In the Matter of: Ali Caby, a/k/a “Alex” Caby, Blvd. James Boucher 91, Apt. 13, Floor 4, Lozenets, Sofia, Bulgaria 1407, et al., Respondents; Order Relating to Ali Caby, a/k/a “Alex” Caby, 61870-61872 [2019-24742]
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61870
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 220 / Thursday, November 14, 2019 / Notices
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or engaging
in any other activity subject to the
Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or
from any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
Second, no person may, directly or
indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of the Denied Person any item subject to
the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
the Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States, including financing or other
support activities related to a
transaction whereby the Denied Person
acquires or attempts to acquire such
ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from the Denied Person of
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been exported from the United
States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in
the United States any item subject to the
Regulations with knowledge or reason
to know that the item will be, or is
intended to be, exported from the
United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by the Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States. For purposes of this paragraph,
servicing means installation,
maintenance, repair, modification or
testing.
Third, after notice and opportunity for
comment as provided in Section 766.23
of the Regulations, any other person,
firm, corporation, or business
organization related to Biria by
ownership, control, position of
responsibility, affiliation, or other
connection in the conduct of trade or
business may also be made subject to
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:47 Nov 13, 2019
Jkt 250001
the provisions of this Order in order to
prevent evasion of this Order.
Fourth, in accordance with Part 756 of
the Regulations, Biria may file an appeal
of this Order with the Under Secretary
of Commerce for Industry and Security.
The appeal must be filed within 45 days
from the date of this Order and must
comply with the provisions of Part 756
of the Regulations.
Fifth, a copy of this Order shall be
delivered to Biria and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
Sixth, this Order is effective
immediately and shall remain in effect
until August 14, 2029.
Issued this 7th day of November 2019.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel,
Director, Office of Exporter Services.
[FR Doc. 2019–24737 Filed 11–13–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Action Affecting Export Privilege:
Rasheed Al Jijakli; Correction
Summary: In the Federal Register of
Monday, October 7, 2019, the Bureau of
Industry and Security published an
Order denying the export privileges of
Rasheed Al Jijakli. The Order
inadvertently referenced the U.S.
District Court as the ‘‘U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia’’
instead of the ‘‘United States District
Court for the Central District of
California’’. This notice is being
published to correct the name of the
U.S. District Court.
Correction:
In the Federal Register of Monday,
October 7, 2019, in FR Doc. 2019–
21745, on page 53405, in the first full
paragraph of the third column, the
correct name of the U.S. District Court
should read as follows ‘‘. . . in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of
California . . .’’
Issued this 7th day of November 2019.
Karen H. Nies-Vogel,
Director, Office of Exporter Services.
[FR Doc. 2019–24738 Filed 11–13–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Case No. 18–BIS–0002]
In the Matter of: Ali Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Alex’’
Caby, Blvd. James Boucher 91, Apt.
13, Floor 4, Lozenets, Sofia, Bulgaria
1407, et al., Respondents; Order
Relating to Ali Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Alex’’ Caby
The Bureau of Industry and Security,
U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘BIS’’),
has notified Ali Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Alex’’
Caby, of Sofia, Bulgaria, that it has
initiated an administrative proceeding
against him pursuant to Section 766.3 of
the Export Administration Regulations
(the ‘‘Regulations’’),1 through the
issuance of a Charging Letter alleging
that Ali Caby, Arash Caby, Marjan Caby,
AW-Tronics LLC, (‘‘AW-Tronics’’) and
Arrowtronic, LLC (‘‘Arrowtronic’’)
(collectively, ‘‘Respondents’’) violated
the Regulations as follows:
Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)—Conspiracy
Beginning as early as in or about
September 2013, and continuing through in
or about March 2014, Respondents conspired
and acted in concert with others, known and
unknown, to bring about one or more acts
that constitute a violation of the Regulations.
The purpose and object of the conspiracy was
to unlawfully export goods from the United
States through transshipment points to Syria,
including to Syrian Arab Airlines (‘‘Syrian
Air’’), the flag carrier airline of Syria and a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(‘‘SDGT’’), and in doing so evade the
prohibitions and licensing requirements of
the Regulations and avoid detection by U.S.
law enforcement.
