uh-huh.
CS: when you didn’t get—uh—you did not
give him enough, and again, he wanted to
borrow from me—and I was like ‘‘No, I’m
selling them to you this time’’
Germeil: [U/I]
CS: ‘‘You are going to give me money’’
. . . .
CS: Last month he ran out—he’s drinking
three (3), four (4) pills a day—I said, ‘‘Bro,
you are not going [to] bum anything of me,
you are going to give me money for these
pills’’ and he has to pay me first [U/I]
because I’m not going to give them to him for
free. I’m tired of him! I’m tired of him, doc!’’
Id. Respondent’s only response to Y.H.’s
admission to diverting her controlled
substances was ‘‘Okay.’’ Id. at 19.
Despite Y.H. not knowing the location
of her own pain, requesting an increase
in the number of pills prescribed, and
admitting to diversion, Respondent
wrote Y.H. prescriptions for controlled
substances during the visit. GX 14
(Prescriptions issued to Y.H. on
September 8), at 1. The parties
stipulated that on September 8, 2016,
Respondent prescribed Y.H. one
hundred and forty 22 dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg.23 and sixty
dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.24 ALJX
11, at 2; Tr. 9.
Y.H. testified that during this visit,
Respondent did not conduct a physical
exam, did not discuss other medical
conditions Y.H. might have, did not
discuss the medications that Y.H. was
taking, did not discuss Y.H.’s diet or
exercise. Tr. 48–49. Y.H. testified that
the person who took her vitals on
September 8, 2016, did not conduct a
physical exam, discuss Y.H.’s medical
condition, or ask about controlled
substances Y.H. was taking. Tr. 45.
According to the patient records for
that visit, Y.H.’s chief complaint was ‘‘I
need a little bit more of my pills, I ran
out so fast. I really need them. I am
getting married soon and I need a little
bit more.’’ RX 1, at 22. The patient
records ‘‘Plan’’ stated that Respondent,
among other things, explained the side
effects of the medication, advised
regarding adverse reactions, discussed
lifestyle modifications to control weight
and blood pressure, and that a
22 Y.H. requested an increase from one hundred
and twenty to one hundred and forty pills a month,
and this prescription shows that Respondent agreed
to prescribe the additional pills. GX 3, at 10; GX 14.
23 The parties stipulated that oxycodone HCL is
listed by DEA as a Schedule II controlled substance.
ALJX 11, at 2.
24 The parties stipulated that alprazolam is listed
by DEA as a Schedule IV controlled substance.
ALJX 11, at 2.
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‘‘[d]etail[ed] explanation was provided
about and against ‘shopping’ from
physician to physicians [sic] and the
harm (s) [sic] that can provoke.’’ Id.
According to the patient records,
‘‘[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in
this encounter,’’ and Y.H.’s pain level
was ‘‘9.’’ Id. However, Y.H.’s testimony
and the recordings directly contradict
the information in the ‘‘Plan.’’
Dr. Hoch opined that the two
prescriptions issued by Respondent to
Y.H. on September 8, 2016, (namely one
hundred and forty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the state
of Florida. Tr. 208–09; GX 14. In
support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch noted
that the plan does not bear any
resemblance to the actual visit and
discussion between Respondent and
Y.H. Tr. 218. Compare RX 1, at 22, with
GX 2 and GX 3. Dr. Hoch explains that
Y.H. is a female and the plan refers to
a male. Tr. 213, RX 1 (Patient File for
Y.H.), at 22. Additionally, the plan
discusses managing blood pressure
when Y.H. has ‘‘quite a good blood
pressure’’ that does not need to be
controlled. Tr. 214. Also, Dr. Hoch
explains that Respondent did not
discuss side effects with Y.H., fall
precautions, or the harms that occur by
shopping from physician to physician,
but that those non-existent
conversations were recorded in the
plan. Tr. 213–218. Additionally, Dr.
Hoch pointed out that the plan records
that the visit lasted approximately 60
minutes when the visit did not last an
hour. Tr. 215. Finally, Dr. Hoch found
no indication that Respondent
performed a physical exam or took a
medical history at the visit. Tr. 227.
Further, Dr. Hoch opined that there is
no indication in the patient treatment
notes that Respondent maintained on
Y.H. that Respondent conducted a
periodic review of her treatment of
Y.H.’s conditions by prescribing
controlled substances to her. Tr. 246.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch opined that
there was nothing documented in the
patient file to justify the oxycodone or
alprazolam 25 prescriptions and that
‘‘prescription of these medications
together has to be qualified quite
extensively in the medical record.’’ Tr.
259; see also id. at 219. Respondent
prescribed Y.H. oxycodone 30 mg.
which is a ‘‘very strong’’ dosage, and
prescribed her one hundred and forty
25 Dr. Hoch explains that ‘‘[t]wo milligrams of
[a]lprazolam is a very high dose of [a]lprazolam.’’
Tr. 222.
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pills which ‘‘means approximately four
to maybe five a day . . . [or] 120
milligrams of [o]xycodone a day.’’ Tr.
219. According to Dr. Hoch, the
oxycodone prescription can cause a
number of side effects that Respondent
did not discuss with Y.H. Tr. 220–21.
He further testified that the side effects
of opioid use, in the order of ‘‘the least
to the most disabling,’’ include pruritus
or itching, urinary retention, nausea and
vomiting, and constipation. Id. at 220.
Dr. Hoch explained that ‘‘the most
devastating complication or side effect
of an opioid [like oxycodone] is
respiratory depression, and that’s what
kills people.’’ Tr. 221–22. Dr. Hoch
explained that the risk is particularly
high where, as here, the opioid is given
with a benzodiazepine like alprazolam.
Tr. 222. In light of the medications
prescribed, Dr. Hoch explained that
Respondent was required to warn Y.H.
about the risk of respiratory depression
and instruct the patient to make sure
there was at least a three to four hour
gap between administering the two
different medications. Id. Based on Dr.
Hoch’s credible and uncontroverted
testimony and based on the video
recording and transcript, I find that
there was no discussion of the risks at
this visit. Id.
Dr. Hoch explained that in Florida, ‘‘it
is a very big responsibility for
prescribing physicians to be concerned
about diversion.’’ Tr. 224. Accordingly,
when Y.H. informed Respondent that
‘‘she[ was] either giving or selling pills
that she[ was] receiving from the
doctor,’’ Respondent should have been
‘‘[t]remendous[ly] concern[ed].’’ Id. Dr.
Hoch concludes that Y.H.’s diversion
admission was ‘‘a very big red flag that
[had] to be addressed at that moment.’’
Tr. 224–25. I find that Respondent did
not address Y.H.’s diversion admission
on September 8, 2016. See also RD, at
68.
Accordingly, based on the credible
and uncontroverted testimony of Dr.
Hoch, I find that the two prescriptions
issued by Respondent to Y.H. on
September 8, 2016, (namely one
hundred and forty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the state
of Florida. See RD, at 68.
2. Y.H.’s October 12, 2016 Visit
On October 12, 2016, Y.H. visited
Respondent in her capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the
instructions given to her by her DEA
handler. Tr. 43–44. During the visit,
Y.H. wore a recording device that
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provided both audio and visual
recordings of the office visit and she
activated the device when she began
interactions with Respondent. RD, at 27;
Tr. 52, 183. As is evident from the
records, Respondent spent less than
seven minutes with Y.H. GX 4 (Video
Recording from October 12, Encounter);
GX 5 (Transcript of Recording from
October 12, Encounter), at 13. The
majority of that time was spent
discussing Y.H.’s cancelled wedding
and a potential hurricane. GX 5, at 2–
9; RD, at 69.
Towards the end of the visit, Y.H.
informed Respondent that she had been
selling some of her pills to her brother.
GX 5, at 12–13.
CS: I tell [my brother], doc. ‘‘Go get your own
stuff.’’ I’m tired of selling him my pills.
Germeil: You’re right!
CS: But I sold him the pills, I sure did it, at
twenty (20) bucks a pop, and he paid for
them. I said, ‘‘You don’t go see the
doctor?’’
Germeil: You’re right about that, but . . . .
He has to learn.
CS: Exactly, doc.
Id. The video and transcription of the
appointment show that Respondent did
not express any concern about Y.H.
selling her controlled substances to her
brother. RD, at 69; GX 4; GX 5. Instead,
Respondent seems to have
acknowledged Y.H.’s admission of
diversion and to have condoned the
conduct. Id.; Tr. 231. Dr. Hoch
explained, ‘‘[Y.H.] is clearly indicating
to [Respondent] that they are diverting
the medication to someone else . . .
selling their [p]ills at $20 a pop. The
doctor notes it, addresses it and
condones it.’’ Tr. 231. Dr. Hoch explains
that Respondent’s actions with regard to
Y.H.’s admission of diversion were ‘‘a
tremendous cause for concern.’’ Id.
Not only did Respondent fail to
address Y.H.’s admission of diversion,
but Respondent, as the parties
stipulated, went on to prescribe Y.H.
one hundred and forty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX 11, at
2; Tr. 9. See also GX 15 (Prescriptions
Issued to Y.H. on October 12).
Dr. Hoch opined that the two
prescriptions issued by Respondent to
Y.H. on October 12, 2016, were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the state
of Florida. Tr. 228–29; GX 15. In
support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch noted
that the plan documented for the
October 12, 2016, visit was identical to,
and has the same problems as the plan
for the September 9, 2016 visit. Tr. 234,
236. As with the prior visit, Y.H. is a
female and the plan refers to a male. Tr.
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235; RX 1, at 20. Additionally, the plan
discusses managing blood pressure
when Y.H.’s does not require
management. Tr. 236. Dr. Hoch opined
that the plan was too generic and failed
to identify what Respondent was ‘‘doing
for that particular problem.’’ Tr. 235. Dr.
Hoch also points out that in the patient
record ’’ . . . Subjective is empty . . .
[O]bjective is empty . . . Assessment is
empty.’’ Tr. 233. Additionally, Dr. Hoch
explained that ‘‘back pain’’ is an
indication of a complaint, but that a
proper complaint, unlike this one,
would explain ‘‘what the patient is
actually feeling, where, . . . what part
of their back, the nature and quality of
the pain.’’ Tr. 234. Dr. Hoch’s credible
and uncontroverted testimony is that
the patient chart does not justify the
prescriptions that Respondent gave to
Y.H. on October 12, 2016. Tr. 236.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch explained that
these were the same two prescriptions
issued on October 12, 2016, as were
issued on September 9, 2016, and that
the same issues about which he had
already opined regarding the issuance of
both an opioid and a benzodiazepine
were present here. Tr. 232. Also, once
again Dr. Hoch pointed out that
Respondent failed to discuss with Y.H.
the risks involved with prescribing
opioids and benzodiazepines together.
Tr. 232.
Further, Dr. Hoch explained, that
Respondent’s October 12, 2016 visit
with Y.H. lacked the required
‘‘encounter between the physician and
the patient [and] discussion of the
ongoing problem as this is a chronic
pain problem.’’ Tr. 229. Dr. Hoch
explained that Respondent did not
address the patient’s pain, conduct a
physical examination, take a complete
medical history, discuss the risks of
controlled substances, develop a
treatment plan, or conduct a periodic
review of the treatment of Y.H.’s
conditions. Tr. 230, 246.
Based on Dr. Hoch’s uncontroverted
and credible testimony, the ALJ found,
and I agree, that Respondent failed to
make any statements that addressed
Y.H.’s medical concerns during the
October 12, 2016 visit. RD, at 27 (citing
GX 4 and GX 5). Respondent did not ask
any questions to determine Y.H.’s
current medical condition, assess Y.H.’s
level of pain or determine whether the
treatment regimen she had prescribed to
Y.H. was effective. RD, at 28 (citing GX
5); Tr. 87–88, 230. Respondent failed to:
Conduct a physical examination of
Y.H.; 26 discuss the side effects of the
26 In fact, during the appointment, Dr. Germeil sat
on one side of an office desk and Y.H. sat across
the desk from her. RD, at 70 (citing GX 4).
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medication she was prescribing to Y.H.
or the risks of using controlled
substances; discuss the risks of doctor
shopping; discuss Y.H.’s diet and
exercise; discuss any medications Y.H.
was taking; take a complete medical
history of Y.H.; or develop an adequate
treatment plan for Y.H. RD, at 28 (citing
Tr. 54, 230, 232); GX 4; GX 5; RX 1, at
20.
In contrast, the patient notes that
Respondent created concerning Y.H.’s
October 12, 2016 appointment indicate
that: The encounter lasted 60 minutes;
and that Respondent discussed ‘‘side
effects,’’ ‘‘adverse reactions,’’ ‘‘safety
precautions,’’ and doctor shopping with
Y.H. RD, at 28 (citing RX 1, at 20). The
‘‘Plan’’ for the October 12, 2016, visit
was identical to the ‘‘Plan’’ for the
September 8, 2016, visit and did not
accurately capture what happened
during the October 12, 2016, visit. RD,
at 29; and compare RX 1, at 20, with id.
at 22. Y.H.’s chief complaint was
recorded as ‘‘I have a lot [of] back pain
and I need my pain meds.’’ RX 1, at 20.
Y.H.’s pain level was recorded as ‘‘9.’’
Id. But Dr. Hoch explained that a patient
who presents with a pain level of nine
would show ‘‘a tremendous degree of
discomfort.’’ RD, at 29 (citing Tr. 331).
The October 12, 2016 records lacked
any information in the ‘‘Subjective,’’
‘‘Objective,’’ and ‘‘Assessment’’
sections. RX 1, at 20.
The ALJ found based on Dr. Hoch’s
testimony, and I agree, that Respondent
should have recognized Y.H.’s
admission that she was diverting
controlled substances as a red flag and
considered it a ‘‘deal breaker’’ such that
Respondent should not have issued
prescriptions to Y.H. on October 12,
2016. RD, at 71; Tr. 351. The ALJ found,
and I agree, that the prescriptions
Respondent issued to Y.H., on October
12, 2016, were not issued for a
legitimate medical purpose, and were
not issued in the usual course of
professional practice in the State of
Florida. RD, at 71; Tr. 229, 236.
3. Y.H.’s January 25, 2017 Visit
On January 25, 2017, Y.H. visited
Respondent in her capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the
instructions given to her by her DEA
handler. Tr. 43–44. During the visit,
Y.H. wore a recording device that
provided both audio and visual
recordings of the office visit and she
activated the device when she began
interactions with Respondent. RD, at 30;
Tr. 58, 183. As is evident from the
records, Respondent spent
approximately seven and a half minutes
with Y.H. GX 6 (Video Recording from
October 25, Encounter). The majority of
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that time was spent on small talk
discussing Y.H.’s family matters,
including Y.H.’s trip to Cuba following
her aunt’s death, her brother’s drug
dependency, and the financial strain
that resulted. GX 7 (Transcript of
Recording from October 25, Encounter);
RD, at 72.
At several points during the visit,
Y.H. informed Respondent that she had
been selling some of her pills. GX 7, at
4, 6, 9–11. During a discussion
regarding an aunt of Y.H.’s who died in
Cuba, Y.H., stated, ‘‘I didn’t even have
money—I had to actually sell my pills
unfortunately. I had to make some
money. I had to go over there.
Everything was on me.’’ GX 7, at 4. Y.H.
went on to state, ‘‘Thank God I had
some—the—some of the—pills that I
had I was able to get rid of them and get
some money to help me out, which I
had to do now, because—I had to pay
my rent.’’ GX 7, at 6. Then the visit
concluded with a final conversation
regarding diversion.
CS: You think is right that I have to sell my
own pills, my meds to, to pay for stuff
for—[STUTTERS] that’s just crazy doc.
Germeil: Listen! [STUTTERS] You are a good
person . . . good things happen to good
people. . . .
CS: . . . Right now, I’ll probably go and I’ll
take some of these, I have to keep some,
and then the others I probably have to sell
[to my brother]. He probably, he’ll probably
take some from me ‘cause that’s all he
does.’’ . . .
Germeil: I feel sorry for you but uh—that’s
your call. That’s mine, too. . . .
CS: Yeah, [o]xycodone’s—thirty milligrams—
[MURMERS] Yeah, we’re good. Quantity
one-forty (140). This is great. You don’t
know how much this helps me out, doc.
You just don’t know.
Germeil: Relax! Do not say that to nobody.
CS: Of course, not. . . .
Germeil: I know. I don’t want to . . . get into
trouble.
Id. at 9–11.
Despite Y.H.’s admission of diversion,
Respondent, as the parties stipulated,
prescribed Y.H. one hundred and forty
dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg.
and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2
mg. ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9. See also GX
16 (Prescriptions Issued to Y.H. on
January 25). Dr. Hoch found that the
same two prescriptions were issued on
January 25, 2017, as were issued on
September 9, 2016, and October 12,
2016, and that the same concerns about
which he had already opined regarding
the issuance of both an opioid and a
benzodiazepine were present here. Tr.
237–38.
Dr. Hoch’s credible and
uncontroverted opinion was that the
two prescriptions issued by Respondent
to Y.H. on January 25, 2017, (namely
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one hundred and forty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the State
of Florida. Tr. 237, 244; GX 16. In
support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch found
that the plan documented for the
January 25, 2017 visit is nearly identical
to, and has the same problems as the
plan for the September 9, 2016, and
October 12, 2016 visits. Tr. 241. As with
the prior visits, Y.H. is a female and the
plan refers to a male. Tr. 241; RX 1, at
19. Further, as with the prior visits, the
plan stated that side effects, adverse
reactions, diet and exercise, blood
pressure, doctor shopping, and other
matters were discussed during the
encounter when the transcript and
video evidence make clear that they
were not. Tr. 241–42. Dr. Hoch opined
that the plan has ‘‘a disconnect’’ in so
far as it fails to address Respondent’s
approach for treating the diagnoses
identified in the assessment section
(specifically anxiety disorder and back
ache). Tr. 240. Again, Dr. Hoch
identified flaws in the chief complaint
section of Respondent’s records for
Y.H., which contained a list of diagnosis
rather than a true complaint. Tr. 239. Dr.
Hoch’s opinion was that the patient
chart reflects an incomplete medical
record and does not justify the
prescriptions that Respondent gave to
Y.H. on January 25, 2017. Tr. 250.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch explained
that, once again, Respondent failed to
conduct a thorough physical exam, take
a complete medical history, or conduct
a periodic review of the treatment of
Y.H. Tr. 242, 246. In fact, during the
encounter, Respondent sat on one side
of an office desk and Y.H. sat across the
desk from her. GX 6; RD, at 72. Dr.
Hoch’s conclusion is further supported
by Respondent’s failure to address
Y.H.’s admission of diversion. Dr. Hoch
explained, that there was a statement
from ‘‘the patient to the physician that
the pills were being sold[,]’’ which ‘‘is
diversion[,]’’ and that ‘‘the rule states
that diversion is not acceptable.’’ Tr.
243–44.
Based on Dr. Hoch’s expert testimony,
the ALJ found, and I agree, that
Respondent failed to make any
statements that addressed Y.H.’s
medical concerns during the January 25,
2017 visit. RD, at 30 (citing GX 6 and
GX 7). Respondent did not ask any
questions to determine Y.H.’s current
medical condition, assess Y.H.’s level of
pain or determine whether the treatment
regimen she had prescribed to Y.H. was
effective. RD, at 32 (citing GX 7; Tr. 87–
88, 246). Respondent did not discuss the
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side effects of the medication she was
prescribing to Y.H.; discuss the risks of
doctor shopping; discuss Y.H.’s diet and
exercise; discuss any medications Y.H.
was taking; take a complete medical
history of Y.H,; or develop an adequate
treatment plan for Y.H. RD, at 32 (citing
Tr. 59, 241–243; GX 6; GX 7; RX 1, at
19). Further, Y.H. testified that
Respondent did not conduct a physical
exam during the encounter. Tr. 59.
In contrast, the patient notes that
Respondent created concerning Y.H.’s
January 25, 2017, appointment indicate
that: the encounter lasted 60 minutes;
and that Respondent discussed ‘‘side
effects,’’ ‘‘adverse reactions,’’ ‘‘safety
precautions,’’ and doctor shopping with
Y.H. RD, at 33 (citing RX 1, at 19). The
‘‘Plan’’ for the January 25, 2017 visit
was nearly identical to the ‘‘Plan’’ for
the September 8, 2016, and October 12,
2016 visits (the only difference is the
first line regarding a request for a urine
drug test) and did not accurately capture
what happened during the January 25,
2017 visit. RD, at 33; compare RX 1, at
19, with id. at 20, 22, and with GX–6,
GX–7. Y.H.’s pain level was recorded as
‘‘10.’’ RX 1, at 19. But Dr. Hoch
explained that a patient who presents
with a pain level of ten would be in
‘‘excruciating pain’’ and one would
question how such a patient could
‘‘even sit in front of you.’’ RD, at 33
(citing Tr. 331). If a person has a pain
level of ten, then that person is usually
in the hospital. Id. As with the prior
patient records, the January 25, 2017
records lacked any information in the
‘‘Subjective,’’ and ‘‘Objective’’ sections.
RX 1, at 19.
The ALJ found, and I agree, that
Respondent did not advise Y.H. not to
sell her controlled substances or
otherwise engage in any meaningful
conversation about diversion with Y.H.
RD, at 72–73; GX 6; GX 7. The ALJ
found, and I agree, that Respondent
should have recognized Y.H.’s
admission that she was diverting
controlled substances as a red flag and
considered it a ‘‘deal breaker’’ such that
Respondent should not have issued
prescriptions to Y.H. on January 25,
2017. RD, at 73; Tr. 242–44, 351.
The ALJ found, and I agree, that based
on Dr. Hoch’s testimony, the
prescriptions Respondent issued to
Y.H., on January 25, 2017, were not
issued for a legitimate medical purpose,
and were not issued in the usual course
of professional practice in the State of
Florida. RD, at 73–74.
In summary, I find that the six
controlled substance prescriptions
Respondent issued to Y.H., on
September 8, 2016, October 12, 2016,
and January 25, 2017, were not issued
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for a legitimate medical purpose and
were issued outside of the usual course
of professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the State
of Florida.
H. Allegation of Improper Prescribing to
L.G.
Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the ALJ
and find that the record contains
substantial evidence that Respondent
improperly prescribed controlled
substances to L.G. without a legitimate
medical purpose, beneath the standard
of care, and outside of the usual course
of professional practice in the State of
Florida. RD, at 77, 80, and 82; infra.
L.G. visited Respondent in the
capacity as a confidential source for
DEA a total of five times between July
2016, and August 2017. Tr. 96–97; RX
2 (Patient File for L.G.). L.G.’s first
encounter with Respondent was on July
25, 2016.27 RX 2, at 22. According to the
patient records, L.G.’s chief complaint
during the first visit was, ‘‘I have been
having this strong right shoulder pain
since a few years back. It just started
again. I am tired of: [sic] ibuprofen/
bengay/tylenol.’’ RX 2, at 22. L.G.’s last
three visits with Respondent, and the
prescriptions resulting therefrom, were
presented as evidence in this case—
February 3, 2017, July 18, 2017, and
August 3, 2017.
1. L.G.’s February 3, 2017 Visit
On February 3, 2017, L.G. visited
Respondent in his capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the
instructions given to him by his DEA
handler. Tr. 96–97. During the visit, L.G.
wore a recording device that provided
both audio and visual recordings of the
office visit and he activated the device
shortly before he went into
Respondent’s office. Tr. 97, 183. As is
evident from the records, Respondent
spent approximately seven and a half
minutes with L.G. GX 8 (Video
Recording from February 3rd
Encounter). The vast majority of that
time was spent discussing L.G.’s family
issues and travels. GX 9 (Transcript of
Video Recording from February 3,
Encounter). At this visit, there was no
discussion between L.G. and
Respondent regarding any medical
concerns. RD, at 35; GX 8; GX 9.
27 No videos or transcripts of L.G.’s other visits
with Respondent were introduced in this matter.
However, based on L.G.’s credible testimony, I find
that Respondent did not document or conduct a
physical examination of L.G. during any of his five
visits with L.G. Tr. 137, 338–39. Respondent
presented no evidence to demonstrate that a
physical examination was conducted.
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Although medical concerns were not
discussed at the visit, L.G. made several
statements indicating that he was
diverting pills. GX 9.
CS: and—what I did last time—with one of
the prescriptions—knowing I’m not
supposed to do that, I flipped it—I took
some for me . . . took the rest to make
some money
. . .
CS: I’m not trying to get in trouble or nothing
like this.
Germeil: I know. Sometimes you have to
help.
. . .
Germeil: But don’t worry—uh. [L.G.]. You are
okay.
CS: No, I mean—I’m being honest with you.
That’s what I’ve been doing. I—I sold a few
of them . . . I—kept some for me.
. . .
Germeil: That’s okay. Relax. Okay? But try to
keep it for yourself. Try to keep your
medication for yourself, okay?
. . .
CS: I mean, like I said, I took some—I took
some for me and then the rest—just sold
some of them
Germeil: Okay.
CS: Well, the majority of them.
Germeil: The majority of them?
Germeil: Okay. That—that is—Isn’t, is that
illegal, . . . ?
CS: I don’t—I don’t believe so. I know that
but I’m telling you ‘cause uh
Germeil: You don’t know?
CS: You’re my doctor!
. . .
Germeil: Be careful, okay?
Id. at 7–8, 11–13.
Despite L.G. admitting to diversion,
Respondent wrote L.G. prescriptions for
controlled substances during the visit.
GX 17 (Prescriptions Issued to L.G. on
February 3). The parties stipulated that
on February 3, 2017, Respondent
prescribed L.G. one hundred and twenty
dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg.
and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2
mg. ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
During the encounter, there was no
discussion regarding the amount of
L.G.’s pain. GX 9. L.G. testified that on
February 3, 2017, Respondent did not
conduct a physical exam—in fact, the
video evidence shows that Respondent
sat on one side of an office desk and
L.G. sat across the desk from her. Tr.
103; GX 8. Respondent also did not
discuss any medical conditions L.G.
had, did not discuss the side effects of
or adverse reactions to the medications
she was prescribing to L.G., did not
discuss other medications L.G. was
taking (other than the ones Respondent
was prescribing), did not discuss L.G.’s
diet or exercise. Tr. 103. L.G. testified
that the employee at the Clinic who took
his vitals on February 3, 2017, did not
conduct a physical exam, ask any
question about his medical conditions
or ask about his pain. Tr. 98.
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The ‘‘Plan’’ in L.G.’s records stated
that Respondent, among other things,
explained the side effects of the
medication, advised regarding adverse
reactions, discussed lifestyle
modifications to control weight and
blood pressure, and that a ‘‘[d]etail[ed]
explanation was provided about and
against ‘shopping’ from physician to
physicians [sic] and the harm (s) [sic]
that can provoke.’’ RX 2, at 20.
