Statement of Policy on Performance Requirements for Operators of Aircraft That are Equipped With Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out, 31713-31717 [2019-14127]
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 128 / Wednesday, July 3, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
Where EASA AD 2018–0229 refers to its
effective date, this AD requires using the
effective date of this AD.
(2) The ‘‘Remarks’’ section of EASA AD
2018–0229 does not apply to this AD.
(3) Where Note 1 of EASA AD 2018–0229
specifies the grace period to be counted from
January 6, 2001, this AD requires the grace
period to be counted from December 19, 2005
(the effective date of AD 2005–23–08,
Amendment 39–14366 (70 FR 69056,
November 14, 2005) (‘‘AD 2005–23–08’’)).
(4) Where Note 2 and Note 4 of EASA AD
2018–0229 specify the grace periods to be
counted from November 7, 2017, without
exceeding certain inspection thresholds and
intervals, the grace periods in those Notes for
this AD are within 12 months after November
7, 2018 (the effective date of AD 2018–19–
18).
(5) Paragraph (11) of EASA AD 2018–0229
specifies to report all inspection results to
Airbus. For this AD, report all inspection
results to Airbus Service Bulletin Reporting
Online Application on Airbus World (https://
w3.airbus.com/) at the applicable time
specified in paragraph (h)(5)(i) or (h)(5)(ii) of
this AD. The report must include the
inspection results, the method of inspection,
the airplane serial number, and the number
of flight cycles and flight hours on the
airplane.
(i) If the inspection was done on or after
the effective date of this AD: Submit the
report within 30 days after the inspection.
(ii) If the inspection was done before the
effective date of this AD: Submit the report
within 30 days after the effective date of this
AD.
(i) Terminating Action for AD 2014–20–18
Accomplishment of the action required by
paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2018–0229 and
the initial inspections required by paragraphs
(3), (4), and (5) of EASA AD 2018–0229
terminates all requirements of AD 2014–20–
18.
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(j) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for actions
required by paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2018–
0229, if those actions were performed before
December 19, 2005 (the effective date of AD
2005–23–08) using Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–57–6050, Revision 02, dated February
10, 2000.
(k) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this
AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR
39.19, send your request to your principal
inspector or local Flight Standards District
Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the International Section, send it
to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (l)(1) of this AD. Information may
be emailed to: 9-ANM-116-AMOCREQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal
inspector, the manager of the local flight
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standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any
requirement in this AD to obtain instructions
from a manufacturer, the instructions must
be accomplished using a method approved
by the Manager, International Section,
Transport Standards Branch, FAA; or EASA;
or Airbus SAS’s EASA Design Organization
Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA,
the approval must include the DOAauthorized signature.
(3) Required for Compliance (RC): For any
service information referenced in EASA AD
2018–0229 that contains RC procedures and
tests: Except as required by paragraph (k)(2)
of this AD, RC procedures and tests must be
done to comply with this AD; any procedures
or tests that are not identified as RC are
recommended. Those procedures and tests
that are not identified as RC may be deviated
from using accepted methods in accordance
with the operator’s maintenance or
inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the
procedures and tests identified as RC can be
done and the airplane can be put back in an
airworthy condition. Any substitutions or
changes to procedures or tests identified as
RC require approval of an AMOC.
(4) Paperwork Reduction Act Burden
Statement: A federal agency may not conduct
or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, nor shall a person be subject to
a penalty for failure to comply with a
collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction
Act unless that collection of information
displays a current valid OMB Control
Number. The OMB Control Number for this
information collection is 2120–0056. Public
reporting for this collection of information is
estimated to be approximately 1 hour per
response, including the time for reviewing
instructions, completing and reviewing the
collection of information. All responses to
this collection of information are mandatory.
Comments concerning the accuracy of this
burden and suggestions for reducing the
burden should be directed to the FAA at: 800
Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC
20591, Attn: Information Collection
Clearance Officer, AES–200.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) AD 2018–0229, dated October 23,
2018.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For EASA AD 2018–0229, contact the
EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668
Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 89990
6017; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; Internet
www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this
EASA AD on the EASA website at https://
ad.easa.europa.eu.
(4) You may view this EASA AD at the
FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 2200
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195.
EASA AD 2018–0229 may be found in the
AD docket on the internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for and
locating Docket No. FAA–2019–0020.
(5) You may view this material that is
incorporated by reference at the National
Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030,
or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
(l) Related Information
(1) For more information about this AD,
contact Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer,
International Section, Transport Standards
Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206–
231–3225.
(2) For Airbus service information
identified in this AD that is not incorporated
by reference, contact Airbus SAS,
Airworthiness Office—EAW, Rond-Point
Emile Dewoitine No: 2, 31700 Blagnac Cedex,
France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33
5 61 93 44 51; email account.airworth-eas@
airbus.com; internet https://www.airbus.com.
AGENCY:
(m) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
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Issued in Des Moines, Washington, on June
12, 2019.
Dionne Palermo,
Acting Director, System Oversight Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2019–14152 Filed 7–2–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 91
[Docket No. FAA–2019–0539]
Statement of Policy on Performance
Requirements for Operators of Aircraft
That are Equipped With Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS–B) Out
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Policy statement.
This action announces the
FAA’s policy on performance
requirements for certain operations of
aircraft with Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) Out
equipment in ADS–B airspace after
January 1, 2020. Under the
circumstances identified in this policy,
the FAA is providing assurance to
operators that it will not consider
degradation in Global Positioning
System performance due to conditions
outside the operator’s control that
results in an operation falling below
ADS–B rule requirements to constitute
non-compliance, provided the operator
SUMMARY:
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has exercised appropriate due diligence
prior to conducting an operation.
DATES: The policy described herein is
effective January 2, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical information concerning this
action, contact David Gray, Surveillance
and Broadcast Group Manager, Air
Traffic Organization, at (202) 267–3615.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Action
The FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the
United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle
I, Section (§ ) 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator.
Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the
agency’s authority.
