NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center, 63682-63686 [2019-24855]

Download as PDF 63682 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2019 / Notices notice published on May 29, 2019, at 84 FR 24827. All comments have been considered in the development of the proposed version. Please see https:// www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/. A summary of the significant changes and clarifications to the PAPPG has been incorporated into the document. Title of Collection: ‘‘National Science Foundation Proposal & Award Policies & Procedures Guide.’’ OMB Approval Number: 3145–0058. Type of Request: Intent to seek approval to extend with revision an information collection for three years. Proposed Project: The National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81–507) sets forth NSF’s mission and purpose: ‘‘To promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense. . . .’’ The Act authorized and directed NSF to initiate and support: • Basic scientific research and research fundamental to the engineering process; • Programs to strengthen scientific and engineering research potential; • Science and engineering education programs at all levels and in all the various fields of science and engineering; • Programs that provide a source of information for policy formulation; and • Other activities to promote these ends. NSF’s core purpose resonates clearly in everything it does: Promoting achievement and progress in science and engineering and enhancing the potential for research and education to contribute to the Nation. While NSF’s vision of the future and the mechanisms it uses to carry out its charges have evolved significantly over the last six decades, its ultimate mission remains the same. Use of the Information: The regular submission of proposals to the Foundation is part of the collection of information and is used to help NSF fulfill this responsibility by initiating and supporting merit-selected research and education projects in all the scientific and engineering disciplines. NSF receives more than 50,000 proposals annually for new projects and makes approximately 11,000 new awards. Support is made primarily through grants, contracts, and other agreements awarded to approximately 2,000 colleges, universities, academic consortia, nonprofit institutions, and small businesses. The awards are based mainly on merit evaluations of proposals submitted to the Foundation. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:41 Nov 15, 2019 Jkt 250001 The Foundation has a continuing commitment to monitor the operations of its information collection to identify and address excessive reporting burdens as well as to identify any real or apparent inequities based on gender, race, ethnicity, or disability of the proposed principal investigator(s)/ project director(s) or the co-principal investigator(s)/co-project director(s). Burden on the Public Dated: November 13, 2019. Suzanne H. Plimpton, Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation. [FR Doc. 2019–24906 Filed 11–15–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P Frm 00078 Fmt 4703 [Docket No. 50–331; NRC–2019–0194] NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Exemption; issuance. AGENCY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an exemption in response to a February 28, 2019, request from NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC. The exemption allows a certified fuel handler, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to suspend security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) after both the ‘‘Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations’’ and the ‘‘Certification of Permanent Fuel Removal’’ have been docketed for the facility. SUMMARY: It has been estimated that the public expends an average of approximately 120 burden hours for each proposal submitted. Since the Foundation expects to receive approximately 50,600 proposals in FY 2019, an estimated 6,072,000 burden hours will be placed on the public. The Foundation has based its reporting burden on the review of approximately 50,600 new proposals expected during FY 2019. It has been estimated that anywhere from one hour to 20 hours may be required to review a proposal. We have estimated that approximately 5 hours are required to review an average proposal. Each proposal receives an average of 3 reviews, resulting in approximately 759,000 hours per year. The information collected on the reviewer background questionnaire (NSF 428A) is used by managers to maintain an automated database of reviewers for the many disciplines represented by the proposals submitted to the Foundation. Information collected on gender, race, and ethnicity is used in meeting NSF needs for data to permit response to Congressional and other queries into equity issues. These data also are used in the design, implementation, and monitoring of NSF efforts to increase the participation of various groups in science, engineering, and education. The estimated burden for the Reviewer Background Information (NSF 428A) is estimated at 5 minutes per respondent with up to 10,000 potential new reviewers for a total of 833 hours. The aggregate number of burden hours is estimated to be 6,831,000. The actual burden on respondents has not changed. PO 00000 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Sfmt 4703 The exemption was issued on November 7, 2019. ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2019–0194 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly available information related to this document using any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2019–0194. Address questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127; email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@ nrc.gov. For the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in a table in the ‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section of this document. • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. DATES: E:\FR\FM\18NON1.SGM 18NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2019 / Notices DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 8371; email: Mahesh.Chawla@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NRC is making the documents identified below available to interested FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mahesh Chawla, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, persons through one or more of the following methods, as indicated. To access documents related to this action, see the ADDRESSES section of this document. ADAMS accession No. Document NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; ‘‘Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations’’; Dated January 18, 2019 .... NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; ‘‘Request for Approval of Certified Fuel Handler Training Program’’; Dated January 29, 2019. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; ‘‘Duane Arnold Energy Center—Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Continuing Training Program’’; Dated August 28, 2019. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; ‘‘Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) Related to the Suspension of Security Measures in an Emergency or During Severe Weather’’; Dated February 28, 2019. The text of the exemption is attached. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of November, 2019. