Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), 61740-61741 [2020-21622]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
• National Nuclear Security Administration

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 190 (Wednesday, September 30, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61740-61741]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-21622]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-
12 National Security Complex (Y-12)

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Amended record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
is amending its October 2019 Amended Record of Decision (AROD) for the 
Continued Interim Operation of the Y-12 National Security Complex (2019 
AROD) to continue to implement its approach for meeting enriched 
uranium (EU) requirements, by upgrading existing EU processing 
buildings and constructing a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). 
Since publication of the 2019 AROD, NNSA finalized a Supplement 
Analysis for the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Y-12 National Security Complex, Earthquake Accident Analysis (DOE/EIS-
0387-SA-04) (2020 SA), which presented an accident analysis of 
earthquake consequences at the Y-12 site using updated seismic hazard 
analyses. Based on the analysis in the 2020 SA, NNSA determined that no 
additional NEPA documentation is required. This new 2020 AROD combines 
elements of the two alternatives previously analyzed in the 2011 Final 
Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security 
Complex (DOE/EIS-0387) (Y-12 SWEIS), and separates the single-structure 
UPF design concept into a new design consisting of multiple buildings, 
with each constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate 
to the building's function. All other defense mission activities and 
non-defense mission activities conducted at Y-12 under the alternative 
selected for implementation in the 2011 ROD would continue to be 
implemented.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on this 2020 
AROD or on the 2020 SA, contact: Ms. Terri Slack, Field Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA 
Production Office, P.O. Box 2050, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, (865) 576-1722. 
This 2020 AROD and related NEPA documents are available at https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Y-12 is NNSA's primary site for uranium operations, including EU 
processing and storage, and is one of the primary manufacturing 
facilities for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Y-12 is 
unique in that it is the only source of secondaries, cases, and other 
nuclear weapons components for the NNSA nuclear security mission. In 
the Y-12 SWEIS, NNSA analyzed the potential environmental impacts of 
ongoing and future operations and activities at Y-12, including 
alternatives for changes to site infrastructure and levels of 
operation. Five alternatives were analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS: (1) No 
Action Alternative (maintain the status quo), (2) UPF Alternative, (3) 
Upgrade in-Place Alternative, (4) Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and 
(5) No Net Production/Capability-sized UPF Alternative. In the 2011 ROD 
(July 20, 2011, 76 FR 43319), NNSA decided to implement the Capability-
sized UPF Alternative, to continue operation of Y-12, and to construct 
and operate a single-structure Capability-sized UPF at Y-12 as a 
replacement for certain existing buildings. Subsequent to the 
publication of the 2011 ROD, concerns about UPF cost and schedule 
growth prompted NNSA to reevaluate its strategy for meeting EU 
requirements, including the UPF design approach.
    Under the updated strategy, approved in a July 12, 2016, Amended 
Record of Decision (2016 AROD), NNSA would meet EU requirements using a 
revised approach of upgrading existing EU processing buildings and 
constructing a smaller-scale UPF facility,

[[Page 61741]]

implementing a new multiple building design approach. The updated 
strategy is consistent with recommendations from a project peer review 
of the UPF [``Final Report of the Committee to Recommend Alternatives 
to the Uranium Processing Facility Plan in Meeting the Nation's 
Enriched Uranium Strategy''] conducted in 2014. As approved in the 2016 
AROD, under the new multiple building design approach, the single-
structure UPF concept would be separated into multiple buildings, each 
being constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate to 
the building's function and NNSA would perform necessary maintenance 
and upgrades to some existing EU facilities.
    As the result of a lawsuit filed against DOE and NNSA, the federal 
district court issued several rulings related to NNSA's NEPA documents 
for Y-12. See the 2019 AROD ((October 4, 2019, 84 FR 53133)) for a 
detailed discussion of that lawsuit and the associated NEPA documents 
for Y-12. Based on its determination that additional NEPA analysis of 
new information pertaining to seismic risks at Y-12 was needed, the 
judge vacated several of the Y-12 NEPA documents that were prepared 
subsequent to the Y-12 SWEIS, including the 2016 AROD. However, the 
court held that NNSA's revised strategy of upgrading existing EU 
buildings pursuant to the Extended Life Program and constructing UPF 
with multiple buildings was adequately considered as part of the Y-12 
SWEIS. Consequently, the court did not vacate the 2011 ROD or Y-12 
SWEIS or enjoin any activities at Y-12. The court further held that 
NNSA is not required to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact 
Statement for the UPF Project or the Extended Life Program. See 
Memorandum Opinion and Order in Case 3:18-cv-00150-PLR-DCP. Thus, 
consistent with 10 CFR 1021.315(e), NNSA determined that the existing 
2011 ROD for the Y-12 SWEIS could be amended, and in October 2019, NNSA 
issued the 2019 AROD (84 FR 53133) that authorized continuing 
implementation of the improvements previously authorized in the vacated 
2016 AROD on an interim basis, pending the completion of the additional 
seismic analysis ordered by the court. In accordance with the court's 
determination that additional NEPA analysis of new information 
pertaining to seismic risks at Y-12 is needed, NNSA prepared the 2020 
SA.

