Notice of Intent To Prepare a Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 47362-47366 [2020-17054]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 151 / Wednesday, August 5, 2020 / Notices
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BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security
Administration
Notice of Intent To Prepare a Site-Wide
Environmental Impact Statement for
Continued Operation of the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory
National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of intent.
AGENCY:
The National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), a
semi-autonomous agency within the
United States (U.S.) Department of
Energy (DOE), announces its intent to
prepare a Site-Wide Environmental
Impact Statement (SWEIS) for the
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL or Laboratory) in
Livermore, California (LLNL SWEIS).
The LLNL SWEIS will be prepared by
NNSA’s Livermore Field Office (LFO)
and analyze the potential environmental
impacts of the Proposed Action, other
reasonable alternatives that may be
identified, and the No Action
Alternative for continuing operations of
LLNL for approximately the next 15
years. The continued operation of LLNL
is critical to NNSA’s Stockpile
Stewardship Program, to preventing the
spread and use of nuclear weapons
worldwide, and to many other areas that
may impact national security and global
stability. The Proposed Action
Alternative will include continued
operations and foreseeable new and/or
modified operations/facilities to address
aging infrastructure concerns at LLNL.
The purpose of this Notice is to invite
public participation in the process and
to encourage public involvement on the
scope and alternatives that should be
considered.
DATES: The public scoping period begins
with the publication of this Notice in
the Federal Register and continues until
September 21, 2020. Comments received
after this date will be considered to the
extent practicable. NNSA will hold one
public scoping meeting for the proposed
LLNL SWEIS as follows:
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SUMMARY:
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Produccio´n de Energı´a
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Order 4556 granting blanket authority to export natural gas
to Mexico.
Order 4557 granting blanket authority to import/export natural gas from/to Canada/Mexico, and vacating prior authority (Order 4211).
In light of recent public health
concerns, NNSA will be hosting an
internet-based, virtual public scoping
meeting in place of an in-person
meeting. The date of the meeting will be
provided in a future notice posted on
the following website: https://
www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepareading-room. NNSA will hold the
meeting no earlier than 15 days from the
posting of the notice. Public scoping
meeting details will also be announced
in local media outlets.
nepa-reading-room and announced in
local media outlets.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
further information about this Notice,
please contact Ms. Fana GebeyehuHouston, NEPA Document Manager,
National Nuclear Security
Administration, Livermore Field Office,
7000 East Avenue, L–293, Livermore,
CA 94550–9234; phone: 833–778–0508;
or email to: LLNLSWEIS@
NNSA.DOE.GOV.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
NNSA invites other Federal
and state agencies, state and local
governments, Native American tribes,
industry, other organizations, and
members of the public to submit
comments to assist in identifying
environmental issues and in
determining the appropriate scope of
the LLNL SWEIS. Written and oral
comments will be given equal weight
and NNSA will consider all comments
received or postmarked by the end of
the comment period in preparing the
Draft LLNL SWEIS. Comments received
or postmarked after the comment period
will be considered to the extent
practicable. Written comments on the
scope of the LLNL SWEIS or requests for
information related to the LLNL SWEIS
should be sent to: Ms. Fana GebeyehuHouston, NEPA Document Manager,
National Nuclear Security
Administration, Livermore Field Office,
7000 East Avenue, L–293, Livermore,
CA 94550–9234 or email to:
LLNLSWEIS@NNSA.DOE.GOV. Before
including your address, phone number,
email address, or other personally
identifiable information in your
comment, please be advised that your
entire comment—including your
personally identifiable information—
may be made publicly available. If you
wish for NNSA to withhold your name
and/or other personally identifiable
information, please state this
prominently at the beginning of your
comment. You may also submit
comments anonymously.
Information related to the online
scoping meeting, including internet and
telephone access details, and
instructions on how to participate will
be available at the following website:
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-
Background
LLNL has been in existence for 68
years, has an annual budget of
approximately $2.2 billion and employs
approximately 8,000 people. LLNL
consists of two federally-owned sites: A
770-acre site in Livermore, California
(Livermore Site) and a 7,000-acre
experimental test site (Site 300)
southeast of the Livermore Site between
Livermore and Tracy, California. Most
LLNL operations are located at the
Livermore Site, which is situated about
50 miles east of San Francisco in
southeastern Alameda County. Site 300
is primarily a test site for explosives and
non-nuclear weapons components; it is
located about 15 miles southeast of
Livermore in the hills of the Diablo
Range. Most of Site 300 is located in San
Joaquin County; the western edge of the
site is in Alameda County.
ADDRESSES:
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Missions
The 21st century presents a growing
set of challenges that are the focus of the
Laboratory’s mission as a DOE/NNSA
national security laboratory. LLNL’s
defining responsibility is ensuring the
safety, security, and reliability of the
nation’s nuclear deterrent. LLNL’s
mission is broader than stockpile
stewardship and also includes missions
that respond to national security and
global security concerns that range from
nuclear proliferation and terrorism to
energy shortages and climate change.
The Laboratory’s science and
engineering capabilities are applied to
these challenges. Programs at LLNL
support DOE, NNSA, Department of
Defense (DoD), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and other
federal sponsor missions. LLNL also
conducts work to collaborate with and
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support state and local agencies, private
and academic sponsors, and other
scientific collaborators.
Basic science is the engine that drives
national security research at LLNL.
Funded by a broad contingent of the
scientific community—including the
Office of Science, academic partners,
and Laboratory Directed Research and
Development investments—basic
science ensures that LLNL research
capabilities remain at the cutting edge
and that LLNL’s scientists and engineers
are prepared to solve critical challenges
across national security missions. This
basic science supports the LLNL
missions.
Weapons
The Weapons Program works to
ensure that the nation’s nuclear
deterrent remains safe, secure, and
reliable. The program accomplishes this
through the Stockpile Stewardship
Program—an ongoing effort to apply a
science-based fundamental
understanding of nuclear weapons
performance—from the development of
enhanced warhead surveillance tools
that detect the onset of problems to
manufacturing capabilities that produce
critical components. High performance
computational capabilities used for
physics computer simulations and code
development are conducted on some of
the world’s most capable
supercomputers, located at LLNL.