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mahesh L. Chawla, Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Attachment: Exemption Related to the Approval Authority for Suspension of Security Measures in an Emergency or During Severe Weather Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50–331 NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center Exemption Related to the Approval Authority for Suspension of Security Measures in an Emergency or During Severe Weather I. Background NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA) is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC). The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all applicable rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission), now or hereafter in effect. The DAEC facility consists of a boiling-water reactor located in Linn County, Iowa. By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NEDA provided formal notification to the NRC pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Sections 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.4(b)(8) of the intention to permanently cease power operations at the DAEC in the fourth quarter of 2020. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i)–(ii) and 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 license for the facility no longer authorizes reactor operation or VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:41 Nov 15, 2019 Jkt 250001 emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel, after certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are docketed for the DAEC. As a result, licensed senior operators (i.e., individuals licensed under 10 CFR part 55 to manipulate the controls of a facility and to direct the licensed activities of licensed operators) will no longer be required to support plant operating activities. Instead, certified fuel handlers (CFHs) (i.e., nonlicensed operators who have qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program approved by the Commission) will perform activities associated with decommissioning, irradiated fuel handling, and management. Commission approval of a fuel handler training program is needed to facilitate these activities. By letter dated January 29, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19037A016), NEDA submitted a request for Commission approval of the CFH Training and Retraining Program for the DAEC. By letter dated August 28, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19204A287), the Commission approved the CFH Training and Retraining Program for the DAEC. The CFH Training and Retraining Program is to be used to satisfy training requirements for the plant personnel responsible for supervising and directing the monitoring, storage, handling, and cooling of irradiated fuel in a manner consistent with ensuring the health and safety of the public. As stated in 10 CFR 50.2, ‘‘Definitions,’’ CFHs are qualified in accordance with a Commissionapproved training program. II. Request/Action The Commission’s regulation at 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1) addresses the suspension of security measures in an emergency (10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i)) or during severe weather (10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii)) by stating: PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 4703 63683 Sfmt 4703 ML19023A196 ML19037A016 ML19204A287 ML19059A099 The licensee may suspend implementation of affected requirements of this section under the following conditions: (i) In accordance with §§ 50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of this chapter, the licensee may suspend any security measures under this section in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension of security measures must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator before taking this action. (ii) During severe weather when the suspension of affected security measures is immediately needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel and no other immediately apparent action consistent with the license conditions and technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent protection. This suspension of security measures must be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator, with input from the security supervisor or manager, before taking this action. By letter dated February 28, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19059A099), NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii), pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ‘‘Specific exemptions.’’ Consistent with 10 CFR 50.54(y), the proposed exemption would authorize a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC. III. Discussion The NRC’s security rules have long recognized the potential need to suspend security or safeguards measures under certain conditions. Accordingly, 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y), first published in 1983, allow a licensee to take reasonable actions in an emergency that depart from license conditions or technical specifications when those actions are immediately ‘‘needed to protect the public health and safety’’ and no actions consistent with license conditions and technical specifications E:\FR\FM\18NON1.SGM 18NON1 63684 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2019 / Notices that can provide adequate or equivalent protection are immediately apparent (48 FR 13970; April 1, 1983). This departure from license conditions or technical specifications must be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator. In 1986, in its final rule, ‘‘Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants’’ (51 FR 27817; August 4, 1986), the Commission issued 10 CFR 73.55(a), stating, in part: In accordance with § 50.54(x) and (y) of Part 50, the licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to § 73.55 in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to taking the action. In 1996, the NRC made a number of regulatory changes to address decommissioning. One of the changes was to amend 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y) to authorize a non-licensed operator called a ‘‘certified fuel handler,’’ in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve such protective actions in an emergency situation at a permanently shutdown facility. Specifically, in addressing the role of the CFH during emergencies, the Commission stated in the proposed rule, ‘‘Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors’’ (60 FR 37379; July 20, 1995): The Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR 50.54(y) to permit a certified fuel handler at nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel, subject to the requirements of § 50.82(a) and consistent with the proposed definition of ‘‘Certified Fuel Handler’’ specified in § 50.2, to make these evaluations and judgments. A nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel does not require a licensed individual to monitor core conditions. A certified fuel handler at a permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear power reactor undergoing decommissioning is an individual who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate plant conditions and make these judgments. In the final rule (61 FR 39298; July 29, 1996), the NRC added the following definition to 10 CFR 50.2, ‘‘[c]ertified fuel handler means, for a nuclear power reactor facility, a non-licensed operator who has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program approved by the Commission.’’ However, the decommissioning rule did not propose or make parallel changes to 10 CFR 73.55(a) regarding the role of a non- VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:41 Nov 15, 2019 Jkt 250001 licensed CFH at a permanently shutdown facility. In the final rule, ‘‘Power Reactor Security Requirements’’ (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009), the NRC relocated the security suspension requirements from 10 CFR 73.55(a) to 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii). The role of a CFH was not discussed in the rulemaking; therefore, the suspension of security measures in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(p) continues to require approval, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator, even for a permanently shutdown facility. Under 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as it determines are authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest. As explained below, the proposed exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law The proposed exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) would permit, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown. Although the exemption is effective upon receipt, the actions permitted by the exemption may not be implemented at the DAEC until the 10 CFR part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). The intent of the proposed exemption is to align these regulations with 10 CFR 50.54(y). Per 10 CFR 73.5, the NRC may grant specific exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as are authorized by law. Granting the proposed exemption is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and not otherwise inconsistent with NRC regulations or other applicable laws. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law. B. The Exemption Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and Security Permitting, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown will not endanger life or property or the common PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 defense and security for the reasons discussed below. First, 10 CFR 73.55(p)(2) will continue to require that ‘‘[s]uspended security measures must be reinstated as soon as conditions permit.’’ Second, the suspension of security measures for emergencies under 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) will continue to be invoked only ‘‘when this action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.’’ Thus, the exemption would not prevent the licensee from meeting the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) to protect the public health and safety. Third, the suspension of security measures for severe weather under 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be used only when ‘‘the suspension of affected security measures is immediately needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel and no other immediately apparent action consistent with the license conditions and technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent protection.’’ The requirement in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) to receive input from the security supervisor or manager will remain. Therefore, the exemption would not prevent the licensee from meeting the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) to protect the health and safety of the security force. Additionally, by letter dated August 28, 2019, the NRC approved the DAEC CFH Training and Retraining Program. The NRC staff found that, among other things, the program addresses the safe conduct of decommissioning activities, the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and the appropriate response to plant emergencies. Because a CFH at the DAEC will be sufficiently trained and qualified under an NRC-approved program, the NRC staff considers the CFH to have sufficient knowledge of operational and safety concerns, such that allowing the CFH to suspend security measures in emergencies or during severe weather will not result in undue risk to the public health and safety. In addition, since the exemption allows a CFH the same authority currently given to the licensed senior operator under 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii), no change is required to physical security. Since no change is required to physical security, the exemption would not reduce the overall effectiveness of the DAEC physical security plan and would not adversely E:\FR\FM\18NON1.SGM 18NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2019 / Notices impact the licensee’s ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material at the DAEC, and thus, would not have an effect on the common defense and security. The NRC staff has determined that the exemption would not reduce security measures currently in place to protect against radiological sabotage. Instead, the exemption would align the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) with the existing requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(y). For these reasons, permitting, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security. C. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest The proposed exemption would allow a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency when ‘‘immediately needed to protect the public health and safety’’ or during severe weather when ‘‘immediately needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel’’ at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown. If the exemption is not granted, the DAEC will be required to have a licensed senior operator available to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather for a permanently shutdown plant, even though there would no longer be a requirement for a licensed senior operator after the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) are submitted. This exemption is in the public interest for the following reasons. Without the exemption, there would be uncertainty regarding how the licensee will invoke the temporary suspension of security measures that may be needed for protecting the public health and safety or the personal health and safety of the security force personnel in emergencies or during severe weather given the differences between the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) and 10 CFR 50.54(y). The exemption would allow the licensee to make decisions pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) without having to maintain a staff of licensed senior operators at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel. The exemption would also allow the licensee to have an established procedure in place to allow VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:41 Nov 15, 2019 Jkt 250001 a CFH to suspend security measures in an emergency or during severe weather after the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) have been submitted. Finally, the consistent and efficient regulation of nuclear power plants serves the public interest and this exemption would assure consistency between the regulations in 10 CFR part 73 and 10 CFR 50.54(y) and the requirements concerning licensed operators in 10 CFR part 55. The NRC staff has determined that granting the proposed exemption would allow the licensee to designate a CFH with qualifications appropriate for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency to protect the public health and safety and during severe weather to protect the personal health and safety of the security force personnel at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown, which is consistent with the similar authority provided by 10 CFR 50.54(y). Therefore, the exemption is in the public interest. D. Environmental Consideration The NRC’s