Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes, 54891-54893 [2020-19402]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 172 / Thursday, September 3, 2020 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2020–0338; Product Identifier 2020–NM–047–AD; Amendment 39–21224; AD 2020–18–03] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by the results of laboratory tests on nonrechargeable lithium batteries installed in certain emergency locator transmitters (ELTs), which highlighted a lack of protection against current injections of 28 volts direct current (DC) or 115 volts alternating current (AC) that could lead to thermal runaway and a battery fire. This AD requires modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT and the terminal block, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD is effective October 8, 2020. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 8, 2020. ADDRESSES: For material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@ easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this IBR material on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this IBR material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. It is also available in the AD docket on the internet at https:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 0338. SUMMARY: Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https:// VerDate Sep<11>2014 15:53 Sep 02, 2020 Jkt 250001 www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 0338; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. Kathleen Arrigotti, Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206–231–3218; email kathleen.arrigotti@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion The EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2020–0070, dated March 24, 2020 (‘‘EASA AD 2020–0070’’) (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe condition for certain Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes. The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on April 27, 2020 (85 FR 23262). The NPRM was prompted by the results of laboratory tests on nonrechargeable lithium batteries installed in certain ELTs, which highlighted a lack of protection against current injections of 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC that could lead to thermal runaway and a battery fire. The NPRM proposed to require modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT and the terminal block, as specified in an EASA AD. The FAA is issuing this AD to address local fires in non-rechargeable lithium batteries installed in ELTs, which could result in damage to the airplane and injury to occupants. See the MCAI for additional background information. Comments The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA’s response to each comment. PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 54891 Request To Withdraw NPRM Delta Air Lines (DAL) noted that the NPRM was based on the failure mode where a wire from the ELT is shorted to another wire carrying 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC causing voltage to be induced into the ELT’s battery, resulting in a battery fire. The commenter explained that on Airbus Model A321 and A330 airplanes this failure mode could occur because the wiring is characterized by four discrete wires run in bundles with other discrete wires carrying 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC. The commenter questioned whether the NPRM should be applicable to Airbus Model A350 airplanes because these airplanes have a cable assembly with its four wires inside an outer jacket and shielding, which would therefore mitigate the unsafe condition addressed in the NPRM. The FAA infers that the commenter is requesting that the NPRM be withdrawn because of the unique configuration of certain airplanes, including Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes. The FAA disagrees with the commenter’s request. EASA, the State of Design Authority for these airplane models, conducted a risk assessment, and concluded that the type design of the applicable airplanes are susceptible to the current injection of 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC, that is not limited to just wire chafing. Therefore, the FAA is requiring the applicable corrective actions in this AD to mitigate the risk of the thermal runaway and battery fire. The FAA has determined that it is necessary to issue this final rule. Request To Allow Any Color and Width of Tape DAL also requested that operators be allowed to use any color and width of reinforced silicon tape instead of part number ASNA51072503, to protect the wiring in the area where the diode is secured to the harness. The commenter explained that part number ASNA51072503 is specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P152, dated January 10, 2020 (‘‘Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P152’’), and is for the 1-inch orange tape under the ASNA5107 standard [which is an aerospace industry standard for a silicone rubber tape]. The commenter requested approval to use any color and width of tape meeting the specifications of the broader ASNA5107 standard. The FAA partially agrees with the commenter’s request. EASA AD 2020– 0070 refers to Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P151, dated January 10, 2020 (‘‘Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25– P151’’), and Airbus Service Bulletin E:\FR\FM\03SER1.SGM 03SER1 54892 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 172 / Thursday, September 3, 2020 / Rules and Regulations A350–25–P152, as the sources of service information for modifying the affected ELTs. Although the commenter mentioned only Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P152 in its comment, silicone tape having part number ASNA51072503 is specified in both service bulletins. The FAA agrees that operators can use any brightly colored tape because orange does not have a specific safety function. The FAA disagrees that operators can use any width of tape because the width could provide a safety function. The FAA has added paragraph (h)(3) to this AD to specify that operators may use any brightly colored 1-inch tape that meets the criteria specified in the ASNA5107 standard. Request To Allow an Alternative Continuity Check In addition, DAL requested and provided an option to replace Step 3.C.(g) specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P152. The commenter explained that Step 3.C.(g) in Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25– P152 requires a continuity test of the modified wiring and provides no specific steps for this test other than referencing Electrical Standard Practices (ESP) section A350–A–20–52–21– 00ZZZ–36AZ–A. The commenter noted that although this ESP section does provide basic continuity procedures, it fails to provide a procedure for a wire with a diode installed. The FAA disagrees with the commenter’s request. Based on the report from EASA, the State of Design Authority for these airplane models, the FAA has determined that the procedures described in Step 3.C.