Order Relating to Marjan Caby, 4276-4278 [2020-01177]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 16 / Friday, January 24, 2020 / Notices
a Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States,
including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction
whereby a Denied Person acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from a Denied Person of any
item subject to the EAR that has been
exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the
United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know
that the item will be, or is intended to
be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by a Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States. For
purposes of this paragraph, servicing
means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
Section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization or entity related to
Muhammad Kamran Wali, Muhammad
Ahsan Wali, Haji Wali Muhammad
Sheikh, Ahmed Waheed, Ashraf Khan
Muhammad, Business World (of
Pakistan), Buziness World (of Canada),
Business World (of Hong Kong), and
Industria Hong Kong Ltd by ownership,
control, position of responsibility,
affiliation, or other connection in the
conduct of trade or business may also be
made subject to the provisions of this
Order.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Muhammad Kamran Wali, Muhammad
Ahsan Wali, Haji Wali Muhammad
Sheikh, Ahmed Waheed, Ashraf Khan
Muhammad, Business World (of
Pakistan), Buziness World (of Canada),
Business World (of Hong Kong), and
Industria Hong Kong Ltd may, at any
time, appeal this Order by filing a full
written statement in support of the
appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South
Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–
4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of
the EAR, Product Engineering may, at
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any time, appeal its inclusion as a
related person by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with
the Office of the Administrative Law
Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202–4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. Muhammad
Kamran Wali, Muhammad Ahsan Wali,
Haji Wali Muhammad Sheikh, Ahmed
Waheed, Ashraf Khan Muhammad,
Business World (of Pakistan), Buziness
World (of Canada), Business World (of
Hong Kong), and Industria Hong Kong
Ltd may oppose a request to renew this
Order by filing a written submission
with the Assistant Secretary for Export
Enforcement, which must be received
not later than seven days before the
expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be sent to
Muhammad Kamran Wali, Muhammad
Ahsan Wali, Haji Wali Muhammad
Sheikh, Ahmed Waheed, Ashraf Khan
Muhammad, Business World (of
Pakistan), Buziness World (of Canada),
Business World (of Hong Kong),
Industria Hong Kong Ltd and Product
Engineering, and shall be published in
the Federal Register.
This Order is effective upon issuance
and shall remain in effect for 180 days.
Dated: January 15, 2020.
Douglas Hassebrock,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020–01118 Filed 1–23–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Case No. 18–BIS–0002]
Order Relating to Marjan Caby
In the Matter of: Marjan Caby, 8500 SW
109th Avenue, Apt. 211, Miami, FL 33173, et
al., Respondents.
The Bureau of Industry and Security,
U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘BIS’’),
has notified Marjan Caby, of Miami,
Florida, that it has initiated an
administrative proceeding against her
pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export
Administration Regulations (the
‘‘Regulations’’),1 through the issuance of
1 The Regulations originally issued under the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50
U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘the EAA’’),
which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President,
through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001
(3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was
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a Charging Letter alleging that Marjan
Caby, Ali Caby, Arash Caby, AWTronics LLC, (‘‘AW-Tronics’’) and
Arrowtronic, LLC (‘‘Arrowtronic’’)
(collectively, ‘‘Respondents’’) violated
the Regulations as follows:
Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)—Conspiracy
Beginning as early as in or about
September 2013, and continuing
through in or about March 2014,
Respondents conspired and acted in
concert with others, known and
unknown, to bring about one or more
acts that constitute a violation of the
Regulations. The purpose and object of
the conspiracy was to unlawfully export
goods from the United States through
transshipment points to Syria, including
to Syrian Arab Airlines (‘‘Syrian Air’’),
the flag carrier airline of Syria and a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(‘‘SDGT’’), and in doing so evade the
prohibitions and licensing requirements
of the Regulations and avoid detection
by U.S. law enforcement.
Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the
Regulations, a license is required for the
export or reexport to Syria of all items
subject to the Regulations, except food
and medicine classified as EAR99.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 744.12
of the Regulations, a license is required
to export or reexport items subject to the
Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian Air was
designated as an SDGT on May 16, 2013
(see 78 FR 32304, May 29, 2013), under
authority granted to the Department of
the Treasury by Executive Order 13,224,
and was at all times pertinent hereto
(and remains) listed as an SDGT. At all
pertinent times, AW-Tronics and
Arrowtronic were active limited liability
companies incorporated in the State of
Florida. Documentary evidence and
extended by successive Presidential Notices,
continued the Regulations in full force and effect
under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)
(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of
2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the
EAA (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides,
in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that
were made or issued under the EAA, including as
continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13,
2018), shall continue in effect according to their
terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or
revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the
authority provided under ECRA. The Regulations
are currently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2018). The
charged violation occurred in 2013–2014. The
Regulations governing the violation at issue are
found in the 2013–2014 versions of the Code of
Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730–774 (2013–
2014)). The 2019 Regulations set forth the
procedures that apply to this matter.
