Pipeline Safety: Inside Meters and Regulators, 61101-61104 [2020-21507]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 189 / Tuesday, September 29, 2020 / Notices
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
operators must assemble this
information to the extent necessary to
support the development and
implementation of their integrity
management programs. Underlying
procedures must also identify additional
information necessary to improve their
understanding and provide a plan for
gaining that information over time
through the normal activities of
operating and maintaining pipeline
systems (e.g., collecting information
about buried components when portions
of the pipeline must be excavated for
other reasons). Operators must also
develop a process by which the program
will be periodically reviewed and
refined, as needed. The outcome of the
process should be that all affected
departments of an operator’s
organization are aware of any planned
construction work, have had the
opportunity to review and provide
comments on potential failure modes
and to adopt a process for providing
final approval of construction
procedures.
Identifying Threats and Ranking Risk
(§ 192.1007(b)–(c))
PHMSA reminds operators of their
obligation under DIMP regulations (part
192, subpart P) to consider available
information when identifying all
potential and existing threats to the
integrity of their systems
(§ 192.1007(b)). In accordance with
§ 192.1007(b), operators are required to
consider seven specific threats,
including equipment failure and
incorrect operation. Further, PHMSA
reminds operators to evaluate the risks
associated with their distribution
pipelines, determine the relative
importance of each threat, and rank the
risks posed to their pipeline systems
(§ 192.1007(c)). PHMSA reminds
operators that consideration of
consequences is important to help
ensure that risks are properly ranked. A
potential accident of relatively low
likelihood but one that would produce
significant consequences may be a
higher risk than an accident with
somewhat greater likelihood, but one
that is not expected to produce major
consequences.
Given the catastrophic consequences
of the Merrimack Valley accident,
PHMSA considers the possibility of an
overpressure protection system failure
to be a high-risk threat for low-pressure
distribution systems where there are not
adequate provisions to protect such
systems. Therefore, PHMSA
recommends that operators consider the
single point of failure that could lead to
an overpressurization of a low-pressure
system as a high-risk threat and to
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Sep 28, 2020
Jkt 250001
review and adjust their DIMP plans
accordingly. NTSB’s Pipeline Accident
Report sufficiently documents the
occurrence of overpressurization of lowpressure distribution systems such that
the threat of overpressurization should
be considered a real and present threat.
If the threat of overpressurization of
low-pressure distribution systems is not
considered an existing threat by an
operator, justification for the
elimination of this threat from
consideration should be documented.
In performing a risk analysis required
by DIMP (§ 192.1007), PHMSA
recommends operators use a failure
modes and effectiveness analysis
(FMEA) model or an equivalent
structured and systematic method to
identify and mitigate risks. Failure
modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a
generally accepted and recognized
engineering practice used to identify
and assess potential failures, including
common mode failures. As NTSB
concluded, a comprehensive and formal
risk assessment, such as FMEA, would
have identified the human error that
caused the redundant regulators to open
and over-pressurize the low-pressure
system. Operators may already be
leveraging FMEA or other similarly
robust methodologies to perform the
risk analysis and should continue to do
so. PHMSA recommends that operators
consider adopting FMEA or another
qualitative tool that may help to identify
possible failures or consequences of
those failures that would not be
identified otherwise.
Identify and Implement Measures To
Address Risk (§ 192.1007(d))
PHMSA reminds operators that they
must determine and implement
measures designed to reduce the risk of
failure on their pipeline systems
(§ 192.1007(d)). If additional actions
have not been taken to reduce risks,
justification should be documented
(e.g., current overpressure protection
design was determined to be sufficient;
risks were deemed to be low).
There are several ways that operators
can protect low-pressure distribution
systems from overpressure events. Some
notable examples include:
• Installing a full-capacity relief valve
downstream of the low-pressure
regulator station, including in
applications where there is only workermonitor pressure control;
• Installing a ‘‘slam shut’’ device;
• Using telemetered pressure
recordings at district regulator stations
to signal failures immediately to
operators at control centers; and
PO 00000
Frm 00147
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
61101
• Completely and accurately
documenting the location for all control
(i.e., sensing) lines on the system.
Measure Performance, Monitor Results,
and Evaluate Effectiveness
(§ 192.1007(e))
PHMSA reminds operators that they
must monitor performance measures
from an established baseline to evaluate
the effectiveness of DIMP
(§ 192.1007(e)). Section 192.1007(e)(vi)
requires that these performance
measures include any additional
measures determined necessary to
control identified threats. PHMSA
reminds operators to modify their DIMP
as appropriate, considering the potential
failure of overpressure protection
systems as a high-risk threat.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September
24, 2020, under authority delegated in 49
CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2020–21508 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2020–0115]
Pipeline Safety: Inside Meters and
Regulators
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA); DOT.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory
bulletin.