Summary of Impacts Associated With Continued Operation of Y-12

    NNSA prepared the 2020 SA to present an unbounded accident analysis 
of earthquake consequences at Y-12, using updated seismic hazard 
analyses. The 2020 SA presents the earthquake impacts for the UPF and 
Extended Life Program facilities based upon updated seismic hazard 
information and analyses, including analysis of the 2014 U.S. 
Geological Survey seismic hazard/maps. The 2020 SA compares and 
contrasts those impacts with impacts from the Y-12 SWEIS accident 
analysis. Two types of impact comparisons are presented: (1) Facility-
to-facility; and (2) alternative-to-alternative. These comparisons 
support conclusions/determinations as to whether the earthquake 
consequences constitute a substantial change that is relevant to 
environmental concerns; or if the new seismic information constitutes 
significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental 
concerns and bearing on continued operations at Y-12 compared to the 
analysis in the Y-12 SWEIS.
    As discussed in the 2020 SA, the potential impacts to non-involved 
workers and the offsite population associated with an earthquake 
accident at Y-12 would be less than impacts presented in the Y-12 
SWEIS, both in considering the potential consequences of such an 
accident as well as the risks that such an accident would occur. The 
2020 SA shows that the UPF design-basis earthquake accident and a 
seismic-induced criticality event in either the 9215 Complex or 9204-2E 
Facility (the two existing EU buildings)--or both facilities combined--
would have insignificant impacts to non-involved workers and the 
offsite population and would have a very low likelihood of occurring. 
Under the worst case scenario of a beyond design-basis earthquake at 
the UPF, consequences of less than one latent cancer fatality would 
likewise be expected to the offsite population and non-involved workers 
and would have an extremely low risk of occurring. The 2020 SA also 
confirms that potential impacts to involved workers would be similar to 
or less than impacts presented in the 2011 SWEIS. Based on the results 
of the 2020 SA, NNSA determined that: (1) The earthquake consequences 
and risks do not constitute a substantial change; (2) there are no 
significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental 
concerns; and (3) no additional NEPA documentation is required at this 
time.

Amended Decision

    Based on the Y-12 SWEIS and the analysis in the 2020 SA, NNSA has 
decided to continue to operate Y-12 to meet the stockpile stewardship 
mission critical activities assigned to the site. NNSA will also meet 
EU requirements using a hybrid approach of upgrading existing EU 
buildings under its Extended Life Program and separating the single-
structure UPF into multiple buildings, with each constructed to safety 
and security requirements appropriate to the building's function. This 
amended decision will enable NNSA to maintain the required expertise 
and capabilities to deliver uranium products while modernizing 
production facilities. This amended decision to continue operations 
will avoid many of the safety risks of operating aged buildings and 
equipment by relocating processes that cannot be sustained in existing, 
enduring buildings or through process improvements. Through the 
Extended Life Program, mission-critical existing and enduring buildings 
and infrastructure will be maintained and/or upgraded, which will 
enhance safety and security at the Y-12 site.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on September 
18, 2020, by Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for Nuclear 
Security and Administrator, NNSA, pursuant to delegated authority from 
the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and 
date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in 
compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the 
undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to 
sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as 
an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative 
process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon 
publication in the Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on September 22, 2020.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2020-21622 Filed 9-29-20; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6450-01-P