Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 107, 53209-53234 [2020-18804]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 168 / Friday, August 28, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
five year grant period or by such time
as required by the Secretary.
(b) ACF will review the relevant data
to determine if one or more of the
conditions under § 1304.11 were met by
the Head Start and Early Head Start
agency during the current project
period.
(c) ACF will give notice to grantees on
Designation Renewal System status,
except as provided in § 1304.14, at least
12 months before the expiration date of
a Head Start or Early Head Start
agency’s current grant, stating:
(1) The Head Start or Early Head Start
agency will be required to compete for
funding for an additional five-year
period because ACF finds that one or
more conditions under § 1304.11 were
met by the agency’s program during the
relevant time period described in
paragraph (b) of this section, identifying
the conditions ACF found, and
summarizing the basis for the finding; or
(2) That such agency has been
determined on a preliminary basis to be
eligible for renewed funding for five
years without competition because ACF
finds that none of the conditions under
§ 1304.11 have been met during the
relevant time period described in
paragraph (b) of this section. If prior to
the award of that grant, ACF determines
that the grantee has met one of the
conditions under § 1304.11 during the
relevant time period described in
paragraph (b) of this section, this
determination will change and the
grantee will receive notice under
paragraph (c)(1) of this section that it
will be required to compete for funding
for an additional five-year period.
PART 1305—DEFINITIONS
5. The authority citation for part 1305
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 9801 et seq.
6. Amend § 1305.2 by adding, in
alphabetical order, the definition
‘‘Denial of Refunding’’ to read as
follows:
■
§ 1305.2
Terms.
*
*
*
*
*
Denial of Refunding means the refusal
of a funding agency to fund an
application for a continuation of a Head
Start program for a subsequent program
year when the decision is based on a
determination that the grantee has
improperly conducted its program, or is
incapable of doing so properly in the
future, or otherwise is in violation of
applicable law, regulations, or other
policies.
*
*
*
*
*
[FR Doc. 2020–17746 Filed 8–27–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4184–01–P
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 1 and 96
[AU Docket No. 20–25; FCC 20–110]
Auction of Flexible-Use Service
Licenses in the 3.7–3.98 GHz Band for
Next-Generation Wireless Services;
Notice and Filing Requirements,
Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront
Payments, and Other Procedures for
Auction 107
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Final action; requirements and
procedures.
AGENCY:
This document summarizes
the procedures and deadlines for the
upcoming auction of 3.7 GHz Service
Licenses in the 3.7–3.98 GHz Band. The
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice
summarized here is intended to
familiarize applicants with the
procedures and other requirements
governing participation in Auction 107
by providing details regarding the
procedures, terms, conditions, dates,
and deadlines, as well as an overview of
the post-auction application and
payment processes.
DATES: Applications to participate in
Auction 107 must be submitted prior to
6 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020.
Upfront payments for Auction 107 must
be received by 6 p.m. ET on November
2, 2020. Bidding in Auction 107 is
scheduled to begin on December 8,
2020.
SUMMARY:
For
auction legal questions, Erik Beith or
Daniel Habif in the Auctions Division of
the Office of Economics and Analytics
at (202) 418–0660. For general auction
questions, the Auctions Hotline at (717)
338–2868. For 3.7 GHz Service
questions, Anna Gentry in the Mobility
Division of the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau at (202)
418–1991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice, AU Docket No. 20–25,
FCC 20–110, adopted on August 6,
2020, and released on August 7, 2020.
The complete text of the public notice,
including attachments and any related
documents, is available for public
inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to
4:30 p.m. ET Monday through Thursday
or from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on
Fridays in the FCC Reference
Information Center, located in Room
CY–A257, of the FCC Headquarters, 445
12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554,
except when Commission Headquarters
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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53209
is otherwise closed to visitors. See
Public Notice, Restrictions on Visitors to
FCC Facilities, March 12, 2020. The
complete text of the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice is also
available on the Commission’s website
at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. To request
materials in accessible formats for
people with disabilities (braille, large
print, electronic files, audio format),
send an email to FCC504@fcc.gov or call
the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), (202)
418–0432 (TTY).
I. General Information
A. Introduction
1. With the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice, the Commission
established the procedures to be used
for Auction 107, the auction of new
flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7–
3.98 GHz band (the 3.7 GHz Service).
2. The bidding for new licenses in
Auction 107 is scheduled to commence
on December 8, 2020. The Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice provides
details regarding the procedures, terms,
conditions, dates, and deadlines
governing participation in Auction 107
bidding, as well as an overview of the
post-auction application and payment
processes.
B. Background and Relevant Authority
3. In the 3.7 GHz Report and Order,
85 FR 31705, May 27, 2020, the
Commission made available 280
megahertz of spectrum in the 3.7–3.98
GHz band for licensed use. In that
Order, the Commission proposed to
modify the licenses and market access
authorizations of incumbent Fixed
Satellite Service (FSS) operators,
transmit receive earth station licensees,
and Fixed Service (FS) licensees to clear
the 3.7–4.0 GHz band for new flexibleuse terrestrial operations in the
contiguous United States. Among other
things, the Commission authorized both
fixed and mobile operations in the 3.7–
3.98 GHz band using geographic area
licensing, established licensing and
operating rules for the new 3.7 GHz
Service, and decided to use its
competitive bidding rules to assign 3.7
GHz Service licenses.
4. On March 3, 2020, in accordance
with section 309(j)(3) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, the Commission released the
Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, 85
FR 23287, April 27, 2020, seeking
comment on certain competitive
bidding procedures and various other
procedures to be used in Auction 107.
The Commission received comments
from seven parties in response to the
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Auction 107 Comment Public Notice,
including five reply comments. These
comments are available under
proceeding 20–25 in the Commission’s
Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS). The ECFS home page is publicly
accessible at: www.fcc.gov/ecfs. In the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice,
the Commission resolved all open issues
raised in the Auction 107 Comment
Public Notice and addressed the
comments received.
5. Prospective applicants should
familiarize themselves with the
Commission’s rules regarding the 3.7
GHz Service. In addition, prospective
applicants should be thoroughly
familiar with the procedures, terms, and
conditions contained in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice and any future
public notices that may be released in
proceeding 20–25.
6. The terms contained in the
Commission’s rules, relevant orders,
and public notices are not negotiable.
The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained
in its public notices at any time and will
issue public notices to convey any new
or supplemental generally applicable
information to applicants. In addition,
the Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau (WTB) and the Office of
Economics and Analytics (OEA) retain
the authority to establish further
procedures during the course of the
auction. It is the responsibility of all
applicants to remain current with all
Commission rules and with all public
notices pertaining to Auction 107.
Copies of most auctions-related
Commission documents, including
public notices, can be retrieved from the
Commission’s FCC Auctions internet
site at www.fcc.gov/auctions.
Additionally, documents are available at
the Commission’s headquarters during
normal business hours when the
building is open to the public.
C. Description of Licenses To Be Offered
in Auction 107
7. Auction 107 will offer 5,684 new
flexible-use overlay licenses for
spectrum in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band
throughout the contiguous United States
subject to clearing requirements. The
280 megahertz of spectrum available in
Auction 107 will be licensed on an
unpaired basis in three blocks divided
into 20-megahertz sub-blocks by partial
economic area (PEA) in the contiguous
states and the District of Columbia
(PEAs 1–41, 43–211, 213–263, 265–297,
299–359, and 361–411). Flexible-use
overlay licenses will not be issued for
Honolulu, Anchorage, Kodiak,
Fairbanks, Juneau, Puerto Rico, GuamNorthern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin
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Islands, American Samoa, and the Gulf
of Mexico (PEAs 42, 212, 264, 298, 360,
412–416). Specifically, the A Block will
cover 100 megahertz from 3.7–3.8 GHz
in five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3700–
3720 MHz (A1), 3720–3740 MHz (A2),
3740–3760 MHz (A3), 3760–3780 MHz
(A4), and 3780–3800 MHz (A5). The B
Block will cover 100 megahertz from
3.8–3.9 GHz in five 20-megahertz subblocks: 3800–3820 MHz (B1), 3820–
3840 MHz (B2), 3840–3860 MHz (B3),
3860–3880 MHz (B4), and 3880–3900
MHz (B5). The C Block will cover 80
megahertz from 3.9–3.98 GHz, and four
20-megahertz sub-blocks will be
licensed for flexible use: 3900–3920
MHz (C1), 3920–3940 MHz (C2), 3940–
3960 MHz (C3), and 3960–3980 MHz
(C4). The 20 megahertz at 3980–4000
MHz will be a guard band and not
available for auction. 3.7 GHz Service
licenses will be issued for 15-year,
renewable license terms. Licenses in the
46 PEAs may be issued as paired
interim and final licenses, which taken
together, provide authorization for a
block over the full 15-year license term.
A licensee in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band
may provide any services permitted
under terrestrial fixed or mobile
allocations, as set forth in the nonFederal Government column of the
Table of Frequency Allocations in
section 2.106 of the Commission’s rules.
A summary of the licenses offered in
Auction 107 is available in Attachment
A to the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice, which is available on the
Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/
auction/107.
8. Incumbent satellite operators have,
in aggregate, made sufficient
commitments to clear the 3.7–4.0 GHz
band on the accelerated timeline
described in the 3.7 GHz Report and
Order. As a result, licenses in the A
Block in 46 of the top 50 PEAs—PEAs
1–4, 6–10, 12–19, 21–41, and 43–50—
will be subject to the Phase I accelerated
relocation deadline, and licenses in the
B and C Blocks in the 46 PEAs and in
the A, B, and C Blocks in the remaining
360 PEAs will be subject to the Phase II
accelerated relocation deadline.
D. Auction Specifics
1. Auction Title and Start Date
9. The auction of licenses in the 3.7–
3.98 GHz band will be referred to as
‘‘Auction 107.’’ Bidding in Auction 107
will begin on Tuesday, December 8,
2020. The initial schedule for bidding
rounds in Auction 107 will be
announced by public notice at least one
week before bidding begins.
10. Unless otherwise announced,
bidding on all licenses will be
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conducted on each business day until
bidding has stopped on all licenses.
2. Auction Dates and Deadlines
11. The following dates and deadlines
apply to Auction 107: Auction
Application Tutorial Available (via
internet). No later than August 21, 2020.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
Filing Window Opens—September 9,
2020, 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET)
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
Filing Window Deadline—September
22, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
Upfront Payments (via wire
transfer)—June 19, 2020, 6:00 p.m.
ET
Bidding Tutorial Available (via
internet)—No later than July 9, 2020
Mock Auction—December 3, 2020
Bidding Begins in Auction 107—
December 8, 2020
3. Requirements for Participation
12. Those wishing to participate in
Auction 107 must: Submit a short-form
application (FCC Form 175)
electronically prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on
September 22, 2020, following the
electronic filing procedures set forth in
the FCC Form 175 Instructions
(available in the Education section of
the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/
auctions/107); submit a sufficient
upfront payment and an FCC
Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form
159) by 6:00 p.m. ET on November 2,
2020, following the procedures and
instructions set forth in the FCC Form
159 Instructions; and comply with all
provisions outlined in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice and applicable
Commission rules.
II. Applying To Participate in Auction
107
A. General Information Regarding
Short-Form Applications
13. An application to participate in
Auction 107, referred to as a short-form
application or FCC Form 175, provides
information that the Commission uses to
determine whether the applicant has the
legal, technical, and financial
qualifications to participate in a
Commission auction for spectrum
licenses. The short-form application is
the first part of the Commission’s twophased auction application process. In
the first phase, a party seeking to
participate in Auction 107 must file a
short-form application in which it
certifies, under penalty of perjury, that
it is qualified to participate. Eligibility
to participate in Auction 107 is based on
an applicant’s short-form application
and certifications and on the applicant’s
submission of a sufficient upfront
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payment for the auction. After bidding
closes, in the second phase of the
process, each winning bidder must file
a more comprehensive post-auction,
long-form application (FCC Form 601)
for the licenses it wins in the auction,
and it must have a complete and
accurate ownership disclosure
information report (FCC Form 602) on
file with the Commission. Being deemed
qualified to bid in Auction 107 does not
constitute a determination that a party
is qualified to hold a Commission
license or is eligible for a designated
entity bidding credit.
14. A party seeking to participate in
Auction 107 must file an FCC Form 175
electronically via the Auction
Application System prior to 6:00 p.m.
ET on September 22, 2020, following
the procedures prescribed in the FCC
Form 175 Instructions. If an applicant
claims eligibility for a bidding credit,
then the information provided in its
FCC Form 175 as of the filing date will
be used to determine whether the
applicant may request the claimed
bidding credit. An applicant that files
an FCC Form 175 for Auction 107 will
be subject to the Commission’s rule
prohibiting certain communications. An
applicant is subject to the prohibition
beginning at the deadline for filing
short-form applications—6:00 p.m. ET
on September 22, 2020. The prohibition
will end for applicants on the postauction down payment deadline for
Auction 107.
15. An applicant bears full
responsibility for submitting an
accurate, complete, and timely shortform application. Each applicant must
make a series of certifications under
penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175
related to the information provided in
its application and its participation in
the auction, and it must confirm that it
is legally, technically, financially, and
otherwise qualified to hold a license. If
an Auction 107 applicant fails to make
the required certifications in its FCC
Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its
application will be deemed
unacceptable for filing and cannot be
corrected after the filing deadline.
16. An applicant should note that
submitting an FCC Form 175 (and any
amendments thereto) constitutes a
representation by the certifying official
that he or she is an authorized
representative of the applicant with
authority to bind the applicant, that he
or she has read the form’s instructions
and certifications, and that the contents
of the application, its certifications, and
any attachments are true and correct.
Submitting a false certification to the
Commission may result in penalties,
including monetary forfeitures, license
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forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in
future auctions, and/or criminal
prosecution.
17. Applicants are cautioned that,
because the required information
submitted in FCC Form 175 bears on
each applicant’s qualifications, requests
for confidential treatment will not be
routinely granted. The Commission
generally has held that it may publicly
release confidential business
information where the party has put that
information at issue in a Commission
proceeding or where the Commission
has identified a compelling public
interest in disclosing the information. In
this regard, the Commission specifically
has held that information submitted in
support of receiving bidding credits in
auction proceedings should be made
available to the public.
18. An applicant must designate at
least one individual as an authorized
bidder, and no more than three, in its
FCC Form 175. The Commission’s rules
prohibit an individual from serving as
an authorized bidder for more than one
auction applicant.
19. No individual or entity may file
more than one short-form application or
have a controlling interest in more than
one short-form application. If a party
submits multiple short-form
applications for an auction, then only
one application may form the basis for
that party to become qualified to bid in
that auction.
20. Similarly, and consistent with the
Commission’s general prohibition on
joint bidding agreements, a party is
generally permitted to participate in a
Commission auction only through a
single bidding entity. Accordingly, the
filing of applications in Auction 107 by
multiple entities controlled by the same
individual or set of individuals
generally will not be permitted. This
restriction applies across all
applications, without regard to the
geographic areas selected. There is a
limited exception to the general
prohibition on the filing of multiple
applications by commonly controlled
entities for qualified rural wireless
partnerships and individual members of
such partnerships. Under this limited
exception, each qualifying rural wireless
partnership and its individual members
will be permitted to participate
separately in an auction.
21. After the initial short-form
application filing deadline, Commission
staff will review all timely submitted
applications for Auction 107 to
determine whether each application
complies with the application
requirements and whether the applicant
has provided all required information
concerning the applicant’s
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qualifications for bidding. After this
review is completed, a public notice
will be released announcing the status
of applications and identifying the
applications that are complete and those
that are incomplete because of minor
defects that may be corrected. The
public notice will include the deadline
for resubmitting modified applications.
To become a qualified bidder, an
applicant must have a complete
application (i.e., have timely filed an
application that is deemed complete
after the deadline for correcting any
identified deficiencies), and must make
a timely and sufficient upfront payment.
Qualified bidders will be identified by
public notice at least 10 days prior to
the mock auction.
22. An applicant should consult the
Commission’s rules to ensure that all
required information is included in its
short-form application. To the extent the
information in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice does not
address a potential applicant’s specific
operating structure, or if the applicant
needs additional information or
guidance concerning the described
disclosure requirements, the applicant
should review the educational materials
for Auction 107 (see the Education
section of the Auction 107 website at
www.fcc.gov/auction/107) and/or use
the contact information provided to
consult with Commission staff to better
understand the information it must
submit in its short-form application.
B. License Area Selection
23. An applicant must select all the
license areas on which it may want to
bid from the list of available PEAs on its
FCC Form 175. An applicant must
carefully review and verify its PEA
selections before the FCC Form 175
filing deadline because those selections
cannot be changed after the auction
application filing deadline. An
applicant is not required to place bids
on any or all of the license areas
selected, but the FCC Auction Bidding
System (bidding system) will not accept
bids for blocks located in PEAs that the
applicant did not select in its FCC Form
175. The auction application system,
however, will provide an applicant the
option to select ‘‘all PEAs.’’
C. Disclosure of Agreements and
Bidding Arrangements
24. An applicant must provide in its
FCC Form 175 a brief description of,
and identify each party to, any
partnerships, joint ventures, consortia or
agreements, arrangements, or
understandings of any kind relating to
the licenses being auctioned, including
any agreements that address or
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communicate directly or indirectly bids
(including specific prices), bidding
strategies (including the specific
licenses on which to bid or not to bid),
or the post-auction market structure, to
which the applicant, or any party that
controls or is controlled by the
applicant, is a party. A controlling
interest includes all individuals or
entities with positive or negative de jure
or de facto control of the applicant. In
connection with the agreement
disclosure, the applicant must certify
under penalty of perjury in its FCC
Form 175 that it has described, and
identified each party to, any such
agreements, arrangements, or
understandings to which it (or any party
that controls it or that it controls) is a
party. If, after the FCC Form 175 filing
deadline, an auction applicant enters
into any agreement relating to the
licenses being auctioned, then it is
subject to these same disclosure
obligations. All applicants must
maintain the accuracy and completeness
of the information in their pending
auction application.
25. For purposes of making the
required agreement disclosures on the
FCC Form 175, if parties agree in
principle on all material terms prior to
the application filing deadline, then
each party to the agreement that is
submitting an auction application must
provide a brief description of, and
identify the other party or parties to, the
agreement on its respective FCC Form
175, even if the agreement has not been
reduced to writing. Parties that have not
agreed in principle by the FCC Form
175 filing deadline should not describe,
or include the names of parties to, the
discussions on their applications.
26. The Commission’s rules generally
prohibit joint bidding and other
arrangements involving auction
applicants (including any party that
controls or is controlled by such
applicants). For purposes of the
prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement
includes any arrangement relating to the
licenses being auctioned that addresses
or communicates, directly or indirectly,
bidding at the auction, bidding
strategies, including arrangements
regarding price or the specific licenses
on which to bid, and any such
arrangement relating to the post-auction
market structure.
27. This prohibition applies to joint
bidding arrangements involving two or
more nationwide providers, as well as
joint bidding arrangements involving a
nationwide provider and one or more
non-nationwide providers, where at
least one party to the arrangement is an
applicant for the auction. A ‘‘nonnationwide provider’’ refers to any
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provider of communications services
that is not a nationwide provider. The
Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile,
and Verizon to be nationwide providers
for the purpose of implementing the
Commission’s competitive bidding rules
in Auction 107.
28. Under certain circumstances, a
non-nationwide provider may enter into
an agreement to form a consortium or a
joint venture (as applicable) that results
in a single party applying to participate
in an auction. A designated entity can
participate in one consortium or joint
venture in an auction, and nonnationwide providers that are not
designated entities may participate in an
auction through only one joint venture.
A non-nationwide provider may enter
into only one agreement to form a
consortium or joint venture (as
applicable), and such consortium or
joint venture shall be the exclusive
bidding vehicle for its members in the
auction. The general prohibition on
joint bidding arrangements excludes
certain agreements, including those that
are solely operational in nature. Under
the Commission’s rules, agreements that
are solely operational in nature are
those that address operational aspects of
providing a mobile service, such as
agreements for roaming, device
acquisition, and spectrum leasing and
other spectrum use arrangements,
provided that any such agreement does
not both relate to the licenses at auction
and address or communicate, directly or
indirectly, bidding at auction (including
specific prices to be bid) or bidding
strategies (including the specific
licenses on which to bid or not to bid)
or post-auction market structure.
29. The Commission’s rules require
each applicant to certify in its shortform application that it has disclosed
any arrangements or understandings of
any kind relating to the licenses being
auctioned to which it (or any party that
controls or is controlled by it) is a party.
The applicant must also certify that it
(or any party that controls or is
controlled by it) has not entered and
will not enter into any arrangement or
understanding of any kind relating
directly or indirectly to bidding at
auction with, among others, any other
applicant or a nationwide provider.
30. Although the Commission’s rules
do not prohibit auction applicants from
communicating about matters that are
within the scope of an excepted
agreement that has been disclosed in an
FCC Form 175, certain discussions or
exchanges could nonetheless touch
upon impermissible subject matters, and
compliance with the Commission’s
rules will not insulate a party from
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
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31. A winning bidder will be required
to disclose in its FCC Form 601 postauction application the specific terms,
conditions, and parties involved in any
agreement relating to the licenses being
auctioned into which it had entered
prior to the time bidding was
completed. This applies to any bidding
consortium, joint venture, partnership,
or other agreement, arrangement, or
understanding of any kind entered into
relating to the competitive bidding
process, including any agreements
relating to the licenses being auctioned
that address or communicate directly or
indirectly bids (including specific
prices), bidding strategies (including the
specific licenses on which to bid or not
to bid), or the post-auction market
structure, to which the applicant, or any
party that controls or is controlled by
the applicant, is a party.
D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements
32. Each applicant must comply with
the applicable part 1 ownership
disclosure requirements and provide
information required by sections 1.2105
and 1.2112, and, where applicable,
section 1.2110, of the Commission’s
rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an
applicant must fully disclose
information regarding the real party- or
parties-in-interest in the applicant or
application and the ownership structure
of the applicant, including both direct
and indirect ownership interests of 10%
or more. Each applicant is responsible
for ensuring that information submitted
in its short-form application is complete
and accurate.
33. In certain circumstances, an
applicant may have previously filed an
FCC Form 602 ownership disclosure
information report or filed an auction
application for a previous auction in
which ownership information was
disclosed. The most current ownership
information contained in any FCC Form
602 or previous auction application on
file with the Commission that used the
same FCC Registration Number (FRN)
the applicant is using to submit its FCC
Form 175 will automatically be prefilled into certain ownership sections on
the applicant’s FCC Form 175, if such
information is in an electronic format
compatible with FCC Form 175.
Applicants are encouraged to submit an
FCC Form 602 ownership report or
update any ownership information on
file with the Commission in an FCC
Form 602 ownership report prior to
starting a short-form application for
Auction 107 to ensure that their most
recent ownership information is prefilled into their short-form application.
Each applicant must carefully review
any ownership information
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automatically entered into its FCC Form
175, including any ownership
attachments, to confirm that all
information supplied on FCC Form 175
is complete and accurate as of the
application filing deadline. Any
information that needs to be corrected
or updated must be changed directly in
FCC Form 175.
E. Foreign Ownership Disclosure
Requirements
34. Section 310 of the
Communications Act requires the
Commission to review foreign
investment in radio station licenses and
imposes specific restrictions on who
may hold certain types of radio licenses.
Section 310 applies to applications for
initial radio licenses, applications for
assignments and transfers of control of
radio licenses, and spectrum leasing
arrangements under the Commission’s
secondary market rules. In completing
FCC Form 175, an applicant is required
to disclose information concerning
foreign ownership of the applicant. If an
applicant has foreign ownership
interests in excess of the applicable
limit or benchmark set forth in section
310(b), then it may seek to participate in
Auction 107 as long as it has filed a
petition for declaratory ruling with the
Commission prior to the FCC Form 175
filing deadline. An applicant must
certify in its FCC Form 175 that, as of
the deadline for filing its application to
participate in the auction, the applicant
either is in compliance with the foreign
ownership provisions of section 310 or
has filed a petition for declaratory ruling
requesting Commission approval to
exceed the applicable foreign ownership
limit or benchmark in section 310(b)
that is pending before, or has been
granted by, the Commission. Additional
information concerning foreign
ownership disclosure requirements is
provided in the FCC Form 175
Instructions.
F. Information Procedures During the
Auction Process
35. The Commission is limiting
information available in Auction 107 in
order to prevent the identification of
bidders placing particular bids until
after the bidding has closed. The
Commission will not make public until
after bidding has closed: (1) The license
areas that an applicant selects for
bidding in its short-form application, (2)
the amount of any upfront payment
made by or on behalf of an applicant, (3)
any applicant’s bidding eligibility, and
(4) any other bidding-related
information that might reveal the
identity of the bidder placing a bid.
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36. Once the bidding begins in
Auction 107, under the limited
information procedures (sometimes also
referred to as anonymous bidding),
information to be made public after each
round of bidding will include, for
licenses in each geographic area, the
supply, the aggregate demand, the price
at the end of the last completed round,
and the price for the next round. The
identities of bidders placing specific
bids and the net bid amounts (reflecting
bidding credits) will not be disclosed
until after the close of bidding.
37. Bidders will have access to
additional information related to their
own bidding and bidding eligibility
through the Commission’s bidding
system. For example, bidders will be
able to view their own level of
eligibility, both before and during the
auction.
38. After the close of bidding, bidders’
PEA selections, upfront payment
amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and
other bidding-related actions will be
made publicly available.
39. The direct or indirect
communication to other applicants or
the public disclosure of non-public
information (e.g., reductions in
eligibility, identities of bidders) could
violate the Commission’s rule
prohibiting certain communications. To
the extent an applicant believes that
such a disclosure is required by law or
regulation, including regulations issued
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, the applicant should
consult with the Commission staff in the
Auctions Division before making such
disclosure.
G. Prohibited Communications and
Compliance With Antitrust Laws
40. The rules prohibiting certain
communications set forth in section
1.2105(c) apply to each applicant that
files a short-form application (FCC Form
175) in Auction 107. Section
1.2105(c)(1) of the Commission’s rules
provides that, subject to specified
exceptions, after the short-form
application filing deadline, all
applicants are prohibited from
cooperating or collaborating with
respect to, communicating with or
disclosing, to each other or any
nationwide provider of communications
services that is not an applicant, or, if
the applicant is a nationwide provider,
any non-nationwide provider that is not
an applicant, in any manner the
substance of their own, or each other’s,
or any other applicants’ bids or bidding
strategies (including post-auction
market structure), or discussing or
negotiating settlement agreements, until
after the down payment deadline.
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1. Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c)
41. An applicant for purposes of this
rule includes all controlling interests in
the entity submitting the FCC Form 175
auction application, as well as all
holders of interests amounting to 10%
or more of the entity, and all officers
and directors of that entity. A party that
submits an application becomes an
applicant under the rule at the
application deadline, and that status
does not change based on later
developments. Thus, an auction
applicant that does not correct
deficiencies in its application, fails to
submit a timely and sufficient upfront
payment, or does not otherwise become
qualified, remains an ‘‘applicant’’ for
purposes of the rule and remains subject
to the prohibition on certain
communications until the Auction 107
down payment deadline.
42. The Commission considers AT&T,
T-Mobile, and Verizon to be nationwide
providers for the purposes of the
prohibited communications rule for
Auction 107.
2. Prohibition Applies Until Down
Payment Deadline
43. Section 1.2105(c)’s prohibition of
certain communications begins at an
auction’s short-form application filing
deadline and ends at the auction’s down
payment deadline after the auction
closes, which will be announced in a
future public notice.
3. Scope of Prohibition on Certain
Communications; Prohibition on Joint
Bidding Agreements
44. Section 1.2105(c) of the
Commission’s rules prohibits certain
communications between applicants for
an auction, regardless of whether the
applicants seek permits or licenses in
the same geographic area or market. The
rule also applies to communications by
applicants with non-applicant
nationwide providers of
communications services and by
nationwide applicants with nonapplicant non-nationwide providers.
The rule further prohibits joint bidding
arrangements, including arrangements
relating to the permits or licenses being
auctioned that address or communicate,
directly or indirectly, bidding at the
auction, bidding strategies, including
arrangements regarding price or the
specific permits or licenses on which to
bid, and any such arrangements relating
to the post-auction market structure.
The rule allows for limited exceptions
for communications within the scope of
any arrangement consistent with the
exclusion from the Commission’s rules
prohibiting joint bidding, provided such
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arrangement is disclosed on the
applicant’s auction application.
Applicants may communicate pursuant
to any pre-existing agreements,
arrangements, or understandings
relating to the licenses being auctioned
that are solely operational or that
provide for the transfer or assignment of
licenses, provided that such agreements,
arrangements, or understandings are
disclosed on their applications and do
not both relate to the licenses at auction
and address or communicate bids
(including amounts), bidding strategies,
or the particular permits or licenses on
which to bid or the post-auction market
structure.
45. The prohibition against
communicating in any manner includes
public disclosures as well as private
communications and indirect or
implicit communications.
Consequently, an applicant must take
care to determine whether its auctionrelated communications may reach
another applicant. Applicants must
determine whether their
communications with other parties are
permissible under the rule once the
prohibition begins at the deadline for
submitting applications, even before the
public notice identifying applicants is
released.
46. Parties subject to section 1.2105(c)
should take special care in
circumstances where their officers,
directors, and employees may receive
information directly or indirectly
relating to any applicant’s bids or
bidding strategies. Such information
may be deemed to have been received
by the applicant under certain
circumstances. For example,
Commission staff have found that,
where an individual serves as an officer
and director for two or more applicants,
the bids and bidding strategies of one
applicant are presumed conveyed to the
other applicant through the shared
officer, which creates an apparent
violation of the rule.
47. Section 1.2105(c)(1) prohibits
applicants from communicating with
specified other parties only with respect
to their own, or each other’s, or any
other applicant’s bids or bidding
strategies. A communication conveying
bids or bidding strategies (including
post-auction market structure) must also
relate to the licenses being auctioned in
order to be covered by the prohibition.
Thus, the prohibition is limited in scope
and does not apply to all
communications between or among the
specified parties. The Commission
consistently has made clear that
application of the rule prohibiting
communications has never required
total suspension of essential ongoing
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business. Entities subject to the
prohibition may negotiate agreements
during the prohibition period, provided
that the communications involved do
not relate to both: (1) The licenses being
auctioned and (2) bids or bidding
strategies or post-auction market
structure.
48. Business discussions and
negotiations that are unrelated to
bidding in Auction 107 and that do not
convey information about the bids or
bidding strategies, including the postauction market structure, of an
applicant are not prohibited by the rule.
Moreover, not all auction-related
information is covered by the
prohibition. For example,
communicating merely whether a party
has or has not applied to participate in
Auction 107 will not violate the rule. In
contrast, communicating how a party
will participate, including specific
geographic areas selected, specific bid
amounts, and/or whether or not the
party is placing bids, would convey bids
or bidding strategies and would be
prohibited.
49. Each applicant must remain
vigilant not to communicate, directly or
indirectly, information that affects, or
could affect, bids or bidding strategies.
Certain discussions might touch upon
subject matters that could convey price
or geographic information related to
bidding strategies. Such subject areas
include, but are not limited to,
management, sales, local marketing
agreements, and other transactional
agreements.
50. Bids or bidding strategies may be
communicated outside of situations that
involve one party subject to the
prohibition communicating privately
and directly with another such party.
For example, the Commission has
warned that prohibited communications
concerning bids and bidding strategies
may include communications regarding
capital calls or requests for additional
funds in support of bids or bidding
strategies to the extent such
communications convey information
concerning the bids and bidding
strategies directly or indirectly.
Moreover, the Commission found a
violation of the rule against prohibited
communications when an applicant
used the Commission’s bidding system
to disclose its bidding strategy in a
manner that explicitly invited other
auction participants to cooperate and
collaborate in specific markets, and has
placed auction participants on notice
that the use of its bidding system to
disclose market information to
competitors will not be tolerated and
will subject bidders to sanctions.
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51. When completing a short-form
application, each applicant should
avoid any statements or disclosures that
may violate section 1.2105(c). An
applicant should avoid including any
information in its short-form application
that might convey information regarding
its PEA selections, such as referring to
certain markets in describing
agreements, including any information
in application attachments that will be
publicly available that may otherwise
disclose the applicant’s PEA selections,
or using applicant names that refer to
licenses being offered.
52. Applicants also should be mindful
that communicating non-public
application or bidding information
publicly or privately to another
applicant may violate section 1.2105(c)
even though that information
subsequently may be made public
during later periods of the application
or bidding processes.
4. Communicating With Third Parties
53. Section 1.2105(c) does not
prohibit an applicant from
communicating bids or bidding
strategies to a third party, such as a
consultant or consulting firm, counsel,
or lender. The applicant should take
appropriate steps, however, to ensure
that any third party it employs for
advice pertaining to its bids or bidding
strategies does not become a conduit for
prohibited communications to other
specified parties, as that would violate
the rule. For example, an applicant
might require a third party, such as a
lender, to sign a non-disclosure
agreement before the applicant
communicates any information
regarding bids or bidding strategy to the
third party. Within third-party firms,
separate individual employees, such as
attorneys or auction consultants, may
advise individual applicants on bids or
bidding strategies, as long as such firms
implement firewalls and other
compliance procedures that prevent
such individuals from communicating
the bids or bidding strategies of one
applicant to other individuals
representing separate applicants.
Although firewalls and/or other
procedures should be used, their
existence is not an absolute defense to
liability if a violation of the rule has
occurred.
54. In the case of an individual, the
objective precautionary measure of a
firewall is not available. An individual
that is privy to bids or bidding
information of more than one applicant
presents a greater risk of becoming a
conduit for a prohibited
communication. Whether a prohibited
communication has taken place in a
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given case will depend on all the facts
pertaining to the case, including who
possessed what information, what
information was conveyed to whom,
and the course of bidding in the auction.
55. Potential applicants may discuss
the short-form application or bids for
specific licenses or license areas with
the counsel, consultant, or expert of
their choice before the short-form
application deadline. The same thirdparty individual could continue to give
advice after the short-form deadline
regarding the application, provided that
no information pertaining to bids or
bidding strategies, including PEAs
selected on the short-form application,
is conveyed to that individual. To the
extent potential applicants can develop
bidding instructions prior to the shortform deadline that a third party could
implement without changes during
bidding, the third party could follow
such instructions for multiple
applicants provided that those
applicants do not communicate with the
third party during the prohibition
period.