Lasers
The National Ignition program is an
important national scientific resource
that uses advanced lasers to research
materials at temperatures and pressures
that otherwise would only exist in the
cores of stars and giant planets and
inside nuclear weapons. The National
Ignition Facility’s (NIF) primary
purpose is assuring viability of the
nation’s nuclear deterrent as part of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. This
includes a variety of scientific studies
from the DOE national laboratories, high
energy density science research centers,
academia, and other national and
international scientific programs.
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Biosecurity
To keep the world safe from everchanging biological threats,
revolutionary advances in detection,
characterization and mitigation are
essential to safeguard against disease.
High performance computational
capabilities are used to enhance
bioinformatics and to develop novel
drug development strategies and pointof-care public health monitoring and
detection.
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Counterterrorism
In a world where threats are
continuously changing, the Laboratory
is working diligently to help the nation
prevent and mitigate catastrophic
incidents arising from biological,
chemical, radiological, or high explosive
materials. This broad scope of
capabilities has resulted in
collaborations with sponsors such as
DHS, the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of Justice, the Department
of Commerce, state and local
governments, and non-governmental
organizations.
Defense
LLNL supports DoD as a preeminent
innovative science and technology
contributor. For 68 years the Laboratory
has answered the call to help defend
this nation, fielding products and
providing services that strengthen the
ability of the DoD to achieve precision
effects and enhance situational
awareness.
Energy
LLNL advances the nation’s security
through innovative science and
technology solutions to improve
national energy security and surety
while reducing environmental impact.
LLNL is developing technologies that
enable expanded use of renewable
energy, improved efficiency, new
resources, systems integration, and
reduced costs.
Intelligence
The Laboratory’s Intelligence Program
delivers comprehensive analysis, policy
and operational support in areas where
technology research and development
are critical to national strategic
priorities, from combating weapons of
mass destruction and cyber security, to
space and other emerging and
disruptive technologies.
Nonproliferation
With globalization and the spreading
availability of technologies,
proliferation challenges continue to
grow and evolve. LLNL works to stem
chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear proliferation by providing
scientific and technological solutions
and sound advice to counter emerging
threats.
Purpose and Need for Agency Action
National security policies require
DOE, through NNSA, to maintain the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the
nation’s core competencies in nuclear
weapons. NNSA has the mission to
maintain and enhance the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the
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nuclear weapons stockpile. The 2018
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states
that an effective, responsive, and
resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure
is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt
flexibly to shifting requirements and
support the sustainment of its nuclear
forces to protect the homeland, assure
allies, deter adversaries, and hedge
against adverse developments.
The U.S. nuclear weapons
infrastructure is aging and historically
underfunded. Over half of NNSA’s
infrastructure is over 40 years old, and
a quarter dates back to the early 1950s.
Previous NPRs have highlighted the
need to maintain a modern nuclear
weapons infrastructure, but the U.S. has
fallen short in sustaining a modern
infrastructure that is resilient and has
the capacity to respond to unforeseen
developments. The 2018 NPR places a
high priority on recapitalizing the
physical infrastructure needed to
produce strategic materials and
components for U.S. nuclear weapons.
The 2018 NPR affirms the U.S. will
have the ability to maintain and certify
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal. Synchronized with DoD
replacement programs, the U.S. will
sustain and deliver on-time the
warheads needed to support both
strategic and non-strategic nuclear
capabilities by completing several Life
Extension Programs (LEPs) as part of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. LLNL
will complete some of the LEPs by
conducting testing and maintenance of
weapons components without nuclear
testing. LLNL will also continue its
basic science to support biosecurity,
counterterrorism, defense, weapons
technology, energy, intelligence,
nonproliferation, space programs,
climate security, and cybersecurity.
LLNL is in need of facilities and
infrastructure investments. Half of the
operating buildings at LLNL are
assessed as being inadequate or in
substandard condition. This
deterioration of assets presents program
and operational risks in executing
mission needs, attracting and
maintaining a high-quality workforce,
and meeting regulatory requirements.
Requirements To Fulfill DOE NEPA
Compliance
The LLNL SWEIS will be prepared
pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq.), the Council on
Environmental Quality’s NEPA
regulations (40 CFR parts 1500–1508)
and the DOE NEPA Implementing
Procedures (10 CFR part 1021). The
DOE regulations (10 CFR 1021.330)
require preparation of site-wide
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documents for certain large, multiple
facility sites, such as LLNL. The
purpose of a SWEIS is to provide the
public with an analysis of the potential
environmental impacts from ongoing
and reasonably foreseeable new and
modified operations and facilities, and
reasonable alternatives at a DOE site, to
provide a basis for site-wide decision
making, and to improve and coordinate
agency plans, functions, programs, and
resource utilization. The SWEIS
provides an overall NEPA baseline so
that the environmental effects of
proposed future changes in programs
and activities can be compared to the
baseline. A SWEIS also enables DOE to
‘‘tier’’ its later NEPA project-specific
reviews at a site to eliminate repetitive
discussion of the same issues in future
project-specific NEPA studies, and to
focus on the actual issues ready for
decisions at each level of environmental
review.
The NEPA process allows for all
interested agencies (federal, state and
local), public interest groups, Native
American Tribes, local businesses, and
members of the general public to
participate in the environmental review
process. The new SWEIS will utilize the
baseline information from the previous
LLNL SWEIS (2005 LLNL SWEIS), to
the extent possible, as well as current
information contained in annual site
environmental reports and other
technical reports.
Preliminary Alternatives
The scoping process is an opportunity
for the public to assist NNSA in
determining the alternatives and issues
for analysis. NNSA welcomes specific
comments or suggestions on the content
of these alternatives, or on other
alternatives that could be considered. A
preliminary set of alternatives and
issues for evaluation in the LLNL
SWEIS is identified below.
Additionally, during the development of
the LLNL SWEIS, NNSA may consider
other alternatives judged to be
reasonable.
