Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 70574-70578 [2019-27658]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 246 (Monday, December 23, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70574-70578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-27658]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-293; NRC-2019-0247]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC; Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued 
exemptions in response to a request from the licensee regarding certain 
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions eliminate the 
requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Pilgrim 
Nuclear Power Station, based on the reduced risks of accidents that 
could result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning 
nuclear power reactor.

DATES: The exemption was issued on December 18, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0247 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0247. Address 
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; 
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at

[[Page 70575]]

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select 
``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please 
contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS 
accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in 
ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott P. Wall, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2855, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of December, 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Scott P. Wall,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of 
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachment--Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket No. 50-293

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Exemption

I. Background

    By letter dated November 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15328A053), Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) that it planned to permanently cease power operations 
at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) no later than June 1, 2019. 
On May 31, 2019, ENOI permanently ceased power operations at Pilgrim. 
By letter dated June 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19161A033), ENOI 
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the 
Pilgrim reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) on June 
9, 2019. Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel, as specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR) Section 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 license for Pilgrim no 
longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention 
of fuel into the reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to 
possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is 
currently stored onsite at the Pilgrim facility in the SFP and in a dry 
cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety 
analysis reports (USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures 
or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor 
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the 
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent 
cessation of power operations at Pilgrim and the permanent removal of 
the fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer 
possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems 
are no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage 
of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning (EP) provisions for 
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, 
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have 
permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no 
explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a 
power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for 
a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP 
requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning 
status of the facility, the Pilgrim licensee must obtain exemptions 
from those EP regulations. Only then can the Pilgrim licensee modify 
the facility emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated with 
the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of Pilgrim.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated July 3, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18186A635), as 
supplemented by letters dated November 30 and December 4, 2018, and 
February 14 and February 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18338A205, 
ML18341A219, ML19050A298, and ML19056A260, respectively), ENOI 
requested exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 for 
Pilgrim. Specifically, ENOI requested exemptions from certain planning 
standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume 
exposure and ingestion pathway EP zones for nuclear power reactors; and 
from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, 
which establish the elements that comprise the content of emergency 
plans. In the letters dated November 30 and December 4, 2018, and 
February 14 and February 18, 2019, ENOI provided supplemental 
information and responses to the NRC staff's requests for additional 
information concerning the proposed exemptions.
    By letter dated November 16, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML18320A031), ENOI, on behalf of itself and Entergy Nuclear Generation 
Company (ENGC) (to be known as Holtec Pilgrim, LLC), Holtec 
International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC 
(HDI, the licensee) (together, Applicants), requested that the NRC 
consent to: (1) The indirect transfer of control of Renewed Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim, as well as the general 
license for the Pilgrim ISFSI (together, the Licenses), to Holtec; and 
(2) the direct transfer of ENOI's operating authority (i.e., its 
authority to conduct licensed activities at Pilgrim) to HDI. In 
addition, the Applicants requested that the NRC approve a conforming 
administrative amendment to the Licenses to reflect the proposed direct 
transfer of the Licenses from ENOI to HDI; a planned name change for 
ENGC from ENGC to Holtec Pilgrim, LLC; and deletion of certain license 
conditions to reflect satisfaction and termination of all ENGC 
obligations after the license transfer and equity sale.
    By Order dated August 22, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A265), 
the NRC staff approved the direct and indirect transfers requested in 
the November 16, 2018, application. Additionally, on August 22, 2019, 
HDI informed the NRC (ADAMS Accession No. ML19234A357) that:
    HDI will assume responsibility for all ongoing NRC regulatory 
actions and reviews currently underway for Pilgrim Nuclear Power 
Station. HDI respectfully requests NRC continuation of these regulatory 
actions and reviews.
    On August 26, 2019, ENOI informed the NRC that the license transfer 
transaction closed on August 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML19239A037). On August 27, 2019 (ADAMS Accession

[[Page 70576]]

No. ML19235A050), the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 249 to reflect the 
license transfer. Accordingly, HDI is now the licensee for 
decommissioning operations at Pilgrim.
    The information provided by the licensee included justifications 
for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested would eliminate 
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency 
preparedness plans reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR, ``Emergency Management and 
Assistance,'' part 350, ``Review and Approval of State and Local 
Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness,'' and would reduce the 
scope of onsite EP activities at Pilgrim. The licensee stated that the 
application of all the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 
10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E is not needed for 
adequate emergency response capability, based on the substantially 
lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of accidents still 
possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility, as compared 
to an operating facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for 
a highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accident that could challenge the 
safe storage of spent fuel at Pilgrim, provisions exist for offsite 
agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency 
management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to 
protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, 
also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in 
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and 
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is publicly available 
at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf. 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State, 
territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a 
common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and 
decision-making and helps planners at all levels of government in their 
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats 
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for 
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be 
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific 
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and 
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be 
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards 
planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible 
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. 
However, the EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor 
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release 
from credible emergency accident scenarios is significantly reduced. 
The reduced risk for any significant offsite radiological release is 
based on two factors. One factor is the elimination of accidents 
applicable only to an operating power reactor, resulting in fewer 
credible accident scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-
lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to 
radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the 
reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the 
radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue to decay as the 
spent fuel ages. The irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to 
radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a loss of 
water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and 
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR 
[Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the 
NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at 
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and 
defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and 
conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is 
significantly less than for an operating power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested for Pilgrim, 
have been granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor 
licensees. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions was 
based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological 
consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase Protective 
Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the 
exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a 
beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat 
transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to 
initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite 
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP 
approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at Pilgrim, the licensee 
provided analysis demonstrating that 10 months following permanent 
cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the 
only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite 
radiological release (the fuel handling accident in the Auxiliary 
Building, where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the 
EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
    With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at Pilgrim, the 
licensee analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively 
impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 10 
months after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be at 
least 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the 
limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) 
reaches 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), the temperature used to assess 
the potential onset of fission product release. The analysis 
conservatively assumed that

