Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 2153-2158 [2020-00416]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 14, 2020 / Notices
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technical content of this proposed BTP
7–19 revision.
Following NRC staff evaluation of
public comments, the NRC intends to
finalize BTP 7–19 Revision 8 in ADAMS
and post it on the NRC’s public website
at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/. The
SRP is guidance for the NRC staff. The
SRP is not a substitute for the NRC
regulations, and compliance with the
SRP is not required.
III. Backfitting, Issue Finality, and
Forward Fitting Discussion
Chapter 7 of the SRP provides
guidance to the staff for reviewing
information on instrumentation and
controls in licensing applications.
Issuance of this draft BTP, if finalized,
would not constitute backfitting as
defined in title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.109 (the Backfit
Rule) and as described in NRC
Management Directive 8.4,
‘‘Management of Backfitting, Forward
Fitting, Issue Finality, and Information
Requests;’’ would not affect the issue
finality of an approval under 10 CFR
part 52; and would not constitute
forward fitting as that term is defined
and described in Management Directive
8.4. The staff’s position is based upon
the following considerations.
1. The draft BTP, if finalized, would
not constitute backfitting or forward
fitting or affect issue finality, inasmuch
as the BTP would be internal guidance
to NRC staff.
The BTP provides guidance to the
staff on how to review an application for
NRC regulatory approval in the form of
licensing. Changes in internal staff
guidance, without further NRC action,
are not matters that meet the definition
of backfitting or forward fitting or affect
the issue finality of a part 52 approval.
2. Current or future applicants are
not—with limited exceptions not
applicable here—within the scope of the
backfitting and issue finality regulations
and forward fitting policy.
Applicants are not, with certain
exceptions, covered by either the Backfit
Rule or any issue finality provisions
under 10 CFR part 52. This is because
neither the Backfit Rule nor the issue
finality provisions under 10 CFR part
52—with certain exclusions discussed
below—were intended to apply to every
NRC action which substantially changes
the expectations of current and future
applicants.
The exceptions to the general
principle are applicable whenever an
applicant references a 10 CFR part 52
license (e.g., an early site permit) and/
or NRC regulatory approval (e.g., a
design certification rule) with specified
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issue finality provisions or a
construction permit under 10 CFR part
50. The staff does not, at this time,
intend to impose the positions
represented in the draft BTP (if
finalized) in a manner that would
constitute backfitting or affect the issue
finality of a part 52 approval. If, in the
future, the staff seeks to impose a
position in the draft BTP (if finalized) in
a manner that constitutes backfitting or
does not provide issue finality as
described in the applicable issue finality
provision, then the staff would need to
address the Backfit Rule or the criteria
for avoiding issue finality as described
in the applicable issue finality
provision.
The staff does not, at this time, intend
to impose the positions represented in
the draft BTP (if finalized) in a manner
that would constitute forward fitting. If,
in the future, the staff seeks to impose
a position in the draft BTP (if finalized)
in a manner that constitutes forward
fitting, then the staff would need to
address the forward fitting criteria in
Management Directive 8.4.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day
of January, 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dennis C. Morey,
Chief, Licensing Projects Branch, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020–00350 Filed 1–13–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–293; NRC–2019–0244]
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC;
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from
the licensee that would permit Holtec
Pilgrim, LLC and Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC to
reduce the minimum coverage limit for
onsite property damage insurance from
$1.06 billion to $50 million for Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on
January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2019–0244 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
SUMMARY:
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information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2019–0244. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301–287–9127; email:
Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@
nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced (if it is
available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Scott Wall, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington DC 20555–
0001; telephone: 301–415–2855, email:
Scott.Wall@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day
of January, 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing
Branch III, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
Attachment—Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Docket No. 50–293
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015
(Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy
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Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI)
certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim)
no later than June 1, 2019. On May 31,
2019, ENOI permanently ceased power
operations at Pilgrim. By letter dated
June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19161A033), ENOI certified to the
NRC that the fuel was permanenetly
removed from the Pilgrim reactor vessel
and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP)
on June 9, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant
to Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.82(a)(2), the Pilgrim renewed facility
operating license no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement
or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
The facility is still authorized to possess
and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored
onsite at the Pilgrim facility in the SFP
and in a dry cask independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
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II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19088A050),
as supplemented by letter dated July 30,
2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19211B509), ENOI requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
concerning onsite liability insurance.
The exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
would permit the licensee to reduce the
required level of onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50
million for Pilgrim.
