Special Conditions: Robinson Helicopter Company, Model Robinson R66, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and Stability Augmentation System (AP/SAS System), 64194-64195 [2019-25292]
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 225 / Thursday, November 21, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. FAA–2019–0106; Notice No. 27–
046–SC]
Special Conditions: Robinson
Helicopter Company, Model Robinson
R66, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and
Stability Augmentation System (AP/
SAS System)
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for the Robinson Helicopter
Company (Robinson) Model R66
helicopter. This helicopter will have a
novel or unusual design feature
associated with installation of the
autopilot and stability augmentation
system (AP/SAS system). The
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for this design feature.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: These special conditions are
effective December 23, 2019.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andy Shaw, Aerospace Engineer, FAA,
Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and
Innovation Division, 10101 Hillwood
Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone
(817) 222–5384; email Andy.Shaw@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
Background
On June 8, 2018, Robinson applied to
amend type certificate (TC) Number
R00015LA to install an AP/SAS system
on the Robinson Model R66 helicopter.
The Robinson Model R66 helicopter is
a 14 CFR part 27 normal category, single
turbine engine, conventional helicopter
designed for civil operation. This
helicopter model is capable of carrying
up to four passengers with one pilot and
has a maximum gross weight of up to
2,700 pounds, depending on the model
configuration. The major design features
include a 2-blade main rotor, an antitorque tail rotor system, a skid landing
gear, and a visual flight rule basic
avionics configuration. Robinson
proposes to modify this model
helicopter by installing an AP/SAS
system.
The AP/SAS system provides attitude
stabilization in two or three axes (pitch
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:55 Nov 20, 2019
Jkt 250001
and roll with optional yaw) as well as
higher-level autopilot functions such as
altitude hold, heading command and
navigation tracking. However, the
possible failure conditions for this
system, and their effect on the
continued safe flight and landing of the
helicopter, are more severe than those
envisioned by the present rules.
The effect on safety is not adequately
covered under 14 CFR 27.1309 for the
application of new technology and new
application of standard technology.
Specifically, the present provisions of
§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address
the safety requirements for systems
whose failures could result in
catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major
failure conditions, or for complex
systems whose failures could result in
major failure conditions. The current
regulations are inadequate because
when § 27.1309(c) was promulgated, it
was not envisioned that this type of
rotorcraft would use systems that are
complex or whose failure could result in
‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is
particularly true with the application of
new technology, new application of
standard technology, or other
applications not envisioned by the rule
that affect safety.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.101, Robinson must
show that the Model R66 helicopter, as
modified by the installed AP/SAS,
continues to meet the applicable
regulations in effect on the date of
application for the change to the type
certificate. The baseline certification
basis for the unmodified Robinson
Model R66 helicopter is listed in TC
Number R00015LA. Additionally,
compliance must be shown to any
applicable equivalent level of safety
findings, exemptions, and special
conditions prescribed by the
Administrator as part of the certification
basis.
The Administrator has determined the
applicable airworthiness regulations
(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain
to this amended TC, do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the Robinson Model R66 helicopter
because of a novel or unusual design
feature. Therefore, special conditions
are prescribed under § 21.16.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Robinson must show
compliance of the AP/SAS amended TC
altered model R66 helicopter with the
noise certification requirements of 14
CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in § 11.19, in accordance with
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
§ 11.38 and they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.101(d).
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Robinson Model R66 helicopter
will incorporate the following novel or
unusual design features: AP/SAS. An
autopilot (AP) is a system used to
control the trajectory of an aircraft
without constant input from the pilot.
This allows the pilot to focus on other
aspects of operations such as weather
and systems. A stability augmentation
system (SAS) is another type of
automatic flight control system;
however, instead of maintaining the
aircraft on a predetermined attitude or
flight path, the SAS will reduce pilot
workload by dampening aircraft
buffeting regardless of the attitude or
flight path.
