Airworthiness Directives; Textron Aviation, Inc. Airplanes, 33583-33587 [2020-11351]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 106 / Tuesday, June 2, 2020 / Proposed Rules
the availability of information for this
action. You may obtain publiclyavailable information related to this
action by any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
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for Docket ID NRC–2020–0059.
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proposed revision describes an
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meet regulatory requirements related to
changes affecting independent spent
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fuel storage cask designs, and monitored
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by endorsing guidance document NEI
12–04, ‘‘Guidelines for 10 CFR 72.48
Implementation,’’ Revision 2.
The staff is also issuing for public
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(ADAMS Accession No. ML19269B764).
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section 72.62, ‘‘Backfitting,’’ and as
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Accession No. ML18093B087). As
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‘‘Implementation,’’ of the draft
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II. Additional Information
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This DG, identified by its task
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The draft guide is proposed Revision 1
of RG 3.72 of the same name. The
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III. Backfitting, Forward Fitting, and
Issue Finality
Dated: May 27, 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Stanley J. Gardocki,
Acting Chief, Regulatory Guidance and
Generic Issues Branch, Division of
Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research.
[FR Doc. 2020–11717 Filed 6–1–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2020–0493; Product
Identifier 2019–CE–046–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Textron
Aviation, Inc. Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
The FAA proposes to
supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2019–08–13 for Textron Aviation, Inc.
(type certificate previously held by
SUMMARY:
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33583
Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525,
525A, and 525B airplanes with
Tamarack active load alleviation system
(ATLAS) winglets installed in
accordance with Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC) SA03842NY. AD 2019–
08–13 resulted from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information
(MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country to identify
and correct an unsafe condition on an
aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as malfunction of
the ATLAS. This AD results from the
identification of corrective actions that,
if implemented, allow operators to
reactivate the ATLAS and restore
operations to normal procedures. The
FAA is proposing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: The FAA must receive comments
on this proposed AD by July 17, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
For Cranfield Aerospace Solutions
Limited and Tamarack Aerospace Group
service information identified in this
AD, contact Cranfield Aerospace
Solutions Ltd., Cranfield, Bedford MK43
0AL, United Kingdom; telephone: +44
1234 754 166; FAX: +44 1234 752 375;
email: g.mitchell@
cranfieldaerospace.com; internet:
https://www.cranfieldaerospace.com/
service/aircraft-modification-products/
et. You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the
FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (816) 329–
4148.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2020–
0493; or in person at Docket Operations
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 106 / Tuesday, June 2, 2020 / Proposed Rules
proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other
information. The street address for the
Docket Office is listed above. Comments
will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven Dzierzynski, Avionics Engineer,
FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600
Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury,
New York 11590; telephone: (516) 287–
7367; fax: (516) 794–5531; email:
steven.dzierzynski@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites you to send any
written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD.
Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section.
Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2020–0493;
Product Identifier 2019–CE–046–AD’’ at
the beginning of your comments. The
FAA specifically invites comments on
the overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
this proposed AD. The FAA will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD because of those
comments.
The FAA will post all comments
received, without change, to https://
regulations.gov, including any personal
information you provide. The FAA will
also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact received
about this proposed AD.
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Discussion
The FAA issued AD 2019–08–13,
Amendment 39–19634 (84 FR 24007;
May 24, 2019) (‘‘AD 2019–08–13’’) for
Textron Aviation, Inc. Models 525,
525A, and 525B airplanes with
Tamarack ATLAS winglets installed in
accordance with STC SA03842NY. AD
2019–08–13 prohibits all flight by
revising the operating limitations in the
airplane flight manual (AFM) and
fabricating and installing a placard,
until a modification has been
incorporated in accordance with an
FAA-approved method. AD 2019–080–
13 was based on MCAI originated by the
European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Community. EASA issued AD No.
2019–0086–E, dated April 19, 2019, to
address an unsafe condition related to
reports of the ATLAS malfunctioning,
which could lead to loss of control of
the airplane.
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Actions Since AD 2019–08–13 Was
Issued
Since the FAA issued AD 2019–08–
13, Cranfield Aerospace Solutions
Limited (Cranfield), the holder of STC
SA03842NY, determined that failure of
the Tamarack Active Camber Surface
(TACS) control units (TCUs) was caused
by a printed circuit board attachment
screw coming loose, which caused a
short circuit in the TCU. EASA revised
the MCAI and issued EASA AD No.
2019–0086R1, dated August 9, 2019, to
require modifications previously
developed by Cranfield to restore the
safety of the ATLAS design. Cranfield
modified the TCUs with a self-locking
screw, an additional flat washer, and
linear variable differential transformer
potting to prevent detachment from
vibration during flight. Cranfield also
developed centering strips to modify the
trailing edge of the TACS that will
return the TACS to faired when TCU
power is removed or when the TACS are
‘‘blown’’ out of position if ATLAS
power is removed.
Installation of the modified TCU will
prevent a short circuit of the ATLAS
TCU, and installation of the centering
strips to the TACS will ensure the TACS
remains in a faired position in case of
inadvertent power loss to the ATLAS.
Cranfield also revised the Tamarack
maintenance manual supplement for
airplanes with the Tamarack ATLAS
winglets installed to include
instructions for continued airworthiness
related to the centering strips.
Comments
The FAA gave the public the
opportunity to comment on AD 2019–
08–13 and received 34 comments. The
majority of the commenters were
operators and maintenance personnel.
The remaining commenters included
Tamarack Aerospace Group (Tamarack)
and the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association (GAMA). The following
presents the relevant comments
received on AD 2019–08–13 and the
FAA’s response to each comment.
