Special Conditions: Leonardo S.p.A. (Leonardo) Model AW189, Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), 48646-48650 [2020-17089]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 156 (Wednesday, August 12, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 48646-48650]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-17089]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 29

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0756; Special Conditions No. 29-050-SC]


Special Conditions: Leonardo S.p.A. (Leonardo) Model AW189, 
Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Leonardo Model 
AW189 helicopters. This model of helicopter, as modified by Leonardo, 
will have the novel or unusual design feature associated with 
installing an optional SAR AFCS. The applicable airworthiness standards 
do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design 
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety 
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to show a level of 
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness 
standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is August 27, 
2020. The FAA must receive your comments by September 11, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2020-0756 
using any of the following methods:
    [ballot] Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
    [ballot] Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    [ballot] Hand Delivery of Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    [ballot] Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to https://regulations.gov, including any personal information 
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket 
website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments 
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual 
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can 
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477-19478), as well as at https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington,

[[Page 48647]]

DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: FAA, Mr. Mitchell Soth (AIR-713), 
Regulations and Policy Section, AIR-681, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, 
Policy & Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, 10101 
Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177; telephone (817) 222-5104; 
facsimile (817) 222-5961.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

    The FAA has determined, in accordance with 5 U.S. Code 553(b)(3)(B) 
and 553(d)(3), that notice and opportunity for prior public comment 
hereon are unnecessary because substantially identical special 
conditions have been previously subject to the public comment process 
in several prior instances such that the FAA is satisfied that new 
comments are unlikely. For the same reason, the FAA finds that good 
cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The 
FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views 
that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities 
for comment.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Special conditions No.            Company and helicopter model
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 29-041-SC \1\.....................  Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
                                         Model 412EP Helicopter.
No. 29-022-SC \2\.....................  Eurocopter France Model EC225LP
                                         Helicopter.
No. 29-027-SC \3\.....................  Agusta S.p.A. Model AW139 and
                                         AB139 Helicopter.
No. 29-023-SC \4\.....................  Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
                                         Model S-92A Helicopter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 82 FR 24458, May 30, 2017.
\2\ 77 FR 60883, October 5, 2012.
\3\ 77 FR 44110, July 27, 2012.
\4\ 75 FR 77524, December 13, 2010.

Comments Invited

    While the FAA did not precede these special conditions with a 
notice of proposed special conditions, the FAA invites interested 
people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, 
data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended 
change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments 
received by the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. The FAA may change these special conditions based on 
the comments received.

Background

    On October 18, 2019, Leonardo applied for a change to Type 
Certificate (TC) No. R00004RD to install an optional SAR AFCS in the 
Model AW189 helicopter. The Model AW189 is a transport category 
helicopter certificated for Category A operations. This helicopter is 
also certificated for instrument flight under the requirements of 
Appendix B of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29-51. It is powered by two 
General Electric CT7-2E1 engines and is capable of carrying a maximum 
of 19 passengers and 2 crew members.
    Leonardo proposes that the Model AW189 include the use of a novel 
and unusual design feature, which is a SAR AFCS. The use of dedicated 
AFCS upper modes, in which a fully coupled autopilot provides 
operational SAR profiles, is needed for SAR operations conducted over 
water in offshore areas clear of obstructions. The SAR modes enable the 
helicopter pilot to fly fully coupled maneuvers, to include predefined 
search patterns during cruise flight, and to transition from cruise 
flight to a stabilized hover and departure (transition from hover to 
cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also includes an auxiliary crew control 
that allows another crewmember (such as a hoist operator) to have 
limited authority to control the helicopter's longitudinal and lateral 
position during hover operations.
    Flight operations conducted over water at night may have an 
extremely limited visual horizon with little visual reference to the 
surface even when conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions. 
Consequently, the certification requirements for SAR modes must meet 
Appendix B to 14 CFR part 29. While Appendix B to 14 CFR part 29 
prescribes airworthiness criteria for instrument flight, it does not 
consider operations below instrument flight minimum speed 
(VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow for coupled operations 
at low speed, all-azimuth flight to zero airspeed (hover).
    The regulations as currently promulgated did not envision 
instrument flight below the Appendix B envelope, including hover using 
AFCS modes. This necessitates the development of a special condition to 
address the gap in 14 CFR part 29 regulations and the lack of adequate 
airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR mode certification to include 
flight characteristics, performance, and installed equipment and 
systems.

