Solicitation of Written Comments by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 32055-32057 [2020-11453]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 103 / Thursday, May 28, 2020 / Notices
whether the information will have
practical utility.
• Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used.
• Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
• Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Agency: DOL-Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs.
Type of Review: Extension Without
Changes.
Title of Collection: Claim for
Continuance of Compensation.
Agency Form Number: CA–12.
OMB Control Number: 1240–0015.
Affected Public: Individuals or
households.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
2,866.
Frequency: Annually.
Total Estimated Annual Responses:
2,866.
Estimated Average Time per
Response: 5 minutes.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 239 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Other Cost
Burden: $1,562.
Comments submitted in response to
this notice will be summarized and/or
included in the request for Office of
Management and Budget approval of the
information collection request; they will
also become a matter of public record.
(Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A))
Anjanette Suggs,
Agency Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. 2020–11471 Filed 5–27–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–CH–P
(MCC) Advisory Council was
established as a discretionary advisory
committee on July 14, 2016. Its charter
was renewed for a second term on July
11, 2018. The MCC Advisory Council
serves MCC solely in an advisory
capacity and provides insight regarding
innovations in infrastructure,
technology and sustainability; perceived
risks and opportunities in MCC partner
countries; new financing mechanisms
for developing country contexts; and
shared value approaches. The MCC
Advisory Council provides a platform
for systematic engagement with the
private sector and other external
stakeholders and contributes to MCC’s
mission—to reduce poverty through
sustainable, economic growth.
DATES: Tuesday, June 16, 2020, from 10
a.m.–12 p.m. ET.
ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held
via conference call.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jennifer Rimbach, 202.521.3932,
MCCAdvisoryCouncil@mcc.gov or visit
https://www.mcc.gov/about/org-unit/
advisory-council.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Agenda.
During the Spring 2020 meeting of the
MCC Advisory Council, members will
be provided an update from MCC
leadership. MCC Advisory Council CoChairs will provide updates from the
subcommittee meetings, and council
members will provide advice on the
threshold development process and
MCC’s investment strategy in Ethiopia.
Public Participation. The meeting will
be open to the public. Members of the
public may file written statement(s)
before or after the meeting. If you plan
to attend, please submit your name and
affiliation no later than Tuesday, June 9,
2020 to MCCAdvisoryCouncil@mcc.gov
to receive dial-in instructions and to be
placed on an attendee list.
Dated: May 21, 2020.
Thomas G. Hohenthaner,
Acting VP/General Counsel and Corporate
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2020–11408 Filed 5–27–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9211–03–P
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
CORPORATION
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
[MCC FR 20–02]
Notice of Open Meeting
Millennium Challenge
Corporation.
ACTION: Notice.
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
requirements of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.—App., the
Millennium Challenge Corporation
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:32 May 27, 2020
Jkt 250001
Solicitation of Written Comments by
the National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence
National Security Commission
on Artificial Intelligence
ACTION: Request for comments.
AGENCY:
The National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00053
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
32055
(the ‘‘Commission’’) was created by
Congress in the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019 to ‘‘consider the methods and
means necessary to advance the
development of artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and associated
technologies by the United States to
comprehensively address the national
security and defense needs of the
United States.’’ In connection with this
effort, the Commission seeks to learn
more about the general public’s views
on these topics.
DATES: Comment Date: The Commission
requests comments on or before
September 30, 2020 to be considered by
the Commission in the formation of its
final report.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. 05–2020–01,
by one of the following methods:
• Email: inquiry@nscai.gov. Please
include the docket number in the
subject line of the message.
• Mail: National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence,
Attn: RFI COMMENT—Docket No. 05–
2020–01, 2530 Crystal Drive, Box 45,
Arlington, VA 22202.
• Fax: +1–571–778–5049. Please
include the docket number on the cover
page of the fax.
Due to the ongoing COVID–19
coronavirus pandemic, email is the
Commission’s primary method of
receiving public comment. All
submissions received must include the
docket number. If the Commission
cannot read your comment due to
technical difficulties and cannot contact
you for clarification, the Commission
may not be able to consider your
comment. Late comments will be
considered as time permits. Please note,
any comments received by the
Commission may be published online or
included with its reports and/or
recommendations. Submitters should be
aware that the Commission is subject to
the Freedom of Information Act and will
transfer official records, including
comments received, to the National
Archives and Records Administration
upon termination of the Commission.
