Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program System of Records, 13831-13833 [2020-04796]
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13831
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 85, No. 47
Tuesday, March 10, 2020
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS–2019–0034]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/ALL–038 Insider Threat
Program System of Records
Department of Homeland
Security.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Department of Homeland
Security is giving concurrent notice of a
modified system of records pursuant to
the Privacy Act of 1974 for the
‘‘Department of Homeland Security/
ALL–038 Insider Threat Program
System of Records’’ and this proposed
rulemaking. In this proposed
rulemaking, the Department proposes to
exempt portions of the system of records
from one or more provisions of the
Privacy Act because of criminal, civil,
and administrative enforcement
requirements.
SUMMARY:
Comments must be received on
or before April 9, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number DHS–
2019–0034 by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–343–4010.
• Mail: Jonathan R. Cantor, Acting
Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528–0655.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and
docket number for this notice. All
comments received will be posted
without change to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
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DATES:
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comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov.
For
questions please contact: Jonathan R.
Cantor, (202–343–1717), Acting Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528–0655.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
I. Background
In accordance with the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) proposes to
modify a DHS system of records titled
‘‘DHS/ALL–038 Insider Threat Program
System of Records.’’
DHS is modifying the Insider Threat
Program System of Records Notice
(SORN) to account for the new
population affected and new types of
information the program is now
authorized to collect and maintain
pursuant to a memorandum, Expanding
the Scope of the Department of
Homeland Security Insider Threat
Program, submitted to the Secretary of
Homeland Security on December 7,
2016 and approved on January 3, 2017.
Originally, the Insider Threat Program
(ITP) focused on the detection,
prevention, and mitigation of
unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by DHS personnel with
active security clearances. The
Secretary’s memorandum expands the
scope of the ITP to its current breadth:
Threats posed to the Department by all
individuals who have or had access to
the Department’s facilities, information,
equipment, networks, or systems.
Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information is merely one way in which
this threat might manifest. Therefore,
the expanded scope increases the
population covered by the system to
include all those with past or current
access to DHS facilities, information,
equipment, networks, or systems. The
ITP system may include information
from any DHS Component, office,
program, record, or source, and includes
records from information security,
personnel security, and systems security
for both internal and external security
threats. Moreover, the Insider Threat
Program system of records may cover
information lawfully obtained from any
United States Government Agency, DHS
Component, other domestic or foreign
government entity, and from a private
sector entity.
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Consistent with DHS’s information
sharing mission, information stored in
the DHS/ALL–038 Insider Threat
Program system of records may be
shared with other DHS components that
have a need to know the information to
carry out their national security, law
enforcement, immigration, intelligence,
or other homeland security functions. In
addition, DHS may share information
with appropriate federal, state, local,
tribal, territorial, foreign, or
international government agencies
consistent with the routine uses set
forth in the associated system of records
notice.
DHS is issuing this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking to exempt this
system of records from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act. The
system of records notice is published
elsewhere in this Federal Register. This
newly established system will be
included in DHS’s inventory of record
systems.
II. Privacy Act
The Privacy Act embodies fair
information practice principles in a
statutory framework governing the
means by which Federal Government
agencies collect, maintain, use, and
disseminate individuals’ records. The
Privacy Act applies to information that
is maintained in a ‘‘system of records.’’
A ‘‘system of records’’ is a group of any
records under the control of an agency
from which information is retrieved by
the name of the individual or by some
identifying number, symbol, or other
identifying particular assigned to the
individual. In the Privacy Act, an
individual is defined to encompass U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent
residents. Similarly, the Judicial Redress
Act (JRA) provides a statutory right to
covered persons to make requests for
access and amendment to covered
records, as defined by the JRA, along
with judicial review for denials of such
requests. In addition, the JRA prohibits
disclosures of covered records, except as
otherwise permitted by the Privacy Act.