AGENCY:
PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to alert owners and
operators of natural gas distribution
pipelines to the consequences of failures
of inside meters and regulators. PHMSA
is also reminding operators of existing
Federal regulations covering the
installation and maintenance of inside
meter and regulators, including the
integrity management regulations for
distribution systems to reduce the risks
associated with failures of inside meter
and regulator installations.
ADDRESSES: PHMSA guidance,
including this advisory bulletin, can be
found on PHMSA’s website at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/guidance. You may
also view this advisory bulletin and
related documents at https://
www.regulations.gov.
SUMMARY:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Technical Questions: Michael
Thompson, Transportation Specialist,
by phone at 503–883–3495.
E:\FR\FM\29SEN1.SGM
29SEN1
61102
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 189 / Tuesday, September 29, 2020 / Notices
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
General Questions: Ashlin Bollacker,
Technical Writer, by phone at 202–366–
4203.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On August 10, 2016, a natural gasfueled explosion and fire caused the
partial collapse of a 14-unit apartment
building located at 8701 Arliss Street
(Building 8701) in the Flower Branch
Apartment Complex of Silver Spring,
Maryland. The explosion and fire also
heavily damaged an adjacent apartment
building, which shared a common wall
with Building 8701. As a result of this
accident, 7 residents died, 65 residents
were transported to the hospital, and 3
firefighters were treated and released
from the hospital. The property damage
from the accident exceeded $1 million.
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) determined that the probable
cause of the explosion was the failure of
an indoor mercury service regulator
with an unconnected vent line. The
unconnected vent line allowed natural
gas to flow into the meter room, where
the gas accumulated and ignited from an
unknown ignition source. A
contributing factor to the accident was
the mercury service regulator being
located in a space where leak detection
by odor was not readily available.
A ‘‘service regulator’’ is defined in
§ 192.3 as a ‘‘device on a service line
that controls the pressure of gas
delivered from a higher pressure to the
pressure provided to the customer. A
service regulator may serve one
customer or multiple customers through
a meter header or manifold.’’ Service
regulators are installed to a meter inlet
to control the gas pressure into a
building. They reduce the high pressure
used to transport natural gas through the
delivery systems to the lower pressures
used in homes and businesses. Service
regulators include a relief valve that
opens if the pressure of the regulated
gas exceeds a specified pressure to
allow the excess gas to vent to the
outside atmosphere. Mercury service
regulators present an increased risk of
failure due to their age.1
Building 8701 received natural gas
from a distribution system owned and
operated by Washington Gas Light
Company (WGL). WGL delivers natural
gas to more than one million residential,
commercial, and industrial customers
throughout Washington, DC, and the
surrounding regions in Maryland and
Virginia. According to WGL, the
1 The
design of mercury service regulators
includes materials such as leather diaphragms and
rubber valve seats that are subject to age-related
deterioration.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Sep 28, 2020
Jkt 250001
mercury service regulators installed in
Building 8701 were also installed in all
26 buildings of the Flower Branch
apartment complex between 1955 and
1956. Since the accident, all of the
mercury service regulators in the Flower
Branch apartment complex have been
removed and replaced.
the appropriate location of the service
regulators. If access is an issue to check
and maintain inside regulators properly,
operators should do what is necessary to
have the customer provide access for the
operator to check the regulator and
conduct the leakage and atmospheric
corrosion surveys.
NTSB Accident Investigation Findings
and Recommendations to PHMSA
On April 24, 2019, NTSB adopted its
report, ‘‘Building Explosion and Fire,
Silver Spring, Maryland, August 10,
2016,’’ 2 determined the probable cause
of the explosion, and issued safety
recommendations. In its report, NTSB
stated that several residents of Buildings
8701 and 8703 reported to investigators
that they smelled gas in the weeks and
months leading up to the explosion. On
July 25, 2016, before the accident,
several residents called the building
manager, 9–1–1, and local fire personnel
about gas odor. However, there was no
evidence that residents, building
management, or any emergency
personnel notified the operator, WGL, of
the gas odor. The investigation revealed
that, had anyone notified WGL of a gas
odor call made two weeks earlier, the
accident may have been prevented.
Notifying WGL would have allowed a
service technician to enter the meter
room of the building, identify the
unconnected vent line, and remedy the
situation. NTSB noted, however, that
the use of gas odorants alone does not
sufficiently mitigate the risk of death
and injuries caused by gas system leaks,
such as the leak that occurred in this
accident.