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No Action Alternative: Continuing
Present Operations
The No Action Alternative would
continue current facility operations
throughout LLNL in support of assigned
missions. NEPA regulations require
analysis of the No Action Alternative to
provide a benchmark for comparison
with environmental effects of the other
alternatives. This alternative includes
the programs and activities described
above in the LLNL Mission and those
activities for which NEPA review is
already done or underway.
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Proposed Action Alternative
The programmatic context for this
alternative is the continued support of
existing programs and development of
additional missions or projects that
would be needed to meet DOE/NNSA
mission requirements and sustain
science, technology, and engineering
excellence to respond to future national
security challenges. This alternative
would include the scope of the No
Action Alternative, as described above,
and an increase in current facility
operations or enhanced operations that
may require new or modified facilities
and are reasonably foreseeable over the
next 15 years. NNSA has identified four
categories of actions associated with the
Proposed Action: (1) New Facility
Construction Projects; (2)
Modernization/Upgrades of Existing
Facilities and Infrastructure; (3)
Operational Changes; and (4)
Decontamination, Decommissioning,
and Demolition Projects. Each of these
categories of actions is discussed below.
NNSA has identified approximately
35 new facility construction projects,
including laboratory facilities related to
materials engineering, exascale
computing, laser-explosives
applications, and high explosives
research and development; general
office buildings; maintenance facilities;
science centers for both nuclear security
and forensics; and a new fire station.
New facility projects would be proposed
at both the Livermore Site and Site 300.
With regard to modernization/
upgrades of existing facilities and
infrastructure, NNSA has identified
approximately 65 discrete projects,
including upgrades to basic
infrastructure (e.g., domestic water
systems, electrical systems, fire
protection systems, communication
systems, and security systems);
modernization of firing and control
systems at Site 300; NIF laser power
upgrades and utility system
replacements; biosecurity and
bioscience facility upgrades;
modernization of high performance
computing capabilities; seismic risk
reduction initiatives; and waste
management facility enhancements.
Modernization/upgrades will extend
facility lifetimes, improve work
environments, and enhance operational
capabilities.
Proposed operational changes are
expected to include: Changes to
material-at-risk (MAR), administrative
limits, and radiological bounding
accident scenarios as a result of the
deinventory of Security Category I and
II special nuclear materials from LLNL,
which was completed in 2012; and
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changes in various facility operations,
which would be defined in the LLNL
SWEIS, and may result in changes in
generated wastes and shipments to
disposal sites. All proposed operational
changes would be described in detail
and analyzed in the Draft LLNL SWEIS.
Decontamination, decommissioning,
and demolition of older facilities would
be conducted on a continuing basis to
eliminate excess facilities and reduce
costs and risks. Over the 15-year LLNL
SWEIS planning horizon, NNSA has
identified more than 110 excess
facilities, totaling more than 1.1 million
square feet, to be decontaminated,
decommissioned, and demolished.
The net effect of new facility
construction, existing facility
modernization/upgrades, and
demolition of excess facilities is
expected to reduce LLNL’s footprint and
improve the efficiency of operations.
The LLNL SWEIS will identify the
specific projects and facilities that are
potentially affected by the Proposed
Action, and will assess the potential
impacts associated with implementation
of the Proposed Action.
Other Potential Reasonable
Alternatives
The timeframe for the LLNL SWEIS
analysis is approximately 15 years into
the future. NNSA recognizes that
requirements, needs, opportunities, and
vision may change over such a long
planning horizon. Consequently, NNSA
is exploring the possibility of including
additional alternatives in the LLNL
SWEIS—such as reduced operations or
expanded operations—that could be
reasonable and responsive to that
planning horizon. NNSA welcomes
input on alternatives that the public
thinks are reasonable and should be
analyzed in the LLNL SWEIS.
Alternatives that NNSA will not
consider as reasonable are: The
complete closure and decontamination
and decommissioning of the Livermore
Site or Site 300, and transfer of current
missions/operations from LLNL to other
sites, as those actions would be
inconsistent with the LLNL mission
defined by NNSA. Such a possibility
was considered in 2008 when NNSA
prepared the Complex Transformation
Supplemental Programmatic EIS. In that
document, NNSA concluded that, ‘‘as a
result of the continuing challenges of
certification [of nuclear weapons]
without underground testing, the need
for robust peer review, benefits of
intellectual diversity from competing
physics design laboratories, and
uncertainty over the details [of] future
stockpiles, NNSA does not consider it
reasonable to evaluate laboratory
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consolidation [or elimination] at this
time.’’ That conclusion has not changed
today. In addition, as one of only three
nuclear weapons laboratories, LLNL
contributes significantly to the core
intellectual and technical competencies
of the United States related to nuclear
weapons. These competencies embody
more than 50 years of weapons
knowledge and experience. The
laboratories perform the basic research,
design, system engineering,
development testing, reliability and
assessment, and certification of nuclear
weapon safety, reliability, and
performance. From a broader national
security perspective, the core
intellectual and technical competencies
of LLNL (and Los Alamos National
Laboratory and Sandia National
Laboratories [NNSA’s other nuclear
weapons laboratories]) provide the
technical basis for the pursuit of U.S.
arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation objectives.
The Complex Transformation
Supplemental Programmatic EIS also
considered and evaluated the transfer of
missions/operations to/from LLNL, and
NNSA has implemented, as appropriate,
decisions that followed preparation of
that document. NNSA has not identified
any new proposals for current missions/
operations that are reasonable for
transfer to/from LLNL.
Preliminary Environmental Analysis
The following issues have been
identified for analysis in the LLNL
SWEIS. The list is tentative and
intended to facilitate public comment
on the scope of the LLNL SWEIS. It is
not intended to be all-inclusive, nor
does it imply any predetermination of
potential impacts. The NNSA
specifically invites suggestions for the
addition or deletion of items on this list.
1. Potential effects on the public and
workers from exposures to radiological
and hazardous materials during normal
operations, construction, reasonably
foreseeable accidents, and intentional
destructive acts.
2. Impacts on surface and
groundwater, floodplains and wetlands,
and on water use and quality.
3. Impacts on air quality.
4. Impacts to plants and animals and
their habitat, including species which
are federally- or state-listed as
threatened or endangered, or of special
concern.