56. Applicants also should use
caution in their dealings with other
parties, such as members of the press,
financial analysts, or others who might
become conduits for the communication
of prohibited bidding information. For
example, even though communicating
that it has applied to participate in the
auction will not violate the rule, an
applicant’s statement to the press that it
intends to stop bidding in an auction
could give rise to a finding of a section
1.2105 violation. Similarly, an
applicant’s public statement of intent
not to place bids during bidding in
Auction 107 could also violate the rule.
5. Section 1.2105(c) Certifications
57. By electronically submitting its
FCC Form 175 auction application, each
applicant for Auction 107 certifies its
compliance with section 1.2105(c) of the
rules. If an applicant has a noncontrolling interest with respect to more
than one application, the applicant must
certify that it has established internal
control procedures to preclude any
person acting on behalf of the applicant
from possessing information about the
bids or bidding strategies of more than
one applicant or communicating such
information with respect to either
applicant to another person acting on
behalf of and possessing such
information regarding another
applicant. The mere filing of a certifying
statement as part of an application will
not outweigh specific evidence that a
prohibited communication has
occurred, nor will it preclude the
initiation of an investigation when
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warranted. Any applicant found to have
violated these communication
prohibitions may be subject to
sanctions.
6. Duty To Report Prohibited
Communications
58. Section 1.2105(c)(4) requires that
any applicant that makes or receives a
communication that appears to violate
section 1.2105(c) must report such
communication in writing to the
Commission immediately, and in no
case later than five business days after
the communication occurs. Each
applicant’s obligation to report any such
communication continues beyond the
five-day period after the communication
is made, even if the report is not made
within the five-day period.
7. Procedures for Reporting Prohibited
Communications
59. A party reporting any information
or communication pursuant to sections
1.65, 1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must
take care to ensure that any report of a
prohibited communication does not
itself give rise to a violation of section
1.2105(c). For example, a party’s report
of a prohibited communication could
violate the rule by communicating
prohibited information to other parties
specified under the rule through the use
of Commission filing procedures that
allow such materials to be made
available for public inspection.
60. Parties must file only a single
report concerning a prohibited
communication and must file that report
with the Commission personnel
expressly charged with administering
the Commission’s auctions. This rule is
designed to minimize the risk of
inadvertent dissemination of
information in such reports. Any reports
required by section 1.2105(c) must be
filed consistent with the instructions set
forth in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice. Such reports must be
filed with the Chief of the Auctions
Division, Office of Economics and
Analytics, by the most expeditious
means available. Any such report
should be submitted by email to the
Auctions Division Chief and sent to
auction107@fcc.gov. If you choose to
submit a report in hard copy, contact
Auctions Division staff at auction107@
fcc.gov or (202) 418–0660 for guidance.
61. A party seeking to report such a
prohibited communication should
consider submitting its report with a
request that the report or portions of the
submission be withheld from public
inspection by following the procedures
specified in section 0.459 of the
Commission’s rules. Filers requesting
confidential treatment of documents
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53215
must be sure that the cover page of the
filing prominently displays that the
documents seek confidential treatment.
For example, a filing might include a
cover page stamped with ‘‘Request for
Confidential Treatment Attached’’ or
‘‘Not for Public Inspection.’’ Any such
request must cover all the material to
which the request applies. Because the
hand-delivery filing location at FCC
Headquarters is permanently closed,
such materials should be submitted in
accordance with the procedures
described in Order, Amendment of the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure, May 28, 2020. Such parties
are encouraged to coordinate with the
Auctions Division staff about the
procedures for submitting such reports.
8. Winning Bidders Must Disclose
Terms of Agreements
62. Each applicant that is a winning
bidder will be required to provide as
part of its long-form application any
agreement or arrangement it has entered
into and a summary of the specific
terms, conditions, and parties involved
in any agreement it has entered into.
Such agreements must have been
entered into prior to the filing of shortform applications. This applies to any
bidding consortia, joint venture,
partnership, or agreement,
understanding, or other arrangement
entered into relating to the competitive
bidding process, including any
agreement relating to the post-auction
market structure. Failure to comply with
the Commission’s rules can result in
enforcement action.
9. Additional Information Concerning
Prohibition on Certain Communications
in Commission Auctions
63. A summary listing of documents
issued by the Commission and OEA/
WTB addressing the application of
section 1.2105(c) is available on the
Commission’s auction web page at
www.fcc.gov/summary-listingdocuments-addressing-application-ruleprohibiting-certain-communications.
10. Antitrust Laws
64. Applicants remain subject to the
antitrust laws. Compliance with the
disclosure requirements of section
1.2105(c)(4) will not insulate a party
from enforcement of the antitrust laws.
For instance, a violation of the antitrust
laws could arise out of actions taking
place well before any party submits a
short-form application. The Commission
has cited a number of examples of
potentially anticompetitive actions that
would be prohibited under antitrust
laws: For example, actual or potential
competitors may not agree to divide
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territories in order to minimize
competition, regardless of whether they
split a market in which they both do
business, or whether they merely
reserve one market for one and another
market for the other.
65. To the extent the Commission
becomes aware of specific allegations
that suggest that violations of the federal
antitrust laws may have occurred, the
Commission may refer such allegations
to the United States Department of
Justice for investigation. If an applicant
is found to have violated the antitrust
laws or the Commission’s rules in
connection with its participation in the
competitive bidding process, it may be
subject to a forfeiture and may be
prohibited from participating further in
Auction 107 and in future auctions,
among other sanctions.
H. Provisions for Small Businesses and
Rural Service Providers
66. In Auction 107, bidding credits
will be available to applicants
demonstrating eligibility for a small
business or a rural service provider
bidding credit and subsequently
winning license(s). A bidding credit
represents an amount by which a
bidder’s winning bid will be
discounted. These bidding credits will
not be cumulative—an applicant is
permitted to claim either a small
business bidding credit or a rural
service provider bidding credit, but not
both. Each applicant must also certify
that it is eligible for the claimed bidding
credit in its FCC Form 175. Each
applicant should review carefully the
Commission’s decisions regarding the
designated entity provisions as well as
the part 1 rules.
67. Applicants applying for
designated entity bidding credits should
take due account of the requirements of
the Commission’s rules and
implementing orders regarding de jure
and de facto control of such applicants.
These rules include a prohibition,
which applies to all applicants (whether
they seek bidding credits or not), against
changes in ownership of the applicant
that would constitute an assignment or
transfer of control. Applicants should
not expect to receive any opportunities
to revise their ownership structure after
the filing of their short- and long-form
applications, including making
revisions to their agreements or other
arrangements with interest holders,
lenders, or others in order to address
potential concerns relating to
compliance with the designated entity
bidding credit requirements.
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1. Small Business Bidding Credit
68. For Auction 107, bidding credits
will be available to eligible small
businesses and consortia thereof. Under
the service rules applicable to the 3.7
GHz Service licenses to be offered in
Auction 107, the level of bidding credit
available is determined as follows: A
bidder with attributed average annual
gross revenues that do not exceed $55
million for the preceding five years is
eligible to receive a 15% discount on its
winning bid; a bidder with attributed
average annual gross revenues that do
not exceed $20 million for the preceding
five years is eligible to receive a 25%
discount on its winning bid.
69. Small business bidding credits are
not cumulative; an eligible applicant
may receive either the 15% or the 25%
bidding credit on its winning bid, but
not both. The Commission’s unjust
enrichment provisions also apply to a
winning bidder that uses a bidding
credit and subsequently seeks to assign
or transfer control of its license within
a certain period to an entity not
qualifying for at least the same level of
small business bidding credit. Thus, for
example, the Commission’s unjust
enrichment provisions would not apply
to a winning bidder that uses the 15%
small business bidding credit and seeks
to transfer control of its license to an
entity that qualifies for either the 15%
small business bidding credit or the
rural service provider bidding credit.
The provisions would apply, however,
if that same winning bidder uses the
25% small business bidding credit,
unless the proposed transferee also
qualifies for the 25% small business
bidding credit.
70. Each applicant claiming a small
business bidding credit must disclose
the gross revenues for the preceding five
years for each of the following: (1) The
applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its
controlling interests, and (4) the
affiliates of its controlling interests. The
applicant must also submit an
attachment that lists all parties with
which the applicant has entered into
any spectrum use agreements or
arrangements for any licenses that may
be won by the applicant in Auction 107.
In addition, to the extent that an
applicant has an agreement with any
disclosable interest holder for the use of
more than 25% of the spectrum capacity
of any license that may be won in
Auction 107, the identity and the
attributable gross revenues of any such
disclosable interest holder must be
disclosed. This attribution rule will be
applied on a license-by-license basis. As
a result, an applicant may be eligible for
a bidding credit on some, but not all, of
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the licenses for which it is bidding in
Auction 107. If an applicant is applying
as a consortium of small businesses,
then the disclosures described in this
paragraph must be provided for each
consortium member.
2. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit
71. An eligible applicant may request
a 15% discount on its winning bid using
a rural service provider bidding credit.
To be eligible for a rural service
provider bidding credit, an applicant
must: (1) Be a service provider that is in
the business of providing commercial
communications services and, together
with its controlling interests, affiliates,
and the affiliates of its controlling
interests, has fewer than 250,000
combined wireless, wireline,
broadband, and cable subscribers; and
(2) serve predominantly rural areas,
defined as counties with a population
density of 100 or fewer persons per
square mile. An applicant seeking a
rural service provider bidding credit
must provide the number of subscribers
served as of the short-form application
deadline. An applicant may count any
subscriber as a single subscriber even if
that subscriber receives more than one
service. For instance, a subscriber
receiving both wireline and telephone
service and broadband would be
counted as a single subscriber.
72. Each applicant seeking a rural
service provider bidding credit must
disclose the number of its subscribers,
along with the number of subscribers of
its affiliates, controlling interests, and
the affiliates of its controlling interests.
The applicant must also submit an
attachment that lists all parties with
which the applicant has entered into
any spectrum use agreements or
arrangements for any licenses that may
be won by the applicant in Auction 107.
To the extent that an applicant has an
agreement with any disclosable interest
holder for the use of more than 25% of
the spectrum capacity of any license
that may be won in Auction 107, the
identity and the attributable subscribers
of any such disclosable interest holder
must be disclosed. Eligible rural service
providers may form a consortium. If an
applicant is applying as a consortium of
rural service providers, then the
disclosures described in this paragraph,
including the certification, must be
provided for each consortium member.
3. Caps on Bidding Credits
73. Eligible applicants claiming either
a small business or rural service
provider bidding credit will be subject
to specified caps on the total amount of
bidding credit discounts that they may
receive. The Commission adopted a $25
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million cap on the total amount of
bidding credit discounts that may be
awarded to an eligible small business,
and a $10 million cap on the total
amount of bidding credit discounts that
may be awarded to an eligible rural
service provider in Auction 107. No
winning designated entity bidder will
receive more than $10 million in
bidding credit discounts in total for
licenses won in markets with a
population of 500,000 or less. To the
extent an applicant seeking a small
business bidding credit does not claim
the full $10 million in bidding credits
in those smaller markets, it may apply
the remaining balance to its winning
bids on licenses in larger markets, up to
the aggregate $25 million cap.
4. Attributable Interests
a. Controlling Interests and Affiliates
74. An applicant’s eligibility for
designated entity benefits is determined
by attributing the gross revenues (for
those seeking small business benefits) or
subscribers (for those seeking rural
service provider benefits) of the
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests. Controlling
interests of an applicant include
individuals and entities with either de
facto or de jure control of the applicant.
Typically, ownership of greater than
50% of an entity’s voting stock
evidences de jure control. De facto
control is determined on a case-by-case
basis based on the totality of the
circumstances. The following are some
common indicia of de facto control: The
entity constitutes or appoints more than
50% of the board of directors or
management committee; the entity has
authority to appoint, promote, demote,
and fire senior executives that control
the day-to-day activities of the licensee;
and the entity plays an integral role in
management decisions.
75. Applicants should refer to section
1.2110(c)(2) of the Commission’s rules
and the FCC Form 175 Instructions to
understand how certain interests are
calculated in determining control for
purposes of attributing gross revenues.
For example, officers and directors of an
applicant are considered to have a
controlling interest in the applicant.
76. Affiliates of an applicant or
controlling interest include an
individual or entity that: (1) Directly or
indirectly controls or has the power to
control the applicant, (2) is directly or
indirectly controlled by the applicant,
(3) is directly or indirectly controlled by
a third party that also controls or has the
power to control the applicant, or (4)
has an ‘‘identity of interest’’ with the
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applicant. The Commission’s definition
of an affiliate of the applicant
encompasses both controlling interests
of the applicant and affiliates of
controlling interests of the applicant.
77. An applicant seeking a small
business bidding credit must
demonstrate its eligibility for the
bidding credit by: (1) Meeting the
applicable small business size standard,
based on the controlling interest and
affiliation rules, and (2) retaining
control, on a license-by-license basis,
over the spectrum associated with the
licenses for which it seeks small
business benefits. Control and affiliation
may arise through, among other things,
ownership interests, voting interests,
management and other operating
agreements, or the terms of any other
types of agreements—including
spectrum lease agreements—that
independently or together create a
controlling, or potentially controlling,
interest in the applicant’s or licensee’s
business as a whole. Except under the
limited provisions provided for
spectrum manager lessors, the
Commission’s decision to discontinue
its policy requiring designated entity
licensees to operate as primarily
facilities-based providers of service
directly to the public does not alter the
rules that require the Commission to
consider whether any particular use
agreement may confer control of or
create affiliation with the applicant.
Once an applicant demonstrates
eligibility as a small business under the
first prong, it must also be eligible for
benefits on a license-by-license basis
under the second prong. As part of
making the FCC Form 175 certification
that it is qualified as a designated entity
under section 1.2110, an applicant is
certifying that it does not have any
spectrum use or other agreements that
would confer either de jure or de facto
control of any license it seeks to acquire
with bidding credits. For instance, if an
applicant has a spectrum use agreement
on a particular license that calls into
question whether, under the
Commission’s affiliation rules, the
user’s revenues should be attributed to
the applicant for that particular license,
rather than for its overall business
operations, the applicant could be
ineligible to acquire or retain benefits
with respect to that particular license.
78. If an applicant executes a
spectrum use agreement that does not
comply with the Commission’s relevant
standard of de facto control, then it will
be subject to unjust enrichment
obligations for the benefits associated
with that particular license, as well as
the penalties associated with any
violation of section 310(d) of the
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Communications Act and related
regulations, which require Commission
approval of transfers of control.
Although in this scenario the applicant
may not be eligible for a bidding credit
and may be subject to the Commission’s
unjust enrichment rules, the applicant
need not be eligible for small business
benefits on each of the spectrum
licenses it holds in order to demonstrate
its overall eligibility for such benefits. If
that spectrum use agreement (either
alone or in combination with the
designated entity controlling interest
and attribution rules) goes so far as to
confer control of the applicant’s overall
business, then the gross revenues of the
additional interest holders will be
attributed to the applicant, which could
render the applicant ineligible for all
current and future small business
benefits on all licenses. The
Commission applies the same de facto
control standard to designated entity
spectrum manager lessors that is
applied to non-designated entity
spectrum manager lessors.
b. Limitation on Spectrum Use
79. The gross revenues (or the
subscribers, in the case of a rural service
provider) of an applicant’s disclosable
interest holder are attributable to the
applicant, on a license-by-license basis,
if the disclosable interest holder has an
agreement with the applicant to use, in
any manner, more than 25% of the
spectrum capacity of any license won by
the applicant and acquired with a
bidding credit during the five-year
unjust enrichment period for the
applicable license. A disclosable
interest holder of an applicant seeking
designated entity benefits is defined as
any individual or entity holding a 10%
or greater interest of any kind in the
applicant, including but not limited to,
a 10% or greater interest in any class of
stock, warrants, options, or debt
securities in the applicant or licensee.
Any applicant seeking a bidding credit
for licenses won in Auction 107 will be
subject to this attribution rule and must
make the requisite disclosures.
80. Certain disclosable interest
holders may be excluded from this
attribution rule. An applicant claiming
the rural service provider bidding credit
may have spectrum license use
agreements with a disclosable interest
holder, without having to attribute the
disclosable interest holder’s subscribers,
so long as the disclosable interest holder
is independently eligible for a rural
service provider credit and the use
agreement is otherwise permissible
under the Commission’s existing rules.
If applicable, the applicant must attach
to its FCC Form 175 any additional
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information as may be required to
indicate any license (or license area)
that may be subject to this attribution
rule or to demonstrate its eligibility for
the exception from this attribution rule.
The Commission intends to withhold
from public disclosure all information
contained in any such attachments until
after the close of Auction 107.
c. Exceptions From Attribution Rules for
Small Businesses and Rural Service
Providers
81. Applicants claiming designated
entity benefits may be eligible for
certain exceptions from the
Commission’s attribution rules. For
example, in calculating an applicant’s
gross revenues under the controlling
interest standard, the Commission will
not attribute to the applicant the
personal net worth, including personal
income, of its officers and directors. To
the extent that the officers and directors
of the applicant are controlling interest
holders of other entities, the gross
revenues of those entities will be
attributed to the applicant. Moreover, if
an officer or director operates a separate
business, the gross revenues derived
from that separate business would be
attributed to the applicant, although any
personal income from such separate
business would not be attributed. The
Commission has also exempted from
attribution to the applicant the gross
revenues of the affiliates of a rural
telephone cooperative’s officers and
directors, if certain conditions specified
in section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii) of the
Commission’s rules are met. An
applicant claiming this exemption must
provide, in an attachment, an
affirmative statement that the applicant,
affiliate and/or controlling interest is an
eligible rural telephone cooperative
within the meaning of section
1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and the applicant must
supply any additional information as
may be required to demonstrate
eligibility for the exemption from the
attribution rule.
82. An applicant claiming a rural
service provider bidding credit may be
eligible for an exception from the
Commission’s attribution rules as an
existing rural partnership. To qualify for
this exception, an applicant must be a
rural partnership providing service as of
July 16, 2015, and each member of the
rural partnership must individually
have fewer than 250,000 combined
wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable
subscribers. The Commission will
evaluate eligibility for an existing rural
wireless partnership on the same basis
as it would for an applicant applying for
a bidding credit as a consortium of rural
service providers. A partnership that
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includes a nationwide provider as a
member will not be eligible for the
benefit. Members of such partnerships
that fall under this exception may also
apply as individual applicants or
members of a consortium (to the extent
that it is otherwise permissible to do so
under the Commission’s rules) and seek
eligibility for a rural service provider
bidding credit.
83. A consortium of small businesses
or rural service providers may seek an
exception from the Commission’s
attribution rules. A consortium of small
businesses or rural service providers is
a conglomerate organization composed
of two or more entities, each of which
individually satisfies the definition of
small business or rural service provider.
A consortium must provide additional
information for each member
demonstrating each member’s eligibility
for the claimed bidding credit in order
to show that the applicant satisfies the
eligibility criteria for the bidding credit.
The gross revenue or subscriber
information of each consortium member
will not be aggregated for purposes of
determining the consortium’s eligibility
for the claimed bidding credit. This
information must be provided to ensure
that each consortium member qualifies
for the bidding credit sought by the
consortium.
I. Provisions Regarding Former and
Current Defaulters
84. Each applicant must make
certifications regarding whether it is a
current or former defaulter or
delinquent. A current defaulter or
delinquent is not eligible to participate
in Auction 107, but a former defaulter
or delinquent may participate so long as
it is otherwise qualified and makes an
upfront payment that is 50% more than
would otherwise be necessary. An
applicant is considered a current
defaulter or a current delinquent when
it, any of its affiliates, any of its
controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of its controlling interests, is in
default on any payment for any
Commission construction permit or
license (including a down payment) or
is delinquent on any non-tax debt owed
to any Federal agency as of the filing
deadline for auction applications. Nontax debt owed to any Federal agency
includes, within the meaning of the
rule, all amounts owed under Federal
programs, including contributions to the
Universal Service Fund (USF),
Telecommunications Relay Services
Fund, and the North American
Numbering Plan Administration,
notwithstanding that the administrator
of any such fund may not be considered
a Federal ‘‘agency’’ under the Debt
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Collection Improvement Act of 1996.
For example, an applicant with a past
due USF contribution as of the auction
application filing deadline would be
disqualified from participating in
Auction 107 under the Commission’s
rules. If the applicant cures the overdue
debt prior to the auction application
filing deadline (and such debt does not
fall within one of the exclusions
described in section 1.2105(a)(2)(xii)), it
may be eligible to participate in Auction
107 as a former defaulter. Each
applicant must certify under penalty of
perjury on its FCC Form 175 that it, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and
the affiliates of its controlling interests
are not in default on any payment for a
Commission construction permit or
license (including down payments) and
that it is not delinquent on any non-tax
debt owed to any Federal agency.
Additionally, an applicant must certify
under penalty of perjury whether it
(along with its controlling interests) has
ever been in default on any payment for
a Commission construction permit or
license (including down payments) or
has ever been delinquent on any non-tax
debt owed to any Federal agency,
subject to the exclusions. The term
‘‘controlling interest’’ is defined in
section 1.2105(a)(4)(i) of the
Commission rules.
85. An applicant is considered a
former defaulter or a former delinquent
when, as of the FCC Form 175 deadline,
the applicant or any of its controlling
interests has defaulted on any
Commission construction permit or
license or has been delinquent on any
non-tax debt owed to any Federal
agency, but has since remedied all such
defaults and cured all of the outstanding
non-tax delinquencies. The applicant
may exclude from consideration any
cured default on a Commission
construction permit or license or cured
delinquency on a non-tax debt owed to
a Federal agency for which any of the
following criteria are met: (1) The notice
of the final payment deadline or
delinquency was received more than
seven years before the FCC Form 175
filing deadline, (2) the default or
delinquency amounted to less than
$100,000, (3) the default or delinquency
was paid within two quarters (i.e., six
months) after receiving the notice of the
final payment deadline or delinquency,
or (4) the default or delinquency was the
subject of a legal or arbitration
proceeding and was cured upon
resolution of the proceeding. Notice to
a debtor may include notice of a final
payment deadline or notice of
delinquency and may be express or
implied depending on the origin of any
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Federal non-tax debt giving rise to a
default or delinquency. The date of
receipt of the notice of a final default
deadline or delinquency by the
intended party or debtor will be used for
purposes of verifying receipt of notice.
A debt will not be deemed to be in
default or delinquent until after the
expiration of a final payment deadline.
To the extent that the rules providing
for payment of a specific federal debt
permit payment after an original
payment deadline accompanied by late
fee(s), such debts would not be in
default or delinquent for purposes of
applying the former defaulter rules until
after the late payment deadline. Any
winning bidder that fails to timely pay
its post-auction down payment or the
balance of its final winning bid
amount(s) or is disqualified for any
reason after the close of an auction will
be in default and subject to a default
payment. Commission staff provide
individual notice of the amount of such
a default payment as well as procedures
and information required by the Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1996,
including the payment due date and any
charges, interest, and/or penalties that
accrue in the event of delinquency.
Such notice provided by Commission
staff assessing a default payment arising
out of a default on a winning bid,
constitutes notice of the final payment
deadline with respect to a default on a
Commission license.
86. Applicants are encouraged to
review previous guidance on default
and delinquency disclosure
requirements in the context of the
auction short-form application process.
Parties are also encouraged to consult
with Auctions Division staff if they have
any questions about default and
delinquency disclosure requirements.
87. The Commission considers
outstanding debts owed to the United
States Government, in any amount, to be
a serious matter. The Commission has
previously adopted rules, including a
provision referred to as the ‘‘red light
rule,’’ that implement its obligations
under the Debt Collection Improvement
Act of 1996, which governs the
collection of debts owed to the United
States. Under the red light rule,
applications and other requests for
benefits filed by parties that have
outstanding debts owed to the
Commission will not be processed. The
Commission’s adoption of the red light
rule does not alter the applicability of
any of its competitive bidding rules,
including the provisions and
certifications of sections 1.2105 and
1.2106, with regard to current and
former defaults or delinquencies.
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88. The Commission’s Red Light
Display System, which provides
information regarding debts currently
owed to the Commission, may not be
determinative of an auction applicant’s
ability to comply with the default and
delinquency disclosure requirements of
section 1.2105. Thus, while the red light
rule ultimately may prevent the
processing of long-form applications by
auction winners, an auction applicant’s
lack of current red light status is not
necessarily determinative of its
eligibility to participate in an auction
(or whether it may be subject to an
increased upfront payment obligation).
A prospective applicant in Auction 107
should note that any long-form
applications filed after the close of
bidding will be reviewed for compliance
with the Commission’s red light rule,
and such review may result in the
dismissal of a winning bidder’s longform application. Applicants that have
their long-form applications dismissed
will be deemed to have defaulted and
will be subject to default payments
under sections 1.2104(g) and 1.2109(c)
of the Commission’s rules. Each
applicant should carefully review all
records and other available Federal
agency databases and information
sources to determine whether the
applicant, or any of its affiliates, or any
of its controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of its controlling interests,
owes or was ever delinquent in the
payment of non-tax debt owed to any
Federal agency. To access the
Commission’s Red Light Display
System, go to: https://apps.fcc.gov/
redlight/login.cfm.
J. Optional Applicant Status
Identification
89. Applicants owned by members of
minority groups and/or women, as
defined in section 1.2110(c)(3), and
rural telephone companies, as defined
in section 1.2110(c)(4), may identify
themselves regarding this status in
filling out their FCC Form 175
applications. This applicant status
information is collected for statistical
purposes only and assists the
Commission in monitoring the
participation of various groups in its
auctions.
K. Modifications to FCC Form 175
1. Only Minor Modifications Allowed
90. After the initial FCC Form 175
filing deadline, an Auction 107
applicant will be permitted to make
only minor changes to its application
consistent with the Commission’s rules.
Minor amendments include any changes
that are not major, such as correcting
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53219
typographical errors and supplying or
correcting information as requested to
support the certifications made in the
application. Examples of minor changes
include the deletion or addition of
authorized bidders (to a maximum of
three) and the revision of addresses and
telephone numbers of the applicant, its
responsible party, and its contact
person. Major modification to an FCC
Form 175 (e.g., change of PEA selection,
certain changes in ownership that
would constitute an assignment or
transfer of control of the applicant,
change in the required certifications,
change in applicant’s legal classification
that results in a change in control, or
change in claimed eligibility for a higher
percentage of bidding credit) will not be
permitted after the initial FCC Form 175
filing deadline. If an amendment
reporting changes is a ‘‘major
amendment,’’ as described in section
1.2105(b)(2), the major amendment will
not be accepted and may result in the
dismissal of the application. Any
change in control of an applicant will be
considered a major modification, and
the application will consequently be
dismissed. Even if an applicant’s FCC
Form 175 is dismissed, the applicant
would remain subject to the
communication prohibitions of section
1.2105(c) until the down payment
deadline for Auction 107.
2. Duty To Maintain Accuracy and
Completeness of FCC Form 175
91. Each applicant has a continuing
obligation to maintain the accuracy and
completeness of information furnished
in a pending application, including a
pending application to participate in
Auction 107. An applicant’s FCC Form
175 and associated attachments will
remain pending until the release of a
public notice announcing the close of
the auction. Auction 107 applicants
remain subject to the section 1.2105(c)
prohibition on certain communications
until the post-auction deadline for
making down payments on winning
bids in Auction 107. An applicant’s
post-auction application (FCC Form
601) is considered pending from the
time it is accepted for filing by the
Commission until a Commission grant
or denial of the application is no longer
subject to reconsideration by the
Commission or to review by any court.
An applicant for Auction 107 must
furnish additional or corrected
information to the Commission within
five business days after a significant
occurrence or amend its FCC Form 175
no more than five business days after
the applicant becomes aware of the need
for the amendment. An applicant is
obligated to amend its pending
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application even if a reported change
may result in the dismissal of the
application because it is subsequently
determined to be a major modification.
3. Modifying an FCC Form 175
92. A party seeking to participate in
Auction 107 must file an FCC Form 175
electronically via the FCC’s Auction
Application System. During the initial
filing window, an applicant will be able
to make any necessary modifications to
its FCC Form 175 in the Auction
Application System. An applicant that
has certified and submitted its FCC
Form 175 before the close of the initial
filing window may continue to make
modifications as often as necessary until
the close of that window; the applicant
must re-certify and re-submit its FCC
Form 175 before the close of the initial
filing window to confirm and effect its
latest application changes. After each
submission, a confirmation page will be
displayed stating the submission time
and submission date. Applicants are
advised to retain a copy of this
confirmation page.
93. An applicant will also be allowed
to modify its FCC Form 175 in the
Auction Application System, except for
certain fields, during the resubmission
filing window and after the release of
the public notice announcing the
qualified bidders for an auction. An
applicant will not be allowed to modify
electronically in the Auction
Application System the applicant’s legal
classification, the applicant’s name, or
the certifying official. During the
resubmission filing window and after
the release of the public notice
announcing the qualified bidders for an
auction, if an applicant needs to make
permissible minor changes to its FCC
Form 175 or must make changes in
order to maintain the accuracy and
completeness of its application pursuant
to sections 1.65 and 1.2105(b)(4), then it
must make the change(s) in the Auction
Application System and re-certify and
re-submit its application to confirm and
effect the change(s).
94. An applicant’s ability to modify
its FCC Form 175 in the Auction
Application System will be limited
between the closing of the initial filing
window and the opening of the
application resubmission filing window,
and between the closing of the
resubmission filing window and the
release of the public notice announcing
the qualified bidders for an auction.
During these periods, an applicant will
be able to view its submitted
application, but will be permitted to
modify only the applicant’s address,
responsible party address, and contact
information (e.g., name, address,
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telephone number, etc.) in the Auction
Application System. An applicant will
not be able to modify any other pages
of the FCC Form 175 in the Auction
Application System during these
periods. If, during these periods, an
applicant needs to make other
permissible minor changes to its FCC
Form 175, or changes to maintain the
accuracy and completeness of its
application, the applicant must submit
a letter briefly summarizing the changes
to its FCC Form 175 via email to
auction107@fcc.gov. The email
summarizing the changes must include
a subject line referring to Auction 107
and the name of the applicant, for
example, ‘‘Re: Changes to Auction 107
Auction Application of XYZ Corp.’’ Any
attachments to the email must be
formatted as Adobe® Acrobat® (PDF) or
Microsoft® Word documents. An
applicant that submits its changes in
this manner must subsequently modify,
certify, and submit its FCC Form 175
application(s) electronically in the
Auction Application System once it is
again open and available to applicants.
95. Applicants should also note that
even at times when the Auction
Application System is open and
available to applicants, the system will
not allow an applicant to make certain
other permissible changes itself (e.g.,
correcting a misstatement of the
applicant’s legal classification). If an
applicant needs to make a permissible
minor change of this nature, then it
must submit a written request by email
to the Auctions Division Chief, via
auction107@fcc.gov, requesting that the
Commission manually make the change
on the applicant’s behalf. Once
Commission staff has informed the
applicant that the change has been made
in the Auction Application System, the
applicant must then re-certify and resubmit its FCC Form 175 in the Auction
Application System to confirm and
effect the change(s).
96. Any amendment(s) to the
application and related statements of
fact must be certified by an authorized
representative of the applicant with
authority to bind the applicant.
Submission of any such amendment or
related statement of fact constitutes a
representation by the person certifying
that he or she is an authorized
representative with such authority and
that the contents of the amendment or
statement of fact are true and correct.
97. Applicants must not submit
application-specific material through
the Commission’s Electronic Comment
Filing System. Parties submitting
information related to their applications
should use caution to ensure that their
submissions do not contain confidential
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information or communicate
information that would violate section
1.2105(c) or the limited information
procedures adopted for Auction 107. An
applicant seeking to submit, outside of
the Auction Application System,
information that might reflect nonpublic information, such as an
applicant’s PEA selection(s), upfront
payment amount, or bidding eligibility,
should consider including in its email a
request that the filing or portions of the
filing be withheld from public
inspection until the end of the
prohibition on certain communications.
98. Questions about FCC Form 175
amendments should be directed to the
Auctions Division at (202) 418–0660.
III. Preparing for Bidding in Auction
107
A. Due Diligence
99. Each potential bidder is solely
responsible for investigating and
evaluating all technical and marketplace
factors that may have a bearing on the
value of the licenses that it is seeking in
Auction 107. The Commission makes no
representations or warranties about the
use of this spectrum or these licenses for
particular services. Each applicant
should be aware that a Commission
auction represents an opportunity to
become a Commission licensee, subject
to certain conditions and regulations.
This includes the established authority
of the Commission to alter the terms of
existing licenses by rulemaking, which
is equally applicable to licenses
awarded by auction. A Commission
auction does not constitute an
endorsement by the Commission of any
particular service, technology, or
product, nor does a Commission license
constitute a guarantee of business
success.
100. An applicant should perform its
due diligence research and analysis
before proceeding, as it would with any
new business venture. Each potential
bidder should perform technical
analyses and/or refresh its previous
analyses to assure itself that, should it
become a winning bidder for any
Auction 107 license, it will be able to
build and operate facilities that will
fully comply with all applicable
technical and legal requirements. Each
applicant should inspect any
prospective sites for communications
facilities located in, or near, the
geographic area for which it plans to
bid, confirm the availability of such
sites, and to familiarize itself with the
Commission’s rules regarding the
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the National Historic
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Preservation Act (NHPA), and other
environmental statutes.
101. Each applicant in Auction 107
should continue to conduct its own
research throughout the auction in order
to determine the existence of pending or
future administrative or judicial
proceedings that might affect its
decision on continued participation in
the auction. Each applicant is
responsible for assessing the likelihood
of the various possible outcomes and for
considering the potential impact on
licenses available in an auction. The
due diligence considerations mentioned
in the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice do not constitute an exhaustive
list of steps that should be undertaken
prior to participating in Auction 107.
The burden is on the potential bidder to
determine how much research to
undertake, depending upon the specific
facts and circumstances related to its
interests. For example, applicants
should pay particular attention to the
framework adopted in the 3.7 GHz
Report and Order that requires new
overlay licensees to pay a specified
share of accelerated relocation payments
as well as relocation expenses to
reimburse incumbents for the
reasonable costs of transitioning out of
the lower 300 megahertz of the band in
the contiguous United States.