Discussion
To comply with the provisions of the
special conditions, the FAA requires
that Robinson provide the FAA with a
systems safety assessment (SSA) for the
final AP/SAS installation configuration
that will adequately address the safety
objectives established by a functional
hazard assessment (FHA). This process
will ensure that all failure conditions
and their resulting effects are adequately
addressed for the installed AP/SAS. The
SSA process is part of the overall safety
assessment process discussed in FAA
Advisory Circular 27–1B, Certification
of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and
Society of Automotive Engineers
document Aerospace Recommended
Practice 4761, Guidelines and Methods
for Conducting the Safety Assessment
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
Equipment.
These special conditions require that
the AP/SAS installed on a Robinson
Model R66 helicopter meet the
requirements to adequately address the
failure effects identified by the FHA,
and subsequently verified by the SSA,
within the defined design integrity
requirements.
Failure conditions are classified
according to the severity of their effects
on the rotorcraft.
Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document
DO–178C, Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification, provides software design
assurance levels most commonly used
for the major, hazardous/severe-major,
and catastrophic failure condition
categories. The AP/SAS system
equipment must be qualified for the
expected installation environment. The
test procedures prescribed in RTCA
Document DO–160G, Environmental
Conditions and Test Procedures for
E:\FR\FM\21NOR1.SGM
21NOR1
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 225 / Thursday, November 21, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
Airborne Equipment, are recognized by
the FAA as acceptable methodologies
for finding compliance with the
environmental requirements. Equivalent
environment test standards may also be
acceptable. Environmental qualification
provides data to show that the AP/SAS
system can perform its intended
function under the expected operating
condition. Some of the main
considerations for environmental
concerns are installation locations and
the resulting exposure to environmental
conditions for the AP/SAS system
equipment, including considerations for
other equipment that may also be
affected environmentally by the AP/SAS
equipment installation. The level of
environmental qualification must be
related to the severity of the considered
failure conditions and effects on the
rotorcraft.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of proposed special conditions
No. 27–046–SC for the Robinson Model
R66 helicopter was published in the
Federal Register on June 26, 2019 (84
FR 30050). Comments were received
from two commenters. The commenters
stated that special conditions previously
issued for an AP/SAS system on a
different model helicopter were more
aligned with rulemaking whereas this
special condition text seemed more
appropriate for guidance material. The
commenters requested the FAA change
the proposed special conditions to be
consistent with those previously issued
for the same type of equipment. The
FAA agrees that an effort should be
made to maintain consistency and has
revised the proposed special conditions
to align with previously issued special
conditions.
The commenters also noted the
Discussion section of the proposed
special conditions contains references to
specific revisions of RTCA Document
DO–178 and RTCA Document DO–160G
and requested these references to
specific revisions be removed. The FAA
disagrees, however an applicant may
request to use a later approved revision
to these documents if the applicant
shows the later revision meets the safety
level intended by the special condition.
Except for the changes previously
discussed, these special conditions are
adopted as proposed.
Applicability
These special conditions are
applicable to the AP/SAS installed as an
amended TC approval in Robinson
Model R66 helicopter, TC Number
R00015LA.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:55 Nov 20, 2019
Jkt 250001
64195
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features for an AP/
SAS amended TC installed on one
model helicopter. It is not a rule of
general applicability and affects only
the applicant who applied to the FAA
for approval of these features.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
RIN 2120–AA64
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) issues the
following special conditions as part of
the amended type certification basis for
installation of the autopilot and stability
augmentation system (AP/SAS) on
Robinson Model R66 helicopters.
Instead of the requirements of 14 CFR
27.1309(b) and (c), the following must
be met for certification of the AP/SAS
system installed on Robinson Model
R66 helicopters:
a. The equipment and systems must
be designed and installed so that any
equipment and systems do not
adversely affect the safety of the
rotorcraft or its occupants.
b. The rotorcraft systems and
associated components considered
separately and in relation to others
systems, must be designed and installed
so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic
failure condition is extremely
improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any hazardous
failure condition is extremely remote;
and
(3) The occurrence of any major
failure condition is remote.
c. Information concerning an unsafe
system operating condition must be
provided in a timely manner to the crew
to enable them to take appropriate
corrective action. An appropriate alert
must be provided if immediate pilot
awareness and immediate or subsequent
corrective action is required. Systems
and controls, including indications and
annunciations, must be designed to
minimize crew errors which could
create additional hazards.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November
13, 2019.