A. Supportive Comments
Erin Saunders, Victor Ochoa, and an
anonymous commenter support the AD
action.
B. Comments Regarding the FAA’s
Justification of an Unsafe Condition
Requests for a Thorough Investigation
of the Issues
Many commenters questioned or
requested clarification of the FAA’s
determination that there is an unsafe
condition. Seven commenters stated the
FAA should have completed a more
thorough investigation and analysis of
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the issues. Tamarack, Advanced Jets,
LLC (Advanced Jets), and Kenneth
Adelman requested the FAA consider
that the data extracted from the incident
aircraft does not agree with the pilot’s
description of an aggressive roll rate.
John Harris, Andrew Vann, Douglas
Sayre, and five other commenters stated
that the malfunction of the European
aircraft that prompted EASA’s
emergency AD was caused by the failure
of the operator to comply with the
manufacturer’s mandatory service
bulletin. These commenters noted that
there have been no failures experienced
by aircraft with winglets that have
complied with the manufacturer’s
mandatory service bulletin. Fourteen
commenters stated they have been
operating for a considerable time with
the ATLAS winglets and have not
experienced any issues. These
commenters further stated that
installation of the winglets increases
performance, safety, and economy and
expressed support for Tamarack as a
company.
The FAA has considered the
comments pertaining to the pilot’s
incident report on the European
airplane. At the time AD 2019–08–13
was issued, the airplane data from the
incident that prompted the EASA AD
was not available. However, the FAA
analyzed the information from the
pilot’s incident report and additional
information received from EASA to
make the decision to issue AD 2019–08–
13. Since AD 2019–08–13 was issued,
Cranfield provided data to identify the
root cause of the unsafe condition and
to provide corrective action, which
prompted this superseding NPRM.
The FAA agrees with the comments
regarding the operator’s failure to
comply with the manufacturer’s service
bulletin. However, operators are not
required to comply with manufacturer
service bulletins unless mandated by
the FAA or other civil aviation
authority. EASA AD No. 2019–0086–E,
dated April 19, 2019, which prompted
AD 2019–08–13, did not require
incorporation of the service bulletins for
TCU modification and installation of the
centering strips. This NPRM proposes to
require TCU modification and
installation of the centering strips using
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited
Service Bulletin CAS/SB1480, Issue A,
dated July 2019 (Cranfield CAS/SB1480,
Issue A), which incorporates two earlier
service bulletins for those actions.
The fact that commenters’ personal
experience with ATLAS winglets has
been positive does not negate the
existence of an unsafe condition.
Despite any benefit to individual
owners when the system operates
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C. Comments Regarding the NTSB
Investigation
without failure, the FAA determined
that an unsafe condition with the
ATLAS exists and requires corrective
action.
Requests To Clarify the Hazard Caused
by a Malfunction
Four commenters disputed the FAA’s
determination that a malfunction of the
ATLAS may reduce the pilot’s ability to
control the airplane. Tamarack noted
that this determination conflicts with
the certification basis and system safety
analysis of the design and compliance
data during certification testing.
Advanced Jets stated that the ATLAS
has been shown to be safe at speeds
under 140 knots even if it malfunctions.
Kenneth Adelman stated that any
reduction of pilot control when the
ATLAS malfunctions is minor and was
demonstrated as safe during the original
certification of the system.
The FAA disagrees with these
comments. The ATLAS complied with
the certification basis during
certification testing. EASA performed
the certification flight tests, and those
tests included the ‘‘worst case’’
condition where the TACS were
deployed in a fully asymmetric failure
position that induces the greatest roll
input. EASA determined that case to be
‘‘recoverable.’’ However, the incident
exposed a failure mode that was not
anticipated during certification, which
is the basis of this NPRM.
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Requests To Clarify the FAA’s Position
on the Use of Speed Tape
Kenneth Adelman, Advanced Jets,
and two anonymous commenters
questioned the FAA’s rejection of the
use speed tape to hold the winglets
flush. These commenters noted that
speed tape is a product that is widely
accepted and has been used for decades.
The FAA disagrees. The statement in
the AD regarding the use of ‘‘speed
tape’’ as a corrective action to prevent
movement of the TACS during flight is
based on discussions between the FAA
and EASA. Speed tape is non-structural;
therefore, it cannot be relied upon to
immobilize the TACS. The corrective
action in the EASA AD required
disabling the TACS. Furthermore, any
modifications mandated through AD
action become changes to the type
design. As explained in AD 2019–08–
13, the speed tape did not have
sufficient testing and analysis to support
the type design.
The FAA did not change this NPRM
as a result of these comments.
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Tamarack, Advanced Jets, GAMA, and
six other commenters noted that AD
2019–08–13 contained an incorrect
statement regarding the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
investigation of a fatal accident and the
role the ATLAS may have played in the
accident. Most of these commenters
stated that the preliminary report
released by the NTSB did not reference
the ATLAS. These commenters
requested the FAA correct or remove the
statement if it is not accurate.
The FAA agrees. The preamble
language of AD 2019–08–13 contained a
statement pertaining to an NTSB
investigation into a fatal airplane
accident. Although the airplane
involved in the accident had the ATLAS
STC installed, since the NTSB has not
released its factual report, that statement
should not have been in the preamble of
AD 2019–08–13.
D. Comments Requesting the FAA
Rescind the AD
Vincent Phillips, Stanley Jobe, and CJ
Holdings requested that the AD be
rescinded and the airplanes returned to
service. Two of these commenters noted
that EASA has revised its emergency AD
and urged the FAA to do the same.