1 The Regulations originally issued under the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50
U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘the EAA’’),
which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President,
through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001
(3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was
extended by successive Presidential Notices,
continued the Regulations in full force and effect
under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)
(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of
2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the
EAA (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides,
in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that
were made or issued under the EAA, including as
continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13,
2018), shall continue in effect according to their
terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or
revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the
authority provided under ECRA. The Regulations
are currently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2018). The
charged violation occurred in 2013–2014. The
Regulations governing the violation at issue are
found in the 2013–2014 versions of the Code of
Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730–774 (2013–
2014)). The 2019 Regulations set forth the
procedures that apply to this matter.
E:\FR\FM\14NON1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 220 / Thursday, November 14, 2019 / Notices
Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the
Regulations, a license is required for the
export or reexport to Syria of all items subject
to the Regulations, except food and medicine
classified as EAR99. Furthermore, pursuant
to Section 744.12 of the Regulations, a
license is required to export or reexport items
subject to the Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian
Air was designated as an SDGT on May 16,
2013 (see 78 FR 32304, May 29, 2013), under
authority granted to the Department of the
Treasury by Executive Order 13,224, and was
at all times pertinent hereto (and remains)
listed as an SDGT.
At all pertinent times, AW-Tronics and
Arrowtronic were active limited liability
companies incorporated in the State of
Florida. Documentary evidence and email
correspondence shows that AW-Tronics
personnel represented to various transaction
parties that AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic
(collectively, ‘‘AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic’’)
were the same company. Arash Caby was
listed on Florida corporate records as a
Managing Member of AW-Tronics at the time
of the violations. From January 2014 until its
most recent annual report in January 2017,
Ali Caby was listed on Florida corporate
records as the registered agent of AWTronics. AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic has
maintained offices in Miami, Florida and
Sofia, Bulgaria, as well as other locations.
As part of the conspiracy, the coconspirators used electronic mail (email) and
other forms of communication to
communicate with each other between the
United States, Bulgaria, United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Syria. Under their
scheme, co-conspirators would purchase
from U.S. suppliers or vendors items subject
to the Regulations for export to Syrian Air in
Syria, including aircraft parts and equipment,
and would provide materially false or
misleading documents and information to
conceal the illegal exports. In furtherance of
the conspiracy, they also would arrange for
payment for the illegal exports to be made
using third-party companies to transfer
payments between the co-conspirators.
Overall, between in or about September 2013
and in or about March 2014, Respondents
engaged in multiple transactions with Syrian
Air involving the export of aircraft parts and
equipment subject to the Regulations from
the Miami office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic
to Syrian Air’s transshipment point in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates. These items were
actually intended for, and some or all were
ultimately delivered to, Syrian Air in Syria.
During the conspiracy, Ali Caby managed
the Bulgaria office of AW-Tronics/
Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby managed its
Miami office, and Marjan Caby was its
internal auditor. In furtherance of the
conspiracy, each of these respondents
exchanged numerous emails with other AWTronics/Arrowtronic employees authorizing
or otherwise discussing the above-described
exports to Syrian Air. These email
communications included, for example,
instructions that were designed to prevent
U.S. law enforcement from detecting the
unlawful exports to Syria and to allow them
to continue by changing the routing of
exports from AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic’s
Miami, Florida office. In March 2014, United
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:47 Nov 13, 2019
Jkt 250001
States Customs and Border Protection seized
a shipment of micro switches that, according
to Electronic Export Information (EEI) filed in
the Automated Export System, was destined
for Syrian Air in the UAE, when, in fact, the
ultimate destination was Syria. On March 5,
2014, Marjan Caby sent an email to AWTronics/Arrowtronic logistics employees,
copying Alex Caby, that explained, ‘‘We will
. . . have packages stopped by the US
Customs and Border Control [and] have a
case file like this for the same client[,]’’ and
provided instructions stating, ‘‘NOTHING
WILL BE SHIPPED TO CLIENTS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST FROM THE USA OFFICE. WE
HAVE TO SEND TO BG [Bulgaria] THEN TO
CLIENT.’’ (Emphasis in original). ‘‘SYRIA’’
was specifically listed as one country for
which Respondents would use Bulgaria as a
transshipment point. (Same).
In so doing, Ali Caby, a/k/a Alex Caby,
Arash Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Axel’’ Caby, Marjan Caby,
AW-Tronics, LLC, and Arrowtronic, LLC
violated Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations,
for which they are jointly and severally
liable.
