Public Inquiry, 53181-53183 [2019-21679]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 193 / Friday, October 4, 2019 / Notices Interested parties are encouraged to send comments to the OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the address shown in the ADDRESSES section within thirty-(30) days of publication of this notice in the Federal Register. In order to help ensure appropriate consideration, comments should mention OMB Control Number 1220–0045. The OMB is particularly interested in comments that: • Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility. • Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used. • Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and • Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses. Agency: DOL–BLS. Title of Collection: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses. OMB Control Number: 1220–0045. Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profits; Not-for-profit institutions; Farms; State, Local or Tribal Governments. Total Estimated Number of Respondents: 232,400. Total Estimated Number of Responses: 232,400. Total Estimated Annual Time Burden: 195,060 hours. Total Estimated Annual Other Costs Burden: $0. (Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(1)(D)). Dated: September 27, 2019. Frederick Licari, Departmental Clearance Officer. [FR Doc. 2019–21611 Filed 10–3–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4510–24–P khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463, as amended), the National Science Foundation (NSF) announces the following meeting: VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:49 Oct 03, 2019 Jkt 250001 Name And Committee Code: Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences (#66). Date and Time: October 23, 2019; 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. October 24, 2019; 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Place: NSF, 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314 (Open Meeting). To attend the meeting in person, all visitors must contact the Directorate for MPS at least 48 hours prior to the meeting to arrange for a visitor’s badge. All visitors must access NSF via the Visitor Center entry adjacent to the south building entrance on Eisenhower Avenue on the day of the meeting to receive a visitor’s badge. It is suggested that visitors allow time to pass through security screening. Type of Meeting: Open. Contact Person: Nade`ge Aoki, National Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Room C 9015B, Alexandria, Virginia 22314; Telephone: 703/292–4934. Summary of Minutes: Minutes and meeting materials will be available on the MPS Advisory Committee website at https://www.nsf.gov/mps/advisory.jsp or can be obtained from contact person listed above. Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice, recommendations and counsel on major goals and policies pertaining to MPS programs and activities. Agenda Frm 00084 —Preparation for Meeting with NSF Director and COO —Meeting and discussion with NSF Director and COO —Closing remarks and adjourn for the day Thursday, October 24, 2019 —Call to Order and Official Opening of the 2nd Day—Anne Kinney, Assistant Director, MPS —FACA Briefing—Tomasz Durakiewicz, MPS —Key Questions from May Meeting of MPS AC—reminder—Anne Kinney, Assistant Director, MPS —DISCUSSION: Key Questions —SynBio Subcommittee: Reminder, charge, short discussion—Germano Iannacchione —SynBio Subcommittee: Vote—MPSAC Chair —Magnetic Science and Facilities— Linda Sapochak —Recap and revisit of the meeting + action items for the next meeting —Adjourn—Anne Kinney, Assistant Director, MPS Dated: October 1, 2019. Crystal Robinson, Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 2019–21678 Filed 10–3–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. PI2020–1; Order No. 5260] Wednesday, October 23, 2019 —Call to Order and Official Opening of the Meeting—Anne Kinney, Assistant Director, MPS —FACA and COI Briefing—Tomasz Durakiewicz, MPS —Approval of Prior Meeting Minutes (2 meetings)—Catherine T. Hunt, MPSAC Chair —UPDATE: MPS—Anne Kinney, Assistant Director, MPS —AST COV Report Presentation—Roger Brissenden, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics —AST COV Report discussion and vote on acceptance—MPSAC Chair —DMR COV Report Presentation— Melissa Hines, Cornell University —DMR COV Report discussion and vote on acceptance—MPSAC Chair —MPS Broadening Participation Working Group, report and discussion —Unstructured lunch conversations: Broadening Participation —DISCUSSION: Broadening Participation—Carol Bessel —Presentation by Carol Lynn Alpert, Director, Strategic Projects Group, Boston Museum of Science ‘‘Broadening Participation: Quantum Physics for All’’ PO 00000 53181 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Public Inquiry Postal Regulatory Commission. Notice. AGENCY: ACTION: The Commission is suggesting modifications and enhancements to the current estimation methodology to account specifically for recent Postal Service data changes, and for any other aspects of the monopolies estimation methodology. This document informs the public of this proceeding and the technical conference, invites public comment, and takes other administrative steps. DATES: Comments are due: November 1, 2019. ADDRESSES: Submit comments electronically via the Commission’s Filing Online system at https:// www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit comments electronically should contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section by telephone for advice on filing alternatives. