Special Conditions: Robinson Helicopter Company, Model Robinson R66, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and Stability Augmentation System (AP/SAS System), 30050-30052 [2019-13651]

Download as PDF 30050 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 26, 2019 / Proposed Rules VII. Regulatory Procedures jbell on DSK3GLQ082PROD with PROPOSALS Regulatory Flexibility Act The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires that, in connection with a notice of proposed rulemaking, an agency prepare and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the impact of a proposed rule on small entities. A regulatory flexibility analysis is not required, however, if the agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (defined for purposes of the RFA to include credit unions with assets less than $100 million) 10 and publishes its certification and a short, explanatory statement in the Federal Register together with the rule. The proposed delay of the 2015 Final Rule and 2018 Supplemental Rule would affect only complex credit unions, which are those with greater than $500 million in assets under the 2018 Supplemental Rule. As a result, credit unions with $100 million or less in total assets would not be affected by this proposal. Accordingly, the NCUA certifies that this proposal will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small credit unions. Paperwork Reduction Act The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) applies to rulemakings in which an agency creates new or amends existing information collection requirements.11 For purposes of the PRA, an information collection requirement may take the form of a reporting, recordkeeping, or a thirdparty disclosure requirement. The information collection requirements prescribed by § 702.101(b) were set-out in the August 8, 2018 (83 FR 38997), proposed rule and assigned OMB control number 3133–0191. This proposed rule does not contain any new information collection requirements that require approval by OMB under the PRA. The proposed rule would only extend the effective date. The Board invites comment on (a) whether the collections of information are necessary for the proper performance of the agency’s function, including practical utility; (b) the accuracy of estimates of the burden of the information collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information being collected; and (d) 10 See 11 44 80 FR 57512 (Sept. 24, 2015). U.S.C. 3507(d). VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:20 Jun 25, 2019 Jkt 247001 ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. All comments are a matter of public record. Comments regarding the information collection requirements of this rule should be sent to (1) Dawn Wolfgang, NCUA PRA Clearance Officer, National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, or Fax No. 703–519–8572, or Email at PRAcomments@ncua.gov and the (2) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Attention: Desk Officer for NCUA, New Executive Office Building, Room 10235, Washington, DC 20503, or email at OIRA_Submission@ OMB.EOP.gov. Submission of comments. The NCUA considers comments by the public on this proposed collection of information in: • Evaluating whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the NCUA, including whether the information will have a practical use; • Evaluating the accuracy of the NCUA’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; • Enhancing the quality, usefulness, and clarity of the information to be collected; and • Minimizing the burden of collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology; e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses. Executive Order 13132 Executive Order 13132 encourages independent regulatory agencies to consider the impact of their actions on state and local interests. The NCUA, an independent regulatory agency as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5), voluntarily complies with the principles of the executive order to adhere to fundamental federalism principles. This proposed rule reduces the number of federally insured natural-person credit unions, including federally insured, state-chartered natural-person credit unions that would be subject to the 2015 Final Rule. It may have, to some degree, a direct effect on the states, on the relationship between the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power and PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 responsibilities among the various levels of government. It does not, however, rise to the level of material impact for purposed of Executive Order 13132. Assessment of Federal Regulations and Policies on Families The NCUA has determined that this proposed rule will not affect family well-being within the meaning of section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). By the National Credit Union Administration Board on June 20, 2019. Gerard Poliquin, Secretary of the Board. [FR Doc. 2019–13589 Filed 6–25–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7535–01–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 27 [Docket No. FAA–2019–0106; Notice No. 27– 046–SC] Special Conditions: Robinson Helicopter Company, Model Robinson R66, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and Stability Augmentation System (AP/ SAS System) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions. AGENCY: This action proposes special conditions for the Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R66 helicopter. This helicopter will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with installation of the autopilot and stability augmentation system (AP/SAS system). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: Send your comments on or before August 12, 2019. ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [FAA–2019–XXXX] using any of the following methods: b Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically. SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\26JNP1.SGM 26JNP1 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 26, 2019 / Proposed Rules b Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590–0001. b Hand Delivery of Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 8 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. b Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202–493–2251. Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andy Shaw, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222–5384; email Andy.Shaw@ faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: jbell on DSK3GLQ082PROD with PROPOSALS Comments Invited The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. The FAA may change these special conditions based on the comments it receives. VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:20 Jun 25, 2019 Jkt 247001 Background On June 8, 2018, Robinson applied to amend type certificate (TC) Number R00015LA to install an AP/SAS system on the Robinson Model R66 helicopter. The Robinson Model R66 helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27 normal category, single turbine engine, conventional helicopter designed for civil operation. This helicopter model is capable of carrying up to four passengers with one pilot and has a maximum gross weight of up to 2,700 pounds, depending on the model configuration. The major design features include a 2-blade main rotor, an antitorque tail rotor system, a skid landing gear, and a visual flight rule basic avionics configuration. Robinson proposes to modify this model helicopter by installing an AP/SAS system. The AP/SAS system provides attitude stabilization in two or three axes (pitch and roll with optional yaw) as well as higher-level autopilot functions such as altitude hold, heading command and navigation tracking. However, the possible failure conditions for this system, and their effect on the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter, are more severe than those envisioned by the