Whereas, BIS and Ali Caby have
entered into a Settlement Agreement
pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the
Regulations, whereby they agreed to
settle this matter in accordance with the
terms and conditions set forth therein;
Whereas, I have taken into
consideration the plea agreement
entered into by Ali Caby with the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of Florida, and the sentence
imposed against him following or upon
the entry of his guilty plea and
conviction (‘‘the plea agreement and
sentence’’); and
Whereas, I have approved of the terms
of the Settlement Agreement;
It is therefore ordered:
First, for the period of six (6) years
from the date of this Order Ali Caby,
a/k/a ‘‘Alex’’ Caby, with a last known
address of Blvd. James Boucher 91, Apt.
13, Floor 4, Lozenets, Sofia, Bulgaria
1407, and when acting for or on his
behalf, his successors, assigns,
representatives, agents, or employees
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
the ‘‘Denied Person’’), may not, directly
or indirectly, participate in any way in
any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
‘‘item’’) exported to or to be exported
from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or in any other activity
subject to the Regulations, including,
but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, license exception, or export
control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
61871
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the Regulations, or engaging
in any other activity subject to the
Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the Regulations, or
from any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
Second, no person may, directly or
indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of the Denied Person any item subject to
the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
the Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States, including financing or other
support activities related to a
transaction whereby the Denied Person
acquires or attempts to acquire such
ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from the Denied Person of
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been exported from the United
States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in
the United States any item subject to the
Regulations with knowledge or reason
to know that the item will be, or is
intended to be, exported from the
United States, or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the Regulations that
has been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by the Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the Regulations that has been
or will be exported from the United
States. For purposes of this paragraph,
servicing means installation,
maintenance, repair, modification or
testing.
Third, any licenses issued under the
Regulations in which Ali Caby has an
interest as of the date of this Order shall
be revoked by BIS.
Fourth, after notice and opportunity
for comment as provided in Section
766.23 of the Regulations, any person,
firm, corporation, or business
organization related to the Denied
Person by affiliation, ownership,
control, or position of responsibility in
the conduct of trade or related services
may also be made subject to the
provisions of this Order.
E:\FR\FM\14NON1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 220 / Thursday, November 14, 2019 / Notices
Fifth, the six-year denial period set
forth above shall be active for a period
of four years from the date of this Order.
As authorized by Section 766.18(c) of
the Regulations, the remaining two
years of the denial period shall be
suspended during a probationary period
of two years under this Order, and shall
thereafter be waived, provided that Ali
Caby has committed no other violation
of the Export Control Reform Act of
2018 (‘‘ECRA’’),2 or the Regulations or
any order, license or authorization
issued under ECRA or the Regulations.
If Ali Caby commits another violation of
ECRA or the Regulations or any order,
license or authorization issued under
ECRA or the Regulations during the sixyear denial period under this Order, the
two-year suspended portion of this
Order may be modified or revoked by
BIS. If the suspension is modified or
revoked, BIS may extend the active
denial period until up to six years from
the date of this Order when the
activation occurs during the first four
years from the date of this Order. BIS
may extend the active denial period
until up to two years from the date of
the activation when the activation
occurs more than four years from the
date of this Order.
Sixth, Ali Caby shall not take any
action or make or permit to be made any
public statement, directly or indirectly,
denying the allegations in the Charging
Letter or this Order.
Seventh, the Charging Letter, the
Settlement Agreement, and this Order
shall be made available to the public.
Eighth, this Order shall be served on
Ali Caby and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the
final agency action in this matter related
to Ali Caby, is effective immediately.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Director, Office of Export Enforcement,
performing the non-exclusive functions and
duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2019–24742 Filed 11–13–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Bureau of Industry and Security
In the Matter of: Arash Caby, a/k/a
‘‘Axel’’ Caby, 7405 SW 79CT, Miami, FL
33143, et al., Respondents, Case No.