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at 202–789–6820. SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\04OCN1.SGM 04OCN1 53182 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 193 / Friday, October 4, 2019 / Notices SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents I. Introduction II. Background III. Comments IV. Ordering Paragraphs I. Introduction In its Annual Report, the Commission estimates both a value for the Postal Service combined letter and mailbox monopolies, which are jointly referred to as the postal monopoly, and a separate value for the mailbox monopoly alone.1 The current methodology estimates the hypothetical lost profit to the Postal Service if potential competitors were allowed to enter and compete in the Postal Service’s letter and mailbox monopolies. FY 2018 Annual Report at 53–54. The Commission is soliciting comments and suggestions for modifications and enhancements to the current estimation methodology to account specifically for recent Postal Service data changes, and for any other aspects of the monopolies estimation methodology.2 khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES II. Background On December 19, 2008, the Commission transmitted to Congress and to the President a Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 3 as required by section 702 of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA), Public Law 109–435, 120 Stat. 3218 (2006).4 In its Report, the Commission first estimated the annual value of the combined letter and mailbox monopolies to be $3.48 billion and the value of the mailbox monopoly alone to be $1.33 billion for FY 2007. See Report at 144; Order No. 152. Since then, although not required to do so by statute, the Commission also 1 See PRC Annual Report to the President and Congress Fiscal Year 2018, January 10, 2019, at 53– 54 (FY 2018 Annual Report). 2 In this proceeding as in previous related Dockets, the Commission continues to solicit comments and participation of interested parties on the methodology to estimate the value of the Postal Service monopolies. See Docket No. PI2008–3, Notice and Order Providing An Opportunity to Comment, April 18, 2008 (Order No. 71); Docket No. PI2009–1, Notice and Order Providing an Opportunity for Comment, December 19, 2008 (Order No. 152). 3 PRC Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly, December 19, 2008 (Report). The Commission was assisted in this undertaking by a team of experts assembled by the School of Public Policy at George Mason University (GMU) and by GMU’s Center for Social Science Research. 4 Section 702(a)(1) of the PAEA requires the Commission to submit a report to the President and Congress on ‘‘universal postal service and the postal monopoly in the United States . . . including the monopoly on the delivery of mail and on access to mailboxes.’’ VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:49 Oct 03, 2019 Jkt 250001 publishes in its Annual Report updated estimates for the values of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone using the base case assumptions and methodology outlined in its Report. See Report at 143–152. The estimates for the value of the monopolies vary each year depending on changes in delivery costs, volumes, and revenues. See, e.g., FY 2018 Annual Report at 53. Section 702(a)(1) of the PAEA uses the term ‘‘postal monopoly’’ to include both the Postal Service’s monopoly on the delivery of mail (letter monopoly) and on access to mailboxes (mailbox monopoly). The letter monopoly is the Postal Service’s exclusive right to carry and deliver most addressed, paperbased correspondence.5 The mailbox monopoly is the Postal Service’s exclusive right to deliver to and collect from mailboxes. 18 U.S.C. 1725. For the estimated values of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone, profits under the status quo are calculated and then compared with profits without the monopoly element under review, leaving all elements of the universal service obligation (USO) in place.6 The estimated value of the combined letter and mailbox monopolies is a hypothetical estimate of the potential profit that the Postal Service would lose if both the letter and mailbox monopolies were lifted, and the Postal Service were subject to competition for mail currently covered by the letter and mailbox monopolies.7 The Commission also estimates the value of the mailbox monopoly alone because some mail is outside the letter monopoly.8 For example, it is lawful for private parties to deliver Periodicals, unaddressed saturation mail, catalogs over 24 pages, letters over 12.5 ounces, and parcels as these products are all not subject to the letter monopoly. FY 2018 Annual Report at 54. Therefore, to estimate the hypothetical value of the mailbox 5 Id. The letter monopoly is codified in the Private Express Statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 1693–1699; 39 U.S.C. 601–606. 