Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 49332-49355 [2020-15804]

Agencies

• Department of Justice
• Office of the Attorney General

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 157 (Thursday, August 13, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49332-49355]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-15804]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Office of the Attorney General

28 CFR Part 72

[Docket No. OAG 157; AG Order No. 4759-2020]
RIN 1105-AB52


Registration Requirements Under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice is proposing a rule that specifies 
the registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (``SORNA''). The rule in part reflects express 
requirements of SORNA and in part reflects the exercise of authorities 
SORNA grants to the Attorney General to interpret and implement SORNA's 
requirements. SORNA's requirements have previously been delineated in 
guidelines issued by the Attorney General for implementation of SORNA's 
requirements by registration jurisdictions.

[[Page 49333]]


DATES: Written and electronic comments must be sent or submitted on or 
before October 13, 2020. Comments received by mail will be considered 
timely if they are postmarked on or before the last day of the comment 
period. The electronic Federal Docket Management System will accept 
electronic comments until midnight Eastern Time at the end of that day.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to Regulations Docket Clerk, Office 
of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue 
NW, Room 4234, Washington, DC 20530. To ensure proper handling, please 
reference Docket No. OAG 157 on your correspondence. You may submit 
comments electronically or view an electronic version of this proposed 
rule at https://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David J. Karp, Senior Counsel, Office 
of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 202-514-
3273.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Posting of Public Comments. Please note that 
all comments received are considered part of the public record and made 
available for public inspection online at https://www.regulations.gov. 
Such information includes personal identifying information (such as 
your name, address, etc.) voluntarily submitted by the commenter.
    You are not required to submit personal identifying information in 
order to comment on this rule. Nevertheless, if you still want to 
submit personal identifying information (such as your name, address, 
etc.) as part of your comment, but do not want it to be posted online, 
you must include the phrase ``PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION'' in the 
first paragraph of your comment. You also must locate all the personal 
identifying information you do not want posted online in the first 
paragraph of your comment and identify what information you want 
redacted.
    If you want to submit confidential business information as part of 
your comment, but do not want it to be posted online, you must include 
the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph 
of your comment. You also must prominently identify confidential 
business information to be redacted within the comment. If a comment 
has so much confidential business information that it cannot be 
effectively redacted, all or part of that comment may not be posted on 
https://www.regulations.gov.
    Personal identifying information and confidential business 
information identified and located as set forth above will be placed in 
the agency's public docket file, but not posted online. If you wish to 
inspect the agency's public docket file in person by appointment, 
please see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT paragraph.

Overview

    The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (``SORNA''), 
which is title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, Public Law 109-248, 34 U.S.C. 20901 et seq., establishes national 
standards for sex offender registration and notification in the United 
States. SORNA has a dual character, imposing registration obligations 
on sex offenders as a matter of Federal law that are federally 
enforceable under circumstances supporting Federal jurisdiction, see 18 
U.S.C. 2250, and providing minimum national standards that non-Federal 
jurisdictions are expected to incorporate in their sex offender 
registration and notification programs, subject to a reduction of 
Federal funding for those that fail to do so, see 34 U.S.C. 20912(a), 
20926-27.
    The Justice Department's Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, 
Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (``SMART Office'') 
administers the national standards for sex offender registration and 
notification under SORNA and assists all jurisdictions in implementing 
the SORNA standards in their programs. See id. 20945. As provided by 
SORNA, the Department of Justice also (i) prosecutes SORNA violations 
by sex offenders committed under circumstances supporting Federal 
jurisdiction, see 18 U.S.C. 2250; (ii) assists in the enforcement of 
sex offender registration requirements through the activities of the 
U.S. Marshals Service, see 34 U.S.C. 20941; (iii) operates, through the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Sex Offender Registry, 
which compiles the information obtained through the sex offender 
registration programs of the states and other registration 
jurisdictions and makes it available on a nationwide basis for law 
enforcement purposes, see id. 20921; and (iv) operates the Dru Sjodin 
National Sex Offender Public website, www.nsopw.gov, which provides 
public access through a single national site to the information about 
sex offenders posted on the public sex offender websites of the various 
registration jurisdictions, see id. 20922.
    SORNA generally directs the Attorney General to ``issue guidelines 
and regulations to interpret and implement [SORNA].'' Id. 20912(b). 
SORNA also authorizes the Attorney General to take more specific 
actions in certain contexts.
    One such provision is 34 U.S.C. 20913. That section states in 
subsection (b) that sex offenders are generally to register initially 
before release from imprisonment, or within three business days of 
sentencing if not sentenced to imprisonment, but it provides further in 
subsection (d) that the Attorney General has ``the authority to specify 
the applicability of the requirements of [SORNA] to sex offenders 
convicted before the enactment of [SORNA] or its implementation in a 
particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of 
any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who 
are unable to comply with subsection (b).'' As discussed below in 
connection with 28 CFR 72.3, section 20913(d) is not a constitutionally 
impermissible delegation of legislative authority. Rather, it enables 
the Attorney General to effectuate the legislative intent that SORNA 
apply to all sex offenders, regardless of when they were convicted.
    Another relevant provision lists several types of information that 
sex offenders must provide for inclusion in sex offender registries, 
and states that sex offenders must also provide ``[a]ny other 
information required by the Attorney General.'' Id. 20914(a)(8). This 
provision as well is not an impermissible delegation of legislative 
authority, but rather is instrumental to the Attorney General's 
effectuating the legislative objective to ``protect the public from sex 
offenders and offenders against children'' by ``establish[ing] a 
comprehensive national system for the registration of those 
offenders.'' Id. 20901; see 73 FR at 38054-57; 76 FR at 1637. The 
Attorney General's exercise of the authority under section 20914(a)(8) 
is limited to requiring additional information that furthers the 
legislative public safety objective or the implementation or 
enforcement of SORNA's provisions. How that has been done is explained 
below in connection with proposed 28 CFR 72.6 and 72.7.
    The Attorney General has exercised these authorities in previous 
rulemakings and issuances of guidelines under SORNA, as detailed in the 
rulemaking history and section-by-section analysis below, and the 
interpretations and policy decisions in this proposed rule follow those 
already adopted in existing SORNA-related documents. The present rule 
provides a concise and comprehensive statement of what sex offenders 
must do to comply with SORNA's requirements.

[[Page 49334]]

    In addition to SORNA's original provisions, described above, this 
rulemaking draws on and implements provisions of the International 
Megan's Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other Sexual Crimes 
Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders 
(``International Megan's Law''), Public Law 114-119. Section 6 of 
International Megan's Law amended SORNA by (i) redesignating, in 34 
U.S.C. 20914(a), former paragraph (7) as paragraph (8) and adding a new 
paragraph (7) that requires a sex offender to provide for inclusion in 
the sex offender registry information relating to intended travel 
outside the United States, including several specified types of 
information ``and any other itinerary or other travel-related 
information required by the Attorney General''; (ii) adding a new 
subsection (c) to 34 U.S.C. 20914 that requires sex offenders to 
provide and update registration information required by SORNA ``in 
conformity with any time and manner requirements prescribed by the 
Attorney General''; and (iii) adding a new subsection (b) to SORNA's 
criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. 2250, that specifically reaches 
international travel reporting violations.
    This rulemaking is not innovative in terms of policy. Many of the 
requirements it articulates reflect express SORNA requirements. These 
include, inter alia, statutory specifications about (i) where and when 
sex offenders must register; (ii) several categories of required 
registration information; (iii) how long sex offenders must continue to 
register, including different registration periods for sex offenders in 
different tiers and lifetime registration for those in the highest 
tier; and (iv) a requirement to appear periodically to verify the 
registration information. See 34 U.S.C. 20911(2)-(4), 20913, 
20914(a)(1)-(7), 20915, 20918.
    Other features of the rule reflect exercises of the Attorney 
General's powers to implement SORNA's requirements. These include 
additional specifications regarding information sex offenders must 
provide, how and when they must report certain changes in registration 
information, and the time and manner for complying with SORNA's 
registration requirements by sex offenders who cannot comply with 
SORNA's normal registration procedures. On these matters, however, the 
proposed rule embodies the same policies as those appearing in the 
previously issued SORNA guidelines and prior rulemakings under SORNA.
    The rule also makes no change in what registration jurisdictions 
need to do to substantially implement SORNA in their registration 
programs, a matter that will continue to be governed by the previously 
issued guidelines for SORNA implementation. While this rule does not 
make new policy, as discussed above, it is expected to have a number of 
benefits. The rule will facilitate enforcement of SORNA's registration 
requirements through prosecution of non-compliant sex offenders under 
18 U.S.C. 2250. By providing a comprehensive articulation of SORNA's 
registration requirements in regulations addressed to sex offenders, it 
will provide a more secure basis for prosecution of sex offenders who 
engage in knowing violations of any of SORNA's requirements. It will 
also resolve a number of specific concerns that have arisen in past 
litigation or could be expected to arise in future litigation, if not 
clarified and resolved by this rule. For example, as discussed below, 
the amendment of Sec.  72.3 in the rule will ensure that its 
application of SORNA's requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA 
convictions is given effect consistently, resolving an issue resulting 
from the decision in United States v. DeJarnette, 741 F.3d 971 (9th 
Cir. 2013).
    Beyond the benefits to effective enforcement of SORNA's 
requirements, the rule will benefit sex offenders by providing a clear 
and comprehensive statement of their registration obligations under 
SORNA. This statement will make it easier for sex offenders to 
determine what they are required to do and thus facilitate compliance.
    By facilitating the enforcement of, and compliance with, SORNA's 
registration requirements, the rule will further SORNA's public safety 
objectives. See 34 U.S.C. 20901. More consistent adherence to these 
requirements will enable registration and law enforcement authorities 
to better track and monitor released sex offenders in the community and 
enhance the basis for public notification regarding registered sex 
offenders that SORNA requires. See id. 20920, 20923.
    Effective September 1, 2017, the provisions of SORNA, formerly 
appearing at 42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq., were recodified in a new title 34 
of the United States Code, and now appear at 34 U.S.C. 20901 et seq. 
See https://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t34/. 
United States Code citations of SORNA provisions in this proposed rule 
accordingly differ from the corresponding citations in earlier sources 
and documents.

Rulemaking History

    This proposed rule is the ninth document the Attorney General has 
published pursuant to the statutory directive to the Attorney General 
to issue guidelines and regulations to interpret and implement SORNA. 
See 34 U.S.C. 20912(b). The previous SORNA-related documents are as 
follows:
    (1) Interim rule entitled, ``Applicability of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act,'' published at 72 FR 8894 (Feb. 28, 
2007). The interim rule solicited public comments, and the comment 
period ended on April 30, 2007. The interim rule added a new part 72 to 
title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, entitled ``Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification.'' The interim rule provided that ``[t]he 
requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the 
offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of 
that Act.'' 28 CFR 72.3.
    (2) Proposed guidelines, published at 72 FR 30210 (May 30, 2007), 
whose general purpose was to provide guidance and assistance to 
registration jurisdictions in implementing the SORNA standards in their 
sex offender registration and notification programs. The proposed 
guidelines solicited public comment, and the comment period ended on 
August 1, 2007.
    (3) Final guidelines for registration jurisdictions regarding SORNA 
implementation entitled, ``The National Guidelines for Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification'' (the ``SORNA Guidelines''), published 
at 73 FR 38030 (July 2, 2008).
    (4) Proposed supplemental guidelines for SORNA implementation, 
published at 75 FR 27362 (May 14, 2010), whose general purpose was to 
address certain issues arising in SORNA implementation that required 
that some aspects of the SORNA Guidelines be augmented or modified. The 
proposed supplemental guidelines solicited public comment, and the 
comment period closed on July 13, 2010.
    (5) Final rule entitled, ``Applicability of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act,'' published at 75 FR 81849 (Dec. 29, 
2010). This rule finalized the February 28, 2007, interim rule 
providing for SORNA's applicability to all sex offenders, including 
those with pre-SORNA convictions.
    (6) Final supplemental guidelines for SORNA implementation 
entitled, ``Supplemental Guidelines for Sex

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Offender Registration and Notification'' (the ``SORNA Supplemental 
Guidelines''), published at 76 FR 1630 (Jan. 11, 2011).
    (7) Proposed supplemental guidelines, published at 81 FR 21397 
(Apr. 11, 2016), whose general purpose was to afford registration 
jurisdictions greater flexibility in their efforts to substantially 
implement SORNA's juvenile registration requirement. These proposed 
supplemental guidelines solicited public comment, and the comment 
period closed on June 10, 2016.
    (8) Final supplemental guidelines regarding substantial 
implementation of SORNA's juvenile registration requirement entitled, 
``Supplemental Guidelines for Juvenile Registration Under the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act,'' published at 81 FR 50552 
(Aug. 1, 2016).

Section-by-Section Analysis

    The present proposed rule expands part 72 of title 28 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations to provide a full statement of the registration 
requirements for sex offenders under SORNA. It revises the statement of 
purpose and definitional sections in 28 CFR 72.1 and 72.2. It maintains 
the existing provision in 28 CFR 72.3 stating that SORNA's requirements 
apply to all sex offenders, regardless of when they were convicted, and 
incorporates additional language in Sec.  72.3 to reinforce that point. 
It also adds to part 72 provisions--Sec. Sec.  72.4 through 72.8--
articulating where sex offenders must register, how long they must 
register, what information they must provide, how they must register 
and keep their registrations current to satisfy SORNA's requirements, 
and the liability they face for violations, following SORNA's express 
requirements and the prior articulation of standards for these matters 
in the SORNA Guidelines and the SORNA Supplemental Guidelines.

Section 72.1--Purpose

    Section 72.1(a) states part 72's purpose to specify SORNA's 
registration requirements and their scope of application. It further 
notes that the Attorney General has the authority pursuant to 
provisions of SORNA to specify these requirements and their 
applicability as provided in part 72.
    Section 72.1(b) states that part 72 does not preempt or limit any 
obligations of or requirements relating to sex offenders under other 
laws, rules, or policies. It further notes that states and other 
governmental entities may prescribe requirements, with which sex 
offenders must comply, that are more extensive or stringent than those 
prescribed by SORNA. This reflects the fact that SORNA provides minimum 
national standards for sex offender registration. It is intended to 
establish a floor rather than a ceiling for the registration programs 
of states and other jurisdictions, which can prescribe registration 
requirements binding on sex offenders under their own laws independent 
of SORNA. Jurisdictions accordingly are free to adopt more stringent or 
extensive registration requirements for sex offenders than those set 
forth in this part, including more stringent or extensive requirements 
regarding where, when, and how long sex offenders must register, what 
information they must provide, and what they must do to keep their 
registrations current. See 73 FR at 38032-35, 38046.

Section 72.2--Definitions

    Section 72.2 states that terms used in part 72 have the same 
meaning as in SORNA. Hence, for example, references in the part to 
registration ``jurisdictions'' mean the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and Indian tribes 
qualifying under 34 U.S.C. 20929. See id. 20911(10); 73 FR at 38045, 
38048. Likewise, where the part uses such terms as sex offender (and 
tiers thereof), sex offense, convicted or conviction, sex offender 
registry, student, employee or employment, and reside or residence, the 
meaning is the same as in SORNA. See 34 U.S.C. 20911(1)-(9), (11)-(13); 
73 FR at 38050-57, 38061-62.