As discussed above, NTSB
determined that the probable cause of
the explosion was the failure of an
indoor mercury service regulator with
an unconnected vent line. The
unconnected vent line allowed natural
gas to flow into the meter room, where
the gas accumulated and ignited from an
unknown ignition source. NTSB issued
Safety Recommendations P–19–001 and
P–19–002 to PHMSA based on the
finding in the Silver Spring
investigation that, had service regulators
been located outside Building 8701, the
explosion would have been avoided
because gas would have vented to the
atmosphere and dissipated. In light of
these recommendations, PHMSA
believes that operators should ensure
compliance with the applicable pipeline
safety regulations and should evaluate
each service installation to determine
Minimum Federal Safety Standards for
Customer Meters, Service Regulators
and Service Lines
The Federal Pipeline Safety
Regulations prescribe minimum safety
standards for customer meters, service
regulators, and service lines. They
require operators to take into
consideration the possibility of
corrosion, overpressure events, and
physical damage in the design,
installation, and maintenance of these
facilities. The Federal Pipeline Safety
Regulations at 49 CFR 192.353 require
that each meter and service regulator,
whether inside or outside a building,
must be installed in a readily accessible
location and be protected from
corrosion and other damage, including
vehicular damage. For regulators located
inside a building, each service regulator
must be located as near as practical to
the point of service line entrance. Each
meter must be located in a ventilated
place and not less than 3 feet from any
source of ignition or any source of heat
that might damage the meter. Section
192.355(b) states: ‘‘[s]ervice regulator
vents and relief vents must terminate
outdoors, and the outdoor terminus
must . . . [b]e located at a place where
gas from the vent can escape freely into
the atmosphere and away from any
opening into the building.’’ Section
192.357(d) requires regulators that
might release gas to be vented to the
outside atmosphere.
Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations
include requirements that operators
conduct leakage surveys of their
systems, including meter and service
regulators located inside buildings
(§ 192.723). In scheduling such surveys,
operators must consider the nature of
their operations and the local
conditions. At a minimum, operators
must conduct surveys: (1) In business
districts at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar
year; and (2) outside business districts
as frequently as necessary, but at least
once every five calendar years at
intervals not exceeding 63 months. The
regulations also require that operators
inspect each pipeline or portion of
pipeline that is exposed to the
atmosphere for evidence of atmospheric
corrosion in accordance with § 192.481.
Further, if atmospheric corrosion is
found during an inspection, the operator
2 NTSB/PAR–19/01. The details of this accident
investigation and the resulting safety
recommendations may be accessed at https://
ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
PAR1901.pdf.
PO 00000
Frm 00148
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E:\FR\FM\29SEN1.SGM
29SEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 189 / Tuesday, September 29, 2020 / Notices
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
must provide protection against the
corrosion as required by § 192.479.
PHMSA is reminding operators of
these existing requirements for inside
meters and regulators. This advisory
bulletin notes that, if access is an issue
to check and maintain inside regulators
properly, operators should endeavor to
have the customer provide access for the
operator to check the regulator and
conduct the leakage and atmospheric
corrosion surveys.
Distribution Integrity Management
Program (DIMP) Regulations
In addition to these requirements for
inside meters and regulators, PHMSA is
also reminding operators of their
obligation to continually assess risks to
their systems and address those risks in
accordance with DIMP regulations at
§ 192.1007. A DIMP program requires
that operators demonstrate knowledge
of their system (§ 192.1007(a)).
Additionally, a DIMP program requires
that operators identify existing and
potential threats (§ 192.1007(b)).
Identification of the threats that affect,
or could potentially affect, a distribution
pipeline is key to assuring its integrity.
Knowledge of applicable threats allows
operators to evaluate the risks they pose
and to rank those risks, allowing safety
resources to be applied where they will
be most effective. Section 192.1007(c)
requires that an operator evaluate the
identified threats to determine their
relative importance and rank the risks
associated with its pipeline. Operators
must consider the likelihood of threats
as well as the consequences of a failure
that might result from each threat. The
integrity management programs must
include measures designed and
implemented to reduce the risk of
failure from identified threats
(§ 192.1007(d)). Measuring performance
periodically and conducting a complete
program re-evaluation at least every five
years allows operators to determine
whether actions being taken to address
threats are effective, or whether
different or additional actions are
needed (§ 192.1007(e)–(f)). An operator
should conduct a program evaluation
any time there are changes in factors
that would affect the risk of failure.
While the DIMP Regulations have
been in place since 2009, some
operators may not be sufficiently aware
of their pipeline attributes, or may not
be adequately or consistently assessing
threats as part of their DIMP programs.