6 Report at 143. The Postal Service’s obligation to provide ‘‘universal service’’ is often referred to as the USO. ‘‘Universal postal service’’ is the term commonly used to refer to postal service to all parts of the country. See United States Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, at 741 (2004) (citing 39 U.S.C. 101, 403); Order No. 71. 7 FY 2018 Annual Report at 53; see Report at 144. 8 Report at 148. The value of the letter monopoly alone (retaining the mailbox monopoly) is not separately estimated. Without access to mailboxes, it is unlikely that the entrant could successfully capture mail directed to a specific person or address because those mailpieces are delivered to and collected from mailboxes. FY 2018 Annual Report at 53. PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 monopoly alone, the current methodology calculates the potential decrease in Postal Service profits that would result from eliminating the mailbox monopoly while retaining the letter monopoly. Id. at 53–54. The current methodology for estimating the value of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone has been in use since FY 2009.9 This methodology examines Postal Service data on city and rural delivery routes to see if a private delivery firm (or entrant) could profitably deliver a portion of mail, which is termed ‘‘contestable’’ mail.10 The current methodology assumes that entry from a competitor would potentially occur on all routes that are most profitable for the competitor.11 In the 2009 Annual Report, the Commission stated that the estimated values of the monopolies ‘‘should be viewed as upper bounds for several reasons.’’ FY 2009 Annual Report at 32. The Commission acknowledged the possibility that entry by a competitor may only occur on profitable routes that are co-located (e.g., multiple profitable routes are sufficiently close together to make entry into that geographic area attractive). Id. Given that possibility, and the current methodology that evaluates entry for each route regardless of the extent of route clustering, the Commission noted that the estimated monopoly values are likely overstated. Id. Additionally, the current estimation methodology does not account for any carrier route sorting costs required by potential entrants for five digit sorted letter mail entering the system at the sectional center facility or the destination delivery unit. Id. The Commission noted that inclusion of these costs would also lower the extent of entry to some degree. Id. On December 15, 2017, the Commission approved a methodology change to the City Carrier Cost System (CCCS).12 In the CCCS, the Postal 9 See PRC Annual Report to the President and Congress, Fiscal Year 2009, January 8, 2010, at 32– 33 (FY 2009 Annual Report); Order No. 152. 10 See Report, folder ‘‘Appendices.zip,’’ folder ‘‘USO Appendices,’’ PDF file ‘‘Appendix F Section 4.pdf,’’ Quantitative Analysis of the Value of the Postal and Mailbox Monopolies, Robert H. Cohen (Analysis of Postal and Mailbox Monopolies), at 4, available at: https://www.prc.gov/prcreports?keys=USO&field_report_type_ value=All&=Apply. 11 Id. See Report for a detailed description of the estimation methodology, SAS programs, workbooks and data files used for the Analysis of Postal and Mailbox Monopolies, folder ‘‘Workpapers and Data Files AppendixF4.zip,’’ folder ‘‘Workpapers and Data Files Appendix F4,’’ Word file ‘‘WorkpaperF4.doc.’’ 12 See Docket No. RM 2017–3, Order on Analytical Principals Used In Periodic Reporting E:\FR\FM\04OCN1.SGM 04OCN1 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 193 / Friday, October 4, 2019 / Notices Service replaced the delivery point sequence (DPS) manual mail sampling for the route with a sampling method that evaluates a sample of digital images from Delivery Barcode sequence second pass operations within a ZIP Code.13 This new methodology creates issues related to calculating the profitability for DPS mail on city carrier routes in the current estimation methodology.14 As such, the Commission is soliciting comments and suggestions for modifications and enhancements to the current estimation methodology for both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies value, as well as the mailbox monopoly alone value, to account for the recent CCCS data changes, as well as any other potential modifications to the methodology for estimating the values of the monopolies. III. Comments The Commission invites public comment concerning its methodology to estimate the values of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone reported in its Annual Report. Interested persons are invited to comment on any or all aspects of potential methodology changes. Comments are due November 1, 2019. The Commission does not anticipate the need for reply comments at this time. Material filed in this docket will be available for review on the Commission’s website, https:// www.prc.gov. IV. Ordering Paragraphs khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES It is ordered: 1. The Commission establishes Docket No. PI2020–1 for the purpose of considering potential methodological changes to the computation of the estimated values of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone. 2. Interested persons may submit written comments on any or all aspects of the Commission’s estimation methodology no later than November 1, 2019. 