Section 72.3--Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act

    Section 72.3 carries forward in substance current 28 CFR 72.3, 
which states that SORNA's requirements apply to all sex offenders, 
including those whose sex offense convictions predate SORNA's 
enactment. This section was initially adopted on February 28, 2007, and 
amended on December 29, 2010. The section and its rationale are 
explained further in the interim and final rulemakings that adopted it. 
See 72 FR 8894; 75 FR 81849.
    Section 72.3, and its modification by this rulemaking, are 
constitutionally sound. In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the 
Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of sex offender 
registration requirements against an ex post facto challenge, in 
reviewing a state registration system whose major features paralleled 
SORNA's in many ways. The commonalities between SORNA and the state 
registration program upheld in Smith include required registration 
before release from imprisonment; provision of name, address, 
employment, vehicle, and other registration information; continued 
registration and periodic verification of registration information for 
at least 15 years; lifetime registration and quarterly verification for 
certain registrants convicted of aggravated or multiple sex offenses; 
and public internet posting of information about registrants. See id. 
at 90-91. The Federal courts have consistently rejected ex post facto 
challenges to SORNA itself. See, e.g., United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 
599, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2012).
    Section 72.3 also is not premised on any constitutionally 
impermissible delegation of legislative authority to the executive 
branch of government. Congress intended that SORNA apply to all sex 
offenders, regardless of when they were convicted. See Reynolds v. 
United States, 565 U.S. 432, 442-45 (2012); id. at 448-49 & n. (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (agreeing that Congress intended for SORNA to apply to 
all sex offenders). Congress authorized the Attorney General to specify 
the applicability of SORNA's requirements to sex offenders with pre-
SORNA and pre-SORNA-implementation convictions, see 34 U.S.C. 20913(d), 
in order to effectuate that intent while enabling the Attorney General 
to address transitional issues presented in integrating the existing 
sex offender population into SORNA's comprehensive nationwide 
registration system. See Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 440-42; 72 FR at 8895-
97; 73 FR at 38035-36, 38046, 38063-64; 75 FR at 81850-52. In adopting 
Sec.  72.3, the Attorney General implemented the relevant legislative 
policy--that SORNA's requirements should apply to all sex offenders--to 
the maximum, having found no reason to delay or qualify its 
implementation. Consequently, as an articulation of a legislative 
policy embodied in SORNA, the issuance of Sec.  72.3 pursuant to 34 
U.S.C. 20913(d) involved no exercise of legislative authority and did 
not contravene the non-delegation doctrine. See Gundy v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123-30 (2019) (plurality opinion); id. at 2130-31 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id., Brief for the United 
States at 22-38.
    Moreover, regardless of any question concerning the validity of 34 
U.S.C. 20913(d), Sec.  72.3 is adequately supported on the basis of the 
Attorney General's authority to issue guidelines and regulations to 
interpret and implement SORNA, appearing in 34 U.S.C. 20912(b). In 
Sec.  72.3, the Attorney General interpreted SORNA as intended by

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Congress to apply to all sex offenders regardless of when they were 
convicted--an interpretation endorsed by the Supreme Court, see 
Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 440-45; see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123-31--
and he implemented that legislative policy by embodying it in a clearly 
stated rule.
    The same considerations apply to the amended version of Sec.  72.3 
proposed here, which effectuates more reliably the legislative policy 
judgment that SORNA's requirements should apply to all sex offenders by 
restating the current rule with additional specificity, but which 
involves no change in substance. In comparison with the current 
formulation of Sec.  72.3, this proposed rule adds a second sentence 
stating that (i) all sex offenders must comply with all requirements of 
SORNA, regardless of when they were convicted; (ii) this is so 
regardless of whether a registration jurisdiction has substantially 
implemented SORNA or any particular SORNA requirement; and (iii) this 
is so regardless of whether a particular requirement or class of sex 
offenders is mentioned in examples in the rules or guidelines issued by 
the Attorney General.
    The first part of the added sentence reiterates Sec.  72.3's 
specification of SORNA's applicability to all sex offenders in the form 
of an affirmative direction to sex offenders, and it states explicitly 
that all of SORNA's requirements so apply.
    The added sentence further states that the registration duties 
SORNA prescribes for sex offenders are not conditional on registration 
jurisdictions' having adopted SORNA's requirements in their own 
registration laws or policies. For example, SORNA requires sex 
offenders to register in the states (and other registration 
jurisdictions) in which they reside, work, or attend school. See 34 
U.S.C. 20913(a). All of the states have sex offender registration 
programs, which were initially established long before the enactment of 
SORNA. Hence, sex offenders are able to register in these existing 
state programs. The fact that a particular state has not modified its 
registration program at this time to incorporate the full range of 
SORNA requirements does not prevent a sex offender required to register 
by SORNA from registering in the state or excuse a failure to do so. 
See, e.g., Felts, 674 F.3d at 603-05.
    The same principle applies in situations in which a jurisdiction's 
law does not track or incorporate a particular SORNA requirement 
affecting a sex offender. Consider a situation of this nature in which 
SORNA requires a sex offender to register but the law of the state in 
which he resides does not. This may occur, for example, because state 
law does not require registration based on the particular sex offense 
for which the offender was convicted, or because state law requires 
registration by sex offenders for shorter periods of time than SORNA, 
or because state law does not apply its registration requirements 
``retroactively'' as broadly as Sec.  72.3 applies SORNA's requirements 
to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions. Notwithstanding the 
absence of a parallel state law, the registration authorities in the 
state may be willing to register the sex offender because Federal law 
(i.e., SORNA) requires him to register. Cf. Doe v. Keathley, 290 SW3d 
719 (Mo. 2009) (state constitutional prohibition of retrospective laws 
does not preclude registration based on SORNA). If the state 
registration authorities are willing to register the sex offender, he 
is not relieved of the duty to register merely because state law does 
not track the Federal law registration requirement.
    Hence, sex offenders can be held liable for violating any 
requirement stated in this rule, regardless of when they were 
convicted, and regardless of whether the jurisdiction in which the 
violation occurs has adopted the requirement in its own law. This does 
not mean, however, that SORNA unfairly holds sex offenders liable for 
failing to comply with its requirements, where the requirement is 
unknown to the sex offender or impossible for him to carry out. Cf. 
Felts, 674 F.3d at 605 (noting concern). Federal enforcement of SORNA's 
requirements occurs primarily through SORNA's criminal provision, 18 
U.S.C. 2250. That provision makes it a Federal crime for a person 
required to register by SORNA to knowingly fail to register or update a 
registration as required by SORNA under circumstances supporting 
Federal jurisdiction, such as conviction of a Federal sex offense or 
interstate or foreign travel. As discussed below, section 2250 holds 
sex offenders liable only for violations of known registration 
obligations, and it excuses failures to comply with SORNA under certain 
conditions if the non-compliance results from circumstances beyond the 
sex offenders' control.
    Consider first the concern that sex offenders may lack notice 
regarding registration obligations. Under the procedures prescribed by 
SORNA, and under standard procedures that have generally been adopted 
by registration jurisdictions whether or not they have implemented 
SORNA's requirements, the registration of sex offenders normally 
involves (i) informing sex offenders of their registration duties, (ii) 
obtaining from sex offenders signed acknowledgments confirming receipt 
of that information, and (iii) having sex offenders provide the 
required registration information. See 34 U.S.C. 20919(a); 73 FR at 
38062-63.
    Registration procedures of this nature inform sex offenders of what 
they must do, and the acknowledgments obtained from them provide 
evidence that they were so informed. See 76 FR at 1638. If a 
jurisdiction that registers a sex offender has not fully revised its 
processes for conformity to SORNA, then it may not tell the sex 
offender about some of the registration requirements imposed by SORNA, 
such as those that the jurisdiction has not incorporated in its own 
laws. If the jurisdiction fails to inform a sex offender about some of 
SORNA's registration requirements, the sex offender then does not know 
about some of his registration obligations under SORNA based on the 
information received from the jurisdiction, and may not learn of them 
from other sources. In such cases, the possibility of liability under 
18 U.S.C. 2250 continues to be limited to cases in which a sex offender 
``knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by 
[SORNA].'' The limitation to ``knowing[ ]'' violations provides a 
safeguard against liability based on unwitting violations of SORNA 
requirements of which a sex offender was not aware. Section 
72.8(a)(1)(iii) of this rule, and the accompanying discussion below, 
provide further explanation about the limitation of liability under 18 
U.S.C. 2250 to cases involving violation of known registration 
obligations.
    The second concern about fairness involves situations in which a 
sex offender has failed to do something SORNA requires because it is 
impossible for him to do so. For example, as noted above, a 
jurisdiction with laws that do not require registration based on the 
particular offense for which a sex offender was convicted may 
nevertheless be willing to register him in light of his Federal law 
(SORNA) registration obligation. But alternatively, the jurisdiction's 
law or practice may constrain its registration personnel to register 
only sex offenders whom its own laws require to register. In such a 
case, it is impossible for the sex offender to register in that 
jurisdiction, though subject to a registration duty under SORNA. This 
is so because registration is by its nature a two-party transaction, 
involving a sex offender's providing information about where he resides 
and other matters as required, and acceptance of that

[[Page 49337]]

information by the jurisdiction for inclusion in the sex offender 
registry. If the jurisdiction is unwilling to carry out its side of the 
transaction, then the sex offender cannot register.
    Concerns of this nature are also addressed in SORNA's criminal 
provision, 18 U.S.C. 2250. Subsection (c) of section 2250 provides an 
affirmative defense to liability for SORNA violations if ``(1) 
uncontrollable circumstances prevented the individual from complying; 
(2) the individual did not contribute to the creation of such 
circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to comply; and 
(3) the individual complied as soon as such circumstances ceased to 
exist.'' A registration jurisdiction's law or practice that precludes 
registration of a sex offender, as described above, is a circumstance 
that the sex offender cannot control and to which he did not 
contribute, so he cannot be held liable for failure to register with 
that jurisdiction as SORNA requires.
    The defense in section 2250(c) comes with the proviso that the 
defendant must comply with SORNA ``as soon as [the preventing] 
circumstances cease[ ] to exist.'' For example, consider the case posed 
above of a jurisdiction that refuses to register sex offenders based on 
a particular offense for which SORNA requires registration, so that a 
sex offender residing in the jurisdiction who was convicted of that 
offense cannot register there. Suppose that the jurisdiction later 
progresses in its implementation of SORNA and becomes willing to 
register offenders who have been convicted for that sex offense. In 
light of the proviso, the sex offender's obligation to register revives 
once the jurisdiction becomes willing to register him. That is fair, 
because the circumstance preventing his compliance with the SORNA 
registration requirement no longer exists.
    Section 72.8(a)(2) of this rule, and the accompanying discussion 
below, provide further explanation about the contours of the 
impossibility defense under 18 U.S.C. 2250(c).
    Returning to the text of proposed Sec.  72.3, the added sentence 
states at the end that sex offenders must comply with SORNA's 
requirements ``regardless of whether any particular requirement or 
class of sex offenders is mentioned in examples in this regulation or 
in other regulations or guidelines issued by the Attorney General.'' In 
conjunction with the earlier statement in the provision that all sex 
offenders must comply with all SORNA requirements, the added language 
responds to a judicial decision that did not give full effect to the 
current regulation.
    Section 72.3, as currently formulated, states that SORNA's 
``requirements . . . apply to all sex offenders,'' exercising the 
Attorney General's ``authority to specify the applicability of the 
requirements of [SORNA] to sex offenders convicted before the enactment 
of [SORNA] or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction.'' 34 
U.S.C. 20913(d); see Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 441-45 (explaining 
Congress's decision to give the Attorney General authority to apply 
SORNA's requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions). 
Nevertheless, in United States v. DeJarnette, 741 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 
2013), the court believed that the Attorney General had not made all of 
SORNA's requirements applicable to all sex offenders. The case 
concerned the applicability of SORNA's requirement that a sex offender 
register initially in the jurisdiction in which he is convicted, if it 
differs from his residence jurisdiction, see 34 U.S.C. 20913(a) (second 
sentence), where the sex offender's conviction predated SORNA's 
enactment. Notwithstanding 28 CFR 72.3, the court concluded that the 
Attorney General had not made this SORNA requirement applicable to sex 
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions, if they were already subject to 
state law registration requirements. DeJarnette, 741 F.3d at 982. The 
decision was largely premised on the fact that the particular SORNA 
requirement at issue was not mentioned in relation to that particular 
class of sex offenders in the examples of sex offenders subject to 
SORNA's requirements in 28 CFR 72.3 and the SORNA Guidelines. 
DeJarnette, 741 F.3d at 976-80.
    The sentence added to Sec.  72.3 by this rulemaking will foreclose 
future decisions of this nature and ensure that Sec.  72.3's 
application of SORNA's requirements to all sex offenders is given 
effect consistently.
    The proposed rule includes one further change in Sec.  72.3, 
affecting the first example in the provision. The example as currently 
formulated describes a sex offender convicted in 1990 and released 
following imprisonment in 2007, and says that the sex offender is 
subject to SORNA's requirements. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court held 
that SORNA's requirements did not apply to sex offenders with pre-SORNA 
convictions prior to the Attorney General's exercise of the authority 
under 34 U.S.C. 20913(d) to specify SORNA's applicability to those 
offenders. 565 U.S. at 434-35. It follows that SORNA's requirements did 
not apply to such sex offenders before the Attorney General's original 
issuance of 28 CFR 72.3 on February 28, 2007. Example 1 in Sec.  72.3 
might be misunderstood as suggesting the contrary, i.e., that a sex 
offender with a pre-SORNA conviction released from imprisonment at any 
time in 2007 was immediately subject to SORNA's requirements. Hence, to 
avoid any possible inconsistency or apparent inconsistency with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds, the rule proposes to change the 
example by substituting a later year for 2007.

Section 72.4--Where sex offenders must register

    Section 72.4 tracks SORNA's express requirement that a sex offender 
must register and keep the registration current in each jurisdiction in 
which the sex offender resides, is an employee, or is a student, and 
must also initially register in the jurisdiction in which the offender 
was convicted if that jurisdiction differs from the jurisdiction of 
residence. See 34 U.S.C. 20913(a); 73 FR at 38061-62.

Section 72.5--How long sex offenders must register

    Section 72.5 sets out SORNA's requirements regarding the duration 
of registration. SORNA classifies sex offenders into three ``tiers,'' 
based on the nature and seriousness of their sex offenses and their 
histories of recidivism. See 34 U.S.C. 20911(2)-(4); 73 FR at 38052-54. 
The tier in which a sex offender falls affects how long the offender 
must continue to register under SORNA. The required registration 
periods are generally 15 years for a tier I sex offender, 25 years for 
a tier II sex offender, and life for a tier III sex offender. See 34 
U.S.C. 20915(a); 73 FR at 38068. Paragraph (a) in Sec.  72.5 reproduces 
these requirements.
    Paragraph (a) of Sec.  72.5 provides an exception ``when the sex 
offender is in custody or civilly committed,'' incorporating in 
substance an express proviso appearing in SORNA, 34 U.S.C. 20915(a). 
The exception and proviso mean that SORNA does not require a sex 
offender to carry out its processes for registering or updating 
registrations during subsequent periods of confinement, e.g., when 
imprisoned because of conviction for some other offense following his 
release from imprisonment for the sex offense. This reflects that ``the 
SORNA procedures for keeping up the registration . . . generally 
presuppose the case of a sex offender who is free in the community'' 
and that ``[w]here a sex offender is confined, the public is protected 
against the risk of his reoffending in a more direct way, and more 
certain means are available for tracking his whereabouts.''

[[Page 49338]]

73 FR at 38068. However, registration jurisdictions may see incremental 
value in requiring sex offenders to carry out their processes for 
registering and updating registrations during subsequent confinement 
and are free to do so, though SORNA does not require it.
    The proviso relating to custody or civil commitment does not 
pertain to or limit SORNA's requirement that initial registration is to 
occur while the sex offender is still imprisoned following conviction 
for the predicate sex offense. See 34 U.S.C. 20913(b)(1), 20919(a). 
Rather, as indicated above, it affects a sex offender's registration 
obligations under SORNA if he is later reincarcerated after his 
release. The proviso relating to custody or civil commitment also does 
not mean that the running of the SORNA registration period is suspended 
during such subsequent confinement, and does not otherwise affect the 
commencement or duration of a sex offender's registration period under 
SORNA.
    For example, consider a sex offender, released in 2010 from 
imprisonment for a sex offense conviction, whom SORNA requires to 
register for 25 years as a tier II sex offender, and suppose the sex 
offender is subsequently convicted during the registration period for 
committing a robbery and imprisoned for three years for the latter 
offense. SORNA's registration requirement for that sex offender 
terminates in 2035, although he was incarcerated for three years of the 
25-year SORNA registration period. Sex offenders should keep in mind, 
however, that their registration jurisdictions are free to impose more 
extensive requirements than SORNA, including longer registration 
periods. Hence, the basic registration period under the law of a 
jurisdiction in which such a sex offender is registered may be longer 
than 25 years. And even if the basic registration period under the 
jurisdiction's law is the same as the 25 years required by SORNA, the 
jurisdiction may choose not to credit the three years the sex offender 
spent in prison for the robbery towards the running of the registration 
period under state law. See 73 FR at 38032-35, 38046, 38068. Expiration 
of the SORNA registration period accordingly does not obviate the need 
for sex offenders to check with registration jurisdictions whether they 
remain subject to registration requirements under the jurisdictions' 
laws.
    As provided in paragraph (b) of Sec.  72.5, the registration period 
under SORNA begins to run upon release from imprisonment following a 
sex offense conviction, or at the time of sentencing for a sex offense 
where imprisonment does not ensue. See 73 FR at 38068. The sex 
offender's release from imprisonment, which marks the start of the 
registration period for an incarcerated sex offender, may occur later 
than the end of the sentence imposed for the sex offense itself. For 
example, suppose that a sex offender is convicted for a fatal sexual 
assault upon a victim, resulting in a sentence of three years of 
imprisonment for the sexual assault and a concurrent or consecutive 
sentence of 25 years of imprisonment for murder. Or consider a case in 
which a sex offender is sentenced to three years of imprisonment for a 
sexual assault and at a later time he is sentenced to 25 years of 
imprisonment for an unrelated murder, while still imprisoned for the 
sex offense. Or suppose that a sex offender is already serving a 25-
year prison term for an unrelated murder, when he is sentenced to three 
years of imprisonment for a sexual assault. In all such cases, the 
registration period under SORNA starts to run when the sex offender 
actually completes his imprisonment and is released. It does not start 
to run while the sex offender is still imprisoned but has completed the 
portion of the sentence attributable to the sex offense.
    This conclusion follows from the general design and specific 
requirements of SORNA's registration procedures. SORNA provides that 
incarcerated sex offenders must initially register ``before completing 
a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the [registration] 
offense.'' 34 U.S.C. 20913(b)(1). SORNA further states that the 
correlative responsibilities of registration officials in effecting the 
initial registration are to be carried out ``shortly before release of 
the sex offender from custody.'' Id. 20919(a); see 73 FR at 38063 
(explaining requirement to register shortly before release from 
custody). Thereafter, sex offenders must ``keep the registration[s] 
current'' for specified periods of time, depending on their 
``tier[s].'' 34 U.S.C. 20915(a). In light of these provisions, the 
registration period is logically understood as being framed at the 
start by the release from custody and at the end by the termination of 
the specified time period.
    Considering specifically cases in which a sex offender is serving 
an aggregate prison term for multiple crimes, 34 U.S.C. 20913(b)(1) 
requires registration ``before completing a sentence of imprisonment 
with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration 
requirement.'' (Emphasis added). It does not require registration 
``before completing a sentence of imprisonment for the offense giving 
rise to the registration requirement.'' The broader ``with respect to'' 
language is best understood to mean that the relevant prison term under 
section 20913(b)(1) is not the specific sentence imposed for the 
predicate sex offense alone, but rather is the full related sentence of 
imprisonment, including any prison time imposed for other crimes. The 
corresponding language in section 20919(a) supports this understanding, 
requiring initial registration of the sex offender ``shortly before 
release of the sex offender from custody.'' This language does not 
signify that initial registration is to occur when the sex offender is 
about to complete the portion of an aggregate sentence attributable 
specifically to the sex offense, though the sex offender will remain in 
custody because he is serving additional time for another offense or 
offenses. Rather, by its terms, section 20919(a) contemplates that 
initial registration will occur shortly before the sex offender is 
actually released, and section 20913(b)(1) must be understood in the 
same way, because section 20913(b)(1) and section 20919(a) describe the 
same transaction (initial registration) from different perspectives.
    For example, consider the case of a sex offender convicted and 
sentenced for a fatal sexual assault, resulting in a three-year prison 
term for the sexual assault and a concurrent or consecutive 25-year 
sentence for murder. Suppose that the sexual assault involved was a 
sexual contact offense against an adult victim, resulting in the 
classification of the sex offender as a tier I sex offender and a 
registration period of 15 years. See 34 U.S.C. 20911(2)-(4), 
20915(a)(1). If the registration period started to run at the end of 
the first three years of the sex offender's incarceration, then the 15-
year registration period would expire long before the sex offender's 
release, because of the extension of his imprisonment by the murder 
sentence. This result would be at odds with section 20919(a)'s 
direction that sex offenders are to be initially registered ``shortly 
before release . . . from custody,'' because the sex offender's 
registration obligation under SORNA would be a thing of the past by 
that time, and also with the requirements under sections 20913 and 
20915(a)(1) that the sex offender register and keep the registration 
current for 15 years, because his registration period would be over 
before he registered in the first place.
    In addition to the inconsistency with the statutory provisions 
discussed above, starting the running of the registration period upon 
the conclusion

