Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records, 14734-14736 [2020-04991]
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14734
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 51 / Monday, March 16, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
exemption from section (c)(3) of the Privacy
Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) as is necessary and
appropriate to protect this information.
(b) Additionally, this system contains law
enforcement and other derogatory records or
information recompiled from or created from
information contained in other systems of
records that are exempt from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act. For these
records or information only, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1),
(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I),
(e)(5), and (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)–(4);
(e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).
Exemptions from these particular subsections
cited above under (a) and (b) are justified, on
a case-by-case basis to be determined at the
time a request is made, for the following
reasons:
(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of that investigation
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(ii) From subsection (d) (Access and
Amendment to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of
records could inform the subject of an
investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the
existence of that investigation and reveal
investigative interest on the part of DHS or
another agency. Access to the records could
permit the individual who is the subject of
a record to impede the investigation, to
tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to
avoid detection or apprehension.
Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement activities and would impose an
unreasonable administrative burden by
requiring investigations to be continually
reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access
and amendment to such information could
disclose security-sensitive information that
could be detrimental to homeland security.
(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear, or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
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appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of the
investigation, thereby interfering with that
investigation and related law enforcement
activities.
(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information could impede law enforcement
by compromising the existence of a
confidential investigation or reveal the
identity of witnesses or confidential
informants.
(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f)
(Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access
provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons
noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or
procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in
the system of records or otherwise setting up
procedures pursuant to which individuals
may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities
of witnesses, potential witnesses, and
confidential informants.
(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because with the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’s ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to
the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Jonathan R. Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2020–04987 Filed 3–13–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–14–P
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. USCBP–2019–0041]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/U.S. Customs and Border
Protection–022 Electronic Visa Update
System (EVUS) System of Records
U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is issuing a final rule to
amend its regulations to exempt
portions of a newly updated system of
records titled, ‘‘Department of
Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and
Border Protection–022 Electronic Visa
Update System (EVUS) System of
Records’’ from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act. Specifically, the
Department exempts portions of this
system of records from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative
enforcement requirements.
DATES: This final rule is effective March
16, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general questions please contact: Debra
L. Danisek (202) 344–1610, CBP Privacy
Officer, Privacy and Diversity Office,
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20229. For privacy
issues please contact: Jonathan R.
Cantor (202) 343–1717, Acting Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Background
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) published a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NRPM)
in the Federal Register (8 FR 30632 June
27, 2019) proposing to exempt portions
of DHS/CBP–022 Electronic Visa Update
System (EVUS) System of Records from
one or more provisions of the Privacy
Act because of criminal, civil, and
administrative enforcement
requirements. DHS issued the ‘‘DHS/
CBP–022 Electronic Visa Update System
(EVUS) System of Records’’ in the
Federal Register at 8 FR 30751 on June
27, 2019, to provide notice to the public
to (1) clarify that the EVUS enrollment
information includes questions
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necessary to evaluate whether a covered
alien’s travel to the United States poses
a law enforcement or security risk, and
to make administrative changes to
remove references to the specific EVUS
application questions and data
elements; (2) provide additional
transparency that vetting results are
retained in ATS; (3) expand the
previously issued exemptions to clarify
that DHS/CBP is exempting certain
portions of records in this system from
provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974
because of criminal, civil and
administrative enforcement
requirements; and (4) to add new
Routine Uses and clarify previously
issued ones.
DHS/CBP invited comments on both
the (NPRM) and System of Records
Notice (SORN).
II. Public Comments
DHS received no comments on the
NPRM and no comments on the SORN.
DHS will implement the rulemaking as
proposed.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS amends Chapter I of
Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as
follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Pub. L.
107–296, 116 Stat. 2135; 5 U.S.C. 301.
Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
2. In Appendix C to Part 5, revise
paragraph 74 to read as follows:
■
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
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*
*
*
*
*
74. The DHS/CBP–022 Electronic Visa
Update System (EVUS) System of Records
consists of electronic and paper records and
will be used by DHS and its components. The
DHS/CBP–022 EVUS System of Records is a
repository of information held by DHS in
connection with its several and varied
missions and functions, including the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
thereunder; national security and intelligence
activities. This system of records covers
information collected by, on behalf of, in
support of, or in cooperation with DHS and
its components and may contain personally
identifiable information collected by other
federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. As part of
the process of determining EVUS eligibility
or admissibility to the United States, CBP
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collects two types of data for which it claims
different exemptions.
(a) CBP will not assert any exemption to
limit an individual from accessing or
amending his or her record under subsection
552a(d) with respect to information
maintained in the system as it relates to data
submitted by or on behalf of a person who
travels to visit the United States and crosses
the border, nor shall an exemption be
asserted with respect to the resulting
determination (approval or denial). However,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), CBP will not
disclose the fact that a law enforcement or
intelligence agency has sought particular
records because it may affect ongoing law
enforcement activities, and thus, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has
exempted such records covered by this
system from sections (c)(3), (e)(8), and (g) of
the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as is
necessary and appropriate to protect this
information. Further, DHS will claim
exemption from section (c)(3) of the Privacy
Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) as is necessary and
appropriate to protect this information.