According to the patient records,
‘‘[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in
this encounter,’’ and L.G.’s pain level
was ‘‘9.’’ Id.
Dr. Hoch opined that the two
prescriptions issued by Respondent to
L.G. on February 3, 2017 (namely one
hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the state
of Florida. Tr. 248, GX 17. In support of
his opinion, Dr. Hoch explained that the
plan does not bear any resemblance to
the actual visit and discussion between
Respondent and L.G. Tr. 254. Compare
RX 2, at 20, with GX 8 and GX 9.
Additionally, the plan discusses
managing blood pressure, when L.G.’s
blood pressure does not require
monitoring. Tr. 253. Also, Dr. Hoch
explains that Respondent did not
discuss side effects with L.G., fall
precautions, or the harms that occur
from shopping from physician to
physician, but those conversations are
recorded in the plan. Tr. 251–54.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch explains the
plan records that the visit lasted
approximately 60 minutes when the
visit did not last an hour. Tr. 252–53.
Dr. Hoch testified that the plan
Respondent recorded for L.G.’s February
3, 2017 visit was ‘‘very similar to,’’ the
plan for Y.H.’s September 9, 2016 visit
which, as discussed above, was riddled
with problems. Tr. 250. Also compare,
RX 1, at 22, with RX 2, at 20.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch’s credible and
uncontested opinion was that there was
nothing documented in the patient file
to justify the oxycodone or alprazolam
prescriptions. Tr. 250. As Dr. Hoch has
mentioned, this combination of
controlled substances is a particular
concern due to the risk of respiratory
depression—and Respondent did not
discuss those risks with L.G. during this
visit as was required. Tr. 247. Moreover,
Dr. Hoch opined that it was ‘‘a source
of tremendous concern’’ (for L.G.’s
safety) that L.G. was prescribed this
combination of a high-dose opioid and
benzodiazepine after Respondent
informed the physician that he drinks
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alcohol (and Respondent again did not
discuss the risks with L.G.). Tr. 255.
Dr. Hoch, as discussed above,
explained that in Florida, ‘‘it is a very
big responsibility for prescribing
physicians to be concerned about
diversion.’’ Tr. 224; see supra II(E).
Accordingly, when L.G. informed
Respondent that he was selling these
‘‘potentially deadly medications’’ that
was ‘‘a huge issue for the community at
large.’’ Tr. 256. Dr. Hoch opined that
Respondent failed to follow the ‘‘state’s
recommendation of being always
cautious about diversion of the
medications . . .’’ and that she should
not have written another prescription
for L.G. following his admission of
diversion. Tr. 256–57. I find that
Respondent did not engage L.G. in any
meaningful discussion about diversion.
RD, at 76; GX 8; GX 9.
Further, Dr. Hoch testified that
Respondent did not conduct a periodic
review of her treatment of L.G.’s
conditions before prescribing controlled
substances to him and also did not
document a periodic review in the
medical record. Tr. 250.
In conclusion, I concur with the ALJ
and find that, based on Dr. Hoch’s
testimony, the two prescriptions for
controlled substances issued by
Respondent to L.G. on February 3, 2017,
were not issued for a legitimate medical
purpose and were issued outside of the
usual course of professional practice
and beneath the standard of care in the
State of Florida. RD, at 77; Tr. 248.
2. L.G.’s July 18, 2017 Visit
On July 18, 2017, L.G. visited
Respondent in his capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the
instructions given to him by his DEA
handler. Tr. 96–97. During the visit, L.G.
wore a recording device that provided
both audio and visual recordings of the
office visit and he activated the device
shortly before he went into
Respondent’s office. Tr. 97, 183. As is
evident from the records, Respondent
spent approximately seven minutes
with L.G. GX 10 (Video Recording from
July 18, Encounter). Much of that time
was spent discussing travel to Cuba. GX
11 (Transcript of Recording from July
18, Encounter), at 8–12. At this visit,
discussion between L.G. and
Respondent regarding medical concerns
was limited to L.G. stating that he had
pain ‘‘like last time.’’ GX 11, at 6–7; RD,
at 40. However, there was no further
elaboration of L.G.’s pain intensity or
even where it was located, and
Respondent and L.G. did not discuss
pain at the prior visit. Id. Respondent
also pointed out that L.G. did not visit
Respondent often, in fact, his last
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appointment had been more than four
months prior, and that he could have an
appointment every month. GX 11, at 11.
Respondent did not ask L.G. how he had
managed his pain between
appointments without a prescription. Id.
Respondent and L.G. had a more
elaborate conversation discussing
diversion at the July 18, 2017 visit. GX
11. The conversation began with
Respondent admonishing L.G. for
selling his pills. GX 11.
CS: Between you and me, [WHISPERING]
remember last time I told you I was selling
my script.
Germeil: Yes, I know.
CS: I had to sell it to get to Cuba, to help
somebody in the family, which I did. And
that’s why I say, ‘‘Thank you!’’
Germeil: Yeah, but you cannot sell that.
That’s a controlled medication, uh, . . . .
[Y]ou have to keep that for your pain. . . .
Germeil: Don’t do that or I can’t give you the
meditation—medication.
GX 11, at 2–3, 6. Following the
admonition, Respondent stated that she
was going to ‘‘send [L.G.] to have a drug
test done.’’ GX 11, at 7. But then,
Respondent said that she would still
give L.G. a prescription because she
knew that L.G. was in pain and she
knew that L.G. was joking when he said
that he was selling his pills. GX 11, at
8.
Germeil: I know that you have pain so, that’s
the reason I’m gonna give them to you.
CS: Okay, thank you.
Germeil: Yeah, but I shouldn’t [U/I]. Never
tell a doctor that you, you sell your
medication. I know you didn’t sell them,
okay?
CS: Okay.
Germeil: You just wanted to be—to be—[i]t’s
fashionable now, okay?
CS: Okay.
Germeil: It’s fashionable that everybody sells
their medications but uh . . . I know that
you don’t do that.
CS: [CHUCKLES] Okay, no
Germeil: Because you joke, right?
CS: Yeah. A joke. Big joke.
Id.
Respondent wrote L.G. prescriptions
for controlled substances during the
visit. GX 18 (Prescriptions Issued to L.G.
on July 18). The parties stipulated that
on July 18, 2017, Respondent prescribed
L.G. one hundred and twenty dosage
units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and
sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.
ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
L.G. testified that on July 18, 2017,
Respondent did not conduct a physical
exam—in fact, the video recording
reveals that Respondent sat on one side
of an office desk and L.G. sat across the
desk from her. Tr. 108–09, GX 10.
Again, L.G. testified that Respondent
did not discuss any medical conditions
L.G. had, did not discuss the side effects
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of or adverse reactions to the
medications she was prescribing to L.G.,
did not discuss other medications L.G.
was on, did not discuss L.G.’s diet or
exercise. Tr. 109. L.G. testified that the
clinic employee who took his vitals on
February 3, 2017, did not conduct a
physical exam, ask any question about
his medical conditions or ask about his
pain. Tr. 107.
The ‘‘Plan’’ in the patient records for
L.G.’s July 18, 2017, visit was identical
to the plan for the February 3, 2017,
visit. Compare RX 2, at 18 with RX 2,
at 20. The ‘‘Plan’’ again documents that
Respondent, among other things,
explained the side effects of the
medication, advised regarding adverse
reactions, discussed lifestyle
modifications to control weight and
blood pressure, and that a ‘‘[d]etail[ed]
explanation was provided about and
against ‘shopping’ from physician to
physicians [sic] and the harm (s) [sic]
that can provoke.’’ RX 2, at 18.
According to the patient records,
‘‘[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in
this encounter,’’ and L.G.’s pain level
was ‘‘9.’’ Id.
Dr. Hoch opined that the two
prescriptions issued by Respondent to
L.G. on July 18, 2017 (namely one
hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the state
of Florida. Tr. 259; GX 18. In support of
his opinion, Dr. Hoch noted that there
was no indication that a physical exam
was conducted or that a medical history
was taken. Tr. 261.
Dr. Hoch explained that the plan
Respondent recorded for L.G.’s July 18,
2017 visit was similar to the plan for
L.G.’s February 3, 2017, visit. Tr. 262.
Also compare, RX 2, at 18, with RX 2,
at 20. Accordingly, Dr. Hoch opined that
the patient’s record does not bear any
resemblance to the actual visit and
discussion between Respondent and
L.G. Tr. 264. Compare RX 2, at 18, with
GX 10 and GX 11. Again, Dr. Hoch
explained that Respondent did not
discuss side effects or adverse reactions
with L.G., fall precautions or safety
measures, or the dangers of shopping
from physician-to-physician, but those
conversations are recorded in the plan
as if they had happened. Tr. 263–64.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch opined that
there was nothing documented in the
patient file to justify the oxycodone or
alprazolam prescriptions here. Tr. 258–
59, 263. As found above, this
combination of controlled substances,
namely ‘‘a very strong opioid with a
very strong [b]enzodiazepine[,] . . . has
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to be qualified quite extensively in the
medical record to justify that both of
them are being given at the same time.’’
Tr. 258–59. Dr. Hoch explained that the
justification was not present here. Tr.
259.
Regarding diversion, Dr. Hoch again
opined that L.G. ‘‘was admitting to
[Respondent] that he was diverting
medications that were given to him, and
regardless of that statement, he did, in
fact, get the prescription[s].’’ Tr. 259.
Accordingly, I agree with the ALJ’s
finding that Respondent did not engage
L.G. in any meaningful discussion about
diversion. RD, at 79; GX 10; GX 11.
Further, Dr. Hoch opined that the
record for L.G. did not indicate that
Respondent conducted a periodic
review of her treatment of L.G.’s
conditions. Tr. 262. Dr. Hoch explained
that Respondent’s Medical record for
L.G.’s July 18, 2020 visit was not
accurate, complete, or otherwise
sufficient to meet the Florida standard
of care. Tr. 262.
In conclusion, based on the credible
and uncontroverted opinion of Dr.
Hoch, I concur with the ALJ that the two
prescriptions for controlled substances
issued by Respondent to L.G. on
February 3, 2017, were not issued for a
legitimate medical purpose and were
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the State
of Florida. RD, at 80; Tr. 259.
3. L.G.’s August 30, 2017 Visit
On August 30, 2017, L.G. visited
Respondent in his capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the
instructions given to him by his DEA
handler. Tr. 96–97, 113. During the
visit, L.G. wore a recording device that
provided both audio and visual
recordings of the office visit and he
activated the device shortly before he
went into Respondent’s office. Tr. 97,
183. As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent approximately seven
minutes with L.G. GX 12 (Video
Recording from August 30, Encounter);
RD, at 45. The vast majority of that time
was spent on small talk and discussing
potential appointments for people L.G.
knew. GX 13 (Transcript of Recording
from August 30, Encounter).
At this visit, there was limited
discussion between L.G. and
Respondent regarding a new medical
concern. RD, at 35; GX 12; GX 13.
CS: . . . Can you, really quick, check my
knees right here, cause it’s discomfort—
Ouch, you saw, you heard?
Germeil: Let me see, let me see.
CS: It’s still in discomfort. . . .
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Germeil: Uh-huh. Yeah, you have arthritis,
bones against bones . . . . Listen, you have
to put [STUTTERS] a, uh, support. . . .
CS: Yeah, cause it’s always been in
discomfort.
Germeil: Uh-huh. Maybe you had a, a trauma
in this knee before? You, you hit—did you
hit it—somewhere? . . .
CS: I mean, I think so. . . .
Germeil: You have arthritis, the worst
arthritis . . . . [Y]ou need to put a, a
support, and then massage. Buy Bengay
GX 13, at 9–10. In response to the newly
identified knee problem, L.G. testified
that Respondent touched his knee; she
‘‘grabbed [his] knee [right on his
kneecap] with her two fingers and her
thumb, and for like no more than three
seconds, and she said [he] had
arthritis.’’ Tr. 143. L.G. further testified
that Respondent did not conduct ‘‘a
thorough physical exam.’’ Tr. at 115.
See also RD, at 81; GX 12.
In addition to the limited discussion
of his knee concern, L.G. stated during
this appointment that he was no longer
selling his pills. GX 13, at 4–5. Later in
the visit, Respondent seemed to advise
L.G. to ‘‘be careful with the
medications.’’ GX 13, at 7. L.G. also
explained to Respondent that the guys
he was selling to would like to become
Respondent’s patients and Respondent
told him to check with the front desk.
GX 13, at 4–5.
CS: Anyways—pss—[WHISPERING] I’m not
selling no more. I’m taking my own stuff.
Germeil: Okay. . . .
CS: . . . I was gonna mention it to you, if I
can, the guys that I was, whatever they
need to see a doctor. I don’t know if you
want new patients or you might need new
patients, because they want to get the
meds. . . . The [o]xycodone or
whatever. . . .
Germeil: You can, you can, you can ask [at
the front desk] if they have any, any, uh—
any, any spot . . . [f]or new patients.
CS: Yeah, they guys, okay the guys I was
selling to, but they are good people, they’re
reliable people. They won’t even miss their
appointments or nothing. They are good
people. . . .
Id.
Respondent wrote L.G. prescriptions
for controlled substances during the
visit (prior to touching L.G.’s knee). GX
19 (Prescriptions Issued to L.G. on
August 30); GX 12. The parties
stipulated that on August 30, 2017,
Respondent prescribed L.G. one
hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX 11, at
2; Tr. 9.
Prior to issuing the prescriptions on
August 30, 2017, there was no
discussion of the amount of L.G.’s pain.
GX 12. After receiving the prescriptions,
L.G. mentioned that he had
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‘‘discomfort’’ in his right knee, which
Respondent quickly looked at and
claimed was the result of arthritis. GX
13, at 9; Tr. 115; RD, at 45. L.G. testified
that Respondent did not conduct a
thorough physical exam. Tr. 115. For
most of the appointment, Respondent
sat on one side of an office desk and
L.G. sat across the desk from her. GX 13;
RD, at 81. Respondent also did not
discuss any medical conditions L.G.
had, did not discuss the side effects of
or adverse reactions to the medications
she was prescribing to L.G., did not
discuss other medications L.G. was on,
did not discuss L.G.’s diet or exercise.
Tr. 115–16. L.G. testified that the person
who took his vitals on August 30, 2017,
did not conduct a physical exam, ask
any question about his medical
conditions or ask about his pain. Tr.
113–14.
The ‘‘Plan’’ in Respondent’s records
on L.G. for the August 30, 2017, visit,
was identical to the plans for L.G.’s July
18, 2017, and February 3, 2017, visits;
and was nearly identical to the plan
sections purporting to capture Y.H.’s
three visits at issue in the case. Compare
RX 2, at 16, with RX 2, at 18 and 20,
and RX 1, at 19, 20, and 22. Once again,
the ‘‘Plan’’ stated that Respondent,
among other things, explained the side
effects of the medication, advised
regarding adverse reactions, discussed
lifestyle modifications to control weight
and blood pressure, and that a
‘‘[d]etail[ed] explanation was provided
about and against ‘shopping’ from
physician to physicians [sic] and the
harm (s) [sic] that can provoke.’’ RX 2,
at 16. According to the patient records,
‘‘[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in
this encounter,’’ and L.G.’s pain level
was ‘‘9.’’ Id.
Dr. Hoch opined that the two
prescriptions issued by Respondent to
L.G. on August 30, 2017, (namely one
hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage
units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued
outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the state
of Florida. Tr. 270–71; GX 19. In
support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch
explained that the plan differs from the
actual visit and discussion between
Respondent and L.G. Tr. 267–69.
Compare RX 2, at 16, with GX 12 and
GX 13. Dr. Hoch explained that
Respondent did not discuss side effects
or adverse reactions with L.G., fall
precautions, or the harms that occur by
shopping from physician to physician,
but those conversations are recorded in
the plan. Tr. 268–69. Dr. Hoch
explained that the plan Respondent
recorded for L.G.’s August 30, 2017 visit
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73797
was ‘‘identical’’ to the plan for L.G.’s
July 18, 2017, and February 3, 2017,
visits. Tr. 267–68. Compare RX 2, at 16,
with RX 2, at 18 and 20.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch’s expert
opinion was that the patient file was
insufficient to justify the oxycodone or
alprazolam prescriptions here. Tr. 267.
He also explained that the record was
not complete and accurate. Tr. 269. As
found above, per Dr. Hoch, this
combination of controlled substances is
a particular concern due to the risk of
respiratory depression, and Respondent
did not discuss those risks with L.G.
during this visit as was required. Tr.
247, 265–66.
Regarding diversion, Dr. Hoch
pointed out that once again at this visit,
L.G. informed Respondent that he had
been selling his medication. Tr. 266. Dr.
Hoch noted that Respondent did inform
L.G. that he needed to be careful with
the medications, but opined that the
statement was not sufficient to warn
L.G. of the dangers of diversion. Tr. 270.
Further, Dr. Hoch opined that
Respondent did not conduct a periodic
review of her treatment of L.G.’s
conditions before prescribing controlled
substances to him (let alone document
it in the medical record). Tr. 269. He
also opined that there was no indication
in the record that Respondent gave a
physical exam 28 or took a full and
complete medical history. Tr. 269.
In conclusion, and based on the
credible and uncontroverted testimony
of Dr. Hoch, I concur with the ALJ that
the two prescriptions for controlled
substances prescriptions issued by
Respondent to L.G. on August 30, 2017,
were not issued for a legitimate medical
purpose and were outside the usual
course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care
in the State of Florida. RD, at 83; Tr.
270–71. In summary, I find that the six
controlled substance prescriptions
Respondent issued to L.G., on February
3, 2017, July 18, 2017, and August 30,
2017, were issued outside of the usual
course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care
in the State of Florida.
28 Dr. Hoch testified that merely touching a knee
is insufficient for a doctor to determine that a
patient has arthritis. Tr. 330. To adequately conduct
a physical examination regarding knee pain, a
physician would ‘‘have to do flexion extension
exercises . . . palpate or examine the knee, press
it and try to find particular locations and then if
you[’re] very concerned . . . [t]his is where x-rays
and perhaps MRIs do come into play.’’ Tr. 329.
Thus, I agree with the ALJ’s finding that
Respondent’s touching of L.G.’s right knee on
August 30, 2017, did not constitute a sufficient
physical examination. RD, at 81.
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I. Allegation of Recordkeeping
Violations and Other State Law
Violations
The medical records at issue in this
case cover the six different encounters 29
discussed in detail above: Y.H.’s
encounters with Respondent on
September 8, 2016, October 12, 2016,
and January 25, 2017; and L.G.’s
encounters with Respondent on
February 3, 2017, July 18, 2017, and
August 30, 2017. See OSC; supra II.
According to Dr. Hoch’s credible and
uncontroverted testimony, the records
Respondent maintained for Y.H. and
L.G. do not document a complete
medical history, a physical examination,
or a periodic review as required by state
law. RD, at 50; Tr. 324, 338–39; RX 1;
RX 2. Based on Dr. Hoch’s testimony
and the record as a whole, I find that the
medical records for each of the six
encounters are insufficient, inaccurate,
and incomplete.
Consistent with the findings of the
ALJ and based on the uncontroverted
and credible testimony of Dr. Hoch, I
find that the ‘‘Plan’’ sections of the
patient records for each of the six
encounters at issue in this case are
identical (with the exception of Y.H.’s
January 25, 2017, plan which contains
one additional line regarding the need
for a drug test). Compare RX 1, at 19, 20,
22; and RX 2, at 16, 18, 20; see also Tr.
234, 236, 241, 250, 262, 267–68. All six
of the patient records document that
Respondent, among other things,
explained the side effects of the
medication, advised regarding adverse
reactions, discussed lifestyle
modifications to control weight and
blood pressure, discussed safety
precautions, and that a ‘‘[d]etail[ed]
explanation was provided about and
against ‘shopping’ from physician to
physicians [sic] and the harm (s) [sic]
that can provoke.’’ RX 1, at 19, 20, 22;
and RX 2, at 16, 18, 20. In contrast to
the patient records, I have found that
Respondent did not discuss the side
effects of the medication, adverse
reactions, lifestyle modifications to
control weight and blood pressure,
safety precautions, or shopping from
physician to physician during any of the
six encounters at issue. See supra and
GX 3, GX 5, GX 7, GX 9, GX 11, and GX
13. My finding is consistent with Dr.
Hoch’s testimony that the plan section
of the patient records does not bear any
resemblance to the actual visits and
discussions between Respondent and
the confidential sources. See Tr. 218,
29 Dr. Hoch explains that the word ‘‘encounter
refers to the direct encounter for the physician with
the patient,’’ and does not include time the patient
spent with a medical assistant. Tr. 303.
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241–42, 251–54, 263–64, 268–69. I agree
with the ALJ’s finding that ‘‘merely by
comparing the recordings made by both
Y.H. and L.G. when they met with
[Respondent] with her treatment notes,
it is readily obvious that the records
[Respondent] prepared do not
accurately report what happened during
those encounters.’’ RD, at 91.
Not only are the plans inaccurate, but
even if they were accurate, Dr. Hoch
opined that none of the plans explain
what the objectives are that the
Respondent was planning to use to
determine the success of her treatment.
Tr. 353. See also 230, 246. This is
because, as Dr. Hoch characterized it,
there was a ‘‘generic rehashing of the
same plan visit after visit’’ and the plans
fail to identify what Respondent was
‘‘doing for [any] particular problem.’’ Tr.
235.
I have found above that the patient
records for each of the six encounters at
issue reflect that ‘‘[a]proximately 60 min
was spent in [each] encounter.’’ RX 1, at
19, 20, 22; and RX 2, at 16, 18, 20. In
contrast to the patient records, I have
found that the lengthiest encounter at
issue in this matter was only
approximately ten minutes, and that
most of the encounters were around
seven to seven–and-a-half minutes long.
GX 2, GX 4, GX 6, GX 8, GX 10, and GX
12.
I have found above, based on the
record as a whole and Dr. Hoch’s
testimony, that Respondent did not
conduct a physical exam during any of
the six encounters and that none of
Respondent’s medical records reflect
that a physical exam was conducted at
any of the six encounters at issue. GX
2, GX 4, GX 6, GX 8, GX 10, and GX 12;
RX 1, at 19, 20, 22; and RX 2, at 16, 18,
20; Tr. 48–49, 54, 103, 109, 115, 230,
232, 242, 246, 269, 324, 339.
Additionally, I find, consistent with Dr.
Hoch’s testimony, that none of the
medical records at issue in this matter
reflect a complete medical history. Tr.
324. Additionally, I find, consistent
with Dr. Hoch’s testimony, that there
was no periodic review conducted at
any of the six encounters at issue here.
Tr. 230, 242, 246, 250, 262, 269.
Therefore, I agree with the ALJ and find
substantial evidence that Respondent
issued a total of twelve prescriptions to
two different CSs without maintaining
sufficient, accurate or complete records.
To summarize my findings above, I
agree with the ALJ and find substantial
evidence that Respondent issued these
twelve prescriptions for controlled
substances outside of the usual course
of professional practice and beneath the
standard of care in the State of Florida
in violation of federal and state law.
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III. Discussion
A. Allegation That Respondent’s
Registration is Inconsistent With the
Public Interest
Under Section 304 of the CSA, ‘‘[a]
registration . . . to . . . dispense a
controlled substance . . . may be
suspended or revoked by the Attorney
General upon a finding that the
registrant . . . has committed such acts
as would render his registration under
section 823 of this title inconsistent
with the public interest as determined
by such section.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In
the case of a ‘‘practitioner,’’ defined in
21 U.S.C. 802(21) to include a
‘‘physician,’’ Congress directed the
Attorney General to consider the
following factors in making the public
interest determination:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing . . . controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the . . .
distribution[ ] or dispensing of controlled
substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
21 U.S.C. 823(f). These factors are
considered in the disjunctive. Robert A.
Leslie, M.D., 68 F R 15,227, 15,230
(2003).
According to Agency decisions, I
‘‘may rely on any one or a combination
of factors and may give each factor the
weight [I] deem[ ] appropriate in
determining whether’’ to revoke a
registration. Id.; see also Jones Total
Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug
Enf’t Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th
Cir. 2018) (citing Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug
Enf’t Admin., 841 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir.
2016); MacKay v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011);
Volkman v. U. S. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009); Hoxie
v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 482
(6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, while I am
required to consider each of the factors,
I ‘‘need not make explicit findings as to
each one.’’ MacKay, 664 F.3d at 816
(quoting Volkman, 567 F.3d at 222); see
also Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482. ‘‘In short,
. . . the Agency is not required to
mechanically count up the factors and
determine how many favor the
Government and how many favor the
registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which
focuses on protecting the public
interest; what matters is the seriousness
of the registrant’s misconduct.’’ Jayam
Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 462
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(2009). Accordingly, as the Tenth
Circuit has recognized, findings under a
single factor can support the revocation
of a registration. MacKay, 664 F.3d at
821.
Under DEA’s regulation, ‘‘[a]t any
hearing for the revocation . . . of a
registration, the . . . [Government] shall
have the burden of proving that the
requirements for such revocation . . .
pursuant to . . . 21 U.S.C. [§ ] 824(a)
. . . are satisfied.’’ 21 CFR 1301.44(e).
In this matter, while I have considered
all of the factors, the relevant evidence
is confined to Factors One, Two and
Four. I find that the evidence satisfies
the Government’s prima facie burden of
showing that Respondent’s continued
registration would be ‘‘inconsistent with
the public interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).
I further find that Respondent failed to
produce sufficient evidence to rebut the
Government’s prima facie case.
1. Factors One and Three: The
Recommendation of the Appropriate
State Licensing Board or Professional
Disciplinary Authority and
Respondent’s Conviction Record Under
Federal or State Laws Relating to
Controlled Substances
Respondent suggests that Factor One
weighs in her favor because the parties
stipulated and the ALJ found that
Respondent holds a valid state medical
license in Florida. ALJX 28
(Respondent’s Posthearing Brief), at 11;
ALJX 11, at 1; RD, at 59.
In determining the public interest, the
‘‘recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority . . . shall be
considered.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(1). Two
forms of recommendations appear in
Agency decisions: (1) A
recommendation to DEA directly from a
state licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority (hereinafter,
appropriate state entity), which
explicitly addresses the granting or
retention of a DEA COR; and (2) the
appropriate state entity’s action
regarding the licensure under its
jurisdiction on the same matter that is
the basis for the DEA OSC. John O.