[[Page 49339]]

of the portion of a sentence attributable to the registration offense 
would result in arbitrary differences in registration requirements, 
depending on fortuities in the structuring of criminal sentences or 
their descriptions in judgments. For example, considering again the 
case of a fatal sexual assault, suppose that the resulting sentence 
involves a three-year prison term for the sexual assault, followed by a 
consecutive 25-year prison term for murder. As discussed above, the 
assumed 15-year registration period for the sexual assault would then 
run out long before the sex offender's release, and he would never have 
to register at all. But suppose the sentence is cast instead as a 25-
year prison term for murder, followed by a consecutive three-year 
prison term for the sexual assault. The completion of the prison term 
for the sexual assault would then coincide with the sex offender's 
release from prison, and he would have to register and keep the 
registration current for 15 years. Because the ordering of the sexual 
assault and murder sentences has no relevance to the public safety 
purposes served by sex offender registration, the discrepancy between 
the two cases as to resulting registration requirements would be 
irrational. For this reason as well, the registration period under 
SORNA starts to run when the sex offender is actually released, and not 
at an earlier time upon completion of the portion of an aggregate 
sentence specifically attributable to the predicate sex offense.
    By way of comparison, an offender's term of post-imprisonment 
supervised release for a sex offense does not start to run until he is 
released from prison, including in cases in which the offender's 
release is delayed by his serving additional prison time for another 
offense or offenses. This is not unfair or illogical; it rationally 
reflects the nature of supervision as a measure designed for overseeing 
and managing offenders following their release. While sex offender 
registration differs from supervision in being a non-punitive, civil 
regulatory measure, see, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-106; Felts, 674 
F.3d at 605-06, it is likewise concerned with the post-release 
treatment of sex offenders in the community. Hence, as with periods of 
supervision, it is rational for an offender's registration period for a 
sex offense to begin to run when he is released from prison, including 
in cases in which the offender's release is delayed by his serving 
additional prison time for other criminal conduct. This reflects the 
nature of registration as a measure designed for tracking and 
monitoring sex offenders following their release.
    The principle that the registration period under SORNA commences on 
release also applies to cases in which the sex offender is not 
imprisoned for the sex offense per se but is imprisoned because of 
conviction for another offense. For example, suppose that a sex 
offender is convicted of sexually assaulting and robbing a victim, 
resulting in a sentence of probation for the sexual assault and a 
sentence of five years of imprisonment for the robbery. Considering the 
relevant statutory provisions, section 20913(b)(2) makes applicable an 
alternative time for initial registration--three business days after 
sentencing--only ``if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment.'' Correspondingly, section 20919(a) provides for initial 
registration immediately after sentencing, rather than shortly before 
release from custody, only ``if the sex offender is not in custody.'' 
These provisions, by their terms, do not apply to a sex offender who 
remains in custody, though on the basis of an offense other than the 
predicate sex offense. Hence, cases of this nature must fall under the 
requirement of sections 20913(b)(1) and 20919(a) to effect initial 
registration shortly before the sex offender's release, and the 
consequences are the same as in the cases discussed above involving 
aggregate prison terms for the registration offense and other crimes. 
Where the sex offender receives a non-incarcerative sentence for the 
registration offense and a prison term for another offense, the 
registration period starts upon the sex offender's release, so that 
once registered and out in the community he must keep the registration 
current for the full registration period specified in 34 U.S.C. 20915, 
and not just for a truncated period reduced by his incarceration for 
another offense.
    In terms of underlying policy, registration is by definition 
concerned with tracking sex offenders in the community following their 
release. See 73 FR at 38044-45. The tiers and the associated 
registration periods under SORNA reflect categorical legislative 
judgments as to how long sex offenders should be tracked following 
release for public safety purposes. These judgments do not come into 
play until the sex offender is released. When that happens may be 
affected by many factors--such as the length of the prison term the sex 
offender receives for the sex offense; whether the sex offender makes 
parole (in a state system having parole) or gets good-conduct credit; 
whether the jurisdiction adopts an early release program because of 
prison crowding; and whether the sex offender gets additional prison 
time because of sentencing for other offenses, related or unrelated to 
the sex offense.
    Whatever the reasons may be, it is logical to start a post-release 
tracking regime--i.e., registration--when the sex offender is actually 
released. Initial registration is to occur ``shortly before'' that, as 
34 U.S.C. 20919(a) requires, ``in light of the underlying objectives of 
ensuring that sex offenders have their registration obligations in mind 
when they are released, and avoiding situations in which registration 
information changes significantly between the time the initial 
registration procedures are carried out and the time the offender is 
released.'' 73 FR at 38063.
    Hence, the registration period under SORNA starts to run when a sex 
offender is released from imprisonment, and not at an earlier time when 
the specific sentence for the registration offense has been served, if 
the two times differ. This follows from the features of the statutory 
provisions discussed above, from the absurdities entailed by a 
different interpretation, and from the basic character of registration 
as a post-release tracking measure. To the extent that there might be 
any uncertainty or argument to the contrary, the Attorney General in 
this rule exercises his authority under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b) to interpret 
and implement SORNA's provisions affecting the duration of registration 
in the manner stated.
    Paragraph (c) in Sec.  72.5 sets out SORNA's reduction of its 
registration period for certain sex offenders who maintain a ``clean 
record'' in accordance with statutory standards. The specific ``clean 
record'' conditions are that the sex offender not be convicted of any 
felony or any sex offense, successfully complete any period of 
supervision, and successfully complete an appropriate sex offender 
treatment program (certified by a registration jurisdiction or the 
Attorney General). The SORNA registration period is reduced by five 
years for a tier I sex offender who maintains a clean record for 10 
years, and reduced to the period for which the clean record is 
maintained for a tier III sex offender required to register on the 
basis of a juvenile delinquency adjudication who maintains a clean 
record for 25 years. See 34 U.S.C. 20915(a), (b); 73 FR at 38068-69.

Section 72.6--Information Sex Offenders Must Provide

    Section 72.6 sets out the registration information sex offenders 
must provide. Much of the specified information is

[[Page 49340]]

expressly required by SORNA, see 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(1)-(7), and the 
remainder reflects SORNA's direction that sex offenders must provide 
``[a]ny other information required by the Attorney General,'' id. 
20914(a)(8).
    In general terms, the required information comprises (i) name, 
birth date, and Social Security number; (ii) remote communication 
identifiers (including email addresses and telephone numbers); (iii) 
information about places of residence, non-residential lodging, 
employment, and school attendance; (iv) international travel; (v) 
passports and immigration documents; (vi) vehicle information; and 
(vii) professional licenses. By providing basic information about who a 
sex offender is, where he is, how he gets around, and what he is 
authorized to do, these requirements implement SORNA and further its 
public safety objectives.
    Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec.  72.6 requires that a sex offender provide 
his name, including any alias, which is an express SORNA requirement. 
See 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(1); 73 FR at 38055.
    Paragraph (a)(2) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
date of birth information, a requirement the Attorney General has 
adopted in the SORNA Guidelines and this rule because date of birth 
information is regularly utilized as part of an individual's basic 
identification information and hence is of value in helping to 
identify, track, and locate registered sex offenders. The paragraph 
requires that any date that the sex offender uses as his or her 
purported date of birth must be provided, in addition to the actual 
date of birth, because sex offenders may, for example, provide false 
date of birth information in seeking employment that would provide 
access to children or other potential victims. See 73 FR at 38057.
    Paragraph (a)(3) of Sec.  72.6 requires that a sex offender provide 
his Social Security number, which is an express SORNA requirement. See 
34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(2). The paragraph further requires provision of any 
number that a sex offender uses as his purported Social Security 
number. The Attorney General has adopted the latter requirement--
already appearing in the SORNA Guidelines in 2008--because sex 
offenders may, for example, attempt to use false Social Security 
numbers in seeking employment that would provide access to children or 
other potential victims. See 73 FR at 38055.
    Paragraph (b) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide all 
remote communication identifiers that he uses in internet or telephonic 
communications or postings, including email addresses and telephone 
numbers. A provision of the Keeping the internet Devoid of Sexual 
Predators Act of 2008 (KIDS Act), Public Law 110-400, directed the 
Attorney General to use the authority under paragraph (7) of 34 U.S.C. 
20914(a) [now designated paragraph (8)] to require sex offenders to 
provide internet identifiers. The Attorney General has previously 
exercised that authority to require the specified information in the 
SORNA Guidelines. See 34 U.S.C. 20916(a); 73 FR at 38055; 76 FR at 
1637. The Attorney General has exercised the same authority to require 
telephone numbers--a requirement also already appearing in the SORNA 
Guidelines--for a number of reasons, including facilitating 
communication between registration personnel and sex offenders, and 
addressing the potential use of telephonic communication by sex 
offenders in efforts to contact or lure potential victims. See 73 FR at 
38055.
    Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
residence address information or other residence location information 
if the sex offender lacks a residence address. Providing residence 
address information is an express SORNA requirement. See 34 U.S.C. 
20914(a)(3). In the SORNA Guidelines, and now in this rule, the 
Attorney General has adopted the requirement to provide other residence 
location information for sex offenders who do not have residence 
addresses, such as homeless sex offenders or sex offenders living in 
rural areas that lack street addresses, because having this type of 
location information serves the same public safety purposes as knowing 
the whereabouts of sex offenders with definite residence addresses. See 
73 FR at 38055-56, 38061-62.
    Paragraph (c)(2) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
information about temporary lodging while away from his residence for 
seven or more days. In the SORNA Guidelines, and now in this rule, the 
Attorney General has adopted this requirement because sex offenders may 
reoffend at locations away from the places in which they have a 
permanent or long-term presence, and indeed could be encouraged to do 
so to the extent that information about their places of residence is 
available to the authorities but information is lacking concerning 
their temporary lodgings elsewhere. The benefits of having this 
information include facilitating the successful investigation of crimes 
committed by sex offenders while away from their normal places of 
residence and discouraging sex offenders from committing crimes in such 
circumstances. See 73 FR at 38056.
    Paragraph (c)(3) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
employer name and address information, or other employment location 
information if the sex offender lacks a fixed place of employment. 
Providing employer name and address information is an express SORNA 
requirement. See 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(4). The Attorney General has 
adopted, in the SORNA Guidelines and this rule, the requirement to 
provide other employment location information for sex offenders who 
work but do not have fixed places of employment--e.g., a long-haul 
trucker whose ``workplace'' is roads and highways throughout the 
country, a self-employed handyman who works out of his home and does 
repair or home improvement work at other people's homes, or a person 
who frequents sites that contractors visit to obtain day labor and 
works for any contractor who hires him on a given day. The Attorney 
General has adopted this requirement because knowing where such sex 
offenders are in the course of employment serves the same public safety 
purposes as knowing the whereabouts of sex offenders who work at fixed 
locations. See 73 FR at 38056, 38062.
    Paragraph (c)(4) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
the name and address of any place where the sex offender is or will be 
a student, an express SORNA requirement. See 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(5); 73 
FR at 38056-57, 38062.
    Paragraph (d) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
information about intended travel outside of the United States. This is 
an express SORNA requirement, added by International Megan's Law. See 
34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(7); Public Law 114-119, sec. 6(a)(1). A related 
provision in Sec.  72.7(f) of this rule requires sex offenders to 
report international travel information at least 21 days in advance. 
Exercising the general authority under paragraph (8) of 34 U.S.C. 
20914(a) [then designated paragraph (7)] to expand the required range 
of registration information, the Attorney General initially adopted 
these requirements in the SORNA Supplemental Guidelines, see 76 FR at 
1637-38, even before the enactment of International Megan's Law, for a 
number of reasons:
    (i) Realizing SORNA's public safety objectives requires that 
registered sex offenders be effectively tracked as they leave and 
return to the United States, and that other sex offenders who enter the 
United States be identified, so that domestic registration and law 
enforcement authorities know about the