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email correspondence shows that AWTronics personnel represented to
various transaction parties that AWTronics and Arrowtronic (collectively,
‘‘AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic’’) were the
same company. Arash Caby was listed
on Florida corporate records as a
Managing Member of AW-Tronics at the
time of the violations. From January
2014 until its most recent annual report
in January 2017, Ali Caby was listed on
Florida corporate records as the
registered agent of AW-Tronics. AWTronics/Arrowtronic has maintained
offices in Miami, Florida and Sofia,
Bulgaria, as well as other locations.
As part of the conspiracy, the coconspirators used electronic mail
(email) and other forms of
communication to communicate with
each other between the United States,
Bulgaria, United Arab Emirates (UAE),
and Syria. Under their scheme, coconspirators would purchase from U.S.
suppliers or vendors items subject to the
Regulations for export to Syrian Air in
Syria, including aircraft parts and
equipment, and would provide
materially false or misleading
documents and information to conceal
the illegal exports. In furtherance of the
conspiracy, they also would arrange for
payment for the illegal exports to be
made using third-party companies to
transfer payments between the coconspirators. Overall, between in or
about September 2013 and in or about
March 2014, Respondents engaged in
multiple transactions with Syrian Air
involving the export of aircraft parts and
equipment subject to the Regulations
from the Miami office of AW-Tronics/
Arrowtronic to Syrian Air’s
transshipment point in Dubai, United
Arab Emirates. These items were
actually intended for, and some or all
were ultimately delivered to, Syrian Air
in Syria.
During the conspiracy, Ali Caby
managed the Bulgaria office of AWTronics/Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby
managed its Miami office, and Marjan
Caby was its internal auditor. In
furtherance of the conspiracy, each of
these respondents exchanged numerous
emails with other AW-Tronics/
Arrowtronic employees authorizing or
otherwise discussing the abovedescribed exports to Syrian Air. These
email communications included, for
example, instructions that were
designed to prevent U.S. law
enforcement from detecting the
unlawful exports to Syria and to allow
them to continue by changing the
routing of exports from AW-Tronics/
Arrowtronic’s Miami, Florida office. In
March 2014, United States Customs and
Border Protection seized a shipment of
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micro switches that, according to
Electronic Export Information (EEI) filed
in the Automated Export System, was
destined for Syrian Air in the UAE,
when, in fact, the ultimate destination
was Syria. On March 5, 2014, Marjan
Caby sent an email to AW-Tronics/
Arrowtronic logistics employees,
copying Alex Caby, that explained, ‘‘We
will . . . have packages stopped by the
US Customs and Border Control [and]
have a case file like this for the same
client[,]’’ and provided instructions
stating, ‘‘NOTHING WILL BE SHIPPED
TO CLIENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
FROM THE USA OFFICE. WE HAVE
TO SEND TO BG [Bulgaria] THEN TO
CLIENT.’’ (Emphasis in original).
‘‘SYRIA’’ was specifically listed as one
country for which Respondents would
use Bulgaria as a transshipment point.
(Same).
Caby, Arash Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Axel’’ Caby,
Marjan Caby, AW-Tronics, LLC, and
Arrowtronic, LLC violated Section
764.2(d) of the Regulations, for which
they are jointly and severally liable.
