Regulatory Capital Rules: Tier 1/Tier 2 Framework, 55786-55801 [2020-16052]
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55786
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 85, No. 176
Thursday, September 10, 2020
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Parts 614, 615, 620 and 628
RIN 3052–AD27
Regulatory Capital Rules: Tier 1/Tier 2
Framework
Farm Credit Administration.
Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Farm Credit
Administration (FCA or we) seeks
comments on this proposed rule that
would amend regulatory capital
requirements for Farm Credit System
(System) institutions and clarify certain
provisions in the Tier 1/Tier 2
Framework final rule that became
effective in 2017. This proposed rule
would incorporate, and further clarify,
the guidance provided in FCA
Bookletter—BL–068—Tier 1/Tier 2
Capital Framework Guidance. The
proposal would also eliminate
regulatory capital requirements for the
Farm Credit Services Leasing
Corporation, simplify the Safe Harbor
Deemed Prior Approval calculation,
revise the board resolution requirement
for certain equities to be included in tier
1 or tier 2 capital, and amend the
lending and leasing limit base to use
total capital instead of permanent
capital and eliminate the exceptional
treatment of certain purchased stock. To
maintain comparability in our
regulatory capital requirements, we
propose to amend certain definitions
pertaining to qualified financial
contracts in conformity with changes
adopted by the Federal banking
regulatory agencies.
DATES: Please send us your comments
on or before November 9, 2020.
ADDRESSES: For accuracy and efficiency
reasons, please submit comments by
email or through FCA’s website. We do
not accept comments submitted by
facsimile (fax), as faxes are difficult for
us to process in compliance with
section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Please do not submit your
comment multiple times via different
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SUMMARY:
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methods. You may submit comments by
any of the following methods:
• Email: Send us an email at regcomm@fca.gov.
• FCA website: https://www.fca.gov.
Click inside the ‘‘I want to . . .’’ field
near the top of the page; select
‘‘comment on a pending regulation’’
from the dropdown menu; and click
‘‘Go.’’ This takes you to an electronic
public comment form.
• Mail: Jeremy R. Edelstein, Associate
Director, Office of Regulatory Policy,
Farm Credit Administration, 1501 Farm
Credit Drive, McLean, VA 22102–5090.
You may review copies of all
comments we receive at our office in
McLean, Virginia or on our website at
https://www.fca.gov. Once you are on the
website, click inside the ‘‘I want to
. . .’’ field near the top of the page;
select ‘‘find comments on a pending
regulation’’ from the dropdown menu;
and click ‘‘Go.’’ This will take you to the
Comment Letters page where you can
select the regulation for which you
would like to read the public comments.
We will show your comments as
submitted, including any supporting
data provided, but for technical reasons
we may omit items such as logos and
special characters. Identifying
information that you provide, such as
phone numbers and addresses, will be
publicly available. However, we will
attempt to remove email addresses to
help reduce internet spam.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jeremy R. Edelstein, Associate Director
or Clayton D. Milburn, Senior Financial
Analyst, Finance and Capital Markets
Team, Office of Regulatory Policy, Farm
Credit Administration, McLean, VA
22102–5090, (703) 883–4414, TTY (703)
883–4056; or
Mary Alice Donner, Senior Counsel or
Jennifer A. Cohn, Senior Counsel, Office
of General Counsel, Farm Credit
Administration, McLean, VA 22102–
5090, (703) 883–4020, TTY (703) 883–
4056.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
A. Objectives of Proposed Rule
B. Background
II. Proposed Revisions to the Capital Rule
A. Substantive Revisions to the Capital
Rule
1. Safe Harbor Deemed Prior Approval
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2. Capital Bylaw or Board Resolution to
Include Equities in Tier 1 and Tier 2
Capital
3. Common Cooperative Equity Issuance
Date
4. Farm Credit Leasing Services
Corporation
5. Lending and Leasing Limit Base
Calculation
6. Qualified Financial Contract (QFC)
Related Definitions
7. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Eligibility
Requirements
B. Clarifying and Other Revisions to the
Capital Rule
1. Capitalization Bylaw Adjustment
2. Annual Report to Shareholder
Corrections
3. Appropriate Risk-Weighting of Cash
4. Securitization Formulas
5. Unallocated Retained Earnings and
Equivalents Deductions and Adjustments
6. Service Corporation Deductions and
Adjustments
7. Adjustments for Accruing Patronage and
Dividends
8. Bank Disclosures
9. Retirement of Statutory Borrower Stock
C. General Discussion
1. Continuously Redeemable Preferred
Stock (H Stock)
2. Farm Credit Council Letter
3. Permanent Capital
III. Abbreviations
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
I. Introduction
A. Objectives of Proposed Rule
The FCA’s objectives in proposing
this rule are to:
• Provide technical corrections,
amendments and clarification to certain
provisions in the Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital
Framework; and
• Ensure the System’s capital
requirements maintain comparability
with the standardized approach that the
Federal banking regulatory agencies
have adopted.
B. Background
In 1916, Congress created the System
to provide permanent, stable, affordable,
and reliable sources of credit and
related services to American agricultural
and aquatic producers.1 The System
consists of 3 Farm Credit Banks, 1
1 The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation
(Farmer Mac), which is also a System institution,
has authority to operate secondary markets for
agricultural real estate mortgage loans, rural
housing mortgage loans, and rural utility
cooperative loans. The FCA has a separate set of
capital regulations that apply to Farmer Mac. This
rulemaking does not affect Farmer Mac, and the use
of the term ‘‘System institution’’ in this preamble
and proposed rule does not include Farmer Mac.
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agricultural credit bank, 67 agricultural
credit associations, 1 Federal land credit
association, service corporations, and
the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding
Corporation (Funding Corporation).
Farm Credit banks (which include both
the Farm Credit Banks and the
agricultural credit bank) issue Systemwide consolidated debt obligations in
the capital markets through the Funding
Corporation, which enable associations
to provide short-, intermediate-, and
long-term credit and related services to
farmers, ranchers, producers and
harvesters of aquatic products, rural
residents for housing, and farm-related
service businesses.2 The System’s
enabling statute is the Farm Credit Act
of 1971, as amended (Act).3
FCA’s Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital
Framework final regulation (Capital
Rule) was published in the Federal
Register in July 2016.4 The objectives of
the Capital Rule were:
• To modernize capital requirements
while ensuring that institutions
continue to hold enough regulatory
capital to fulfill their mission as a
Government-sponsored enterprise
(GSE);
• To ensure that the System’s capital
requirements are comparable to the
Basel III framework and the
standardized approach that the Federal
banking regulatory agencies have
adopted, but also to ensure that the
rules take into account the cooperative
structure and the organization of the
System;
• To make System regulatory capital
requirements more transparent; and
• To meet the requirements of section
939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).5
To date, the FCA believes the Capital
Rule has met, and continues to meet,
these stated objectives.6
On December 22, 2016, the FCA
Board adopted FCA Bookletter—BL–
068—Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital Framework
2 The agricultural credit bank lends to, and
provides other financial services to farmer-owned
cooperatives, rural utilities (electric and telephone),
and rural water and waste water disposal systems.
It also finances U.S. agricultural exports and
imports, and provides international banking
services to cooperatives and other eligible
borrowers. The agricultural credit bank operates a
Farm Credit Bank subsidiary.
3 12 U.S.C. 2001–2279cc. The Act is available at
www.fca.gov under ‘‘Laws and regulations,’’ and
‘‘Statutes.’’
4 81 FR 49720 (July 28, 2016).
5 Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
6 For a more comprehensive discussion of this
rulemaking, including a comprehensive discussion
of all System capital requirements, see 81 FR 49720
and Parts 615 and 628 of FCA Regulations.
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Guidance (Capital BL).7 The Capital BL
provided additional guidance to ensure
System institutions had the necessary
information to correctly implement the
requirements of the Capital Rule. The
Capital BL included clarification and
technical fixes on 18 separate items.
Furthermore, the Capital BL stated: ‘‘We
intend to incorporate some of these
items into the regulation in a future
rulemaking project.’’ 8 This proposed
rule would incorporate some of that
guidance, with adjustments as discussed
below,9 into the capital regulation.
Additionally, the proposed rule would:
• Eliminate the stand alone capital
requirements for Farm Credit Leasing
Services Corporation (Farm Credit
Leasing);
• Change the computation of the
lending and leasing limit base in
§ 614.4351, by using total capital instead
of permanent capital in the
calculation; 10
• Simplify ’’Safe Harbor’’ provisions
that determine when System
institutions have ‘‘deemed prior
approval’’ from FCA to distribute cash
payments;
• Revise and clarify certain criteria
that capital instruments must meet to be
included in common equity tier 1
(CET1) and tier 2 capital;
• Provide further clarification on
when the ‘‘holding period’’ starts for
including certain Common Cooperative
Equities in CET1 or tier 2 capital; and
• Amend the requirement to adopt an
annual board resolution with respect to
prior approval requirements and the
minimum redemption and revolvement
periods for certain equities included in
CET1 or tier 2 capital.
Finally, we propose to amend the
definitions of ‘‘Collateral agreement,’’
‘‘Eligible margin loan,’’ ‘‘Qualifying
master netting agreement (QMNA),’’ and
‘‘Repo-style transaction’’ to incorporate
amendments made to these definitions
in the capital rules of the Federal
banking regulatory agencies.11
The above amendments, as well as
technical changes and other guidance
on FCA’s expectations for certain
7 A copy of the Capital BL can be found at
www.fca.gov, under ‘‘Laws & Regulations’’ and
‘‘Bookletters.’’
8 Id.
9 FCA made adjustments to some of the guidance
provided in the Capital BL to address concerns
identified through ongoing monitoring and
examination of the requirements of the Capital
Rule.
10 Total capital is defined at § 628.2. Permanent
capital is defined at § 615.5201.
11 The Federal banking regulatory agencies are the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
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provisions of the Capital Rule, are
described in greater detail below. FCA
believes the additional proposed
changes will address issues and
concerns identified since the Capital
Rule’s effective date of January 1, 2017,
while maintaining and supporting the
objectives of the Capital Rule.
We welcome comments on every
aspect of this proposed regulation, but
there are certain areas described below
where we are specifically seeking
comment.
II. Proposed Revisions to the Capital
Rule
A. Substantive Revisions to the Capital
Rule
The amendments to the Capital Rule
proposed and discussed in this section
are substantive issues that go beyond
technical corrections or incorporation of
issues discussed in the Capital BL.
1. Safe Harbor Deemed Prior Approval
The proposal amends the ‘‘Safe
Harbor Deemed Prior Approval’’
provisions under which System
institutions are deemed to have prior
approval from FCA to distribute cash
payments as long as certain conditions
are met. Existing § 628.20(f) requires
System institutions to obtain prior
approval from FCA before making any
distributions of capital included in tier
1 or tier 2 capital.12 Under the ‘‘safe
harbor’’ provision in paragraphs (f)(5)
and (6) of existing § 628.20, cash
dividends, cash patronage, and cash
redemptions or revolvements of
common cooperative equities are
deemed to have FCA prior approval,
provided that:
(i) The equities meet applicable
minimum holding period requirements;
(ii) After such cash payments, the
dollar amount of CET1 capital equals or
exceeds the dollar amount of CET1
capital on the same date in the previous
calendar year; and
(iii) The institution continues to
comply with all regulatory capital
requirements and supervisory or
enforcement actions.
Under the existing ’’safe harbor,’’ after
the cash payment the dollar amount of
CET1 capital must not decline
compared to the dollar amount of CET1
capital on the same date in the previous
calendar year.13 FCA considers the date
of the cash payment to be the date on
which the institution’s board passes a
binding resolution declaring an amount
it will make as a cashdividend or
12 Section 628.20(f) outlines the requirements for
FCA prior approval of capital redemptions and
dividends.
13 Section 628.20(f)(5)(ii).
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patronage refund 14 (declaration date).
We consider this declaration date to be
the date in which the cash payment is
made because it results in a binding
legal obligation to pay a dividend or
patronage refund to the institution’s
member-borrowers, the patronage
amount is calculable within a short-time
frame, and it is paid within 8.5 months
of the close of the taxable year.
In practice, it is difficult for FCA to
monitor and enforce the existing
requirement to use the same date in the
previous calendar year because System
institutions report regulatory capital
quarterly, not daily or monthly.
Institutions can and do declare
dividends or make patronage payments
on any date during a calendar quarter.
We propose to replace the requirement
to use the exact calendar date on which
the cash payment is made with a
requirement to use the date of the
quarter-end in which the System
institution’s board declares its dividend
or patronage.
Under the proposal, a System
institution has ‘‘deemed- prior
approval’’ from FCA if, after making the
cash payment, the dollar amount of the
CET1 capital at the quarter-end after the
declaration date, equals or exceeds the
dollar amount of CET1 capital on the
same quarter-end in the previous
calendar year. The following is an
example of our proposed deemed prior
approval: A System institution’s board
declares a cash patronage on December
16, 2020. To use the ‘‘Safe Harbor
Deemed Prior Approval,’’ the institution
would need to ensure that after such
payment, its dollar amount of CET1
capital on December 31, 2020, equals or
exceeds the dollar amount of CET1
capital on December 31, 2019. As
another example, a System institution’s
board declares a cash patronage on
January 15, 2021. To use the ‘‘Safe
Harbor Deemed Prior Approval,’’ the
institution would need to ensure that
after such payment, its dollar amount of
CET1 capital on March 31, 2021, equals
or exceeds the dollar amount of CET1
capital on March 31, 2020.15 System
institutions that declare patronage early
in a quarter need to ensure that they
have developed and implemented
appropriate processes and controls to
ensure compliance with these
provisions.
We believe that this proposed
amendment to the ‘‘Safe Harbor Deemed
Prior Approval’’ would not increase or
decrease the amount of cash patronage
System institutions can pay when
compared to the existing provision. As
stated in the preamble to the final Tier
1/Tier 2 Capital Framework regulation,
we expect institution boards to give
significant thought to capital
distribution decisions and how they
impact the overall capitalization of their
institution, especially a cash payment
that exceeds net income over the past 12
months. Ordinarily, cash payments or
redemptions (revolvements) are made at
very predictable intervals, and we have
not identified any situations where
institutions are likely to need to make
unplanned, significant capital
distributions.16
2. Capital Bylaw or Board Resolution To
Include Equities in Tier 1 and Tier 2
Capital
The proposal would amend the
requirement in § 615.5200(d) that a
System institution board adopt a
redemption and revolvement resolution
that it must re-affirm in its capital plan
each year. It would also add a sentence
to § 615.5200(b) with respect to capital
adequacy plans.
Currently, to include otherwise
eligible purchased or allocated equities
in CET1 capital,17 a System institution
must commit to obtaining prior
approval from FCA under § 628.20(f)
before redeeming or revolving the
equities less than 7 years after issuance
or allocation. For tier 2 purchased or
allocated equities, the institution must
make a commitment not to call, redeem,
or revolve the equities less than 5 years
after issuance or allocation without FCA
approval. Finally, boards must commit
to obtaining prior approval from FCA
before taking other specified actions that
could impact the institution’s capital
quantity or quality.18 A System
16 See
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14 This
can either be a specified dollar amount or
must include language whereby an amount could be
calculated.
15 In both these examples, to use the ‘‘Safe Harbor
Deemed Prior Approval,’’ the System institution
would also need to ensure that after such cash
payment, it continues to comply with all regulatory
capital requirements and supervisory or
enforcement actions. These examples assume a cash
patronage payment and not the redemption or
revolvement of common cooperative equities
(CCEs). CCEs must be held for the minimum
required holding period described in
§ 628.20(f)(5)(i) for redemption to qualify for
deemed prior approval under the ‘‘Safe Harbor.’’
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81 FR 49735 (July 28, 2016).
eligible purchased or allocated
equities would be equities that meet the criteria
under § 628.20(b)(1) for inclusion in CET1 capital,
such as allocated equities that will not be redeemed
or revolved for at least 7 years.
18 Existing § 615.5200(d)(3) requires boards to
obtain prior approval before redesignating
unallocated retained earning (URE) equivalents as
redeemable equities; removing equities from
regulatory capital (other than through repurchase,
cancellation, redemption, or liquidation); or
redesignating equities from one regulatory capital
component to another. Section 615.5200(d)(4)
requires that URE equivalents will not be revolved,
except under very limited circumstances.
17 Otherwise
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institution’s board must affirm these
commitments by either adopting a
capitalization bylaw or a resolution that
must be re-affirmed by the board
annually.
The proposal would move the existing
requirements in § 615.5200(d) to a new
section, § 628.21. Under proposed
§ 628.21, a System institution’s board
must either adopt a capitalization bylaw
or adopt a binding resolution to obtain
the FCA prior approval that § 628.20(f)
requires. Under the proposed rule, to
reduce burden, an institution’s board
would no longer need to re-affirm this
resolution annually; instead, the System
institution would be required to
expressly acknowledge the continuing
and binding effect of these resolutions
annually in their capital adequacy plan.
Proposed § 615.5200(b) would add to
the existing provisions a requirement
that the capital adequacy plan must
expressly acknowledge the continuing
and binding effect of the board
resolutions.19 Once the board adopts
this resolution, it would remain binding
going forward. Modifying or eliminating
this binding resolution may impact an
institution’s ability to include allocated
or purchased equities in tier 1 or tier 2
capital, if the change is not consistent
with the requirements of proposed
§ 628.21 and § 628.20(b)(1)(xiv),
(c)(1)(xiv), and (d)(1)(xi).
The capital adequacy plan
acknowledgment would, at a minimum,
outline the existence of such a
resolution and assure that any equities
issued, allocated, redeemed or revolved
shall be done so in accordance with the
resolution. Consistent with the existing
rule, any issuance or allocation of
equities that a System institution
intends to include in tier 1 or tier 2
capital, must be designated either CET1,
AT1, or tier 2 at time of issuance or
allocation.20 We note that, in these
proposed changes, our intent that
institutions must establish the
permanence of their regulatory capital
designations is unchanged, but the
means by which institutions do so
should be less burdensome.
19 Specifically, § 615.5200(b) would be amended
to require that the plan shall expressly acknowledge
the continuing and binding effect of all board
resolutions adopted in accordance with sections
628.20(b)(1)(xiv), 628.20(c)(1)(xiv), 628.20(d)(1)(xi),
and 628.21. Conforming changes are being proposed
to those sections to refer to new § 628.21 instead of
§ 615.5200(d).
20 Under existing § 615.5200(d)(3)(iii), which is
proposed to be redesignated as § 628.21(c)(3), a
System institution cannot redesignate equities
included in one component of regulatory capital for
inclusion in another without FCA prior approval.
Accordingly, the regulatory capital classification
(i.e., CET1, AT1, or tier 2) must be designated at
issuance.
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3. Common Cooperative Equity Issuance
Date
The proposal adds a new definition to
part 628 to provide clarification and
certainty to System institutions on the
start of the holding period to include
certain common cooperative equities in
CET1 or tier 2 capital and redeem them
under the ‘‘Safe Harbor Deemed Prior
Approval’’. Proposed § 628.21(e) states
that the minimum redemption and
revolvement period for purchased and
allocated equities starts on the common
cooperative equity issuance date, as
defined in § 628.2.
As discussed above, to include
otherwise eligible purchased or
allocated equities in CET1 or tier 2
capital, a System institution must
commit to obtaining prior approval from
FCA under § 628.20(f) before redeeming
or revolving the equities in less than 7
or 5 years, respectively, after issuance or
allocation. In December 2016, FCA
provided guidance to the System on
when the holding period starts for
purchased and allocated equities, as
follows:
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The minimum holding period starts on the
issuance date, which is the date the
institution segregates its ‘‘new’’ allocated
equities (qualified and nonqualified) from its
URE. This generally occurs after the board
adopts a resolution to make a patronage
distribution in cash and equity, and the
institution makes accounting entries that
move the dollar amounts from URE to an
appropriate payable account and allocated
equity.21
The proposed definition of ‘‘common
cooperative equity issuance date’’ is
similar to the guidance previously
provided by FCA; however, as proposed
the issuance date would be the quarterend in which the board has declared a
patronage refund and the applicable
accounting treatment has taken place.
As an example, a System institution
board adopts a resolution to make a
patronage distribution in cash and
equity on December 15, 2020.22 On
January 2, 2021, it makes a general
ledger entry that moves the dollar
amounts from URE to an appropriate
payable account and allocated equity.
The general ledger entry is made
effective December 31, 2020 and is
reflected in the yearend 2020 financial
statements. On April 5, 2021, dollar
amounts are assigned to each borrower.
In this example, the ‘‘Common
21 See
Capital BL, item 7.
discussed elsewhere in this preamble, the
board declaration must include an amount it will
pay in patronage or must include language whereas
an amount could be calculated because it provides
evidence of the board’s intent to obligate the
institution to pay a specific patronage amount to its
member-borrowers.
cooperative equity issuance date’’
would be December 31, 2020. If the
System institution includes the equities
in CET1 capital, they would need to
hold the equities for at least 7 years
from December 31, 2020 (i.e., December
31, 2027) to meet the minimum holding
period requirement.
The holding period start date for
purchased stock is slightly different
from the holding period start date for
allocated equities. Members purchase
stock as a requirement of membership to
borrow from the institution and the
institution’s bylaws allow for such
issuance. Purchased stock would not
result in a reallocation or reassignment
of URE, but would result in new equity
for the System institution. Accordingly,
the holding period on purchased stock
would be the quarter-end in which the
System institution recognizes the stock
on its financial statement.
We note that section
628.20(b)(1)(xiv)(B) allows for the
statutory minimum borrower stock
requirement to count as CET1 capital
without any minimum holding period.23
The statutory minimum borrower stock
requirement under section 4.3A of the
Act, is $1,000 or 2 percent of the loan
amount, whichever is less.
FCA believes this new approach to
recognizing the start of the holding
period, when combined with other
proposed ‘‘Safe Harbor’’ related
changes, results in a simplified ‘‘Safe
Harbor’’ framework. More specifically,
using the quarter-end date for the start
of the holding period aligns with the
proposed changes to the ‘‘Safe Harbor
Deemed Prior Approval,’’ which we
discuss above. As proposed, the ‘‘Safe
Harbor’’ also would use a date that is
the quarter-end after a board has
declared a patronage payment.
Furthermore, we believe using a quarterend date reduces the burden for System
institutions to track and monitor the
amount of time equities have been
outstanding. It also improves FCA’s
ability to monitor and enforce the ’’Safe
Harbor’’ requirements.
Question 1: The FCA seeks comments
on whether the new definition of
‘‘Common cooperative equity issuance
date’’ creates a burden for System
institutions due to the changes in
established controls and processes that
may be required. Please provide support
for your position.