5. Impacts on physiography,
topography, geology, and soil
characteristics including vadose zone.
6. Impacts to cultural resources such
as those that are historic, prehistoric,
archaeological, scientific, or
paleontological.
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7. Socioeconomic impacts to affected
communities.
8. Environmental Justice, particularly
whether or not activities at LLNL have
a disproportionately high and adverse
effect on minority and/or low-income
populations.
9. Potential impacts on land use and
applicable plans and policies.
10. Impacts from traffic and
transportation of radiological and
hazardous materials and waste on and
off the LLNL sites.
11. Pollution prevention and
materials and waste management
practices and activities.
12. Impacts on visual aesthetics and
noise levels of the LLNL facilities on the
surrounding communities and ambient
environment.
13. Impacts to community services,
including fire protection, police
protection, schools, and solid waste
disposal in landfills.
14. Impacts from use of utilities,
including water and electricity
consumption, fuel use, sewer
discharges, and resource conservation.
15. Impacts from site contamination,
characterization and remediation.
16. Unavoidable adverse impacts due
to natural phenomena (e.g., floods,
earthquakes, etc.).
17. Environmental compliance and
inadvertent releases.
18. Short term uses and long-term
productivity.
19. Irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources.
20. Cumulative effects of past,
present, and future operations.
21. Reasonably foreseeable impacts
associated with the shutdown or
demolition of excess facilities.
22. Mitigation commitments.
Site Specific LLNL SWEIS Process
The scoping process is intended to
involve all interested agencies (federal,
state, and local), public interest groups,
Native American Tribes, local
businesses, and members of the general
public. Interested parties are invited to
participate in the LLNL SWEIS process,
to refine the preliminary alternatives
and environmental issues that are not
reasonable or pertinent. Input from the
scoping meeting will assist NNSA in
formulating the proposed action,
refining the alternatives, and defining
the scope of the LLNL SWEIS analyses.
Following the scoping process
announced in this Notice, and after
consideration of comments received
during scoping, NNSA will prepare a
Draft LLNL SWEIS for the continued
operation of the LLNL. NNSA will
announce the availability of the Draft
LLNL SWEIS in the Federal Register
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47365
and local media outlets. NNSA will
hold one or more public hearings for the
Draft LLNL SWEIS. Any comments
received on the Draft LLNL SWEIS will
be considered and addressed in the
Final LLNL SWEIS. NNSA will then
issue a Record of Decision no sooner
than 30 days after publication by the
Environmental Protection Agency of a
Notice of Availability of the Final LLNL
SWEIS.
Relationship to Existing and Other
NEPA Analyses
NNSA is responsible for management
and implementation of the requirements
of NEPA and the regulations and
policies promulgated thereunder,
including but not limited to the Council
of Environmental Quality NEPA
regulations (40 CFR parts 1500–1508),
the DOE NEPA implementing
procedures (10 CFR part 1021), and
NNSA Policy (NAP) 451.1. In addition
to compliance with NEPA, the LLNL
SWEIS will address requirements in the
California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA), Public Resources Code Sec
21000 et seq. Because requirements for
NEPA and CEQA are somewhat
different, the document would be
prepared to comply with whichever
requirements are more stringent.
The current SWEIS for Continued
Operation of LLNL (2005 LLNL SWEIS)
was completed in 2005. This was the
conclusion of a process involving
roughly 42 months of analysis, public
meetings, and document preparation.
Previously, a SWEIS was issued in 1992.
While there is no specific ‘‘lifespan’’ for
a SWEIS, historically, NNSA has
performed new SWEIS analyses for
national laboratories on an average of
every 10 years.
In 2008, the NNSA completed the
Complex Transformation Supplemental
Programmatic EIS which included
further analysis for LLNL programs/
facilities. Some facilities identified for
closure in that document remain
operational due to programmatic
requirements.
In 2011, NNSA prepared a
Supplement Analysis (SA) to the 2005
LLNL SWEIS which included new
information that was not available for
consideration when the 2005 LLNL
SWEIS was prepared. It concluded that
the 2005 LLNL SWEIS remained
adequate for LLNL for the next five
years. A team of LFO and Lawrence
Livermore National Security, LLC
subject matter experts then began
working on a new SA in 2016. Although
this more recent SA process was not
completed, the team reached a
consensus that a new SWEIS would
provide numerous programmatic and
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operational benefits for the LLNL
national security mission.
EIS Preparation and Schedule
NNSA expects to issue the Draft LLNL
SWEIS in early 2021.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of
Energy was signed on this 21st day of
July, 2020, by Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty,
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
and Administrator, NNSA, pursuant to
delegated authority from the Secretary
of Energy. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DOE. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DOE Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
the Department of Energy. This
administrative process in no way alters
the legal effect of this document upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on July 31,
2020.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S.
Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2020–17054 Filed 8–4–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Project No. 13652–001]
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
Gary and Rita Hall; Notice of
Revocation of Exemption and
Soliciting Comments, Motions to
Intervene, and Protests
Take notice that the following
hydroelectric proceeding has been
initiated by the Commission:
a. Type of Proceeding: Revocation of
exemption pursuant to Article 14.
b. Project No.: 13652–001.
c. Date Initiated: May 9, 2018.
d. Exemptee: Gary and Rita Hall.
e. Name of Project: Potter Creek
Hydroelectric Project.
f. Location: The project was located
on Potter Creek, in Flathead County,
Montana, and occupied lands within the
Flathead National Forest managed by
the U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service).
g. Pursuant to: Article 14 and section
31(a) of the Federal Power Act.
h. Exemptee Contact: Rita Hall, P.O.
Box 133, Olney, Montana 59927.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:55 Aug 04, 2020
Jkt 250001
i. FERC Contact: Diana Shannon,
(202) 502–6136 or diana.shannon@
ferc.gov.
j. Deadline for filing comments,
interventions, and protests is August 31,
2020.