Whereas, BIS and Marjan Caby have
entered into a Settlement Agreement
pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the
Regulations, whereby they agreed to
settle this matter in accordance with the
terms and conditions set forth therein;
Whereas, I have taken into
consideration the plea agreement
entered into by Marjan Caby with the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of Florida, and the sentence
imposed against her following or upon
the entry of her guilty plea and
conviction (‘‘the plea agreement and
sentence’’); and
Whereas, I have approved of the terms
of the Settlement Agreement;
It is therefore ordered:
First, for the period of four (4) years
from the date of this Order, Marjan
Caby, with a last known address of 8500
SW 109th Avenue, Apt. 211, Miami, FL
33173, and when acting for or on her
behalf, her successors, assigns,
representatives, agents, or employees
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
the ‘‘Denied Person’’), may not, directly
or indirectly, participate in any way in
any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘‘item’’) exported to or to be exported
from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations, including,
but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, license exception, or export
control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
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storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or engaging
in any other activity subject to the
Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or
from any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
Second, no person may, directly or
indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of the Denied Person any item subject to
the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
the Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States, including financing or other
support activities related to a
transaction whereby the Denied Person
acquires or attempts to acquire such
ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from the Denied Person of
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been exported from the United
States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in
the United States any item subject to the
Regulations with knowledge or reason
to know that the item will be, or is
intended to be, exported from the
United States, or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by the Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States. For purposes of this paragraph,
servicing means installation,
maintenance, repair, modification or
testing.
Third, any licenses issued under the
Regulations in which Marjan Caby has
an interest as of the date of this Order
shall be revoked by BIS.
Fourth, after notice and opportunity
for comment as provided in Section
766.23 of the Regulations, any person,
firm, corporation, or business
organization related to the Denied
Person by affiliation, ownership,
control, or position of responsibility in
the conduct of trade or related services
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 16 / Friday, January 24, 2020 / Notices
may also be made subject to the
provisions of the Order.
Fifth, Marjan Caby shall not take any
action or make or permit to be made any
public statement, directly or indirectly,
denying the allegations in the Charging
Letter or this Order.
Sixth, the Charging Letter, the
Settlement Agreement, and this Order
shall be made available to the public.
Seventh, this Order shall be served on
Marjan Caby and shall be published in
the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the
final agency action in this matter related
to Marjan Caby, is effective
immediately.
Issued this 17th day of January, 2020.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020–01177 Filed 1–23–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
[RTID 0648–XR049]
Takes of Marine Mammals Incidental to
Specified Activities; Taking Marine
Mammals Incidental to Construction
Activities for the Statter Harbor
Improvement Project
National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of an incidental
harassment authorization.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
regulations implementing the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) as
amended, notification is hereby given
that NMFS has issued an incidental
harassment authorization (IHA) to the
City of Juneau to incidentally harass, by
Level A and Level B harassment only,
marine mammals during construction
activities associated with the Statter
Harbor improvement project in Auke
Bay, Alaska.
DATES: This authorization is effective
from October 1, 2020 to September 30,
2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sara
Young, Office of Protected Resources,
NMFS, (301) 427–8401. Electronic
copies of the application and supporting
documents, as well as a list of the
references cited in this document, may
be obtained online at: https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/permit/
incidental-take-authorizations-under-
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SUMMARY:
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marine-mammal-protection-act. In case
of problems accessing these documents,
please call the contact listed above.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The MMPA prohibits the ‘‘take’’ of
marine mammals, with certain
exceptions. Sections 101(a)(5)(A) and
(D) of the MMPA (16 U.S.C. 1361 et
seq.) direct the Secretary of Commerce
(as delegated to NMFS) to allow, upon
request, the incidental, but not
intentional, taking of small numbers of
marine mammals by U.S. citizens who
engage in a specified activity (other than
commercial fishing) within a specified
geographical region if certain findings
are made and either regulations are
issued or, if the taking is limited to
harassment, a notice of a proposed
incidental take authorization may be
provided to the public for review.
Authorization for incidental takings
shall be granted if NMFS finds that the
taking will have a negligible impact on
the species or stock(s) and will not have
an unmitigable adverse impact on the
availability of the species or stock(s) for
taking for subsistence uses (where
relevant). Further, NMFS must prescribe
the permissible methods of taking and
other ‘‘means of effecting the least
practicable adverse impact’’ on the
affected species or stocks and their
habitat, paying particular attention to
rookeries, mating grounds, and areas of
similar significance, and on the
availability of such species or stocks for
taking for certain subsistence uses
(referred to in shorthand as
‘‘mitigation’’); and requirements
pertaining to the mitigation, monitoring
and reporting of such takings are set
forth.
The definitions of all applicable
MMPA statutory terms cited above are
included in the relevant sections below.
Summary of Request
On April 15, 2019, NMFS received a
request from the City of Juneau for an
IHA to take marine mammals incidental
to construction activities at Statter
Harbor in Auke Bay, Alaska. The
application was deemed adequate and
complete on September 26, 2019. The
City of Juneau’s request is for take of a
small number of eight species of marine
mammals, by Level B harassment and
Level A harassment. Neither the City of
Juneau nor NMFS expects serious injury
or mortality to result from this activity
and, therefore, an IHA is appropriate.