By letter dated November 16, 2018
(ADAMS Accession No. ML18320A031),
ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy
Nuclear Generation Company (ENGC)
(to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC),
Holtec International (Holtec), and
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC (HDI, the licensee) (together,
Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of
control of Renewed Facility Operating
License No. DPR–35 for Pilgrim, as well
as the general license for the Pilgrim
ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec;
and (2) the direct transfer of ENOI’s
operating authority (i.e., its authority to
conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to
HDI. In addition, the Applicants
requested that the NRC approve a
conforming administrative amendment
to the Licenses to reflect the proposed
direct transfer of the Licenses from
ENOI to HDI; a planned name change
for ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim,
LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and
termination of all ENGC obligations
after the license transfer and equity sale.
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By Order dated August 22, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and
indirect transfers requested in the
November 16, 2018 application.
Additionally, on August 22, 2019, HDI
informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession
No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all
ongoing NRC regulatory actions and
reviews currently underway for Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station. HDI respectfully
requests NRC continuation of these
regulatory actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed
the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19239A037).
On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML19235A050), the NRC staff
issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect
the license transfer. Accordingly, HDI is
now the licensee for decommissioning
operations at Pilgrim.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
requires each licensee to have and
maintain onsite property damage
insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor
site in the event of an accident. The
onsite insurance coverage must be either
$1.06 billion or whatever amount of
insurance is generally available from
private sources (whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an
incident at a permanently shutdown
and defueled reactor is much less than
the risk from an operating power
reactor. In addition, since reactor
operation is no longer authorized at
Pilgrim, there are no events that would
require the stabilization of reactor
conditions after an accident. Similarly,
the risk of an accident that would result
in significant onsite contamination at
Pilgrim is also much lower than the risk
of such an event at operating reactors.
Therefore, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to
reduce its onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50
million, commensurate with the
reduced risk of an incident at the
permanently shutdown and defueled
Pilgrim site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions
are authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to public health or safety,
and are consistent with the common
defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2) are present.
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The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after
the Three Mile Island accident out of
concern that licensees may be unable to
financially cover onsite cleanup costs in
the event of a major nuclear accident.
The specified $1.06 billion coverage
amount requirement was developed
based on an analysis of an accident at
a nuclear reactor operating at power
resulting in a large fission product
release and requiring significant
resource expenditures to stabilize the
reactor and ultimately decontaminate
and cleanup the site.
These cost estimates were developed
based on the spectrum of postulated
accidents for an operating nuclear
reactor. Those costs were derived from
the consequences of a release of
radioactive material from the reactor.
Although the risk of an accident at an
operating reactor is very low, the
consequences onsite and offsite can be
significant. In an operating plant, the
high temperature and pressure of the
reactor coolant system (RCS), as well as
the inventory of relatively short-lived
radionuclides, contribute to both the
risk and consequences of an accident.
With the permanent cessation of reactor
operations at Pilgrim and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor
vessel, such accidents are no longer
possible. As a result, the reactor vessel,
RCS, and supporting systems no longer
operate and have no function related to
the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are
no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the
largest radiological risks are associated
with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In
the exemption request dated March 25,
2019, as supplemented by letter dated
July 30, 2019, the licensee discussed
both design-basis and beyond designbasis events involving irradiated fuel
stored in the SFP. The licensee
determined that there are no possible
design-basis events at Pilgrim that could
result in an offsite radiological release
exceeding the limits established by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) early phase Protective Action
Guides (PAGs) of 1 roentgen equivalent
man (rem) at the exclusion area
boundary, as a way to demonstrate that
any possible radiological releases would
be minimal and would not require
precautionary protective actions (e.g.,
sheltering in place or evacuation). The
NRC staff evaluated the radiological
consequences associated with various
decommissioning activities and the
design-basis accidents at Pilgrim, in
consideration of a permanently
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shutdown and defueled condition. The
possible design-basis accident scenarios
at Pilgrim have greatly reduced
radiological consequences. Based on its
review, the NRC staff concluded that no
reasonably conceivable design-basis
accident exists that could cause an
offsite release greater than the EPA
PAGs.
The only incident that might lead to
a significant radiological release at a
decommissioning reactor is a zirconium
fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond
design-basis accident scenario that
involves loss of water inventory from
the SFP resulting in a significant heatup
of the spent fuel, and culminating in
substantial zirconium cladding
oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario
is related to the decay heat of the
irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium
fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time since Pilgrim has
been permanently shut down.