3. Lawrence Fenster is designated to represent the interests of the general public in this docket. 4. The Secretary shall arrange for publication of this Notice in the Federal Register. (Proposal Nine), December 15, 2017 (Order No. 4278). 13 See Docket No. ACR2018, Library Reference USPS–FY18–34, December 28, 2018, at 1, 28–32. 14 The current estimation methodology uses the delivery volumes on all evaluated rural routes and uses a sample of city routes in the CCCS to estimate all city routes delivered volumes. See Report, Analysis of Postal and Mailbox Monopolies, at 9. VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:49 Oct 03, 2019 Jkt 250001 By the Commission. Darcie S. Tokioka, Acting Secretary. II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change [FR Doc. 2019–21679 Filed 10–3–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7710–FW–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34–87154; File No. SR CboeBYX–2019–014] Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change To Make Permanent the Exchange’s Pilot Retail Price Improvement Program, Rule 11.24, Which is Set To Expire on September 30, 2019, and Order Granting Limited Exemption Pursuant to Rule 612(c) of Regulation NMS September 30, 2019. I. Introduction On August 22, 2019, Cboe BYX Exchange, Inc. (the ‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘BYX’’) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘SEC’’), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule change to make permanent Exchange Rule 11.24, which sets forth the Exchange’s Pilot Retail Price Improvement (‘‘RPI’’) Program (‘‘Program’’).3 The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on August 29, 2019.4 The Commission received no comment letters on the proposed rule change. In connection with the proposed rule change, the Exchange requests exemptive relief from Rule 612 of Regulation NMS,5 which, among other things, prohibits a national securities exchange from accepting or ranking orders priced greater than $1.00 per share in an increment smaller than $0.01 (‘‘Sub-Penny Rule’’).6 The Commission is issuing this order approving the proposed rule change and granting the Exchange limited exemptive relief pursuant to Rule 612(c) of Regulation NMS. 1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). CFR 240.19b–4. 3 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68303 (November 27, 2012), 77 FR 71652 (December 3, 2012) (‘‘RPI Approval Order’’) (SR–BYX–2012–019). 4 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 86742 (August 23, 2019), 84 FR 45575 (‘‘Notice’’). 5 17 CFR 242.612(c). 6 See note 11 infra. 2 17 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 4703 53183 Sfmt 4703 The Exchange proposes to make the Program permanent. In the Notice, the Exchange sets forth and discusses its analysis of the Program and basis for permanent approval. Overview of the Program The Program is designed to attract retail order flow to the Exchange, and allow such order flow to receive potential price improvement.7 All Regulation NMS securities traded on the Exchange are eligible for the RPI Program. The Program is limited to trades occurring at prices equal to or greater than $1.00 per share.8 Exchange Rule 11.24 sets forth the rules governing the Program. Exchange Rule 11.24(a) contains the defined terms for the Program. It defines a ‘‘Retail Member Organization’’ (or ‘‘RMO’’) as a Member (or a division thereof) that has been approved by the Exchange to submit Retail Orders. Under Exchange Rule 11.24(b)(1), to qualify as an RMO, a Member of the Exchange must conduct a retail business or route retail orders on behalf of another broker-dealer. Exchange Rule 11.24(b)(2) sets forth the process for a Member to apply to become an RMO, which includes an attestation from the Member that substantially all orders that it submits as Retail Orders will qualify as such. Exchange Rule 11.24(c) sets forth when and how the Exchange would remove a Member’s RMO Status (i.e., disqualification), and Exchange Rule 11.24(d) sets forth the process for a Member to appeal a disapproval of its RMO application or an RMO disqualification under Exchange Rule 11.24(c). Exchange Rule 11.24(a) defines the terms ‘‘Retail Order’’ 9 and ‘‘Retail Price Improvement Order’’ (‘‘RPI Order’’ or collectively, ‘‘RPI Interest’’).10 Both 7 See Notice, supra note 4, at 45575. Rule 11.24(h). 9 Under Exchange Rule 11.24(a)(2), a ‘‘Retail Order’’ is defined as an agency order or riskless principal that meets the criteria of FINRA Rule 5320.03 that originates from a natural person and is submitted to the Exchange by a Retail Member Organization, provided that no change is made to the terms of the order with respect to price or side of market and the order does not originate from a trading algorithm or any other computerized methodology. A Retail Order is an Immediate or Cancel (‘‘IOC’’) Order and shall operate in accordance with Rule 11.24(f). A Retail Order may be an odd lot, round lot, or mixed lot. 10 Under Exchange Rule 11.24(a)(3), an RPI Order is consists of non-displayed interest on the Exchange that is priced better than the Protected NBB or Protected NBO by at least $0.001 and that is identified as such (‘‘RPI interest’’). The System will monitor whether RPI buy or sell interest, 8 Exchange E:\FR\FM\04OCN1.SGM Continued 04OCN1

