Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 1827-1832 [2020-00285]
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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 8 / Monday, January 13, 2020 / Notices
reporting requirement in appendix H to
10 CFR part 50 could be revised.
This Direct Final Rule will extend the
reporting period from 1 year to 18
months and reduce the need for
licensees to prepare and submit
extension requests and the NRC
resources to review the requests.
III. Specific Requests for Comments
The NRC is seeking comments that
address the following questions:
1. Is the proposed collection of
information necessary for the NRC to
properly perform its functions? Does the
information have practical utility?
2. Is the estimate of the burden of the
information collection accurate?
3. Is there a way to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the
information collection on respondents
be minimized, including the use of
automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology?
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day
of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David C. Cullison,
NRC Clearance Officer, Office of the Chief
Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 2020–00284 Filed 1–10–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–293; NRC–2019–0245]
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC;
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from
the licensee that would permit Holtec
Pilgrim, LLC and Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC to
reduce the required level of primary
offsite liability insurance from $450
million to $100 million and to eliminate
the requirement to carry secondary
financial protection for Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on
January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2019–0245 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
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SUMMARY:
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• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2019–0245. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301–287–9127; email:
Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@
nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced (if it is
available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Scott Wall, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington DC 20555–
0001; telephone: 301–415–2855, email:
Scott.Wall@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day
of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing
Branch III, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
Attachment—Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Docket No. 50–293
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015
(Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI)
certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
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1827
Commission (NRC) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim)
no later than June 1, 2019. On May 31,
2019, ENOI permanently ceased power
operations at Pilgrim. By letter dated
June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19161A033), ENOI certified to the
NRC that the fuel was permanently
removed from the Pilgrim reactor vessel
and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP)
on June 9, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant
to Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.82(a)(2), the Pilgrim renewed facility
operating license no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement
or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
The facility is still authorized to possess
and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored
onsite at the Pilgrim facility in the SFP
and in a dry cask independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19088A127),
as supplemented by letter dated July 30,
2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19211B509), ENOI requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
concerning offsite primary and
secondary liability insurance. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
would permit the licensee to reduce the
required level of primary offsite liability
insurance from $450 million to $100
million and to eliminate the
requirement to carry secondary financial
protection for Pilgrim.
By letter dated November 16, 2018
(ADAMS Accession No. ML18320A031),
ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy
Nuclear Generation Company (ENGC)
(to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC),
Holtec International (Holtec), and
Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC (HDI, the licensee) (together,
Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of
control of Renewed Facility Operating
License No. DPR–35 for Pilgrim, as well
as the general license for the Pilgrim
ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec;
and (2) the direct transfer of ENOI’s
operating authority (i.e., its authority to
conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to
HDI. In addition, the Applicants
requested that the NRC approve a
conforming administrative amendment
to the Licenses to reflect the proposed
direct transfer of the Licenses from
ENOI to HDI; a planned name change
for ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim,
LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and
termination of all ENGC obligations
after the license transfer and equity sale.
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By Order dated August 22, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and
indirect transfers requested in the
November 16, 2018 application.
Additionally, on August 22, 2019, HDI
informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession
No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all
ongoing NRC regulatory actions and
reviews currently underway for Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station. HDI respectfully
requests NRC continuation of these
regulatory actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed
the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19239A037).
On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML19235A050), the NRC staff
issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect
the license transfer. Accordingly, HDI is
now the licensee for decommissioning
operations at Pilgrim.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
requires each licensee to have and
maintain primary financial protection in
an amount of $450 million. In addition,
the licensee is required to participate in
an industry retrospective rating plan
(secondary financial protection) that
commits each licensee to pay into an
insurance pool to be used for damages
that may exceed primary insurance
coverage. Participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan will subject the
licensee to deferred premium charges
up to a maximum total deferred
premium of $131,056,000 with respect
to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a
maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power
reactors involve failures or malfunctions
of systems, which could affect the fuel
in the reactor core and, in the most
severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of large quantities of
fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Pilgrim
and the permanent removal of the fuel
from the reactor vessel, many accidents
are no longer possible. Similarly, the
associated risk of offsite liability
damages that would require insurance
or indemnification is commensurately
lower for permanently shut down and
defueled plants. Therefore, the licensee
requested an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction in
primary offsite liability insurance and to
withdraw from participation in the
industry retrospective rating plan.
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III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ‘‘Specific
exemptions,’’ the Commission may,
upon application of any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
such exemptions from the requirements
of the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public
interest. The NRC staff has reviewed the
licensee’s request for an exemption from
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) and has concluded
that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in
the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957
(PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to
compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident.
Specifically, the PAA requires licensees
of facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of
100,000 electrical kilowatts or more’’ to
maintain the maximum amount of
primary offsite liability insurance
commercially available (currently $450
million) and a specified amount of
secondary insurance coverage (currently
up to $131,056,000 per reactor). In the
event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each
licensee would be assessed a prorated
share of the excess damages, up to
$131,056,000 per reactor, for a total of
approximately $13 billion per nuclear
incident. The NRC’s regulations at 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA
insurance requirements and set forth the
amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee
must have.