22 As
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23 As discussed in greater detail under section 7—
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Eligibility
Requirements, statutory minimum borrower stock
‘‘funded’’ through the creation of a non-interestbearing account receivable is not eligible for
inclusion in CET1 or tier 2 capital.
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4. Farm Credit Leasing Services
Corporation
The proposal removes Farm Credit
Leasing from the list of institutions
defined as System institutions in
§§ 615.5201 and 628.2.24 Under the
proposal, Farm Credit Leasing as a
stand-alone entity would no longer be
required to meet minimum capital and
related regulatory requirements under
part 615, subpart H, and part 628 of our
regulations because of its current
ownership status, as discussed below. If
this ownership status were to change in
the future, we would reassess the need
for Farm Credit Leasing to
independently meet capital
requirements.25
Farm Credit Leasing was previously
owned by a group of System institutions
but is now a wholly owned subsidiary
of CoBank.26 It is a business unit of the
bank; profits and losses of the entity are
accrued to the bank; and its assets and
liabilities are consolidated with the
bank’s for financial and regulatory
reporting purposes. CoBank’s
consolidation of Farm Credit Leasing
ensures that minimum capital is
appropriately held against Farm Credit
Leasing’s assets. The proposal would
reduce the regulatory burden created by
separately applying the minimum
capital requirements and relevant
capital regulations to Farm Credit
Leasing on a stand-alone basis. The
proposed change is not intended to
reduce the amount of capital that must
be held against Farm Credit Leasing and
CoBank’s combined assets.
Question 2: The FCA seeks comment
on the appropriateness of removing the
specific reference to Farm Credit
Leasing from these provisions.
5. Lending and Leasing Limit Base
Calculation
The proposal would amend
§ 614.4351 to change the composition
and calculation of each System bank
24 Farm Credit Leasing is a service corporation
chartered under section 4.25 of the Act. A service
corporation is a System institution established by
System banks or associations and chartered by FCA,
and it is subject to FCA regulation and examination.
See title IV, subpart E of the Act.
25 The definitions of ‘‘System institution’’ allows
us to include any FCA-chartered institution that we
determine should be included, even if it is not
specifically referenced.
26 In 1983, several System banks acquired an
existing non-System corporation in the lease
financing business that became Farm Credit
Leasing. Farm Credit Leasing offers leasing services
and related products to agribusiness, agricultural
producers, rural infrastructure companies, and
other related partners. As the System consolidated,
the number of bank owners of Farm Credit Leasing
declined. In 2004, CoBank acquired all Farm Credit
Leasing stock outstanding, making it a whollyowned subsidiary of the bank.
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and association’s lending and leasing
limit base. The existing lending and
leasing limit base is equal to the amount
of a System institution’s permanent
capital as adjusted for the calculation of
the permanent capital ratio in
accordance with § 615.5207, and with
two additional adjustments in
§ 614.4351(a) that apply only to the
lending limit base. Section
614.4351(a)(1) provides that a System
institution may count in its lending
limit base any stock it purchases from
another System institution in
connection with the sale of a loan
participation interest, and the other
institution must exclude such stock
from its lending limit base. Section
614.4351(a)(2) provides that any
otherwise eligible third-party capital
instruments may be included in the
lending limit base of a System
institution, irrespective of the limits on
third-party capital for the tier 1/tier 2
capital ratios as outlined under § 628.23.
We propose two amendments to
§ 614.4351. First, instead of using
permanent capital to calculate the
lending limit base, institutions would
use total capital as defined and adjusted
in §§ 628.20 through 628.22 but
including any otherwise eligible thirdparty capital that would be excluded
under § 628.23. Second, we would
eliminate the exceptional treatment of
stock purchased in connection with a
loan participation in § 614.4351(a)(1).
Our proposal to eliminate the existing
exceptional treatment of stock
purchased in connection with loan
participations would align the lending
and leasing limit base with the Capital
Rule’s treatment of investments in other
System institutions. The Capital Rule
requires institutions to deduct their
investments in another System
institution because it is the issuing
institution, not the investing institution,
that has discretion whether or not to
retire the investment. FCA believes that
equities should be counted in the
regulatory capital and the lending and
leasing limit base of the institution that
has control of the equities. This is a
more accurate reflection of where the
capital is available to absorb losses.
Our proposal would preserve the
existing provision in § 614.4351(a)(2)
which allows the inclusion of all
otherwise qualifying third-party capital
in the lending limit base, irrespective of
limits on the inclusion of such
instruments in regulatory capital under
§ 628.23. The requirements of § 628.23
recognize and emphasize the
cooperative principles upon which
System institutions operate by limiting
the amount of non-cooperative equities
that may be included in regulatory
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capital. Accordingly, we propose to
continue to permit institutions to
include all otherwise qualifying thirdparty capital in their lending limit base.
Our proposed changes to the
calculation would result in modest
changes in System institutions’ lending
limits.27 Using total capital as the base
instead of permanent capital would
increase the lending and leasing limit
for most System institutions due
primarily to the inclusion of at least a
portion of the allowance for loan losses
in total capital.28 A small number of
System institutions would see their
lending limit decline due to various
factors.29 If both amendments are
adopted, we estimate that about 16
institutions’ lending limits would
modestly decrease.30 We note that most
institutions have adopted policies that
set significantly lower lending limits
than the current regulation allows.
We adopted the Capital Rule to
improve the quality and quantity of a
System institution’s capital, consistent
with the objectives of the Basel III
framework and the standardized
approach of the Federal banking
regulatory agencies (U.S. Rule).
Accordingly, since 2017, FCA has
focused on regulatory tier 1 and tier 2
capital when evaluating the safe and
sound operation of a System institution
rather than on permanent capital.31
Similarly, we believe it is more
appropriate to base the lending and
leasing limit on the regulatory total
capital of the institution and not on
permanent capital.
Question 3: The FCA seeks comment
on the proposed change to the lending
base, and the continued
appropriateness of the adjustment
required in § 614.4351(a)(1), and
whether its removal would have any
27 Under § 614.4360(b)(2), loans funded pursuant
to a commitment that was within the lending and
leasing limit at the time the commitment was made
would not violate the lending and leasing limit if
the limit subsequently declines.
28 Under § 628.20(d)(3), tier 2 capital (a
component of total capital) includes the allowance
for loan losses up to 1.25 percent of the institution’s
total risk-weighted assets not including any amount
of the allowance.
29 As of September 30, 2019, the vast majority of
System institutions (banks and associations) would
see their lending limit increase by 2.8 percent on
average, with increases ranging from 0.5 percent to
8.3 percent. Two system institutions would see an
average decrease of 2.2 percent.
30 Including both the switch from permanent
capital and the elimination of the loan
participation-related treatment under
§ 614.4351(a)(1), 56 institutions would see their
lending limit increase by 3.0 percent on average.
The decrease at the remaining institutions would
average 1.6 percent.
31 Section 301 of the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987 directed the FCA to adopt risk-based
permanent capital regulations for System
institutions.
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significant adverse impacts on any
System institution.
6. Qualified Financial Contract (QFC)
Related Definitions
We are proposing to amend the
definitions of ‘‘Collateral agreement,’’
‘‘Eligible margin loan,’’ ‘‘Qualifying
master netting agreement (QMNA),’’ and
‘‘Repo-style transaction’’ to incorporate
amendments made to these definitions
in the capital rules of the Federal
banking regulatory agencies.
Furthermore, the proposed amendment
to the definition of ‘‘QMNA’’ will
harmonize it with the amended
definition of ‘‘Eligible master netting
agreement (EMNA)’’ in FCA’s Margin
and Capital Requirements for Covered
Swap Entities regulation (Swap Margin
Rule).32
As part of the broader regulatory
reform effort following the financial
crisis, to increase the resolvability and
resiliency of U.S. global systemically
important banking institutions (GSIBs),
the Federal banking regulatory agencies
adopted final rules that establish
restrictions on, and requirements for,
certain financial contracts of GSIBs and
their subsidiaries (QFC Rules).33
Generally, these QFC Rules require
covered qualified financial contracts 34
of covered entities (GSIBs and U.S.
operations of foreign GSIBs) to contain
contractual provisions that opt into the
‘‘temporary stay-and-transfer treatment’’
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(FDI Act) 35 and Title II of the DoddFrank Act, thereby reducing the risk that
32 See
83 FR 50805 (October 10, 2018).
82 FR 56630 (November 29, 2017) (OCC);
82 FR 50228 (October 30, 2017) (FDIC); and 82 FR
42882 (September 12, 2017) (FRB).
34 Qualified financial contracts generally include
financial contracts for a derivative contract,
repurchase agreement, reverse purchase agreement,
and securities lending and borrowing agreement.
When an entity goes into resolution under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, attempts by the debtor entity’s
creditors to enforce their debt through any means
other than participation in the bankruptcy
proceeding, such as seizing collateral, are generally
blocked by the imposition of an automatic stay (See
82 FR 42882, 42886 (September 12, 2017) citing 11
U.S.C. 362). However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
generally exempts QFC counterparties of the debtor
from the automatic stay through ‘‘safe harbor’’
provisions (See 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27),
362(o), 555, 556, 559, 560, 561. The U.S.
Bankruptcy Code specifies the types of parties to
which the safe harbor provisions apply). Under
these provisions, any rights that a QFC counterparty
has to terminate the contract, set off obligations,
and liquidate collateral in response to a direct
default are not subject to the stay and may be
exercised against the debtor immediately upon
default. We note that the Bankruptcy Code does not
use the term ‘‘qualified financial contracts,’’ but the
set of transactions covered by its safe harbor
provisions closely tracks the set of transactions that
fall within the definition of ‘‘qualified financial
contract’’ used in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.
35 12 U.S.C. 1811 et. seq.
33 See
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the stay-and-transfer treatment would be
challenged by a covered entity’s
counterparty or a court in a foreign
jurisdiction. The stay-and-transfer
treatment provides that the rights of a
failed insured depository institution’s or
financial company’s counterparties to
terminate, liquidate, or net certain
qualified financial contracts upon the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver are
temporarily stayed to allow for the
transfer of the failed entities’ qualified
financial contracts to a solvent party.36
As a result of the QFC Rules, the
Federal banking regulatory agencies
amended the definition of QMNA in
their capital rules to prevent the QFC
Rules from having a disruptive effect on
the netting sets of their supervised
institutions. The amended definition of
QMNA is substantially similar to the
previous definition and continues to
recognize that default rights may be
stayed if the financial company is in
resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act or
FDI Act, a substantially similar law
applicable to GSEs, or a substantially
similar foreign law, or where the
agreement is subject by its terms to any
of those laws.37 However, the amended
definition includes additional language
permitting a master netting agreement to
meet the definition of QMNA to the
extent necessary to comply with the
requirements of the QFC Rules even if
the agreement limits the right to
accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a
net basis all transactions under the
agreement and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of
default of a counterparty. We are
proposing a parallel change.
Additionally, the Federal banking
regulatory agencies amended the
definitions of ‘‘Collateral agreement,’’
‘‘Eligible margin loan,’’ and ‘‘Repo-style
transaction’’ to ensure that their
supervised institutions can continue to
recognize the risk-mitigating effects of
financial collateral received in a secured
lending transaction, repo-style
transaction, or eligible margin loan.38
The amendments to these definitions
include conforming changes to provide
that a counterparty’s default rights may
be limited as required by the QFC Rules.
In order to remain consistent, to the
extent practical, with the capital rules of
the Federal banking regulatory agencies,
as well as aligning the definition of
36 12
U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B), 5390(c)(10)(B).
the Agriculture Improvement Act
of 2018 amended section 5.61 of the Act to give the
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation
receivership authorities parallel to those of the
Federal banking regulatory agencies. Public Law
115–334, 132 Stat 4490 (2018).
38 See 82 FR 50228 (October 30, 2017) for further
discussion.
37 Importantly,
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‘‘Qualifying master netting agreement’’
with the recent amendments to the
definition of ‘‘Eligible master netting
agreement’’ in FCA’s Swap Margin Rule,
we propose to adopt parallel
amendments to the definitions of
‘‘Collateral agreement,’’ ‘‘Eligible margin
loan,’’ ‘‘Qualifying master netting
agreement,’’ and ‘‘Repo-style
transaction.’’ While the QFC rules
primarily apply to GSIBs supervised by
one of the Federal banking regulatory
agencies, a System institution, as a
counterparty to a GSIB, may need to
ensure its qualified financial contracts
include this new language recognizing
the close-out restrictions imposed by the
QFC Rules.
Without the proposed definitional
changes, System institutions could
potentially see higher capital charges
imposed on certain counterparty
exposures. The current definitions in
our Capital Rule do not recognize the
close-out restrictions on certain
qualified financial contracts newly
imposed by the QFC Rules. If a System
institution incorporates these new closeout restrictions in contracts with an
entity subject to the QFC Rules (i.e.,
GSIBs), the contract may not meet the
existing definition of ‘‘Collateral
agreement,’’ ‘‘Eligible margin loan,’’
‘‘Qualifying master netting agreement,’’
and ‘‘Repo-style transaction’’ in FCA’s
Capital Rule. As a result, a System
institution may lose its ability to net
offsetting exposures or recognize the
risk-mitigating effects of financial
collateral, thus resulting in a higher
capital requirement for the System
institution. Moreover, a System
institution engaging in a derivative
transaction that is subject to an EMNA,
as defined in the Swap Margin Rule,39
would lose the ability to net offsetting
exposures for capital purposes. The
proposed changes to the definitions of
these terms would avoid these issues.
The changes to these definitions do
not result in System institutions
waiving or eliminating their ability to
exercise their rights against a defaulting
party. Rather, consistent with other
GSIB counterparties, the System
institution would not be able to
immediately exercise its rights against a
defaulting party until the FDIC begins
an orderly resolution of the
counterparty. If a System institution is
not transacting with an entity subject to
the QFC Rules, these new restrictions
would not be applicable.
Question 4: To what extent would the
QFC Rules impact System institutions as
counterparties to GSIBs or to U.S.
operations of foreign GSIBs? For
39 See
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example, if FCA did not amend these
definitions, what would be the result?
7. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital
Eligibility Requirements
As discussed above, one of FCA’s
objectives in the Capital Rule is to
ensure that the System’s capital
requirements are comparable to the
Basel III framework and the U.S. Rule,
taking into account the cooperative
structure of the System.40 The Basel III
framework specified the criteria that
capital instruments must meet in order
to be included in the different capital
measures. Among these criteria is the
requirement that an instrument be
directly issued and paid-in.41 We are
proposing to add the term ‘‘paid-in’’ to
the eligibility criteria for CET1 capital in
§ 628.20(b)(1)(i), consistent with the
criteria set forth in the Basel III
framework and the U.S Rule.42 Basel III
defines paid-in capital as capital that (1)
has been received with finality by the
institution, (2) is reliably valued, (3) is
fully under the institution’s control, and
(4) does not directly or indirectly expose
the institution to the credit risk of the
investor.43
When we promulgated the Capital
Rule, we did not require CET1
instruments to be paid-in because we
had interpreted the term to exclude
allocated equities. Allocated equities are
the earnings of a System institution that
the institution has converted to stock or
to similar stock-like equities and
allocated to member-borrowers.44 Farm
Credit banks routinely allocate equities
to their affiliated associations and (in
CoBank’s case) to retail borrowers, and
many of the associations routinely
allocate equities to their retail
borrowers. We have reexamined the
attributes of allocated equities and
determined that they fully meet the
definition of paid-in capital: The
allocated equities are received with
finality by the allocating System
institution when earned and issued;
their value is reliably established as the
dollar value of institution net assets
allocated; they are fully under the
institution’s control because they can be
revolved only at the discretion of the
System institution, with the prior
40 See
81 FR 49720 (July 28, 2016).
BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking
Systems, December 2010 (as revised June 2011).
42 See 12 CFR 217.20(b)(1)(i) (FRB); 12 CFR
324.20(b)(1)(i) (FDIC); 12 CFR 3.20(b)(1)(i) (OCC).
43 See BCBS, Basel III Definition of capital—
Frequently Asked Questions, September 2017
(update of FAQs published in December 2011).
44 For a detailed discussion on allocated equities
and its stock-like characteristics, see 81 FR 49727
(July 28, 2016).
41 See
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approval of the FCA; 45 and the lossabsorbing capacity of the allocated
equities is not dependent on the
creditworthiness of the memberborrower. We do not expect the
proposed clarification to have any
impact on System institution practices
with respect to allocated equities.
FCA views the statutorily required
borrower stock financed by the System
institution as part of an overall loan
commitment as meeting the Basel III
criteria for paid-instruments.46
However, borrower stock is not suitable
for inclusion in CET1 if it is funded
using non-interest-bearing account
receivables.47
We also propose a conforming change
in § 628.20(d)(1)(i) to clarify that all
instruments included in tier 2 capital
must be issued and paid-in.
In addition, we are proposing minor
changes to § 628.20(b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii)
to align the language more closely to the
language in the U.S. Rule and at the
same time to emphasize a difference
from the U.S. Rule. Specifically, the
U.S. Rule requires CET1 instruments to
entitle the holder to a claim on residual
assets (after all senior claims have been
satisfied) that is proportional to the
holder’s share of issued capital. Our rule
does not require the equity holder’s
claim to be proportional. This is
because, unlike commercial banks and
mutual associations that do not allocate
equities, System institutions may have
liquidation bylaws that prioritize
residual payments among different
classes of common cooperative
equityholders if there are assets
45 See
§§ 628.20(b)(1)(iii) and (d)(x).
example, System institutions usually
increase a borrower’s loan commitment by $1,000
in order to cover the stock or participation
certificate purchase. While the loan commitment
will increase by $1,000, those funds are not
disbursed to the borrower and are retained by the
institution to cover the purchase. We note that
under FCA Regulation § 628.20(b)(1)(x), statutory
borrower stock required under section 4.3A of the
Act is not considered to be ‘‘directly or indirectly’’
funded as long as: (A) The purpose of the loan is
not the purchase of capital instruments of the
System institution providing the loan, and (B) the
purchase of acquisition of one or more member
equities of the institution is necessary in order for
the beneficiary of the loan to become a member of
the institution. This approach follows the approach
of the European Banking Authority regarding the
standards for CET1 instruments for cooperatives.
See 79 FR 52824 (September 4, 2014) for additional
discussion.
47 ‘‘Stock’’ funded in this manner has not been
received with finality by the System institution and
exposes the System institution to the credit risk of
the borrower. On December 27, 2019, the FCA
Board used its reservation of authority in
§ 628.1(d)(2)(i) to determine that borrower stock
funded through the creation of a non-interestbearing account receivable in the borrower’s name
has characteristics and terms that diminish its
ability to absorb losses and is not suitable for
inclusion in CET1 or tier 2 capital.
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remaining after all classes have received
par or face value of their equities. We
believe these changes to § 628.20(b)(1)
are not substantive.
B. Clarifying and Other Revisions to the
Capital Rule
The proposed amendments to the
Capital Rule discussed in this section
incorporate issues discussed in the
Capital BL, with appropriate
adjustments. In addition, we propose to
make other changes to the Capital Rule
that clarify Agency position.
1. Capitalization Bylaw Adjustment
Section 615.5220(a)(6) requires
System institutions to include in their
capitalization bylaws a provision stating
that equities other than those protected
under section 4.9A of the Act are
retireable at the sole discretion of the
board, provided minimum capital
adequacy standards established in
subpart H of this part (615) and part 628
of this chapter are met. We propose to
amend this section by replacing the
reference to parts 615 and 628 with a
general reference to FCA regulations. A
general reference to FCA’s capital
adequacy standards would satisfy the
requirement to reference parts 615 and
628 and would incorporate all capital
requirements of the FCA, as well as any
future capital requirements that could
potentially be adopted under a new or
different part.
If a System institution has already
amended its capitalization bylaws to
include a reference to both part 615 and
628, it would not need to amend its
capitalization bylaws to replace those
references with a general reference to
capital adequacy standards established
by FCA. As discussed above, a reference
to both part 615 and part 628 would
satisfy the proposed requirement for an
institution’s capitalization bylaws to
include a general reference to capital
adequacy standards established by FCA.
However, if the bylaws reference only
part 615 subpart H, or reference only
part 628, this would not satisfy the
requirement we are proposing. In these
instances, a System institution would
have to amend its capitalization bylaws
to include a general reference to capital
adequacy standards established by FCA.
System institution changes to its
bylaws to conform to this regulatory
requirement should not change any
substantive rights of the System
institution or its member-borrowers. If
the change is non-substantive and does
not alter, reduce, or increase the rights
of any member-borrowers, a System
institution’s board may choose to make
a conforming change to their
capitalization bylaws to include a
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general reference to regulatory capital
adequacy standards without a vote by
its member-borrowers, assuming such
bylaws allow for technical amendments
without a shareholder vote.
2. Annual Report to Shareholder
Corrections
In existing § 620.5, which lists the
required contents of a System
institution’s annual report, we propose
technical revisions to ensure
institutions report financial data as we
intended. System associations must
report their tier 1 leverage ratio in each
annual report for each of the last 5 fiscal
years. This requirement was
inadvertently placed in paragraph
(f)(4)(iv) of § 620.5. We propose to move
the requirement from § 620.5(f)(4)(iv)
and place it in proposed § 620.5(f)(3)(v),
as originally intended.
In addition, we propose to amend the
requirement in § 620.5(f)(4) that System
institutions report core surplus, total
surplus, and the net collateral ratio
(banks only) in a comparative columnar
form for each fiscal year ending in 2012
through 2016. System institutions must
currently report these ratios in each
annual report through 2021, in addition
to reporting the capital ratios required
under § 620(f)(2) and (3), resulting in
System institutions reporting capital
ratios beyond the 5-year requirement
established in § 620.5(f). Accordingly,
we propose to revise § 620.5(f)(4) to
require these disclosures in each annual
report through 2021 but only as long as
these ratios are part of the previous 5
fiscal years for which disclosures are
required. For example, the fiscal year
ending 2020 annual report to
shareholders would report the
permanent capital ratio, CET1 capital
ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, total capital
ratio, and tier 1 leverage ratio for the
fiscal years ending in 2017–2020, and
the core surplus ratio, total surplus,
ratio, and net collateral ratio for the
fiscal year ending in 2016 only.
3. Appropriate Risk-Weighting of Cash
Existing § 628.32(l)(1) states, among
other things, that a System institution
must assign a 0-percent risk-weight to
cash held in accounts at a depository
institution. This provision may create
confusion about the proper risk-weight
for deposits that exceed the limit of
FDIC deposit insurance coverage
(currently set at $250,000). Accordingly,
we propose to delete this provision. It
is unnecessary to address in
§ 628.32(l)(1) the risk-weight assigned to
cash held in depository institution
accounts, because other provisions more
accurately address this risk-weight.