The ADS–B Out equipage and
performance requirements were
promulgated under the authority
described in Subtitle VII, Part A,
Subpart I, Section 40103, Sovereignty
and use of airspace, and Subpart III,
Section 44701, General requirements.
Under section 40103, the FAA is
charged with prescribing regulations on
the flight of aircraft (including
regulations on safe altitudes) for
navigating, protecting, and identifying
aircraft, and the efficient use of the
navigable airspace. Under section
44701, the FAA is charged with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce.
Under § 91.227 of Title 14 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), which
was issued in accordance with the
FAA’s statutory authority in sections
40103 and 44701, the FAA set forth the
ADS–B Out equipment performance
requirements, including accuracy and
integrity performance standards. This
policy statement informs operators
about how the FAA will handle: (1)
Operators when their avionics produce
broadcast elements with values less
than required by § 91.227 due to
circumstances beyond the operator’s
control; and (2) circumstances in which
the operator cannot use the Service
Availability Prediction Tool (SAPT) due
to a system outage.
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I. Background
In 2010, the FAA issued a final rule
prescribing equipage requirements and
performance standards for ADS–B Out
avionics on aircraft operating in certain
airspace after January 1, 2020.1 ADS–B
1 Final Rule, Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADS–B) Out Performance Requirements
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Out is an advanced surveillance
technology that combines an aircraft’s
positioning source, other aircraft
avionics, and a receiver infrastructure to
create an accurate and shared
surveillance picture between aircraft
and air traffic control (ATC). ADS–B
Out provides air traffic controllers with
real-time position information that is, in
most cases, more accurate than the
information available with current
radar-based systems. With more
accurate information, ATC will be able
to position and separate aircraft with
improved precision and timing so that
efficiency and capacity will increase
beyond current levels to meet the
predicted demand for ATC services
while maintaining or improving safety.
ADS–B Position Sources
Aircraft with ADS–B Out equipment
continually broadcast information, such
as identification, current position,
altitude, and velocity, through an
onboard transmitter, which can be
received by ADS–B ground stations (or
other capable receivers) and by other
aircraft appropriately equipped to
receive this information. The ADS–B
Out rule specifies the aircraft’s ADS–B
Out equipment performance
requirements for each flight in rule
airspace rather than requiring any
particular type of position source. All
currently approved position sources rely
on a Global Positioning System (GPS)
receiver.2 The quality of each type of
receiver can be described by its ‘‘rule
performance’’ availability, which means
the GPS receiver’s ability to achieve the
performance requirements of
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) for Navigation
Accuracy Category for Position (NACp)
and Navigation Integrity Category (NIC).
Technical Standard Order (TSO)–C166b
and TSO–C154c contain the avionics
standards for outputting NACp and NIC.
To date, Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS) is the only GPS
position source that consistently
provides the equivalent availability to
radar.3 Operators who equip with GPS
position sources such as Selective
Ability 4-On (SA-On) or SA-Aware are
more likely to experience performance
to Support Air Traffic Control (ATC), 75 FR 30160
(May 28, 2010).
2 GPS is a specific type of Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS).
3 FAA has determined that certain GPS tightly
integrated with inertial navigation systems will also
provide 99.9 percent availability.
4 SA was a feature that deliberately degraded the
GPS satellite signal, resulting in a reduction of the
reported accuracy of an aircraft’s position. On May
1, 2000, the United States deactivated SA to allow
more accurate civilian use of GPS. SA is not
included in new GPS satellite designs.
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outages that limit their access to the
airspace defined in the rule.5
FAA ADS–B Service Availability
Prediction Tool (SAPT)
The ADS–B SAPT is a preflight
availability prediction tool, developed
by the FAA, that predicts the ability of
an aircraft to meet the requirements of
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) along a given
route of flight. This prediction is based
on the ability of the aircraft’s position
source (GPS receiver) to meet
performance requirements specified in
FAA TSOs C129, C129a, C145c/C146c,
and C196, as well as the predicted status
of the GPS constellation. The SAPT will
also evaluate if backup surveillance is
available where ADS–B outages are
predicted.6 The ADS–B SAPT is
primarily intended for pilots,
dispatchers, and commercial operators
to verify their predicted surveillance
availability before flight and ensure
compliance with the ADS–B Out rule.7
Exemption No. 12555
In April 2015, Airlines for America
(A4A) petitioned the FAA, on behalf of
A4A member airlines, for an exemption
from the Navigation Accuracy Category
for Position (NACp) and Navigation
Integrity Category (NIC) requirements of
the rule. In August 2015, the
Administrator issued Exemption No.
12555, a time-limited grant of
exemption from § 91.227(c)(1)(i) and
(iii) for the period from January 1, 2020
through December 31, 2024. Exemption
No. 12555 permits operations in ADS–
B Out rule airspace during periods
when the GPS position provided to the
installed ADS–B Out equipment does
not achieve the required accuracy or
integrity performance, provided certain
conditions and limitations are met.
For those aircraft meeting the
performance requirements of TSO–C196
(SA-Aware), the operator is not required
to perform a preflight availability
prediction prior to conducting an
operation under the exemption.8 For
5 For additional information about SA-On and
SA-Aware, please refer to Exemption No. 12555 at
https://www.regulations.gov/
searchResults?rpp=25&po=0&s=FAA-20150971&fp=true&ns=true.
6 FAA plans to begin divesture of some radar
infrastructure as part of the transition to a satellitebased navigation and surveillance system. During
the period from 2020 to 2025, FAA’s planned radar
divestures will focus primarily on eliminating
redundant/overlapping radars.
7 For more information on the SAPT, the FAA has
developed the ADS–B SAPT/Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) User Guide, which is
available at https://sapt.faa.gov/adsb-start.php.
