Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act Annual Report, 72424-72430 [2019-28231]
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and Net Asset Value, suspension of
trading or removal, trading halts,
surveillance, minimum price variation
for quoting and order entry, the
information circular, and firewalls as set
forth in the proposed Exchange rules
applicable to Portfolio Fund Shares and
the orders approving such rules.
Moreover, U.S.-listed equity securities
held by the Funds will trade on markets
that are a member of ISG or affiliated
with a member of ISG or with which the
Exchange has in place a comprehensive
surveillance sharing agreement.31 All
statements and representations made in
this filing regarding the description of
the portfolio or reference assets,
limitations on portfolio holdings or
reference assets, dissemination and
availability of reference asset and
intraday indicative values (as
applicable), or the applicability of
Exchange listing rules specified in this
filing shall constitute continued listing
requirements for the Shares. The issuer
has represented to the Exchange that it
will advise the Exchange of any failure
by a Fund or Shares to comply with the
continued listing requirements, and,
pursuant to its obligations under
Section 19(g)(1) of the Act, the Exchange
will surveil for compliance with the
continued listing requirements. FINRA
conducts certain cross-market
surveillances on behalf of the Exchange
pursuant to a regulatory services
agreement. The Exchange is responsible
for FINRA’s performance under this
regulatory services agreement. If a Fund
is not in compliance with the applicable
listing requirements, the Exchange will
commence delisting procedures with
respect to such Fund under Exchange
Rule 14.12.
For the above reasons, the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change
is consistent with the requirements of
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that
the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purpose of the Act. Rather, the
Exchange notes that the proposed rule
change will facilitate the listing of a new
type of actively-managed exchangetraded products, thus enhancing
competition among both market
participants and listing venues, to the
benefit of investors and the marketplace.
31 For a list of the current members of ISG, see
www.isgportal.com. The Exchange notes that not all
components of the Funds may trade on markets that
are members of ISG or with which the Exchange has
in place a comprehensive surveillance sharing
agreement.
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C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
The Exchange has neither solicited
nor received written comments on the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 45 days of the date of
publication of this notice in the Federal
Register or within such longer period
up to 90 days (i) as the Commission may
designate if it finds such longer period
to be appropriate and publishes its
reasons for so finding or (ii) as to which
the Exchange consents, the Commission
will:
A. By order approve or disapprove
such proposed rule change, or
B. institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule change
should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for website viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the
filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal
office of the Exchange. All comments
received will be posted without change.
Persons submitting comments are
cautioned that we do not redact or edit
personal identifying information from
comment submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish
to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CboeBZX–2019–107, and
should be submitted on or before
January 21, 2020.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.32
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Deputy Secretary.
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
[FR Doc. 2019–28217 Filed 12–30–19; 8:45 am]
Electronic Comments
Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act Annual Report
• Use the Commission’s internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@
sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–
CboeBZX–2019–107 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CboeBZX–2019–107. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if email is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
internet website (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
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BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 10976]
This notice contains the text
of the report required by the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act, as submitted by the
Secretary of State pursuant to Executive
Order 13818.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob
Viglietta, Email: VigliettaR@state.gov,
Phone: (202) 647–6526
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On
December 10, 2019, the Secretary of
State approved the following report
pursuant to Executive Order 13818 of
December 20, 2017, ‘‘Executive Order
Blocking the Property of Persons
Involved in Serious Human Rights
Abuse or Corruption’’ (E.O. 13818),
which builds on and implements the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Pub. L. 114–328,
Title XII, Subtitle F) (‘‘the Act’’). The
text of the report follows:
Pursuant to Section 1264 of the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act of 2016 (Pub. L.
114–328, Title XII, Subtitle F), and in
accordance with E.O. 13818, ‘‘Executive
Order Blocking the Property of Persons
Involved in Serious Human Rights
SUMMARY:
32 17
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Abuse or Corruption’’ the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury, submits this report to
detail the Administration’s
implementation of the Act in 2019.
In 2019, the United States took
significant action under the Global
Magnitsky sanctions program (‘‘Global
Magnitsky’’). As of December 10, 2019,
the United States has designated 198
foreign persons (individuals and
entities) under E.O. 13818. This
sanctions program, which targets human
rights abusers, corrupt actors, and their
enablers, represents the best of the
United States’ values by taking
impactful steps to protect and promote
human rights and combat corruption
around the world. Through the Act and
E.O. 13818, the United States has sought
to disrupt and deter serious human
rights abuse and corruption abroad;
promote accountability for those who
act with impunity; and protect,
promote, and enforce longstanding
international norms alongside our
partners and allies.
As the President outlined in his
National Security Strategy (NSS),
liberty, free enterprise, equal justice
under the law and the dignity of every
human life are values that represent
who we are as a people. Further, the
NSS states we support with our words
and actions those who live under
oppressive regimes and seek freedom,
individual dignity, and the rule of law.
Through Global Magnitsky, the
Administration is taking action to
execute the President’s vision as
described in the NSS.
Actions taken in 2019 demonstrated
the reach, flexibility, and broad scope of
Global Magnitsky. The United States
responded to corrupt actors in South
Sudan involved in draining the country
of critical resources; targeted members
of a significant corruption network
responsible for bribery and
misappropriation of assets in South
Africa; imposed consequences on a
former Ugandan Police Inspector
General for corruption and leading an
organization engaged in human rights
abuses; promoted accountability for
serious human rights abuse and
corruption among Iraqi militia and
former governors; addressed actions of a
former Mexican governor accepting
bribes from narcotics trafficking
organizations; and clearly demonstrated
the resolve of the Administration to
leverage this important tool, when
appropriate, to target individuals and
entities engaging in specified conduct.
When considering financial sanctions
under Global Magnitsky, the United
States prioritizes actions that are
expected to produce a tangible and
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significant impact on the sanctioned
persons and their affiliates, to prompt
changes in behavior or disrupt the
activities of malign actors. Persons
sanctioned pursuant to this authority
appear on the Office of Foreign Assets
Control’s (OFAC) List of Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons (SDN List). As a result of these
actions, any property or interests in
property of the sanctioned persons
within or transiting U.S. jurisdiction is
blocked. Additionally, U.S. persons are
generally prohibited from engaging in
transactions with blocked persons,
including entities 50 percent or more
owned by designated persons. The
Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, imposed
financial sanctions on the following
persons pursuant to Global Magnitsky:
1. Roberto Sandoval Castaneda:
Sandoval Castaneda was designated on
May 17, 2019, for engaging in an array
of corruption activities, such as the
misappropriation of state assets and the
receipt of bribes from Mexican drug
trafficking organizations, including the
Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion
(CJNG). Sandoval Castaneda has held
numerous public offices in his home
state of Nayarit, Mexico. During this
time, Sandoval Castaneda
misappropriated state assets and
received bribes from narcotics
trafficking organizations, including
CJNG, in exchange for information and
protection. In a related action, OFAC
designated three of Sandoval
Castaneda’s complicit family members
who have acted or purported to act on
his behalf by holding his ill-gotten assets
in their names: Ana Lilia Lopez Torres
(wife), Lidy Alejandra Sandoval Lopez
(adult daughter), and Pablo Roberto
Sandoval Lopez (adult son).
Four Mexican entities were also
designated for being owned or
controlled by Sandoval or a designated
family member: Bodecarne, S.A. de C.V.
(butcher business), Iyari (clothing and
accessories store), L-Inmo, S.A. de C.V.
(real estate holding company), and
Valor y Principio de Dar, A. C. (landholding foundation).
2. Rayan al-Kildani: Al-Kildani was
designated on July 18, 2019, for being
responsible for or complicit in, or
having directly or indirectly engaged in,
serious human rights abuse as the
leader of the 50th Brigade, a militia
operating in Iraq’s Ninewa Plain. In May
2018, a video circulated among Iraqi
human rights civil society organizations
in which al-Kildani cut off the ear of a
handcuffed detainee. The 50th Brigade
is reportedly the primary impediment to
the return of internally displaced
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persons to the Ninewa Plain. The 50th
Brigade has systematically looted homes
in Batnaya, which is struggling to
recover from ISIS’s brutal rule. The 50th
Brigade has reportedly illegally seized
and sold agricultural land, and the local
population has accused the group of
intimidation, extortion, and harassment
of women.