Type Certification Basis

    Under 14 CFR 21.101, Leonardo must show the AW189 model helicopter, 
as changed, continues to meet either the applicable provisions of the 
regulations incorporated by reference in TC No. R00004RD or the 
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the 
change, depending on the significance of the change as defined by 14 
CFR 21.101. The regulations incorporated by reference in the TC are 
commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The 
regulations incorporated by reference in R00004RD are as follows: 14 
CFR 21.29 and Part 29, Amendments 29-1 through 29-52 (dated March 30, 
2010). 14 CFR 36, Appendix H, Amendment 36-1 through Amendment 36-29 
(dated March 11, 2013). Special Condition No. 29-034-SC, 30 Minute All 
Engines Operating (AEO) Power Rating: 14 CFR 29.1049, 29.1305, 29.1521.
    Equivalent Level of Safety Findings (ELOS) issued against:
    (a) 14 CFR 29.807(c) Passenger emergency exits (documented in ELOS 
Memo TC4265RD-R-C-01).
    (b) 14 CFR 29.813(c) Passenger access to each emergency exit 
(documented in ELOS Memo TC4265RD-R-C-02).
    (c) 14 CFR 29.807 (d)(2) & (d)(3) Ditching emergency exits for 
passengers (documented in ELOS Memo TC4265RD-R-C-04).
    (d) 14 CFR 29.815 Main aisle width (documented in ELOS Memo 
TC4265RD-R-C-05).
    (e) 14 CFR 29.1545(b) Airspeed indicator (documented in ELOS Memo 
TC4265RD-R-F-01).
    (f) 14 CFR 29.1305 and Sec.  29.1549 Power Index (documented in 
ELOS Memo TC4265RD-R-F-03).

Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions

    The Administrator has determined that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (that is, 14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the Leonardo Model AW189 helicopter 
because of a novel or unusual design feature. Therefore, special 
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec.  11.19, under 
Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under 
Sec.  21.101.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the TC for that model be amended later to 
include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual 
design feature, or should any other model already included on the same 
TC be modified to incorporate the

[[Page 48648]]

same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would 
also apply to the other model under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Leonardo Model AW189 helicopters will incorporate the following 
novel or unusual design features:
    The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes, 
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a 
hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFCS 
coupled SAR functions include:
    (a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
    (b) Ground speed hold.
    (c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the 
navigation computer.
    (d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over 
which the helicopter has flown.
    (e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
    (f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the 
navigation computer.
    (g) Monitor the preselected hover height with an automatic increase 
in collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum 
height.
    These SAR modes are intended to be used over large bodies of water 
in areas clear of obstructions. Further, the use of the modes that 
transition down from cruise to hover will include operation at 
airspeeds below VMINI.
    The SAR system only entails navigation, flight control, and coupled 
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The system does not include the 
additional equipment that may be required for over water flight or 
external loads to meet other operational requirements.

Discussion

    The following is a summary of the final special conditions:
    (a) In addition to the requirements of 14 CFR part 29 for Category 
A and Appendix B Helicopter Instrument Flight (IFR), the SAR Helicopter 
and AFCS must:
    (1) Be safe and controllable in flight for all three axes at 
airspeeds from VMINI to hover,
    (2) have adequate dynamic stability, and
    (3) provide an automatic transition sequencing from the approved 
Appendix B IFR envelope without unintended flight below a safe minimum 
height and return to the Appendix B envelope.
    (4) Deliver adequate one engine inoperative (OEI) performance.
    (5) Operate safely in the requested flight envelope, which 
includes:
    (i) Sea States where the wave height is 2.5m (8.2 feet) and
    (ii) a headwind of 25 knots, 17 knots from all other azimuths.
    (6) Contain relevant limitations and procedures, including 
operations in salt spray environments.
    (b) The design and system architecture of the SAR helicopter must:
    (1) Include a ground mapping radar.
    (2) Incorporate a system to limit engine power demand such that 
engine limits are not exceeded.
    (3) Provide the following to each pilot:
    (i) A selectable Go-Around Mode and minimum safe height,
    (ii) aircraft height above the surface,
    (iii) heading and pilot-selected heading information,
    (iv) aircraft and pilot selected ground speeds when used by the 
AFCS, and
    (v) wind speed and direction.
    (4) Include a system that monitors flight guidance deviations, 
failures, mode changes and alerts the flight crew.
    (5) Provide to the SAR Hoist operator a control which includes a 
flight control with limited authority, which
    (i) is designed, located and safely controllable for that operator 
without interfering with the safe operation of the helicopter, and
    (ii) can be safely overridden by the pilot or copilot.
    (6) Ensure the AFCS design is reliable in relation to the effects 
of its failures and operating environment.