8 To accommodate these aircraft in the system
under the requested exemption, the FAA effectively
accepted the risk of degraded performance from SAaware GPS receivers (if the GPS constellation is
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operators having aircraft equipped with
TSO–C129 (SA-On) approved GPS
receivers that do not meet the
performance requirements of TSO–196
or TSO–C145/146, the operator must
run a preflight prediction.9 Although
the exemption does not require
operators with SA-On to use the SAPT
for preflight availability prediction, if
the operator uses its own preflight
availability prediction tool and receives
an indication that performance will fall
below rule requirements, it must use
SAPT to determine whether backup
surveillance is available along the
planned route of flight per Exemption
No. 12555.
SA-On and SA-Aware Without
Exemption No. 12555 Relief
Some operators of aircraft with SA-On
and SA-Aware receivers did not petition
the FAA for relief under Exemption No.
12555. As such, they are not exempt
from meeting the performance
requirements in § 91.227(c)(1)(i) and
(iii). Under § 91.103, a pilot in
command is required before beginning a
flight to become familiar with all
available information concerning that
flight, which includes, among other
things, conducting due diligence to
confirm that a planned route of flight
will comply with the ADS–B
performance requirements in
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii).10 Given the
previously identified limitations of SAOn and SA-Aware receivers, the use of
a preflight prediction tool is a reliable
way of satisfying due diligence
requirements under § 91.103. Operators
may use any reliable preflight
prediction tool; however, the SAPT
currently provides a comprehensive and
reliable preflight prediction for
operators.
II. Discussion of FAA’s Policy
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After January 1, 2020, unless
otherwise authorized by ATC, all
aircraft operating in the airspace
identified in § 91.225 must comply with
the ADS–B Out equipage and
performance requirements in §§ 91.225
and 91.227. Nothing in this notice shall
be deemed to modify or alter those
degraded). The FAA noted, however, that it could
not accept this risk indefinitely and limited the
relief in the exemption to 5 years.
9 For SA-on GPS receivers using the current GPS
constellation, the rule performance availability is
approximately 95 percent or higher.
10 Under part 121, the aircraft dispatcher (or
director of operations for supplemental operations)
shares operational control with the pilot in
command and is jointly responsible for preflight
planning. Generally, the aircraft dispatcher will
perform the preflight prediction to satisfy preflight
planning requirements.
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requirements established in the 2010
final rule.
In this notice, the FAA explains
circumstances outside of an operator’s
control that may result in a temporary
degradation of GPS performance and an
apparent violation of § 91.227. The
purpose of this notice is to announce
FAA’s policy for certain operations of
aircraft with ADS–B Out that may
encounter such circumstances,
including: (1) Operations that are
required to use SAPT under the
conditions of Exemption No. 12555 or
non-exemption holders required to
conduct preflight due diligence under
§ 91.103 to confirm preflight
availability; (2) operations that may
encounter GPS interference; and (3)
operations that may be affected by a
SAPT outage. Although it could appear
that an operator has not complied with
the performance requirements in
§ 91.227 due to the circumstances
described in this document, the FAA
would not consider these situations to
constitute a violation as such an
application of the regulations would
impose a standard of conduct wholly
outside the operator’s control. The FAA
cautions that, for operators who have
been notified by the FAA of consistent
and repeated ADS–B Out performance
issues, conducting an operation in
accordance with the policy described
herein without first redressing the
identified non-performance issue will
be considered a continuation of existing
non-compliance with the performance
requirements.
A. Preflight Prediction for Certain
Operators
As previously discussed, certain
operators are required to use a preflight
availability prediction tool to predict
the ability of an aircraft to meet the
performance requirements of
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) along a given
route of flight. For exemption holders
with SA-On receivers, the preflight
availability prediction must be
performed as part of an operator’s
preflight planning process. For nonexemption holders with SA-On and SAAware receivers, the preflight
availability prediction tool is part of the
preflight action necessary to ensure rule
compliance on a planned route of flight.
If the predicted GPS performance does
not support the proposed flight, the
operator may need to adjust the flight
plan accordingly to avoid the degraded
GPS performance.
After an operator receives a
satisfactory preflight availability
prediction for an intended operation,
there may be certain conditions that
warrant a subsequent prediction. For
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31715
example, a change in departure time or
a change in the GPS satellite
constellation as indicated by a Notice to
Airmen (NOTAM) may have an effect on
the predicted GPS performance for the
intended operation. If an operator
becomes aware of a change that could
result in degraded GPS performance
prior to receiving an initial ATC
clearance for the intended route of
flight, the operator should—consistent
with preflight action required by
§ 91.103—conduct a subsequent
preflight availability prediction for the
planned flight to ensure that GPS
performance is still predicted to comply
with the performance requirements of
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii).
The duty to conduct a subsequent
preflight availability prediction for an
intended route of flight will cease once
an operator receives an ATC route
clearance for the intended operation.
More specifically, if an operator receives
a satisfactory preflight availability
prediction and an ATC route clearance
for the intended operation, the FAA will
consider the operator as having
exercised its due diligence in ensuring
the intended operation complies with
the performance requirements in
§ 91.227. Therefore, upon receiving a
satisfactory preflight availability
prediction and an ATC clearance for an
intended route of flight, the operator
will be deemed to have complied with
the preflight availability prediction
requirement and the performance
requirements of § 91.227(c)(1)(i) and
(iii).
The FAA recognizes that there are
circumstances outside the operator’s
control that may result in unanticipated
changes to an operator’s planned route
of flight, which may cause temporary
degraded GPS performance and
technical noncompliance with
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii). For example,
ATC will continue to exercise its
responsibility for the safe and efficient
movement of air traffic, including
changes to the routing of traffic to
achieve those objectives. In addition, a
planned route of flight may be changed
due to environmental conditions, such
as a thunderstorm, or an operator may
experience unexpected GPS
degradations during flight. After an ATC
route clearance is obtained for the flight,
the FAA does not expect an operator to
conduct a subsequent preflight
availability prediction to accommodate
rerouting caused by ATC or
environmental conditions.
The FAA notes that the policy
described above applies only to those
operators who have exercised due
diligence in complying with the
preflight availability prediction and
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ADS–B Out performance requirements.