approval of the proposed exemption belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first finding that the category of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. Specifically, the NRC’s approval of the exemption is categorically excluded from further environmental analysis under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), the granting of an exemption from the requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought involve: Recordkeeping requirements; reporting requirements; inspection or surveillance requirements; equipment servicing or maintenance scheduling requirements; education, training, experience, qualification, requalification or other employment suitability requirements; safeguard PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 63685 plans, and materials control and accounting inventory scheduling requirements; scheduling requirements; surety, insurance or indemnity requirements; or other requirements of an administrative, managerial, or organizational nature. The NRC staff has determined that granting the proposed exemption involves no significant hazards consideration because allowing a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the security suspension at a permanently shutdown and defueled power plant does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed exemption is unrelated to any operational restriction. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The proposed exemption is not associated with construction, so there is no significant construction impact. The proposed exemption does not concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an accident) or mitigation. Thus, there is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents. Finally, the requirement regarding suspensions of security measures involves either safeguards, materials control, or managerial/ organizational matters. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and (c)(25), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the approval of the proposed exemption. IV. Conclusion Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the proposed exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee’s request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) to permit, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC once the certifications required under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) have been submitted. E:\FR\FM\18NON1.SGM 18NON1 63686 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2019 / Notices The exemption is effective upon receipt. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th, day of November 2019. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. /RA/ Craig G. Erlanger, Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2019–24855 Filed 11–15–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC–2019–0073] Stakeholder Input on Best Practices for Establishment and Operation of Local Community Advisory Boards in Response to a Portion of the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act On September 27, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) solicited comments on best practices for establishment and operation of local community advisory boards (CABs) associated with decommissioning activities, including lessons learned from existing boards, as required by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA). The public comment period was originally scheduled to close on November 15, 2019. The NRC has elected to reopen the public comment period to allow more time for members of the public to develop and submit their comments. Consistent with the consultation requirements in NEIMA Section 108, the NRC has hosted 11 public meetings and a public webinar to consult with host States, communities within the emergency planning zone of an applicable nuclear power reactor, and existing local CABs. The NRC is planning to host a second public webinar on November 19, 2019. In addition to these public meetings and public webinars, the NRC has developed a questionnaire to collect information regarding the areas identified in NEIMA with respect to the creation and operation of CABs from CABs in the vicinity of power reactors undergoing decommissioning, similar established stakeholder groups, or local government organizations. The results of the meetings, along with any other data received as a result of the NRC’s information collection activities VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:41 Nov 15, 2019 Jkt 250001 The due date of comments requested in the notice published on September 27, 2019 (84 FR 51189) is reopened. Comments should be filed no later than December 6, 2019. Comments received after this date will be considered, if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. The NRC hosted 11 Category 3 public meetings and a public webinar from August through October of 2019. A second public webinar will take place on November 19, 2019. Specific details regarding the webinar can be found on the NRC’s public website at https:// www.nrc.gov/waste/decommissioning/ neima-section-108.html. DATES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2019–0073. Address questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127; email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • Mail comments to: Office of Administration, Mail Stop: TWFN–7– A60M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 0001, ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff. For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see ‘‘Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments’’ in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. ADDRESSES: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Public meetings and webinar; reopening of comment period. AGENCY: SUMMARY: associated with the NEIMA Section 108, will be captured in a best practices report that will be submitted to Congress. Kim Conway, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 1335; email: NEIMA108.Resource@ nrc.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments A. Obtaining Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2019– 0073 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publiclyavailable information related to this action by any of the following methods: PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 • Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2019–0073. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@ nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this document. • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC–2019– 0073 in your comment submission. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at https:// www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS. II. Introduction On September 27, 2019 (84 FR 51189), as part of the ongoing efforts to obtain feedback from members of the public and other stakeholders, the NRC solicited comments on best practices for establishment and operation of local CABs associated with decommissioning activities, including lessons learned from existing boards, as required by Section 108 of NEIMA. The NRC is coordinating activities in accordance with Section 108 of NEIMA to develop a report identifying best practices for establishment and operation of CABs. E:\FR\FM\18NON1.SGM 18NON1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 222 (Monday, November 18, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63682-63686]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-24855]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-331; NRC-2019-0194]


NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an 
exemption in response to a February 28, 2019, request from NextEra 
Energy Duane Arnold, LLC. The exemption allows a certified fuel 
handler, in addition to a licensed senior operator, to suspend security 
measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the Duane Arnold 
Energy Center (DAEC) after both the ``Certification of Permanent 
Cessation of Operations'' and the ``Certification of Permanent Fuel 
Removal'' have been docketed for the facility.

DATES: The exemption was issued on November 7, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2019-0194 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0194. Address 
questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; 
telephone: 301-287-9127; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, contact the NRC's Public Document 
Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email 
to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS 
accession numbers are provided in a table in the ``Availability of 
Documents'' section of this document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

[[Page 63683]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mahesh Chawla, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-8371; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    The NRC is making the documents identified below available to 
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as 
indicated. To access documents related to this action, see the 
ADDRESSES section of this document.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Document                       ADAMS  accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;         ML19023A196
 ``Certification of Permanent Cessation
 of Power Operations''; Dated January
 18, 2019.
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;         ML19037A016
 ``Request for Approval of Certified
 Fuel Handler Training Program''; Dated
 January 29, 2019.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;       ML19204A287
 ``Duane Arnold Energy Center--Approval
 of a Certified Fuel Handler Training
 and Continuing Training Program'';
 Dated August 28, 2019.
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC;         ML19059A099
 ``Request for Exemption from 10 CFR
 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) Related to the
 Suspension of Security Measures in an
 Emergency or During Severe Weather'';
 Dated February 28, 2019.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of November, 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mahesh L. Chawla,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of Operating 
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachment: Exemption Related to the Approval Authority for Suspension 
of Security Measures in an Emergency or During Severe Weather

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-331

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC; Duane Arnold Energy Center

Exemption Related to the Approval Authority for Suspension of Security 
Measures in an Emergency or During Severe Weather

