Arms Sales Notification, 39183-39186 [2020-14067]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
• Office of the Secretary

[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 126 (Tuesday, June 30, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39183-39186]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-14067]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 20-05]


Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Arms sales notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text 
of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karma Job at [email protected] 
or (703) 697-8976.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is 
published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-
164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 20-05 with 
attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology.

    Dated: June 24, 2020.
Aaron T. Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P

[[Page 39184]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN30JN20.112

BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
Transmittal No. 20-05
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
    (i) Prospective Purchaser: Republic of the Philippines
    (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment *................  $1.0 billion
Other....................................  $ .5 billion
                                          ------------------------------
  Total..................................  $1.5 billion
 

    (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
    Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Six (6) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters
Eighteen (18) T700-GE-701D Engines (12 installed, 6 spares)
Fifteen (15) Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Inertial 
Navigation (EGIs) w/Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (12 installed, 3 
spares)
Two hundred (200) AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles
Twelve (12) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM)
Three hundred (300) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) Kits
One thousand seven hundred (1,700) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon 
System (APKWS) Guidance Sections
Six (6) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/
AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS)
Six (6) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units 
(REU)
Six (6) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (M-RFI)
Eight (8) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6 installed, 2 
spares)
Two hundred (200) FIM-92H Stinger Missiles
Eight (8) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Video Receivers (6 
installed, 2 spares)
Eight (8) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Air-Air-Ground Kits (6 
installed, 2 spares)
    Non-MDE:
Also included are eight (8) AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting sets (6 
installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/APR-39C(V)l+ Radar Signal Detecting 
sets (6 installed, 2 spares); fourteen (14) Single Channel Ground and 
Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) radios (12 installed, 2 spares); 
fourteen (14) UHF/VHF/LOS airborne radios (12 installed, 2 spares); 
eight (8) AN/APX-123A (V) Common Transponders (6 installed, 2 spares); 
eight (8) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems (6 new, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/
ARN-149 (V)3 Automatic Direction Finders (6 installed, 2 spares); eight 
(8) Doppler ASN-157 Doppler Radar Velocity Sensors (6 installed, 2 
spares); eight

[[Page 39185]]

(8) AN/APN-209 Radar Altimeters (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/
ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation sets (TACAN) (6 installed, 2 spares); 
four (4) TACAN Ground Stations; eight (8) Very High Frequency Omni-
Directional Range/Instrument Landing Systems (VOR/ILS) (6 installed, 2 
spares); three (3) AN/PYQ-10(C) Simple Key Loader (3 new); six (6) 
M230El + M139 AWS Automatic Gun (6 new); eighteen (18) M261 rocket 
launchers (12 new, 6 spares); eighteen (18) M299 missile launchers (12 
new, 6 spares); six (6) rocket motor, 2.75-inch, MK66-4, Inert (6 new); 
six (6) High Explosive Warhead for Airborne 2.75 Rocket, Inert (6 new); 
eighteen (18) Stinger air-to-air launchers (18 new); twelve (12) 
Stinger Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) (12 new); six (6) Stinger Aerial 
Handling Trainers (AHT) (6 new); five thousand (5,000) each 2.75 inch 
rockets (5,000 new); eighty thousand (80,000) 30mm rounds (80,000 new), 
training devices, communication systems, helmets, simulators, 
generators, transportation and organization equipment, spare and repair 
parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and 
publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. 
Government and contractor technical assistance, technical and logistics 
support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
    (iv) Military Department: Army (PI-B-VXX)
    (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None
    (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be 
Paid: None
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or 
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex
    (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: April 30, 2020
    *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Philippines--Apache AH-64E Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and 
Support

