National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs, 47211-47213 [2020-16884]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 150 / Tuesday, August 4, 2020 / Notices
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needing dual illumination than
previously estimated.
Finally, the Public Notice establishes
the process for electing lump sum
payments. Consistent with the 3.7 GHz
Report and Order, incumbent earth
station owners must make their lump
sum payment election no later than
August 31, 2020. Because IBFS
registrations do not contain sufficient
information to determine the classes of
earth stations/antennas that are
registered at each earth station site or to
determine whether an earth station site
is an MVPD earth station, the Bureau
requires earth station owners to certify
that the information they provide in
their lump sum election—including the
antenna type and class of earth station—
is accurate to the best of their
knowledge.
Incumbent earth station owners
choosing the lump sum election must
file in IB Docket No. 20–205, with the
following information for each of that
operator’s incumbent earth station sites:
1. Licensee/Registrant/Applicant
Name,
2. Earth Station Callsign,
3. Site ID,
4. Antenna ID,
5. Number of antennas associated
with that Antenna ID,
6. Site address,
7. GPS coordinates of the earth
station,
8. File Number(s) of current
authorization and/or pending
application,
9. Confirmation that the earth station
meets the definition of incumbent earth
station under 47 CFR 27.1411(b)(3) and
25.138(c), including indication of
whether earth station appears on the
International Bureau’s final list of
eligible earth stations,1
10. Category of lump sum election for
each registered antenna at that
registered earth station site (e.g. Receive
Only ES Single-feed; Receive Only ES
Multi-feed; Small Multi-beam (2–4
beams) ES, etc.),
11. Whether earth station site is an
MVPD earth station site (to claim the
per-site technology upgrade installation
amount),
12. Total lump sum amount claimed
for that earth station (calculated by the
number of registered antennas at that
incumbent earth station multiplied by
the relevant lump sum base amount,
plus technology upgrade installation
amount if MVPD), and
13. Whether the incumbent earth
station will be transitioned to the upper
200 megahertz in order to maintain Cband services or will discontinue Cband services.
The lump sum election must include
a certification from the incumbent earth
station owner (if an individual) or a
duly authorized representative with
authority to bind the station, which
certifies to the following:
1. That the information contained in
the lump sum election is true and
accurate to the best of the incumbent
earth station owner (if an individual) or
duly authorized representative
knowledge;
2. That all earth stations for which the
lump sum is being elected will not have
ceased operation more than 90 days
before the deadline for the lump sum
election;
3. That, if the incumbent earth station
owner intends to continue to receive
content from a satellite operator after
the transition at any of its earth station
antennas, it accepts responsibility for
undertaking the necessary transition
actions in accordance with the timelines
set forth in the satellite operators’
Transition Plans;
4. That the incumbent earth station
owner agrees to coordinate with the
relevant space station operator as
necessary to complete the transition;
5. An irrevocable release of claims for
reimbursement for actual reasonable
relocation costs from the Relocation
Payment Clearinghouse, eligible satellite
operators, or video programmers; and
6. An irrevocable release of claims
against the payor and/or Commission
with respect to any dispute about the
amount received.
Federal Communications Commission.
Amy Brett,
Chief of Staff, Competition and Infrastructure
Policy Division,Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2020–17058 Filed 8–3–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
[WC Docket No. 18–89; FCC 20–99; FRS
16963]
National Security Threats to the
Communications Supply Chain
Through FCC Programs
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
See International Bureau Releases Preliminary
List of Incumbent Earth Stations in the 3.7–4.2 GHz
Band in the Contiguous United States, Public
Notice, DA 20–703, at 1–2 (IB July 6, 2020). We note
that the International Bureau will have released the
final list of incumbent earth stations prior to the
election deadline.
1
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In this document, the Federal
Communications Commission
(Commission) finds it has already
SUMMARY:
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47211
substantially complied with the Secure
and Trusted Communications Networks
Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act) with
the prohibition adopted in the 2019
Supply Chain Order.
DATES: This Declaratory Ruling is
applicable July 17, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
further information, please contact
Brian Cruikshank, Wireline Competition
Bureau, Brian.Cruikshank@fcc.gov, 202–
418–7400 or TTY: 202–418–0484.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s
Declaratory Ruling in WC Docket No.
18–89, FCC 20–99, adopted on July 16,
2020 and released July 17, 2020. Due to
the COVID–19 pandemic, the
Commission’s headquarters will be
closed to the general public until further
notice. The full text of this document is
available at the following internet
address: https://www.fcc.gov/document/
implementing-secure-networks-act-0.
The Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that was adopted
concurrently with this Declaratory
Ruling will be published elsewhere in
the Federal Register.
I. Introduction
1. America’s communications
networks have become the
indispensable infrastructure of our
economy and our everyday lives. The
COVID–19 pandemic has demonstrated
as never before the importance of these
networks for employment and economic
opportunity, education, health care,
social and civic engagement, and
staying connected with family and
friends. It is therefore imperative that
the Commission safeguards this critical
infrastructure from potential security
threats.
2. The Commission has taken a
number of targeted steps in this regard.
For example, in November 2019, the
Commission prohibited the use of
public funds from the Commission’s
Universal Service Fund (USF) to
purchase or obtain any equipment or
services produced or provided by
companies posing a national security
threat to the integrity of
communications networks or the
communications supply chain. The
Commission also initially designated
Huawei Technologies Company
(Huawei) and ZTE Corporation (ZTE) as
covered companies for purposes of this
rule, and the Commission established a
process for designating additional
covered companies in the future.
Additionally, last month, the
Commission’s Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB)
issued final designations of Huawei and
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 150 / Tuesday, August 4, 2020 / Notices
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ZTE as covered companies, thereby
prohibiting the use of USF funds on
equipment or services produced or
provided by these two suppliers.
3. The Commission takes further steps
to protect the nation’s communications
networks from potential security threats
as it integrates provisions of the recently
enacted Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019
(Secure Networks Act) into its existing
supply chain rulemaking proceeding.
The Commission adopts a Declaratory
Ruling finding that, in the 2019 Supply
Chain Order, 85 FR 230, January 3,
2020, it fulfilled its obligation pursuant
to section 3 of the Secure Networks Act
to prohibit the use of funds made
available through a Federal subsidy
program administered by the
Commission to purchase, rent, lease, or
otherwise obtain or maintain any
covered communications equipment or
services from certain companies.
II. Declaratory Ruling
4. In the 2019 Supply Chain Order,
the Commission prohibited the use of
universal service support for equipment
and services produced or provided by
companies designated as a national
security threat. The Commission finds
that its prohibition, codified in section
54.9 of the Commission’s rules, is
consistent with and substantially
implements subsection 3(a) of the
Secure Networks Act, which prohibits
the use of federal funds on certain
communications equipment and
services. Accordingly, the Commission
further finds that it has satisfied the
requirements of section 3(b) in the
Secure Networks Act and it needs not
revisit or otherwise modify our prior
action in the 2019 Supply Chain Order.
5. Introduced prior to the adoption of
the 2019 Supply Chain Order and
subsequently enacted on March 12,
2020, section 3(a) of the Secure
Networks Act prohibits ‘‘[a] Federal
subsidy that is made available through
a program administered by the
Commission and that provides funds to
be used for the capital expenditures
necessary for the provision of advanced
communications service’’ from being
used either to ‘‘purchase, rent, lease or
otherwise obtain any covered
communications equipment or service;
or maintain any covered
communications equipment or service
. . . .’’ The prohibition applies ‘‘60
days after the date the Commission
places such equipment or service on the
list’’ required by section 2(a) of the
statute.
6. In section 3(b), Congress directed
the Commission to adopt a Report and
Order to implement this prohibition
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18:14 Aug 03, 2020
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within 180 days following the Secure
Networks Act’s enactment. Section 3(b)
further states, ‘‘If the Commission has,
before the date of the enactment of this
Act, taken action that in whole or in
part implements subsection (a), the
Commission is not required to revisit
such action, but only to the extent such
action is consistent with this section.’’
The Commission interprets the language
in section 3(b) to mean that if it has,
prior to the enactment of the Secure
Networks Act, already adopted a
prohibition on the use of Federal funds
that substantially tracks the statutory
prohibition, then the Commission is
deemed to have satisfied the 180-day
deadline contained in section 3(b) and
need not revisit its prior action. To avail
itself of this exception to the statutory
deadline, however, the Commission’s
previously adopted prohibition must be
‘‘consistent’’ with, i.e., compatible with,
and must not conflict with, the
requirements of section 3(a).