[[Page 49341]]

sex offenders' presence in the United States and can ensure that they 
register while here as SORNA requires. To that end, SORNA directs the 
Attorney General to establish and maintain a system for informing 
relevant registration jurisdictions about persons entering the United 
States whom SORNA requires to register. See 34 U.S.C. 20930. Sections 
72.6(d) and 72.7(f) of this rule are part of that system, requiring 
registered sex offenders to inform their registration jurisdictions 
about travel abroad, including information that encompasses both their 
departure from and return to the United States. Beyond this direct 
benefit, learning about sex offenders' entry into the United States may 
depend on notice from the authorities of the countries they come from--
authorities who may expect reciprocal notice about sex offenders 
traveling to their countries from the United States. Having U.S. sex 
offenders inform their registration jurisdictions of travel abroad 
provides information that is used by U.S. authorities, including the 
U.S. Marshals Service and INTERPOL Washington-U.S. National Central 
Bureau, to notify the authorities in the destination countries about 
sex offenders traveling to their areas. These foreign authorities may 
in return advise U.S. authorities about sex offenders traveling to the 
United States from their countries, facilitating the notification of 
domestic registration jurisdictions about the sex offenders' presence 
that section 20930 contemplates. See 73 FR at 38066; 76 FR at 1637.
    (ii) Sex offenders traveling abroad may remain subject in some 
respects to U.S. jurisdiction, e.g., because a sex offender intends to 
go to an overseas U.S. military base or to work as or for a U.S. 
military contractor in another country. In such cases, the intended 
travel of the sex offender may implicate the same public safety 
concerns in relation to communities abroad for which the United States 
has responsibility as it does in relation to communities within the 
United States. See 73 FR at 38067; 76 FR at 1637-38.
    (iii) More broadly, for a sex offender disposed to reoffend, it may 
be attractive to travel to foreign countries where law enforcement is 
weaker (or perceived to be weaker), where sexually trafficked children 
or other vulnerable victims may be more readily available, and where 
the registration and notification measures to which the sex offender is 
subject in the United States are inoperative. The United States does 
not wish to export the public safety threat posed by its sex offenders 
to other countries. Requiring sex offenders in the United States to 
inform their registration jurisdictions about international travel 
provides a basis for notifying foreign authorities in the destination 
countries, which helps to reduce the resulting risks. If these sex 
offenders do reoffend in other countries, the resulting human harm to 
victims is no less because it occurs in a foreign country, and the 
United States' image and foreign relations interests may be adversely 
affected as well. Sex offenders from the United States who commit sex 
offenses in other countries may be subject to prosecution under various 
Federal laws, which reflect the United States' policy of, and 
commitment to, combating the commission of crimes of sexual abuse and 
exploitation internationally as well as domestically. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. 1591, 2251(c), 2260, 2423. Consistent tracking of international 
travel by sex offenders helps to deter and prevent such crimes, and to 
facilitate their investigation if they occur.
    Beyond creating a general requirement to report travel outside of 
the United States at least 21 days in advance, the SORNA Supplemental 
Guidelines authorized the requirement of more definite information 
about international travel plans. 76 FR at 1638 (additional directions 
may be issued by the SMART Office ``concerning the information to be 
required in sex offenders' reports of intended international travel, 
such as information concerning expected itinerary, departure and return 
dates, and means and purpose of travel''); see Information Required for 
Notice of International Travel, https://ojp.gov/smart/international_travel.htm (providing such directions). Section 72.6(d) 
in this rule specifically directs sex offenders traveling abroad to 
report information regarding any anticipated itinerary, dates and 
places of departure, arrival, or return, carrier and flight numbers for 
air travel, destination countries and address or contact information 
therein, and means and purpose of travel. More detailed information of 
this type is needed because notice only that a sex offender intends to 
travel somewhere outside of the United States at some time three weeks 
or more in the future would be inadequate to realize the objectives of 
international tracking of sex offenders--objectives that include, as 
discussed above, notification as appropriate of U.S. and foreign 
authorities in destination countries for public safety purposes, 
preventing and detecting the offenders' commission of sex offenses in 
other countries, and reliably tracking sex offenders as they leave and 
enter the United States for purposes of enforcing registration 
requirements. Requiring the specified information concerning 
international travel is justified by its value in furthering these 
objectives. See 73 FR at 38066-67; 76 FR at 1634, 1637-38.
    Congress endorsed these objectives and the stated conclusion in 
International Megan's Law, whose purposes include ``[t]o protect 
children and others from sexual abuse and exploitation, including sex 
trafficking and sex tourism, by providing advance notice of intended 
travel by registered sex offenders outside the United States to the 
government of the country of destination [and] requesting foreign 
governments to notify the United States when a known sex offender is 
seeking to enter the United States.'' Public Law 114-119; see 162 Cong. 
Rec. H390-94 (Feb. 1, 2016) (explanation in House floor debate on 
passage). As noted above, the measures adopted by International Megan's 
Law in support of its international notification system include an 
express requirement that sex offenders report intended international 
travel, making this requirement a permanent feature of SORNA that 
exists independently of regulatory action. See 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(7); 
Public Law 114-119, sec. 6(a)(1).
    Section 72.6(d) in this rule follows the new SORNA travel 
information provision added by International Megan's Law, which states 
that sex offenders must provide ``[i]nformation relating to intended 
travel of the sex offender outside the United States, including any 
anticipated dates and places of departure, arrival, or return, carrier 
and flight numbers for air travel, destination country and address or 
other contact information therein, means and purpose of travel, and any 
other itinerary or other travel-related information required by the 
Attorney General.'' 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(7). A sex offender must report 
all anticipated information in these categories in relation to both the 
United States and destination countries as the language of Sec.  
72.6(d) makes clear. For example, a sex offender who is leaving the 
United States must report any anticipated date and place of departure 
from the United States, and also any anticipated date and place of 
return to the United States if the sex offender expects to return. 
Likewise, with respect to each foreign country to be visited, the sex 
offender must report any anticipated date and place of arrival in that 
country and any anticipated date and place of departure from that 
country.
    Paragraph (e) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
information concerning any passport or passports he

[[Page 49342]]

has, and concerning documents establishing his immigration status if he 
is an alien. The passports referenced in the paragraph include 
passports of all types and nationalities, not just U.S. passports. 
Where the sex offender has multiple passports, as may occur, for 
example, in cases involving dual citizenship, the paragraph's reference 
to ``each passport'' the sex offender has means that the sex offender 
must report all of his passports. The Attorney General has included 
information about passports and immigration documents as required 
registration information in the SORNA Guidelines and in this rule 
because having this type of information in the registries serves 
various purposes. These include locating and apprehending registrants 
who may attempt to leave the United States after committing new sex 
offenses or registration violations, facilitating the tracking and 
identification of registrants who leave the United States but later 
reenter while still required to register, see 34 U.S.C. 20930, and 
crosschecking the accuracy and completeness of other types of 
information that registrants are required to provide--e.g., if 
immigration documents show that an alien registrant is in the United 
States on a student visa but the registrant fails to provide school 
attendance information as required by 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(5). See 73 FR 
at 38056.
    Paragraph (f) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
information concerning any vehicle owned or operated by the sex 
offender, information concerning the license plate number or other 
registration number or identifier for the vehicle, and information as 
to where the vehicle is habitually kept. In part, the paragraph 
reflects the express SORNA requirement in 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(6) that a 
sex offender provide ``[t]he license plate number and a description of 
any vehicle owned or operated by the sex offender.'' This includes, in 
addition to vehicles registered to the sex offender, any vehicle that 
the sex offender regularly drives, either for personal use or in the 
course of employment. See 73 FR at 38057. The remainder of the 
paragraph reflects the Attorney General's requirement (previously 
adopted in the SORNA Guidelines) of additional vehicle-related 
information that serves similar purposes or may be useful to help 
prevent flight, facilitate investigation, or effect an apprehension if 
the sex offender commits new offenses or violates registration 
requirements. See id.
    Paragraph (g) of Sec.  72.6 requires a sex offender to provide 
information concerning all licensing of the offender that authorizes 
him to engage in an occupation or carry out a trade or business. The 
Attorney General has adopted this requirement, initially in the SORNA 
Guidelines and now in this rule, because information of this type (i) 
may be helpful in locating a registered sex offender if he absconds, 
(ii) may provide a basis for notifying the responsible licensing 
authority if the offender's conviction of a sex offense may affect his 
eligibility for the license, and (iii) may be useful in crosschecking 
the accuracy and completeness of other information the offender is 
required to provide--e.g., if the sex offender is licensed to engage in 
a certain occupation but does not provide name or place of employment 
information as required by 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(4) for such an 
occupation. See 73 FR at 38056.

Section 72.7--How Sex Offenders Must Register and Keep the Registration 
Current

    SORNA requires sex offenders to register and keep the registrations 
current in jurisdictions in which they reside, work, or attend school. 
Section 72.7 sets out the procedures for doing so, addressing the 
timing requirements for registering and updating registrations, the 
jurisdictions to which changes in registration information must be 
reported, and the means for reporting such changes. In general terms, 
the section requires (i) initial registration before release from 
imprisonment, or within three business days after sentencing if the sex 
offender is not imprisoned; (ii) periodic in-person appearances to 
verify and update the registration information; (iii) reporting of 
changes in name, residence, employment, or school attendance; (iv) 
reporting of intended departure or termination of residence, 
employment, or school attendance in a jurisdiction; (v) reporting of 
changes relating to remote communication identifiers, temporary lodging 
information, and vehicle information; (vi) reporting of international 
travel; and (vii) compliance with a jurisdiction's rules if a sex 
offender has not complied with the normal time and manner 
specifications for carrying out a SORNA requirement.
    The requirements articulated in this section in part appear 
expressly in SORNA and in part reflect exercises of the powers SORNA 
confers on the Attorney General to further specify its requirements. 
The authorities relied on include the following: SORNA directs the 
Attorney General to issue rules and guidelines to ``interpret and 
implement'' its provisions, which include the basic requirement that 
each sex offender must ``register . . . and keep the registration 
current.'' 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(a). Previously in the SORNA 
Guidelines, see 73 FR at 38062-67, and now in this rule, the Attorney 
General interprets his authority to ``interpret and implement'' SORNA 
as including the authority to articulate a comprehensive, gap-free set 
of procedural requirements for registering and updating registrations. 
Authority of this nature is needed to implement SORNA in conformity 
with the legislative objective of protecting the public from sex 
offenders by establishing a comprehensive national system for their 
registration. 34 U.S.C. 20901. Beyond the public safety need, this 
understanding of section 20912(b) ``takes Congress to have filled 
potential lacunae'' in SORNA in a manner consistent with fair notice 
concerns, empowering the Attorney General to eliminate any ``vagueness 
and uncertainty'' regarding how sex offenders are to comply with 
SORNA's registration requirements. Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 441-42.
    The Attorney General's authority to interpret and implement SORNA 
includes in particular the authority to adopt additional specifications 
regarding the time and manner in which its requirements must be carried 
out. For example, SORNA expressly requires that sex offenders must 
appear in person to report changes of name, residence, employment, and 
student status within three business days of such changes. 34 U.S.C. 
20913(c). But SORNA does not expressly require the reporting within a 
particular timeframe of changes relating to other types of registration 
information that also bear directly and importantly on the 
identification, tracking, and location of sex offenders. These include 
remote communication identifiers (such as email addresses), temporary 
lodging information, international travel information, and vehicle 
information, as described in Sec.  72.6(b), (c)(2), (d), and (f) of 
this rule. Absent a requirement that changes in these types of 
information be reported promptly, the information in the registries 
about these matters could become seriously out of date, which would in 
turn impair SORNA's basic objective of effectively tracking and 
locating sex offenders in the community following their release. See 73 
FR at 38044-45, 38066-67. The Attorney General accordingly has adopted 
definite timing requirements for reporting changes in these types of 
information, previously in the guidelines for SORNA implementation, and 
now in Sec.  72.7(e)-(f) in this rule.
    Adopting such rules reflects an exercise of the Attorney General's 
authority to ``interpret and implement''

[[Page 49343]]

SORNA, 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), and more specifically to interpret and 
implement SORNA's requirement that sex offenders must ``keep the 
registration current,'' id. 20913(a). While the heading of subsection 
(c) of section 20913 is ``[k]eeping the registration current,'' the 
heading only signifies that the subsection sets out an updating rule 
for the most basic types of registration information. It does not 
signify that nothing more can be required to keep the registration 
current. The contrary is evident from section 20915(a), which specifies 
the duration of required registration under SORNA. Section 20915(a) 
uses the same terminology, stating that a sex offender ``shall keep the 
registration current'' for the relevant period of time. Obviously, in 
providing that a sex offender must ``keep the registration current'' 
for a specified period, section 20915(a) defines the period of time 
during which a sex offender must continue to comply with all of SORNA's 
requirements, given the absence of any other provision in SORNA 
specifying how long sex offenders must comply with its various 
requirements. Among other consequences, this means that sex offenders 
must appear in person periodically to verify and update their 
registration information, as required by section 20918, for the 
specified period of time--not just that they must report changes in 
name, residence, employment, and school attendance, as provided in 
section 20913(c), for the specified period of time. That consideration 
alone demonstrates that section 20913(c) does not exhaust SORNA's 
requirements for ``keep[ing] the registration current.''
    Regarding other matters, such as changes in registration 
information relating to remote communication identifiers, temporary 
lodging, vehicles, and international travel, the Attorney General has 
understood the authority to interpret and implement SORNA's requirement 
to keep the registration current as including the authority to adopt 
specific time and manner requirements for the reporting of such 
changes. Congress ratified this understanding in the KIDS Act. In that 
Act, Congress provided that (i) ``[t]he Attorney General, using the 
authority provided in [34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(8)], shall require that each 
sex offender provide to the sex offender registry those internet 
identifiers the sex offender uses or will use'' and (ii) ``[t]he 
Attorney General, using the authority provided in [34 U.S.C. 20912(b)], 
shall specify the time and manner for keeping current information 
required to be provided under this section.'' 34 U.S.C. 20916(a)-(b).
    Notably, Congress did not find it necessary to make new grants of 
authority to the Attorney General for these purposes and instead 
directed the Attorney General to utilize the pre-existing authorities 
under SORNA to require internet identifier information and specify the 
time and manner for keeping it current. This confirms that the section 
20912(b) authority includes the authority to adopt additional time and 
manner requirements in the rules and guidelines the Attorney General 
issues.
    SORNA directs sex offenders to provide for inclusion in the sex 
offender registry several expressly described types of registration 
information and, in addition, ``[a]ny other information required by the 
Attorney General.'' Id. 20914(a)(8). The section 20914(a)(8) authority 
underlies the specification of required types of registration 
information in Sec.  72.6 in this rule beyond those expressly set forth 
in section 20914(a)(1)-(7). The section 20914(a)(8) authority also 
provides an additional, independent legal basis for various 
requirements in Sec.  72.7, including a number of timing rules it 
incorporates.
    In relation to some types of required registration information 
under this rule, which may be based wholly or in part on the exercise 
of the Attorney General's authority under section 20914(a)(8), a timing 
requirement is inherent in the nature of the information that must be 
reported. This is true of the requirement under Sec.  72.7(d) to report 
if a sex offender will be commencing residence, employment, or school 
attendance elsewhere or will be terminating residence, employment, or 
school attendance in a jurisdiction. It is likewise true of the 
requirement under Sec.  72.7(f) to report intended international 
travel. Because these provisions constitute requirements to report 
present intentions regarding expected future actions, the information 
they require necessarily must be reported in advance of the expected 
actions.
    Section 20914(a)(8) also provides an additional, independent legal 
basis for more specific timeframe requirements appearing in Sec.  72.7 
of this rule. One of these requirements is that intended international 
travel is to be reported at least 21 days in advance of the travel, as 
provided in Sec.  72.7(f). In substance, this is a requirement that a 
sex offender report to the residence jurisdiction an intention to 
travel outside of the United States at some time 21 days or more in the 
future. Viewing the expected timing of the travel as an aspect of the 
required information, it is within the Attorney General's authority 
under 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(8) to require sex offenders to provide ``[a]ny 
other information''--and following the adoption of section 20914(a)(7) 
by International Megan's Law, within the Attorney General's more 
specific authority under the latter provision to require ``any other . 
. . travel-related information.'' Essentially the same point applies to 
the rule's specification that sex offenders must report within three 
business days changes relating to certain types of registration 
information the Attorney General has required. Section 72.7(e) directs 
reporting of changes in information within that timeframe relating to 
remote communication identifiers, temporary lodging, and vehicles. 
Viewed as requirements to report the information that certain actions 
or occurrences have taken place within the preceding three business 
days, these requirements are within the Attorney General's authority 
under 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(8).
    Turning to another SORNA provision supporting time and manner 
requirements, 34 U.S.C. 20913(d) authorizes the Attorney General to 
specify the applicability of SORNA's requirements to sex offenders 
convicted before the enactment of SORNA or its implementation in a 
particular jurisdiction ``and to prescribe rules for the registration 
of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who 
are unable to comply with subsection (b).'' The cross-referenced 
``subsection (b)'' is the SORNA provision that requires sex offenders 
to register initially before release from imprisonment, or within three 
business days of sentencing if the sex offender is not imprisoned. As 
discussed below in connection with Sec.  72.7(a)(2) of this rule, sex 
offenders released from Federal or military custody and sex offenders 
convicted in foreign countries generally are unable to register prior 
to release. The section 20913(d) authority to prescribe registration 
rules for sex offenders ``unable to comply with subsection (b)'' 
accordingly provides one of the legal bases for the alternative timing 
rules in Sec.  72.7(a)(2), which direct registration by sex offenders 
in the affected classes within three business days of entering a 
jurisdiction following release.
    The authorities described above--under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 
20913(d), and 20914(a)(8)--provided the basis for the Attorney 
General's adoption of time and manner specifications for complying with 
SORNA's registration requirements in previously issued guidelines under 
SORNA. More recently, International Megan's Law added an express, 
general

[[Page 49344]]

grant of authority to the Attorney General to make such specifications. 
The relevant provision is 34 U.S.C. 20914(c), which reads as follows: 
``(c) TIME AND MANNER.--A sex offender shall provide and update 
information required under subsection (a), including information 
relating to intended travel outside the United States required under 
paragraph (7) of that subsection, in conformity with any time and 
manner requirements prescribed by the Attorney General.''
    The cross-referenced ``subsection (a)'' is SORNA's list of all the 
registration information that sex offenders must provide. Hence, the 
new section 20914(c) requires sex offenders to comply with the Attorney 
General's directions regarding the time and manner for providing and 
updating all registration information required by SORNA. In addition to 
empowering the Attorney General to specify the time and manner for 
reporting particular types of registration information, this provision 
enables the Attorney General to specify the time and manner for 
registration. This is so because registration on the part of a sex 
offender consists of providing required registration information to the 
registration jurisdiction for inclusion in the sex offender registry. 
Given that the Attorney General has the authority under section 
20914(c) to specify the time and manner for a sex offender's provision 
of each required type of registration information, it follows that the 
Attorney General has the authority under section 20914(c) to specify 
the time and manner for a sex offender's provision of the required 
types of information collectively, which constitutes registration under 
SORNA.