Dimowo, M.D., 85 FR 15,800, 15,810
(2020); see also Vincent J. Scolaro, D.O.,
67 FR 42,060, 42,065 (2002).
In this case, neither the State Board
nor any other state entity has made a
direct recommendation to the Agency
regarding whether the Respondent’s
registration should be suspended or
revoked; however, as previously
discussed, the State Board issued an
Order incorporating a Settlement
Agreement reached following an
Administrative Complaint filed by the
State of Florida Department of Health
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against Respondent based on
Respondent’s treatment of one patient,
M.N., between July 2013 and August
2015. RX 11, at 19. The Florida
allegations regarding Respondent’s
treatment of M.N. are similar 30 to the
facts I found above regarding
Respondent’s treatment of Y.H. and L.G
between 2016 and 2017; however, they
clearly do not constitute the same
matter as the facts alleged in the OSC
(they involved an entirely different
patient during a preceding timeframe).
See supra II(F).
I have much more evidence of
misconduct before me than the State
Board had at the time that it made its
decision. Further, the fact that the State
Board did not choose to revoke
Respondent’s state medical registration
carries minimal to no weight under
Factor One, because there is no
evidence that the State Board would
have made the same decision in the face
of the egregious conduct found herein
involving two further patients, who
were openly diverting their
prescriptions, after the State Board had
already disciplined Respondent for
similar behavior.31 Accordingly, the
terms of the State Board Order have
been considered, but I find that they
have no impact on the public interest
inquiry in this case. See John O.
Dimowo, M.D., 85 FR at 15,810.
As to Factor Three, the parties
stipulated that Respondent has never
been convicted of violating any federal
or state law relating to the manufacture,
distribution, or dispensing of controlled
substances. ALJX 19; Tr. 11. See also 21
U.S.C. 823(f)(3). However, as Agency
cases have noted, there are a number of
30 Respondent’s Posthearing Brief states: ‘‘In
January 2017, a complaint was filed against Dr.
Germeil before the Florida Board of Medicine for
allegations similar to the instant case.’’ ALJX 28, at
15. Additionally Respondent’s counsel stated in her
oral closing arguments, ‘‘the allegations, as you’ll
see, are similar in prescribing medication for not a
legitimate purpose and for medical records.’’ Tr.
489–90.
31 In Dimowo, the Acting Administrator found
that ‘‘[a]lthough statutory analysis [of the CSA] may
not definitively settle . . . [the breadth of the
cognizable state ‘recommendation’ referenced in
Factor One], the most impartial and reasonable
course of action is to continue to take into
consideration all actions indicating a
recommendation from an appropriate state;’’
however, Dimowo also limited the
‘‘recommendations’’ DEA would consider to the
‘‘actions of an appropriate state entity on the same
matters, particularly where it rendered an opinion
regarding the practitioner’s medical practice in the
state due to the same facts alleged in the DEA OSC.’’
John O. Dimowo, 85 FR at 15,810. Although the
same ‘‘matters’’ may include the same types of
violations, in this case, I have no indication that the
Board would have made a similar decision in the
face of these additional egregious violations and
continued misconduct. In fact, Respondent
specifically agreed in the settlement not to commit
further violations of law. RX 11, at 12.
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reasons why a person who has engaged
in criminal misconduct may never have
been convicted of an offense under this
factor, let alone prosecuted for one.
Dewey C. MacKay, M.D., 75 FR 49,956,
49,973 (2010). Agency cases have
therefore held that ‘‘the absence of such
a conviction is of considerably less
consequence in the public interest
inquiry’’ and is therefore not
dispositive. Id.
2. Factors Two and Four—the
Respondent’s Experience in Dispensing
Controlled Substances and Compliance
With Applicable Laws Related to
Controlled Substances
Respondent asks that I consider
evidence of her positive dispensing
experience. ALJX 28, at 12. In
evaluating Respondent’s dispensing
experience, I note that Respondent has
significant experience as a licensed
physician in Florida since October 2007,
and running her own medical practice
since 2011. RX 5, at 1. Respondent
claimed, without providing any
evidence to support the claim, that she
has treated ‘‘thousands of patients for
pain medicine, and there have been no
reported overdoses or deaths during that
period of time.’’ 32 Tr. 19. The Agency
assumes that all of the prescriptions
Respondent issued were issued
lawfully, except for those prescriptions
that the Government alleged and
established were issued unlawfully. See
Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 FR 14,944,
14,982–84 (2017). Respondent also
claimed, and included 38 unique letters
to patients as evidence, that she has
discharged patients who refused urine
testing. RX 8. However, Respondent’s
evidence shows that both Y.H. and L.G.
were ordered to take urine drug tests,
did not take those urine drug tests, and
did not receive discharge letters
(although they were not seen again). RX
1, at 13, 18; RX 3; RX 8; Tr. 405–06,
409–10, 413. Furthermore, even without
the urine drug tests, Respondent knew
that Y.H. and L.G. were not taking their
medication as prescribed because they
directly told her that they were
diverting the controlled substances.
Respondent’s handling of the two
confidential sources as found herein
demonstrates that her prescribing
practices fell short of the applicable
standard of care for twelve
32 I decline to consider that ‘‘no reported
overdoses or deaths’’ is an indicator of positive
dispensing experience and there is no legal
authority for the proposition that I must find death
or an overdose before I may suspend or revoke a
registration. Agency decisions have found that
‘‘diversion occurs whenever controlled substances
leave ‘the closed system of distribution established
by the CSA . . . .’’ Roy S. Schwartz, 79 FR 34,360,
34,363 (2014)).
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prescriptions. As I discuss further
below, Respondent failed to address
patient admissions of diversion, failed
to conduct physical exams, failed to
discuss the risks of controlled
substances, and falsified medical
records.
Factor four is demonstrated by
evidence that a registrant has not
complied with laws related to
controlled substances, including
violations of the CSA, DEA regulations,
or other state or local laws regulating
the prescribing of controlled substances.
(a) Allegation that Respondent Issued
Prescriptions for Controlled Substances
Outside the Usual Course of the
Professional Practice
According to the CSA’s implementing
regulations, a lawful prescription for
controlled substances is one that is
‘‘issued for a legitimate medical purpose
by an individual practitioner acting in
the usual course of his professional
practice.’’ 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The
Supreme Court has stated, in the context
of the CSA’s requirement that schedule
II controlled substances may be
dispensed only by written prescription,
that ‘‘the prescription requirement . . .
ensures patients use controlled
substances under the supervision of a
doctor so as to prevent addiction and
recreational abuse . . . [and] also bars
doctors from peddling to patients who
crave the drugs for those prohibited
uses.’’ Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 274 (2006).
As I have found, in agreement with
the RD and based on the credible expert
testimony of Dr. Hoch, Florida
regulations require that a doctor: Take a
complete medical history and conduct a
physical examination 33 before issuing a
prescription for a controlled substance;
develop a written treatment plan;
discuss the risks and benefits of
controlled substances with a patient;
and maintain complete and accurate
records with respect to a patient. RD, at
9; Tr. 205–06, 338. Additionally, a
physician is required to conduct a
periodic review of the course of
treatment provided to a patient. RD, at
50; Tr. 337–38.
33 The Florida Code does not define what
constitutes a physical exam and does not
necessarily require that a physician conduct a
physical examination of a patient each time the
patient presents for an appointment. RD, at 50; Tr.
289. However, Dr. Hoch opined that the standard
of care requires a physician to perform a physical
examination in certain circumstances including
when the patient requests a higher dose of
controlled substances, presents with new symptoms
or complaints, has a new diagnosis, or hasn’t been
seen for a period of months. See Tr. 290, 341–42,
345–46.
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Based on the credible and
uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Hoch,
and in agreement with the RD, I find
that Respondent issued a total of twelve
prescriptions outside of the usual course
of professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the State
of Florida in violation of 21 CFR
1306.04(a). RD, at 92.
i. Failure To Address Patients’
Admissions of Diversion
The Florida Code provides that
‘‘[p]hysicians should be diligent in
preventing the diversion of drugs for
illegitimate purposes.’’ Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B8–9.013(1)(d) (West 2020).
Dr. Hoch explained that when a patient
tells a doctor that he or she is diverting
his or her controlled substances that
statement ‘‘is a very big red flag that has
to be addressed at that moment.’’ Tr.
224–25; RD, at 51. In fact, Dr. Hoch
stated that if a patient tells a doctor that
he or she is selling or giving away
controlled substances, ‘‘that’s sort of a
deal breaker . . . .’’ Tr. 351. In other
words, as I found above the standard of
care in Florida requires that a physician
stop writing prescriptions for a patient
following statements from the patient
that are consistent with diversion. See
supra, II(E).
I have found above that each of the
CIs admitted to having engaged in
diversion at each of the six encounters
at issue in this matter. Y.H. clearly
admitted to Respondent that she had
been selling at least some of her pills to
her brother on September 8, 2016,
October 12, 2016, and January 25, 2017.
GX 3, at 17, 19; GX 5, 13 12–13; GX 7,
at 4, 6, 9–11. Yet, as I have found,
Respondent did not advise Y.H. not to
sell her controlled substances or
otherwise engage in any meaningful
conversation about diversion with Y.H.
See RD, at 68, 71, 73. In fact, on October
12, 2016, Respondent clearly
acknowledged Y.H.’s admission of
diversion and seems to have even
condoned the conduct. See supra,
II(G)(2); GX 5, at 12–13. And on January
25, 2017, Respondent replied to Y.H.’s
admission of selling pills by reassuring
Y.H. that she was a good person. GX 7,
at 9–11. The only counseling
Respondent did with Y.H. regarding
diversion was to warn Y.H. not to tell
anyone that Respondent was helping
her out because Respondent ‘‘d[idn’t]
want to . . . get into trouble.’’ Id. at 11.
L.G. also clearly admitted to
Respondent that he had been selling at
least some of his pills to people on
February 3, 2017, July 18, 2017, and
August 30, 2017. GX 9, at 7–8, 11–13;
GX 11, at 2–3, 6; GX 13, at 4–5. Yet, as
I have found above, Respondent did not
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engage in any meaningful conversation
about diversion with L.G. either. See
supra, II(H); RD, at 76, 79. Respondent
did discuss diversion in greater detail
with L.G. than she did with Y.H., and
Respondent did provide warnings to
L.G. at each of the three encounters
including: That he needed to ‘‘try to
keep [his medication] for himself,’’ GX
9, at 12; that ‘‘[he] cannot sell [the
scripts because] [t]hat’s a controlled
medication,’’ GX 11, at 3; and that he
should ‘‘be careful with the
medications.’’ GX 13, at 7. However,
Respondent issued prescriptions to L.G.
immediately following these warnings,
which renders her comments
perfunctory. See RD, at 80.
Dr. Hoch opined that each of the
twelve prescriptions at issue in this case
were issued without a legitimate
medical purpose because diversion was
not appropriately addressed at any of
the six visits in this case.34 See Tr. 224,
231, 243–44, 256–57, 259, 270. Indeed,
the confidential sources admitted to
having engaged in diversion during each
of the six visits and the parties have
stipulated that prescriptions were
issued during each of the six visits.
For all of these reasons, I find that
Respondent violated federal law and
Florida Administrative Code § 64B8–
9.013(1)(d) by prescribing controlled
substances to Y.H. and L.G. in spite of
their admitting to engaging in diversion
immediately prior to the issuance of the
prescriptions.
ii. Failure To Conduct Physical
Examinations
As I found above based on Dr. Hoch’s
testimony, the State of Florida requires
that, when prescribing controlled
34 The ALJ found that diversion was not properly
addressed at only five of the encounters. We both
found that the prescriptions issued by Respondent
to L.G. were not issued for a legitimate medical
purpose on August 30. 2017; however, the ALJ
found that Respondent did not have any obligation
during this visit to address L.G.’s diversion, because
L.G. stated that he was no longer selling pills and
that the people he was selling pills to wanted to
become patients. RD, at 81–82. I agree that L.G.’s
statements indicate that he did not plan to engage
in diversion in the future, however L.G. did still
admit that he had engaged in diversion of
Respondent’s prescriptions in the past. Dr. Hoch
seemed to be fully aware that L.G. was admitting
to past diversion (stating, ‘‘[t]he CS or patient
informs the doctor that he was selling the
medication . . .’’ Tr. 266 (emphasis added), when
he opined that Respondent’s discussion of the
dangers of diversion at the August 30, 2017,
encounter were insufficient and that the
prescriptions that followed were not issued in the
usual course of professional practice. Tr. 270. I see
no reason to stray from Dr. Hoch’s credible and
uncontroverted opinion. Further, the fact that the
former customers of L.G. who previously obtained
controlled substances unlawfully might visit
Respondent to obtain controlled substances directly
from Respondent hardly seems to address the
diversion issue.
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substances for pain, a ‘‘physical
examination must be conducted and
documented in the medical record.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(a) (West
2020); supra, II(E). According to Dr.
Hoch, the Florida Code does not define
what constitutes an initial physical
exam and does not necessarily require
that a physician conduct a physical
examination of a patient each time the
patient presents for an appointment. RD,
at 50; Tr. 289. However, Dr. Hoch
opined that the standard of care requires
a physician to perform a follow up
physical examination in certain
circumstances including when the
patient requests a higher dose of
controlled substances, presents with
new symptoms or complaints, has a new
diagnosis, or has not been seen for a
period of months. See Tr. 290, 341–42,
345–46.
I found above that Respondent did not
conduct a physical exam during any of
the confidential sources’ six visits.35 See
supra, II(I); Tr. 230, 232, 242, 246, 269,
324, 339. Not only did the confidential
sources credibly testify that no physical
examination was conducted during their
respective encounters, see Tr. 48–49, 54,
59, 104, 109, 115, but Dr. Hoch’s
uncontroverted testimony was that there
was no indication in the record
(including the video evidence) that
Respondent performed a physical exam
during the six visits. Tr. 227, 230, 242,
249, 261, 269, 338–39. I find that
Respondent’s failure to perform a
physical exam during any of the six
visits in this matter violates the
standard of care.
The record in the evidence establishes
that Respondent never performed a
physical examination on Y.H.36 RD, at
22; Tr. 92. Additionally, Dr. Hoch
opined that, even if an initial physical
examination had been performed,
Respondent would have been required
to give a new physical examination to
Y.H. on September 8, 2016, to justify the
40% increase in oxycodone HCL 30 mg.
that Respondent prescribed. RD, at 25;
Tr. 339–342.
Similarly, there is no indication in the
record that Respondent ever performed
a physical examination of L.G.37 RD, at
79; RX 2, at 16, 18, 20–22. Additionally,
Dr. Hoch opined that, even if an initial
35 In fact, the ‘‘objective’’ section of each and
every one of the patient records Respondent
introduced into evidence was empty. See RX 1, and
RX 2. Dr. Hoch testified that the ‘‘objective’’ section
is where a doctor should identify her objective
findings based on a physical examination. RD, at
51; Tr. 212. Based on the records and Dr. Hoch’s
testimony, it is fair to conclude that Respondent
never conducted a physical exam of either
confidential source.
36 See supra n.19.
37 See supra n.27.
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physical examination had been
performed, Respondent would have
been required to give a new physical
examination to L.G. on February 3,
2017, because of the new diagnosis of
chronic back pain on that date. Tr. 345–
46. Per Dr. Hoch a new physical
examination would also have been
required on both February 3, 2017, and
July 18, 2017, because it had been over
five months between Respondent’s
prescriptions to L.G. for controlled
substances for pain and the delay in
treatment gives rise to the question of
whether L.G. had such severe pain that
he needed the controlled substances to
relieve his pain. RD, at 37, 43, 76, 79;
Tr. 345–48.
For all these reasons, I find that
Respondent violated Florida
Administrative Code § 64B8–9.013 and
issued prescriptions outside the usual
course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care
by prescribing controlled substances for
pain without conducting a physical
exam.
iii. Failure To Discuss Risk of
Controlled Substances With Patients
In accordance with Dr. Hoch’s
opinion, I found above that the State of
Florida requires that a doctor discuss
the risks and benefits of controlled
substances with a patient. See supra,
II(E); RD, at 9; Tr. 205–06; Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(c) (West 2020).
Here Respondent prescribed each
confidential source both oxycodone 30
mg., which Dr. Hoch stated is a very
strong dose, and alprazolam 2 mg.,
which Dr. Hoch stated is a very strong
dose, during each of the six encounters
at issue in this case (for a total of twelve
prescriptions). RX 1, at 16; RX 2, at 14;
Tr. 219, 222.
Dr. Hoch explained that the
oxycodone prescription alone can cause
a number of side effects that Respondent
did not discuss with Y.H. Tr. 220–221.
Some of the less disabling side effects of
opioid use include pruritus or itching,
urinary retention, nausea and vomiting,
and constipation. Tr. 220–221. Dr. Hoch
explained that ‘‘the most devastating
complication or side effect of an opioid
[like oxycodone] is respiratory
depression, and that’s what kills
people.’’ Tr. 221–222. Dr. Hoch
explained that the risk is particularly
high where, as here, the opioid is
prescribed with a drug like alprazolam.
Tr. 222.
In light of the medications prescribed,
Dr. Hoch opined that Respondent was
required to warn of the risk of side
effects including respiratory depression
and instruct the patient to make sure
there was at least a three-to-four hour
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73801
gap between administering the two
different medications. Id. Based on Dr.
Hoch’s credible and uncontroverted
opinion, I find that there was no
discussion of the risks of using these
controlled substances (much less the
risk of respiratory depression that can
occur when using them together) at any
of the six encounters. Tr. 222, 230, 232,
237–38, 241, 247, 251, 258–59, 263, and
268.
Another example of Respondent’s
failure to discuss the risks of using
controlled substances occurred when
L.G. informed Respondent he drinks
alcohol. Tr. 255. According to Dr. Hoch,
when a physician learns that a patient
could be drinking while being
prescribed a high dose opioid and
benzodiazepine, the patient ‘‘should be
warned very strongly’’ that the
medications and alcohol should not be
taken together. Tr. 255. According to Dr.
Hoch, ‘‘[w]hen [patients] tell you that
they’re drinking, that’s a huge issue for
their safety.’’ Tr. 256. Dr. Hoch opined
that on February 3, 2017, L.G. informed
Respondent that he drinks alcohol,
Respondent was required to warn L.G.
of the risks of taking the prescribed
controlled substances with alcohol, and
Respondent failed to issue the required
warning. Tr. 255–56.
For all these reasons, I find that
Respondent violated Florida
Administrative Code § 64B8–9.013 and
issued prescriptions outside of the usual
course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care
by failing to discuss the risks of using
the prescribed controlled substances
with Y.H. and L.G.
In light of the above, the ALJ found,
and I agree, that Respondent issued a
total of twelve prescriptions outside of
the usual course of professional practice
and beneath the applicable standard of
care in the State of Florida. RD, at 92.
iv. Recordkeeping Violations
Florida Administrative Code, Rule
64B8–9.013 lays out a physician’s
responsibilities when prescribing
controlled substances for pain
management.38 See supra, II(E); RD, at 9;
Tr. 203–05. With regard to medical
records, the Florida Administrative
Code provides that a physician is
required to ‘‘keep accurate and complete
38 Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013 provides
guidelines that are authoritative on physicians in
Florida; however, ‘‘[t]he Board will not take
disciplinary action against a physician for failing to
adhere strictly to the provisions of these standards,
if good cause is shown for such deviation.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(1)(f) (West 2020); see
also RD, at 9; Tr. 272, 280–81.
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medical records’’ to include, but not be
limited to:
—‘‘The complete medical history and a
physical examination, including history of
drug abuse or dependence as appropriate.’’
Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(f)(1)
(West 2020).
—‘‘Treatment objectives.’’ Fla. Admin. Code
r. 64B8–9.013(3)(f)(4) (West 2020).
—‘‘[D]iscussion of risks and benefits.’’ Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(f)(5) (West
2020).
—‘‘Periodic reviews. Records must remain
current, maintained in an accessible
manner, readily available for review, and
must be in full compliance with Rule
64B8–9.003 . . . .’’ Fla. Admin. Code r.
64B8–9.013(3)(f)(10) (West 2020).
Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–9.013(3)(f)
(West 2020) (emphasis added).
Additionally, a physician’s ‘‘medical
record shall contain sufficient
information to identify the patient,
support the diagnosis, justify the
treatment and document the course and
results of treatment accurately, by
including, at a minimum, patient
histories; examination results; test
results; records of drugs prescribed
. . . .’’ Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8–
9.003(3) (West 2020) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Florida Statute provides
that the ‘‘following acts constitute
grounds for denial of a license or
disciplinary action . . .: Failing to keep
legible . . . medical records . . . that
justify the course of treatment of the
patient, including, but not limited to,
patient histories; examination results;
test results; records of drugs prescribed,
dispensed, or administered; and reports
of consultations and hospitalizations.’’
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.331(1)(m) (West
2020).
Dr. Hoch testified that the ‘‘plan’’
portion of Respondent’s records was
where Respondent should have
provided ‘‘a justification as to why [she]
was doing what [she was] doing’’ with
regards to her treatment of a patient. Tr.
212. Dr. Hoch further opined that the
‘‘plans’’ contained in Respondent’s
medical records concerning L.G. and
Y.H. are not plans in so far as they did
not contain any objective standards by
which treatment success could be
measured. Tr. 335–36, 353. In light of
Dr. Hoch’s testimony, I find that the
Respondent’s records were insufficient
to meet the requirements set by the State
of Florida. Dr. Hoch also testified that
the plans do not bear any resemblance
to the recorded corresponding visits
they were meant to document. Tr. 218.
In fact, the ALJ found, and I agree, that
merely by comparing the recordings
made by both Y.H. and L.G. when they
met with Respondent with the treatment
notes, it is readily obvious that the
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records that Respondent prepared do
not accurately report what happened
during these encounters. RD, at 91. I
therefore find that Respondent did not
maintain the records required by the
State of Florida. In fact, Respondent
admitted as much in her Posthearing
Brief, stating ‘‘that her medical records
for Y.H. and L.G. were not complete and
accurate.’’ ALJX 28, at 15. Therefore, I
find, consistent with the ALJ and Dr.
Hoch’s testimony, that in failing to keep
sufficient and accurate records as
required by the State of Florida,
Respondent violated Florida
Administrative Code § 64B8–9.013 and
9.003.
The Government further alleged that
Respondent violated the state law by
‘‘falsif[ying] numerous patient records
in order to conceal [her] illegal
prescribing.’’ OSC, at 2. More
specifically, the OSC alleged that
Respondent falsified her records by
documenting that 60 minutes was spent
on each encounter when none of the
encounters exceeded 15 minutes and by
documenting that she discussed side
effects, adverse reactions, safety
precautions and the risks of physician
shopping, when ‘‘those issues were
never discussed.’’ OSC, at 9; see also
RD, at 83.
To support the allegation that
Respondent’s recordkeeping was
fraudulent, the Government points to
the Administrative Complaint filed
against Respondent by the State of
Florida. ALJX 27 (Gov Posthearing
Brief), at 29. The Government states
that, regardless of the merits of the
allegations contained in the
Administrative Complaint, it clearly put
Respondent on notice ‘‘no later than
January 2017 that the standard of care
required her to discontinue prescribing
controlled substances to patients
engaged in diversion and required her to
properly maintain medical records.’’
ALJX 27 (Gov Posthearing), at 30.
Despite this notice, Respondent
continued to issue prescriptions for
controlled substances to Y.H. and L.G,
without maintaining proper records in
violation of the relevant standard of care
and Florida law.
The ALJ found, and I agree, that not
only do Respondent’s medical records
for Y.H. and L.G. fail to contain the
minimum information required under
Florida law, they also clearly report
events that did not occur during the
medical appointments. RD, at 91. DEA
has recognized that the falsification of
medical records creates a ‘‘fair
inference’’ that a prescriber is issuing
prescriptions ‘‘outside the usual course
of professional practice and lacked a
legitimate medical purpose.’’ Syed
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Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 FR 42,962,
42,964 (2015). Here, the ALJ found, and
I agree, that Respondent falsified the
medical records of Y.H. and L.G., and
that these false entries allow for the fair
inference that Respondent acted outside
of the usual course of professional
practice and beneath the standard of
care in the State of Florida in issuing the
twelve prescriptions to Y.H. and L.G.
RD, at 91–92.
For all these reasons, I find that
Respondent violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a),
Florida Statute § 458.331(1)(m), and
Florida Administrative Code §§ 64B8–
9.013 and 64B8–9.003, by falsifying
patient records.
In total, I find that the Government
has proven by substantial evidence that
Respondent issued twelve controlled
substance prescriptions without a
legitimate medical purpose and outside
of the usual course of professional
practice and beneath the applicable
standard of care in the State of Florida
in violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a),
Florida Statute § 458.331(1)(m), and
Florida Administrative Code §§ 64B8–
9.013 and 64B8–9.003. Overall, I find
that the Government has established a
prima facie case that Respondent’s
continued registration is inconsistent
with the public interest.
B. Summary of Factors Two and Four
and Imminent Danger
As found above, the Government’s
case establishes by substantial evidence
that Respondent issued controlled
substance prescriptions outside the
usual course of the professional
practice. I, therefore, conclude that
Respondent engaged in misconduct
which supports the revocation of her
registration. See Wesley Pope, 82 FR
14,944, 14,985 (2017).
For purposes of the imminent danger
inquiry, my findings also lead to the
conclusion that Respondent has
‘‘fail[ed] . . . to maintain effective
controls against diversion or otherwise
comply with the obligations of a
registrant’’ under the CSA. 21 U.S.C.
824(d)(2). The substantial evidence that
Respondent issued controlled substance
prescriptions outside the usual course of
the professional practice establishes ‘‘a
substantial likelihood of an immediate
threat that death, serious bodily harm,
or abuse of a controlled substance . . .
[would] occur in the absence of the
immediate suspension’’ of Respondent’s
registration. Id.; see e.g., Tr. 256
(opinion of the Government’s expert, Dr.
Hoch, that Respondent was prescribing
‘‘potentially deadly’’ medications); Tr.
221–22 (opinion of Dr. Hoch that using
‘‘an opioid [can result in] respiratory
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depression, and that’s what kills
people’’).
Not only was Respondent prescribing
a ‘‘potentially deadly’’ combination of
medications to confidential sources
without properly warning them of the
risks associated with taking those
controlled substances, but, Respondent
continued writing the prescriptions after
the confidential sources admitted to
diverting these ‘‘potentially deadly’’
controlled substances. See supra,
III(A)(2)(a)(i) and (iii); Tr. 221.
According to Dr. Hoch, when a patient
diverts medication ‘‘that’s a huge issue
for the community at large.’’ Tr. 256.
Thus, as I have found above, at the
time the Government issued the OSC/
ISO, the Government had clear evidence
of violations of law based on the two
confidential sources, who had been
unlawfully prescribed controlled
substances, with no physical exam, with
no explanation of the risks associated
with the potentially deadly combination
of controlled substances, and after the
confidential sources had admitted to
diverting the prescriptions.
