Transmission Planning Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, 8155-8161 [2020-02170]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 30 / Thursday, February 13, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2020–02–18 Gulfstream Aerospace
Corporation: Amendment 39–21026;
Docket No. FAA–2020–0116; Product
Identifier 2019–CE–060–AD.
(g) Special Flight Permit
Special flight permits are prohibited for
this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 39.23.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective February 13, 2020.
(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Gulfstream Aerospace
Corporation Models GVI, GVII–G500, and
GVII–G600 airplanes, all serial numbers,
certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America
Code 27, Flight Controls.
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(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of
continued flight after the flight control
computer (FCC) has commanded flight
control surfaces into a damped by-pass mode
(surface shutdown). If flight is continued
after a flight control surface shutdown, the
airplane is left without protection against
flight control surface hard-over and force
fight events. The FAA is issuing this AD to
provide operating limitations and flight crew
procedures in the event of loss of protection
against flight control surface hard-over and
force fight events. The unsafe condition, if
not addressed, could result in loss of
structural integrity and loss of control of the
airplane.
(f) Actions and Compliance
Comply with this AD within 15 days after
February 13, 2020 (the effective date of this
AD), unless already done.
(1) Revise the airplane flight manual (AFM)
for your airplane by attaching the applicable
airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS)
specified in paragraphs (f)(1)(i) through (iv)
of this AD. When these flight manual changes
have been included in a future revision of the
AFM, you may insert the revisions in the
limitations, abnormal procedures, and
emergency procedures sections of the AFM,
provided the information is identical to that
in the AFMS, and then you may remove the
AFMS.
(i) Gulfstream Aerospace G650 Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement No. G650–2019–
04, dated December 16, 2019.
(ii) Gulfstream Aerospace G650ER Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement No. G650ER–
2019–04, dated December 16, 2019.
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(iii) Gulfstream Aerospace GVII–G500
Airplane Flight Manual Supplement No.
GVII–G500–2019–08, dated December 16,
2019.
(iv) Gulfstream Aerospace G600 Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement No. GVII–G600–
2019–02, dated December 16, 2019.
(2) The action required by paragraph (f)(1)
of this AD may be performed by the owner/
operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot
certificate and must be entered into the
aircraft records showing compliance with
this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9(a)(1)
through (4), and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v). The
record must be maintained as required by 14
CFR 91.417, 121.380, or 135.439.
(1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with
14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your
principal inspector or local Flight Standards
District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the
certification office, send it to the attention of
the person identified in paragraph (j) of this
AD.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
(i) Related Information
For more information about this AD,
contact Myles Jalalian, Aerospace Engineer,
Atlanta ACO Branch, FAA, 1701 Columbia
Avenue, College Park, Georgia 30337; phone:
(404) 474–5572; fax: (404) 474–5606; email:
myles.jalalian@faa.gov.
(j) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Gulfstream Aerospace G650 Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement No. G650–2019–
04, dated December 16, 2019.
(ii) Gulfstream Aerospace G650ER Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement No. G650ER–
2019–04, dated December 16, 2019.
(iii) Gulfstream Aerospace GVII–G500
Airplane Flight Manual Supplement No.
GVII–G500–2019–08, dated December 16,
2019.
(iv) Gulfstream Aerospace G600 Airplane
Flight Manual Supplement No. GVII–G600–
2019–02, dated December 16, 2019.
(3) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Gulfstream Aerospace
Corporation, Technical Publications Dept.,
P.O. Box 2206, Savannah, GA 31402–2206;
telephone: (800) 810–4853; fax: (912) 965–
3520; email: pubs@gulfstream.com; internet:
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https://www.gulfstream.com/customersupport.
(4) You may view this service information
at FAA, Policy and Innovation Division, 901
Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (816) 329–4148.
(5) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA,
email: fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to:
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/
ibr-locations.html.
Issued on January 27, 2020.
Patrick R. Mullen,
Aircraft Certification Service, Manager, Small
Airplane Standards Branch, AIR–690.
[FR Doc. 2020–02856 Filed 2–12–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM19–10–000]
Transmission Planning Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission)
approves Reliability Standard TPL–001–
5 (Transmission System Planning
Performance Requirements), submitted
by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), the
Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will
become effective April 13, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Eugene Blick (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426, (301) 665–1759, eugene.blick@
ferc.gov
Leigh Anne Faugust (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6396, leigh.faugust@
ferc.gov
SUMMARY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the
Federal Power Act (FPA), the
Commission approves Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 (Transmission
System Planning Performance
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 30 / Thursday, February 13, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
Requirements).1 The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC),
the Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO),
submitted Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 for Commission approval in
response to directives in Order No.
786.2 As discussed in this final rule, we
determine that Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 improves upon currentlyeffective Reliability Standard TPL–001–
4 by addressing: (1) The study of single
points of failure of protection systems;
and (2) planned maintenance outages
and stability analysis for spare
equipment strategies.
2. The improvements in Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 are responsive to
the directives in Order No. 786
regarding planned maintenance outages
and stability analysis for spare
equipment strategies.3 Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 is responsive in
that it requires each planning
coordinator and transmission planner to
perform an annual planning assessment
of its portion of the bulk electric system
considering a number of system
conditions and contingencies with a
risk-based approach. The improvements
in Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 are
also responsive to the concerns
identified in Order No. 754 regarding
the study of a single point of failure on
protection systems.4 Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 contains revisions
to the planning events (Category P5) and
extreme events (Stability 2.a–h)
identified in Table 1 (Steady State and
Stability Performance Planning Events
and Steady State and Stability
Performance Extreme Events), as well as
the associated footnote 13, to provide
for a more comprehensive study of the
potential impacts of protection system
single points of failure.
3. For more common scenarios (i.e.,
planning events), the planning entity
must develop a corrective action plan if
it determines through studies that its
system would experience performance
issues.5 For less common scenarios that
could result in potentially severe
impacts such as cascading (i.e., extreme
events), the planning entity must
conduct a comprehensive analysis to
understand both the potential impacts
on its system and the types of actions
1 16
U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
Planning Reliability Standards,
Order No. 786, 145 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2013).
3 Order No. 786, 145 FERC ¶ 61,051, at PP 40, 89.
4 Interpretation of Transmission Planning
Reliability Standard, Order No. 754, 136 FERC
¶ 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
5 NERC defines ‘‘Corrective Action Plan’’ as, ‘‘A
list of actions and an associated timetable for
implementation to remedy a specific problem.’’
Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability
Standards (May 13, 2019) (NERC Glossary).
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2 Transmission
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that could reduce or mitigate those
impacts.6
4. Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 is
also responsive to Order No. 786 by
modifying the requirements for stability
analysis to require an entity to assess
the impact of the possible unavailability
of long lead time equipment, consistent
with the entity’s spare equipment
strategy. Accordingly, pursuant to
section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the
Commission approves Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 as just, reasonable,
not unduly discriminatory or
preferential, and in the public interest.
5. In the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR), the Commission
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to modify
the Reliability Standard to require
corrective action plans for protection
system single points of failure in
combination with a three-phase fault if
planning studies indicate potential
cascading.7 As discussed below, we
determine not to adopt the proposed
directive.
I. Background
A. Section 215 and Mandatory
Reliability Standards
6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the
Commission to certify an ERO to
develop mandatory and enforceable
Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. Once
approved, the Reliability Standards may
be enforced in the United States by the
ERO, subject to Commission oversight,
or by the Commission independently.8
Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the
Commission established a process to
select and certify an ERO,9 and
subsequently certified NERC.10
B. Industry Advisory
7. On March 30, 2009, NERC issued
an advisory report notifying industry
that failure of a single component of a
6 NERC defines ‘‘Cascading’’ as, ‘‘The
uncontrolled successive loss of System Elements
triggered by an incident at any location. Cascading
results in widespread electric service interruption
that cannot be restrained from sequentially
spreading beyond an area predetermined by
studies.’’ NERC Glossary.
7 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5); Transmission Planning
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 84 FR 30,639 (Jun. 27, 2019), 167
FERC ¶ 61,249, at P 5 (2019) (NOPR).