I. Background

    NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NEDA) is the holder of Renewed 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy 
Center (DAEC). The license provides, among other things, that the 
facility is subject to all applicable rules, regulations, and orders of 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission), now or 
hereafter in effect. The DAEC facility consists of a boiling-water 
reactor located in Linn County, Iowa.
    By letter dated January 18, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19023A196), NEDA provided 
formal notification to the NRC pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Sections 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.4(b)(8) of 
the intention to permanently cease power operations at the DAEC in the 
fourth quarter of 2020.
    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i)-(ii) and 50.82(a)(2), the 
10 CFR part 50 license for the facility no longer authorizes reactor 
operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel, 
after certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent 
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are docketed for the DAEC. As a 
result, licensed senior operators (i.e., individuals licensed under 10 
CFR part 55 to manipulate the controls of a facility and to direct the 
licensed activities of licensed operators) will no longer be required 
to support plant operating activities. Instead, certified fuel handlers 
(CFHs) (i.e., non-licensed operators who have qualified in accordance 
with a fuel handler training program approved by the Commission) will 
perform activities associated with decommissioning, irradiated fuel 
handling, and management. Commission approval of a fuel handler 
training program is needed to facilitate these activities.
    By letter dated January 29, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19037A016), 
NEDA submitted a request for Commission approval of the CFH Training 
and Retraining Program for the DAEC. By letter dated August 28, 2019 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19204A287), the Commission approved the CFH 
Training and Retraining Program for the DAEC. The CFH Training and 
Retraining Program is to be used to satisfy training requirements for 
the plant personnel responsible for supervising and directing the 
monitoring, storage, handling, and cooling of irradiated fuel in a 
manner consistent with ensuring the health and safety of the public. As 
stated in 10 CFR 50.2, ``Definitions,'' CFHs are qualified in 
accordance with a Commission-approved training program.

II. Request/Action

    The Commission's regulation at 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1) addresses the 
suspension of security measures in an emergency (10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i)) 
or during severe weather (10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii)) by stating:

    The licensee may suspend implementation of affected requirements 
of this section under the following conditions:
    (i) In accordance with Sec. Sec.  50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of this 
chapter, the licensee may suspend any security measures under this 
section in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to 
protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with 
license conditions and technical specifications that can provide 
adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This 
suspension of security measures must be approved as a minimum by a 
licensed senior operator before taking this action.
    (ii) During severe weather when the suspension of affected 
security measures is immediately needed to protect the personal 
health and safety of security force personnel and no other 
immediately apparent action consistent with the license conditions 
and technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent 
protection. This suspension of security measures must be approved, 
as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator, with input from the 
security supervisor or manager, before taking this action.

    By letter dated February 28, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML19059A099), NEDA requested an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) 
and (ii), pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions.'' Consistent 
with 10 CFR 50.54(y), the proposed exemption would authorize a CFH, in 
addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of 
security measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC.

III. Discussion

    The NRC's security rules have long recognized the potential need to 
suspend security or safeguards measures under certain conditions. 
Accordingly, 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y), first published in 1983, allow a 
licensee to take reasonable actions in an emergency that depart from 
license conditions or technical specifications when those actions are 
immediately ``needed to protect the public health and safety'' and no 
actions consistent with license conditions and technical specifications

[[Page 63684]]

that can provide adequate or equivalent protection are immediately 
apparent (48 FR 13970; April 1, 1983). This departure from license 
conditions or technical specifications must be approved, as a minimum, 
by a licensed senior operator. In 1986, in its final rule, 
``Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Power Plants'' (51 FR 27817; August 4, 1986), the Commission 
issued 10 CFR 73.55(a), stating, in part:

    In accordance with Sec.  50.54(x) and (y) of Part 50, the 
licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to Sec.  73.55 
in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect 
the public health and safety and no action consistent with license 
conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or 
equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension must 
be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to 
taking the action.