The Commission has previously
authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this
analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In
SECY–96–256, ‘‘Changes to Financial
Protection Requirements for
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR
140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483),
the NRC staff recommended changes to
the power reactor financial protection
regulations that would allow licensees
to lower onsite insurance levels to $50
million upon demonstration that the
fuel stored in the SFP can be air-cooled.
In its Staff Requirements Memorandum
to SECY–96–256, dated January 28,
1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454), the Commission
supported the NRC staff’s
recommendation that, among other
things, would allow permanently shut
down power reactor licensees to reduce
commercial onsite property damage
insurance coverage to $50 million when
the licensee was able to demonstrate the
technical criterion that the spent fuel
could be air-cooled if the SFP was
drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical
criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning reactors (e.g.,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion
Nuclear Power Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 1999
(64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power
Station, published in the Federal
Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR
15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear
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Generation Plant, published in the
Federal Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR
26100); and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 2018
(83 FR 67365)). These prior exemptions
were based on these licensees
demonstrating that the SFP could be aircooled, consistent with the technical
criterion discussed above.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML19211B509), ENOI
provided a supplement to its exemption
request addressing air-cooling of fuel in
a drained pool. In the attachment to this
letter, the licensee compared Pilgrim
fuel storage parameters with those used
in NRC generic evaluations of fuel
cooling included in NUREG/CR–6451,
‘‘A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of
Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated August 1997 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML082260098). The
analysis described in NUREG/CR–6451
determined that natural air circulation
would adequately cool fuel that has
decayed for 7 months after operation in
a typical BWR. The licensee compared
the post-shutdown fuel storage
conditions with those assumed for the
analysis presented in NUREG/CR–6451.
The licensee found that the Pilgrim fuel
storage configuration is nearly identical
to the representative configuration used
in the NUREG/CR–6451 analysis with
respect to the fuel assembly size, the
fuel storage pitch, the rack material, and
the rack orifice size being larger than the
BWR fuel assembly inlet nozzle size.
Thus, the cooling air flow should be
comparable. However, although the
Pilgrim final cycle fuel operated at a
lower power density, it achieved a
higher total burnup than assumed for
the NUREG/CR–6451 analysis. The
licensee determined that the higher
decay heat resulting from the increased
burnup would be offset by the longer
decay time (i.e., 10 months) at the
effective date of the requested
exemption as compared to the decay
time used in the NUREG/CR–6451
analysis (i.e., 7 months), which results
in a lower total decay heat rate.
Therefore, at 10 months after permanent
shutdown (i.e., the effective date of the
requested exemption), the NRC staff has
reasonable assurance that fuel stored in
the Pilgrim SFP would be adequately
air-cooled in the unlikely event the SFP
completely drained.
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
and Emergency Preparedness
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Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
the Spent Fuel Pool,’’ dated June 4, 2001
(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626
and ML011450420, respectively), the
NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium
fire risks at decommissioning reactors
and associated implications for onsite
property damage insurance. Providing
an analysis of when the spent fuel
stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that can be used
to demonstrate that the probability of a
zirconium fire is exceedingly low.
However, the NRC staff has more
recently used an additional analysis that
bounds an incomplete drain down of
the SFP water, or some other
catastrophic event (such as a complete
drainage of the SFP with rearrangement
of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The
analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via
conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is
often referred to as an adiabatic heatup.
The licensee’s adiabatic heatup
analyses demonstrate that there would
be at least 10 hours after the loss of all
means of cooling (both air and/or
water), before the spent fuel cladding
would reach a temperature where the
potential for a significant offsite
radiological release could occur. The
licensee states that for this loss of all
cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient
time for personnel to respond with
additional resources, equipment, and
capability to restore cooling to the SFPs,
even after a non-credible, catastrophic
event.
In the analysis provided in
Attachment 2, ‘‘Calculation No. PNPS–
EC–81416–M1418, Adiabatic Heatup
Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool,’’
to the letter dated February 18, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19056A260),
the licensee compared the conditions
for the hottest fuel assembly stored in
the SFP to a criterion proposed in
SECY–99–168, ‘‘Improving
Decommissioning Regulations for
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated June 30,
1999 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12265A598), applicable to offsite
emergency response for the unit in the
decommissioning process. This criterion
considers the time for the hottest
assembly to heat up from 30 degrees
Celsius (°C) to 900 °C adiabatically. If
the heatup time is greater than 10 hours,
then offsite emergency preplanning
involving the plant is not necessary.