102. Applicants are solely responsible
for identifying associated risks and for
investigating and evaluating the degree
to which such matters may affect their
ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or
make use of the licenses available in
Auction 107. Each potential bidder is
responsible for undertaking research to
ensure that any licenses won in the
auction will be suitable for its business
plans and needs. Each potential bidder
must undertake its own assessment of
the relevance and importance of
information gathered as part of its due
diligence efforts.
103. The Commission makes no
representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of
information in its databases or any
third-party databases, including, for
example, court docketing systems. To
the extent the Commission’s databases
may not include all information deemed
necessary or desirable by an applicant,
it must obtain or verify such
information from independent sources
or assume the risk of any
incompleteness or inaccuracy in said
databases. Furthermore, the
Commission makes no representations
or guarantees regarding the accuracy or
completeness of information that has
been provided by incumbent licensees
and incorporated into its databases.
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B. Licensing Considerations
1. Transition of Incumbent Operations
104. Potential applicants in Auction
107 should consider carefully the
process for transitioning incumbent
operations out of the 3.7–3.98 GHz band
when developing business plans,
assessing market conditions, and
evaluating the availability of equipment
for 3.7 GHz Service operations. Each
applicant should follow closely releases
from the Commission concerning these
issues and consider carefully the
technical and economic implications for
commercial use of the 3.7–3.98 GHz
band.
2. International Coordination
105. Potential bidders seeking
licenses for geographic areas adjacent to
the Canadian and Mexican borders
should be aware that the use of the 3.7
GHz Service frequencies they acquire in
Auction 107 are subject to current and
future agreements with the governments
of Canada and Mexico.
106. The Commission routinely works
with the United States Department of
State and Canadian and Mexican
government officials to ensure the
efficient use of the spectrum as well as
interference-free operations in the
border areas near Canada and Mexico.
Until such time as any adjusted
agreements, as needed, between the
United States, Mexico, and/or Canada
can be agreed to, operations in the 3.7–
3.98 GHz band must not cause harmful
interference across the border,
consistent with the terms of the
agreements currently in force.
3. Environmental Review Requirements
107. Licensees must comply with the
Commission’s rules for environmental
review under the NEPA, the NHPA, and
other environmental statutes. Licensees
and other applicants that propose to
build certain types of communications
facilities for licensed service must
follow Commission procedures
implementing obligations under NEPA
and NHPA prior to constructing the
facilities. Under NEPA, a licensee or
applicant must assess if certain
environmentally sensitive conditions
specified in the Commission’s rules are
relevant to the proposed facilities, and
prepare an environmental assessment
when applicable. This assessment may
require consultation with expert
agencies having environmental
responsibilities, such as U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, among others. If
an environmental assessment is
required, then facilities may not be
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constructed until environmental
processing is completed. Under NHPA,
a licensee or applicant must follow the
procedures in section 1.1320 of the
Commission’s rules, the Nationwide
Programmatic Agreement for
Collocation of Wireless Antennas and
the Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement Regarding the Section 106
National Historic Preservation Act
Review Process. Compliance with
section 106 of the NHPA requires tribal
consultation, and if construction of the
communications facilities would have
adverse effects on historic or tribally
significant properties, an environmental
assessment must be prepared.
4. Mobile Spectrum Holdings Policies
108. Bidders are reminded of the
Commission’s mobile spectrum
holdings policies applicable to the 3.7–
3.98 GHz band. Specifically, the
Commission did not impose a preauction bright-line limit on acquisitions
of the 3.7–3.98 GHz band. Instead, the
Commission incorporated into the
spectrum screen the 280 megahertz of
spectrum available in the 3.7–3.98 GHz
band. The Commission will also
perform case-by-case review of the longform license applications filed as a
result of Auction 107.
C. Bidder Education
109. Before the opening of the shortform filing window for Auction 107,
detailed educational information will be
provided in various formats to would-be
participants on the Auction 107 web
page. OEA will provide various
materials on the pre-bidding processes
in advance of the opening of the shortform application window, beginning
with the release of step-by-step
instructions for completing the FCC
Form 175, which OEA has made
available in the Education section of the
Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/
auction/107. OEA will provide an
online application procedures tutorial
for the auction, covering information on
pre-bidding preparation, completing
short-form applications, and the
application review process.
110. In advance of the start of the
mock auction, OEA will provide
educational materials on the bidding
procedures for Auction 107, beginning
with release of a user guide for the
bidding system and bidding system file
formats, followed by an online bidding
procedures tutorial. The educational
materials shall be released as soon as
reasonably possible to provide potential
applicants and bidders with time to
understand them and ask questions
before bidding begins.
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111. The online tutorials will allow
viewers to navigate the presentation
outline, review written notes, and listen
to audio of the notes. Additional
features of this web-based tool include
links to auction-specific Commission
releases, email links for contacting
Commission staff, and screen shots of
the online application and bidding
systems. The online tutorials will be
accessible in the Education section of
the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/
auction/107. Once posted, the tutorials
will be accessible anytime.
D. Short-Form Applications: Due Before
6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020
112. In order to be eligible to bid in
Auction 107, an applicant must first
follow the procedures to submit a shortform application (FCC Form 175)
electronically via the Auction
Application System, following the
instructions set forth in the FCC Form
175 Instructions. The short-form
application will become available with
the opening of the initial filing window
and must be submitted prior to 6:00
p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. Late
applications will not be accepted. No
application fee is required.
113. Applications may be filed at any
time beginning at noon ET on
September 9, 2020, until the filing
window closes at 6:00 p.m. ET on
September 22, 2020. Applicants should
file early and are responsible for
allowing adequate time for filing their
applications. There are no limits or
restrictions on the number of times an
application can be updated or amended
until the initial filing deadline on
September 22, 2020.
114. An applicant must always click
on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button on
the ‘‘Certify & Submit’’ screen to
successfully submit its FCC Form 175
and any modifications; otherwise the
application or changes to the
application will not be received or
reviewed by Commission staff.
Additional information about accessing,
completing, and viewing the FCC Form
175 is provided in the FCC Form 175
Instructions. Applicants requiring
technical assistance should contact FCC
Auctions Technical Support at (877)
480–3201, option nine; (202) 414–1250;
or (202) 414–1255 (text telephone
(TTY)); hours of service are Monday
through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. ET. All calls to Technical Support
are recorded.
115. Applicants are cautioned that the
Commission periodically performs
scheduled maintenance of its IT
systems. During scheduled maintenance
activities, which typically occur over
the weekends, every effort is made to
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minimize any downtime to auctionrelated systems, including the Auction
Application System. However, there are
occasions when auction-related systems
may be temporarily unavailable.
E. Application Processing and Minor
Modifications
1. Public Notice of Applicants’ Initial
Application Status and Opportunity for
Minor Modifications
116. After the deadline for filing
auction applications, the Commission
will process all timely submitted
applications to determine whether each
applicant has complied with the
application requirements and provided
all information concerning its
qualifications for bidding. OEA will
issue a public notice with applicants’
initial application status, identifying: (1)
Those that are complete; and (2) those
that are incomplete or deficient because
of defects that may be corrected. The
public notice will include the deadline
for resubmitting corrected applications
and an electronic copy will be sent by
email to the contact address listed in the
FCC Form 175 for each applicant. In
addition, each applicant with an
incomplete application will be sent
information on the nature of the
deficiencies in its application, along
with the name and contact information
of a Commission staff member who can
answer questions specific to the
application.
117. After the initial application filing
deadline on September 22, 2020,
applicants can make only minor
modifications to their applications.
Major modifications (e.g., change of PEA
selection, certain changes in ownership
that would constitute an assignment or
transfer of control of the applicant,
change in the required certifications,
change in applicant’s legal classification
that results in a change in control, or
change in claimed eligibility for a higher
percentage of bidding credit) will not be
permitted. After the deadline for
resubmitting corrected applications, an
applicant will have no further
opportunity to cure any deficiencies in
its application or provide any additional
information that may affect Commission
staff’s ultimate determination of
whether and to what extent the
applicant is qualified to participate in
Auction 107.
118. Commission staff will
communicate only with an applicant’s
contact person or certifying official, as
designated on the applicant’s FCC Form
175, unless the applicant’s certifying
official or contact person notifies
Commission staff in writing that another
representative is authorized to speak on
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the applicant’s behalf. In no event,
however, will the Commission send
auction registration materials to anyone
other than the contact person listed on
the applicant’s FCC Form 175 or
respond to a request for replacement
registration materials from anyone other
than the authorized bidder, contact
person, or certifying official listed on
the applicant’s FCC Form 175.
Authorizations may be sent by email to
auction107@fcc.gov.
2. Public Notice of Applicants’ Final
Application Status After Upfront
Payment Deadline
119. After Commission staff reviews
resubmitted applications and upfront
payments, OEA will release a public
notice identifying applicants that have
become qualified bidders for the
auction. A Qualified Bidders Public
Notice will be issued before bidding in
the auction begins. Qualified bidders are
those applicants with submitted FCC
Form 175 applications that are deemed
timely filed and complete and that have
made a sufficient upfront payment.
F. Upfront Payments
120. In order to be eligible to bid in
Auction 107, a sufficient upfront
payment and a complete and accurate
FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC
Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be
submitted before 6:00 p.m. ET on
November 2, 2020. After completing its
short-form application, an applicant
will have access to an electronic prefilled version of the FCC Form 159. An
accurate and complete FCC Form 159
must accompany each payment. Proper
completion of this form is critical to
ensuring correct crediting of upfront
payments. Payers using the pre-filled
FCC Form 159 are responsible for
ensuring that all the information on the
form, including payment amounts, is
accurate. Instructions for completing
FCC Form 159 for Auction 107 are
provided in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice.
1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire
Transfer for Auction 107
121. Upfront payments for Auction
107 must be wired to, and will be
deposited in, the U.S. Treasury.
122. Wire transfer payments for
Auction 107 must be received before
6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. An
applicant must initiate the wire transfer
through its bank, authorizing the bank
to wire funds from the applicant’s
account to the proper account at the
U.S. Treasury. No other payment
method is acceptable. To avoid
untimely payments, applicants should
discuss arrangements (including bank
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closing schedules and other specific
bank wire transfer requirements, such as
an in-person written request before a
specified time of day) with their bankers
several days before they plan to make
the wire transfer, and must allow
sufficient time for the transfer to be
initiated and completed before the
deadline. The information needed to
place an order for a wire transfer is set
forth in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice.
123. At least one hour before placing
the order for the wire transfer (but on
the same business day), applicants must
print and fax a completed FCC Form
159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202)
418–2843. Alternatively, the completed
form can be scanned and sent as an
attachment to an email to
RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov. On the fax
cover sheet or in the email subject
header, write ‘‘Wire Transfer—Auction
Payment for Auction 107’’. To meet the
upfront payment deadline, an
applicant’s payment must be credited to
the Commission’s account for Auction
107 before the deadline.
124. Each applicant is responsible for
ensuring timely submission of its
upfront payment and for timely filing of
an accurate and complete FCC Form
159. An applicant should coordinate
with its financial institution well ahead
of the due date regarding its wire
transfer and allow sufficient time for the
transfer to be initiated and completed
prior to the deadline. Among other
things, each applicant is cautioned to
plan ahead regarding any potential
delays in its or its financial institution’s
ability to complete wire transfers due to
the COVID–19 pandemic. The
Commission repeatedly has cautioned
auction participants about the
importance of planning ahead to
prepare for unforeseen last-minute
difficulties in making payments by wire
transfer. Each applicant also is
responsible for obtaining confirmation
from its financial institution that its
wire transfer to the U.S. Treasury was
successful and from Commission staff
that its upfront payment was timely
received and that it was deposited into
the proper account. To receive
confirmation from Commission staff,
contact Scott Radcliffe of the Office of
Managing Director’s Revenue &
Receivables Operations Group/Auctions
at (202) 418–7518 or Theresa Meeks at
(202) 418–2945.
125. All payments must be made in
U.S. dollars. All payments must be
made by wire transfer. Upfront
payments for Auction 107 go to an
account number different from the
accounts used in previous FCC auctions.
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126. Failure to deliver a sufficient
upfront payment as instructed herein by
the upfront payment deadline will
result in dismissal of the short-form
application and disqualification from
participation in the auction.
2. Completing and Submitting FCC
Form 159
127. Information that supplements the
standard instructions for FCC Form 159
(Revised 2/03) is provided in the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice to
help ensure correct completion of FCC
Form 159 for upfront payments for
Auction 107. Applicants need to
complete FCC Form 159 carefully,
because mistakes may affect bidding
eligibility and lack of consistency
between information provided in FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03), FCC Form
175, long-form application (FCC Form
601), and correspondence about an
application may cause processing
delays. Appropriate cross-references
between the FCC Form Remittance
Advise and the short-form application
are described in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice.
3. Upfront Payments and Bidding
Eligibility
128. An upfront payment is a
refundable deposit made by each
applicant seeking to participate in
bidding to establish its eligibility to bid
on licenses.
129. Applicants that are former
defaulters must pay upfront payments
50% greater than non-former defaulters.
For purposes of this classification as a
former defaulter or a former delinquent,
defaults and delinquencies of the
applicant itself and its controlling
interests are included.
130. An applicant must make an
upfront payment sufficient to obtain
bidding eligibility on the generic blocks
on which it will bid. Upfront payments
are based on MHz-pops, and the amount
of the upfront payment submitted by an
applicant will determine its initial
bidding eligibility, the maximum
number of bidding units on which a
bidder may place bids in any single
round. In order to bid for a block,
qualified bidders must have a current
eligibility level that meets or exceeds
the number of bidding units assigned to
that generic block in a PEA. At a
minimum, an applicant’s total upfront
payment must be enough to establish
eligibility to bid on at least one block in
one of the PEAs selected on its FCC
Form 175 for Auction 107, or else the
applicant will not become qualified to
participate in the auction. The total
upfront payment does not affect the
total dollar amount the bidder may bid.
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131. Upfront payments for a generic
block in a PEA are based on $0.015 per
MHz-pop for PEAs 1–50, $0.0030 per
MHz-pop for PEAs 51–100, and $0.0015
per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject
to a minimum of $500. The results of
the upfront payment calculations will
be rounded as follows: Results above
$10,000 will be rounded to the nearest
$1,000; results below $10,000 but above
$1,000 will be rounded to the nearest
$100; and results below $1,000 will be
rounded to the nearest $10. The upfront
payment amount per block in each PEA
is set forth in the Attachment A file,
available at www.fcc.gov/auction/107.
The upfront payment amounts are
approximately half the minimum
opening bid amounts.
132. Each generic block in a PEA is
assigned a specific number of bidding
units, equal to one bidding unit per $10
of the upfront payment. The number of
bidding units for one block in a given
PEA is fixed, since it is based on the
MHz-pops in the block and does not
change during the auction as prices
change. Thus, in calculating its upfront
payment amount, an applicant should
determine the maximum number of
bidding units on which it may wish to
bid in any single round and submit an
upfront payment amount for the auction
covering that number of bidding units.
In some cases, a qualified bidder’s
maximum eligibility may be less than
the amount of its upfront payment
because the qualified bidder has either
previously been in default on a
Commission construction permit or
license or delinquent on non-tax debt
owed to a Federal agency, or has
submitted an upfront payment that
exceeds the total amount of bidding
units associated with the license areas it
selected on its FCC Form 175. In order
to make this calculation, an applicant
should add together the bidding units
for the number of blocks in PEAs on
which it seeks to be active in any given
round. Applicants should check their
calculations carefully, as there is no
provision for increasing a bidder’s
eligibility after the upfront payment
deadline.
133. If an applicant is a former
defaulter, it must calculate its upfront
payment for the maximum amount of
generic blocks in each PEA on which it
plans to bid by multiplying the number
of bidding units on which it wishes to
be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the
number of bidding units to assign to
former defaulters, the Commission will
calculate the number of bidding units a
non-former defaulter would get for the
upfront payment received, divide that
number by 1.5, and round the result up
to the nearest bidding unit. If a former
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defaulter fails to submit a sufficient
upfront payment to establish eligibility
to bid on at least one generic block in
a PEA, the applicant will not be eligible
to participate in Auction 107.
G. Auction Registration
134. All qualified bidders for Auction
107 are automatically registered for the
auction. Registration materials will be
distributed prior to the auction by
overnight delivery. The mailing will be
sent only to the contact person at the
contact address listed in the FCC Form
175 and will include the SecurID®
tokens that will be required to place
bids.
135. Qualified bidders that do not
receive this registration mailing will not
be able to submit bids. Therefore, any
qualified bidder for Auction 107 that
has not received this mailing by noon
on November 25, 2020, should call the
Auctions Hotline at (717) 338–2868.
Receipt of this registration mailing is
critical to participating in the auction,
and each applicant is responsible for
ensuring it has received all the
registration materials.
136. If a SecurID® token is lost or
damaged, only a person who has been
designated as an authorized bidder, the
contact person, or the certifying official
on the applicant’s short-form
application may request a replacement.
To request a replacement, call the
Auction Bidder Line at the telephone
number provided in the registration
materials or the Auction Hotline at (717)
338–2868.
H. Remote Electronic Bidding via the
FCC Auction Bidding System
137. Bidders will be able to
participate in Auction 107 over the
internet using the FCC Auction Bidding
System (bidding system). Bidders will
have the option of placing bids by
telephone through a dedicated auction
bidder line. Please note that the
telephonic bid assistants are required to
use a script when entering bids placed
by telephone. Telephonic bidders are
therefore reminded to allow sufficient
time to bid by placing their calls well in
advance of the close of a round. The
length of a call to place a telephonic bid
may vary; please allow a minimum of 10
minutes. The toll-free telephone number
for the auction bidder line will be
provided to qualified bidders prior to
the stat of bidding in the auction.
138. Only qualified bidders are
permitted to bid. Each authorized
bidder must have his or her own
SecurID® token, which the Commission
will provide at no charge. Each
applicant will be issued three SecurID®
tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his
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or her SecurID® token. In order to access
the bidding function of the bidding
system, bidders must be logged in
during the bidding round using the
passcode generated by the SecurID®
token and a personal identification
number (PIN) created by the bidder.
Bidders are strongly encouraged to print
a bid summary for each round after they
have completed all their activity for that
round. For security purposes, the
SecurID® tokens and a telephone
number for bidding questions are only
mailed to the contact person at the
contact address listed on the FCC Form
175. Each SecurID® token is tailored to
a specific auction. SecurID® tokens
issued for other auctions or obtained
from a source other than the FCC will
not work for Auction 107. The SecurID®
tokens can be recycled, and the
Commission requests that bidders return
the tokens to the FCC. Pre-addressed
envelopes will be provided to return the
tokens once the auction has ended.
139. The Commission makes no
warranties whatsoever and shall not be
deemed to have made any warranties,
with respect to the bidding system,
including any implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event shall the
Commission, or any of its officers,
employees, or agents, be liable for any
damages whatsoever (including, but not
limited to, loss of business profits,
business interruption, loss of use,
revenue, or business information, or any
other direct, indirect, or consequential
damages) arising out of or relating to the
existence, furnishing, functioning, or
use of the bidding system. Moreover, no
obligation or liability will arise out of
the Commission’s technical,
programming, or other advice or service
provided in connection with the
bidding system.
140. To the extent an issue arises with
the bidding system itself, the
Commission will take all appropriate
measures to resolve such issues quickly
and equitably. Should an issue arise that
is outside the bidding system or
attributable to a bidder, including, but
not limited to, a bidder’s hardware,
software, or internet access problem that
prevents the bidder from submitting a
bid prior to the end of a round, the
Commission shall have no obligation to
resolve or remediate such an issue on
behalf of the bidder. Similarly, if an
issue arises due to bidder error using the
bidding system, the Commission shall
have no obligation to resolve or
remediate such an issue on behalf of the
bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a
bidding round, the results of bid
processing will not be altered absent
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evidence of any failure in the bidding
system.
I. Mock Auction
141. All qualified bidders will be
eligible to participate in a mock auction
for the clock phase, which will begin on
December 3, 2020. Only those bidders
that are qualified to participate in
Auction 107 will be eligible to
participate in the mock auction. The
mock auction will enable qualified
bidders to become familiar with the
bidding system and to practice
submitting bids prior to the auction. All
qualified bidders, including all their
authorized bidders, are encouraged to
participate to assure that they can log in
to the bidding system and gain
experience with the bidding procedures.
Participating in the mock auction may
reduce the likelihood of a bidder
making a mistake during the auction.
Details regarding the mock auction will
be announced in the Qualified Bidders
Public Notice for Auction 107.
142. After the clock phase of the
auction concludes, a separate mock
auction for the assignment phase will be
held for those qualified bidders that
won generic blocks in the clock phase.
J. Auction Delay, Suspension, or
Cancellation
143. At any time before or during the
bidding process, OEA, in conjunction
with WTB, may delay, suspend, or
cancel bidding in Auction 107 in the
event of a natural disaster, technical
obstacle, network interruption,
administrative or weather necessity,
evidence of an auction security breach
or unlawful bidding activity, or for any
other reason that affects the fair and
efficient conduct of competitive
bidding. OEA will notify participants of
any such delay, suspension, or
cancellation by public notice and/or
through the bidding system’s
announcement function. If the bidding
is delayed or suspended, then OEA may,
in its sole discretion, elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of
the current round or from some
previous round, or cancel the auction in
its entirety. OEA and WTB will exercise
this authority at their discretion.
K. Fraud Alert
144. As is the case with many
business investment opportunities,
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may
attempt to use Auction 107 to deceive
and defraud unsuspecting investors.
Common warning signals of fraud
include the following:
• The first contact is a ‘‘cold call’’
from a telemarketer or is made in
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response to an inquiry prompted by a
radio or television infomercial.
• The offering materials used to
invest in the venture appear to be
targeted at IRA funds, for example, by
including all documents and papers
needed for the transfer of funds
maintained in IRA accounts.
• The amount of investment is less
than $25,000.
• The sales representative makes
verbal representations that: (a) The
Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or
other government agency has approved
the investment; (b) the investment is not
subject to state or federal securities
laws; or (c) the investment will yield
unrealistically high short-term profits.
In addition, the offering materials often
include copies of actual FCC releases, or
quotes from FCC personnel, giving the
appearance of FCC knowledge or
approval of the solicitation.
145. Information about deceptive
telemarketing investment schemes is
available from the FCC, as well as the
FTC and SEC. Additional sources of
information for potential bidders and
investors may be obtained from the
following sources:
• The FCC’s Consumer Call Center at
(888) 225–5322 or by visiting
www.fcc.gov/general/frauds-scams-andalerts-guides.
• the FTC at (877) FTC–HELP ((877)
382–4357) or by visiting
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0238investment-risks.
• the SEC at (202) 942–7040 or by
visiting www.sec.gov/investor.
146. Complaints about specific
deceptive telemarketing investment
schemes should be directed to the FTC,
the SEC, or the National Fraud
Information Center at (202) 835–0618.
IV. Bidding Procedures
147. Auction 107 will be conducted
using an ascending clock auction design
with two phases. The first phase of the
auction—the clock phase—will consist
of successive clock bidding rounds in
which bidders indicate their demands
for a number of generic license blocks
in specific categories and PEAs. In the
second phase—the assignment phase—
winning clock phase bidders will have
the opportunity to bid for their preferred
combinations of frequency-specific
license assignments, consistent with
their clock phase winnings, in a series
of single sealed-bid rounds conducted
by PEA or, in some cases, PEA group.
148. Updated technical guides that
provide the mathematical details of the
auction design and algorithms for the
clock and assignment phases of Auction
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107 are available in the Education
section of the Auction 107 website
(www.fcc.gov/auction/107). The
information in the updated technical
guides supplements the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice.
A. Clock Phase
1. Clock Auction Design
149. During the clock phase of
Auction 107, bidders will indicate their
demands for generic license blocks in
up to two bidding categories in specific
geographic areas—in this case, PEAs.
Under the clock auction format, the
auction will proceed in a series of
rounds, with bidding conducted
simultaneously for all spectrum blocks
in all PEAs available in the auction.
During each bidding round, the bidding
system will announce a per-block clock
price for each product—a category in a
PEA—and qualified bidders will submit,
for each product for which they wish to
bid, the number of blocks they seek at
the clock prices associated with the
current round. Bidding rounds will be
open for predetermined periods of time.
Bidders will be subject to activity and
eligibility rules that govern the pace at
which they participate in the auction.
150. In Auction 107, For each
product, the clock price for a generic
license block will increase from round
to round if bidders indicate total
demand for blocks in that product that
exceeds the number of blocks available.
The bidding rounds will continue until,
for all products, the total number of
blocks that bidders demand does not
exceed the supply of available blocks.
At that point, those bidders indicating
demand for a product at the final price
will be deemed winning bidders.
151. Following the clock phase, the
assignment phase will offer clock phase
winners the opportunity to bid an
additional amount for licenses with
specific frequencies. All winning
bidders, regardless of whether they bid
in the assignment phase, will be
assigned licenses for contiguous blocks
within each PEA.
2. Generic License Blocks and Bidding
Categories
152. The clock phase categories will
be determined based on the specific
clearing deadline to which incumbent
earth stations are subject, i.e., Phase I or
Phase II.
153. In the 46 PEAs where certain
blocks are subject to the Phase I
deadline and others only to the Phase II
deadline, clock phase bidding will be
conducted for two categories of generic
blocks based on whether the Phase I or
Phase II deadline applies to the specific
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blocks. Accordingly, in the 46 PEAs
where certain blocks are subject to the
Phase I deadline, the first category of
generic blocks will consist of the 20megahertz sub-blocks between 3.7–3.8
GHz. This category, designated Category
A, will comprise the five blocks subject
to the Phase I deadline. The second
category of blocks, Category BC, will
consist of the nine blocks that are
subject to the Phase II deadline. In the
remaining 360 PEAs where there are no
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline
there will be a single bidding category,
designated ABC, consisting of all of the
14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7–
3.98 GHz.
154. In each bidding round, a bidder
will have the opportunity to bid for the
quantity of generic blocks it demands in
each bidding category available in each
PEA. Bidding in the clock phase will
determine a single price for all the
generic blocks in each category in each
PEA.
3. Bidding Rounds
155. Auction 107 will consist of
sequential bidding rounds, each
followed by the release of round results.
The Commission will conduct bidding
simultaneously for all spectrum blocks
in all bidding categories for all PEAs
available in the auction. In the first
bidding round of Auction 107, a bidder
will indicate, for each product, how
many generic license blocks it demands
at the minimum opening bid price.
156. The initial bidding schedule will
be announced in a public notice to be
released at least one week before the
start of bidding. The bidding schedule
may be changed in order to foster an
auction pace that reasonably balances
speed with the bidders’ need to study
round results and adjust their bidding
strategies. Such changes may include
the amount of time for bidding rounds,
the amount of time between rounds, or
the number of rounds per day,
depending upon bidding activity and
other factors. The bidding system will
announce any such changes to the
bidding schedule several rounds before
the change occurs.
157. A bidder may submit its bids
using the bidding system’s upload
function, which allows bid files in a
comma-separated value (CSV) format to
be uploaded. A bidder may also submit
bids through the auction bidding system
user interface or using the telephonic
bidder line. The bidding system will not
allow bids to be submitted unless the
bidder selected the PEAs on its FCC
Form 175 and the bidder has sufficient
bidding eligibility.
158. During each round, a bidder may
also remove bids placed in the current
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round. If a bidder modifies its bids for
blocks in a PEA in a round, the system
takes the last bid submission as that
bidder’s bid for the round.
4. Stopping Rule
159. The Commission will use a
simultaneous stopping rule for the clock
phase of Auction 107, under which all
blocks in both categories in all PEAs
will remain available for bidding until
the bidding stops in every PEA. In the
clock phase, bidding will close for
blocks in all PEAs after the first round
in which there is no excess processed
demand in any product. Consequently,
it is not possible to determine in
advance how long the bidding in
Auction 107 will last. No bids may be
withdrawn after the close of a round.
5. Availability of Bidding Information
160. The Commission will make
public after each clock round of Auction
107, for each category in each PEA: (1)
The supply, (2) the aggregate demand,
(3) the posted price of the last
completed round (which generally is the
clock price of the previous round if
demand exceeds supply; the start-ofround price of the previous round if
supply exceeds demand; or the price at
which a reduction caused demand to
equal supply), and (4) the clock price for
the next round. The identities of bidders
demanding blocks in a specific category
or PEA will not be disclosed until after
Auction 107 concludes (i.e., after the
close of bidding).
161. Each bidder will have access to
additional information related to its
own bidding and bid eligibility. After
the bids of a round have been processed,
the bidding system will inform each
bidder of the number of blocks it holds
after the round (its processed demand)
for every product and its eligibility for
the next round.
6. Activity Requirement and Activity
Upper Limit
162. Activity requirement. Bidders are
required to maintain a minimum, high
level of activity in each clock round in
order to maintain bidding eligibility.
The activity requirement (the activity
requirement percentage) will be
between 90% and 100% of a bidder’s
bidding eligibility in all clock rounds.
The initial activity requirement
percentage will be 95%. Failure to
maintain the requisite activity level will
result in a reduction in the bidder’s
eligibility, possibly curtailing or
eliminating the bidder’s ability to place
additional bids in the auction. Bidders
that do not place any bids in the first
round of the auction will have their
eligibility reduced to zero, and will be
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eliminated from bidding during the
remainder of the auction.
163. The Commission will use upfront
payments to determine a bidder’s initial
(maximum) eligibility in terms of
bidding units. Each spectrum block in a
PEA will be assigned a specific number
of bidding units based on the number of
MHz-pops in the PEA. Therefore, a
bidder’s upfront payment will
determine the maximum number of
blocks as measured by their associated
bidding units that a bidder can demand
at the start of the auction.
164. The activity rule will be satisfied
when a bidder has bidding activity on
blocks with bidding units that total at
least the activity requirement percentage
of its eligibility in the round. If the
activity rule is met, then the bidder’s
eligibility will not change in the next
round. Bidding eligibility will be
reduced as the auction progresses if a
bidder does not meet the activity
requirement. The bidding system will
reduce the bidder’s eligibility to the
amount at which the bidder would be
meeting the activity requirement, which
can be calculated by multiplying the
bidder’s activity by the reciprocal of the
activity requirement. For example, with
an activity requirement of 95%, the
eligibility of a bidder not meeting the
activity requirement would be
calculated as the bidder’s activity
multiplied by 100/95, rounded up to the
nearest integer.
165. For this clock auction, a bidder’s
activity in a round for purposes of the
activity rule will be the sum of the
bidding units associated with the
bidder’s processed demands, which may
not be equal to its submitted demands.
For instance, if a bidder requests a
reduction in the quantity of blocks it
demands in a product, but the bidding
system does not apply the request
because demand for the product would
fall below the available supply, the
bidder’s activity will reflect its
unreduced demand. Under the
ascending clock auction format, the FCC
auction bidding system will not allow a
bidder to reduce the quantity of blocks
it demands in a product if the reduction
would result in aggregate demand
falling below (or further below) the
available supply of blocks in the
product.
166. Activity upper limit. A bidder
will be allowed to submit bids with
associated bidding activity greater than
its current bidding eligibility, noting,
however, that a bidder’s activity as
applied by the auction bidding system
during bid processing will not exceed
the bidder’s current bidding eligibility.
Because a bidder’s eligibility for the
next round is calculated based on the
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bidder’s demands as applied by the
auction bidding system during bid
processing, a bidder’s eligibility may be
reduced even if the bidder submitted
bids that meet its activity requirement
for the round. This may occur, for
example, if the bidder bids to reduce its
demand in PEA X by two blocks (with
10 bidding units each) and bids to
increase its demand by one block (with
20 bidding units) in PEA Y. If the
bidder’s demand can only be reduced by
one block in PEA X (because there is
only one block of excess demand), the
increase in PEA Y cannot be applied,
and absent other bidding activity the
bidder’s eligibility would be reduced.
The Commission anticipates that an
‘‘activity upper limit’’ will help a bidder
avoid having its eligibility reduced as a
result of submitted bids that cannot be
applied during bid processing. For
example, depending upon the bidder’s
overall bidding eligibility and the
activity limit percentage, a bidder could
submit an ‘‘additional’’ bid or bids that
would be considered (in price point
order with its other bids) and applied as
available eligibility permits during the
bid processing.
167. When submitting bids with
associated bidding activity greater than
its current bidding eligibility, a bidder
should consider the price points
associated with each of its bids to
indicate the order in which it wishes the
bidding system to consider its bid
requests. Therefore, if bids submitted at
lower price points cannot be applied as
requested, thereby leaving the bidder
with unused eligibility, then the system
will consider the additional bids
submitted at higher price points to use
the otherwise lost eligibility. Although a
bidder may submit bids with associated
bidding units exceeding 100% of its
current bidding eligibility, its processed
activity can never exceed its eligibility.
Thus, if a bidder submits bids with
associated bidding units exceeding the
bidder’s current eligibility, the bidding
system will not apply all of those bids.
168. After Round 1, a bidder may
submit bids with bidding units totaling
up to its activity upper limit, which is
equal to the bidder’s current bidding
eligibility for the round times a
percentage (the activity limit
percentage) equal to or greater than
100%. An initial activity limit
percentage of 120% will apply to Round
2 and subsequent rounds. In any
bidding round, the auction bidding
system will advise the bidder of its
current bidding eligibility, its required
bidding activity, and its activity upper
limit.
169. OEA retains the discretion to
change the activity requirement
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percentage and the activity limit
percentage during the auction, and to
set the activity limit percentage within
a range of 100% and 140%. The bidding
system will announce any such changes
in advance of the round in which they
would take effect, giving bidders
adequate notice to adjust their bidding
strategies.
170. Missing bids. Under the clock
auction format, a bidder is required to
indicate its demands in every round,
even if its demands at the new round’s
prices are unchanged from the previous
round. Missing bids—bids that are not
reconfirmed—are treated by the auction
bidding system as bids that request to
reduce to a quantity of zero blocks for
the product at the start-of-round price.
If these bids are applied, or applied
partially, then a bidder’s bidding
activity, and its bidding eligibility for
the next round, may be reduced.
7. Acceptable Bids
a. Minimum Opening Bids and Reserve
Price
171. The Commission established in
the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice minimum opening bid amounts
for Auction 107. The bidding system
will not accept bids lower than the
minimum opening bids for each
product. Based on the Commission’s
experience in past auctions, setting
minimum opening bid amounts
judiciously is an effective tool for
accelerating the competitive bidding
process.
