Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, 52321-52324 [2020-18587]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 165 / Tuesday, August 25, 2020 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Order Temporarily Denying Export
Privileges
PT MS Aero Support, Mth Square Building,
No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Halim
Perdana Kusuma Airport Building, 2nd Fl.
#261–262, Jakarta 13610, Indonesia, and
Sinar Kasih Building 4th Floor, JL. Dewi
Sartika No. 136 D, Jakarta 13630 Indonesia
PT Antasena Kreasi, Mth Square Building,
No, B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia and Palma One
Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR Rasuna Said
Blok X–2 Kav 4, Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan,
Indonesia
PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, Jalan Wijaya No
75, Jakarta Selatan 12170 Indonesia, and
Palma One Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR
Rasuna Said Blok X–2 Kav 4, Setiabudi
Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Sunarko Kuntjoro, Mth Square Building, No.
B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta
13330, Indonesia
Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, Mth Square Building,
No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia and Jalan Wijaya
No 75, Jakarta Selatan 12170 Indonesia
Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito, Mth Square
Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10,
East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Halim
Perdana Kusuma Airport Building, 2nd Fl.
#261–262, Jakarta 13610, Indonesia
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Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations (the
‘‘Regulations’’ or ‘‘EAR’’),1 the Bureau of
Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S.
Department of Commerce, through its
Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’),
has requested the issuance of an Order
temporarily denying, for a period of 180
days, the export privileges under the
Regulations of: PT MS Aero Support
(‘‘PTMS Aero’’), PT Antasena Kreasi
1 The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR
parts 730–774 (2020), originally issued pursuant to
the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601–
4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘EAA’’), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001
Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive
Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in
effect under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012))
(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of
2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the
EAA (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides,
in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations,
and other forms of administrative action that were
made or issued under the EAA, including as
continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13,
2018), shall continue in effect according to their
terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or
revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the
authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section
1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of
temporary denial orders.
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(‘‘PTAK’’), PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama
(‘‘PTKEU’’), Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi
Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio Wiharjo
Sasmito. OEE’s request and related
information indicates that these parties
are located in Indonesia, at the
respective addresses listed on the
caption page of this order and on page
11, infra, and that Sunarko Kuntjoro
owns or controls or is otherwise
affiliated with PTMS Aero and the other
companies at issue. Moreover, Sunarko
Kuntjoro’s son Triadi Senna Kuntjoro
and brother Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito are
not only close relatives but also were
involved in the operation of these
companies and the unlicensed exports
as discussed further below.
I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may
issue an order temporarily denying a
respondent’s export privileges upon a
showing that the order is necessary in
the public interest to prevent an
‘‘imminent violation’’ of the
Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and
766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be
‘imminent’ either in time or degree of
likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS
may show ‘‘either that a violation is
about to occur, or that the general
circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or
administrative charges demonstrate a
likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As
to the likelihood of future violations,
BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ‘‘is significant,
deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur
again, rather than technical or
negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘[l]ack of information
establishing the precise time a violation
may occur does not preclude a finding
that a violation is imminent, so long as
there is sufficient reason to believe the
likelihood of a violation.’’ Id.
Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and
766.24, a temporary denial order
(‘‘TDO’’) may also be made applicable to
other persons if BIS has reason to
believe that they are related to a
respondent and that applying the order
to them is necessary to prevent its
evasion. 15 CFR 766.23(a)–(b) and
766.24(c). A ‘‘related person’’ is a
person, either at the time the TDO’s
issuance or thereafter, who is related to
a respondent ‘‘by ownership, control,
position of responsibility, affiliation, or
other connection in the conduct of trade
or business.’’ 15 CFR 766.23(a). Related
persons may be added to a TDO on an
ex-parte basis in accordance with
Section 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 15
CFR 766.23(b).
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52321
II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary
Denial Order
As referenced in OEE’s request, PTMS
Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko
Kuntjoro were each indicted in
December 2019 on multiple counts in
the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. The charges
include, but are not limited to,
conspiring to violate U.S. export control
and sanctions laws in connection with
the unlicensed export of aircraft parts to
Mahan Air, an Iranian airline and
prohibited end-user, often in
coordination with Mustafa Ovieci, a
Mahan executive. These parties also
facilitated the shipment of damaged
Mahan Air parts to the United States for
repair and subsequent export back to
Iran in further violation of U.S. laws. In
both instances, the fact that the items
were destined to Iran/Mahan Air was
concealed from U.S. companies,
shippers, and freight forwarders.
Mahan Air has been on BIS’s Denied
Persons List since March 2008, due to
numerous significant, continuing,
deliberate, and covert violations of the
Regulations.2 In addition, since October
2011, it has been designated as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(‘‘SDGT’’) by the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control
(‘‘OFAC’’) pursuant to Executive Order
13224 for providing financial, material
and technological support to Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsQods Force (IRGC–QF). See 77 FR
64,427 (October 18, 2011).