For example, if an operator fails to
conduct a preflight availability
prediction for the operator’s intended
operation and subsequently encounters
degradation of GPS performance that
results in the aircraft falling below the
performance requirements of
§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii), that operator
will be deemed to have violated the
ADS–B rule—even if the operator’s
flight were rerouted due to unforeseen
circumstances.
When an operator performs a preflight
availability prediction using the FAA’s
SAPT, the SAPT retains a record of each
transaction enabling the FAA to confirm
that an operator took preflight action.
The FAA recommends that operators
using an alternate tool retain
documentation that verifies the
completion of the satisfactory preflight
availability prediction for each intended
route of flight. The FAA recommends
that the prediction should be done not
more than 24 hours prior to the planned
departure. Predictions using SAPT to
determine the availability of backup
surveillance per Exemption No. 12555
should be done within the 3 hours prior
to planned departure.
GPS Interference
There may be times when the GPS
position source cannot meet the
required technical performance due to
planned GPS interference. In the event
of a scheduled interference outage of
GPS, the FAA will issue a NOTAM that
identifies the airspace and time periods
that may be affected by the interference.
The affected area will frequently
encompass a large radius of ADS–B Out
rule airspace. The FAA finds that
requiring operators to avoid the affected
area would cause significant disruption
to air traffic in that vicinity.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
these operators would experience actual
interference and a degradation in GPS
performance in the area. For these
reasons, the FAA has determined that it
would be impractical and not in the
public interest to require operators to
avoid the affected area based on the
chance that an otherwise compliant
flight could experience GPS
interference.
Accordingly, operators should
proceed with their intended operation if
the only impediment to their operation
is possible planned GPS interference.
Under this policy, an operator who is
required to perform a preflight
availability prediction for the intended
route of flight is still required to obtain
a satisfactory preflight availability
prediction. When a NOTAM identifies
the airspace and time periods that may
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be affected by GPS interference, an
operator will not be required to alter his
or her route of flight to avoid the area
based solely on that NOTAM. As
explained in the preamble to the final
rule, if an aircraft’s avionics meet the
performance requirements but
unexpected GPS degradations during
flight inhibit the position source from
providing adequate accuracy and
integrity, ATC will be alerted via the
aircraft’s broadcasted data and services
will be provided to that aircraft using
the backup strategy. If an operator
encounters actual GPS interference
during their flight that results in a
degradation of ADS–B Out performance,
the policy described in Part II above will
apply, provided the operator has taken
the appropriate preflight actions.
SAPT Outages
As noted, certain operators are
required to use a preflight availability
prediction tool prior to a planned flight
as a condition of Exemption No. 12555.
Other operators with SA-On and SAAware equipment who do not hold this
exemption exercise due diligence, as
required under § 91.103, that a planned
route of flight will comply with ADS–
B performance requirements
under§ 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii). Some
operators will use the FAA SAPT for
this purpose. The FAA intends that
SAPT will be continuously available to
operators. However, because
unexpected circumstances could lead to
a SAPT outage, the inability to access
the tool could have an adverse impact
on operators with SA-On or SA-Aware
GPS receivers. As previously noted in
Advisory Circular (AC) 90–114A CHG 1
Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast Operations, ATC will issue a
NOTAM announcing when the SAPT is
not available.
The FAA understands that a SAPT
outage prevents those operators who
hold relief under Exemption No. 12555
from confirming the availability of backup surveillance as required under the
exemption’s conditions and
limitations.11 It also reduces the ability
of non-exemption holders without their
own preflight availability prediction
tool to determine that a particular
operation will meet the performance
requirements prior to conducting an
operation. The unavailability of the
SAPT for brief periods would result in
operators having to choose between
11 The FAA anticipates that any outage would be
of short duration and any potential risk would be
minimal because, concurrent with the outage, GPS
performance would have to fall below rule values
on the route of flight and radar coverage would
have to be unavailable at the same time and
location.
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conducting flights that might result in
non-compliance and not conducting an
operation that would have complied
with ADS-B Out rule performance. The
FAA does not intend to inhibit
operators from conducting otherwise
permissible operations when the SAPT
is unavailable. As such, when there is
a SAPT outage, the policy described
above will apply to operators who rely
on the SAPT if their operation falls
below the performance requirements.
Implementation
Additional information for operators
on the policy described in this
document will be contained in other
FAA publications, including AC 90–114
and the Notices to Airmen
publication.12
Summary
After January 1, 2020, unless
otherwise authorized by ATC, all
aircraft operating in the airspace
identified in § 91.225 must comply with
the ADS–B Out performance
requirements in § 91.227. As described
above, however, there are circumstances
outside of an operator’s control that may
result in a temporary degradation of
GPS performance and an apparent
violation of § 91.227. An operator may
exercise due diligence in performing a
preflight availability prediction for its
intended route of flight but experience
rerouting by ATC after obtaining an
initial ATC route clearance, which may
cause an unanticipated degradation of
performance. Additionally, an operator
may encounter actual GPS interference
on its intended path of flight, which
would affect the ability of an aircraft to
meet the performance requirements of
§ 91.227. Lastly, an operator may not be
able to complete a preflight availability
prediction for its intended route of flight
due to the FAA’s SAPT being out of
service. As previously explained, the
FAA recognizes that these situations are
outside of the operator’s control.
Therefore, the FAA will not consider
these events to constitute
noncompliance with § 91.227 due to the
circumstances discussed in this
document to the extent such an
application would impose a standard of
conduct wholly outside the operator’s
control.
12 The Notices to Airmen publication is published
every 28 days. The latest two editions of the
publication are available on the FAA’s website at
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/
notices/.
E:\FR\FM\03JYR1.SGM
03JYR1
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 128 / Wednesday, July 3, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 26,
2019.
Teri L. Bristol,
Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization.