NMFS previously issued an IHA to
the City of Juneau for related work (84
FR 11066; March 25, 2019), which
covers the first phase of activities
(dredging, blasting, pile removal) and is
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effective from October 1, 2019 to
September 30, 2020. The City of Juneau
has not yet conducted any work under
the previous IHA and therefore no
monitoring results are available at the
time of writing.
This IHA covers one year of a larger
project for which the City of Juneau
obtained one prior IHA. The larger
multi-year project involves several
harbor improvement projects including
dismantling and demolition of existing
docks, construction of a mechanically
stabilized earth wall, and installation of
concrete floats.
Description of Specified Activity
Overview
The harbor improvements described
in the application include installation of
timber floats supported by 20 16-inch
steel pipe piles, installation of a
gangway, replacement of piles
supporting a transient float, and
removal of temporary fill that will be
placed under the first IHA and
construction of the permanent
mechanically stabilized earth (MSE)
wall.
Dates and Duration
The activities are expected to occur
between October 1, 2020 and May 1,
2021 but the IHA will be valid for one
year to account for any delays in the
construction timeline. In winter months,
shorter 8-hour to 10-hour workdays in
available daylight are anticipated. To be
conservative, 12-hour work days were
assumed for the purposes of analysis in
this notice.
Specific Geographic Region
The activities will occur at Statter
Harbor in Auke Bay, Alaska which is in
the southeast portion of the state. See
Figure 3 in the application for detailed
maps of the project area. Statter Harbor
is located at the most northeasterly
point of Auke Bay.
Detailed Description of Specific Activity
New infrastructure to be installed
includes 9,136 square feet (848.8 square
meters) of timber floats supported by
twenty (20) 16-inch (4.1-decimeter)
diameter steel pipe piles, an 10-foot by
100-foot gangway (3-meters by 30.5meters), removal of the temporary
surcharge fill and construction of the
permanent MSE wall. In addition to the
new infrastructure, three existing piles
will be repaired. The previously
installed temporary piles will be
removed with a crane or vibratory
hammer and reinstalled with rock
sockets to provide sufficient moorage
capacity for the float.
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 16 (Friday, January 24, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4276-4278]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-01177]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Case No. 18-BIS-0002]
Order Relating to Marjan Caby
In the Matter of: Marjan Caby, 8500 SW 109th Avenue, Apt. 211,
Miami, FL 33173, et al., Respondents.
The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
(``BIS''), has notified Marjan Caby, of Miami, Florida, that it has
initiated an administrative proceeding against her pursuant to Section
766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (the
``Regulations''),\1\ through the issuance of a Charging Letter alleging
that Marjan Caby, Ali Caby, Arash Caby, AW-Tronics LLC, (``AW-
Tronics'') and Arrowtronic, LLC (``Arrowtronic'') (collectively,
``Respondents'') violated the Regulations as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Regulations originally issued under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp.
III 2015) (``the EAA''), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR,
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was extended by successive
Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in full force and
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the
President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export
Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for
three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA
provides, in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that
were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect
pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment
(August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms
until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. The
Regulations are currently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2018). The charged violation
occurred in 2013-2014. The Regulations governing the violation at
issue are found in the 2013-2014 versions of the Code of Federal
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774 (2013-2014)). The 2019 Regulations
set forth the procedures that apply to this matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy
Beginning as early as in or about September 2013, and continuing
through in or about March 2014, Respondents conspired and acted in
concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about one or more acts
that constitute a violation of the Regulations. The purpose and object
of the conspiracy was to unlawfully export goods from the United States
through transshipment points to Syria, including to Syrian Arab
Airlines (``Syrian Air''), the flag carrier airline of Syria and a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT''), and in doing so evade
the prohibitions and licensing requirements of the Regulations and
avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement.
Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the Regulations, a license is required
for the export or reexport to Syria of all items subject to the
Regulations, except food and medicine classified as EAR99. Furthermore,
pursuant to Section 744.12 of the Regulations, a license is required to
export or reexport items subject to the Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian
Air was designated as an SDGT on May 16, 2013 (see 78 FR 32304, May 29,
2013), under authority granted to the Department of the Treasury by
Executive Order 13,224, and was at all times pertinent hereto (and
remains) listed as an SDGT. At all pertinent times, AW-Tronics and
Arrowtronic were active limited liability companies incorporated in the
State of Florida. Documentary evidence and
[[Page 4277]]
email correspondence shows that AW-Tronics personnel represented to
various transaction parties that AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic
(collectively, ``AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic'') were the same company. Arash
Caby was listed on Florida corporate records as a Managing Member of
AW-Tronics at the time of the violations. From January 2014 until its
most recent annual report in January 2017, Ali Caby was listed on
Florida corporate records as the registered agent of AW-Tronics. AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic has maintained offices in Miami, Florida and Sofia,
Bulgaria, as well as other locations.
As part of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators used electronic mail
(email) and other forms of communication to communicate with each other
between the United States, Bulgaria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and
Syria. Under their scheme, co-conspirators would purchase from U.S.
suppliers or vendors items subject to the Regulations for export to
Syrian Air in Syria, including aircraft parts and equipment, and would
provide materially false or misleading documents and information to
conceal the illegal exports. In furtherance of the conspiracy, they
also would arrange for payment for the illegal exports to be made using
third-party companies to transfer payments between the co-conspirators.
Overall, between in or about September 2013 and in or about March 2014,
Respondents engaged in multiple transactions with Syrian Air involving
the export of aircraft parts and equipment subject to the Regulations
from the Miami office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic to Syrian Air's
transshipment point in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. These items were
actually intended for, and some or all were ultimately delivered to,
Syrian Air in Syria.
During the conspiracy, Ali Caby managed the Bulgaria office of AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby managed its Miami office, and
Marjan Caby was its internal auditor. In furtherance of the conspiracy,
each of these respondents exchanged numerous emails with other AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic employees authorizing or otherwise discussing the
above-described exports to Syrian Air. These email communications
included, for example, instructions that were designed to prevent U.S.
law enforcement from detecting the unlawful exports to Syria and to
allow them to continue by changing the routing of exports from AW-
Tronics/Arrowtronic's Miami, Florida office. In March 2014, United
States Customs and Border Protection seized a shipment of micro
switches that, according to Electronic Export Information (EEI) filed
in the Automated Export System, was destined for Syrian Air in the UAE,
when, in fact, the ultimate destination was Syria. On March 5, 2014,
Marjan Caby sent an email to AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic logistics
employees, copying Alex Caby, that explained, ``We will . . . have
packages stopped by the US Customs and Border Control [and] have a case
file like this for the same client[,]'' and provided instructions
stating, ``NOTHING WILL BE SHIPPED TO CLIENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM
THE USA OFFICE. WE HAVE TO SEND TO BG [Bulgaria] THEN TO CLIENT.''
(Emphasis in original). ``SYRIA'' was specifically listed as one
country for which Respondents would use Bulgaria as a transshipment
point. (Same). doing, Ali Caby, a/k/a Alex Caby, Arash Caby, a/k/a
``Axel'' Caby, Marjan Caby, AW-Tronics, LLC, and Arrowtronic, LLC
violated Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations, for which they are
jointly and severally liable.
Whereas, BIS and Marjan Caby have entered into a Settlement
Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby
they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth therein;
Whereas, I have taken into consideration the plea agreement entered
into by Marjan Caby with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of Florida, and the sentence imposed against her following or
upon the entry of her guilty plea and conviction (``the plea agreement
and sentence''); and
Whereas, I have approved of the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
It is therefore ordered:
First, for the period of four (4) years from the date of this
Order, Marjan Caby, with a last known address of 8500 SW 109th Avenue,
Apt. 211, Miami, FL 33173, and when acting for or on her behalf, her
successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the ``Denied Person''), may not, directly
or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to
as ``item'') exported to or to be exported from the United States that
is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the
Regulations, including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license
exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any
other activity subject to the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.
Second, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item
subject to the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or
control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be
exported from the United States, including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States, or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
Third, any licenses issued under the Regulations in which Marjan
Caby has an interest as of the date of this Order shall be revoked by
BIS.
Fourth, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in
Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to the Denied Person by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of
trade or related services
[[Page 4278]]
may also be made subject to the provisions of the Order.
Fifth, Marjan Caby shall not take any action or make or permit to
be made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the
allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order.
Sixth, the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and this
Order shall be made available to the public.
Seventh, this Order shall be served on Marjan Caby and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this
matter related to Marjan Caby, is effective immediately.
Issued this 17th day of January, 2020.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020-01177 Filed 1-23-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