8 Id. 824o(e).
9 Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric
Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of
Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, 114
FERC ¶ 61,104, order on reh’g, Order No. 672–A,
114 FERC ¶ 61,328 (2006).
10 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116
FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g and compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v.
FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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protection system caused three
significant system disturbances in the
previous five years.11 In the Industry
Advisory, NERC stated that
‘‘[p]rotection system component failures
may render a protective scheme
inoperative, which could result in N–1
transmission system contingencies
evolving into more severe or even
extreme events.’’ 12 NERC advised
registered transmission owners,
generator owners, and distribution
providers ‘‘to address single points of
failure on their protection systems,
when identified in routine system
evaluations, to prevent N–1
transmission system contingencies from
evolving into more severe events or
even extreme events.’’ 13 NERC also
advised industry to begin preparing an
estimate of the resource commitment
required to review, re-engineer, and
develop a workable outage and
construction schedule to address single
points of failure.
C. Order No. 754
8. On November 17, 2009, NERC
submitted a petition requesting approval
of NERC’s interpretation of Reliability
Standard TPL–002–2, Requirement
R1.3.10. In the resulting Order No. 754,
the Commission determined that ‘‘there
may be a system protection issue that
merits further exploration by technical
experts’’ and that there is ‘‘an issue
concerning the study of the
non-operation of non-redundant
primary protection systems; e.g., the
study of a single point of failure on
protection systems.’’ 14 To address this
concern, the Commission directed
‘‘Commission staff to meet with NERC
and its appropriate subject matter
experts to explore the reliability
concern, including where it can best be
addressed, and identify any additional
actions necessary to address the
matter.’’ 15 The Commission also
directed NERC ‘‘to make an
informational filing . . . explaining
whether there is a further system
protection issue that needs to be
addressed and, if so, what forum and
process should be used to address that
issue and what priority it should be
accorded relative to other reliability
initiatives planned by NERC.’’ 16
11 Industry Advisory, Protection System Single
Point of Failure (March 30, 2009), https://
www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/
2009%20Advisories/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf (Industry
Advisory).
12 Id. at 2.
13 Id. at 1.
14 Order No. 754, 136 FERC ¶ 61,186, at P 19
(2011).
15 Id. P 20.
16 Id.
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9. Commission staff then hosted a
technical conference in October 2011 on
single points of failure, which resulted
in four consensus points and the
following problem statement: ‘‘[t]he
group perceives a reliability concern
regarding the comprehensive
assessment of potential protection
system failures by registered entities.
The group agrees on the need to study
if a [reliability] gap exists regarding the
study and resolution of a single point of
failure on protection systems.’’ 17 One
outcome of the 2011 technical
conference, as described in the 2012
Informational Filing, was that the NERC
Board of Trustees approved the issuance
of a data request to aid in assessing
whether single points of failure in
protection systems pose a reliability
concern.18
10. Over the next two years, NERC
collected data from transmission
planners that it used to assess protection
system single points of failure. This
assessment examined in detail the
protection systems related to nearly
4,000 buses. The findings were
presented in a September 2015 report
that concluded that single points of
failure on protection systems posed a
reliability risk that warranted further
action.19 After considering alternatives,
the 2015 Report recommended that
NERC modify Reliability Standard TPL–
001–4 to maximize reliability of
protection system performance and
align with the directives in Order No.
754. In particular, the 2015 Report
recommended that three-phase faults
involving protection system failures be
assessed as an extreme event in
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4. As an
extreme event under Reliability
Standard TPL–001–4, Part 4.5, an entity
is required to evaluate, but not
implement, possible actions designed to
mitigate cascading.20 Notably however,
the report did not recommend elevating
three-phase faults with a protection
system failure to a planning event under
Part 2.7, which requires a corrective
action plan when analysis indicates an
inability to meet performance
requirements. The report explained that
the ‘‘[p]robability of three-phase fault
with a protection system failure is low
17 NERC, Order No. 754 Single Point of Failure
Technical Meeting Notes at 8 (October 24–25,
2011).
18 2012 NERC Informational Filing at 7 (stating
that the data request ‘‘is based on an approach that
utilizes . . . a three-phase (3;) fault and assesses
simulated system performance against performance
measures’’).
19 NERC, Order No. 754 Assessment of Protection
System Single Points of Failure Based on the
Section 1600 Data Request, at 11 (September 2015)
(2015 Report).
20 Id.
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enough that it does not warrant a
planning event.’’ 21
D. Order No. 786
11. In Order No. 786, the Commission
approved the currently-effective version
of the transmission system planning
standard, Reliability Standard TPL–
001–4, and issued several directives to
NERC. First, the Commission expressed
concern that the six (6) month outage
duration threshold in Reliability
Standard TPL–001–4, Requirement R1
could exclude planned maintenance
outages of significant facilities from
future planning assessments.22 The
Commission determined that planned
maintenance outages of less than six (6)
months in duration may result in
relevant impacts during one or both of
the seasonal off-peak periods, and that
prudent transmission planning should
consider maintenance outages at those
load levels when planned outages are
performed to allow for a single element
to be taken out of service for
maintenance without compromising the
ability of the system to meet demand
without loss of load. The Commission
further determined that a properly
planned transmission system should
ensure the known, planned removal of
facilities (i.e., generation, transmission,
or protection system facilities) for
maintenance purposes without the loss
of nonconsequential load or detrimental
impacts to system reliability such as
cascading, voltage instability, or
uncontrolled islanding. The
Commission directed NERC to modify
the Reliability Standards to address
these concerns.
12. Second, while stating that NERC
had met the Commission’s Order No.
693 directive to include a spare
equipment strategy for steady state
analysis in Reliability Standard TPL–
001–4, the Commission determined that
a spare equipment strategy for stability
analysis was not addressed in the
standard.23 The Commission stated that
a similar spare equipment strategy for
stability analysis should exist that
requires studies to be performed for no
or single contingency categories 24 with
the conditions that the system is
expected to experience during the
possible unavailability of the long lead
time equipment. Rather than direct a
change at that time, however, the
21 Id.
at 9.
No. 786, 145 FERC ¶ 61,051 at PP 40–45.
23 Id. PP 85, 88–89 (citing Mandatory Reliability
Standards for the Bulk-Power System, Order No.
693, 118 FERC ¶ 61,218, at P 1786, order on reh’g,
Order No. 693–A, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007)).
24 See Reliability Standard TPL–001–4, Table 1—
Steady State & Stability Performance Planning
Events, Categories P0, P1, and P2.
22 Order
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Commission directed NERC to consider
the issue during the next review cycle
of Reliability Standard TPL–001–4.25
E. NERC Petition and Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5
13. On December 7, 2018, NERC
submitted Reliability Standard TPL–
001–5 for Commission approval.26
NERC maintains that Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 addresses the
Order No. 786 directives. With regard to
protection system single points of
failure, NERC indicates that Table 1 of
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5
describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential
system contingencies required to be
evaluated by the planner.27 Table 1
includes three parts: (1) Steady State &
Stability Performance Planning Events;
(2) Steady State & Stability Performance
Extreme Events; and (3) Steady State &
Stability Performance Footnotes. Table 1
describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential
system contingencies required to be
evaluated by the planner. The table
categorizes the events as either
‘‘planning events’’ or ‘‘extreme events.’’
The table lists seven contingency
planning events (P1 through P7) that
require steady-state and stability
analysis as well as five extreme event
contingencies: Three for steady-state
and two for stability.
14. According to NERC, Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 includes certain
modifications to better ensure that
planning entities are performing a more
complete analysis of potential
protection system single points of
failure issues on their systems and
taking appropriate action to address
these concerns. NERC explains that
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5
contains revisions to both the Table 1
planning event (Category P5) and
extreme events (Stability 2.a–h) and the
associated footnote 13 to provide for
more comprehensive study of the
potential impacts of protection system
single points of failure.
25 Order
No. 786, 145 FERC ¶ 61,051 at PP 88–89.