Paragraph (a)--Initial Registration

    Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec.  72.7 tracks SORNA's general rule that a 
sex offender must initially register--that is, register for the first 
time based on a sex offense conviction--before release from 
imprisonment, or within three business days of sentencing in case of a 
non-incarcerative sentence. See 34 U.S.C. 20913(b) (initial 
registration by sex offenders); id. 20919(a) (complementary duties of 
registration officials); 73 FR at 38062-65 (related explanation in 
guidelines).
    Paragraph (a)(2)(i) of Sec.  72.7 addresses the situation of sex 
offenders who are released from Federal or military custody or 
sentenced for a Federal or military sex offense. There is no separate 
Federal registration program for such offenders. Hence, Federal 
authorities cannot register these offenders prior to their release from 
custody or near the time of sentencing. This is in contrast to the 
authorities of the SORNA registration jurisdictions--the states, the 
District of Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and 
qualifying Indian tribes--who may register their sex offenders prior to 
release or near sentencing as provided in 34 U.S.C. 20913(b), 20919(a). 
SORNA instead enacted special provisions under which Federal 
correctional and supervision authorities (i) are required to inform 
Federal (including military) offenders with sex offense convictions 
that they must register as required by SORNA and (ii) must notify the 
(non-Federal) jurisdictions in which the sex offenders will reside 
following release or sentencing so that these jurisdictions can 
integrate the sex offenders into their registration programs. See 18 
U.S.C. 4042(c); Public Law 105-119, sec. 115(a)(8)(C), as amended by 
Public Law. 109-248, sec. 141(i) (10 U.S.C. 951 note); 73 FR at 38064; 
see also 18 U.S.C. 3563(a)(8); id. 3583(d) (third sentence); id. 
4209(a) (second sentence) (mandatory Federal supervision condition to 
comply with SORNA); 34 U.S.C 20931 (requiring the Secretary of Defense 
to provide to the Attorney General military sex offender information 
for inclusion in the National Sex Offender Registry and National Sex 
Offender Public website).
    The timing rule adopted for such situations is that sex offenders 
released from Federal or military custody or convicted of Federal or 
military sex offenses but not sentenced to imprisonment must register 
within three business days of entering or remaining in a jurisdiction 
to reside, see 73 FR at 38064, which parallels SORNA's normal timeframe 
for registering or updating a registration following changes of 
residence, see 34 U.S.C. 20913(c). Section 72.7(a)(2)(i) refers to a 
sex offender entering ``or remaining'' in a jurisdiction to reside 
because, for example, a Federal sex offender released from a Federal 
prison located in a state may remain in that state to reside, rather 
than relocating to some other state. In such a case, the three-
business-day period for registering with the state runs from the time 
of the sex offender's release.
    In terms of legal authority, the requirement of Sec.  72.7(a)(2)(i) 
is supported by the Attorney General's authority to interpret and 
implement SORNA's requirement to register in the jurisdiction of 
residence, 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(a); the Attorney General's 
authority under section 20913(d) to prescribe rules for the 
registration of sex offenders who are unable to comply with section 
20913(b)'s timing rule for initial registration; and the Attorney 
General's authority under section 20914(c) to adopt time and manner 
specifications for providing and updating registration information, 
which includes the authority to adopt time and manner specifications 
for registration as discussed above. Viewing a sex offender's being 
released from Federal or military custody and taking up residence in a 
jurisdiction as a change of residence, this requirement is also 
supportable as a direct application of section 20913(c).
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of Sec.  72.7 addresses the situation of 
persons required to register on the basis of foreign sex offense 
convictions. Registration by the convicting state is not an available 
option under SORNA in such cases because foreign states are not 
registration jurisdictions under SORNA. See 34 U.S.C. 20911(10). Also, 
there may be no domestic jurisdiction in which SORNA requires such 
offenders to register--if they are not residing, working, or attending 
school in the United States at the time they are released from custody 
or sentenced in the foreign country--but SORNA's requirements will 
apply if they travel or return to the United States. The rule adopted 
for foreign conviction situations is that the sex offender must 
register within three business days of entering a domestic jurisdiction 
to reside, work, or attend school, see 73 FR at 38050-51, 38064-65, 
which parallels SORNA's normal timeframe for registering or updating a 
registration following changes of residence, employment, or student 
status, see 34 U.S.C. 20913(c).
    In terms of legal authority, this requirement is supported by the 
Attorney General's authority to interpret and implement SORNA's 
requirement to register in jurisdictions of residence, employment, and 
school attendance, 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(a); the Attorney General's 
authority under section 20913(d) to prescribe rules for the 
registration of sex offenders who are unable to comply with section 
20913(b)'s timing rule for initial registration; and the Attorney 
General's authority under section 20914(c) to adopt time and manner 
specifications for providing and updating registration information, 
which includes the authority to adopt time and manner specifications 
for registration as discussed above. Insofar as a sex offender's travel 
or return to the United States following a foreign conviction involves 
a change of residence, employment, or student status, this

[[Page 49345]]

requirement is also supportable as a direct application of section 
20913(c).

Paragraph (b)--Periodic In-Person Verification

    Paragraph (b) of Sec.  72.7 sets out the express requirement of 34 
U.S.C. 20918 that sex offenders periodically appear in person in the 
jurisdictions in which they are required to register, allow the 
jurisdictions to take current photographs, and verify their 
registration information, with the frequency of the required 
appearances determined by their tiering. See 73 FR at 38067-68.
    The second sentence of paragraph (b), exercising the Attorney 
General's authority under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), interprets and implements 
section 20918's requirement of verifying the information in each 
registry to include correcting any information that is out of date or 
inaccurate and reporting any new registration information. With respect 
to most types of registration information, other provisions of Sec.  
72.7 require reporting of changes within shorter timeframes than the 
intervals between periodic in-person appearances for verification. 
Hence, a sex offender who has complied with SORNA's requirements is 
likely to have reported changes in most types of registration 
information prior to his next verification appearance. But Sec.  72.7 
does not specially address the time and manner for reporting changes in 
some types of registration information. See Sec.  72.6(a)(2)-(3), (e), 
(g) (requiring as well information concerning actual and purported 
dates of birth and Social Security numbers, passports and immigration 
documents, and professional licenses). Sex offenders can keep their 
registrations current with respect to the latter categories of 
information by reporting any changes in their periodic verifications. 
See 73 FR at 38067-68.

Paragraph (c)--Reporting of Initiation and Changes Concerning Name, 
Residence, Employment, and School Attendance

    Paragraph (c) of Sec.  72.7 is based on SORNA's express requirement 
that ``[a] sex offender shall, not later than 3 business days after 
each change of name, residence, employment, or student status, appear 
in person in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant to [34 U.S.C. 
20913(a)] and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the 
information required for that offender in the sex offender registry.'' 
34 U.S.C. 20913(c); see 73 FR at 38065-66.
    While SORNA provides a definite timeframe for reporting these 
changes (within three business days), specifies a means of reporting 
(through in-person appearance), and requires reporting of a change in 
``at least 1 jurisdiction,'' it does not specify the particular 
jurisdiction in which each kind of change--i.e., change in name, 
residence, employment, or school attendance--is to be reported. As 
discussed earlier, the Attorney General's authority under 34 U.S.C. 
20912(b) to interpret and implement SORNA includes the authority to 
further specify the manner in which changes in registration information 
are to be reported where there are such gaps or ambiguities in SORNA's 
statutory provisions. In addition, the Attorney General now has express 
authority under 34 U.S.C. 20914(c) to prescribe the manner in which all 
required registration information is to be provided and updated. 
Exercising those authorities in paragraph (c) in Sec.  72.7, the 
Attorney General interprets and implements the requirement of section 
20913(c), and prescribes the manner in which sex offenders must provide 
and update information about name, residence, employment, or student 
status, by specifying the particular jurisdiction in which a sex 
offender must appear to report the changes section 20913(c) describes--
in the residence jurisdiction to report a change of name or residence, 
in the employment jurisdiction to report a change of employment, and in 
the jurisdiction of school attendance to report a change in school 
attendance. See 73 FR at 38065.
    For example, suppose that a sex offender resides in state A and 
commutes to work in state B. Pursuant to 34 U.S.C. 20913(a), the sex 
offender must register in both states--in state A as his residence 
state, and in state B as his employment state. Suppose that the sex 
offender changes his place of residence in state A and continues to 
work at the same place in state B. Logically, the sex offender should 
carry out his in-person appearance in state A to report his change of 
residence in state A, rather than in state B, where his contact with 
the latter state (employment) has not changed. Conversely, varying the 
example, suppose that the sex offender changes his place of employment 
from one employer to another in state B, but continues to reside in the 
same place in state A. The sex offender should carry out his in-person 
appearance in state B to report his change of employment in state B, 
rather than in state A, where his contact with the latter state 
(residence) has not changed.
    These conclusions follow from the underlying policies of SORNA's 
in-person appearance requirements, which aim to provide opportunities 
for face to face encounters between sex offenders and persons 
responsible for their registrations in the local areas in which they 
will be present. Such encounters may help law enforcement personnel to 
familiarize themselves with the sex offenders in their areas, thereby 
facilitating the effective discharge of their protective and 
investigative functions in relation to those sex offenders, and helping 
to ensure that their responsibilities to track those offenders are 
taken seriously and carried out consistently. Likewise, from the 
perspective of sex offenders, face to face encounters with officers 
responsible for their monitoring in the local areas where they are 
present may help to impress on them that their identities, locations, 
and past criminal conduct are known to the authorities in those areas. 
Hence, there is a reduced likelihood of their avoiding detection and 
apprehension if they reoffend, and this may help them to resist the 
temptation to reoffend. See 73 FR at 38065, 38067.
    These policies are furthered by sex offenders appearing in person 
to report changes in residence, employment, and school attendance in 
the jurisdictions in which the changes occur, rather than in other 
jurisdictions where they may be required to register, but within whose 
borders there has been no change in the location of the sex offender. 
Section 72.7(c) in the rule accordingly provides that changes in the 
most basic types of location information--residence, employment, school 
attendance--are to be reported through in-person appearances in the 
jurisdictions in which they occur. Section 72.7(c) also provides 
definiteness regarding the reporting of name changes under 34 U.S.C. 
20913(c), providing that such changes are to be reported in the 
residence jurisdiction, as the jurisdiction in which a sex offender is 
likely to have his most substantial presence and contacts.

Paragraph (d)--Reporting of Departure and Termination Concerning 
Residence, Employment, and School Attendance

    Paragraph (d) of Sec.  72.7 requires sex offenders to inform the 
jurisdictions in which they reside if they will be commencing 
residence, employment, or school attendance in another jurisdiction or 
outside of the United States, and to inform the relevant jurisdictions 
if they will be terminating residence, employment, or school attendance 
in a jurisdiction. The Attorney General has previously articulated 
these requirements in the SORNA Guidelines. See 73 FR at

[[Page 49346]]

38065-67. These requirements are not part of the requirement under 34 
U.S.C. 20913(c) to report certain changes through in-person appearances 
and they may be reported by any means allowed by registration 
jurisdictions in their discretion. See 73 FR at 38067.
    Paragraph (d)(1) of Sec.  72.7, relating to notice about intended 
commencement of residence, employment, or school attendance outside of 
a jurisdiction, and paragraph (d)(2), relating to notice about 
termination of residence, employment, or school attendance in a 
jurisdiction, are complementary, each applying in certain situations 
that may be outside the scope of the other. For example, Sec.  
72.7(d)(1) requires a sex offender to inform his residence jurisdiction 
if he will be starting a job in another jurisdiction, even if he will 
continue to reside where he has resided and will not be terminating any 
existing connection to the residence jurisdiction. Section 72.7(d)(2) 
requires a sex offender to inform a jurisdiction of his intended 
termination of residence, employment, or school attendance in that 
jurisdiction ``even if there is no ascertainable or expected future 
place of residence, employment, or school attendance for the sex 
offender.'' 73 FR at 38066. Regarding the underlying legal authority 
for Sec.  72.7(d), its informational requirements overlap with types of 
information 34 U.S.C. 20914(a) expressly requires sex offenders to 
provide, which include information as to where a sex offender ``will 
reside,'' ``will be an employee,'' or ``will be a student.'' Id. 
20914(a)(3)-(5). To the extent Sec.  72.7(d) goes beyond the 
registration information that SORNA expressly requires, it is a 
straightforward exercise of the Attorney General's authority under 34 
U.S.C. 20914(a)(8) to require any additional registration information.
    Even before the enactment of International Megan's Law, the 
Attorney General's implementation authority under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b) 
was understood to include the authority to specify time and manner 
requirements for providing and updating registration information, as 
discussed above. Currently, section 20914(c) confers express authority 
on the Attorney General to adopt the time and manner requirements set 
forth in Sec.  72.7(d)--i.e., that (i) intended commencement of 
residence, employment, or school attendance in another jurisdiction or 
outside the United States is to be reported to the residence 
jurisdiction (by whatever means it allows) prior to any termination of 
residence in that jurisdiction and prior to commencing residence, 
employment, or school attendance in the other jurisdiction or outside 
of the United States; and (ii) intended termination of residence, 
employment, or school attendance in a jurisdiction is to be reported to 
the jurisdiction (by whatever means it allows) prior to the termination 
of residence, employment, or school attendance in the jurisdiction. 
Section 72.7(d)'s requirement that the intended actions or changes are 
to be reported prior to the termination of residence, employment, or 
school attendance in the relevant jurisdiction ensures that the 
reporting requirement applies while the sex offender is still subject 
to the requirement to register and keep the registration current in the 
jurisdiction pursuant to 34 U.S.C. 20913(a). This approach avoids any 
question about the validity of requiring a sex offender to provide or 
update information in a jurisdiction in which he is no longer required 
to register under SORNA.
    The exercise of the authorities described above in Sec.  72.7(d) 
furthers SORNA's objective of creating a ``comprehensive national 
system for the registration of [sex] offenders,'' 34 U.S.C. 20901, 
which reliably tracks sex offenders as they move away from and into 
registration jurisdictions. A sex offender's departure from a 
jurisdiction in which he is registered may eventually be discovered--
e.g., because he fails to appear for the next periodic verification of 
his registration, see id. 20918--even if he does not affirmatively 
notify the jurisdiction that he is leaving. But considerable time may 
elapse before that happens, leaving a cold trail for law enforcement 
efforts to locate the sex offender, if he does not register in the 
destination jurisdiction as SORNA requires.
    For example, for a sex offender who decides to change his residence 
from one state to another, Sec.  72.7(d) requires the sex offender to 
inform the state he is leaving prior to his departure, and Sec.  
72.7(c) requires him to inform the destination state within three 
business days of his arrival there. Under SORNA's procedures for 
information sharing among registration jurisdictions, the state of 
origin in such a case directly notifies the identified destination 
state. See 34 U.S.C. 20921(b), 20923(b)(3); 73 FR at 38065; 76 FR at 
1638. If the sex offender then fails to appear and register as expected 
in the destination state, appropriate follow-up ensues, which may 
include investigative efforts by state and local law enforcement and 
the U.S. Marshals Service to locate the sex offender, issuance of a 
warrant for his arrest, and entry of information into national law 
enforcement databases reflecting the sex offender's status as an 
absconder or unlocatable. See 34 U.S.C. 20924; 73 FR at 38069. In the 
context of this system, the requirement of Sec.  72.7(d) for a sex 
offender to notify the residence jurisdiction concerning his departure 
is an important element. It helps to ensure that agencies and officials 
responsible for sex offender registration and its enforcement are 
promptly made aware of major changes in the location of sex offenders, 
and thereby reduces the risk that sex offenders will disappear in the 
interstices between jurisdictions.
    In so doing, Sec.  72.7(d) resolves certain potential problems in 
the operation of SORNA's registration system following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Nichols v. United States, 136 S Ct. 1113 (2016), 
and a similar earlier decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
United States v. Lunsford, 725 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2013). Nichols 
involved a sex offender who abandoned his residence in Kansas and 
relocated to the Philippines, without informing the Kansas registration 
authorities of his departure. The issue in the case was whether Nichols 
had violated 34 U.S.C. 20913(c), which requires a sex offender ``not 
later than three business days after each change of name, residence, 
employment, or student status'' to ``appear in person in at least 1 
jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a) and inform that 
jurisdiction of all changes'' in the required registration information.
    The Court noted that subsection (a) of section 20913 mentions three 
jurisdictions as possibly ``involved''--``where the offender resides, 
where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a 
student''-- which would not include the state of Kansas after Nichols 
had moved to the Philippines. Nichols, 136 S Ct. at 1117 (quoting 34 
U.S.C. 20913(a)). The Court further noted that section 20913(c) 
requires appearance and registration within three business days after a 
change of residence, and Nichols could not have appeared in Kansas 
after he left the state. Id. at 1117-18. The Court accordingly 
concluded that Nichols' failure to inform Kansas of his departure was 
not a violation of section 20913(c), since Kansas was no longer an 
``involved'' jurisdiction in which section 20913(c) may require a sex 
offender to report changes in residence. Id. at 1118. Applying the same 
reasoning to the domestic context, if a sex offender terminates his 
residence in a state and thereafter takes up residence in another 
state, he cannot violate section 20913(c) by failing to inform the 
state he is leaving. For, following the termination of residence in 
that state, it