[FR Doc. 2019–14127 Filed 7–2–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
26 CFR Parts 1, 31, and 301
[TD 9861]
RIN 1545–BN35
Use of Truncated Taxpayer
Identification Numbers on Forms W–2,
Wage and Tax Statement, Furnished to
Employees
Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
Treasury.
ACTION: Final rulemaking.
AGENCY:
This document contains final
regulations under sections 6051 and
6052 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code). To aid employers’ efforts to
protect employees from identity theft,
these regulations amend existing
regulations to permit employers to
voluntarily truncate employees’ social
security numbers (SSNs) on copies of
Forms W–2, Wage and Tax Statement,
that are furnished to employees so that
the truncated SSNs appear in the form
of IRS truncated taxpayer identification
numbers (TTINs). These regulations also
amend the regulations under section
6109 to clarify the application of the
truncation rules to Forms W–2 and to
add an example illustrating the
application of these rules. Additionally,
these regulations delete obsolete
provisions and update cross references
in the regulations under sections 6051
and 6052. These regulations affect
employers who are required to furnish
Forms W–2 and employees who receive
Forms W–2.
DATES: Effective Date: These regulations
are effective on July 3, 2019.
Applicability Date: For dates of
applicability, see §§ 1.6052–2(d),
31.6051–1(k), 31.6051–2(d), 31.6051–
3(f), 301.6109–4(c).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Concerning these regulations, Eliezer
Mishory, (202) 317–6844 (not a toll-free
number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES
SUMMARY:
Background:
This document contains amendments
to the Income Tax Regulations (26 CFR
part 1), the Employment Taxes and
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:37 Jul 02, 2019
Jkt 247001
Collection of Income Tax at Source
Regulations (26 CFR part 31), and the
Procedure and Administration
Regulations (26 CFR part 301) regarding
statements that are required to be
furnished to employees by employers or
other persons under sections 6051 and
6052 of the Code. On September 20,
2017, a notice of proposed rulemaking
(REG–105004–16) was published in the
Federal Register (82 FR 43920). The
notice of proposed rulemaking proposed
to permit employers to truncate
employees’ SSNs to appear in the form
of TTINs on copies of Forms W–2 that
are furnished to employees. In addition,
the notice of proposed rulemaking
proposed to amend the regulations
under section 6109 to clarify the
application of the truncation rules to
Forms W–2 and to add an example
illustrating the application of these
rules. Finally, the notice of proposed
rulemaking proposed to delete obsolete
provisions and update cross references
in the regulations under sections 6051
and 6052. The proposed regulations
were proposed to apply to statements
required to be filed and furnished under
sections 6051 and 6052 after December
31, 2018.
The IRS received comments on the
notice of proposed rulemaking, but no
public hearing was requested or held.
After consideration of the comments,
this Treasury decision adopts the
proposed regulations without
substantive changes to the content of the
rules. The applicability date provisions
have been changed. The regulations will
apply to returns, statements, and other
documents required to be filed or
furnished after December 31, 2020,
except for § 31.6051–2, as amended,
which will apply as of the date of
publication in the Federal Register. A
detailed explanation of these regulations
can be found in the preamble to the
proposed rules. 82 FR 43920.
Summary of Comments
Seventeen written comments were
submitted on the notice of proposed
rulemaking. They are available at
www.regulations.gov or upon request.
Many of the comments recommended
adopting the proposed rules. This
preamble addresses the substantive
comments that were critical of the
proposed rules permitting employers to
truncate employees’ SSNs to appear in
the form of TTINs on copies of Forms
W–2 that are furnished to employees or
requested clarification of the proposed
rule.
Several commenters disagreed with
the proposed rules. Commenters stated
that not including a complete SSN on
the copy of the Form W–2 will make it
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
31717
difficult for employees to verify that the
SSN appearing on the copy of the
employee’s Form W–2 that is filed with
the Social Security Administration
(SSA) and the IRS is correct, will make
it difficult for employees to identify and
correct mistakes in lifetime earnings,
will make it more difficult for tax return
preparers to verify that the taxpayer has
provided the correct SSN, may make it
more difficult for employees to provide
proof of income to lenders, and will
confuse employees who receive
multiple Forms W–2, some with
truncated SSNs and others with
complete SSNs.
The Department of the Treasury
(Treasury Department) and the IRS did
not adopt these comments. The
commenters noted potential,
unintended consequences of allowing
SSNs to appear in the form of a TTIN
on Forms W–2. The Treasury
Department and the IRS have
determined that the benefit of allowing
employers to protect their employees
from identity theft by truncating
employees’ SSNs to appear in the form
of a TTIN outweighs the risk that the
unintended consequences identified by
the commenters will occur.
Additionally, many of the potential
consequences noted by the commenters
can be mitigated.
First, tax return preparers can use
Forms W–2 containing truncated SSNs
to verify employee information by using
the last four digits of the SSN and the
employee’s name and address. Second,
preparers can use other documentation
to verify employee information. For
example, they can verify the accuracy of
a taxpayer’s SSN by requesting to see
the taxpayer’s social security card.
Third, the only comment submitted
regarding lender verification questioned
whether verification would be more
difficult, and the commenter did not
represent having any expertise on the
topic. No lender submitted comments
suggesting the inclusion of a truncated
SSN rather than a complete SSN would
affect the lenders’ ability to verify
income using Forms W–2. If a lender
refuses to accept a Form W–2 with a
truncated SSN, employees may verify
income by other methods, such as
providing pay stubs. Fourth, there are
many taxpayers who do not receive
Forms W–2, and tax return preparers
and lenders are able to verify the
accuracy of these taxpayers’
information. Methods used to verify
information for taxpayers who do not
receive a Form W–2 can be used to
verify information for taxpayers who
received a Form W–2 with a truncated
SSN. Similarly, methods used by
taxpayers who do not receive a Form
E:\FR\FM\03JYR1.SGM
03JYR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 128 (Wednesday, July 3, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 31713-31717]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-14127]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 91
[Docket No. FAA-2019-0539]
Statement of Policy on Performance Requirements for Operators of
Aircraft That are Equipped With Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Policy statement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This action announces the FAA's policy on performance
requirements for certain operations of aircraft with Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment in ADS-B
airspace after January 1, 2020. Under the circumstances identified in
this policy, the FAA is providing assurance to operators that it will
not consider degradation in Global Positioning System performance due
to conditions outside the operator's control that results in an
operation falling below ADS-B rule requirements to constitute non-
compliance, provided the operator
[[Page 31714]]
has exercised appropriate due diligence prior to conducting an
operation.