Specifically, § 628.32(a)(1)(i)(B) requires
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a System institution to assign a 0percent risk-weight to the portion of an
exposure that is directly and
unconditionally guaranteed by the U.S.
Government, its central bank, or a U.S.
Government agency, including a deposit
or other exposure or the portion of a
deposit or other exposure that is insured
or otherwise unconditionally
guaranteed by the FDIC or National
Credit Union Administration. Section
628.32(d)(1) requires a System
institution to assign a 20-percent riskweight to exposures to U.S. depository
institutions and credit unions that are
not assigned a 0-percent risk-weight
under § 628.20(a)(1)(i)(B). We confirm
that the 20-percent risk-weight applies,
for example, to a System institution’s
deposit with an FDIC-insured bank of
funds in excess of the deposit insurance
coverage of $250,000.
Existing § 628.32(l)(1) also states that
System institutions must assign a 0percent risk-weight to cash held in
accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank. We
propose to remove this provision
because it is redundant. Section
628.32(a)(1)(i)(A) assigns a 0-percent
risk-weight to an exposure to the central
bank of the United States government,
which includes Federal Reserve Banks.
Finally, we propose to revise
§ 628.32(l)(1) to add a provision
generally assigning a 0-percent riskweight to gold bullion held in the
System institution’s own vaults. The
existing provision already generally
assigns a 0-percent risk-weight to gold
bullion held in the vaults of a
depository institution.
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4. Securitization Formulas
The proposed rule would correct 3
formulas used in the simplified
supervisory formula approach (SSFA)
equation under § 628.43(d) and one
formula used in the simple risk-weight
approach (SRWA) under § 628.52. These
formulas were printed incorrectly in the
Federal Register version of the Tier 1/
Tier 2 Capital Framework final rule. We
previously provided the correct
formulas in our Capital BL. These are
technical corrections to ensure these
approaches are calculated correctly.
5. Unallocated Retained Earnings and
Equivalents Deductions and
Adjustments
The proposed rule would clarify the
calculation of the requirement described
in § 628.10 that at least 1.5 percent of
the 4 percent tier 1 leverage ratio
minimum must consist of URE and URE
equivalents (UREE). The Capital Rule
did not specify how to calculate this
requirement. In our Capital BL, we
provided guidance to System
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institutions on the deductions to make
when calculating this minimum URE
and UREE requirement.48 We stated:
‘‘When calculating the URE and URE
equivalents requirement for the leverage
ratio, a System institution must deduct
from the numerator an amount equal to
all the deductions required under
§ 628.22(a). All deductions made to the
denominator when calculating the tier 1
leverage ratio must be made to the
denominator when calculating the URE
and URE equivalents requirement.’’ 49
We propose to add the Capital BL
guidance to § 628.10. We also propose to
require System institutions to deduct
purchased equity investments that are
required to be deducted under the
corresponding deduction approach in
§ 628.22(c). The URE and UREE
measure, because it is a component of
the tier 1 leverage ratio, should have
similar deductions.50 While the URE
and UREE measure represents only a
part of the numerator of the tier 1
leverage ratio, our previous guidance to
deduct such amounts only from
§ 628.22(a) resulted in the majority of
System institution’s URE and UREE
measures being higher than the tier 1
leverage ratio, which was not our
intention. We believe our proposed
deduction of purchased stock under
§ 628.22(c) will have a minimal impact
on System institutions and will not
result in any System institution’s URE
and UREE measure falling below the
regulatory minimum.51 In addition,
when calculating the URE and UREE
measure, System institutions must
continue to use the same denominator
as the tier 1 leverage ratio. The
denominator is equal to the institution’s
average total consolidated assets as
reported on the institution’s Call Report
minus amounts deducted from tier 1
capital under §§ 628.22(a), and (c) and
628.23.52
Question 5: The FCA seeks comment
on the appropriate deductions and
48 See
Capital BL, item 4.
628.10(c)(4) requires the amounts
deducted under §§ 628.22(a) and (c) and 628.23 to
be deducted from tier 1 capital when calculating the
tier 1 leverage ratio. However, the deductions under
§§ 628.22(c) and 628.23 were not applied to the
numerator when calculating the URE and UREE
requirement as they do not increase the URE of a
System institution.
50 We do not find it necessary to require the
deductions under § 628.23 as third-party stock is
not a component of URE, UREE, or CET1 capital.
51 As of September 30, 2019, the inclusion of
deductions under § 628.22(c) in the computation of
the URE and UREE measure would have decreased
the ratio at System institutions by 1 percent on
average. With computations including the
deductions under § 628.22(c), all institutions
remain well above the regulatory minimum.
52 As of the date of this proposal, this would be
total average assets for leverage ratio on schedule
RC–R.5, line 1.d.
49 Section
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55793
adjustments that should be made to
URE and URE equivalents in
determining compliance with
§ 628.10(b)(4).
6. Service Corporation Deductions and
Adjustments
The proposed rule would expand the
requirement under existing
§ 628.22(a)(6) for a System institution to
deduct any allocated equity investment
in another System institution, which is
defined in part 628 to mean each
System bank or association,53 by
requiring a System institution also to
deduct any allocated equity investment
in a System service corporation.
Although we do not know of any
allocation of equities by a service
corporation to another institution in the
System, a service corporation’s bylaws
may permit it to allocate equities to
another System institution. The
allocated equity is retained, controlled,
and at risk at the service corporation.
Therefore, consistent with FCA’s stated
position that equities should be counted
in the regulatory capital of the System
institution that has control of the
equities rather than at the System
institution that does not control them,
these allocated equities should be
counted at the service corporation as
applicable, and deducted from the
regulatory capital of the recipient
System institution.
Question 6: The FCA seeks comment
on whether any System institution has
received an allocated equity investment
from a service corporation.
7. Adjustments for Accruing Patronage
and Dividends
We propose to amend the regulatory
capital adjustment and deduction
requirements under § 628.22 by
including in proposed § 628.22(b) the
existing requirement to reverse any
accruals of patronage or dividend
payables or receivables that occur prior
to a board declaration resolution.54
Under GAAP, institutions that make
patronage and dividend payments that
can be reasonably estimated on a regular
and routine basis may accrue those
payments as payables. Similarly,
institutions that receive patronage and
dividend payments that can be
reasonably estimated on regular and
53 ‘‘System institution’’ is defined in existing
§ 628.2 as ‘‘a System bank, an association of the
Farm Credit System, . . . and any other institution
chartered by the FCA that the FCA determines
should be considered a System institution for the
purposes of this part.’’ The FCA has not made any
determinations to include other institutions in this
definition.
54 See existing Call Report instructions for
Schedule RC–R.4, Line item 3 at https://
www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/fcs-call-reports.
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routine basis may accrue those
payments as receivables. Many System
institutions accrue these payables or
receivables on their balance sheet prior
to the board adopting a declaration
resolution. For regulatory capital
purposes only, these institutions must
adjust their unallocated retained
earnings as follows:
• If a System institution accrues a
patronage or dividend receivable prior
to the date of the board declaration
resolution by the paying institution,
then it must subtract this accrual from
its URE.
• If a System institution accrues a
patronage or dividend payable to either
another institution or a borrower prior
to the date of its board declaration
resolution, then it must add it back to
URE.
If the System institution chooses not
to accrue a payable or receivable until
it is declared by the board, then no
adjustments to regulatory capital are
necessary. Any adjustment to accruals
made pursuant to this provision is
applicable only to regulatory capital
measures as reported to FCA.
8. Bank Disclosures
The proposed rule would amend
§ 628.63(b)(4) by requiring banks to
disclose a reconciliation of their
regulatory capital elements as they
relate to their balance sheets in any
audited consolidated financial
statements. We propose to add the word
‘‘applicable’’ before ‘‘audited’’ to clarify
that this reconciliation requirement
applies only to current period financial
statements that are audited. There is no
requirement to reconcile with audited
financial statements from previous
quarters. Specifically, if a System bank
audits only its year-end financial
statements, and not its quarterly
financial statements (as is the general
practice of System banks), this
requirement would apply only to the
bank’s annual report to shareholders.
The reconciliation applies to quarterly
shareholder reports only if the reports
are audited.
We also propose to require System
banks to disclose the reconciliation of
regulatory capital elements using both
point-in-time and three-month average
daily balance regulatory capital values.
Section 628.10(a) requires a System
institution to compute its regulatory
capital ratios using average daily
balances for the most recent 3 months.
Existing § 628.63(b)(4) does not specify
whether to complete the reconciliation
using point-in-time or average daily
balance regulatory capital values.
FCA has long required institutions to
compute their capital ratios using three-
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month average daily balances; so we
believe it is appropriate that the
reconciliation to any applicable audited
consolidated financial statements also
use the three-month average daily
balances. One of the primary purposes
of this requirement is to address the
disconnect between the numbers used
for the calculation of regulatory capital
and the numbers used in published
financial statements. Because FCA
measures and monitors regulatory
capital using average daily balances, we
believe the reconciliation using average
daily balances is the most accurate and
beneficial way to disclose differences
between regulatory capital and audited
consolidated financial statements.
We believe it is also appropriate to
include the reconciliation using pointin-time values. The audited
consolidated financial statement uses
point-in-time values; therefore, also
completing the reconciliation using
point-in-time values allows for a
comparison between GAAP and
regulatory capital using point-in-time
numbers. Disclosing the reconciliation
using both average daily and point-intime values provides investors and
stockholders with the most accurate,
complete, and transparent means to
understanding differences between
regulatory capital and GAAP capital.
In addition, we propose to further
clarify System disclosures as follows:
Existing § 620.3 requires disclosures by
institutions and by employees, officers,
directors, and institution director
nominees to be ‘‘complete.’’ Section
628.62(a) requires disclosures from
System banks as outlined in § 628.63.
Section 628.62(c) permits a System
bank, in certain situations, not to
disclose certain information that it
would otherwise be required to disclose
under § 628.63 and to instead disclose
more limited information.
Specifically, § 628.62(c) permits a
System bank not to disclose specific
proprietary or confidential commercial
or financial information that it would
otherwise be required to disclose if it
concludes that such disclosures would
compromise its position, as long as it
discloses more general information
about the subject matter, together with
the fact that, and the reasons why, the
specific items of information are not
being disclosed.
To clarify that § 620.3 does not
require the disclosure of information
that banks may properly not disclose
under § 628.62(c), we propose to revise
§ 620.3 to state that unless otherwise
determined by FCA, the use of the
authorized limited disclosure does not
create an incomplete disclosure. We
also propose to revise § 620.3 to permit
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the modification of the required
statement that the information provided
is true, accurate, and complete to
explain that the completeness of the
disclosure was determined in
consideration of § 628.62(c).
We are also proposing a technical edit
to remove and reserve § 628.63(b)(3)
because it is no longer applicable.
Question 7: The FCA seeks comment
on the appropriateness and usefulness
to internal and/or external stakeholders
of completing the reconciliation using
both point-in-time and average daily
balance values?
9. Retirement of Statutory Borrower
Stock
Existing § 628.20(b)(1)(xiv)(B) allows
System institutions to redeem the
minimum statutory borrower stock
described in § 628.20(b)(1)(x) without
prior FCA approval and without
satisfying the minimum holding period
for common cooperative equities
included in CET1 capital. We propose to
add a provision expressly stating that an
institution may redeem such statutory
borrower stock only provided that, after
such redemption, the institution
continues to comply with all minimum
regulatory capital requirements.
Although the existing rule is silent on
whether the institution must maintain
compliance with the regulatory capital
standards, institutions have been
required to do so by the Act and FCA
regulations since 1988. Section
4.3A(c)(1)(I) of the Act and
§ 615.5220(a)(6) condition the
retirement of stock on the institution
meeting the minimum capital adequacy
standards established by FCA. The
proposed amendment to
§ 628.(b)(1)(xiv)(B) would eliminate any
possible misinterpretation that an
institution could retire the statutory
borrower stock if the institution were
not meeting its regulatory capital
requirements both before and after the
retirement.
Although we are not proposing
additional changes to the treatment of
statutory borrower stock, we provide the
following additional clarifications:
• For any statutory borrower stock
that exceeds $1,000 or 2 percent of the
loan amount, whichever is less, the
minimum holding periods apply (7
years for CET1 and 5 years for Tier 2)
if an institution plans to include the
additional stock in tier 1 or tier 2
capital.
• The minimum statutory borrower
stock includible in CET1 is the
outstanding balance of the statutory
minimum borrower stock. If a loan is for
$50,000 or more, the amount includible
in CET1 capital without a minimum
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holding period is no more than $1,000
until such stock is retired. If a loan is
for less than $50,000 at origination, the
amount includible in CET1 capital is 2
percent of the originated loan amount
until such stock is retired. If a revolving
line of credit is originated for $50,000 or
more and the amount of borrower stock
is retired as the loan pays down, the
amount of stock remaining on the
calculation date, up to $1,000, is the
amount includible in CET1 without a
minimum holding period. If a revolving
line of credit is originated for less than
$50,000 and the amount of borrower
stock is retired as the loan pays down,
the amount of stock remaining on the
calculation date, up to 2 percent of the
originated loan amount, is the amount
includible in CET1 without a minimum
holding period.
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C. General Discussion
FCA is using this notice of proposed
rulemaking to provide further
clarification and guidance to the System
on continuously redeemable preferred
stock and to respond to a letter received
from the Farm Credit Council. We also
seek comment on potential changes that
may be made to FCA’s existing
permanent capital regulations.
1. Continuously Redeemable Preferred
Stock (H Stock)
Some System associations have issued
continuously redeemable perpetual
preferred stock (typically called Harvest
Stock or H Stock) to their memberborrowers to invest and participate in
their cooperative beyond the minimum
borrower stock purchase. H Stock is an
at-risk investment, issued without a
stated maturity and retireable only at
the discretion of the institution’s board.
A feature of the stock is the institution’s
intent to redeem it upon the request of
the holder as long as the institution is
in compliance with its regulatory capital
requirements. Because of this feature,
FCA considers the stock to be
continuously redeemable. Some of the
institutions also lower the operational
hurdles to redemption by delegating the
board’s authority to retire all memberborrower stock to management provided
certain board-approved minimum
regulatory capital ratios are maintained.
FCA has determined that holders
reasonably expect the institution to
redeem the stock shortly after they make
a request and, therefore, the stock does
not meet the requirements of
§ 628.20(b)(1)(iv), § 628.20(c)(1)(xiv)(A)
or § 628.20(d)(1)(xi)(A) for inclusion in
tier 1 or tier 2 capital. Even after the
stock has been outstanding for 5 years
or more, the continued policy of the
institutions to redeem this stock upon
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request and the continued expectations
of holders disqualify the stock for
inclusion in tier 1 or tier 2 capital.
2. Farm Credit Council Letter
In addition, FCA has received a letter
from the Farm Credit Council on behalf
of System banks and associations
(System Letter) 55 recommending
changes to the risk-weighting of
investments by System institutions in
service corporations and unincorporated
business entities (UBEs).
The System Letter requests that a
System institution’s investment in a
service corporation be risk-weighted at
100 percent instead of being deducted
from CET1 capital. The stated basis for
such treatment is that investments in
service corporations are approved by
their respective owners that closely
control their activities, and the service
corporations do not possess lending
authorities (i.e., they do not assume
exposure to credit risks).
The System Letter also recommended
directing System institutions to either
risk-weight or deduct their investments
in UBEs, depending on the specific
nature of the UBE.56 The letter suggests
that institutions with an equity
investment in AgDirect, LLP should
deduct the investment from regulatory
capital.
We have considered the request and
have decided not to propose that
institutions risk-weight equity
investments in service corporations
instead of deducting such investments.
FCA continues to believe that such
capital investments are committed to
support risks at the service corporation
level and that such capital investments
must be available to meet any capital
needs of the service corporation.57
With respect to the treatment of UBEs,
FCA may consider the appropriate
regulatory capital treatment of the UBE
and apply such treatment on a case-bycase determination, as appropriate.
FCA clarifies that the Farm Credit
System Association Captive Insurance
Company (Captive Insurance Company)
is not a System institution as defined in
§ 628.2. Accordingly, any System
institution with an equity investment in
55 Letter dated November 22, 2016, from Charles
Dana, General Counsel, Farm Credit Council to Gary
K. Van Meter, Director, Office of Regulatory Policy.
The Farm Credit Council is a trade association
representing the interests of System banks and
associations. This letter was received after the final
Capital Rule had been adopted by the FCA Board
and communicates a request to change certain
provisions of the final Capital Rule, as discussed in
this section.
56 Under the existing rules, equity investments in
UBEs are generally included in risk-weighted assets
in accordance with § 628.52.
57 See 63 FR 39222 (July 22, 1998).
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55795
the Captive Insurance Company must
risk-weight that equity investment.
3. Permanent Capital
In 1988, Congress added a definition
of ‘‘permanent capital’’ to the Act and
required the FCA to adopt risk-based
permanent capital standards for System
institutions. The FCA adopted
permanent capital regulations in 1988.58
The Act defines permanent capital to
include current earnings, unallocated
and allocated earnings,59 stock (other
than stock retireable on repayment of
the holder’s loan or at the discretion of
the holder, and certain stock issued
before October 1988), surplus less
allowance for loan losses, and other
debt or equity instruments that the FCA
determines appropriate to be considered
permanent capital. Allocated equities
shared by a bank and each affiliated
association—that is, equities that a bank
has allocated to an affiliated
association—appear on the books of
both institutions but can be counted in
only one institution’s permanent capital
pursuant to a capital allotment
agreement between the two institutions.
By adopting and implementing the
Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital Framework, FCA
has shifted its focus from permanent
capital to total capital (tier 1 and tier 2).
Because the Act defines permanent
capital, FCA must require reporting and
monitoring of permanent capital.
Moreover, FCA has limited authority to
change the components of permanent
capital. However, the FCA has full
authority to implement appropriate
deductions to permanent capital in the
numerator and set the risk-weights used
in risk-adjusted assets in the
denominator of the permanent capital
ratio. FCA seeks to reduce the burden
associated with permanent capital, and
we seek comment on the best way to do
so consistent with statutory mandates.
We note that H Stock, in its current
form, is included in permanent capital
and FCA does not seek to exclude H
Stock from permanent capital.
Question 8: What, if any, changes to
the permanent capital regulations
(§§ 615.5201, 615.5206, 615.5207, and
615.5208) should be made to increase
their clarity and understanding?
Question 9: Is calculating permanent
capital burdensome for System
institutions? If so, are there any changes
FCA could make to this calculation that
would reduce this burden, considering
that the definition of permanent capital
58 See
53 FR 39229 (October 6, 1988).
this preamble, ‘‘unallocated and allocated
earnings’’ would be equivalent to ‘‘unallocated
retained earnings and allocated equities.’’
Additionally, ‘‘surplus’’ would be ‘‘unallocated
retained earnings.’’
59 In
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in the Act precludes us from changing
the components of permanent capital?
Question 10: Should FCA more
closely align the permanent capital
calculation with the total capital (tier 1
and tier 2) calculations? If so, how could
FCA accomplish this, considering that
for permanent capital, the Act specifies
deductions related to bank and
association allotment agreements?
12 CFR Part 620
III. Abbreviations
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the Farm Credit
Administration proposes to amend parts
614, 615, 620 and 628 of chapter VI, title
12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as
follows:
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading
Commission
EMNA Eligible Master Netting Agreement
FCA Farm Credit Administration
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
FDI Act Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council
FR Federal Register
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (U.S.)
GSE Government-Sponsored Enterprise
GSIB Global Systemically Important Bank
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
QFC Qualified Financial Contract
QMNA Qualified Master Netting Agreement
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SFA Supervisory Formula Approach
SRWA Simple Risk-Weight Approach
SSFA Simplified Supervisory Formula
Approach
UBE Unincorporated Business Entity
URE Unallocated Retained Earnings
UREE Unallocated Retained Earnings
Equivalents
U.S.C. United States Code
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601
et seq.), FCA hereby certifies that this
proposed rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Each of the
banks in the Farm Credit System,
considered together with its affiliated
associations, has assets and annual
income in excess of the amounts that
would qualify them as small entities.
Therefore, Farm Credit System
institutions are not ‘‘small entities’’ as
defined in the Regulatory Flexibility
Act.
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Lists of Subjects
12 CFR Part 614
Agriculture, Banks, Banking, Foreign
trade, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Rural areas.
12 CFR Part 615
Accounting, Agriculture, Banks,
Banking, Government securities,
Investments, Rural areas.
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Accounting, Agriculture, Banks,
Banking, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Rural areas.
Accounting, Agriculture, Banks,
Banking, Capital, Government
securities, Investments, Rural areas.
PART 614—LOAN POLICIES AND
OPERATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 614
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: Secs. 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 1.10,
1.11, 2.0, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.10, 2.12, 2.13, 2.15,
3.0, 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.8, 3.10, 3.20, 3.28, 4.12,
4.12A, 4.13B, 4.14, 4.14A, 4.14D, 4.14E, 4.18,
4.18A, 4.19, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.36, 4.37,
5.9, 5.10, 5.17, 7.0, 7.2, 7.6, 7.8, 7.12, 7.13,
8.0, 8.5 of the Farm Credit Act (12 U.S.C.
2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019,
2071, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2091, 2093, 2094,
2097, 2121, 2122, 2124, 2128, 2129, 2131,
2141, 2149, 2183, 2184, 2201, 2202, 2202a,
2202d, 2202e, 2206, 2206a, 2207, 2211, 2212,
2213, 2214, 2219a, 2219b, 2243, 2244, 2252,
2279a, 2279a–2, 2279b, 2279c–1, 2279f,
2279f–1, 2279aa, 2279aa–5); sec. 413 of Pub.
L. 100–233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1639, as amended
by section 405 of Pub. L. 100–399, 102 Stat.
1000 (12 U.S.C. 2121 note); 42 U.S.C. 4012a,
4104a, 4104b, 4106, and 4128.
2. Amend § 614.4351 by:
a. Revising paragraph (a);
■ b. Removing and reserving paragraph
(a)(1); and
■ c. Revising paragraph (a)(2).
The revisions read as follows:
■
■
§ 614.4351 Computation of lending and
leasing limit base.
(a) Lending and leasing limit base. An
institution’s lending and leasing limit
base is composed of the total capital
(Tier 1 and Tier 2) of the institution, as
defined in § 628.2 of this chapter, with
adjustments applicable to the institution
provided for in § 628.22 of this chapter,
and with the following further
adjustments:
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Eligible third-party capital that is
required to be excluded from total
capital under § 628.23 of this chapter
may be included in the lending limit
base.