The Privacy Act allows government
agencies to exempt certain records from
the access and amendment provisions. If
an agency claims an exemption,
however, it must issue a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking to make clear to
the public the reasons why a particular
exemption is claimed.
DHS is claiming exemptions from
certain requirements of the Privacy Act
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13832
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 47 / Tuesday, March 10, 2020 / Proposed Rules
for DHS/ALL–038 Insider Threat
Program System of Records. Some
information in this system of records
relates to official DHS national security,
law enforcement, and intelligence
activities. These exemptions are needed
to protect information relating to DHS
activities from disclosure to subjects or
others related to these activities.
Specifically, the exemptions are
required to: Preclude subjects of these
activities from frustrating these
processes; avoid disclosure of insider
threat techniques; protect the identities
and physical safety of confidential
informants and law enforcement
personnel; ensure DHS’s ability to
obtain information from third parties
and other sources; protect the privacy of
third parties; and safeguard classified
information. Disclosure of information
to the subject of the inquiry could also
permit the subject to avoid detection or
apprehension.
In appropriate circumstances, when
compliance would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the law
enforcement purposes of this system
and the overall law enforcement
process, the applicable exemptions may
be waived on a case by case basis.
A notice of system of records DHS/
ALL–038 Insider Threat Program
System of Records is also published in
this issue of the Federal Register.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information; Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS proposes to amend
chapter I of title 6, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for Part 5
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Pub. L.
107–296, 116 Stat. 2135; 5 U.S.C. 301.
2. In Appendix C to Part 5, add new
paragraph 82 to read as follows:
■
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
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*
*
*
*
*
82. The DHS/ALL–038 Insider Threat
Program System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used
by DHS and its components. The DHS/ALL–
038 Insider Threat Program System of
Records covers information held by DHS in
connection with various missions and
functions, including, but not limited to the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws;
investigations, inquiries, and proceedings
there under; and national security and
intelligence activities. The system of records
covers information that is collected by, on
behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation
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with DHS and its components and may
contain personally identifiable information
collected by other federal, state, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government
agencies.
The Secretary of Homeland Security,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4);
(d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (e)(12); (f); and (g)(1).
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1),
(k)(2), and (k)(5), has exempted this system
from the following provisions of the Privacy
Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).
Where a record received from another
system has been exempted in that source
system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5), DHS will claim
the same exemptions for those records that
are claimed for the original primary systems
of records from which they originated and
claims any additional exemptions set forth
here.
Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified on a case-by-case
basis and determined at the time a request is
made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of that investigation
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS and the recipient agency. Disclosure
of the accounting would therefore present a
serious impediment to law enforcement
efforts and efforts to preserve national
security. Disclosure of the accounting would
also permit the subject of a record to impede
the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process. When an
investigation has been completed,
information on disclosures made may
continue to be exempted if the fact that an
investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and
Amendment to Records) because providing
access or permitting amendment to the
records contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an investigation
of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest
on the part of DHS or another agency. Access
to the records could permit the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper
with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment of
the records could interfere with ongoing
investigations and law enforcement activities
and would impose an unreasonable
administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually
reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access
and amendment to such information could
disclose security-sensitive information that
could be detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
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course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear, or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of the
investigation, thereby interfering with that
investigation and related law enforcement
activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information could impede law enforcement
by compromising the existence of a
confidential investigation or reveal the
identity of witnesses or confidential
informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f)
(Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access
provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons
noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or
procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in
the system of records or otherwise setting up
procedures pursuant to which individuals
may access and view records pertaining to
themselves in the system would undermine
investigative efforts and reveal the identities
of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and
confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because with the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’s ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Matching
Agreements) because requiring DHS to
provide notice of a new or revised matching
agreement with a non-Federal agency, if one
existed, would impair DHS operations by
indicating which data elements and
information are valuable to DHS’s analytical
functions, thereby providing harmful
disclosure of information to individuals who
would seek to circumvent or interfere with
DHS’s missions.