Standard TPL–001–5 is available on
the Commission’s eLibrary document retrieval
system in Docket No. RM19–10–000 and on the
NERC website, www.nerc.com.
27 Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 includes an
expanded list of protection system components for
single points of failure studies. The selected list of
components account for: (1) Those failed nonredundant components of a protection system that
may impact one or more protection systems; (2) the
duration that faults remain energized until delayed
fault clearing; and (3) the additional system
equipment removed from service following fault
clearing depending on the specific failed nonredundant component of a protection system. NERC
Petition at 16.
26 Reliability
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15. NERC states that where the study
of a protection system single point of
failure for a single-line-to-ground fault
(i.e., a Category P5 event) identifies
cascading, a corrective action plan is
required.28 NERC considers this a
relatively commonplace scenario, and
NERC explains that an entity would be
required to develop a corrective action
plan if it determines that its system
would be unable to meet the
performance requirements of Table 1 for
the Category P5 event.
16. In contrast, the revisions treat a
protection system single point of failure
in combination with a three-phase fault
as an extreme event that does not
require a corrective action plan. NERC
asserts that the three-phase fault
scenario is much less common than the
single-line-to-ground fault scenario.
According to NERC, like the other
extreme events in Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5, the three-phase fault
scenario, while rare, could result in
more significant impacts to an entity’s
system.29 Under this approach, if an
entity determines that its system will
experience cascading as a result of a
three-phase fault scenario, the entity
would evaluate possible actions
designed to reduce the likelihood or
mitigate the consequences of the event;
however, a corrective action plan would
not be required.
17. NERC explains that the likelihood
of a three-phase fault event occurring
and resulting in the most severe impacts
would be small based on an historical
analysis of NERC data on protection
system misoperation. NERC states that it
reviewed over 12,000 protection system
misoperation in its Misoperation
Information Data Analysis System
database reported since 2011, of which
only 28 involved three-phase faults. Of
those, NERC states that 10 involved
breakers that failed to operate, and the
remaining 18 involved breakers that
were slow to operate.30 NERC contends
that a failure to operate may indicate an
instance of a protection system single
point of failure. While the potential for
severe impacts from such events
remains, NERC asserts that none of the
10 failure to trip scenarios reported
since 2011 resulted in events that
reached the threshold for reporting
28 Reliability Standard TPL–001–5, Table 1
(Steady State and Stability Performance Planning
Events), Category P5 requires the study of a singleline-to-ground faulted element (e.g., generator,
transmission circuit or transformer) along with a
failure to operate of a non-redundant component of
the protection system (i.e., a single point of failure)
protecting the faulted element.
29 Order No. 693, 118 FERC ¶ 61,218 at P 1826
(describing extreme events as ‘‘events resulting in
loss of two or more elements or cascading’’).
30 NERC Petition at 26, n.55.
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under Reliability Standard EOP–004
(Event Reporting).31 With regard to the
Order No. 786 directives, NERC
maintains that Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 provides for a more
complete consideration of factors for
selecting which known outages will be
included in near-term transmission
planning horizon studies.
F. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
18. On June 20, 2019, the Commission
issued a NOPR that proposed to approve
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 as the
Reliability Standard largely addresses
the directives in Order No. 786. The
NOPR also proposed to direct NERC,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA, to modify the Reliability Standard
to require corrective action plans for
protection system single points of
failure in combination with a threephase fault if planning studies indicate
potential cascading.32 The NOPR stated
that NERC had not adequately justified
categorizing protection system single
points of failure in combination with a
three-phase fault as an extreme event
that only requires study, but not a
corrective action plan, when there is the
potential for cascading. The NOPR also
expressed concern with NERC’s
assessment that such events do not
necessitate corrective action plans
because of their rarity. The NOPR
proposed to direct NERC to submit the
modified Reliability Standard for
approval within twelve (12) months
from the effective date of a final rule.
19. In addition to inviting comment
on the proposed directive, the NOPR
sought comment on: (1) How many
corrective action plans are expected for
protection system single points of
failure in combination with a threephase fault if a study indicates
cascading, so the Commission could
better understand the potential for
increased costs and other
implementation issues; and (2) the
Commission’s proposal to direct NERC
address the directive within twelve (12)
months of the effective date of the final
rule.
20. The Commission received ten sets
of NOPR comments. We address below
the issues raised in the NOPR and the
comments submitted in response. The
Appendix to this final rule lists the
entities that filed comments.
31 Reliability Standard EOP–004–3 (Event
Reporting), Attachment 1: Reportable Events,
contains a list of thresholds for reporting certain
events to NERC. Examples of reporting thresholds
include: Loss of firm load for 15 minutes or more
if 300 MW or greater for entities with a previous
year’s demand of at least 3,000 MW, or 200 MW or
greater for all other entities.
32 NOPR, 167 FERC ¶ 61,249 at P 1.
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II. Discussion
21. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of
the FPA, the Commission approves
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 as just,
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory
or preferential, and in the public
interest. We conclude that Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 is an improvement
over currently-effective Reliability
Standard TPL–001–4 and will improve
Bulk-Power System reliability by
requiring enhanced transmission system
planning regarding the study of
protection system single points of
failure in combination with a singleline-to-ground fault, as discussed in
Order No. 754. The Commission also
approves the associated violation risk
factors, violation severity levels, and
implementation plan.
22. The Commission determines that
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 satisfies
the Order No. 786 directives regarding
planned maintenance outages and
stability analysis for spare equipment
strategies. First, Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 provides for a more
complete consideration of factors for
selecting which known outages will be
included in near-term transmission
planning horizon studies. The
modifications in Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5 also address the
Commission’s concern that the
exclusion of known outages of less than
six (6) months in currently-effective
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4 could
result in outages of significant facilities
not being studied. Second, Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 modifies
requirements for stability analysis to
require an entity to assess the impact of
the possible unavailability of long lead
time equipment, consistent with the
entity’s spare equipment strategy. For
these reasons, the Commission approves
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5.
23. In addition, the Commission
determines not to direct NERC to
develop and submit modifications to the
Reliability Standards to require
corrective action plans to address
protection system single points of
failure in combination with a threephase fault if planning studies indicate
potential cascading. We are persuaded
by NERC and other commenters of the
improbability of single points of failure
in combination with three-phase faults
resulting in cascading outages.33 Our
determination is also supported by the
2015 Report’s assessment that the
probability of an adverse system impact
from a three-phase fault accompanied
by a protection system failure is low
33 See, e.g., NERC Petition 25–26, NERC
Comments at 5, Trade Associations Comments at 5–
6.
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enough that it does not warrant being a
planning event (i.e., requiring a
corrective action plan). Although the
Commission previously noted that there
is an average of approximately one
three-phase fault event every three (3)
months since 2011, only ten indicated
instances of a protection system single
point of failure, which we agree is a rare
occurrence. Given the NERC standard
drafting team’s assessment of the
improbability of single points of failure
in combination with three-phase faults
resulting in cascading outages, we
determine that it is reasonable to
address such occurrences as extreme
events only requiring analysis and
evaluation of possible mitigating actions
designed to reduce adverse impacts.
24. Further, we do not adopt BPA’s
recommendation, as an alternative to
the NOPR directive, for NERC to
conduct a two-year pilot to determine
whether the types of actions that could
reduce or mitigate the impacts of single
point of failure events are a costeffective means of ensuring reliability.34
As discussed above, we conclude that
the record reflects the infrequent nature
of single points of failure in
combination with three-phase faults
resulting in cascading outages and
therefore justifies our determination not
to adopt the NOPR directive.
Other Issues Raised in NOPR Comments
25. MISO’s comments include
recommendations apart from the issues
discussed above. First, MISO
recommends revising Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5 to address the
need for planned outage flexibility in
the planning horizon. MISO contends
that since very few planned outages are
scheduled in the planning horizon, the
Reliability Standard omits consideration
of planned (i.e., known) outages in the
planning assessment. MISO states that
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 does
not define the term ‘‘known’’ outages.