7. In the 2019 Supply Chain Order,
the Commission prohibited the use of
universal service support to ‘‘maintain,
improve, modify, operate, manage, or
otherwise support any equipment or
services produced or provided by a
company posing a national security
threat to the integrity of the
communications networks or the
communications supply chain.’’ The
Commission also initially designated
two companies, Huawei and ZTE, as
companies posing a national security
threat. PSHSB recently issued final
designations of these entities, thereby
prohibiting the use of USF funds to
maintain, improve, modify, operate,
manage, or otherwise support
equipment or services produced or
provided by Huawei and ZTE effective
June 30, 2020.
8. The Commission’s prohibition in
the 2019 Supply Chain Order is
consistent with and substantially
implements the prohibition required by
section 3(a) of the Secure Networks Act.
The Commission starts by noting that it
administers two ongoing programs that
provide a ‘‘Federal subsidy’’: the USF, a
Federal subsidy program that subsidizes
the cost of obtaining communications
equipment and/or services for carriers
serving high-cost areas, schools and
libraries, rural health care providers,
and low-income households, and the
Interstate Telecommunications Relay
Service Fund, a Federal subsidy
program that subsidizes the cost of relay
services for individuals who are deaf,
hard of hearing, deaf/blind, or have a
speech impediment. Given that the USF,
unlike the Interstate
Telecommunications Relay Service
Fund, ‘‘provides funds to be used for the
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Frm 00053
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
capital expenditures necessary for the
provision of advanced communications
service,’’ we believe Congress clearly
intended the section 3 prohibition to
apply to the USF.
9. The Commission also finds the
scope of communications equipment
and services covered by the
Commission’s prohibition encompasses
the scope of the Secure Networks Act’s
section 3 prohibition. The Commission’s
prohibition broadly covers ‘‘any
equipment or services produced by any
company posing a national security
threat.’’ In comparison, the prohibition
in section 3 of the Secure Networks Act
applies to ‘‘any covered
communications equipment or service.’’
Covered communications equipment or
service is limited to that which is
capable of certain functions and
capabilities or otherwise poses a
security threat. Although the
Commission’s prohibition goes further
than the requirements of the Secure
Networks Act, it does not conflict with
the statutory requirements of section
3(a). Accordingly, by complying with
the Commission’s broader prohibition,
USF support recipients will be in
compliance with the Secure Networks
Act prohibition. Section 3(a) of the
Secure Networks Act also specifies that
the ban takes effect 60 days after the
Commission places the equipment or
service on the list required by section 2
of the statute. The Commission believes
that rule 54.9 substantially implements
this section 3 requirement by providing
a notice period for interested parties
(which, if opposed, the Commission
would expect to last at least 60 days)
and stating that the ban takes effect only
when initial designations of covered
companies are finalized. However, to
the extent there are differences between
the Commission’s rules and section 3 of
the Secure Networks Act, it seeks
comment on additional changes to its
rules.
10. With the Commission’s adoption
of the prohibition in the 2019 Supply
Chain Order, the Commission has
substantially implemented the section 3
statutory mandate to adopt a prohibition
on covered communications equipment
or services. As such, the Commission
avails ourselves of the proviso, set forth
in section 3(b), not to revisit its prior
action implementing the mandate.
Nevertheless, in the concurrently
adopted Further Notice, the
Commission seeks comment on
additional changes to its rules pursuant
to section 3 of the Secure Networks Act.
III. Ordering Clause
11. It is further Ordered that, pursuant
to Section 3 of the Secure Networks Act,
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 150 / Tuesday, August 4, 2020 / Notices
47 U.S.C. 1602 and the authority
contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 201(b),
214, 254, 303(r), and 403 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 155(b),
155(c), 201(b), 214, 254, 303(r), and 403,
and Sections 1.2 and 54.9 of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.2 and
54.9, the Declaratory Ruling in WC
Docket No. 18–89 is adopted.
12. It is further Ordered that the
Declaratory Ruling is effective upon
release.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020–16884 Filed 8–3–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
Notice of the FDIC’s Response to
Exception Requests Pursuant To
Recordkeeping for Timely Deposit
Insurance Determination
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of the FDIC’s response to
exception requests pursuant to the
Recordkeeping for Timely Deposit
Insurance Determination rule.
AGENCY:
In accordance with its rule
regarding recordkeeping for timely
deposit insurance determination, the
FDIC is providing notice to covered
institutions that it has granted a timelimited exception of up to 18 months
concerning the information technology
system requirements and general
recordkeeping requirements for certain
deposit accounts for sole
proprietorships that the covered
institution’s information technology
systems misclassify with an incorrect
ownership right and capacity code and
a time-limited exception of up to 12
months concerning the information
technology system requirements and
general recordkeeping requirements for
limited number of joint deposit
accounts that the covered institution has
not confirmed are ‘‘qualifying joint
accounts’’ for deposit insurance
purposes.