DATES: The policy described herein is effective January 2, 2020.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical information concerning
this action, contact David Gray, Surveillance and Broadcast Group
Manager, Air Traffic Organization, at (202) 267-3615.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Action
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle I, Section
(Sec. ) 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator.
Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of
the agency's authority.
The ADS-B Out equipage and performance requirements were
promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A,
Subpart I, Section 40103, Sovereignty and use of airspace, and Subpart
III, Section 44701, General requirements. Under section 40103, the FAA
is charged with prescribing regulations on the flight of aircraft
(including regulations on safe altitudes) for navigating, protecting,
and identifying aircraft, and the efficient use of the navigable
airspace. Under section 44701, the FAA is charged with promoting safe
flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce.
Under Sec. 91.227 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(14 CFR), which was issued in accordance with the FAA's statutory
authority in sections 40103 and 44701, the FAA set forth the ADS-B Out
equipment performance requirements, including accuracy and integrity
performance standards. This policy statement informs operators about
how the FAA will handle: (1) Operators when their avionics produce
broadcast elements with values less than required by Sec. 91.227 due
to circumstances beyond the operator's control; and (2) circumstances
in which the operator cannot use the Service Availability Prediction
Tool (SAPT) due to a system outage.
I. Background
In 2010, the FAA issued a final rule prescribing equipage
requirements and performance standards for ADS-B Out avionics on
aircraft operating in certain airspace after January 1, 2020.\1\ ADS-B
Out is an advanced surveillance technology that combines an aircraft's
positioning source, other aircraft avionics, and a receiver
infrastructure to create an accurate and shared surveillance picture
between aircraft and air traffic control (ATC). ADS-B Out provides air
traffic controllers with real-time position information that is, in
most cases, more accurate than the information available with current
radar-based systems. With more accurate information, ATC will be able
to position and separate aircraft with improved precision and timing so
that efficiency and capacity will increase beyond current levels to
meet the predicted demand for ATC services while maintaining or
improving safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Final Rule, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B) Out Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control
(ATC), 75 FR 30160 (May 28, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADS-B Position Sources
Aircraft with ADS-B Out equipment continually broadcast
information, such as identification, current position, altitude, and
velocity, through an onboard transmitter, which can be received by ADS-
B ground stations (or other capable receivers) and by other aircraft
appropriately equipped to receive this information. The ADS-B Out rule
specifies the aircraft's ADS-B Out equipment performance requirements
for each flight in rule airspace rather than requiring any particular
type of position source. All currently approved position sources rely
on a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver.\2\ The quality of each
type of receiver can be described by its ``rule performance''
availability, which means the GPS receiver's ability to achieve the
performance requirements of Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) for
Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) and Navigation
Integrity Category (NIC). Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C166b and TSO-
C154c contain the avionics standards for outputting NACp and NIC. To
date, Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is the only GPS position
source that consistently provides the equivalent availability to
radar.\3\ Operators who equip with GPS position sources such as
Selective Ability \4\-On (SA-On) or SA-Aware are more likely to
experience performance outages that limit their access to the airspace
defined in the rule.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GPS is a specific type of Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS).
\3\ FAA has determined that certain GPS tightly integrated with
inertial navigation systems will also provide 99.9 percent
availability.
\4\ SA was a feature that deliberately degraded the GPS
satellite signal, resulting in a reduction of the reported accuracy
of an aircraft's position. On May 1, 2000, the United States
deactivated SA to allow more accurate civilian use of GPS. SA is not
included in new GPS satellite designs.
\5\ For additional information about SA-On and SA-Aware, please
refer to Exemption No. 12555 at https://www.regulations.gov/searchResults?rpp=25&po=0&s=FAA-2015-0971&fp=true&ns=true.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA ADS-B Service Availability Prediction Tool (SAPT)
The ADS-B SAPT is a preflight availability prediction tool,
developed by the FAA, that predicts the ability of an aircraft to meet
the requirements of Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) along a given route
of flight. This prediction is based on the ability of the aircraft's
position source (GPS receiver) to meet performance requirements
specified in FAA TSOs C129, C129a, C145c/C146c, and C196, as well as
the predicted status of the GPS constellation. The SAPT will also
evaluate if backup surveillance is available where ADS-B outages are
predicted.\6\ The ADS-B SAPT is primarily intended for pilots,
dispatchers, and commercial operators to verify their predicted
surveillance availability before flight and ensure compliance with the
ADS-B Out rule.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ FAA plans to begin divesture of some radar infrastructure as
part of the transition to a satellite-based navigation and
surveillance system. During the period from 2020 to 2025, FAA's
planned radar divestures will focus primarily on eliminating
redundant/overlapping radars.
\7\ For more information on the SAPT, the FAA has developed the
ADS-B SAPT/Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) User
Guide, which is available at https://sapt.faa.gov/adsb-start.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exemption No. 12555
In April 2015, Airlines for America (A4A) petitioned the FAA, on
behalf of A4A member airlines, for an exemption from the Navigation
Accuracy Category for Position (NACp) and Navigation Integrity Category
(NIC) requirements of the rule. In August 2015, the Administrator
issued Exemption No. 12555, a time-limited grant of exemption from
Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii) for the period from January 1, 2020
through December 31, 2024. Exemption No. 12555 permits operations in
ADS-B Out rule airspace during periods when the GPS position provided
to the installed ADS-B Out equipment does not achieve the required
accuracy or integrity performance, provided certain conditions and
limitations are met.