IV. Sanction
Where, as here, the Government has
met its prima facie burden of showing
that Respondent’s continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest,
the burden shifts to the Respondent to
show why she can be entrusted with a
registration. Garrett Howard Smith,
M.D., 83 FR 18,882, 18,910 (2018)
(collecting cases). Respondent has made
little to no effort to establish that she
can be trusted with a registration.
The CSA authorizes the Attorney
General to ‘‘promulgate and enforce any
rules, regulations, and procedures
which he may deem necessary and
appropriate for the efficient execution of
his functions under this subchapter.’’ 21
U.S.C. 871(b). This authority
specifically relates ‘‘to ‘registration’ and
‘control,’ and ‘for the efficient execution
of his functions’ under the statute.’’
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259
(2006). A clear purpose of this authority
is to ‘‘bar[ ] doctors from using their
prescription-writing powers as a means
to engage in illicit drug dealing and
trafficking.’’ Id. at 270.
In efficiently executing the revocation
and suspension authority delegated to
me under the CSA for the
aforementioned purposes, I review the
evidence and argument Respondent
submitted to determine whether or not
she has presented ‘‘sufficient mitigating
evidence to assure the Administrator
that [she] can be trusted with the
responsibility carried by such a
registration.’’ Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S.,
72 FR 23,848, 23,853 (2007) (quoting
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Jkt 253001
Leo R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR 21,931,
21,932 (1988)). ‘‘‘Moreover, because
‘‘past performance is the best predictor
of future performance,’’ ALRA Labs, Inc.
v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995),
[the Agency] has repeatedly held that
where a registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, the
registrant must accept responsibility for
[the registrant’s] actions and
demonstrate that [registrant] will not
engage in future misconduct.’ ’’ Jayam
Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 463 (2009)
(quoting Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR 364,
387 (2008)); see also Jackson, 72 FR at
23,853; John H. Kennnedy, M.D., 71 FR
35,705, 35,709 (2006); Prince George
Daniels, D.D.S., 60 FR 62,884, 62,887
(1995).
The issue of trust is necessarily a factdependent determination based on the
circumstances presented by the
individual respondent; therefore, the
Agency looks at factors, such as the
acceptance of responsibility and the
credibility of that acceptance as it
relates to the probability of repeat
violations or behavior and the nature of
the misconduct that forms the basis for
sanction, while also considering the
Agency’s interest in deterring similar
acts. See Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR
8247, 8248 (2016).
In evaluating the degree required of a
respondent’s acceptance of
responsibility to entrust him with a
registration, in Mohammed Asgar, M.D.,
83 FR 29,569, 29,572 (2018), the Agency
looked for ‘‘unequivocal acceptance of
responsibility when a respondent has
committed knowing or intentional
misconduct.’’ Id. (citing Lon F.
Alexander, M.D., 82 FR 49,704, 49,728).
In this case, Respondent made
statements to the confidential sources
during their encounters that I believe
demonstrate that she knew it was
unlawful to prescribe controlled
substances after the confidential sources
had admitted to diversion. For example,
on January 25, 2017, Y.H. told
Respondent how much the prescriptions
helped her out (in connection with her
need to sell pills to make money) and
Respondent replied, ‘‘Relax! Do not say
that to nobody . . . . I don’t want to
. . . get into trouble.’’ 39 GX 7, at 10–11.
Additionally, the State of Florida
Administrative Complaint,40 clearly
39 Additional examples include Respondent’s
statement on July 8, 2017, that if L.G. sells his
medication then Respondent cannot give him
medication. GX 11, at 3 and 6. And during the same
appointment Respondent tried to cover herself by
stating that she knew L.G. was just joking and really
did not sell his medication. GX 11, at 8.
40 Respondent seems to have received the
Administrative Complaint on or about January 20–
23, 2017, but certainly received it no later than
PO 00000
Frm 00134
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
73803
notified Respondent that the
professional standard of care required
that Respondent discontinue prescribing
scheduled medications upon learning
that a patient was sharing medications.
RX 11, at 19. The ALJ found, and I
agree, ‘‘it is clear that when
[Respondent] issued prescriptions to
Y.H. and L.G. after they told her they
were selling their prescriptions, her
actions constituted a knowing diversion
of oxycodone HCL and alprazolam.’’ RD,
at 100.
But there is no clear acceptance of
responsibility in the record. Here,
Respondent did not testify on her own
behalf, and did not attempt to explain
why, in spite of her egregious
misconduct, she can be entrusted with
a registration.41 Such silence weighs
against the Respondent’s continued
registration. Zvi H. Perper, M.D., 77 FR
64,131, at 64,142 (citing Medicine
Shoppe, 73 FR at 387); see also Samuel
S. Jackson, 72 FR at 23,853.
Respondent argued, that even though
she did not testify in this case, her
actions showed her acceptance of
responsibility. ALJX 28, at 15.
Respondent claimed that she updated
the practice’s procedures and
equipment, completed continuing
education courses, and discharged
patients who refused to submit to urine
drug screening.42 Id.; RD, at 105. ‘‘The
degree of acceptance of responsibility
that is required does not hinge on the
respondent uttering ‘‘magic words’’ of
repentance, but rather on whether the
respondent has credibly and candidly
demonstrated that [s]he will not repeat
the same behavior and endanger the
public in a manner that instills
confidence in the Administrator.’’
Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46,968, 49,973
(2019). In this case, Respondent has not
issued any words of repentance or
acceptance of responsibility, because
she has not testified, nor has she made
any admissions of fault. As such, I
cannot trust that Respondent would not
repeat her behavior. See MacKay, 664
F.3d at 820 (upholding the Agency’s
finding that a respondent’s failure to
testify warranted an adverse inference,
February 8, 2017, when she signed the Settlement
Agreement. See RX 11, at 15, 24.
41 In Zvi H. Perper, the Respondent did not testify
in this proceeding; therefore, the Agency found, ‘‘he
neither took responsibility for his misconduct nor
provided any assurances that he has implemented
remedial measures to ensure such conduct is not
repeated.’’ Zvi H. Perper, M.D., 77 FR 64,131, at
64,142.
42 The continuing education courses were
required by Respondent’s Settlement Agreement
and the remaining actions appear to have been
related to the Settlement Agreement’s requirement
to engage a risk manager to conduct a quality
assurance consultation or risk management
assessment. See RX 11, at 10–12; Tr. at 385–386.
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 224 / Thursday, November 19, 2020 / Notices
because there was ‘‘no evidence that
[respondent] recognized the extent of
his misconduct and was prepared to
remedy his prescribing practices’’); see
also T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 FR 57,133
(2012) (stating that ‘‘it is appropriate to
draw an adverse inference from
Respondent’s failure to testify.’’).
Indeed, the facts on the record
irrefutably demonstrate that Respondent
cannot be entrusted to amend her
behavior. The State of Florida
Administrative Complaint, dated
January 20, 2017, notified Respondent
that she should discontinue prescribing
after learning that a patient is diverting.
RX 11, at 19. Days later, on January 25,
2017, Respondent prescribed to Y.H.
following an admission of diversion.
See supra II(G)(3). On or about February
8, 2017, Respondent signed a Settlement
Agreement (which became a Final Order
on April 21, 2017), wherein Respondent
agreed to not violate Chapters 456, 458
or 893 of the Florida Statutes or any
other state or federal law relating to the
practice of medicine. RX 11, at 15. Yet,
on both July 18, 2017, and on August
30, 2017, Respondent violated those
laws when she again issued
prescriptions (this time to L.G.)
following an admission of diversion.
See supra II(H)(2) and (3).
The Agency also looks to the
egregiousness and extent of the
misconduct which are significant factors
in determining the appropriate sanction.
Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR at
18,910 (collecting cases). In this case, I
agree with the ALJ that Respondent’s
actions can be characterized as
‘‘particularly egregious.’’ RD, at 100. On
six separate occasions over an elevenmonth period, Respondent issued
twelve prescriptions to confidential
sources without having conducted a
physical exam or warning of the
potential risks in violation of state law.
Supra III(A)(2)(a); RD, at 104.
Furthermore, Respondent issued
prescriptions to the confidential sources
immediately after those confidential
sources admitted to diverting the
medication. Supra III(A)(2)(a)(i); Tr.
221. As a separate matter, the medical
records that Respondent maintained on
the confidential sources not only
contained false information, but they
did not document any physical
examinations, medical history, or
periodic reviews. See supra II(I). I agree
with the ALJ’s finding ‘‘that
[Respondent’s] misconduct of diversion
and falsifying records to cover it up, as
proven in the Administrative Record, is
egregious and supports the revocation of
her registration.’’ RD, at 104.
In sanction determinations, the
Agency has historically considered its
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19:40 Nov 18, 2020
Jkt 253001
interest in deterring similar acts, both
with respect to the respondent in a
particular case and the community of
registrants. See Joseph Gaudio, M.D., 74
FR 10,083, 10,095 (2009); Singh, 81 FR
at 8248. I agree with the ALJ who found
‘‘that considerations of both specific and
general deterrence weigh in favor of
revocation in this case.’’ RD, at 105.
There is simply no evidence that
Respondent’s egregious behavior is not
likely to recur in the future such that I
can entrust her with a CSA registration;
in other words, the factors weigh in
favor of revocation as a sanction.
I will therefore order that
Respondent’s registration be revoked
and that any pending applications be
denied as contained in the Order below.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate
of Registration No. FG0560765 issued to
Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. Further,
pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(f), I hereby deny any pending
application of Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D.
to renew or modify this registration, as
well as any other pending application of
Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. for registration
in Florida. This Order is effective
December 21, 2020.
Timothy J. Shea,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2020–25528 Filed 11–18–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Hil Rizvi, M.D.; Decision and Order
On July 20, 2020, the Assistant
Administrator, Diversion Control
Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration (hereinafter,
Government), issued an Order to Show
Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Hil Rizvi,
M.D. (hereinafter, Registrant) of Tyrone,
Pennsylvania. OSC, at 1, 3. The OSC
proposed the revocation of Registrant’s
Certificate of Registration No.
BR4988599. It alleged that Registrant is
without ‘‘authority to handle controlled
substances in Pennsylvania, the state in
which [Registrant is] registered with
DEA.’’ Id. at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f)
and 824(a)(3)).
Specifically, the OSC alleged that the
Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine
(hereinafter, the Board) revoked
Registrant’s license to practice medicine
PO 00000
Frm 00135
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
effective October 28, 2018.1 Id. The OSC
concluded that ‘‘DEA must revoke
[Registrant’s] DEA registration based on
[his] lack of authority to handle
controlled substances in the State of
Pennsylvania.’’ Id. at 2.
The OSC notified Registrant of the
right to request a hearing on the
allegations or to submit a written
statement, while waiving the right to a
hearing, the procedures for electing each
option, and the consequences for failing
to elect either option. Id. (citing 21 CFR
1301.43). The OSC also notified
Registrant of the opportunity to submit
a corrective action plan. Id. at 3 (citing
21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)).
Adequacy of Service
In a Declaration dated August 20,
2020, the Chief of Police for the Borough
of Tyrone Police Department, stated that
on July 22, 2020, he, another police
officer, and two DEA Diversion
Investigators (hereinafter, DIs) traveled
to Registrant’s registered address located
at 910 Pennsylvania Avenue, Tyrone,
PA 16686. Request for Final Agency
Action dated July 10, 2019 (hereinafter,
RFAA), Exhibit (hereinafter, RFAAX) 8,
at 2 (Chief of Police’s Declaration). The
Chief of Police stated that upon arrival
at the registered address, ‘‘[he] knocked
repeatedly on the office door to no
response.’’ Id. The team then proceeded
to Registrant’s residence and again,
‘‘knock[ed] repeatedly on the front door
of the residence,’’ but there was no
answer. Id. The Chief of Police then
stated that ‘‘[a]fter unsuccessful
attempts at reaching [Registrant] on his
landline and cell telephone numbers,
[he] left [his] business card in the front
door slot of the residence.’’ Id. Later that
afternoon, the Chief of Police received a
phone call from Registrant at the
telephone number on his business card.
Id. at 3. The Chief of Police stated that
he had a letter to deliver, but Registrant
‘‘insisted’’ that he was not in town
‘‘despite placing a call to [the Chief of
Police] at the business card [he] left at
the residence earlier that day.’’ Id.
Following the phone call, the Chief of
Police ‘‘immediately returned to
[Registrant’s] office location. When [he]
knocked on the front door of the office,
[Registrant] answered. [He] then handed
the envelope containing the [OSC] to
[Registrant] and left the premises.’’ Id.
The DEA DI assigned to the case
stated that ‘‘[s]tarting immediately after
his July 22, 2020 receipt of the [OSC],
and on several occasions since, [the DI
has] received numerous calls and an
1 It is noted that the effective date of the Order
was September 12, 2018. See Request for Final
Agency Action, at 1 n.1; Exhibit 3, at 12.
E:\FR\FM\19NON1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 224 (Thursday, November 19, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 73786-73804]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-25528]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. Decision and Order
On March 5, 2018, a former Acting Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (hereinafter, DEA or Government), issued an
Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration
(hereinafter, collectively OSC) to Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D.,
(hereinafter, Respondent). Administrative Law Judge Exhibit
(hereinafter, ALJX) 1 (Order to Show Cause), at 1. The OSC informed
Respondent of the immediate suspension of her Certificate of
Registration No. FG0560765 pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(d), because her
continued registration constituted an imminent danger to the public
health and safety. Id. The OSC also proposed the revocation of
Respondent's Certificate of Registration (hereinafter, registration)
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4), ``because [her] continued registration
is inconsistent with the public interest . . . .'' Id. (citing 21
U.S.C. 823(f)).
I. Procedural History
Specifically, the OSC alleged that Respondent ``prescribed
controlled substances to [two] DEA confidential source[s], Patient Y.H.
[and Patient L.G.], that [she] knew or should have known were not for a
legitimate medical purpose, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and
842(a), 21 CFR 1306.04(a), and Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013.'' OSC,
at 2; see also id. at 6. The OSC alleged that Respondent ``[was] aware
that at least a portion of the controlled substances [she was]
prescribing to Y.H. [and to L.G.] were being sold, given to third
parties, or otherwise diverted, because Y.H. [and L.G.] told [her]
so.'' OSC, at 2; see also id. at 6. Additionally, the OSC alleged that
Respondent ``had been falsifying [her] medical records.'' Id. at 9. The
OSC alleged that Respondent's ``falsification of the[ ] records
violated state law, see Fla. Stat. Sec. 458.331(1)(m), and further
demonstrate[d] that [Respondent] issued prescriptions for controlled
substances to Patients Y.H. and L.G. outside the usual course of
professional practice and that these prescriptions were beneath the
standard of care for the State of Florida, violating both 21 CFR
[1306.04(a) \1\] and Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The citation to 21 CFR 1604(a) throughout the OSC appears to
be a typographical error (as no such regulation exists). It is clear
from the surrounding text, that where the government typed 21 CFR
1604(a), it was referring to 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The Government also
specifically notified Respondent that was alleging violations of 21
CFR 1306.04(a). OSC, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 5, 2018, the former Acting Administrator made a
preliminary finding ``that [Respondent had] issued prescriptions for
controlled substances that [she] knew were without a legitimate medical
purpose and outside the usual course of professional practice, which is
inconsistent with the public interest . . . .'' Id. And that ``in light
of the rampant and deadly problem of prescription controlled substance
abuse, that [Respondent's] continued registration . . . would
constitute an imminent danger to the public health or safety because of
the substantial likelihood that [she would] continue to unlawfully
prescribe controlled substances, thereby allowing the diversion of
controlled substances unless [her] DEA [registration was] suspended.''
Id. The former Acting Administrator concluded that Respondent's
``continued registration . . . [would] constitute[ ] an imminent danger
to the public health and safety.'' Id.
[[Page 73787]]
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(f) and 21 CFR 1301.36(f), the former
Acting Administrator authorized DEA Special Agents (hereinafter, SA)
and Diversion Investigators (hereinafter, DI) serving the OSC on
Respondent to place under seal or to remove for safekeeping all
controlled substances that Respondent possessed pursuant to the
suspended registration. Id. The former Acting Administrator also
directed those employees to take possession of Respondent's
registration No. FG0560765 and any unused prescription forms. Id.
The OSC notified Respondent of the right to either request a
hearing on the allegations or submit a written statement in lieu of
exercising the right to a hearing, the procedures for electing each
option, and the consequences for failing to elect either option. Id. at
10 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). According to the Government's Notice of
Service, a member of the DEA Miami Field Division personally served the
OSC on Respondent on March 7, 2018. ALJX 2 (Government's Notice of
Service of OSC), at 1.
By letter dated April 3, 2018, Respondent timely requested a
hearing. ALJX 3 (Request for a Hearing), at 1. The matter was placed on
the docket of the Office of Administrative Law Judges and assigned to
Administrative Law Judge Charles Wm. Dorman (hereinafter, the ALJ). On
April 6, 2018, the ALJ established a schedule for the filing of
prehearing statements. ALJX 4 (Order for Prehearing Statements), at 1.
The Government filed its prehearing statement on April 20, 2018. ALJX 6
(Government's Prehearing Statement), at 1. After requesting and
receiving additional time, Respondent filed her Prehearing Statement on
May 31, 2018. See ALJX 7 (Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to
File Prehearing Statement), ALJX 8 (Order Granting Respondent's Motion
for Extension of Time to File Prehearing Statement), and ALJX 9
(Respondent's Prehearing Statement). Thereafter, the ALJ issued an
Order denying Respondent's motion requesting discovery on the grounds
that Respondent failed to establish that the documents she sought were
relevant, material, and that the denial of access to the documents was
prejudicial. ALJX 18 (Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Compel
Discovery), at 4; see also ALJX 12 (Motion to Compel Discovery or in
the Alternative Issuance of Subpoena), and ALJX 15 (Government's
Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Compel and
Government's Motion to Quash Subpoena).
On June 6, 2018, the ALJ issued a Prehearing Ruling that, among
other things, set out 18 agreed upon stipulations and established
schedules for the filing of additional joint stipulations and for the
hearing. ALJX 11 (Prehearing Ruling), at 3. Joint Stipulations were
filed on June 19, 2018, and on June 26, 2018, the Respondent proposed
additional Stipulations to which the Government had no objection. See
ALJX 16 (Joint Stipulations) and ALJX 19 (Additional Stipulations
Proposed by Respondent). The hearing in this matter took place in
Miami, Florida and spanned three days. See generally Transcript of
Proceedings in the Matter of Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. (hereinafter,
Tr.). Both parties filed posthearing briefs. See ALJX 27 (Government's
Posthearing Brief) and ALJX 28 (Respondent's Posthearing Brief). The
ALJ's Recommended Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decision (hereinafter, RD) is dated August 31, 2018. Neither party
filed exceptions to the RD. Transmittal Letter, at 2. I have reviewed
and agree with the procedural rulings of the ALJ during the
administration of the hearing.
Having considered the record in its entirety, I agree with the RD
that the record established, by substantial evidence, that Respondent's
``continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest
because of her improper prescribing and falsification of medical
records.'' RD, at 106. I further agree with the RD that Respondent's
``failure to acknowledge any wrongdoing whatsoever'' and her
``fabrication of documentation to cover her tracks'' shows that she
``cannot be entrusted with the ability to continue prescribing
controlled substances.'' Id. Moreover, I agree with the RD that
revocation is the appropriate sanction. Id. I make the following
findings of fact.
II. Findings of Fact
A. DEA Registration
The parties stipulated that Respondent is registered with DEA to
handle controlled substances in schedules II through V under DEA
Certificate of Registration No. FG0560765, at 951 North East 167th
Street, North Miami Beach, Florida 33162. ALJX 11, at 1; Tr. 9; and GX
1 (Controlled Substance Registration Certificate). This registration
expired on September 30, 2019.\2\ GX 1.
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\2\ The fact that a registrant allows his registration to expire
during the pendency of an OSC does not impact my jurisdiction or
prerogative under the Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA)
to adjudicate the OSC to finality. Jeffrey D. Olsen, M.D., 84 FR
68,474 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. The Investigation
DEA opened its investigation into Respondent after receiving
information from the North Miami Beach Police Department that it had
responded to Respondent's office several times due to ``altercations
between the staff at the office and patients . . . [which] appeared to
be over prescriptions for oxycodone.'' Tr. 28.
DEA used two confidential sources (hereinafter, CS), Y.H. and L.G.,
when conducting the investigation into Respondent. Tr. 28, 150. A DEA
SA was the DEA handler for the two confidential sources. Tr. 150. SA
would coordinate the undercover operation, meet with the confidential
sources, give them direction as to what DEA wanted them to say or do,
and provide them with electronic recording devices used to record audio
and video of the interaction between the sources and Respondent. Tr.
151. After the undercover operation was finished, SA would obtain the
recording devices from the confidential sources, download the
information recorded to a DVD, and place the DVD into evidence. Tr.
151-53. SA would also provide a copy of the DVD to a DEA contractor,
who would transcribe the DVD. Tr. 154. Thereafter, SA would compare the
transcript to the recording for quality control and to make sure the
transcript was accurate. Tr. 154-56, 163.
In November 2017, DEA executed a search warrant on Practice Fusion,
an electronic medical record software company, to obtain Respondent's
patient files. Tr. 29-30. DEA compared the obtained patient files for
Y.H. and L.G. with the recordings made by Y.H. and L.G. and determined
that there were inaccuracies in the medical records. Tr. 30.
Thereafter, DEA retained a medical expert to review the patient files
and recorded videos. Id.
C. Government's Case
The Government's documentary evidence consists primarily of video
recordings \3\ and transcripts of two confidential sources' visits with
Respondent, and prescription records for the two confidential sources.
See GX 1-19, 22. Additionally, the Government called five witnesses: A
DI, confidential source Y.H., confidential source L.G., SA and an
expert, Dr. Reuben Hoch, M.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Respondent's counsel conceded that ``there can be [no]
question that the video evidence is always going to be good
evidence.'' Tr. 485.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DI testified about his investigation-related actions, including his
role in
[[Page 73788]]
executing a search warrant to obtain Respondent's patient files. Tr.
26-42; RD, at 5. Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I
agree with the RD that DI ``presented his testimony in a professional,
candid, and straightforward manner.'' RD, at 5. I also agree that DI's
testimony is ``sufficiently objective, detailed, plausible, and
internally consistent'' to be given full credibility. Id.
Y.H. testified about her role as a confidential source \4\ during
DEA's investigation into Respondent, identified the recordings she made
while meeting with Respondent, and identified the prescriptions
Respondent issued to her. Tr. 42-95. Y.H. also testified regarding her
non-recorded interactions with the staff at Respondent's practice. Tr.
45-46, 52, 57. Y.H. is a felon; however, her last conviction occurred
in 1996, and I agree with the ALJ that it is too distant to impact her
credibility. RD, at 6; Tr. 43. Having read and analyzed all of the
record evidence, I agree with the RD that Y.H. ``presented her
testimony in a candid and straightforward manner.'' RD, at 6. I also
agree that ``Y.H.'s testimony was sufficiently objective, detailed,
plausible, and internally consistent with other evidence of record . .
. [to] merit it as credible.'' \5\ RD, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Y.H. has worked for DEA as a paid confidential source since
2002. Tr. 43.
\5\ The Respondent requested that the ALJ treat the testimony of
both Y.H. and L.G. as not credible and afford their testimony no
weight. RD, at 58; Tr. 487; ALJX 28, at 13-14. In support,
Respondent argued that Y.H. and L.G. were both convicted felons who
were paid to serve as confidential sources and, as such, they had
``every incentive to . . . help the government.'' Tr. 486. I agree
with the ALJ's thorough assessment of the credibility of Y.H. and
L.G. RD, at 94-95. In short, the relevant testimony of Y.H. and L.G.
with regard to their encounters with Respondent is fully supported
by the video evidence which, as Respondent notes, ``speaks for
itself.'' ALJX 28, at 13; see also Tr. 485; RD, at 94. I also agree
with the ALJ that the unrecorded interactions that Y.H. and L.G. had
with Respondent's office staff and medical assistants are irrelevant
to what Respondent herself did or did not do. See RD, at 94. As Dr.
Hoch testified, it is the physician's responsibility to examine the
patient, to draw his or her own conclusions, and to maintain medical
records. Tr. 326, 354; RD, at 94. As such, it is the physician's
recorded interactions with the patients that are relevant to this
case. I fully agree with the ALJ's determination that Y.H. and L.G.
are credible witnesses. RD, at 95.
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L.G. testified about his role as a confidential source \6\ during
DEA's investigation into Respondent, identified the recordings he made
while meeting with Respondent, and identified the prescriptions
Respondent issued to him. Tr. 96-145. Y.H. also testified regarding his
non-recorded interactions with the staff at Respondent's practice. Id.
at 98, 106-07, 113-14. On this topic (which I find is irrelevant, see
supra n.5), the ALJ found that L.G.'s testimony was briefly evasive
when he did not acknowledge on cross examination that hypothetical
video evidence of his interactions with Respondent's staff would have
been better evidence than L.G.'s live testimony. RD, at 7; Tr. 133-35.
The RD found that this was relevant to L.G.'s credibility. RD, at 7.
L.G. also testified that he was convicted of a felony in 2010 for
impersonating a police officer and was released from confinement for
that offense in 2015. Tr. 96, 119; RD, at 6. The ALJ found the felony
conviction was relevant to L.G.'s credibility. RD, at 7. However, the
ALJ found, and I agree, that the two items relevant to L.G.'s
credibility, ultimately ``do not diminish L.G.'s overall credibility.''
RD, at 7. Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I agree
with the RD that L.G. ``presented his testimony in a candid and
straightforward manner.'' Id. I also agree that ``L.G.'s testimony was
sufficiently objective, detailed, plausible, and internally consistent
with other evidence of record . . . [to] merit it as credible.'' Id.
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\6\ L.G. has worked as a confidential source for DEA for about
two and a half years. Tr. 96.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SA testified about the investigative work he did regarding
Respondent, including his work as the handler for both Y.H. and L.G.
Tr. 150-52. SA also testified regarding the integrity and
authentication of the video evidence and the accompanying transcripts.
Id. at 152-63. Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I
agree with the RD that SA presented his testimony ``in a professional,
candid, and straightforward manner.'' RD, at 8. I also agree that SA's
testimony is ``sufficiently objective, detailed, plausible, and
internally consistent'' to be given full credibility. Id.
Dr. Hoch, is Board-certified in anesthesiology and pain medicine.
Tr. 193; GX 22 (Resume of Dr. Hoch); RD, at 8. He is the chief
anesthesiologist at the Aventura Hospital, where he is involved in the
administration of surgical anesthesia and the management of pain. Id.