The FAA partially agrees. The FAA
has determined that an unsafe condition
exists on the ATLAS and that action to
address the condition is required;
therefore, the FAA disagrees with
rescinding the AD. However, since AD
2019–08–13 was issued, the root cause
of the failure of the ATLAS winglets has
been identified. For the reasons
explained in more detail in response to
other comments, this NPRM proposes to
supersede AD 2019–08–13 to allow
operation of the airplane after modifying
the ATLAS.
E. Comments Requesting Modifications
to the AD
Twelve commenters noted that
Cranfield’s TCU upgrade and centering
strips modification eliminate the unsafe
condition. These commenters requested
the FAA allow the modifications as an
alternative to the operational
prohibition of AD 2019–08–13. Richard
Helms and several other commenters
stated that no aircraft with these
modifications have experienced upsets.
Jerome Simon requested the FAA define
an alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) so the airplanes could return to
flight.
The FAA agrees. This NPRM proposes
to supersede AD 2019–08–13. Instead of
the operational prohibition of AD 2019–
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33585
08–13, this NPRM proposes to require
modification of the TCU and installation
of the centering strips on the TACS
using Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A,
which incorporates two earlier service
bulletins for those actions. This NPRM
also proposes revising the Tamarack
maintenance manual supplement to add
inspections for the centering strips.
F. Comments Regarding the Costs of
Compliance
Several commenters requested the
FAA modify the cost of compliance to
include costs associated with loss of
revenue from the inability to fly the
airplanes. These commenters stated that
AD 2019–08–13 is costing operators
anywhere from thousands of dollars per
month to millions of dollars in total.
The FAA disagrees. The FAA
acknowledges the economic hardship
for those who depend on their airplanes
for income. However, the cost analysis
in AD rulemaking actions typically
includes only the actual maintenance
costs to comply with the AD and not
indirect costs such as down-time and
loss of revenue.
G. Comments Requesting Clarification
on Type Design Change
GAMA requested clarification on the
language in AD 2019–08–13 regarding
speed tape as a type design change.
GAMA questioned whether a temporary
repair while waiting for a permanent
design solution should be characterized
as a type design change.
The FAA agrees to provide
clarification. The language in AD 2019–
08–13 is based on the FAA’s
Airworthiness Directives Legal
Interpretation, which explained that
AD-mandated modifications to an
aircraft become part of the FAAapproved type design that must be
maintained as required by §§ 39.7 and
39.9 (81 FR 24695, April 27, 2016).
Regardless of whether a repair
mandated by an AD is intended to be
permanent or temporary, the repair
becomes a required change to the type
design unless and until the AD is
superseded or rescinded or the operator
obtains an approved AMOC.
H. Comment Requesting Pilot Training
Three commenters requested or
suggested the FAA require pilot training
and familiarity with emergency
procedures in the event of an
uncommanded deflection of the ATLAS
in flight.
The FAA acknowledges the
commenters’ request for pilot training
related to the uncommanded deflection
of the ATLAS in flight. Since AD 2019–
08–13 was issued, the root cause of the
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failure of the ATLAS winglets has been
identified. This NPRM proposes to
supersede AD 2019–08–13 to allow
operation of the airplane after modifying
the ATLAS. The ATLAS modification
and associated manual revisions
proposed in this NPRM are expected to
mitigate the unsafe condition without
the need for additional pilot training.
I. Comment Requesting Procedure To
Pull ATLAS Circuit Breaker
Kenneth Adelman requested the FAA
require adding a line item to the
abnormal/emergency section in the
Tamarack Winglet AFM Supplement to
indicate that, in the event of a TCAS
runaway, the circuit breaker should be
pulled.
The FAA acknowledges the
commenter’s request to revise the
Tamarack Winglet AFM Supplement. As
stated earlier, since AD 2019–08–13 was
issued, the root cause of the failure of
the ATLAS winglets has been identified.
This NPRM proposes to supersede AD
2019–08–13 to allow operation of the
airplane after modifying the ATLAS.
The ATLAS modification and associated
manual revisions proposed in this
NPRM are expected to mitigate the
unsafe condition, precluding the need
for the requested AFM revision.
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J. Comments Regarding the FAA’s
Rulemaking Process
Two commenters questioned the
FAA’s decision to issue AD 2019–08–13
as an immediately effective rule without
prior notice and comment. Richard
Helms stated that this decision was
neither justified nor reasonable.
Advanced Jets noted that the FAA’s
action is not an emergency because of
the amount of time (35 days) between
issuance of EASA’s emergency AD and
the FAA’s issuance of AD 2019–08–13.
The FAA acknowledges the
commenters’ concerns that it took 35
days to issue AD 2019–08–13 without
notice and comment. The FAA worked
through the unique difficulties
associated with this unsafe condition
and considered all options. The FAA
coordinated with EASA and the design
approval holder before determining the
best course of action to mitigate the
unsafe condition. The risk to the flying
public associated with this unsafe
condition required immediate action.
Allowing notice and comment would
have delayed mitigating the unsafe
condition significantly longer than 35
days. The FAA also notes that it is
proposing to supersede AD 2019–08–13
based on comments received.
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Related Service Information Under 1
CFR Part 51
develop on other products of the same
type design.