*
*
*
*
*
Frm 00011
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3. The authority citation for part 615
is revised to read as follows:
■
12 CFR Part 628
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AFFAIRS, LOAN POLICIES AND
OPERATIONS, AND FUNDING
OPERATIONS
Sfmt 4702
Authority: Secs. 1.5, 1.7, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12,
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.12, 3.1, 3.7, 3.11, 3.25, 4.3,
4.3A, 4.9, 4.14B, 4.25, 5.9, 5.17, 8.0, 8.3, 8.4,
8.6, 8.8, 8.10, 8.12 of the Farm Credit Act (12
U.S.C. 2013, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2073,
2074, 2075, 2076, 2093, 2122, 2128, 2132,
2146, 2154, 2154a, 2160, 2202b, 2211, 2243,
2252, 2279aa, 2279aa–3, 2279aa–4, 2279aa–6,
2279aa–8, 2279aa–10, 2279aa–12); sec.
301(a), Pub. L. 100–233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1608
(12 U.S.C. 2154 note); sec. 939A, Pub. L. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1326, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o–7
note).
4. Amend § 615.5200 by replacing the
existing language with the following
language:
■
§ 615.5200
Capital planning.
(a) The Board of Directors of each
System institution shall determine the
amount of regulatory capital needed to
assure the System institution’s
continued financial viability and to
provide for growth necessary to meet
the needs of its borrowers. The
minimum capital standards specified in
this part and part 628 of this chapter are
not meant to be adopted as the optimal
capital level in the System institution’s
capital adequacy plan. Rather, the
standards are intended to serve as
minimum levels of capital that each
System institution must maintain to
protect against the credit and other
general risks inherent in its operations.
(b) Each Board of Directors shall
establish, adopt, and maintain a formal
written capital adequacy plan as a part
of the financial plan required by
§ 618.8440 of this chapter. The plan
shall include the capital targets that are
necessary to achieve the System
institution’s capital adequacy goals as
well as the minimum permanent capital,
common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital,
tier 1 capital, total capital, and tier 1
leverage ratios (including the
unallocated retained earnings (URE) and
URE equivalents minimum) standards.
The plan shall expressly acknowledge
the continuing and binding effect of all
board resolutions adopted in accordance
with §§ 628.20(b)(1)(xiv), (c)(1)(xiv),
(d)(1)(xi), and 628.21. The plan shall
address any projected dividend
payments, patronage payments, equity
retirements, or other action that may
decrease the System institution’s capital
or the components thereof for which
minimum amounts are required by this
part and part 628 of this chapter. The
plan shall set forth the circumstances
and minimum timeframes in which
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equities may be redeemed or revolved
consistent with the System institution’s
applicable bylaws or board of directors’
resolutions.
(c) In addition to factors that must be
considered in meeting the minimum
standards, the board of directors shall
also consider at least the following
factors in developing the capital
adequacy plan:
(1) Capability of management and the
board of directors (the assessment of
which may be a part of the assessments
required in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) and
(b)(7)(i) of § 618.8440 of this chapter);
(2) Quality of operating policies,
procedures, and internal controls;
(3) Quality and quantity of earnings;
(4) Asset quality and the adequacy of
the allowance for losses to absorb
potential loss within the loan and lease
portfolios;
(5) Sufficiency of liquid funds;
(6) Needs of a System institution’s
customer base; and
(7) Any other risk-oriented activities,
such as funding and interest rate risks,
potential obligations under joint and
several liability, contingent and offbalance-sheet liabilities or other
conditions warranting additional
capital.
■ 5. Amend § 615.5201 by revising the
definition of ‘‘System institution’’ to
read as follows:
§ 615.5201
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
System institution means a System
bank, an association of the Farm Credit
System, and their successors, and any
other institution chartered by the FCA
that the FCA determines should be
considered a System institution for the
purposes of this subpart.
■ 6. Amend § 615.5220 by revising
paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:
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§ 615.5220
Capitalization bylaws.
(a) * * *
(6) The manner in which equities will
be retired, including a provision stating
that equities other than those protected
under section 4.9A of the Act are
retireable at the sole discretion of the
board, provided minimum capital
adequacy standards established by the
Farm Credit Administration, and the
capital requirements established by the
board of directors of the System
institution, are met;
*
*
*
*
*
PART 620—DISCLOSURE TO
SHAREHOLDERS
7. The authority citation for part 620
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Secs. 4.3, 4.3A, 4.19, 5.9, 5.17,
5.19 of the Farm Credit Act (12 U.S.C. 2154,
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2154a, 2207, 2243, 2252, 2254); sec. 424 of
Pub. L. 100–233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1656; sec.
514 of Pub. L. 102–552, 106 Stat. 4102.
8. Amend § 620.3 byadding in
paragraphs (a) and (c)(3) a new last
sentence to read as follows.
■
§ 620.3 Accuracy of reports and
assessment of internal control over
financial reporting.
(a) * * * Unless otherwise
determined by FCA, the appropriate use
of the limited disclosure authorized by
§ 628.62(c) does not create an
incomplete disclosure.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * * If the report contains the
limited disclosure authorized by
§ 628.62(c), the statement may be
modified to explain that the
completeness of the report was
determined in consideration of
§ 628.62(c).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 9. Amend § 620.5 by:
■ a. Adding paragraph(f)(3)(v);
■ b. Revising (f)(4).
The addition and revision read as
follows:
§ 620.5 Contents of the annual report to
shareholders.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(3) * * *
(v) Tier 1 leverage ratio.
(4) The following ratios shall be
disclosed in comparative columnar form
in each annual report through fiscal year
end 2021, only as long as these ratios
are part of the previous 5 fiscal years of
financial data required under § 620.5(2)
and (3):
(i) Core surplus ratio.
(ii) Total surplus ratio.
(iii) For banks only, net collateral
ratio.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 628—CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF
SYSTEM INSTITUTIONS
10. The authority citation for part 628
is revised to read as follows:
■
Authority: Secs. 1.5, 1.7, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12,
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.12, 3.1, 3.7, 3.11, 3.25, 4.3,
4.3A, 4.9, 4.14B, 4.25, 5.9, 5.17, 8.0, 8.3, 8.4,
8.6, 8.8, 8.10, 8.12 of the Farm Credit Act (12
U.S.C. 2013, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2073,
2074, 2075, 2076, 2093, 2122, 2128, 2132,
2146, 2154, 2154a, 2160, 2202b, 2211, 2243,
2252, 2279aa, 2279aa–3, 2279aa–4, 2279aa–6,
2279aa–8, 2279aa–10, 2279aa–12); sec.
301(a), Pub. L. 100–233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1608
(12 U.S.C. 2154 note); sec. 939A, Pub. L. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1326, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o–7
note).
11. Amend § 628.2 by:
a. Revising the definition of
‘‘Collateral agreement’’;
■
■
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55797
b. Adding in alphabetical order a
definition for ‘‘Common cooperative
equity issuance date’’;
■ c. Revising the definition of ‘‘Eligible
margin loan’’;
■ d. Revising the definition of
‘‘Qualifying master netting agreement’’;
■ e. Revising the definition of ‘‘Repostyle transaction’’;
■ f. Revising the definition of ‘‘System
institution’’.
The revisions and addition read as
follows:
■
§ 628.2
Definitions
*
*
*
*
*
Collateral agreement means a legal
contract that specifies the time when,
and circumstances under which, a
counterparty is required to pledge
collateral to a System institution for a
single financial contract or for all
financial contracts in a netting set and
confers upon the System institution a
perfected, first-priority security interest
(notwithstanding the prior security
interest of any custodial agent), or the
legal equivalent thereof, in the collateral
posted by the counterparty under the
agreement. This security interest must
provide the System institution with a
right to close-out the financial positions
and liquidate the collateral upon an
event of default of, or failure to perform
by, the counterparty under the collateral
agreement. A contract would not satisfy
this requirement if the System
institution’s exercise of rights under the
agreement may be stayed or avoided:
(1) Under applicable law in the
relevant jurisdictions, other than:
(i) In receivership, conservatorship, or
resolution under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, Title II of the DoddFrank Act, or under any similar
insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or
laws of foreign jurisdictions that are
substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (1)(i) in
order to facilitate the orderly resolution
of the defaulting counterparty;
(ii) Where the agreement is subject by
its terms to, or incorporates, any of the
laws referenced in paragraph (1)(i) of
this definition; or
(2) Other than to the extent necessary
for the counterparty to comply with the
requirements of part 47, Subpart I of
part 252 or part 382 of Title 12, as
applicable.
*
*
*
*
*
Common cooperative equity issuance
date means the date in which the
holding period for purchased stock
(excluding statutory minimum borrower
stock and third-party stock) and
allocated equities start:
(1)For allocated equities, the quarterending in which:
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(i) The System institution’s Board of
Directors has passed a resolution
declaring a patronage refund; and
(ii) The System institution has
completed the applicable accounting
treatment by segregating the new
allocated equities from its unallocated
retained earnings.
(iii) For purchased stock (excluding
statutory minimum borrower stock and
third-party stock), the quarter-ending in
which the stock is acquired by the
holder and recognized on the
institution’s balance sheet.
*
*
*
*
*
Eligible margin loan means:
(1) An extension of credit where:
(i) The extension of credit is
collateralized exclusively by liquid and
readily marketable debt or equity
securities, or gold;
(ii) The collateral is marked-to-fair
value daily, and the transaction is
subject to daily margin maintenance
requirements; and
(iii) The extension of credit is
conducted under an agreement that
provides the System institution the right
to accelerate and terminate the
extension of credit and to liquidate or
set-off collateral promptly upon an
event of default, including upon an
event of receivership, insolvency,
liquidation, conservatorship, or similar
proceeding, of the counterparty,
provided that, in any such case:
(A) Any exercise of rights under the
agreement will not be stayed or avoided
under applicable law in the relevant
jurisdictions, other than:
(1) In receivership, conservatorship,
or resolution under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, Title II of the DoddFrank Act, or under any similar
insolvency law applicable to GSEs,60 or
laws of foreign jurisdictions that are
substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph
(1)(iii)(A)(1) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting
counterparty; or
(2) Where the agreement is subject by
its terms to, or incorporates, any of the
laws referenced in paragraph
(1)(iii)(A)(1) of this definition; and
(B) The agreement may limit the right
to accelerate, terminate, and close-out
on a net basis all transactions under the
agreement and to liquidate or set-off
60 This requirement is met where all transactions
under the agreement are (i) executed under U.S. law
and (ii) constitute ‘‘securities contracts’’ under
section 555 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 555),
qualified financial contracts under section 11(e)(8)
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or netting
contracts between or among financial institutions
under sections 401–407 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act or the
Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation EE (12 CFR part
231).
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collateral promptly upon an event of
default of the counterparty to the extent
necessary for the counterparty to
comply with the requirements of part
47, subpart I of part 252 or part 382 of
Title 12, as applicable.
(2) In order to recognize an exposure
as an eligible margin loan for purposes
of this subpart, a System institution
must comply with the requirements of
§ 628.3(b) with respect to that exposure.
*
*
*
*
*
Qualifying master netting agreement
means a written, legally enforceable
agreement provided that:
(1) The agreement creates a single
legal obligation for all individual
transactions covered by the agreement
upon an event of default following any
stay permitted by paragraph (2) of this
definition, including upon an event of
receivership, conservatorship,
insolvency, liquidation, or similar
proceeding, of the counterparty;
(2) The agreement provides the
System institution the right to
accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a
net basis all transactions under the
agreement and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of
default, including upon an event of
receivership, conservatorship,
insolvency, liquidation, or similar
proceeding, of the counterparty,
provided that, in any such case:
(i) Any exercise of rights under the
agreement will not be stayed or avoided
under applicable law in the relevant
jurisdictions, other than:
(A) In receivership, conservatorship,
or resolution under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, Title II of the DoddFrank Act, or under any similar
insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or
laws of foreign jurisdictions that are
substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (2)(i)(A) in
order to facilitate the orderly resolution
of the defaulting counterparty; or
(B) Where the agreement is subject by
its terms to, or incorporates, any of the
laws referenced in paragraph (2)(i)(A) of
this definition; and
(ii) The agreement may limit the right
to accelerate, terminate, and close-out
on a net basis all transactions under the
agreement and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of
default of the counterparty to the extent
necessary for the counterparty to
comply with the requirements of part
47, Subpart I of part 252 or part 382 of
Title 12, as applicable;
(3) The agreement does not contain a
walkaway clause (that is, a provision
that permits a non-defaulting
counterparty to make a lower payment
than it otherwise would make under the
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agreement, or no payment at all, to a
defaulter or the estate of a defaulter,
even if the defaulter or the estate of the
defaulter is a net creditor under the
agreement); and
(4) In order to recognize an agreement
as a qualifying master netting agreement
for purposes of this subpart, a System
institution must comply with the
requirements of § 628.3(d) with respect
to that agreement.
*
*
*
*
*
Repo-style transaction means a
repurchase or reverse repurchase
transaction, or a securities borrowing or
securities lending transaction, including
a transaction in which the System
institution acts as agent for a customer
and indemnifies the customer against
loss, provided that:
(1) The transaction is based solely on
liquid and readily marketable securities,
cash, or gold;
(2) The transaction is marked-to-fair
value daily and subject to daily margin
maintenance requirements;
(3)(i) The transaction is a ‘‘securities
contract’’ or ‘‘repurchase agreement’’
under section 555 or 559, respectively,
of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 555
or 559), a qualified financial contract
under section 11(e)(8) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, or a netting
contract between or among financial
institutions under sections 401–407 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act or the
Federal Reserve’s Regulation EE (12 CFR
part 231); or
(ii) If the transaction does not meet
the criteria set forth in paragraph (3)(i)
of this definition, then either:
(A) The transaction is executed under
an agreement that provides the System
institution the right to accelerate,
terminate, and close-out the transaction
on a net basis and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of
default, including upon an event of
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding, of the counterparty,
provided that, in any such case:
(1) Any exercise of rights under the
agreement will not be stayed or avoided
under applicable law in the relevant
jurisdictions, other than:
(i) In receivership, conservatorship, or
resolution under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, Title II of the DoddFrank Act, or under any similar
insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or
laws of foreign jurisdictions that are
substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph
(3)(ii)(A)(1)(i) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting
counterparty;
(ii) Where the agreement is subject by
its terms to, or incorporates, any of the
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laws referenced in paragraph
(3)(ii)(A)(1)(i) of this definition; and
(2) The agreement may limit the right
to accelerate, terminate, and close-out
on a net basis all transactions under the
agreement and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of
default of the counterparty to the extent
necessary for the counterparty to
comply with the requirements of part
47, Subpart I of part 252 or part 382 of
Title 12, as applicable; or
(B) The transaction is:
(1) Either overnight or
unconditionally cancelable at any time
by the System institution; and
(2) Executed under an agreement that
provides the System institution the right
to accelerate, terminate, and close-out
the transaction on a net basis and to
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly
upon an event of counterparty default;
and
(4) In order to recognize an exposure
as a repo-style transaction for purposes
of this subpart, a System institution
must comply with the requirements of
§ 628.3(e) of this part with respect to
that exposure.
*
*
*
*
*
System institution means a System
bank, an association of the Farm Credit
System, and their successors, and any
other institution chartered by the FCA
that the FCA determines should be
considered a System institution for the
purposes of this subpart.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 12. Amend § 628.10 by revising
paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:
§ 628.10
Minimum capital requirements.
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*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(4) Tier 1 leverage ratio. (i) A System
institution’s leverage ratio is the ratio of
the institution’s tier 1 capital to the
institution’s average total consolidated
assets as reported on the institution’s
Call Report minus amounts deducted
from tier 1 capital under §§ 628.22(a)
and (c) and 628.23.
(ii) To calculate the measure of URE
and URE equivalents described in
§ 628.10(b)(4), a System institution must
deduct from URE and URE equivalents
an amount equal to all the deductions
required under § 628.22(a) and (c), and
must use the denominator of the tier 1
leverage ratio.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 13. Amend § 628.20 by revising
paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (ii), (xiv),
(c)(1)(xiv), (d)(1)(i), (1)(xi), and (f)(5)(ii).
The revisions read as follows:
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§ 628.20 Capital components and eligibility
criteria for tier 1 and tier 2 capital
instruments.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) The instrument is paid-in, issued
directly by the System institution, and
represents the most subordinated claim
in a receivership, insolvency,
liquidation, or similar proceeding of the
System institution;
(ii) The holder of the instrument is
entitled to a claim on the residual assets
of the System institution after all senior
claims have been satisfied in a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding;
*
*
*
*
*
(xiv) The System institution’s
capitalization bylaws, or a resolution
adopted by its board of directors under
§ 628.21, provides that the institution:
(A) Establishes a minimum
redemption or revolvement period of 7
years for equities included in CET1; and
(B) Shall not redeem, revolve, cancel,
or remove any equities included in
CET1 without prior approval of the FCA
under § 628.20(f), except that the
minimum statutory borrower stock
described in paragraph (b)(1)(x) of this
section may be redeemed without a
minimum period outstanding after
issuance and without the prior approval
of the FCA, as long as after the
redemption, the System institution
continues to comply with all minimum
regulatory capital requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(xiv) The System institution’s
capitalization bylaws, or a resolution
adopted by its board of directors under
§ 628.21, provides that the institution:
(A) Establishes a minimum
redemption or no-call period of 5 years
for equities included in additional tier
1; and
(B) Shall not redeem, revolve, cancel,
or remove any equities included in
additional tier 1 capital without prior
approval of the FCA under § 628.20(f).
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) The instrument is issued and paidin;
*
*
*
*
*
(xi) The System institution’s
capitalization bylaws, or a resolution
adopted by its board of directors under
§ 628.21, provides that the institution:
(A) Establishes a minimum call,
redemption or revolvement period of 5
years for equities included in tier 2
capital; and
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55799
(B) Shall not call, redeem, revolve,
cancel, or remove any equities included
in tier 2 capital without prior approval
of the FCA under § 628.20(f).
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(5) * * *
(ii) After such cash payments have
been declared and defined by resolution
of the board, the dollar amount of the
System institution’s CET1 capital at
quarter-end equals or exceeds the dollar
amount of CET1 capital on the same
quarter-end in the previous calendar
year; and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 14. Add new § 628.21 to read as
follows:
§ 628.21 Capital bylaw or board resolution
to include equities in tier 1 and tier 2
capital.
In order to include otherwise eligible
purchased and allocated equities in tier
1 capital and tier 2 capital, the System
institution must adopt a capitalization
bylaw, or its board of directors must
adopt a binding resolution, which
resolution must be acknowledged by the
board on an annual basis in the capital
adequacy plan described in § 615.5200,
in which the institution undertakes the
following, as applicable:
(a) The institution shall obtain prior
FCA approval under § 628.20(f) before:
(1) Redeeming or revolving the
equities included in common equity tier
1 (CET1) capital;
(2) Redeeming or calling the equities
included in additional tier 1 capital; and
(3) Redeeming, revolving, or calling
instruments included in tier 2 capital
other than limited life preferred stock or
subordinated debt on the maturity date.
(b) The equities shall have a
minimum redemption or revolvement
period as follows:
(1) 7 years for equities included in
CET1 capital, except that the minimum
statutory borrower stock described in
§ 628.20(b)(1)(x) may be redeemed
without a minimum holding period and
that equities designated as unallocated
retained earnings (URE) equivalents
cannot be revolved without submitting
a written request to the FCA for prior
approval;
(2) A minimum no-call, repurchase, or
redemption period of 5 years for
additional tier 1 capital; and
(3) A minimum no-call, repurchase,
redemption, or revolvement period of 5
years for tier 2 capital.
(c) The institution shall submit to
FCA a written request for prior approval
before:
(1) Redesignating URE equivalents as
equities that the institution may
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§ 628.22 Regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions.
*
*
*
*
*
18. Amend § 628.52 by revising
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) to read as follows:
§ 628.52 Simple risk-weight approach
(SRWA).
Where:
Xt = At¥Bt;
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■
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*
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(6) The System institution’s allocated
equity investment in another System
institution or service corporation; and
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Regulatory adjustments to
common equity tier 1 capital. (1) Any
accrual of a patronage or dividend
payable or receivable recognized in the
financial statements prior to a related
board declaration resolution must be
reversed to or from unallocated retained
earnings for purposes of calculating
common equity tier 1 capital.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 16. Amend § 628.32 by revising
paragraph (l)(1) to read as follows:
§ 628.32
General risk weights.
*
*
*
*
*
(l) Other assets. (1) A System
institution must assign a 0-percent risk
weight to cash owned and held in all
offices of the System institution or in
transit; to gold bullion held in the
System institution’s own vaults or held
*
*
*
(c) * * *
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*
*
in a depository institution’s vaults on an
allocated basis, to the extent the gold
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion
liabilities; and to exposures that arise
from the settlement of cash transactions
(such as equities, fixed income, spot
foreign exchange (FX) and spot
commodities) with a central
counterparty where there is no
assumption of ongoing counterparty
credit risk by the central counterparty
after settlement of the trade.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 17. Amend § 628.43 by revising
paragraphs (d)(1) and(2) to read as
follows:
§ 628.43 Simplified supervisory formula
approach (SSFA) and the gross-up
approach.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(1) The System institution must
define the following parameters:
KA = (1¥W) × KG + (0.5 × W)
(2) Then the System institution must
calculate KSSFA according to the
following equation:
(2) * * *
(ii) Under the variability-reduction
method of measuring effectiveness:
At = the value at time t of one exposure in
a hedge pair; and
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exercise its discretion to redeem other
than upon dissolution or liquidation;
(2) Removing equities or other
instruments from CET1, additional tier
1, or tier 2 capital other than through
repurchase, cancellation, redemption or
revolvement; and
(3) Redesignating equities included in
one component of regulatory capital
(CET1 capital, additional tier 1 capital,
or tier 2 capital) for inclusion in another
component of regulatory capital.
(d) The institution shall not exercise
its discretion to revolve URE
equivalents except upon dissolution or
liquidation and shall not offset URE
equivalents against a loan in default
except as required under final order of
a court of competent jurisdiction or if
required under § 615.5290 in connection
with a restructuring under part 617 of
this chapter.
(e) The minimum redemption and
revolvement period (holding period) for
purchased and allocated equities starts
on the common cooperative equity
issuance date, as defined in § 628.2.
■ 15. Amend § 628.22 by revising
paragraphs (a)(6) and (b) to read as
follows:
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Bt = the value at time t of the other exposure
in a hedge pair.
*
*
*
*
*
19. Amend § 628.63 by:
■ a. Removing and reserving paragraph
(b)(3);
■ b. Revising paragraph (b)(4).