3. Waad Qado: Qado, the leader of the
30th Brigade, a militia operating in
Iraq’s Ninewa Plain, was designated on
July 18, 2019, for being a leader or
official of an entity that has engaged in,
or whose members have engaged in,
serious human rights abuse relating to
his tenure. The 30th Brigade has
extracted money from the population
around Bartalla through extortion,
illegal arrests, and kidnappings. The
30th Brigade has frequently detained
people without warrants, or with
fraudulent warrants, and has charged
arbitrary customs fees at its
checkpoints. Members of the local
population allege that the 30th Brigade
has been responsible for egregious
offenses including physical
intimidation, extortion, robbery,
kidnapping, and rape.
4. Nawfal Hammadi al-Sultan: AlSultan, a former governor of Ninewa
Province, Iraq, was designated on July
18, 2019, for being a current or former
government official, or a person acting
for or on behalf of such an official, who
is responsible for or complicit in, or who
has directly or indirectly engaged in,
corruption. Following a ferry accident in
Ninewa’s capital, Mosul, that killed
nearly 100 people, Iraq’s parliament
removed al-Sultan from office. Iraqi
authorities have issued an arrest
warrant for the former governor, who
fled shortly after the accident. In a letter
to Members of Parliament after the ferry
accident, Prime Minister Adel Abdul
Mahdi accused al-Sultan of negligence
and dereliction of duty and said there
was evidence the former governor was
misusing funds and abusing his power.
5. Ahmed al-Jubouri: Al-Jubouri is a
former governor of Salah al-Din, Iraq,
and current Member of Parliament who
was designated on July 18, 2019 for
being a current or former government
official, or a person acting for or on
behalf of such an official, who is
responsible for or complicit in, or who
has directly or indirectly engaged in,
corruption. Al-Jubouri was removed as
governor and sentenced to prison in July
2017 upon conviction for misusing
authority and federal funds and
appropriating land for personal use. AlJubouri has since been released. AlJubouri has been known to protect his
personal interests by accommodating
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Iran-backed proxies that operate outside
of state control.
6. Kale Kayihura: Kayihura, the
former Inspector General of Police (IGP)
of the Ugandan Police Force (UPF), was
designated on September 13, 2019, for
having been a leader or official of an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse against Ugandan
citizens, as well as for his involvement
in corruption. As the IGP for the UPF,
Kayihura led individuals from the UPF’s
Flying Squad Unit, which has engaged
in the inhumane treatment of detainees.
Detainees also reported that after being
subjected to the abuse they were offered
significant sums of money if they
confessed to their involvement in a
crime. In addition, Kayihura has
engaged in numerous acts of corruption,
including using bribery to strengthen his
political position within the Government
of Uganda, stealing funds intended for
official Ugandan government business,
and using another government
employee to smuggle illicit goods,
including drugs, gold, and wildlife, out
of Uganda.
7. Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta;
Salim Essa: The Guptas and Essa were
designated on October 10, 2019, for
their involvement in corruption in South
Africa. The members of this network
leveraged overpayments on government
contracts, bribery, and other corrupt
acts to fund political contributions and
influence government actions. Ajay was
designated for being the leader of an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, corruption.
Ajay is the family patriarch who
formulated the family’s corrupt business
strategies and controlled its finances.
Atul has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or
goods or services to or in support of, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, corruption.
Atul is widely known to have overseen
the Gupta family’s outreach to corrupt
government officials.
Rajesh has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or
goods or services to or in support of, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, corruption.
Rajesh cultivated important
relationships with the sons of powerful
South African politicians and led efforts
to pursue business and relationships in
a South African province where
corruption was rampant. Rajesh
attempted to use at least one of those
relationships to seek undue influence
with additional members of a South
African political party.
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Essa, a business associate of the
Gupta family, has materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or
goods or services to or in support of, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, corruption.
8. Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal:
Al-Cardinal was designated on October
11, 2019, for having materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or
goods or services to or in support of,
corruption, largely operating within
South Sudan. Five companies owned or
controlled by Al-Cardinal were also
designated: Alcardinal General Trading
Limited, Alcardinal General Trading
LLC, Al Cardinal Investments Co. LTD,
Alcardinal Petroleum Company limited,
and NILETEL.
Sudanese businessman Al-Cardinal
has been used by a senior South
Sudanese government official as an
intermediary to deposit and hold a large
amount of funds in a country outside of
South Sudan. Further, in early 2019, the
South Sudanese government made
millions of dollars in payments to a
company owned by Al-Cardinal; while
the official reason was for the payment
for food, the money instead went to
senior South Sudanese government
officials. Other South Sudanese
government officials have expressed
dissatisfaction with the massive
corruption in the South Sudanese
government, noting that although large
amounts of money were paid to AlCardinal for supplies and provisions,
government forces never seemed to be
adequately supplied. Separately, a
company partially owned by AlCardinal has been publicly implicated
in the importation of amphibious
armored vehicles into South Sudan that
gave the Government of South Sudan
the ability to extend offensives that
included violent attacks on innocent
civilians.
9. Kur Ajing Ater: Ajing was
designated on October 11, 2019, for
having materially assisted, sponsored,
or provided financial, material,
technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, an entity
that has engaged in, or whose members
have engaged in, corruption, largely
operating within South Sudan. One
company owned or controlled by Ajing
was also designated: Lou Trading and
Investment Company Limited. Ajing is a
South Sudanese businessman who has
bribed key officials in the Government
of South Sudan in order to maintain
influence and access to the South
Sudanese oil market. Ajing used these
bribes to both curry favor with a senior
gatekeeper within the Government of
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South Sudan and to ensure the silence
and compliance of a key government
officials. According to public media
reports, Ajing received millions of
dollars in contracts for the South
Sudanese military, including one
contract that alone exceeds the total
amount budgeted for the military’s
goods and services for the year by a
factor of ten.
10. Qais al-Khazali: Al-Khazali was
designated on December 6, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is a leader
or official of an entity, including any
government entity, that has engaged in,
or whose members have engaged in
serious human rights abuse relating to
his tenure. Al-Khazali is Secretary
General of the Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl
al-Haq (AAH) militia in Iraq. During the
late 2019 protests in many cities in Iraq,
AAH has opened fire on and killed
protestors. Additionally, Qais and Laith
al-Khazali had leading roles in a
January 2007 attack on an Iraqi
government compound in Karbala. The
attack killed five U.S. soldiers and
wounded three.
11. Laith al-Khazali: Al-Khazali was
designated on December 6, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is
responsible for, complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in serious
human rights abuse. Al-Khazali is a
leader of AAH. In late 2015, al-Khazali
controlled efforts to remove Sunnis from
areas of Diyala Province, including
killings to drive Sunnis from the area.
Additionally, Qais and Laith al-Khazali
had leading roles in a January 2007
attack on an Iraqi government
compound in Karbala. The attack killed
five U.S. soldiers and wounded three.
12. Husayn Falih ‘Aziz al-Lami: AlLami was designated on December 6,
2019, for being a foreign person who is
responsible for, complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in serious
human rights abuse. Al-Lami is an Iranbacked militia leader, tasked by other
senior militia commanders with
suppressing the late 2019 protests in
Iraq. Al-Lami directed militia fighters
who shot protesters in early October
2019, a time when dozens of protesters
were killed.
13. Khamis Farhan Al-Khanjar AlIssawi: Al-Khanjar was designated on
December 6, 2019, for having materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological
support for, or goods or services to or in
support of corruption, including the
misappropriation of state assets, the
expropriation of private assets for
personal gain, corruption related to
government contracts or the extraction
of natural resources, or bribery. AlKhanjar is an Iraqi businessman and
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millionaire who enjoys significant power
on a regional and international level.
According to a former senior Iraqi
government official, al-Khanjar’s
influence has been mostly due to his
willingness and ability to use his wealth
to bribe others. Al-Khanjar has
reportedly planned to spend millions of
dollars in payments to Iraqi political
figures in order to secure their support.