MISO believes that the industry
stakeholders will primarily interpret the
term ‘‘known’’ to require that only
scheduled outages be included in
transmission planning models. MISO
maintains that because the eventual
occurrence of a future planned outage is
certain to occur, such planned outages
should be considered ‘‘known’’ for
purposes of applying Reliability
Standards to the transmission planning
process.
26. Second, MISO recommends
adding instrument transformers (i.e.,
current transformers and voltage
transformers) to Reliability Standard
TPL–001–5, Table 1, Footnote 13 to
define protection system nonredundancies. MISO observes that
instrument transformers are components
listed in the NERC definition of
protection system and, according to
NERC, represent valid single points of
failure.
Commission Determination
27. The Commission agrees with
MISO that ‘‘because the eventual
occurrence of a future planned outage is
certain to occur, such planned outages
should be considered ‘known’ for
purposes of applying Reliability
Standards to the transmission planning
process.’’ 35 As MISO observes, the
Commission stated in Order No. 786
that a ‘‘properly planned transmission
system should ensure the known,
planned removal of facilities (i.e.,
generation, transmission or protection
system facilities) for maintenance
purposes without the loss of nonconsequential load or detrimental
impacts to system reliability such as
cascading, voltage instability or
uncontrolled islanding.’’ 36 Moreover,
the Commission indicated in Order No.
786 that known planned facility outages
(i.e. generation, transmission or
protection system facilities) should be
addressed so long as their ‘‘planned
start times and durations may be
anticipated as occurring for some period
of time during the planning time
horizon.’’ 37 Given these statements, we
are not convinced that registered
entities will interpret ‘‘known’’ in
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 to mean
scheduled, as MISO contends.
Accordingly, we decline to adopt
MISO’s recommendation to modify the
Reliability Standard.
28. The Commission also declines to
direct NERC to include instrument
transformer (i.e., current transformers
and voltage transformers) failure as a
single component failure in Reliability
Standard TPL–001–5, Footnote 13. The
standard drafting team explained in the
Technical Rationale document for
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 that the
‘‘[System Protection and Control
Subcommittee and System Modeling
and Analysis Subcommittee] report
described voltage or current sensing
devices [i.e., current transformers and
voltage transformers] as having a lower
level of risk of failure to trip due to
robustness and likelihood to actually
cause tripping upon failure. Therefore,
these components of a Protection
System are omitted from Footnote
35 MISO
Comments at 5.
No. 786, 45 FERC ¶ 61,051 at P 41.
37 Id. P 44.
36 Order
34 BPA
Comments at 2–3.
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8159
13.’’ 38 While it contends that ‘‘ignoring
instrument transformers . . . is contrary
to good utility practice,’’ MISO
acknowledges that ‘‘instrument
transformers are generally more robust
than the other components of a
protection system.’’ 39 Based on this
record, the Commission declines to
adopt MISO’s recommendation.
III. Information Collection Statement
29. The Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) 40 requires each federal agency to
seek and obtain the Office of
Management and Budget’s (OMB)
approval before undertaking a collection
of information (including reporting,
record keeping, and public disclosure
requirements) directed to ten or more
persons or contained in a rule of general
applicability. OMB regulations require
approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by
rules (including deletion, revision, or
implementation of new requirements).41
Upon approval of a collection of
information, OMB will assign an OMB
control number and expiration date.
Respondents subject to the filing
requirements of this rule will not be
penalized for failing to respond to the
collection of information unless the
collection of information displays a
valid OMB Control Number.
30. The Commission is submitting
these reporting and recordkeeping
requirements to OMB for its review and
approval under section 3507(d) of the
PRA. The Commission solicits
comments on the Commission’s need for
this information, whether the
information will have practical utility,
the accuracy of the burden estimates,
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be collected
or retained, and any suggested methods
for minimizing respondents’ burden,
including the use of automated
information techniques.
31. Burden Estimate: 42 The estimated
burden 43 and cost 44 for the
38 NERC
Petition, Exhibit F (Technical Rationale)
at 5.
39 MISO
Comments at 12.
U.S.C. 3501–21.
41 5 CFR 1320.
42 ‘‘Burden’’ is the total time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate,
maintain, retain, or disclose or provide information
to or for a Federal agency. For further explanation
of what is included in the information collection
burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
43 The estimated burden is a one-time burden
estimate in addition to the already approved burden
estimate in Reliability Standard TPL–001–4.
44 Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) figures for May 2018 (Sector 22,
Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/
current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits (https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We
40 44
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 30 / Thursday, February 13, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
requirements contained in this final rule
follows:
FERC–725N, MODIFICATIONS DUE TO FINAL RULE IN DOCKET NO. RM19–10–000
Areas of modification
Annual
number of
responses
per
respondent
Total number
of responses
Average burden & cost per
response
Total annual burden hours &
total annual cost
(1)
(2)
(1) * (2) = (3)
(4)
(3) * (4) = (5)
Single Point of Failure (onetime).
214 (PC/TP) ...
1
214
16 hrs. (reporting: 12 hrs.;
recordkeeping: 4 hrs.);
$880.
Spare Equipment Strategy
(one-time).
214 (PC/TP) ...
1
214
4 hrs. (reporting: 2 hrs.; recordkeeping: 2 hrs.); $220.
Plan Maintenance Outage
(one-time).
214 (PC/TP) ...
1
214
16 hrs. (reporting: 12 hrs.;
recordkeeping: 4 hrs.)
$880.
Sub-Total for Reporting Requirements.
Sub-Total for Recordkeeping
Requirements.
........................
........................
........................
...............................................
3,424 hrs. & $188,320. (reporting, 2,568 hrs. &
$141,240, & recordkeeping, 856 hrs.,
$47,080).
856 hrs. & $47,080 (reporting, 428 hrs. & $23,540;
recordkeeping, 428 hrs. &
$23,540).
3,424 hrs. & $188,320 (reporting, 2,568 hrs. &
$141,240; recordkeeping,
856 hrs. & $47,080).
5,564 hrs.; $306,020
........................
........................
........................
...............................................
2,140 hrs.; $117,700
........................
........................
642
...............................................
7,704 hrs.; $423,720
Total ...............................
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Number of
respondents 45
submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments
submitted to OMB should include
FERC–725N and OMB Control No.
1902–0264.
32. This final rule will not
significantly change existing burdens on
an ongoing basis. The Commission
estimates a one-time burden increase for
Year 1 only because Year 1 represents
a one-time task not repeated in
subsequent years.
33. Title: FERC–725N, Mandatory
Reliability Standards: Transmission
Planning (TPL) Reliability Standards.
Action: Revision to FERC–725N
information collection.
OMB Control No.: 1902–0264.
Respondents: Businesses or other forprofit institutions; not-for-profit
institutions.
Frequency of Responses: One Time.
Necessity of the Information: This
final rule approves the requested
modifications to a Reliability Standard
pertaining to transmission planning. As
discussed above, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard TPL–001–
5 pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2)
because it improves upon the currentlyeffective Reliability Standard TPL–001–
4.
Internal Review: The Commission has
reviewed Reliability Standard TPL–001–
5 and determined that its action is
necessary to implement section 215 of
the FPA. The Commission has assured
itself, by means of its internal review,
that there is specific, objective support
for the burden estimates associated with
the information requirements.
34. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the
following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20426, [Attention:
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive
Director, email: DataClearance@
ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502–8663, fax:
(202) 273–0873].
Submit comments concerning the
collection of information and the
associated burden estimate to the
Commission in this docket, and to the
Office of Management and Budget,
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, 725 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20503, [Attention: Desk
Officer for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission]. For security
reasons, comments to OMB should be
submitted by email to: oira_
35. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.46 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.47 The
actions proposed herein fall within this
categorical exclusion in the
Commission’s regulations.
estimate that Office and Administrative Support
(Occupation code: 43–0000) would perform the
functions associated with recordkeeping
requirements, at an average hourly cost (for wages
and benefits) of $42.11. We estimate the functions
associated with reporting requirements would be
performed by an Electrical Engineer (Occupation
code: 17–2051) at an average hourly cost (including
wages and benefits) of $68.17. These occupational
categories’ wage figures are averaged and weighted
equally as follows: ($42.11 hour + $68.17 hour) ÷
2 = $55.14/hour. The resulting wage figure is
rounded to $55.00/hour for use in calculating wage
figures in the final rule in Docket No. RM19–10–
000.