Agencies

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 193 (Friday, October 4, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 53181-53183]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-21679]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. PI2020-1; Order No. 5260]

Public Inquiry

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission is suggesting modifications and enhancements to
the current estimation methodology to account specifically for recent
Postal Service data changes, and for any other aspects of the
monopolies estimation methodology. This document informs the public of
this proceeding and the technical conference, invites public comment,
and takes other administrative steps.

DATES: Comments are due: November 1, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments electronically via the Commission's Filing
Online system at https://www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit comments
electronically should contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section by telephone for advice on filing
alternatives.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at
202-789-6820.

[[Page 53182]]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Background
III. Comments
IV. Ordering Paragraphs

I. Introduction

In its Annual Report, the Commission estimates both a value for the
Postal Service combined letter and mailbox monopolies, which are
jointly referred to as the postal monopoly, and a separate value for
the mailbox monopoly alone.\1\ The current methodology estimates the
hypothetical lost profit to the Postal Service if potential competitors
were allowed to enter and compete in the Postal Service's letter and
mailbox monopolies. FY 2018 Annual Report at 53-54. The Commission is
soliciting comments and suggestions for modifications and enhancements
to the current estimation methodology to account specifically for
recent Postal Service data changes, and for any other aspects of the
monopolies estimation methodology.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ See PRC Annual Report to the President and Congress Fiscal
Year 2018, January 10, 2019, at 53-54 (FY 2018 Annual Report).
\2\ In this proceeding as in previous related Dockets, the
Commission continues to solicit comments and participation of
interested parties on the methodology to estimate the value of the
Postal Service monopolies. See Docket No. PI2008-3, Notice and Order
Providing An Opportunity to Comment, April 18, 2008 (Order No. 71);
Docket No. PI2009-1, Notice and Order Providing an Opportunity for
Comment, December 19, 2008 (Order No. 152).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Background