[[Page 70577]]

the heat up time starts when the SFP has been completely drained, 
although it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an 
incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider 
the period of time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water 
inventory until cooling is lost.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and 
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) 
will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 10 months after 
Pilgrim has permanently ceased power operations. An assessment of the 
licensee's EP exemptions is described in SECY-19-0078, ``Request by the 
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency 
Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,'' dated 
August 9, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18347A717). The Commission 
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the exemptions in the 
staff requirements memorandum to SECY-19-0078, dated November 4, 2019 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19308A034). Descriptions of the specific 
exemptions requested by the licensee and the NRC staff's basis for 
granting each exemption are provided in SECY-19-0078. The NRC staff's 
detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP 
exemptions requested by the licensee are provided in the NRC staff's 
safety evaluation dated December 18, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML19142A043).

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, that would allow the licensee to revise the Pilgrim 
Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled 
condition of the facility. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 
50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or 
upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the 
licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. 
Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, the licensee provided analyses that show that 
the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed 
the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans 
required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection 
of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents still possible at 
Pilgrim 10 months after the plant has permanently ceased power 
operations.
    Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-
basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the 
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to 
operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different 
sequences make significant contributions to risk. As described in 
NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a 
few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The 
report further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of 
offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and 
because even under current EP requirements for operating power 
reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation 
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All 
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too 
low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present 
an undue risk to the public health and safety.

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by the licensee only involve EP 
requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow the licensee to revise 
the Pilgrim Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and 
defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at 
Pilgrim are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The 
discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at Pilgrim 
will not adversely affect the licensee's ability to physically secure 
the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed 
exemptions are consistent with common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and 
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the 
risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed 
full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor 
accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section III, because Pilgrim is 
permanently shut down and defueled, there will no longer be a risk of a 
significant offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident 
exceeding EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary and the 
risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-
design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating 
power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at Pilgrim 
by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 
to site-specific conditions at Pilgrim and determined that the risk 
values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented at Pilgrim. As indicated 
by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more 
recently for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis 
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling 
Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from 
SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite 
early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP 
requirements were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-
basis accident

[[Page 70578]]

involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic 
heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows 
that within 10 months after permanent cessation of power operations, 
the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C is 10 hours 
after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of all cooling 
means.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur, involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such 
a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent 
fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident 
shows that within 10 months after permanent cessation of power 
operations, more than 10 hours would be available between the time the 
fuel is initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is 
conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a 
temperature of 900 [deg]C, which is the temperature associated with 
rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant 
radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include the 
period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water 
inventory until all cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its 
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in 
granting the requested exemptions to the licensee, there is no design-
basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release 
exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In 
the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting 
the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes 
of heat transfer, there will be over 10 hours available before an 
offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to 
initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat 
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to 
occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is 
considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement 
protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and 
safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing 
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the 
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously 
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP 
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate 
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness 
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently 
shutdown and defueled facilities.
    Additionally, Pilgrim committed to maintaining SFP makeup 
strategies in its letters to the NRC dated November 30 and December 4, 
2018, and February 14 and February 18, 2019. The multiple strategies 
for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using existing plant systems 
for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on the fire 
protection system with redundant pumps (one diesel-driven and electric 
motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire truck that can take suction from 
the Cape Cod Bay. These strategies will continue to be required as 
License Condition 3.K, ``Mitigation Strategy License Condition,'' of 
Renewed Facility License No. DPR-35 for Pilgrim. Considering the very 
low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, 
these diverse strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional 
makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite 
radiological release.
    For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of 
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special 
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the 
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated 
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Pilgrim 
facility 10 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by 
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness 
at Pilgrim and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that 
adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and 
local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the highly unlikely 
event of a radiological emergency at Pilgrim. Since the underlying 
purpose of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even 
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to 
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and 
the reduction in the scope of the onsite EP activities at Pilgrim, the 
special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's 
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published in the Federal Register on December 18, 2019 (84 
FR 69396).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
19-0078, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense 
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants the licensee's exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the 
NRC staff's safety evaluation dated December 18, 2019. The exemptions 
are effective as of 10 months after permanent cessation of power 
operations.


    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of December, 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Craig G. Erlanger,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2019-27658 Filed 12-20-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P