    The Government of the Philippines has requested to buy six (6) AH-
64E Apache attack helicopters; eighteen (18) T700-GE-701D engines (12 
installed, 6 spares); fifteen (15) Honeywell Embedded Global 
Positioning Systems/Inertial Navigation (EGIs) w/Precise Positioning 
Service (PPS) (12 installed, 3 spares); two hundred (200) AGM-114 
Hellfire missiles; twelve (12) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training 
Missiles (CATM); three hundred (300) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon 
System (APKWS) Kits; one thousand seven hundred (1,700) Advanced 
Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) Guidance Sections; six (6) AN/ASQ-
170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 
Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS); six (6) AN/APG-78 
Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units (REU); six (6) 
AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (M-RFI); eight 
(8) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6 installed, 2 
spares); two hundred (200) FIM-92H Stinger missiles; eight (8) Manned-
Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Video Receivers (6 installed, 2 spares); 
and eight (8) MannedUnmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Air-Air-Ground Kits (6 
installed, 2 spares). Also included are eight (8) AN/AVR-2B Laser 
Detecting sets (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/APR-39C(V)l+ Radar 
Signal Detecting sets (6 installed, 2 spares); fourteen (14) Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) radios (12 
installed, 2 spares); fourteen (14) UHF/VHF/LOS airborne radios (12 
installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/APX-123A (V) Common Transponders (6 
installed, 2 spares); eight (8) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems (6 new, 2 
spares); eight (8) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 Automatic Direction Finders (6 
installed, 2 spares); eight (8) Doppler ASN-157 Doppler Radar Velocity 
Sensors (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/APN-209 Radar Altimeters 
(6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation 
sets (TACAN) (6 installed, 2 spares); four (4) TACAN Ground Stations; 
eight (8) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range/Instrument Landing 
Systems (VOR/ILS) (6 installed, 2 spares); three (3) AN/PYQ-10(C) 
Simple Key Loader (3 new); six (6) M230El + M139 AWS Automatic Gun (6 
new); eighteen (18) M261 rocket launchers (12 new, 6 spares); eighteen 
(18) M299 missile launchers (12 new, 6 spares); six (6) rocket motor, 
2.75-inch, MK66-4, Inert (6 new); six (6) High Explosive Warhead for 
Airborne 2.75 Rocket, Inert (6 new); eighteen (18) Stinger air-to-air 
launchers (18 new); twelve (12) Stinger Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) 
(12 new); six (6) Stinger Aerial Handling Trainers (AHT) (6 new); five 
thousand (5,000) each 2.75 inch rockets (5,000 new); eighty thousand 
(80,000) 30mm rounds (80,000 new), training devices, communication 
systems, helmets, simulators, generators, transportation and 
organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, 
tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel 
training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor 
technical assistance, technical and logistics support services, and 
other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $1.5 
billion.
    This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national 
security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a 
friendly country that continues to be an important force for political 
stability, peace, and economic progress in South-East Asia.
    The Philippines is considering either the AH-64E or the AH-1Z to 
modernize its attack helicopter capabilities. The proposed sale will 
assist the Philippines in developing and maintaining strong self-
defense, counterterrorism, and critical infrastructure protection 
capabilities. The Philippines will have no difficulty absorbing this 
equipment and support into its armed forces.
    The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the 
basic military balance in the region.
    The principal contractors will be Boeing, Mesa, Arizona; and 
Lockheed Martin, Orlando, Florida. Offsets may be a requirement of 
doing business in the Philippines; however, offsets are negotiated 
directly between the Original Equipment Manufacturers or other vendors 
and the Government of the Philippines, and further details are not 
known at this time.
    Implementation of this proposed sale will require 60 U.S. 
Government or contractor representatives to travel to Philippines for a 
period of 6 weeks (non concurrent). Activities will include de-
processing/fielding, training, and technical/logistics support.
    There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a 
result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 20-05
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex
Item No. vii
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
    1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter is a fielded armed attack 
rotary wing aircraft in the Army inventory. The AH-64E is equipped with 
communication and target identification equipment, navigational 
equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, displays and sensors. 
Components considered to contain sensitive technology in the proposed 
case are as follows:
    a. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation 
Sight/AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision

[[Page 39186]]