As noted above, the PAA
requirements with respect to primary
and secondary insurance and the
implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of
facilities with a ‘‘rated capacity of
100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.’’ In
accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the
license for a power reactor no longer
authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel into
the reactor vessel upon the docketing of
the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel.
Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to
generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is
undergoing decommissioning has no
‘‘rated capacity.’’ Thus, the NRC may
take the reactor licensee out of the
category of reactor licensees that are
required to maintain the maximum
available insurance and to participate in
the secondary retrospective insurance
pool.
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The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) were established to
require a licensee to maintain sufficient
insurance, as specified under the PAA,
to satisfy liability claims by members of
the public for personal injury, property
damage, and the legal cost associated
with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear
accident at an operating reactor with a
rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts
electric or greater. Thus, the insurance
levels established by this regulation, as
required by the PAA, were associated
with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity
of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical
basis for granting exemptions from 10
CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY–93–
127, ‘‘Financial Protection Required of
Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants
During Decommissioning,’’ dated May
10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis
underlying SECY–93–127 concluded
that, upon a technical finding that lesser
potential hazards exist after permanent
cessation of power operations (and the
reactor having no ‘‘rated capacity’’), the
Commission has the discretion under
the PAA to reduce the amount of
insurance required of a licensee
undergoing decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a
reactor has permanently ceased power
operations is not itself determinative as
to whether a licensee may cease
providing the offsite liability coverage
required by the PAA and 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of
freshly discharged irradiated fuel in the
SFP at a recently shut down reactor, the
potential for an offsite radiological
release from a zirconium fire with
consequences comparable in some
respects to an operating reactor accident
remains. That risk is very low at the
time of reactor shutdown because of
design provisions that prevent a
significant reduction in coolant
inventory in the SFP under normal and
accident conditions and becomes no
longer credible once the continual
reduction in decay heat provides ample
time to restore coolant inventory and
permits air cooling in a drained SFP.
After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a
zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the
SFP is still operational and an inventory
of radioactive materials still exists
onsite. Therefore, an evaluation of the
potential for offsite damage is necessary
to determine the appropriate level of
offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission’s
discretionary authority under the PAA
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to establish an appropriate level of
required financial protection for such
permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an
evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and
transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor, no
reasonably conceivable potential
accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During
normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor
coolant system (RCS) removes heat
generated by the reactor. The RCS
transfers this heat away from the reactor
core by converting reactor feedwater to
steam, which then flows to the main
turbine generator to produce electricity.
Most of the accident scenarios
postulated for operating power reactors
involve failures or malfunctions of
systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe
postulated accidents would involve the
release of large quantities of fission
products. With the permanent cessation
of reactor operations at Pilgrim and the
permanent removal of the fuel from the
reactor core, such accidents are no
longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the
storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore,
postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or
supporting systems are no longer
applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the
principal radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel
onsite. On a case-by-case basis,
licensees undergoing decommissioning
have been granted permission to reduce
the required amount of primary offsite
liability insurance coverage from $450
million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One
of the technical criteria for granting the
exemption is that the possibility of a
design-basis event that could cause
significant offsite damage has been
eliminated.
The NRC staff performed an
evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for Pilgrim being permanently defueled
as part of SECY–19–0078, ‘‘Request by
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station,’’ dated August 9,
2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18347A717).
ENOI has stated, and the NRC staff
agrees, that while spent fuel remains in
the SFP, the only postulated designbasis accident that would remain
applicable to Pilgrim in the permanently
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defueled condition that could contribute
a significant dose is a fuel handling
accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building,
where the SFP is located. For
completeness, the NRC staff also
evaluated the applicability of other
design-basis accidents documented in
the Pilgrim Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16083A494) to ensure
that these accidents would not have
consequences that could potentially
exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and
Regulatory Guide 1.183, ‘‘Alternative
Radiological Source Terms for
Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at
Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ dose
acceptance criteria or approach the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
early phase protective action guides
(PAGs).
In the Pilgrim UFSAR, the licensee
has determined that within 46 days after
shutdown, the FHA doses would
decrease to a level that would not
warrant protective actions under the
EPA early phase PAG framework,
notwithstanding meeting the dose limit
requirements under 10 CFR 50.67 and
dose acceptance criteria under
Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC staff
notes that the doses from an FHA are
dominated by the isotope Iodine-131.