Website: The most current
information about the Commission and
its activities and recommendations is
available on the Commission’s website:
https://www.nscai.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general inquiries, submission process
questions, or any additional information
about this request for comments, please
contact Tara Rigler by email at inquiry@
nscai.gov or by phone at 703–614–6379.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM
28MYN1
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
32056
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 103 / Thursday, May 28, 2020 / Notices
Background: The John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19 NDAA), Sec.
1051, Public Law 115–232, 132 Stat.
1636, 1962–65 (2018), as amended by
the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020, Sec. 1735, Public
Law 116–92 (2019), created the National
Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence (the ‘‘Commission’’) to
‘‘consider the methods and means
necessary to advance the development
of artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and associated technologies by
the United States to comprehensively
address the national security and
defense needs of the United States.’’
Specifically, in Section 1051 of the
FY19 NDAA, Congress directed the
Commission to consider:
A. ‘‘The competitiveness of the
United States in artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and other associated
technologies, including matters related
to national security, defense, publicprivate partnerships, and investments.’’
B. ‘‘Means and methods for the
United States to maintain a
technological advantage in artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and
other associated technologies related to
national security and defense.’’
C. ‘‘Developments and trends in
international cooperation and
competitiveness, including foreign
investments in artificial intelligence,
related machine learning, and computer
science fields that are materially related
to national security and defense.’’
D. ‘‘Means by which to foster greater
emphasis and investments in basic and
advanced research to stimulate private,
public, academic and combined
initiatives in artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and other associated
technologies, to the extent that such
efforts have application materially
related to national security and
defense.’’
E. ‘‘Workforce and education
incentives to attract and recruit leading
talent in artificial intelligence and
machine learning disciplines, including
science, technology, engineering, and
math programs.’’
F. ‘‘Risks associated with United
States and foreign country advances in
military employment of artificial
intelligence and machine learning,
including international law of armed
conflict, international humanitarian
law, and escalation dynamics.’’
G. ‘‘Associated ethical considerations
related to artificial intelligence and
machine learning as it will be used for
future applications related to national
security and defense.’’
H. ‘‘Means to establish data standards,
and incentivize the sharing of open
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:32 May 27, 2020
Jkt 250001
training data within related national
security and defense data-driven
industries.’’
I. ‘‘Consideration of the evolution of
artificial intelligence and appropriate
mechanism for managing such
technology related to national security
and defense.’’
J. ‘‘Any other matters the Commission
deems relevant to the common defense
of the Nation.’’
The Commission is required to
provide the President and the Congress
a final report containing its findings and
recommendations regarding these
matters no later than March 2021. In
connection with this effort, the
Commission seeks to learn more about
the general public’s views on these
topics.
Specific Topics to Address: The
Commission invites written comments
on any of the topics set forth above
under ‘‘Background’’ for which
Congress has requested Commission
input.
In addition, the Commission would
welcome comments on any of the
following seven consensus principles
from its November 2019 Interim Report,
which can be accessed at https://
www.nscai.gov/reports:
1. Global leadership in AI technology
is a matter of national security.
2. Adopting AI for defense and
security is an urgent priority.
3. Private sector and government
share responsibility for our nation’s
future.
4. People matter more than ever in an
AI competition.
5. Protecting our most valuable assets
and ideas must not come at the expense
of free inquiry and innovation.
6. Ethical and trustworthy AI is a
strategic and operational necessity.
7. Any use of AI by the United States
must have American values—including
the rule of law—at its core.
Furthermore, the Commission also
welcomes comments related to any of
the Commission’s November 2019
Interim Report judgments stemming
from the Commission’s lines of effort:
Line of Effort 1—Invest in AI Research
& Development and Software
1. Federal R&D funding for AI has not
kept pace with the revolutionary
potential it holds or with aggressive
investments by competitors.
Investments that are multiple times
greater than current levels are needed.
2. Untapped opportunities exist to
build a nationwide AI R&D
infrastructure and encourage regional
innovation ‘‘clusters.’’ Such AI districts
for defense would benefit both national
security and economic competitiveness.
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
3. The U.S. government should
implement more flexible funding
mechanisms to support AI research.