SUMMARY:
The FDIC’s grants of exception
relief were effective as of July 28, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Benjamin Schneider, Section Chief,
Division of Complex Institution
Supervision and Resolution;
beschneider@fdic.gov; 917–320–2534.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FDIC
granted two time-limited exception
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DATES:
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18:14 Aug 03, 2020
Jkt 250001
requests to a covered institution
pursuant to the FDIC’s rule entitled
‘‘Recordkeeping for Timely Deposit
Insurance Determination,’’ codified at
12 CFR part 370 (part 370).1 Part 370
generally requires covered institutions
to implement the information
technology system and recordkeeping
capabilities needed to quickly calculate
the amount of deposit insurance
coverage available for each deposit
account in the event of failure. Pursuant
to section 370.8(b)(1), one or more
covered institutions may submit a
request in the form of a letter to the
FDIC for an exception from one or more
of the requirements of part 370 if
circumstances exist that would make it
impracticable or overly burdensome to
meet those requirements. Pursuant to
section 370.8(b)(3), a covered institution
may rely upon another covered
institution’s exception request which
the FDIC has previously granted by
notifying the FDIC that it will invoke
relief from certain part 370 requirements
and demonstrating that the covered
institution has substantially similar
facts and circumstances to those of the
covered institution that has already
received the FDIC’s approval. The
notification letter must also include the
information required under section
370.8(b)(1) and cite the applicable
notice published pursuant to section
370.8(b)(2). Unless informed otherwise
by the FDIC within 120 days after
receipt of a complete notification for
exception, the exception will be deemed
granted subject to the same conditions
set forth in the FDIC’s published notice.
These grants of relief may be
rescinded or modified upon material
change of circumstances or conditions
related to the subject accounts, or upon
failure to satisfy conditions applicable
to each. These grants of relief will be
subject to ongoing FDIC review,
analysis, and verification during the
FDIC’s routine part 370 compliance
tests. The FDIC presumes each covered
institution is meeting all the
requirements set forth in the Rule unless
relief has otherwise been granted. The
following exceptions were granted by
the FDIC as of July 28, 2020.
I. Certain Deposit Accounts for Sole
Proprietorships That the Covered
Institution’s Information Technology
Systems Misclassify With an Incorrect
Ownership, Right and Capacity Code
The FDIC granted a time-limited
exception of up to 18 months from the
information technology requirements set
forth in section 370.3 and general
recordkeeping requirements set forth in
1 12
PO 00000
section 370.4(a) of the rule to allow a
covered institution to perform system
updates and remediation efforts to
ensure certain sole proprietorship
deposit accounts are correctly classified
by its part 370 information technology
system. The covered institution
identified that the subject accounts were
opened in a manner such that its
information technology systems
identified the accounts as being held
under the BUS ownership right and
capacity code. As a result, the
institution must update its information
technology systems to ensure the
appropriate ownership right and
capacity code of SGL is applied to the
subject accounts.
In connection with the FDIC’s grant of
relief, the covered institution has
represented that it will both perform
information technology system updates
and update policies to ensure current
and future accounts for sole
proprietorships are assigned the
appropriate SGL ownership right and
capacity code. The covered institution
has represented that it will maintain the
capability to place holds on the deposit
accounts subject to the exception in the
event of failure until a deposit insurance
determination can be made and place all
such accounts into the pending file of
its part 370 output files during the relief
period. As conditions of relief, the
covered institution must submit a status
report to part370@fdic.gov at the
midpoint of the exception relief period
and immediately bring to the FDIC’s
attention any change of circumstances
or conditions.
II. A Limited Number of Joint Accounts
for Which the Covered Institution Has
Not Confirmed ‘‘Qualifying Joint
Account’’ Status for Deposit Insurance
Purposes Pursuant to 12 CFR Section
330.9
The FDIC granted a time-limited
exception of up to 12 months from the
information technology requirements set
forth in section 370.3 and general
recordkeeping requirements set forth in
section 370.4(a) of the rule for a limited
number of joint accounts that a covered
institution has not confirmed are
‘‘qualifying joint accounts’’ entitled to
separate deposit insurance coverage
pursuant to 12 CFR 330.9(c).2 The
2 Pursuant to 12 CFR 330.9(c)(1), the following
requirements must be met for a joint account to be
a ‘‘qualifying joint account’’ entitled to separate
deposit insurance coverage: (i) All co-owners of the
funds in the account are ‘‘natural persons’’ (as
defined in § 330.1(l)); (ii) each co-owner has
personally signed, which may include signing
electronically, a deposit account signature card, or
the alternative method provided in paragraph (c)(4)
CFR part 370.