Pilgrim permanently ceased power
operations on May 31, 2019. With 10
months of decay, the thyroid dose from
an FHA would be negligible. After 10
months of decay, the only isotope
remaining in significant amounts,
among those postulated to be released in
a design-basis FHA, would be Krypton85. Since Krypton-85 primarily decays
by beta emission, the calculated skin
dose from an FHA analysis would make
an insignificant contribution to the total
effective dose equivalent (TEDE), which
is the parameter of interest in the
determination of the EPA early phase
PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. The
NRC staff concludes that the dose
consequence from an FHA for the
permanently shutdown Pilgrim would
not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from
a design-basis radiological release is
highly unlikely and, thus, a significant
amount of offsite liability insurance
coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event
that has the potential to lead to a
significant radiological release at a
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactor is a zirconium fire. The
zirconium fire scenario is a postulated,
but highly unlikely, accident scenario
that involves the loss of water inventory
from the SFP resulting in a significant
heatup of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium
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cladding oxidation and fuel damage.
The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of
the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium
fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that Pilgrim has
been permanently shut down.
In the analysis provided in
Attachment 2, ‘‘Calculation No. PNPS–
EC–81416–M1418, Adiabatic Heatup
Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel Pool,’’
to the letter dated February 18, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19056A260),
the licensee compared the conditions
for the hottest fuel assembly stored in
the SFP to a criterion proposed in
SECY–99–168, ‘‘Improving
Decommissioning Regulations for
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated June 30,
1999 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12265A598), applicable to offsite
emergency response for the unit in the
decommissioning process. This criterion
considers the time for the hottest
assembly to heat up from 30 degrees
Celsius (°C) to 900 °C adiabatically. If
the heatup time is greater than 10 hours,
then offsite emergency preplanning
involving the plant is not necessary.
Based on the limiting fuel assembly for
decay heat and adiabatic heatup
analysis presented in Attachment 2, at
10 months after permanent cessation of
power operations (i.e., 10 months of
decay time), the time for the hottest fuel
assembly to reach 900 °C is 10 hours
after the assemblies have been
uncovered. As stated in NUREG–1738,
‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February
2001 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML010430066), 900 °C is an acceptable
temperature to use for assessing onset of
fission product release under transient
conditions to establish the critical decay
time for determining the availability of
10 hours for deployment of mitigation
equipment and, if necessary, for offsite
agencies to take appropriate action to
protect the health and safety of the
public if fuel and cladding oxidation
occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the
calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were
within acceptable ranges and the results
were accurate. The NRC staff
determined that physical properties
were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC
staff found that 10 months after
permanent cessation of power
operations, more than 10 hours would
be available before a significant offsite
release could begin. The NRC staff
concluded that the adiabatic heatup
calculation provided an acceptable
method for determining the minimum
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time available for deployment of
mitigation equipment and, if necessary,
implementing measures under a
comprehensive general emergency plan.
In this regard, one technical criterion
for relieving decommissioning reactor
licensees from the insurance obligations
applicable to an operating reactor is a
finding that the heat generated by the
SFP has decayed to the point where the
possibility of a zirconium fire is highly
unlikely.
This was addressed in SECY–93–127,
where the NRC staff concluded that
there was a low likelihood and reduced
short-term public health consequences
of a zirconium fire once a
decommissioning plant’s spent fuel has
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff
Requirements Memorandum, ‘‘Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of
Large Nuclear Power Plants during
Decommissioning,’’ dated July 13, 1993
(ADAMS Accession No. ML003760936),
the Commission approved a policy that
authorized, through the exemption
process, withdrawal from participation
in the secondary insurance layer and a
reduction in commercial liability
insurance coverage to $100 million
when a licensee is able to demonstrate
that the spent fuel could be air-cooled
if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical
criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning reactors (e.g.,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion
Nuclear Power Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 1999
(64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power
Station, published in the Federal
Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR
15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear
Generation Plant, published in the
Federal Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR
26100); and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 2018
(83 FR 67365)).
Additional discussions of other
decommissioning reactor licensees that
have received exemptions to reduce
their primary insurance level to $100
million are provided in SECY–96–256,
‘‘Changes to the Financial Protection
Requirements for Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10
CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,’’
dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15062A483). These
prior exemptions were based on the
licensee demonstrating that the SFP
could be air-cooled consistent with the
technical criterion discussed above.
The NRC staff has evaluated the issue
of zirconium fires in SFPs and
presented an independent evaluation of
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an SFP subject to a severe earthquake in
NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a
Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S.
Mark l Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated
September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365). This evaluation
concluded that, for a representative
boiling-water reactor, fuel in a dispersed
high-density configuration would be
adequately cooled by natural circulation
air flow within several months after
discharge from a reactor if the pool was
drained of water.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML19211B509), ENOI
provided a supplement to its exemption
request addressing air-cooling of fuel in
a drained SFP. In the attachment to this
letter, the licensee compared Pilgrim
fuel storage parameters with those used
in NRC generic evaluations of fuel
cooling included in NUREG/CR–6451,
‘‘A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of
Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated August 1997 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML082260098). The
analysis described in NUREG/CR–6451
determined that natural air circulation
would adequately cool fuel that has
decayed for 7 months after operation in
a typical BWR. The licensee compared
the post-shutdown fuel storage
conditions with those assumed for the
analysis presented in NUREG/CR–6451.