14. Aivars Lembergs: Lembergs was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is a current
or foreign government official
responsible for or complicit in, or
directly or indirectly engaged in,
corruption, including the
misappropriation of state assets, the
expropriation of private assets for
personal gain, corruption related to
government contracts or the extraction
of natural resources, or bribery.
Lembergs has served as the Mayor of
Ventspils, Latvia since 1988. From that
time, he has been repeatedly accused of
money laundering, bribery, and abuse of
office. Lembergs controls entities
through political parties and corrupt
politicians, and systematically exploits
those entities and individuals for his
own economic gain. Lembergs has used
his influence over leadership of political
parties to shape government personnel
and place certain government officials
in positions, as well as to obstruct other
government officials from obtaining
leadership positions. Additionally,
Lembergs has leveraged and corrupted
law enforcement officials to protect his
interests and subvert politicians whom
he otherwise was unable to control.
Additionally, four Latvia-based
entities were designated on December 9,
2019, for being owned or controlled by
Lembergs: Ventspils Freeport Authority,
Ventspils Attistibas Agentura (also
known as Ventspils Development
Agency), Biznesa Attistibas Asociacija
(also known as Business Development
Association), and Latvijas Tranzita
Biznesa Asociacija (also known as
Latvian Transit Business Association).
15. Try Pheap: Pheap was designated
on December 9, 2019, for being a foreign
person who is a current or former
government official who is responsible
for or complicit in, or has directly or
indirectly engaged in corruption,
including the misappropriation of state
assets, the expropriation of private
assets for personal gain, corruption
related to government contracts or the
extraction of natural resources, or
bribery. Pheap used his vast network
inside Cambodia to build a largescale
illegal logging consortium that relies on
the collusion of Cambodian officials, to
include purchasing protection from the
government, including military
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protection, for the movement of his
illegal products. The support of these
officials makes it difficult for local
authorities to take legal action against
Pheap.
Additionally, 11 Cambodia-registered
entities were designated on December 9,
2019, for being owned or controlled by
Pheap: Try Pheap Group CO., Ltd.;
M.D.S. Import Export Co., Ltd.; Try
Pheap Dry Port Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap
Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.;
Try Pheap Grand Royal Co., Ltd.; Try
Pheap Import Export Co., Ltd.; Papa
Petroleum Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Property
Co. Ltd.; Try Pheap Travel & Tours Co.,
Ltd.; M D S Thmorda S E Z Co., Ltd.;
and Try Pheap Oyadav S E Z Co., Ltd.
16. Kun Kim: Kim was designated on
December 9, 2019, for being a foreign
person who is a current or former
government official who is responsible
for or complicit in, or has directly or
indirectly engaged in corruption,
including the misappropriation of state
assets, the expropriation of private
assets for personal gain, corruption
related to government contracts or the
extraction of natural resources, or
bribery. Kim was a senior General in the
Royal Cambodian Air Force (RCAF) and
was instrumental in a development in
Koh Kong province and had reaped
significant financial benefit from his
relationships with a People’s Republic
of China (PRC) state-owned entity. Kim
used RCAF soldiers to intimidate,
demolish, and clear-out land sought by
the PRC-owned entity. Cambodian
elites, like Kim, use their familial
networks to create shadow structures to
shield ill-gotten assets. In addition to
Kim, three members of Kim’s family
were designated for acting or purporting
to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Kim.
17. King Chandy: Chandy was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kun
Kim. Additionally, one entity, K D
Rubber Plantation Co., Ltd., is registered
in Cambodia and is designated for being
owned or controlled by Chandy.
18. Kim Sophary: Sophary was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kun
Kim.
Additionally, two entities, Cambo
Elite Security Force Co., Ltd. and 7
Makara Phary Co., Ltd., are registered in
Cambodia, and are designated for being
owned or controlled by Sophary.
19. Kim Phara: Phara was designated
on December 9, 2019, for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, Kun Kim.
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Additionally, two entities, Romdoul
Capital Pawn Co., Ltd. and Romdoul
Development Co., Ltd., are registered in
Cambodia and are designated for being
owned or controlled by Phara.
20. Goran Andric: Andric was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Slobodan Tesic. Andric is one of Tesic’s
closest associates and has represented
Tesic in various international sales,
including conducting contract
negotiations on Tesic’s behalf while
Tesic was on the United Nations travel
ban list and unable to travel. In working
for Tesic, Andric was involved in
facilitating arms deals, including an
occasion when Andric signed a contract
on behalf of the designated entity,
Partizan Tech.
In a related action, one entity, Serbiabased Velcom Trade D.O.O. Beograd
was designated on December 9, 2019,
for being owned or controlled by Andric.
21. Esad Kapidzic: Kapidzic was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Kapidzic is a director and secretary of
Cyprus-based Finrost Limited, as well as
a director and representative of Serbiabased Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O.,
two entities concurrently designated for
being owned or controlled by, or for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Finrost Limited received and moved
money on behalf of Tesic, and was used
by Tesic for a weapons contract with a
foreign government in Africa.
Additionally, Falcon Strategic
Solutions D.O.O. was established by
Tesic immediately following his
December 21, 2017 designation to avoid
sanctions.
22. Nebojsa Sarenac: Sarenac was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Sarenac is a managing director of
designated entities, Technoglobal and
Partizan Tech. Additionally, Sarenac is
Tesic’s nephew and one of his closest
associates.
Additionally, one entity, Melvale
Corporation D.O.O. Beograd, which is
based in Serbia, was designated on
December 9, 2019, for being owned or
controlled by Sarenac who is the owner
and representative.
23. Zoran Petrovic: Petrovic was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Petrovic is a managing director and
principal of Partizan Tech, an entity
designated in December 2017. Petrovic
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has negotiated with foreign entities on
Tesic’s behalf.
24. Nikola Brkic: Brkic was designated
on December 9, 2019, for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, Tesic. Brkic is a
principal and legal representative of
Partizan Tech.
25. Milan Subotic: Subotic was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Subotic is the owner, managing director,
and representative of Serbia-based
Vectura Trans DOO, an entity
concurrently designated for being
owned or controlled by, or for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, Tesic. Tesic
utilized Vectura Trans to receive an
approved license for exports, to
complete arms deals, and to finalize
weapons contracts with a foreign
government. Subotic was also listed as
the point of contact for export permits
related to designated entity Partizan
Tech.
26. Zelimir Petrovic: Petrovic was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Petrovic is the owner, managing
director, and representative of Serbiabased Araneks DOO, an entity
concurrently designated for being
owned or controlled by, or for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, Tesic. Araneks
was used by Tesic to finalize weapons
contracts with a foreign government in
Africa, and in dealings with another
foreign government.
27. Sreten Cvjetkovic: Cvjetkovic was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Cvjetkovic is a 50 percent owner and
legal representative of Falcon Strategic
Solutions D.O.O.
28. Ljobo Maricic: Maricic was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Maricic is the director of Technoglobal
and a former representative of Partizan
Arms, the predecessor to Tesic’s
Partizan Tech.
29. Moonstorm Enterprises LTD:
Cyprus-based Moonstorm Enterprises
LTD was designated on December 9,
2019, for being owned or controlled by,
or acting or purporting to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Slobodan Tesic, a person designated
pursuant E.O. 13818.
30. Tardigrade Limited: Tardigrade
was designated on December 9, 2019,
for being owned or controlled by, or
acting or purporting to act for or on
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behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Slobodan Tesic, a person designated
pursuant E.O. 13818. Tesic used
Cyprus-based Tardigrade to conduct
business in third party countries,
particularly Arab and African countries.
Tesic has also used his Serbian
companies to sign contracts with
Tardigrade before selling the goods to a
final buyer.
31. Business Diversity Limited:
Business Diversity Limited was
designated on December 9, 2019, for
being owned or controlled by, or acting
or purporting to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a
person designated pursuant E.O. 13818.
Tesic established Hong Kong-based
Business Diversity Limited in order to
conduct business with a European
country. Tesic has used Business
Diversity Limited in Euro denominated
contracts to evade U.S. sanctions.