The FAA reviewed the following
service documents proposed for
compliance with this NPRM:
• Cranfield Aerospace Solutions
Limited Service Bulletin CAS/SB1480,
Issue A, dated July 2019, which
contains instructions to ensure
installation of a modified TCU and the
TACS centering strips;
• Cranfield Aerospace Solutions
Limited Service Bulletin CAS/SB1475,
Issue A, dated February 2019, which
contains the instructions for installing
the centering strips to the TACS; and
• Tamarack Aerospace Group Cessna
525, 525A, & 525B ATLAS Winglet
Maintenance Manual Supplement,
Report Number: TAG–1100–0101, Issue
G, dated September 3, 2019, which adds
instructions to inspect the centering
strips and adds repetitive inspection
intervals to the Airworthiness
Limitations section of the supplement
for the centering strips.
This service information is reasonably
available because the interested parties
have access to it through their normal
course of business or by the means
identified in the ADDRESSES section of
this NPRM.
Costs of Compliance
Other Related Service Information
The FAA also reviewed the following
documents related to this NPRM:
• Tamarack Aerospace Group ATLAS
Service Bulletin SBATLAS–57–03,
dated July 27, 2018, which contains
instructions to remove the ATLAS TCU
and return it to the ATLAS repair
facility for modification;
• Tamarack Aerospace Group ATLAS
Service Bulletin SBATLAS–57–05,
dated February 20, 2019, which
contains instructions to install centering
strips on the TACS; and
• Cranfield Aerospace Solutions
Limited Service Bulletin CAS/SB1467,
Issue B, dated July 2018, which contains
instructions to remove the ATLAS TCU
assembly and modify it as specified in
CAS/SB1480, Issue A.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of the Proposed AD
This product has been approved by
the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation
in the United States. Pursuant to our
bilateral agreement with this State of
Design Authority, it has notified the
FAA of the unsafe condition described
in the MCAI and service information
referenced above. The FAA is proposing
this AD because it evaluated all
information and determined the unsafe
condition exists and is likely to exist or
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The FAA estimates that this proposed
AD will affect 76 products of U.S.
registry. The FAA also estimates that it
would take 16 work-hours with a parts
cost of $4,314 per product to modify the
TCU, 24 work-hours with a parts cost of
$199 per product to install the centering
strips, and 1 work-hour per product to
revise the limitations section as
proposed by this AD. The average labor
rate is $85 per work-hour.
Based on these figures, the FAA
estimates the cost of the proposed AD
on U.S. operators to be $607,848, or
$7,998 per product.
According to the manufacturer, some
of the costs of this proposed AD may be
covered under warranty, thereby
reducing the cost impact on affected
individuals. The FAA does not control
warranty coverage for affected
individuals. As a result, the FAA has
included all costs in our cost estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking
under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section
44701: General requirements. Under
that section, Congress charges the FAA
with promoting safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and
procedures the Administrator finds
necessary for safety in air commerce.
This regulation is within the scope of
that authority because it addresses an
unsafe condition that is likely to exist or
develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
The FAA determined that this
proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify this proposed regulation:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
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(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by
removing Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2019–08–13, Amendment 39–19634 (84
FR 24007, May 24, 2019) and adding the
following new AD:
■
Textron Aviation, Inc. (Type certificate
previously held by Cessna Aircraft
Company): Docket No. FAA–2020–0493;
Product Identifier 2019–CE–046–AD.
(a) Comments Due Date
The FAA must receive comments by July
17, 2020.
(b) Affected ADs
This AD replaces AD 2019–08–13,
Amendment 39–19634 (84 FR 24007, May 24,
2019) (‘‘AD 2019–08–13’’).
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Textron Aviation, Inc.
(type certificate previously held by Cessna
Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and
525B airplanes, certificated in any category,
with Tamarack active load alleviation system
(ATLAS) winglets installed in accordance
with Supplemental Type Certificate
SA03842NY.
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with PROPOSALS
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
issued by the aviation authority of another
country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI
describes the unsafe condition as
malfunction of the ATLAS, which could
cause difficulty for the pilot to recover the
airplane to safe light. The FAA is issuing this
AD to prevent malfunction of the ATLAS and
to ensure the Tamarack Active Camber
Surface (TACS) remains in a faired position
18:29 Jun 01, 2020
Jkt 250001
(f) Compliance
Unless already done, do the following
actions in paragraphs (g) and (h) of this AD.
(g) Modifications
Before further flight after the effective date
of this AD, do the following corrective
actions:
(1) Determine whether the serial number of
the TACS control unit (TCU) assembly is
listed in table 7.8. of Cranfield Aerospace
Solutions Limited (Cranfield) Service
Bulletin CAS/SB1480, Issue A, dated July
2019 (Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A). If the
serial number of the TCU assembly is not
listed in table 7.8., replace the TCU assembly
with a TCU assembly that has a part number
listed in section 5 and a serial number listed
in table 7.8 of Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue
A.
(2) Determine whether centering strips
have been installed on the trailing edge of the
TACS by following step 7.4. of Cranfield
CAS/SB1480, Issue A. If the trailing edge of
the TCAS does not have centering strips,
install Cranfield modification CAeM/Cessna/
1475.
(h) Revision to the Maintenance Manual
Supplement
(1) Before further flight after the effective
date of this AD, revise the Airworthiness
Limitations section (ALS) and Instructions
for Continued Airworthiness for your
airplane by adding the updates in Tamarack
Aerospace Group Cessna 525, 525A & 525B
ATLAS Winglet Maintenance Manual
Supplement, Modification CAeM/Cessna/
1375/1430/1440/1452/1475/1480, Report
Number: TAG–1100–0101, Issue G, dated
September 3, 2019.