Business as usual is insufficient.
4. The U.S. government must identify,
prioritize, coordinate, and urgently
implement national security-focused AI
R&D investments.
5. Bureaucratic and resource
constraints are hindering governmentaffiliated labs and research centers from
reaching their full potential in AI R&D.
Line of Effort 2—Apply AI to National
Security Missions
6. AI can help the U.S. Government
execute core national security missions,
if we let it.
7. Implementation of the
government’s national security
strategies for AI is threatened by
bureaucratic impediments and inertia.
Defense and intelligence agencies must
urgently accelerate their efforts.
8. Pockets of successful bottom-up
innovation exist across the Department
of Defense (DoD) and the United States
Intelligence Community (IC). These
isolated programs cannot translate into
strategic change without top-down
leadership to overcome organizational
barriers.
9. AI adoption and deployment
requires a different approach to
acquisition.
10. Rapidly fielding AI is an
operational necessity. To get there
requires investment in resilient, robust,
reliable, and secure AI systems.
11. AI is only as good as the
infrastructure behind it. Within DoD in
particular this infrastructure is severely
underdeveloped.
12. The U.S. government is not
adequately leveraging basic, commercial
AI to improve business practices and
save taxpayer dollars. Departments and
agencies must modernize to become
more effective and cost-efficient.
Line of Effort 3—Train and Recruit AI
Talent
13. National security agencies need to
rethink the requirements for an AI-ready
workforce. That includes extending
familiarity with a range of relevant AI
technologies throughout organizations,
infusing training on the ethical and
responsible development and fielding of
AI at every level, and spreading the use
of modern software tools.
14. DoD and the IC are failing to
capitalize on existing technical talent
because they do not have effective ways
to identify AI-relevant skills already
present in their workforce. They should
systematically measure and incentivize
the development of those skills.
E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM
28MYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 103 / Thursday, May 28, 2020 / Notices
15. The U.S. Government is not fully
utilizing civilian hiring authorities to
recruit AI talent. Agencies need to make
better use of pipelines for people with
STEM training.
16. Expanding AI-focused fellowships
and exchange opportunities can give
officials and service members access to
cutting-edge technology, and bring
talent from our top AI companies into
federal service.
17. The military and national security
agencies are struggling to compete for
top AI talent. They need a better pitch,
incentive structure, and better on-ramps
for recent graduates.
18. American colleges and
universities cannot meet the demand for
undergraduate student interest in AI
and computer science generally.
19. The American AI talent pool
depends heavily on international
students and workers. Our global
competitiveness hinges on our ability to
attract and retain top minds from
around the world.
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
Line of Effort 4—Protect and Build
Upon U.S. Technological Advantages &
Hardware
20. The U.S. Government should
continue to use export controls––
including multilateral controls––to
protect specific U.S. and allied AI
hardware advantages, in particular those
in semiconductor manufacturing
equipment.
21. However, traditional item-based
export controls and narrowly-scoped
foreign investment reviews are by
themselves insufficient to sustain U.S.
competitiveness in AI.
22. The United States must continue
leading in AI-related hardware, and
ensure the government has trusted
access to the latest technologies.
23. Law enforcement and academic
leaders can and should find common
ground on preserving an open research
system while reducing security risks
from foreign government-directed
activity on American campuses.
Line of Effort 5—Marshal Global AI
Cooperation
24. The United States must enhance
its competitiveness in AI by establishing
a network of partners dedicated to AI
data sharing, R&D coordination,
capacity building, and talent exchanges.
25. AI presents significant challenges
for military interoperability. If the
United States and its allies do not
coordinate early and often on AIenabled capabilities, the effectiveness of
our military coalitions will suffer.
26. U.S. diplomacy should be open to
possible cooperation with China and
Russia on promoting AI safety and
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:32 May 27, 2020
Jkt 250001
managing AI’s impact on strategic
stability.
27. The United States should lead in
establishing a positive agenda for
cooperation with all nations on AI
advances that promise to benefit
humanity.
Line of Effort 6—Ethics and
Responsible AI (this cross-cutting
priority has been elevated to an
identified level of effort since the
publication of the November 2019
Interim Report)
28. Developing trustworthy AI
systems is essential for operational
integrity and adoption. It is closely
connected to, and depends on,
reliability, robustness, auditability,
explainability, and fairness.