(b) Additionally, this system contains law
enforcement and other derogatory records or
information recompiled from or created from
information contained in other systems of
records that are exempt from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act, and possibly
relied upon as the basis for denial of an
EVUS application. For these records or
information only, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has
exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), and
(e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from
the following provisions of the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).
Exemptions from these particular
subsections cited above under (a) and (b) are
justified, on a case-by-case basis to be
determined at the time a request is made, for
the following reasons:
(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of that investigation
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(ii) From subsection (d) (Access and
Amendment to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of
records could inform the subject of an
investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the
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14735
existence of that investigation and reveal
investigative interest on the part of DHS or
another agency. Access to the records could
permit the individual who is the subject of
a record to impede the investigation, to
tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to
avoid detection or apprehension.
Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law
enforcement activities and would impose an
unreasonable administrative burden by
requiring investigations to be continually
reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access
and amendment to such information could
disclose security-sensitive information that
could be detrimental to homeland security.
(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear, or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of the
investigation, thereby interfering with that
investigation and related law enforcement
activities.
(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information could impede law enforcement
by compromising the existence of a
confidential investigation or reveal the
identity of witnesses or confidential
informants.
(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f)
(Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access
provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons
noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or
procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in
the system of records or otherwise setting up
procedures pursuant to which individuals
may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities
of witnesses, potential witnesses, and
confidential informants.
(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because with the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’s ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal and could result in disclosure of
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 51 / Monday, March 16, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to
the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Jonathan R. Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2020–04991 Filed 3–13–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–14–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[NRC–2017–0024]
RIN 3150–AJ93
Approval of American Society of
Mechanical Engineers’ Code Cases
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is amending its
regulations to incorporate by reference
the latest revisions of three regulatory
guides approving new, revised, and
reaffirmed Code Cases published by the
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers. This action allows licensees
and applicants to use the Code Cases
listed in these regulatory guides as
voluntary alternatives to engineering
standards for the construction, inservice
inspection, and inservice testing of
nuclear power plant components. These
engineering standards are set forth in
the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers’ Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Codes and American Society of
Mechanical Engineers’ Operation and
Maintenance Codes, which are currently
incorporated by reference into the
NRC’s regulations. Further, this final
rule announces the availability of a
related regulatory guide, not
incorporated by reference into the
NRC’s regulations, that lists Code Cases
that the NRC has not approved for use.
DATES: This final rule is effective on
April 15, 2020. The incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed
in the regulation is approved by the
Director of the Federal Register as of
April 15, 2020.
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SUMMARY:
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16:35 Mar 13, 2020
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Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2017–0024 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information
related to this action by any of the
following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2017–0024. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions contact the
individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For the
convenience of the reader, instructions
about obtaining materials referenced in
this document are provided in the
‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Yanely Malave, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards,
telephone: 301–415–1519, email:
Yanely.Malave@nrc.gov; and Bruce Lin,
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,
telephone: 301–415–2446; email:
Bruce.Lin@nrc.gov. Both are staff of the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
ADDRESSES:
Executive Summary
A. Need for the Regulatory Action
The purpose of this regulatory action
is to incorporate by reference into the
NRC’s regulations the latest revisions of
three regulatory guides (RGs). The three
RGs identify new, revised, and
reaffirmed Code Cases published by the
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME), which the NRC has
determined are acceptable for use as
voluntary alternatives to compliance
with certain provisions of the ASME
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Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code
and ASME Operation and Maintenance
(OM) Code currently incorporated by
reference into the NRC’s regulations.
B. Major Provisions
The three RGs that the NRC is
incorporating by reference are RG 1.84,
‘‘Design, Fabrication, and Materials
Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section
III,’’ Revision 38; RG 1.147, ‘‘Inservice
Inspection Code Case Acceptability,
ASME Section XI, Division 1,’’ Revision
19; and RG 1.192, ‘‘Operation and
Maintenance Code Case Acceptability,
ASME OM Code,’’ Revision 3. This final
rule allows nuclear power plant
licensees and applicants for
construction permits, operating licenses,
combined licenses, standard design
certifications, standard design
approvals, and manufacturing licenses
to voluntarily use the Code Cases, newly
listed in these revised RGs, as
alternatives to engineering standards for
the design, construction, inservice
inspection (ISI) and inservice testing
(IST), and repair/replacement of nuclear
power plant components. In this
document, the NRC also notifies the
public of the availability of RG 1.193,
‘‘ASME Code Cases Not Approved for
Use,’’ Revision 6, which lists Code
Cases that the NRC has not approved for
generic use and will not be incorporated
by reference into the NRC’s regulations.