32. Min Aung Hlaing: Min Aung
Hlaing was designated on December 10,
2019, for his role as the Commander-inChief of the Burmese security forces, an
entity that has engaged in or whose
members have engaged in serious
human rights abuse under his
command. Min Aung Hlaing’s military
forces were responsible for the brutal
security operation that began in August
2017 in Rahkine State and ultimately
caused more than 500,000 people to flee
to Bangladesh. During this time,
members of ethnic minority groups were
killed or injured by gunshot, often while
fleeing, or by soldiers using large-bladed
weapons; others were burned to death in
their own houses. There are credible
claims of mass-scale rape and other
forms of sexual violence committed by
soldiers under Min Aung Hlaing’s
command.
33. Soe Win: Soe Win was designated
on December 10, 2019, for his role as the
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the
Burmese military forces, an entity that
has engaged in or whose members have
engaged in serious human rights abuse
during his tenure. Soe Win has been
heavily involved in directing major
operations that occurred in 2017,
including the decision to deploy combat
divisions to Rakhine State and other
regions where serious human rights
abuses occurred. Burmese military units
responsible for some of the most serious
violence, including many instances of
sexual violence, reported directly to Soe
Win.
34. Than Oo: Than Oo was designated
on December 10, 2019, for being a
leader of the 99th Light Infantry
Division (LID), an entity that has
engaged in or whose members have
engaged in serious human rights abuse
under his command. In 2017, the 99th
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LID deployed to Rakhine State and,
while there, participated in serious
human rights abuses alongside the 33rd
LID and other security forces. In one
operation in Tula Toli, hundreds of
men, women, and children were
reportedly forced to the nearby
riverbank where the 99th LID opened
fire, executing many of the men, and
forced women and girls to nearby
houses where they were sexually
assaulted. A number of these women
and children were later stabbed and
beaten, with the houses set fire while
they were inside. The 99th LID was
designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 on
August 17, 2018, for engaging in serious
human rights abuse.
35. Aung Aung: Aung Aung was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a leader of the 33rd LID, an entity
that has engaged in or whose members
have engaged in serious human rights
abuse under his command. The 33rd
LID participated in abuses in Rakhine
State, including the August 27, 2017
operation in Chut Pyin village. This
operation included extrajudicial
killings, forced disappearances, and
sexual violence, as well as firing on
fleeing villagers. More than 100 people
were reportedly killed in this one
operation alone. The 33rd LID was
designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 on
August 17, 2018 for engaging in serious
human rights abuse.
36. Rao Anwar Khan: Anwar was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is
responsible for or complicit in, or
having directly or indirectly engaged in
serious human rights abuse. During his
tenure as the Senior Superintendent of
Police in District Malir, Pakistan, Rao
Anwar was reportedly responsible for
staging numerous fake police
encounters in which individuals were
killed by police, and was involved in
over 190 police encounters that resulted
in the deaths of over 400 people,
including the brutal murder of
Naqeebullah Mehsood. Anwar helped
lead a network of police and criminal
thugs that were allegedly responsible for
extortion, land grabbing, narcotics, and
murder.
37. Mahmud al-Warfalli: Al-Warfalli
was designated on December 10, 2019,
for being a foreign person who is
responsible for or complicit in, or
having directly or indirectly engaged in,
serious human rights abuse. Al-Warfalli
served as commander of a militia
known as the al-Saiqa Brigade. Since
2016, al-Warfalli has carried out or
ordered the killings of 43 unarmed
detainees in eight separate incidents.
Many of these killings were filmed and
published on social media. On January
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24, 2018, al-Warfalli was filmed
carrying out a mass execution of ten
unarmed detainees in Benghazi. After
al-Warfalli shot each detainee in the
head one by one, al-Warfalli fired freely
at the group of ten executed detainees.
On July 17, 2017, al-Warfalli ordered the
methodical killings of 20 kneeling and
unarmed detainees. In several of the
incidents, al-Warfalli continued to shoot
at the detainees after they were
executed.
38. Marian Kocner: Kocner was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person responsible for or
complicit in, or having directly or
indirectly engaged in, serious human
rights abuse. Kocner threatened Jan
Kuciak, a reporter who was investigating
Kocner’s corrupt dealings. Kuciak’s
investigative journalism focused on
Kocner’s ability, through a complicated
series of financial transactions, to earn
millions of Euros through fraudulent tax
returns from Slovakia. Kuciak was also
responsible for several expose´s on
Kocner’s corrupt dealings, highlighting
Kocner’s connections to the police and
prosecutors. Kocner also hired former
Slovak Intelligence Service members to
surveil Kuciak ahead of his eventual
murder. Slovak authorities charged
Kocner with hiring a hitman who
murdered Kuciak and his fiancé´e,
Martina Kusnirova.
Additionally, six entities were
designated on December 10, 2019 for
being owned or controlled by Kocner:
Hotel Holding, S.R.O.; International
Investment Development Holding A.S.;
International Investment Hotels Holding
A.S.; Sprava A Inkaso Pohladavok,
S.R.O.; Sprava A Inkaso Zmeniek,
S.R.O.; and Tranz-Tel, A.S.
39. Musa Baluku: Baluku was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is the leader
of the Allied Defense Forces (ADF), an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse.
40. Amigo Kibirige: Kibirige was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and
services to or in support of, the ADF, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse.
41. Muhammed Lumisa: Lumisa was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and
services to or in support of, the ADF, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse.
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42. Elias Segujja: Segujja was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and
services to or in support of, the ADF, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse.
43. Kayiira Muhammad: Muhammad
was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and
services to or in support of, the ADF, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse.
44. Amisi Kasadha: Kasadha was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and
services to or in support of, the ADF, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious
human rights abuse.
45. Abud Stephen Thiongkol:
Thiongkol was designated on December
10, 2019, for being a foreign person that
is or has been the leader of an entity
that has engaged in, serious human
rights abuse. Thiongkol has been
identified as the commander of the
detention facilities where Aggrey Idri
(Aggrey), a member of the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement—In
Opposition (SPLM–IO), and Dong
Samuel Luak (Dong), a South Sudanese
human rights lawyer, were held prior to
their killings.
46. Malual Dhal Muorwel: Muorwel
was designated on December 10, 2019,
for being a foreign person that is
responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious
human rights abuse. In addition to
Muorwel’s participation in the killings
of Dong and Aggrey, he has been
identified as being the commander of
forces who detained and assaulted three
international monitors in December of
2018.
47. Michael Kuajien: Kuajien was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person that is
responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious
human rights abuse. Kuajien is one of
two people publicly identified as being
present in Kenya during, and in having
a hand in, the kidnapping of Dong and
Aggrey.
48. John Top Lam: Lam was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person that is
responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious
human rights abuse. Lam is one of two
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72429
people publicly identified as being
present in Kenya during, and in having
a hand in, the kidnapping of Dong and
Aggrey. Further, Lam is reported to have
called a member of Dong’s family in
order to provide information on Dong’s
whereabouts in return for a substantial
cash payment.
49. Angelo Kuot Garang: Garang was
designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person that is
responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious
human rights abuse. Garang has been
identified as being involved in the
killing of Dong and Aggrey, as well as
of other individuals.
Visa Restrictions Imposed
Although no visa restrictions were
imposed under the Act during 2019,
persons designated pursuant to E.O.
13818 shall be subject to the visa
restrictions articulated in section 2,
unless an exception applies. Section 2
provides that the entry of persons
designated under section 1 of the order
is suspended pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation 8693. In 2019, the State
Department also applied, when
appropriate, visa restrictions on foreign
persons involved in significant
corruption or gross violation of human
rights under other authorities, reported
to Congress through other means. As
appropriate, the Department of State
will take additional action to impose
visa restrictions on those responsible for
certain human rights violations and
corruption pursuant to other authorities,
including Presidential Proclamations
7750 and 8697, and Section 7031(c) of
the FY2019 Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, as carried forward by the
FY2020 Continuing Appropriations Act,
2020. In addition, section 212(a)(3)(E) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act
renders aliens ineligible for visas if a
consular officer has reason to believe
that they participated in acts of
genocide, torture or extrajudicial
killings.