The revision reads as follows:
■
§ 628.63
Disclosures.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) [Reserved]
(4) A reconciliation of regulatory
capital elements using both month-end
and average daily balances as they relate
to its balance sheet in any applicable
audited consolidated financial
statements.
*
*
*
*
*
Dated: July 21, 2020.
Dale Aultman,
Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board.
[FR Doc. 2020–16052 Filed 9–9–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6705–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
19 CFR Part 351
[Docket No. 200904–0234]
RIN 0625–AB10
Regulations To Improve
Administration and Enforcement of
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Laws; Extension of Comment Period
To Allow Submissions of Rebuttal
Comments and Requirement of
Electronic Submission of Comments
and Rebuttal Comments
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of
comment period for rebuttal comments
and requirement of electronic
submissions.
AGENCY:
The Department of Commerce
(Commerce) is extending the comment
period for the proposed rule, entitled
‘‘Regulations to Improve Administration
and Enforcement of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws,’’ which
published in the Federal Register on
August 13, 2020, solely to allow parties
the opportunity to submit rebuttal
comments. During the extension period,
parties may only submit rebuttals to
comments that were submitted by other
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:58 Sep 09, 2020
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parties as of September 14, 2020.
Additionally, Commerce will only be
able to accept electronically submitted
comments following the publication of
this document in the Federal Register.
DATES: To be assured of consideration,
written comments must be received no
later than September 14, 2020, and
written rebuttal comments must be
received no later than September 28,
2020. The September 14, 2020 deadline
for comments on the proposed rule is
unchanged. ADDRESSES: Following
publication of this document in the
Federal Register, submit comments and
rebuttal comments only through the
Federal eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.Regulations.gov, Docket No. ITA–
2020–0001. Due to the COVID–19
situation, the Department is not able to
accept comments submitted by mail or
hand-delivery at this time.
All rebuttal comments submitted
during the additional 14-day period
permitted by this document will be a
matter of public record and will
generally be available on the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.Regulations.gov. Commerce will
not accept response comments
accompanied by a request that part or
all of the material be treated
confidentially because of its business
proprietary nature or for any other
reason. Therefore, do not submit
confidential business information or
otherwise sensitive or protected
information.
Any questions concerning the process
for submitting comments should be
submitted to Enforcement & Compliance
(E&C) Communications office at (202)
482–0063 or ECCOMMS@trade.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Scott McBride at (202) 482–6292; David
Mason at (202) 482–5051; or Jessica
Link at (202) 482–1411.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August
13, 2020 (85 FR 49472), Commerce
published a proposed rule entitled
‘‘Regulations to Improve Administration
and Enforcement of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws’’ in the
Federal Register with a comment period
ending no later than September 14,
2020. Commerce has subsequently
received requests for two extensions of
time—one for comments on the
proposed rule and an additional
extension for parties to submit
comments in response to comments
made by other parties on the proposed
rule (available on the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.Regulations.gov, Docket No. ITA–
2020–0001).
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
55801
Commerce has determined that no
extension of time is warranted for
comments on the proposed rule because
the existing comment period allows
adequate time for interested persons to
fully consider the proposal and submit
comments. Thus, Commerce will not
grant an extension for the submission of
such comments.
However, Commerce agrees that the
public and the agency would benefit if
parties have the opportunity to submit
rebuttal comments in response to
comments filed by other parties on the
proposed rule. Accordingly, Commerce
is granting an extension of time solely
for the purpose of allowing the public
to file such rebuttal comments.
Commerce will consider all rebuttal
comments submitted by September 28,
2020. Submissions received after
September 14, 2020 must respond to
comments which were filed on or before
that date and should not include
original arguments regarding the
proposed rule. Otherwise, Commerce
will disregard submissions during that
period of time in drafting its final rule
which do not respond to comments
submitted by other parties.
Thus, comments on the proposed rule
are due on September 14, 2020.
Commerce will not modify this
deadline. However, as stated above,
Commerce has determined to allow
parties to submit rebuttals to comments
on the proposed rule that were
submitted on or before September 14,
2020. Such rebuttal comments will be
due September 28, 2020. Commerce will
not consider comments on the proposed
rule submitted after September 14, 2020,
which are not responsive to comments
submitted by other parties on or before
September 14, 2020.
Furthermore, although the proposed
rule indicated that comments might also
be submitted by mail or hand delivery/
courier, due to the COVID–19 situation
Commerce will not be able to receive
such submissions. Accordingly, from
the date of publication of this document
in the Federal Register, all comments
and rebuttal comments must be
submitted through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.Regulations.gov.
Dated: September 4, 2020.
Jeffrey I. Kessler,
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and
Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2020–20037 Filed 9–9–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
E:\FR\FM\10SEP1.SGM
10SEP1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 176 (Thursday, September 10, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55786-55801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-16052]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 176 / Thursday, September 10, 2020 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 55786]]
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Parts 614, 615, 620 and 628
RIN 3052-AD27
Regulatory Capital Rules: Tier 1/Tier 2 Framework
AGENCY: Farm Credit Administration.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Farm Credit Administration (FCA or we) seeks comments on
this proposed rule that would amend regulatory capital requirements for
Farm Credit System (System) institutions and clarify certain provisions
in the Tier 1/Tier 2 Framework final rule that became effective in
2017. This proposed rule would incorporate, and further clarify, the
guidance provided in FCA Bookletter--BL-068--Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital
Framework Guidance. The proposal would also eliminate regulatory
capital requirements for the Farm Credit Services Leasing Corporation,
simplify the Safe Harbor Deemed Prior Approval calculation, revise the
board resolution requirement for certain equities to be included in
tier 1 or tier 2 capital, and amend the lending and leasing limit base
to use total capital instead of permanent capital and eliminate the
exceptional treatment of certain purchased stock. To maintain
comparability in our regulatory capital requirements, we propose to
amend certain definitions pertaining to qualified financial contracts
in conformity with changes adopted by the Federal banking regulatory
agencies.
DATES: Please send us your comments on or before November 9, 2020.
ADDRESSES: For accuracy and efficiency reasons, please submit comments
by email or through FCA's website. We do not accept comments submitted
by facsimile (fax), as faxes are difficult for us to process in
compliance with section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Please
do not submit your comment multiple times via different methods. You
may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Email: Send us an email at [email protected].
FCA website: https://www.fca.gov. Click inside the ``I want
to . . .'' field near the top of the page; select ``comment on a
pending regulation'' from the dropdown menu; and click ``Go.'' This
takes you to an electronic public comment form.
Mail: Jeremy R. Edelstein, Associate Director, Office of
Regulatory Policy, Farm Credit Administration, 1501 Farm Credit Drive,
McLean, VA 22102-5090.
You may review copies of all comments we receive at our office in
McLean, Virginia or on our website at https://www.fca.gov. Once you are
on the website, click inside the ``I want to . . .'' field near the top
of the page; select ``find comments on a pending regulation'' from the
dropdown menu; and click ``Go.'' This will take you to the Comment
Letters page where you can select the regulation for which you would
like to read the public comments.
We will show your comments as submitted, including any supporting
data provided, but for technical reasons we may omit items such as
logos and special characters. Identifying information that you provide,
such as phone numbers and addresses, will be publicly available.
However, we will attempt to remove email addresses to help reduce
internet spam.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeremy R. Edelstein, Associate
Director or Clayton D. Milburn, Senior Financial Analyst, Finance and
Capital Markets Team, Office of Regulatory Policy, Farm Credit
Administration, McLean, VA 22102-5090, (703) 883-4414, TTY (703) 883-
4056; or
Mary Alice Donner, Senior Counsel or Jennifer A. Cohn, Senior
Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Farm Credit Administration, McLean,
VA 22102-5090, (703) 883-4020, TTY (703) 883-4056.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
A. Objectives of Proposed Rule
B. Background
II. Proposed Revisions to the Capital Rule
A. Substantive Revisions to the Capital Rule
1. Safe Harbor Deemed Prior Approval
2. Capital Bylaw or Board Resolution to Include Equities in Tier
1 and Tier 2 Capital
3. Common Cooperative Equity Issuance Date
4. Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation
5. Lending and Leasing Limit Base Calculation
6. Qualified Financial Contract (QFC) Related Definitions
7. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Eligibility Requirements
B. Clarifying and Other Revisions to the Capital Rule
1. Capitalization Bylaw Adjustment
2. Annual Report to Shareholder Corrections
3. Appropriate Risk-Weighting of Cash
4. Securitization Formulas
5. Unallocated Retained Earnings and Equivalents Deductions and
Adjustments
6. Service Corporation Deductions and Adjustments
7. Adjustments for Accruing Patronage and Dividends
8. Bank Disclosures
9. Retirement of Statutory Borrower Stock
C. General Discussion
1. Continuously Redeemable Preferred Stock (H Stock)
2. Farm Credit Council Letter
3. Permanent Capital
III. Abbreviations
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
I. Introduction
A. Objectives of Proposed Rule
The FCA's objectives in proposing this rule are to:
Provide technical corrections, amendments and
clarification to certain provisions in the Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital
Framework; and
Ensure the System's capital requirements maintain
comparability with the standardized approach that the Federal banking
regulatory agencies have adopted.
B. Background
In 1916, Congress created the System to provide permanent, stable,
affordable, and reliable sources of credit and related services to
American agricultural and aquatic producers.\1\ The System consists of
3 Farm Credit Banks, 1
[[Page 55787]]
agricultural credit bank, 67 agricultural credit associations, 1
Federal land credit association, service corporations, and the Federal
Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation (Funding Corporation). Farm
Credit banks (which include both the Farm Credit Banks and the
agricultural credit bank) issue System-wide consolidated debt
obligations in the capital markets through the Funding Corporation,
which enable associations to provide short-, intermediate-, and long-
term credit and related services to farmers, ranchers, producers and
harvesters of aquatic products, rural residents for housing, and farm-
related service businesses.\2\ The System's enabling statute is the
Farm Credit Act of 1971, as amended (Act).\3\
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\1\ The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac),
which is also a System institution, has authority to operate
secondary markets for agricultural real estate mortgage loans, rural
housing mortgage loans, and rural utility cooperative loans. The FCA
has a separate set of capital regulations that apply to Farmer Mac.
This rulemaking does not affect Farmer Mac, and the use of the term
``System institution'' in this preamble and proposed rule does not
include Farmer Mac.
\2\ The agricultural credit bank lends to, and provides other
financial services to farmer-owned cooperatives, rural utilities
(electric and telephone), and rural water and waste water disposal
systems. It also finances U.S. agricultural exports and imports, and
provides international banking services to cooperatives and other
eligible borrowers. The agricultural credit bank operates a Farm
Credit Bank subsidiary.
\3\ 12 U.S.C. 2001-2279cc. The Act is available at www.fca.gov
under ``Laws and regulations,'' and ``Statutes.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCA's Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital Framework final regulation (Capital
Rule) was published in the Federal Register in July 2016.\4\ The
objectives of the Capital Rule were:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 81 FR 49720 (July 28, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To modernize capital requirements while ensuring that
institutions continue to hold enough regulatory capital to fulfill
their mission as a Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE);
To ensure that the System's capital requirements are
comparable to the Basel III framework and the standardized approach
that the Federal banking regulatory agencies have adopted, but also to
ensure that the rules take into account the cooperative structure and
the organization of the System;
To make System regulatory capital requirements more
transparent; and
To meet the requirements of section 939A of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank
Act).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, the FCA believes the Capital Rule has met, and continues
to meet, these stated objectives.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a more comprehensive discussion of this rulemaking,
including a comprehensive discussion of all System capital
requirements, see 81 FR 49720 and Parts 615 and 628 of FCA
Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 22, 2016, the FCA Board adopted FCA Bookletter--BL-
068--Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital Framework Guidance (Capital BL).\7\ The
Capital BL provided additional guidance to ensure System institutions
had the necessary information to correctly implement the requirements
of the Capital Rule. The Capital BL included clarification and
technical fixes on 18 separate items. Furthermore, the Capital BL
stated: ``We intend to incorporate some of these items into the
regulation in a future rulemaking project.'' \8\ This proposed rule
would incorporate some of that guidance, with adjustments as discussed
below,\9\ into the capital regulation. Additionally, the proposed rule
would:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ A copy of the Capital BL can be found at www.fca.gov, under
``Laws & Regulations'' and ``Bookletters.''
\8\ Id.
\9\ FCA made adjustments to some of the guidance provided in the
Capital BL to address concerns identified through ongoing monitoring
and examination of the requirements of the Capital Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eliminate the stand alone capital requirements for Farm
Credit Leasing Services Corporation (Farm Credit Leasing);
Change the computation of the lending and leasing limit
base in Sec. 614.4351, by using total capital instead of permanent
capital in the calculation; \10\
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\10\ Total capital is defined at Sec. 628.2. Permanent capital
is defined at Sec. 615.5201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simplify ''Safe Harbor'' provisions that determine when
System institutions have ``deemed prior approval'' from FCA to
distribute cash payments;
Revise and clarify certain criteria that capital
instruments must meet to be included in common equity tier 1 (CET1) and
tier 2 capital;
Provide further clarification on when the ``holding
period'' starts for including certain Common Cooperative Equities in
CET1 or tier 2 capital; and
Amend the requirement to adopt an annual board resolution
with respect to prior approval requirements and the minimum redemption
and revolvement periods for certain equities included in CET1 or tier 2
capital.
Finally, we propose to amend the definitions of ``Collateral
agreement,'' ``Eligible margin loan,'' ``Qualifying master netting
agreement (QMNA),'' and ``Repo-style transaction'' to incorporate
amendments made to these definitions in the capital rules of the
Federal banking regulatory agencies.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Federal banking regulatory agencies are the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above amendments, as well as technical changes and other
guidance on FCA's expectations for certain provisions of the Capital
Rule, are described in greater detail below. FCA believes the
additional proposed changes will address issues and concerns identified
since the Capital Rule's effective date of January 1, 2017, while
maintaining and supporting the objectives of the Capital Rule.
We welcome comments on every aspect of this proposed regulation,
but there are certain areas described below where we are specifically
seeking comment.
II. Proposed Revisions to the Capital Rule
A. Substantive Revisions to the Capital Rule
The amendments to the Capital Rule proposed and discussed in this
section are substantive issues that go beyond technical corrections or
incorporation of issues discussed in the Capital BL.
1. Safe Harbor Deemed Prior Approval
The proposal amends the ``Safe Harbor Deemed Prior Approval''
provisions under which System institutions are deemed to have prior
approval from FCA to distribute cash payments as long as certain
conditions are met. Existing Sec. 628.20(f) requires System
institutions to obtain prior approval from FCA before making any
distributions of capital included in tier 1 or tier 2 capital.\12\
Under the ``safe harbor'' provision in paragraphs (f)(5) and (6) of
existing Sec. 628.20, cash dividends, cash patronage, and cash
redemptions or revolvements of common cooperative equities are deemed
to have FCA prior approval, provided that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Section 628.20(f) outlines the requirements for FCA prior
approval of capital redemptions and dividends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) The equities meet applicable minimum holding period
requirements;
(ii) After such cash payments, the dollar amount of CET1 capital
equals or exceeds the dollar amount of CET1 capital on the same date in
the previous calendar year; and
(iii) The institution continues to comply with all regulatory
capital requirements and supervisory or enforcement actions.
Under the existing ''safe harbor,'' after the cash payment the
dollar amount of CET1 capital must not decline compared to the dollar
amount of CET1 capital on the same date in the previous calendar
year.\13\ FCA considers the date of the cash payment to be the date on
which the institution's board passes a binding resolution declaring an
amount it will make as a cashdividend or
[[Page 55788]]
patronage refund \14\ (declaration date). We consider this declaration
date to be the date in which the cash payment is made because it
results in a binding legal obligation to pay a dividend or patronage
refund to the institution's member-borrowers, the patronage amount is
calculable within a short-time frame, and it is paid within 8.5 months
of the close of the taxable year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Section 628.20(f)(5)(ii).
\14\ This can either be a specified dollar amount or must
include language whereby an amount could be calculated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In practice, it is difficult for FCA to monitor and enforce the
existing requirement to use the same date in the previous calendar year
because System institutions report regulatory capital quarterly, not
daily or monthly. Institutions can and do declare dividends or make
patronage payments on any date during a calendar quarter. We propose to
replace the requirement to use the exact calendar date on which the
cash payment is made with a requirement to use the date of the quarter-
end in which the System institution's board declares its dividend or
patronage.
Under the proposal, a System institution has ``deemed- prior
approval'' from FCA if, after making the cash payment, the dollar
amount of the CET1 capital at the quarter-end after the declaration
date, equals or exceeds the dollar amount of CET1 capital on the same
quarter-end in the previous calendar year. The following is an example
of our proposed deemed prior approval: A System institution's board
declares a cash patronage on December 16, 2020. To use the ``Safe
Harbor Deemed Prior Approval,'' the institution would need to ensure
that after such payment, its dollar amount of CET1 capital on December
31, 2020, equals or exceeds the dollar amount of CET1 capital on
December 31, 2019. As another example, a System institution's board
declares a cash patronage on January 15, 2021. To use the ``Safe Harbor
Deemed Prior Approval,'' the institution would need to ensure that
after such payment, its dollar amount of CET1 capital on March 31,
2021, equals or exceeds the dollar amount of CET1 capital on March 31,
2020.\15\ System institutions that declare patronage early in a quarter
need to ensure that they have developed and implemented appropriate
processes and controls to ensure compliance with these provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ In both these examples, to use the ``Safe Harbor Deemed
Prior Approval,'' the System institution would also need to ensure
that after such cash payment, it continues to comply with all
regulatory capital requirements and supervisory or enforcement
actions. These examples assume a cash patronage payment and not the
redemption or revolvement of common cooperative equities (CCEs).
CCEs must be held for the minimum required holding period described
in Sec. 628.20(f)(5)(i) for redemption to qualify for deemed prior
approval under the ``Safe Harbor.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that this proposed amendment to the ``Safe Harbor Deemed
Prior Approval'' would not increase or decrease the amount of cash
patronage System institutions can pay when compared to the existing
provision. As stated in the preamble to the final Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital
Framework regulation, we expect institution boards to give significant
thought to capital distribution decisions and how they impact the
overall capitalization of their institution, especially a cash payment
that exceeds net income over the past 12 months. Ordinarily, cash
payments or redemptions (revolvements) are made at very predictable
intervals, and we have not identified any situations where institutions
are likely to need to make unplanned, significant capital
distributions.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See 81 FR 49735 (July 28, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Capital Bylaw or Board Resolution To Include Equities in Tier 1 and
Tier 2 Capital
The proposal would amend the requirement in Sec. 615.5200(d) that
a System institution board adopt a redemption and revolvement
resolution that it must re-affirm in its capital plan each year. It
would also add a sentence to Sec. 615.5200(b) with respect to capital
adequacy plans.
Currently, to include otherwise eligible purchased or allocated
equities in CET1 capital,\17\ a System institution must commit to
obtaining prior approval from FCA under Sec. 628.20(f) before
redeeming or revolving the equities less than 7 years after issuance or
allocation. For tier 2 purchased or allocated equities, the institution
must make a commitment not to call, redeem, or revolve the equities
less than 5 years after issuance or allocation without FCA approval.
Finally, boards must commit to obtaining prior approval from FCA before
taking other specified actions that could impact the institution's
capital quantity or quality.\18\ A System institution's board must
affirm these commitments by either adopting a capitalization bylaw or a
resolution that must be re-affirmed by the board annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Otherwise eligible purchased or allocated equities would be
equities that meet the criteria under Sec. 628.20(b)(1) for
inclusion in CET1 capital, such as allocated equities that will not
be redeemed or revolved for at least 7 years.
\18\ Existing Sec. 615.5200(d)(3) requires boards to obtain
prior approval before redesignating unallocated retained earning
(URE) equivalents as redeemable equities; removing equities from
regulatory capital (other than through repurchase, cancellation,
redemption, or liquidation); or redesignating equities from one
regulatory capital component to another. Section 615.5200(d)(4)
requires that URE equivalents will not be revolved, except under
very limited circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposal would move the existing requirements in Sec.
615.5200(d) to a new section, Sec. 628.21. Under proposed Sec.
628.21, a System institution's board must either adopt a capitalization
bylaw or adopt a binding resolution to obtain the FCA prior approval
that Sec. 628.20(f) requires. Under the proposed rule, to reduce
burden, an institution's board would no longer need to re-affirm this
resolution annually; instead, the System institution would be required
to expressly acknowledge the continuing and binding effect of these
resolutions annually in their capital adequacy plan. Proposed Sec.
615.5200(b) would add to the existing provisions a requirement that the
capital adequacy plan must expressly acknowledge the continuing and
binding effect of the board resolutions.\19\ Once the board adopts this
resolution, it would remain binding going forward. Modifying or
eliminating this binding resolution may impact an institution's ability
to include allocated or purchased equities in tier 1 or tier 2 capital,
if the change is not consistent with the requirements of proposed Sec.
628.21 and Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(xiv), (c)(1)(xiv), and (d)(1)(xi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Specifically, Sec. 615.5200(b) would be amended to require
that the plan shall expressly acknowledge the continuing and binding
effect of all board resolutions adopted in accordance with sections
628.20(b)(1)(xiv), 628.20(c)(1)(xiv), 628.20(d)(1)(xi), and 628.21.
Conforming changes are being proposed to those sections to refer to
new Sec. 628.21 instead of Sec. 615.5200(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The capital adequacy plan acknowledgment would, at a minimum,
outline the existence of such a resolution and assure that any equities
issued, allocated, redeemed or revolved shall be done so in accordance
with the resolution. Consistent with the existing rule, any issuance or
allocation of equities that a System institution intends to include in
tier 1 or tier 2 capital, must be designated either CET1, AT1, or tier
2 at time of issuance or allocation.\20\ We note that, in these
proposed changes, our intent that institutions must establish the
permanence of their regulatory capital designations is unchanged, but
the means by which institutions do so should be less burdensome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Under existing Sec. 615.5200(d)(3)(iii), which is proposed
to be redesignated as Sec. 628.21(c)(3), a System institution
cannot redesignate equities included in one component of regulatory
capital for inclusion in another without FCA prior approval.
Accordingly, the regulatory capital classification (i.e., CET1, AT1,
or tier 2) must be designated at issuance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 55789]]
3. Common Cooperative Equity Issuance Date
The proposal adds a new definition to part 628 to provide
clarification and certainty to System institutions on the start of the
holding period to include certain common cooperative equities in CET1
or tier 2 capital and redeem them under the ``Safe Harbor Deemed Prior
Approval''. Proposed Sec. 628.21(e) states that the minimum redemption
and revolvement period for purchased and allocated equities starts on
the common cooperative equity issuance date, as defined in Sec. 628.2.