Further, Mustafa Oveici, an Iranian
national and Mahan Air executive was
placed on BIS’s Entity List, Supplement
No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations, on
December 12, 2013 (see 78 FR 75,463),
for engaging in activities contrary to the
national security or foreign policy
interests of the United States. See 15
CFR 744.11. Mr. Oveici was one of 19
persons engaged in the operation of a
procurement scheme that directly
supported the operation of Mahan Air.
See 78 FR 75,463 (Dec. 12, 2013). As a
result of that listing, no item subject to
the Regulations may be exported,
reexported, or transferred (in-country) to
him without prior license authorization
from BIS. See 15 CFR 744.11; Supp No.
4 to 15 CFR part 744. Moreover, BIS’s
review policy regarding such
2 Mahan Airways’ status as a denied person was
most recently renewed by BIS through a temporary
denial order issued on May 29, 2020. See 85 FR
34405 (Jun. 4, 2020). The May 29, 2020 renewal
order summarizes the initial TDO issued against
Mahan in March 2008, and the other renewal orders
prior to May 29, 2020. See id.
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applications involving Mr. Oveici is a
presumption of denial. Id.
In its request, OEE has presented
evidence indicating that Sunarko
Kuntjoro and the other above-captioned
parties are engaged in procurement and
servicing activities relating to U.S.origin aircraft parts for or on behalf of
Mahan Air, operating as parties to the
transactions and/or facilitating
transactions that are structured to evade
the Regulations as well as the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations
(‘‘ITSR’’), 31 CFR part 560, administered
by OFAC 3 by routing unlicensed
exports or reexports through Indonesia
and other third countries, including but
not limited to Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Thailand to Iran.
A. Misconduct Charged in December
2019 Indictment
The December 10, 2019 indictment
charged Sunarko Kuntjoro, PTMS Aero,
PTAK, and PTKEU with conspiracy to
unlawfully export U.S.-origin goods and
technology to Iran and to defraud the
United States. Sunarko Kuntjoro and
PTMS Aero were also charged with
unlawful exports and attempted exports
to an embargoed country, conspiracy to
launder monetary instruments, and false
statements. The evidence presented and
charged in the indictment covers
misconduct occurring between at least
March 2011 through at least July 2018
and shows that Sunarko Kuntjoro was
not only aware of U.S. export control
laws but also took active steps to
conceal his unlawful export-related
activities in order to evade detection by
law enforcement. As stated in the
indictment for instance, in May 2013,
OEE contacted Sunarko Kuntjoro
regarding an attempted export involving
PTMS Aero that was suspected of being
diverted to Iran. In addition to asking
about the specific transaction, OEE
provided educational material on U.S.
export controls, including restrictions
on exports to Iran. Sunarko Kuntjoro
acknowledged receipt responding, in
part, ‘‘[t]hank you for the valuable
information you gave me on the
attachment. I do understand the US
government policy.’’
Later that same month, Sunarko
Kuntjoro contacted Mahan Air, copying
Triadi Senna Kuntjoro on the
correspondence, about the need to
conceal their activities by using a
company other than PTMS Aero for
3 Pursuant to Section 746.7(e) of the EAR, 15 CFR
746.7(e), no person may export or reexport any item
that is subject to the EAR if such transaction is
prohibited by the ITSR and has not been authorized
by OFAC. The prohibition found in Section 746.7(e)
applies whether or not the EAR requires a license
for the export or reexport in question. Id.
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19:55 Aug 24, 2020
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procuring aircraft parts. Specifically,
Sunarko Kuntjoro states, in part, that
‘‘[a]s proposed during the meeting with
mr O[veici], he recommended to use
other company name besides of MS aero
. . . I have established the company
name Kandiyasa Energi Utama [PTKEU]
. . . The person incharge is Triadi Sena
Sunarko . . . I also in this company
. . . so everytime you send the rfq
[request for quote] for tools and
equipment ONLY, you will get
quotation from KANDIYASA’’
(typographical errors in original
communication). When subsequently
questioned by OEE via email in June
2013 regarding the export of aircraft
engines subject to the Regulations,
Sunarko Kuntjoro and Mostafa Oveici
expressed concerns with each other that
their activities had been discovered and
discussed the need to avoid email
correspondence and discuss the matter
in person because ‘‘there may be a leak
in the system that jeopardize all
transaction[s].’’
As further alleged in the indictment,
in February 2017, Sunarko Kuntjoro and
PTAK negotiated with Mahan Air to
have PTAK purchase, repair, and
refurbish aircraft parts for the benefit of
Mahan. Mahan Air would send the parts
to PTAK via a freight forwarder in
Singapore. PTAK would then remove
any references to Mahan Air or Iran and
then have the parts forwarded to the
United States for repair via a different
freight forwarder located in Hong Kong.