The licensee found that the Pilgrim fuel
storage configuration is nearly identical
to the representative configuration used
in the NUREG/CR–6451 analysis with
respect to the fuel assembly size, the
fuel storage pitch, the rack material, and
the rack orifice size being larger than the
BWR fuel assembly inlet nozzle size.
Thus, the cooling air flow should be
comparable. However, although the
Pilgrim final cycle fuel operated at a
lower power density, it achieved a
higher total burnup than assumed for
the NUREG/CR–6451 analysis. The
licensee determined that the higher
decay heat resulting from the increased
burnup would be offset by the longer
decay time (i.e., 10 months) at the
effective date of the requested
exemption as compared to the decay
time used in the NUREG/CR–6451
analysis (i.e., 7 months), which results
in a lower total decay heat rate.
Therefore, at 10 months after permanent
shutdown (i.e., the effective date of the
requested exemption), the NRC staff has
reasonable assurance that fuel stored in
the Pilgrim SFP would be adequately
air-cooled in the unlikely event the SFP
completely drained.
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
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Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
and Emergency Preparedness
Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 2001
(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626
and ML011450420, respectively), the
NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium
fire risks at decommissioning reactors
and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent
fuel stored in the SFP is capable of
adequate air-cooling is one measure that
demonstrates when the probability of a
zirconium fire would be exceedingly
low.
In addition, the licensee performed
adiabatic heatup analyses in which a
complete drainage of the SFP is
combined with rearrangement of spent
fuel rack geometry and/or the addition
of rubble to the SFP; this type of
analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via
conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. The licensee’s
adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate
that 10 months after the permanent
cessation of operations, there would be
at least 10 hours after the loss of all
means of cooling (both air and/or water)
before the spent fuel cladding would
reach a temperature where the potential
for a significant offsite radiological
release could occur.
In the March 25, 2019, application,
ENOI furnished the following
information: ‘‘Based on the length of
time it would take for the adiabatic heat
up to occur, there is ample time to
respond to any partial drain down event
that might cause such an occurrence by
restoring SFP cooling or makeup, or
providing SFP spray. As a result, the
likelihood that such a scenario would
progress to a zirconium fire is deemed
not credible.’’
In the NRC staff’s evaluation
contained in SECY–19–0078, the NRC
staff assessed the ENOI accident
analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire
at a permanently shut down and
defueled Pilgrim site. For the highly
unlikely beyond design-basis accident
scenario where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that
all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the
NRC staff found that there will be a
minimum of 10 hours from the
initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where
offsite radiological release might occur.
The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is
sufficient time to support deployment of
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mitigation equipment, consistent with
plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a
point of rapid oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the
licensee’s proposed reduction in
primary offsite liability coverage to a
level of $100 million and the licensee’s
proposed withdrawal from participation
in the secondary insurance pool for
offsite financial protection are
consistent with the policy established in
SECY–93–127 and subsequent
insurance considerations resulting from
zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY–00–0145 and SECY–01–0100.
The NRC has previously determined in
SECY–00–0145 that the minimum
offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that
secondary insurance is not required
once it is determined that the spent fuel
in the SFP is no longer thermalhydraulically capable of sustaining a
zirconium fire based on a plant-specific
analysis. In addition, the NRC staff
notes that similar exemptions from
these insurance requirements have been
granted to other permanently shut down
and defueled power reactors upon
satisfactory demonstration that
zirconium fire risk from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing
regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that
have a rated capacity of 100,000
kilowatts electric or more to have and
maintain $450 million in primary
financial protection and to participate in
a secondary retrospective insurance
pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8,
the Commission may grant exemptions
from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are
authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting
exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 are set
forth in SECY–93–127. The legal
analysis underlying SECY–93–127
concluded that, upon a technical
finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of
operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the
amount of insurance required of a
licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption
request, the NRC staff concludes that the
technical criteria for relieving Holtec
Pilgrim and HDI from their existing
primary and secondary insurance
obligations have been met. As explained
above, the NRC staff has concluded that
no reasonably conceivable design-basis
accident exists that could cause an
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16:32 Jan 10, 2020
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offsite release greater than the EPA
PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite
consequence from a design-basis
radiological release is highly unlikely
and the need for a significant amount of
offsite liability insurance coverage is
unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC
staff determined that, after 10 months
decay, the fuel stored in the Pilgrim SFP
will be capable of being adequately
cooled by air in the highly unlikely
event of pool drainage. Moreover, in the
highly unlikely beyond design-basis
accident scenario where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that
all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the
NRC staff has determined that at least 10
hours would be available and is
sufficient time to support deployment of
mitigation equipment, consistent with
plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a
point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC
staff concludes that the fuel stored in
the Pilgrim SFP will have decayed
sufficiently by the requested effective
date for the exemption of 10 months
after permanent cessation of power
operations to support a reduction in the
required insurance consistent with
SECY–00–0145.