29. From the earliest phase, systems
should be designed with ethics in mind.
30. Each agency’s design and
deployment of AI, as with other
technologies, must align with America’s
democratic values and institutional
values.
31. Throughout their life cycles,
ethical AI systems for national security
will need to preserve individual rights
and liberties as protected by law. In
international contexts, this includes
America’s commitments to international
humanitarian law and human rights.
Dated: May 22, 2020.
Michael Gable,
Chief of Staff.
[FR Doc. 2020–11453 Filed 5–27–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3610–Y8–P
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Information Collection; Improving
Customer Experience (OMB Circular
A–11, Section 280 Implementation)
National Science Foundation.
Notice; request for comment.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The National Science
Foundation (NSF), as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
and respondent burden, is announcing
an opportunity for public comment on
a new proposed collection of
information by the Agency. Under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA), Federal Agencies are required to
publish notice in the Federal Register
concerning each proposed collection of
information, and to allow 60 days for
public comment in response to the
notice. This notice solicits comments on
new collection proposed by the Agency.
DATES: Submit comments on or before:
July 27, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Suzanne H. Plimpton, Reports Clearance
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
32057
Officer, National Science Foundation,
2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite
W18200, Alexandria, Virginia 22314;
telephone (703) 292–7556; or send email
to splimpto@nsf.gov. Individuals who
use a telecommunications device for the
deaf (TDD) may call the Federal
Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–
800–877–8339, which is accessible 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a
year (including Federal holidays).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Purpose
Under the PRA, (44 U.S.C. 3501–
3520) Federal Agencies must obtain
approval from the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) for each collection of
information they conduct or sponsor.
‘‘Collection of information’’ is defined
in 44 U.S.C. 3502(3) and 5 CFR
1320.3(c) and includes Agency requests
or requirements that members of the
public submit reports, keep records, or
provide information to a third party.
Section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the PRA
requires Federal Agencies to provide a
60-day notice in the Federal Register
concerning each proposed collection of
information, including each proposed
extension of an existing collection of
information, before submitting the
collection to OMB for approval. To
comply with this requirement, GSA is
publishing notice of the proposed
collection of information set forth in
this document.
Whether seeking a loan, Social
Security benefits, veterans benefits, or
other services provided by the Federal
Government, individuals and businesses
expect Government customer services to
be efficient and intuitive, just like
services from leading private-sector
organizations. Yet the 2016 American
Consumer Satisfaction Index and the
2017 Forrester Federal Customer
Experience Index show that, on average,
Government services lag nine
percentage points behind the private
sector.
A modern, streamlined and
responsive customer experience means:
Raising government-wide customer
experience to the average of the private
sector service industry; developing
indicators for high-impact Federal
programs to monitor progress towards
excellent customer experience and
mature digital services; and providing
the structure (including increasing
transparency) and resources to ensure
customer experience is a focal point for
agency leadership. To support this,
OMB Circular A–11 Section 280
established government-wide standards
for mature customer experience
organizations in government and
measurement. To enable Federal
E:\FR\FM\28MYN1.SGM
28MYN1
Agencies
- NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 103 (Thursday, May 28, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32055-32057]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-11453]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Solicitation of Written Comments by the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence
AGENCY: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
ACTION: Request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence
(the ``Commission'') was created by Congress in the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 to ``consider
the methods and means necessary to advance the development of
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies
by the United States to comprehensively address the national security
and defense needs of the United States.'' In connection with this
effort, the Commission seeks to learn more about the general public's
views on these topics.
DATES: Comment Date: The Commission requests comments on or before
September 30, 2020 to be considered by the Commission in the formation
of its final report.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. 05-2020-
01, by one of the following methods:
Email: [email protected]. Please include the docket number
in the subject line of the message.
Mail: National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence, Attn: RFI COMMENT--Docket No. 05-2020-01, 2530 Crystal
Drive, Box 45, Arlington, VA 22202.
Fax: +1-571-778-5049. Please include the docket number on
the cover page of the fax.
Due to the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, email is the
Commission's primary method of receiving public comment. All
submissions received must include the docket number. If the Commission
cannot read your comment due to technical difficulties and cannot
contact you for clarification, the Commission may not be able to
consider your comment. Late comments will be considered as time
permits. Please note, any comments received by the Commission may be
published online or included with its reports and/or recommendations.