Based on the limiting fuel assembly for
decay heat and adiabatic heatup
analysis presented in Attachment 2 to
the February 18, 2019 letter, at 10
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months after permanent cessation of
power operations (i.e., 10 months of
decay time), the time for the hottest fuel
assembly to reach 900 °C is 10 hours
after the assemblies have been
uncovered. As stated in NUREG–1738,
‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February
2001 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML010430066), 900 °C is an acceptable
temperature to use for assessing onset of
fission product release under transient
conditions to establish the critical decay
time for determining the availability of
10 hours for deployment of mitigation
equipment and, if necessary, for offsite
agencies to take appropriate action to
protect the health and safety of the
public if fuel and cladding oxidation
occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the
calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were
within acceptable ranges and the results
were accurate. The NRC staff
determined that physical properties
were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC
staff found that 10 months after
permanent cessation of power
operations, more than 10 hours would
be available before a significant offsite
release could begin. The NRC staff
concluded that the adiabatic heatup
calculation provided an acceptable
method for determining the minimum
time available for deployment of
mitigation equipment and, if necessary,
implementing measures under a
comprehensive general emergency plan.
The NRC staff performed an
evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for Pilgrim being permanently defueled
as part of SECY–19–0078, ‘‘Request by
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station,’’ dated August 9,
2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18347A717).
Based on the evaluation in SECY–19–
0078 and SECY–96–256, the NRC staff
determined $50 million to be an
adequate level of onsite property
damage insurance for a
decommissioning reactor once the spent
fuel in the SFP is no longer susceptible
to a zirconium fire. The NRC staff has
postulated that there is still a potential
for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could
result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire.
In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the
rupture of a large contaminated liquid
storage tank (∼450,000 gallon) causing
soil contamination and potential
groundwater contamination as the most
costly postulated event to
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decontaminate and remediate (other
than an SFP zirconium fire). The
postulated large liquid radiological
waste storage tank rupture event was
determined to have a bounding onsite
cleanup cost of approximately $50
million. Therefore, the NRC staff
determined that the licensee’s proposal
to reduce onsite insurance to a level of
$50 million would be consistent with
the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY–96–256, to account for the
postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the Pilgrim
site, should such an event occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the
licensee’s proposed reduction in onsite
property damage insurance coverage to
a level of $50 million is consistent with
SECY–96–256 and subsequent
insurance considerations resulting from
additional zirconium fire risks as
discussed in SECY–00–0145 and SECY–
01–0100. In addition, the NRC staff
notes that similar exemptions have been
granted to other permanently shut down
and defueled power reactors, upon
demonstration that the criterion of the
zirconium fire risks from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern. As previously stated, the NRC
staff concluded that 10 months after the
permanent cessation of power
operations on May 31, 2019, sufficient
irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at Pilgrim to decrease the
probability of an onsite radiological
release from a postulated zirconium fire
accident to negligible levels. In
addition, the licensee’s proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50
million is consistent with the maximum
estimated cleanup costs for the recovery
from the rupture of a large liquid
radwaste storage tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in
accordance with the Pilgrim PostShutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report (PSDAR) dated November 16,
2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18320A040), all spent fuel will be
removed from the SFP and moved into
dry storage at an onsite ISFSI by the end
of 2021, and the probability of an
initiating event that would threaten SFP
integrity occurring before that time is
extremely low, which further supports
the conclusion that the zirconium fire
risk is negligible.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow Holtec
Pilgrim and HDI to reduce the minimum
coverage limit for onsite property
damage insurance. As stated above, 10
CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
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CFR part 50 when the exemptions are
authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has
determined that the licensee’s proposed
reduction in onsite property damage
insurance coverage to a level of $50
million is consistent with SECY–96–
256. Moreover, the NRC staff concluded
that 10 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient
irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at Pilgrim to decrease the
probability of an onsite and offsite
radiological release from a postulated
zirconium fire accident to negligible
levels. In addition, the licensee’s
proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a
level of $50 million is consistent with
the maximum estimated cleanup costs
for the recovery from the rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste storage
tank.