(2) Thereafter, except as provided in
paragraph (i) of this AD, no alternative
inspection intervals may be approved for the
centering strips. Inserting a later issue of the
ALS with language identical to that
contained in Issue G for the centering strips
is acceptable for compliance with the
requirements of this paragraph.
(3) The AFM revision and placard required
by AD 2019–08–13, if installed, may be
removed after completing the modifications
required by paragraph (g) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association of America
(ATA) Code 27: Flight Controls.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
in the case of inadvertent power loss to the
ATLAS, which could lead to loss of control
of the airplane.
The Manager, New York ACO Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to
ATTN: Program Manager, Continued
Operational Safety FAA, New York ACO
Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, New York 11590; telephone: (516)
287–7321; fax: (516) 794–5531; email: 9-avsnyaco-cos@faa.gov. Before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to which
the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate
principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking
a PI, your local FSDO.
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
33587
(j) Related Information
Refer to European Union Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) AD No. 2019–0086R1, dated
August 9, 2019, for related information. You
may examine the MCAI on the internet at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2020–0493.
For Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited
and Tamarack Aerospace Group service
information identified in this AD, contact
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Ltd.,
Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL, United
Kingdom; telephone: +44 1234 754 166; FAX:
+44 1234 752 375; email: g.mitchell@
cranfieldaerospace.com; internet: https://
www.cranfieldaerospace.com/service/
aircraft-modification-products/et. You may
review copies of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch,
901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (816) 329–4148.
Issued on May 14, 2020.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2020–11351 Filed 6–1–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 71
[Docket No. FAA–2020–0277; Airspace
Docket No. 20–AEA–5]
RIN 2120–AA66
Proposed Amendment of Class E
Airspace; Pottsville, PA
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
This action proposes to
amend Class E airspace extending
upward from 700 feet above the surface
at Schuylkill County (Joe Zerbey)
Airport, Pottsville, PA due to the
extension of runway 11. This action
would also update the geographic
coordinates of the airport, and
Schuylkill Medical Center Heliport,
(formerly Pottsville Hospital).
Controlled airspace is necessary for the
safety and management of instrument
flight rules (IFR) operations in the area.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before July 17, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Send comments on this
proposal to: The U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
Washington, DC 20590–0001;
Telephone: (800) 647–5527, or (202)
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\02JNP1.SGM
02JNP1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 106 (Tuesday, June 2, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 33583-33587]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11351]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2020-0493; Product Identifier 2019-CE-046-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Textron Aviation, Inc. Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2019-08-13 for Textron Aviation, Inc. (type certificate previously held
by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and 525B airplanes with
Tamarack active load alleviation system (ATLAS) winglets installed in
accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA03842NY. AD 2019-
08-13 resulted from mandatory continuing airworthiness information
(MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to
identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The
MCAI describes the unsafe condition as malfunction of the ATLAS. This
AD results from the identification of corrective actions that, if
implemented, allow operators to reactivate the ATLAS and restore
operations to normal procedures. The FAA is proposing this AD to
address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 17,
2020.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited and Tamarack Aerospace
Group service information identified in this AD, contact Cranfield
Aerospace Solutions Ltd., Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL, United Kingdom;
telephone: +44 1234 754 166; FAX: +44 1234 752 375; email:
[email protected]; internet: https://www.cranfieldaerospace.com/service/aircraft-modification-products/et.
You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA,
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust,
Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-
0493; or in person at Docket Operations Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this
[[Page 33584]]
proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for the Docket Office is listed
above. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after
receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Dzierzynski, Avionics Engineer,
FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New
York 11590; telephone: (516) 287-7367; fax: (516) 794-5531; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2020-0493;
Product Identifier 2019-CE-046-AD'' at the beginning of your comments.
The FAA specifically invites comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. The
FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may
amend this proposed AD because of those comments.
The FAA will post all comments received, without change, to https://regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The
FAA will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact
received about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The FAA issued AD 2019-08-13, Amendment 39-19634 (84 FR 24007; May
24, 2019) (``AD 2019-08-13'') for Textron Aviation, Inc. Models 525,
525A, and 525B airplanes with Tamarack ATLAS winglets installed in
accordance with STC SA03842NY. AD 2019-08-13 prohibits all flight by
revising the operating limitations in the airplane flight manual (AFM)
and fabricating and installing a placard, until a modification has been
incorporated in accordance with an FAA-approved method. AD 2019-080-13
was based on MCAI originated by the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the
European Community. EASA issued AD No. 2019-0086-E, dated April 19,
2019, to address an unsafe condition related to reports of the ATLAS
malfunctioning, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
Actions Since AD 2019-08-13 Was Issued
Since the FAA issued AD 2019-08-13, Cranfield Aerospace Solutions
Limited (Cranfield), the holder of STC SA03842NY, determined that
failure of the Tamarack Active Camber Surface (TACS) control units
(TCUs) was caused by a printed circuit board attachment screw coming
loose, which caused a short circuit in the TCU. EASA revised the MCAI
and issued EASA AD No. 2019-0086R1, dated August 9, 2019, to require
modifications previously developed by Cranfield to restore the safety
of the ATLAS design. Cranfield modified the TCUs with a self-locking
screw, an additional flat washer, and linear variable differential
transformer potting to prevent detachment from vibration during flight.
Cranfield also developed centering strips to modify the trailing edge
of the TACS that will return the TACS to faired when TCU power is
removed or when the TACS are ``blown'' out of position if ATLAS power
is removed.
Installation of the modified TCU will prevent a short circuit of
the ATLAS TCU, and installation of the centering strips to the TACS
will ensure the TACS remains in a faired position in case of
inadvertent power loss to the ATLAS.