The NRC staff has determined that
granting the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Section 170, or other laws, as amended,
which require licensees to maintain
adequate financial protection.
Accordingly, consistent with the legal
standard presented in SECY–93–127,
under which decommissioning reactor
licensees may be relieved of the
requirements to carry the maximum
amount of insurance available and to
participate in the secondary
retrospective premium pool where there
is sufficient technical justification, the
NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the
Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 140.11 were established to require
licensees to maintain sufficient offsite
liability insurance to ensure adequate
funding for offsite liability claims
following an accident at an operating
reactor. However, the regulation does
not consider the reduced potential for
and consequence of nuclear incidents at
permanently shutdown and
decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY–93–127,
SECY–00–0145, and SECY–01–0100
allows licensees of decommissioning
plants to reduce their primary offsite
liability insurance and to withdraw
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1831
from participation in the retrospective
rating pool for deferred premium
charges. As discussed in these
documents, once the zirconium fire
concern is determined to be negligible,
possible accident scenario risks at
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors are greatly reduced when
compared to the risks at operating
reactors and the associated potential for
offsite financial liabilities from an
accident are commensurately less. The
licensee analyzed and the NRC staff
confirmed that the risks of accidents
that could result in an offsite
radiological risk are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in
offsite primary liability insurance and
withdrawal from participation in the
secondary retrospective rating pool for
deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the
secondary retrospective rating pool
could potentially have adverse
consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a
nuclear incident sufficient to trigger the
secondary insurance layer occurred at
another nuclear power plant, the
licensee could incur financial liability
of up to $131,056,000. However,
because Pilgrim is permanently shut
down, it cannot produce revenue from
electricity generation sales to cover such
a liability. Therefore, such liability if
subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the
facility to conduct and complete timely
radiological decontamination and
decommissioning activities. In addition,
as SECY–93–127 concluded, the shared
financial risk exposure to the licensee is
greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by Pilgrim when
compared to operating reactors. The
reduced overall risk to the public at
decommissioning power plants does not
warrant that the licensee be required to
carry full operating reactor insurance
coverage after the requisite spent fuel
cooling period has elapsed following
final reactor shutdown. The licensee’s
proposed financial protection limits will
maintain a level of liability insurance
coverage commensurate with the risk to
the public. These changes are consistent
with previous NRC policy as discussed
in SECY–00–0145 and exemptions
approved for other decommissioning
reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose
of the regulations will not be adversely
affected by the reductions in insurance
coverage. Accordingly, an exemption
from participation in the secondary
insurance pool and a reduction in the
primary insurance to $100 million, a
value more in line with the potential
consequences of accidents, would be in
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the public interest in that this ensures
that there will be adequate funds to
address any of those consequences and
helps to ensure the safe and timely
decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has
concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit
Holtec Pilgrim and HDI to lower the
Pilgrim primary insurance levels and to
withdraw from the secondary
retrospective premium pool at the
requested effective date of 10 months
after permanent cessation of power
operations, is in the public interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC’s approval of an exemption
from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of
actions that the Commission, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion after first finding
that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from the requirement to prepare an
environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting
of an exemption from the requirements
of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR
is a categorical exclusion provided that:
(i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no
significant construction impact; (v)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Operating
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, I have determined
that approval of the exemption request
involves no significant hazards
consideration, as defined in 10 CFR
50.92, because reducing a licensee’s
offsite liability requirements at Pilgrim
does not: (1) Involve a significant
increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted
financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of Pilgrim or
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16:32 Jan 10, 2020
Jkt 250001
site activities. Accordingly, there is no
significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of
any effluents that may be released
offsite and no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The
exempted regulation is not associated
with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern
the source term (i.e., potential amount
of radiation in an accident) nor any
activities conducted at the site.
Therefore, there is no significant
increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological
accident. In addition, there would be no
significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions
in the region resulting from issuance of
the requested exemption. The
requirement for offsite liability
insurance involves surety, insurance, or
indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by
law and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission
hereby grants Holtec Pilgrim and HDI an
exemption from the requirements of 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4) for Pilgrim. Pilgrim
permanently ceased power operations
on May 31, 2019. The exemption from
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits Pilgrim to
reduce the required level of primary
financial protection from $450 million
to $100 million and to withdraw from
participation in the secondary layer of
financial protection 10 months after
permanent cessation of power
operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10
months after permanent cessation of
power operations.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day
of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020–00285 Filed 1–10–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD
Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation
Adjustment
Railroad Retirement Board.