On December 19, 2008, the Commission transmitted to Congress and to
the President a Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal
Monopoly \3\ as required by section 702 of the Postal Accountability
and Enhancement Act (PAEA), Public Law 109-435, 120 Stat. 3218
(2006).\4\ In its Report, the Commission first estimated the annual
value of the combined letter and mailbox monopolies to be $3.48 billion
and the value of the mailbox monopoly alone to be $1.33 billion for FY
2007. See Report at 144; Order No. 152. Since then, although not
required to do so by statute, the Commission also publishes in its
Annual Report updated estimates for the values of both the combined
letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone using the
base case assumptions and methodology outlined in its Report. See
Report at 143-152. The estimates for the value of the monopolies vary
each year depending on changes in delivery costs, volumes, and
revenues. See, e.g., FY 2018 Annual Report at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ PRC Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal
Monopoly, December 19, 2008 (Report). The Commission was assisted in
this undertaking by a team of experts assembled by the School of
Public Policy at George Mason University (GMU) and by GMU's Center
for Social Science Research.
\4\ Section 702(a)(1) of the PAEA requires the Commission to
submit a report to the President and Congress on ``universal postal
service and the postal monopoly in the United States . . . including
the monopoly on the delivery of mail and on access to mailboxes.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 702(a)(1) of the PAEA uses the term ``postal monopoly'' to
include both the Postal Service's monopoly on the delivery of mail
(letter monopoly) and on access to mailboxes (mailbox monopoly). The
letter monopoly is the Postal Service's exclusive right to carry and
deliver most addressed, paper-based correspondence.\5\ The mailbox
monopoly is the Postal Service's exclusive right to deliver to and
collect from mailboxes. 18 U.S.C. 1725. For the estimated values of
both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox
monopoly alone, profits under the status quo are calculated and then
compared with profits without the monopoly element under review,
leaving all elements of the universal service obligation (USO) in
place.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ Id. The letter monopoly is codified in the Private Express
Statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 1693-1699; 39 U.S.C. 601-606.
\6\ Report at 143. The Postal Service's obligation to provide
``universal service'' is often referred to as the USO. ``Universal
postal service'' is the term commonly used to refer to postal
service to all parts of the country. See United States Postal Serv.
v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, at 741 (2004) (citing
39 U.S.C. 101, 403); Order No. 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The estimated value of the combined letter and mailbox monopolies
is a hypothetical estimate of the potential profit that the Postal
Service would lose if both the letter and mailbox monopolies were
lifted, and the Postal Service were subject to competition for mail
currently covered by the letter and mailbox monopolies.\7\ The
Commission also estimates the value of the mailbox monopoly alone
because some mail is outside the letter monopoly.\8\ For example, it is
lawful for private parties to deliver Periodicals, unaddressed
saturation mail, catalogs over 24 pages, letters over 12.5 ounces, and
parcels as these products are all not subject to the letter monopoly.
FY 2018 Annual Report at 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ FY 2018 Annual Report at 53; see Report at 144.
\8\ Report at 148. The value of the letter monopoly alone
(retaining the mailbox monopoly) is not separately estimated.
Without access to mailboxes, it is unlikely that the entrant could
successfully capture mail directed to a specific person or address
because those mailpieces are delivered to and collected from
mailboxes. FY 2018 Annual Report at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Therefore, to estimate the hypothetical value of the mailbox
monopoly alone, the current methodology calculates the potential
decrease in Postal Service profits that would result from eliminating
the mailbox monopoly while retaining the letter monopoly. Id. at 53-54.
The current methodology for estimating the value of both the combined
letter and mailbox monopolies and the mailbox monopoly alone has been
in use since FY 2009.\9\ This methodology examines Postal Service data
on city and rural delivery routes to see if a private delivery firm (or
entrant) could profitably deliver a portion of mail, which is termed
``contestable'' mail.\10\ The current methodology assumes that entry
from a competitor would potentially occur on all routes that are most
profitable for the competitor.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ See PRC Annual Report to the President and Congress, Fiscal
Year 2009, January 8, 2010, at 32-33 (FY 2009 Annual Report); Order
No. 152.
\10\ See Report, folder ``Appendices.zip,'' folder ``USO
Appendices,'' PDF file ``Appendix F Section 4.pdf,'' Quantitative
Analysis of the Value of the Postal and Mailbox Monopolies, Robert
H. Cohen (Analysis of Postal and Mailbox Monopolies), at 4,
available at: https://www.prc.gov/prc-reports?keys=USO&field_report_type_value=All&=Apply.
\11\ Id. See Report for a detailed description of the estimation
methodology, SAS programs, workbooks and data files used for the
Analysis of Postal and Mailbox Monopolies, folder ``Workpapers and
Data Files AppendixF4.zip,'' folder ``Workpapers and Data Files
Appendix F4,'' Word file ``WorkpaperF4.doc.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the 2009 Annual Report, the Commission stated that the estimated
values of the monopolies ``should be viewed as upper bounds for several
reasons.'' FY 2009 Annual Report at 32. The Commission acknowledged the
possibility that entry by a competitor may only occur on profitable
routes that are co-located (e.g., multiple profitable routes are
sufficiently close together to make entry into that geographic area
attractive). Id. Given that possibility, and the current methodology
that evaluates entry for each route regardless of the extent of route
clustering, the Commission noted that the estimated monopoly values are
likely overstated. Id. Additionally, the current estimation methodology
does not account for any carrier route sorting costs required by
potential entrants for five digit sorted letter mail entering the
system at the sectional center facility or the destination delivery
unit. Id. The Commission noted that inclusion of these costs would also
lower the extent of entry to some degree. Id.
On December 15, 2017, the Commission approved a methodology change
to the City Carrier Cost System (CCCS).\12\ In the CCCS, the Postal