Cranfield also revised the Tamarack maintenance manual supplement
for airplanes with the Tamarack ATLAS winglets installed to include
instructions for continued airworthiness related to the centering
strips.
Comments
The FAA gave the public the opportunity to comment on AD 2019-08-13
and received 34 comments. The majority of the commenters were operators
and maintenance personnel. The remaining commenters included Tamarack
Aerospace Group (Tamarack) and the General Aviation Manufacturers
Association (GAMA). The following presents the relevant comments
received on AD 2019-08-13 and the FAA's response to each comment.
A. Supportive Comments
Erin Saunders, Victor Ochoa, and an anonymous commenter support the
AD action.
B. Comments Regarding the FAA's Justification of an Unsafe Condition
Requests for a Thorough Investigation of the Issues
Many commenters questioned or requested clarification of the FAA's
determination that there is an unsafe condition. Seven commenters
stated the FAA should have completed a more thorough investigation and
analysis of the issues. Tamarack, Advanced Jets, LLC (Advanced Jets),
and Kenneth Adelman requested the FAA consider that the data extracted
from the incident aircraft does not agree with the pilot's description
of an aggressive roll rate. John Harris, Andrew Vann, Douglas Sayre,
and five other commenters stated that the malfunction of the European
aircraft that prompted EASA's emergency AD was caused by the failure of
the operator to comply with the manufacturer's mandatory service
bulletin. These commenters noted that there have been no failures
experienced by aircraft with winglets that have complied with the
manufacturer's mandatory service bulletin. Fourteen commenters stated
they have been operating for a considerable time with the ATLAS
winglets and have not experienced any issues. These commenters further
stated that installation of the winglets increases performance, safety,
and economy and expressed support for Tamarack as a company.
The FAA has considered the comments pertaining to the pilot's
incident report on the European airplane. At the time AD 2019-08-13 was
issued, the airplane data from the incident that prompted the EASA AD
was not available. However, the FAA analyzed the information from the
pilot's incident report and additional information received from EASA
to make the decision to issue AD 2019-08-13. Since AD 2019-08-13 was
issued, Cranfield provided data to identify the root cause of the
unsafe condition and to provide corrective action, which prompted this
superseding NPRM.
The FAA agrees with the comments regarding the operator's failure
to comply with the manufacturer's service bulletin. However, operators
are not required to comply with manufacturer service bulletins unless
mandated by the FAA or other civil aviation authority. EASA AD No.
2019-0086-E, dated April 19, 2019, which prompted AD 2019-08-13, did
not require incorporation of the service bulletins for TCU modification
and installation of the centering strips. This NPRM proposes to require
TCU modification and installation of the centering strips using
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin CAS/SB1480,
Issue A, dated July 2019 (Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A), which
incorporates two earlier service bulletins for those actions.
The fact that commenters' personal experience with ATLAS winglets
has been positive does not negate the existence of an unsafe condition.
Despite any benefit to individual owners when the system operates
[[Page 33585]]
without failure, the FAA determined that an unsafe condition with the
ATLAS exists and requires corrective action.
Requests To Clarify the Hazard Caused by a Malfunction
Four commenters disputed the FAA's determination that a malfunction
of the ATLAS may reduce the pilot's ability to control the airplane.
Tamarack noted that this determination conflicts with the certification
basis and system safety analysis of the design and compliance data
during certification testing. Advanced Jets stated that the ATLAS has
been shown to be safe at speeds under 140 knots even if it
malfunctions. Kenneth Adelman stated that any reduction of pilot
control when the ATLAS malfunctions is minor and was demonstrated as
safe during the original certification of the system.
The FAA disagrees with these comments. The ATLAS complied with the
certification basis during certification testing. EASA performed the
certification flight tests, and those tests included the ``worst case''
condition where the TACS were deployed in a fully asymmetric failure
position that induces the greatest roll input. EASA determined that
case to be ``recoverable.'' However, the incident exposed a failure
mode that was not anticipated during certification, which is the basis
of this NPRM.
Requests To Clarify the FAA's Position on the Use of Speed Tape
Kenneth Adelman, Advanced Jets, and two anonymous commenters
questioned the FAA's rejection of the use speed tape to hold the
winglets flush. These commenters noted that speed tape is a product
that is widely accepted and has been used for decades.
The FAA disagrees. The statement in the AD regarding the use of
``speed tape'' as a corrective action to prevent movement of the TACS
during flight is based on discussions between the FAA and EASA. Speed
tape is non-structural; therefore, it cannot be relied upon to
immobilize the TACS. The corrective action in the EASA AD required
disabling the TACS. Furthermore, any modifications mandated through AD
action become changes to the type design. As explained in AD 2019-08-
13, the speed tape did not have sufficient testing and analysis to
support the type design.
The FAA did not change this NPRM as a result of these comments.
C. Comments Regarding the NTSB Investigation
Tamarack, Advanced Jets, GAMA, and six other commenters noted that
AD 2019-08-13 contained an incorrect statement regarding the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of a fatal accident
and the role the ATLAS may have played in the accident. Most of these
commenters stated that the preliminary report released by the NTSB did
not reference the ATLAS. These commenters requested the FAA correct or
remove the statement if it is not accurate.
The FAA agrees. The preamble language of AD 2019-08-13 contained a
statement pertaining to an NTSB investigation into a fatal airplane
accident. Although the airplane involved in the accident had the ATLAS
STC installed, since the NTSB has not released its factual report, that
statement should not have been in the preamble of AD 2019-08-13.