For example, NTSB found that WGL’s
inadequate procedures led to the
exclusion of the requirement that
technicians verify the connection of
vent lines for indoor service regulators
during service and maintenance
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Sep 28, 2020
Jkt 250001
activities, and as such, vent lines could
be inadvertently left disconnected
following service work. NTSB
concluded that WGL relied on
unvalidated information to determine
the location and condition of mercury
service regulators. Therefore, the NTSB
recommended that throughout the WGL
network, WG implement an audit
program to verify the data on the service
forms used to determine the location
and condition of mercury service
regulators to ensure the accuracy of this
safety-critical data.
Because it is so essential that
operators identify the conditions that
can cause failures and address them
before a failure can occur, PHMSA is
reminding operators of their obligations
to comply with DIMP regulations. This
advisory bulletin serves as a reminder to
operators to identify and evaluate the
physical and operational characteristics
of each pipeline system. Operators
following these requirements should
help to ensure the safety of customer
meters and regulators.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2020–01)
To: Owners and Operators of Gas
Distribution Systems.
Subject: Requirements for Inside
Meters and Regulators.
Advisory: To further enhance
PHMSA’s safety efforts and implement
NTSB’s April 24, 2019,
Recommendations P–19–001 and P–19–
002, PHMSA is issuing this advisory
bulletin to remind operators of the
requirements for inside meters and
regulators. PHMSA is also reminding
operators of existing Federal DIMP
regulations to reduce the possibility of
the failure of inside meter and regulator
installations. Further, PHMSA advises
operators to review NTSB’s report
concerning the August 10, 2016,
accident as it may serve as prudent
guidance regarding potential safety
problems that operators may need to act
on if it addresses a relevant factor on
their system. This advisory bulletin is
intended to clarify and describe the
existing pipeline safety standards for
operators and the public. The contents
of this advisory bulletin do not have the
force and effect of law and are not
meant to bind the public in any way.
However, pipeline operators must
comply with the underlying pipeline
safety standards at 49 CFR part 192.
PHMSA is reminding operators of
§§ 192.353, 192.355, and 192.357, which
provide requirements regarding the
location and safety of customer meters
and regulators. While the regulations
allow service regulators to be located
inside or outside structures, the
requirements for indoor regulators are
PO 00000
Frm 00149
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
61103
more stringent than those located
outdoors. Section 192.353(a) requires
that each meter and service regulator,
whether inside or outside of a building,
be installed in a readily accessible
location and be protected from
corrosion and other damage, including
vehicular damage. Section 192.353(b)
requires each service regulator installed
within a building to be located as near
as practical to the point of service line
entrance, and § 192.353(c) requires that
each meter installed within a building
must be located in a ventilated place
and not less than 3 feet from any source
of ignition or any source of heat that
might damage the meter. In addition,
§ 192.355(b) requires that the service
regulator vents and relief vents must
terminate outdoors, and the outdoor
terminus must be located at a place
where gas from the vent can escape
freely into the atmosphere and away
from any opening into the building.
Section 192.357(d) requires regulators
that might release gas to be vented to the
outside atmosphere.
The Federal Pipeline Safety
Regulations include requirements that
operators conduct leakage and
atmospheric corrosion surveys of their
systems, including service regulators
located inside or outside a building
(§§ 192.723 and 192.481). If access is an
issue to check and maintain inside
meter and regulators properly, operators
should endeavor to have the customer
provide access for the operator to check
these facilities and conduct the leakage
and atmospheric corrosion surveys.
PHMSA is also reminding operators of
their obligation to continually assess
risks to their systems and address those
risks as required by the DIMP
regulations (§ 192.1007). PHMSA
reminds pipeline operators of their
responsibilities to continuously improve
their knowledge of their pipeline
systems, identify integrity threats,
evaluate and rank risks, and identify,
evaluate, and implement preventative
and mitigative measures as required by
the Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations.