[[Page 49347]]

is no longer a ``jurisdiction involved'' for purposes of section 
20913(c).
    There is no comparable problem, however, with Sec.  72.7(d)'s 
requirement that a sex offender inform a jurisdiction in which he 
resides of his intended departure from the jurisdiction, because Sec.  
72.7(d) does not depend on the requirements of section 20913(c). 
Rather, Sec.  72.7(d) is grounded in the requirement of section 
20914(a) that sex offenders provide certain information, including 
``[a]ny other information required by the Attorney General,'' and the 
requirement of section 20914(c) that they report the required 
information in the ``time and manner . . . prescribed by the Attorney 
General.''
    The Attorney General's exercise of his authorities under section 
20914(a) and 20914(c) to require sex offenders to inform their 
registration jurisdictions that they will be going elsewhere in no way 
conflicts with Nichols' conclusion that section 20913(c) does not 
require such pre-departure notice of intended relocation. Section 
20914(a)(8) says that sex offenders must provide ``[a]ny other 
information required by the Attorney General.'' The statute does not 
say that sex offenders must provide ``[a]ny other information required 
by the Attorney General, except for information about intended 
departure from the jurisdiction.'' Nichols' interpretation of section 
20913(c) provides no basis for reading such an unstated limitation into 
section 20914(a)(8). Likewise, Nichols provides no basis for reading 
unstated limitations into the Attorney General's authority--now 
expressly granted by section 20914(c)--to prescribe time and manner 
requirements for providing and updating registration information, which 
adequately supports Sec.  72.7(d)'s requirement that a sex offender 
inform the jurisdiction in which he resides about intended departure 
prior to any termination of residence and before going elsewhere.
    The Attorney General's adoption of the Sec.  72.7(d) requirements 
is also consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of particular 
arguments and issues in Nichols. The salient points are as follows:
    First, the Court in Nichols noted that the predecessor Federal sex 
offender registration law (the ``Wetterling Act'') required a sex 
offender to ``report the change of address to the responsible agency in 
the State the person is leaving,'' while SORNA contains no comparable 
provision that expressly requires sex offenders to notify jurisdictions 
they are leaving. 136 S Ct. at 1118 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 14071(b)(5) 
(2000)). However, SORNA does not attempt to articulate all the 
particulars of its registration requirements for sex offenders, instead 
authorizing the Attorney General to complete the regulatory scheme 
through interpretation and implementation of SORNA. See, e.g., 34 
U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(d), 20914(a)(8), 20914(c). Given the extent of 
the Attorney General's powers under SORNA, it was not necessary for 
Congress to include an express provision in SORNA requiring sex 
offenders to notify jurisdictions they are leaving. Nor can there be 
any doubt that requiring such notification is now within the terms of 
the Attorney General's powers under SORNA, as discussed above. Indeed, 
34 U.S.C. 20923(b)(3)--which provides that a jurisdiction's officials 
are to inform each jurisdiction ``from or to which a change of 
residence, employment, or student status occurs''-- contemplates the 
Attorney General's adoption of requirements like those appearing in 
Sec.  72.7(d). For if sex offenders were not required to advise the 
jurisdictions they leave of their departure and destination, those 
jurisdictions could not inform the jurisdictions ``to which'' sex 
offenders relocate.
    Second, the Court in Nichols rejected an argument that a 
jurisdiction necessarily remains ``involved'' for purposes of section 
20913(c) if the sex offender continues to appear on the jurisdiction's 
registry as a current resident. The Court responded that section 
20913(a) gives jurisdictions where the offender resides, is an 
employee, or is a student as the only possibilities for an ``involved'' 
jurisdiction, and does not include a jurisdiction ``where the offender 
appears on a registry.'' 136 S Ct. at 1118. The Court said ``[w]e 
decline the . . . invitation to add an extra clause to the text of 
Sec.  [20]913(a).'' Id. In contrast, Sec.  72.7(d) in this rule does 
not require the addition of an extra clause to section 20913(a). It 
involves the exercise of the Attorney General's authorities under SORNA 
to include the information described in Sec.  72.7(d) in the 
information that a sex offender must provide to the jurisdictions 
described in the actual clauses of section 20913(a)--i.e., those in 
which he resides, is an employee, or is a student.
    Third, the Court rejected an argument that Nichols was required to 
inform Kansas of his intended departure based on 34 U.S.C. 
20914(a)(3)'s direction to sex offenders to provide information about 
where they ``will reside.'' The Court noted that ``Sec.  [20]914(a) 
merely lists the pieces of information that a sex offender must provide 
if and when he updates his registration; it says nothing about whether 
the offender has an obligation to update his registration in the first 
place.'' 136 S Ct. at 1118. In context, the Court's point was that 
section 20914(a)(3) just specifies a type of information sex offenders 
must provide, and does not say when they must provide it, so section 
20914(a)(3) does not in itself require sex offenders to provide change 
of residence information in advance when they leave a jurisdiction. For 
example, without more, section 20914(a)(3) might be taken to entail 
that sex offenders must advise where they ``will reside'' when 
initially registering before release from imprisonment, see 34 U.S.C. 
20913(b)(1), but not necessarily that they give advance notice to their 
registration jurisdictions of expected future residence on subsequent 
relocations.
    However, this understanding of section 20914(a)(3) does not imply 
any limitation on the Attorney General's authority to require a sex 
offender to ``update his registration in the first place,'' Nichols, 
136 S Ct. at 1118, on the basis of 34 U.S.C. 20914(c), which directs 
that ``[a] sex offender shall provide and update information required 
under subsection (a) . . . in conformity with any time and manner 
requirements prescribed by the Attorney General.'' Nor does it imply 
any limitation on the Attorney General's authority under SORNA to 
require sex offenders to report the full range of information described 
in Sec.  72.7(d). In Sec.  72.7(d), as discussed above, the Attorney 
General exercises these authorities to require sex offenders to inform 
jurisdictions of intended departure and expected future residence prior 
to any termination of residence in a jurisdiction.
    Finally, the Court in Nichols rejected an argument that Nichols had 
to notify Kansas of his departure on the theory that he engaged in two 
changes of residence--the first when he abandoned his residence in 
Kansas, and the second when he checked into a hotel in the Philippines. 
136 S Ct. at 1118-19. Section 72.7(d) in this rule, however, does not 
assume any such multiplicity in changes of residence. Rather, it 
establishes a freestanding requirement to inform registration 
jurisdictions in advance of termination of residence and commencement 
of intended future residence.
    At the end of the Nichols decision, the Court noted that--
considering the International Megan's Law amendments to SORNA--``[o]ur 
interpretation of the SORNA provisions at issue in this case in no way 
means that sex offenders will be able to escape punishment for leaving 
the United States without

[[Page 49348]]

notifying the jurisdictions in which they lived while in this 
country.'' 136 S. Ct. at 1119. The Court noted the addition of a new 
subsection (b) to 18 U.S.C. 2250, which ``criminalized the `knowin[g] 
fail[ure] to provide information required by [SORNA] relating to 
intended travel in foreign commerce,' '' and the addition of 34 U.S.C. 
20914(a)(7), which requires sex offenders to provide information about 
intended international travel. 136 S. Ct. at 1119 (brackets in 
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2250(b)(2)). The Court concluded: ``We are 
thus reassured that our holding today is not likely to create 
`loopholes and deficiencies' in SORNA's nationwide sex-offender 
registration scheme.'' Id. (quoting United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 
U.S. 387, 399 (2013)).
    Section 72.7(d) in this rule similarly helps to ensure that the 
interpretation of 34 U.S.C. 20913(c) in Nichols and Lunsford does not 
create ``loopholes and deficiencies'' in the operation of SORNA's 
tracking system, in relation to both domestic and international 
relocations. For example, consider a sex offender who terminates his 
residence in a state without informing the state. Suppose the sex 
offender is later found elsewhere in the United States, but he cannot 
be shown to have taken up residence--or to have been employed or a 
student--in another jurisdiction after leaving the original state of 
residence. In light of Nichols, section 20913(c) does not require the 
sex offender to report his relocation to the original state because it 
is no longer an ``involved'' jurisdiction after he leaves, and there 
may be no other relevant jurisdiction in which he must report the 
change, i.e., one in which he presently resides, is employed, or is a 
student. However, with Sec.  72.7(d) in effect, a sex offender in this 
circumstance will have violated 34 U.S.C. 20914(a) and (c)'s 
requirements to provide registration information, including ``[a]ny 
other information'' prescribed by the Attorney General, in the time and 
manner prescribed by the Attorney General. At a minimum, in the case 
described, the sex offender would have failed to provide the 
information that he is terminating his residence in the original state 
of residence prior to his termination of residence in that state, 
contravening Sec.  72.7(d).
    Hence, Sec.  72.7(d) provides an additional safeguard against 
registered sex offenders' simply disappearing without informing anyone 
about their relocation. The consequences for non-compliant sex 
offenders include potential prosecution by registration jurisdictions, 
which have been encouraged to adopt departure notification requirements 
similar to Sec.  72.7(d) in their registration laws by the Attorney 
General's prior articulation of those requirements in the SORNA 
Guidelines. See 73 FR at 38065-66. The consequences of noncompliance 
with Sec.  72.7(d) will also include potential Federal prosecution 
under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for violations committed under circumstances 
supporting Federal jurisdiction.
    Sex offenders must comply both with the requirements of Sec.  
72.7(c) and with the requirements of Sec.  72.7(d). For example, 
suppose a sex offender changes residence from state A to state B. It is 
not sufficient if (i) the sex offender complies with Sec.  72.7(d) by 
telling state A that he is leaving and going to state B, but (ii) he 
fails to appear in state B and register there as required by Sec.  
72.7(c), and then (iii) he attempts to excuse his failure to comply 
with Sec.  72.7(c) on the ground that state A could have told state B 
about his relocation. Likewise, it is not sufficient if the sex 
offender in such a case (i) complies with Sec.  72.7(c) by registering 
in state B, but (ii) he fails to inform state A about the intended 
relocation prior to his departure, and then (iii) he attempts to excuse 
his failure to comply with Sec.  72.7(d) on the ground that state B 
could have told state A about his relocation. As discussed above, 
appearance and registration by sex offenders in jurisdictions in which 
they commence residence, employment, or school attendance, as required 
by Sec.  72.7(c), and notification by sex offenders to jurisdictions in 
which they terminate residence, employment, or school attendance, as 
required by Sec.  72.7(d), both serve important purposes in SORNA's 
registration system as articulated in this rule and the previously 
issued SORNA guidelines. Compliance with both requirements is necessary 
to the seamless and effective operation of that system for the reasons 
explained above.

Paragraph (e)--Reporting of Changes in Information Relating to Remote 
Communication Identifiers, Temporary Lodging, and Vehicles

    Paragraph (e) requires sex offenders to report to their residence 
jurisdictions within three business days changes in remote 
communication identifier information, temporary lodging information, 
and vehicle information. In terms of legal authority, as discussed 
earlier, these requirements are supportable on the basis of the 
Attorney General's authority to interpret and implement SORNA's 
requirement to keep the registration current, the Attorney General's 
authority to expand the information that sex offenders must provide to 
registration jurisdictions, and the Attorney General's authority to 
prescribe the time and manner for providing and updating registration 
information. See 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(a), 20914(a)(8), (c), 
20916(b); 73 FR at 38066; 76 FR at 1637. (The SORNA Guidelines state 
that such changes are to be reported ``immediately'' and explain at an 
earlier point that ``immediately'' in the context of SORNA's timing 
requirements means within three business days, see 73 FR at 38060, 
38066.) SORNA does not require that these changes be reported through 
in-person appearances and they may be reported by any means allowed by 
registration jurisdictions in their discretion. See id. at 38067.

Paragraph (f)--Reporting of International Travel

    Paragraph (f) of Sec.  72.7 requires sex offenders to report 
intended travel outside of the United States to their residence 
jurisdictions. The expected travel must be reported at least 21 days in 
advance and, if applicable, prior to any termination of residence in 
the jurisdiction. Reporting of information about intended international 
travel is an express SORNA requirement following SORNA's amendment by 
International Megan's Law. See 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(7); Public Law 114-
119, sec. 6(a). The underlying reasons for requiring reporting of 
international travel are explained above in connection with Sec.  
72.6(d) of this rule.
    The 21-day advance notice requirement is designed to provide 
relevant agencies, including the U.S. Marshals Service and INTERPOL 
Washington-U.S. National Central Bureau, sufficient lead time for any 
investigation or inquiry that may be warranted relating to the sex 
offender's international travel, and for notification of U.S. and 
foreign authorities in destination countries, prior to the sex 
offender's arrival in a destination country. The requirement that the 
intended international travel be reported prior to any termination of 
residence in the jurisdiction--potentially an issue in cases in which 
the sex offender is terminating his U.S. residence and relocating to a 
foreign country--ensures that a SORNA violation has occurred in case of 
noncompliance while the sex offender is still residing in the 
jurisdiction and hence required by 34 U.S.C. 20913(a) to register and 
keep the registration current in that jurisdiction. The requirement to 
report intended international travel at least 21 days in advance 
applies in relation to all international travel, including both cases 
in which the sex

[[Page 49349]]

offender is temporarily traveling abroad while maintaining a domestic 
residence and cases in which the sex offender is terminating his 
residence in the particular jurisdiction or the United States.
    The rule recognizes, however, that reporting of intended 
international travel 21 days in advance is not possible in some 
circumstances. Section 72.8(a)(2) of the rule generally addresses 
situations in which sex offenders cannot comply with SORNA requirements 
because of circumstances beyond their control, and it specifically 
addresses inability to comply with the timeframe for reporting of 
international travel in Example 3 in that provision.
    In terms of legal authority, the requirement to report intended 
international travel to the residence jurisdiction at least 21 days in 
advance and prior to any termination of residence is supportable as an 
exercise of the express authority of the Attorney General under 34 
U.S.C. 20914(c), which states in part that ``[a] sex offender shall 
provide and update . . . information relating to intended travel 
outside the United States . . . in conformity with any time and manner 
requirements prescribed by the Attorney General.'' As discussed above, 
the international travel reporting requirement, including its 
associated timeframe requirement, is also supportable on the basis of 
other SORNA authorities of the Attorney General, which were relied on 
in SORNA guidelines preceding the addition of 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(7), 
(c) by International Megan's Law. These authorities include the 
Attorney General's authority under 34 U.S.C. 20914(a)(8) to expand the 
range of required registration information and the Attorney General's 
authority under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b) to issue rules to interpret and 
implement SORNA's requirement to keep the registration current.

Paragraph (g)--Compliance With Jurisdictions' Requirements for 
Registering and Keeping the Registration Current

    Paragraph (g) of Sec.  72.7 requires sex offenders to register and 
keep the registration current in conformity with the time and manner 
requirements of their registration jurisdictions, where they have not 
done so in the time and manner normally required under SORNA.
    SORNA generally requires sex offenders to register initially before 
release from imprisonment or within three business days of sentencing, 
but it recognizes that sex offenders may be unable to comply with these 
requirements in some circumstances. The difficulty can arise in cases 
in which a jurisdiction has no provision for registering certain sex 
offenders as required by SORNA at the time of their release--or even no 
registration program at all at that time--but the jurisdiction can 
register them later as it progresses in its implementation of SORNA's 
requirements. The SORNA Guidelines provide guidance to registration 
jurisdictions about integrating previously excluded sex offenders into 
their registration programs in such circumstances and ensuring that 
these sex offenders fully comply with SORNA's requirements. See 73 FR 
at 38063-64; see also Smith, 538 U.S. 84 (application of new sex 
offender registration requirements to previously convicted sex 
offenders does not violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post 
facto laws).
    Because the normal timeframe for initial registration under SORNA 
may be past in these situations, SORNA authorizes the Attorney General 
to prescribe rules for registration. Specifically, 34 U.S.C. 20913(d) 
gives the Attorney General the authority to specify the applicability 
of SORNA's requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA or pre-SORNA-
implementation convictions, ``and to prescribe rules for the 
registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex 
offenders who are unable to comply with'' SORNA's initial registration 
requirements. More broadly, as discussed above, the Attorney General's 
general authority under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b) to interpret and implement 
SORNA includes the authority to fill gaps in SORNA's time and manner 
requirements for registering and keeping the registration current, and 
34 U.S.C. 20914(c) expressly requires sex offenders to provide and 
update registration information required by SORNA in the time and 
manner prescribed by the Attorney General.
    In section 72.7(g) in this rule, the Attorney General proposes to 
exercise his authorities under 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(d), and 
20914(c) to require sex offenders to register and keep their 
registrations current in the time and manner specified by their 
registration jurisdictions, where the sex offenders have not registered 
or kept the registrations up to date in the time and manner normally 
required by SORNA as articulated in the earlier portions of Sec.  72.7. 
This proposal complements the directions to registration jurisdictions 
in the SORNA Guidelines about integrating previously excluded sex 
offenders and previously omitted SORNA requirements into their 
registration programs, with suitable timeframes and procedures, as the 
jurisdictions progress with SORNA implementation. See 73 FR at 38063-
64. Of course sex offenders are independently required by the laws of 
their registration jurisdictions to comply with the jurisdictions' time 
and manner specifications for registering and updating their 
registrations. The effect of Sec.  72.7(g) is to adopt the 
jurisdictions' time and manner specifications as SORNA requirements in 
the situations it covers.
    Section 72.7(g)(1) includes four examples. The first example 
concerns a situation in which a state does not register sex offenders 
before release, but a sex offender can register soon after release in 
conformity with the state's procedures. The second example concerns a 
situation in which a jurisdiction does not register certain sex 
offenders at all at the time of their release or entry into the 
jurisdiction, but a sex offender in the excluded class becomes able to 
register at a later time and is directed by the jurisdiction to do so 
after it extends its registration requirements.
    As the Supreme Court noted in Reynolds, SORNA, in section 20913(b), 
``says that a sex offender must register before completing his prison 
term, but the provision says nothing about when a pre-Act offender who 
completed his prison term pre-Act must register. . . . Pre-Act 
offenders . . . might, on their own, reach different conclusions about 
whether, or how, the new registration requirements applied to them. A 
ruling from the Attorney General [under section 20913(d)], however, 
could diminish or eliminate those uncertainties . . . .'' 565 U.S. at 
441-42. In Sec.  72.7(g), the Attorney General exercises his 
authorities under sections 20912(b), 20913(d), and 20914(c) to 
``eliminate those uncertainties'' in conformity with Congress's intent 
concerning the filling of ``potential lacunae'' in SORNA, 565 U.S. at 
441-42. Section 72.7(g) fills the gaps in such cases by adopting the 
timing rules and procedures of the relevant registration jurisdictions. 
This applies in relation to sex offenders who do not register initially 
in conformity with SORNA because they were convicted and released 
before SORNA's enactment, as described by the Court in Reynolds, and in 
relation to all other sex offenders who do not register in accordance 
with the normal time and manner requirements under SORNA, e.g., because 
of shortfalls in a jurisdictions' registration requirements that may 
later be corrected or that allow registration in some variant way.