Additional steps taken by Sunarko
Kuntjoro and PTMS Aero to evade the
regulations include, but are not limited
to, making false statements in January
2018 on a BIS Form 711 [Statement by
Ultimate Consignee] submitted to a U.S.
exporter regarding a shipment of aircraft
parts detained by OEE. Sunarko
Kuntjoro signed the form as Chairman of
PTMS Aero falsely stating the parts
would be used by Indonesian airlines
and omitting any reference to Mahan
Air—the true intended end-user.
Moreover, when questioned about the
form by OEE Special Agents in February
2018, Sunarko Kuntjoro reiterated the
false statements claiming the
information on the BIS Form 711 was
correct.
B. Additional Unlawful Exports of
Aircraft Parts From the United States
In addition to the wide-ranging
conduct addressed in the indictment
which spanned more than six years,
OEE has detected that these parties
continue to seek aircraft parts from the
United States until as recently as
December 2019, raising further concerns
of continuing additional violations of
both the Regulations and the Mahan Air
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TDO. OEE has identified an additional
six exports of aircraft parts involving
PTAK during 2018 valued at
approximately $43,184, plus five 2019
shipments involving both PTMS AERO
and PTAK worth approximately
$79,548. As an example, on December
20, 2019, OEE Special Agents detained
an export of aircraft parts identified as
Viledon P15 Pre-filter Mats intended for
PTAK. This transaction appeared to be
structured in a similar manner to those
charged in the indictment, including
that the items were to be shipped from
the United States to a freight forwarder
in Singapore, rather than PTAK in
Indonesia. Correspondence related to
this shipment identified the email
address aryo.antasenakreasi@gmail.com
which closely matches PTAK’s full
name and the associated IP address
relates back to Iran. Notably, Triadi
Senna Kuntjoro is also copied on the
correspondence for this transaction.
In sum, the facts and circumstances
here and related evidence indicate a
high likelihood of future violations of
the Regulations and U.S. export control
laws, given the repeated attempts over
an extended period of time to evade the
long-standing and well-known U.S.
embargo against Iran by obtaining and
facilitating the acquisition of U.S.-origin
aircraft parts from the United States for
transshipment to Iran and specifically to
Mahan Air, a denied person (and
SDGT).
C. Triadi Senna Kuntjoro and Satrio
Wiharjo Sasmito as Related Persons
OEE’s investigation has established
that Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, Sunarko
Kuntjoro’s son, is also connected to
PTAK and involved in business
activities on behalf of Mahan Air. In
addition to his awareness of the
December 2019 export detained by OEE
as referenced above, Triadi Senna
Kunjoro was also involved in the
February 2017 negotiations between
PTAK and Mahan Air as referenced
above as well. Specifically, on February
7, 2017, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro sent his
father Sunarko Kuntjoro a document
titled, ‘‘MoU W5–AK–3.docx’’. The
attachment was a memorandum of
understanding between Mahan Air and
PTAK, with Triadi Senna Kuntjoro
listed as a managing director of PTAK.4
The purpose of the memorandum of
understanding was to define the scope
of the working relationship between
‘‘W5 [Mahan Air] and Antasena [PTAK]
with respect to aviation industry for
purchasing, repair, consultant and
4 ‘‘W5’’ is the unique code given to Mahan Air by
the International Air Transport Association
(‘‘IATA’’).
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forwarding the aircraft parts for W5
[Mahan Air].’’
Similarly, OEE has provided evidence
that Sunarko Kuntjoro’s brother Satrio
Wiharjo Sasmito was not only aware of
restrictions on exports to prohibited
end-users and destinations such as Iran,
but was also involved in obtaining
aircraft parts from the United States for
such prohibited end-users and
destinations. An example of such
evidence includes June 2015
correspondence between Satrio Wiharjo
Sasmito and a U.S. aviation parts
company using his PTMS Aero email
account. Specifically, Satrio Wiharjo
Sasmito provided the U.S. Company
with a signed ‘‘End-Use Statement’’
form on behalf of PTMS Aero listing his
position within the company as
‘‘President Director’’ and omitting any
reference to Mahan and/or Iran. The
form further acknowledges that PTMS
Aero will not export or reexport the
items to prohibited destinations such as
Iran or to parties on BIS’s Denied
Persons List or OFAC’s SDN List. These
actions show not only an awareness of
the EAR but also a willingness to
provide false end-user information
which resulted in the concealment of
the item’s ultimate destination from
both the U.S. exporter and law
enforcement.