The NRC staff has determined that
granting the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, or the Commission’s
regulations. Therefore, based on its
review of the licensee’s exemption
request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY–96–256, the NRC
staff concludes that the exemption is
authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue
Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
were established to provide financial
assurance that following a significant
nuclear incident, onsite conditions
could be stabilized and the site
decontaminated. The requirements of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level
of onsite insurance coverage for Pilgrim
are predicated on the assumption that
the reactor is operating. However,
Pilgrim permanently shut down on May
31, 2019, and defueled on June 10, 2019.
The permanently shutdown and
defueled status of the facility results in
a significant reduction in the number
and severity of potential accidents and,
correspondingly, a significant reduction
in the potential for and severity of
onsite property damage. The proposed
reduction in the amount of onsite
insurance coverage does not impact the
probability or consequences of potential
accidents. The proposed level of
insurance coverage is commensurate
with the reduced consequences of
potential nuclear accidents at Pilgrim.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
granting the requested exemption will
not present an undue risk to the health
and safety of the public.
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14JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 14, 2020 / Notices
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the
Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not
eliminate any requirements associated
with physical protection of the site and
would not adversely affect the licensee’s
ability to physically secure the site or
protect special nuclear material.
Physical security measures at Pilgrim
are not affected by the requested
exemption. Therefore, the proposed
exemption is consistent with the
common defense and security.
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with NOTICES
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present
whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be
available to stabilize reactor conditions
and cover onsite cleanup costs
associated with site decontamination
following an accident that results in the
release of a significant amount of
radiological material. Since Pilgrim
permanently shut down on May 31,
2019, and defueled on June 10, 2019, it
is no longer possible for the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents
or other credible events at Pilgrim to
exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. The licensee
has evaluated the consequences of
highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis
conditions involving a loss of coolant
from the SFP. The analyses show that 10
months after the permanent cessation of
power operations on May 31, 2019, the
likelihood of such an event leading to a
large radiological release is negligible.
The NRC staff’s evaluation of the
licensee’s analyses confirm this
conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the
licensee’s proposed $50 million level of
onsite insurance is consistent with the
bounding cleanup and decontamination
cost as discussed in SECY–96–256, to
account for the hypothetical rupture of
a large liquid radiological waste tank at
the Pilgrim site, should such an event
occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the
current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in
onsite insurance coverage is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule for the permanently
shutdown and defueled Pilgrim reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special
circumstances are present whenever
compliance would result in undue
hardship or other costs that are
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18:41 Jan 13, 2020
Jkt 250001
significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted, or that are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the
licensee was required to continue to
maintain an onsite insurance level of
$1.06 billion, the associated insurance
premiums would be in excess of those
necessary and commensurate with the
radiological contamination risks posed
by the site. In addition, such insurance
levels would be significantly in excess
of other decommissioning reactor
facilities that have been granted similar
exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance
with the existing rule would result in an
undue hardship or other costs that are
significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted and are significantly in excess
of those incurred by others similarly
situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances
required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC’s approval of an exemption
from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of
actions that the Commission, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion after first finding
that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from the requirement to prepare an
environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting
of an exemption from the requirements
of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR
is a categorical exclusion provided that:
(i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no
significant construction impact; (v)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Operating
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, I have determined
that approval of the exemption request
involves no significant hazards
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
2157
consideration, as defined in 10 CFR
50.92, because reducing the licensee’s
onsite property damage insurance for
Pilgrim does not: (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted
financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of Pilgrim or
site activities. Accordingly, there is no
significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of
any effluents that may be released
offsite and no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The
exempted regulation is not associated
with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern
the source term (i.e., potential amount
of radiation in an accident) nor any
activities conducted at the site.
Therefore, there is no significant
increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological
accident. In addition, there would be no
significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions
in the region resulting from issuance of
the requested exemption. The
requirement for onsite property damage
insurance involves surety, insurance,
and indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special
circumstances are present as set forth in
10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants Holtec Pilgrim and HDI an
exemption from the requirements of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) for Pilgrim. Pilgrim
permanently ceased power operations
on May 31, 2019. The exemption
permits Pilgrim to lower the minimum
required onsite insurance to $50 million
10 months after permanent cessation of
power operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10
months after permanent cessation of
power operations.
E:\FR\FM\14JAN1.SGM
14JAN1
2158
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 14, 2020 / Notices
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day
of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020–00416 Filed 1–13–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2020–0017]
Biweekly Notice; Applications and
Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses and Combined Licenses
Involving No Significant Hazards
Considerations
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Biweekly notice.
AGENCY:
Pursuant to section 189.a.(2)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
publishing this regular biweekly notice.