Efforts To Encourage Governments of
Other Countries To Impose Sanctions
Similar to Those Authorized by the Act
In 2019, the Administration
continued to build on the successful
outreach campaign to international
partners regarding the expansion of
domestic and multilateral
anticorruption and human rights
sanctions regimes. Following successful
outreach in 2018, the United Kingdom
and the European Union are progressing
in the development of their own human
rights sanction’s authorities. Canada
enacted its authority in October 2017
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and since that time, the Administration
has worked closely with the Canadian
government in pursuing coordinated
actions against human rights abusers
and corrupt actors. The Administration
sought out new partners with which to
create truly global authorities to
promote accountability for those that
abuse human rights and engage in
corruption. Throughout this outreach,
the Administration has identified
champions, partners, and potential
spoilers of the objectives established by
Congress within the Act. The
Departments of State and Treasury have,
over the last year, shared information,
coordinated messaging, and provided
technical assistance to this end.
David Hale,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, United
States Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2019–28231 Filed 12–30–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–AE–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. FAA–2019–0836]
Agency Information Collection
Activities: Requests for Comments;
Clearance of New Approval of
Information Collection: Airman
Knowledge Test Registration
Collection
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, FAA
invites public comments about our
intention to request the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)
approval for a new information
collection. The Federal Register Notice
with a 60-day comment period soliciting
comments on the following collection of
information was published on October
22, 2019. The information collected is
necessary to ensure compliance and
proper registration of an individual for
the necessary knowledge test for the
certification or rating pursued by the
individual.
SUMMARY:
Written comments should be
submitted by January 30, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget. Comments should be addressed
to the attention of the Desk Officer,
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DATES:
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Department of Transportation/FAA, and
sent via electronic mail to oira_
submission@omb.eop.gov, or faxed to
(202) 395–6974, or mailed to the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget,
Docket Library, Room 10102, 725 17th
Street NW, Washington, DC 20503.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ryan C. Smith by email at:
Ryan.C.Smith@faa.gov; Phone: 405–
954–6742.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Public Comments Invited: You are
asked to comment on any aspect of this
information collection, including (a)
Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for FAA’s
performance; (b) the accuracy of the
estimated burden; (c) ways for FAA to
enhance the quality, utility and clarity
of the information collection; and (d)
ways that the burden could be
minimized without reducing the quality
of the collected information. The agency
will summarize and/or include your
comments in the request for OMB’s
clearance of this information collection.
OMB Control Number: 2120–XXXX.
Title: Airman Knowledge Test
Registration Collection.
Form Numbers: There are no forms
associated with this collection.
Type of Review: New information
collection.
Background: The Federal Register
Notice with a 60-day comment period
soliciting comments on the following
collection of information was published
on October 22, 2019 (84 FR 56520).
Individuals pursuing an FAA certificate
or rating to operate in the National
Airspace System (NAS) must meet the
standards established in the FAA
regulations specific to the certificate
sought by the individual. FAA
certification requires that an individual
must successfully pass an Airman
Knowledge Test as part of the
requirements to obtain an FAA
certificate or rating. The FAA develops
and administers 90 different knowledge
tests in many different areas that are
required as part of the overall airman
certification process.
Airman Knowledge Tests are
administered at approved Knowledge
Testing Centers by an approved test
proctor who is required to administer
the appropriate Airman Knowledge Test
to the individual pursuing FAA
certification. Individuals taking an FAA
Airman Knowledge Test must provide
the following information to be
collected in order to complete the
registration process before the
administration of the Airman
Knowledge Test: Name, FAA Tracking
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Number (FTN), physical address, Date
of Birth, email address, photo
identification, phone number, test
authorization (credentials of the
individual such as an instructor
endorsement), and previous number of
test attempts.
The information provided by the
individual is collected and stored
electronically in the application used
for test registration and delivery. This
information is used to determine the
identify and eligibility of the individual
for compliance of FAA certification
requirements.
Respondents: 150,000 annually.
Frequency: n/a.
Estimated Average Burden per
Response: 2 minutes.
Estimated Total Annual Burden:
5,000 hours annually; 150,000
respondents × 2 minutes each = 300,000
minutes; 300,000 minutes/60 minutes in
an hour = 5,000 hours annually.
Issued in Oklahoma City, OK, on October
17, 2019.
Ryan C. Smith,
Airman Knowledge Testing Program Manager,
Airman Testing Standards Branch (AFS–630).
[FR Doc. 2019–28241 Filed 12–30–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Highway Administration
Notice of Final Federal Agency Actions
on Proposed Highway Project in
Rhode Island
Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of limitation on claims
for judicial review of actions by FHWA.
AGENCY:
This notice announces actions
taken by the FHWA that are final
pursuant to the statute. The actions
relate to a proposed highway project, I–
95 Northbound Providence Viaduct
Replacement in the City of Providence
in the State of Rhode Island, FHWA
Project Number IM–0953–105, Rhode
Island Department of Transportation
(RIDOT) Contract Number 2008–EB–
001B.
SUMMARY:
By this notice, the FHWA is
advising the public of final agency
actions subject to 23 U.S.C. 139(1)(1). A
claim seeking judicial review of the
Federal agency actions on the highway
project will be barred unless the claim
is filed on or before May 29, 2020. If the
Federal law that authorizes judicial
review of a claim provides a time period
of less than 150 days for filing such
DATES:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 250 (Tuesday, December 31, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72424-72430]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-28231]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 10976]
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act Annual Report
SUMMARY: This notice contains the text of the report required by the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, as submitted by the
Secretary of State pursuant to Executive Order 13818.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob Viglietta, Email:
[email protected], Phone: (202) 647-6526
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 10, 2019, the Secretary of State
approved the following report pursuant to Executive Order 13818 of
December 20, 2017, ``Executive Order Blocking the Property of Persons
Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption'' (E.O. 13818),
which builds on and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Pub. L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F) (``the
Act''). The text of the report follows:
Pursuant to Section 1264 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act of 2016 (Pub. L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F),
and in accordance with E.O. 13818, ``Executive Order Blocking the
Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights
[[Page 72425]]
Abuse or Corruption'' the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, submits this report to detail the
Administration's implementation of the Act in 2019.
In 2019, the United States took significant action under the Global
Magnitsky sanctions program (``Global Magnitsky''). As of December 10,
2019, the United States has designated 198 foreign persons (individuals
and entities) under E.O. 13818. This sanctions program, which targets
human rights abusers, corrupt actors, and their enablers, represents
the best of the United States' values by taking impactful steps to
protect and promote human rights and combat corruption around the
world. Through the Act and E.O. 13818, the United States has sought to
disrupt and deter serious human rights abuse and corruption abroad;
promote accountability for those who act with impunity; and protect,
promote, and enforce longstanding international norms alongside our
partners and allies.
As the President outlined in his National Security Strategy (NSS),
liberty, free enterprise, equal justice under the law and the dignity
of every human life are values that represent who we are as a people.
Further, the NSS states we support with our words and actions those who
live under oppressive regimes and seek freedom, individual dignity, and
the rule of law. Through Global Magnitsky, the Administration is taking
action to execute the President's vision as described in the NSS.
Actions taken in 2019 demonstrated the reach, flexibility, and
broad scope of Global Magnitsky. The United States responded to corrupt
actors in South Sudan involved in draining the country of critical
resources; targeted members of a significant corruption network
responsible for bribery and misappropriation of assets in South Africa;
imposed consequences on a former Ugandan Police Inspector General for
corruption and leading an organization engaged in human rights abuses;
promoted accountability for serious human rights abuse and corruption
among Iraqi militia and former governors; addressed actions of a former
Mexican governor accepting bribes from narcotics trafficking
organizations; and clearly demonstrated the resolve of the
Administration to leverage this important tool, when appropriate, to
target individuals and entities engaging in specified conduct.
When considering financial sanctions under Global Magnitsky, the
United States prioritizes actions that are expected to produce a
tangible and significant impact on the sanctioned persons and their
affiliates, to prompt changes in behavior or disrupt the activities of
malign actors. Persons sanctioned pursuant to this authority appear on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) List of Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). As a result of
these actions, any property or interests in property of the sanctioned
persons within or transiting U.S. jurisdiction is blocked.