Additionally, the above-referenced
indictment states in part that PTMS
Aero, PTKEU, and Satrio Wiharjo
Sasmito [identified in the indictment as
‘‘Person C’’] wired hundreds of
thousands of dollars to the United States
to ‘‘repair Mahan airplane parts in the
United States and to re-export those
airplane parts back to PTMS [Aero] and
Mahan.’’ This conduct violates the
Mahan TDO’s prohibition on
‘‘[e]ngaging in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed, or controlled by a Denied
Person [Mahan] . . . For purposes of
this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair,
modification, or testing.’’
III. Findings
I find that the evidence presented by
BIS demonstrates that a violation of the
Regulations by the above-captioned
parties is imminent in both time and
degree of likelihood. As such, a TDO is
needed to give notice to persons and
companies in the United States and
abroad that they should cease dealing
with PT MS Aero Support, PT Antasena
Kreasi, PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, and
Sunarko Kuntjoro in export or reexport
transactions involving items subject to
the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with
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the public interest to preclude future
violations of the Regulations given the
deliberate, covert, and determined
nature of the misconduct and clear
disregard for complying with U.S.
export control laws. Additionally, I find
that Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio
Wiharjo Sasmito meet the criteria set
out in Section 766.23 and should be
added to the TDO as related persons in
order to prevent evasion.
This Order is being issued on an ex
parte basis without a hearing based
upon BIS’s showing of an imminent
violation in accordance with Section
766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations.
It is therefore ordered:
First, that PT MS Aero Support, with
an address at Mth Square Building, No.
B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Halim
Perdana Kusuma Airport Building, 2nd
Fl. #261–262, Jakarta 13610, Indonesia,
and Sinar Kasih Building 4th Floor, JL.
Dewi Sartika No. 136 D, Jakarta 13630
Indonesia; PT Antasena Kreasi, with an
address at Mth Square Building, No.
B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Palma
One Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR
Rasuna Said Blok X–2 Kav 4, Setiabudi
Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia; PT
Kandiyasa Energi Utama, with an
address at Jalan Wijaya No 75, Jakarta
Selatan 12170 Indonesia, and Palma
One Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR
Rasuna Said Blok X–2 Kav 4, Setiabudi
Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia; Sunarko
Kuntjoro, with an address at Mth Square
Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav
10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia; Triadi
Senna Kuntjoro, with an address at Mth
Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt.
Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330,
Indonesia, and Jalan Wijaya No 75,
Jakarta Selatan 12170 Indonesia; and
Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito, with an address
at Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt.
Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330,
Indonesia, and Halim Perdana Kusuma
Airport Building, 2nd Fl. #261–262,
Jakarta 13610, Indonesia, and when
acting for or on their behalf, any
successors or assigns, agents, or
employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ and
collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) may
not, directly or indirectly, participate in
any way in any transaction involving
any commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from
the United States that is subject to the
EAR, or in any other activity subject to
the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, License Exception, or
export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
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52323
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the EAR, or in any
other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of a Denied Person any item subject to
the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
a Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States,
including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction
whereby a Denied Person acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from a Denied Person of any
item subject to the EAR that has been
exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the
United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know
that the item will be, or is intended to
be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by a Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States. For
purposes of this paragraph, servicing
means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization related to PT MS Aero
Support, PT Antasena Kreasi, PT
Kandiyasa Energi Utama, or Sunarko
Kuntjoro by affiliation, ownership,
control, or position of responsibility in
the conduct of trade or related services
may also be made subject to the
provisions of this Order.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, PT MS
Aero Support, PT Antasena Kreasi, PT
Kandiyasa Energi Utama, and Sunarko
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Kuntjoro may, at any time, appeal this
Order by filing a full written statement
in support of the appeal with the Office
of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S.
Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland
21202–4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of
the EAR, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro and
Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito may, at any
time, appeal their inclusion as a related
person by filing a full written statement
in support of the appeal with the Office
of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S.
Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland
21202–4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. Respondents
PT MS Aero Support, PT Antasena
Kreasi, PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, and
Sunarko Kuntjoro may oppose a request
to renew this Order by filing a written
submission with the Assistant Secretary
for Export Enforcement, which must be
received not later than seven days
before the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served
on each denied person and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for 180 days.
Dated: August 19, 2020.
P. Lee Smith,
Performing the Non-exclusive Functions and
Duties of the Assistant Secretary for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020–18587 Filed 8–24–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[C–533–839]
Carbazole Violet Pigment 23 From
India: Rescission of Countervailing
Duty Administrative Review: 2018
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce
(Commerce) is rescinding the
administrative review of the
countervailing duty (CVD) order on
carbazole violet pigment 23 (CVP–23)
from India for the period of review
(POR) January 1, 2018 through
December 31, 2018, based on the timely
withdrawal of the request for review.
DATES: Applicable August 25, 2020.