As discussed above, to include otherwise eligible purchased or
allocated equities in CET1 or tier 2 capital, a System institution must
commit to obtaining prior approval from FCA under Sec. 628.20(f)
before redeeming or revolving the equities in less than 7 or 5 years,
respectively, after issuance or allocation. In December 2016, FCA
provided guidance to the System on when the holding period starts for
purchased and allocated equities, as follows:
The minimum holding period starts on the issuance date, which is
the date the institution segregates its ``new'' allocated equities
(qualified and nonqualified) from its URE. This generally occurs
after the board adopts a resolution to make a patronage distribution
in cash and equity, and the institution makes accounting entries
that move the dollar amounts from URE to an appropriate payable
account and allocated equity.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See Capital BL, item 7.
The proposed definition of ``common cooperative equity issuance
date'' is similar to the guidance previously provided by FCA; however,
as proposed the issuance date would be the quarter-end in which the
board has declared a patronage refund and the applicable accounting
treatment has taken place. As an example, a System institution board
adopts a resolution to make a patronage distribution in cash and equity
on December 15, 2020.\22\ On January 2, 2021, it makes a general ledger
entry that moves the dollar amounts from URE to an appropriate payable
account and allocated equity. The general ledger entry is made
effective December 31, 2020 and is reflected in the yearend 2020
financial statements. On April 5, 2021, dollar amounts are assigned to
each borrower. In this example, the ``Common cooperative equity
issuance date'' would be December 31, 2020. If the System institution
includes the equities in CET1 capital, they would need to hold the
equities for at least 7 years from December 31, 2020 (i.e., December
31, 2027) to meet the minimum holding period requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, the board
declaration must include an amount it will pay in patronage or must
include language whereas an amount could be calculated because it
provides evidence of the board's intent to obligate the institution
to pay a specific patronage amount to its member-borrowers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The holding period start date for purchased stock is slightly
different from the holding period start date for allocated equities.
Members purchase stock as a requirement of membership to borrow from
the institution and the institution's bylaws allow for such issuance.
Purchased stock would not result in a reallocation or reassignment of
URE, but would result in new equity for the System institution.
Accordingly, the holding period on purchased stock would be the
quarter-end in which the System institution recognizes the stock on its
financial statement.
We note that section 628.20(b)(1)(xiv)(B) allows for the statutory
minimum borrower stock requirement to count as CET1 capital without any
minimum holding period.\23\ The statutory minimum borrower stock
requirement under section 4.3A of the Act, is $1,000 or 2 percent of
the loan amount, whichever is less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ As discussed in greater detail under section 7--Common
Equity Tier 1 Capital Eligibility Requirements, statutory minimum
borrower stock ``funded'' through the creation of a non-interest-
bearing account receivable is not eligible for inclusion in CET1 or
tier 2 capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCA believes this new approach to recognizing the start of the
holding period, when combined with other proposed ``Safe Harbor''
related changes, results in a simplified ``Safe Harbor'' framework.
More specifically, using the quarter-end date for the start of the
holding period aligns with the proposed changes to the ``Safe Harbor
Deemed Prior Approval,'' which we discuss above. As proposed, the
``Safe Harbor'' also would use a date that is the quarter-end after a
board has declared a patronage payment. Furthermore, we believe using a
quarter-end date reduces the burden for System institutions to track
and monitor the amount of time equities have been outstanding. It also
improves FCA's ability to monitor and enforce the ''Safe Harbor''
requirements.
Question 1: The FCA seeks comments on whether the new definition of
``Common cooperative equity issuance date'' creates a burden for System
institutions due to the changes in established controls and processes
that may be required. Please provide support for your position.
4. Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation
The proposal removes Farm Credit Leasing from the list of
institutions defined as System institutions in Sec. Sec. 615.5201 and
628.2.\24\ Under the proposal, Farm Credit Leasing as a stand-alone
entity would no longer be required to meet minimum capital and related
regulatory requirements under part 615, subpart H, and part 628 of our
regulations because of its current ownership status, as discussed
below. If this ownership status were to change in the future, we would
reassess the need for Farm Credit Leasing to independently meet capital
requirements.\25\
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\24\ Farm Credit Leasing is a service corporation chartered
under section 4.25 of the Act. A service corporation is a System
institution established by System banks or associations and
chartered by FCA, and it is subject to FCA regulation and
examination. See title IV, subpart E of the Act.
\25\ The definitions of ``System institution'' allows us to
include any FCA-chartered institution that we determine should be
included, even if it is not specifically referenced.
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Farm Credit Leasing was previously owned by a group of System
institutions but is now a wholly owned subsidiary of CoBank.\26\ It is
a business unit of the bank; profits and losses of the entity are
accrued to the bank; and its assets and liabilities are consolidated
with the bank's for financial and regulatory reporting purposes.
CoBank's consolidation of Farm Credit Leasing ensures that minimum
capital is appropriately held against Farm Credit Leasing's assets. The
proposal would reduce the regulatory burden created by separately
applying the minimum capital requirements and relevant capital
regulations to Farm Credit Leasing on a stand-alone basis. The proposed
change is not intended to reduce the amount of capital that must be
held against Farm Credit Leasing and CoBank's combined assets.
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\26\ In 1983, several System banks acquired an existing non-
System corporation in the lease financing business that became Farm
Credit Leasing. Farm Credit Leasing offers leasing services and
related products to agribusiness, agricultural producers, rural
infrastructure companies, and other related partners. As the System
consolidated, the number of bank owners of Farm Credit Leasing
declined. In 2004, CoBank acquired all Farm Credit Leasing stock
outstanding, making it a wholly-owned subsidiary of the bank.
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Question 2: The FCA seeks comment on the appropriateness of
removing the specific reference to Farm Credit Leasing from these
provisions.
5. Lending and Leasing Limit Base Calculation
The proposal would amend Sec. 614.4351 to change the composition
and calculation of each System bank
[[Page 55790]]
and association's lending and leasing limit base. The existing lending
and leasing limit base is equal to the amount of a System institution's
permanent capital as adjusted for the calculation of the permanent
capital ratio in accordance with Sec. 615.5207, and with two
additional adjustments in Sec. 614.4351(a) that apply only to the
lending limit base. Section 614.4351(a)(1) provides that a System
institution may count in its lending limit base any stock it purchases
from another System institution in connection with the sale of a loan
participation interest, and the other institution must exclude such
stock from its lending limit base. Section 614.4351(a)(2) provides that
any otherwise eligible third-party capital instruments may be included
in the lending limit base of a System institution, irrespective of the
limits on third-party capital for the tier 1/tier 2 capital ratios as
outlined under Sec. 628.23.
We propose two amendments to Sec. 614.4351. First, instead of
using permanent capital to calculate the lending limit base,
institutions would use total capital as defined and adjusted in
Sec. Sec. 628.20 through 628.22 but including any otherwise eligible
third-party capital that would be excluded under Sec. 628.23. Second,
we would eliminate the exceptional treatment of stock purchased in
connection with a loan participation in Sec. 614.4351(a)(1).
Our proposal to eliminate the existing exceptional treatment of
stock purchased in connection with loan participations would align the
lending and leasing limit base with the Capital Rule's treatment of
investments in other System institutions. The Capital Rule requires
institutions to deduct their investments in another System institution
because it is the issuing institution, not the investing institution,
that has discretion whether or not to retire the investment. FCA
believes that equities should be counted in the regulatory capital and
the lending and leasing limit base of the institution that has control
of the equities. This is a more accurate reflection of where the
capital is available to absorb losses.
Our proposal would preserve the existing provision in Sec.
614.4351(a)(2) which allows the inclusion of all otherwise qualifying
third-party capital in the lending limit base, irrespective of limits
on the inclusion of such instruments in regulatory capital under Sec.
628.23. The requirements of Sec. 628.23 recognize and emphasize the
cooperative principles upon which System institutions operate by
limiting the amount of non-cooperative equities that may be included in
regulatory capital. Accordingly, we propose to continue to permit
institutions to include all otherwise qualifying third-party capital in
their lending limit base.
Our proposed changes to the calculation would result in modest
changes in System institutions' lending limits.\27\ Using total capital
as the base instead of permanent capital would increase the lending and
leasing limit for most System institutions due primarily to the
inclusion of at least a portion of the allowance for loan losses in
total capital.\28\ A small number of System institutions would see
their lending limit decline due to various factors.\29\ If both
amendments are adopted, we estimate that about 16 institutions' lending
limits would modestly decrease.\30\ We note that most institutions have
adopted policies that set significantly lower lending limits than the
current regulation allows.
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\27\ Under Sec. 614.4360(b)(2), loans funded pursuant to a
commitment that was within the lending and leasing limit at the time
the commitment was made would not violate the lending and leasing
limit if the limit subsequently declines.
\28\ Under Sec. 628.20(d)(3), tier 2 capital (a component of
total capital) includes the allowance for loan losses up to 1.25
percent of the institution's total risk-weighted assets not
including any amount of the allowance.
\29\ As of September 30, 2019, the vast majority of System
institutions (banks and associations) would see their lending limit
increase by 2.8 percent on average, with increases ranging from 0.5
percent to 8.3 percent. Two system institutions would see an average
decrease of 2.2 percent.
\30\ Including both the switch from permanent capital and the
elimination of the loan participation-related treatment under Sec.
614.4351(a)(1), 56 institutions would see their lending limit
increase by 3.0 percent on average. The decrease at the remaining
institutions would average 1.6 percent.
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We adopted the Capital Rule to improve the quality and quantity of
a System institution's capital, consistent with the objectives of the
Basel III framework and the standardized approach of the Federal
banking regulatory agencies (U.S. Rule). Accordingly, since 2017, FCA
has focused on regulatory tier 1 and tier 2 capital when evaluating the
safe and sound operation of a System institution rather than on
permanent capital.\31\ Similarly, we believe it is more appropriate to
base the lending and leasing limit on the regulatory total capital of
the institution and not on permanent capital.
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\31\ Section 301 of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 directed
the FCA to adopt risk-based permanent capital regulations for System
institutions.
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Question 3: The FCA seeks comment on the proposed change to the
lending base, and the continued appropriateness of the adjustment
required in Sec. 614.4351(a)(1), and whether its removal would have
any significant adverse impacts on any System institution.
6. Qualified Financial Contract (QFC) Related Definitions
We are proposing to amend the definitions of ``Collateral
agreement,'' ``Eligible margin loan,'' ``Qualifying master netting
agreement (QMNA),'' and ``Repo-style transaction'' to incorporate
amendments made to these definitions in the capital rules of the
Federal banking regulatory agencies. Furthermore, the proposed
amendment to the definition of ``QMNA'' will harmonize it with the
amended definition of ``Eligible master netting agreement (EMNA)'' in
FCA's Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities
regulation (Swap Margin Rule).\32\
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\32\ See 83 FR 50805 (October 10, 2018).
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As part of the broader regulatory reform effort following the
financial crisis, to increase the resolvability and resiliency of U.S.
global systemically important banking institutions (GSIBs), the Federal
banking regulatory agencies adopted final rules that establish
restrictions on, and requirements for, certain financial contracts of
GSIBs and their subsidiaries (QFC Rules).\33\ Generally, these QFC
Rules require covered qualified financial contracts \34\ of covered
entities (GSIBs and U.S. operations of foreign GSIBs) to contain
contractual provisions that opt into the ``temporary stay-and-transfer
treatment'' of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) \35\ and
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, thereby reducing the risk that
[[Page 55791]]
the stay-and-transfer treatment would be challenged by a covered
entity's counterparty or a court in a foreign jurisdiction. The stay-
and-transfer treatment provides that the rights of a failed insured
depository institution's or financial company's counterparties to
terminate, liquidate, or net certain qualified financial contracts upon
the appointment of the FDIC as receiver are temporarily stayed to allow
for the transfer of the failed entities' qualified financial contracts
to a solvent party.\36\
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\33\ See 82 FR 56630 (November 29, 2017) (OCC); 82 FR 50228
(October 30, 2017) (FDIC); and 82 FR 42882 (September 12, 2017)
(FRB).
\34\ Qualified financial contracts generally include financial
contracts for a derivative contract, repurchase agreement, reverse
purchase agreement, and securities lending and borrowing agreement.
When an entity goes into resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
attempts by the debtor entity's creditors to enforce their debt
through any means other than participation in the bankruptcy
proceeding, such as seizing collateral, are generally blocked by the
imposition of an automatic stay (See 82 FR 42882, 42886 (September
12, 2017) citing 11 U.S.C. 362). However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
generally exempts QFC counterparties of the debtor from the
automatic stay through ``safe harbor'' provisions (See 11 U.S.C.
362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 362(o), 555, 556, 559, 560, 561. The
U.S. Bankruptcy Code specifies the types of parties to which the
safe harbor provisions apply). Under these provisions, any rights
that a QFC counterparty has to terminate the contract, set off
obligations, and liquidate collateral in response to a direct
default are not subject to the stay and may be exercised against the
debtor immediately upon default. We note that the Bankruptcy Code
does not use the term ``qualified financial contracts,'' but the set
of transactions covered by its safe harbor provisions closely tracks
the set of transactions that fall within the definition of
``qualified financial contract'' used in Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act.
\35\ 12 U.S.C. 1811 et. seq.
\36\ 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B), 5390(c)(10)(B).
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As a result of the QFC Rules, the Federal banking regulatory
agencies amended the definition of QMNA in their capital rules to
prevent the QFC Rules from having a disruptive effect on the netting
sets of their supervised institutions. The amended definition of QMNA
is substantially similar to the previous definition and continues to
recognize that default rights may be stayed if the financial company is
in resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act or FDI Act, a substantially
similar law applicable to GSEs, or a substantially similar foreign law,
or where the agreement is subject by its terms to any of those
laws.\37\ However, the amended definition includes additional language
permitting a master netting agreement to meet the definition of QMNA to
the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of the QFC Rules
even if the agreement limits the right to accelerate, terminate, and
close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and to
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of a
counterparty. We are proposing a parallel change.
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\37\ Importantly, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018
amended section 5.61 of the Act to give the Farm Credit System
Insurance Corporation receivership authorities parallel to those of
the Federal banking regulatory agencies. Public Law 115-334, 132
Stat 4490 (2018).
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Additionally, the Federal banking regulatory agencies amended the
definitions of ``Collateral agreement,'' ``Eligible margin loan,'' and
``Repo-style transaction'' to ensure that their supervised institutions
can continue to recognize the risk-mitigating effects of financial
collateral received in a secured lending transaction, repo-style
transaction, or eligible margin loan.\38\ The amendments to these
definitions include conforming changes to provide that a counterparty's
default rights may be limited as required by the QFC Rules.
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\38\ See 82 FR 50228 (October 30, 2017) for further discussion.
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In order to remain consistent, to the extent practical, with the
capital rules of the Federal banking regulatory agencies, as well as
aligning the definition of ``Qualifying master netting agreement'' with
the recent amendments to the definition of ``Eligible master netting
agreement'' in FCA's Swap Margin Rule, we propose to adopt parallel
amendments to the definitions of ``Collateral agreement,'' ``Eligible
margin loan,'' ``Qualifying master netting agreement,'' and ``Repo-
style transaction.'' While the QFC rules primarily apply to GSIBs
supervised by one of the Federal banking regulatory agencies, a System
institution, as a counterparty to a GSIB, may need to ensure its
qualified financial contracts include this new language recognizing the
close-out restrictions imposed by the QFC Rules.
Without the proposed definitional changes, System institutions
could potentially see higher capital charges imposed on certain
counterparty exposures. The current definitions in our Capital Rule do
not recognize the close-out restrictions on certain qualified financial
contracts newly imposed by the QFC Rules. If a System institution
incorporates these new close-out restrictions in contracts with an
entity subject to the QFC Rules (i.e., GSIBs), the contract may not
meet the existing definition of ``Collateral agreement,'' ``Eligible
margin loan,'' ``Qualifying master netting agreement,'' and ``Repo-
style transaction'' in FCA's Capital Rule. As a result, a System
institution may lose its ability to net offsetting exposures or
recognize the risk-mitigating effects of financial collateral, thus
resulting in a higher capital requirement for the System institution.
Moreover, a System institution engaging in a derivative transaction
that is subject to an EMNA, as defined in the Swap Margin Rule,\39\
would lose the ability to net offsetting exposures for capital
purposes. The proposed changes to the definitions of these terms would
avoid these issues.
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\39\ See 83 FR 50805 (October 10, 2018).
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The changes to these definitions do not result in System
institutions waiving or eliminating their ability to exercise their
rights against a defaulting party. Rather, consistent with other GSIB
counterparties, the System institution would not be able to immediately
exercise its rights against a defaulting party until the FDIC begins an
orderly resolution of the counterparty. If a System institution is not
transacting with an entity subject to the QFC Rules, these new
restrictions would not be applicable.
Question 4: To what extent would the QFC Rules impact System
institutions as counterparties to GSIBs or to U.S. operations of
foreign GSIBs? For example, if FCA did not amend these definitions,
what would be the result?
7. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Eligibility Requirements
As discussed above, one of FCA's objectives in the Capital Rule is
to ensure that the System's capital requirements are comparable to the
Basel III framework and the U.S. Rule, taking into account the
cooperative structure of the System.\40\ The Basel III framework
specified the criteria that capital instruments must meet in order to
be included in the different capital measures. Among these criteria is
the requirement that an instrument be directly issued and paid-in.\41\
We are proposing to add the term ``paid-in'' to the eligibility
criteria for CET1 capital in Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(i), consistent with the
criteria set forth in the Basel III framework and the U.S Rule.\42\
Basel III defines paid-in capital as capital that (1) has been received
with finality by the institution, (2) is reliably valued, (3) is fully
under the institution's control, and (4) does not directly or
indirectly expose the institution to the credit risk of the
investor.\43\
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\40\ See 81 FR 49720 (July 28, 2016).
\41\ See BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, December 2010 (as revised June
2011).
\42\ See 12 CFR 217.20(b)(1)(i) (FRB); 12 CFR 324.20(b)(1)(i)
(FDIC); 12 CFR 3.20(b)(1)(i) (OCC).
\43\ See BCBS, Basel III Definition of capital--Frequently Asked
Questions, September 2017 (update of FAQs published in December
2011).
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When we promulgated the Capital Rule, we did not require CET1
instruments to be paid-in because we had interpreted the term to
exclude allocated equities. Allocated equities are the earnings of a
System institution that the institution has converted to stock or to
similar stock-like equities and allocated to member-borrowers.\44\ Farm
Credit banks routinely allocate equities to their affiliated
associations and (in CoBank's case) to retail borrowers, and many of
the associations routinely allocate equities to their retail borrowers.
We have reexamined the attributes of allocated equities and determined
that they fully meet the definition of paid-in capital: The allocated
equities are received with finality by the allocating System
institution when earned and issued; their value is reliably established
as the dollar value of institution net assets allocated; they are fully
under the institution's control because they can be revolved only at
the discretion of the System institution, with the prior
[[Page 55792]]
approval of the FCA; \45\ and the loss-absorbing capacity of the
allocated equities is not dependent on the creditworthiness of the
member-borrower. We do not expect the proposed clarification to have
any impact on System institution practices with respect to allocated
equities.
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\44\ For a detailed discussion on allocated equities and its
stock-like characteristics, see 81 FR 49727 (July 28, 2016).
\45\ See Sec. Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(iii) and (d)(x).
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FCA views the statutorily required borrower stock financed by the
System institution as part of an overall loan commitment as meeting the
Basel III criteria for paid-instruments.\46\ However, borrower stock is
not suitable for inclusion in CET1 if it is funded using non-interest-
bearing account receivables.\47\
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\46\ For example, System institutions usually increase a
borrower's loan commitment by $1,000 in order to cover the stock or
participation certificate purchase. While the loan commitment will
increase by $1,000, those funds are not disbursed to the borrower
and are retained by the institution to cover the purchase. We note
that under FCA Regulation Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(x), statutory borrower
stock required under section 4.3A of the Act is not considered to be
``directly or indirectly'' funded as long as: (A) The purpose of the
loan is not the purchase of capital instruments of the System
institution providing the loan, and (B) the purchase of acquisition
of one or more member equities of the institution is necessary in
order for the beneficiary of the loan to become a member of the
institution. This approach follows the approach of the European
Banking Authority regarding the standards for CET1 instruments for
cooperatives. See 79 FR 52824 (September 4, 2014) for additional
discussion.
\47\ ``Stock'' funded in this manner has not been received with
finality by the System institution and exposes the System
institution to the credit risk of the borrower. On December 27,
2019, the FCA Board used its reservation of authority in Sec.
628.1(d)(2)(i) to determine that borrower stock funded through the
creation of a non-interest-bearing account receivable in the
borrower's name has characteristics and terms that diminish its
ability to absorb losses and is not suitable for inclusion in CET1
or tier 2 capital.
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We also propose a conforming change in Sec. 628.20(d)(1)(i) to
clarify that all instruments included in tier 2 capital must be issued
and paid-in.
In addition, we are proposing minor changes to Sec.
628.20(b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) to align the language more closely to
the language in the U.S. Rule and at the same time to emphasize a
difference from the U.S. Rule. Specifically, the U.S. Rule requires
CET1 instruments to entitle the holder to a claim on residual assets
(after all senior claims have been satisfied) that is proportional to
the holder's share of issued capital. Our rule does not require the
equity holder's claim to be proportional. This is because, unlike
commercial banks and mutual associations that do not allocate equities,
System institutions may have liquidation bylaws that prioritize
residual payments among different classes of common cooperative
equityholders if there are assets remaining after all classes have
received par or face value of their equities. We believe these changes
to Sec. 628.20(b)(1) are not substantive.
B. Clarifying and Other Revisions to the Capital Rule
The proposed amendments to the Capital Rule discussed in this
section incorporate issues discussed in the Capital BL, with
appropriate adjustments. In addition, we propose to make other changes
to the Capital Rule that clarify Agency position.
1. Capitalization Bylaw Adjustment
Section 615.5220(a)(6) requires System institutions to include in
their capitalization bylaws a provision stating that equities other
than those protected under section 4.9A of the Act are retireable at
the sole discretion of the board, provided minimum capital adequacy
standards established in subpart H of this part (615) and part 628 of
this chapter are met. We propose to amend this section by replacing the
reference to parts 615 and 628 with a general reference to FCA
regulations. A general reference to FCA's capital adequacy standards
would satisfy the requirement to reference parts 615 and 628 and would
incorporate all capital requirements of the FCA, as well as any future
capital requirements that could potentially be adopted under a new or
different part.