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Continued
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 150 (Tuesday, August 4, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47211-47213]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-16884]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[WC Docket No. 18-89; FCC 20-99; FRS 16963]
National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain
Through FCC Programs
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) finds it has already substantially complied with the
Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks
Act) with the prohibition adopted in the 2019 Supply Chain Order.
DATES: This Declaratory Ruling is applicable July 17, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, please
contact Brian Cruikshank, Wireline Competition Bureau,
[email protected], 202-418-7400 or TTY: 202-418-0484.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Declaratory Ruling in WC Docket No. 18-89, FCC 20-99, adopted on July
16, 2020 and released July 17, 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Commission's headquarters will be closed to the general public until
further notice. The full text of this document is available at the
following internet address: https://www.fcc.gov/document/implementing-secure-networks-act-0. The Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
that was adopted concurrently with this Declaratory Ruling will be
published elsewhere in the Federal Register.
I. Introduction
1. America's communications networks have become the indispensable
infrastructure of our economy and our everyday lives. The COVID-19
pandemic has demonstrated as never before the importance of these
networks for employment and economic opportunity, education, health
care, social and civic engagement, and staying connected with family
and friends. It is therefore imperative that the Commission safeguards
this critical infrastructure from potential security threats.
2. The Commission has taken a number of targeted steps in this
regard. For example, in November 2019, the Commission prohibited the
use of public funds from the Commission's Universal Service Fund (USF)
to purchase or obtain any equipment or services produced or provided by
companies posing a national security threat to the integrity of
communications networks or the communications supply chain. The
Commission also initially designated Huawei Technologies Company
(Huawei) and ZTE Corporation (ZTE) as covered companies for purposes of
this rule, and the Commission established a process for designating
additional covered companies in the future. Additionally, last month,
the Commission's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB)
issued final designations of Huawei and
[[Page 47212]]
ZTE as covered companies, thereby prohibiting the use of USF funds on
equipment or services produced or provided by these two suppliers.
3. The Commission takes further steps to protect the nation's
communications networks from potential security threats as it
integrates provisions of the recently enacted Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act) into its
existing supply chain rulemaking proceeding. The Commission adopts a
Declaratory Ruling finding that, in the 2019 Supply Chain Order, 85 FR
230, January 3, 2020, it fulfilled its obligation pursuant to section 3
of the Secure Networks Act to prohibit the use of funds made available
through a Federal subsidy program administered by the Commission to
purchase, rent, lease, or otherwise obtain or maintain any covered
communications equipment or services from certain companies.
II. Declaratory Ruling
4. In the 2019 Supply Chain Order, the Commission prohibited the
use of universal service support for equipment and services produced or
provided by companies designated as a national security threat. The
Commission finds that its prohibition, codified in section 54.9 of the
Commission's rules, is consistent with and substantially implements
subsection 3(a) of the Secure Networks Act, which prohibits the use of
federal funds on certain communications equipment and services.
Accordingly, the Commission further finds that it has satisfied the
requirements of section 3(b) in the Secure Networks Act and it needs
not revisit or otherwise modify our prior action in the 2019 Supply
Chain Order.
5. Introduced prior to the adoption of the 2019 Supply Chain Order
and subsequently enacted on March 12, 2020, section 3(a) of the Secure
Networks Act prohibits ``[a] Federal subsidy that is made available
through a program administered by the Commission and that provides
funds to be used for the capital expenditures necessary for the
provision of advanced communications service'' from being used either
to ``purchase, rent, lease or otherwise obtain any covered
communications equipment or service; or maintain any covered
communications equipment or service . . . .'' The prohibition applies
``60 days after the date the Commission places such equipment or
service on the list'' required by section 2(a) of the statute.