18–BIS–0002; Order Relating to Arash
Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Axel’’ Caby
The Bureau of Industry and Security,
U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘BIS’’),
2 See
note 1, supra.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:47 Nov 13, 2019
Jkt 250001
has notified Arash Caby, a/k/a ‘‘Axel’’
Caby, of Miami, Florida, that it has
initiated an administrative proceeding
against him pursuant to Section 766.3 of
the Export Administration Regulations
(the ‘‘Regulations’’),1 through the
issuance of a Charging Letter alleging
that Arash Caby, Ali Caby, Marjan Caby,
AW-Tronics LLC, (‘‘AW-Tronics’’) and
Arrowtronic, LLC (‘‘Arrowtronic’’)
(collectively, ‘‘Respondents’’) violated
the Regulations as follows:
Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)—Conspiracy
Beginning as early as in or about
September 2013, and continuing through in
or about March 2014, Respondents conspired
and acted in concert with others, known and
unknown, to bring about one or more acts
that constitute a violation of the Regulations.
The purpose and object of the conspiracy was
to unlawfully export goods from the United
States through transshipment points to Syria,
including to Syrian Arab Airlines (‘‘Syrian
Air’’), the flag carrier airline of Syria and a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(‘‘SDGT’’), and in doing so evade the
prohibitions and licensing requirements of
the Regulations and avoid detection by U.S.
law enforcement.
Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the
Regulations, a license is required for the
export or reexport to Syria of all items subject
to the Regulations, except food and medicine
classified as EAR99. Furthermore, pursuant
to Section 744.12 of the Regulations, a
license is required to export or reexport items
subject to the Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian
Air was designated as an SDGT on May 16,
2013 (see 78 FR 32304, May 29, 2013), under
authority granted to the Department of the
Treasury by Executive Order 13,224, and was
at all times pertinent hereto (and remains)
listed as an SDGT.
1 The Regulations originally issued under the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50
U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘the EAA’’),
which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President,
through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001
(3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was
extended by successive Presidential Notices,
continued the Regulations in full force and effect
under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)
(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of
2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the
EAA (except for three sections which are
inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides,
in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that
were made or issued under the EAA, including as
continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13,
2018), shall continue in effect according to their
terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or
revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the
authority provided under ECRA. The Regulations
are currently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2018). The
charged violation occurred in 2013–2014. The
Regulations governing the violation at issue are
found in the 2013–2014 versions of the Code of
Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730–774 (2013–
2014)). The 2019 Regulations set forth the
procedures that apply to this matter.
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
At all pertinent times, AW-Tronics and
Arrowtronic were active limited liability
companies incorporated in the State of
Florida. Documentary evidence and email
correspondence shows that AW-Tronics
personnel represented to various transaction
parties that AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic
(collectively, ‘‘AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic’’)
were the same company. Arash Caby was
listed on Florida corporate records as a
Managing Member of AW-Tronics at the time
of the violations. From January 2014 until its
most recent annual report in January 2017,
Ali Caby was listed on Florida corporate
records as the registered agent of AWTronics. AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic has
maintained offices in Miami, Florida and
Sofia, Bulgaria, as well as other locations.
As part of the conspiracy, the coconspirators used electronic mail (email) and
other forms of communication to
communicate with each other between the
United States, Bulgaria, United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Syria. Under their
scheme, co-conspirators would purchase
from U.S. suppliers or vendors items subject
to the Regulations for export to Syrian Air in
Syria, including aircraft parts and equipment,
and would provide materially false or
misleading documents and information to
conceal the illegal exports. In furtherance of
the conspiracy, they also would arrange for
payment for the illegal exports to be made
using third-party companies to transfer
payments between the co-conspirators.
Overall, between in or about September 2013
and in or about March 2014, Respondents
engaged in multiple transactions with Syrian
Air involving the export of aircraft parts and
equipment subject to the Regulations from
the Miami office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic
to Syrian Air’s transshipment point in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates. These items were
actually intended for, and some or all were
ultimately delivered to, Syrian Air in Syria.