[[Page 49350]]

    The third example in Sec.  72.7(g)(1) concerns a sex offender in a 
jurisdiction that initially does not provide for sex offenders' 
periodically updating registrations through verification appearances as 
required by SORNA, but the jurisdiction later directs the sex offender 
to do so after it incorporates this aspect of SORNA into its 
registration program. Since the periodic verification appearances 
required by 34 U.S.C. 20918 fall under SORNA's requirement to keep the 
registration current and involve updating the registration information 
required by SORNA, it is within the Attorney General's authority under 
34 U.S.C. 20912(b) and 20914(c) to specify the time and manner for the 
verifications where SORNA's verification requirement or normal 
timeframes for verifications have not been followed. Section 72.7(g)(1) 
directs sex offenders to comply with the jurisdiction's requirements 
for periodic verification in such situations.
    The fourth example in Sec.  72.7(g)(1) concerns a sex offender who 
does not provide particular information within the time required by 
SORNA because a jurisdiction's informational requirements fall short of 
SORNA's requirements but are later brought into line. The example 
illustrates the point by reference to email addresses. As provided in 
Sec.  72.6(b), sex offenders must include this information when they 
register and, as provided in Sec.  72.7(e), they must report any 
subsequent changes within three business days. Where the normal 
reporting time is past when a jurisdiction decides to include a type of 
information in its sex offender registry, Sec.  72.7(g)(1) requires sex 
offenders to comply with the jurisdiction's directions to provide the 
information at a later time.
    Section 72.7(g)(2) provides that, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 
2250, Sec.  72.7(g)(1) does not relieve a sex offender of the need to 
show an inability to comply with SORNA as an affirmative defense to 
liability. The situations described in Sec.  72.7(g)(1), which may 
involve noncompliance with SORNA's requirements because of deficits in 
registration jurisdictions' requirements or procedures, overlap with 
situations in which a sex offender may have a defense under 18 U.S.C. 
2250(c) because he was prevented from complying with SORNA by 
circumstances beyond his control. However, the purpose and effect of 
Sec.  72.7(g)(1) are to hold sex offenders to compliance with the 
registration rules and procedures of registration jurisdictions in the 
situations it covers. Section 72.7(g) does not, in any case, relieve 
sex offenders of the obligation to comply fully with SORNA if able to 
do so or shift the burden of proof to the government to establish that 
a registration jurisdiction's procedures would have allowed a sex 
offender to register or keep the registration current in conformity 
with SORNA. Rather, the defense under 18 U.S.C. 2250(c) is an 
affirmative defense, as that provision explicitly provides, and as 
Sec. Sec.  72.7(g)(2) and 72.8(a)(2) in this rule reiterate.

Section 72.8--Liability for Violations

    Section 72.8 of the rule explains the liability of sex offenders 
for SORNA violations and limitations on that potential liability.

Paragraph (a)(1)--Offense

    SORNA's criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. 2250, provides criminal 
liability for sex offenders based on SORNA violations.
    Section 72.8(a)(1)(i) in the rule refers to potential criminal 
liability under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Section 2250(a) authorizes 
imprisonment for up to 10 years based on a knowing failure to register 
or update a registration as required by SORNA. Federal criminal 
liability may result under this provision when the violation occurs 
under circumstances supporting Federal jurisdiction as specified in the 
statute. These jurisdictional circumstances include (i) violation of 
SORNA by sex offenders convicted of sex offenses under Federal 
(including military) law, the law of the District of Columbia, Indian 
tribal law, or the law of a U.S. territory or possession; or (ii) 
travel in interstate or foreign commerce or entering, leaving, or 
residing in Indian country. Section 2250(a) reaches all types of SORNA 
violations, including failure to register or keep the registration 
current in each jurisdiction of residence, employment, or school 
attendance, as required by 34 U.S.C. 20913; failure to provide or 
update registration information required by 34 U.S.C. 20914; or failure 
to appear periodically and verify the registration information, as 
required by 34 U.S.C. 20918.
    Section 72.8(a)(1)(ii) in the rule refers to potential criminal 
liability under 18 U.S.C. 2250(b), which was added by International 
Megan's Law. See Public Law 114-119, sec. 6(b). Section 2250(b) defines 
an offense that specifically reaches violations of SORNA's 
international travel reporting requirement. The provision authorizes 
imprisonment for up to 10 years for a sex offender who (i) knowingly 
fails to provide information required by SORNA relating to intended 
travel in foreign commerce and (ii) ``engages or attempts to engage in 
the intended travel in foreign commerce.'' The jurisdictional language 
in section 2250(b) reaches cases in which the contemplated travel is 
not carried out, in addition to those in which the sex offender does 
travel abroad. For example, consider a sex offender who (i) purchases a 
plane ticket to a foreign destination but (ii) fails to report the 
intended international travel as required by SORNA and (iii) does not 
actually leave the country because the unreported travel is detected by 
the authorities who arrest him at the airport. The attempted travel in 
foreign commerce provides a sufficient jurisdictional basis for Federal 
prosecution under section 2250(b).
    Section 72.8(a)(1)(iii) in the rule explains the condition for 
liability under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)-(b) that the defendant ``knowingly'' 
fail to comply with a SORNA requirement. The ``knowingly'' limitation 
ensures that sex offenders are not held liable under section 2250 for 
violations of registration requirements they did not know about. 
However, this does not require knowledge that the requirement is 
imposed by SORNA. State sex offenders, for example, are likely to be 
instructed in the registration process regarding many of the 
registration requirements appearing in SORNA, which are widely 
paralleled in state registration laws, such as the need to report 
changes in residence, employment, internet identifiers, and vehicle 
information; the need to report intended international travel; and the 
need to appear periodically to update and verify registration 
information. The acknowledgment forms obtained from sex offenders in 
registration often provide a means of establishing their knowledge of 
the registration requirements in later prosecutions for violations. See 
76 FR at 1634-35, 1638. But sex offenders may not be informed that the 
registration requirements they are subject to are imposed by a 
particular Federal law, SORNA. This does not impugn the fairness or 
propriety of holding sex offenders liable under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for 
knowingly violating a registration requirement that is in fact imposed 
by SORNA, so long as they are aware of an obligation from some source 
to comply with the requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 683 
F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 
261-62 (5th Cir. 2009). Section 72.8(a)(1)(iii) makes these

[[Page 49351]]

points about 18 U.S.C. 2250's knowledge requirement in the rule.

Paragraph (a)(2)--Defense

    Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. 2250 provides an affirmative defense to 
liability under certain conditions where uncontrollable circumstances 
prevented a sex offender from complying with SORNA, so long as the sex 
offender complied as soon as the preventing circumstances ceased. 
Section 72.8(a)(2) in the rule reproduces this affirmative defense 
provision and provides examples of its operation.
    Registration is a reciprocal process, involving the provision of 
registration information by sex offenders, and the registration 
jurisdiction's acceptance of the information for inclusion in the sex 
offender registry. The circumstances preventing compliance with SORNA 
under section 2250(c) accordingly may be a registration jurisdiction's 
failure or refusal to carry out the reciprocal role needed to effect 
registration, or the updating of a registration, as required by SORNA.
    Example 1 in Sec.  72.8(a)(2) illustrates this type of situation, 
describing a case in which a sex offender cannot appear and report an 
inter-jurisdictional change of residence within three business days 
because the office with which he needs to register will not meet with 
him for a week. The case implicates both 34 U.S.C. 20913(a)'s 
requirement that a sex offender register in each jurisdiction in which 
he resides and 34 U.S.C. 20913(c)'s requirement that sex offenders 
report changes of residence within three business days. These 
provisions' net effect is that a sex offender establishing residence in 
a new jurisdiction must register there but with a three-business-days 
grace period. In the case described, 18 U.S.C. 2250(c) would excuse the 
failure to report within the three-business-day timeframe. However, the 
inability to meet section 20913(c)'s specific timeframe does not 
obviate the need to comply with section 20913(a)'s requirement to 
register in each state of residence. Nothing prevents the sex offender 
from complying with this registration requirement once the office is 
willing to meet with him, so he will need to appear and carry out the 
registration at the appointed time in order to have the benefit of the 
18 U.S.C. 2250(c) defense.
    Example 2 in Sec.  72.8(a)(2) also illustrates a situation in which 
the circumstance preventing compliance with SORNA is a failure by the 
registration jurisdiction to carry out a necessary reciprocal role. The 
specific situation described in the example is a state's refusal to 
register sex offenders based on the offense for which the sex offender 
was convicted. For example, SORNA requires registration based on 
conviction for child pornography possession offenses, see 34 U.S.C. 
20911(7)(G), but some states that have not fully implemented SORNA's 
requirements in their registration programs may be unwilling to 
register a sex offender on the basis of such an offense. Section 
2250(c)'s excuse of the failure to register terminates if the state 
subsequently becomes willing to register the sex offender, because the 
circumstance preventing compliance with SORNA no longer exists. 
However, liability based on a continuing failure by the sex offender to 
comply with SORNA in such a case--following a change in state policy or 
practice allowing compliance--depends on the sex offender's becoming 
aware of the change since, as discussed above, 18 U.S.C. 2250 does not 
impose liability for violation of unknown registration obligations. Cf. 
73 FR at 38063-64 (direction to registration jurisdictions to instruct 
sex offenders about new or additional registration duties in connection 
with SORNA implementation).
    Example 3 in Sec.  72.8(a)(2) describes a situation in which the 
circumstance preventing compliance with SORNA relates to the situation 
of the sex offender rather than the registration jurisdiction. The 
second sentence of Sec.  72.7(f) in the rule requires in part that a 
sex offender report intended international travel 21 days in advance, 
which he cannot do if he does not anticipate a trip abroad that far in 
advance. In such a case, as described in the example, 18 U.S.C. 2250(c) 
would excuse a sex offender's failure to report the travel 21 days in 
advance. Cf. 76 FR at 1638 (``[R]equiring 21 days advance notice may 
occasionally be unnecessary or inappropriate. For example, a sex 
offender may need to travel abroad unexpectedly because of a family or 
work emergency.''). However, inability to comply with the 21-day 
timeframe in a particular case does not prevent a sex offender from 
otherwise complying with SORNA's requirements to inform the residence 
jurisdiction about intended international travel, appearing in 34 
U.S.C. 20914(a)(7) and in Sec. Sec.  72.6(d) and 72.7(f) in this rule. 
Hence, once the intention to travel exists, the sex offender must 
inform the registration jurisdiction to avoid liability under 18 U.S.C. 
2250.

Paragraph (b)--Supervision Condition

    Section 72.8(b) recounts that, for sex offenders convicted of 
Federal offenses, compliance with SORNA is a mandatory condition of 
probation and supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. 3563(a)(8), 3583(d) 
(third sentence). Violation of this condition may result in revocation 
of release. See 18 U.S.C. 3565(a)(2), 3583(e)(3). Section 72.8(b) also 
notes that compliance with SORNA is a mandatory condition of parole for 
sex offenders convicted of Federal offenses, see 18 U.S.C. 4209(a) 
(second sentence), a requirement of narrow application given the 
abolition of parole in Federal cases, except for offenses committed 
before November 1, 1987.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Attorney General, in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this regulation and by approving it 
certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities for the purposes of 
that Act because the regulation only articulates SORNA's registration 
requirements for sex offenders.

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563--Regulatory Planning and Review

    This regulation has been drafted and reviewed in accordance with 
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' section 
1(b), Principles of Regulation, and Executive Order 13563, ``Improving 
Regulation and Regulatory Review.'' The regulation expands part 72 of 
title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations to provide a concise and 
comprehensive statement of what sex offenders must do to comply with 
SORNA's requirements, following express requirements appearing in SORNA 
and previous exercises of authority SORNA grants to the Attorney 
General to interpret and implement SORNA. The justification of these 
requirements as means of furthering SORNA's objectives is explained in 
the preamble to this regulation and in previous SORNA-related 
documents, including the rulemaking entitled ``Applicability of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act,'' 75 FR 81849 (final rule), 
72 FR 8894 (interim rule); the SORNA Guidelines, 73 FR 38030; and the 
SORNA Supplemental Guidelines, 76 FR 1630. The Department of Justice 
has determined that this rule is a ``significant regulatory action'' 
under Executive Order 12866, section 3(f), and accordingly this rule 
has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
    The Department of Justice expects that the proposed rule will not 
entail new costs and will result in a number

[[Page 49352]]

of benefits. For registration jurisdictions, there are no new costs 
because their requirements under SORNA continue to be those articulated 
in the previously issued SORNA guidelines. Likewise, for sex offenders, 
the requirements articulated in the rule either appear expressly in 
SORNA or have previously been articulated by the Attorney General in 
the SORNA guidelines. The procedures by which sex offenders register 
will continue to depend on the registration processes of the 
jurisdictions that register them, which will not be made more time-
consuming or expensive or otherwise changed by this rule.
    In terms of benefits, the rule will provide in one place a clear, 
concise, and comprehensive statement of sex offenders' registration 
requirements under SORNA. This will reduce any expenditure by sex 
offenders of time or money required for inquiry with state or Federal 
authorities or others to resolve uncertainties, or required in 
attempting to comply with perceived registration requirements under 
SORNA that go beyond the requirements the Attorney General has actually 
specified. The clarity provided by this rule will make it easier for 
sex offenders to determine what SORNA requires them to do and thereby 
facilitate compliance with SORNA.
    There are also expected benefits for the government. As the 
preamble explains, the rule's comprehensive articulation of SORNA's 
registration requirements in regulations addressed to sex offenders 
will provide a secure basis for Federal prosecution of knowing 
violations of any of SORNA's requirements. It will resolve specific 
problems that have arisen in past litigation or can be expected to 
arise in future litigation if not clarified and resolved by this rule, 
thereby avoiding the expenditure of litigation resources on these 
matters.
    As explained in the existing SORNA guidelines, SORNA aims to 
prevent the commission of sex offenses, and to bring the perpetrators 
of such offenses to justice more speedily and reliably, by enabling the 
authorities to better identify, track, and monitor released sex 
offenders and by informing the public regarding the presence of 
released sex offenders in the community. See 73 FR at 38044-45. Hence, 
by facilitating the enforcement of, and compliance with, SORNA's 
registration requirements, and enhancing the basis for public 
notification, the rule is expected to further SORNA's public safety 
objectives and reduce the time and resources required in achieving 
these objectives.
    While the proposed rule is expected to result in cost reductions, 
as discussed above, additional information would be helpful in 
determining the extent of these savings. We accordingly seek comment on 
the extent to which this rule will result in reductions in time, 
expense, or other costs.