For those aircraft meeting the performance requirements of TSO-C196
(SA-Aware), the operator is not required to perform a preflight
availability prediction prior to conducting an operation under the
exemption.\8\ For
[[Page 31715]]
operators having aircraft equipped with TSO-C129 (SA-On) approved GPS
receivers that do not meet the performance requirements of TSO-196 or
TSO-C145/146, the operator must run a preflight prediction.\9\ Although
the exemption does not require operators with SA-On to use the SAPT for
preflight availability prediction, if the operator uses its own
preflight availability prediction tool and receives an indication that
performance will fall below rule requirements, it must use SAPT to
determine whether backup surveillance is available along the planned
route of flight per Exemption No. 12555.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ To accommodate these aircraft in the system under the
requested exemption, the FAA effectively accepted the risk of
degraded performance from SA-aware GPS receivers (if the GPS
constellation is degraded). The FAA noted, however, that it could
not accept this risk indefinitely and limited the relief in the
exemption to 5 years.
\9\ For SA-on GPS receivers using the current GPS constellation,
the rule performance availability is approximately 95 percent or
higher.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SA-On and SA-Aware Without Exemption No. 12555 Relief
Some operators of aircraft with SA-On and SA-Aware receivers did
not petition the FAA for relief under Exemption No. 12555. As such,
they are not exempt from meeting the performance requirements in Sec.
91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii). Under Sec. 91.103, a pilot in command is
required before beginning a flight to become familiar with all
available information concerning that flight, which includes, among
other things, conducting due diligence to confirm that a planned route
of flight will comply with the ADS-B performance requirements in Sec.
91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii).\10\ Given the previously identified
limitations of SA-On and SA-Aware receivers, the use of a preflight
prediction tool is a reliable way of satisfying due diligence
requirements under Sec. 91.103. Operators may use any reliable
preflight prediction tool; however, the SAPT currently provides a
comprehensive and reliable preflight prediction for operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Under part 121, the aircraft dispatcher (or director of
operations for supplemental operations) shares operational control
with the pilot in command and is jointly responsible for preflight
planning. Generally, the aircraft dispatcher will perform the
preflight prediction to satisfy preflight planning requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Discussion of FAA's Policy
After January 1, 2020, unless otherwise authorized by ATC, all
aircraft operating in the airspace identified in Sec. 91.225 must
comply with the ADS-B Out equipage and performance requirements in
Sec. Sec. 91.225 and 91.227. Nothing in this notice shall be deemed to
modify or alter those requirements established in the 2010 final rule.
In this notice, the FAA explains circumstances outside of an
operator's control that may result in a temporary degradation of GPS
performance and an apparent violation of Sec. 91.227. The purpose of
this notice is to announce FAA's policy for certain operations of
aircraft with ADS-B Out that may encounter such circumstances,
including: (1) Operations that are required to use SAPT under the
conditions of Exemption No. 12555 or non-exemption holders required to
conduct preflight due diligence under Sec. 91.103 to confirm preflight
availability; (2) operations that may encounter GPS interference; and
(3) operations that may be affected by a SAPT outage. Although it could
appear that an operator has not complied with the performance
requirements in Sec. 91.227 due to the circumstances described in this
document, the FAA would not consider these situations to constitute a
violation as such an application of the regulations would impose a
standard of conduct wholly outside the operator's control. The FAA
cautions that, for operators who have been notified by the FAA of
consistent and repeated ADS-B Out performance issues, conducting an
operation in accordance with the policy described herein without first
redressing the identified non-performance issue will be considered a
continuation of existing non-compliance with the performance
requirements.
A. Preflight Prediction for Certain Operators
As previously discussed, certain operators are required to use a
preflight availability prediction tool to predict the ability of an
aircraft to meet the performance requirements of Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i)
and (iii) along a given route of flight. For exemption holders with SA-
On receivers, the preflight availability prediction must be performed
as part of an operator's preflight planning process. For non-exemption
holders with SA-On and SA-Aware receivers, the preflight availability
prediction tool is part of the preflight action necessary to ensure
rule compliance on a planned route of flight. If the predicted GPS
performance does not support the proposed flight, the operator may need
to adjust the flight plan accordingly to avoid the degraded GPS
performance.
After an operator receives a satisfactory preflight availability
prediction for an intended operation, there may be certain conditions
that warrant a subsequent prediction. For example, a change in
departure time or a change in the GPS satellite constellation as
indicated by a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) may have an effect on the
predicted GPS performance for the intended operation. If an operator
becomes aware of a change that could result in degraded GPS performance
prior to receiving an initial ATC clearance for the intended route of
flight, the operator should--consistent with preflight action required
by Sec. 91.103--conduct a subsequent preflight availability prediction
for the planned flight to ensure that GPS performance is still
predicted to comply with the performance requirements of Sec.
91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii).
The duty to conduct a subsequent preflight availability prediction
for an intended route of flight will cease once an operator receives an
ATC route clearance for the intended operation. More specifically, if
an operator receives a satisfactory preflight availability prediction
and an ATC route clearance for the intended operation, the FAA will
consider the operator as having exercised its due diligence in ensuring
the intended operation complies with the performance requirements in
Sec. 91.227. Therefore, upon receiving a satisfactory preflight
availability prediction and an ATC clearance for an intended route of
flight, the operator will be deemed to have complied with the preflight
availability prediction requirement and the performance requirements of
Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii).
The FAA recognizes that there are circumstances outside the
operator's control that may result in unanticipated changes to an
operator's planned route of flight, which may cause temporary degraded
GPS performance and technical noncompliance with Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i)
and (iii). For example, ATC will continue to exercise its
responsibility for the safe and efficient movement of air traffic,
including changes to the routing of traffic to achieve those
objectives. In addition, a planned route of flight may be changed due
to environmental conditions, such as a thunderstorm, or an operator may
experience unexpected GPS degradations during flight. After an ATC
route clearance is obtained for the flight, the FAA does not expect an
operator to conduct a subsequent preflight availability prediction to
accommodate rerouting caused by ATC or environmental conditions.