During the conspiracy, Ali Caby managed
the Bulgaria office of AW-Tronics/
Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby managed its
Miami office, and Marjan Caby was its
internal auditor. In furtherance of the
conspiracy, each of these respondents
exchanged numerous emails with other AWTronics/Arrowtronic employees authorizing
or otherwise discussing the above-described
exports to Syrian Air. These email
communications included, for example,
instructions that were designed to prevent
U.S. law enforcement from detecting the
unlawful exports to Syria and to allow them
to continue by changing the routing of
exports from AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic’s
Miami, Florida office. In March 2014, United
States Customs and Border Protection seized
a shipment of micro switches that, according
to Electronic Export Information (EEI) filed in
the Automated Export System, was destined
for Syrian Air in the UAE, when, in fact, the
ultimate destination was Syria. On March 5,
2014, Marjan Caby sent an email to AWTronics/Arrowtronic logistics employees,
copying Alex Caby, that explained, ‘‘We will
. . . have packages stopped by the US
Customs and Border Control [and] have a
case file like this for the same client[,]’’ and
provided instructions stating, ‘‘NOTHING
WILL BE SHIPPED TO CLIENTS IN THE
E:\FR\FM\14NON1.SGM
14NON1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 220 (Thursday, November 14, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61870-61872]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-24742]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Case No. 18-BIS-0002]
In the Matter of: Ali Caby, a/k/a ``Alex'' Caby, Blvd. James
Boucher 91, Apt. 13, Floor 4, Lozenets, Sofia, Bulgaria 1407, et al.,
Respondents; Order Relating to Ali Caby, a/k/a ``Alex'' Caby
The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
(``BIS''), has notified Ali Caby, a/k/a ``Alex'' Caby, of Sofia,
Bulgaria, that it has initiated an administrative proceeding against
him pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations
(the ``Regulations''),\1\ through the issuance of a Charging Letter
alleging that Ali Caby, Arash Caby, Marjan Caby, AW-Tronics LLC, (``AW-
Tronics'') and Arrowtronic, LLC (``Arrowtronic'') (collectively,
``Respondents'') violated the Regulations as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Regulations originally issued under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp.
III 2015) (``the EAA''), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The
President, through Executive Order 13,222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR,
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which was extended by successive
Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in full force and
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the
President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export
Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While
Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for
three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA
provides, in pertinent part, that all rules and regulations that
were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect
pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment
(August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms
until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action
undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. The
Regulations are currently codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2018). The charged violation
occurred in 2013-2014. The Regulations governing the violation at
issue are found in the 2013-2014 versions of the Code of Federal
Regulations (15 CFR parts 730-774 (2013-2014)). The 2019 Regulations
set forth the procedures that apply to this matter.
Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy
Beginning as early as in or about September 2013, and continuing
through in or about March 2014, Respondents conspired and acted in
concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about one or more
acts that constitute a violation of the Regulations. The purpose and
object of the conspiracy was to unlawfully export goods from the
United States through transshipment points to Syria, including to
Syrian Arab Airlines (``Syrian Air''), the flag carrier airline of
Syria and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT''), and in
doing so evade the prohibitions and licensing requirements of the
Regulations and avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement.
[[Page 61871]]
Pursuant to Section 746.9 of the Regulations, a license is
required for the export or reexport to Syria of all items subject to
the Regulations, except food and medicine classified as EAR99.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 744.12 of the Regulations, a
license is required to export or reexport items subject to the
Regulations to SDGTs. Syrian Air was designated as an SDGT on May
16, 2013 (see 78 FR 32304, May 29, 2013), under authority granted to
the Department of the Treasury by Executive Order 13,224, and was at
all times pertinent hereto (and remains) listed as an SDGT.
At all pertinent times, AW-Tronics and Arrowtronic were active
limited liability companies incorporated in the State of Florida.
Documentary evidence and email correspondence shows that AW-Tronics
personnel represented to various transaction parties that AW-Tronics
and Arrowtronic (collectively, ``AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic'') were the
same company. Arash Caby was listed on Florida corporate records as
a Managing Member of AW-Tronics at the time of the violations. From
January 2014 until its most recent annual report in January 2017,
Ali Caby was listed on Florida corporate records as the registered
agent of AW-Tronics. AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic has maintained offices
in Miami, Florida and Sofia, Bulgaria, as well as other locations.
As part of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators used electronic
mail (email) and other forms of communication to communicate with
each other between the United States, Bulgaria, United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and Syria. Under their scheme, co-conspirators would purchase
from U.S. suppliers or vendors items subject to the Regulations for
export to Syrian Air in Syria, including aircraft parts and
equipment, and would provide materially false or misleading
documents and information to conceal the illegal exports. In
furtherance of the conspiracy, they also would arrange for payment
for the illegal exports to be made using third-party companies to
transfer payments between the co-conspirators. Overall, between in
or about September 2013 and in or about March 2014, Respondents
engaged in multiple transactions with Syrian Air involving the
export of aircraft parts and equipment subject to the Regulations
from the Miami office of AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic to Syrian Air's
transshipment point in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. These items were
actually intended for, and some or all were ultimately delivered to,
Syrian Air in Syria.