Executive Order 13132--Federalism

    This regulation will not have substantial direct effects on the 
states, on the relationship between the national Government and the 
states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. There has been substantial consultation 
with state officials regarding the interpretation and implementation of 
SORNA. The previously issued SORNA Guidelines and SORNA Supplemental 
Guidelines articulate the requirements for implementation of the SORNA 
standards by states and other jurisdictions in their sex offender 
registration and notification programs, requirements that are not 
changed by this regulation's provision of a separate statement of the 
registration obligations of sex offenders under SORNA. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule 
does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the 
preparation of a federalism assessment.

Executive Order 12988--Civil Justice Reform

    This regulation meets the applicable standards set forth in section 
3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This rule will not result in the expenditure by state, local and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year, and it will not significantly or 
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed 
necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995. This rule adds provisions to part 72 of title 28 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations that articulate SORNA's registration requirements 
for sex offenders, including where, when, and how long sex offenders 
must register, what information they must provide, and how they must 
keep their registrations current. The Attorney General has previously 
addressed these matters and has resolved them in the same way in the 
SORNA Guidelines, appearing at 73 FR 38030, and in the SORNA 
Supplemental Guidelines, appearing at 76 FR 1630. Those previously 
issued sets of guidelines determine what state, local, and tribal 
jurisdictions must do to achieve substantial implementation of the 
SORNA standards in their registration programs. Reiteration of some of 
these requirements in a concise set of directions to sex offenders in 
this rule will not change what jurisdictions need to do to implement 
SORNA or affect their costs in doing so.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

    This rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by section 251 of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. 5 U.S.C. 
804(2). This rule will not result in an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices; or 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, 
productivity, or innovation, or on the ability of U.S.-based 
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and 
export markets.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 72

    Crime, Information, Law enforcement, Prisoners, Prisons, Probation 
and parole, Records.

0
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the preamble, chapter I of title 
28 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended by 
revising part 72 to read as follows:

PART 72--SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION

Sec.
72.1 Purpose.
72.2 Definitions.
72.3 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act.
72.4 Where sex offenders must register.
72.5 How long sex offenders must register.
72.6 Information sex offenders must provide.
72.7 How sex offenders must register and keep the registration 
current.
72.8 Liability for violations.

    Authority:  34 U.S.C. 20901-45; Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587; 
Pub. L. 114-119, 130 Stat. 15.


Sec.  72.1   Purpose.

    (a) This part specifies the registration requirements of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901 et 
seq., and the scope of those requirements' application. The Attorney 
General has the authority to specify the requirements of SORNA and 
their applicability as provided in this part pursuant to provisions of 
SORNA, including 34 U.S.C. 20912(b), 20913(d), and 20914(a)(8), (c).

[[Page 49353]]

    (b) This part does not preempt or limit any obligations of or 
requirements relating to sex offenders under other Federal laws, rules, 
or policies, or under the laws, rules, or policies of registration 
jurisdictions or other entities. States and other governmental entities 
may prescribe registration requirements and other requirements, with 
which sex offenders must comply, that are more extensive or stringent 
than those prescribed by SORNA.


Sec.  72.2   Definitions.

    All terms used in this part have the same meaning as in SORNA.


Sec.  72.3   Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act.

    The requirements of SORNA apply to all sex offenders. All sex 
offenders must comply with all requirements of that Act, regardless of 
when the conviction of the offense for which registration is required 
occurred (including if the conviction occurred before the enactment of 
that Act), regardless of whether a jurisdiction in which registration 
is required has substantially implemented that Act's requirements or 
has implemented any particular requirement of that Act, and regardless 
of whether any particular requirement or class of sex offenders is 
mentioned in examples in this regulation or in other regulations or 
guidelines issued by the Attorney General.
    Example 1. A sex offender is federally convicted of aggravated 
sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. 2241 in 1990 and is released following 
imprisonment in 2009. The sex offender is subject to the requirements 
of SORNA and could be held criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for 
failing to register or keep the registration current in any 
jurisdiction in which the sex offender resides, is an employee, or is a 
student.
    Example 2. A sex offender is convicted by a state jurisdiction in 
1997 for molesting a child and is released following imprisonment in 
2000. The sex offender initially registers as required but relocates to 
another state in 2009 and fails to register in the new state of 
residence. The sex offender has violated the requirement under SORNA to 
register in any jurisdiction in which he resides, and could be held 
criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for the violation because he 
traveled in interstate commerce.


Sec.  72.4   Where sex offenders must register.

    A sex offender must register, and keep the registration current, in 
each jurisdiction in which the offender resides, is an employee, or is 
a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender must 
also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if that 
jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence.


Sec.  72.5   How long sex offenders must register.

    (a) Duration. A sex offender has a continuing obligation to 
register and keep the registration current (except when the sex 
offender is in custody or civilly committed) for the following periods 
of time:
    (1) 15 years, if the offender is a tier I sex offender;
    (2) 25 years, if the offender is a tier II sex offender; and
    (3) The life of the offender, if the offender is a tier III sex 
offender.
    (b) Commencement. The registration period begins to run--
    (1) When a sex offender is released from imprisonment following 
conviction for the offense giving rise to the registration requirement, 
including in cases in which the term of imprisonment is based wholly or 
in part on the sex offender's conviction for another offense; or
    (2) If the sex offender is not sentenced to imprisonment, when the 
sex offender is sentenced for the offense giving rise to the 
registration requirement.
    (c) Reduction. If a tier I sex offender has maintained for 10 years 
a clean record, as described in 34 U.S.C. 20915(b)(1), the period for 
which the sex offender must register and keep the registration current 
under paragraph (a) of this section is reduced by 5 years. If a tier 
III sex offender required to register on the basis of a juvenile 
delinquency adjudication has maintained a clean record, as described in 
34 U.S.C. 20915(b)(1), for 25 years, the period for which the sex 
offender must register and keep the registration current under 
paragraph (a) of this section is reduced to the period for which the 
clean record has been maintained.


Sec.  72.6   Information sex offenders must provide.

    Sex offenders must provide the following information for inclusion 
in the sex offender registries of the jurisdictions in which they are 
required to register:
    (a) Name, date of birth, and Social Security number.
    (1) The name of the sex offender, including any alias used by the 
sex offender.
    (2) The sex offender's date of birth and any date that the sex 
offender uses as his purported date of birth.
    (3) The Social Security number of the sex offender and any number 
that the sex offender uses as his purported Social Security number.
    (b) Remote communication identifiers. All designations the sex 
offender uses for purposes of routing or self-identification in 
internet or telephonic communications or postings, including email 
addresses and telephone numbers.
    (c) Residence, temporary lodging, employment, and school 
attendance. (1) The address of each residence at which the sex offender 
resides or will reside or, if the sex offender has no present or 
expected residence address, other information describing where the sex 
offender resides or will reside with whatever definiteness is possible 
under the circumstances.
    (2) Information about any place in which the sex offender is 
staying when away from his residence for seven or more days, including 
the identity of the place and the period of time the sex offender is 
staying there.
    (3) The name and address of any place where the sex offender is or 
will be an employee or, if the sex offender is or will be employed but 
with no fixed place of employment, other information describing where 
the sex offender works or will work with whatever definiteness is 
possible under the circumstances.
    (4) The name and address of any place where the sex offender is a 
student or will be a student.
    (d) International travel. Information relating to intended travel 
outside the United States, including any anticipated itinerary, dates 
and places of departure from, arrival in, or return to the United 
States and each country visited, carrier and flight numbers for air 
travel, destination country or countries and address or other contact 
information therein, and means and purpose of travel.
    (e) Passports and immigration documents. Information about each 
passport the sex offender has and, if the sex offender is an alien, 
information about any document or documents establishing the sex 
offender's immigration status, including passport or immigration 
document type and number.
    (f) Vehicle information. The license plate number and a description 
of any vehicle owned or operated by the sex offender, including 
watercraft and aircraft in addition to land vehicles. If a vehicle has 
no license plate but has some other type of registration number or 
identifier, then the registration number or identifier must be 
provided. Information must also be provided as to where any vehicle 
owned or operated by the sex offender is habitually parked, docked, or 
otherwise kept.
    (g) Professional licenses. Information concerning all licensing of 
the sex offender that authorizes the sex offender

[[Page 49354]]

to engage in an occupation or carry out a trade or business.


Sec.  72.7   How sex offenders must register and keep the registration 
current.

    (a) Initial registration--(1) In general. Except as provided in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, a sex offender must register before 
release from imprisonment following conviction for the offense giving 
rise to the registration requirement, or, if the sex offender is not 
sentenced to imprisonment, within three business days after being 
sentenced for that offense.
    (2) Special rules for certain cases. The following special 
requirements apply:
    (i) Federal and military offenders. A sex offender who is released 
from Federal or military custody, or who is convicted for a Federal or 
military sex offense but not sentenced to imprisonment, must register 
within three business days of entering or remaining in a jurisdiction 
to reside following the release or sentencing.
    (ii) Foreign convictions. A sex offender required to register on 
the basis of a conviction in a foreign country must register within 
three business days of entering any jurisdiction in the United States 
to reside, work, or attend school.
    (b) Periodic in-person verification. A sex offender must appear in 
person, allow the jurisdiction to take a current photograph, and verify 
the information in each registry in which the offender is required to 
register. In carrying out the required verification of information in 
each registry, the sex offender must correct any information that has 
changed or is otherwise inaccurate and must report any new registration 
information. A sex offender must appear in person for these purposes 
not less frequently than--
    (1) Each year, if the offender is a tier I sex offender;
    (2) Every six months, if the offender is a tier II sex offender; 
and
    (3) Every three months, if the offender is a tier III sex offender.
    (c) Reporting of initiation and changes concerning name, residence, 
employment, and school attendance. A sex offender who enters a 
jurisdiction to reside, or who resides in a jurisdiction and changes 
his name or his place of residence in the jurisdiction, must appear in 
person in that jurisdiction and register or update the registration 
within three business days. A sex offender who commences employment or 
school attendance in a jurisdiction, or who changes employer, school 
attended, or place of employment or school attendance in a 
jurisdiction, must appear in person in that jurisdiction and register 
or update the registration within three business days.
    (d) Reporting of departure and termination concerning residence, 
employment, and school attendance. (1) A sex offender residing in a 
jurisdiction must inform that jurisdiction (by whatever means the 
jurisdiction allows) if the sex offender will be commencing residence, 
employment, or school attendance in another jurisdiction or outside of 
the United States. The sex offender must so inform the jurisdiction in 
which he is residing prior to any termination of residence in that 
jurisdiction and prior to commencing residence, employment, or school 
attendance in the other jurisdiction or outside of the United States.
    (2) A sex offender who will be terminating residence, employment, 
or school attendance in a jurisdiction must so inform that jurisdiction 
(by whatever means the jurisdiction allows) prior to the termination of 
residence, employment, or school attendance in the jurisdiction.
    (e) Reporting of changes in information relating to remote 
communication identifiers, temporary lodging, and vehicles. A sex 
offender must report within three business days to his residence 
jurisdiction (by whatever means the jurisdiction allows) any change in 
remote communication identifier information, as described in Sec.  
72.6(b), temporary lodging information, as described in Sec.  
72.6(c)(2), and any change in vehicle information, as described in 
Sec.  72.6(f).
    (f) Reporting of international travel. A sex offender must report 
intended travel outside the United States, including the information 
described in Sec.  72.6(d), to his residence jurisdiction (by whatever 
means the jurisdiction allows). The sex offender must report the travel 
information to the jurisdiction at least 21 days in advance of the 
intended travel and, if the sex offender is terminating his residence 
in the jurisdiction, prior to his termination of residence in the 
jurisdiction.
    (g) Compliance with jurisdictions' requirements for registering and 
keeping the registration current. (1) A sex offender who does not 
comply with a requirement of SORNA in conformity with the time and 
manner specifications of paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section 
must comply with the requirement in conformity with any applicable time 
and manner specifications of a jurisdiction in which the offender is 
required to register.
    Example 1. A sex offender convicted in a state does not initially 
register before release from imprisonment, as required by 34 U.S.C. 
20913(b)(1) and paragraph (a)(1) of this section, because the state has 
no procedure for pre-release registration of sex offenders. Instead, 
the state informs sex offenders that they must go to a local police 
station within seven days of release to register. The sex offender must 
comply with the state's requirements for initial registration, i.e., 
the offender must report to the police station to register within seven 
days of release.
    Example 2. A sex offender does not register when he is released 
from custody, or does not register upon entering a jurisdiction to 
reside as required by 34 U.S.C. 20913(c) and paragraph (c) of this 
section, because the jurisdiction, at the time, does not register sex 
offenders based on the offense for which he was convicted. The 
jurisdiction later sends the sex offender a notice advising that it has 
extended its registration requirements to include sex offenders like 
him and directing him to report to a specified agency within 90 days to 
register. The sex offender must report to the agency to register within 
the specified timeframe.
    Example 3. A sex offender registers as required when released from 
imprisonment or upon entering a jurisdiction to reside, but the 
jurisdiction has no procedure for sex offenders to appear periodically 
in person to update and verify the registration information as required 
by 34 U.S.C. 20918 and paragraph (b) of this section. The jurisdiction 
later sends the sex offender a notice advising that it has adopted a 
periodic verification requirement and directing the sex offender to 
appear at a designated time and place for an initial update meeting. 
The sex offender must appear and update the registration as directed.
    Example 4. A sex offender does not report his email address to the 
jurisdiction in which he resides when he initially registers, or within 
three business days of a change as required by paragraph (e) of this 
section, because email addresses are not among the information the 
jurisdiction accepts for inclusion in its registry. The jurisdiction 
later notifies the sex offender that it has extended the registration 
information it collects to include email addresses and directs him to 
send a reply within a specified time that provides his current email 
address. The sex offender must comply with this direction.
    (2) In a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 2250, paragraph (g)(1) of this 
section does not in any case relieve a sex offender of the need to 
establish as an affirmative defense an inability to comply with SORNA 
because of circumstances beyond his control as

[[Page 49355]]

provided in 18 U.S.C. 2250(c) and Sec.  72.8(a)(2).


Sec.  72.8   Liability for violations.

    (a) Criminal liability--(1) Offense. (i) A sex offender who 
knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by 
SORNA may be liable to criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a).
    (ii) A sex offender who knowingly fails to provide information 
required by SORNA relating to intended travel outside the United States 
may be liable to criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. 2250(b).
    (iii) As a condition of liability under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)-(b) for 
failing to comply with a requirement of SORNA, a sex offender must have 
been aware of the requirement he is charged with violating, but need 
not have been aware that the requirement is imposed by SORNA.
    (2) Defense. A sex offender may have an affirmative defense to 
liability, as provided in 18 U.S.C. 2250(c), if uncontrollable 
circumstances prevented the sex offender from complying with SORNA, 
where the sex offender did not contribute to the creation of those 
circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to comply and 
complied as soon as the circumstances preventing compliance ceased to 
exist.
    Example 1. A sex offender changes residence from one jurisdiction 
to another, bringing into play SORNA's requirement to register in each 
jurisdiction where the sex offender resides and SORNA's requirement to 
appear in person and report changes of residence within three business 
days. See 34 U.S.C. 20913(a), (c). The sex offender attempts to comply 
with these requirements by contacting the local sheriff's office, which 
is responsible for sex offender registration in the destination 
jurisdiction. The sheriff's office advises that it cannot schedule an 
appointment for him to register within three business days but that he 
should come by in a week. The sex offender would have a defense to 
liability if he appeared at the sheriff's office at the appointed time 
and registered as required. The sex offender's temporary inability to 
register and inability to report the change of residence within three 
business days in the new residence jurisdiction was due to a 
circumstance beyond his control--the sheriff office's refusal to meet 
with him until a week had passed--and he complied with the requirement 
to register as soon as the circumstance preventing compliance ceased to 
exist.
    Example 2. A sex offender cannot register in a state in which he 
resides because its registration authorities will not register 
offenders on the basis of the offense for which the sex offender was 
convicted. The sex offender would have a defense to liability because 
the state's unwillingness to register sex offenders like him is a 
circumstance beyond his control. However, if the sex offender failed to 
register after becoming aware of a change in state policy or practice 
allowing his registration, the 18 U.S.C. 2250(c) defense would no 
longer apply, because in such a case the circumstance preventing 
compliance with the registration requirement would no longer exist.
    Example 3. A sex offender needs to travel to a foreign country on 
short notice--less than 21 days--because of an unforeseeable family or 
work emergency. The sex offender would have a defense to liability for 
failing to report the intended travel 21 days in advance, as required 
by Sec.  72.7(f), because it is impossible to report an intention to 
travel outside the United States before the intention exists. However, 
if the sex offender failed to inform the registration jurisdiction 
(albeit on short notice) once he intended to travel, 18 U.S.C. 2250(c) 
would not excuse that failure, because the preventing circumstance--
absence of an intent to travel abroad--would no longer exist.
    (b) Supervision condition. For a sex offender convicted of a 
Federal offense, compliance with SORNA is a mandatory condition of 
probation, supervised release, and parole. The release of such an 
offender who does not comply with SORNA may be revoked.

    Dated: July 15, 2020.
William P. Barr,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2020-15804 Filed 8-12-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-18-P