172. In the first bidding round of
Auction 107, a bidder will indicate how
many generic license blocks in a PEA it
demands at the minimum opening bid
price. Minimum opening bid amounts
are calculated based on bandwidth and
license area population using a tiered
approach, under which minimum
opening bid amounts will vary by
market population. For PEAs 1–50,
minimum opening bid amounts are
based on $0.03 per MHz-pop; for PEAs
51–100, minimum opening bid amounts
are based on $0.006 per MHz-pop; and
for all other PEAs, minimum opening
bid amounts are based on $0.003 per
MHz-pop, subject to a minimum of
$1,000. These minimum opening bid
amounts are specified in the Attachment
A file.
b. Clock Price Increments
173. After bidding in the first round
and before each subsequent round, the
FCC auction bidding system will
announce the start-of-round price and
the clock price for each product for the
upcoming round—that is, the lowest
price and the highest price at which
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bidders can specify the number of
blocks they demand during the round.
The start-of-round price is also referred
to as the posted price of the previous
round. As long as aggregate demand for
blocks in the product exceeds the
supply of blocks, the start-of-round
price will be equal to the clock price
from the prior round. Aggregate demand
for a product is equal to the total
number of blocks for which bidders
have processed demand. If aggregate
demand equals supply at a price in a
previous round, either a clock price or
an intra-round price, then the start-ofround price for the next round will be
equal to the price at which demand
equaled supply. If demand was less than
supply in the previous round, then the
start-of-round price for the next round
will not increase.
174. The Commission will set the
clock price for blocks in a specific
product for a round by adding a
percentage increment to the start-ofround price. For example, if the start-ofround price for a block in a given
product is $10,000, and the percentage
increment is 20%, then the clock price
for the round will be $12,000. Results
above $10,000 will be rounded up to the
nearest $1,000; results below $10,000
but above $1,000 will be rounded up to
the nearest $100; and results below
$1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest
$10.
175. The Commission will set the
clock price for blocks in a PEA by
adding a fixed increment percentage to
the start-of-round price. The
Commission will set the increment
percentage within a range of 5% to 20%
inclusive and will set the initial
increment percentage at 10%. The
Commission may adjust the increment
as rounds continue.
c. Intra-Round Bids
176. A bidder may make intra-round
bids by indicating a point between the
start-of-round price and the clock price
at which its demand for blocks changes.
In placing an intra-round bid, a bidder
would indicate a specific price and a
quantity of blocks it demands if the
price for blocks should increase beyond
that price. For example, if a bidder has
processed demand of three blocks at the
start-of-round price of $100, but wishes
to hold only two blocks if the price
increases by more than $10 (assuming
the bid increment is greater than $10),
then the bidder will indicate a bid
quantity of two at a price of $110 ($100
+ $10). Similarly, if the bidder wishes
to reduce its demand to zero should the
price increase at all above $100, then
the bidder will indicate a bid quantity
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of zero at the start-of-round price of
$100.
177. Intra-round bids are optional; a
bidder may choose to express its
demands only at the clock prices.
8. Bids To Change Demand, Bid Types,
and Bid Processing
178. A bidder that is willing to
maintain the same demand in a product
at the new clock price will bid for that
quantity at the clock price, indicating
that it is willing to pay up to and
including that price, if need be, for the
specified quantity. Bids to maintain
demand will always be applied by the
auction bidding system. A bidder that
wishes to change the quantity it
demands in a product (relative to its
demand from the previous round as
processed by the bidding system) can
express its demand at the clock price or
at an intra-round price, but depending
upon the bidder’s eligibility and the
aggregate demand for the product, the
bidding system may not be able to apply
the requested change.
179. In order to facilitate bidding for
multiple blocks in a product, bidders
will be permitted to make two types of
bids: Simple bids and switch bids.
• A ‘‘simple’’ bid indicates a desired
quantity of blocks in a product at a price
(either the clock price or an intra-round
price). Simple bids may be applied
partially. A simple bid that involves a
reduction from the bidder’s previous
demands may be implemented partially
if aggregate excess demand is
insufficient to support the entire
reduction. A simple bid to increase a
bidder’s demand in a category may be
applied partially if the total number of
bidding units associated with the
bidder’s full increase in demand
exceeds the bidder’s bidding eligibility
for the round.
• A ‘‘switch’’ bid, applicable in PEAs
in which there are blocks in both A and
BC categories, allows the bidder to
request to move its demand for a
quantity of blocks from the A category
to the BC category, or vice versa, within
the same PEA. A switch bid may be
applied partially, but the increase in
demand in the ‘‘to’’ category will always
match in quantity the reduction in the
‘‘from’’ category.
180. These bid types will allow
bidders to express their demand for
blocks in the next clock round without
running the risk that they will be forced
to purchase more spectrum at a higher
price than they wish. When a bid to
reduce demand can be applied only
partially, the uniform price for the
category will stop increasing at that
point, since the partial application of
the bid results in demand falling to
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equal supply. Hence, a bidder that
makes a simple bid or a switch bid that
cannot be applied fully will not face a
price that is higher than its bid price for
the remaining demand.
181. A bidder may bid for multiple
blocks in a bidding category in a PEA
and may submit bids for multiple PEAs.
The assignment phase will assign
contiguous blocks to winners of
multiple blocks in a PEA and give
bidders an opportunity to express their
preferences for specific frequency
blocks, thereby facilitating aggregations
of licenses.
182. The auction bidding system will,
after each bidding round, process bids
to change demand to determine the
processed demand of each bidder for
each product and a posted price for each
product that would serve as the start-ofround price for the next round.
a. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids To
Reduce Demand
183. The FCC auction bidding system
will not apply a bid to reduce the
quantity of blocks a bidder demands in
a product if the reduction would result
in aggregate demand falling below (or
further below) the available supply of
blocks in the product. Therefore, if a
bidder submits a simple bid to reduce
the number of blocks for which it has
processed demand as of the previous
round, then the FCC auction bidding
system will treat the bid as a request to
reduce demand that will be applied
only if the ‘‘no excess supply’’ rule
would be satisfied. Similarly, if a bidder
submits a switch bid to move its
demand for a quantity of blocks from
the A category to the BC category within
the same PEA, the FCC auction bidding
system will treat the bid as a request
that will be applied only if the ‘‘no
excess supply’’ rule would be satisfied
for the A category in the PEA.
b. Eligibility Rule for Bids To Increase
Demand
184. The bidding system will not
allow a bidder to increase the quantity
of blocks it demands in a product if the
total number of bidding units associated
with the bidder’s demand exceeds the
bidder’s bidding eligibility for the
round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a
simple bid to increase the number of
blocks for which it has processed
demand as of the previous round, the
FCC auction bidding system will treat
the bid as a request to increase demand
that will be applied only if that would
not cause the bidder’s activity to exceed
its eligibility.
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c. Partial Application of Bids
185. A bid (simple bid or switch bid)
that involves a reduction from the
bidder’s previous demands will be
applied partially—that is, reduced by
fewer blocks than requested in the bid—
if excess demand is insufficient to
support the entire reduction. A switch
bid may be applied partially, but the
increase in demand in the ‘‘to’’ category
will always match in quantity the
reduction in the ‘‘from’’ category. A
simple bid to increase a bidder’s
demand will be applied partially if the
total number of bidding units associated
with the bidder’s demand exceeds the
bidder’s bidding eligibility for the
round.
d. Processed Demands
186. After a round ends, the bidding
system will process bids to change
demand in order of price point, where
the price point represents the
percentage of the bidding interval for
the round. Bids to maintain demand are
always applied before the bidding
system considers bids to change
demand. For example, if the start-ofround price is $5,000 and the clock
price is $6,000, a price of $5,100 will
correspond to the 10% price point,
since it is 10% of the bidding interval
between $5,000 and $6,000. The bidding
system will first consider intra-round
bids in ascending order of price point
and then bids at the clock price. The
system will consider bids at the lowest
price point across all products, then
look at bids at the next price point in
all products, and so on. If there are
multiple bids at a single price point, the
system will process bids in order of a
bid-specific pseudo-random number. As
it considers each submitted bid during
bid processing, the bidding system will
determine the extent to which there is
excess demand in each product at that
point in the processing to determine
whether a bidder’s request to reduce
demand can be applied. Similarly, the
auction bidding system will evaluate the
activity associated with the bidder’s
most recently determined demands at
that point in the processing to
determine whether a request to increase
demand can be applied.
187. Because in any given round some
bidders may request to increase
demands for licenses while others may
request reductions, the price point at
which a bid is considered by the auction
bidding system can affect whether it is
applied. Bids not applied because of
insufficient aggregate demand or
insufficient eligibility will be held in a
queue and considered, again in order of
price point, if there should be excess
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demand or sufficient eligibility later in
the processing after other bids are
processed.
188. Once a round closes, the auction
bidding system will process bids to
change demand by first considering the
bid submitted at the lowest price point
and determining the maximum extent to
which that bid can be applied given
bidders’ demands as determined at that
point in the bid processing. If the bid
can be applied (either in full or
partially), the number of licenses the
bidder holds at that point in the
processing will be adjusted, and
aggregate demand will be recalculated
accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied
in full, the unfulfilled bid, or portion
thereof, will be held in a queue to be
considered later during bid processing
for that round. The bidding system will
then consider the bid submitted at the
next highest price point, applying it in
full, in part, or not at all, given the most
recently determined demands of
bidders. Any unfulfilled requests will
again be held in the queue, and
aggregate demand will again be
recalculated. Every time a bid or part of
a bid is applied, the unfulfilled bids
held in the queue will be reconsidered,
in the order of their original price points
(and by pseudo-random number, in the
case of tied price points). The auction
bidding system will not carry over
unfulfilled bid requests to the next
round, however. The bidding system
will advise bidders of the status of their
bids when round results are released.
e. Price Determination
189. The Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice describes the bid
processing procedures to determine,
based on aggregate demand, the posted
price for each product for the round that
will serve as the start-of-round price for
the next round. The uniform price for
all of the blocks in a product will
increase from round to round as long as
there is excess demand for blocks in the
product, but will not increase if
aggregate demand does not exceed the
available supply of blocks.
190. If, at the end of a round, the
aggregate demand for blocks in the
product exceeds the supply of blocks,
then the posted price will equal the
clock price for the round. If a reduction
in demand was applied during the
round and caused demand in the
product to equal supply, then the posted
price will be the price at which the
reduction was applied. If aggregate
demand is less than or equal to supply
and no bid to reduce demand was
applied for the product, then the posted
price will equal the start-of-round price
for the round. The range of acceptable
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bid amounts for the next round will be
set by adding the percentage increment
to the posted price.
191. When a bid to reduce demand
can be applied only partially, the
uniform price for the product will stop
increasing at that point, since the partial
application of the bid will result in
demand falling to equal supply. Hence,
a bidder that makes a bid to reduce
demand that cannot be fully applied
will not face a price for the remaining
demand that is higher than its bid price.
192. After the bids of the round have
been processed, if the stopping rule has
not been met, the FCC auction bidding
system will announce clock prices to
indicate a range of acceptable bids for
the next round. Each bidder will be
informed of its processed demand and
the extent of excess demand for blocks
in each product.
9. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase
193. Under the clock auction format
for Auction 107, bidders with processed
demand for a product at the time the
stopping rule is met will become the
winning bidders of licenses
corresponding to that number of blocks
and will be assigned specific
frequencies in the assignment phase.
The final clock phase price for a generic
block in a product will be the posted
price for the final round.
B. Assignment Phase
194. The assignment phase will
determine which frequency-specific
licenses will be won by the winning
bidders of generic blocks during the
clock phase. In the assignment phase,
winning bidders will have the
opportunity to bid for preferred
combinations of frequency-specific
licenses. A bidder can indicate a price
using a sealed bid for one or more
possible frequency assignments for
which it wishes to express a preference,
consistent with its winning bids for
generic blocks in the clock phase. The
bid prices will represent the maximum
payment that the bidder is willing to
pay for the frequency-specific license
assignment, in addition to the final
price established in the clock phase for
the generic blocks. The Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice will determine
the optimal assignment of licenses
within each assignment category in each
PEA based on bid amounts in the
assignment phase.
195. The assignment phase will use
an alternative approach for PEAs with
blocks in two clock phase categories
that allows for final frequency specific
assignments of contiguous blocks within
each PEA. Accordingly, the assignment
phase procedures for the 46 PEAs where
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certain blocks are subject to the Phase
I deadline will make a separate interim
assignment of contiguous blocks within
Category A, i.e., those blocks subject to
the Phase I deadline, and will make a
separate final assignment of contiguous
blocks for all of a bidder’s clock phase
winnings whether in Category A and/or
BC. In the 360 PEAs where there are no
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline,
the assignment phase procedures will
make one assignment for all of a
bidder’s clock phase winnings in
Category ABC, consisting of all of the 14
20-megahertz blocks between 3.7–3.98
GHz. Procedures to implement this
approach are set forth in more detail in
the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice.
196. Participation in the assignment
phase is voluntary; a winning bidder in
the clock phase of Auction 107 need not
bid in order to be assigned contiguous
licenses corresponding to the outcome
of the clock phase. Moreover, a bidder
that wins multiple blocks in Category A
in one of the 46 PEAs with blocks
subject to the Phase I deadline will
receive an interim assignment for
contiguous blocks of licenses in
conjunction with a final assignment for
contiguous blocks, which could include
blocks in any of the 14 available blocks
in the PEA, even without bidding in the
assignment phase. More specifically, to
provide each winning bidder with
frequency-specific licenses based on its
interim and final assignments, the
bidding system will match interim and
final assignments as follows: First, any
blocks that appear both in a bidder’s
interim and final assignment will be
matched together. Then, considering all
remaining blocks in the bidder’s interim
assignment (from lowest to highest),
each will be matched with the lowest
available block in the bidder’s final
assignment.
1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs
197. Sequencing of rounds.
Assignment rounds will be conducted
for the largest markets first. This
sequencing will enable bidders to
establish a ‘‘footprint,’’ making it easier
for a bidder to incorporate frequency
assignments from previously assigned
areas into its bid preferences for other
areas, and recognizes that a bidder
winning blocks in multiple PEAs may
prefer contiguous blocks across adjacent
PEAs.
198. Specifically, the Commission
will conduct a separate assignment
round for each of the top 20 PEAs
sequentially, beginning with the largest
PEAs. Once the top 20 PEAs have been
assigned, the Commission will conduct,
for each Regional Economic Area
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Grouping (REAG), a series of assignment
rounds for the remaining PEAs within
that region. Top 20 PEAs are PEAs 1–
20. The six REAGs are: Northeast,
Southeast, Great Lakes, Mississippi
Valley, Central, and West. The
assignment rounds will be sequenced
within a REAG in descending order of
population for a PEA group or
individual PEA.
199. Grouping of PEAs. To reduce the
total amount of time required to
complete the assignment phase, the
Commission will group for assignment
any non-top 20 PEAs within a REAG in
which the same bidders won the same
number of blocks in each clock phase
category, and all are subject to the small
markets bidding cap or all are not
subject to the cap. This approach will
also help maximize contiguity across
PEAs. Accordingly, where these criteria
are met, a bidder will submit a single set
of bids for assignment options that will
apply to all the PEAs in the group and
will be assigned the same frequencyspecific licenses in each PEA.
200. The Commission will conduct
the bidding for the different REAGs in
parallel. That is, bidding for
assignments in multiple PEAs or PEA
groups will take place during the same
timed bidding round.
2. Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing
201. Prior to the start of the
assignment phase, the bidding system
will provide each clock phase winner
with bidding options for all possible
contiguous frequency assignments for
blocks won in the clock phase. More
specifically, in the 46 PEAs with blocks
subject to the Phase I deadline, a winner
of Category A blocks will have options
for all possible contiguous interim
assignments for the quantity of A blocks
it won and all possible contiguous final
assignments of all blocks it won in the
clock phase regardless of the clock
phase bidding category. A bidder will
not see a separate set of bidding options
for generic BC blocks won. They will be
assigned as part of the final joint
assignment of A and BC blocks. For
example, suppose that, in one of the 46
PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline, a
bidder won three Category A blocks and
four Category BC blocks. Then, the
bidder will be assigned three blocks in
the interim assignment and seven blocks
in the final assignment. The bidder will
have three bidding options for the
interim frequency assignment (A1–A3,
A2–A4, and A3–A5) and eight bidding
options for the final frequency
assignment (A1–B2, A2–B3, A3–B4, A4–
B5, A5–C1, B1–C2, B2–C3, and B3–C4).
In the 360 PEAs where there are no
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline,
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a clock phase winner will have one set
of options for all possible contiguous
assignments for its clock phase
winnings in Category ABC, consisting of
all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks
between 3.7–3.98 GHz.
202. A bidder will not see a separate
set of bidding options for generic BC
blocks won. They will be assigned as
part of the final joint assignment of A
and BC blocks.
203. An optimization approach will
be used to determine the winning
frequency assignment for each
assignment category in each PEA or PEA
group. The bidding system will select
the assignment that maximizes the sum
of bid amounts among all assignments
in which each bidder’s assignment is
contiguous. If there are multiple blocks
in a category that remain unsold, the
unsold licenses will be contiguous.
204. Further, the additional price a
bidder will pay for a specific frequency
assignment (above the final clock phase
price) will be calculated consistent with
a generalized ‘‘second price’’
approach—that is, the winner will pay
a price that would be just sufficient to
result in the bidder receiving that same
winning frequency assignment while
ensuring that no group of bidders is
willing to pay more for an alternative
assignment in which every bidder is
assigned contiguous spectrum. This
price will be less than or equal to the
price the bidder indicated it was willing
to pay for the assignment. Determining
prices in this way encourages bidders to
bid their full value for the assignment,
knowing that if the assignment is
selected, they will pay no more than
would be necessary to ensure that the
outcome is competitive.
3. Information Available to Bidders
During the Assignment Phase
205. After the clock phase concludes
but before bidding begins in the
assignment phase, the bidding system
will provide to each assignment phase
bidder a menu of bidding options
consisting of possible configurations of
frequency-specific licenses on which it
can bid. These bidding options will be
consistent with the bidder’s clock-phase
winnings. The bidding system will also
announce the order in which
assignment rounds will take place and
indicate which PEAs will be grouped
together for bidding. The bidding
system will provide clock phase
winning bidders with this information
as soon as possible and will announce
a schedule of assignment phase rounds
that will commence no sooner than five
business days later.
206. After each assignment round, the
bidding system will inform each bidder
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of its own assignment and assignment
payment for each assignment category
for each PEA or PEA group assigned in
the round. The bidding system will also
provide each bidder with its current
total payment, which is calculated as
the sum of the bidder’s total clock
payment across all PEAs and the
bidder’s assignment payments for the
PEAs for which an assignment round
has already completed. This information
will provide the bidder a running
estimate during the assignment rounds
of the dollar amount it will owe at the
end of the auction. A bidder that is
claiming a bidding credit will also be
informed about its current bidding
credit discount and whether the
discount has been capped.
4. Final Payment Calculations
207. When all assignment rounds
have been completed, a bidder’s final
payment takes into account the sum of
final clock phase prices across all
licenses that it won, the sum of all of the
bidder’s assignment payments, and any
claimed bidding credits. Specifically, if
a bidder is not claiming a bidding
credit, its final payment is determined
by summing the final clock phase prices
across all licenses that it won and its
assignment payments across all PEAs or
PEA groups.
208. If a bidder claims a bidding
credit, a bidding credit discount is
calculated by applying the bidder’s
bidding credit percentage to the sum of
the bidder’s clock payments and
assignment payments, capping the
bidding credit discount if it exceeds the
applicable caps for small businesses,
rural service providers, and small
markets. The resulting bidding credit
discount is subtracted from the sum of
the bidder’s clock payments and
assignment payments to determine the
final payment for a bidder with a
bidding credit.
C. License Authorizations for Interim
and Final Assignments
209. The Commission will condition
the 3.7 GHz licenses awarded postauction for the interim and final
frequency assignments deadline.
210. For a given frequency block in
the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the
Phase I deadline, the interim and final
authorizations may be awarded via
either a single standard license
authorization (where both the interim
and final assignments are for the same
frequency block(s)) or through a twolicense paired authorization (including
an interim assignment and a final
assignment of different specific
frequency blocks) that collectively
provides authority for the full 15-year
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license term. In the paired authorization
approach, the interim assignment of the
pair would expire on the earlier of
December 5, 2025, or the date the
relevant PEA is confirmed cleared, with
no option for renewal, and the resulting
final license would provide for
operation after the interim authorization
expires until the remainder of the 15year term. The B1–C4 blocks in a PEA
will be confirmed cleared consistent
with the process for validation of a
space station operator’s Certification of
Accelerated Relocation that it satisfied
the Phase II clearing deadline, as
described in section 27.1412(g) of the
Commission’s rules. These paired
authorizations together provide the full
range of interim and final rights over the
license term. To ensure consistent
treatment of licenses for frequencies in
the A block, paired interim and final
licenses will be conditioned to clarify
that if they are transferred/assigned,
they must be transferred/assigned
together, in the same manner. There is
no restriction on spectrum leasing for
either of the paired authorizations.
211. The assignment phase results
will dictate whether a particular
winning bidder may be awarded a single
or paired license authorizations. For
example, if a winner of clock phase
Category A blocks (in the 46 PEAs
subject to the Phase I deadline) is
assigned to the same frequencies for
both interim and final assignments, a
single authorization will be issued
providing both interim and final rights
for those A block frequencies. If the
winner of the interim assignment for
specific frequencies in the A block does
not also win the final assignment for the
same frequencies in that block, a paired
authorization will be issued to the
bidder for an interim assignment in
blocks A1–A5 and final assignment in
blocks A1–C4 that together provide
interim and final rights. In all other
cases where one or more clock phase
Category A blocks are not won and
therefore no interim assignment is
made, the winner of a final assignment
will be issued a single authorization
conveying final rights. For example, if
the bidder wins only BC or ABC blocks
in the PEA in the clock phase. The
resulting final license will provide for
operation on the earlier of December 5,
2025 or the date the relevant PEA is
confirmed cleared. That is, in the event
a Category A generic block is unsold
and therefore interim rights are not
assigned to a bidder, interim rights
revert to the licensee holding the final
authorization for that frequency block.
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D. Calculating Individual ‘‘Per-License’’
Prices
212. While final auction payments for
winning bidders will be calculated with
bidding credit caps and assignment
payments applied on an aggregate basis,
rather than to individual license
authorizations (single or paired), the
bidding system will also calculate a
‘‘per-license’’ price for each license
authorization. Such individual prices
may be needed if a licensee later incurs
license-specific obligations, such as
unjust enrichment payments.
213. After the assignment phase, the
auction bidding system will determine a
net and gross post-auction price for each
license authorization (or paired
authorization, if the authorization
comprises both an interim and final
frequency assignment) that was won by
a bidder by apportioning assignment
payments and bidding credit discounts
(only applicable for the net price) across
all the license authorizations or paired
authorizations that the bidder won. To
calculate the gross per-license price, the
auction bidding system will apportion
the assignment payment to
authorizations in proportion to the final
clock phase price of the blocks that the
bidder is assigned in that assignment
category and PEA (or PEA group). To
calculate the net price, the auction
bidding system will first apportion any
applicable bidding credit discounts to
each PEA or PEA group in proportion to
the gross payment for that market. Then,
for each PEA or PEA group, the auction
bidding system will apportion the
assignment payment and the discount to
licenses in proportion to the final clock
phase price of the blocks that the bidder
is assigned in that assignment category
for that PEA (or PEA group).
E. Auction Results
214. The bidding system will
determine winning bidders as described
in the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice. After release of the public notice
announcing auction results, the public
will be able to view and download
bidding and results data through the
FCC Public Reporting System (PRS).
F. Auction Announcements
215. Commission staff will use
auction announcements to report
necessary information, such as schedule
changes, to bidders. All auction
announcements will be available by
clicking a link in the bidding system.
V. Post-Auction Procedures
216. The public notice announcing
the close of the bidding and auction
results will be released shortly after
bidding has ended in Auction 107. This
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public notice will also establish the
deadlines for submitting down
payments, final payments, and the longform applications (FCC Form 601) for
the auction.
A. Down Payments
217. Within 10 business days after
release of the auction closing public
notice for Auction 107, each winning
bidder must submit sufficient funds (in
addition to its upfront payment) to bring
its total amount of money on deposit
with the Commission to 20% of the net
amount of its winning bids (less any
bidding credits, if applicable).
B. Final Payments
218. Each winning bidder will be
required to submit the balance of the net
amount for each of its winning bids
within 10 business days after the
deadline for submitting down payments.
C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form
601)
219. Within 10 business days after
release of the auction closing public
notice, winning bidders must
electronically submit a properly
completed post-auction application
(FCC Form 601) for the license(s) they
won through the auction.
220. A winning bidder claiming
eligibility for a small business bidding
credit or a rural service provider
bidding credit must demonstrate its
eligibility for the bidding credit sought
in its FCC Form 601 post-auction
application. Further instructions on
these and other filing requirements will
be provided to winning bidders in the
auction closing public notice for
Auction 107.
221. Winning bidders organized as
bidding consortia must comply with the
FCC Form 601 post-auction application
procedures set forth in section 1.2107(g)
of the Commission’s rules. Specifically,
license(s) won by a consortium must be
applied for as follows: (a) An individual
member of the consortium or a new
legal entity comprising two or more
individual consortium members must
file for licenses covered by the winning
bids; (b) each member or group of
members of a winning consortium
seeking separate licenses will be
required to file a separate FCC Form 601
for its/their respective license(s) in their
legal business name; (c) in the case of
a license to be partitioned or
disaggregated, the member or group
filing the applicable FCC Form 601 shall
include the parties’ partitioning or
disaggregation agreement with the FCC
Form 601; and (d) if a designated entity
credit is sought (either small business or
rural service provider), the applicant
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53231
must meet the applicable eligibility
requirements in the Commission’s rules
for the credit.
D. Ownership Disclosure Information
Report (FCC Form 602)
222. Within 10 business days after
release of the auction closing public
notice for Auction 107, each winning
bidder must also comply with the
ownership reporting requirements in
sections 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 of the
Commission’s rules by submitting an
ownership disclosure information report
for wireless telecommunications
services (FCC Form 602) with its FCC
Form 601 post-auction application.
223. If a winning bidder already has
a complete and accurate FCC Form 602
on file in the FCC’s Universal Licensing
System (ULS), then it is not necessary
to file a new report, but the winning
bidder must certify in its FCC Form 601
application that the information on file
with the Commission is complete and
accurate. If the winning bidder does not
have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if it
is not complete and accurate, it must
submit a new one.
224. When a winning bidder submits
an FCC Form 175, ULS automatically
creates an ownership record. This
record is not an FCC Form 602, but it
may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form
602 with the ownership information
submitted on the winning bidder’s FCC
Form 175 application. A winning bidder
must review the pre-filled information
and confirm that it is complete and
accurate as of the filing date of the FCC
Form 601 post-auction application
before certifying and submitting the FCC
Form 602. Further instructions will be
provided to winning bidders in the
auction closing public notice.
E. Default and Disqualification
225. Any winning bidder that defaults
or is disqualified after the close of an
auction (i.e., fails to remit the required
down payment by the specified
deadline, fails to submit a timely longform application, fails to make a full
and timely final payment, or is
otherwise disqualified) is liable for
default payments as described in section
1.2104(g)(2). A default payment consists
of a deficiency payment, equal to the
difference between the amount of the
bidder’s winning bid and the amount of
the winning bid the next time a license
covering the same spectrum is won in
an auction, plus an additional payment
equal to a percentage of the defaulter’s
bid or of the subsequent winning bid,
whichever is less.
226. The percentage of the applicable
bid to be assessed as an additional
payment for defaults in a particular
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auction is established in advance of the
auction. The additional default payment
for Auction 107 is 15% of the applicable
bid for winning bids. The bidding
system will calculate individual perlicense prices that are separate from
final auction payments, which are
calculated on an aggregate basis. These
prices determine the defaulted bid
amount on individual licenses.
227. Finally, in the event of a default,
the Commission has the discretion to reauction the license or offer it to the next
highest bidder (in descending order) at
its final bid amount. In addition, if a
default or disqualification involves
gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or
bad faith by an applicant, then the
Commission may declare the applicant
and its principals ineligible to bid in
future auctions and may take any other
action that it deems necessary,
including institution of proceedings to
revoke any existing authorizations held
by the applicant.
F. Refund of Remaining Upfront
Payment Balance
228. All refunds of upfront payment
balances will be returned to the payer of
record as identified on the FCC Form
159 unless the payer submits written
authorization instructing otherwise.
Bidders are encouraged to use the
Refund Information icon found on the
Auction Application Manager page or
the Refund Form link available on the
Auction Application Submit
Confirmation page in the FCC Auction
Application System to access the form.
After the required information is
completed on the blank form, the form
should be printed, signed, and
submitted to the Commission by mail,
fax, or email as instructed in the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.
VI. Procedural Matters
229. Supplemental Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis. As required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), a Supplemental Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(Supplemental IRFA) was incorporated
in the Auction 107 Comment Public
Notice released in March 2020. The
Commission sought public comment on
the proposals in the Auction 107
Comment Public Notice, including
comments on the Supplemental IRFA.
No comments were filed addressing the
Supplemental IRFA. The Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice establishes the
procedures to be used for Auction 107
and supplements the Initial and Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analyses
completed by the Commission in the 3.7
GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83
FR 44128, August 29, 2018, and the 3.7
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GHz Report and Order, and other
Commission orders pursuant to which
Auction 107 will be conducted. This
present Supplemental Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental
FRFA) conforms to the RFA.
230. Need for, and Objectives of, the
Rules. The Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice implements auction
procedures for those entities that seek to
bid to acquire licenses in Auction 107.
Auction 107 will be the Commission’s
second auction of mid-band spectrum in
furtherance of the deployment of fifthgeneration (5G) wireless, the Internet of
Things (IoT), and other advanced
spectrum-based services. The Public
Notice adopts procedural rules and
terms and conditions governing Auction
107, and the post-auction application
and payment processes, as well as sets
the minimum opening bid amounts for
flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7–
3.98 GHz band (3.7 GHz Service) that
will be offered in Auction 107.
231. To promote the efficient and fair
administration of the competitive
bidding process for all Auction 107
participants, the Commission adopted
the following procedures proposed in
the Auction 107 Comment Public
Notice:
• Use of anonymous bidding/limited
information procedures which will not
make public: (1) The license areas that
an applicant selects for bidding in its
auction application (FCC Form 175); (2)
the amount of any upfront payment
made by or on behalf of an applicant for
Auction 107; (3) an applicant’s bidding
eligibility; and (4) any other biddingrelated information that might reveal the
identity of the bidder placing a bid,
until after bidding has closed;
• establishment of bidding credit caps
for eligible small businesses and rural
service providers in Auction 107;
• adjustment of the bidding schedule
as necessary in order to manage the pace
of Auction 107;
• use of a simultaneous stopping rule
in Auction 107, under which all blocks
in both categories in all PEAs will
remain available for bidding until
bidding has stopped in every PEA;
• provision of discretionary authority
to OEA, in conjunction with WTB, to
delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in
Auction 107 for any reason that affects
the ability of the competitive bidding
process to be conducted fairly and
efficiently;
• use of a clock auction format for
Auction 107 under which each qualified
bidder will indicate in successive clock
bidding rounds its demands for
categories of generic blocks in specific
PEAs, and associated bidding and bid
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processing procedures to implement the
clock auction format;
• use of an activity rule, which
requires a bidder to bid actively during
the auction on a high percentage of its
bidding eligibility, including a
modification that would allow a bidder
to submit bids, but not to be assigned
bids, that exceed its bidding eligibility;
• use of an activity rule that does not
include a waiver of the rule to preserve
a bidder’s eligibility;
• a requirement that bidders be active
on between 90% and 100% of a bidder’s
bidding eligibility in all clock rounds;
• a specific minimum opening bid
amount for generic blocks in each
product available in Auction 107;
• a specific upfront payment amount
for generic blocks in each product
available in Auction 107;
• establishment of a bidder’s initial
bidding eligibility in bidding units
based on that bidder’s upfront payment
through assignment of a specific number
of bidding units for each generic block;
• establishment of acceptable bid
amounts, including clock price
increments and intra-round bids, along
with a methodology for calculating such
amounts;
• a methodology for processing bids
and requests to reduce and increase
demand subject to the no excess supply
rule for bids to reduce demand and the
eligibility rule for bids to increase
demand;
• use of bid processing procedures
that the auction bidding system will
use, after each bidding round, to process
bids to determine the processed demand
of each bidder and a posted price for
each product that would serve as the
start-of-round price for the next round;
• establishment of an assignment
phase that will determine which
frequency-specific licenses will be won
by the winning bidders of generic blocks
during the clock phase; and
• establishment of additional default
payments of 15% for bids pursuant to
section 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the
event that a winning bidder defaults or
is disqualified after the auction.
232. The procedures for the conduct
of Auction 107 constitute the more
specific implementation of the
competitive bidding rules contemplated
by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission’s
rules and the underlying rulemaking
orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report
and Order, and relevant competitive
bidding orders, and are fully consistent
therewith.
233. Summary of Significant Issues
Raised by Public Comments in Response
to the IRFA. There were no comments
filed that specifically address the
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procedures and policies proposed in the
Supplemental IRFA.
234. Response to Comments by the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration. Pursuant to
the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010,
which amended the RFA, the
Commission is required to respond to
any comments filed by the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA and to
provide a detailed statement of any
changes made to the proposed
procedures as a result of those
comments. The Chief Counsel did not
file any comments in response to the
procedures that were proposed in the
Auction 107 Comment Public Notice.
235. Description and Estimate of the
Number of Small Entities to Which the
Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs
agencies to provide a description of,
and, where feasible, an estimate of the
number of small entities that may be
affected by the rules and policies
adopted herein. The RFA generally
defines the term ‘‘small entity’’ as
having the same meaning as the terms
‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small organization,’’
and ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction.’’
In addition, the term ‘‘small business’’
has the same meaning as the term
‘‘small business concern’’ under the
Small Business Act. A ‘‘small business
concern’’ is one which: (1) Is
independently owned and operated, (2)
is not dominant in its field of operation,
and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
established by the SBA.