If a System institution has already amended its capitalization
bylaws to include a reference to both part 615 and 628, it would not
need to amend its capitalization bylaws to replace those references
with a general reference to capital adequacy standards established by
FCA. As discussed above, a reference to both part 615 and part 628
would satisfy the proposed requirement for an institution's
capitalization bylaws to include a general reference to capital
adequacy standards established by FCA. However, if the bylaws reference
only part 615 subpart H, or reference only part 628, this would not
satisfy the requirement we are proposing. In these instances, a System
institution would have to amend its capitalization bylaws to include a
general reference to capital adequacy standards established by FCA.
System institution changes to its bylaws to conform to this
regulatory requirement should not change any substantive rights of the
System institution or its member-borrowers. If the change is non-
substantive and does not alter, reduce, or increase the rights of any
member-borrowers, a System institution's board may choose to make a
conforming change to their capitalization bylaws to include a general
reference to regulatory capital adequacy standards without a vote by
its member-borrowers, assuming such bylaws allow for technical
amendments without a shareholder vote.
2. Annual Report to Shareholder Corrections
In existing Sec. 620.5, which lists the required contents of a
System institution's annual report, we propose technical revisions to
ensure institutions report financial data as we intended. System
associations must report their tier 1 leverage ratio in each annual
report for each of the last 5 fiscal years. This requirement was
inadvertently placed in paragraph (f)(4)(iv) of Sec. 620.5. We propose
to move the requirement from Sec. 620.5(f)(4)(iv) and place it in
proposed Sec. 620.5(f)(3)(v), as originally intended.
In addition, we propose to amend the requirement in Sec.
620.5(f)(4) that System institutions report core surplus, total
surplus, and the net collateral ratio (banks only) in a comparative
columnar form for each fiscal year ending in 2012 through 2016. System
institutions must currently report these ratios in each annual report
through 2021, in addition to reporting the capital ratios required
under Sec. 620(f)(2) and (3), resulting in System institutions
reporting capital ratios beyond the 5-year requirement established in
Sec. 620.5(f). Accordingly, we propose to revise Sec. 620.5(f)(4) to
require these disclosures in each annual report through 2021 but only
as long as these ratios are part of the previous 5 fiscal years for
which disclosures are required. For example, the fiscal year ending
2020 annual report to shareholders would report the permanent capital
ratio, CET1 capital ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, total capital ratio,
and tier 1 leverage ratio for the fiscal years ending in 2017-2020, and
the core surplus ratio, total surplus, ratio, and net collateral ratio
for the fiscal year ending in 2016 only.
3. Appropriate Risk-Weighting of Cash
Existing Sec. 628.32(l)(1) states, among other things, that a
System institution must assign a 0-percent risk-weight to cash held in
accounts at a depository institution. This provision may create
confusion about the proper risk-weight for deposits that exceed the
limit of FDIC deposit insurance coverage (currently set at $250,000).
Accordingly, we propose to delete this provision. It is unnecessary to
address in Sec. 628.32(l)(1) the risk-weight assigned to cash held in
depository institution accounts, because other provisions more
accurately address this risk-weight. Specifically, Sec.
628.32(a)(1)(i)(B) requires
[[Page 55793]]
a System institution to assign a 0-percent risk-weight to the portion
of an exposure that is directly and unconditionally guaranteed by the
U.S. Government, its central bank, or a U.S. Government agency,
including a deposit or other exposure or the portion of a deposit or
other exposure that is insured or otherwise unconditionally guaranteed
by the FDIC or National Credit Union Administration. Section
628.32(d)(1) requires a System institution to assign a 20-percent risk-
weight to exposures to U.S. depository institutions and credit unions
that are not assigned a 0-percent risk-weight under Sec.
628.20(a)(1)(i)(B). We confirm that the 20-percent risk-weight applies,
for example, to a System institution's deposit with an FDIC-insured
bank of funds in excess of the deposit insurance coverage of $250,000.
Existing Sec. 628.32(l)(1) also states that System institutions
must assign a 0-percent risk-weight to cash held in accounts at a
Federal Reserve Bank. We propose to remove this provision because it is
redundant. Section 628.32(a)(1)(i)(A) assigns a 0-percent risk-weight
to an exposure to the central bank of the United States government,
which includes Federal Reserve Banks.
Finally, we propose to revise Sec. 628.32(l)(1) to add a provision
generally assigning a 0-percent risk-weight to gold bullion held in the
System institution's own vaults. The existing provision already
generally assigns a 0-percent risk-weight to gold bullion held in the
vaults of a depository institution.
4. Securitization Formulas
The proposed rule would correct 3 formulas used in the simplified
supervisory formula approach (SSFA) equation under Sec. 628.43(d) and
one formula used in the simple risk-weight approach (SRWA) under Sec.
628.52. These formulas were printed incorrectly in the Federal Register
version of the Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital Framework final rule. We
previously provided the correct formulas in our Capital BL. These are
technical corrections to ensure these approaches are calculated
correctly.
5. Unallocated Retained Earnings and Equivalents Deductions and
Adjustments
The proposed rule would clarify the calculation of the requirement
described in Sec. 628.10 that at least 1.5 percent of the 4 percent
tier 1 leverage ratio minimum must consist of URE and URE equivalents
(UREE). The Capital Rule did not specify how to calculate this
requirement. In our Capital BL, we provided guidance to System
institutions on the deductions to make when calculating this minimum
URE and UREE requirement.\48\ We stated: ``When calculating the URE and
URE equivalents requirement for the leverage ratio, a System
institution must deduct from the numerator an amount equal to all the
deductions required under Sec. 628.22(a). All deductions made to the
denominator when calculating the tier 1 leverage ratio must be made to
the denominator when calculating the URE and URE equivalents
requirement.'' \49\
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\48\ See Capital BL, item 4.
\49\ Section 628.10(c)(4) requires the amounts deducted under
Sec. Sec. 628.22(a) and (c) and 628.23 to be deducted from tier 1
capital when calculating the tier 1 leverage ratio. However, the
deductions under Sec. Sec. 628.22(c) and 628.23 were not applied to
the numerator when calculating the URE and UREE requirement as they
do not increase the URE of a System institution.
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We propose to add the Capital BL guidance to Sec. 628.10. We also
propose to require System institutions to deduct purchased equity
investments that are required to be deducted under the corresponding
deduction approach in Sec. 628.22(c). The URE and UREE measure,
because it is a component of the tier 1 leverage ratio, should have
similar deductions.\50\ While the URE and UREE measure represents only
a part of the numerator of the tier 1 leverage ratio, our previous
guidance to deduct such amounts only from Sec. 628.22(a) resulted in
the majority of System institution's URE and UREE measures being higher
than the tier 1 leverage ratio, which was not our intention. We believe
our proposed deduction of purchased stock under Sec. 628.22(c) will
have a minimal impact on System institutions and will not result in any
System institution's URE and UREE measure falling below the regulatory
minimum.\51\ In addition, when calculating the URE and UREE measure,
System institutions must continue to use the same denominator as the
tier 1 leverage ratio. The denominator is equal to the institution's
average total consolidated assets as reported on the institution's Call
Report minus amounts deducted from tier 1 capital under Sec. Sec.
628.22(a), and (c) and 628.23.\52\
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\50\ We do not find it necessary to require the deductions under
Sec. 628.23 as third-party stock is not a component of URE, UREE,
or CET1 capital.
\51\ As of September 30, 2019, the inclusion of deductions under
Sec. 628.22(c) in the computation of the URE and UREE measure would
have decreased the ratio at System institutions by 1 percent on
average. With computations including the deductions under Sec.
628.22(c), all institutions remain well above the regulatory
minimum.
\52\ As of the date of this proposal, this would be total
average assets for leverage ratio on schedule RC-R.5, line 1.d.
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Question 5: The FCA seeks comment on the appropriate deductions and
adjustments that should be made to URE and URE equivalents in
determining compliance with Sec. 628.10(b)(4).
6. Service Corporation Deductions and Adjustments
The proposed rule would expand the requirement under existing Sec.
628.22(a)(6) for a System institution to deduct any allocated equity
investment in another System institution, which is defined in part 628
to mean each System bank or association,\53\ by requiring a System
institution also to deduct any allocated equity investment in a System
service corporation.
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\53\ ``System institution'' is defined in existing Sec. 628.2
as ``a System bank, an association of the Farm Credit System, . . .
and any other institution chartered by the FCA that the FCA
determines should be considered a System institution for the
purposes of this part.'' The FCA has not made any determinations to
include other institutions in this definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although we do not know of any allocation of equities by a service
corporation to another institution in the System, a service
corporation's bylaws may permit it to allocate equities to another
System institution. The allocated equity is retained, controlled, and
at risk at the service corporation. Therefore, consistent with FCA's
stated position that equities should be counted in the regulatory
capital of the System institution that has control of the equities
rather than at the System institution that does not control them, these
allocated equities should be counted at the service corporation as
applicable, and deducted from the regulatory capital of the recipient
System institution.
Question 6: The FCA seeks comment on whether any System institution
has received an allocated equity investment from a service corporation.
7. Adjustments for Accruing Patronage and Dividends
We propose to amend the regulatory capital adjustment and deduction
requirements under Sec. 628.22 by including in proposed Sec.
628.22(b) the existing requirement to reverse any accruals of patronage
or dividend payables or receivables that occur prior to a board
declaration resolution.\54\ Under GAAP, institutions that make
patronage and dividend payments that can be reasonably estimated on a
regular and routine basis may accrue those payments as payables.
Similarly, institutions that receive patronage and dividend payments
that can be reasonably estimated on regular and
[[Page 55794]]
routine basis may accrue those payments as receivables. Many System
institutions accrue these payables or receivables on their balance
sheet prior to the board adopting a declaration resolution. For
regulatory capital purposes only, these institutions must adjust their
unallocated retained earnings as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ See existing Call Report instructions for Schedule RC-R.4,
Line item 3 at https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/fcs-call-reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If a System institution accrues a patronage or dividend
receivable prior to the date of the board declaration resolution by the
paying institution, then it must subtract this accrual from its URE.
If a System institution accrues a patronage or dividend
payable to either another institution or a borrower prior to the date
of its board declaration resolution, then it must add it back to URE.
If the System institution chooses not to accrue a payable or
receivable until it is declared by the board, then no adjustments to
regulatory capital are necessary. Any adjustment to accruals made
pursuant to this provision is applicable only to regulatory capital
measures as reported to FCA.
8. Bank Disclosures
The proposed rule would amend Sec. 628.63(b)(4) by requiring banks
to disclose a reconciliation of their regulatory capital elements as
they relate to their balance sheets in any audited consolidated
financial statements. We propose to add the word ``applicable'' before
``audited'' to clarify that this reconciliation requirement applies
only to current period financial statements that are audited. There is
no requirement to reconcile with audited financial statements from
previous quarters. Specifically, if a System bank audits only its year-
end financial statements, and not its quarterly financial statements
(as is the general practice of System banks), this requirement would
apply only to the bank's annual report to shareholders. The
reconciliation applies to quarterly shareholder reports only if the
reports are audited.
We also propose to require System banks to disclose the
reconciliation of regulatory capital elements using both point-in-time
and three-month average daily balance regulatory capital values.
Section 628.10(a) requires a System institution to compute its
regulatory capital ratios using average daily balances for the most
recent 3 months. Existing Sec. 628.63(b)(4) does not specify whether
to complete the reconciliation using point-in-time or average daily
balance regulatory capital values.
FCA has long required institutions to compute their capital ratios
using three-month average daily balances; so we believe it is
appropriate that the reconciliation to any applicable audited
consolidated financial statements also use the three-month average
daily balances. One of the primary purposes of this requirement is to
address the disconnect between the numbers used for the calculation of
regulatory capital and the numbers used in published financial
statements. Because FCA measures and monitors regulatory capital using
average daily balances, we believe the reconciliation using average
daily balances is the most accurate and beneficial way to disclose
differences between regulatory capital and audited consolidated
financial statements.
We believe it is also appropriate to include the reconciliation
using point-in-time values. The audited consolidated financial
statement uses point-in-time values; therefore, also completing the
reconciliation using point-in-time values allows for a comparison
between GAAP and regulatory capital using point-in-time numbers.
Disclosing the reconciliation using both average daily and point-in-
time values provides investors and stockholders with the most accurate,
complete, and transparent means to understanding differences between
regulatory capital and GAAP capital.
In addition, we propose to further clarify System disclosures as
follows: Existing Sec. 620.3 requires disclosures by institutions and
by employees, officers, directors, and institution director nominees to
be ``complete.'' Section 628.62(a) requires disclosures from System
banks as outlined in Sec. 628.63. Section 628.62(c) permits a System
bank, in certain situations, not to disclose certain information that
it would otherwise be required to disclose under Sec. 628.63 and to
instead disclose more limited information.
Specifically, Sec. 628.62(c) permits a System bank not to disclose
specific proprietary or confidential commercial or financial
information that it would otherwise be required to disclose if it
concludes that such disclosures would compromise its position, as long
as it discloses more general information about the subject matter,
together with the fact that, and the reasons why, the specific items of
information are not being disclosed.
To clarify that Sec. 620.3 does not require the disclosure of
information that banks may properly not disclose under Sec. 628.62(c),
we propose to revise Sec. 620.3 to state that unless otherwise
determined by FCA, the use of the authorized limited disclosure does
not create an incomplete disclosure. We also propose to revise Sec.
620.3 to permit the modification of the required statement that the
information provided is true, accurate, and complete to explain that
the completeness of the disclosure was determined in consideration of
Sec. 628.62(c).
We are also proposing a technical edit to remove and reserve Sec.
628.63(b)(3) because it is no longer applicable.
Question 7: The FCA seeks comment on the appropriateness and
usefulness to internal and/or external stakeholders of completing the
reconciliation using both point-in-time and average daily balance
values?
9. Retirement of Statutory Borrower Stock
Existing Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(xiv)(B) allows System institutions to
redeem the minimum statutory borrower stock described in Sec.
628.20(b)(1)(x) without prior FCA approval and without satisfying the
minimum holding period for common cooperative equities included in CET1
capital. We propose to add a provision expressly stating that an
institution may redeem such statutory borrower stock only provided
that, after such redemption, the institution continues to comply with
all minimum regulatory capital requirements.
Although the existing rule is silent on whether the institution
must maintain compliance with the regulatory capital standards,
institutions have been required to do so by the Act and FCA regulations
since 1988. Section 4.3A(c)(1)(I) of the Act and Sec. 615.5220(a)(6)
condition the retirement of stock on the institution meeting the
minimum capital adequacy standards established by FCA. The proposed
amendment to Sec. 628.(b)(1)(xiv)(B) would eliminate any possible
misinterpretation that an institution could retire the statutory
borrower stock if the institution were not meeting its regulatory
capital requirements both before and after the retirement.
Although we are not proposing additional changes to the treatment
of statutory borrower stock, we provide the following additional
clarifications:
For any statutory borrower stock that exceeds $1,000 or 2
percent of the loan amount, whichever is less, the minimum holding
periods apply (7 years for CET1 and 5 years for Tier 2) if an
institution plans to include the additional stock in tier 1 or tier 2
capital.
The minimum statutory borrower stock includible in CET1 is
the outstanding balance of the statutory minimum borrower stock. If a
loan is for $50,000 or more, the amount includible in CET1 capital
without a minimum
[[Page 55795]]
holding period is no more than $1,000 until such stock is retired. If a
loan is for less than $50,000 at origination, the amount includible in
CET1 capital is 2 percent of the originated loan amount until such
stock is retired. If a revolving line of credit is originated for
$50,000 or more and the amount of borrower stock is retired as the loan
pays down, the amount of stock remaining on the calculation date, up to
$1,000, is the amount includible in CET1 without a minimum holding
period. If a revolving line of credit is originated for less than
$50,000 and the amount of borrower stock is retired as the loan pays
down, the amount of stock remaining on the calculation date, up to 2
percent of the originated loan amount, is the amount includible in CET1
without a minimum holding period.
C. General Discussion
FCA is using this notice of proposed rulemaking to provide further
clarification and guidance to the System on continuously redeemable
preferred stock and to respond to a letter received from the Farm
Credit Council. We also seek comment on potential changes that may be
made to FCA's existing permanent capital regulations.
1. Continuously Redeemable Preferred Stock (H Stock)
Some System associations have issued continuously redeemable
perpetual preferred stock (typically called Harvest Stock or H Stock)
to their member-borrowers to invest and participate in their
cooperative beyond the minimum borrower stock purchase. H Stock is an
at-risk investment, issued without a stated maturity and retireable
only at the discretion of the institution's board. A feature of the
stock is the institution's intent to redeem it upon the request of the
holder as long as the institution is in compliance with its regulatory
capital requirements. Because of this feature, FCA considers the stock
to be continuously redeemable. Some of the institutions also lower the
operational hurdles to redemption by delegating the board's authority
to retire all member-borrower stock to management provided certain
board-approved minimum regulatory capital ratios are maintained. FCA
has determined that holders reasonably expect the institution to redeem
the stock shortly after they make a request and, therefore, the stock
does not meet the requirements of Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(iv), Sec.
628.20(c)(1)(xiv)(A) or Sec. 628.20(d)(1)(xi)(A) for inclusion in tier
1 or tier 2 capital. Even after the stock has been outstanding for 5
years or more, the continued policy of the institutions to redeem this
stock upon request and the continued expectations of holders disqualify
the stock for inclusion in tier 1 or tier 2 capital.
2. Farm Credit Council Letter
In addition, FCA has received a letter from the Farm Credit Council
on behalf of System banks and associations (System Letter) \55\
recommending changes to the risk-weighting of investments by System
institutions in service corporations and unincorporated business
entities (UBEs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Letter dated November 22, 2016, from Charles Dana, General
Counsel, Farm Credit Council to Gary K. Van Meter, Director, Office
of Regulatory Policy. The Farm Credit Council is a trade association
representing the interests of System banks and associations. This
letter was received after the final Capital Rule had been adopted by
the FCA Board and communicates a request to change certain
provisions of the final Capital Rule, as discussed in this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The System Letter requests that a System institution's investment
in a service corporation be risk-weighted at 100 percent instead of
being deducted from CET1 capital. The stated basis for such treatment
is that investments in service corporations are approved by their
respective owners that closely control their activities, and the
service corporations do not possess lending authorities (i.e., they do
not assume exposure to credit risks).
The System Letter also recommended directing System institutions to
either risk-weight or deduct their investments in UBEs, depending on
the specific nature of the UBE.\56\ The letter suggests that
institutions with an equity investment in AgDirect, LLP should deduct
the investment from regulatory capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Under the existing rules, equity investments in UBEs are
generally included in risk-weighted assets in accordance with Sec.
628.52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have considered the request and have decided not to propose that
institutions risk-weight equity investments in service corporations
instead of deducting such investments. FCA continues to believe that
such capital investments are committed to support risks at the service
corporation level and that such capital investments must be available
to meet any capital needs of the service corporation.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See 63 FR 39222 (July 22, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the treatment of UBEs, FCA may consider the
appropriate regulatory capital treatment of the UBE and apply such
treatment on a case-by-case determination, as appropriate.
FCA clarifies that the Farm Credit System Association Captive
Insurance Company (Captive Insurance Company) is not a System
institution as defined in Sec. 628.2. Accordingly, any System
institution with an equity investment in the Captive Insurance Company
must risk-weight that equity investment.
3. Permanent Capital
In 1988, Congress added a definition of ``permanent capital'' to
the Act and required the FCA to adopt risk-based permanent capital
standards for System institutions. The FCA adopted permanent capital
regulations in 1988.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See 53 FR 39229 (October 6, 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Act defines permanent capital to include current earnings,
unallocated and allocated earnings,\59\ stock (other than stock
retireable on repayment of the holder's loan or at the discretion of
the holder, and certain stock issued before October 1988), surplus less
allowance for loan losses, and other debt or equity instruments that
the FCA determines appropriate to be considered permanent capital.
Allocated equities shared by a bank and each affiliated association--
that is, equities that a bank has allocated to an affiliated
association--appear on the books of both institutions but can be
counted in only one institution's permanent capital pursuant to a
capital allotment agreement between the two institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ In this preamble, ``unallocated and allocated earnings''
would be equivalent to ``unallocated retained earnings and allocated
equities.'' Additionally, ``surplus'' would be ``unallocated
retained earnings.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By adopting and implementing the Tier 1/Tier 2 Capital Framework,
FCA has shifted its focus from permanent capital to total capital (tier
1 and tier 2). Because the Act defines permanent capital, FCA must
require reporting and monitoring of permanent capital. Moreover, FCA
has limited authority to change the components of permanent capital.
However, the FCA has full authority to implement appropriate deductions
to permanent capital in the numerator and set the risk-weights used in
risk-adjusted assets in the denominator of the permanent capital ratio.
FCA seeks to reduce the burden associated with permanent capital, and
we seek comment on the best way to do so consistent with statutory
mandates. We note that H Stock, in its current form, is included in
permanent capital and FCA does not seek to exclude H Stock from
permanent capital.
Question 8: What, if any, changes to the permanent capital
regulations (Sec. Sec. 615.5201, 615.5206, 615.5207, and 615.5208)
should be made to increase their clarity and understanding?
Question 9: Is calculating permanent capital burdensome for System
institutions? If so, are there any changes FCA could make to this
calculation that would reduce this burden, considering that the
definition of permanent capital
[[Page 55796]]
in the Act precludes us from changing the components of permanent
capital?
Question 10: Should FCA more closely align the permanent capital
calculation with the total capital (tier 1 and tier 2) calculations? If
so, how could FCA accomplish this, considering that for permanent
capital, the Act specifies deductions related to bank and association
allotment agreements?
III. Abbreviations
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission
EMNA Eligible Master Netting Agreement
FCA Farm Credit Administration
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDI Act Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
FR Federal Register
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S.)
GSE Government-Sponsored Enterprise
GSIB Global Systemically Important Bank
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
QFC Qualified Financial Contract
QMNA Qualified Master Netting Agreement
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SFA Supervisory Formula Approach
SRWA Simple Risk-Weight Approach
SSFA Simplified Supervisory Formula Approach
UBE Unincorporated Business Entity
URE Unallocated Retained Earnings
UREE Unallocated Retained Earnings Equivalents
U.S.C. United States Code
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.), FCA hereby certifies that this proposed rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Each of the banks in the Farm Credit System, considered
together with its affiliated associations, has assets and annual income
in excess of the amounts that would qualify them as small entities.
Therefore, Farm Credit System institutions are not ``small entities''
as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Lists of Subjects
12 CFR Part 614
Agriculture, Banks, Banking, Foreign trade, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Rural areas.
12 CFR Part 615
Accounting, Agriculture, Banks, Banking, Government securities,
Investments, Rural areas.
12 CFR Part 620
Accounting, Agriculture, Banks, Banking, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Rural areas.