Additionally, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in
transactions with blocked persons, including entities 50 percent or
more owned by designated persons. The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
imposed financial sanctions on the following persons pursuant to Global
Magnitsky:
1. Roberto Sandoval Castaneda: Sandoval Castaneda was designated on
May 17, 2019, for engaging in an array of corruption activities, such
as the misappropriation of state assets and the receipt of bribes from
Mexican drug trafficking organizations, including the Cartel de Jalisco
Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Sandoval Castaneda has held numerous public
offices in his home state of Nayarit, Mexico. During this time,
Sandoval Castaneda misappropriated state assets and received bribes
from narcotics trafficking organizations, including CJNG, in exchange
for information and protection. In a related action, OFAC designated
three of Sandoval Castaneda's complicit family members who have acted
or purported to act on his behalf by holding his ill-gotten assets in
their names: Ana Lilia Lopez Torres (wife), Lidy Alejandra Sandoval
Lopez (adult daughter), and Pablo Roberto Sandoval Lopez (adult son).
Four Mexican entities were also designated for being owned or
controlled by Sandoval or a designated family member: Bodecarne, S.A.
de C.V. (butcher business), Iyari (clothing and accessories store), L-
Inmo, S.A. de C.V. (real estate holding company), and Valor y Principio
de Dar, A. C. (land-holding foundation).
2. Rayan al-Kildani: Al-Kildani was designated on July 18, 2019,
for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or
indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse as the leader of the
50th Brigade, a militia operating in Iraq's Ninewa Plain. In May 2018,
a video circulated among Iraqi human rights civil society organizations
in which al-Kildani cut off the ear of a handcuffed detainee. The 50th
Brigade is reportedly the primary impediment to the return of
internally displaced persons to the Ninewa Plain. The 50th Brigade has
systematically looted homes in Batnaya, which is struggling to recover
from ISIS's brutal rule. The 50th Brigade has reportedly illegally
seized and sold agricultural land, and the local population has accused
the group of intimidation, extortion, and harassment of women.
3. Waad Qado: Qado, the leader of the 30th Brigade, a militia
operating in Iraq's Ninewa Plain, was designated on July 18, 2019, for
being a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to his
tenure. The 30th Brigade has extracted money from the population around
Bartalla through extortion, illegal arrests, and kidnappings. The 30th
Brigade has frequently detained people without warrants, or with
fraudulent warrants, and has charged arbitrary customs fees at its
checkpoints. Members of the local population allege that the 30th
Brigade has been responsible for egregious offenses including physical
intimidation, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and rape.
4. Nawfal Hammadi al-Sultan: Al-Sultan, a former governor of Ninewa
Province, Iraq, was designated on July 18, 2019, for being a current or
former government official, or a person acting for or on behalf of such
an official, who is responsible for or complicit in, or who has
directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption. Following a ferry
accident in Ninewa's capital, Mosul, that killed nearly 100 people,
Iraq's parliament removed al-Sultan from office. Iraqi authorities have
issued an arrest warrant for the former governor, who fled shortly
after the accident. In a letter to Members of Parliament after the
ferry accident, Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi accused al-Sultan of
negligence and dereliction of duty and said there was evidence the
former governor was misusing funds and abusing his power.
5. Ahmed al-Jubouri: Al-Jubouri is a former governor of Salah al-
Din, Iraq, and current Member of Parliament who was designated on July
18, 2019 for being a current or former government official, or a person
acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is responsible for or
complicit in, or who has directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption.
Al-Jubouri was removed as governor and sentenced to prison in July 2017
upon conviction for misusing authority and federal funds and
appropriating land for personal use. Al-Jubouri has since been
released. Al-Jubouri has been known to protect his personal interests
by accommodating
[[Page 72426]]
Iran-backed proxies that operate outside of state control.
6. Kale Kayihura: Kayihura, the former Inspector General of Police
(IGP) of the Ugandan Police Force (UPF), was designated on September
13, 2019, for having been a leader or official of an entity that has
engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights
abuse against Ugandan citizens, as well as for his involvement in
corruption. As the IGP for the UPF, Kayihura led individuals from the
UPF's Flying Squad Unit, which has engaged in the inhumane treatment of
detainees. Detainees also reported that after being subjected to the
abuse they were offered significant sums of money if they confessed to
their involvement in a crime. In addition, Kayihura has engaged in
numerous acts of corruption, including using bribery to strengthen his
political position within the Government of Uganda, stealing funds
intended for official Ugandan government business, and using another
government employee to smuggle illicit goods, including drugs, gold,
and wildlife, out of Uganda.
7. Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta; Salim Essa: The Guptas and Essa
were designated on October 10, 2019, for their involvement in
corruption in South Africa. The members of this network leveraged
overpayments on government contracts, bribery, and other corrupt acts
to fund political contributions and influence government actions. Ajay
was designated for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in,
or whose members have engaged in, corruption. Ajay is the family
patriarch who formulated the family's corrupt business strategies and
controlled its finances.
Atul has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in
support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, corruption. Atul is widely known to have overseen the Gupta
family's outreach to corrupt government officials.
Rajesh has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in
support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, corruption. Rajesh cultivated important relationships with
the sons of powerful South African politicians and led efforts to
pursue business and relationships in a South African province where
corruption was rampant. Rajesh attempted to use at least one of those
relationships to seek undue influence with additional members of a
South African political party.
Essa, a business associate of the Gupta family, has materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological
support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that
has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption.
8. Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal: Al-Cardinal was designated on
October 11, 2019, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, corruption, largely operating within
South Sudan. Five companies owned or controlled by Al-Cardinal were
also designated: Alcardinal General Trading Limited, Alcardinal General
Trading LLC, Al Cardinal Investments Co. LTD, Alcardinal Petroleum
Company limited, and NILETEL.
Sudanese businessman Al-Cardinal has been used by a senior South
Sudanese government official as an intermediary to deposit and hold a
large amount of funds in a country outside of South Sudan. Further, in
early 2019, the South Sudanese government made millions of dollars in
payments to a company owned by Al-Cardinal; while the official reason
was for the payment for food, the money instead went to senior South
Sudanese government officials. Other South Sudanese government
officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the massive corruption in
the South Sudanese government, noting that although large amounts of
money were paid to Al-Cardinal for supplies and provisions, government
forces never seemed to be adequately supplied. Separately, a company
partially owned by Al-Cardinal has been publicly implicated in the
importation of amphibious armored vehicles into South Sudan that gave
the Government of South Sudan the ability to extend offensives that
included violent attacks on innocent civilians.
9. Kur Ajing Ater: Ajing was designated on October 11, 2019, for
having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in,
corruption, largely operating within South Sudan. One company owned or
controlled by Ajing was also designated: Lou Trading and Investment
Company Limited. Ajing is a South Sudanese businessman who has bribed
key officials in the Government of South Sudan in order to maintain
influence and access to the South Sudanese oil market. Ajing used these
bribes to both curry favor with a senior gatekeeper within the
Government of South Sudan and to ensure the silence and compliance of a
key government officials. According to public media reports, Ajing
received millions of dollars in contracts for the South Sudanese
military, including one contract that alone exceeds the total amount
budgeted for the military's goods and services for the year by a factor
of ten.
10. Qais al-Khazali: Al-Khazali was designated on December 6, 2019,
for being a foreign person who is a leader or official of an entity,
including any government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members
have engaged in serious human rights abuse relating to his tenure. Al-
Khazali is Secretary General of the Iran-backed Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
militia in Iraq. During the late 2019 protests in many cities in Iraq,
AAH has opened fire on and killed protestors. Additionally, Qais and
Laith al-Khazali had leading roles in a January 2007 attack on an Iraqi
government compound in Karbala. The attack killed five U.S. soldiers
and wounded three.
11. Laith al-Khazali: Al-Khazali was designated on December 6,
2019, for being a foreign person who is responsible for, complicit in,
or has directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights abuse.
Al-Khazali is a leader of AAH. In late 2015, al-Khazali controlled
efforts to remove Sunnis from areas of Diyala Province, including
killings to drive Sunnis from the area. Additionally, Qais and Laith
al-Khazali had leading roles in a January 2007 attack on an Iraqi
government compound in Karbala. The attack killed five U.S. soldiers
and wounded three.