Notice announcing updated
penalty inflation adjustments for civil
monetary penalties for 2020.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
As required by Section 701 of
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
entitled the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements
Act of 2015, the Railroad Retirement
Board (Board) hereby publishes its 2020
annual adjustment of civil penalties for
inflation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marguerite P. Dadabo, Assistant General
Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board,
844 North Rush Street, Chicago, IL
60611–1275, (312) 751–4945, TTD (312)
751–4701.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
701 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of
2015, Public Law 114–74 (Nov. 2, 2015),
entitled the Federal Civil Penalties
Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements
Act of 2015 (the 2015 Act), amended the
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461
note) (Inflation Adjustment Act) to
require agencies to publish regulations
adjusting the amount of civil monetary
penalties provided by law within the
jurisdiction of the agency not later than
January 15th of every year.
For the 2020 annual adjustment for
inflation of the maximum civil penalty
under the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act of 1986, the Board applies
the formula provided by the 2015 Act
and the Board’s regulations at Title 20,
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 356.
In accordance with the 2015 Act, the
amount of the adjustment is based on
the percent increase between the
Consumer Price Index (CPI–U) for the
month of October preceding the date of
the adjustment and the CPI–U for the
October one year prior to the October
immediately preceding the date of the
adjustment. If there is no increase, there
is no adjustment of civil penalties. The
percent increase between the CPI–U for
October 2019 and October 2018, as
provided by Office of Management and
Budget Memorandum M–20–05
(December 16, 2019) is 1.01764 percent.
Therefore, the new maximum penalty
under the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act is $11,665 (the 2019
maximum penalty of $11,463 multiplied
by 1.01764, rounded to the nearest
dollar). The new minimum penalty
under the False Claims Act is $11,665
(the 2019 minimum penalty of $11,463
multiplied by 1.01764, rounded to the
SUMMARY:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 8 (Monday, January 13, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1827-1832]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-00285]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-293; NRC-2019-0245]
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC;
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from the licensee that would permit
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC to
reduce the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from
$450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry
secondary financial protection for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
DATES: The exemption was issued on January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0245 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0245. Address
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges;
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Wall, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2855, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-293
Holtec Pilgrim, LLC
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated November 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) no later than June 1, 2019.
On May 31, 2019, ENOI permanently ceased power operations at Pilgrim.
By letter dated June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19161A033), ENOI
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the
Pilgrim reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) on June
9, 2019. Accordingly, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.82(a)(2), the Pilgrim renewed facility
operating license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The facility is
still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the Pilgrim facility in
the SFP and in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation
(ISFSI).
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19088A127),
as supplemented by letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19211B509), ENOI requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
concerning offsite primary and secondary liability insurance. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) would permit the licensee to reduce
the required level of primary offsite liability insurance from $450
million to $100 million and to eliminate the requirement to carry
secondary financial protection for Pilgrim.
By letter dated November 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML18320A031), ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy Nuclear Generation
Company (ENGC) (to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC), Holtec
International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC
(HDI, the licensee) (together, Applicants), requested that the NRC
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of control of Renewed Facility
Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim, as well as the general
license for the Pilgrim ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec; and
(2) the direct transfer of ENOI's operating authority (i.e., its
authority to conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to HDI. In
addition, the Applicants requested that the NRC approve a conforming
administrative amendment to the Licenses to reflect the proposed direct
transfer of the Licenses from ENOI to HDI; a planned name change for
ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; and deletion of certain license
conditions to reflect satisfaction and termination of all ENGC
obligations after the license transfer and equity sale.
[[Page 1828]]
By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265),
the NRC staff approved the direct and indirect transfers requested in
the November 16, 2018 application. Additionally, on August 22, 2019,
HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:
HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory
actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory
actions and reviews.
On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the license transfer
transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19235A050), the
NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect the license transfer.
Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for decommissioning operations at
Pilgrim.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to
have and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450
million. In addition, the licensee is required to participate in an
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection)
that commits each licensee to pay into an insurance pool to be used for
damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in
the industry retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to
deferred premium charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of
$131,056,000 with respect to any nuclear incident at any operating
nuclear power plant and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of
$20,496,000 per incident.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Pilgrim and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer
possible. Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages
that would require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower
for permanently shut down and defueled plants. Therefore, the licensee
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction
in primary offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor,
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary
retrospective insurance pool.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation,
as required by the PAA, were associated with the risks and potential
consequences of an accident at an operating reactor with a rated
capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or greater.
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12257A628). The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that,
upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards exist after
permanent cessation of power operations (and the reactor having no
``rated capacity''), the Commission has the discretion under the PAA to
reduce the amount of insurance required of a licensee undergoing
decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shut down reactor,
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions and
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational and an
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA
[[Page 1829]]
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for
such permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at Pilgrim and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been eliminated.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for Pilgrim being permanently defueled as part of SECY-19-0078,
``Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station,'' dated August 9, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18347A717).
ENOI has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel
remains in the SFP, the only postulated design-basis accident that
would remain applicable to Pilgrim in the permanently defueled
condition that could contribute a significant dose is a fuel handling
accident (FHA) in the Reactor Building, where the SFP is located. For
completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of other
design-basis accidents documented in the Pilgrim Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16083A494) to ensure
that these accidents would not have consequences that could potentially
exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183,
``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis
Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dose acceptance criteria or
approach the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase
protective action guides (PAGs).