D. Comments Requesting the FAA Rescind the AD
Vincent Phillips, Stanley Jobe, and CJ Holdings requested that the
AD be rescinded and the airplanes returned to service. Two of these
commenters noted that EASA has revised its emergency AD and urged the
FAA to do the same.
The FAA partially agrees. The FAA has determined that an unsafe
condition exists on the ATLAS and that action to address the condition
is required; therefore, the FAA disagrees with rescinding the AD.
However, since AD 2019-08-13 was issued, the root cause of the failure
of the ATLAS winglets has been identified. For the reasons explained in
more detail in response to other comments, this NPRM proposes to
supersede AD 2019-08-13 to allow operation of the airplane after
modifying the ATLAS.
E. Comments Requesting Modifications to the AD
Twelve commenters noted that Cranfield's TCU upgrade and centering
strips modification eliminate the unsafe condition. These commenters
requested the FAA allow the modifications as an alternative to the
operational prohibition of AD 2019-08-13. Richard Helms and several
other commenters stated that no aircraft with these modifications have
experienced upsets. Jerome Simon requested the FAA define an
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) so the airplanes could return
to flight.
The FAA agrees. This NPRM proposes to supersede AD 2019-08-13.
Instead of the operational prohibition of AD 2019-08-13, this NPRM
proposes to require modification of the TCU and installation of the
centering strips on the TACS using Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A, which
incorporates two earlier service bulletins for those actions. This NPRM
also proposes revising the Tamarack maintenance manual supplement to
add inspections for the centering strips.
F. Comments Regarding the Costs of Compliance
Several commenters requested the FAA modify the cost of compliance
to include costs associated with loss of revenue from the inability to
fly the airplanes. These commenters stated that AD 2019-08-13 is
costing operators anywhere from thousands of dollars per month to
millions of dollars in total.
The FAA disagrees. The FAA acknowledges the economic hardship for
those who depend on their airplanes for income. However, the cost
analysis in AD rulemaking actions typically includes only the actual
maintenance costs to comply with the AD and not indirect costs such as
down-time and loss of revenue.
G. Comments Requesting Clarification on Type Design Change
GAMA requested clarification on the language in AD 2019-08-13
regarding speed tape as a type design change. GAMA questioned whether a
temporary repair while waiting for a permanent design solution should
be characterized as a type design change.
The FAA agrees to provide clarification. The language in AD 2019-
08-13 is based on the FAA's Airworthiness Directives Legal
Interpretation, which explained that AD-mandated modifications to an
aircraft become part of the FAA-approved type design that must be
maintained as required by Sec. Sec. 39.7 and 39.9 (81 FR 24695, April
27, 2016). Regardless of whether a repair mandated by an AD is intended
to be permanent or temporary, the repair becomes a required change to
the type design unless and until the AD is superseded or rescinded or
the operator obtains an approved AMOC.
H. Comment Requesting Pilot Training
Three commenters requested or suggested the FAA require pilot
training and familiarity with emergency procedures in the event of an
uncommanded deflection of the ATLAS in flight.
The FAA acknowledges the commenters' request for pilot training
related to the uncommanded deflection of the ATLAS in flight. Since AD
2019-08-13 was issued, the root cause of the
[[Page 33586]]
failure of the ATLAS winglets has been identified. This NPRM proposes
to supersede AD 2019-08-13 to allow operation of the airplane after
modifying the ATLAS. The ATLAS modification and associated manual
revisions proposed in this NPRM are expected to mitigate the unsafe
condition without the need for additional pilot training.
I. Comment Requesting Procedure To Pull ATLAS Circuit Breaker
Kenneth Adelman requested the FAA require adding a line item to the
abnormal/emergency section in the Tamarack Winglet AFM Supplement to
indicate that, in the event of a TCAS runaway, the circuit breaker
should be pulled.
The FAA acknowledges the commenter's request to revise the Tamarack
Winglet AFM Supplement. As stated earlier, since AD 2019-08-13 was
issued, the root cause of the failure of the ATLAS winglets has been
identified. This NPRM proposes to supersede AD 2019-08-13 to allow
operation of the airplane after modifying the ATLAS. The ATLAS
modification and associated manual revisions proposed in this NPRM are
expected to mitigate the unsafe condition, precluding the need for the
requested AFM revision.
J. Comments Regarding the FAA's Rulemaking Process
Two commenters questioned the FAA's decision to issue AD 2019-08-13
as an immediately effective rule without prior notice and comment.
Richard Helms stated that this decision was neither justified nor
reasonable. Advanced Jets noted that the FAA's action is not an
emergency because of the amount of time (35 days) between issuance of
EASA's emergency AD and the FAA's issuance of AD 2019-08-13.
The FAA acknowledges the commenters' concerns that it took 35 days
to issue AD 2019-08-13 without notice and comment. The FAA worked
through the unique difficulties associated with this unsafe condition
and considered all options. The FAA coordinated with EASA and the
design approval holder before determining the best course of action to
mitigate the unsafe condition. The risk to the flying public associated
with this unsafe condition required immediate action. Allowing notice
and comment would have delayed mitigating the unsafe condition
significantly longer than 35 days. The FAA also notes that it is
proposing to supersede AD 2019-08-13 based on comments received.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed the following service documents proposed for
compliance with this NPRM:
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin
CAS/SB1480, Issue A, dated July 2019, which contains instructions to
ensure installation of a modified TCU and the TACS centering strips;
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin
CAS/SB1475, Issue A, dated February 2019, which contains the
instructions for installing the centering strips to the TACS; and
Tamarack Aerospace Group Cessna 525, 525A, & 525B ATLAS
Winglet Maintenance Manual Supplement, Report Number: TAG-1100-0101,
Issue G, dated September 3, 2019, which adds instructions to inspect
the centering strips and adds repetitive inspection intervals to the
Airworthiness Limitations section of the supplement for the centering
strips.