Sensor (MTADS/PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather 
target information, as well as night navigation capabilities. The PNVS 
provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-earth flight to, from, 
and within the battle area, while TADS provides the co-pilot gunner 
with search, detection, recognition, and designation by means of Direct 
View Optics (DVO), EI2 television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) 
sighting systems that may be used singularly or in combinations. MTADS/
PNVS contain sensitive technology and are classified CONFIDENTIAL.
    b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low-
probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined with a 
passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometer (M-RFI) 
mounted on top of the helicopter mast. The AN/APG-78 and the AN/APR-78B 
M-RFI hardware components contain sensitive critical technologies. The 
FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes 
stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks and mobile air defense 
systems as well as hovering helicopters, helicopters, and fixed wing 
aircraft.
    c. The AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometer (M-RFI) 
is an updated version of the passive radar detection and direction 
finding system. The AN/APR-78B M-RFI hardware components contain 
sensitive technology and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. It utilizes a 
detachable UDM on the M-RFI processor, which contains the Radar 
Frequency (RF) threat library.
    d. The AGM-114R Hellfire is an air-to-ground missiles used against 
heavy and light armored targets, thin skinned vehicles, urban 
structures, bunkers, caves and personnel. The missile is Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU) based, with a variable delay fuse, improved 
safety and reliability. The highest level of classified information 
that could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the end 
item is up to and including SECRET. Loss or compromise of classified 
information associated with AGM-1144R could lead to development of 
countermeasures or exploitation of system vulnerabilities by those 
obtaining the information.
    e. The Hellfire M36E9 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM) is a 
flight-training missile that consists of a functional guidance section 
coupled to an inert missile bus. The M36E9 CATM does not have a 
functional rocket motor or warhead, and cannot be launched. It 
functions like a tactical missile (without launch capability) during 
captive carry on the aircraft, making it suitable for training the 
aircrew in simulated Hellfire missile target acquisition and lock. The 
highest level of classified information that could be disclosed by a 
proposed sale or by testing of the end item is SECRET.
    f. The aircraft has an Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial 
Navigation System (EGI) plus MultiMode Receiver (MMR), and two EGIs 
which use internal accelerometers, rate gyro measurements, and external 
sensor measurements to estimate the aircraft state, provides aircraft 
flight and position data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-
aided, strap down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The EGI unit 
houses a GPS receiver. Integrated within the EGI is an Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU) for processing functions. Each EGI also houses 
an MMR to provide for reception of ground based NAVAID signals for 
instrument aided flight.
    g. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects energy 
emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates potential false alarm 
emitters in the environment, declares validity of threat and selects 
appropriate countermeasures. The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control 
Unit (ECU), Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and 
Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware is 
classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for operation and 
maintenance are classified SECRET.
    h. The AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Set is a system that 
provides warnings of radar-directed air defense threats and allows 
appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553 databus compatible 
configuration. The hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed 
with threat data; releasable technical manuals for operation and 
maintenance are classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical data 
(technical performance) is classified SECRET. The system can be 
programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing country.
    i. The M36E9 Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) is a Hellfire 
training missile (Non-NATO) that consists of a functional guidance 
section coupled to an inert missile bus. The missile has an operational 
semi-active laser seeker that can search for and lock-on to laser 
designated targets for pilot training, but it does not have a warhead 
or propulsion section and cannot be launched.
    j. The Stinger RMP Block I Missile, hardware, embedded software 
object code and operating documentation contain sensitive technology 
and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. The highest classification of the 
Stinger 92H Reprogrammable Micro-Processor (RMP) Block I missile 
hardware is CONFIDENTIAL, and the highest classification of data and 
information is SECRET. The guidance section of the missile and tracking 
head trainer contain highly sensitive technology and are classified 
CONFIDENTIAL. Missile System hardware components contain sensitive 
critical technologies. Stinger Block I critical technology is primarily 
in the area of design and production know-how and not end-items. 
Information on countermeasures vulnerability to electronic 
countermeasures, system performance capabilities and effectiveness, 
simulation and test data and software source code are classified up to 
SECRET.
    2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge 
of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could 
be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system 
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or 
advanced capabilities.
    3. A determination has been made that the Republic of the 
Philippines can provide substantially the same degree of protection for 
the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This 
sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
    4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal 
have been authorized for release and export to the Republic of the 
Philippines.

[FR Doc. 2020-14067 Filed 6-29-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P