The NRC prepared a regulatory
analysis (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19156A178) to identify the benefits
and costs associated with this final rule.
The regulatory analysis prepared for this
final rule was used to determine if the
rule is cost-effective, overall, and to
help the NRC evaluate potentially costly
conditions placed on specific provisions
of the ASME Code Cases, which are the
subject of this final rule. In addition,
qualitative factors to be considered in
the NRC’s rulemaking decision are
considered in the regulatory analysis.
The analysis concluded that this rule
would result in net savings to the
industry and the NRC. Table 1 shows
the estimated total net benefit relative to
the regulatory baseline, the quantitative
benefits outweigh the costs by a range
from approximately $6.34 million (7
percent net present value (NPV)) to
$7.20 million (3 percent NPV).
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 51 (Monday, March 16, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 14734-14736]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-04991]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. USCBP-2019-0041]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of
Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection-022 Electronic
Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is issuing a final
rule to amend its regulations to exempt portions of a newly updated
system of records titled, ``Department of Homeland Security/U.S.
Customs and Border Protection-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS)
System of Records'' from certain provisions of the Privacy Act.
Specifically, the Department exempts portions of this system of records
from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act because of criminal,
civil, and administrative enforcement requirements.
DATES: This final rule is effective March 16, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions please contact:
Debra L. Danisek (202) 344-1610, CBP Privacy Officer, Privacy and
Diversity Office, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20229. For
privacy issues please contact: Jonathan R. Cantor (202) 343-1717,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NRPM) in
the Federal Register (8 FR 30632 June 27, 2019) proposing to exempt
portions of DHS/CBP-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of
Records from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement requirements. DHS
issued the ``DHS/CBP-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of
Records'' in the Federal Register at 8 FR 30751 on June 27, 2019, to
provide notice to the public to (1) clarify that the EVUS enrollment
information includes questions
[[Page 14735]]
necessary to evaluate whether a covered alien's travel to the United
States poses a law enforcement or security risk, and to make
administrative changes to remove references to the specific EVUS
application questions and data elements; (2) provide additional
transparency that vetting results are retained in ATS; (3) expand the
previously issued exemptions to clarify that DHS/CBP is exempting
certain portions of records in this system from provisions of the
Privacy Act of 1974 because of criminal, civil and administrative
enforcement requirements; and (4) to add new Routine Uses and clarify
previously issued ones.
DHS/CBP invited comments on both the (NPRM) and System of Records
Notice (SORN).
II. Public Comments
DHS received no comments on the NPRM and no comments on the SORN.
DHS will implement the rulemaking as proposed.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS amends Chapter I of
Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
0
1. The authority citation for Part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135; 5 U.S.C. 301.
Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
0
2. In Appendix C to Part 5, revise paragraph 74 to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
74. The DHS/CBP-022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System
of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP-022 EVUS System of Records is
a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and functions, including the enforcement
of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and
proceedings thereunder; national security and intelligence
activities. This system of records covers information collected by,
on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its
components and may contain personally identifiable information
collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or
international government agencies. As part of the process of
determining EVUS eligibility or admissibility to the United States,
CBP collects two types of data for which it claims different
exemptions.
(a) CBP will not assert any exemption to limit an individual
from accessing or amending his or her record under subsection
552a(d) with respect to information maintained in the system as it
relates to data submitted by or on behalf of a person who travels to
visit the United States and crosses the border, nor shall an
exemption be asserted with respect to the resulting determination
(approval or denial). However, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), CBP
will not disclose the fact that a law enforcement or intelligence
agency has sought particular records because it may affect ongoing
law enforcement activities, and thus, the Secretary of Homeland
Security has exempted such records covered by this system from
sections (c)(3), (e)(8), and (g) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as
amended, as is necessary and appropriate to protect this
information. Further, DHS will claim exemption from section (c)(3)
of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2) as is necessary and appropriate to protect this
information.
(b) Additionally, this system contains law enforcement and other
derogatory records or information recompiled from or created from
information contained in other systems of records that are exempt
from certain provisions of the Privacy Act, and possibly relied upon
as the basis for denial of an EVUS application. For these records or
information only, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d)(1)-
(4); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I),
(e)(5), and (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)-(4); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I); and (f).
Exemptions from these particular subsections cited above under
(a) and (b) are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined
at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:
(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for
Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could
alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process.
(ii) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because access to the records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence
of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the
individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere
with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and would
impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland
security.
(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal
the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I)
(Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of
this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records
or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may
access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system would
undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of
witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
[[Page 14736]]
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Jonathan R. Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2020-04991 Filed 3-13-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-14-P