236. As noted above, Regulatory
Flexibility Analyses were incorporated
into the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed
Rule Making and 3.7 GHz Report and
Order. These orders provide the
underlying authority for the procedures
proposed in the Auction 107 Comment
Public Notice and are adopted herein for
Auction 107. In those regulatory
flexibility analyses, the Commission
described in detail the small entities
that might be significantly affected. In
the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice, the Commission incorporated by
reference the descriptions and estimates
of the number of small entities from the
previous Regulatory Flexibility
Analyses in the 3.7 GHz Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and 3.7 GHz
Report and Order.
237. Description of Projected
Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small
Entities. The Commission designed the
auction application process itself to
minimize reporting and compliance
requirements for applicants, including
small business applicants. In the first
part of the Commission’s two-phased
auction application process, parties
desiring to participate in an auction file
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streamlined, short-form applications in
which they certify under penalty of
perjury as to their qualifications.
Eligibility to participate in bidding is
based on an applicant’s short-form
application and certifications, as well as
its upfront payment. In the second
phase of the process, winning bidders
file a more comprehensive long-form
application. Thus, an applicant that fails
to become a winning bidder does not
need to file a long-form application or
provide the additional showings and
more detailed demonstrations required
of a winning bidder.
238. The Commission does not expect
that the processes and procedures
adopted in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice will require small entities
to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants,
or other professionals to participate in
Auction 107 and comply with the
procedures the Commission adopts
because of the information, resources,
and guidance it makes available to
potential and actual participants. The
Commission cannot quantify the cost of
compliance with the procedures,
however, the Commission does not
believe that the cost of compliance will
unduly burden small entities that
choose to participate in the auction. The
processes and procedures are consistent
with existing Commission policies and
procedures used in prior auctions. Thus,
some small entities may already be
familiar with such procedures and have
the processes and procedures in place to
facilitate compliance resulting in
minimal incremental costs to comply.
For those small entities that may be new
to the Commission’s auction process,
the various resources that will be made
available, including, but not limited to,
the mock auction, remote electronic
bidding, and access to hotlines for both
technical and auction assistance, should
help facilitate participation without the
need to hire professionals. For example,
the Commission will release an online
tutorial that will help applicants
understand the procedures for filing the
auction short-form applications (FCC
Form 175). The Commission will offer
other educational opportunities for
applicants in Auction 107 to familiarize
themselves with the FCC Auction
Application System and the bidding
system. By providing these resources as
well as the resources discussed below,
the Commission expects small entities
that use the available resources to
experience lower participation and
compliance costs.
239. Steps Taken To Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives
Considered. The RFA requires an
agency to describe any significant,
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Frm 00097
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
53233
specifically small business, alternatives
that it has considered in reaching its
approach, which may include the
following four alternatives (among
others): ‘‘(1) The establishment of
differing compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification,
consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements
under the rule for such small entities;
(3) the use of performance rather than
design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part
thereof, for such small entities.’’
240. The Commission has taken steps
to minimize any economic impact of its
auction procedures on small entities
through, among other things, the many
free resources the Commission provides
to potential auction participants.
Consistent with the past practices in
prior auctions, small entities that are
potential participants will have access
to detailed educational information and
Commission personnel to help guide
their participation in Auction 107,
which should alleviate any need to hire
professionals. More specifically, small
entities and other auction participants
may seek clarification of, or guidance
on, complying with competitive bidding
rules and procedures, reporting
requirements, and using the bidding
system. Additionally, an FCC Auctions
Hotline will provide small entities oneon-one access to Commission staff for
information about the auction process
and procedures. Further, the FCC
Auctions Technical Support Hotline is
another resource that provides technical
assistance to applicants, including small
entities, on issues such as access to or
navigation within the electronic FCC
Form 175 and use of the bidding system.
Small entities and other would-be
participants will also be provided with
various materials on the pre-bidding
process in advance of the short-form
application filing window, which
includes step-by-step instructions on
how to complete FCC Form 175. In
addition, small entities will have access
to the web-based, interactive online
tutorials produced by Commission staff
to familiarize themselves with auction
procedures, filing requirements, bidding
procedures, and other matters related to
an auction.
241. Various databases and other
sources of information, including the
Auctions program websites and copies
of Commission decisions, are available
to the public without charge, providing
a low-cost mechanism for small entities
to conduct research prior to and
throughout the auction. Prior to and at
the close of Auction 107, the
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 168 / Friday, August 28, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
Commission will post public notices on
the Auctions website, which articulate
the procedures and deadlines for the
auction. The Commission will make this
information easily accessible and
without charge to benefit all Auction
107 applicants, including small entities,
thereby lowering their administrative
costs to comply with the Commission’s
competitive bidding rules.
242. Eligible bidders will be given an
opportunity to become familiar with
auction procedures and the bidding
system by participating in a mock
auction. Eligible bidders will have
access to a user guide for the bidding
system, bidding file formats, and an
online bidding procedures tutorial in
advance of the mock auction. Further,
the Commission intends to conduct
Auction 107 electronically over the
internet using a web-based auction
system that eliminates the need for
small entities and other bidders to be
physically present in a specific location.
These mechanisms are made available
to facilitate participation in Auction 107
by all eligible bidders and may result in
significant cost savings for small entities
that use them. Moreover, the adoption
of bidding procedures in advance of the
auction, consistent with statutory
directive, is designed to ensure that the
auction will be administered
predictably and fairly for all
participants, including small
businesses.
243. Another step taken to minimize
the economic impact for small entities
participating in Auction 107 is the
Commission’s adoption of bidding
credits for small businesses. In
accordance with the service rules
applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service
licenses to be offered in Auction 107,
bidding credit discounts will be
available to eligible small businesses
and small business consortiums on the
following basis: (1) A bidder with
attributed average annual gross revenues
that do not exceed $55 million for the
preceding five years is eligible to receive
a 15% discount on its winning bid or (2)
a bidder with attributed average annual
gross revenues that do not exceed $20
million for the preceding five years is
eligible to receive a 25% discount on its
winning bid. Eligible applicants can
receive only one of the available bidding
credits—not both.
244. The total amount of bidding
credit discounts that may be awarded to
an eligible small business is capped at
$25 million. In addition, the
Commission adopts a $10 million cap
on the overall amount of bidding credits
that any winning small business bidder
may apply to winning licenses in
markets with a population of 500,000 or
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:18 Aug 27, 2020
Jkt 250001
less. Based on the technical
characteristics of the 3.7–3.98 GHz band
and the Commission’s analysis of past
auction data, the Commission
anticipates that the caps will allow the
majority of small businesses to take full
advantage of the bidding credit program,
thereby lowering the relative costs of
participation for small businesses. The
Commission declined to adopt a small
business bidding credit cap of at least
$200 million requested by one
commenter, Moise Advisory, because, as
the Commission previously explained,
the proposed $25 million cap in past
auctions would have allowed the vast
majority of eligible small businesses to
realize the full value of their bidding
credits.
245. These procedures for the conduct
of Auction 107 constitute the more
specific implementation of the
competitive bidding rules contemplated
by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission’s
rules and the underlying rulemaking
orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report
and Order and relevant competitive
bidding orders, and are fully consistent
therewith.
246. Report to Congress. The
Commission will send a copy of the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice,
including the Supplemental FRFA, in a
report to Congress pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act. In addition,
the Commission will send a copy of the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice,
including the Supplemental FRFA to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
SBA.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020–18804 Filed 8–27–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 9
[PS Docket No. 07–114; FCC 20–98; FRS
16998]
Wireless E911 Location Accuracy
Requirements
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
In this document, the Federal
Communications Commission (the FCC
or Commission) builds upon the
Commission’s efforts to improve its
wireless Enhanced 911 (E911) location
accuracy rules by enabling 911 call
centers and first responders to more
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00098
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
accurately identify the floor level for
wireless 911 calls made from multistory buildings. The Sixth Report and
Order and Order on Reconsideration
affirms the April 3, 2021, and April 3,
2023, z-axis location accuracy
requirements for nationwide wireless
providers and rejects an untimely
proposal to weaken these requirements;
allows wireless providers to deploy
technologies that focus on multi-story
buildings, where vertical location
information is most vital to first
responders, and handset-based
deployment solutions that meet the zaxis metric; requires nationwide
wireless providers to deploy z-axis
technology nationwide by April 3, 2025
(non-nationwide wireless providers
would have an additional year to deploy
z-axis technology throughout their
service areas (i.e., April 3, 2026)); and
requires wireless providers, beginning
January 6, 2022, to provide dispatchable
location with wireless 911 calls when it
is technically feasible to do so. Finally,
we deny a Petition for Reconsideration
of the Fifth Report and Order.
DATES: Effective date: September 28,
2020.
Compliance date: Compliance will
not be required for § 9.10(i)(4)(iv) and
(v), (j)(4), and (k) until the Commission
publishes a document in the Federal
Register announcing the compliance
date.
ADDRESSES: The complete text of this
document is available for inspection
and copying during normal business
hours in the FCC Reference Information
Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street SW,
Room CY–A257, Washington, DC 20554.
Effective March 19, 2020, and until
further notice, the Commission no
longer accepts any hand or messenger
delivered filings. This is a temporary
measure taken to help protect the health
and safety of individuals, and to
mitigate the transmission of COVID–19.
See FCC Announces Closure of FCC
Headquarters Open Window and
Change in Hand-Delivery Policy, Public
Notice, DA 20–304 (March 19, 2020).
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcccloses-headquarters-open-window-andchanges-hand-delivery-policy. During
the time the Commission’s building is
closed to the general public and until
further notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Brenda Boykin, Attorney-Advisor,
Policy and Licensing Division, Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau,
(202) 418–2062 or via email at
Brenda.Boykin@fcc.gov, and John A.
Evanoff, Deputy Chief, Policy and
Licensing Division, Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418–
E:\FR\FM\28AUR1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 168 (Friday, August 28, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 53209-53234]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-18804]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 1 and 96
[AU Docket No. 20-25; FCC 20-110]
Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band
for Next-Generation Wireless Services; Notice and Filing Requirements,
Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for
Auction 107
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final action; requirements and procedures.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This document summarizes the procedures and deadlines for the
upcoming auction of 3.7 GHz Service Licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band.
The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice summarized here is intended to
familiarize applicants with the procedures and other requirements
governing participation in Auction 107 by providing details regarding
the procedures, terms, conditions, dates, and deadlines, as well as an
overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.
DATES: Applications to participate in Auction 107 must be submitted
prior to 6 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. Upfront payments for Auction
107 must be received by 6 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. Bidding in
Auction 107 is scheduled to begin on December 8, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For auction legal questions, Erik
Beith or Daniel Habif in the Auctions Division of the Office of
Economics and Analytics at (202) 418-0660. For general auction
questions, the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868. For 3.7 GHz Service
questions, Anna Gentry in the Mobility Division of the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau at (202) 418-1991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice, AU Docket No. 20-25, FCC 20-110, adopted on
August 6, 2020, and released on August 7, 2020. The complete text of
the public notice, including attachments and any related documents, is
available for public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. ET
Monday through Thursday or from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays
in the FCC Reference Information Center, located in Room CY-A257, of
the FCC Headquarters, 445 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554, except
when Commission Headquarters is otherwise closed to visitors. See
Public Notice, Restrictions on Visitors to FCC Facilities, March 12,
2020. The complete text of the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice is
also available on the Commission's website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107.
To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities
(braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email
to [email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at
(202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
I. General Information
A. Introduction
1. With the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, the Commission
established the procedures to be used for Auction 107, the auction of
new flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band (the 3.7 GHz
Service).
2. The bidding for new licenses in Auction 107 is scheduled to
commence on December 8, 2020. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice
provides details regarding the procedures, terms, conditions, dates,
and deadlines governing participation in Auction 107 bidding, as well
as an overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.
B. Background and Relevant Authority
3. In the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, 85 FR 31705, May 27, 2020, the
Commission made available 280 megahertz of spectrum in the 3.7-3.98 GHz
band for licensed use. In that Order, the Commission proposed to modify
the licenses and market access authorizations of incumbent Fixed
Satellite Service (FSS) operators, transmit receive earth station
licensees, and Fixed Service (FS) licensees to clear the 3.7-4.0 GHz
band for new flexible-use terrestrial operations in the contiguous
United States. Among other things, the Commission authorized both fixed
and mobile operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band using geographic area
licensing, established licensing and operating rules for the new 3.7
GHz Service, and decided to use its competitive bidding rules to assign
3.7 GHz Service licenses.
4. On March 3, 2020, in accordance with section 309(j)(3) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission released the
Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, 85 FR 23287, April 27, 2020, seeking
comment on certain competitive bidding procedures and various other
procedures to be used in Auction 107. The Commission received comments
from seven parties in response to the
[[Page 53210]]
Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, including five reply comments. These
comments are available under proceeding 20-25 in the Commission's
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). The ECFS home page is publicly
accessible at: www.fcc.gov/ecfs. In the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice, the Commission resolved all open issues raised in the Auction
107 Comment Public Notice and addressed the comments received.
5. Prospective applicants should familiarize themselves with the
Commission's rules regarding the 3.7 GHz Service. In addition,
prospective applicants should be thoroughly familiar with the
procedures, terms, and conditions contained in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice and any future public notices that may be
released in proceeding 20-25.
6. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders,
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental
generally applicable information to applicants. In addition, the
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) and the Office of Economics
and Analytics (OEA) retain the authority to establish further
procedures during the course of the auction. It is the responsibility
of all applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with
all public notices pertaining to Auction 107. Copies of most auctions-
related Commission documents, including public notices, can be
retrieved from the Commission's FCC Auctions internet site at
www.fcc.gov/auctions. Additionally, documents are available at the
Commission's headquarters during normal business hours when the
building is open to the public.
C. Description of Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 107
7. Auction 107 will offer 5,684 new flexible-use overlay licenses
for spectrum in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band throughout the contiguous United
States subject to clearing requirements. The 280 megahertz of spectrum
available in Auction 107 will be licensed on an unpaired basis in three
blocks divided into 20-megahertz sub-blocks by partial economic area
(PEA) in the contiguous states and the District of Columbia (PEAs 1-41,
43-211, 213-263, 265-297, 299-359, and 361-411). Flexible-use overlay
licenses will not be issued for Honolulu, Anchorage, Kodiak, Fairbanks,
Juneau, Puerto Rico, Guam-Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, and the Gulf of Mexico (PEAs 42, 212, 264,
298, 360, 412-416). Specifically, the A Block will cover 100 megahertz
from 3.7-3.8 GHz in five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3700-3720 MHz (A1),
3720-3740 MHz (A2), 3740-3760 MHz (A3), 3760-3780 MHz (A4), and 3780-
3800 MHz (A5). The B Block will cover 100 megahertz from 3.8-3.9 GHz in
five 20-megahertz sub-blocks: 3800-3820 MHz (B1), 3820-3840 MHz (B2),
3840-3860 MHz (B3), 3860-3880 MHz (B4), and 3880-3900 MHz (B5). The C
Block will cover 80 megahertz from 3.9-3.98 GHz, and four 20-megahertz
sub-blocks will be licensed for flexible use: 3900-3920 MHz (C1), 3920-
3940 MHz (C2), 3940-3960 MHz (C3), and 3960-3980 MHz (C4). The 20
megahertz at 3980-4000 MHz will be a guard band and not available for
auction. 3.7 GHz Service licenses will be issued for 15-year, renewable
license terms. Licenses in the 46 PEAs may be issued as paired interim
and final licenses, which taken together, provide authorization for a
block over the full 15-year license term. A licensee in the 3.7-3.98
GHz band may provide any services permitted under terrestrial fixed or
mobile allocations, as set forth in the non-Federal Government column
of the Table of Frequency Allocations in section 2.106 of the
Commission's rules. A summary of the licenses offered in Auction 107 is
available in Attachment A to the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice,
which is available on the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107.
8. Incumbent satellite operators have, in aggregate, made
sufficient commitments to clear the 3.7-4.0 GHz band on the accelerated
timeline described in the 3.7 GHz Report and Order. As a result,
licenses in the A Block in 46 of the top 50 PEAs--PEAs 1-4, 6-10, 12-
19, 21-41, and 43-50--will be subject to the Phase I accelerated
relocation deadline, and licenses in the B and C Blocks in the 46 PEAs
and in the A, B, and C Blocks in the remaining 360 PEAs will be subject
to the Phase II accelerated relocation deadline.
D. Auction Specifics
1. Auction Title and Start Date
9. The auction of licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band will be
referred to as ``Auction 107.'' Bidding in Auction 107 will begin on
Tuesday, December 8, 2020. The initial schedule for bidding rounds in
Auction 107 will be announced by public notice at least one week before
bidding begins.
10. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be
conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all
licenses.
2. Auction Dates and Deadlines
11. The following dates and deadlines apply to Auction 107: Auction
Application Tutorial Available (via internet). No later than August 21,
2020.
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
Filing Window Opens--September 9, 2020, 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time
(ET)
Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175)
Filing Window Deadline--September 22, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
Upfront Payments (via wire transfer)--June 19, 2020, 6:00 p.m. ET
Bidding Tutorial Available (via internet)--No later than July 9,
2020
Mock Auction--December 3, 2020
Bidding Begins in Auction 107--December 8, 2020
3. Requirements for Participation
12. Those wishing to participate in Auction 107 must: Submit a
short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m.
ET on September 22, 2020, following the electronic filing procedures
set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions (available in the Education
section of the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auctions/107); submit
a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC
Form 159) by 6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020, following the procedures
and instructions set forth in the FCC Form 159 Instructions; and comply
with all provisions outlined in the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice and applicable Commission rules.
II. Applying To Participate in Auction 107
A. General Information Regarding Short-Form Applications
13. An application to participate in Auction 107, referred to as a
short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information that the
Commission uses to determine whether the applicant has the legal,
technical, and financial qualifications to participate in a Commission
auction for spectrum licenses. The short-form application is the first
part of the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In the
first phase, a party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file a
short-form application in which it certifies, under penalty of perjury,
that it is qualified to participate. Eligibility to participate in
Auction 107 is based on an applicant's short-form application and
certifications and on the applicant's submission of a sufficient
upfront
[[Page 53211]]
payment for the auction. After bidding closes, in the second phase of
the process, each winning bidder must file a more comprehensive post-
auction, long-form application (FCC Form 601) for the licenses it wins
in the auction, and it must have a complete and accurate ownership
disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) on file with the
Commission. Being deemed qualified to bid in Auction 107 does not
constitute a determination that a party is qualified to hold a
Commission license or is eligible for a designated entity bidding
credit.
14. A party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file an FCC
Form 175 electronically via the Auction Application System prior to
6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020, following the procedures prescribed
in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. If an applicant claims eligibility
for a bidding credit, then the information provided in its FCC Form 175
as of the filing date will be used to determine whether the applicant
may request the claimed bidding credit. An applicant that files an FCC
Form 175 for Auction 107 will be subject to the Commission's rule
prohibiting certain communications. An applicant is subject to the
prohibition beginning at the deadline for filing short-form
applications--6:00 p.m. ET on September 22, 2020. The prohibition will
end for applicants on the post-auction down payment deadline for
Auction 107.
15. An applicant bears full responsibility for submitting an
accurate, complete, and timely short-form application. Each applicant
must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its
FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and
its participation in the auction, and it must confirm that it is
legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a
license. If an Auction 107 applicant fails to make the required
certifications in its FCC Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its
application will be deemed unacceptable for filing and cannot be
corrected after the filing deadline.
16. An applicant should note that submitting an FCC Form 175 (and
any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation by the certifying
official that he or she is an authorized representative of the
applicant with authority to bind the applicant, that he or she has read
the form's instructions and certifications, and that the contents of
the application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and
correct. Submitting a false certification to the Commission may result
in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures,
ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or criminal
prosecution.
17. Applicants are cautioned that, because the required information
submitted in FCC Form 175 bears on each applicant's qualifications,
requests for confidential treatment will not be routinely granted. The
Commission generally has held that it may publicly release confidential
business information where the party has put that information at issue
in a Commission proceeding or where the Commission has identified a
compelling public interest in disclosing the information. In this
regard, the Commission specifically has held that information submitted
in support of receiving bidding credits in auction proceedings should
be made available to the public.
18. An applicant must designate at least one individual as an
authorized bidder, and no more than three, in its FCC Form 175. The
Commission's rules prohibit an individual from serving as an authorized
bidder for more than one auction applicant.
19. No individual or entity may file more than one short-form
application or have a controlling interest in more than one short-form
application. If a party submits multiple short-form applications for an
auction, then only one application may form the basis for that party to
become qualified to bid in that auction.
20. Similarly, and consistent with the Commission's general
prohibition on joint bidding agreements, a party is generally permitted
to participate in a Commission auction only through a single bidding
entity. Accordingly, the filing of applications in Auction 107 by
multiple entities controlled by the same individual or set of
individuals generally will not be permitted. This restriction applies
across all applications, without regard to the geographic areas
selected. There is a limited exception to the general prohibition on
the filing of multiple applications by commonly controlled entities for
qualified rural wireless partnerships and individual members of such
partnerships. Under this limited exception, each qualifying rural
wireless partnership and its individual members will be permitted to
participate separately in an auction.
21. After the initial short-form application filing deadline,
Commission staff will review all timely submitted applications for
Auction 107 to determine whether each application complies with the
application requirements and whether the applicant has provided all
required information concerning the applicant's qualifications for
bidding. After this review is completed, a public notice will be
released announcing the status of applications and identifying the
applications that are complete and those that are incomplete because of
minor defects that may be corrected. The public notice will include the
deadline for resubmitting modified applications. To become a qualified
bidder, an applicant must have a complete application (i.e., have
timely filed an application that is deemed complete after the deadline
for correcting any identified deficiencies), and must make a timely and
sufficient upfront payment. Qualified bidders will be identified by
public notice at least 10 days prior to the mock auction.
22. An applicant should consult the Commission's rules to ensure
that all required information is included in its short-form
application. To the extent the information in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice does not address a potential applicant's
specific operating structure, or if the applicant needs additional
information or guidance concerning the described disclosure
requirements, the applicant should review the educational materials for
Auction 107 (see the Education section of the Auction 107 website at
www.fcc.gov/auction/107) and/or use the contact information provided to
consult with Commission staff to better understand the information it
must submit in its short-form application.
B. License Area Selection
23. An applicant must select all the license areas on which it may
want to bid from the list of available PEAs on its FCC Form 175. An
applicant must carefully review and verify its PEA selections before
the FCC Form 175 filing deadline because those selections cannot be
changed after the auction application filing deadline. An applicant is
not required to place bids on any or all of the license areas selected,
but the FCC Auction Bidding System (bidding system) will not accept
bids for blocks located in PEAs that the applicant did not select in
its FCC Form 175. The auction application system, however, will provide
an applicant the option to select ``all PEAs.''
C. Disclosure of Agreements and Bidding Arrangements
24. An applicant must provide in its FCC Form 175 a brief
description of, and identify each party to, any partnerships, joint
ventures, consortia or agreements, arrangements, or understandings of
any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any
agreements that address or
[[Page 53212]]
communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices),
bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or
not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the
applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the
applicant, is a party. A controlling interest includes all individuals
or entities with positive or negative de jure or de facto control of
the applicant. In connection with the agreement disclosure, the
applicant must certify under penalty of perjury in its FCC Form 175
that it has described, and identified each party to, any such
agreements, arrangements, or understandings to which it (or any party
that controls it or that it controls) is a party. If, after the FCC
Form 175 filing deadline, an auction applicant enters into any
agreement relating to the licenses being auctioned, then it is subject
to these same disclosure obligations. All applicants must maintain the
accuracy and completeness of the information in their pending auction
application.
25. For purposes of making the required agreement disclosures on
the FCC Form 175, if parties agree in principle on all material terms
prior to the application filing deadline, then each party to the
agreement that is submitting an auction application must provide a
brief description of, and identify the other party or parties to, the
agreement on its respective FCC Form 175, even if the agreement has not
been reduced to writing. Parties that have not agreed in principle by
the FCC Form 175 filing deadline should not describe, or include the
names of parties to, the discussions on their applications.
26. The Commission's rules generally prohibit joint bidding and
other arrangements involving auction applicants (including any party
that controls or is controlled by such applicants). For purposes of the
prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement includes any arrangement
relating to the licenses being auctioned that addresses or
communicates, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction, bidding
strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific
licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangement relating to the
post-auction market structure.
27. This prohibition applies to joint bidding arrangements
involving two or more nationwide providers, as well as joint bidding
arrangements involving a nationwide provider and one or more non-
nationwide providers, where at least one party to the arrangement is an
applicant for the auction. A ``non-nationwide provider'' refers to any
provider of communications services that is not a nationwide provider.
The Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be nationwide
providers for the purpose of implementing the Commission's competitive
bidding rules in Auction 107.
28. Under certain circumstances, a non-nationwide provider may
enter into an agreement to form a consortium or a joint venture (as
applicable) that results in a single party applying to participate in
an auction. A designated entity can participate in one consortium or
joint venture in an auction, and non-nationwide providers that are not
designated entities may participate in an auction through only one
joint venture. A non-nationwide provider may enter into only one
agreement to form a consortium or joint venture (as applicable), and
such consortium or joint venture shall be the exclusive bidding vehicle
for its members in the auction. The general prohibition on joint
bidding arrangements excludes certain agreements, including those that
are solely operational in nature. Under the Commission's rules,
agreements that are solely operational in nature are those that address
operational aspects of providing a mobile service, such as agreements
for roaming, device acquisition, and spectrum leasing and other
spectrum use arrangements, provided that any such agreement does not
both relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate,
directly or indirectly, bidding at auction (including specific prices
to be bid) or bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on
which to bid or not to bid) or post-auction market structure.
29. The Commission's rules require each applicant to certify in its
short-form application that it has disclosed any arrangements or
understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned to
which it (or any party that controls or is controlled by it) is a
party. The applicant must also certify that it (or any party that
controls or is controlled by it) has not entered and will not enter
into any arrangement or understanding of any kind relating directly or
indirectly to bidding at auction with, among others, any other
applicant or a nationwide provider.
30. Although the Commission's rules do not prohibit auction
applicants from communicating about matters that are within the scope
of an excepted agreement that has been disclosed in an FCC Form 175,
certain discussions or exchanges could nonetheless touch upon
impermissible subject matters, and compliance with the Commission's
rules will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.
31. A winning bidder will be required to disclose in its FCC Form
601 post-auction application the specific terms, conditions, and
parties involved in any agreement relating to the licenses being
auctioned into which it had entered prior to the time bidding was
completed. This applies to any bidding consortium, joint venture,
partnership, or other agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any
kind entered into relating to the competitive bidding process,
including any agreements relating to the licenses being auctioned that
address or communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific
prices), bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which
to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which
the applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the
applicant, is a party.
D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements
32. Each applicant must comply with the applicable part 1 ownership
disclosure requirements and provide information required by sections
1.2105 and 1.2112, and, where applicable, section 1.2110, of the
Commission's rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant must fully
disclose information regarding the real party- or parties-in-interest
in the applicant or application and the ownership structure of the
applicant, including both direct and indirect ownership interests of
10% or more. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring that
information submitted in its short-form application is complete and
accurate.
33. In certain circumstances, an applicant may have previously
filed an FCC Form 602 ownership disclosure information report or filed
an auction application for a previous auction in which ownership
information was disclosed. The most current ownership information
contained in any FCC Form 602 or previous auction application on file
with the Commission that used the same FCC Registration Number (FRN)
the applicant is using to submit its FCC Form 175 will automatically be
pre-filled into certain ownership sections on the applicant's FCC Form
175, if such information is in an electronic format compatible with FCC
Form 175. Applicants are encouraged to submit an FCC Form 602 ownership
report or update any ownership information on file with the Commission
in an FCC Form 602 ownership report prior to starting a short-form
application for Auction 107 to ensure that their most recent ownership
information is pre-filled into their short-form application. Each
applicant must carefully review any ownership information
[[Page 53213]]
automatically entered into its FCC Form 175, including any ownership
attachments, to confirm that all information supplied on FCC Form 175
is complete and accurate as of the application filing deadline. Any
information that needs to be corrected or updated must be changed
directly in FCC Form 175.
E. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirements
34. Section 310 of the Communications Act requires the Commission
to review foreign investment in radio station licenses and imposes
specific restrictions on who may hold certain types of radio licenses.
Section 310 applies to applications for initial radio licenses,
applications for assignments and transfers of control of radio
licenses, and spectrum leasing arrangements under the Commission's
secondary market rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant is
required to disclose information concerning foreign ownership of the
applicant. If an applicant has foreign ownership interests in excess of
the applicable limit or benchmark set forth in section 310(b), then it
may seek to participate in Auction 107 as long as it has filed a
petition for declaratory ruling with the Commission prior to the FCC
Form 175 filing deadline. An applicant must certify in its FCC Form 175
that, as of the deadline for filing its application to participate in
the auction, the applicant either is in compliance with the foreign
ownership provisions of section 310 or has filed a petition for
declaratory ruling requesting Commission approval to exceed the
applicable foreign ownership limit or benchmark in section 310(b) that
is pending before, or has been granted by, the Commission. Additional
information concerning foreign ownership disclosure requirements is
provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.
F. Information Procedures During the Auction Process
35. The Commission is limiting information available in Auction 107
in order to prevent the identification of bidders placing particular
bids until after the bidding has closed. The Commission will not make
public until after bidding has closed: (1) The license areas that an
applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application, (2) the
amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant, (3)
any applicant's bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related
information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid.
36. Once the bidding begins in Auction 107, under the limited
information procedures (sometimes also referred to as anonymous
bidding), information to be made public after each round of bidding
will include, for licenses in each geographic area, the supply, the
aggregate demand, the price at the end of the last completed round, and
the price for the next round. The identities of bidders placing
specific bids and the net bid amounts (reflecting bidding credits) will
not be disclosed until after the close of bidding.
37. Bidders will have access to additional information related to
their own bidding and bidding eligibility through the Commission's
bidding system. For example, bidders will be able to view their own
level of eligibility, both before and during the auction.
38. After the close of bidding, bidders' PEA selections, upfront
payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related
actions will be made publicly available.
39. The direct or indirect communication to other applicants or the
public disclosure of non-public information (e.g., reductions in
eligibility, identities of bidders) could violate the Commission's rule
prohibiting certain communications. To the extent an applicant believes
that such a disclosure is required by law or regulation, including
regulations issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the
applicant should consult with the Commission staff in the Auctions
Division before making such disclosure.
G. Prohibited Communications and Compliance With Antitrust Laws
40. The rules prohibiting certain communications set forth in
section 1.2105(c) apply to each applicant that files a short-form
application (FCC Form 175) in Auction 107. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the
Commission's rules provides that, subject to specified exceptions,
after the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are
prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to,
communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any nationwide
provider of communications services that is not an applicant, or, if
the applicant is a nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider
that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of their own, or
each other's, or any other applicants' bids or bidding strategies
(including post-auction market structure), or discussing or negotiating
settlement agreements, until after the down payment deadline.
1. Entities Subject to Section 1.2105(c)
41. An applicant for purposes of this rule includes all controlling
interests in the entity submitting the FCC Form 175 auction
application, as well as all holders of interests amounting to 10% or
more of the entity, and all officers and directors of that entity. A
party that submits an application becomes an applicant under the rule
at the application deadline, and that status does not change based on
later developments. Thus, an auction applicant that does not correct
deficiencies in its application, fails to submit a timely and
sufficient upfront payment, or does not otherwise become qualified,
remains an ``applicant'' for purposes of the rule and remains subject
to the prohibition on certain communications until the Auction 107 down
payment deadline.
42. The Commission considers AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be
nationwide providers for the purposes of the prohibited communications
rule for Auction 107.
2. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline
43. Section 1.2105(c)'s prohibition of certain communications
begins at an auction's short-form application filing deadline and ends
at the auction's down payment deadline after the auction closes, which
will be announced in a future public notice.
3. Scope of Prohibition on Certain Communications; Prohibition on Joint
Bidding Agreements
44. Section 1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibits certain
communications between applicants for an auction, regardless of whether
the applicants seek permits or licenses in the same geographic area or
market. The rule also applies to communications by applicants with non-
applicant nationwide providers of communications services and by
nationwide applicants with non-applicant non-nationwide providers. The
rule further prohibits joint bidding arrangements, including
arrangements relating to the permits or licenses being auctioned that
address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction,
bidding strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the
specific permits or licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangements
relating to the post-auction market structure. The rule allows for
limited exceptions for communications within the scope of any
arrangement consistent with the exclusion from the Commission's rules
prohibiting joint bidding, provided such
[[Page 53214]]
arrangement is disclosed on the applicant's auction application.
Applicants may communicate pursuant to any pre-existing agreements,
arrangements, or understandings relating to the licenses being
auctioned that are solely operational or that provide for the transfer
or assignment of licenses, provided that such agreements, arrangements,
or understandings are disclosed on their applications and do not both
relate to the licenses at auction and address or communicate bids
(including amounts), bidding strategies, or the particular permits or
licenses on which to bid or the post-auction market structure.
45. The prohibition against communicating in any manner includes
public disclosures as well as private communications and indirect or
implicit communications. Consequently, an applicant must take care to
determine whether its auction-related communications may reach another
applicant. Applicants must determine whether their communications with
other parties are permissible under the rule once the prohibition
begins at the deadline for submitting applications, even before the
public notice identifying applicants is released.
46. Parties subject to section 1.2105(c) should take special care
in circumstances where their officers, directors, and employees may
receive information directly or indirectly relating to any applicant's
bids or bidding strategies. Such information may be deemed to have been
received by the applicant under certain circumstances. For example,
Commission staff have found that, where an individual serves as an
officer and director for two or more applicants, the bids and bidding
strategies of one applicant are presumed conveyed to the other
applicant through the shared officer, which creates an apparent
violation of the rule.
47. Section 1.2105(c)(1) prohibits applicants from communicating
with specified other parties only with respect to their own, or each
other's, or any other applicant's bids or bidding strategies. A
communication conveying bids or bidding strategies (including post-
auction market structure) must also relate to the licenses being
auctioned in order to be covered by the prohibition. Thus, the
prohibition is limited in scope and does not apply to all
communications between or among the specified parties. The Commission
consistently has made clear that application of the rule prohibiting
communications has never required total suspension of essential ongoing
business. Entities subject to the prohibition may negotiate agreements
during the prohibition period, provided that the communications
involved do not relate to both: (1) The licenses being auctioned and
(2) bids or bidding strategies or post-auction market structure.