The Commission strongly encourages
electronic filing. Please file motions to
intervene, protests and comments using
the Commission’s eFiling system at
https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/
efiling.asp. Commenters can submit
brief comments up to 6,000 characters,
without prior registration, using the
eComment system at https://
www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/
ecomment.asp. You must include your
name and contact information at the end
of your comments. For assistance,
please contact FERC Online Support at
FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov, (866)
208–3676 (toll free), or (202) 502–8659
(TTY). In lieu of electronic filing, please
send a paper copy to: Secretary, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426
if you are using the United States Postal
Service, and to Secretary, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 12225
Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, Maryland
20852 if you are using any other
carriers/couriers. The first page of any
filing should include docket number P–
13652–001.
k. Description of Proceeding: Article
14 of the exemption provides, in part,
for the Commission to revoke the
exemption if essential project property
is removed or destroyed or becomes
unfit for use without adequate
replacement. On May 9, 2018, the Forest
Service filed a report with the
Commission indicating that project
features, including the dam, were
removed on October 20, 2017 by the
Forest Service. Sediments were
excavated, the historic channel was
reshaped, erosion control measures
were implemented, and the area was
replanted with native shrubs. The
exemptee did not file an application to
surrender the exemption and neither the
exemptee nor the Forest Service
contacted the Commission before the
project was removed and restoration
work completed. Because essential
project property was removed, and the
area has been restored, we are providing
notice of revocation pursuant to Article
14 of the exemption.
l. Filings may be viewed on the
Commission’s website at https://
www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp.
Enter the docket number (P–13652–001)
excluding the last three digits in the
docket number field to access the
documents. You may also register
online at https://www.ferc.gov/docsfiling/esubscription.asp to be notified
PO 00000
Frm 00029
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 9990
via email of new filings and issuances
related to this or other pending projects.
For assistance, call 1–866–208–3676 or
email FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov, for
TTY, call (202) 502–8659. Agencies may
obtain copies of the application directly
from the applicant.
m. Individuals desiring to be included
on the Commission’s mailing list should
so indicate by writing to the Secretary
of the Commission.
n. Comments, Protests, or Motions to
Intervene: Anyone may submit
comments, a protest, or a motion to
intervene in accordance with the
requirements of Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 18 CFR 385.210, .211, .212
and .214. In determining the appropriate
action to take, the Commission will
consider all protests or other comments
filed, but only those who file a motion
to intervene in accordance with the
Commission’s Rules may become a
party to the proceeding. Any comments,
protests, or motions to intervene must
be received on or before the specified
comment date for the particular
application.
o. Filing and Service of Documents:
Any filing must (1) bear in all capital
letters the title COMMENTS, PROTEST,
or MOTION TO INTERVENE as
applicable; (2) set forth in the heading
the name of the applicant and the
project number of the application to
which the filing responds; (3) furnish
the name, address, and telephone
number of the person protesting or
intervening; and (4) otherwise comply
with the requirements of 18 CFR
385.2001 through 385.2005. All
comments, motions to intervene, or
protests should relate to the surrender
application that is the subject of this
notice. Agencies may obtain copies of
the application directly from the
applicant. A copy of any protest or
motion to intervene must be served
upon each representative of the
applicant specified in the particular
application. If an intervener files
comments or documents with the
Commission relating to the merits of an
issue that may affect the responsibilities
of a particular resource agency, they
must also serve a copy of the document
on that resource agency.
Dated: July 30, 2020.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020–17076 Filed 8–4–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
E:\FR\FM\05AUN1.SGM
05AUN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 151 (Wednesday, August 5, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47362-47366]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-17054]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
Notice of Intent To Prepare a Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement for Continued Operation of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of intent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-
autonomous agency within the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy
(DOE), announces its intent to prepare a Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement (SWEIS) for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL
or Laboratory) in Livermore, California (LLNL SWEIS). The LLNL SWEIS
will be prepared by NNSA's Livermore Field Office (LFO) and analyze the
potential environmental impacts of the Proposed Action, other
reasonable alternatives that may be identified, and the No Action
Alternative for continuing operations of LLNL for approximately the
next 15 years. The continued operation of LLNL is critical to NNSA's
Stockpile Stewardship Program, to preventing the spread and use of
nuclear weapons worldwide, and to many other areas that may impact
national security and global stability. The Proposed Action Alternative
will include continued operations and foreseeable new and/or modified
operations/facilities to address aging infrastructure concerns at LLNL.
The purpose of this Notice is to invite public participation in the
process and to encourage public involvement on the scope and
alternatives that should be considered.
DATES: The public scoping period begins with the publication of this
Notice in the Federal Register and continues until September 21, 2020.
Comments received after this date will be considered to the extent
practicable. NNSA will hold one public scoping meeting for the proposed
LLNL SWEIS as follows:
In light of recent public health concerns, NNSA will be hosting an
internet-based, virtual public scoping meeting in place of an in-person
meeting. The date of the meeting will be provided in a future notice
posted on the following website: https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room. NNSA will hold the meeting no earlier than 15 days from
the posting of the notice. Public scoping meeting details will also be
announced in local media outlets.
ADDRESSES: NNSA invites other Federal and state agencies, state and
local governments, Native American tribes, industry, other
organizations, and members of the public to submit comments to assist
in identifying environmental issues and in determining the appropriate
scope of the LLNL SWEIS. Written and oral comments will be given equal
weight and NNSA will consider all comments received or postmarked by
the end of the comment period in preparing the Draft LLNL SWEIS.
Comments received or postmarked after the comment period will be
considered to the extent practicable. Written comments on the scope of
the LLNL SWEIS or requests for information related to the LLNL SWEIS
should be sent to: Ms. Fana Gebeyehu-Houston, NEPA Document Manager,
National Nuclear Security Administration, Livermore Field Office, 7000
East Avenue, L-293, Livermore, CA 94550-9234 or email to:
[email protected]. Before including your address, phone number,
email address, or other personally identifiable information in your
comment, please be advised that your entire comment--including your
personally identifiable information--may be made publicly available. If
you wish for NNSA to withhold your name and/or other personally
identifiable information, please state this prominently at the
beginning of your comment. You may also submit comments anonymously.