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
AGENCY:
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19:55 Aug 24, 2020
Jkt 250001
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gene Calvert, AD/CVD Operations,
Office VII, Enforcement and
Compliance, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue
NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone:
(202) 482–3586.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On December 6, 2019, Commerce
published a notice of opportunity to
request an administrative review of the
CVD order on CVP–23 from India for the
POR of January 1, 2018 through
December 31, 2018.1 On December 31,
2019, Commerce received a timely-filed
request from Pidilite Industries Limited
(Pidilite) for an administrative review of
Pidilite, in accordance with section
751(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended (the Act), and 19 CFR
351.213(b).2
On February 6, 2020, pursuant to this
request, and in accordance with 19 CFR
351.221(c)(1)(i), Commerce published a
notice initiating an administrative
review of the countervailing duty order
on CVP–23 from India for Pidilite.3 On
May 6, 2020, Pidilite timely withdrew
its request for an administrative
review.4
Rescission of Review
Pursuant to 19 CFR 351.213(d)(1),
Commerce will rescind an
administrative review, in whole or in
part, if the party or parties that
requested a review withdraws the
request within 90 days of the
publication date of the notice of
initiation of the requested review.
Pidilite withdrew its request for review
within the requisite 90 days. No other
parties requested an administrative
review of the order. Therefore, in
accordance with 19 CFR 351.213(d)(1),
we are rescinding this review in its
entirety.
Assessment
Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) to assess
countervailing duties on all appropriate
entries of CVP–23 from India.
Countervailing duties shall be assessed
1 See Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order,
Finding, or Suspended Investigation; Opportunity
To Request Administrative Review, 84 FR 66880
(December 6, 2019).
2 See Pidilite’s Letter, ‘‘Carbazole Violet Pigment
23 from India—Request for Administrative
Review,’’ dated December 31, 2019.
3 See Initiation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 85 FR
6896 (February 6, 2020).
4 See Pidilite’s Letter, ‘‘Carbazole Violet Pigment
23 from India—Withdrawal of Request for
Administrative Review,’’ dated May 6, 2020.
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
at rates equal to the cash deposit of
estimated countervailing duties required
at the time of entry, or withdrawal from
warehouse, for consumption in
accordance with 19 CFR
351.212(c)(1)(i). Commerce intends to
issue appropriate assessment
instructions to CBP 15 days after the
date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register.
Administrative Protective Orders
This notice also serves as a reminder
to all parties subject to administrative
protective order (APO) of their
responsibility concerning the return or
destruction of proprietary information
disclosed under APO in accordance
with 19 CFR 351.305. Timely written
notification of the return/destruction of
APO materials or conversion to judicial
protective order is hereby requested.
Failure to comply with the regulations
and terms of an APO is a violation
which is subject to sanction.
Notification to Interested Parties
This notice is issued and published in
accordance with sections 751(a)(1) and
777(i)(1) of the Act, and 19 CFR
351.213(d)(4).
Dated: August 19, 2020.
James Maeder,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Operations.
[FR Doc. 2020–18593 Filed 8–24–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A–427–831, A–588–879, A–469–822]
Methionine From France, Japan, and
Spain: Initiation of Less-Than-FairValue Investigations
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
AGENCY:
DATES:
Applicable August 18, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Zachary Shaykin at (202) 482–2638
(France); Robert Scully at (202) 482–
0572 (Japan); and Elizabeth Bremer at
(202) 482–4987 (Spain); AD/CVD
Operations, Enforcement and
Compliance, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue
NW, Washington, DC 20230.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Petitions
On July 29, 2020, the Department of
Commerce (Commerce) received
antidumping duty (AD) petitions
E:\FR\FM\25AUN1.SGM
25AUN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 165 (Tuesday, August 25, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52321-52324]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-18587]
[[Page 52321]]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
PT MS Aero Support, Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono
Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Halim Perdana Kusuma
Airport Building, 2nd Fl. #261-262, Jakarta 13610, Indonesia, and
Sinar Kasih Building 4th Floor, JL. Dewi Sartika No. 136 D, Jakarta
13630 Indonesia
PT Antasena Kreasi, Mth Square Building, No, B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono
Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia and Palma One Building, Lt 5,
Suite 500, JIHR Rasuna Said Blok X-2 Kav 4, Setiabudi Jakarta
Selatan, Indonesia
PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, Jalan Wijaya No 75, Jakarta Selatan 12170
Indonesia, and Palma One Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR Rasuna Said
Blok X-2 Kav 4, Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia
Sunarko Kuntjoro, Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav
10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia
Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono
Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia and Jalan Wijaya No 75,
Jakarta Selatan 12170 Indonesia
Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito, Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt.
Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Halim Perdana
Kusuma Airport Building, 2nd Fl. #261-262, Jakarta 13610, Indonesia
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and
Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of
Export Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested the issuance of an Order
temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges
under the Regulations of: PT MS Aero Support (``PTMS Aero''), PT
Antasena Kreasi (``PTAK''), PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama (``PTKEU''),
Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito.
OEE's request and related information indicates that these parties are
located in Indonesia, at the respective addresses listed on the caption
page of this order and on page 11, infra, and that Sunarko Kuntjoro
owns or controls or is otherwise affiliated with PTMS Aero and the
other companies at issue. Moreover, Sunarko Kuntjoro's son Triadi Senna
Kuntjoro and brother Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito are not only close
relatives but also were involved in the operation of these companies
and the unlicensed exports as discussed further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774
(2020), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While Section 1766 of
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections
which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall
continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.''
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24, a temporary denial order
(``TDO'') may also be made applicable to other persons if BIS has
reason to believe that they are related to a respondent and that
applying the order to them is necessary to prevent its evasion. 15 CFR
766.23(a)-(b) and 766.24(c). A ``related person'' is a person, either
at the time the TDO's issuance or thereafter, who is related to a
respondent ``by ownership, control, position of responsibility,
affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business.''
15 CFR 766.23(a). Related persons may be added to a TDO on an ex-parte
basis in accordance with Section 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 15 CFR
766.23(b).
II. OEE's Request for a Temporary Denial Order
As referenced in OEE's request, PTMS Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko
Kuntjoro were each indicted in December 2019 on multiple counts in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The charges
include, but are not limited to, conspiring to violate U.S. export
control and sanctions laws in connection with the unlicensed export of
aircraft parts to Mahan Air, an Iranian airline and prohibited end-
user, often in coordination with Mustafa Ovieci, a Mahan executive.
These parties also facilitated the shipment of damaged Mahan Air parts
to the United States for repair and subsequent export back to Iran in
further violation of U.S. laws. In both instances, the fact that the
items were destined to Iran/Mahan Air was concealed from U.S.
companies, shippers, and freight forwarders.
Mahan Air has been on BIS's Denied Persons List since March 2008,
due to numerous significant, continuing, deliberate, and covert
violations of the Regulations.\2\ In addition, since October 2011, it
has been designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(``SDGT'') by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control (``OFAC'') pursuant to Executive Order 13224 for providing
financial, material and technological support to Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). See 77 FR 64,427
(October 18, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mahan Airways' status as a denied person was most recently
renewed by BIS through a temporary denial order issued on May 29,
2020. See 85 FR 34405 (Jun. 4, 2020). The May 29, 2020 renewal order
summarizes the initial TDO issued against Mahan in March 2008, and
the other renewal orders prior to May 29, 2020. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, Mustafa Oveici, an Iranian national and Mahan Air
executive was placed on BIS's Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744
of the Regulations, on December 12, 2013 (see 78 FR 75,463), for
engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States. See 15 CFR 744.11. Mr. Oveici
was one of 19 persons engaged in the operation of a procurement scheme
that directly supported the operation of Mahan Air. See 78 FR 75,463
(Dec. 12, 2013). As a result of that listing, no item subject to the
Regulations may be exported, reexported, or transferred (in-country) to
him without prior license authorization from BIS. See 15 CFR 744.11;
Supp No. 4 to 15 CFR part 744. Moreover, BIS's review policy regarding
such
[[Page 52322]]
applications involving Mr. Oveici is a presumption of denial. Id.
In its request, OEE has presented evidence indicating that Sunarko
Kuntjoro and the other above-captioned parties are engaged in
procurement and servicing activities relating to U.S.-origin aircraft
parts for or on behalf of Mahan Air, operating as parties to the
transactions and/or facilitating transactions that are structured to
evade the Regulations as well as the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations (``ITSR''), 31 CFR part 560, administered by OFAC \3\ by
routing unlicensed exports or reexports through Indonesia and other
third countries, including but not limited to Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Thailand to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pursuant to Section 746.7(e) of the EAR, 15 CFR 746.7(e), no
person may export or reexport any item that is subject to the EAR if
such transaction is prohibited by the ITSR and has not been
authorized by OFAC. The prohibition found in Section 746.7(e)
applies whether or not the EAR requires a license for the export or
reexport in question. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Misconduct Charged in December 2019 Indictment
The December 10, 2019 indictment charged Sunarko Kuntjoro, PTMS
Aero, PTAK, and PTKEU with conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S.-origin
goods and technology to Iran and to defraud the United States. Sunarko
Kuntjoro and PTMS Aero were also charged with unlawful exports and
attempted exports to an embargoed country, conspiracy to launder
monetary instruments, and false statements. The evidence presented and
charged in the indictment covers misconduct occurring between at least
March 2011 through at least July 2018 and shows that Sunarko Kuntjoro
was not only aware of U.S. export control laws but also took active
steps to conceal his unlawful export-related activities in order to
evade detection by law enforcement. As stated in the indictment for
instance, in May 2013, OEE contacted Sunarko Kuntjoro regarding an
attempted export involving PTMS Aero that was suspected of being
diverted to Iran. In addition to asking about the specific transaction,
OEE provided educational material on U.S. export controls, including
restrictions on exports to Iran. Sunarko Kuntjoro acknowledged receipt
responding, in part, ``[t]hank you for the valuable information you
gave me on the attachment. I do understand the US government policy.''