The FAA notes that the policy described above applies only to those
operators who have exercised due diligence in complying with the
preflight availability prediction and
[[Page 31716]]
ADS-B Out performance requirements. For example, if an operator fails
to conduct a preflight availability prediction for the operator's
intended operation and subsequently encounters degradation of GPS
performance that results in the aircraft falling below the performance
requirements of Sec. 91.227(c)(1)(i) and (iii), that operator will be
deemed to have violated the ADS-B rule--even if the operator's flight
were rerouted due to unforeseen circumstances.
When an operator performs a preflight availability prediction using
the FAA's SAPT, the SAPT retains a record of each transaction enabling
the FAA to confirm that an operator took preflight action. The FAA
recommends that operators using an alternate tool retain documentation
that verifies the completion of the satisfactory preflight availability
prediction for each intended route of flight. The FAA recommends that
the prediction should be done not more than 24 hours prior to the
planned departure. Predictions using SAPT to determine the availability
of backup surveillance per Exemption No. 12555 should be done within
the 3 hours prior to planned departure.
GPS Interference
There may be times when the GPS position source cannot meet the
required technical performance due to planned GPS interference. In the
event of a scheduled interference outage of GPS, the FAA will issue a
NOTAM that identifies the airspace and time periods that may be
affected by the interference. The affected area will frequently
encompass a large radius of ADS-B Out rule airspace. The FAA finds that
requiring operators to avoid the affected area would cause significant
disruption to air traffic in that vicinity. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that these operators would experience actual interference and
a degradation in GPS performance in the area. For these reasons, the
FAA has determined that it would be impractical and not in the public
interest to require operators to avoid the affected area based on the
chance that an otherwise compliant flight could experience GPS
interference.
Accordingly, operators should proceed with their intended operation
if the only impediment to their operation is possible planned GPS
interference. Under this policy, an operator who is required to perform
a preflight availability prediction for the intended route of flight is
still required to obtain a satisfactory preflight availability
prediction. When a NOTAM identifies the airspace and time periods that
may be affected by GPS interference, an operator will not be required
to alter his or her route of flight to avoid the area based solely on
that NOTAM. As explained in the preamble to the final rule, if an
aircraft's avionics meet the performance requirements but unexpected
GPS degradations during flight inhibit the position source from
providing adequate accuracy and integrity, ATC will be alerted via the
aircraft's broadcasted data and services will be provided to that
aircraft using the backup strategy. If an operator encounters actual
GPS interference during their flight that results in a degradation of
ADS-B Out performance, the policy described in Part II above will
apply, provided the operator has taken the appropriate preflight
actions.
SAPT Outages
As noted, certain operators are required to use a preflight
availability prediction tool prior to a planned flight as a condition
of Exemption No. 12555. Other operators with SA-On and SA-Aware
equipment who do not hold this exemption exercise due diligence, as
required under Sec. 91.103, that a planned route of flight will comply
with ADS-B performance requirements underSec. 91.227(c)(1)(i) and
(iii). Some operators will use the FAA SAPT for this purpose. The FAA
intends that SAPT will be continuously available to operators. However,
because unexpected circumstances could lead to a SAPT outage, the
inability to access the tool could have an adverse impact on operators
with SA-On or SA-Aware GPS receivers. As previously noted in Advisory
Circular (AC) 90-114A CHG 1 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
Operations, ATC will issue a NOTAM announcing when the SAPT is not
available.
The FAA understands that a SAPT outage prevents those operators who
hold relief under Exemption No. 12555 from confirming the availability
of back-up surveillance as required under the exemption's conditions
and limitations.\11\ It also reduces the ability of non-exemption
holders without their own preflight availability prediction tool to
determine that a particular operation will meet the performance
requirements prior to conducting an operation. The unavailability of
the SAPT for brief periods would result in operators having to choose
between conducting flights that might result in non-compliance and not
conducting an operation that would have complied with ADS-B Out rule
performance. The FAA does not intend to inhibit operators from
conducting otherwise permissible operations when the SAPT is
unavailable. As such, when there is a SAPT outage, the policy described
above will apply to operators who rely on the SAPT if their operation
falls below the performance requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The FAA anticipates that any outage would be of short
duration and any potential risk would be minimal because, concurrent
with the outage, GPS performance would have to fall below rule
values on the route of flight and radar coverage would have to be
unavailable at the same time and location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation
Additional information for operators on the policy described in
this document will be contained in other FAA publications, including AC
90-114 and the Notices to Airmen publication.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The Notices to Airmen publication is published every 28
days. The latest two editions of the publication are available on
the FAA's website at https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/notices/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
After January 1, 2020, unless otherwise authorized by ATC, all
aircraft operating in the airspace identified in Sec. 91.225 must
comply with the ADS-B Out performance requirements in Sec. 91.227. As
described above, however, there are circumstances outside of an
operator's control that may result in a temporary degradation of GPS
performance and an apparent violation of Sec. 91.227. An operator may
exercise due diligence in performing a preflight availability
prediction for its intended route of flight but experience rerouting by
ATC after obtaining an initial ATC route clearance, which may cause an
unanticipated degradation of performance. Additionally, an operator may
encounter actual GPS interference on its intended path of flight, which
would affect the ability of an aircraft to meet the performance
requirements of Sec. 91.227. Lastly, an operator may not be able to
complete a preflight availability prediction for its intended route of
flight due to the FAA's SAPT being out of service. As previously
explained, the FAA recognizes that these situations are outside of the
operator's control. Therefore, the FAA will not consider these events
to constitute noncompliance with Sec. 91.227 due to the circumstances
discussed in this document to the extent such an application would
impose a standard of conduct wholly outside the operator's control.
[[Page 31717]]
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2019.
Teri L. Bristol,
Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization.
[FR Doc. 2019-14127 Filed 7-2-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P