Information related to the online scoping meeting, including
internet and telephone access details, and instructions on how to
participate will be available at the following website: https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/nnsa-nepa-reading-room and announced in local media
outlets.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about this
Notice, please contact Ms. Fana Gebeyehu-Houston, NEPA Document
Manager, National Nuclear Security Administration, Livermore Field
Office, 7000 East Avenue, L-293, Livermore, CA 94550-9234; phone: 833-
778-0508; or email to: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
LLNL has been in existence for 68 years, has an annual budget of
approximately $2.2 billion and employs approximately 8,000 people. LLNL
consists of two federally-owned sites: A 770-acre site in Livermore,
California (Livermore Site) and a 7,000-acre experimental test site
(Site 300) southeast of the Livermore Site between Livermore and Tracy,
California. Most LLNL operations are located at the Livermore Site,
which is situated about 50 miles east of San Francisco in southeastern
Alameda County. Site 300 is primarily a test site for explosives and
non-nuclear weapons components; it is located about 15 miles southeast
of Livermore in the hills of the Diablo Range. Most of Site 300 is
located in San Joaquin County; the western edge of the site is in
Alameda County.
Missions
The 21st century presents a growing set of challenges that are the
focus of the Laboratory's mission as a DOE/NNSA national security
laboratory. LLNL's defining responsibility is ensuring the safety,
security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear deterrent. LLNL's
mission is broader than stockpile stewardship and also includes
missions that respond to national security and global security concerns
that range from nuclear proliferation and terrorism to energy shortages
and climate change. The Laboratory's science and engineering
capabilities are applied to these challenges. Programs at LLNL support
DOE, NNSA, Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and other federal sponsor missions. LLNL also conducts work to
collaborate with and
[[Page 47363]]
support state and local agencies, private and academic sponsors, and
other scientific collaborators.
Basic science is the engine that drives national security research
at LLNL. Funded by a broad contingent of the scientific community--
including the Office of Science, academic partners, and Laboratory
Directed Research and Development investments--basic science ensures
that LLNL research capabilities remain at the cutting edge and that
LLNL's scientists and engineers are prepared to solve critical
challenges across national security missions. This basic science
supports the LLNL missions.
Weapons
The Weapons Program works to ensure that the nation's nuclear
deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable. The program accomplishes
this through the Stockpile Stewardship Program--an ongoing effort to
apply a science-based fundamental understanding of nuclear weapons
performance--from the development of enhanced warhead surveillance
tools that detect the onset of problems to manufacturing capabilities
that produce critical components. High performance computational
capabilities used for physics computer simulations and code development
are conducted on some of the world's most capable supercomputers,
located at LLNL.
Lasers
The National Ignition program is an important national scientific
resource that uses advanced lasers to research materials at
temperatures and pressures that otherwise would only exist in the cores
of stars and giant planets and inside nuclear weapons. The National
Ignition Facility's (NIF) primary purpose is assuring viability of the
nation's nuclear deterrent as part of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. This includes a variety of scientific studies from the DOE
national laboratories, high energy density science research centers,
academia, and other national and international scientific programs.
Biosecurity
To keep the world safe from ever-changing biological threats,
revolutionary advances in detection, characterization and mitigation
are essential to safeguard against disease. High performance
computational capabilities are used to enhance bioinformatics and to
develop novel drug development strategies and point-of-care public
health monitoring and detection.
Counterterrorism
In a world where threats are continuously changing, the Laboratory
is working diligently to help the nation prevent and mitigate
catastrophic incidents arising from biological, chemical, radiological,
or high explosive materials. This broad scope of capabilities has
resulted in collaborations with sponsors such as DHS, the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce,
state and local governments, and non-governmental organizations.
Defense
LLNL supports DoD as a preeminent innovative science and technology
contributor. For 68 years the Laboratory has answered the call to help
defend this nation, fielding products and providing services that
strengthen the ability of the DoD to achieve precision effects and
enhance situational awareness.
Energy
LLNL advances the nation's security through innovative science and
technology solutions to improve national energy security and surety
while reducing environmental impact. LLNL is developing technologies
that enable expanded use of renewable energy, improved efficiency, new
resources, systems integration, and reduced costs.
Intelligence
The Laboratory's Intelligence Program delivers comprehensive
analysis, policy and operational support in areas where technology
research and development are critical to national strategic priorities,
from combating weapons of mass destruction and cyber security, to space
and other emerging and disruptive technologies.
Nonproliferation
With globalization and the spreading availability of technologies,
proliferation challenges continue to grow and evolve. LLNL works to
stem chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear proliferation by
providing scientific and technological solutions and sound advice to
counter emerging threats.
Purpose and Need for Agency Action
National security policies require DOE, through NNSA, to maintain
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the nation's core competencies
in nuclear weapons. NNSA has the mission to maintain and enhance the
safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that an effective,
responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential
to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting requirements and
support the sustainment of its nuclear forces to protect the homeland,
assure allies, deter adversaries, and hedge against adverse
developments.
The U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure is aging and historically
underfunded. Over half of NNSA's infrastructure is over 40 years old,
and a quarter dates back to the early 1950s. Previous NPRs have
highlighted the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons
infrastructure, but the U.S. has fallen short in sustaining a modern
infrastructure that is resilient and has the capacity to respond to
unforeseen developments. The 2018 NPR places a high priority on
recapitalizing the physical infrastructure needed to produce strategic
materials and components for U.S. nuclear weapons.
The 2018 NPR affirms the U.S. will have the ability to maintain and
certify a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Synchronized
with DoD replacement programs, the U.S. will sustain and deliver on-
time the warheads needed to support both strategic and non-strategic
nuclear capabilities by completing several Life Extension Programs
(LEPs) as part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. LLNL will complete
some of the LEPs by conducting testing and maintenance of weapons
components without nuclear testing. LLNL will also continue its basic
science to support biosecurity, counterterrorism, defense, weapons
technology, energy, intelligence, nonproliferation, space programs,
climate security, and cybersecurity.
LLNL is in need of facilities and infrastructure investments. Half
of the operating buildings at LLNL are assessed as being inadequate or
in substandard condition. This deterioration of assets presents program
and operational risks in executing mission needs, attracting and
maintaining a high-quality workforce, and meeting regulatory
requirements.