Later that same month, Sunarko Kuntjoro contacted Mahan Air,
copying Triadi Senna Kuntjoro on the correspondence, about the need to
conceal their activities by using a company other than PTMS Aero for
procuring aircraft parts. Specifically, Sunarko Kuntjoro states, in
part, that ``[a]s proposed during the meeting with mr O[veici], he
recommended to use other company name besides of MS aero . . . I have
established the company name Kandiyasa Energi Utama [PTKEU] . . . The
person incharge is Triadi Sena Sunarko . . . I also in this company . .
. so everytime you send the rfq [request for quote] for tools and
equipment ONLY, you will get quotation from KANDIYASA'' (typographical
errors in original communication). When subsequently questioned by OEE
via email in June 2013 regarding the export of aircraft engines subject
to the Regulations, Sunarko Kuntjoro and Mostafa Oveici expressed
concerns with each other that their activities had been discovered and
discussed the need to avoid email correspondence and discuss the matter
in person because ``there may be a leak in the system that jeopardize
all transaction[s].''
As further alleged in the indictment, in February 2017, Sunarko
Kuntjoro and PTAK negotiated with Mahan Air to have PTAK purchase,
repair, and refurbish aircraft parts for the benefit of Mahan. Mahan
Air would send the parts to PTAK via a freight forwarder in Singapore.
PTAK would then remove any references to Mahan Air or Iran and then
have the parts forwarded to the United States for repair via a
different freight forwarder located in Hong Kong.
Additional steps taken by Sunarko Kuntjoro and PTMS Aero to evade
the regulations include, but are not limited to, making false
statements in January 2018 on a BIS Form 711 [Statement by Ultimate
Consignee] submitted to a U.S. exporter regarding a shipment of
aircraft parts detained by OEE. Sunarko Kuntjoro signed the form as
Chairman of PTMS Aero falsely stating the parts would be used by
Indonesian airlines and omitting any reference to Mahan Air--the true
intended end-user. Moreover, when questioned about the form by OEE
Special Agents in February 2018, Sunarko Kuntjoro reiterated the false
statements claiming the information on the BIS Form 711 was correct.
B. Additional Unlawful Exports of Aircraft Parts From the United States
In addition to the wide-ranging conduct addressed in the indictment
which spanned more than six years, OEE has detected that these parties
continue to seek aircraft parts from the United States until as
recently as December 2019, raising further concerns of continuing
additional violations of both the Regulations and the Mahan Air TDO.
OEE has identified an additional six exports of aircraft parts
involving PTAK during 2018 valued at approximately $43,184, plus five
2019 shipments involving both PTMS AERO and PTAK worth approximately
$79,548. As an example, on December 20, 2019, OEE Special Agents
detained an export of aircraft parts identified as Viledon P15 Pre-
filter Mats intended for PTAK. This transaction appeared to be
structured in a similar manner to those charged in the indictment,
including that the items were to be shipped from the United States to a
freight forwarder in Singapore, rather than PTAK in Indonesia.
Correspondence related to this shipment identified the email address
[email protected] which closely matches PTAK's full name
and the associated IP address relates back to Iran. Notably, Triadi
Senna Kuntjoro is also copied on the correspondence for this
transaction.
In sum, the facts and circumstances here and related evidence
indicate a high likelihood of future violations of the Regulations and
U.S. export control laws, given the repeated attempts over an extended
period of time to evade the long-standing and well-known U.S. embargo
against Iran by obtaining and facilitating the acquisition of U.S.-
origin aircraft parts from the United States for transshipment to Iran
and specifically to Mahan Air, a denied person (and SDGT).
C. Triadi Senna Kuntjoro and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito as Related Persons
OEE's investigation has established that Triadi Senna Kuntjoro,
Sunarko Kuntjoro's son, is also connected to PTAK and involved in
business activities on behalf of Mahan Air. In addition to his
awareness of the December 2019 export detained by OEE as referenced
above, Triadi Senna Kunjoro was also involved in the February 2017
negotiations between PTAK and Mahan Air as referenced above as well.