In the Pilgrim UFSAR, the licensee has determined that within 46
days after shutdown, the FHA doses would decrease to a level that would
not warrant protective actions under the EPA early phase PAG framework,
notwithstanding meeting the dose limit requirements under 10 CFR 50.67
and dose acceptance criteria under Regulatory Guide 1.183. The NRC
staff notes that the doses from an FHA are dominated by the isotope
Iodine-131. Pilgrim permanently ceased power operations on May 31,
2019. With 10 months of decay, the thyroid dose from an FHA would be
negligible. After 10 months of decay, the only isotope remaining in
significant amounts, among those postulated to be released in a design-
basis FHA, would be Krypton-85. Since Krypton-85 primarily decays by
beta emission, the calculated skin dose from an FHA analysis would make
an insignificant contribution to the total effective dose equivalent
(TEDE), which is the parameter of interest in the determination of the
EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. The NRC staff
concludes that the dose consequence from an FHA for the permanently
shutdown Pilgrim would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
Therefore, any offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological
release is highly unlikely and, thus, a significant amount of offsite
liability insurance coverage is not required.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that involves the
loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a significant heatup
of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding
oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario
is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to
decrease as a function of the time that Pilgrim has been permanently
shut down.
In the analysis provided in Attachment 2, ``Calculation No. PNPS-
EC-81416-M1418, Adiabatic Heatup Analysis for Drained Spent Fuel
Pool,'' to the letter dated February 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19056A260), the licensee compared the conditions for the hottest fuel
assembly stored in the SFP to a criterion proposed in SECY-99-168,
``Improving Decommissioning Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12265A598), applicable to
offsite emergency response for the unit in the decommissioning process.
This criterion considers the time for the hottest assembly to heat up
from 30 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) to 900 [deg]C adiabatically. If the
heatup time is greater than 10 hours, then offsite emergency
preplanning involving the plant is not necessary. Based on the limiting
fuel assembly for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis presented in
Attachment 2, at 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations (i.e., 10 months of decay time), the time for the hottest
fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is 10 hours after the assemblies have
been uncovered. As stated in NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent
Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), 900 [deg]C is an
acceptable temperature to use for assessing onset of fission product
release under transient conditions to establish the critical decay time
for determining the availability of 10 hours for deployment of
mitigation equipment and, if necessary, for offsite agencies to take
appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public if
fuel and cladding oxidation occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were within acceptable ranges and the
results were accurate. The NRC staff determined that physical
properties were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC staff found that 10
months after permanent cessation of power operations, more than 10
hours would be available before a significant offsite release could
begin. The NRC staff concluded that the adiabatic heatup calculation
provided an acceptable method for determining the minimum
[[Page 1830]]
time available for deployment of mitigation equipment and, if
necessary, implementing measures under a comprehensive general
emergency plan.
In this regard, one technical criterion for relieving
decommissioning reactor licensees from the insurance obligations
applicable to an operating reactor is a finding that the heat generated
by the SFP has decayed to the point where the possibility of a
zirconium fire is highly unlikely.
This was addressed in SECY-93-127, where the NRC staff concluded
that there was a low likelihood and reduced short-term public health
consequences of a zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent
fuel has sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum,
``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power
Plants during Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML003760936), the Commission approved a policy that authorized,
through the exemption process, withdrawal from participation in the
secondary insurance layer and a reduction in commercial liability
insurance coverage to $100 million when a licensee is able to
demonstrate that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was
drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999
(64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638);
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the Federal
Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); and Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the Federal Register on December 28,
2018 (83 FR 67365)).
Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor licensees
that have received exemptions to reduce their primary insurance level
to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes to the Financial
Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were based on
the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
The NRC staff has evaluated the issue of zirconium fires in SFPs
and presented an independent evaluation of an SFP subject to a severe
earthquake in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark l Boiling
Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365). This evaluation concluded that, for a representative
boiling-water reactor, fuel in a dispersed high-density configuration
would be adequately cooled by natural circulation air flow within
several months after discharge from a reactor if the pool was drained
of water.