Dr. Hoch has been involved in pain management for at least 25 years,
including managing his own pain medicine practice, working as an
interventional pain specialist at the JFK Medical Center in Palm Beach,
Florida, and working as the Chief of the Division of Pain Medicine at
Brooklyn Hospital. Tr. 194-95; RD, at 8. Dr. Hoch is licensed in
Florida and was accepted in this matter (and he has been accepted in
other DEA matters) ``as an expert in pain management and prescribing
controlled substances with respect to the standard of care for pain
management in the State of Florida.'' RD, at 9; see also Tr. 198, 202.
Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I agree with the
RD that Dr. Hoch's testimony ``was sufficiently objective, detailed,
plausible, and internally consistent . . . [to] merit it as fully
credible.'' RD, at 10-11. Moreover, Dr. Hoch's expert testimony was
unrebutted. Id. at 11.
D. Respondent's Case
The Respondent's documentary evidence consists primarily of medical
and criminal records for the two confidential sources, photos of the
Germeil clinic, employee resumes,\7\ a list of continuing education
courses Respondent attended,\8\ discharge letters for various patients
\9\ (not including Y.H. or L.G.), and documents related to an
Administrative Complaint filed by the State of Florida Department of
Health against Respondent. See RX 1-8, 11. As for live testimony,
Respondent called two witnesses: J.F. and J.W. The main arguments
Respondent attempted to establish through the witness testimony were:
(1) That Respondent's positive dispensing experience should be
considered; (2) that the Germeil clinic's procedures were to conduct a
physical exam at the first visit and that medical assistants conducted
pain assessments as part of taking a patient's vitals and discussed the
vitals (including the pain assessment) with Respondent; and (3) that
Respondent demonstrated her acceptance of responsibility by instituting
remedial measures. ALJX 28, at 12-15. Notably, Respondent did not
testify in this matter.
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\7\ Respondent's resume indicates that Respondent has been a
licensed physician in the State of Florida since October 2007. RX 5
(Resume of Jeanne Esther Germeil), at 1. She has had her own medical
practice, Germeil Medical, Inc., since September 2011. Id.
\8\ Among other things, the CLE records show that on October 7,
2017, Respondent completed 5 credits in the educational activity
titled ``Legal & Ethical Implications in Medicine: A physician's
Survival Guide--Laws & Rules.'' RX 6 (List of Respondent's Completed
Continuing Education Courses), at 7. On October 1, 2017, Respondent
completed 8 credits in the live educational activity titled,
``Quality Medical Record Keeping for Health Care Professionals.''
Id. at 9. On December 27, 2017, the Florida Medical Association
notified Respondent that her record keeping mentor ``noted that
[Respondent's] follow-up records showed improvement and that the
recommendations made during Phase I, for the most part, were
successfully implemented.'' Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). The
Florida Medical Association mentioned that there were additional
suggestions for further improvements, but that documentation was not
included in the record. Id. The CLE records also show that
Respondent took courses in prescribing for pain in 2013. Id. at 2.
\9\ I note, that there are 47 pages of discharge letters
including 38 unique letters and 9 duplicates. See RX 8 (Discharge
Letters), at 14, 16, 19, 21, 24-25, 26-27, 32).
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[[Page 73789]]
J.F. is Respondent's husband and the general manager of the Germeil
Medical Clinic. Tr. 362, 390. J.F. testified regarding his roll
maintaining the clinic's records and regarding the Clinic's procedures.
Id. at 362. Concerning records, J.F. testified that, since 2011,
medical records were contained in the Practice Fusion system and that,
early on, the Clinic had problems with the system losing medical
records.\10\ Id. at 368. He also testified that L.G. was ordered to
have a urine test performed, and that Respondent would no longer see
him as a patient when L.G. did not comply with the order. Tr. 376-78;
RX 3 (Lab Order for L.G. dated October 4, 2017). On this issue, the ALJ
found ``[J.F.'s] reasons why the Clinic had not issued termination
letters to Y.H. and L.G. for failing to take urine tests to be less
than credible.'' RD, at 12. J.F. stated that the Clinic's procedure for
vitals included taking blood pressure, weight, height, and conducting a
pain assessment. Tr. 372. Further, J.F. testified that he was not
present when vitals were taken, but he made sure that the information
was entered into Practice Fusion. Id. at 372-73. The ALJ found that
J.F. lacked credibility when he testified that he had personal
knowledge of what vitals were taken with Y.H. and L.G., when really,
J.F. simply had to trust that the recorded information was accurate.
RD, at 12-13; Tr. 392, 419-20. J.F. also testified regarding the
general procedures Respondent used when seeing patients and regarding
improvements that the Germeil Clinic had instituted in the year prior
to the hearing. Tr. 385, 387-88; RD, at 12.
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\10\ DI testified that he has investigated at least three
clinics that used the Practice Fusion program and he has not found
that the program deletes or omits things. Tr. 32-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I agree with
the RD that J.F.'s testimony was not presented in a straightforward and
candid manner. RD, at 13. Still, the RD found, and I agree, that J.F.
was generally a credible witness. Id. The RD went on to find that much
of J.F.'s testimony was irrelevant because he had little personal
knowledge of how Y.H. and L.G. were treated as patients and because
Respondent did not accept responsibility for her actions. Id. I agree.
J.W. is the office manager of the Germeil Clinic and, in that role,
he supervises the medical assistants. Tr. 433-34, 437; see also RX 7
(Resume of J.W.). J.W. testified concerning the office procedures for
taking a patient's vitals (which J.W. occasionally did himself). Tr.
442-47. In taking vitals, a medical assistant obtains a patient's blood
pressure, weight, height, and conducts a preliminary pain assessment.
Id. at 443. The vitals are then provided to Respondent who occasionally
asks questions about a patient's pain. Tr. 445, 447, 453. Diminishing
J.W.'s credibility, the ALJ found that J.W. painted a picture of being
able to consistently monitor (hear and observe) the medical assistants,
while they took vitals, when he obviously had other responsibilities as
the office manager to which he had to attend. Tr. 434, 459, 471-74.
Moreover, while J.W. testified credibly as to the clinic's procedures
for taking a patient's vitals, he provided no testimony that he
observed the taking of Y.H. or L.G.'s vitals. RD, at 14. Thus, the RD
found, and I agree, that J.W.'s testimony does not outweigh the direct
testimony of both Y.H. and L.G. concerning how their vitals were taken
and whether or not they were asked about their pain.\11\
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\11\ Moreover, this testimony is irrelevant as this matter
involves Respondent's failure to conduct physical examinations, not
her failure to collect vitals. And as Dr. Hoch explains,
Respondent's responsibility to conduct a physical exam cannot be
satisfied by her medical assistants. See infra n.33; Tr. 307, 326.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ALJ found the remainder of J.W.'s testimony to be generally
credible. RD, at 14. He testified that if Respondent suspected that a
patient was diverting drugs, she would send the patient for a urine
drug test. Tr. 448. If the patient did not take the urine drug test,
the patient would not be seen again until the test is taken. Id. If the
patient refuses to take the test, the patient would be discharged. Id.
J.W. testified that since he started in December 2016, the Germeil
Clinic had worked to reduce patients' wait times, spend more time with
patients, use a pain questionnaire, and give more attention to taking
vitals. Tr. 449-50.
Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I agree with
the RD that J.W.'s testimony was presented in a straightforward and
candid manner. RD, at 14. The RD went on to find that, like J.F.'s
testimony and for the same reasons, much of J.W.'s testimony was
irrelevant to the issues in this case. Id. Again, I agree.
E. The Standard of Care in the State of Florida
According to the Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter, CSA),
``Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally . . . to . . . distribute, . . .
dispense, or with intent to . . . distribute[ ] or dispense, a
controlled substance.'' 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The CSA's implementing
regulations state that a lawful controlled substance order or
prescription is one that is ``issued for a legitimate medical purpose
by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
During the prehearing conference on June 6, 2018, the parties
stipulated that Respondent ``is presently'' licensed in the State of
Florida as a Medical Doctor. Dr. Hoch presented unrebutted testimony
regarding the usual course of professional practice and the applicable
standard of care for a Florida physician when prescribing controlled
substances.
Dr. Hoch explained that Florida Administrative Code, Rule 64B8-
9.013, Standards for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment
of Pain, lays out a physician's responsibilities when prescribing
controlled substances for pain management.\12\ RD, at 9; Tr. 203-05.
Dr. Hoch acknowledged that Florida Administrative Code Sec. 64B8-9.013
\13\ provides guidelines rather than black-and-white rules, but he
further acknowledged that those guidelines are authoritative regarding
a physician's standard of care in Florida. RD, at 9; Tr. 272, 280-81.
The Florida Code states that ``[t]he Board will not take disciplinary
action against a physician for failing to adhere strictly to the
provisions of these standards, if good cause is shown for such
deviation.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(1)(f) (West 2020).
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\12\ Moreover, the parties stipulated that ``a Florida licensed
physician must follow the standards and rules set forth by the
Florida Department of Health, Standards of Practice of Medical
Doctors. ALJX 16, at 1; Tr. 10. The parties further stipulated that
``Florida Administrative Code, Rule 64B8-9.013, Standards for the
Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, applies to a
Florida licensed [p]hysician dispensing controlled substances.'' Id.
\13\ The relevant portions of Florida Administrative Code Sec.
64B8-9.013 have not been amended at any time during the relevant
time period in this matter.
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According to Dr. Hoch, that regulation requires that a doctor: Take
a complete medical history and conduct a physical examination \14\
before issuing a prescription for a controlled substance; develop a
written treatment plan; discuss the risks and benefits of controlled
substances with a patient;
[[Page 73790]]
and maintain complete and accurate records with respect to a patient.
RD, at 9; Tr. 205-06, 338. Additionally, a physician is required to
conduct a periodic review of the course of treatment provided to a
patient. RD, at 50; Tr. 337-38.
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\14\ The Florida Code does not define what constitutes a
physical exam and does not necessarily require that a physician
conduct a physical examination of a patient each time the patient
presents for an appointment. RD, at 50; Tr. 289. However, Dr. Hoch
opined that the standard of care requires a physician to perform a
physical examination in certain circumstances including before first
prescribing a controlled substance, when the patient requests a
higher dose of controlled substances, presents with new symptoms or
complaints, has a new diagnosis, or has not been seen for a period
of months. See Tr. 290, 341-42, 345-46.
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Further, a physician's medical records must also meet the standards
set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.003 \15\ and
Florida Statute Sec. 458.331(1)(m).\16\ Under the Florida
Administrative Code, ``[a] licensed physician shall maintain patient
medical records . . . with sufficient detail to clearly demonstrate why
the course of treatment was undertaken.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-
9.003(2) (West 2020). The regulation also states that physician's
``medical record shall contain sufficient information to identify the
patient, support the diagnosis, justify the treatment and document the
course and results of treatment accurately, by including, at a minimum,
patient histories; examination results; test results; records of drugs
prescribed . . . .'' Id. at 9.003(3). The Florida Statute provides that
the ``following acts constitute grounds for denial of a license or
disciplinary action . . .: [f]ailing to keep legible . . . medical
records . . . that justify the course of treatment of the patient,
including, but not limited to, patient histories; examination results;
test results; records of drugs prescribed, dispensed, or administered;
and reports of consultations and hospitalizations.'' Fla. Stat. Ann.
Sec. 458.331(1)(m) (West 2020).
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\15\ The relevant portions of Florida Administrative Code Sec.
64B8-9.003 have not been amended at any time during the relevant
time period in this matter.
\16\ Florida Statute Sec. 458.331(1)(m) has not been amended at
any time during the relevant time period in this matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Florida Administrative Code provides the following standards
and record keeping requirements, see Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013
(West 2020):
--``A complete medical history and physical examination must be
conducted and documented in the medical record.'' Fla. Admin. Code
r. 64B8-9.013(3)(a) (West 2020). A Florida physician ``is required
to keep accurate and complete records to include . . . [t]he
complete medical history and a physical examination, including
history of drug abuse or dependence, as appropriate.'' Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f)(1) (West 2020).
--``The written treatment plan shall state objectives that will be
used to determine treatment success, such as pain relief and
improved physical and psychosocial function . . . .'' Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(b) (West 2020). A Florida physician ``is
required to keep accurate and complete records . . . [on t]reatment
objectives.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f)(4) (West 2020).
--``The physician shall discuss the risks and benefits of the use of
controlled substances with the patient.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-
9.013(3)(c) (West 2020). A Florida physician ``is required to keep
accurate and complete records to include . . . [d]iscussion of risks
and benefits.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f)(5) (West 2020).
--``[T]he physician shall review the course of treatment and any new
information about the etiology of the pain. Continuation or
modification of therapy shall depend on the physician's evaluation
of the patient's progress. If treatment goals are not being
achieved, despite medication adjustments, the physician shall
reevaluate the appropriateness of continued treatment.'' Fla. Admin.
Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(d) (West 2020). A Florida physician ``is
required to keep accurate and complete records to include . . .
[p]eriodic reviews. Records must remain current, maintained in an
accessible manner, readily available for review . . . .'' Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f)(10) (West 2020).
Dr. Hoch explained that the basic rule of thumb for medical
documentation is a ``SOAP'' note. RD, at 51; Tr. 212. The ``S'' is a
patient's subjective complaint; the ``O'' is the doctor's objective
findings based on a physical examination; ``A'' is the doctor's
assessment or impression or the diagnosis of the condition the doctor
is treating; and the ``P'' is the plan where a doctor explains why a
particular treatment has been selected. RD, at 51; Tr. 212. He
testified that the plan is the most important part of the documentation
because it allows a doctor to explain ``why [she's] doing what [she's]
doing . . . [and] detail [her] decision-making.'' Tr. 212. Dr. Hoch
explained that it is a doctor's responsibility to maintain patients'
records. RD, at 50; Tr. 354.
The Florida Administrative Code provides that ``[p]hysicians should
be diligent in preventing the diversion of drugs for illegitimate
purposes.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(1)(d) (West 2020). Dr. Hoch
explained that, in Florida, ``it is a very big responsibility for
prescribing physicians to be concerned about diversion.'' Tr. 224. When
a patient tells a doctor that he or she is diverting his or her
controlled substances that statement ``is a very big red flag that has
to be addressed at that moment.'' RD, at 51; Tr. 224-25. In fact, Dr.
Hoch stated that if a patient tells a doctor that he or she is selling
or giving away controlled substances, ``that's sort of a deal breaker .
. . .'' \17\ Tr. 351. Therefore, in accordance with Dr. Hoch's
testimony and the record as a whole, I find that the standard of care
in Florida requires that a physician stop writing prescriptions for a
patient following statements from the patient that are consistent with
diversion. See Tr. 256-57.
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\17\ Dr. Hoch's meaning by ``deal breaker'' is clarified by the
totality of his testimony. Tr. 351. He testified that if he had a
patient that admitted to diversion, he would not write another
prescription for that patient. Tr. 256-57. Similarly, the Florida
Administrative Complaint makes clear that the Florida Department of
Health's position is that practitioners should ``discontinue
prescribing scheduled medications after learning that the patient
[engaged in diversion].'' RX 11, at 19. I also note that
Respondent's Posthearing states, ``[Respondent] knows that she
should not have issued the prescription for Y.H. and L.G. after they
made statements consistent with diversion . . . she had a duty to
investigate . . . [and] should have refused to give the
prescription[s] and sent them for drug testing immediately.'' ALJX
28, at 15.
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F. The Florida Department of Health Complaint
The parties stipulated that Respondent's license to practice
medicine has never been suspended or revoked by the State of Florida,
Board of Medicine. ALJX 19 (Additional Joint Stipulations Proposed by
Respondent), at 1.
On January 20, 2017, the Florida Department of Health issued an
Administrative Complaint (hereinafter, Complaint) against Respondent.
Respondent's Exhibit (RX) 11 (Records from the Florida Administrative
Complaint against Respondent), at 16-24. The Complaint alleged, among
other things, that Respondent's medical treatment of a patient
M.N.,\18\ between July 2013, and August 2015, ``fell below the
prevailing professional standard of care,'' that she ``prescribed
controlled substances inappropriately . . . , '' and that she ``failed
to adequately create or maintain medical records that justified [the]
amount and/or type of controlled substances she prescribed'' in
violation of Florida Statute Section 458.331(1)(m) and Florida
Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.003. Id. at 20, 22-23. The facts
alleged in support of the Complaint are that Respondent: Continued
prescribing controlled substances to her patient upon learning that the
patient was sharing another person's pain medication; failed to obtain
a medical history; failed to list a chief complaint or history of
present illness; recorded the patient's vitals only one time; and did
not have the patient sign a pain medication contract. Id. at 17-18, 21.
Based on the alleged violations, the Complaint sought ``permanent
[[Page 73791]]
revocation or suspension of Respondent's license, restriction of
practice, imposition of an administrative fine, issuance of a
reprimand'' and/or other lesser penalties against Respondent. RX 11, at
24.
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\18\ There are no allegations of improper prescribing in this
proceeding relevant to patient M.N.; however, this Complaint is
relevant for other reasons as described herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 8, 2017, Respondent signed a Settlement Agreement to
settle the matters alleged in the Complaint. Id. at 6-15. Although
Respondent neither admitted nor denied the allegations in the
Complaint, she did admit that if the allegations were proven, they
``would constitute violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes.'' Id.
at 7. The Settlement Agreement (as amended by the Florida Board of
Medicine (hereinafter, State Board) pursuant to the Final Order, dated
April 21, 2017) required Respondent to pay a fine of $10,000, reimburse
$2,895.21 in costs, take four classes within a year, have a risk
manager evaluate her medical practice, and comply with the risk
manager's recommendations for improvements. Id. at 1-2, 6-15.
Additionally the Settlement Agreement stated that ``[i]n the future,
Respondent shall not violate Chapter 456, 458 or 893, Florida Statutes,
or the rules promulgated pursuant thereto, or any other state or
federal law, rule, or regulation relating to the practice or the
ability to practice medicine . . . .'' Id. at 12.
G. Allegation of Improper Prescribing to Y.H.
Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I agree with
the RD and find that the record contains substantial evidence that
Respondent improperly prescribed controlled substances to Y.H. without
a legitimate medical purpose, beneath the standard of care and outside
the usual course of professional practice. RD, at 68, 71, and 73. Y.H.
visited in the capacity as a confidential source for DEA a total of
eight times between March 3, 2016, and January 25, 2017. Tr. 43-44; RX
1.\19\ Y.H.'s first encounter with Respondent was on March 22, 2016. RX
1, at 30. According to the patient records, Y.H.'s chief complaint
during the first visit was, ``I just came to hav[e] some pain meds. I
am not function [sic.] w/o pain meds. . . . I share oxycodone 30 mg. I
had 2 MVA and a bad slip[ ] about 2 years ago. I'd like flexeril as
well.'' RX 1, at 30. Y.H.'s last three visits with Respondent, and the
prescriptions resulting therefrom, presented as evidence in this case--
September 8, 2016, October 12, 2016, and January 25, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ No videos or transcripts of Y.H.'s earlier visits with
Respondent were introduced in this matter. However, based on Y.H.'s
credible testimony and the opinion of Dr. Hoch, I find that
Respondent did not document or conduct a physical examination of
Y.H. during any of her eight visits with Y.H. Tr. 92, 338-39.
Respondent presented no evidence to demonstrate that a physical
examination was conducted.
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1. Y.H.'s September 8, 2016 Visit
On September 8, 2016, Y.H. visited Respondent in her capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the instructions given to her by
her DEA handler. Tr. 43-44. During the visit, Y.H. wore a recording
device that provided both audio and visual recordings of the office
visit and she activated the device when she began interactions with
Respondent. Id. at 44. As is evident from the records, Respondent spent
approximately ten minutes with Y.H. GX 2 (Video Recording from
September 8, Encounter). The vast majority of that time was spent
discussing Y.H.'s sexuality and upcoming wedding. GX 3 (Transcript of
Recording from September 8, Encounter), at 4-14.
During the visit, there was no discussion regarding the amount of
Y.H.'s pain. See generally GX 3. Further, Y.H. testified that she was
not asked to describe her pain levels by any member of Respondent's
staff. Tr. 45, 87-88. The only discussion that occurred regarding pain
occurred when Y.H. seemingly could not remember the location of her
pain. GX 3, at 3
CS: I don't know. It's hurting my back.
Germeil: Uh--! \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Throughout the transcripts of the video recorded encounters
(GXs 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 13), the transcriber used ellipses to
depict pauses in the conversation. I have removed these and replaced
them with dashes to prevent confusion between pauses and omissions
of word from the quotations. Where they would have appeared at the
beginning or end of a line, I have omitted them altogether.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CS: Oh! I forgot. It's not my back--it's my neck.
Germeil: Uh
CS: It's my back and my neck. Yeah, `cause
[VOICES OVERLAP] \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Bracketed text that describes the mechanics of the
conversation between the confidential sources and Respondent, appear
in the original transcript. Examples include, [VOICES OVERLAP], [U/
I] which stands for unintelligible (Tr. 155, 159-60), [STUDDERS],
and [WHISPERING].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germeil: So, it's not on your shoulder but [U/I]
CS: No. Not at all [U/I].
Id. After seemingly not knowing the location of her pain, Y.H.
requested additional pills. ``Doc, remember last month you were going
to give me one twenty (120)--for the Oxy's, but you didn't, and you
told Josh to tell me this month you'd give me one forty (140).'' Id. at
10. After requesting additional pills, Y.H. informed Respondent that
she had been giving, even selling, some of her pills to her brother.
Id. at 17, 19.
CS: Okay, [my brother] is coming and he has to get pills because
last month
Germeil: Uh-huh.
CS: when you didn't get--uh--you did not give him enough, and again,
he wanted to borrow from me--and I was like ``No, I'm selling them
to you this time''
Germeil: [U/I]
CS: ``You are going to give me money''
. . . .
CS: Last month he ran out--he's drinking three (3), four (4) pills a
day--I said, ``Bro, you are not going [to] bum anything of me, you
are going to give me money for these pills'' and he has to pay me
first [U/I] because I'm not going to give them to him for free. I'm
tired of him! I'm tired of him, doc!''
Id. Respondent's only response to Y.H.'s admission to diverting her
controlled substances was ``Okay.'' Id. at 19.
Despite Y.H. not knowing the location of her own pain, requesting
an increase in the number of pills prescribed, and admitting to
diversion, Respondent wrote Y.H. prescriptions for controlled
substances during the visit. GX 14 (Prescriptions issued to Y.H. on
September 8), at 1. The parties stipulated that on September 8, 2016,
Respondent prescribed Y.H. one hundred and forty \22\ dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg.\23\ and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.\24\
ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
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\22\ Y.H. requested an increase from one hundred and twenty to
one hundred and forty pills a month, and this prescription shows
that Respondent agreed to prescribe the additional pills. GX 3, at
10; GX 14.
\23\ The parties stipulated that oxycodone HCL is listed by DEA
as a Schedule II controlled substance. ALJX 11, at 2.
\24\ The parties stipulated that alprazolam is listed by DEA as
a Schedule IV controlled substance. ALJX 11, at 2.
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Y.H. testified that during this visit, Respondent did not conduct a
physical exam, did not discuss other medical conditions Y.H. might
have, did not discuss the medications that Y.H. was taking, did not
discuss Y.H.'s diet or exercise. Tr. 48-49. Y.H. testified that the
person who took her vitals on September 8, 2016, did not conduct a
physical exam, discuss Y.H.'s medical condition, or ask about
controlled substances Y.H. was taking. Tr. 45.
According to the patient records for that visit, Y.H.'s chief
complaint was ``I need a little bit more of my pills, I ran out so
fast. I really need them. I am getting married soon and I need a little
bit more.'' RX 1, at 22. The patient records ``Plan'' stated that
Respondent, among other things, explained the side effects of the
medication, advised regarding adverse reactions, discussed lifestyle
modifications to control weight and blood pressure, and that a
[[Page 73792]]
``[d]etail[ed] explanation was provided about and against `shopping'
from physician to physicians [sic] and the harm (s) [sic] that can
provoke.'' Id. According to the patient records, ``[a]pproximately 60
min was spent in this encounter,'' and Y.H.'s pain level was ``9.'' Id.
However, Y.H.'s testimony and the recordings directly contradict the
information in the ``Plan.''
Dr. Hoch opined that the two prescriptions issued by Respondent to
Y.H. on September 8, 2016, (namely one hundred and forty dosage units
of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.)
were issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care in the state of Florida. Tr.
208-09; GX 14. In support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch noted that the plan
does not bear any resemblance to the actual visit and discussion
between Respondent and Y.H. Tr. 218. Compare RX 1, at 22, with GX 2 and
GX 3. Dr. Hoch explains that Y.H. is a female and the plan refers to a
male. Tr. 213, RX 1 (Patient File for Y.H.), at 22. Additionally, the
plan discusses managing blood pressure when Y.H. has ``quite a good
blood pressure'' that does not need to be controlled. Tr. 214. Also,
Dr. Hoch explains that Respondent did not discuss side effects with
Y.H., fall precautions, or the harms that occur by shopping from
physician to physician, but that those non-existent conversations were
recorded in the plan. Tr. 213-218. Additionally, Dr. Hoch pointed out
that the plan records that the visit lasted approximately 60 minutes
when the visit did not last an hour. Tr. 215. Finally, Dr. Hoch found
no indication that Respondent performed a physical exam or took a
medical history at the visit. Tr. 227. Further, Dr. Hoch opined that
there is no indication in the patient treatment notes that Respondent
maintained on Y.H. that Respondent conducted a periodic review of her
treatment of Y.H.'s conditions by prescribing controlled substances to
her. Tr. 246.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch opined that there was nothing documented in
the patient file to justify the oxycodone or alprazolam \25\
prescriptions and that ``prescription of these medications together has
to be qualified quite extensively in the medical record.'' Tr. 259; see
also id. at 219. Respondent prescribed Y.H. oxycodone 30 mg. which is a
``very strong'' dosage, and prescribed her one hundred and forty pills
which ``means approximately four to maybe five a day . . . [or] 120
milligrams of [o]xycodone a day.'' Tr. 219. According to Dr. Hoch, the
oxycodone prescription can cause a number of side effects that
Respondent did not discuss with Y.H. Tr. 220-21. He further testified
that the side effects of opioid use, in the order of ``the least to the
most disabling,'' include pruritus or itching, urinary retention,
nausea and vomiting, and constipation. Id. at 220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Dr. Hoch explains that ``[t]wo milligrams of [a]lprazolam
is a very high dose of [a]lprazolam.'' Tr. 222.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Hoch explained that ``the most devastating complication or side
effect of an opioid [like oxycodone] is respiratory depression, and
that's what kills people.'' Tr. 221-22. Dr. Hoch explained that the
risk is particularly high where, as here, the opioid is given with a
benzodiazepine like alprazolam. Tr. 222. In light of the medications
prescribed, Dr. Hoch explained that Respondent was required to warn
Y.H. about the risk of respiratory depression and instruct the patient
to make sure there was at least a three to four hour gap between
administering the two different medications. Id. Based on Dr. Hoch's
credible and uncontroverted testimony and based on the video recording
and transcript, I find that there was no discussion of the risks at
this visit. Id.