Applicability

    These special conditions apply to the Leonardo Model AW189 
helicopter. Should Leonardo apply at a later date for an amendment to 
the TC to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual 
design feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as 
well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on the Leonardo Model AW189 helicopter. It is not a rule of general 
applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for the Leonardo Model AW189 helicopter 
when the optional Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight Control 
System (AFCS) is installed:
    In addition to the part 29 certification requirements for Category 
A and helicopter instrument flight for Appendix B, the following 
additional requirements must be met for certification of the SAR AFCS:
    (a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled SAR flight modes must provide:
    (1) Safe and controlled flight in the three axes at all airspeeds 
(lateral position and speed, longitudinal position and speed, and 
height and vertical speed) from the previous VMINI to a 
hover (within the maximum demonstrated wind envelope).
    (2) Automatic transition to the helicopter instrument flight 
(Appendix B) envelope as part of the normal SAR mode sequencing.
    (3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around mode that safely interrupts any 
other coupled mode and automatically transitions the helicopter to the 
instrument flight (Appendix B) envelope.
    (4) A means to prevent unintended flight below a safe minimum 
height. Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height is 
acceptable, provided the alerting requirements in paragraph (b)(8)(i) 
of these Special Conditions alert the pilot of this descent below safe 
minimum height.
    (b) SAR Mode System Architecture. To support the integrity of the 
SAR modes, the following system architecture is required:
    (1) Ground mapping radar function that presents real-time 
information to the pilots.
    (2) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS 
when any of the automatic piloting modes are engaged, so full authority 
digital engine control power limitations, such as torque and 
temperature, are not exceeded.
    (3) A system providing the aircraft height above the surface and 
final pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel in a 
position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and 
usable by any pilot at their station.
    (4) A system providing the aircraft heading and the pilot-selected 
heading at a location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable 
to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot 
at their station.
    (5) A system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral ground 
speeds and the pilot-selected longitudinal and

[[Page 48649]]

lateral ground speeds when used by the AFCS in the flight envelope 
where airspeed indications become unreliable. This information must be 
presented at a location on the instrument panel in a position 
acceptable to the FAA that is plainly visible to and usable by any 
pilot at their station.
    (6) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic 
piloting modes are engaged or transitioning from one mode to another.
    (7) A system that monitors for flight guidance deviations and 
failures and contains an alerting function that provides the flight 
crew with enough information to take appropriate corrective action.
    (8) The alerting system must provide visual or aural alerts, or 
both, to the flight crew under any of the below conditions:
    (i) When the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is 
reached.
    (ii) When a SAR mode system malfunction occurs.
    (iii) When the AFCS changes modes automatically from one SAR mode 
to another. For normal transitions from one SAR mode to another, a 
single visual or aural alert may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or 
a mode having a time-critical component, the flight crew alerting 
system must activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take 
timely and appropriate action. The alerting system means must be 
designed to alert the flight crew in order to minimize crew errors that 
could create an additional hazard.
    (9) The SAR system hoist operator control is considered a flight 
control with limited authority and must comply with the following:
    (i) The hoist operator control must be designed and located to 
provide for convenient operation and to prevent confusion and 
inadvertent operation.
    (ii) The helicopter must be safely controllable by the hoist 
operator control throughout the range of that control.
    (iii) The hoist operator control may not interfere with the safe 
operation of the helicopter.
    (iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls must be able to smoothly 
override the limited control authority of the hoist operator control, 
without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without 
the danger of exceeding any other limitation because of the override.
    (10) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of 
its failure. The occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent 
continued safe flight and landing must be extremely improbable. For any 
failure condition of the AFCS which is not shown to be extremely 
improbable:
    (i) The helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of 
continued safe flight without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 
strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control 
system must be evaluated.
    (ii) The AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous 
deviation in the flight path or produce hazardous loads on the 
helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a malfunction or 
failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period 
of time. Where multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction 
conditions must be evaluated in sequence unless their occurrence is 
shown to be improbable.
    (11) A functional hazard assessment and a system safety assessment 
must address the failure conditions associated with SAR operations.
    (i) For SAR catastrophic failure conditions, changes may be 
required to the following:
    (A) System architecture.
    (B) Software and complex electronic hardware design assurance 
levels.
    (C) High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) test levels.
    (D) Instructions for continued airworthiness.
    (ii) The assessments must consider all the systems required for SAR 
operations to include the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for 
example, radio altimeter), and primary flight displays. Electrical and 
electronic systems with SAR catastrophic failure conditions (for 
example, AFCS) must comply with the Sec.  29.1317(a)(4) HIRF 
requirements.
    (c) SAR Mode Performance Requirements.
    (1) Demonstrate the SAR modes for the requested flight envelope, 
including the following minimum sea-state and wind conditions:
    (i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), considering 
both short and long swells.
    (ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 knots for all other azimuths.
    (2) The selected hover height and hover velocity must be captured 
(to include the transition from one captured mode to another captured 
mode) accurately and smoothly and not exhibit any significant overshoot 
or oscillation.
    (3) The minimum use height (MUH) for the SAR modes must be no more 
than the maximum loss of height following any single failure or any 
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, plus an 
additional margin of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is the minimum 
height at which any SAR AFCS mode may be engaged.
    (4) The SAR mode system must be usable up to the maximum certified 
gross weight of the aircraft or to the lower of the following weights:
    (i) Maximum emergency flotation weight.
    (ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground Effect (OGE) weight.
    (iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
    (d) Flight Characteristics.
    (1) The basic aircraft must meet all of the part 29 airworthiness 
criteria for helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B).
    (2) For SAR mode coupled flight below VMINI, at the 
maximum demonstrated winds, the helicopter must be able to maintain any 
required flight condition and make a smooth transition from any flight 
condition to any other flight condition without requiring exceptional 
piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without exceeding the limit 
load factor. This requirement also includes aircraft control through 
the hoist operator's control.
    (3) For coupled flight below the previously established 
VMINI, the following stability requirements replace the 
stability requirements of paragraph IV, V, and VI of Appendix B to part 
29:
    (i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The requirements of paragraph IV 
of Appendix B are not applicable.
    (ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: The requirements of 
paragraph V of Appendix B are not applicable.
    (iii) Dynamic Stability: The requirements of paragraph VI of 
Appendix B are replaced with the following two paragraphs:
    (A) Any oscillation must be damped and any aperiodic response must 
not double in amplitude in less than 10 seconds. This requirement must 
also be met with degraded upper mode(s) of the AFCS. An ``upper mode'' 
is a mode that utilizes a fully coupled autopilot to provide an 
operational SAR profile.
    (B) After any upset, the AFCS must return the aircraft to the last 
commanded position within 10 seconds or less.
    (4) With any of the upper modes of the AFCS engaged, the pilot must 
be able to manually recover the aircraft and transition to the normal 
(Appendix B) IFR flight profile envelope without exceptional skill, 
alertness, or strength.
    (e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Information.
    (1) The following performance information must be provided in the 
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS):
    (i) OEI performance information and emergency procedures, providing 
the