During the conspiracy, Ali Caby managed the Bulgaria office of
AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic, while Arash Caby managed its Miami office,
and Marjan Caby was its internal auditor. In furtherance of the
conspiracy, each of these respondents exchanged numerous emails with
other AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic employees authorizing or otherwise
discussing the above-described exports to Syrian Air. These email
communications included, for example, instructions that were
designed to prevent U.S. law enforcement from detecting the unlawful
exports to Syria and to allow them to continue by changing the
routing of exports from AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic's Miami, Florida
office. In March 2014, United States Customs and Border Protection
seized a shipment of micro switches that, according to Electronic
Export Information (EEI) filed in the Automated Export System, was
destined for Syrian Air in the UAE, when, in fact, the ultimate
destination was Syria. On March 5, 2014, Marjan Caby sent an email
to AW-Tronics/Arrowtronic logistics employees, copying Alex Caby,
that explained, ``We will . . . have packages stopped by the US
Customs and Border Control [and] have a case file like this for the
same client[,]'' and provided instructions stating, ``NOTHING WILL
BE SHIPPED TO CLIENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE USA OFFICE. WE
HAVE TO SEND TO BG [Bulgaria] THEN TO CLIENT.'' (Emphasis in
original). ``SYRIA'' was specifically listed as one country for
which Respondents would use Bulgaria as a transshipment point.
(Same).
In so doing, Ali Caby, a/k/a Alex Caby, Arash Caby, a/k/a
``Axel'' Caby, Marjan Caby, AW-Tronics, LLC, and Arrowtronic, LLC
violated Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations, for which they are
jointly and severally liable.
Whereas, BIS and Ali Caby have entered into a Settlement Agreement
pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby they agreed
to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and conditions set
forth therein;
Whereas, I have taken into consideration the plea agreement entered
into by Ali Caby with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of Florida, and the sentence imposed against him following or
upon the entry of his guilty plea and conviction (``the plea agreement
and sentence''); and
Whereas, I have approved of the terms of the Settlement Agreement;
It is therefore ordered:
First, for the period of six (6) years from the date of this Order
Ali Caby, a/k/a ``Alex'' Caby, with a last known address of Blvd. James
Boucher 91, Apt. 13, Floor 4, Lozenets, Sofia, Bulgaria 1407, and when
acting for or on his behalf, his successors, assigns, representatives,
agents, or employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
``Denied Person''), may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any
way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology
(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported to or to be
exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or
in any other activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not
limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license
exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any
other activity subject to the Regulations; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.
Second, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item
subject to the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or
control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be
exported from the United States, including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires
or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to
the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the
item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States, or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the
Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States
and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or
service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any
item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from
the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means
installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
Third, any licenses issued under the Regulations in which Ali Caby
has an interest as of the date of this Order shall be revoked by BIS.
Fourth, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in
Section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to the Denied Person by affiliation,
ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of
trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of
this Order.
[[Page 61872]]
Fifth, the six-year denial period set forth above shall be active
for a period of four years from the date of this Order. As authorized
by Section 766.18(c) of the Regulations, the remaining two years of the
denial period shall be suspended during a probationary period of two
years under this Order, and shall thereafter be waived, provided that
Ali Caby has committed no other violation of the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018 (``ECRA''),\2\ or the Regulations or any order, license or
authorization issued under ECRA or the Regulations. If Ali Caby commits
another violation of ECRA or the Regulations or any order, license or
authorization issued under ECRA or the Regulations during the six-year
denial period under this Order, the two-year suspended portion of this
Order may be modified or revoked by BIS. If the suspension is modified
or revoked, BIS may extend the active denial period until up to six
years from the date of this Order when the activation occurs during the
first four years from the date of this Order. BIS may extend the active
denial period until up to two years from the date of the activation
when the activation occurs more than four years from the date of this
Order.
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\2\ See note 1, supra.
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Sixth, Ali Caby shall not take any action or make or permit to be
made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the
allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order.
Seventh, the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and this
Order shall be made available to the public.
Eighth, this Order shall be served on Ali Caby and shall be
published in the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this
matter related to Ali Caby, is effective immediately.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Director, Office of Export Enforcement, performing the non-exclusive
functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2019-24742 Filed 11-13-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