Dr. Hoch explained that in Florida, ``it is a very big
responsibility for prescribing physicians to be concerned about
diversion.'' Tr. 224. Accordingly, when Y.H. informed Respondent that
``she[ was] either giving or selling pills that she[ was] receiving
from the doctor,'' Respondent should have been ``[t]remendous[ly]
concern[ed].'' Id. Dr. Hoch concludes that Y.H.'s diversion admission
was ``a very big red flag that [had] to be addressed at that moment.''
Tr. 224-25. I find that Respondent did not address Y.H.'s diversion
admission on September 8, 2016. See also RD, at 68.
Accordingly, based on the credible and uncontroverted testimony of
Dr. Hoch, I find that the two prescriptions issued by Respondent to
Y.H. on September 8, 2016, (namely one hundred and forty dosage units
of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.)
were issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care in the state of Florida. See
RD, at 68.
2. Y.H.'s October 12, 2016 Visit
On October 12, 2016, Y.H. visited Respondent in her capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the instructions given to her by
her DEA handler. Tr. 43-44. During the visit, Y.H. wore a recording
device that provided both audio and visual recordings of the office
visit and she activated the device when she began interactions with
Respondent. RD, at 27; Tr. 52, 183. As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent less than seven minutes with Y.H. GX 4 (Video
Recording from October 12, Encounter); GX 5 (Transcript of Recording
from October 12, Encounter), at 13. The majority of that time was spent
discussing Y.H.'s cancelled wedding and a potential hurricane. GX 5, at
2-9; RD, at 69.
Towards the end of the visit, Y.H. informed Respondent that she had
been selling some of her pills to her brother. GX 5, at 12-13.
CS: I tell [my brother], doc. ``Go get your own stuff.'' I'm tired
of selling him my pills.
Germeil: You're right!
CS: But I sold him the pills, I sure did it, at twenty (20) bucks a
pop, and he paid for them. I said, ``You don't go see the doctor?''
Germeil: You're right about that, but . . . . He has to learn.
CS: Exactly, doc.
Id. The video and transcription of the appointment show that Respondent
did not express any concern about Y.H. selling her controlled
substances to her brother. RD, at 69; GX 4; GX 5. Instead, Respondent
seems to have acknowledged Y.H.'s admission of diversion and to have
condoned the conduct. Id.; Tr. 231. Dr. Hoch explained, ``[Y.H.] is
clearly indicating to [Respondent] that they are diverting the
medication to someone else . . . selling their [p]ills at $20 a pop.
The doctor notes it, addresses it and condones it.'' Tr. 231. Dr. Hoch
explains that Respondent's actions with regard to Y.H.'s admission of
diversion were ``a tremendous cause for concern.'' Id.
Not only did Respondent fail to address Y.H.'s admission of
diversion, but Respondent, as the parties stipulated, went on to
prescribe Y.H. one hundred and forty dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30
mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
See also GX 15 (Prescriptions Issued to Y.H. on October 12).
Dr. Hoch opined that the two prescriptions issued by Respondent to
Y.H. on October 12, 2016, were issued outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the applicable standard of care in
the state of Florida. Tr. 228-29; GX 15. In support of his opinion, Dr.
Hoch noted that the plan documented for the October 12, 2016, visit was
identical to, and has the same problems as the plan for the September
9, 2016 visit. Tr. 234, 236. As with the prior visit, Y.H. is a female
and the plan refers to a male. Tr.
[[Page 73793]]
235; RX 1, at 20. Additionally, the plan discusses managing blood
pressure when Y.H.'s does not require management. Tr. 236. Dr. Hoch
opined that the plan was too generic and failed to identify what
Respondent was ``doing for that particular problem.'' Tr. 235. Dr. Hoch
also points out that in the patient record '' . . . Subjective is empty
. . . [O]bjective is empty . . . Assessment is empty.'' Tr. 233.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch explained that ``back pain'' is an indication of
a complaint, but that a proper complaint, unlike this one, would
explain ``what the patient is actually feeling, where, . . . what part
of their back, the nature and quality of the pain.'' Tr. 234. Dr.
Hoch's credible and uncontroverted testimony is that the patient chart
does not justify the prescriptions that Respondent gave to Y.H. on
October 12, 2016. Tr. 236.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch explained that these were the same two
prescriptions issued on October 12, 2016, as were issued on September
9, 2016, and that the same issues about which he had already opined
regarding the issuance of both an opioid and a benzodiazepine were
present here. Tr. 232. Also, once again Dr. Hoch pointed out that
Respondent failed to discuss with Y.H. the risks involved with
prescribing opioids and benzodiazepines together. Tr. 232.
Further, Dr. Hoch explained, that Respondent's October 12, 2016
visit with Y.H. lacked the required ``encounter between the physician
and the patient [and] discussion of the ongoing problem as this is a
chronic pain problem.'' Tr. 229. Dr. Hoch explained that Respondent did
not address the patient's pain, conduct a physical examination, take a
complete medical history, discuss the risks of controlled substances,
develop a treatment plan, or conduct a periodic review of the treatment
of Y.H.'s conditions. Tr. 230, 246.
Based on Dr. Hoch's uncontroverted and credible testimony, the ALJ
found, and I agree, that Respondent failed to make any statements that
addressed Y.H.'s medical concerns during the October 12, 2016 visit.
RD, at 27 (citing GX 4 and GX 5). Respondent did not ask any questions
to determine Y.H.'s current medical condition, assess Y.H.'s level of
pain or determine whether the treatment regimen she had prescribed to
Y.H. was effective. RD, at 28 (citing GX 5); Tr. 87-88, 230. Respondent
failed to: Conduct a physical examination of Y.H.; \26\ discuss the
side effects of the medication she was prescribing to Y.H. or the risks
of using controlled substances; discuss the risks of doctor shopping;
discuss Y.H.'s diet and exercise; discuss any medications Y.H. was
taking; take a complete medical history of Y.H.; or develop an adequate
treatment plan for Y.H. RD, at 28 (citing Tr. 54, 230, 232); GX 4; GX
5; RX 1, at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ In fact, during the appointment, Dr. Germeil sat on one
side of an office desk and Y.H. sat across the desk from her. RD, at
70 (citing GX 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast, the patient notes that Respondent created concerning
Y.H.'s October 12, 2016 appointment indicate that: The encounter lasted
60 minutes; and that Respondent discussed ``side effects,'' ``adverse
reactions,'' ``safety precautions,'' and doctor shopping with Y.H. RD,
at 28 (citing RX 1, at 20). The ``Plan'' for the October 12, 2016,
visit was identical to the ``Plan'' for the September 8, 2016, visit
and did not accurately capture what happened during the October 12,
2016, visit. RD, at 29; and compare RX 1, at 20, with id. at 22. Y.H.'s
chief complaint was recorded as ``I have a lot [of] back pain and I
need my pain meds.'' RX 1, at 20. Y.H.'s pain level was recorded as
``9.'' Id. But Dr. Hoch explained that a patient who presents with a
pain level of nine would show ``a tremendous degree of discomfort.''
RD, at 29 (citing Tr. 331). The October 12, 2016 records lacked any
information in the ``Subjective,'' ``Objective,'' and ``Assessment''
sections. RX 1, at 20.
The ALJ found based on Dr. Hoch's testimony, and I agree, that
Respondent should have recognized Y.H.'s admission that she was
diverting controlled substances as a red flag and considered it a
``deal breaker'' such that Respondent should not have issued
prescriptions to Y.H. on October 12, 2016. RD, at 71; Tr. 351. The ALJ
found, and I agree, that the prescriptions Respondent issued to Y.H.,
on October 12, 2016, were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose,
and were not issued in the usual course of professional practice in the
State of Florida. RD, at 71; Tr. 229, 236.
3. Y.H.'s January 25, 2017 Visit
On January 25, 2017, Y.H. visited Respondent in her capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the instructions given to her by
her DEA handler. Tr. 43-44. During the visit, Y.H. wore a recording
device that provided both audio and visual recordings of the office
visit and she activated the device when she began interactions with
Respondent. RD, at 30; Tr. 58, 183. As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent approximately seven and a half minutes with Y.H. GX 6
(Video Recording from October 25, Encounter). The majority of that time
was spent on small talk discussing Y.H.'s family matters, including
Y.H.'s trip to Cuba following her aunt's death, her brother's drug
dependency, and the financial strain that resulted. GX 7 (Transcript of
Recording from October 25, Encounter); RD, at 72.
At several points during the visit, Y.H. informed Respondent that
she had been selling some of her pills. GX 7, at 4, 6, 9-11. During a
discussion regarding an aunt of Y.H.'s who died in Cuba, Y.H., stated,
``I didn't even have money--I had to actually sell my pills
unfortunately. I had to make some money. I had to go over there.
Everything was on me.'' GX 7, at 4. Y.H. went on to state, ``Thank God
I had some--the--some of the--pills that I had I was able to get rid of
them and get some money to help me out, which I had to do now,
because--I had to pay my rent.'' GX 7, at 6. Then the visit concluded
with a final conversation regarding diversion.
CS: You think is right that I have to sell my own pills, my meds to,
to pay for stuff for--[STUTTERS] that's just crazy doc.
Germeil: Listen! [STUTTERS] You are a good person . . . good things
happen to good people. . . .
CS: . . . Right now, I'll probably go and I'll take some of these, I
have to keep some, and then the others I probably have to sell [to
my brother]. He probably, he'll probably take some from me `cause
that's all he does.'' . . .
Germeil: I feel sorry for you but uh--that's your call. That's mine,
too. . . .
CS: Yeah, [o]xycodone's--thirty milligrams--[MURMERS] Yeah, we're
good. Quantity one-forty (140). This is great. You don't know how
much this helps me out, doc. You just don't know.
Germeil: Relax! Do not say that to nobody.
CS: Of course, not. . . .
Germeil: I know. I don't want to . . . get into trouble.
Id. at 9-11.
Despite Y.H.'s admission of diversion, Respondent, as the parties
stipulated, prescribed Y.H. one hundred and forty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX
11, at 2; Tr. 9. See also GX 16 (Prescriptions Issued to Y.H. on
January 25). Dr. Hoch found that the same two prescriptions were issued
on January 25, 2017, as were issued on September 9, 2016, and October
12, 2016, and that the same concerns about which he had already opined
regarding the issuance of both an opioid and a benzodiazepine were
present here. Tr. 237-38.
Dr. Hoch's credible and uncontroverted opinion was that the two
prescriptions issued by Respondent to Y.H. on January 25, 2017, (namely
[[Page 73794]]
one hundred and forty dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty
dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were issued outside of the usual
course of professional practice and beneath the applicable standard of
care in the State of Florida. Tr. 237, 244; GX 16. In support of his
opinion, Dr. Hoch found that the plan documented for the January 25,
2017 visit is nearly identical to, and has the same problems as the
plan for the September 9, 2016, and October 12, 2016 visits. Tr. 241.
As with the prior visits, Y.H. is a female and the plan refers to a
male. Tr. 241; RX 1, at 19. Further, as with the prior visits, the plan
stated that side effects, adverse reactions, diet and exercise, blood
pressure, doctor shopping, and other matters were discussed during the
encounter when the transcript and video evidence make clear that they
were not. Tr. 241-42. Dr. Hoch opined that the plan has ``a
disconnect'' in so far as it fails to address Respondent's approach for
treating the diagnoses identified in the assessment section
(specifically anxiety disorder and back ache). Tr. 240. Again, Dr. Hoch
identified flaws in the chief complaint section of Respondent's records
for Y.H., which contained a list of diagnosis rather than a true
complaint. Tr. 239. Dr. Hoch's opinion was that the patient chart
reflects an incomplete medical record and does not justify the
prescriptions that Respondent gave to Y.H. on January 25, 2017. Tr.
250.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch explained that, once again, Respondent
failed to conduct a thorough physical exam, take a complete medical
history, or conduct a periodic review of the treatment of Y.H. Tr. 242,
246. In fact, during the encounter, Respondent sat on one side of an
office desk and Y.H. sat across the desk from her. GX 6; RD, at 72. Dr.
Hoch's conclusion is further supported by Respondent's failure to
address Y.H.'s admission of diversion. Dr. Hoch explained, that there
was a statement from ``the patient to the physician that the pills were
being sold[,]'' which ``is diversion[,]'' and that ``the rule states
that diversion is not acceptable.'' Tr. 243-44.
Based on Dr. Hoch's expert testimony, the ALJ found, and I agree,
that Respondent failed to make any statements that addressed Y.H.'s
medical concerns during the January 25, 2017 visit. RD, at 30 (citing
GX 6 and GX 7). Respondent did not ask any questions to determine
Y.H.'s current medical condition, assess Y.H.'s level of pain or
determine whether the treatment regimen she had prescribed to Y.H. was
effective. RD, at 32 (citing GX 7; Tr. 87-88, 246). Respondent did not
discuss the side effects of the medication she was prescribing to Y.H.;
discuss the risks of doctor shopping; discuss Y.H.'s diet and exercise;
discuss any medications Y.H. was taking; take a complete medical
history of Y.H,; or develop an adequate treatment plan for Y.H. RD, at
32 (citing Tr. 59, 241-243; GX 6; GX 7; RX 1, at 19). Further, Y.H.
testified that Respondent did not conduct a physical exam during the
encounter. Tr. 59.
In contrast, the patient notes that Respondent created concerning
Y.H.'s January 25, 2017, appointment indicate that: the encounter
lasted 60 minutes; and that Respondent discussed ``side effects,''
``adverse reactions,'' ``safety precautions,'' and doctor shopping with
Y.H. RD, at 33 (citing RX 1, at 19). The ``Plan'' for the January 25,
2017 visit was nearly identical to the ``Plan'' for the September 8,
2016, and October 12, 2016 visits (the only difference is the first
line regarding a request for a urine drug test) and did not accurately
capture what happened during the January 25, 2017 visit. RD, at 33;
compare RX 1, at 19, with id. at 20, 22, and with GX-6, GX-7. Y.H.'s
pain level was recorded as ``10.'' RX 1, at 19. But Dr. Hoch explained
that a patient who presents with a pain level of ten would be in
``excruciating pain'' and one would question how such a patient could
``even sit in front of you.'' RD, at 33 (citing Tr. 331). If a person
has a pain level of ten, then that person is usually in the hospital.
Id. As with the prior patient records, the January 25, 2017 records
lacked any information in the ``Subjective,'' and ``Objective''
sections. RX 1, at 19.
The ALJ found, and I agree, that Respondent did not advise Y.H. not
to sell her controlled substances or otherwise engage in any meaningful
conversation about diversion with Y.H. RD, at 72-73; GX 6; GX 7. The
ALJ found, and I agree, that Respondent should have recognized Y.H.'s
admission that she was diverting controlled substances as a red flag
and considered it a ``deal breaker'' such that Respondent should not
have issued prescriptions to Y.H. on January 25, 2017. RD, at 73; Tr.
242-44, 351.
The ALJ found, and I agree, that based on Dr. Hoch's testimony, the
prescriptions Respondent issued to Y.H., on January 25, 2017, were not
issued for a legitimate medical purpose, and were not issued in the
usual course of professional practice in the State of Florida. RD, at
73-74.
In summary, I find that the six controlled substance prescriptions
Respondent issued to Y.H., on September 8, 2016, October 12, 2016, and
January 25, 2017, were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose and
were issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and
beneath the applicable standard of care in the State of Florida.
H. Allegation of Improper Prescribing to L.G.
Having read and analyzed all of the record evidence, I agree with
the ALJ and find that the record contains substantial evidence that
Respondent improperly prescribed controlled substances to L.G. without
a legitimate medical purpose, beneath the standard of care, and outside
of the usual course of professional practice in the State of Florida.
RD, at 77, 80, and 82; infra.
L.G. visited Respondent in the capacity as a confidential source
for DEA a total of five times between July 2016, and August 2017. Tr.
96-97; RX 2 (Patient File for L.G.). L.G.'s first encounter with
Respondent was on July 25, 2016.\27\ RX 2, at 22. According to the
patient records, L.G.'s chief complaint during the first visit was, ``I
have been having this strong right shoulder pain since a few years
back. It just started again. I am tired of: [sic] ibuprofen/bengay/
tylenol.'' RX 2, at 22. L.G.'s last three visits with Respondent, and
the prescriptions resulting therefrom, were presented as evidence in
this case--February 3, 2017, July 18, 2017, and August 3, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ No videos or transcripts of L.G.'s other visits with
Respondent were introduced in this matter. However, based on L.G.'s
credible testimony, I find that Respondent did not document or
conduct a physical examination of L.G. during any of his five visits
with L.G. Tr. 137, 338-39. Respondent presented no evidence to
demonstrate that a physical examination was conducted.
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1. L.G.'s February 3, 2017 Visit
On February 3, 2017, L.G. visited Respondent in his capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the instructions given to him by
his DEA handler. Tr. 96-97. During the visit, L.G. wore a recording
device that provided both audio and visual recordings of the office
visit and he activated the device shortly before he went into
Respondent's office. Tr. 97, 183. As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent approximately seven and a half minutes with L.G. GX 8
(Video Recording from February 3rd Encounter). The vast majority of
that time was spent discussing L.G.'s family issues and travels. GX 9
(Transcript of Video Recording from February 3, Encounter). At this
visit, there was no discussion between L.G. and Respondent regarding
any medical concerns. RD, at 35; GX 8; GX 9.
[[Page 73795]]
Although medical concerns were not discussed at the visit, L.G.
made several statements indicating that he was diverting pills. GX 9.
CS: and--what I did last time--with one of the prescriptions--
knowing I'm not supposed to do that, I flipped it--I took some for
me . . . took the rest to make some money
. . .
CS: I'm not trying to get in trouble or nothing like this.
Germeil: I know. Sometimes you have to help.
. . .
Germeil: But don't worry--uh. [L.G.]. You are okay.
CS: No, I mean--I'm being honest with you. That's what I've been
doing. I--I sold a few of them . . . I--kept some for me.
. . .
Germeil: That's okay. Relax. Okay? But try to keep it for yourself.
Try to keep your medication for yourself, okay?
. . .
CS: I mean, like I said, I took some--I took some for me and then
the rest--just sold some of them
Germeil: Okay.
CS: Well, the majority of them.
Germeil: The majority of them?
Germeil: Okay. That--that is--Isn't, is that illegal, . . . ?
CS: I don't--I don't believe so. I know that but I'm telling you
`cause uh
Germeil: You don't know?
CS: You're my doctor!
. . .
Germeil: Be careful, okay?
Id. at 7-8, 11-13.
Despite L.G. admitting to diversion, Respondent wrote L.G.
prescriptions for controlled substances during the visit. GX 17
(Prescriptions Issued to L.G. on February 3). The parties stipulated
that on February 3, 2017, Respondent prescribed L.G. one hundred and
twenty dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of
alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
During the encounter, there was no discussion regarding the amount
of L.G.'s pain. GX 9. L.G. testified that on February 3, 2017,
Respondent did not conduct a physical exam--in fact, the video evidence
shows that Respondent sat on one side of an office desk and L.G. sat
across the desk from her. Tr. 103; GX 8. Respondent also did not
discuss any medical conditions L.G. had, did not discuss the side
effects of or adverse reactions to the medications she was prescribing
to L.G., did not discuss other medications L.G. was taking (other than
the ones Respondent was prescribing), did not discuss L.G.'s diet or
exercise. Tr. 103. L.G. testified that the employee at the Clinic who
took his vitals on February 3, 2017, did not conduct a physical exam,
ask any question about his medical conditions or ask about his pain.
Tr. 98.
The ``Plan'' in L.G.'s records stated that Respondent, among other
things, explained the side effects of the medication, advised regarding
adverse reactions, discussed lifestyle modifications to control weight
and blood pressure, and that a ``[d]etail[ed] explanation was provided
about and against `shopping' from physician to physicians [sic] and the
harm (s) [sic] that can provoke.'' RX 2, at 20. According to the
patient records, ``[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in this
encounter,'' and L.G.'s pain level was ``9.'' Id.
Dr. Hoch opined that the two prescriptions issued by Respondent to
L.G. on February 3, 2017 (namely one hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were
issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and beneath
the applicable standard of care in the state of Florida. Tr. 248, GX
17. In support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch explained that the plan does
not bear any resemblance to the actual visit and discussion between
Respondent and L.G. Tr. 254. Compare RX 2, at 20, with GX 8 and GX 9.
Additionally, the plan discusses managing blood pressure, when L.G.'s
blood pressure does not require monitoring. Tr. 253. Also, Dr. Hoch
explains that Respondent did not discuss side effects with L.G., fall
precautions, or the harms that occur from shopping from physician to
physician, but those conversations are recorded in the plan. Tr. 251-
54. Additionally, Dr. Hoch explains the plan records that the visit
lasted approximately 60 minutes when the visit did not last an hour.
Tr. 252-53.
Dr. Hoch testified that the plan Respondent recorded for L.G.'s
February 3, 2017 visit was ``very similar to,'' the plan for Y.H.'s
September 9, 2016 visit which, as discussed above, was riddled with
problems. Tr. 250. Also compare, RX 1, at 22, with RX 2, at 20.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch's credible and uncontested opinion was that
there was nothing documented in the patient file to justify the
oxycodone or alprazolam prescriptions. Tr. 250. As Dr. Hoch has
mentioned, this combination of controlled substances is a particular
concern due to the risk of respiratory depression--and Respondent did
not discuss those risks with L.G. during this visit as was required.
Tr. 247. Moreover, Dr. Hoch opined that it was ``a source of tremendous
concern'' (for L.G.'s safety) that L.G. was prescribed this combination
of a high-dose opioid and benzodiazepine after Respondent informed the
physician that he drinks alcohol (and Respondent again did not discuss
the risks with L.G.). Tr. 255.
Dr. Hoch, as discussed above, explained that in Florida, ``it is a
very big responsibility for prescribing physicians to be concerned
about diversion.'' Tr. 224; see supra II(E). Accordingly, when L.G.
informed Respondent that he was selling these ``potentially deadly
medications'' that was ``a huge issue for the community at large.'' Tr.
256. Dr. Hoch opined that Respondent failed to follow the ``state's
recommendation of being always cautious about diversion of the
medications . . .'' and that she should not have written another
prescription for L.G. following his admission of diversion. Tr. 256-57.
I find that Respondent did not engage L.G. in any meaningful discussion
about diversion. RD, at 76; GX 8; GX 9.
Further, Dr. Hoch testified that Respondent did not conduct a
periodic review of her treatment of L.G.'s conditions before
prescribing controlled substances to him and also did not document a
periodic review in the medical record. Tr. 250.
In conclusion, I concur with the ALJ and find that, based on Dr.
Hoch's testimony, the two prescriptions for controlled substances
issued by Respondent to L.G. on February 3, 2017, were not issued for a
legitimate medical purpose and were issued outside of the usual course
of professional practice and beneath the standard of care in the State
of Florida. RD, at 77; Tr. 248.
2. L.G.'s July 18, 2017 Visit
On July 18, 2017, L.G. visited Respondent in his capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the instructions given to him by
his DEA handler. Tr. 96-97. During the visit, L.G. wore a recording
device that provided both audio and visual recordings of the office
visit and he activated the device shortly before he went into
Respondent's office. Tr. 97, 183. As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent approximately seven minutes with L.G. GX 10 (Video
Recording from July 18, Encounter). Much of that time was spent
discussing travel to Cuba. GX 11 (Transcript of Recording from July 18,
Encounter), at 8-12. At this visit, discussion between L.G. and
Respondent regarding medical concerns was limited to L.G. stating that
he had pain ``like last time.'' GX 11, at 6-7; RD, at 40. However,
there was no further elaboration of L.G.'s pain intensity or even where
it was located, and Respondent and L.G. did not discuss pain at the
prior visit. Id. Respondent also pointed out that L.G. did not visit
Respondent often, in fact, his last
[[Page 73796]]
appointment had been more than four months prior, and that he could
have an appointment every month. GX 11, at 11. Respondent did not ask
L.G. how he had managed his pain between appointments without a
prescription. Id.
Respondent and L.G. had a more elaborate conversation discussing
diversion at the July 18, 2017 visit. GX 11. The conversation began
with Respondent admonishing L.G. for selling his pills. GX 11.
CS: Between you and me, [WHISPERING] remember last time I told you I
was selling my script.
Germeil: Yes, I know.
CS: I had to sell it to get to Cuba, to help somebody in the family,
which I did. And that's why I say, ``Thank you!''
Germeil: Yeah, but you cannot sell that. That's a controlled
medication, uh, . . . . [Y]ou have to keep that for your pain. . . .
Germeil: Don't do that or I can't give you the meditation--
medication.
GX 11, at 2-3, 6. Following the admonition, Respondent stated that she
was going to ``send [L.G.] to have a drug test done.'' GX 11, at 7. But
then, Respondent said that she would still give L.G. a prescription
because she knew that L.G. was in pain and she knew that L.G. was
joking when he said that he was selling his pills. GX 11, at 8.
Germeil: I know that you have pain so, that's the reason I'm gonna
give them to you.
CS: Okay, thank you.
Germeil: Yeah, but I shouldn't [U/I]. Never tell a doctor that you,
you sell your medication. I know you didn't sell them, okay?
CS: Okay.
Germeil: You just wanted to be--to be--[i]t's fashionable now, okay?
CS: Okay.
Germeil: It's fashionable that everybody sells their medications but
uh . . . I know that you don't do that.
CS: [CHUCKLES] Okay, no
Germeil: Because you joke, right?
CS: Yeah. A joke. Big joke.
Id.
Respondent wrote L.G. prescriptions for controlled substances
during the visit. GX 18 (Prescriptions Issued to L.G. on July 18). The
parties stipulated that on July 18, 2017, Respondent prescribed L.G.
one hundred and twenty dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty
dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
L.G. testified that on July 18, 2017, Respondent did not conduct a
physical exam--in fact, the video recording reveals that Respondent sat
on one side of an office desk and L.G. sat across the desk from her.