45 The number of respondents is based on the
NERC Registry on November 21, 2019, which
showed 8 entities registered as planning
coordinators (PCs), 139 entities registered as
transmission planners (TPs), ad 67 entities
registered as both PCs and TPs.
46 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987) (crossreferenced at 41 FERC ¶ 61,284).
47 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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IV. Environmental Analysis
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
36. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 48 generally requires a
description and analysis of rulemakings
that will have significant economic
E:\FR\FM\13FER1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 30 / Thursday, February 13, 2020 / Rules and Regulations
impact on a substantial number of small
entities.49 The Small Business
Administration’s (SBA) Office of Size
Standards develops the numerical
definition of a small business.50 The
SBA revised its size standard for electric
utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a
standard based on the number of
employees, including affiliates (from the
prior standard based on megawatt hour
sales).51
37. Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 is
expected to impose an additional
burden on 214 entities 52 (PCs and TPs).
Of the 214 affected entities discussed
above, we estimate that approximately
10 percent of the affected entities are
small entities. We estimate that each of
the 21 small entities to whom the
proposed modifications to proposed
Reliability Standard TPL–001–5 apply
will incur one-time costs of
approximately $1,980 per entity to
implement the proposed Reliability
Standard. We do not consider the
estimated costs for these 21 small
entities to be a significant economic
impact.
38. Accordingly, the Commission
certifies that this final rule will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
VI. Document Availability
39. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the internet through
FERC’s Home Page (https://
www.ferc.gov) and in FERC’s Public
Reference Room during normal business
hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern
time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A,
Washington, DC 20426.
40. From FERC’s Home Page on the
internet, this information is available on
eLibrary. The full text of this document
is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access
this document in eLibrary, type the
docket number excluding the last three
digits of this document in the docket
number field.
41. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the FERC’s website during
normal business hours from FERC
Online Support at (202) 502–6652 (toll
free at 1–866–208–3676) or email at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202)502–8659. Email the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VII. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
42. These regulations are effective
April 13, 2020. The Commission has
determined, with the concurrence of the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB, that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
as defined in section 351 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be
provided to the Senate, House,
Government Accountability Office, and
the SBA.
By the Commission.
Issued: January 23, 2020.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
Note: The following appendix will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendix—List of Commenters
Abbreviation
Commenter
AF&PA ............................................
APS .................................................
BPA .................................................
Carder .............................................
MISO ...............................................
NERC ..............................................
Pugh ................................................
Trade Associations .........................
American Forest and Paper Association.
Arizona Public Service Company.
Bonneville Power Administration.
William Carder.
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
Theresa Pugh.
American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Large Public Power Council, National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association.
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.
Tennessee Valley Authority.
Tri-State ..........................................
TVA .................................................
ACTION:
[FR Doc. 2020–02170 Filed 2–12–20; 8:45 am]
Final rule.
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission)
approves Reliability Standard CIP–012–
1 (Cyber Security—Communications
between Control Centers). The North
American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the Commissioncertified Electric Reliability
Organization, submitted Reliability
Standard CIP–012–1 for Commission
approval in response to a Commission
directive. In addition, the Commission
directs NERC to develop modifications
to the CIP Reliability Standards to
require protections regarding the
availability of communication links and
SUMMARY:
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM18–20–000; ORDER NO. 866]
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Reliability Standard CIP–012–1—Cyber
Security—Communications Between
Control Centers
jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES
8161
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
AGENCY:
48 5
U.S.C. 601–612.
52 Public utilities may fall under one of several
different categories, each with a size threshold
based on the company’s number of employees,
including affiliates, the parent company, and
49 Id.
50 13
51 Id.
CFR 121.101.
121.201.
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data communicated between bulk
electric system Control Centers.
DATES: This rule will become effective
April 13, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Vincent Le, (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6204, vincent.le@
ferc.gov
Kevin Ryan, (Legal Information), Office
of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE, Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6840, kevin.ryan@
ferc.gov
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
subsidiaries. We are using a 500-employee
threshold due to each affected entity falling within
the role of Electric Bulk Power Transmission and
Control (NAISC Code: 221121).
E:\FR\FM\13FER1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 30 (Thursday, February 13, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 8155-8161]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-02170]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM19-10-000]
Transmission Planning Reliability Standard TPL-001-5
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 (Transmission System Planning
Performance Requirements), submitted by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective April 13, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Eugene Blick (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426, (301) 665-1759, [email protected]
Leigh Anne Faugust (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington,
DC 20426, (202) 502-6396, [email protected]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),
the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 (Transmission
System Planning Performance
[[Page 8156]]
Requirements).\1\ The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization
(ERO), submitted Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 for Commission approval
in response to directives in Order No. 786.\2\ As discussed in this
final rule, we determine that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 improves
upon currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 by addressing:
(1) The study of single points of failure of protection systems; and
(2) planned maintenance outages and stability analysis for spare
equipment strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
\2\ Transmission Planning Reliability Standards, Order No. 786,
145 FERC ] 61,051 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 are
responsive to the directives in Order No. 786 regarding planned
maintenance outages and stability analysis for spare equipment
strategies.\3\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is responsive in that it
requires each planning coordinator and transmission planner to perform
an annual planning assessment of its portion of the bulk electric
system considering a number of system conditions and contingencies with
a risk-based approach. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 are also responsive to the concerns identified in Order No. 754
regarding the study of a single point of failure on protection
systems.\4\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 contains revisions to the
planning events (Category P5) and extreme events (Stability 2.a-h)
identified in Table 1 (Steady State and Stability Performance Planning
Events and Steady State and Stability Performance Extreme Events), as
well as the associated footnote 13, to provide for a more comprehensive
study of the potential impacts of protection system single points of
failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051, at PP 40, 89.
\4\ Interpretation of Transmission Planning Reliability
Standard, Order No. 754, 136 FERC ] 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. For more common scenarios (i.e., planning events), the planning
entity must develop a corrective action plan if it determines through
studies that its system would experience performance issues.\5\ For
less common scenarios that could result in potentially severe impacts
such as cascading (i.e., extreme events), the planning entity must
conduct a comprehensive analysis to understand both the potential
impacts on its system and the types of actions that could reduce or
mitigate those impacts.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ NERC defines ``Corrective Action Plan'' as, ``A list of
actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a
specific problem.'' Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability
Standards (May 13, 2019) (NERC Glossary).
\6\ NERC defines ``Cascading'' as, ``The uncontrolled successive
loss of System Elements triggered by an incident at any location.
Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that
cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area
predetermined by studies.'' NERC Glossary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is also responsive to Order No.
786 by modifying the requirements for stability analysis to require an
entity to assess the impact of the possible unavailability of long lead
time equipment, consistent with the entity's spare equipment strategy.
Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
5. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the Commission
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to
modify the Reliability Standard to require corrective action plans for
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault if planning studies indicate potential cascading.\7\ As
discussed below, we determine not to adopt the proposed directive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5); Transmission Planning Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 FR 30,639
(Jun. 27, 2019), 167 FERC ] 61,249, at P 5 (2019) (NOPR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Background
A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards
6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\8\ Pursuant
to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a process to
select and certify an ERO,\9\ and subsequently certified NERC.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Id. 824o(e).
\9\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, 114
FERC ] 61,104, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, 114 FERC ] 61,328
(2006).