The Act requires the Commission to
publish notice of any amendments
issued, or proposed to be issued, and
grants the Commission the authority to
issue and make immediately effective
any amendment to an operating license
or combined license, as applicable,
upon a determination by the
Commission that such amendment
involves no significant hazards
consideration, notwithstanding the
pendency before the Commission of a
request for a hearing from any person.
This biweekly notice includes all
amendments issued, or proposed to be
issued, from December 17, 2019, to
December 30, 2019. This notice also
incorporates the revised biweekly
format as noticed in the Federal
Register on December 3, 2019. The last
biweekly notice was published on
December 31, 2019.
DATES: Comments must be filed by
February 13, 2020. A request for a
hearing or petitions for leave to
intervene must be filed by March 16,
2020.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods (unless
this document describes a different
method for submitting comments on a
specific subject):
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2020–0017. Address
questions about NRC Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301–287–9127; email:
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
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18:41 Jan 13, 2020
Jkt 250001
Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• Mail comments to: Office of
Administration, Mail Stop: TWFN–7–
A60M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, ATTN: Program Management,
Announcements and Editing Staff.
For additional direction on obtaining
information and submitting comments,
see ‘‘Obtaining Information and
Submitting Comments’’ in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Lynn Ronewicz, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, 301–415–1927,
email: Lynn.Ronewicz@nrc.gov, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Obtaining Information and
Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2020–
0017, when contacting the NRC about
the availability of information for this
action. You may obtain publiclyavailable information related to this
action by any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2020–0017.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@
nrc.gov. For the convenience of the
reader, instructions about obtaining
materials referenced in this document
are provided in the ‘‘Availability of
Documents’’ section.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC–2020–
0017, facility name, unit nos. docket
no., application date, and subject, in
your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include
identifying or contact information that
you do not want to be publicly
disclosed in your comment submission.
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
The NRC will post all comment
submissions at https://
www.regulations.gov as well as enter the
comment submissions into ADAMS.
The NRC does not routinely edit
comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating
comments from other persons for
submission to the NRC, then you should
inform those persons not to include
identifying or contact information that
they do not want to be publicly
disclosed in their comment submission.
Your request should state that the NRC
does not routinely edit comment
submissions to remove such information
before making the comment
submissions available to the public or
entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance
of Amendments to Facility Operating
Licenses and Combined Licenses and
Proposed No Significant Hazards
Consideration Determination
For the facility-specific amendment
requests shown below, the Commission
finds that the licensee’s analyses
provided, consistent with title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
Section 50.91 is sufficient to support the
proposed determination that these
amendment requests involve No
Significant Hazards Consideration
(NSHC). Under the Commission’s
regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, operation
of the facility in accordance with the
proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated, or (2)
create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated; or (3)
involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The Commission is seeking public
comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received
within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be
considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not
issue the amendment until the
expiration of 60 days after the date of
publication of this notice. The
Commission may issue the license
amendment before expiration of the 60day period provided that its final
determination is that the amendment
involves NSHC. In addition, the
Commission may issue the amendment
prior to the expiration of the 30-day
comment period if circumstances
change during the 30-day comment
period such that failure to act in a
timely way would result, for example in
E:\FR\FM\14JAN1.SGM
14JAN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 9 (Tuesday, January 14, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2153-2158]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-00416]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-293; NRC-2019-0244]
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC;
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC to
reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage insurance
from $1.06 billion to $50 million for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0244 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0244. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Wall, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2855, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of January, 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-293
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy
[[Page 2154]]
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power
operations at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) no later than
June 1, 2019. On May 31, 2019, ENOI permanently ceased power operations
at Pilgrim. By letter dated June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19161A033), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanenetly
removed from the Pilgrim reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel
pool (SFP) on June 9, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant to Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.82(a)(2), the Pilgrim
renewed facility operating license no longer authorizes operation of
the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
The facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the
Pilgrim facility in the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19088A050),
as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19211B509), ENOI requested an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
concerning onsite liability insurance. The exemption from 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for
Pilgrim.
By letter dated November 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18320A031), ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy Nuclear Generation
Company (ENGC) (to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC), Holtec
International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
(HDI, the licensee) (together, Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of control of Renewed Facility
Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim, as well as the general
license for the Pilgrim ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec; and
(2) the direct transfer of ENOI's operating authority (i.e., its
authority to conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to HDI. In
addition, the Applicants requested that the NRC approve a conforming
administrative amendment to the Licenses to reflect the proposed direct
transfer of the Licenses from ENOI to HDI; a planned name change for
ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and termination of all ENGC
obligations after the license transfer and equity sale.