48. Business discussions and negotiations that are unrelated to
bidding in Auction 107 and that do not convey information about the
bids or bidding strategies, including the post-auction market
structure, of an applicant are not prohibited by the rule. Moreover,
not all auction-related information is covered by the prohibition. For
example, communicating merely whether a party has or has not applied to
participate in Auction 107 will not violate the rule. In contrast,
communicating how a party will participate, including specific
geographic areas selected, specific bid amounts, and/or whether or not
the party is placing bids, would convey bids or bidding strategies and
would be prohibited.
49. Each applicant must remain vigilant not to communicate,
directly or indirectly, information that affects, or could affect, bids
or bidding strategies. Certain discussions might touch upon subject
matters that could convey price or geographic information related to
bidding strategies. Such subject areas include, but are not limited to,
management, sales, local marketing agreements, and other transactional
agreements.
50. Bids or bidding strategies may be communicated outside of
situations that involve one party subject to the prohibition
communicating privately and directly with another such party. For
example, the Commission has warned that prohibited communications
concerning bids and bidding strategies may include communications
regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds in support of
bids or bidding strategies to the extent such communications convey
information concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or
indirectly. Moreover, the Commission found a violation of the rule
against prohibited communications when an applicant used the
Commission's bidding system to disclose its bidding strategy in a
manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to cooperate
and collaborate in specific markets, and has placed auction
participants on notice that the use of its bidding system to disclose
market information to competitors will not be tolerated and will
subject bidders to sanctions.
51. When completing a short-form application, each applicant should
avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate section 1.2105(c).
An applicant should avoid including any information in its short-form
application that might convey information regarding its PEA selections,
such as referring to certain markets in describing agreements,
including any information in application attachments that will be
publicly available that may otherwise disclose the applicant's PEA
selections, or using applicant names that refer to licenses being
offered.
52. Applicants also should be mindful that communicating non-public
application or bidding information publicly or privately to another
applicant may violate section 1.2105(c) even though that information
subsequently may be made public during later periods of the application
or bidding processes.
4. Communicating With Third Parties
53. Section 1.2105(c) does not prohibit an applicant from
communicating bids or bidding strategies to a third party, such as a
consultant or consulting firm, counsel, or lender. The applicant should
take appropriate steps, however, to ensure that any third party it
employs for advice pertaining to its bids or bidding strategies does
not become a conduit for prohibited communications to other specified
parties, as that would violate the rule. For example, an applicant
might require a third party, such as a lender, to sign a non-disclosure
agreement before the applicant communicates any information regarding
bids or bidding strategy to the third party. Within third-party firms,
separate individual employees, such as attorneys or auction
consultants, may advise individual applicants on bids or bidding
strategies, as long as such firms implement firewalls and other
compliance procedures that prevent such individuals from communicating
the bids or bidding strategies of one applicant to other individuals
representing separate applicants. Although firewalls and/or other
procedures should be used, their existence is not an absolute defense
to liability if a violation of the rule has occurred.
54. In the case of an individual, the objective precautionary
measure of a firewall is not available. An individual that is privy to
bids or bidding information of more than one applicant presents a
greater risk of becoming a conduit for a prohibited communication.
Whether a prohibited communication has taken place in a
[[Page 53215]]
given case will depend on all the facts pertaining to the case,
including who possessed what information, what information was conveyed
to whom, and the course of bidding in the auction.
55. Potential applicants may discuss the short-form application or
bids for specific licenses or license areas with the counsel,
consultant, or expert of their choice before the short-form application
deadline. The same third-party individual could continue to give advice
after the short-form deadline regarding the application, provided that
no information pertaining to bids or bidding strategies, including PEAs
selected on the short-form application, is conveyed to that individual.
To the extent potential applicants can develop bidding instructions
prior to the short-form deadline that a third party could implement
without changes during bidding, the third party could follow such
instructions for multiple applicants provided that those applicants do
not communicate with the third party during the prohibition period.
56. Applicants also should use caution in their dealings with other
parties, such as members of the press, financial analysts, or others
who might become conduits for the communication of prohibited bidding
information. For example, even though communicating that it has applied
to participate in the auction will not violate the rule, an applicant's
statement to the press that it intends to stop bidding in an auction
could give rise to a finding of a section 1.2105 violation. Similarly,
an applicant's public statement of intent not to place bids during
bidding in Auction 107 could also violate the rule.
5. Section 1.2105(c) Certifications
57. By electronically submitting its FCC Form 175 auction
application, each applicant for Auction 107 certifies its compliance
with section 1.2105(c) of the rules. If an applicant has a non-
controlling interest with respect to more than one application, the
applicant must certify that it has established internal control
procedures to preclude any person acting on behalf of the applicant
from possessing information about the bids or bidding strategies of
more than one applicant or communicating such information with respect
to either applicant to another person acting on behalf of and
possessing such information regarding another applicant. The mere
filing of a certifying statement as part of an application will not
outweigh specific evidence that a prohibited communication has
occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when
warranted. Any applicant found to have violated these communication
prohibitions may be subject to sanctions.
6. Duty To Report Prohibited Communications
58. Section 1.2105(c)(4) requires that any applicant that makes or
receives a communication that appears to violate section 1.2105(c) must
report such communication in writing to the Commission immediately, and
in no case later than five business days after the communication
occurs. Each applicant's obligation to report any such communication
continues beyond the five-day period after the communication is made,
even if the report is not made within the five-day period.
7. Procedures for Reporting Prohibited Communications
59. A party reporting any information or communication pursuant to
sections 1.65, 1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must take care to ensure
that any report of a prohibited communication does not itself give rise
to a violation of section 1.2105(c). For example, a party's report of a
prohibited communication could violate the rule by communicating
prohibited information to other parties specified under the rule
through the use of Commission filing procedures that allow such
materials to be made available for public inspection.
60. Parties must file only a single report concerning a prohibited
communication and must file that report with the Commission personnel
expressly charged with administering the Commission's auctions. This
rule is designed to minimize the risk of inadvertent dissemination of
information in such reports. Any reports required by section 1.2105(c)
must be filed consistent with the instructions set forth in the Auction
107 Procedures Public Notice. Such reports must be filed with the Chief
of the Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics, by the
most expeditious means available. Any such report should be submitted
by email to the Auctions Division Chief and sent to [email protected].
If you choose to submit a report in hard copy, contact Auctions
Division staff at [email protected] or (202) 418-0660 for guidance.
61. A party seeking to report such a prohibited communication
should consider submitting its report with a request that the report or
portions of the submission be withheld from public inspection by
following the procedures specified in section 0.459 of the Commission's
rules. Filers requesting confidential treatment of documents must be
sure that the cover page of the filing prominently displays that the
documents seek confidential treatment. For example, a filing might
include a cover page stamped with ``Request for Confidential Treatment
Attached'' or ``Not for Public Inspection.'' Any such request must
cover all the material to which the request applies. Because the hand-
delivery filing location at FCC Headquarters is permanently closed,
such materials should be submitted in accordance with the procedures
described in Order, Amendment of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure, May 28, 2020. Such parties are encouraged to coordinate with
the Auctions Division staff about the procedures for submitting such
reports.
8. Winning Bidders Must Disclose Terms of Agreements
62. Each applicant that is a winning bidder will be required to
provide as part of its long-form application any agreement or
arrangement it has entered into and a summary of the specific terms,
conditions, and parties involved in any agreement it has entered into.
Such agreements must have been entered into prior to the filing of
short-form applications. This applies to any bidding consortia, joint
venture, partnership, or agreement, understanding, or other arrangement
entered into relating to the competitive bidding process, including any
agreement relating to the post-auction market structure. Failure to
comply with the Commission's rules can result in enforcement action.
9. Additional Information Concerning Prohibition on Certain
Communications in Commission Auctions
63. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and
OEA/WTB addressing the application of section 1.2105(c) is available on
the Commission's auction web page at www.fcc.gov/summary-listing-documents-addressing-application-rule-prohibiting-certain-communications.
10. Antitrust Laws
64. Applicants remain subject to the antitrust laws. Compliance
with the disclosure requirements of section 1.2105(c)(4) will not
insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance,
a violation of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking
place well before any party submits a short-form application. The
Commission has cited a number of examples of potentially
anticompetitive actions that would be prohibited under antitrust laws:
For example, actual or potential competitors may not agree to divide
[[Page 53216]]
territories in order to minimize competition, regardless of whether
they split a market in which they both do business, or whether they
merely reserve one market for one and another market for the other.
65. To the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific
allegations that suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws
may have occurred, the Commission may refer such allegations to the
United States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant
is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules
in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding
process, it may be subject to a forfeiture and may be prohibited from
participating further in Auction 107 and in future auctions, among
other sanctions.
H. Provisions for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers
66. In Auction 107, bidding credits will be available to applicants
demonstrating eligibility for a small business or a rural service
provider bidding credit and subsequently winning license(s). A bidding
credit represents an amount by which a bidder's winning bid will be
discounted. These bidding credits will not be cumulative--an applicant
is permitted to claim either a small business bidding credit or a rural
service provider bidding credit, but not both. Each applicant must also
certify that it is eligible for the claimed bidding credit in its FCC
Form 175. Each applicant should review carefully the Commission's
decisions regarding the designated entity provisions as well as the
part 1 rules.
67. Applicants applying for designated entity bidding credits
should take due account of the requirements of the Commission's rules
and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control of such
applicants. These rules include a prohibition, which applies to all
applicants (whether they seek bidding credits or not), against changes
in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or
transfer of control. Applicants should not expect to receive any
opportunities to revise their ownership structure after the filing of
their short- and long-form applications, including making revisions to
their agreements or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders,
or others in order to address potential concerns relating to compliance
with the designated entity bidding credit requirements.
1. Small Business Bidding Credit
68. For Auction 107, bidding credits will be available to eligible
small businesses and consortia thereof. Under the service rules
applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service licenses to be offered in Auction
107, the level of bidding credit available is determined as follows: A
bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed
$55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive a 15%
discount on its winning bid; a bidder with attributed average annual
gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the preceding five
years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its winning bid.
69. Small business bidding credits are not cumulative; an eligible
applicant may receive either the 15% or the 25% bidding credit on its
winning bid, but not both. The Commission's unjust enrichment
provisions also apply to a winning bidder that uses a bidding credit
and subsequently seeks to assign or transfer control of its license
within a certain period to an entity not qualifying for at least the
same level of small business bidding credit. Thus, for example, the
Commission's unjust enrichment provisions would not apply to a winning
bidder that uses the 15% small business bidding credit and seeks to
transfer control of its license to an entity that qualifies for either
the 15% small business bidding credit or the rural service provider
bidding credit. The provisions would apply, however, if that same
winning bidder uses the 25% small business bidding credit, unless the
proposed transferee also qualifies for the 25% small business bidding
credit.
70. Each applicant claiming a small business bidding credit must
disclose the gross revenues for the preceding five years for each of
the following: (1) The applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its
controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling
interests. The applicant must also submit an attachment that lists all
parties with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use
agreements or arrangements for any licenses that may be won by the
applicant in Auction 107. In addition, to the extent that an applicant
has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of
more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license that may be won
in Auction 107, the identity and the attributable gross revenues of any
such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed. This attribution
rule will be applied on a license-by-license basis. As a result, an
applicant may be eligible for a bidding credit on some, but not all, of
the licenses for which it is bidding in Auction 107. If an applicant is
applying as a consortium of small businesses, then the disclosures
described in this paragraph must be provided for each consortium
member.
2. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit
71. An eligible applicant may request a 15% discount on its winning
bid using a rural service provider bidding credit. To be eligible for a
rural service provider bidding credit, an applicant must: (1) Be a
service provider that is in the business of providing commercial
communications services and, together with its controlling interests,
affiliates, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, has fewer
than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable
subscribers; and (2) serve predominantly rural areas, defined as
counties with a population density of 100 or fewer persons per square
mile. An applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit must
provide the number of subscribers served as of the short-form
application deadline. An applicant may count any subscriber as a single
subscriber even if that subscriber receives more than one service. For
instance, a subscriber receiving both wireline and telephone service
and broadband would be counted as a single subscriber.
72. Each applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit
must disclose the number of its subscribers, along with the number of
subscribers of its affiliates, controlling interests, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests. The applicant must also submit
an attachment that lists all parties with which the applicant has
entered into any spectrum use agreements or arrangements for any
licenses that may be won by the applicant in Auction 107. To the extent
that an applicant has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder
for the use of more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license
that may be won in Auction 107, the identity and the attributable
subscribers of any such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed.
Eligible rural service providers may form a consortium. If an applicant
is applying as a consortium of rural service providers, then the
disclosures described in this paragraph, including the certification,
must be provided for each consortium member.
3. Caps on Bidding Credits
73. Eligible applicants claiming either a small business or rural
service provider bidding credit will be subject to specified caps on
the total amount of bidding credit discounts that they may receive. The
Commission adopted a $25
[[Page 53217]]
million cap on the total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be
awarded to an eligible small business, and a $10 million cap on the
total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be awarded to an
eligible rural service provider in Auction 107. No winning designated
entity bidder will receive more than $10 million in bidding credit
discounts in total for licenses won in markets with a population of
500,000 or less. To the extent an applicant seeking a small business
bidding credit does not claim the full $10 million in bidding credits
in those smaller markets, it may apply the remaining balance to its
winning bids on licenses in larger markets, up to the aggregate $25
million cap.
4. Attributable Interests
a. Controlling Interests and Affiliates
74. An applicant's eligibility for designated entity benefits is
determined by attributing the gross revenues (for those seeking small
business benefits) or subscribers (for those seeking rural service
provider benefits) of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. Controlling
interests of an applicant include individuals and entities with either
de facto or de jure control of the applicant. Typically, ownership of
greater than 50% of an entity's voting stock evidences de jure control.
De facto control is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the
totality of the circumstances. The following are some common indicia of
de facto control: The entity constitutes or appoints more than 50% of
the board of directors or management committee; the entity has
authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that
control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and the entity plays
an integral role in management decisions.
75. Applicants should refer to section 1.2110(c)(2) of the
Commission's rules and the FCC Form 175 Instructions to understand how
certain interests are calculated in determining control for purposes of
attributing gross revenues. For example, officers and directors of an
applicant are considered to have a controlling interest in the
applicant.
76. Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an
individual or entity that: (1) Directly or indirectly controls or has
the power to control the applicant, (2) is directly or indirectly
controlled by the applicant, (3) is directly or indirectly controlled
by a third party that also controls or has the power to control the
applicant, or (4) has an ``identity of interest'' with the applicant.
The Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant
encompasses both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates
of controlling interests of the applicant.
77. An applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must
demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit by: (1) Meeting the
applicable small business size standard, based on the controlling
interest and affiliation rules, and (2) retaining control, on a
license-by-license basis, over the spectrum associated with the
licenses for which it seeks small business benefits. Control and
affiliation may arise through, among other things, ownership interests,
voting interests, management and other operating agreements, or the
terms of any other types of agreements--including spectrum lease
agreements--that independently or together create a controlling, or
potentially controlling, interest in the applicant's or licensee's
business as a whole. Except under the limited provisions provided for
spectrum manager lessors, the Commission's decision to discontinue its
policy requiring designated entity licensees to operate as primarily
facilities-based providers of service directly to the public does not
alter the rules that require the Commission to consider whether any
particular use agreement may confer control of or create affiliation
with the applicant. Once an applicant demonstrates eligibility as a
small business under the first prong, it must also be eligible for
benefits on a license-by-license basis under the second prong. As part
of making the FCC Form 175 certification that it is qualified as a
designated entity under section 1.2110, an applicant is certifying that
it does not have any spectrum use or other agreements that would confer
either de jure or de facto control of any license it seeks to acquire
with bidding credits. For instance, if an applicant has a spectrum use
agreement on a particular license that calls into question whether,
under the Commission's affiliation rules, the user's revenues should be
attributed to the applicant for that particular license, rather than
for its overall business operations, the applicant could be ineligible
to acquire or retain benefits with respect to that particular license.
78. If an applicant executes a spectrum use agreement that does not
comply with the Commission's relevant standard of de facto control,
then it will be subject to unjust enrichment obligations for the
benefits associated with that particular license, as well as the
penalties associated with any violation of section 310(d) of the
Communications Act and related regulations, which require Commission
approval of transfers of control. Although in this scenario the
applicant may not be eligible for a bidding credit and may be subject
to the Commission's unjust enrichment rules, the applicant need not be
eligible for small business benefits on each of the spectrum licenses
it holds in order to demonstrate its overall eligibility for such
benefits. If that spectrum use agreement (either alone or in
combination with the designated entity controlling interest and
attribution rules) goes so far as to confer control of the applicant's
overall business, then the gross revenues of the additional interest
holders will be attributed to the applicant, which could render the
applicant ineligible for all current and future small business benefits
on all licenses. The Commission applies the same de facto control
standard to designated entity spectrum manager lessors that is applied
to non-designated entity spectrum manager lessors.
b. Limitation on Spectrum Use
79. The gross revenues (or the subscribers, in the case of a rural
service provider) of an applicant's disclosable interest holder are
attributable to the applicant, on a license-by-license basis, if the
disclosable interest holder has an agreement with the applicant to use,
in any manner, more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license
won by the applicant and acquired with a bidding credit during the
five-year unjust enrichment period for the applicable license. A
disclosable interest holder of an applicant seeking designated entity
benefits is defined as any individual or entity holding a 10% or
greater interest of any kind in the applicant, including but not
limited to, a 10% or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants,
options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee. Any applicant
seeking a bidding credit for licenses won in Auction 107 will be
subject to this attribution rule and must make the requisite
disclosures.
80. Certain disclosable interest holders may be excluded from this
attribution rule. An applicant claiming the rural service provider
bidding credit may have spectrum license use agreements with a
disclosable interest holder, without having to attribute the
disclosable interest holder's subscribers, so long as the disclosable
interest holder is independently eligible for a rural service provider
credit and the use agreement is otherwise permissible under the
Commission's existing rules. If applicable, the applicant must attach
to its FCC Form 175 any additional
[[Page 53218]]
information as may be required to indicate any license (or license
area) that may be subject to this attribution rule or to demonstrate
its eligibility for the exception from this attribution rule. The
Commission intends to withhold from public disclosure all information
contained in any such attachments until after the close of Auction 107.
c. Exceptions From Attribution Rules for Small Businesses and Rural
Service Providers
81. Applicants claiming designated entity benefits may be eligible
for certain exceptions from the Commission's attribution rules. For
example, in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the
controlling interest standard, the Commission will not attribute to the
applicant the personal net worth, including personal income, of its
officers and directors. To the extent that the officers and directors
of the applicant are controlling interest holders of other entities,
the gross revenues of those entities will be attributed to the
applicant. Moreover, if an officer or director operates a separate
business, the gross revenues derived from that separate business would
be attributed to the applicant, although any personal income from such
separate business would not be attributed. The Commission has also
exempted from attribution to the applicant the gross revenues of the
affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's officers and directors,
if certain conditions specified in section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii) of the
Commission's rules are met. An applicant claiming this exemption must
provide, in an attachment, an affirmative statement that the applicant,
affiliate and/or controlling interest is an eligible rural telephone
cooperative within the meaning of section 1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and the
applicant must supply any additional information as may be required to
demonstrate eligibility for the exemption from the attribution rule.
82. An applicant claiming a rural service provider bidding credit
may be eligible for an exception from the Commission's attribution
rules as an existing rural partnership. To qualify for this exception,
an applicant must be a rural partnership providing service as of July
16, 2015, and each member of the rural partnership must individually
have fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and
cable subscribers. The Commission will evaluate eligibility for an
existing rural wireless partnership on the same basis as it would for
an applicant applying for a bidding credit as a consortium of rural
service providers. A partnership that includes a nationwide provider as
a member will not be eligible for the benefit. Members of such
partnerships that fall under this exception may also apply as
individual applicants or members of a consortium (to the extent that it
is otherwise permissible to do so under the Commission's rules) and
seek eligibility for a rural service provider bidding credit.
83. A consortium of small businesses or rural service providers may
seek an exception from the Commission's attribution rules. A consortium
of small businesses or rural service providers is a conglomerate
organization composed of two or more entities, each of which
individually satisfies the definition of small business or rural
service provider. A consortium must provide additional information for
each member demonstrating each member's eligibility for the claimed
bidding credit in order to show that the applicant satisfies the
eligibility criteria for the bidding credit. The gross revenue or
subscriber information of each consortium member will not be aggregated
for purposes of determining the consortium's eligibility for the
claimed bidding credit. This information must be provided to ensure
that each consortium member qualifies for the bidding credit sought by
the consortium.
I. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters
84. Each applicant must make certifications regarding whether it is
a current or former defaulter or delinquent. A current defaulter or
delinquent is not eligible to participate in Auction 107, but a former
defaulter or delinquent may participate so long as it is otherwise
qualified and makes an upfront payment that is 50% more than would
otherwise be necessary. An applicant is considered a current defaulter
or a current delinquent when it, any of its affiliates, any of its
controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling
interests, is in default on any payment for any Commission construction
permit or license (including a down payment) or is delinquent on any
non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of the filing deadline for
auction applications. Non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency includes,
within the meaning of the rule, all amounts owed under Federal
programs, including contributions to the Universal Service Fund (USF),
Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, and the North American
Numbering Plan Administration, notwithstanding that the administrator
of any such fund may not be considered a Federal ``agency'' under the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996. For example, an applicant with
a past due USF contribution as of the auction application filing
deadline would be disqualified from participating in Auction 107 under
the Commission's rules. If the applicant cures the overdue debt prior
to the auction application filing deadline (and such debt does not fall
within one of the exclusions described in section 1.2105(a)(2)(xii)),
it may be eligible to participate in Auction 107 as a former defaulter.
Each applicant must certify under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form
175 that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests are not in default on any
payment for a Commission construction permit or license (including down
payments) and that it is not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any
Federal agency. Additionally, an applicant must certify under penalty
of perjury whether it (along with its controlling interests) has ever
been in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or
license (including down payments) or has ever been delinquent on any
non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, subject to the exclusions. The
term ``controlling interest'' is defined in section 1.2105(a)(4)(i) of
the Commission rules.
85. An applicant is considered a former defaulter or a former
delinquent when, as of the FCC Form 175 deadline, the applicant or any
of its controlling interests has defaulted on any Commission
construction permit or license or has been delinquent on any non-tax
debt owed to any Federal agency, but has since remedied all such
defaults and cured all of the outstanding non-tax delinquencies. The
applicant may exclude from consideration any cured default on a
Commission construction permit or license or cured delinquency on a
non-tax debt owed to a Federal agency for which any of the following
criteria are met: (1) The notice of the final payment deadline or
delinquency was received more than seven years before the FCC Form 175
filing deadline, (2) the default or delinquency amounted to less than
$100,000, (3) the default or delinquency was paid within two quarters
(i.e., six months) after receiving the notice of the final payment
deadline or delinquency, or (4) the default or delinquency was the
subject of a legal or arbitration proceeding and was cured upon
resolution of the proceeding. Notice to a debtor may include notice of
a final payment deadline or notice of delinquency and may be express or
implied depending on the origin of any
[[Page 53219]]
Federal non-tax debt giving rise to a default or delinquency. The date
of receipt of the notice of a final default deadline or delinquency by
the intended party or debtor will be used for purposes of verifying
receipt of notice. A debt will not be deemed to be in default or
delinquent until after the expiration of a final payment deadline. To
the extent that the rules providing for payment of a specific federal
debt permit payment after an original payment deadline accompanied by
late fee(s), such debts would not be in default or delinquent for
purposes of applying the former defaulter rules until after the late
payment deadline. Any winning bidder that fails to timely pay its post-
auction down payment or the balance of its final winning bid amount(s)
or is disqualified for any reason after the close of an auction will be
in default and subject to a default payment. Commission staff provide
individual notice of the amount of such a default payment as well as
procedures and information required by the Debt Collection Improvement
Act of 1996, including the payment due date and any charges, interest,
and/or penalties that accrue in the event of delinquency. Such notice
provided by Commission staff assessing a default payment arising out of
a default on a winning bid, constitutes notice of the final payment
deadline with respect to a default on a Commission license.
86. Applicants are encouraged to review previous guidance on
default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of the
auction short-form application process. Parties are also encouraged to
consult with Auctions Division staff if they have any questions about
default and delinquency disclosure requirements.
87. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United
States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The
Commission has previously adopted rules, including a provision referred
to as the ``red light rule,'' that implement its obligations under the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection
of debts owed to the United States. Under the red light rule,
applications and other requests for benefits filed by parties that have
outstanding debts owed to the Commission will not be processed. The
Commission's adoption of the red light rule does not alter the
applicability of any of its competitive bidding rules, including the
provisions and certifications of sections 1.2105 and 1.2106, with
regard to current and former defaults or delinquencies.
88. The Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides
information regarding debts currently owed to the Commission, may not
be determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the
default and delinquency disclosure requirements of section 1.2105.
Thus, while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of
long-form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's lack
of current red light status is not necessarily determinative of its
eligibility to participate in an auction (or whether it may be subject
to an increased upfront payment obligation). A prospective applicant in
Auction 107 should note that any long-form applications filed after the
close of bidding will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's
red light rule, and such review may result in the dismissal of a
winning bidder's long-form application. Applicants that have their
long-form applications dismissed will be deemed to have defaulted and
will be subject to default payments under sections 1.2104(g) and
1.2109(c) of the Commission's rules. Each applicant should carefully
review all records and other available Federal agency databases and
information sources to determine whether the applicant, or any of its
affiliates, or any of its controlling interests, or any of the
affiliates of its controlling interests, owes or was ever delinquent in
the payment of non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. To access the
Commission's Red Light Display System, go to: https://apps.fcc.gov/redlight/login.cfm.
J. Optional Applicant Status Identification
89. Applicants owned by members of minority groups and/or women, as
defined in section 1.2110(c)(3), and rural telephone companies, as
defined in section 1.2110(c)(4), may identify themselves regarding this
status in filling out their FCC Form 175 applications. This applicant
status information is collected for statistical purposes only and
assists the Commission in monitoring the participation of various
groups in its auctions.
K. Modifications to FCC Form 175
1. Only Minor Modifications Allowed
90. After the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline, an Auction 107
applicant will be permitted to make only minor changes to its
application consistent with the Commission's rules. Minor amendments
include any changes that are not major, such as correcting
typographical errors and supplying or correcting information as
requested to support the certifications made in the application.
Examples of minor changes include the deletion or addition of
authorized bidders (to a maximum of three) and the revision of
addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant, its responsible
party, and its contact person. Major modification to an FCC Form 175
(e.g., change of PEA selection, certain changes in ownership that would
constitute an assignment or transfer of control of the applicant,
change in the required certifications, change in applicant's legal
classification that results in a change in control, or change in
claimed eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding credit) will not
be permitted after the initial FCC Form 175 filing deadline. If an
amendment reporting changes is a ``major amendment,'' as described in
section 1.2105(b)(2), the major amendment will not be accepted and may
result in the dismissal of the application. Any change in control of an
applicant will be considered a major modification, and the application
will consequently be dismissed. Even if an applicant's FCC Form 175 is
dismissed, the applicant would remain subject to the communication
prohibitions of section 1.2105(c) until the down payment deadline for
Auction 107.
2. Duty To Maintain Accuracy and Completeness of FCC Form 175
91. Each applicant has a continuing obligation to maintain the
accuracy and completeness of information furnished in a pending
application, including a pending application to participate in Auction
107. An applicant's FCC Form 175 and associated attachments will remain
pending until the release of a public notice announcing the close of
the auction. Auction 107 applicants remain subject to the section
1.2105(c) prohibition on certain communications until the post-auction
deadline for making down payments on winning bids in Auction 107. An
applicant's post-auction application (FCC Form 601) is considered
pending from the time it is accepted for filing by the Commission until
a Commission grant or denial of the application is no longer subject to
reconsideration by the Commission or to review by any court. An
applicant for Auction 107 must furnish additional or corrected
information to the Commission within five business days after a
significant occurrence or amend its FCC Form 175 no more than five
business days after the applicant becomes aware of the need for the
amendment. An applicant is obligated to amend its pending
[[Page 53220]]
application even if a reported change may result in the dismissal of
the application because it is subsequently determined to be a major
modification.
3. Modifying an FCC Form 175
92. A party seeking to participate in Auction 107 must file an FCC
Form 175 electronically via the FCC's Auction Application System.
During the initial filing window, an applicant will be able to make any
necessary modifications to its FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application
System. An applicant that has certified and submitted its FCC Form 175
before the close of the initial filing window may continue to make
modifications as often as necessary until the close of that window; the
applicant must re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 before the
close of the initial filing window to confirm and effect its latest
application changes. After each submission, a confirmation page will be
displayed stating the submission time and submission date. Applicants
are advised to retain a copy of this confirmation page.
93. An applicant will also be allowed to modify its FCC Form 175 in
the Auction Application System, except for certain fields, during the
resubmission filing window and after the release of the public notice
announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. An applicant will not
be allowed to modify electronically in the Auction Application System
the applicant's legal classification, the applicant's name, or the
certifying official. During the resubmission filing window and after
the release of the public notice announcing the qualified bidders for
an auction, if an applicant needs to make permissible minor changes to
its FCC Form 175 or must make changes in order to maintain the accuracy
and completeness of its application pursuant to sections 1.65 and
1.2105(b)(4), then it must make the change(s) in the Auction
Application System and re-certify and re-submit its application to
confirm and effect the change(s).
94. An applicant's ability to modify its FCC Form 175 in the
Auction Application System will be limited between the closing of the
initial filing window and the opening of the application resubmission
filing window, and between the closing of the resubmission filing
window and the release of the public notice announcing the qualified
bidders for an auction. During these periods, an applicant will be able
to view its submitted application, but will be permitted to modify only
the applicant's address, responsible party address, and contact
information (e.g., name, address, telephone number, etc.) in the
Auction Application System. An applicant will not be able to modify any
other pages of the FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application System
during these periods. If, during these periods, an applicant needs to
make other permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175, or changes to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of its application, the
applicant must submit a letter briefly summarizing the changes to its
FCC Form 175 via email to [email protected]. The email summarizing the
changes must include a subject line referring to Auction 107 and the
name of the applicant, for example, ``Re: Changes to Auction 107
Auction Application of XYZ Corp.'' Any attachments to the email must be
formatted as Adobe[supreg] Acrobat[supreg] (PDF) or Microsoft[supreg]
Word documents. An applicant that submits its changes in this manner
must subsequently modify, certify, and submit its FCC Form 175
application(s) electronically in the Auction Application System once it
is again open and available to applicants.
95. Applicants should also note that even at times when the Auction
Application System is open and available to applicants, the system will
not allow an applicant to make certain other permissible changes itself
(e.g., correcting a misstatement of the applicant's legal
classification). If an applicant needs to make a permissible minor
change of this nature, then it must submit a written request by email
to the Auctions Division Chief, via [email protected], requesting that
the Commission manually make the change on the applicant's behalf. Once
Commission staff has informed the applicant that the change has been
made in the Auction Application System, the applicant must then re-
certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 in the Auction Application
System to confirm and effect the change(s).
96. Any amendment(s) to the application and related statements of
fact must be certified by an authorized representative of the applicant
with authority to bind the applicant. Submission of any such amendment
or related statement of fact constitutes a representation by the person
certifying that he or she is an authorized representative with such
authority and that the contents of the amendment or statement of fact
are true and correct.
97. Applicants must not submit application-specific material
through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System. Parties
submitting information related to their applications should use caution
to ensure that their submissions do not contain confidential
information or communicate information that would violate section
1.2105(c) or the limited information procedures adopted for Auction
107. An applicant seeking to submit, outside of the Auction Application
System, information that might reflect non-public information, such as
an applicant's PEA selection(s), upfront payment amount, or bidding
eligibility, should consider including in its email a request that the
filing or portions of the filing be withheld from public inspection
until the end of the prohibition on certain communications.
98. Questions about FCC Form 175 amendments should be directed to
the Auctions Division at (202) 418-0660.
III. Preparing for Bidding in Auction 107
A. Due Diligence
99. Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating
and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a
bearing on the value of the licenses that it is seeking in Auction 107.
The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of
this spectrum or these licenses for particular services. Each applicant
should be aware that a Commission auction represents an opportunity to
become a Commission licensee, subject to certain conditions and
regulations. This includes the established authority of the Commission
to alter the terms of existing licenses by rulemaking, which is equally
applicable to licenses awarded by auction. A Commission auction does
not constitute an endorsement by the Commission of any particular
service, technology, or product, nor does a Commission license
constitute a guarantee of business success.
100. An applicant should perform its due diligence research and
analysis before proceeding, as it would with any new business venture.
Each potential bidder should perform technical analyses and/or refresh
its previous analyses to assure itself that, should it become a winning
bidder for any Auction 107 license, it will be able to build and
operate facilities that will fully comply with all applicable technical
and legal requirements. Each applicant should inspect any prospective
sites for communications facilities located in, or near, the geographic
area for which it plans to bid, confirm the availability of such sites,
and to familiarize itself with the Commission's rules regarding the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic
[[Page 53221]]
Preservation Act (NHPA), and other environmental statutes.
101. Each applicant in Auction 107 should continue to conduct its
own research throughout the auction in order to determine the existence
of pending or future administrative or judicial proceedings that might
affect its decision on continued participation in the auction. Each
applicant is responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various
possible outcomes and for considering the potential impact on licenses
available in an auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in
the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice do not constitute an
exhaustive list of steps that should be undertaken prior to
participating in Auction 107. The burden is on the potential bidder to
determine how much research to undertake, depending upon the specific
facts and circumstances related to its interests. For example,
applicants should pay particular attention to the framework adopted in
the 3.7 GHz Report and Order that requires new overlay licensees to pay
a specified share of accelerated relocation payments as well as
relocation expenses to reimburse incumbents for the reasonable costs of
transitioning out of the lower 300 megahertz of the band in the
contiguous United States.
102. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make
use of the licenses available in Auction 107. Each potential bidder is
responsible for undertaking research to ensure that any licenses won in
the auction will be suitable for its business plans and needs. Each
potential bidder must undertake its own assessment of the relevance and
importance of information gathered as part of its due diligence
efforts.
103. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases
or any third-party databases, including, for example, court docketing
systems. To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, it must
obtain or verify such information from independent sources or assume
the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases.
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.
B. Licensing Considerations
1. Transition of Incumbent Operations
104. Potential applicants in Auction 107 should consider carefully
the process for transitioning incumbent operations out of the 3.7-3.98
GHz band when developing business plans, assessing market conditions,
and evaluating the availability of equipment for 3.7 GHz Service
operations. Each applicant should follow closely releases from the
Commission concerning these issues and consider carefully the technical
and economic implications for commercial use of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band.
2. International Coordination
105. Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas
adjacent to the Canadian and Mexican borders should be aware that the
use of the 3.7 GHz Service frequencies they acquire in Auction 107 are
subject to current and future agreements with the governments of Canada
and Mexico.
106. The Commission routinely works with the United States
Department of State and Canadian and Mexican government officials to
ensure the efficient use of the spectrum as well as interference-free
operations in the border areas near Canada and Mexico. Until such time
as any adjusted agreements, as needed, between the United States,
Mexico, and/or Canada can be agreed to, operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz
band must not cause harmful interference across the border, consistent
with the terms of the agreements currently in force.
3. Environmental Review Requirements
107. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules for
environmental review under the NEPA, the NHPA, and other environmental
statutes. Licensees and other applicants that propose to build certain
types of communications facilities for licensed service must follow
Commission procedures implementing obligations under NEPA and NHPA
prior to constructing the facilities. Under NEPA, a licensee or
applicant must assess if certain environmentally sensitive conditions
specified in the Commission's rules are relevant to the proposed
facilities, and prepare an environmental assessment when applicable.
This assessment may require consultation with expert agencies having
environmental responsibilities, such as U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, among others. If an environmental assessment is required, then
facilities may not be constructed until environmental processing is
completed. Under NHPA, a licensee or applicant must follow the
procedures in section 1.1320 of the Commission's rules, the Nationwide
Programmatic Agreement for Collocation of Wireless Antennas and the
Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National
Historic Preservation Act Review Process. Compliance with section 106
of the NHPA requires tribal consultation, and if construction of the
communications facilities would have adverse effects on historic or
tribally significant properties, an environmental assessment must be
prepared.
4. Mobile Spectrum Holdings Policies
108. Bidders are reminded of the Commission's mobile spectrum
holdings policies applicable to the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. Specifically,
the Commission did not impose a pre-auction bright-line limit on
acquisitions of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. Instead, the Commission
incorporated into the spectrum screen the 280 megahertz of spectrum
available in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band. The Commission will also perform
case-by-case review of the long-form license applications filed as a
result of Auction 107.
C. Bidder Education
109. Before the opening of the short-form filing window for Auction
107, detailed educational information will be provided in various
formats to would-be participants on the Auction 107 web page. OEA will
provide various materials on the pre-bidding processes in advance of
the opening of the short-form application window, beginning with the
release of step-by-step instructions for completing the FCC Form 175,
which OEA has made available in the Education section of the Auction
107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. OEA will provide an online
application procedures tutorial for the auction, covering information
on pre-bidding preparation, completing short-form applications, and the
application review process.
110. In advance of the start of the mock auction, OEA will provide
educational materials on the bidding procedures for Auction 107,
beginning with release of a user guide for the bidding system and
bidding system file formats, followed by an online bidding procedures
tutorial. The educational materials shall be released as soon as
reasonably possible to provide potential applicants and bidders with
time to understand them and ask questions before bidding begins.
[[Page 53222]]
111. The online tutorials will allow viewers to navigate the
presentation outline, review written notes, and listen to audio of the
notes. Additional features of this web-based tool include links to
auction-specific Commission releases, email links for contacting
Commission staff, and screen shots of the online application and
bidding systems. The online tutorials will be accessible in the
Education section of the Auction 107 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. Once posted, the tutorials will be accessible anytime.
D. Short-Form Applications: Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on September 22,
2020
112. In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 107, an applicant
must first follow the procedures to submit a short-form application
(FCC Form 175) electronically via the Auction Application System,
following the instructions set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.
The short-form application will become available with the opening of
the initial filing window and must be submitted prior to 6:00 p.m. ET
on September 22, 2020. Late applications will not be accepted. No
application fee is required.
113. Applications may be filed at any time beginning at noon ET on
September 9, 2020, until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. ET on
September 22, 2020. Applicants should file early and are responsible
for allowing adequate time for filing their applications. There are no
limits or restrictions on the number of times an application can be
updated or amended until the initial filing deadline on September 22,
2020.
114. An applicant must always click on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button
on the ``Certify & Submit'' screen to successfully submit its FCC Form
175 and any modifications; otherwise the application or changes to the
application will not be received or reviewed by Commission staff.
Additional information about accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC
Form 175 is provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. Applicants
requiring technical assistance should contact FCC Auctions Technical
Support at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202) 414-1250; or (202) 414-
1255 (text telephone (TTY)); hours of service are Monday through
Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. All calls to Technical Support
are recorded.
115. Applicants are cautioned that the Commission periodically
performs scheduled maintenance of its IT systems. During scheduled
maintenance activities, which typically occur over the weekends, every
effort is made to minimize any downtime to auction-related systems,
including the Auction Application System. However, there are occasions
when auction-related systems may be temporarily unavailable.
E. Application Processing and Minor Modifications
1. Public Notice of Applicants' Initial Application Status and
Opportunity for Minor Modifications
116. After the deadline for filing auction applications, the
Commission will process all timely submitted applications to determine
whether each applicant has complied with the application requirements
and provided all information concerning its qualifications for bidding.
OEA will issue a public notice with applicants' initial application
status, identifying: (1) Those that are complete; and (2) those that
are incomplete or deficient because of defects that may be corrected.
The public notice will include the deadline for resubmitting corrected
applications and an electronic copy will be sent by email to the
contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 for each applicant. In
addition, each applicant with an incomplete application will be sent
information on the nature of the deficiencies in its application, along
with the name and contact information of a Commission staff member who
can answer questions specific to the application.
117. After the initial application filing deadline on September 22,
2020, applicants can make only minor modifications to their
applications. Major modifications (e.g., change of PEA selection,
certain changes in ownership that would constitute an assignment or
transfer of control of the applicant, change in the required
certifications, change in applicant's legal classification that results
in a change in control, or change in claimed eligibility for a higher
percentage of bidding credit) will not be permitted. After the deadline
for resubmitting corrected applications, an applicant will have no
further opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its application or
provide any additional information that may affect Commission staff's
ultimate determination of whether and to what extent the applicant is
qualified to participate in Auction 107.
118. Commission staff will communicate only with an applicant's
contact person or certifying official, as designated on the applicant's
FCC Form 175, unless the applicant's certifying official or contact
person notifies Commission staff in writing that another representative
is authorized to speak on the applicant's behalf. In no event, however,
will the Commission send auction registration materials to anyone other
than the contact person listed on the applicant's FCC Form 175 or
respond to a request for replacement registration materials from anyone
other than the authorized bidder, contact person, or certifying
official listed on the applicant's FCC Form 175. Authorizations may be
sent by email to [email protected].
2. Public Notice of Applicants' Final Application Status After Upfront
Payment Deadline
119. After Commission staff reviews resubmitted applications and
upfront payments, OEA will release a public notice identifying
applicants that have become qualified bidders for the auction. A
Qualified Bidders Public Notice will be issued before bidding in the
auction begins. Qualified bidders are those applicants with submitted
FCC Form 175 applications that are deemed timely filed and complete and
that have made a sufficient upfront payment.
F. Upfront Payments
120. In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 107, a sufficient
upfront payment and a complete and accurate FCC Remittance Advice Form
(FCC Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be submitted before 6:00 p.m. ET on
November 2, 2020. After completing its short-form application, an
applicant will have access to an electronic pre-filled version of the
FCC Form 159. An accurate and complete FCC Form 159 must accompany each
payment. Proper completion of this form is critical to ensuring correct
crediting of upfront payments. Payers using the pre-filled FCC Form 159
are responsible for ensuring that all the information on the form,
including payment amounts, is accurate. Instructions for completing FCC
Form 159 for Auction 107 are provided in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice.
1. Making Upfront Payments by Wire Transfer for Auction 107
121. Upfront payments for Auction 107 must be wired to, and will be
deposited in, the U.S. Treasury.
122. Wire transfer payments for Auction 107 must be received before
6:00 p.m. ET on November 2, 2020. An applicant must initiate the wire
transfer through its bank, authorizing the bank to wire funds from the
applicant's account to the proper account at the U.S. Treasury. No
other payment method is acceptable. To avoid untimely payments,
applicants should discuss arrangements (including bank
[[Page 53223]]
closing schedules and other specific bank wire transfer requirements,
such as an in-person written request before a specified time of day)
with their bankers several days before they plan to make the wire
transfer, and must allow sufficient time for the transfer to be
initiated and completed before the deadline. The information needed to
place an order for a wire transfer is set forth in the Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice.
123. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire
transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must print and fax
a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202) 418-2843.
Alternatively, the completed form can be scanned and sent as an
attachment to an email to [email protected]. On the fax cover sheet
or in the email subject header, write ``Wire Transfer--Auction Payment
for Auction 107''. To meet the upfront payment deadline, an applicant's
payment must be credited to the Commission's account for Auction 107
before the deadline.
124. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring timely submission
of its upfront payment and for timely filing of an accurate and
complete FCC Form 159. An applicant should coordinate with its
financial institution well ahead of the due date regarding its wire
transfer and allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and
completed prior to the deadline. Among other things, each applicant is
cautioned to plan ahead regarding any potential delays in its or its
financial institution's ability to complete wire transfers due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission repeatedly has cautioned auction
participants about the importance of planning ahead to prepare for
unforeseen last-minute difficulties in making payments by wire
transfer. Each applicant also is responsible for obtaining confirmation
from its financial institution that its wire transfer to the U.S.
Treasury was successful and from Commission staff that its upfront
payment was timely received and that it was deposited into the proper
account. To receive confirmation from Commission staff, contact Scott
Radcliffe of the Office of Managing Director's Revenue & Receivables
Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 418-7518 or Theresa Meeks at (202)
418-2945.
125. All payments must be made in U.S. dollars. All payments must
be made by wire transfer. Upfront payments for Auction 107 go to an
account number different from the accounts used in previous FCC
auctions.
126. Failure to deliver a sufficient upfront payment as instructed
herein by the upfront payment deadline will result in dismissal of the
short-form application and disqualification from participation in the
auction.
2. Completing and Submitting FCC Form 159
127. Information that supplements the standard instructions for FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is provided in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice to help ensure correct completion of FCC Form 159 for
upfront payments for Auction 107. Applicants need to complete FCC Form
159 carefully, because mistakes may affect bidding eligibility and lack
of consistency between information provided in FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/
03), FCC Form 175, long-form application (FCC Form 601), and
correspondence about an application may cause processing delays.
Appropriate cross-references between the FCC Form Remittance Advise and
the short-form application are described in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice.
3. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
128. An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each
applicant seeking to participate in bidding to establish its
eligibility to bid on licenses.
129. Applicants that are former defaulters must pay upfront
payments 50% greater than non-former defaulters. For purposes of this
classification as a former defaulter or a former delinquent, defaults
and delinquencies of the applicant itself and its controlling interests
are included.
130. An applicant must make an upfront payment sufficient to obtain
bidding eligibility on the generic blocks on which it will bid. Upfront
payments are based on MHz-pops, and the amount of the upfront payment
submitted by an applicant will determine its initial bidding
eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may
place bids in any single round. In order to bid for a block, qualified
bidders must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the
number of bidding units assigned to that generic block in a PEA. At a
minimum, an applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to
establish eligibility to bid on at least one block in one of the PEAs
selected on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 107, or else the applicant
will not become qualified to participate in the auction. The total
upfront payment does not affect the total dollar amount the bidder may
bid.
131. Upfront payments for a generic block in a PEA are based on
$0.015 per MHz-pop for PEAs 1-50, $0.0030 per MHz-pop for PEAs 51-100,
and $0.0015 per MHz-pop for all other PEAs, subject to a minimum of
$500. The results of the upfront payment calculations will be rounded
as follows: Results above $10,000 will be rounded to the nearest
$1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 will be rounded to the
nearest $100; and results below $1,000 will be rounded to the nearest
$10. The upfront payment amount per block in each PEA is set forth in
the Attachment A file, available at www.fcc.gov/auction/107. The
upfront payment amounts are approximately half the minimum opening bid
amounts.
132. Each generic block in a PEA is assigned a specific number of
bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per $10 of the upfront
payment. The number of bidding units for one block in a given PEA is
fixed, since it is based on the MHz-pops in the block and does not
change during the auction as prices change. Thus, in calculating its
upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine the maximum
number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid in any single round
and submit an upfront payment amount for the auction covering that
number of bidding units. In some cases, a qualified bidder's maximum
eligibility may be less than the amount of its upfront payment because
the qualified bidder has either previously been in default on a
Commission construction permit or license or delinquent on non-tax debt
owed to a Federal agency, or has submitted an upfront payment that
exceeds the total amount of bidding units associated with the license
areas it selected on its FCC Form 175. In order to make this
calculation, an applicant should add together the bidding units for the
number of blocks in PEAs on which it seeks to be active in any given
round. Applicants should check their calculations carefully, as there
is no provision for increasing a bidder's eligibility after the upfront
payment deadline.
133. If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its
upfront payment for the maximum amount of generic blocks in each PEA on
which it plans to bid by multiplying the number of bidding units on
which it wishes to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number
of bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will
calculate the number of bidding units a non-former defaulter would get
for the upfront payment received, divide that number by 1.5, and round
the result up to the nearest bidding unit. If a former
[[Page 53224]]
defaulter fails to submit a sufficient upfront payment to establish
eligibility to bid on at least one generic block in a PEA, the
applicant will not be eligible to participate in Auction 107.
G. Auction Registration
134. All qualified bidders for Auction 107 are automatically
registered for the auction. Registration materials will be distributed
prior to the auction by overnight delivery. The mailing will be sent
only to the contact person at the contact address listed in the FCC
Form 175 and will include the SecurID[supreg] tokens that will be
required to place bids.
135. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration
mailing will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified
bidder for Auction 107 that has not received this mailing by noon on
November 25, 2020, should call the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868.
Receipt of this registration mailing is critical to participating in
the auction, and each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has
received all the registration materials.
136. If a SecurID[supreg] token is lost or damaged, only a person
who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the contact person, or
the certifying official on the applicant's short-form application may
request a replacement. To request a replacement, call the Auction
Bidder Line at the telephone number provided in the registration
materials or the Auction Hotline at (717) 338-2868.
H. Remote Electronic Bidding via the FCC Auction Bidding System
137. Bidders will be able to participate in Auction 107 over the
internet using the FCC Auction Bidding System (bidding system). Bidders
will have the option of placing bids by telephone through a dedicated
auction bidder line. Please note that the telephonic bid assistants are
required to use a script when entering bids placed by telephone.
Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to
bid by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The
length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary; please allow a
minimum of 10 minutes. The toll-free telephone number for the auction
bidder line will be provided to qualified bidders prior to the stat of
bidding in the auction.
138. Only qualified bidders are permitted to bid. Each authorized
bidder must have his or her own SecurID[supreg] token, which the
Commission will provide at no charge. Each applicant will be issued
three SecurID[supreg] tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his or her
SecurID[supreg] token. In order to access the bidding function of the
bidding system, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round
using the passcode generated by the SecurID[supreg] token and a
personal identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are
strongly encouraged to print a bid summary for each round after they
have completed all their activity for that round. For security
purposes, the SecurID[supreg] tokens and a telephone number for bidding
questions are only mailed to the contact person at the contact address
listed on the FCC Form 175. Each SecurID[supreg] token is tailored to a
specific auction. SecurID[supreg] tokens issued for other auctions or
obtained from a source other than the FCC will not work for Auction
107. The SecurID[supreg] tokens can be recycled, and the Commission
requests that bidders return the tokens to the FCC. Pre-addressed
envelopes will be provided to return the tokens once the auction has
ended.
139. The Commission makes no warranties whatsoever and shall not be
deemed to have made any warranties, with respect to the bidding system,
including any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event shall the Commission, or any of its
officers, employees, or agents, be liable for any damages whatsoever
(including, but not limited to, loss of business profits, business
interruption, loss of use, revenue, or business information, or any
other direct, indirect, or consequential damages) arising out of or
relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning, or use of the
bidding system. Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of
the Commission's technical, programming, or other advice or service
provided in connection with the bidding system.
140. To the extent an issue arises with the bidding system itself,
the Commission will take all appropriate measures to resolve such
issues quickly and equitably. Should an issue arise that is outside the
bidding system or attributable to a bidder, including, but not limited
to, a bidder's hardware, software, or internet access problem that
prevents the bidder from submitting a bid prior to the end of a round,
the Commission shall have no obligation to resolve or remediate such an
issue on behalf of the bidder. Similarly, if an issue arises due to
bidder error using the bidding system, the Commission shall have no
obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the
bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a bidding round, the results of
bid processing will not be altered absent evidence of any failure in
the bidding system.
I. Mock Auction
141. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a
mock auction for the clock phase, which will begin on December 3, 2020.
Only those bidders that are qualified to participate in Auction 107
will be eligible to participate in the mock auction. The mock auction
will enable qualified bidders to become familiar with the bidding
system and to practice submitting bids prior to the auction. All
qualified bidders, including all their authorized bidders, are
encouraged to participate to assure that they can log in to the bidding
system and gain experience with the bidding procedures. Participating
in the mock auction may reduce the likelihood of a bidder making a
mistake during the auction. Details regarding the mock auction will be
announced in the Qualified Bidders Public Notice for Auction 107.
142. After the clock phase of the auction concludes, a separate
mock auction for the assignment phase will be held for those qualified
bidders that won generic blocks in the clock phase.
J. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
143. At any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in
conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction
107 in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, network
interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an
auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other
reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive
bidding. OEA will notify participants of any such delay, suspension, or
cancellation by public notice and/or through the bidding system's
announcement function. If the bidding is delayed or suspended, then OEA
may, in its sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting from
the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or
cancel the auction in its entirety. OEA and WTB will exercise this
authority at their discretion.
K. Fraud Alert
144. As is the case with many business investment opportunities,
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction 107 to
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals of
fraud include the following:
The first contact is a ``cold call'' from a telemarketer
or is made in
[[Page 53225]]
response to an inquiry prompted by a radio or television infomercial.
The offering materials used to invest in the venture
appear to be targeted at IRA funds, for example, by including all
documents and papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA
accounts.
The amount of investment is less than $25,000.
The sales representative makes verbal representations
that: (a) The Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or other government
agency has approved the investment; (b) the investment is not subject
to state or federal securities laws; or (c) the investment will yield
unrealistically high short-term profits. In addition, the offering
materials often include copies of actual FCC releases, or quotes from
FCC personnel, giving the appearance of FCC knowledge or approval of
the solicitation.
145. Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes
is available from the FCC, as well as the FTC and SEC. Additional
sources of information for potential bidders and investors may be
obtained from the following sources:
The FCC's Consumer Call Center at (888) 225-5322 or by
visiting www.fcc.gov/general/frauds-scams-and-alerts-guides.
the FTC at (877) FTC-HELP ((877) 382-4357) or by visiting
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0238-investment-risks.
the SEC at (202) 942-7040 or by visiting www.sec.gov/investor.
146. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment
schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud
Information Center at (202) 835-0618.
IV. Bidding Procedures
147. Auction 107 will be conducted using an ascending clock auction
design with two phases. The first phase of the auction--the clock
phase--will consist of successive clock bidding rounds in which bidders
indicate their demands for a number of generic license blocks in
specific categories and PEAs. In the second phase--the assignment
phase--winning clock phase bidders will have the opportunity to bid for
their preferred combinations of frequency-specific license assignments,
consistent with their clock phase winnings, in a series of single
sealed-bid rounds conducted by PEA or, in some cases, PEA group.
148. Updated technical guides that provide the mathematical details
of the auction design and algorithms for the clock and assignment
phases of Auction 107 are available in the Education section of the
Auction 107 website (www.fcc.gov/auction/107). The information in the
updated technical guides supplements the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice.
A. Clock Phase
1. Clock Auction Design
149. During the clock phase of Auction 107, bidders will indicate
their demands for generic license blocks in up to two bidding
categories in specific geographic areas--in this case, PEAs. Under the
clock auction format, the auction will proceed in a series of rounds,
with bidding conducted simultaneously for all spectrum blocks in all
PEAs available in the auction. During each bidding round, the bidding
system will announce a per-block clock price for each product--a
category in a PEA--and qualified bidders will submit, for each product
for which they wish to bid, the number of blocks they seek at the clock
prices associated with the current round. Bidding rounds will be open
for predetermined periods of time. Bidders will be subject to activity
and eligibility rules that govern the pace at which they participate in
the auction.
150. In Auction 107, For each product, the clock price for a
generic license block will increase from round to round if bidders
indicate total demand for blocks in that product that exceeds the
number of blocks available. The bidding rounds will continue until, for
all products, the total number of blocks that bidders demand does not
exceed the supply of available blocks. At that point, those bidders
indicating demand for a product at the final price will be deemed
winning bidders.
151. Following the clock phase, the assignment phase will offer
clock phase winners the opportunity to bid an additional amount for
licenses with specific frequencies. All winning bidders, regardless of
whether they bid in the assignment phase, will be assigned licenses for
contiguous blocks within each PEA.
2. Generic License Blocks and Bidding Categories
152. The clock phase categories will be determined based on the
specific clearing deadline to which incumbent earth stations are
subject, i.e., Phase I or Phase II.
153. In the 46 PEAs where certain blocks are subject to the Phase I
deadline and others only to the Phase II deadline, clock phase bidding
will be conducted for two categories of generic blocks based on whether
the Phase I or Phase II deadline applies to the specific blocks.
Accordingly, in the 46 PEAs where certain blocks are subject to the
Phase I deadline, the first category of generic blocks will consist of
the 20-megahertz sub-blocks between 3.7-3.8 GHz. This category,
designated Category A, will comprise the five blocks subject to the
Phase I deadline. The second category of blocks, Category BC, will
consist of the nine blocks that are subject to the Phase II deadline.
In the remaining 360 PEAs where there are no blocks subject to the
Phase I deadline there will be a single bidding category, designated
ABC, consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7-3.98
GHz.
154. In each bidding round, a bidder will have the opportunity to
bid for the quantity of generic blocks it demands in each bidding
category available in each PEA. Bidding in the clock phase will
determine a single price for all the generic blocks in each category in
each PEA.
3. Bidding Rounds
155. Auction 107 will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each
followed by the release of round results. The Commission will conduct
bidding simultaneously for all spectrum blocks in all bidding
categories for all PEAs available in the auction. In the first bidding
round of Auction 107, a bidder will indicate, for each product, how
many generic license blocks it demands at the minimum opening bid
price.
156. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public
notice to be released at least one week before the start of bidding.
The bidding schedule may be changed in order to foster an auction pace
that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round
results and adjust their bidding strategies. Such changes may include
the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between
rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding
activity and other factors. The bidding system will announce any such
changes to the bidding schedule several rounds before the change
occurs.
157. A bidder may submit its bids using the bidding system's upload
function, which allows bid files in a comma-separated value (CSV)
format to be uploaded. A bidder may also submit bids through the
auction bidding system user interface or using the telephonic bidder
line. The bidding system will not allow bids to be submitted unless the
bidder selected the PEAs on its FCC Form 175 and the bidder has
sufficient bidding eligibility.
158. During each round, a bidder may also remove bids placed in the
current
[[Page 53226]]
round. If a bidder modifies its bids for blocks in a PEA in a round,
the system takes the last bid submission as that bidder's bid for the
round.
4. Stopping Rule
159. The Commission will use a simultaneous stopping rule for the
clock phase of Auction 107, under which all blocks in both categories
in all PEAs will remain available for bidding until the bidding stops
in every PEA. In the clock phase, bidding will close for blocks in all
PEAs after the first round in which there is no excess processed demand
in any product. Consequently, it is not possible to determine in
advance how long the bidding in Auction 107 will last. No bids may be
withdrawn after the close of a round.
5. Availability of Bidding Information
160. The Commission will make public after each clock round of
Auction 107, for each category in each PEA: (1) The supply, (2) the
aggregate demand, (3) the posted price of the last completed round
(which generally is the clock price of the previous round if demand
exceeds supply; the start-of-round price of the previous round if
supply exceeds demand; or the price at which a reduction caused demand
to equal supply), and (4) the clock price for the next round. The
identities of bidders demanding blocks in a specific category or PEA
will not be disclosed until after Auction 107 concludes (i.e., after
the close of bidding).
161. Each bidder will have access to additional information related
to its own bidding and bid eligibility. After the bids of a round have
been processed, the bidding system will inform each bidder of the
number of blocks it holds after the round (its processed demand) for
every product and its eligibility for the next round.
6. Activity Requirement and Activity Upper Limit
162. Activity requirement. Bidders are required to maintain a
minimum, high level of activity in each clock round in order to
maintain bidding eligibility. The activity requirement (the activity
requirement percentage) will be between 90% and 100% of a bidder's
bidding eligibility in all clock rounds. The initial activity
requirement percentage will be 95%. Failure to maintain the requisite
activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility,
possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place
additional bids in the auction. Bidders that do not place any bids in
the first round of the auction will have their eligibility reduced to
zero, and will be eliminated from bidding during the remainder of the
auction.
163. The Commission will use upfront payments to determine a
bidder's initial (maximum) eligibility in terms of bidding units. Each
spectrum block in a PEA will be assigned a specific number of bidding
units based on the number of MHz-pops in the PEA. Therefore, a bidder's
upfront payment will determine the maximum number of blocks as measured
by their associated bidding units that a bidder can demand at the start
of the auction.
164. The activity rule will be satisfied when a bidder has bidding
activity on blocks with bidding units that total at least the activity
requirement percentage of its eligibility in the round. If the activity
rule is met, then the bidder's eligibility will not change in the next
round. Bidding eligibility will be reduced as the auction progresses if
a bidder does not meet the activity requirement. The bidding system
will reduce the bidder's eligibility to the amount at which the bidder
would be meeting the activity requirement, which can be calculated by
multiplying the bidder's activity by the reciprocal of the activity
requirement. For example, with an activity requirement of 95%, the
eligibility of a bidder not meeting the activity requirement would be
calculated as the bidder's activity multiplied by 100/95, rounded up to
the nearest integer.
165. For this clock auction, a bidder's activity in a round for
purposes of the activity rule will be the sum of the bidding units
associated with the bidder's processed demands, which may not be equal
to its submitted demands. For instance, if a bidder requests a
reduction in the quantity of blocks it demands in a product, but the
bidding system does not apply the request because demand for the
product would fall below the available supply, the bidder's activity
will reflect its unreduced demand. Under the ascending clock auction
format, the FCC auction bidding system will not allow a bidder to
reduce the quantity of blocks it demands in a product if the reduction
would result in aggregate demand falling below (or further below) the
available supply of blocks in the product.
166. Activity upper limit. A bidder will be allowed to submit bids
with associated bidding activity greater than its current bidding
eligibility, noting, however, that a bidder's activity as applied by
the auction bidding system during bid processing will not exceed the
bidder's current bidding eligibility. Because a bidder's eligibility
for the next round is calculated based on the bidder's demands as
applied by the auction bidding system during bid processing, a bidder's
eligibility may be reduced even if the bidder submitted bids that meet
its activity requirement for the round. This may occur, for example, if
the bidder bids to reduce its demand in PEA X by two blocks (with 10
bidding units each) and bids to increase its demand by one block (with
20 bidding units) in PEA Y. If the bidder's demand can only be reduced
by one block in PEA X (because there is only one block of excess
demand), the increase in PEA Y cannot be applied, and absent other
bidding activity the bidder's eligibility would be reduced. The
Commission anticipates that an ``activity upper limit'' will help a
bidder avoid having its eligibility reduced as a result of submitted
bids that cannot be applied during bid processing. For example,
depending upon the bidder's overall bidding eligibility and the
activity limit percentage, a bidder could submit an ``additional'' bid
or bids that would be considered (in price point order with its other
bids) and applied as available eligibility permits during the bid
processing.
167. When submitting bids with associated bidding activity greater
than its current bidding eligibility, a bidder should consider the
price points associated with each of its bids to indicate the order in
which it wishes the bidding system to consider its bid requests.
Therefore, if bids submitted at lower price points cannot be applied as
requested, thereby leaving the bidder with unused eligibility, then the
system will consider the additional bids submitted at higher price
points to use the otherwise lost eligibility. Although a bidder may
submit bids with associated bidding units exceeding 100% of its current
bidding eligibility, its processed activity can never exceed its
eligibility. Thus, if a bidder submits bids with associated bidding
units exceeding the bidder's current eligibility, the bidding system
will not apply all of those bids.
168. After Round 1, a bidder may submit bids with bidding units
totaling up to its activity upper limit, which is equal to the bidder's
current bidding eligibility for the round times a percentage (the
activity limit percentage) equal to or greater than 100%. An initial
activity limit percentage of 120% will apply to Round 2 and subsequent
rounds. In any bidding round, the auction bidding system will advise
the bidder of its current bidding eligibility, its required bidding
activity, and its activity upper limit.
169. OEA retains the discretion to change the activity requirement
[[Page 53227]]
percentage and the activity limit percentage during the auction, and to
set the activity limit percentage within a range of 100% and 140%. The
bidding system will announce any such changes in advance of the round
in which they would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to
adjust their bidding strategies.
170. Missing bids. Under the clock auction format, a bidder is
required to indicate its demands in every round, even if its demands at
the new round's prices are unchanged from the previous round. Missing
bids--bids that are not reconfirmed--are treated by the auction bidding
system as bids that request to reduce to a quantity of zero blocks for
the product at the start-of-round price. If these bids are applied, or
applied partially, then a bidder's bidding activity, and its bidding
eligibility for the next round, may be reduced.
7. Acceptable Bids
a. Minimum Opening Bids and Reserve Price
171. The Commission established in the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 107. The bidding
system will not accept bids lower than the minimum opening bids for
each product. Based on the Commission's experience in past auctions,
setting minimum opening bid amounts judiciously is an effective tool
for accelerating the competitive bidding process.
172. In the first bidding round of Auction 107, a bidder will
indicate how many generic license blocks in a PEA it demands at the
minimum opening bid price. Minimum opening bid amounts are calculated
based on bandwidth and license area population using a tiered approach,
under which minimum opening bid amounts will vary by market population.
For PEAs 1-50, minimum opening bid amounts are based on $0.03 per MHz-
pop; for PEAs 51-100, minimum opening bid amounts are based on $0.006
per MHz-pop; and for all other PEAs, minimum opening bid amounts are
based on $0.003 per MHz-pop, subject to a minimum of $1,000. These
minimum opening bid amounts are specified in the Attachment A file.
b. Clock Price Increments
173. After bidding in the first round and before each subsequent
round, the FCC auction bidding system will announce the start-of-round
price and the clock price for each product for the upcoming round--that
is, the lowest price and the highest price at which bidders can specify
the number of blocks they demand during the round. The start-of-round
price is also referred to as the posted price of the previous round. As
long as aggregate demand for blocks in the product exceeds the supply
of blocks, the start-of-round price will be equal to the clock price
from the prior round. Aggregate demand for a product is equal to the
total number of blocks for which bidders have processed demand. If
aggregate demand equals supply at a price in a previous round, either a
clock price or an intra-round price, then the start-of-round price for
the next round will be equal to the price at which demand equaled
supply. If demand was less than supply in the previous round, then the
start-of-round price for the next round will not increase.
174. The Commission will set the clock price for blocks in a
specific product for a round by adding a percentage increment to the
start-of-round price. For example, if the start-of-round price for a
block in a given product is $10,000, and the percentage increment is
20%, then the clock price for the round will be $12,000. Results above
$10,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000
but above $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $100; and results
below $1,000 will be rounded up to the nearest $10.
175. The Commission will set the clock price for blocks in a PEA by
adding a fixed increment percentage to the start-of-round price. The
Commission will set the increment percentage within a range of 5% to
20% inclusive and will set the initial increment percentage at 10%. The
Commission may adjust the increment as rounds continue.
c. Intra-Round Bids
176. A bidder may make intra-round bids by indicating a point
between the start-of-round price and the clock price at which its
demand for blocks changes. In placing an intra-round bid, a bidder
would indicate a specific price and a quantity of blocks it demands if
the price for blocks should increase beyond that price. For example, if
a bidder has processed demand of three blocks at the start-of-round
price of $100, but wishes to hold only two blocks if the price
increases by more than $10 (assuming the bid increment is greater than
$10), then the bidder will indicate a bid quantity of two at a price of
$110 ($100 + $10). Similarly, if the bidder wishes to reduce its demand
to zero should the price increase at all above $100, then the bidder
will indicate a bid quantity of zero at the start-of-round price of
$100.
177. Intra-round bids are optional; a bidder may choose to express
its demands only at the clock prices.
8. Bids To Change Demand, Bid Types, and Bid Processing
178. A bidder that is willing to maintain the same demand in a
product at the new clock price will bid for that quantity at the clock
price, indicating that it is willing to pay up to and including that
price, if need be, for the specified quantity. Bids to maintain demand
will always be applied by the auction bidding system. A bidder that
wishes to change the quantity it demands in a product (relative to its
demand from the previous round as processed by the bidding system) can
express its demand at the clock price or at an intra-round price, but
depending upon the bidder's eligibility and the aggregate demand for
the product, the bidding system may not be able to apply the requested
change.
179. In order to facilitate bidding for multiple blocks in a
product, bidders will be permitted to make two types of bids: Simple
bids and switch bids.
A ``simple'' bid indicates a desired quantity of blocks in
a product at a price (either the clock price or an intra-round price).
Simple bids may be applied partially. A simple bid that involves a
reduction from the bidder's previous demands may be implemented
partially if aggregate excess demand is insufficient to support the
entire reduction. A simple bid to increase a bidder's demand in a
category may be applied partially if the total number of bidding units
associated with the bidder's full increase in demand exceeds the
bidder's bidding eligibility for the round.