[[Page 53183]]

Service replaced the delivery point sequence (DPS) manual mail sampling
for the route with a sampling method that evaluates a sample of digital
images from Delivery Barcode sequence second pass operations within a
ZIP Code.\13\ This new methodology creates issues related to
calculating the profitability for DPS mail on city carrier routes in
the current estimation methodology.\14\ As such, the Commission is
soliciting comments and suggestions for modifications and enhancements
to the current estimation methodology for both the combined letter and
mailbox monopolies value, as well as the mailbox monopoly alone value,
to account for the recent CCCS data changes, as well as any other
potential modifications to the methodology for estimating the values of
the monopolies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ See Docket No. RM 2017-3, Order on Analytical Principals
Used In Periodic Reporting (Proposal Nine), December 15, 2017 (Order
No. 4278).
\13\ See Docket No. ACR2018, Library Reference USPS-FY18-34,
December 28, 2018, at 1, 28-32.
\14\ The current estimation methodology uses the delivery
volumes on all evaluated rural routes and uses a sample of city
routes in the CCCS to estimate all city routes delivered volumes.
See Report, Analysis of Postal and Mailbox Monopolies, at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Comments

The Commission invites public comment concerning its methodology to
estimate the values of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies
and the mailbox monopoly alone reported in its Annual Report.
Interested persons are invited to comment on any or all aspects of
potential methodology changes. Comments are due November 1, 2019. The
Commission does not anticipate the need for reply comments at this
time. Material filed in this docket will be available for review on the
Commission's website, https://www.prc.gov.

IV. Ordering Paragraphs

It is ordered:
1. The Commission establishes Docket No. PI2020-1 for the purpose
of considering potential methodological changes to the computation of
the estimated values of both the combined letter and mailbox monopolies
and the mailbox monopoly alone.
2. Interested persons may submit written comments on any or all
aspects of the Commission's estimation methodology no later than
November 1, 2019.
3. Lawrence Fenster is designated to represent the interests of the
general public in this docket.
4. The Secretary shall arrange for publication of this Notice in
the Federal Register.

By the Commission.
Darcie S. Tokioka,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019-21679 Filed 10-3-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710-FW-P

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