[[Page 48650]]

maximum weight that will provide a minimum clearance of 15 feet above 
the surface, following failure of the critical engine in a hover. The 
maximum weight must be presented as a function of the hover height for 
the temperature and pressure altitude range requested for 
certification. The effects of wind must be reflected in the hover 
performance information.
    (ii) Hover OGE performance with the critical engine inoperative for 
OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings for those weights, 
altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.

    Note: These OEI performance requirements do not replace 
performance requirements that may be needed to comply with the 
airworthiness or operational standards (14 CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part 
133) for external loads or human external cargo.

    (f) RFMS.
    (1) Limitations necessary for safe operation of the SAR system to 
include:
    (i) Minimum crew requirements. No fewer than two pilots, except for 
approved external load operations that will also require a hoist 
operator.
    (ii) Maximum SAR weight as determined by the lower of the SAR Mode 
performance requirement of paragraph (c)(4) of these Special Conditions 
or the aircraft performance information provided by paragraph (e) of 
these Special Conditions.
    (iii) Maximum demonstrated sea state conditions for ditching 
compliance.
    (iv) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH 
(as determined in subparagraph (c)(3)) of these Special Conditions.
    (v) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR system 
(including operation of the hoist operator control), with AFCS failure 
modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.
    (2) Performance information:
    (i) OEI performance and height-loss.
    (ii) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous 
and time-limited power ratings.
    (iii) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in flight test.
    (iv) Information and advisory information concerning operations in 
a heavy salt spray environment, including any airframe or power effects 
as a result of salt encrustation.
    (g) Flight Demonstration.
    (1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight 
demonstration of all the coupled SAR modes is required.
    (2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled 
maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a 
pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft 
to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed 
of at least the best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
    (3) For any failure condition of the SAR system not shown to be 
extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth 
transition from one flight mode to another without exceptional piloting 
skill, alertness, or strength.
    (4) Failure conditions that are not shown to be extremely 
improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight 
testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal 
pilot recovery times are acceptable:
    (i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover 
modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
    (ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.
    (5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation at the low-speed 
and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations. 
Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions, 
particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must 
include a single or a combination of failures (such as, erroneous data 
from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and altitude 
sensors) that are not shown to be extremely improbable.
    (6) The flight demonstration must include the following 
environmental conditions:
    (i) Swell into the wind.
    (ii) Swell and wind from different directions.
    (iii) Cross swell.
    (iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).
    (7) The flight demonstration must also evaluate OEI procedures from 
hover while hoisting an external load.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 31, 2020.
Jorge Castillo,
Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, AIR-680 Policy & Innovation 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-17089 Filed 8-10-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P