\10\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ]
61,062, order on reh'g and compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126 (2006),
aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Industry Advisory
7. On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an advisory report notifying
industry that failure of a single component of a protection system
caused three significant system disturbances in the previous five
years.\11\ In the Industry Advisory, NERC stated that ``[p]rotection
system component failures may render a protective scheme inoperative,
which could result in N-1 transmission system contingencies evolving
into more severe or even extreme events.'' \12\ NERC advised registered
transmission owners, generator owners, and distribution providers ``to
address single points of failure on their protection systems, when
identified in routine system evaluations, to prevent N-1 transmission
system contingencies from evolving into more severe events or even
extreme events.'' \13\ NERC also advised industry to begin preparing an
estimate of the resource commitment required to review, re-engineer,
and develop a workable outage and construction schedule to address
single points of failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Industry Advisory, Protection System Single Point of
Failure (March 30, 2009), https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/2009%20Advisories/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf (Industry
Advisory).
\12\ Id. at 2.
\13\ Id. at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Order No. 754
8. On November 17, 2009, NERC submitted a petition requesting
approval of NERC's interpretation of Reliability Standard TPL-002-2,
Requirement R1.3.10. In the resulting Order No. 754, the Commission
determined that ``there may be a system protection issue that merits
further exploration by technical experts'' and that there is ``an issue
concerning the study of the non[hyphen]operation of
non[hyphen]redundant primary protection systems; e.g., the study of a
single point of failure on protection systems.'' \14\ To address this
concern, the Commission directed ``Commission staff to meet with NERC
and its appropriate subject matter experts to explore the reliability
concern, including where it can best be addressed, and identify any
additional actions necessary to address the matter.'' \15\ The
Commission also directed NERC ``to make an informational filing . . .
explaining whether there is a further system protection issue that
needs to be addressed and, if so, what forum and process should be used
to address that issue and what priority it should be accorded relative
to other reliability initiatives planned by NERC.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Order No. 754, 136 FERC ] 61,186, at P 19 (2011).
\15\ Id. P 20.
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 8157]]
9. Commission staff then hosted a technical conference in October
2011 on single points of failure, which resulted in four consensus
points and the following problem statement: ``[t]he group perceives a
reliability concern regarding the comprehensive assessment of potential
protection system failures by registered entities. The group agrees on
the need to study if a [reliability] gap exists regarding the study and
resolution of a single point of failure on protection systems.'' \17\
One outcome of the 2011 technical conference, as described in the 2012
Informational Filing, was that the NERC Board of Trustees approved the
issuance of a data request to aid in assessing whether single points of
failure in protection systems pose a reliability concern.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ NERC, Order No. 754 Single Point of Failure Technical
Meeting Notes at 8 (October 24-25, 2011).
\18\ 2012 NERC Informational Filing at 7 (stating that the data
request ``is based on an approach that utilizes . . . a three-phase
(3[Oslash]) fault and assesses simulated system performance against
performance measures'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Over the next two years, NERC collected data from transmission
planners that it used to assess protection system single points of
failure. This assessment examined in detail the protection systems
related to nearly 4,000 buses. The findings were presented in a
September 2015 report that concluded that single points of failure on
protection systems posed a reliability risk that warranted further
action.\19\ After considering alternatives, the 2015 Report recommended
that NERC modify Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 to maximize reliability
of protection system performance and align with the directives in Order
No. 754. In particular, the 2015 Report recommended that three-phase
faults involving protection system failures be assessed as an extreme
event in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4. As an extreme event under
Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Part 4.5, an entity is required to
evaluate, but not implement, possible actions designed to mitigate
cascading.\20\ Notably however, the report did not recommend elevating
three-phase faults with a protection system failure to a planning event
under Part 2.7, which requires a corrective action plan when analysis
indicates an inability to meet performance requirements. The report
explained that the ``[p]robability of three-phase fault with a
protection system failure is low enough that it does not warrant a
planning event.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ NERC, Order No. 754 Assessment of Protection System Single
Points of Failure Based on the Section 1600 Data Request, at 11
(September 2015) (2015 Report).
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Order No. 786
11. In Order No. 786, the Commission approved the currently-
effective version of the transmission system planning standard,
Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, and issued several directives to NERC.
First, the Commission expressed concern that the six (6) month outage
duration threshold in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Requirement R1
could exclude planned maintenance outages of significant facilities
from future planning assessments.\22\ The Commission determined that
planned maintenance outages of less than six (6) months in duration may
result in relevant impacts during one or both of the seasonal off-peak
periods, and that prudent transmission planning should consider
maintenance outages at those load levels when planned outages are
performed to allow for a single element to be taken out of service for
maintenance without compromising the ability of the system to meet
demand without loss of load. The Commission further determined that a
properly planned transmission system should ensure the known, planned
removal of facilities (i.e., generation, transmission, or protection
system facilities) for maintenance purposes without the loss of
nonconsequential load or detrimental impacts to system reliability such
as cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding. The
Commission directed NERC to modify the Reliability Standards to address
these concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051 at PP 40-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Second, while stating that NERC had met the Commission's Order
No. 693 directive to include a spare equipment strategy for steady
state analysis in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, the Commission
determined that a spare equipment strategy for stability analysis was
not addressed in the standard.\23\ The Commission stated that a similar
spare equipment strategy for stability analysis should exist that
requires studies to be performed for no or single contingency
categories \24\ with the conditions that the system is expected to
experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time
equipment. Rather than direct a change at that time, however, the
Commission directed NERC to consider the issue during the next review
cycle of Reliability Standard TPL-001-4.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Id. PP 85, 88-89 (citing Mandatory Reliability Standards
for the Bulk-Power System, Order No. 693, 118 FERC ] 61,218, at P
1786, order on reh'g, Order No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007)).
\24\ See Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Table 1--Steady State &
Stability Performance Planning Events, Categories P0, P1, and P2.
\25\ Order No. 786, 145 FERC ] 61,051 at PP 88-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. NERC Petition and Reliability Standard TPL-001-5
13. On December 7, 2018, NERC submitted Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 for Commission approval.\26\ NERC maintains that Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5 addresses the Order No. 786 directives. With regard
to protection system single points of failure, NERC indicates that
Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential system contingencies required to
be evaluated by the planner.\27\ Table 1 includes three parts: (1)
Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events; (2) Steady State
& Stability Performance Extreme Events; and (3) Steady State &
Stability Performance Footnotes. Table 1 describes system performance
requirements for a range of potential system contingencies required to
be evaluated by the planner. The table categorizes the events as either
``planning events'' or ``extreme events.'' The table lists seven
contingency planning events (P1 through P7) that require steady-state
and stability analysis as well as five extreme event contingencies:
Three for steady-state and two for stability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is available on the
Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM19-
10-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com.
\27\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 includes an expanded list of
protection system components for single points of failure studies.
The selected list of components account for: (1) Those failed non-
redundant components of a protection system that may impact one or
more protection systems; (2) the duration that faults remain
energized until delayed fault clearing; and (3) the additional
system equipment removed from service following fault clearing
depending on the specific failed non-redundant component of a
protection system. NERC Petition at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. According to NERC, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 includes
certain modifications to better ensure that planning entities are
performing a more complete analysis of potential protection system
single points of failure issues on their systems and taking appropriate
action to address these concerns. NERC explains that Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5 contains revisions to both the Table 1 planning
event (Category P5) and extreme events (Stability 2.a-h) and the
associated footnote 13 to provide for more comprehensive study of the
potential impacts of protection system single points of failure.