PHMSA recommends that operators
thoroughly review their current DIMP
for the threat of the failure of inside
meter and regulator installations and
make any changes necessary to become
compliant with the Federal Pipeline
Safety Regulations. For example, based
on the requirements in § 192.1007(a) for
operators to know their systems,
PHMSA would expect operators to
know the location (inside or outside) of
all meters and regulators installed on
their distribution system. Operators
must evaluate the risks associated with
these facilities, determine the relative
importance of each threat, and rank the
E:\FR\FM\29SEN1.SGM
29SEN1
61104
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 189 / Tuesday, September 29, 2020 / Notices
risks posed to their pipeline
(§ 192.1007(c)). PHMSA urges operators
to consider the points-of-failure
identified in NTSB’s accident
investigation report as they relate to
operators’ inside meter and regulator
installations and to adjust their DIMP
accordingly. These measures must
include an effective leak management
program unless all leaks are repaired
when found (§ 192.1007(d)). As part of
their leak management program,
operators must consider all risks,
including the risk of failure or damage
to inside meter and regulator
installations. If risks are identified, risk
reduction measures must be put in place
to address them, or if additional actions
have not been taken to reduce risks,
justification must be documented.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September
24, 2020, under authority delegated in 49
CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2020–21507 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed Renewal;
Comment Request; Renewal Without
Change of Anti-Money Laundering
Programs; Due Diligence Programs for
Correspondent Accounts for Foreign
Financial Institutions and for Private
Banking Accounts
Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
As part of its continuing effort
to reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, FinCEN invites comments on
the proposed renewal, without change,
of a currently approved information
collection found in existing Bank
Secrecy Act regulations. Specifically,
the regulations require banks, brokers or
dealers in securities, futures
commission merchants, introducing
brokers in commodities, and mutual
funds to establish due diligence
programs that include risk-based, and,
where necessary, enhanced, policies,
procedures, and controls reasonably
designed to detect and report money
laundering conducted through or
involving, any correspondent accounts
established or maintained for foreign
financial institutions. The regulations
also require that these same financial
institutions establish due diligence
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Sep 28, 2020
Jkt 250001
programs that include policies,
procedures, and controls reasonably
designed to detect and report money
laundering conducted through or
involving any private banking accounts
established by the financial institutions.
The due diligence programs are required
to be part of the financial institutions’
anti-money laundering programs.
Although no changes are proposed to
the information collection itself, this
request for comments covers a future
expansion of the scope of the annual
hourly burden and cost estimate
associated with these regulations. This
request for comments is made pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
DATES: Written comments are welcome,
and must be received on or before
November 30, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be
submitted by any of the following
methods:
• Federal E-rulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
Refer to Docket Number FINCEN–2020–
0012 and the specific Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) control
number 1506–0046.
• Mail: Policy Division, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, P.O. Box
39, Vienna, VA 22183. Refer to Docket
Number FINCEN–2020–0012 and OMB
control number 1506–0046.
Please submit comments by one
method only. Comments will also be
incorporated into FinCEN’s review of
existing regulations, as provided by
Treasury’s 2011 Plan for Retrospective
Analysis of Existing Rules. All
comments submitted in response to this
notice will become a matter of public
record. Therefore, you should submit
only information that you wish to make
publicly available.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The
FinCEN Regulatory Support Section at
1–800–767–2825 or electronically at
frc@fincen.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
The legislative framework generally
referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA) consists of the Currency and
Financial Transactions Reporting Act of
1970, as amended by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
(USA PATRIOT Act) (Pub. L. 107–56)
and other legislation. The BSA is
codified at 12 U.S.C. 1829b, 12 U.S.C.
1951–1959, 31 U.S.C. 5311–5314 and
5316–5332, and notes thereto, with
implementing regulations at 31 CFR
chapter X.
PO 00000
Frm 00150
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
The BSA authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury, inter alia, to require
financial institutions to keep records
and file reports that are determined to
have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, and regulatory matters, or
in the conduct of intelligence or
counter-intelligence activities to protect
against international terrorism, and to
implement anti-money laundering
(AML) programs and compliance
procedures.1 Regulations implementing
the BSA appear at 31 CFR chapter X.
The authority of the Secretary to
administer the BSA has been delegated
to the Director of FinCEN.2
Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act
added subsection (i) to 31 U.S.C. 5318
of the BSA. Section 312 mandates that
each financial institution that
establishes, maintains, administers, or
manages a correspondent account or a
private banking account in the United
States for non-U.S. persons subject such
accounts to certain anti-money
laundering compliance measures. In
particular, a financial institution must
establish appropriate, specific, and,
where necessary, enhanced, due
diligence (EDD) or enhanced scrutiny
policies, procedures, and controls that
are reasonably designed to detect and
report instances of money laundering
through those accounts. The regulations
implementing the due diligence
requirements for maintaining foreign
correspondent accounts and private
banking accounts are found at 31 CFR
1010.610 and 31 CFR 1010.620,
respectively, and apply to covered
financial institutions defined as banks,
brokers or dealers in securities, futures
commission merchants, introducing
brokers in commodities, and mutual
funds.3
(a) 31 CFR 1010.610—Due diligence
programs for correspondent accounts
for foreign financial institutions.