12 CFR Part 628
Accounting, Agriculture, Banks, Banking, Capital, Government
securities, Investments, Rural areas.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Farm Credit
Administration proposes to amend parts 614, 615, 620 and 628 of chapter
VI, title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 614--LOAN POLICIES AND OPERATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 614 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 2.0, 2.2,
2.3, 2.4, 2.10, 2.12, 2.13, 2.15, 3.0, 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.8, 3.10,
3.20, 3.28, 4.12, 4.12A, 4.13B, 4.14, 4.14A, 4.14D, 4.14E, 4.18,
4.18A, 4.19, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.36, 4.37, 5.9, 5.10, 5.17,
7.0, 7.2, 7.6, 7.8, 7.12, 7.13, 8.0, 8.5 of the Farm Credit Act (12
U.S.C. 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2071, 2073, 2074,
2075, 2091, 2093, 2094, 2097, 2121, 2122, 2124, 2128, 2129, 2131,
2141, 2149, 2183, 2184, 2201, 2202, 2202a, 2202d, 2202e, 2206,
2206a, 2207, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2219a, 2219b, 2243, 2244, 2252,
2279a, 2279a-2, 2279b, 2279c-1, 2279f, 2279f-1, 2279aa, 2279aa-5);
sec. 413 of Pub. L. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1639, as amended by
section 405 of Pub. L. 100-399, 102 Stat. 1000 (12 U.S.C. 2121
note); 42 U.S.C. 4012a, 4104a, 4104b, 4106, and 4128.
0
2. Amend Sec. 614.4351 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Removing and reserving paragraph (a)(1); and
0
c. Revising paragraph (a)(2).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 614.4351 Computation of lending and leasing limit base.
(a) Lending and leasing limit base. An institution's lending and
leasing limit base is composed of the total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2)
of the institution, as defined in Sec. 628.2 of this chapter, with
adjustments applicable to the institution provided for in Sec. 628.22
of this chapter, and with the following further adjustments:
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Eligible third-party capital that is required to be excluded
from total capital under Sec. 628.23 of this chapter may be included
in the lending limit base.
* * * * *
PART 615--FUNDING AND FISCAL AFFAIRS, LOAN POLICIES AND OPERATIONS,
AND FUNDING OPERATIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 615 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 1.5, 1.7, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4,
2.5, 2.12, 3.1, 3.7, 3.11, 3.25, 4.3, 4.3A, 4.9, 4.14B, 4.25, 5.9,
5.17, 8.0, 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.8, 8.10, 8.12 of the Farm Credit Act (12
U.S.C. 2013, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2093,
2122, 2128, 2132, 2146, 2154, 2154a, 2160, 2202b, 2211, 2243, 2252,
2279aa, 2279aa-3, 2279aa-4, 2279aa-6, 2279aa-8, 2279aa-10, 2279aa-
12); sec. 301(a), Pub. L. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1608 (12 U.S.C.
2154 note); sec. 939A, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1326, 1887 (15
U.S.C. 78o-7 note).
0
4. Amend Sec. 615.5200 by replacing the existing language with the
following language:
Sec. 615.5200 Capital planning.
(a) The Board of Directors of each System institution shall
determine the amount of regulatory capital needed to assure the System
institution's continued financial viability and to provide for growth
necessary to meet the needs of its borrowers. The minimum capital
standards specified in this part and part 628 of this chapter are not
meant to be adopted as the optimal capital level in the System
institution's capital adequacy plan. Rather, the standards are intended
to serve as minimum levels of capital that each System institution must
maintain to protect against the credit and other general risks inherent
in its operations.
(b) Each Board of Directors shall establish, adopt, and maintain a
formal written capital adequacy plan as a part of the financial plan
required by Sec. 618.8440 of this chapter. The plan shall include the
capital targets that are necessary to achieve the System institution's
capital adequacy goals as well as the minimum permanent capital, common
equity tier 1 (CET1) capital, tier 1 capital, total capital, and tier 1
leverage ratios (including the unallocated retained earnings (URE) and
URE equivalents minimum) standards. The plan shall expressly
acknowledge the continuing and binding effect of all board resolutions
adopted in accordance with Sec. Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(xiv), (c)(1)(xiv),
(d)(1)(xi), and 628.21. The plan shall address any projected dividend
payments, patronage payments, equity retirements, or other action that
may decrease the System institution's capital or the components thereof
for which minimum amounts are required by this part and part 628 of
this chapter. The plan shall set forth the circumstances and minimum
timeframes in which
[[Page 55797]]
equities may be redeemed or revolved consistent with the System
institution's applicable bylaws or board of directors' resolutions.
(c) In addition to factors that must be considered in meeting the
minimum standards, the board of directors shall also consider at least
the following factors in developing the capital adequacy plan:
(1) Capability of management and the board of directors (the
assessment of which may be a part of the assessments required in
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) and (b)(7)(i) of Sec. 618.8440 of this chapter);
(2) Quality of operating policies, procedures, and internal
controls;
(3) Quality and quantity of earnings;
(4) Asset quality and the adequacy of the allowance for losses to
absorb potential loss within the loan and lease portfolios;
(5) Sufficiency of liquid funds;
(6) Needs of a System institution's customer base; and
(7) Any other risk-oriented activities, such as funding and
interest rate risks, potential obligations under joint and several
liability, contingent and off-balance-sheet liabilities or other
conditions warranting additional capital.
0
5. Amend Sec. 615.5201 by revising the definition of ``System
institution'' to read as follows:
Sec. 615.5201 Definitions.
* * * * *
System institution means a System bank, an association of the Farm
Credit System, and their successors, and any other institution
chartered by the FCA that the FCA determines should be considered a
System institution for the purposes of this subpart.
0
6. Amend Sec. 615.5220 by revising paragraph (a)(6) to read as
follows:
Sec. 615.5220 Capitalization bylaws.
(a) * * *
(6) The manner in which equities will be retired, including a
provision stating that equities other than those protected under
section 4.9A of the Act are retireable at the sole discretion of the
board, provided minimum capital adequacy standards established by the
Farm Credit Administration, and the capital requirements established by
the board of directors of the System institution, are met;
* * * * *
PART 620--DISCLOSURE TO SHAREHOLDERS
0
7. The authority citation for part 620 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 4.3, 4.3A, 4.19, 5.9, 5.17, 5.19 of the Farm
Credit Act (12 U.S.C. 2154, 2154a, 2207, 2243, 2252, 2254); sec. 424
of Pub. L. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1656; sec. 514 of Pub. L. 102-
552, 106 Stat. 4102.
0
8. Amend Sec. 620.3 byadding in paragraphs (a) and (c)(3) a new last
sentence to read as follows.
Sec. 620.3 Accuracy of reports and assessment of internal control
over financial reporting.
(a) * * * Unless otherwise determined by FCA, the appropriate use
of the limited disclosure authorized by Sec. 628.62(c) does not create
an incomplete disclosure.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * * If the report contains the limited disclosure authorized
by Sec. 628.62(c), the statement may be modified to explain that the
completeness of the report was determined in consideration of Sec.
628.62(c).
* * * * *
0
9. Amend Sec. 620.5 by:
0
a. Adding paragraph(f)(3)(v);
0
b. Revising (f)(4).
The addition and revision read as follows:
Sec. 620.5 Contents of the annual report to shareholders.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(3) * * *
(v) Tier 1 leverage ratio.
(4) The following ratios shall be disclosed in comparative columnar
form in each annual report through fiscal year end 2021, only as long
as these ratios are part of the previous 5 fiscal years of financial
data required under Sec. 620.5(2) and (3):
(i) Core surplus ratio.
(ii) Total surplus ratio.
(iii) For banks only, net collateral ratio.
* * * * *
PART 628--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF SYSTEM INSTITUTIONS
0
10. The authority citation for part 628 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 1.5, 1.7, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4,
2.5, 2.12, 3.1, 3.7, 3.11, 3.25, 4.3, 4.3A, 4.9, 4.14B, 4.25, 5.9,
5.17, 8.0, 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.8, 8.10, 8.12 of the Farm Credit Act (12
U.S.C. 2013, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2093,
2122, 2128, 2132, 2146, 2154, 2154a, 2160, 2202b, 2211, 2243, 2252,
2279aa, 2279aa-3, 2279aa-4, 2279aa-6, 2279aa-8, 2279aa-10, 2279aa-
12); sec. 301(a), Pub. L. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1608 (12 U.S.C.
2154 note); sec. 939A, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1326, 1887 (15
U.S.C. 78o-7 note).
0
11. Amend Sec. 628.2 by:
0
a. Revising the definition of ``Collateral agreement'';
0
b. Adding in alphabetical order a definition for ``Common cooperative
equity issuance date'';
0
c. Revising the definition of ``Eligible margin loan'';
0
d. Revising the definition of ``Qualifying master netting agreement'';
0
e. Revising the definition of ``Repo-style transaction'';
0
f. Revising the definition of ``System institution''.
The revisions and addition read as follows:
Sec. 628.2 Definitions
* * * * *
Collateral agreement means a legal contract that specifies the time
when, and circumstances under which, a counterparty is required to
pledge collateral to a System institution for a single financial
contract or for all financial contracts in a netting set and confers
upon the System institution a perfected, first-priority security
interest (notwithstanding the prior security interest of any custodial
agent), or the legal equivalent thereof, in the collateral posted by
the counterparty under the agreement. This security interest must
provide the System institution with a right to close-out the financial
positions and liquidate the collateral upon an event of default of, or
failure to perform by, the counterparty under the collateral agreement.
A contract would not satisfy this requirement if the System
institution's exercise of rights under the agreement may be stayed or
avoided:
(1) Under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other than:
(i) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (1)(i) in order to facilitate the orderly
resolution of the defaulting counterparty;
(ii) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to, or
incorporates, any of the laws referenced in paragraph (1)(i) of this
definition; or
(2) Other than to the extent necessary for the counterparty to
comply with the requirements of part 47, Subpart I of part 252 or part
382 of Title 12, as applicable.
* * * * *
Common cooperative equity issuance date means the date in which the
holding period for purchased stock (excluding statutory minimum
borrower stock and third-party stock) and allocated equities start:
(1)For allocated equities, the quarter-ending in which:
[[Page 55798]]
(i) The System institution's Board of Directors has passed a
resolution declaring a patronage refund; and
(ii) The System institution has completed the applicable accounting
treatment by segregating the new allocated equities from its
unallocated retained earnings.
(iii) For purchased stock (excluding statutory minimum borrower
stock and third-party stock), the quarter-ending in which the stock is
acquired by the holder and recognized on the institution's balance
sheet.
* * * * *
Eligible margin loan means:
(1) An extension of credit where:
(i) The extension of credit is collateralized exclusively by liquid
and readily marketable debt or equity securities, or gold;
(ii) The collateral is marked-to-fair value daily, and the
transaction is subject to daily margin maintenance requirements; and
(iii) The extension of credit is conducted under an agreement that
provides the System institution the right to accelerate and terminate
the extension of credit and to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly
upon an event of default, including upon an event of receivership,
insolvency, liquidation, conservatorship, or similar proceeding, of the
counterparty, provided that, in any such case:
(A) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than:
(1) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs,\60\ or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (1)(iii)(A)(1) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ This requirement is met where all transactions under the
agreement are (i) executed under U.S. law and (ii) constitute
``securities contracts'' under section 555 of the Bankruptcy Code
(11 U.S.C. 555), qualified financial contracts under section
11(e)(8) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or netting contracts
between or among financial institutions under sections 401-407 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act or the
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation EE (12 CFR part 231).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to, or
incorporates, any of the laws referenced in paragraph (1)(iii)(A)(1) of
this definition; and
(B) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate, and
close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and to
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, subpart I of part 252 or part 382 of
Title 12, as applicable.
(2) In order to recognize an exposure as an eligible margin loan
for purposes of this subpart, a System institution must comply with the
requirements of Sec. 628.3(b) with respect to that exposure.
* * * * *
Qualifying master netting agreement means a written, legally
enforceable agreement provided that:
(1) The agreement creates a single legal obligation for all
individual transactions covered by the agreement upon an event of
default following any stay permitted by paragraph (2) of this
definition, including upon an event of receivership, conservatorship,
insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding, of the counterparty;
(2) The agreement provides the System institution the right to
accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a net basis all transactions
under the agreement and to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly
upon an event of default, including upon an event of receivership,
conservatorship, insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding, of the
counterparty, provided that, in any such case:
(i) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than:
(A) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (2)(i)(A) in order to facilitate the
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; or
(B) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to, or
incorporates, any of the laws referenced in paragraph (2)(i)(A) of this
definition; and
(ii) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate,
and close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and
to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, Subpart I of part 252 or part 382 of
Title 12, as applicable;
(3) The agreement does not contain a walkaway clause (that is, a
provision that permits a non-defaulting counterparty to make a lower
payment than it otherwise would make under the agreement, or no payment
at all, to a defaulter or the estate of a defaulter, even if the
defaulter or the estate of the defaulter is a net creditor under the
agreement); and
(4) In order to recognize an agreement as a qualifying master
netting agreement for purposes of this subpart, a System institution
must comply with the requirements of Sec. 628.3(d) with respect to
that agreement.
* * * * *
Repo-style transaction means a repurchase or reverse repurchase
transaction, or a securities borrowing or securities lending
transaction, including a transaction in which the System institution
acts as agent for a customer and indemnifies the customer against loss,
provided that:
(1) The transaction is based solely on liquid and readily
marketable securities, cash, or gold;
(2) The transaction is marked-to-fair value daily and subject to
daily margin maintenance requirements;
(3)(i) The transaction is a ``securities contract'' or ``repurchase
agreement'' under section 555 or 559, respectively, of the Bankruptcy
Code (11 U.S.C. 555 or 559), a qualified financial contract under
section 11(e)(8) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or a netting
contract between or among financial institutions under sections 401-407
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act or the
Federal Reserve's Regulation EE (12 CFR part 231); or
(ii) If the transaction does not meet the criteria set forth in
paragraph (3)(i) of this definition, then either:
(A) The transaction is executed under an agreement that provides
the System institution the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-
out the transaction on a net basis and to liquidate or set-off
collateral promptly upon an event of default, including upon an event
of receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding, of the
counterparty, provided that, in any such case:
(1) Any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed
or avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other
than:
(i) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign
jurisdictions that are substantially similar to the U.S. laws
referenced in this paragraph (3)(ii)(A)(1)(i) in order to facilitate
the orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty;
(ii) Where the agreement is subject by its terms to, or
incorporates, any of the
[[Page 55799]]
laws referenced in paragraph (3)(ii)(A)(1)(i) of this definition; and
(2) The agreement may limit the right to accelerate, terminate, and
close-out on a net basis all transactions under the agreement and to
liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default of
the counterparty to the extent necessary for the counterparty to comply
with the requirements of part 47, Subpart I of part 252 or part 382 of
Title 12, as applicable; or
(B) The transaction is:
(1) Either overnight or unconditionally cancelable at any time by
the System institution; and
(2) Executed under an agreement that provides the System
institution the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out the
transaction on a net basis and to liquidate or set-off collateral
promptly upon an event of counterparty default; and
(4) In order to recognize an exposure as a repo-style transaction
for purposes of this subpart, a System institution must comply with the
requirements of Sec. 628.3(e) of this part with respect to that
exposure.
* * * * *
System institution means a System bank, an association of the Farm
Credit System, and their successors, and any other institution
chartered by the FCA that the FCA determines should be considered a
System institution for the purposes of this subpart.
* * * * *
0
12. Amend Sec. 628.10 by revising paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 628.10 Minimum capital requirements.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) Tier 1 leverage ratio. (i) A System institution's leverage
ratio is the ratio of the institution's tier 1 capital to the
institution's average total consolidated assets as reported on the
institution's Call Report minus amounts deducted from tier 1 capital
under Sec. Sec. 628.22(a) and (c) and 628.23.
(ii) To calculate the measure of URE and URE equivalents described
in Sec. 628.10(b)(4), a System institution must deduct from URE and
URE equivalents an amount equal to all the deductions required under
Sec. 628.22(a) and (c), and must use the denominator of the tier 1
leverage ratio.
* * * * *
0
13. Amend Sec. 628.20 by revising paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (ii),
(xiv), (c)(1)(xiv), (d)(1)(i), (1)(xi), and (f)(5)(ii).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 628.20 Capital components and eligibility criteria for tier 1
and tier 2 capital instruments.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) The instrument is paid-in, issued directly by the System
institution, and represents the most subordinated claim in a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceeding of the
System institution;
(ii) The holder of the instrument is entitled to a claim on the
residual assets of the System institution after all senior claims have
been satisfied in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or similar
proceeding;
* * * * *
(xiv) The System institution's capitalization bylaws, or a
resolution adopted by its board of directors under Sec. 628.21,
provides that the institution:
(A) Establishes a minimum redemption or revolvement period of 7
years for equities included in CET1; and
(B) Shall not redeem, revolve, cancel, or remove any equities
included in CET1 without prior approval of the FCA under Sec.
628.20(f), except that the minimum statutory borrower stock described
in paragraph (b)(1)(x) of this section may be redeemed without a
minimum period outstanding after issuance and without the prior
approval of the FCA, as long as after the redemption, the System
institution continues to comply with all minimum regulatory capital
requirements.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(xiv) The System institution's capitalization bylaws, or a
resolution adopted by its board of directors under Sec. 628.21,
provides that the institution:
(A) Establishes a minimum redemption or no-call period of 5 years
for equities included in additional tier 1; and
(B) Shall not redeem, revolve, cancel, or remove any equities
included in additional tier 1 capital without prior approval of the FCA
under Sec. 628.20(f).
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) The instrument is issued and paid-in;
* * * * *
(xi) The System institution's capitalization bylaws, or a
resolution adopted by its board of directors under Sec. 628.21,
provides that the institution:
(A) Establishes a minimum call, redemption or revolvement period of
5 years for equities included in tier 2 capital; and
(B) Shall not call, redeem, revolve, cancel, or remove any equities
included in tier 2 capital without prior approval of the FCA under
Sec. 628.20(f).
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(5) * * *
(ii) After such cash payments have been declared and defined by
resolution of the board, the dollar amount of the System institution's
CET1 capital at quarter-end equals or exceeds the dollar amount of CET1
capital on the same quarter-end in the previous calendar year; and
* * * * *
0
14. Add new Sec. 628.21 to read as follows:
Sec. 628.21 Capital bylaw or board resolution to include equities in
tier 1 and tier 2 capital.
In order to include otherwise eligible purchased and allocated
equities in tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital, the System institution
must adopt a capitalization bylaw, or its board of directors must adopt
a binding resolution, which resolution must be acknowledged by the
board on an annual basis in the capital adequacy plan described in
Sec. 615.5200, in which the institution undertakes the following, as
applicable:
(a) The institution shall obtain prior FCA approval under Sec.
628.20(f) before:
(1) Redeeming or revolving the equities included in common equity
tier 1 (CET1) capital;
(2) Redeeming or calling the equities included in additional tier 1
capital; and
(3) Redeeming, revolving, or calling instruments included in tier 2
capital other than limited life preferred stock or subordinated debt on
the maturity date.
(b) The equities shall have a minimum redemption or revolvement
period as follows:
(1) 7 years for equities included in CET1 capital, except that the
minimum statutory borrower stock described in Sec. 628.20(b)(1)(x) may
be redeemed without a minimum holding period and that equities
designated as unallocated retained earnings (URE) equivalents cannot be
revolved without submitting a written request to the FCA for prior
approval;
(2) A minimum no-call, repurchase, or redemption period of 5 years
for additional tier 1 capital; and
(3) A minimum no-call, repurchase, redemption, or revolvement
period of 5 years for tier 2 capital.
(c) The institution shall submit to FCA a written request for prior
approval before:
(1) Redesignating URE equivalents as equities that the institution
may
[[Page 55800]]
exercise its discretion to redeem other than upon dissolution or
liquidation;
(2) Removing equities or other instruments from CET1, additional
tier 1, or tier 2 capital other than through repurchase, cancellation,
redemption or revolvement; and
(3) Redesignating equities included in one component of regulatory
capital (CET1 capital, additional tier 1 capital, or tier 2 capital)
for inclusion in another component of regulatory capital.
(d) The institution shall not exercise its discretion to revolve
URE equivalents except upon dissolution or liquidation and shall not
offset URE equivalents against a loan in default except as required
under final order of a court of competent jurisdiction or if required
under Sec. 615.5290 in connection with a restructuring under part 617
of this chapter.
(e) The minimum redemption and revolvement period (holding period)
for purchased and allocated equities starts on the common cooperative
equity issuance date, as defined in Sec. 628.2.
0
15. Amend Sec. 628.22 by revising paragraphs (a)(6) and (b) to read as
follows:
Sec. 628.22 Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(6) The System institution's allocated equity investment in another
System institution or service corporation; and
* * * * *
(b) Regulatory adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital. (1) Any
accrual of a patronage or dividend payable or receivable recognized in
the financial statements prior to a related board declaration
resolution must be reversed to or from unallocated retained earnings
for purposes of calculating common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
0
16. Amend Sec. 628.32 by revising paragraph (l)(1) to read as follows:
Sec. 628.32 General risk weights.
* * * * *
(l) Other assets. (1) A System institution must assign a 0-percent
risk weight to cash owned and held in all offices of the System
institution or in transit; to gold bullion held in the System
institution's own vaults or held in a depository institution's vaults
on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset
by gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures that arise from the
settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot
foreign exchange (FX) and spot commodities) with a central counterparty
where there is no assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the
central counterparty after settlement of the trade.
* * * * *
0
17. Amend Sec. 628.43 by revising paragraphs (d)(1) and(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 628.43 Simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) and the
gross-up approach.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) The System institution must define the following parameters:
KA = (1-W) x KG + (0.5 x W)
(2) Then the System institution must calculate KSSFA according to
the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP10SE20.044
* * * * *
0
18. Amend Sec. 628.52 by revising paragraph (c)(2)(ii) to read as
follows:
Sec. 628.52 Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Under the variability-reduction method of measuring
effectiveness:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP10SE20.045
Where:
Xt = At-Bt;
At = the value at time t of one exposure in a hedge pair; and
[[Page 55801]]
Bt = the value at time t of the other exposure in a hedge pair.
* * * * *
0
19. Amend Sec. 628.63 by:
0
a. Removing and reserving paragraph (b)(3);
0
b. Revising paragraph (b)(4).
The revision reads as follows:
Sec. 628.63 Disclosures.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) [Reserved]
(4) A reconciliation of regulatory capital elements using both
month-end and average daily balances as they relate to its balance
sheet in any applicable audited consolidated financial statements.
* * * * *
Dated: July 21, 2020.
Dale Aultman,
Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board.
[FR Doc. 2020-16052 Filed 9-9-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6705-01-P