Jorge Castillo,
Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy
and Innovation Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2019–25292 Filed 11–20–19; 8:45 am]
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Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2019–0894; Product
Identifier 2019–NE–32–AD; Amendment 39–
19798; AD 2019–21–51]
Airworthiness Directives; General
Electric Company Turbofan Engines
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
General Electric Company (GE) GE90–
115B model turbofan engines.
Emergency AD 2019–21–51 was sent
previously to all known operators of the
GE GE90–115B model turbofan engines
with certain engine serial numbers. This
AD requires the removal from service of
the Interstage Seal, part number
2505M72P01, from the affected engines.
This AD was prompted by a recent
event involving an uncontained highpressure turbine (HPT) failure, resulting
in an aborted takeoff and debris
penetrating the airplane’s fuselage and
the other engine. The FAA is issuing
this AD to address the unsafe condition
on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective December 6,
2019 to all persons except those persons
to whom it was made immediately
effective by Emergency AD 2019–21–51,
issued on October 23, 2019, which
contained the requirements of this
amendment.
The FAA must receive comments on
this AD by January 6, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments,
using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail
address above between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this final rule, contact General Electric
Company, GE Aviation, 1 Neumann
Way, Cincinnati, OH 45125; phone:
877–432–3272; fax: 877–432–3329;
SUMMARY:
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 225 (Thursday, November 21, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 64194-64195]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-25292]
[[Page 64194]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 27
[Docket No. FAA-2019-0106; Notice No. 27-046-SC]
Special Conditions: Robinson Helicopter Company, Model Robinson
R66, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and Stability Augmentation System
(AP/SAS System)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Robinson
Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R66 helicopter. This helicopter
will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with
installation of the autopilot and stability augmentation system (AP/SAS
system). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These
special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: These special conditions are effective December 23, 2019.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andy Shaw, Aerospace Engineer, FAA,
Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 10101
Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5384; email
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On June 8, 2018, Robinson applied to amend type certificate (TC)
Number R00015LA to install an AP/SAS system on the Robinson Model R66
helicopter. The Robinson Model R66 helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27
normal category, single turbine engine, conventional helicopter
designed for civil operation. This helicopter model is capable of
carrying up to four passengers with one pilot and has a maximum gross
weight of up to 2,700 pounds, depending on the model configuration. The
major design features include a 2-blade main rotor, an anti-torque tail
rotor system, a skid landing gear, and a visual flight rule basic
avionics configuration. Robinson proposes to modify this model
helicopter by installing an AP/SAS system.
The AP/SAS system provides attitude stabilization in two or three
axes (pitch and roll with optional yaw) as well as higher-level
autopilot functions such as altitude hold, heading command and
navigation tracking. However, the possible failure conditions for this
system, and their effect on the continued safe flight and landing of
the helicopter, are more severe than those envisioned by the present
rules.
The effect on safety is not adequately covered under 14 CFR 27.1309
for the application of new technology and new application of standard
technology. Specifically, the present provisions of Sec. 27.1309(c) do
not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose
failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major
failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate because when
Sec. 27.1309(c) was promulgated, it was not envisioned that this type
of rotorcraft would use systems that are complex or whose failure could
result in ``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the
rotorcraft. This is particularly true with the application of new
technology, new application of standard technology, or other
applications not envisioned by the rule that affect safety.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR 21.101, Robinson must show that the Model R66
helicopter, as modified by the installed AP/SAS, continues to meet the
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the
change to the type certificate. The baseline certification basis for
the unmodified Robinson Model R66 helicopter is listed in TC Number
R00015LA. Additionally, compliance must be shown to any applicable
equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special conditions
prescribed by the Administrator as part of the certification basis.
The Administrator has determined the applicable airworthiness
regulations (that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this amended
TC, do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the
Robinson Model R66 helicopter because of a novel or unusual design
feature. Therefore, special conditions are prescribed under Sec.
21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, Robinson must show compliance of the AP/SAS amended TC
altered model R66 helicopter with the noise certification requirements
of 14 CFR part 36.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, in
accordance with Sec. 11.38 and they become part of the type
certification basis under Sec. 21.101(d).