Under 31 CFR 1010.610(a), covered
financial institutions are required to
establish due diligence policies,
procedures, and controls that include
each of the following for any
correspondent account established,
maintained, administered, or managed:
(i) Determining whether any such
foreign correspondent account is subject
to EDD; (ii) assessing the money
laundering risks presented by each such
foreign correspondent account; and (iii)
applying risk-based procedures and
controls to each such foreign
1 Section 358 of the USA PATRIOT Act added
language expanding the scope of the BSA to
intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to
protect against international terrorism.
2 Treasury Order 180–01 (re-affirmed Jan. 14,
2020).
3 31 CFR 1010.605(e).
E:\FR\FM\29SEN1.SGM
29SEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 189 (Tuesday, September 29, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61101-61104]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-21507]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2020-0115]
Pipeline Safety: Inside Meters and Regulators
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA);
DOT.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to alert owners and
operators of natural gas distribution pipelines to the consequences of
failures of inside meters and regulators. PHMSA is also reminding
operators of existing Federal regulations covering the installation and
maintenance of inside meter and regulators, including the integrity
management regulations for distribution systems to reduce the risks
associated with failures of inside meter and regulator installations.
ADDRESSES: PHMSA guidance, including this advisory bulletin, can be
found on PHMSA's website at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/guidance. You may
also view this advisory bulletin and related documents at https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Technical Questions: Michael Thompson, Transportation Specialist,
by phone at 503-883-3495.
[[Page 61102]]
General Questions: Ashlin Bollacker, Technical Writer, by phone at
202-366-4203.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On August 10, 2016, a natural gas-fueled explosion and fire caused
the partial collapse of a 14-unit apartment building located at 8701
Arliss Street (Building 8701) in the Flower Branch Apartment Complex of
Silver Spring, Maryland. The explosion and fire also heavily damaged an
adjacent apartment building, which shared a common wall with Building
8701. As a result of this accident, 7 residents died, 65 residents were
transported to the hospital, and 3 firefighters were treated and
released from the hospital. The property damage from the accident
exceeded $1 million.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the
probable cause of the explosion was the failure of an indoor mercury
service regulator with an unconnected vent line. The unconnected vent
line allowed natural gas to flow into the meter room, where the gas
accumulated and ignited from an unknown ignition source. A contributing
factor to the accident was the mercury service regulator being located
in a space where leak detection by odor was not readily available.
A ``service regulator'' is defined in Sec. 192.3 as a ``device on
a service line that controls the pressure of gas delivered from a
higher pressure to the pressure provided to the customer. A service
regulator may serve one customer or multiple customers through a meter
header or manifold.'' Service regulators are installed to a meter inlet
to control the gas pressure into a building. They reduce the high
pressure used to transport natural gas through the delivery systems to
the lower pressures used in homes and businesses. Service regulators
include a relief valve that opens if the pressure of the regulated gas
exceeds a specified pressure to allow the excess gas to vent to the
outside atmosphere. Mercury service regulators present an increased
risk of failure due to their age.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The design of mercury service regulators includes materials
such as leather diaphragms and rubber valve seats that are subject
to age-related deterioration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building 8701 received natural gas from a distribution system owned
and operated by Washington Gas Light Company (WGL). WGL delivers
natural gas to more than one million residential, commercial, and
industrial customers throughout Washington, DC, and the surrounding
regions in Maryland and Virginia. According to WGL, the mercury service
regulators installed in Building 8701 were also installed in all 26
buildings of the Flower Branch apartment complex between 1955 and 1956.
Since the accident, all of the mercury service regulators in the Flower
Branch apartment complex have been removed and replaced.
NTSB Accident Investigation Findings and Recommendations to PHMSA
On April 24, 2019, NTSB adopted its report, ``Building Explosion
and Fire, Silver Spring, Maryland, August 10, 2016,'' \2\ determined
the probable cause of the explosion, and issued safety recommendations.