12. Husayn Falih `Aziz al-Lami: Al-Lami was designated on December
6, 2019, for being a foreign person who is responsible for, complicit
in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights
abuse. Al-Lami is an Iran-backed militia leader, tasked by other senior
militia commanders with suppressing the late 2019 protests in Iraq. Al-
Lami directed militia fighters who shot protesters in early October
2019, a time when dozens of protesters were killed.
13. Khamis Farhan Al-Khanjar Al-Issawi: Al-Khanjar was designated
on December 6, 2019, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of corruption, including the misappropriation
of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain,
corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural
resources, or bribery. Al-Khanjar is an Iraqi businessman and
[[Page 72427]]
millionaire who enjoys significant power on a regional and
international level. According to a former senior Iraqi government
official, al-Khanjar's influence has been mostly due to his willingness
and ability to use his wealth to bribe others. Al-Khanjar has
reportedly planned to spend millions of dollars in payments to Iraqi
political figures in order to secure their support.
14. Aivars Lembergs: Lembergs was designated on December 9, 2019,
for being a foreign person who is a current or foreign government
official responsible for or complicit in, or directly or indirectly
engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets,
the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption
related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources,
or bribery. Lembergs has served as the Mayor of Ventspils, Latvia since
1988. From that time, he has been repeatedly accused of money
laundering, bribery, and abuse of office. Lembergs controls entities
through political parties and corrupt politicians, and systematically
exploits those entities and individuals for his own economic gain.
Lembergs has used his influence over leadership of political parties to
shape government personnel and place certain government officials in
positions, as well as to obstruct other government officials from
obtaining leadership positions. Additionally, Lembergs has leveraged
and corrupted law enforcement officials to protect his interests and
subvert politicians whom he otherwise was unable to control.
Additionally, four Latvia-based entities were designated on
December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled by Lembergs: Ventspils
Freeport Authority, Ventspils Attistibas Agentura (also known as
Ventspils Development Agency), Biznesa Attistibas Asociacija (also
known as Business Development Association), and Latvijas Tranzita
Biznesa Asociacija (also known as Latvian Transit Business
Association).
15. Try Pheap: Pheap was designated on December 9, 2019, for being
a foreign person who is a current or former government official who is
responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged
in corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the
expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related
to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or
bribery. Pheap used his vast network inside Cambodia to build a
largescale illegal logging consortium that relies on the collusion of
Cambodian officials, to include purchasing protection from the
government, including military protection, for the movement of his
illegal products. The support of these officials makes it difficult for
local authorities to take legal action against Pheap.
Additionally, 11 Cambodia-registered entities were designated on
December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled by Pheap: Try Pheap
Group CO., Ltd.; M.D.S. Import Export Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Dry Port
Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap
Grand Royal Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Import Export Co., Ltd.; Papa
Petroleum Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Property Co. Ltd.; Try Pheap Travel &
Tours Co., Ltd.; M D S Thmorda S E Z Co., Ltd.; and Try Pheap Oyadav S
E Z Co., Ltd.
16. Kun Kim: Kim was designated on December 9, 2019, for being a
foreign person who is a current or former government official who is
responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged
in corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the
expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related
to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or
bribery. Kim was a senior General in the Royal Cambodian Air Force
(RCAF) and was instrumental in a development in Koh Kong province and
had reaped significant financial benefit from his relationships with a
People's Republic of China (PRC) state-owned entity. Kim used RCAF
soldiers to intimidate, demolish, and clear-out land sought by the PRC-
owned entity. Cambodian elites, like Kim, use their familial networks
to create shadow structures to shield ill-gotten assets. In addition to
Kim, three members of Kim's family were designated for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kim.
17. King Chandy: Chandy was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Kun Kim. Additionally, one entity, K D Rubber Plantation
Co., Ltd., is registered in Cambodia and is designated for being owned
or controlled by Chandy.
18. Kim Sophary: Sophary was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Kun Kim.
Additionally, two entities, Cambo Elite Security Force Co., Ltd.
and 7 Makara Phary Co., Ltd., are registered in Cambodia, and are
designated for being owned or controlled by Sophary.
19. Kim Phara: Phara was designated on December 9, 2019, for acting
or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kun
Kim.
Additionally, two entities, Romdoul Capital Pawn Co., Ltd. and
Romdoul Development Co., Ltd., are registered in Cambodia and are
designated for being owned or controlled by Phara.
20. Goran Andric: Andric was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Slobodan Tesic. Andric is one of Tesic's closest associates
and has represented Tesic in various international sales, including
conducting contract negotiations on Tesic's behalf while Tesic was on
the United Nations travel ban list and unable to travel. In working for
Tesic, Andric was involved in facilitating arms deals, including an
occasion when Andric signed a contract on behalf of the designated
entity, Partizan Tech.
In a related action, one entity, Serbia-based Velcom Trade D.O.O.
Beograd was designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned or
controlled by Andric.
21. Esad Kapidzic: Kapidzic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Kapidzic is a director and secretary of Cyprus-based
Finrost Limited, as well as a director and representative of Serbia-
based Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O., two entities concurrently
designated for being owned or controlled by, or for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Finrost Limited received and moved money on behalf of Tesic, and was
used by Tesic for a weapons contract with a foreign government in
Africa.
Additionally, Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O. was established by
Tesic immediately following his December 21, 2017 designation to avoid
sanctions.
22. Nebojsa Sarenac: Sarenac was designated on December 9, 2019,
for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Sarenac is a managing director of designated
entities, Technoglobal and Partizan Tech. Additionally, Sarenac is
Tesic's nephew and one of his closest associates.
Additionally, one entity, Melvale Corporation D.O.O. Beograd, which
is based in Serbia, was designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned
or controlled by Sarenac who is the owner and representative.
23. Zoran Petrovic: Petrovic was designated on December 9, 2019,
for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Petrovic is a managing director and principal of
Partizan Tech, an entity designated in December 2017. Petrovic
[[Page 72428]]
has negotiated with foreign entities on Tesic's behalf.
24. Nikola Brkic: Brkic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Brkic is a principal and legal representative of
Partizan Tech.
25. Milan Subotic: Subotic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Subotic is the owner, managing director, and
representative of Serbia-based Vectura Trans DOO, an entity
concurrently designated for being owned or controlled by, or for acting
or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Tesic. Tesic utilized Vectura Trans to receive an approved license for
exports, to complete arms deals, and to finalize weapons contracts with
a foreign government. Subotic was also listed as the point of contact
for export permits related to designated entity Partizan Tech.
26. Zelimir Petrovic: Petrovic was designated on December 9, 2019,
for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Petrovic is the owner, managing director, and
representative of Serbia-based Araneks DOO, an entity concurrently
designated for being owned or controlled by, or for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Araneks was used by Tesic to finalize weapons contracts with a foreign
government in Africa, and in dealings with another foreign government.
27. Sreten Cvjetkovic: Cvjetkovic was designated on December 9,
2019, for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Cvjetkovic is a 50 percent owner and legal
representative of Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O.
28. Ljobo Maricic: Maricic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Maricic is the director of Technoglobal and a former
representative of Partizan Arms, the predecessor to Tesic's Partizan
Tech.
29. Moonstorm Enterprises LTD: Cyprus-based Moonstorm Enterprises
LTD was designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled
by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a person designated pursuant E.O. 13818.
30. Tardigrade Limited: Tardigrade was designated on December 9,
2019, for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a person
designated pursuant E.O. 13818. Tesic used Cyprus-based Tardigrade to
conduct business in third party countries, particularly Arab and
African countries. Tesic has also used his Serbian companies to sign
contracts with Tardigrade before selling the goods to a final buyer.
31. Business Diversity Limited: Business Diversity Limited was
designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled by, or
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a person designated pursuant E.O. 13818.
Tesic established Hong Kong-based Business Diversity Limited in order
to conduct business with a European country. Tesic has used Business
Diversity Limited in Euro denominated contracts to evade U.S.
sanctions.