Tr. 108-09, GX 10. Again, L.G. testified that Respondent did not
discuss any medical conditions L.G. had, did not discuss the side
effects of or adverse reactions to the medications she was prescribing
to L.G., did not discuss other medications L.G. was on, did not discuss
L.G.'s diet or exercise. Tr. 109. L.G. testified that the clinic
employee who took his vitals on February 3, 2017, did not conduct a
physical exam, ask any question about his medical conditions or ask
about his pain. Tr. 107.
The ``Plan'' in the patient records for L.G.'s July 18, 2017, visit
was identical to the plan for the February 3, 2017, visit. Compare RX
2, at 18 with RX 2, at 20. The ``Plan'' again documents that
Respondent, among other things, explained the side effects of the
medication, advised regarding adverse reactions, discussed lifestyle
modifications to control weight and blood pressure, and that a
``[d]etail[ed] explanation was provided about and against `shopping'
from physician to physicians [sic] and the harm (s) [sic] that can
provoke.'' RX 2, at 18. According to the patient records,
``[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in this encounter,'' and L.G.'s pain
level was ``9.'' Id.
Dr. Hoch opined that the two prescriptions issued by Respondent to
L.G. on July 18, 2017 (namely one hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were
issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and beneath
the applicable standard of care in the state of Florida. Tr. 259; GX
18. In support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch noted that there was no
indication that a physical exam was conducted or that a medical history
was taken. Tr. 261.
Dr. Hoch explained that the plan Respondent recorded for L.G.'s
July 18, 2017 visit was similar to the plan for L.G.'s February 3,
2017, visit. Tr. 262. Also compare, RX 2, at 18, with RX 2, at 20.
Accordingly, Dr. Hoch opined that the patient's record does not bear
any resemblance to the actual visit and discussion between Respondent
and L.G. Tr. 264. Compare RX 2, at 18, with GX 10 and GX 11. Again, Dr.
Hoch explained that Respondent did not discuss side effects or adverse
reactions with L.G., fall precautions or safety measures, or the
dangers of shopping from physician-to-physician, but those
conversations are recorded in the plan as if they had happened. Tr.
263-64.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch opined that there was nothing documented in
the patient file to justify the oxycodone or alprazolam prescriptions
here. Tr. 258-59, 263. As found above, this combination of controlled
substances, namely ``a very strong opioid with a very strong
[b]enzodiazepine[,] . . . has to be qualified quite extensively in the
medical record to justify that both of them are being given at the same
time.'' Tr. 258-59. Dr. Hoch explained that the justification was not
present here. Tr. 259.
Regarding diversion, Dr. Hoch again opined that L.G. ``was
admitting to [Respondent] that he was diverting medications that were
given to him, and regardless of that statement, he did, in fact, get
the prescription[s].'' Tr. 259. Accordingly, I agree with the ALJ's
finding that Respondent did not engage L.G. in any meaningful
discussion about diversion. RD, at 79; GX 10; GX 11.
Further, Dr. Hoch opined that the record for L.G. did not indicate
that Respondent conducted a periodic review of her treatment of L.G.'s
conditions. Tr. 262. Dr. Hoch explained that Respondent's Medical
record for L.G.'s July 18, 2020 visit was not accurate, complete, or
otherwise sufficient to meet the Florida standard of care. Tr. 262.
In conclusion, based on the credible and uncontroverted opinion of
Dr. Hoch, I concur with the ALJ that the two prescriptions for
controlled substances issued by Respondent to L.G. on February 3, 2017,
were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose and were outside of
the usual course of professional practice and beneath the applicable
standard of care in the State of Florida. RD, at 80; Tr. 259.
3. L.G.'s August 30, 2017 Visit
On August 30, 2017, L.G. visited Respondent in his capacity as a
confidential source and pursuant to the instructions given to him by
his DEA handler. Tr. 96-97, 113. During the visit, L.G. wore a
recording device that provided both audio and visual recordings of the
office visit and he activated the device shortly before he went into
Respondent's office. Tr. 97, 183. As is evident from the records,
Respondent spent approximately seven minutes with L.G. GX 12 (Video
Recording from August 30, Encounter); RD, at 45. The vast majority of
that time was spent on small talk and discussing potential appointments
for people L.G. knew. GX 13 (Transcript of Recording from August 30,
Encounter).
At this visit, there was limited discussion between L.G. and
Respondent regarding a new medical concern. RD, at 35; GX 12; GX 13.
CS: . . . Can you, really quick, check my knees right here, cause
it's discomfort--Ouch, you saw, you heard?
Germeil: Let me see, let me see.
CS: It's still in discomfort. . . .
[[Page 73797]]
Germeil: Uh-huh. Yeah, you have arthritis, bones against bones . . .
. Listen, you have to put [STUTTERS] a, uh, support. . . .
CS: Yeah, cause it's always been in discomfort.
Germeil: Uh-huh. Maybe you had a, a trauma in this knee before? You,
you hit--did you hit it--somewhere? . . .
CS: I mean, I think so. . . .
Germeil: You have arthritis, the worst arthritis . . . . [Y]ou need
to put a, a support, and then massage. Buy Bengay
GX 13, at 9-10. In response to the newly identified knee problem, L.G.
testified that Respondent touched his knee; she ``grabbed [his] knee
[right on his kneecap] with her two fingers and her thumb, and for like
no more than three seconds, and she said [he] had arthritis.'' Tr. 143.
L.G. further testified that Respondent did not conduct ``a thorough
physical exam.'' Tr. at 115. See also RD, at 81; GX 12.
In addition to the limited discussion of his knee concern, L.G.
stated during this appointment that he was no longer selling his pills.
GX 13, at 4-5. Later in the visit, Respondent seemed to advise L.G. to
``be careful with the medications.'' GX 13, at 7. L.G. also explained
to Respondent that the guys he was selling to would like to become
Respondent's patients and Respondent told him to check with the front
desk. GX 13, at 4-5.
CS: Anyways--pss--[WHISPERING] I'm not selling no more. I'm taking
my own stuff.
Germeil: Okay. . . .
CS: . . . I was gonna mention it to you, if I can, the guys that I
was, whatever they need to see a doctor. I don't know if you want
new patients or you might need new patients, because they want to
get the meds. . . . The [o]xycodone or whatever. . . .
Germeil: You can, you can, you can ask [at the front desk] if they
have any, any, uh--any, any spot . . . [f]or new patients.
CS: Yeah, they guys, okay the guys I was selling to, but they are
good people, they're reliable people. They won't even miss their
appointments or nothing. They are good people. . . .
Id.
Respondent wrote L.G. prescriptions for controlled substances
during the visit (prior to touching L.G.'s knee). GX 19 (Prescriptions
Issued to L.G. on August 30); GX 12. The parties stipulated that on
August 30, 2017, Respondent prescribed L.G. one hundred and twenty
dosage units of oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of
alprazolam 2 mg. ALJX 11, at 2; Tr. 9.
Prior to issuing the prescriptions on August 30, 2017, there was no
discussion of the amount of L.G.'s pain. GX 12. After receiving the
prescriptions, L.G. mentioned that he had ``discomfort'' in his right
knee, which Respondent quickly looked at and claimed was the result of
arthritis. GX 13, at 9; Tr. 115; RD, at 45. L.G. testified that
Respondent did not conduct a thorough physical exam. Tr. 115. For most
of the appointment, Respondent sat on one side of an office desk and
L.G. sat across the desk from her. GX 13; RD, at 81. Respondent also
did not discuss any medical conditions L.G. had, did not discuss the
side effects of or adverse reactions to the medications she was
prescribing to L.G., did not discuss other medications L.G. was on, did
not discuss L.G.'s diet or exercise. Tr. 115-16. L.G. testified that
the person who took his vitals on August 30, 2017, did not conduct a
physical exam, ask any question about his medical conditions or ask
about his pain. Tr. 113-14.
The ``Plan'' in Respondent's records on L.G. for the August 30,
2017, visit, was identical to the plans for L.G.'s July 18, 2017, and
February 3, 2017, visits; and was nearly identical to the plan sections
purporting to capture Y.H.'s three visits at issue in the case. Compare
RX 2, at 16, with RX 2, at 18 and 20, and RX 1, at 19, 20, and 22. Once
again, the ``Plan'' stated that Respondent, among other things,
explained the side effects of the medication, advised regarding adverse
reactions, discussed lifestyle modifications to control weight and
blood pressure, and that a ``[d]etail[ed] explanation was provided
about and against `shopping' from physician to physicians [sic] and the
harm (s) [sic] that can provoke.'' RX 2, at 16. According to the
patient records, ``[a]pproximately 60 min was spent in this
encounter,'' and L.G.'s pain level was ``9.'' Id.
Dr. Hoch opined that the two prescriptions issued by Respondent to
L.G. on August 30, 2017, (namely one hundred and twenty dosage units of
oxycodone HCL 30 mg. and sixty dosage units of alprazolam 2 mg.) were
issued outside of the usual course of professional practice and beneath
the applicable standard of care in the state of Florida. Tr. 270-71; GX
19. In support of his opinion, Dr. Hoch explained that the plan differs
from the actual visit and discussion between Respondent and L.G. Tr.
267-69. Compare RX 2, at 16, with GX 12 and GX 13. Dr. Hoch explained
that Respondent did not discuss side effects or adverse reactions with
L.G., fall precautions, or the harms that occur by shopping from
physician to physician, but those conversations are recorded in the
plan. Tr. 268-69. Dr. Hoch explained that the plan Respondent recorded
for L.G.'s August 30, 2017 visit was ``identical'' to the plan for
L.G.'s July 18, 2017, and February 3, 2017, visits. Tr. 267-68. Compare
RX 2, at 16, with RX 2, at 18 and 20.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch's expert opinion was that the patient file
was insufficient to justify the oxycodone or alprazolam prescriptions
here. Tr. 267. He also explained that the record was not complete and
accurate. Tr. 269. As found above, per Dr. Hoch, this combination of
controlled substances is a particular concern due to the risk of
respiratory depression, and Respondent did not discuss those risks with
L.G. during this visit as was required. Tr. 247, 265-66.
Regarding diversion, Dr. Hoch pointed out that once again at this
visit, L.G. informed Respondent that he had been selling his
medication. Tr. 266. Dr. Hoch noted that Respondent did inform L.G.
that he needed to be careful with the medications, but opined that the
statement was not sufficient to warn L.G. of the dangers of diversion.
Tr. 270.
Further, Dr. Hoch opined that Respondent did not conduct a periodic
review of her treatment of L.G.'s conditions before prescribing
controlled substances to him (let alone document it in the medical
record). Tr. 269. He also opined that there was no indication in the
record that Respondent gave a physical exam \28\ or took a full and
complete medical history. Tr. 269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Dr. Hoch testified that merely touching a knee is
insufficient for a doctor to determine that a patient has arthritis.
Tr. 330. To adequately conduct a physical examination regarding knee
pain, a physician would ``have to do flexion extension exercises . .
. palpate or examine the knee, press it and try to find particular
locations and then if you['re] very concerned . . . [t]his is where
x-rays and perhaps MRIs do come into play.'' Tr. 329. Thus, I agree
with the ALJ's finding that Respondent's touching of L.G.'s right
knee on August 30, 2017, did not constitute a sufficient physical
examination. RD, at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, and based on the credible and uncontroverted
testimony of Dr. Hoch, I concur with the ALJ that the two prescriptions
for controlled substances prescriptions issued by Respondent to L.G. on
August 30, 2017, were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose and
were outside the usual course of professional practice and beneath the
applicable standard of care in the State of Florida. RD, at 83; Tr.
270-71. In summary, I find that the six controlled substance
prescriptions Respondent issued to L.G., on February 3, 2017, July 18,
2017, and August 30, 2017, were issued outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the applicable standard of care in
the State of Florida.
[[Page 73798]]
I. Allegation of Recordkeeping Violations and Other State Law
Violations
The medical records at issue in this case cover the six different
encounters \29\ discussed in detail above: Y.H.'s encounters with
Respondent on September 8, 2016, October 12, 2016, and January 25,
2017; and L.G.'s encounters with Respondent on February 3, 2017, July
18, 2017, and August 30, 2017. See OSC; supra II. According to Dr.
Hoch's credible and uncontroverted testimony, the records Respondent
maintained for Y.H. and L.G. do not document a complete medical
history, a physical examination, or a periodic review as required by
state law. RD, at 50; Tr. 324, 338-39; RX 1; RX 2. Based on Dr. Hoch's
testimony and the record as a whole, I find that the medical records
for each of the six encounters are insufficient, inaccurate, and
incomplete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Dr. Hoch explains that the word ``encounter refers to the
direct encounter for the physician with the patient,'' and does not
include time the patient spent with a medical assistant. Tr. 303.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the findings of the ALJ and based on the
uncontroverted and credible testimony of Dr. Hoch, I find that the
``Plan'' sections of the patient records for each of the six encounters
at issue in this case are identical (with the exception of Y.H.'s
January 25, 2017, plan which contains one additional line regarding the
need for a drug test). Compare RX 1, at 19, 20, 22; and RX 2, at 16,
18, 20; see also Tr. 234, 236, 241, 250, 262, 267-68. All six of the
patient records document that Respondent, among other things, explained
the side effects of the medication, advised regarding adverse
reactions, discussed lifestyle modifications to control weight and
blood pressure, discussed safety precautions, and that a ``[d]etail[ed]
explanation was provided about and against `shopping' from physician to
physicians [sic] and the harm (s) [sic] that can provoke.'' RX 1, at
19, 20, 22; and RX 2, at 16, 18, 20. In contrast to the patient
records, I have found that Respondent did not discuss the side effects
of the medication, adverse reactions, lifestyle modifications to
control weight and blood pressure, safety precautions, or shopping from
physician to physician during any of the six encounters at issue. See
supra and GX 3, GX 5, GX 7, GX 9, GX 11, and GX 13. My finding is
consistent with Dr. Hoch's testimony that the plan section of the
patient records does not bear any resemblance to the actual visits and
discussions between Respondent and the confidential sources. See Tr.
218, 241-42, 251-54, 263-64, 268-69. I agree with the ALJ's finding
that ``merely by comparing the recordings made by both Y.H. and L.G.
when they met with [Respondent] with her treatment notes, it is readily
obvious that the records [Respondent] prepared do not accurately report
what happened during those encounters.'' RD, at 91.
Not only are the plans inaccurate, but even if they were accurate,
Dr. Hoch opined that none of the plans explain what the objectives are
that the Respondent was planning to use to determine the success of her
treatment. Tr. 353. See also 230, 246. This is because, as Dr. Hoch
characterized it, there was a ``generic rehashing of the same plan
visit after visit'' and the plans fail to identify what Respondent was
``doing for [any] particular problem.'' Tr. 235.
I have found above that the patient records for each of the six
encounters at issue reflect that ``[a]proximately 60 min was spent in
[each] encounter.'' RX 1, at 19, 20, 22; and RX 2, at 16, 18, 20. In
contrast to the patient records, I have found that the lengthiest
encounter at issue in this matter was only approximately ten minutes,
and that most of the encounters were around seven to seven-and-a-half
minutes long. GX 2, GX 4, GX 6, GX 8, GX 10, and GX 12.
I have found above, based on the record as a whole and Dr. Hoch's
testimony, that Respondent did not conduct a physical exam during any
of the six encounters and that none of Respondent's medical records
reflect that a physical exam was conducted at any of the six encounters
at issue. GX 2, GX 4, GX 6, GX 8, GX 10, and GX 12; RX 1, at 19, 20,
22; and RX 2, at 16, 18, 20; Tr. 48-49, 54, 103, 109, 115, 230, 232,
242, 246, 269, 324, 339. Additionally, I find, consistent with Dr.
Hoch's testimony, that none of the medical records at issue in this
matter reflect a complete medical history. Tr. 324. Additionally, I
find, consistent with Dr. Hoch's testimony, that there was no periodic
review conducted at any of the six encounters at issue here. Tr. 230,
242, 246, 250, 262, 269. Therefore, I agree with the ALJ and find
substantial evidence that Respondent issued a total of twelve
prescriptions to two different CSs without maintaining sufficient,
accurate or complete records.
To summarize my findings above, I agree with the ALJ and find
substantial evidence that Respondent issued these twelve prescriptions
for controlled substances outside of the usual course of professional
practice and beneath the standard of care in the State of Florida in
violation of federal and state law.
III. Discussion
A. Allegation That Respondent's Registration is Inconsistent With the
Public Interest
Under Section 304 of the CSA, ``[a] registration . . . to . . .
dispense a controlled substance . . . may be suspended or revoked by
the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant . . . has
committed such acts as would render his registration under section 823
of this title inconsistent with the public interest as determined by
such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In the case of a ``practitioner,''
defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(21) to include a ``physician,'' Congress
directed the Attorney General to consider the following factors in
making the public interest determination:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board
or professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing . . . controlled
substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the . . . distribution[ ] or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.
21 U.S.C. 823(f). These factors are considered in the disjunctive.
Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 F R 15,227, 15,230 (2003).
According to Agency decisions, I ``may rely on any one or a
combination of factors and may give each factor the weight [I] deem[ ]
appropriate in determining whether'' to revoke a registration. Id.; see
also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881
F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug Enf't
Admin., 841 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2016); MacKay v. Drug Enf't Admin.,
664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011); Volkman v. U. S. Drug Enf't Admin.,
567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009); Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419 F.3d
477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, while I am required to consider
each of the factors, I ``need not make explicit findings as to each
one.'' MacKay, 664 F.3d at 816 (quoting Volkman, 567 F.3d at 222); see
also Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482. ``In short, . . . the Agency is not
required to mechanically count up the factors and determine how many
favor the Government and how many favor the registrant. Rather, it is
an inquiry which focuses on protecting the public interest; what
matters is the seriousness of the registrant's misconduct.'' Jayam
Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 462
[[Page 73799]]
(2009). Accordingly, as the Tenth Circuit has recognized, findings
under a single factor can support the revocation of a registration.
MacKay, 664 F.3d at 821.
Under DEA's regulation, ``[a]t any hearing for the revocation . . .
of a registration, the . . . [Government] shall have the burden of
proving that the requirements for such revocation . . . pursuant to . .
. 21 U.S.C. [Sec. ] 824(a) . . . are satisfied.'' 21 CFR 1301.44(e).
In this matter, while I have considered all of the factors, the
relevant evidence is confined to Factors One, Two and Four. I find that
the evidence satisfies the Government's prima facie burden of showing
that Respondent's continued registration would be ``inconsistent with
the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). I further find that
Respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the
Government's prima facie case.
1. Factors One and Three: The Recommendation of the Appropriate State
Licensing Board or Professional Disciplinary Authority and Respondent's
Conviction Record Under Federal or State Laws Relating to Controlled
Substances
Respondent suggests that Factor One weighs in her favor because the
parties stipulated and the ALJ found that Respondent holds a valid
state medical license in Florida. ALJX 28 (Respondent's Posthearing
Brief), at 11; ALJX 11, at 1; RD, at 59.
In determining the public interest, the ``recommendation of the
appropriate State licensing board or professional disciplinary
authority . . . shall be considered.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(1). Two forms
of recommendations appear in Agency decisions: (1) A recommendation to
DEA directly from a state licensing board or professional disciplinary
authority (hereinafter, appropriate state entity), which explicitly
addresses the granting or retention of a DEA COR; and (2) the
appropriate state entity's action regarding the licensure under its
jurisdiction on the same matter that is the basis for the DEA OSC. John
O. Dimowo, M.D., 85 FR 15,800, 15,810 (2020); see also Vincent J.
Scolaro, D.O., 67 FR 42,060, 42,065 (2002).
In this case, neither the State Board nor any other state entity
has made a direct recommendation to the Agency regarding whether the
Respondent's registration should be suspended or revoked; however, as
previously discussed, the State Board issued an Order incorporating a
Settlement Agreement reached following an Administrative Complaint
filed by the State of Florida Department of Health against Respondent
based on Respondent's treatment of one patient, M.N., between July 2013
and August 2015. RX 11, at 19. The Florida allegations regarding
Respondent's treatment of M.N. are similar \30\ to the facts I found
above regarding Respondent's treatment of Y.H. and L.G between 2016 and
2017; however, they clearly do not constitute the same matter as the
facts alleged in the OSC (they involved an entirely different patient
during a preceding timeframe). See supra II(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Respondent's Posthearing Brief states: ``In January 2017, a
complaint was filed against Dr. Germeil before the Florida Board of
Medicine for allegations similar to the instant case.'' ALJX 28, at
15. Additionally Respondent's counsel stated in her oral closing
arguments, ``the allegations, as you'll see, are similar in
prescribing medication for not a legitimate purpose and for medical
records.'' Tr. 489-90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have much more evidence of misconduct before me than the State
Board had at the time that it made its decision. Further, the fact that
the State Board did not choose to revoke Respondent's state medical
registration carries minimal to no weight under Factor One, because
there is no evidence that the State Board would have made the same
decision in the face of the egregious conduct found herein involving
two further patients, who were openly diverting their prescriptions,
after the State Board had already disciplined Respondent for similar
behavior.\31\ Accordingly, the terms of the State Board Order have been
considered, but I find that they have no impact on the public interest
inquiry in this case. See John O. Dimowo, M.D., 85 FR at 15,810.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ In Dimowo, the Acting Administrator found that ``[a]lthough
statutory analysis [of the CSA] may not definitively settle . . .
[the breadth of the cognizable state `recommendation' referenced in
Factor One], the most impartial and reasonable course of action is
to continue to take into consideration all actions indicating a
recommendation from an appropriate state;'' however, Dimowo also
limited the ``recommendations'' DEA would consider to the ``actions
of an appropriate state entity on the same matters, particularly
where it rendered an opinion regarding the practitioner's medical
practice in the state due to the same facts alleged in the DEA
OSC.'' John O. Dimowo, 85 FR at 15,810. Although the same
``matters'' may include the same types of violations, in this case,
I have no indication that the Board would have made a similar
decision in the face of these additional egregious violations and
continued misconduct. In fact, Respondent specifically agreed in the
settlement not to commit further violations of law. RX 11, at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As to Factor Three, the parties stipulated that Respondent has
never been convicted of violating any federal or state law relating to
the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances.
ALJX 19; Tr. 11. See also 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(3). However, as Agency cases
have noted, there are a number of reasons why a person who has engaged
in criminal misconduct may never have been convicted of an offense
under this factor, let alone prosecuted for one. Dewey C. MacKay, M.D.,
75 FR 49,956, 49,973 (2010). Agency cases have therefore held that
``the absence of such a conviction is of considerably less consequence
in the public interest inquiry'' and is therefore not dispositive. Id.
2. Factors Two and Four--the Respondent's Experience in Dispensing
Controlled Substances and Compliance With Applicable Laws Related to
Controlled Substances
Respondent asks that I consider evidence of her positive dispensing
experience. ALJX 28, at 12. In evaluating Respondent's dispensing
experience, I note that Respondent has significant experience as a
licensed physician in Florida since October 2007, and running her own
medical practice since 2011. RX 5, at 1. Respondent claimed, without
providing any evidence to support the claim, that she has treated
``thousands of patients for pain medicine, and there have been no
reported overdoses or deaths during that period of time.'' \32\ Tr. 19.
The Agency assumes that all of the prescriptions Respondent issued were
issued lawfully, except for those prescriptions that the Government
alleged and established were issued unlawfully. See Wesley Pope, M.D.,
82 FR 14,944, 14,982-84 (2017). Respondent also claimed, and included
38 unique letters to patients as evidence, that she has discharged
patients who refused urine testing. RX 8. However, Respondent's
evidence shows that both Y.H. and L.G. were ordered to take urine drug
tests, did not take those urine drug tests, and did not receive
discharge letters (although they were not seen again). RX 1, at 13, 18;
RX 3; RX 8; Tr. 405-06, 409-10, 413. Furthermore, even without the
urine drug tests, Respondent knew that Y.H. and L.G. were not taking
their medication as prescribed because they directly told her that they
were diverting the controlled substances.
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\32\ I decline to consider that ``no reported overdoses or
deaths'' is an indicator of positive dispensing experience and there
is no legal authority for the proposition that I must find death or
an overdose before I may suspend or revoke a registration. Agency
decisions have found that ``diversion occurs whenever controlled
substances leave `the closed system of distribution established by
the CSA . . . .'' Roy S. Schwartz, 79 FR 34,360, 34,363 (2014)).
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Respondent's handling of the two confidential sources as found
herein demonstrates that her prescribing practices fell short of the
applicable standard of care for twelve
[[Page 73800]]
prescriptions. As I discuss further below, Respondent failed to address
patient admissions of diversion, failed to conduct physical exams,
failed to discuss the risks of controlled substances, and falsified
medical records.
Factor four is demonstrated by evidence that a registrant has not
complied with laws related to controlled substances, including
violations of the CSA, DEA regulations, or other state or local laws
regulating the prescribing of controlled substances.
(a) Allegation that Respondent Issued Prescriptions for Controlled
Substances Outside the Usual Course of the Professional Practice
According to the CSA's implementing regulations, a lawful
prescription for controlled substances is one that is ``issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a). The
Supreme Court has stated, in the context of the CSA's requirement that
schedule II controlled substances may be dispensed only by written
prescription, that ``the prescription requirement . . . ensures
patients use controlled substances under the supervision of a doctor so
as to prevent addiction and recreational abuse . . . [and] also bars
doctors from peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those
prohibited uses.'' Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
As I have found, in agreement with the RD and based on the credible
expert testimony of Dr. Hoch, Florida regulations require that a
doctor: Take a complete medical history and conduct a physical
examination \33\ before issuing a prescription for a controlled
substance; develop a written treatment plan; discuss the risks and
benefits of controlled substances with a patient; and maintain complete
and accurate records with respect to a patient. RD, at 9; Tr. 205-06,
338. Additionally, a physician is required to conduct a periodic review
of the course of treatment provided to a patient. RD, at 50; Tr. 337-
38.
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\33\ The Florida Code does not define what constitutes a
physical exam and does not necessarily require that a physician
conduct a physical examination of a patient each time the patient
presents for an appointment. RD, at 50; Tr. 289. However, Dr. Hoch
opined that the standard of care requires a physician to perform a
physical examination in certain circumstances including when the
patient requests a higher dose of controlled substances, presents
with new symptoms or complaints, has a new diagnosis, or hasn't been
seen for a period of months. See Tr. 290, 341-42, 345-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the credible and uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Hoch, and
in agreement with the RD, I find that Respondent issued a total of
twelve prescriptions outside of the usual course of professional
practice and beneath the applicable standard of care in the State of
Florida in violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a). RD, at 92.
i. Failure To Address Patients' Admissions of Diversion
The Florida Code provides that ``[p]hysicians should be diligent in
preventing the diversion of drugs for illegitimate purposes.'' Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(1)(d) (West 2020). Dr. Hoch explained that
when a patient tells a doctor that he or she is diverting his or her
controlled substances that statement ``is a very big red flag that has
to be addressed at that moment.'' Tr. 224-25; RD, at 51. In fact, Dr.