In its report, NTSB stated that several residents of Buildings 8701 and
8703 reported to investigators that they smelled gas in the weeks and
months leading up to the explosion. On July 25\,\ 2016, before the
accident, several residents called the building manager, 9-1-1, and
local fire personnel about gas odor. However, there was no evidence
that residents, building management, or any emergency personnel
notified the operator, WGL, of the gas odor. The investigation revealed
that, had anyone notified WGL of a gas odor call made two weeks
earlier, the accident may have been prevented. Notifying WGL would have
allowed a service technician to enter the meter room of the building,
identify the unconnected vent line, and remedy the situation. NTSB
noted, however, that the use of gas odorants alone does not
sufficiently mitigate the risk of death and injuries caused by gas
system leaks, such as the leak that occurred in this accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NTSB/PAR-19/01. The details of this accident investigation
and the resulting safety recommendations may be accessed at https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1901.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, NTSB determined that the probable cause of the
explosion was the failure of an indoor mercury service regulator with
an unconnected vent line. The unconnected vent line allowed natural gas
to flow into the meter room, where the gas accumulated and ignited from
an unknown ignition source. NTSB issued Safety Recommendations P-19-001
and P-19-002 to PHMSA based on the finding in the Silver Spring
investigation that, had service regulators been located outside
Building 8701, the explosion would have been avoided because gas would
have vented to the atmosphere and dissipated. In light of these
recommendations, PHMSA believes that operators should ensure compliance
with the applicable pipeline safety regulations and should evaluate
each service installation to determine the appropriate location of the
service regulators. If access is an issue to check and maintain inside
regulators properly, operators should do what is necessary to have the
customer provide access for the operator to check the regulator and
conduct the leakage and atmospheric corrosion surveys.
Minimum Federal Safety Standards for Customer Meters, Service
Regulators and Service Lines
The Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations prescribe minimum safety
standards for customer meters, service regulators, and service lines.
They require operators to take into consideration the possibility of
corrosion, overpressure events, and physical damage in the design,
installation, and maintenance of these facilities. The Federal Pipeline
Safety Regulations at 49 CFR 192.353 require that each meter and
service regulator, whether inside or outside a building, must be
installed in a readily accessible location and be protected from
corrosion and other damage, including vehicular damage. For regulators
located inside a building, each service regulator must be located as
near as practical to the point of service line entrance. Each meter
must be located in a ventilated place and not less than 3 feet from any
source of ignition or any source of heat that might damage the meter.
Section 192.355(b) states: ``[s]ervice regulator vents and relief vents
must terminate outdoors, and the outdoor terminus must . . . [b]e
located at a place where gas from the vent can escape freely into the
atmosphere and away from any opening into the building.'' Section
192.357(d) requires regulators that might release gas to be vented to
the outside atmosphere.
Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations include requirements that
operators conduct leakage surveys of their systems, including meter and
service regulators located inside buildings (Sec. 192.723). In
scheduling such surveys, operators must consider the nature of their
operations and the local conditions. At a minimum, operators must
conduct surveys: (1) In business districts at intervals not exceeding
15 months, but at least once each calendar year; and (2) outside
business districts as frequently as necessary, but at least once every
five calendar years at intervals not exceeding 63 months. The
regulations also require that operators inspect each pipeline or
portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere for evidence of
atmospheric corrosion in accordance with Sec. 192.481. Further, if
atmospheric corrosion is found during an inspection, the operator
[[Page 61103]]
must provide protection against the corrosion as required by Sec.
192.479.
PHMSA is reminding operators of these existing requirements for
inside meters and regulators. This advisory bulletin notes that, if
access is an issue to check and maintain inside regulators properly,
operators should endeavor to have the customer provide access for the
operator to check the regulator and conduct the leakage and atmospheric
corrosion surveys.
Distribution Integrity Management Program (DIMP) Regulations
In addition to these requirements for inside meters and regulators,
PHMSA is also reminding operators of their obligation to continually
assess risks to their systems and address those risks in accordance
with DIMP regulations at Sec. 192.1007. A DIMP program requires that
operators demonstrate knowledge of their system (Sec. 192.1007(a)).
Additionally, a DIMP program requires that operators identify existing
and potential threats (Sec. 192.1007(b)). Identification of the
threats that affect, or could potentially affect, a distribution
pipeline is key to assuring its integrity. Knowledge of applicable
threats allows operators to evaluate the risks they pose and to rank
those risks, allowing safety resources to be applied where they will be
most effective. Section 192.1007(c) requires that an operator evaluate
the identified threats to determine their relative importance and rank
the risks associated with its pipeline. Operators must consider the
likelihood of threats as well as the consequences of a failure that
might result from each threat. The integrity management programs must
include measures designed and implemented to reduce the risk of failure
from identified threats (Sec. 192.1007(d)). Measuring performance
periodically and conducting a complete program re-evaluation at least
every five years allows operators to determine whether actions being
taken to address threats are effective, or whether different or
additional actions are needed (Sec. 192.1007(e)-(f)). An operator
should conduct a program evaluation any time there are changes in
factors that would affect the risk of failure.