32. Min Aung Hlaing: Min Aung Hlaing was designated on December 10,
2019, for his role as the Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese security
forces, an entity that has engaged in or whose members have engaged in
serious human rights abuse under his command. Min Aung Hlaing's
military forces were responsible for the brutal security operation that
began in August 2017 in Rahkine State and ultimately caused more than
500,000 people to flee to Bangladesh. During this time, members of
ethnic minority groups were killed or injured by gunshot, often while
fleeing, or by soldiers using large-bladed weapons; others were burned
to death in their own houses. There are credible claims of mass-scale
rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by soldiers under Min
Aung Hlaing's command.
33. Soe Win: Soe Win was designated on December 10, 2019, for his
role as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese military forces,
an entity that has engaged in or whose members have engaged in serious
human rights abuse during his tenure. Soe Win has been heavily involved
in directing major operations that occurred in 2017, including the
decision to deploy combat divisions to Rakhine State and other regions
where serious human rights abuses occurred. Burmese military units
responsible for some of the most serious violence, including many
instances of sexual violence, reported directly to Soe Win.
34. Than Oo: Than Oo was designated on December 10, 2019, for being
a leader of the 99th Light Infantry Division (LID), an entity that has
engaged in or whose members have engaged in serious human rights abuse
under his command. In 2017, the 99th LID deployed to Rakhine State and,
while there, participated in serious human rights abuses alongside the
33rd LID and other security forces. In one operation in Tula Toli,
hundreds of men, women, and children were reportedly forced to the
nearby riverbank where the 99th LID opened fire, executing many of the
men, and forced women and girls to nearby houses where they were
sexually assaulted. A number of these women and children were later
stabbed and beaten, with the houses set fire while they were inside.
The 99th LID was designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 on August 17, 2018,
for engaging in serious human rights abuse.
35. Aung Aung: Aung Aung was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a leader of the 33rd LID, an entity that has engaged in or whose
members have engaged in serious human rights abuse under his command.
The 33rd LID participated in abuses in Rakhine State, including the
August 27, 2017 operation in Chut Pyin village. This operation included
extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and sexual violence, as
well as firing on fleeing villagers. More than 100 people were
reportedly killed in this one operation alone. The 33rd LID was
designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 on August 17, 2018 for engaging in
serious human rights abuse.
36. Rao Anwar Khan: Anwar was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit in, or
having directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights abuse.
During his tenure as the Senior Superintendent of Police in District
Malir, Pakistan, Rao Anwar was reportedly responsible for staging
numerous fake police encounters in which individuals were killed by
police, and was involved in over 190 police encounters that resulted in
the deaths of over 400 people, including the brutal murder of
Naqeebullah Mehsood. Anwar helped lead a network of police and criminal
thugs that were allegedly responsible for extortion, land grabbing,
narcotics, and murder.
37. Mahmud al-Warfalli: Al-Warfalli was designated on December 10,
2019, for being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit
in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights
abuse. Al-Warfalli served as commander of a militia known as the al-
Saiqa Brigade. Since 2016, al-Warfalli has carried out or ordered the
killings of 43 unarmed detainees in eight separate incidents. Many of
these killings were filmed and published on social media. On January
[[Page 72429]]
24, 2018, al-Warfalli was filmed carrying out a mass execution of ten
unarmed detainees in Benghazi. After al-Warfalli shot each detainee in
the head one by one, al-Warfalli fired freely at the group of ten
executed detainees. On July 17, 2017, al-Warfalli ordered the
methodical killings of 20 kneeling and unarmed detainees. In several of
the incidents, al-Warfalli continued to shoot at the detainees after
they were executed.
38. Marian Kocner: Kocner was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person responsible for or complicit in, or having
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse. Kocner
threatened Jan Kuciak, a reporter who was investigating Kocner's
corrupt dealings. Kuciak's investigative journalism focused on Kocner's
ability, through a complicated series of financial transactions, to
earn millions of Euros through fraudulent tax returns from Slovakia.
Kuciak was also responsible for several expos[eacute]s on Kocner's
corrupt dealings, highlighting Kocner's connections to the police and
prosecutors. Kocner also hired former Slovak Intelligence Service
members to surveil Kuciak ahead of his eventual murder. Slovak
authorities charged Kocner with hiring a hitman who murdered Kuciak and
his fiancée, Martina Kusnirova.
Additionally, six entities were designated on December 10, 2019 for
being owned or controlled by Kocner: Hotel Holding, S.R.O.;
International Investment Development Holding A.S.; International
Investment Hotels Holding A.S.; Sprava A Inkaso Pohladavok, S.R.O.;
Sprava A Inkaso Zmeniek, S.R.O.; and Tranz-Tel, A.S.
39. Musa Baluku: Baluku was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is the leader of the Allied Defense Forces
(ADF), an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in,
serious human rights abuse.
40. Amigo Kibirige: Kibirige was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support
of, the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
41. Muhammed Lumisa: Lumisa was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support
of, the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
42. Elias Segujja: Segujja was designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of,
the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged
in, serious human rights abuse.
43. Kayiira Muhammad: Muhammad was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support
of, the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
44. Amisi Kasadha: Kasadha was designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of,
the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged
in, serious human rights abuse.
45. Abud Stephen Thiongkol: Thiongkol was designated on December
10, 2019, for being a foreign person that is or has been the leader of
an entity that has engaged in, serious human rights abuse. Thiongkol
has been identified as the commander of the detention facilities where
Aggrey Idri (Aggrey), a member of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement--In Opposition (SPLM-IO), and Dong Samuel Luak (Dong), a South
Sudanese human rights lawyer, were held prior to their killings.
46. Malual Dhal Muorwel: Muorwel was designated on December 10,
2019, for being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit
in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights
abuse. In addition to Muorwel's participation in the killings of Dong
and Aggrey, he has been identified as being the commander of forces who
detained and assaulted three international monitors in December of
2018.
47. Michael Kuajien: Kuajien was designated on December 10, 2019,
for being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit in, or
has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
Kuajien is one of two people publicly identified as being present in
Kenya during, and in having a hand in, the kidnapping of Dong and
Aggrey.
48. John Top Lam: Lam was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse. Lam is
one of two people publicly identified as being present in Kenya during,
and in having a hand in, the kidnapping of Dong and Aggrey. Further,
Lam is reported to have called a member of Dong's family in order to
provide information on Dong's whereabouts in return for a substantial
cash payment.
49. Angelo Kuot Garang: Garang was designated on December 10, 2019,
for being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit in, or
has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
Garang has been identified as being involved in the killing of Dong and
Aggrey, as well as of other individuals.
Visa Restrictions Imposed
Although no visa restrictions were imposed under the Act during
2019, persons designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 shall be subject to the
visa restrictions articulated in section 2, unless an exception
applies. Section 2 provides that the entry of persons designated under
section 1 of the order is suspended pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation 8693. In 2019, the State Department also applied, when
appropriate, visa restrictions on foreign persons involved in
significant corruption or gross violation of human rights under other
authorities, reported to Congress through other means. As appropriate,
the Department of State will take additional action to impose visa
restrictions on those responsible for certain human rights violations
and corruption pursuant to other authorities, including Presidential
Proclamations 7750 and 8697, and Section 7031(c) of the FY2019
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, as
carried forward by the FY2020 Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020. In
addition, section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
renders aliens ineligible for visas if a consular officer has reason to
believe that they participated in acts of genocide, torture or
extrajudicial killings.
Efforts To Encourage Governments of Other Countries To Impose Sanctions
Similar to Those Authorized by the Act
In 2019, the Administration continued to build on the successful
outreach campaign to international partners regarding the expansion of
domestic and multilateral anticorruption and human rights sanctions
regimes. Following successful outreach in 2018, the United Kingdom and
the European Union are progressing in the development of their own
human rights sanction's authorities. Canada enacted its authority in
October 2017
[[Page 72430]]
and since that time, the Administration has worked closely with the
Canadian government in pursuing coordinated actions against human
rights abusers and corrupt actors. The Administration sought out new
partners with which to create truly global authorities to promote
accountability for those that abuse human rights and engage in
corruption. Throughout this outreach, the Administration has identified
champions, partners, and potential spoilers of the objectives
established by Congress within the Act. The Departments of State and
Treasury have, over the last year, shared information, coordinated
messaging, and provided technical assistance to this end.
David Hale,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, United States Department of
State.
[FR Doc. 2019-28231 Filed 12-30-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-AE-P