A ``switch'' bid, applicable in PEAs in which there are
blocks in both A and BC categories, allows the bidder to request to
move its demand for a quantity of blocks from the A category to the BC
category, or vice versa, within the same PEA. A switch bid may be
applied partially, but the increase in demand in the ``to'' category
will always match in quantity the reduction in the ``from'' category.
180. These bid types will allow bidders to express their demand for
blocks in the next clock round without running the risk that they will
be forced to purchase more spectrum at a higher price than they wish.
When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the uniform
price for the category will stop increasing at that point, since the
partial application of the bid results in demand falling to
[[Page 53228]]
equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a simple bid or a switch bid
that cannot be applied fully will not face a price that is higher than
its bid price for the remaining demand.
181. A bidder may bid for multiple blocks in a bidding category in
a PEA and may submit bids for multiple PEAs. The assignment phase will
assign contiguous blocks to winners of multiple blocks in a PEA and
give bidders an opportunity to express their preferences for specific
frequency blocks, thereby facilitating aggregations of licenses.
182. The auction bidding system will, after each bidding round,
process bids to change demand to determine the processed demand of each
bidder for each product and a posted price for each product that would
serve as the start-of-round price for the next round.
a. No Excess Supply Rule for Bids To Reduce Demand
183. The FCC auction bidding system will not apply a bid to reduce
the quantity of blocks a bidder demands in a product if the reduction
would result in aggregate demand falling below (or further below) the
available supply of blocks in the product. Therefore, if a bidder
submits a simple bid to reduce the number of blocks for which it has
processed demand as of the previous round, then the FCC auction bidding
system will treat the bid as a request to reduce demand that will be
applied only if the ``no excess supply'' rule would be satisfied.
Similarly, if a bidder submits a switch bid to move its demand for a
quantity of blocks from the A category to the BC category within the
same PEA, the FCC auction bidding system will treat the bid as a
request that will be applied only if the ``no excess supply'' rule
would be satisfied for the A category in the PEA.
b. Eligibility Rule for Bids To Increase Demand
184. The bidding system will not allow a bidder to increase the
quantity of blocks it demands in a product if the total number of
bidding units associated with the bidder's demand exceeds the bidder's
bidding eligibility for the round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a
simple bid to increase the number of blocks for which it has processed
demand as of the previous round, the FCC auction bidding system will
treat the bid as a request to increase demand that will be applied only
if that would not cause the bidder's activity to exceed its
eligibility.
c. Partial Application of Bids
185. A bid (simple bid or switch bid) that involves a reduction
from the bidder's previous demands will be applied partially--that is,
reduced by fewer blocks than requested in the bid--if excess demand is
insufficient to support the entire reduction. A switch bid may be
applied partially, but the increase in demand in the ``to'' category
will always match in quantity the reduction in the ``from'' category. A
simple bid to increase a bidder's demand will be applied partially if
the total number of bidding units associated with the bidder's demand
exceeds the bidder's bidding eligibility for the round.
d. Processed Demands
186. After a round ends, the bidding system will process bids to
change demand in order of price point, where the price point represents
the percentage of the bidding interval for the round. Bids to maintain
demand are always applied before the bidding system considers bids to
change demand. For example, if the start-of-round price is $5,000 and
the clock price is $6,000, a price of $5,100 will correspond to the 10%
price point, since it is 10% of the bidding interval between $5,000 and
$6,000. The bidding system will first consider intra-round bids in
ascending order of price point and then bids at the clock price. The
system will consider bids at the lowest price point across all
products, then look at bids at the next price point in all products,
and so on. If there are multiple bids at a single price point, the
system will process bids in order of a bid-specific pseudo-random
number. As it considers each submitted bid during bid processing, the
bidding system will determine the extent to which there is excess
demand in each product at that point in the processing to determine
whether a bidder's request to reduce demand can be applied. Similarly,
the auction bidding system will evaluate the activity associated with
the bidder's most recently determined demands at that point in the
processing to determine whether a request to increase demand can be
applied.
187. Because in any given round some bidders may request to
increase demands for licenses while others may request reductions, the
price point at which a bid is considered by the auction bidding system
can affect whether it is applied. Bids not applied because of
insufficient aggregate demand or insufficient eligibility will be held
in a queue and considered, again in order of price point, if there
should be excess demand or sufficient eligibility later in the
processing after other bids are processed.
188. Once a round closes, the auction bidding system will process
bids to change demand by first considering the bid submitted at the
lowest price point and determining the maximum extent to which that bid
can be applied given bidders' demands as determined at that point in
the bid processing. If the bid can be applied (either in full or
partially), the number of licenses the bidder holds at that point in
the processing will be adjusted, and aggregate demand will be
recalculated accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied in full, the
unfulfilled bid, or portion thereof, will be held in a queue to be
considered later during bid processing for that round. The bidding
system will then consider the bid submitted at the next highest price
point, applying it in full, in part, or not at all, given the most
recently determined demands of bidders. Any unfulfilled requests will
again be held in the queue, and aggregate demand will again be
recalculated. Every time a bid or part of a bid is applied, the
unfulfilled bids held in the queue will be reconsidered, in the order
of their original price points (and by pseudo-random number, in the
case of tied price points). The auction bidding system will not carry
over unfulfilled bid requests to the next round, however. The bidding
system will advise bidders of the status of their bids when round
results are released.
e. Price Determination
189. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice describes the bid
processing procedures to determine, based on aggregate demand, the
posted price for each product for the round that will serve as the
start-of-round price for the next round. The uniform price for all of
the blocks in a product will increase from round to round as long as
there is excess demand for blocks in the product, but will not increase
if aggregate demand does not exceed the available supply of blocks.
190. If, at the end of a round, the aggregate demand for blocks in
the product exceeds the supply of blocks, then the posted price will
equal the clock price for the round. If a reduction in demand was
applied during the round and caused demand in the product to equal
supply, then the posted price will be the price at which the reduction
was applied. If aggregate demand is less than or equal to supply and no
bid to reduce demand was applied for the product, then the posted price
will equal the start-of-round price for the round. The range of
acceptable
[[Page 53229]]
bid amounts for the next round will be set by adding the percentage
increment to the posted price.
191. When a bid to reduce demand can be applied only partially, the
uniform price for the product will stop increasing at that point, since
the partial application of the bid will result in demand falling to
equal supply. Hence, a bidder that makes a bid to reduce demand that
cannot be fully applied will not face a price for the remaining demand
that is higher than its bid price.
192. After the bids of the round have been processed, if the
stopping rule has not been met, the FCC auction bidding system will
announce clock prices to indicate a range of acceptable bids for the
next round. Each bidder will be informed of its processed demand and
the extent of excess demand for blocks in each product.
9. Winning Bids in the Clock Phase
193. Under the clock auction format for Auction 107, bidders with
processed demand for a product at the time the stopping rule is met
will become the winning bidders of licenses corresponding to that
number of blocks and will be assigned specific frequencies in the
assignment phase. The final clock phase price for a generic block in a
product will be the posted price for the final round.
B. Assignment Phase
194. The assignment phase will determine which frequency-specific
licenses will be won by the winning bidders of generic blocks during
the clock phase. In the assignment phase, winning bidders will have the
opportunity to bid for preferred combinations of frequency-specific
licenses. A bidder can indicate a price using a sealed bid for one or
more possible frequency assignments for which it wishes to express a
preference, consistent with its winning bids for generic blocks in the
clock phase. The bid prices will represent the maximum payment that the
bidder is willing to pay for the frequency-specific license assignment,
in addition to the final price established in the clock phase for the
generic blocks. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice will determine
the optimal assignment of licenses within each assignment category in
each PEA based on bid amounts in the assignment phase.
195. The assignment phase will use an alternative approach for PEAs
with blocks in two clock phase categories that allows for final
frequency specific assignments of contiguous blocks within each PEA.
Accordingly, the assignment phase procedures for the 46 PEAs where
certain blocks are subject to the Phase I deadline will make a separate
interim assignment of contiguous blocks within Category A, i.e., those
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline, and will make a separate final
assignment of contiguous blocks for all of a bidder's clock phase
winnings whether in Category A and/or BC. In the 360 PEAs where there
are no blocks subject to the Phase I deadline, the assignment phase
procedures will make one assignment for all of a bidder's clock phase
winnings in Category ABC, consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz
blocks between 3.7-3.98 GHz. Procedures to implement this approach are
set forth in more detail in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.
196. Participation in the assignment phase is voluntary; a winning
bidder in the clock phase of Auction 107 need not bid in order to be
assigned contiguous licenses corresponding to the outcome of the clock
phase. Moreover, a bidder that wins multiple blocks in Category A in
one of the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the Phase I deadline will
receive an interim assignment for contiguous blocks of licenses in
conjunction with a final assignment for contiguous blocks, which could
include blocks in any of the 14 available blocks in the PEA, even
without bidding in the assignment phase. More specifically, to provide
each winning bidder with frequency-specific licenses based on its
interim and final assignments, the bidding system will match interim
and final assignments as follows: First, any blocks that appear both in
a bidder's interim and final assignment will be matched together. Then,
considering all remaining blocks in the bidder's interim assignment
(from lowest to highest), each will be matched with the lowest
available block in the bidder's final assignment.
1. Sequencing and Grouping of PEAs
197. Sequencing of rounds. Assignment rounds will be conducted for
the largest markets first. This sequencing will enable bidders to
establish a ``footprint,'' making it easier for a bidder to incorporate
frequency assignments from previously assigned areas into its bid
preferences for other areas, and recognizes that a bidder winning
blocks in multiple PEAs may prefer contiguous blocks across adjacent
PEAs.
198. Specifically, the Commission will conduct a separate
assignment round for each of the top 20 PEAs sequentially, beginning
with the largest PEAs. Once the top 20 PEAs have been assigned, the
Commission will conduct, for each Regional Economic Area Grouping
(REAG), a series of assignment rounds for the remaining PEAs within
that region. Top 20 PEAs are PEAs 1-20. The six REAGs are: Northeast,
Southeast, Great Lakes, Mississippi Valley, Central, and West. The
assignment rounds will be sequenced within a REAG in descending order
of population for a PEA group or individual PEA.
199. Grouping of PEAs. To reduce the total amount of time required
to complete the assignment phase, the Commission will group for
assignment any non-top 20 PEAs within a REAG in which the same bidders
won the same number of blocks in each clock phase category, and all are
subject to the small markets bidding cap or all are not subject to the
cap. This approach will also help maximize contiguity across PEAs.
Accordingly, where these criteria are met, a bidder will submit a
single set of bids for assignment options that will apply to all the
PEAs in the group and will be assigned the same frequency-specific
licenses in each PEA.
200. The Commission will conduct the bidding for the different
REAGs in parallel. That is, bidding for assignments in multiple PEAs or
PEA groups will take place during the same timed bidding round.
2. Acceptable Bids and Bid Processing
201. Prior to the start of the assignment phase, the bidding system
will provide each clock phase winner with bidding options for all
possible contiguous frequency assignments for blocks won in the clock
phase. More specifically, in the 46 PEAs with blocks subject to the
Phase I deadline, a winner of Category A blocks will have options for
all possible contiguous interim assignments for the quantity of A
blocks it won and all possible contiguous final assignments of all
blocks it won in the clock phase regardless of the clock phase bidding
category. A bidder will not see a separate set of bidding options for
generic BC blocks won. They will be assigned as part of the final joint
assignment of A and BC blocks. For example, suppose that, in one of the
46 PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline, a bidder won three Category A
blocks and four Category BC blocks. Then, the bidder will be assigned
three blocks in the interim assignment and seven blocks in the final
assignment. The bidder will have three bidding options for the interim
frequency assignment (A1-A3, A2-A4, and A3-A5) and eight bidding
options for the final frequency assignment (A1-B2, A2-B3, A3-B4, A4-B5,
A5-C1, B1-C2, B2-C3, and B3-C4). In the 360 PEAs where there are no
blocks subject to the Phase I deadline,
[[Page 53230]]
a clock phase winner will have one set of options for all possible
contiguous assignments for its clock phase winnings in Category ABC,
consisting of all of the 14 20-megahertz blocks between 3.7-3.98 GHz.
202. A bidder will not see a separate set of bidding options for
generic BC blocks won. They will be assigned as part of the final joint
assignment of A and BC blocks.
203. An optimization approach will be used to determine the winning
frequency assignment for each assignment category in each PEA or PEA
group. The bidding system will select the assignment that maximizes the
sum of bid amounts among all assignments in which each bidder's
assignment is contiguous. If there are multiple blocks in a category
that remain unsold, the unsold licenses will be contiguous.
204. Further, the additional price a bidder will pay for a specific
frequency assignment (above the final clock phase price) will be
calculated consistent with a generalized ``second price'' approach--
that is, the winner will pay a price that would be just sufficient to
result in the bidder receiving that same winning frequency assignment
while ensuring that no group of bidders is willing to pay more for an
alternative assignment in which every bidder is assigned contiguous
spectrum. This price will be less than or equal to the price the bidder
indicated it was willing to pay for the assignment. Determining prices
in this way encourages bidders to bid their full value for the
assignment, knowing that if the assignment is selected, they will pay
no more than would be necessary to ensure that the outcome is
competitive.
3. Information Available to Bidders During the Assignment Phase
205. After the clock phase concludes but before bidding begins in
the assignment phase, the bidding system will provide to each
assignment phase bidder a menu of bidding options consisting of
possible configurations of frequency-specific licenses on which it can
bid. These bidding options will be consistent with the bidder's clock-
phase winnings. The bidding system will also announce the order in
which assignment rounds will take place and indicate which PEAs will be
grouped together for bidding. The bidding system will provide clock
phase winning bidders with this information as soon as possible and
will announce a schedule of assignment phase rounds that will commence
no sooner than five business days later.
206. After each assignment round, the bidding system will inform
each bidder of its own assignment and assignment payment for each
assignment category for each PEA or PEA group assigned in the round.
The bidding system will also provide each bidder with its current total
payment, which is calculated as the sum of the bidder's total clock
payment across all PEAs and the bidder's assignment payments for the
PEAs for which an assignment round has already completed. This
information will provide the bidder a running estimate during the
assignment rounds of the dollar amount it will owe at the end of the
auction. A bidder that is claiming a bidding credit will also be
informed about its current bidding credit discount and whether the
discount has been capped.
4. Final Payment Calculations
207. When all assignment rounds have been completed, a bidder's
final payment takes into account the sum of final clock phase prices
across all licenses that it won, the sum of all of the bidder's
assignment payments, and any claimed bidding credits. Specifically, if
a bidder is not claiming a bidding credit, its final payment is
determined by summing the final clock phase prices across all licenses
that it won and its assignment payments across all PEAs or PEA groups.
208. If a bidder claims a bidding credit, a bidding credit discount
is calculated by applying the bidder's bidding credit percentage to the
sum of the bidder's clock payments and assignment payments, capping the
bidding credit discount if it exceeds the applicable caps for small
businesses, rural service providers, and small markets. The resulting
bidding credit discount is subtracted from the sum of the bidder's
clock payments and assignment payments to determine the final payment
for a bidder with a bidding credit.
C. License Authorizations for Interim and Final Assignments
209. The Commission will condition the 3.7 GHz licenses awarded
post-auction for the interim and final frequency assignments deadline.
210. For a given frequency block in the 46 PEAs with blocks subject
to the Phase I deadline, the interim and final authorizations may be
awarded via either a single standard license authorization (where both
the interim and final assignments are for the same frequency block(s))
or through a two-license paired authorization (including an interim
assignment and a final assignment of different specific frequency
blocks) that collectively provides authority for the full 15-year
license term. In the paired authorization approach, the interim
assignment of the pair would expire on the earlier of December 5, 2025,
or the date the relevant PEA is confirmed cleared, with no option for
renewal, and the resulting final license would provide for operation
after the interim authorization expires until the remainder of the 15-
year term. The B1-C4 blocks in a PEA will be confirmed cleared
consistent with the process for validation of a space station
operator's Certification of Accelerated Relocation that it satisfied
the Phase II clearing deadline, as described in section 27.1412(g) of
the Commission's rules. These paired authorizations together provide
the full range of interim and final rights over the license term. To
ensure consistent treatment of licenses for frequencies in the A block,
paired interim and final licenses will be conditioned to clarify that
if they are transferred/assigned, they must be transferred/assigned
together, in the same manner. There is no restriction on spectrum
leasing for either of the paired authorizations.
211. The assignment phase results will dictate whether a particular
winning bidder may be awarded a single or paired license
authorizations. For example, if a winner of clock phase Category A
blocks (in the 46 PEAs subject to the Phase I deadline) is assigned to
the same frequencies for both interim and final assignments, a single
authorization will be issued providing both interim and final rights
for those A block frequencies. If the winner of the interim assignment
for specific frequencies in the A block does not also win the final
assignment for the same frequencies in that block, a paired
authorization will be issued to the bidder for an interim assignment in
blocks A1-A5 and final assignment in blocks A1-C4 that together provide
interim and final rights. In all other cases where one or more clock
phase Category A blocks are not won and therefore no interim assignment
is made, the winner of a final assignment will be issued a single
authorization conveying final rights. For example, if the bidder wins
only BC or ABC blocks in the PEA in the clock phase. The resulting
final license will provide for operation on the earlier of December 5,
2025 or the date the relevant PEA is confirmed cleared. That is, in the
event a Category A generic block is unsold and therefore interim rights
are not assigned to a bidder, interim rights revert to the licensee
holding the final authorization for that frequency block.
[[Page 53231]]
D. Calculating Individual ``Per-License'' Prices
212. While final auction payments for winning bidders will be
calculated with bidding credit caps and assignment payments applied on
an aggregate basis, rather than to individual license authorizations
(single or paired), the bidding system will also calculate a ``per-
license'' price for each license authorization. Such individual prices
may be needed if a licensee later incurs license-specific obligations,
such as unjust enrichment payments.
213. After the assignment phase, the auction bidding system will
determine a net and gross post-auction price for each license
authorization (or paired authorization, if the authorization comprises
both an interim and final frequency assignment) that was won by a
bidder by apportioning assignment payments and bidding credit discounts
(only applicable for the net price) across all the license
authorizations or paired authorizations that the bidder won. To
calculate the gross per-license price, the auction bidding system will
apportion the assignment payment to authorizations in proportion to the
final clock phase price of the blocks that the bidder is assigned in
that assignment category and PEA (or PEA group). To calculate the net
price, the auction bidding system will first apportion any applicable
bidding credit discounts to each PEA or PEA group in proportion to the
gross payment for that market. Then, for each PEA or PEA group, the
auction bidding system will apportion the assignment payment and the
discount to licenses in proportion to the final clock phase price of
the blocks that the bidder is assigned in that assignment category for
that PEA (or PEA group).
E. Auction Results
214. The bidding system will determine winning bidders as described
in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice. After release of the
public notice announcing auction results, the public will be able to
view and download bidding and results data through the FCC Public
Reporting System (PRS).
F. Auction Announcements
215. Commission staff will use auction announcements to report
necessary information, such as schedule changes, to bidders. All
auction announcements will be available by clicking a link in the
bidding system.
V. Post-Auction Procedures
216. The public notice announcing the close of the bidding and
auction results will be released shortly after bidding has ended in
Auction 107. This public notice will also establish the deadlines for
submitting down payments, final payments, and the long-form
applications (FCC Form 601) for the auction.
A. Down Payments
217. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing
public notice for Auction 107, each winning bidder must submit
sufficient funds (in addition to its upfront payment) to bring its
total amount of money on deposit with the Commission to 20% of the net
amount of its winning bids (less any bidding credits, if applicable).
B. Final Payments
218. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of
the net amount for each of its winning bids within 10 business days
after the deadline for submitting down payments.
C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)
219. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing
public notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly
completed post-auction application (FCC Form 601) for the license(s)
they won through the auction.
220. A winning bidder claiming eligibility for a small business
bidding credit or a rural service provider bidding credit must
demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit sought in its FCC
Form 601 post-auction application. Further instructions on these and
other filing requirements will be provided to winning bidders in the
auction closing public notice for Auction 107.
221. Winning bidders organized as bidding consortia must comply
with the FCC Form 601 post-auction application procedures set forth in
section 1.2107(g) of the Commission's rules. Specifically, license(s)
won by a consortium must be applied for as follows: (a) An individual
member of the consortium or a new legal entity comprising two or more
individual consortium members must file for licenses covered by the
winning bids; (b) each member or group of members of a winning
consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to file a
separate FCC Form 601 for its/their respective license(s) in their
legal business name; (c) in the case of a license to be partitioned or
disaggregated, the member or group filing the applicable FCC Form 601
shall include the parties' partitioning or disaggregation agreement
with the FCC Form 601; and (d) if a designated entity credit is sought
(either small business or rural service provider), the applicant must
meet the applicable eligibility requirements in the Commission's rules
for the credit.
D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602)
222. Within 10 business days after release of the auction closing
public notice for Auction 107, each winning bidder must also comply
with the ownership reporting requirements in sections 1.913, 1.919, and
1.2112 of the Commission's rules by submitting an ownership disclosure
information report for wireless telecommunications services (FCC Form
602) with its FCC Form 601 post-auction application.
223. If a winning bidder already has a complete and accurate FCC
Form 602 on file in the FCC's Universal Licensing System (ULS), then it
is not necessary to file a new report, but the winning bidder must
certify in its FCC Form 601 application that the information on file
with the Commission is complete and accurate. If the winning bidder
does not have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if it is not complete and
accurate, it must submit a new one.
224. When a winning bidder submits an FCC Form 175, ULS
automatically creates an ownership record. This record is not an FCC
Form 602, but it may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602 with the
ownership information submitted on the winning bidder's FCC Form 175
application. A winning bidder must review the pre-filled information
and confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the filing date of
the FCC Form 601 post-auction application before certifying and
submitting the FCC Form 602. Further instructions will be provided to
winning bidders in the auction closing public notice.
E. Default and Disqualification
225. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the
close of an auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment by
the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely long-form application,
fails to make a full and timely final payment, or is otherwise
disqualified) is liable for default payments as described in section
1.2104(g)(2). A default payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal
to the difference between the amount of the bidder's winning bid and
the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering the same
spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a
percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid,
whichever is less.
226. The percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an
additional payment for defaults in a particular
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auction is established in advance of the auction. The additional
default payment for Auction 107 is 15% of the applicable bid for
winning bids. The bidding system will calculate individual per-license
prices that are separate from final auction payments, which are
calculated on an aggregate basis. These prices determine the defaulted
bid amount on individual licenses.
227. Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission has the
discretion to re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest
bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a
default or disqualification involves gross misconduct,
misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, then the Commission
may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in
future auctions and may take any other action that it deems necessary,
including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing
authorizations held by the applicant.
F. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance
228. All refunds of upfront payment balances will be returned to
the payer of record as identified on the FCC Form 159 unless the payer
submits written authorization instructing otherwise. Bidders are
encouraged to use the Refund Information icon found on the Auction
Application Manager page or the Refund Form link available on the
Auction Application Submit Confirmation page in the FCC Auction
Application System to access the form. After the required information
is completed on the blank form, the form should be printed, signed, and
submitted to the Commission by mail, fax, or email as instructed in the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice.
VI. Procedural Matters
229. Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As
required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), a
Supplemental Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental
IRFA) was incorporated in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice
released in March 2020. The Commission sought public comment on the
proposals in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice, including comments
on the Supplemental IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the
Supplemental IRFA. The Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice establishes
the procedures to be used for Auction 107 and supplements the Initial
and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses completed by the Commission
in the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 FR 44128, August 29,
2018, and the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, and other Commission orders
pursuant to which Auction 107 will be conducted. This present
Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental FRFA)
conforms to the RFA.
230. Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules. The Auction 107
Procedures Public Notice implements auction procedures for those
entities that seek to bid to acquire licenses in Auction 107. Auction
107 will be the Commission's second auction of mid-band spectrum in
furtherance of the deployment of fifth-generation (5G) wireless, the
Internet of Things (IoT), and other advanced spectrum-based services.
The Public Notice adopts procedural rules and terms and conditions
governing Auction 107, and the post-auction application and payment
processes, as well as sets the minimum opening bid amounts for
flexible-use overlay licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band (3.7 GHz
Service) that will be offered in Auction 107.
231. To promote the efficient and fair administration of the
competitive bidding process for all Auction 107 participants, the
Commission adopted the following procedures proposed in the Auction 107
Comment Public Notice:
Use of anonymous bidding/limited information procedures
which will not make public: (1) The license areas that an applicant
selects for bidding in its auction application (FCC Form 175); (2) the
amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for
Auction 107; (3) an applicant's bidding eligibility; and (4) any other
bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the
bidder placing a bid, until after bidding has closed;
establishment of bidding credit caps for eligible small
businesses and rural service providers in Auction 107;
adjustment of the bidding schedule as necessary in order
to manage the pace of Auction 107;
use of a simultaneous stopping rule in Auction 107, under
which all blocks in both categories in all PEAs will remain available
for bidding until bidding has stopped in every PEA;
provision of discretionary authority to OEA, in
conjunction with WTB, to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction
107 for any reason that affects the ability of the competitive bidding
process to be conducted fairly and efficiently;
use of a clock auction format for Auction 107 under which
each qualified bidder will indicate in successive clock bidding rounds
its demands for categories of generic blocks in specific PEAs, and
associated bidding and bid processing procedures to implement the clock
auction format;
use of an activity rule, which requires a bidder to bid
actively during the auction on a high percentage of its bidding
eligibility, including a modification that would allow a bidder to
submit bids, but not to be assigned bids, that exceed its bidding
eligibility;
use of an activity rule that does not include a waiver of
the rule to preserve a bidder's eligibility;
a requirement that bidders be active on between 90% and
100% of a bidder's bidding eligibility in all clock rounds;
a specific minimum opening bid amount for generic blocks
in each product available in Auction 107;
a specific upfront payment amount for generic blocks in
each product available in Auction 107;
establishment of a bidder's initial bidding eligibility in
bidding units based on that bidder's upfront payment through assignment
of a specific number of bidding units for each generic block;
establishment of acceptable bid amounts, including clock
price increments and intra-round bids, along with a methodology for
calculating such amounts;
a methodology for processing bids and requests to reduce
and increase demand subject to the no excess supply rule for bids to
reduce demand and the eligibility rule for bids to increase demand;
use of bid processing procedures that the auction bidding
system will use, after each bidding round, to process bids to determine
the processed demand of each bidder and a posted price for each product
that would serve as the start-of-round price for the next round;
establishment of an assignment phase that will determine
which frequency-specific licenses will be won by the winning bidders of
generic blocks during the clock phase; and
establishment of additional default payments of 15% for
bids pursuant to section 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the event that a
winning bidder defaults or is disqualified after the auction.
232. The procedures for the conduct of Auction 107 constitute the
more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules
contemplated by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission's rules and the
underlying rulemaking orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report and Order,
and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent
therewith.
233. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in
Response to the IRFA. There were no comments filed that specifically
address the
[[Page 53233]]
procedures and policies proposed in the Supplemental IRFA.
234. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act
of 2010, which amended the RFA, the Commission is required to respond
to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA and
to provide a detailed statement of any changes made to the proposed
procedures as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not
file any comments in response to the procedures that were proposed in
the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice.
235. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to
Which the Rules Will Apply. The RFA directs agencies to provide a
description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small
entities that may be affected by the rules and policies adopted herein.
The RFA generally defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same
meaning as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and
``small governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small
business'' has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern''
under the Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one
which: (1) Is independently owned and operated, (2) is not dominant in
its field of operation, and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
established by the SBA.
236. As noted above, Regulatory Flexibility Analyses were
incorporated into the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rule Making and 3.7
GHz Report and Order. These orders provide the underlying authority for
the procedures proposed in the Auction 107 Comment Public Notice and
are adopted herein for Auction 107. In those regulatory flexibility
analyses, the Commission described in detail the small entities that
might be significantly affected. In the Auction 107 Procedures Public
Notice, the Commission incorporated by reference the descriptions and
estimates of the number of small entities from the previous Regulatory
Flexibility Analyses in the 3.7 GHz Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
3.7 GHz Report and Order.
237. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities. The Commission designed the
auction application process itself to minimize reporting and compliance
requirements for applicants, including small business applicants. In
the first part of the Commission's two-phased auction application
process, parties desiring to participate in an auction file
streamlined, short-form applications in which they certify under
penalty of perjury as to their qualifications. Eligibility to
participate in bidding is based on an applicant's short-form
application and certifications, as well as its upfront payment. In the
second phase of the process, winning bidders file a more comprehensive
long-form application. Thus, an applicant that fails to become a
winning bidder does not need to file a long-form application or provide
the additional showings and more detailed demonstrations required of a
winning bidder.
238. The Commission does not expect that the processes and
procedures adopted in the Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice will
require small entities to hire attorneys, engineers, consultants, or
other professionals to participate in Auction 107 and comply with the
procedures the Commission adopts because of the information, resources,
and guidance it makes available to potential and actual participants.
The Commission cannot quantify the cost of compliance with the
procedures, however, the Commission does not believe that the cost of
compliance will unduly burden small entities that choose to participate
in the auction. The processes and procedures are consistent with
existing Commission policies and procedures used in prior auctions.
Thus, some small entities may already be familiar with such procedures
and have the processes and procedures in place to facilitate compliance
resulting in minimal incremental costs to comply. For those small
entities that may be new to the Commission's auction process, the
various resources that will be made available, including, but not
limited to, the mock auction, remote electronic bidding, and access to
hotlines for both technical and auction assistance, should help
facilitate participation without the need to hire professionals. For
example, the Commission will release an online tutorial that will help
applicants understand the procedures for filing the auction short-form
applications (FCC Form 175). The Commission will offer other
educational opportunities for applicants in Auction 107 to familiarize
themselves with the FCC Auction Application System and the bidding
system. By providing these resources as well as the resources discussed
below, the Commission expects small entities that use the available
resources to experience lower participation and compliance costs.
239. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on
Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered. The RFA
requires an agency to describe any significant, specifically small
business, alternatives that it has considered in reaching its approach,
which may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1)
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities.''
240. The Commission has taken steps to minimize any economic impact
of its auction procedures on small entities through, among other
things, the many free resources the Commission provides to potential
auction participants. Consistent with the past practices in prior
auctions, small entities that are potential participants will have
access to detailed educational information and Commission personnel to
help guide their participation in Auction 107, which should alleviate
any need to hire professionals. More specifically, small entities and
other auction participants may seek clarification of, or guidance on,
complying with competitive bidding rules and procedures, reporting
requirements, and using the bidding system. Additionally, an FCC
Auctions Hotline will provide small entities one-on-one access to
Commission staff for information about the auction process and
procedures. Further, the FCC Auctions Technical Support Hotline is
another resource that provides technical assistance to applicants,
including small entities, on issues such as access to or navigation
within the electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the bidding system. Small
entities and other would-be participants will also be provided with
various materials on the pre-bidding process in advance of the short-
form application filing window, which includes step-by-step
instructions on how to complete FCC Form 175. In addition, small
entities will have access to the web-based, interactive online
tutorials produced by Commission staff to familiarize themselves with
auction procedures, filing requirements, bidding procedures, and other
matters related to an auction.
241. Various databases and other sources of information, including
the Auctions program websites and copies of Commission decisions, are
available to the public without charge, providing a low-cost mechanism
for small entities to conduct research prior to and throughout the
auction. Prior to and at the close of Auction 107, the
[[Page 53234]]
Commission will post public notices on the Auctions website, which
articulate the procedures and deadlines for the auction. The Commission
will make this information easily accessible and without charge to
benefit all Auction 107 applicants, including small entities, thereby
lowering their administrative costs to comply with the Commission's
competitive bidding rules.
242. Eligible bidders will be given an opportunity to become
familiar with auction procedures and the bidding system by
participating in a mock auction. Eligible bidders will have access to a
user guide for the bidding system, bidding file formats, and an online
bidding procedures tutorial in advance of the mock auction. Further,
the Commission intends to conduct Auction 107 electronically over the
internet using a web-based auction system that eliminates the need for
small entities and other bidders to be physically present in a specific
location. These mechanisms are made available to facilitate
participation in Auction 107 by all eligible bidders and may result in
significant cost savings for small entities that use them. Moreover,
the adoption of bidding procedures in advance of the auction,
consistent with statutory directive, is designed to ensure that the
auction will be administered predictably and fairly for all
participants, including small businesses.
243. Another step taken to minimize the economic impact for small
entities participating in Auction 107 is the Commission's adoption of
bidding credits for small businesses. In accordance with the service
rules applicable to the 3.7 GHz Service licenses to be offered in
Auction 107, bidding credit discounts will be available to eligible
small businesses and small business consortiums on the following basis:
(1) A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not
exceed $55 million for the preceding five years is eligible to receive
a 15% discount on its winning bid or (2) a bidder with attributed
average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the
preceding five years is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its
winning bid. Eligible applicants can receive only one of the available
bidding credits--not both.
244. The total amount of bidding credit discounts that may be
awarded to an eligible small business is capped at $25 million. In
addition, the Commission adopts a $10 million cap on the overall amount
of bidding credits that any winning small business bidder may apply to
winning licenses in markets with a population of 500,000 or less. Based
on the technical characteristics of the 3.7-3.98 GHz band and the
Commission's analysis of past auction data, the Commission anticipates
that the caps will allow the majority of small businesses to take full
advantage of the bidding credit program, thereby lowering the relative
costs of participation for small businesses. The Commission declined to
adopt a small business bidding credit cap of at least $200 million
requested by one commenter, Moise Advisory, because, as the Commission
previously explained, the proposed $25 million cap in past auctions
would have allowed the vast majority of eligible small businesses to
realize the full value of their bidding credits.
245. These procedures for the conduct of Auction 107 constitute the
more specific implementation of the competitive bidding rules
contemplated by Parts 1 and 96 of the Commission's rules and the
underlying rulemaking orders, including the 3.7 GHz Report and Order
and relevant competitive bidding orders, and are fully consistent
therewith.
246. Report to Congress. The Commission will send a copy of the
Auction 107 Procedures Public Notice, including the Supplemental FRFA,
in a report to Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In
addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Auction 107 Procedures
Public Notice, including the Supplemental FRFA to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the SBA.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-18804 Filed 8-27-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P