Hoch stated that if a patient tells a doctor that he or she is selling
or giving away controlled substances, ``that's sort of a deal breaker .
. . .'' Tr. 351. In other words, as I found above the standard of care
in Florida requires that a physician stop writing prescriptions for a
patient following statements from the patient that are consistent with
diversion. See supra, II(E).
I have found above that each of the CIs admitted to having engaged
in diversion at each of the six encounters at issue in this matter.
Y.H. clearly admitted to Respondent that she had been selling at least
some of her pills to her brother on September 8, 2016, October 12,
2016, and January 25, 2017. GX 3, at 17, 19; GX 5, 13 12-13; GX 7, at
4, 6, 9-11. Yet, as I have found, Respondent did not advise Y.H. not to
sell her controlled substances or otherwise engage in any meaningful
conversation about diversion with Y.H. See RD, at 68, 71, 73. In fact,
on October 12, 2016, Respondent clearly acknowledged Y.H.'s admission
of diversion and seems to have even condoned the conduct. See supra,
II(G)(2); GX 5, at 12-13. And on January 25, 2017, Respondent replied
to Y.H.'s admission of selling pills by reassuring Y.H. that she was a
good person. GX 7, at 9-11. The only counseling Respondent did with
Y.H. regarding diversion was to warn Y.H. not to tell anyone that
Respondent was helping her out because Respondent ``d[idn't] want to .
. . get into trouble.'' Id. at 11.
L.G. also clearly admitted to Respondent that he had been selling
at least some of his pills to people on February 3, 2017, July 18,
2017, and August 30, 2017. GX 9, at 7-8, 11-13; GX 11, at 2-3, 6; GX
13, at 4-5. Yet, as I have found above, Respondent did not engage in
any meaningful conversation about diversion with L.G. either. See
supra, II(H); RD, at 76, 79. Respondent did discuss diversion in
greater detail with L.G. than she did with Y.H., and Respondent did
provide warnings to L.G. at each of the three encounters including:
That he needed to ``try to keep [his medication] for himself,'' GX 9,
at 12; that ``[he] cannot sell [the scripts because] [t]hat's a
controlled medication,'' GX 11, at 3; and that he should ``be careful
with the medications.'' GX 13, at 7. However, Respondent issued
prescriptions to L.G. immediately following these warnings, which
renders her comments perfunctory. See RD, at 80.
Dr. Hoch opined that each of the twelve prescriptions at issue in
this case were issued without a legitimate medical purpose because
diversion was not appropriately addressed at any of the six visits in
this case.\34\ See Tr. 224, 231, 243-44, 256-57, 259, 270. Indeed, the
confidential sources admitted to having engaged in diversion during
each of the six visits and the parties have stipulated that
prescriptions were issued during each of the six visits.
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\34\ The ALJ found that diversion was not properly addressed at
only five of the encounters. We both found that the prescriptions
issued by Respondent to L.G. were not issued for a legitimate
medical purpose on August 30. 2017; however, the ALJ found that
Respondent did not have any obligation during this visit to address
L.G.'s diversion, because L.G. stated that he was no longer selling
pills and that the people he was selling pills to wanted to become
patients. RD, at 81-82. I agree that L.G.'s statements indicate that
he did not plan to engage in diversion in the future, however L.G.
did still admit that he had engaged in diversion of Respondent's
prescriptions in the past. Dr. Hoch seemed to be fully aware that
L.G. was admitting to past diversion (stating, ``[t]he CS or patient
informs the doctor that he was selling the medication . . .'' Tr.
266 (emphasis added), when he opined that Respondent's discussion of
the dangers of diversion at the August 30, 2017, encounter were
insufficient and that the prescriptions that followed were not
issued in the usual course of professional practice. Tr. 270. I see
no reason to stray from Dr. Hoch's credible and uncontroverted
opinion. Further, the fact that the former customers of L.G. who
previously obtained controlled substances unlawfully might visit
Respondent to obtain controlled substances directly from Respondent
hardly seems to address the diversion issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For all of these reasons, I find that Respondent violated federal
law and Florida Administrative Code Sec. 64B8-9.013(1)(d) by
prescribing controlled substances to Y.H. and L.G. in spite of their
admitting to engaging in diversion immediately prior to the issuance of
the prescriptions.
ii. Failure To Conduct Physical Examinations
As I found above based on Dr. Hoch's testimony, the State of
Florida requires that, when prescribing controlled
[[Page 73801]]
substances for pain, a ``physical examination must be conducted and
documented in the medical record.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-
9.013(3)(a) (West 2020); supra, II(E). According to Dr. Hoch, the
Florida Code does not define what constitutes an initial physical exam
and does not necessarily require that a physician conduct a physical
examination of a patient each time the patient presents for an
appointment. RD, at 50; Tr. 289. However, Dr. Hoch opined that the
standard of care requires a physician to perform a follow up physical
examination in certain circumstances including when the patient
requests a higher dose of controlled substances, presents with new
symptoms or complaints, has a new diagnosis, or has not been seen for a
period of months. See Tr. 290, 341-42, 345-46.
I found above that Respondent did not conduct a physical exam
during any of the confidential sources' six visits.\35\ See supra,
II(I); Tr. 230, 232, 242, 246, 269, 324, 339. Not only did the
confidential sources credibly testify that no physical examination was
conducted during their respective encounters, see Tr. 48-49, 54, 59,
104, 109, 115, but Dr. Hoch's uncontroverted testimony was that there
was no indication in the record (including the video evidence) that
Respondent performed a physical exam during the six visits. Tr. 227,
230, 242, 249, 261, 269, 338-39. I find that Respondent's failure to
perform a physical exam during any of the six visits in this matter
violates the standard of care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ In fact, the ``objective'' section of each and every one of
the patient records Respondent introduced into evidence was empty.
See RX 1, and RX 2. Dr. Hoch testified that the ``objective''
section is where a doctor should identify her objective findings
based on a physical examination. RD, at 51; Tr. 212. Based on the
records and Dr. Hoch's testimony, it is fair to conclude that
Respondent never conducted a physical exam of either confidential
source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The record in the evidence establishes that Respondent never
performed a physical examination on Y.H.\36\ RD, at 22; Tr. 92.
Additionally, Dr. Hoch opined that, even if an initial physical
examination had been performed, Respondent would have been required to
give a new physical examination to Y.H. on September 8, 2016, to
justify the 40% increase in oxycodone HCL 30 mg. that Respondent
prescribed. RD, at 25; Tr. 339-342.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See supra n.19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, there is no indication in the record that Respondent
ever performed a physical examination of L.G.\37\ RD, at 79; RX 2, at
16, 18, 20-22. Additionally, Dr. Hoch opined that, even if an initial
physical examination had been performed, Respondent would have been
required to give a new physical examination to L.G. on February 3,
2017, because of the new diagnosis of chronic back pain on that date.
Tr. 345-46. Per Dr. Hoch a new physical examination would also have
been required on both February 3, 2017, and July 18, 2017, because it
had been over five months between Respondent's prescriptions to L.G.
for controlled substances for pain and the delay in treatment gives
rise to the question of whether L.G. had such severe pain that he
needed the controlled substances to relieve his pain. RD, at 37, 43,
76, 79; Tr. 345-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See supra n.27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For all these reasons, I find that Respondent violated Florida
Administrative Code Sec. 64B8-9.013 and issued prescriptions outside
the usual course of professional practice and beneath the applicable
standard of care by prescribing controlled substances for pain without
conducting a physical exam.
iii. Failure To Discuss Risk of Controlled Substances With Patients
In accordance with Dr. Hoch's opinion, I found above that the State
of Florida requires that a doctor discuss the risks and benefits of
controlled substances with a patient. See supra, II(E); RD, at 9; Tr.
205-06; Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(c) (West 2020). Here
Respondent prescribed each confidential source both oxycodone 30 mg.,
which Dr. Hoch stated is a very strong dose, and alprazolam 2 mg.,
which Dr. Hoch stated is a very strong dose, during each of the six
encounters at issue in this case (for a total of twelve prescriptions).
RX 1, at 16; RX 2, at 14; Tr. 219, 222.
Dr. Hoch explained that the oxycodone prescription alone can cause
a number of side effects that Respondent did not discuss with Y.H. Tr.
220-221. Some of the less disabling side effects of opioid use include
pruritus or itching, urinary retention, nausea and vomiting, and
constipation. Tr. 220-221. Dr. Hoch explained that ``the most
devastating complication or side effect of an opioid [like oxycodone]
is respiratory depression, and that's what kills people.'' Tr. 221-222.
Dr. Hoch explained that the risk is particularly high where, as here,
the opioid is prescribed with a drug like alprazolam. Tr. 222.
In light of the medications prescribed, Dr. Hoch opined that
Respondent was required to warn of the risk of side effects including
respiratory depression and instruct the patient to make sure there was
at least a three-to-four hour gap between administering the two
different medications. Id. Based on Dr. Hoch's credible and
uncontroverted opinion, I find that there was no discussion of the
risks of using these controlled substances (much less the risk of
respiratory depression that can occur when using them together) at any
of the six encounters. Tr. 222, 230, 232, 237-38, 241, 247, 251, 258-
59, 263, and 268.
Another example of Respondent's failure to discuss the risks of
using controlled substances occurred when L.G. informed Respondent he
drinks alcohol. Tr. 255. According to Dr. Hoch, when a physician learns
that a patient could be drinking while being prescribed a high dose
opioid and benzodiazepine, the patient ``should be warned very
strongly'' that the medications and alcohol should not be taken
together. Tr. 255. According to Dr. Hoch, ``[w]hen [patients] tell you
that they're drinking, that's a huge issue for their safety.'' Tr. 256.
Dr. Hoch opined that on February 3, 2017, L.G. informed Respondent that
he drinks alcohol, Respondent was required to warn L.G. of the risks of
taking the prescribed controlled substances with alcohol, and
Respondent failed to issue the required warning. Tr. 255-56.
For all these reasons, I find that Respondent violated Florida
Administrative Code Sec. 64B8-9.013 and issued prescriptions outside
of the usual course of professional practice and beneath the applicable
standard of care by failing to discuss the risks of using the
prescribed controlled substances with Y.H. and L.G.
In light of the above, the ALJ found, and I agree, that Respondent
issued a total of twelve prescriptions outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the applicable standard of care in
the State of Florida. RD, at 92.
iv. Recordkeeping Violations
Florida Administrative Code, Rule 64B8-9.013 lays out a physician's
responsibilities when prescribing controlled substances for pain
management.\38\ See supra, II(E); RD, at 9; Tr. 203-05. With regard to
medical records, the Florida Administrative Code provides that a
physician is required to ``keep accurate and complete
[[Page 73802]]
medical records'' to include, but not be limited to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013 provides guidelines that are
authoritative on physicians in Florida; however, ``[t]he Board will
not take disciplinary action against a physician for failing to
adhere strictly to the provisions of these standards, if good cause
is shown for such deviation.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(1)(f)
(West 2020); see also RD, at 9; Tr. 272, 280-81.
--``The complete medical history and a physical examination,
including history of drug abuse or dependence as appropriate.'' Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f)(1) (West 2020).
--``Treatment objectives.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f)(4)
(West 2020).
--``[D]iscussion of risks and benefits.'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-
9.013(3)(f)(5) (West 2020).
--``Periodic reviews. Records must remain current, maintained in an
accessible manner, readily available for review, and must be in full
compliance with Rule 64B8-9.003 . . . .'' Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-
9.013(3)(f)(10) (West 2020).
Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.013(3)(f) (West 2020) (emphasis added).
Additionally, a physician's ``medical record shall contain
sufficient information to identify the patient, support the diagnosis,
justify the treatment and document the course and results of treatment
accurately, by including, at a minimum, patient histories; examination
results; test results; records of drugs prescribed . . . .'' Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.003(3) (West 2020) (emphasis added). Similarly,
the Florida Statute provides that the ``following acts constitute
grounds for denial of a license or disciplinary action . . .: Failing
to keep legible . . . medical records . . . that justify the course of
treatment of the patient, including, but not limited to, patient
histories; examination results; test results; records of drugs
prescribed, dispensed, or administered; and reports of consultations
and hospitalizations.'' Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 458.331(1)(m) (West
2020).
Dr. Hoch testified that the ``plan'' portion of Respondent's
records was where Respondent should have provided ``a justification as
to why [she] was doing what [she was] doing'' with regards to her
treatment of a patient. Tr. 212. Dr. Hoch further opined that the
``plans'' contained in Respondent's medical records concerning L.G. and
Y.H. are not plans in so far as they did not contain any objective
standards by which treatment success could be measured. Tr. 335-36,
353. In light of Dr. Hoch's testimony, I find that the Respondent's
records were insufficient to meet the requirements set by the State of
Florida. Dr. Hoch also testified that the plans do not bear any
resemblance to the recorded corresponding visits they were meant to
document. Tr. 218. In fact, the ALJ found, and I agree, that merely by
comparing the recordings made by both Y.H. and L.G. when they met with
Respondent with the treatment notes, it is readily obvious that the
records that Respondent prepared do not accurately report what happened
during these encounters. RD, at 91. I therefore find that Respondent
did not maintain the records required by the State of Florida. In fact,
Respondent admitted as much in her Posthearing Brief, stating ``that
her medical records for Y.H. and L.G. were not complete and accurate.''
ALJX 28, at 15. Therefore, I find, consistent with the ALJ and Dr.
Hoch's testimony, that in failing to keep sufficient and accurate
records as required by the State of Florida, Respondent violated
Florida Administrative Code Sec. 64B8-9.013 and 9.003.
The Government further alleged that Respondent violated the state
law by ``falsif[ying] numerous patient records in order to conceal
[her] illegal prescribing.'' OSC, at 2. More specifically, the OSC
alleged that Respondent falsified her records by documenting that 60
minutes was spent on each encounter when none of the encounters
exceeded 15 minutes and by documenting that she discussed side effects,
adverse reactions, safety precautions and the risks of physician
shopping, when ``those issues were never discussed.'' OSC, at 9; see
also RD, at 83.
To support the allegation that Respondent's recordkeeping was
fraudulent, the Government points to the Administrative Complaint filed
against Respondent by the State of Florida. ALJX 27 (Gov Posthearing
Brief), at 29. The Government states that, regardless of the merits of
the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, it clearly
put Respondent on notice ``no later than January 2017 that the standard
of care required her to discontinue prescribing controlled substances
to patients engaged in diversion and required her to properly maintain
medical records.'' ALJX 27 (Gov Posthearing), at 30. Despite this
notice, Respondent continued to issue prescriptions for controlled
substances to Y.H. and L.G, without maintaining proper records in
violation of the relevant standard of care and Florida law.
The ALJ found, and I agree, that not only do Respondent's medical
records for Y.H. and L.G. fail to contain the minimum information
required under Florida law, they also clearly report events that did
not occur during the medical appointments. RD, at 91. DEA has
recognized that the falsification of medical records creates a ``fair
inference'' that a prescriber is issuing prescriptions ``outside the
usual course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical
purpose.'' Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 FR 42,962, 42,964 (2015).
Here, the ALJ found, and I agree, that Respondent falsified the medical
records of Y.H. and L.G., and that these false entries allow for the
fair inference that Respondent acted outside of the usual course of
professional practice and beneath the standard of care in the State of
Florida in issuing the twelve prescriptions to Y.H. and L.G. RD, at 91-
92.
For all these reasons, I find that Respondent violated 21 CFR
1306.04(a), Florida Statute Sec. 458.331(1)(m), and Florida
Administrative Code Sec. Sec. 64B8-9.013 and 64B8-9.003, by falsifying
patient records.
In total, I find that the Government has proven by substantial
evidence that Respondent issued twelve controlled substance
prescriptions without a legitimate medical purpose and outside of the
usual course of professional practice and beneath the applicable
standard of care in the State of Florida in violation of 21 CFR
1306.04(a), Florida Statute Sec. 458.331(1)(m), and Florida
Administrative Code Sec. Sec. 64B8-9.013 and 64B8-9.003. Overall, I
find that the Government has established a prima facie case that
Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with the public
interest.
B. Summary of Factors Two and Four and Imminent Danger
As found above, the Government's case establishes by substantial
evidence that Respondent issued controlled substance prescriptions
outside the usual course of the professional practice. I, therefore,
conclude that Respondent engaged in misconduct which supports the
revocation of her registration. See Wesley Pope, 82 FR 14,944, 14,985
(2017).
For purposes of the imminent danger inquiry, my findings also lead
to the conclusion that Respondent has ``fail[ed] . . . to maintain
effective controls against diversion or otherwise comply with the
obligations of a registrant'' under the CSA. 21 U.S.C. 824(d)(2). The
substantial evidence that Respondent issued controlled substance
prescriptions outside the usual course of the professional practice
establishes ``a substantial likelihood of an immediate threat that
death, serious bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance . . .
[would] occur in the absence of the immediate suspension'' of
Respondent's registration. Id.; see e.g., Tr. 256 (opinion of the
Government's expert, Dr. Hoch, that Respondent was prescribing
``potentially deadly'' medications); Tr. 221-22 (opinion of Dr. Hoch
that using ``an opioid [can result in] respiratory
[[Page 73803]]
depression, and that's what kills people'').
Not only was Respondent prescribing a ``potentially deadly''
combination of medications to confidential sources without properly
warning them of the risks associated with taking those controlled
substances, but, Respondent continued writing the prescriptions after
the confidential sources admitted to diverting these ``potentially
deadly'' controlled substances. See supra, III(A)(2)(a)(i) and (iii);
Tr. 221. According to Dr. Hoch, when a patient diverts medication
``that's a huge issue for the community at large.'' Tr. 256.
Thus, as I have found above, at the time the Government issued the
OSC/ISO, the Government had clear evidence of violations of law based
on the two confidential sources, who had been unlawfully prescribed
controlled substances, with no physical exam, with no explanation of
the risks associated with the potentially deadly combination of
controlled substances, and after the confidential sources had admitted
to diverting the prescriptions.
IV. Sanction
Where, as here, the Government has met its prima facie burden of
showing that Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent with
the public interest, the burden shifts to the Respondent to show why
she can be entrusted with a registration. Garrett Howard Smith, M.D.,
83 FR 18,882, 18,910 (2018) (collecting cases). Respondent has made
little to no effort to establish that she can be trusted with a
registration.
The CSA authorizes the Attorney General to ``promulgate and enforce
any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and
appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions under this
subchapter.'' 21 U.S.C. 871(b). This authority specifically relates
``to `registration' and `control,' and `for the efficient execution of
his functions' under the statute.'' Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
259 (2006). A clear purpose of this authority is to ``bar[ ] doctors
from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in
illicit drug dealing and trafficking.'' Id. at 270.
In efficiently executing the revocation and suspension authority
delegated to me under the CSA for the aforementioned purposes, I review
the evidence and argument Respondent submitted to determine whether or
not she has presented ``sufficient mitigating evidence to assure the
Administrator that [she] can be trusted with the responsibility carried
by such a registration.'' Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 FR 23,848,
23,853 (2007) (quoting Leo R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR 21,931, 21,932
(1988)). ```Moreover, because ``past performance is the best predictor
of future performance,'' ALRA Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th
Cir. 1995), [the Agency] has repeatedly held that where a registrant
has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest, the
registrant must accept responsibility for [the registrant's] actions
and demonstrate that [registrant] will not engage in future
misconduct.' '' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 463 (2009) (quoting
Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008)); see also Jackson, 72 FR at
23,853; John H. Kennnedy, M.D., 71 FR 35,705, 35,709 (2006); Prince
George Daniels, D.D.S., 60 FR 62,884, 62,887 (1995).
The issue of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent determination
based on the circumstances presented by the individual respondent;
therefore, the Agency looks at factors, such as the acceptance of
responsibility and the credibility of that acceptance as it relates to
the probability of repeat violations or behavior and the nature of the
misconduct that forms the basis for sanction, while also considering
the Agency's interest in deterring similar acts. See Arvinder Singh,
M.D., 81 FR 8247, 8248 (2016).
In evaluating the degree required of a respondent's acceptance of
responsibility to entrust him with a registration, in Mohammed Asgar,
M.D., 83 FR 29,569, 29,572 (2018), the Agency looked for ``unequivocal
acceptance of responsibility when a respondent has committed knowing or
intentional misconduct.'' Id. (citing Lon F. Alexander, M.D., 82 FR
49,704, 49,728).
In this case, Respondent made statements to the confidential
sources during their encounters that I believe demonstrate that she
knew it was unlawful to prescribe controlled substances after the
confidential sources had admitted to diversion. For example, on January
25, 2017, Y.H. told Respondent how much the prescriptions helped her
out (in connection with her need to sell pills to make money) and
Respondent replied, ``Relax! Do not say that to nobody . . . . I don't
want to . . . get into trouble.'' \39\ GX 7, at 10-11. Additionally,
the State of Florida Administrative Complaint,\40\ clearly notified
Respondent that the professional standard of care required that
Respondent discontinue prescribing scheduled medications upon learning
that a patient was sharing medications. RX 11, at 19. The ALJ found,
and I agree, ``it is clear that when [Respondent] issued prescriptions
to Y.H. and L.G. after they told her they were selling their
prescriptions, her actions constituted a knowing diversion of oxycodone
HCL and alprazolam.'' RD, at 100.
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\39\ Additional examples include Respondent's statement on July
8, 2017, that if L.G. sells his medication then Respondent cannot
give him medication. GX 11, at 3 and 6. And during the same
appointment Respondent tried to cover herself by stating that she
knew L.G. was just joking and really did not sell his medication. GX
11, at 8.
\40\ Respondent seems to have received the Administrative
Complaint on or about January 20-23, 2017, but certainly received it
no later than February 8, 2017, when she signed the Settlement
Agreement. See RX 11, at 15, 24.
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But there is no clear acceptance of responsibility in the record.
Here, Respondent did not testify on her own behalf, and did not attempt
to explain why, in spite of her egregious misconduct, she can be
entrusted with a registration.\41\ Such silence weighs against the
Respondent's continued registration. Zvi H. Perper, M.D., 77 FR 64,131,
at 64,142 (citing Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR at 387); see also Samuel S.
Jackson, 72 FR at 23,853.
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\41\ In Zvi H. Perper, the Respondent did not testify in this
proceeding; therefore, the Agency found, ``he neither took
responsibility for his misconduct nor provided any assurances that
he has implemented remedial measures to ensure such conduct is not
repeated.'' Zvi H. Perper, M.D., 77 FR 64,131, at 64,142.
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Respondent argued, that even though she did not testify in this
case, her actions showed her acceptance of responsibility. ALJX 28, at
15. Respondent claimed that she updated the practice's procedures and
equipment, completed continuing education courses, and discharged
patients who refused to submit to urine drug screening.\42\ Id.; RD, at
105. ``The degree of acceptance of responsibility that is required does
not hinge on the respondent uttering ``magic words'' of repentance, but
rather on whether the respondent has credibly and candidly demonstrated
that [s]he will not repeat the same behavior and endanger the public in
a manner that instills confidence in the Administrator.'' Jeffrey
Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46,968, 49,973 (2019). In this case, Respondent has
not issued any words of repentance or acceptance of responsibility,
because she has not testified, nor has she made any admissions of
fault. As such, I cannot trust that Respondent would not repeat her
behavior. See MacKay, 664 F.3d at 820 (upholding the Agency's finding
that a respondent's failure to testify warranted an adverse inference,
[[Page 73804]]
because there was ``no evidence that [respondent] recognized the extent
of his misconduct and was prepared to remedy his prescribing
practices''); see also T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 FR 57,133 (2012)
(stating that ``it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference from
Respondent's failure to testify.'').
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\42\ The continuing education courses were required by
Respondent's Settlement Agreement and the remaining actions appear
to have been related to the Settlement Agreement's requirement to
engage a risk manager to conduct a quality assurance consultation or
risk management assessment. See RX 11, at 10-12; Tr. at 385-386.
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Indeed, the facts on the record irrefutably demonstrate that
Respondent cannot be entrusted to amend her behavior. The State of
Florida Administrative Complaint, dated January 20, 2017, notified
Respondent that she should discontinue prescribing after learning that
a patient is diverting. RX 11, at 19. Days later, on January 25, 2017,
Respondent prescribed to Y.H. following an admission of diversion. See
supra II(G)(3). On or about February 8, 2017, Respondent signed a
Settlement Agreement (which became a Final Order on April 21, 2017),
wherein Respondent agreed to not violate Chapters 456, 458 or 893 of
the Florida Statutes or any other state or federal law relating to the
practice of medicine. RX 11, at 15. Yet, on both July 18, 2017, and on
August 30, 2017, Respondent violated those laws when she again issued
prescriptions (this time to L.G.) following an admission of diversion.
See supra II(H)(2) and (3).
The Agency also looks to the egregiousness and extent of the
misconduct which are significant factors in determining the appropriate
sanction. Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR at 18,910 (collecting
cases). In this case, I agree with the ALJ that Respondent's actions
can be characterized as ``particularly egregious.'' RD, at 100. On six
separate occasions over an eleven-month period, Respondent issued
twelve prescriptions to confidential sources without having conducted a
physical exam or warning of the potential risks in violation of state
law. Supra III(A)(2)(a); RD, at 104. Furthermore, Respondent issued
prescriptions to the confidential sources immediately after those
confidential sources admitted to diverting the medication. Supra
III(A)(2)(a)(i); Tr. 221. As a separate matter, the medical records
that Respondent maintained on the confidential sources not only
contained false information, but they did not document any physical
examinations, medical history, or periodic reviews. See supra II(I). I
agree with the ALJ's finding ``that [Respondent's] misconduct of
diversion and falsifying records to cover it up, as proven in the
Administrative Record, is egregious and supports the revocation of her
registration.'' RD, at 104.
In sanction determinations, the Agency has historically considered
its interest in deterring similar acts, both with respect to the
respondent in a particular case and the community of registrants. See
Joseph Gaudio, M.D., 74 FR 10,083, 10,095 (2009); Singh, 81 FR at 8248.
I agree with the ALJ who found ``that considerations of both specific
and general deterrence weigh in favor of revocation in this case.'' RD,
at 105. There is simply no evidence that Respondent's egregious
behavior is not likely to recur in the future such that I can entrust
her with a CSA registration; in other words, the factors weigh in favor
of revocation as a sanction.
I will therefore order that Respondent's registration be revoked
and that any pending applications be denied as contained in the Order
below.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
FG0560765 issued to Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I hereby
deny any pending application of Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. to renew or
modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of
Jeanne E. Germeil, M.D. for registration in Florida. This Order is
effective December 21, 2020.
Timothy J. Shea,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2020-25528 Filed 11-18-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P