By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and indirect transfers requested in
the November 16, 2018 application. Additionally, on August 22, 2019,
HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory
actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory
actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19235A050), the
NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect the license transfer.
Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for decommissioning operations at
Pilgrim.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident.
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no
longer authorized at Pilgrim, there are no events that would require
the stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly,
the risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite
contamination at Pilgrim is also much lower than the risk of such an
event at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the
reduced risk of an incident at the permanently shutdown and defueled
Pilgrim site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island accident out of concern that
licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs in
the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion
coverage amount requirement was developed based on an analysis of an
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at power resulting in a large
fission product release and requiring significant resource expenditures
to stabilize the reactor and ultimately decontaminate and cleanup the
site.
These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were
derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor
is very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In
an operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at Pilgrim
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor vessel, RCS,
and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related
to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting
systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption
request dated March 25, 2019, as supplemented by letter dated July 30,
2019, the licensee discussed both design-basis and beyond design-basis
events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The licensee
determined that there are no possible design-basis events at Pilgrim
that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the
limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1 roentgen equivalent
man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way to demonstrate that
any possible radiological releases would be minimal and would not
require precautionary protective actions (e.g., sheltering in place or
evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the radiological consequences
associated with various decommissioning activities and the design-basis
accidents at Pilgrim, in consideration of a permanently
[[Page 2155]]
shutdown and defueled condition. The possible design-basis accident
scenarios at Pilgrim have greatly reduced radiological consequences.
Based on its review, the NRC staff concluded that no reasonably
conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite
release greater than the EPA PAGs.
The only incident that might lead to a significant radiological
release at a decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium
fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design-basis
accident scenario that involves loss of water inventory from the SFP
resulting in a significant heatup of the spent fuel, and culminating in
substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat
of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a
zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time
since Pilgrim has been permanently shut down.
The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire
risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements
for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10
CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A483), the NRC staff recommended changes to the power reactor
financial protection regulations that would allow licensees to lower
onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel
stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements
Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC staff's recommendation
that, among other things, would allow permanently shut down power
reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance
coverage to $50 million when the licensee was able to demonstrate the
technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP
was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638);
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28,
2018 (83 FR 67365)). These prior exemptions were based on these
licensees demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19211B509),
ENOI provided a supplement to its exemption request addressing air-
cooling of fuel in a drained pool. In the attachment to this letter,
the licensee compared Pilgrim fuel storage parameters with those used
in NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451,
``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water
Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML082260098). The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that
natural air circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for
7 months after operation in a typical BWR. The licensee compared the
post-shutdown fuel storage conditions with those assumed for the
analysis presented in NUREG/CR-6451. The licensee found that the
Pilgrim fuel storage configuration is nearly identical to the
representative configuration used in the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis with
respect to the fuel assembly size, the fuel storage pitch, the rack
material, and the rack orifice size being larger than the BWR fuel
assembly inlet nozzle size. Thus, the cooling air flow should be
comparable. However, although the Pilgrim final cycle fuel operated at
a lower power density, it achieved a higher total burnup than assumed
for the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis. The licensee determined that the higher
decay heat resulting from the increased burnup would be offset by the
longer decay time (i.e., 10 months) at the effective date of the
requested exemption as compared to the decay time used in the NUREG/CR-
6451 analysis (i.e., 7 months), which results in a lower total decay
heat rate. Therefore, at 10 months after permanent shutdown (i.e., the
effective date of the requested exemption), the NRC staff has
reasonable assurance that fuel stored in the Pilgrim SFP would be
adequately air-cooled in the unlikely event the SFP completely drained.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC
staff discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for
onsite property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the
spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure
that can be used to demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium
fire is exceedingly low. However, the NRC staff has more recently used
an additional analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP
water, or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of
the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is often referred to as an adiabatic
heatup.
The licensee's adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that there
would be at least 10 hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both
air and/or water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a
temperature where the potential for a significant offsite radiological
release could occur. The licensee states that for this loss of all
cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient time for personnel to respond
with additional resources, equipment, and capability to restore cooling
to the SFPs, even after a non-credible, catastrophic event.