This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section of this
NPRM.
Other Related Service Information
The FAA also reviewed the following documents related to this NPRM:
Tamarack Aerospace Group ATLAS Service Bulletin SBATLAS-
57-03, dated July 27, 2018, which contains instructions to remove the
ATLAS TCU and return it to the ATLAS repair facility for modification;
Tamarack Aerospace Group ATLAS Service Bulletin SBATLAS-
57-05, dated February 20, 2019, which contains instructions to install
centering strips on the TACS; and
Cranfield Aerospace Solutions Limited Service Bulletin
CAS/SB1467, Issue B, dated July 2018, which contains instructions to
remove the ATLAS TCU assembly and modify it as specified in CAS/SB1480,
Issue A.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it has
notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and
service information referenced above. The FAA is proposing this AD
because it evaluated all information and determined the unsafe
condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of
the same type design.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this proposed AD will affect 76 products of
U.S. registry. The FAA also estimates that it would take 16 work-hours
with a parts cost of $4,314 per product to modify the TCU, 24 work-
hours with a parts cost of $199 per product to install the centering
strips, and 1 work-hour per product to revise the limitations section
as proposed by this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour.
Based on these figures, the FAA estimates the cost of the proposed
AD on U.S. operators to be $607,848, or $7,998 per product.
According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this proposed
AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on
affected individuals. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for
affected individuals. As a result, the FAA has included all costs in
our cost estimate.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
[[Page 33587]]
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Airworthiness Directive (AD)
2019-08-13, Amendment 39-19634 (84 FR 24007, May 24, 2019) and adding
the following new AD:
Textron Aviation, Inc. (Type certificate previously held by Cessna
Aircraft Company): Docket No. FAA-2020-0493; Product Identifier
2019-CE-046-AD.
(a) Comments Due Date
The FAA must receive comments by July 17, 2020.
(b) Affected ADs
This AD replaces AD 2019-08-13, Amendment 39-19634 (84 FR 24007,
May 24, 2019) (``AD 2019-08-13'').
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Textron Aviation, Inc. (type certificate
previously held by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and
525B airplanes, certificated in any category, with Tamarack active
load alleviation system (ATLAS) winglets installed in accordance
with Supplemental Type Certificate SA03842NY.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 27: Flight
Controls.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another
country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as malfunction of
the ATLAS, which could cause difficulty for the pilot to recover the
airplane to safe light. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent
malfunction of the ATLAS and to ensure the Tamarack Active Camber
Surface (TACS) remains in a faired position in the case of
inadvertent power loss to the ATLAS, which could lead to loss of
control of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Unless already done, do the following actions in paragraphs (g)
and (h) of this AD.
(g) Modifications
Before further flight after the effective date of this AD, do
the following corrective actions:
(1) Determine whether the serial number of the TACS control unit
(TCU) assembly is listed in table 7.8. of Cranfield Aerospace
Solutions Limited (Cranfield) Service Bulletin CAS/SB1480, Issue A,
dated July 2019 (Cranfield CAS/SB1480, Issue A). If the serial
number of the TCU assembly is not listed in table 7.8., replace the
TCU assembly with a TCU assembly that has a part number listed in
section 5 and a serial number listed in table 7.8 of Cranfield CAS/
SB1480, Issue A.
(2) Determine whether centering strips have been installed on
the trailing edge of the TACS by following step 7.4. of Cranfield
CAS/SB1480, Issue A. If the trailing edge of the TCAS does not have
centering strips, install Cranfield modification CAeM/Cessna/1475.
(h) Revision to the Maintenance Manual Supplement
(1) Before further flight after the effective date of this AD,
revise the Airworthiness Limitations section (ALS) and Instructions
for Continued Airworthiness for your airplane by adding the updates
in Tamarack Aerospace Group Cessna 525, 525A & 525B ATLAS Winglet
Maintenance Manual Supplement, Modification CAeM/Cessna/1375/1430/
1440/1452/1475/1480, Report Number: TAG-1100-0101, Issue G, dated
September 3, 2019.
(2) Thereafter, except as provided in paragraph (i) of this AD,
no alternative inspection intervals may be approved for the
centering strips. Inserting a later issue of the ALS with language
identical to that contained in Issue G for the centering strips is
acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this paragraph.
(3) The AFM revision and placard required by AD 2019-08-13, if
installed, may be removed after completing the modifications
required by paragraph (g) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
The Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Program Manager,
Continued Operational Safety FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart
Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone: (516) 287-
7321; fax: (516) 794-5531; email: [email protected] Before
using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(j) Related Information
Refer to European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD No.
2019-0086R1, dated August 9, 2019, for related information. You may
examine the MCAI on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0493. For Cranfield
Aerospace Solutions Limited and Tamarack Aerospace Group service
information identified in this AD, contact Cranfield Aerospace
Solutions Ltd., Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL, United Kingdom;
telephone: +44 1234 754 166; FAX: +44 1234 752 375; email:
[email protected]; internet: https://www.cranfieldaerospace.com/service/aircraft-modification-products/et. You may review copies of the referenced service information at
the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch,
901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA, call (816) 329-4148.
Issued on May 14, 2020.
Lance T. Gant,
Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2020-11351 Filed 6-1-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