(g) of Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P152 do include a continuity test that considers an installed diode. Operators may, however, request alternative methods of compliance to replace Step 3.C.(g) specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A350–25–P152 by using the procedures described in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD and demonstrating how this alternative addresses the unsafe condition. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue. Conclusion The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes: • Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and • Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM. The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final rule. Related IBR Material Under 1 CFR Part 51 EASA AD 2020–0070 describes procedures for modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT and the terminal block. This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section. Costs of Compliance The FAA estimates that this AD affects 7 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD: ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS Labor cost Parts cost 5 work-hours × $85 per hour = $425 .......................................................................................... According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, the FAA has included all known costs in the cost estimate. jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds VerDate Sep<11>2014 15:53 Sep 02, 2020 Jkt 250001 Cost per product $400 Cost on U.S. operators $825 $5,775 necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Regulatory Findings Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): ■ 2020–18–03 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39– 21224; Docket No. FAA–2020–0338; Product Identifier 2020–NM–047–AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective October 8, 2020. E:\FR\FM\03SER1.SGM 03SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 172 / Thursday, September 3, 2020 / Rules and Regulations (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This AD applies to Airbus SAS Model A350–941 and –1041 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020–0070, dated March 24, 2020 (‘‘EASA AD 2020–0070’’). (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 25, Equipment/Furnishings. (e) Reason This AD was prompted by the results of laboratory tests on non-rechargeable lithium batteries installed in certain emergency locator transmitters (ELTs), which highlighted a lack of protection against current injections of 28 volts direct current (DC) or 115 volts alternating current (AC) that could lead to thermal runaway and a battery fire. The FAA is issuing this AD to address local fires in non-rechargeable lithium batteries installed in ELTs, which could result in damage to the airplane and injury to occupants. (j) Related Information (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Requirements Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, EASA AD 2020–0070. jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES (h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020–0070 (1) Where EASA AD 2020–0070 refers to its effective date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD. (2) The ‘‘Remarks’’ section of EASA AD 2020–0070 does not apply to this AD. (3) Where the service information specified in EASA AD 2020–0070 specifies to use tape having part number ASNA51072503, this AD requires using any brightly colored 1-inch tape that meets the criteria specified in the ASNA5107 standard. (i) Other FAA AD Provisions The following provisions also apply to this AD: (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR730-AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. VerDate Sep<11>2014 15:53 Sep 02, 2020 Jkt 250001 (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus SAS’s EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature. (3) Required for Compliance (RC): For any service information referenced in EASA AD 2020–0070 that contains RC procedures and tests: Except as required by paragraph (i)(2) of this AD, RC procedures and tests must be done to comply with this AD; any procedures or tests that are not identified as RC are recommended. Those procedures and tests that are not identified as RC may be deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the operator’s maintenance or inspection program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the procedures and tests identified as RC can be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or changes to procedures or tests identified as RC require approval of an AMOC. For more information about this AD, contact Kathleen Arrigotti, Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206–231–3218; email kathleen.arrigotti@faa.gov. (k) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. (i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020–0070, dated March 24, 2020. (ii) [Reserved] (3) For information about EASA AD 2020– 0070, contact the EASA, Konrad-AdenauerUfer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@ easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this EASA AD on the EASA website at https:// ad.easa.europa.eu. (4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. This material may be found in the AD docket on the internet at https:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2020–0. (5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, email fedreg.legal@ nara.gov, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/ federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html. PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 54893 Issued on August 19, 2020. Gaetano A. Sciortino, Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2020–19402 Filed 9–2–20; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2020–0332; Product Identifier 2020–NM–037–AD; Amendment 39–21227; AD 2020–18–06] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319–111, –112, –113, –114, –115, –131, –132, and –133 airplanes; Model A320–211, –212, –214, –216, –231, –232, and –233 airplanes; and Model A321–111, –112, –131, –211, –212, –213, –231, and –232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that cracks were detected on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) sides of the first rivet hole of the frame (FR) 43 foot coupling during scheduled maintenance. This AD requires a rotating probe test of the fastener holes at FR43 on the LH and RH sides for any cracking, and on-condition actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD is effective October 8, 2020. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 8, 2020. ADDRESSES: For material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@ easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this IBR material on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this IBR material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\03SER1.SGM 03SER1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 172 (Thursday, September 3, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 54891-54893]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-19402]