6. In section 3(b), Congress directed the Commission to adopt a
Report and Order to implement this prohibition within 180 days
following the Secure Networks Act's enactment. Section 3(b) further
states, ``If the Commission has, before the date of the enactment of
this Act, taken action that in whole or in part implements subsection
(a), the Commission is not required to revisit such action, but only to
the extent such action is consistent with this section.'' The
Commission interprets the language in section 3(b) to mean that if it
has, prior to the enactment of the Secure Networks Act, already adopted
a prohibition on the use of Federal funds that substantially tracks the
statutory prohibition, then the Commission is deemed to have satisfied
the 180-day deadline contained in section 3(b) and need not revisit its
prior action. To avail itself of this exception to the statutory
deadline, however, the Commission's previously adopted prohibition must
be ``consistent'' with, i.e., compatible with, and must not conflict
with, the requirements of section 3(a).
7. In the 2019 Supply Chain Order, the Commission prohibited the
use of universal service support to ``maintain, improve, modify,
operate, manage, or otherwise support any equipment or services
produced or provided by a company posing a national security threat to
the integrity of the communications networks or the communications
supply chain.'' The Commission also initially designated two companies,
Huawei and ZTE, as companies posing a national security threat. PSHSB
recently issued final designations of these entities, thereby
prohibiting the use of USF funds to maintain, improve, modify, operate,
manage, or otherwise support equipment or services produced or provided
by Huawei and ZTE effective June 30, 2020.
8. The Commission's prohibition in the 2019 Supply Chain Order is
consistent with and substantially implements the prohibition required
by section 3(a) of the Secure Networks Act. The Commission starts by
noting that it administers two ongoing programs that provide a
``Federal subsidy'': the USF, a Federal subsidy program that subsidizes
the cost of obtaining communications equipment and/or services for
carriers serving high-cost areas, schools and libraries, rural health
care providers, and low-income households, and the Interstate
Telecommunications Relay Service Fund, a Federal subsidy program that
subsidizes the cost of relay services for individuals who are deaf,
hard of hearing, deaf/blind, or have a speech impediment. Given that
the USF, unlike the Interstate Telecommunications Relay Service Fund,
``provides funds to be used for the capital expenditures necessary for
the provision of advanced communications service,'' we believe Congress
clearly intended the section 3 prohibition to apply to the USF.
9. The Commission also finds the scope of communications equipment
and services covered by the Commission's prohibition encompasses the
scope of the Secure Networks Act's section 3 prohibition. The
Commission's prohibition broadly covers ``any equipment or services
produced by any company posing a national security threat.'' In
comparison, the prohibition in section 3 of the Secure Networks Act
applies to ``any covered communications equipment or service.'' Covered
communications equipment or service is limited to that which is capable
of certain functions and capabilities or otherwise poses a security
threat. Although the Commission's prohibition goes further than the
requirements of the Secure Networks Act, it does not conflict with the
statutory requirements of section 3(a). Accordingly, by complying with
the Commission's broader prohibition, USF support recipients will be in
compliance with the Secure Networks Act prohibition. Section 3(a) of
the Secure Networks Act also specifies that the ban takes effect 60
days after the Commission places the equipment or service on the list
required by section 2 of the statute. The Commission believes that rule
54.9 substantially implements this section 3 requirement by providing a
notice period for interested parties (which, if opposed, the Commission
would expect to last at least 60 days) and stating that the ban takes
effect only when initial designations of covered companies are
finalized. However, to the extent there are differences between the
Commission's rules and section 3 of the Secure Networks Act, it seeks
comment on additional changes to its rules.
10. With the Commission's adoption of the prohibition in the 2019
Supply Chain Order, the Commission has substantially implemented the
section 3 statutory mandate to adopt a prohibition on covered
communications equipment or services. As such, the Commission avails
ourselves of the proviso, set forth in section 3(b), not to revisit its
prior action implementing the mandate. Nevertheless, in the
concurrently adopted Further Notice, the Commission seeks comment on
additional changes to its rules pursuant to section 3 of the Secure
Networks Act.
III. Ordering Clause
11. It is further Ordered that, pursuant to Section 3 of the Secure
Networks Act,
[[Page 47213]]
47 U.S.C. 1602 and the authority contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 201(b),
214, 254, 303(r), and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 155(b), 155(c), 201(b), 214, 254,
303(r), and 403, and Sections 1.2 and 54.9 of the Commission's rules,
47 CFR 1.2 and 54.9, the Declaratory Ruling in WC Docket No. 18-89 is
adopted.
12. It is further Ordered that the Declaratory Ruling is effective
upon release.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020-16884 Filed 8-3-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