While the DIMP Regulations have been in place since 2009, some
operators may not be sufficiently aware of their pipeline attributes,
or may not be adequately or consistently assessing threats as part of
their DIMP programs. For example, NTSB found that WGL's inadequate
procedures led to the exclusion of the requirement that technicians
verify the connection of vent lines for indoor service regulators
during service and maintenance activities, and as such, vent lines
could be inadvertently left disconnected following service work. NTSB
concluded that WGL relied on unvalidated information to determine the
location and condition of mercury service regulators. Therefore, the
NTSB recommended that throughout the WGL network, WG implement an audit
program to verify the data on the service forms used to determine the
location and condition of mercury service regulators to ensure the
accuracy of this safety-critical data.
Because it is so essential that operators identify the conditions
that can cause failures and address them before a failure can occur,
PHMSA is reminding operators of their obligations to comply with DIMP
regulations. This advisory bulletin serves as a reminder to operators
to identify and evaluate the physical and operational characteristics
of each pipeline system. Operators following these requirements should
help to ensure the safety of customer meters and regulators.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2020-01)
To: Owners and Operators of Gas Distribution Systems.
Subject: Requirements for Inside Meters and Regulators.
Advisory: To further enhance PHMSA's safety efforts and implement
NTSB's April 24, 2019, Recommendations P-19-001 and P-19-002, PHMSA is
issuing this advisory bulletin to remind operators of the requirements
for inside meters and regulators. PHMSA is also reminding operators of
existing Federal DIMP regulations to reduce the possibility of the
failure of inside meter and regulator installations. Further, PHMSA
advises operators to review NTSB's report concerning the August 10,
2016, accident as it may serve as prudent guidance regarding potential
safety problems that operators may need to act on if it addresses a
relevant factor on their system. This advisory bulletin is intended to
clarify and describe the existing pipeline safety standards for
operators and the public. The contents of this advisory bulletin do not
have the force and effect of law and are not meant to bind the public
in any way. However, pipeline operators must comply with the underlying
pipeline safety standards at 49 CFR part 192.
PHMSA is reminding operators of Sec. Sec. 192.353, 192.355, and
192.357, which provide requirements regarding the location and safety
of customer meters and regulators. While the regulations allow service
regulators to be located inside or outside structures, the requirements
for indoor regulators are more stringent than those located outdoors.
Section 192.353(a) requires that each meter and service regulator,
whether inside or outside of a building, be installed in a readily
accessible location and be protected from corrosion and other damage,
including vehicular damage. Section 192.353(b) requires each service
regulator installed within a building to be located as near as
practical to the point of service line entrance, and Sec. 192.353(c)
requires that each meter installed within a building must be located in
a ventilated place and not less than 3 feet from any source of ignition
or any source of heat that might damage the meter. In addition, Sec.
192.355(b) requires that the service regulator vents and relief vents
must terminate outdoors, and the outdoor terminus must be located at a
place where gas from the vent can escape freely into the atmosphere and
away from any opening into the building. Section 192.357(d) requires
regulators that might release gas to be vented to the outside
atmosphere.
The Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations include requirements that
operators conduct leakage and atmospheric corrosion surveys of their
systems, including service regulators located inside or outside a
building (Sec. Sec. 192.723 and 192.481). If access is an issue to
check and maintain inside meter and regulators properly, operators
should endeavor to have the customer provide access for the operator to
check these facilities and conduct the leakage and atmospheric
corrosion surveys.
PHMSA is also reminding operators of their obligation to
continually assess risks to their systems and address those risks as
required by the DIMP regulations (Sec. 192.1007). PHMSA reminds
pipeline operators of their responsibilities to continuously improve
their knowledge of their pipeline systems, identify integrity threats,
evaluate and rank risks, and identify, evaluate, and implement
preventative and mitigative measures as required by the Federal
Pipeline Safety Regulations. PHMSA recommends that operators thoroughly
review their current DIMP for the threat of the failure of inside meter
and regulator installations and make any changes necessary to become
compliant with the Federal Pipeline Safety Regulations. For example,
based on the requirements in Sec. 192.1007(a) for operators to know
their systems, PHMSA would expect operators to know the location
(inside or outside) of all meters and regulators installed on their
distribution system. Operators must evaluate the risks associated with
these facilities, determine the relative importance of each threat, and
rank the
[[Page 61104]]
risks posed to their pipeline (Sec. 192.1007(c)). PHMSA urges
operators to consider the points-of-failure identified in NTSB's
accident investigation report as they relate to operators' inside meter
and regulator installations and to adjust their DIMP accordingly. These
measures must include an effective leak management program unless all
leaks are repaired when found (Sec. 192.1007(d)). As part of their
leak management program, operators must consider all risks, including
the risk of failure or damage to inside meter and regulator
installations. If risks are identified, risk reduction measures must be
put in place to address them, or if additional actions have not been
taken to reduce risks, justification must be documented.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 24, 2020, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2020-21507 Filed 9-28-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P