[[Page 54891]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0338; Product Identifier 2020-NM-047-AD; Amendment 
39-21224; AD 2020-18-03]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was 
prompted by the results of laboratory tests on non-rechargeable lithium 
batteries installed in certain emergency locator transmitters (ELTs), 
which highlighted a lack of protection against current injections of 28 
volts direct current (DC) or 115 volts alternating current (AC) that 
could lead to thermal runaway and a battery fire. This AD requires 
modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT and the 
terminal block, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this 
AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective October 8, 2020.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 8, 
2020.

ADDRESSES: For material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD, 
contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; 
telephone +49 221 8999 000; email [email protected]; internet 
www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this IBR material on the EASA website 
at https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may view this IBR material at the 
FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of 
this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available in 
the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by 
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0338.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0338; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains 
this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The 
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kathleen Arrigotti, Aerospace 
Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 
2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-
3218; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    The EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the 
European Union, has issued EASA AD 2020-0070, dated March 24, 2020 
(``EASA AD 2020-0070'') (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing 
Airworthiness Information, or ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe 
condition for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes.
    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus SAS 
Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal 
Register on April 27, 2020 (85 FR 23262). The NPRM was prompted by the 
results of laboratory tests on non-rechargeable lithium batteries 
installed in certain ELTs, which highlighted a lack of protection 
against current injections of 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC that could 
lead to thermal runaway and a battery fire. The NPRM proposed to 
require modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT 
and the terminal block, as specified in an EASA AD.
    The FAA is issuing this AD to address local fires in non-
rechargeable lithium batteries installed in ELTs, which could result in 
damage to the airplane and injury to occupants. See the MCAI for 
additional background information.

Comments

    The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in 
developing this final rule. The following presents the comments 
received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw NPRM

    Delta Air Lines (DAL) noted that the NPRM was based on the failure 
mode where a wire from the ELT is shorted to another wire carrying 28 
volts DC or 115 volts AC causing voltage to be induced into the ELT's 
battery, resulting in a battery fire. The commenter explained that on 
Airbus Model A321 and A330 airplanes this failure mode could occur 
because the wiring is characterized by four discrete wires run in 
bundles with other discrete wires carrying 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC. 
The commenter questioned whether the NPRM should be applicable to 
Airbus Model A350 airplanes because these airplanes have a cable 
assembly with its four wires inside an outer jacket and shielding, 
which would therefore mitigate the unsafe condition addressed in the 
NPRM.
    The FAA infers that the commenter is requesting that the NPRM be 
withdrawn because of the unique configuration of certain airplanes, 
including Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. The FAA 
disagrees with the commenter's request. EASA, the State of Design 
Authority for these airplane models, conducted a risk assessment, and 
concluded that the type design of the applicable airplanes are 
susceptible to the current injection of 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC, 
that is not limited to just wire chafing. Therefore, the FAA is 
requiring the applicable corrective actions in this AD to mitigate the 
risk of the thermal runaway and battery fire. The FAA has determined 
that it is necessary to issue this final rule.

Request To Allow Any Color and Width of Tape

    DAL also requested that operators be allowed to use any color and 
width of reinforced silicon tape instead of part number ASNA51072503, 
to protect the wiring in the area where the diode is secured to the 
harness. The commenter explained that part number ASNA51072503 is 
specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P152, dated January 10, 
2020 (``Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P152''), and is for the 1-inch 
orange tape under the ASNA5107 standard [which is an aerospace industry 
standard for a silicone rubber tape]. The commenter requested approval 
to use any color and width of tape meeting the specifications of the 
broader ASNA5107 standard.
    The FAA partially agrees with the commenter's request. EASA AD 
2020-0070 refers to Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P151, dated January 
10, 2020 (``Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P151''), and Airbus Service 
Bulletin

[[Page 54892]]

A350-25-P152, as the sources of service information for modifying the 
affected ELTs. Although the commenter mentioned only Airbus Service 
Bulletin A350-25-P152 in its comment, silicone tape having part number 
ASNA51072503 is specified in both service bulletins. The FAA agrees 
that operators can use any brightly colored tape because orange does 
not have a specific safety function. The FAA disagrees that operators 
can use any width of tape because the width could provide a safety 
function. The FAA has added paragraph (h)(3) to this AD to specify that 
operators may use any brightly colored 1-inch tape that meets the 
criteria specified in the ASNA5107 standard.