By letter dated July 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19211B509),
ENOI provided a supplement to its exemption request addressing air-
cooling of fuel in a drained SFP. In the attachment to this letter, the
licensee compared Pilgrim fuel storage parameters with those used in
NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, ``A
Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor]
and PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098). The
analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air
circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for 7 months
after operation in a typical BWR. The licensee compared the post-
shutdown fuel storage conditions with those assumed for the analysis
presented in NUREG/CR-6451. The licensee found that the Pilgrim fuel
storage configuration is nearly identical to the representative
configuration used in the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis with respect to the
fuel assembly size, the fuel storage pitch, the rack material, and the
rack orifice size being larger than the BWR fuel assembly inlet nozzle
size. Thus, the cooling air flow should be comparable. However,
although the Pilgrim final cycle fuel operated at a lower power
density, it achieved a higher total burnup than assumed for the NUREG/
CR-6451 analysis. The licensee determined that the higher decay heat
resulting from the increased burnup would be offset by the longer decay
time (i.e., 10 months) at the effective date of the requested exemption
as compared to the decay time used in the NUREG/CR-6451 analysis (i.e.,
7 months), which results in a lower total decay heat rate. Therefore,
at 10 months after permanent shutdown (i.e., the effective date of the
requested exemption), the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that fuel
stored in the Pilgrim SFP would be adequately air-cooled in the
unlikely event the SFP completely drained.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable
of adequate air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the
probability of a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
In addition, the licensee performed adiabatic heatup analyses in
which a complete drainage of the SFP is combined with rearrangement of
spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP; this
type of analysis postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent
fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation would be impeded. The
licensee's adiabatic heatup analyses demonstrate that 10 months after
the permanent cessation of operations, there would be at least 10 hours
after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or water) before
the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential
for a significant offsite radiological release could occur.
In the March 25, 2019, application, ENOI furnished the following
information: ``Based on the length of time it would take for the
adiabatic heat up to occur, there is ample time to respond to any
partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by
restoring SFP cooling or makeup, or providing SFP spray. As a result,
the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire
is deemed not credible.''
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-19-0078, the NRC
staff assessed the ENOI accident analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shut down and
defueled Pilgrim site. For the highly unlikely beyond design-basis
accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, the NRC staff found that there will be a minimum of
10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The NRC
staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment of
[[Page 1831]]
mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid oxidation.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction
in primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million and
the licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary
insurance pool for offsite financial protection are consistent with the
policy established in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance
considerations resulting from zirconium fire risks, as discussed in
SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. The NRC has previously determined in
SECY-00-0145 that the minimum offsite financial protection requirement
may be reduced to $100 million and that secondary insurance is not
required once it is determined that the spent fuel in the SFP is no
longer thermal-hydraulically capable of sustaining a zirconium fire
based on a plant-specific analysis. In addition, the NRC staff notes
that similar exemptions from these insurance requirements have been
granted to other permanently shut down and defueled power reactors upon
satisfactory demonstration that zirconium fire risk from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving Holtec Pilgrim and
HDI from their existing primary and secondary insurance obligations
have been met. As explained above, the NRC staff has concluded that no
reasonably conceivable design-basis accident exists that could cause an
offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any
offsite consequence from a design-basis radiological release is highly
unlikely and the need for a significant amount of offsite liability
insurance coverage is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff
determined that, after 10 months decay, the fuel stored in the Pilgrim
SFP will be capable of being adequately cooled by air in the highly
unlikely event of pool drainage. Moreover, in the highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff has determined that
at least 10 hours would be available and is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that the fuel stored in the
Pilgrim SFP will have decayed sufficiently by the requested effective
date for the exemption of 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations to support a reduction in the required insurance consistent
with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, Section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees
to maintain adequate financial protection. Accordingly, consistent with
the legal standard presented in SECY-93-127, under which
decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved of the requirements
to carry the maximum amount of insurance available and to participate
in the secondary retrospective premium pool where there is sufficient
technical justification, the NRC staff concludes that the requested
exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at
operating reactors and the associated potential for offsite financial
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological risk are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$131,056,000. However, because Pilgrim is permanently shut down, it
cannot produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such
a liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by Pilgrim when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power plants
does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full operating
reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel cooling
period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The licensee's
proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level of liability
insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the public. These
changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as discussed in SECY-
00-0145 and exemptions approved for other decommissioning reactors.
Thus, the underlying purpose of the regulations will not be adversely
affected by the reductions in insurance coverage. Accordingly, an
exemption from participation in the secondary insurance pool and a
reduction in the primary insurance to $100 million, a value more in
line with the potential consequences of accidents, would be in
[[Page 1832]]
the public interest in that this ensures that there will be adequate
funds to address any of those consequences and helps to ensure the safe
and timely decommissioning of the reactor.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit Holtec Pilgrim and HDI to lower
the Pilgrim primary insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary
retrospective premium pool at the requested effective date of 10 months
after permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public
interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, I have determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because reducing a licensee's offsite
liability requirements at Pilgrim does not: (1) Involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial
protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of Pilgrim or site
activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident) nor any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from
issuance of the requested exemption. The requirement for offsite
liability insurance involves surety, insurance, or indemnity matters
only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Holtec Pilgrim
and HDI an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for
Pilgrim. Pilgrim permanently ceased power operations on May 31, 2019.
The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits Pilgrim to reduce the
required level of primary financial protection from $450 million to
$100 million and to withdraw from participation in the secondary layer
of financial protection 10 months after permanent cessation of power
operations.
The exemption is effective as of 10 months after permanent
cessation of power operations.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of January 2020.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2020-00285 Filed 1-10-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P