[[Page 8158]]
15. NERC states that where the study of a protection system single
point of failure for a single-line-to-ground fault (i.e., a Category P5
event) identifies cascading, a corrective action plan is required.\28\
NERC considers this a relatively commonplace scenario, and NERC
explains that an entity would be required to develop a corrective
action plan if it determines that its system would be unable to meet
the performance requirements of Table 1 for the Category P5 event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, Table 1 (Steady State and
Stability Performance Planning Events), Category P5 requires the
study of a single-line-to-ground faulted element (e.g., generator,
transmission circuit or transformer) along with a failure to operate
of a non-redundant component of the protection system (i.e., a
single point of failure) protecting the faulted element.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. In contrast, the revisions treat a protection system single
point of failure in combination with a three-phase fault as an extreme
event that does not require a corrective action plan. NERC asserts that
the three-phase fault scenario is much less common than the single-
line-to-ground fault scenario. According to NERC, like the other
extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5, the three-phase fault
scenario, while rare, could result in more significant impacts to an
entity's system.\29\ Under this approach, if an entity determines that
its system will experience cascading as a result of a three-phase fault
scenario, the entity would evaluate possible actions designed to reduce
the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event; however, a
corrective action plan would not be required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Order No. 693, 118 FERC ] 61,218 at P 1826 (describing
extreme events as ``events resulting in loss of two or more elements
or cascading'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. NERC explains that the likelihood of a three-phase fault event
occurring and resulting in the most severe impacts would be small based
on an historical analysis of NERC data on protection system
misoperation. NERC states that it reviewed over 12,000 protection
system misoperation in its Misoperation Information Data Analysis
System database reported since 2011, of which only 28 involved three-
phase faults. Of those, NERC states that 10 involved breakers that
failed to operate, and the remaining 18 involved breakers that were
slow to operate.\30\ NERC contends that a failure to operate may
indicate an instance of a protection system single point of failure.
While the potential for severe impacts from such events remains, NERC
asserts that none of the 10 failure to trip scenarios reported since
2011 resulted in events that reached the threshold for reporting under
Reliability Standard EOP-004 (Event Reporting).\31\ With regard to the
Order No. 786 directives, NERC maintains that Reliability Standard TPL-
001-5 provides for a more complete consideration of factors for
selecting which known outages will be included in near-term
transmission planning horizon studies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ NERC Petition at 26, n.55.
\31\ Reliability Standard EOP-004-3 (Event Reporting),
Attachment 1: Reportable Events, contains a list of thresholds for
reporting certain events to NERC. Examples of reporting thresholds
include: Loss of firm load for 15 minutes or more if 300 MW or
greater for entities with a previous year's demand of at least 3,000
MW, or 200 MW or greater for all other entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
18. On June 20, 2019, the Commission issued a NOPR that proposed to
approve Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as the Reliability Standard
largely addresses the directives in Order No. 786. The NOPR also
proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to
modify the Reliability Standard to require corrective action plans for
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault if planning studies indicate potential cascading.\32\ The
NOPR stated that NERC had not adequately justified categorizing
protection system single points of failure in combination with a three-
phase fault as an extreme event that only requires study, but not a
corrective action plan, when there is the potential for cascading. The
NOPR also expressed concern with NERC's assessment that such events do
not necessitate corrective action plans because of their rarity. The
NOPR proposed to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability
Standard for approval within twelve (12) months from the effective date
of a final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ NOPR, 167 FERC ] 61,249 at P 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. In addition to inviting comment on the proposed directive, the
NOPR sought comment on: (1) How many corrective action plans are
expected for protection system single points of failure in combination
with a three-phase fault if a study indicates cascading, so the
Commission could better understand the potential for increased costs
and other implementation issues; and (2) the Commission's proposal to
direct NERC address the directive within twelve (12) months of the
effective date of the final rule.
20. The Commission received ten sets of NOPR comments. We address
below the issues raised in the NOPR and the comments submitted in
response. The Appendix to this final rule lists the entities that filed
comments.
II. Discussion
21. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission
approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. We conclude
that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is an improvement over currently-
effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 and will improve Bulk-Power
System reliability by requiring enhanced transmission system planning
regarding the study of protection system single points of failure in
combination with a single-line-to-ground fault, as discussed in Order
No. 754. The Commission also approves the associated violation risk
factors, violation severity levels, and implementation plan.
22. The Commission determines that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5
satisfies the Order No. 786 directives regarding planned maintenance
outages and stability analysis for spare equipment strategies. First,
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 provides for a more complete
consideration of factors for selecting which known outages will be
included in near-term transmission planning horizon studies. The
modifications in Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 also address the
Commission's concern that the exclusion of known outages of less than
six (6) months in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-001-4
could result in outages of significant facilities not being studied.
Second, Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 modifies requirements for
stability analysis to require an entity to assess the impact of the
possible unavailability of long lead time equipment, consistent with
the entity's spare equipment strategy. For these reasons, the
Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.
23. In addition, the Commission determines not to direct NERC to
develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standards to
require corrective action plans to address protection system single
points of failure in combination with a three-phase fault if planning
studies indicate potential cascading. We are persuaded by NERC and
other commenters of the improbability of single points of failure in
combination with three-phase faults resulting in cascading outages.\33\
Our determination is also supported by the 2015 Report's assessment
that the probability of an adverse system impact from a three-phase
fault accompanied by a protection system failure is low
[[Page 8159]]
enough that it does not warrant being a planning event (i.e., requiring
a corrective action plan). Although the Commission previously noted
that there is an average of approximately one three-phase fault event
every three (3) months since 2011, only ten indicated instances of a
protection system single point of failure, which we agree is a rare
occurrence. Given the NERC standard drafting team's assessment of the
improbability of single points of failure in combination with three-
phase faults resulting in cascading outages, we determine that it is
reasonable to address such occurrences as extreme events only requiring
analysis and evaluation of possible mitigating actions designed to
reduce adverse impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See, e.g., NERC Petition 25-26, NERC Comments at 5, Trade
Associations Comments at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. Further, we do not adopt BPA's recommendation, as an
alternative to the NOPR directive, for NERC to conduct a two-year pilot
to determine whether the types of actions that could reduce or mitigate
the impacts of single point of failure events are a cost-effective
means of ensuring reliability.\34\ As discussed above, we conclude that
the record reflects the infrequent nature of single points of failure
in combination with three-phase faults resulting in cascading outages
and therefore justifies our determination not to adopt the NOPR
directive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ BPA Comments at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Issues Raised in NOPR Comments
25. MISO's comments include recommendations apart from the issues
discussed above. First, MISO recommends revising Reliability Standard
TPL-001-5 to address the need for planned outage flexibility in the
planning horizon. MISO contends that since very few planned outages are
scheduled in the planning horizon, the Reliability Standard omits
consideration of planned (i.e., known) outages in the planning
assessment. MISO states that Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 does not
define the term ``known'' outages. MISO believes that the industry
stakeholders will primarily interpret the term ``known'' to require
that only scheduled outages be included in transmission planning
models. MISO maintains that because the eventual occurrence of a future
planned outage is certain to occur, such planned outages should be
considered ``known'' for purposes of applying Reliability Standards to
the transmission planning process.
26. Second, MISO recommends adding instrument transformers (i.e.,
current transformers and voltage transformers) to Reliability Standard
TPL-001-5, Table 1, Footnote 13 to define protection system non-
redundancies. MISO observes that instrument transformers are components
listed in the NERC definition of protection system and, according to
NERC, represent valid single points of failure.
Commission Determination
27. The Commission agrees with MISO that ``because the eventual
occurrence of a future planned outage is certain to occur, such planned
outages should be considered `known' for purposes of applying
Reliability Standards to the transmission planning process.'' \35\ As
MISO observes, the Commission stated in Order No. 786 that a ``properly
planned transmission system should ensure the known, planned removal of
facilities (i.e., generation, transmission or protection system
facilities) for maintenance purposes without the loss of non-
consequential load or detrimental impacts to system reliability such as
cascading, voltage instability or uncontrolled islanding.'' \36\
Moreover, the Commission indicated in Order No. 786 that known planned
facility outages (i.e. generation, transmission or protection system
facilities) should be addressed so long as their ``planned start times
and durations may be anticipated as occurring for some period of time
during the planning time horizon.'' \37\ Given these statements, we are
not convinced that registered entities will interpret ``known'' in
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 to mean scheduled, as MISO contends.
Accordingly, we decline to adopt MISO's recommendation to modify the
Reliability Standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ MISO Comments at 5.
\36\ Order No. 786, 45 FERC ] 61,051 at P 41.