Request To Allow an Alternative Continuity Check

    In addition, DAL requested and provided an option to replace Step 
3.C.(g) specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P152. The 
commenter explained that Step 3.C.(g) in Airbus Service Bulletin A350-
25-P152 requires a continuity test of the modified wiring and provides 
no specific steps for this test other than referencing Electrical 
Standard Practices (ESP) section A350-A-20-52-21-00ZZZ-36AZ-A. The 
commenter noted that although this ESP section does provide basic 
continuity procedures, it fails to provide a procedure for a wire with 
a diode installed.
    The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. Based on the report 
from EASA, the State of Design Authority for these airplane models, the 
FAA has determined that the procedures described in Step 3.C.(g) of 
Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P152 do include a continuity test that 
considers an installed diode. Operators may, however, request 
alternative methods of compliance to replace Step 3.C.(g) specified in 
Airbus Service Bulletin A350-25-P152 by using the procedures described 
in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD and demonstrating how this alternative 
addresses the unsafe condition. The FAA has not changed this AD 
regarding this issue.

Conclusion

    The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments 
received, and determined that air safety and the public interest 
require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously 
and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor 
changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM.
    The FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final 
rule.

Related IBR Material Under 1 CFR Part 51

    EASA AD 2020-0070 describes procedures for modifying a certain ELT 
by installing a diode between the ELT and the terminal block. This 
material is reasonably available because the interested parties have 
access to it through their normal course of business or by the means 
identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 7 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                      Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     Cost per      Cost on U.S.
                           Labor cost                               Parts cost        product        operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 work-hours x $85 per hour = $425..............................            $400            $825          $5,775
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD 
may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on 
affected individuals. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for 
affected individuals. As a result, the FAA has included all known costs 
in the cost estimate.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight 
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary 
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to 
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2020-18-03 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39-21224; Docket No. FAA-2020-0338; 
Product Identifier 2020-NM-047-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective October 8, 2020.

[[Page 54893]]

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 
airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0070, dated March 24, 
2020 (``EASA AD 2020-0070'').

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 25, Equipment/
Furnishings.

(e) Reason

    This AD was prompted by the results of laboratory tests on non-
rechargeable lithium batteries installed in certain emergency 
locator transmitters (ELTs), which highlighted a lack of protection 
against current injections of 28 volts direct current (DC) or 115 
volts alternating current (AC) that could lead to thermal runaway 
and a battery fire. The FAA is issuing this AD to address local 
fires in non-rechargeable lithium batteries installed in ELTs, which 
could result in damage to the airplane and injury to occupants.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Requirements

    Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all 
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in 
accordance with, EASA AD 2020-0070.

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020-0070

    (1) Where EASA AD 2020-0070 refers to its effective date, this 
AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
    (2) The ``Remarks'' section of EASA AD 2020-0070 does not apply 
to this AD.
    (3) Where the service information specified in EASA AD 2020-0070 
specifies to use tape having part number ASNA51072503, this AD 
requires using any brightly colored 1-inch tape that meets the 
criteria specified in the ASNA5107 standard.

(i) Other FAA AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, has 
the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the Large Aircraft Section, International Validation 
Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in 
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your 
appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, 
the manager of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD 
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be 
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, Large Aircraft 
Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus 
SAS's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the 
DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.
    (3) Required for Compliance (RC): For any service information 
referenced in EASA AD 2020-0070 that contains RC procedures and 
tests: Except as required by paragraph (i)(2) of this AD, RC 
procedures and tests must be done to comply with this AD; any 
procedures or tests that are not identified as RC are recommended. 
Those procedures and tests that are not identified as RC may be 
deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the 
operator's maintenance or inspection program without obtaining 
approval of an AMOC, provided the procedures and tests identified as 
RC can be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy 
condition. Any substitutions or changes to procedures or tests 
identified as RC require approval of an AMOC.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Kathleen Arrigotti, 
Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation 
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone 
and fax 206-231-3218; email [email protected].

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed 
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do 
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0070, 
dated March 24, 2020.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For information about EASA AD 2020-0070, contact the EASA, 
Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 
8999 000; email [email protected]; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You 
may find this EASA AD on the EASA website at https://ad.easa.europa.eu.
    (4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., 
Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material 
at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. This material may be found in the AD 
docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching 
for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0.
    (5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference 
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For 
information on the availability of this material at NARA, email 
[email protected], or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on August 19, 2020.
Gaetano A. Sciortino,
Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, Compliance & Airworthiness 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-19402 Filed 9-2-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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