Specifically, on February 7, 2017, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro sent his
father Sunarko Kuntjoro a document titled, ``MoU W5-AK-3.docx''. The
attachment was a memorandum of understanding between Mahan Air and
PTAK, with Triadi Senna Kuntjoro listed as a managing director of
PTAK.\4\ The purpose of the memorandum of understanding was to define
the scope of the working relationship between ``W5 [Mahan Air] and
Antasena [PTAK] with respect to aviation industry for purchasing,
repair, consultant and
[[Page 52323]]
forwarding the aircraft parts for W5 [Mahan Air].''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``W5'' is the unique code given to Mahan Air by the
International Air Transport Association (``IATA'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, OEE has provided evidence that Sunarko Kuntjoro's
brother Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito was not only aware of restrictions on
exports to prohibited end-users and destinations such as Iran, but was
also involved in obtaining aircraft parts from the United States for
such prohibited end-users and destinations. An example of such evidence
includes June 2015 correspondence between Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito and a
U.S. aviation parts company using his PTMS Aero email account.
Specifically, Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito provided the U.S. Company with a
signed ``End-Use Statement'' form on behalf of PTMS Aero listing his
position within the company as ``President Director'' and omitting any
reference to Mahan and/or Iran. The form further acknowledges that PTMS
Aero will not export or reexport the items to prohibited destinations
such as Iran or to parties on BIS's Denied Persons List or OFAC's SDN
List. These actions show not only an awareness of the EAR but also a
willingness to provide false end-user information which resulted in the
concealment of the item's ultimate destination from both the U.S.
exporter and law enforcement.
Additionally, the above-referenced indictment states in part that
PTMS Aero, PTKEU, and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito [identified in the
indictment as ``Person C''] wired hundreds of thousands of dollars to
the United States to ``repair Mahan airplane parts in the United States
and to re-export those airplane parts back to PTMS [Aero] and Mahan.''
This conduct violates the Mahan TDO's prohibition on ``[e]ngaging in
any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or
will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed,
or controlled by a Denied Person [Mahan] . . . For purposes of this
paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification, or testing.''
III. Findings
I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that a
violation of the Regulations by the above-captioned parties is imminent
in both time and degree of likelihood. As such, a TDO is needed to give
notice to persons and companies in the United States and abroad that
they should cease dealing with PT MS Aero Support, PT Antasena Kreasi,
PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, and Sunarko Kuntjoro in export or reexport
transactions involving items subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is
consistent with the public interest to preclude future violations of
the Regulations given the deliberate, covert, and determined nature of
the misconduct and clear disregard for complying with U.S. export
control laws. Additionally, I find that Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and
Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito meet the criteria set out in Section 766.23 and
should be added to the TDO as related persons in order to prevent
evasion.
This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with
Section 766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations.
It is therefore ordered:
First, that PT MS Aero Support, with an address at Mth Square
Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330,
Indonesia, and Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport Building, 2nd Fl. #261-262,
Jakarta 13610, Indonesia, and Sinar Kasih Building 4th Floor, JL. Dewi
Sartika No. 136 D, Jakarta 13630 Indonesia; PT Antasena Kreasi, with an
address at Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Palma One Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR
Rasuna Said Blok X-2 Kav 4, Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia; PT
Kandiyasa Energi Utama, with an address at Jalan Wijaya No 75, Jakarta
Selatan 12170 Indonesia, and Palma One Building, Lt 5, Suite 500, JIHR
Rasuna Said Blok X-2 Kav 4, Setiabudi Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia;
Sunarko Kuntjoro, with an address at Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl.
Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia; Triadi Senna
Kuntjoro, with an address at Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt.
Haryono Kav 10, East Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Jalan Wijaya No 75,
Jakarta Selatan 12170 Indonesia; and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito, with an
address at Mth Square Building, No. B9B, Jl. Mt. Haryono Kav 10, East
Jakarta 13330, Indonesia, and Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport Building,
2nd Fl. #261-262, Jakarta 13610, Indonesia, and when acting for or on
their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a
``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not,
directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction
involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be exported from
the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity
subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License
Exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity
subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item
subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to PT MS Aero Support, PT Antasena
Kreasi, PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, or Sunarko Kuntjoro by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of
trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of
this Order.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
PT MS Aero Support, PT Antasena Kreasi, PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, and
Sunarko
[[Page 52324]]
Kuntjoro may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and
766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro and Satrio Wiharjo
Sasmito may, at any time, appeal their inclusion as a related person by
filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the
Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Respondents PT MS Aero
Support, PT Antasena Kreasi, PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama, and Sunarko
Kuntjoro may oppose a request to renew this Order by filing a written
submission with the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, which
must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date
of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be served on each denied person and
shall be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Dated: August 19, 2020.
P. Lee Smith,
Performing the Non-exclusive Functions and Duties of the Assistant
Secretary for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020-18587 Filed 8-24-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P