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Robinson Model R66 helicopter will incorporate the following
novel or unusual design features: AP/SAS. An autopilot (AP) is a system
used to control the trajectory of an aircraft without constant input
from the pilot. This allows the pilot to focus on other aspects of
operations such as weather and systems. A stability augmentation system
(SAS) is another type of automatic flight control system; however,
instead of maintaining the aircraft on a predetermined attitude or
flight path, the SAS will reduce pilot workload by dampening aircraft
buffeting regardless of the attitude or flight path.
Discussion
To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, the FAA
requires that Robinson provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment
(SSA) for the final AP/SAS installation configuration that will
adequately address the safety objectives established by a functional
hazard assessment (FHA). This process will ensure that all failure
conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the
installed AP/SAS. The SSA process is part of the overall safety
assessment process discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 27-1B,
Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and Society of Automotive
Engineers document Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761, Guidelines and
Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne
Systems and Equipment.
These special conditions require that the AP/SAS installed on a
Robinson Model R66 helicopter meet the requirements to adequately
address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently
verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity requirements.
Failure conditions are classified according to the severity of
their effects on the rotorcraft.
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document
DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification, provides software design assurance levels most commonly
used for the major, hazardous/severe-major, and catastrophic failure
condition categories. The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified for
the expected installation environment. The test procedures prescribed
in RTCA Document DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures
for
[[Page 64195]]
Airborne Equipment, are recognized by the FAA as acceptable
methodologies for finding compliance with the environmental
requirements. Equivalent environment test standards may also be
acceptable. Environmental qualification provides data to show that the
AP/SAS system can perform its intended function under the expected
operating condition. Some of the main considerations for environmental
concerns are installation locations and the resulting exposure to
environmental conditions for the AP/SAS system equipment, including
considerations for other equipment that may also be affected
environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment installation. The level of
environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the
considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of proposed special conditions No. 27-046-SC for the
Robinson Model R66 helicopter was published in the Federal Register on
June 26, 2019 (84 FR 30050). Comments were received from two
commenters. The commenters stated that special conditions previously
issued for an AP/SAS system on a different model helicopter were more
aligned with rulemaking whereas this special condition text seemed more
appropriate for guidance material. The commenters requested the FAA
change the proposed special conditions to be consistent with those
previously issued for the same type of equipment. The FAA agrees that
an effort should be made to maintain consistency and has revised the
proposed special conditions to align with previously issued special
conditions.
The commenters also noted the Discussion section of the proposed
special conditions contains references to specific revisions of RTCA
Document DO-178 and RTCA Document DO-160G and requested these
references to specific revisions be removed. The FAA disagrees, however
an applicant may request to use a later approved revision to these
documents if the applicant shows the later revision meets the safety
level intended by the special condition.
Except for the changes previously discussed, these special
conditions are adopted as proposed.
Applicability
These special conditions are applicable to the AP/SAS installed as
an amended TC approval in Robinson Model R66 helicopter, TC Number
R00015LA.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
for an AP/SAS amended TC installed on one model helicopter. It is not a
rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who
applied to the FAA for approval of these features.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues the
following special conditions as part of the amended type certification
basis for installation of the autopilot and stability augmentation
system (AP/SAS) on Robinson Model R66 helicopters.
Instead of the requirements of 14 CFR 27.1309(b) and (c), the
following must be met for certification of the AP/SAS system installed
on Robinson Model R66 helicopters:
a. The equipment and systems must be designed and installed so that
any equipment and systems do not adversely affect the safety of the
rotorcraft or its occupants.
b. The rotorcraft systems and associated components considered
separately and in relation to others systems, must be designed and
installed so that:
(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is
extremely improbable;
(2) The occurrence of any hazardous failure condition is extremely
remote; and
(3) The occurrence of any major failure condition is remote.
c. Information concerning an unsafe system operating condition must
be provided in a timely manner to the crew to enable them to take
appropriate corrective action. An appropriate alert must be provided if
immediate pilot awareness and immediate or subsequent corrective action
is required. Systems and controls, including indications and
annunciations, must be designed to minimize crew errors which could
create additional hazards.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 13, 2019.
Jorge Castillo,
Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2019-25292 Filed 11-20-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