    In 1996, the NRC made a number of regulatory changes to address 
decommissioning. One of the changes was to amend 10 CFR 50.54(x) and 
(y) to authorize a non-licensed operator called a ``certified fuel 
handler,'' in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve such 
protective actions in an emergency situation at a permanently shutdown 
facility. Specifically, in addressing the role of the CFH during 
emergencies, the Commission stated in the proposed rule, 
``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors'' (60 FR 37379; July 20, 
1995):

    The Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR 50.54(y) to permit a 
certified fuel handler at nuclear power reactors that have 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel, subject to the requirements of Sec.  50.82(a) and 
consistent with the proposed definition of ``Certified Fuel 
Handler'' specified in Sec.  50.2, to make these evaluations and 
judgments. A nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased 
operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel does not 
require a licensed individual to monitor core conditions. A 
certified fuel handler at a permanently shutdown and defueled 
nuclear power reactor undergoing decommissioning is an individual 
who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate plant 
conditions and make these judgments.

    In the final rule (61 FR 39298; July 29, 1996), the NRC added the 
following definition to 10 CFR 50.2, ``[c]ertified fuel handler means, 
for a nuclear power reactor facility, a non-licensed operator who has 
qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program approved 
by the Commission.'' However, the decommissioning rule did not propose 
or make parallel changes to 10 CFR 73.55(a) regarding the role of a 
non-licensed CFH at a permanently shutdown facility.
    In the final rule, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements'' (74 FR 
13926; March 27, 2009), the NRC relocated the security suspension 
requirements from 10 CFR 73.55(a) to 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii). 
The role of a CFH was not discussed in the rulemaking; therefore, the 
suspension of security measures in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(p) 
continues to require approval, as a minimum, by a licensed senior 
operator, even for a permanently shutdown facility.
    Under 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission may, upon application of any 
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as it determines are authorized by law, 
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, 
and are otherwise in the public interest. As explained below, the 
proposed exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the 
public interest.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The proposed exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) would 
permit, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior operator, 
to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or 
during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently shutdown. 
Although the exemption is effective upon receipt, the actions permitted 
by the exemption may not be implemented at the DAEC until the 10 CFR 
part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or 
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance 
with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). The intent of the proposed exemption is to 
align these regulations with 10 CFR 50.54(y).
    Per 10 CFR 73.5, the NRC may grant specific exemptions from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as are authorized by law. Granting the 
proposed exemption is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, and not otherwise inconsistent with NRC regulations or other 
applicable laws. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common 
Defense and Security

    Permitting, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to a licensed senior 
operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an 
emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it is permanently 
shutdown will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 
security for the reasons discussed below.
    First, 10 CFR 73.55(p)(2) will continue to require that 
``[s]uspended security measures must be reinstated as soon as 
conditions permit.''
    Second, the suspension of security measures for emergencies under 
10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) will continue to be invoked only ``when this 
action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety 
and no action consistent with license conditions and technical 
specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is 
immediately apparent.'' Thus, the exemption would not prevent the 
licensee from meeting the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) 
to protect the public health and safety.
    Third, the suspension of security measures for severe weather under 
10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be used only when ``the 
suspension of affected security measures is immediately needed to 
protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel and 
no other immediately apparent action consistent with the license 
conditions and technical specifications can provide adequate or 
equivalent protection.'' The requirement in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) to 
receive input from the security supervisor or manager will remain. 
Therefore, the exemption would not prevent the licensee from meeting 
the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) to protect the health 
and safety of the security force.
    Additionally, by letter dated August 28, 2019, the NRC approved the 
DAEC CFH Training and Retraining Program. The NRC staff found that, 
among other things, the program addresses the safe conduct of 
decommissioning activities, the safe handling and storage of spent 
fuel, and the appropriate response to plant emergencies. Because a CFH 
at the DAEC will be sufficiently trained and qualified under an NRC-
approved program, the NRC staff considers the CFH to have sufficient 
knowledge of operational and safety concerns, such that allowing the 
CFH to suspend security measures in emergencies or during severe 
weather will not result in undue risk to the public health and safety.
    In addition, since the exemption allows a CFH the same authority 
currently given to the licensed senior operator under 10 CFR 
73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii), no change is required to physical security. 
Since no change is required to physical security, the exemption would 
not reduce the overall effectiveness of the DAEC physical security plan 
and would not adversely

[[Page 63685]]

impact the licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect 
special nuclear material at the DAEC, and thus, would not have an 
effect on the common defense and security. The NRC staff has determined 
that the exemption would not reduce security measures currently in 
place to protect against radiological sabotage. Instead, the exemption 
would align the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) with the 
existing requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(y).
    For these reasons, permitting, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to 
a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security 
measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC when it 
is permanently shutdown will not endanger life or property or the 
common defense and security.

C. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    The proposed exemption would allow a CFH, in addition to a licensed 
senior operator, to approve the suspension of security measures in an 
emergency when ``immediately needed to protect the public health and 
safety'' or during severe weather when ``immediately needed to protect 
the personal health and safety of security force personnel'' at the 
DAEC when it is permanently shutdown. If the exemption is not granted, 
the DAEC will be required to have a licensed senior operator available 
to approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or 
during severe weather for a permanently shutdown plant, even though 
there would no longer be a requirement for a licensed senior operator 
after the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) are 
submitted.
    This exemption is in the public interest for the following reasons. 
Without the exemption, there would be uncertainty regarding how the 
licensee will invoke the temporary suspension of security measures that 
may be needed for protecting the public health and safety or the 
personal health and safety of the security force personnel in 
emergencies or during severe weather given the differences between the 
requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) and 10 CFR 50.54(y). The 
exemption would allow the licensee to make decisions pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) without having to maintain a staff of licensed 
senior operators at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased 
operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel. The 
exemption would also allow the licensee to have an established 
procedure in place to allow a CFH to suspend security measures in an 
emergency or during severe weather after the certifications required by 
10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) have been submitted. Finally, the 
consistent and efficient regulation of nuclear power plants serves the 
public interest and this exemption would assure consistency between the 
regulations in 10 CFR part 73 and 10 CFR 50.54(y) and the requirements 
concerning licensed operators in 10 CFR part 55.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the proposed exemption 
would allow the licensee to designate a CFH with qualifications 
appropriate for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor to approve 
the suspension of security measures in an emergency to protect the 
public health and safety and during severe weather to protect the 
personal health and safety of the security force personnel at the DAEC 
when it is permanently shutdown, which is consistent with the similar 
authority provided by 10 CFR 50.54(y). Therefore, the exemption is in 
the public interest.

D. Environmental Consideration

    The NRC's approval of the proposed exemption belongs to a category 
of actions that the Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to 
be a categorical exclusion, after first finding that the category of 
actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect 
on the human environment. Specifically, the NRC's approval of the 
exemption is categorically excluded from further environmental analysis 
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), the granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that: (i) There is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve: Recordkeeping requirements; reporting requirements; inspection 
or surveillance requirements; equipment servicing or maintenance 
scheduling requirements; education, training, experience, 
qualification, requalification or other employment suitability 
requirements; safeguard plans, and materials control and accounting 
inventory scheduling requirements; scheduling requirements; surety, 
insurance or indemnity requirements; or other requirements of an 
administrative, managerial, or organizational nature.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the proposed exemption 
involves no significant hazards consideration because allowing a CFH, 
in addition to a licensed senior operator, to approve the security 
suspension at a permanently shutdown and defueled power plant does not 
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences 
of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety. The proposed exemption is unrelated to any operational 
restriction. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types 
or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite and no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The proposed 
exemption is not associated with construction, so there is no 
significant construction impact. The proposed exemption does not 
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an 
accident) or mitigation. Thus, there is no significant increase in the 
potential for or consequences from radiological accidents. Finally, the 
requirement regarding suspensions of security measures involves either 
safeguards, materials control, or managerial/organizational matters.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and (c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of the proposed exemption.

IV. Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, the proposed exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger 
life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise 
in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the 
licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
73.55(p)(1)(i) and (ii) to permit, as a minimum, a CFH, in addition to 
a licensed senior operator, to approve the suspension of security 
measures in an emergency or during severe weather at the DAEC once the 
certifications required under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) have been submitted.

[[Page 63686]]

    The exemption is effective upon receipt.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th, day of November 2019.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    /RA/

Craig G. Erlanger, Director,

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2019-24855 Filed 11-15-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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