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 47 / Tuesday, March 10, 2020 / Proposed Rules
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies)
to the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Jonathan R. Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2020–04796 Filed 3–9–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9910–9B–P
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Part 51
[Document Number AMS–SC–17–0076, SC–
18–327]
U.S. Standards for Grades of
Grapefruit (Texas and States Other
Than Florida, California, and Arizona),
and U.S. Standards for Grades of
Oranges (Texas and States Other Than
Florida, California, and Arizona)
Agricultural Marketing Service,
USDA.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
The Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) proposes to revise the
U.S. Standards for Grades of Grapefruit
(Texas and States other than Florida,
California, and Arizona) and the U.S.
Standards for Grades of Oranges (Texas
and States other than Florida,
California, and Arizona). The revision
would convert the Acceptable Quality
Level (AQL) tables from showing the
acceptable number of allowable
defective fruit in each grade to showing
the percentage of defects permitted in
each grade; revise the minimum sample
size to 25 fruit; update size
classifications; remove references to
Temple oranges from the orange
standards for grade; and more closely
align terminology in both grade
standards with Florida and California
citrus standards.
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before May 11, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit written comments to
the USDA, Specialty Crops Inspection
Division, 100 Riverside Parkway, Suite
101, Fredericksburg, VA 22406; fax:
(540) 361–1199; or at
www.regulations.gov. Comments should
reference the date and page number of
this issue of the Federal Register and
will be made available for public
inspection in the above office during
regular business hours. Comments can
also be viewed as submitted, including
any personal information you provide,
on the www.regulations.gov website.
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SUMMARY:
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Olivia L. Banks at the address above, or
by phone (540) 361–1120; fax (540) 361–
1199; or, email olivia.banks@usda.gov.
Copies of the proposed U.S. Standards
for Grades of Grapefruit (Texas and
States other than Florida, California,
and Arizona) and U.S. Standards for
Grades of Oranges (Texas and States
other than Florida, California, and
Arizona) may be viewed at https://
www.regulations.gov. Copies of the
current U.S. Standards for Grades of
Grapefruit (Texas and States other than
Florida, California, and Arizona) and
U.S. Standards for Grades of Oranges
(Texas and States other than Florida,
California, and Arizona) are available on
the AMS website at https://
www.ams.usda.gov/grades-standards/
fruits.
The
proposed changes would convert the
AQL tables in the U.S. Standards for
Grades of Grapefruit (Texas and States
other than Florida, California, and
Arizona) and the U.S. Standards for
Grades of Oranges (Texas and States
other than Florida, California, and
Arizona) from showing the acceptable
number of allowable defective fruit in
each grade to showing the percentage of
defects permitted in each grade, revise
minimum sample size to 25 fruit,
update size classifications, remove
reference to Temple orange in the
orange standards for grade and more
closely align terminology in both grade
standards with Florida and California
citrus standards. These revisions also
affect the grade requirements under the
marketing order (Order) Oranges and
Grapefruit Grown in Lower Rio Grande
Valley in Texas, 7 CFR part 906, issued
under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937 (7 U.S.C. 601–
674) and applicable imports.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Orders 12866, 13771, and
13563
This proposed rule is not expected to
be an Executive Order 13771 regulatory
action because it is not significant under
Executive Order 12866. See the Office of
Management and Budget’s
memorandum, ‘‘Interim Guidance
Implementing Section 2 of the Executive
Order of January 30, 2017 titled
‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs’’’ (February 2, 2017).
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
direct agencies to assess all costs and
benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
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13833
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits,
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and
promoting flexibility.
Executive Order 13175
This proposed rule has been reviewed
in accordance with the requirements of
Executive Order 13175, Consultation
and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments. The review reveals that
this regulation would not have
substantial and direct effects on Tribal
governments nor significant Tribal
implications.