\37\ Id. P 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. The Commission also declines to direct NERC to include
instrument transformer (i.e., current transformers and voltage
transformers) failure as a single component failure in Reliability
Standard TPL-001-5, Footnote 13. The standard drafting team explained
in the Technical Rationale document for Reliability Standard TPL-001-5
that the ``[System Protection and Control Subcommittee and System
Modeling and Analysis Subcommittee] report described voltage or current
sensing devices [i.e., current transformers and voltage transformers]
as having a lower level of risk of failure to trip due to robustness
and likelihood to actually cause tripping upon failure. Therefore,
these components of a Protection System are omitted from Footnote 13.''
\38\ While it contends that ``ignoring instrument transformers . . . is
contrary to good utility practice,'' MISO acknowledges that
``instrument transformers are generally more robust than the other
components of a protection system.'' \39\ Based on this record, the
Commission declines to adopt MISO's recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ NERC Petition, Exhibit F (Technical Rationale) at 5.
\39\ MISO Comments at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Information Collection Statement
29. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \40\ requires each federal
agency to seek and obtain the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
approval before undertaking a collection of information (including
reporting, record keeping, and public disclosure requirements) directed
to ten or more persons or contained in a rule of general applicability.
OMB regulations require approval of certain information collection
requirements imposed by rules (including deletion, revision, or
implementation of new requirements).\41\ Upon approval of a collection
of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and expiration
date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of this rule will
not be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of
information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB
Control Number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-21.
\41\ 5 CFR 1320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
30. The Commission is submitting these reporting and recordkeeping
requirements to OMB for its review and approval under section 3507(d)
of the PRA. The Commission solicits comments on the Commission's need
for this information, whether the information will have practical
utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or
retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden,
including the use of automated information techniques.
31. Burden Estimate: \42\ The estimated burden \43\ and cost \44\
for the
[[Page 8160]]
requirements contained in this final rule follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ ``Burden'' is the total time, effort, or financial
resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, or
disclose or provide information to or for a Federal agency. For
further explanation of what is included in the information
collection burden, refer to 5 CFR 1320.3.
\43\ The estimated burden is a one-time burden estimate in
addition to the already approved burden estimate in Reliability
Standard TPL-001-4.
\44\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) figures for May 2018 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate that Office and
Administrative Support (Occupation code: 43-0000) would perform the
functions associated with recordkeeping requirements, at an average
hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $42.11. We estimate the
functions associated with reporting requirements would be performed
by an Electrical Engineer (Occupation code: 17-2051) at an average
hourly cost (including wages and benefits) of $68.17. These
occupational categories' wage figures are averaged and weighted
equally as follows: ($42.11 hour + $68.17 hour) / 2 = $55.14/hour.
The resulting wage figure is rounded to $55.00/hour for use in
calculating wage figures in the final rule in Docket No. RM19-10-
000.
FERC-725N, Modifications Due to Final Rule in Docket No. RM19-10-000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual number Total annual burden
Areas of modification Number of respondents \45\ of responses Total number Average burden & cost hours & total annual
per respondent of responses per response cost
(1)......................... (2) (1) * (2) = (4)..................... (3) * (4) = (5)
(3)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single Point of Failure (one-time).... 214 (PC/TP)................. 1 214 16 hrs. (reporting: 12 3,424 hrs. & $188,320.
hrs.; recordkeeping: 4 (reporting, 2,568 hrs.
hrs.); $880. & $141,240, &
recordkeeping, 856
hrs., $47,080).
Spare Equipment Strategy (one-time)... 214 (PC/TP)................. 1 214 4 hrs. (reporting: 2 856 hrs. & $47,080
hrs.; recordkeeping: 2 (reporting, 428 hrs. &
hrs.); $220. $23,540; recordkeeping,
428 hrs. & $23,540).
Plan Maintenance Outage (one-time).... 214 (PC/TP)................. 1 214 16 hrs. (reporting: 12 3,424 hrs. & $188,320
hrs.; recordkeeping: 4 (reporting, 2,568 hrs.
hrs.) $880. & $141,240;
recordkeeping, 856 hrs.
& $47,080).
Sub-Total for Reporting Requirements.. ............................ .............. .............. ........................ 5,564 hrs.; $306,020
Sub-Total for Recordkeeping ............................ .............. .............. ........................ 2,140 hrs.; $117,700
Requirements.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. ............................ .............. 642 ........................ 7,704 hrs.; $423,720
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. This final rule will not significantly change existing burdens
on an ongoing basis. The Commission estimates a one-time burden
increase for Year 1 only because Year 1 represents a one-time task not
repeated in subsequent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ The number of respondents is based on the NERC Registry on
November 21, 2019, which showed 8 entities registered as planning
coordinators (PCs), 139 entities registered as transmission planners
(TPs), ad 67 entities registered as both PCs and TPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: Transmission
Planning (TPL) Reliability Standards.
Action: Revision to FERC-725N information collection.
OMB Control No.: 1902-0264.
Respondents: Businesses or other for-profit institutions; not-for-
profit institutions.
Frequency of Responses: One Time.
Necessity of the Information: This final rule approves the
requested modifications to a Reliability Standard pertaining to
transmission planning. As discussed above, the Commission approves
Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2)
because it improves upon the currently-effective Reliability Standard
TPL-001-4.
Internal Review: The Commission has reviewed Reliability Standard
TPL-001-5 and determined that its action is necessary to implement
section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has assured itself, by means of
its internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the
burden estimates associated with the information requirements.
34. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, [Attention:
Ellen Brown, Office of the Executive Director, email:
[email protected], phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873].
Submit comments concerning the collection of information and the
associated burden estimate to the Commission in this docket, and to the
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503, [Attention: Desk
Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. For security
reasons, comments to OMB should be submitted by email to:
[email protected]. Comments submitted to OMB should include
FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264.
IV. Environmental Analysis
35. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\46\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\47\ The actions proposed
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987)
(cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284).
\47\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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V. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
36. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \48\ generally
requires a description and analysis of rulemakings that will have
significant economic
[[Page 8161]]
impact on a substantial number of small entities.\49\ The Small
Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the
numerical definition of a small business.\50\ The SBA revised its size
standard for electric utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a
standard based on the number of employees, including affiliates (from
the prior standard based on megawatt hour sales).\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
\49\ Id.
\50\ 13 CFR 121.101.
\51\ Id. 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 is expected to impose an
additional burden on 214 entities \52\ (PCs and TPs). Of the 214
affected entities discussed above, we estimate that approximately 10
percent of the affected entities are small entities. We estimate that
each of the 21 small entities to whom the proposed modifications to
proposed Reliability Standard TPL-001-5 apply will incur one-time costs
of approximately $1,980 per entity to implement the proposed
Reliability Standard. We do not consider the estimated costs for these
21 small entities to be a significant economic impact.
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\52\ Public utilities may fall under one of several different
categories, each with a size threshold based on the company's number
of employees, including affiliates, the parent company, and
subsidiaries. We are using a 500-employee threshold due to each
affected entity falling within the role of Electric Bulk Power
Transmission and Control (NAISC Code: 221121).
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38. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that this final rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
VI. Document Availability
39. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
internet through FERC's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
40. From FERC's Home Page on the internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
41. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's
website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202)
502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
[email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202)502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at
[email protected].
VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification
42. These regulations are effective April 13, 2020. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be provided
to the Senate, House, Government Accountability Office, and the SBA.
By the Commission.
Issued: January 23, 2020.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
Appendix--List of Commenters
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Abbreviation Commenter
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AF&PA............................. American Forest and Paper
Association.
APS............................... Arizona Public Service Company.
BPA............................... Bonneville Power Administration.
Carder............................ William Carder.
MISO.............................. Midcontinent Independent System
Operator, Inc.
NERC.............................. North American Electric Reliability
Corporation.
Pugh.............................. Theresa Pugh.
Trade Associations................ American Public Power Association,
Edison Electric Institute, Large
Public Power Council, National
Rural Electric Cooperative
Association.
Tri-State......................... Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Association, Inc.
TVA............................... Tennessee Valley Authority.
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[FR Doc. 2020-02170 Filed 2-12-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