In the analysis provided in Attachment 2, ``Calculation No. PNPS-
EC-81416-M1418, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel
Pool,'' to the letter dated February 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19056A260), the licensee compared the conditions for the hottest fuel
assembly stored in the SFP to a criterion proposed in SECY-99-168,
``Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12265A598), applicable to
offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning process.
This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly to heat up
from 30 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) to 900 [deg]C adiabatically. If the
heatup time is greater than 10 hours, then offsite emergency
preplanning involving the plant is not necessary. Based on the limiting
fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis presented in
Attachment 2 to the February 18, 2019 letter, at 10
[[Page 2156]]
months after permanent cessation of power operations (i.e., 10 months
of decay time), the time for the hottest fuel assembly to reach 900
[deg]C is 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered. As stated
in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an acceptable temperature to
use for assessing onset of fission product release under transient
conditions to establish the critical decay time for determining the
availability of 10 hours for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if
necessary, for offsite agencies to take appropriate action to protect
the health and safety of the public if fuel and cladding oxidation
occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and the
results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical
properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that 10
months after permanent cessation of power operations, more than 10
hours would be available before a significant offsite release could
begin. The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation
provided an acceptable method for determining the minimum time
available for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if necessary,
implementing measures under a comprehensive general emergency plan.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for Pilgrim being permanently defueled as part of SECY-19-0078,
``Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station,'' dated August 9, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18347A717).
Based on the evaluation in SECY-19-0078 and SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff determined $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property
damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in
the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. The NRC staff has
postulated that there is still a potential for other radiological
incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in significant
onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank
(~450,000 gallon) causing soil contamination and potential groundwater
contamination as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and
remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent
with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY-96-256, to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the Pilgrim site, should such an event
occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million
is consistent with SECY-96-256 and subsequent insurance considerations
resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed in SECY-00-
0145 and SECY-01-0100. In addition, the NRC staff notes that similar
exemptions have been granted to other permanently shut down and
defueled power reactors, upon demonstration that the criterion of the
zirconium fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of
negligible concern. As previously stated, the NRC staff concluded that
10 months after the permanent cessation of power operations on May 31,
2019, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have elapsed at
Pilgrim to decrease the probability of an onsite radiological release
from a postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels. In
addition, the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level
of $50 million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs
for the recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radwaste storage
tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with the Pilgrim Post-
Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated November 16,
2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18320A040), all spent fuel will be removed
from the SFP and moved into dry storage at an onsite ISFSI by the end
of 2021, and the probability of an initiating event that would threaten
SFP integrity occurring before that time is extremely low, which
further supports the conclusion that the zirconium fire risk is
negligible.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow Holtec
Pilgrim and HDI to reduce the minimum coverage limit for onsite
property damage insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC
to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when the
exemptions are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256.
Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 10 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time
will have elapsed at Pilgrim to decrease the probability of an onsite
and offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire
accident to negligible levels. In addition, the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with
the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture
of a large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, based on
its review of the licensee's exemption request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption
is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for
Pilgrim are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, Pilgrim permanently shut down on May 31, 2019, and defueled on
June 10, 2019. The permanently shutdown and defueled status of the
facility results in a significant reduction in the number and severity
of potential accidents and, correspondingly, a significant reduction in
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The proposed
reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does not impact
the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed
level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at Pilgrim. Therefore, the
NRC staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not
present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
[[Page 2157]]
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Physical security measures at Pilgrim are not
affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption
is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize
reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological material. Since Pilgrim permanently
shut down on May 31, 2019, and defueled on June 10, 2019, it is no
longer possible for the radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents or other credible events at Pilgrim to exceed the limits of
the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The licensee has evaluated
the consequences of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions
involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show that 10
months after the permanent cessation of power operations on May 31,
2019, the likelihood of such an event leading to a large radiological
release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's
analyses confirm this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
Pilgrim site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is
not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the
permanently shutdown and defueled Pilgrim reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, I have determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because reducing the licensee's onsite
property damage insurance for Pilgrim does not: (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve
a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial
protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of Pilgrim or site
activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident) nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for onsite
property damage insurance involves surety, insurance, and indemnity
matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present as set
forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Holtec Pilgrim and HDI an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for Pilgrim.
Pilgrim permanently ceased power operations on May 31, 2019. The
exemption permits Pilgrim to lower the minimum required onsite
insurance to $50 million 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations.
[[Page 2158]]
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020-00416 Filed 1-13-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