Executive Order 12988
This proposed rule has been reviewed
under Executive Order 12988, Civil
Justice Reform. It is not intended to
have retroactive effect. There are no
administrative procedures that must be
exhausted prior to any judicial
challenge to the provisions of this rule.
Background
AMS continuously reviews fruit and
vegetable grade standards to assess their
effectiveness in the industry and to
modernize language. On September 20,
2016, AMS received a request from the
Texas Valley Citrus Committee (TVCC)
to modernize the language of and clarify
the Texas citrus standards by removing
outdated AQL tables. The standards
were last revised in September 2003.
AMS worked closely with the TVCC
throughout the development of the
proposed revisions, soliciting their
comments and suggestions about the
standards through discussion drafts that
outlined the conversion from AQL
tables to a defined percentage of defects
permitted in each grade. The proposed
percentages correspond to those
currently allowed in the AQL tables and
more closely align with California and
Florida orange and grapefruit standards.
Additional proposed revisions to the
Texas grapefruit standard include
adding size 64 to the size classifications
to align with sizes in the Order;
changing the minimum sample size
from 33 to 25 fruit; and changing the
scoring basis for defects from a 70-size
fruit to a 41⁄8-inch grapefruit. Proposed
revisions to the Texas orange standard
also include adding size 163 to the size
classifications to align with sizes in the
Order; changing the minimum sample
size from 50 to 25 fruit; changing the
scoring basis for defects from a 200-size
fruit to a 27⁄8-inch orange; and removing
Temple oranges from the standard.
AMS also conducted a grapefruit
shape survey with the TVCC to identify
areas of the standards for revision in
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 47 (Tuesday, March 10, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 13831-13833]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-04796]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 47 / Tuesday, March 10, 2020 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 13831]]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS-2019-0034]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of
Homeland Security/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program System of Records
AGENCY: Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security is giving concurrent
notice of a modified system of records pursuant to the Privacy Act of
1974 for the ``Department of Homeland Security/ALL-038 Insider Threat
Program System of Records'' and this proposed rulemaking. In this
proposed rulemaking, the Department proposes to exempt portions of the
system of records from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act
because of criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement
requirements.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 9, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number DHS-
2019-0034 by one of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-343-4010.
Mail: Jonathan R. Cantor, Acting Chief Privacy Officer,
Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528-
0655.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
and docket number for this notice. All comments received will be posted
without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal
information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions please contact: Jonathan
R. Cantor, (202-343-1717), Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy
Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528-0655.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposes to modify a DHS system
of records titled ``DHS/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program System of
Records.''
DHS is modifying the Insider Threat Program System of Records
Notice (SORN) to account for the new population affected and new types
of information the program is now authorized to collect and maintain
pursuant to a memorandum, Expanding the Scope of the Department of
Homeland Security Insider Threat Program, submitted to the Secretary of
Homeland Security on December 7, 2016 and approved on January 3, 2017.
Originally, the Insider Threat Program (ITP) focused on the detection,
prevention, and mitigation of unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by DHS personnel with active security clearances. The
Secretary's memorandum expands the scope of the ITP to its current
breadth: Threats posed to the Department by all individuals who have or
had access to the Department's facilities, information, equipment,
networks, or systems. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information
is merely one way in which this threat might manifest. Therefore, the
expanded scope increases the population covered by the system to
include all those with past or current access to DHS facilities,
information, equipment, networks, or systems. The ITP system may
include information from any DHS Component, office, program, record, or
source, and includes records from information security, personnel
security, and systems security for both internal and external security
threats. Moreover, the Insider Threat Program system of records may
cover information lawfully obtained from any United States Government
Agency, DHS Component, other domestic or foreign government entity, and
from a private sector entity.
Consistent with DHS's information sharing mission, information
stored in the DHS/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program system of records may
be shared with other DHS components that have a need to know the
information to carry out their national security, law enforcement,
immigration, intelligence, or other homeland security functions. In
addition, DHS may share information with appropriate federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, foreign, or international government
agencies consistent with the routine uses set forth in the associated
system of records notice.