Submitters should be aware that the Commission is subject to the
Freedom of Information Act and will transfer official records,
including comments received, to the National Archives and Records
Administration upon termination of the Commission.
Website: The most current information about the Commission and its
activities and recommendations is available on the Commission's
website: https://www.nscai.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general inquiries, submission
process questions, or any additional information about this request for
comments, please contact Tara Rigler by email at [email protected] or
by phone at 703-614-6379.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
[[Page 32056]]
Background: The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19 NDAA), Sec. 1051, Public Law 115-232, 132
Stat. 1636, 1962-65 (2018), as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Sec. 1735, Public Law 116-92
(2019), created the National Security Commission on Artificial
Intelligence (the ``Commission'') to ``consider the methods and means
necessary to advance the development of artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and associated technologies by the United States to
comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the
United States.''
Specifically, in Section 1051 of the FY19 NDAA, Congress directed
the Commission to consider:
A. ``The competitiveness of the United States in artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and other associated technologies,
including matters related to national security, defense, public-private
partnerships, and investments.''
B. ``Means and methods for the United States to maintain a
technological advantage in artificial intelligence, machine learning,
and other associated technologies related to national security and
defense.''
C. ``Developments and trends in international cooperation and
competitiveness, including foreign investments in artificial
intelligence, related machine learning, and computer science fields
that are materially related to national security and defense.''
D. ``Means by which to foster greater emphasis and investments in
basic and advanced research to stimulate private, public, academic and
combined initiatives in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and
other associated technologies, to the extent that such efforts have
application materially related to national security and defense.''
E. ``Workforce and education incentives to attract and recruit
leading talent in artificial intelligence and machine learning
disciplines, including science, technology, engineering, and math
programs.''
F. ``Risks associated with United States and foreign country
advances in military employment of artificial intelligence and machine
learning, including international law of armed conflict, international
humanitarian law, and escalation dynamics.''
G. ``Associated ethical considerations related to artificial
intelligence and machine learning as it will be used for future
applications related to national security and defense.''
H. ``Means to establish data standards, and incentivize the sharing
of open training data within related national security and defense
data-driven industries.''
I. ``Consideration of the evolution of artificial intelligence and
appropriate mechanism for managing such technology related to national
security and defense.''
J. ``Any other matters the Commission deems relevant to the common
defense of the Nation.''
The Commission is required to provide the President and the
Congress a final report containing its findings and recommendations
regarding these matters no later than March 2021. In connection with
this effort, the Commission seeks to learn more about the general
public's views on these topics.
Specific Topics to Address: The Commission invites written comments
on any of the topics set forth above under ``Background'' for which
Congress has requested Commission input.
In addition, the Commission would welcome comments on any of the
following seven consensus principles from its November 2019 Interim
Report, which can be accessed at https://www.nscai.gov/reports:
1. Global leadership in AI technology is a matter of national
security.
2. Adopting AI for defense and security is an urgent priority.
3. Private sector and government share responsibility for our
nation's future.
4. People matter more than ever in an AI competition.
5. Protecting our most valuable assets and ideas must not come at
the expense of free inquiry and innovation.
6. Ethical and trustworthy AI is a strategic and operational
necessity.
7. Any use of AI by the United States must have American values--
including the rule of law--at its core.
Furthermore, the Commission also welcomes comments related to any
of the Commission's November 2019 Interim Report judgments stemming
from the Commission's lines of effort:
Line of Effort 1--Invest in AI Research & Development and Software
1. Federal R&D funding for AI has not kept pace with the
revolutionary potential it holds or with aggressive investments by
competitors. Investments that are multiple times greater than current
levels are needed.
2. Untapped opportunities exist to build a nationwide AI R&D
infrastructure and encourage regional innovation ``clusters.'' Such AI
districts for defense would benefit both national security and economic
competitiveness.
3. The U.S. government should implement more flexible funding
mechanisms to support AI research. Business as usual is insufficient.
4. The U.S. government must identify, prioritize, coordinate, and
urgently implement national security-focused AI R&D investments.
5. Bureaucratic and resource constraints are hindering government-
affiliated labs and research centers from reaching their full potential
in AI R&D.