Requirements To Fulfill DOE NEPA Compliance
The LLNL SWEIS will be prepared pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the
Council on Environmental Quality's NEPA regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-
1508) and the DOE NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR part 1021). The
DOE regulations (10 CFR 1021.330) require preparation of site-wide
[[Page 47364]]
documents for certain large, multiple facility sites, such as LLNL. The
purpose of a SWEIS is to provide the public with an analysis of the
potential environmental impacts from ongoing and reasonably foreseeable
new and modified operations and facilities, and reasonable alternatives
at a DOE site, to provide a basis for site-wide decision making, and to
improve and coordinate agency plans, functions, programs, and resource
utilization. The SWEIS provides an overall NEPA baseline so that the
environmental effects of proposed future changes in programs and
activities can be compared to the baseline. A SWEIS also enables DOE to
``tier'' its later NEPA project-specific reviews at a site to eliminate
repetitive discussion of the same issues in future project-specific
NEPA studies, and to focus on the actual issues ready for decisions at
each level of environmental review.
The NEPA process allows for all interested agencies (federal, state
and local), public interest groups, Native American Tribes, local
businesses, and members of the general public to participate in the
environmental review process. The new SWEIS will utilize the baseline
information from the previous LLNL SWEIS (2005 LLNL SWEIS), to the
extent possible, as well as current information contained in annual
site environmental reports and other technical reports.
Preliminary Alternatives
The scoping process is an opportunity for the public to assist NNSA
in determining the alternatives and issues for analysis. NNSA welcomes
specific comments or suggestions on the content of these alternatives,
or on other alternatives that could be considered. A preliminary set of
alternatives and issues for evaluation in the LLNL SWEIS is identified
below. Additionally, during the development of the LLNL SWEIS, NNSA may
consider other alternatives judged to be reasonable.
No Action Alternative: Continuing Present Operations
The No Action Alternative would continue current facility
operations throughout LLNL in support of assigned missions. NEPA
regulations require analysis of the No Action Alternative to provide a
benchmark for comparison with environmental effects of the other
alternatives. This alternative includes the programs and activities
described above in the LLNL Mission and those activities for which NEPA
review is already done or underway.
Proposed Action Alternative
The programmatic context for this alternative is the continued
support of existing programs and development of additional missions or
projects that would be needed to meet DOE/NNSA mission requirements and
sustain science, technology, and engineering excellence to respond to
future national security challenges. This alternative would include the
scope of the No Action Alternative, as described above, and an increase
in current facility operations or enhanced operations that may require
new or modified facilities and are reasonably foreseeable over the next
15 years. NNSA has identified four categories of actions associated
with the Proposed Action: (1) New Facility Construction Projects; (2)
Modernization/Upgrades of Existing Facilities and Infrastructure; (3)
Operational Changes; and (4) Decontamination, Decommissioning, and
Demolition Projects. Each of these categories of actions is discussed
below.
NNSA has identified approximately 35 new facility construction
projects, including laboratory facilities related to materials
engineering, exascale computing, laser-explosives applications, and
high explosives research and development; general office buildings;
maintenance facilities; science centers for both nuclear security and
forensics; and a new fire station. New facility projects would be
proposed at both the Livermore Site and Site 300.
With regard to modernization/upgrades of existing facilities and
infrastructure, NNSA has identified approximately 65 discrete projects,
including upgrades to basic infrastructure (e.g., domestic water
systems, electrical systems, fire protection systems, communication
systems, and security systems); modernization of firing and control
systems at Site 300; NIF laser power upgrades and utility system
replacements; biosecurity and bioscience facility upgrades;
modernization of high performance computing capabilities; seismic risk
reduction initiatives; and waste management facility enhancements.
Modernization/upgrades will extend facility lifetimes, improve work
environments, and enhance operational capabilities.
Proposed operational changes are expected to include: Changes to
material-at-risk (MAR), administrative limits, and radiological
bounding accident scenarios as a result of the deinventory of Security
Category I and II special nuclear materials from LLNL, which was
completed in 2012; and changes in various facility operations, which
would be defined in the LLNL SWEIS, and may result in changes in
generated wastes and shipments to disposal sites. All proposed
operational changes would be described in detail and analyzed in the
Draft LLNL SWEIS.
Decontamination, decommissioning, and demolition of older
facilities would be conducted on a continuing basis to eliminate excess
facilities and reduce costs and risks. Over the 15-year LLNL SWEIS
planning horizon, NNSA has identified more than 110 excess facilities,
totaling more than 1.1 million square feet, to be decontaminated,
decommissioned, and demolished.
The net effect of new facility construction, existing facility
modernization/upgrades, and demolition of excess facilities is expected
to reduce LLNL's footprint and improve the efficiency of operations.
The LLNL SWEIS will identify the specific projects and facilities that
are potentially affected by the Proposed Action, and will assess the
potential impacts associated with implementation of the Proposed
Action.
Other Potential Reasonable Alternatives
The timeframe for the LLNL SWEIS analysis is approximately 15 years
into the future. NNSA recognizes that requirements, needs,
opportunities, and vision may change over such a long planning horizon.
Consequently, NNSA is exploring the possibility of including additional
alternatives in the LLNL SWEIS--such as reduced operations or expanded
operations--that could be reasonable and responsive to that planning
horizon. NNSA welcomes input on alternatives that the public thinks are
reasonable and should be analyzed in the LLNL SWEIS.
Alternatives that NNSA will not consider as reasonable are: The
complete closure and decontamination and decommissioning of the
Livermore Site or Site 300, and transfer of current missions/operations
from LLNL to other sites, as those actions would be inconsistent with
the LLNL mission defined by NNSA. Such a possibility was considered in
2008 when NNSA prepared the Complex Transformation Supplemental
Programmatic EIS. In that document, NNSA concluded that, ``as a result
of the continuing challenges of certification [of nuclear weapons]
without underground testing, the need for robust peer review, benefits
of intellectual diversity from competing physics design laboratories,
and uncertainty over the details [of] future stockpiles, NNSA does not
consider it reasonable to evaluate laboratory
[[Page 47365]]
consolidation [or elimination] at this time.'' That conclusion has not
changed today. In addition, as one of only three nuclear weapons
laboratories, LLNL contributes significantly to the core intellectual
and technical competencies of the United States related to nuclear
weapons. These competencies embody more than 50 years of weapons
knowledge and experience. The laboratories perform the basic research,
design, system engineering, development testing, reliability and
assessment, and certification of nuclear weapon safety, reliability,
and performance. From a broader national security perspective, the core
intellectual and technical competencies of LLNL (and Los Alamos
National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories [NNSA's other
nuclear weapons laboratories]) provide the technical basis for the
pursuit of U.S. arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives.
The Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic EIS also
considered and evaluated the transfer of missions/operations to/from
LLNL, and NNSA has implemented, as appropriate, decisions that followed
preparation of that document. NNSA has not identified any new proposals
for current missions/operations that are reasonable for transfer to/
from LLNL.
Preliminary Environmental Analysis
The following issues have been identified for analysis in the LLNL
SWEIS. The list is tentative and intended to facilitate public comment
on the scope of the LLNL SWEIS. It is not intended to be all-inclusive,
nor does it imply any predetermination of potential impacts. The NNSA
specifically invites suggestions for the addition or deletion of items
on this list.
1. Potential effects on the public and workers from exposures to
radiological and hazardous materials during normal operations,
construction, reasonably foreseeable accidents, and intentional
destructive acts.
2. Impacts on surface and groundwater, floodplains and wetlands,
and on water use and quality.
3. Impacts on air quality.
4. Impacts to plants and animals and their habitat, including
species which are federally- or state-listed as threatened or
endangered, or of special concern.
5. Impacts on physiography, topography, geology, and soil
characteristics including vadose zone.
6. Impacts to cultural resources such as those that are historic,
prehistoric, archaeological, scientific, or paleontological.
7. Socioeconomic impacts to affected communities.
8. Environmental Justice, particularly whether or not activities at
LLNL have a disproportionately high and adverse effect on minority and/
or low-income populations.
9. Potential impacts on land use and applicable plans and policies.
10. Impacts from traffic and transportation of radiological and
hazardous materials and waste on and off the LLNL sites.
11. Pollution prevention and materials and waste management
practices and activities.
12. Impacts on visual aesthetics and noise levels of the LLNL
facilities on the surrounding communities and ambient environment.
13. Impacts to community services, including fire protection,
police protection, schools, and solid waste disposal in landfills.
14. Impacts from use of utilities, including water and electricity
consumption, fuel use, sewer discharges, and resource conservation.
15. Impacts from site contamination, characterization and
remediation.
16. Unavoidable adverse impacts due to natural phenomena (e.g.,
floods, earthquakes, etc.).
17. Environmental compliance and inadvertent releases.
18. Short term uses and long-term productivity.
19. Irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.
20. Cumulative effects of past, present, and future operations.
21. Reasonably foreseeable impacts associated with the shutdown or
demolition of excess facilities.
22. Mitigation commitments.
Site Specific LLNL SWEIS Process
The scoping process is intended to involve all interested agencies
(federal, state, and local), public interest groups, Native American
Tribes, local businesses, and members of the general public. Interested
parties are invited to participate in the LLNL SWEIS process, to refine
the preliminary alternatives and environmental issues that are not
reasonable or pertinent. Input from the scoping meeting will assist
NNSA in formulating the proposed action, refining the alternatives, and
defining the scope of the LLNL SWEIS analyses.
Following the scoping process announced in this Notice, and after
consideration of comments received during scoping, NNSA will prepare a
Draft LLNL SWEIS for the continued operation of the LLNL. NNSA will
announce the availability of the Draft LLNL SWEIS in the Federal
Register and local media outlets. NNSA will hold one or more public
hearings for the Draft LLNL SWEIS. Any comments received on the Draft
LLNL SWEIS will be considered and addressed in the Final LLNL SWEIS.
NNSA will then issue a Record of Decision no sooner than 30 days after
publication by the Environmental Protection Agency of a Notice of
Availability of the Final LLNL SWEIS.
Relationship to Existing and Other NEPA Analyses
NNSA is responsible for management and implementation of the
requirements of NEPA and the regulations and policies promulgated
thereunder, including but not limited to the Council of Environmental
Quality NEPA regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), the DOE NEPA
implementing procedures (10 CFR part 1021), and NNSA Policy (NAP)
451.1. In addition to compliance with NEPA, the LLNL SWEIS will address
requirements in the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public
Resources Code Sec 21000 et seq. Because requirements for NEPA and CEQA
are somewhat different, the document would be prepared to comply with
whichever requirements are more stringent.
The current SWEIS for Continued Operation of LLNL (2005 LLNL SWEIS)
was completed in 2005. This was the conclusion of a process involving
roughly 42 months of analysis, public meetings, and document
preparation. Previously, a SWEIS was issued in 1992. While there is no
specific ``lifespan'' for a SWEIS, historically, NNSA has performed new
SWEIS analyses for national laboratories on an average of every 10
years.
In 2008, the NNSA completed the Complex Transformation Supplemental
Programmatic EIS which included further analysis for LLNL programs/
facilities. Some facilities identified for closure in that document
remain operational due to programmatic requirements.
In 2011, NNSA prepared a Supplement Analysis (SA) to the 2005 LLNL
SWEIS which included new information that was not available for
consideration when the 2005 LLNL SWEIS was prepared. It concluded that
the 2005 LLNL SWEIS remained adequate for LLNL for the next five years.
A team of LFO and Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC subject
matter experts then began working on a new SA in 2016. Although this
more recent SA process was not completed, the team reached a consensus
that a new SWEIS would provide numerous programmatic and
[[Page 47366]]
operational benefits for the LLNL national security mission.
EIS Preparation and Schedule
NNSA expects to issue the Draft LLNL SWEIS in early 2021.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on this 21st
day of July, 2020, by Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security and Administrator, NNSA, pursuant to delegated
authority from the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original
signature and date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes
only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of the Department of Energy. This
administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on July 31, 2020.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2020-17054 Filed 8-4-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P