DHS is issuing this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to exempt this
system of records from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. The
system of records notice is published elsewhere in this Federal
Register. This newly established system will be included in DHS's
inventory of record systems.
II. Privacy Act
The Privacy Act embodies fair information practice principles in a
statutory framework governing the means by which Federal Government
agencies collect, maintain, use, and disseminate individuals' records.
The Privacy Act applies to information that is maintained in a ``system
of records.'' A ``system of records'' is a group of any records under
the control of an agency from which information is retrieved by the
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other
identifying particular assigned to the individual. In the Privacy Act,
an individual is defined to encompass U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents. Similarly, the Judicial Redress Act (JRA) provides
a statutory right to covered persons to make requests for access and
amendment to covered records, as defined by the JRA, along with
judicial review for denials of such requests. In addition, the JRA
prohibits disclosures of covered records, except as otherwise permitted
by the Privacy Act.
The Privacy Act allows government agencies to exempt certain
records from the access and amendment provisions. If an agency claims
an exemption, however, it must issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
make clear to the public the reasons why a particular exemption is
claimed.
DHS is claiming exemptions from certain requirements of the Privacy
Act
[[Page 13832]]
for DHS/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program System of Records. Some
information in this system of records relates to official DHS national
security, law enforcement, and intelligence activities. These
exemptions are needed to protect information relating to DHS activities
from disclosure to subjects or others related to these activities.
Specifically, the exemptions are required to: Preclude subjects of
these activities from frustrating these processes; avoid disclosure of
insider threat techniques; protect the identities and physical safety
of confidential informants and law enforcement personnel; ensure DHS's
ability to obtain information from third parties and other sources;
protect the privacy of third parties; and safeguard classified
information. Disclosure of information to the subject of the inquiry
could also permit the subject to avoid detection or apprehension.
In appropriate circumstances, when compliance would not appear to
interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of this
system and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable
exemptions may be waived on a case by case basis.
A notice of system of records DHS/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program
System of Records is also published in this issue of the Federal
Register.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information; Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS proposes to amend
chapter I of title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
0
1. The authority citation for Part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135; 5 U.S.C. 301.
0
2. In Appendix C to Part 5, add new paragraph 82 to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
82. The DHS/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program System of Records
consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and
its components. The DHS/ALL-038 Insider Threat Program System of
Records covers information held by DHS in connection with various
missions and functions, including, but not limited to the
enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries,
and proceedings there under; and national security and intelligence
activities. The system of records covers information that is
collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with
DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable
information collected by other federal, state, local, tribal,
foreign, or international government agencies.
The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the following provisions
of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1),
(e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8),
(e)(12); (f); and (g)(1). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5), has
exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy
Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I); and (f).
Where a record received from another system has been exempted in
that source system under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1),
(k)(2), and (k)(5), DHS will claim the same exemptions for those
records that are claimed for the original primary systems of records
from which they originated and claims any additional exemptions set
forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified on a
case-by-case basis and determined at the time a request is made, for
the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
and the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire
investigative process. When an investigation has been completed,
information on disclosures made may continue to be exempted if the
fact that an investigation occurred remains sensitive after
completion.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records)
because providing access or permitting amendment to the records
contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an
investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency.
Access to the records could permit the subject of a record to impede
the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to
avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could
interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities
and would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland
security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal
the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records
or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may
access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system would
undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of
witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (e)(12) (Matching Agreements) because
requiring DHS to provide notice of a new or revised matching
agreement with a non-Federal agency, if one existed, would impair
DHS operations by indicating which data elements and information are
valuable to DHS's analytical functions, thereby providing harmful
disclosure of information to individuals who would seek to
circumvent or interfere with DHS's missions.
[[Page 13833]]
(j) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
Jonathan R. Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2020-04796 Filed 3-9-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9910-9B-P