Line of Effort 2--Apply AI to National Security Missions
6. AI can help the U.S. Government execute core national security
missions, if we let it.
7. Implementation of the government's national security strategies
for AI is threatened by bureaucratic impediments and inertia. Defense
and intelligence agencies must urgently accelerate their efforts.
8. Pockets of successful bottom-up innovation exist across the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the United States Intelligence
Community (IC). These isolated programs cannot translate into strategic
change without top-down leadership to overcome organizational barriers.
9. AI adoption and deployment requires a different approach to
acquisition.
10. Rapidly fielding AI is an operational necessity. To get there
requires investment in resilient, robust, reliable, and secure AI
systems.
11. AI is only as good as the infrastructure behind it. Within DoD
in particular this infrastructure is severely underdeveloped.
12. The U.S. government is not adequately leveraging basic,
commercial AI to improve business practices and save taxpayer dollars.
Departments and agencies must modernize to become more effective and
cost-efficient.
Line of Effort 3--Train and Recruit AI Talent
13. National security agencies need to rethink the requirements for
an AI-ready workforce. That includes extending familiarity with a range
of relevant AI technologies throughout organizations, infusing training
on the ethical and responsible development and fielding of AI at every
level, and spreading the use of modern software tools.
14. DoD and the IC are failing to capitalize on existing technical
talent because they do not have effective ways to identify AI-relevant
skills already present in their workforce. They should systematically
measure and incentivize the development of those skills.
[[Page 32057]]
15. The U.S. Government is not fully utilizing civilian hiring
authorities to recruit AI talent. Agencies need to make better use of
pipelines for people with STEM training.
16. Expanding AI-focused fellowships and exchange opportunities can
give officials and service members access to cutting-edge technology,
and bring talent from our top AI companies into federal service.
17. The military and national security agencies are struggling to
compete for top AI talent. They need a better pitch, incentive
structure, and better on-ramps for recent graduates.
18. American colleges and universities cannot meet the demand for
undergraduate student interest in AI and computer science generally.
19. The American AI talent pool depends heavily on international
students and workers. Our global competitiveness hinges on our ability
to attract and retain top minds from around the world.
Line of Effort 4--Protect and Build Upon U.S. Technological Advantages
& Hardware
20. The U.S. Government should continue to use export controls--
including multilateral controls--to protect specific U.S. and allied AI
hardware advantages, in particular those in semiconductor manufacturing
equipment.
21. However, traditional item-based export controls and narrowly-
scoped foreign investment reviews are by themselves insufficient to
sustain U.S. competitiveness in AI.
22. The United States must continue leading in AI-related hardware,
and ensure the government has trusted access to the latest
technologies.
23. Law enforcement and academic leaders can and should find common
ground on preserving an open research system while reducing security
risks from foreign government-directed activity on American campuses.
Line of Effort 5--Marshal Global AI Cooperation
24. The United States must enhance its competitiveness in AI by
establishing a network of partners dedicated to AI data sharing, R&D
coordination, capacity building, and talent exchanges.
25. AI presents significant challenges for military
interoperability. If the United States and its allies do not coordinate
early and often on AI-enabled capabilities, the effectiveness of our
military coalitions will suffer.
26. U.S. diplomacy should be open to possible cooperation with
China and Russia on promoting AI safety and managing AI's impact on
strategic stability.
27. The United States should lead in establishing a positive agenda
for cooperation with all nations on AI advances that promise to benefit
humanity.
Line of Effort 6--Ethics and Responsible AI (this cross-cutting
priority has been elevated to an identified level of effort since the
publication of the November 2019 Interim Report)
28. Developing trustworthy AI systems is essential for operational
integrity and adoption. It is closely connected to, and depends on,
reliability, robustness, auditability, explainability, and fairness.
29. From the earliest phase, systems should be designed with ethics
in mind.
30. Each agency's design and deployment of AI, as with other
technologies, must align with America's democratic values and
institutional values.
31. Throughout their life cycles, ethical AI systems for national
security will need to preserve individual rights and liberties as
protected by law. In international contexts, this includes America's
commitments to international humanitarian law and human rights.
Dated: May 22, 2020.
Michael Gable,
Chief of Staff.
[FR Doc. 2020-11453 Filed 5-27-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3610-Y8-P