present rules. The effect on safety is not adequately covered under 14 CFR 27.1309 for the application of new technology and new application of standard technology. Specifically, the present provisions of § 27.1309(c) do not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate because when § 27.1309(c) were promulgated, it was not envisioned that this type of rotorcraft would use systems that are complex or whose failure could result in ‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is particularly true with the application of new technology, new application of standard technology, or other applications not envisioned by the rule that affect safety. Type Certification Basis Under 14 CFR 21.101, Robinson must show that the Model R66 helicopter, as modified by the installed AP/SAS, continues to meet the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the change to the type certificate. The baseline certification basis for the unmodified Robinson Model R66 helicopter is listed in TC Number R00015LA. Additionally, PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 30051 compliance must be shown to any applicable equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special conditions prescribed by the Administrator as part of the certification basis. The Administrator has determined the applicable airworthiness regulations (that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this amended TC, do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Robinson Model R66 helicopter because of a novel or unusual design feature. Therefore, special conditions are prescribed under § 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, Robinson must show compliance of the AP/SAS amended TC altered model R66 helicopter with the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, in accordance with § 11.38 and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.101(d). Novel or Unusual Design Features The Robinson Model R66 helicopter will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: AP/SAS. The AP/SAS performs non-critical control functions. Discussion To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, the FAA proposes to require that Robinson provide the FAA with a systems safety assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS installation configuration that will adequately address the safety objectives established by a functional hazard assessment (FHA). This process will ensure that all failure conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed for the installed AP/SAS. The SSA process is part of the overall safety assessment process discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 27–1B, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and Society of Automotive Engineers document Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment. These proposed special conditions would require that the AP/SAS installed on a Robinson Model R66 helicopter meet the requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity requirements. Failure conditions are classified according to the severity of their effects on the rotorcraft. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document DO–178C, Software E:\FR\FM\26JNP1.SGM 26JNP1 30052 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 123 / Wednesday, June 26, 2019 / Proposed Rules Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, provides software design assurance levels most commonly used for the major, hazardous/severe-major, and catastrophic failure condition categories. The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified for the expected installation environment. The test procedures prescribed in RTCA Document DO–160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, are recognized by the FAA as acceptable methodologies for finding compliance with the environmental requirements. Equivalent environment test standards may also be acceptable. Environmental qualification provides data to show that the AP/SAS system can perform its intended function under the expected operating condition. Some of the main considerations for environmental concerns are installation locations and the resulting exposure to environmental conditions for the AP/SAS system equipment, including considerations for other equipment that may also be affected environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment installation. The level of environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. Applicability These special conditions are applicable to the AP/SAS installed as an amended TC approval in Robinson Model R66 helicopter, TC Number R00015LA. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features for an AP/ SAS amended TC installed on one model helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: jbell on DSK3GLQ082PROD with PROPOSALS Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Proposed Special Conditions Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the following special conditions as part of the amended type certification basis for installation of the AP/SAS system on Robinson Model R66 helicopters. Instead of the requirements of 14 CFR 27.1309(b) and (c), the following must be met for certification of the AP/SAS VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:20 Jun 25, 2019 Jkt 247001 system installed on Robinson Model R66 helicopters: a. The equipment and systems must be designed and installed so that any equipment and systems do not adversely affect the safety of the rotorcraft or its occupants. b. The rotorcraft systems and associated components considered separately and in relation to others systems, must be designed and installed so that: (1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is extremely improbable; (2) The occurrence of any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and (3) The occurrence of any major failure condition is remote. c. Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may be shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis, flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by analysis, in combination with appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ may be shown by flight-testing in combination with analysis and simulation, and the appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Flight tests may be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ failure conditions and effects due to safety considerations. Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be shown by analysis, and appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are used as a part of a showing of compliance for ‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance aspects to address flight safety. d. These special conditions require that the AP/SAS system installed on a Robinson Model R66 helicopter, Type Certificate Number R00015LA, meet these requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design system integrity requirements. e. Information concerning an unsafe system operating condition must be provided in a timely manner to the crew to enable them to take appropriate PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 corrective action. An appropriate alert must be provided if immediate pilot awareness and immediate or subsequent corrective action is required. Systems and controls, including indications and annunciations, must be designed to minimize crew errors that could create additional hazards. Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 19, 2019. Stephen Barbini, Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2019–13651 Filed 6–25–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2019–0485; Product Identifier 2019–NM–064–AD] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). AGENCY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330–243, A330– 243F, A330–341, A330–342, and A330– 343 airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by reports of thrust reverser unit (TRU) beams found with evidence of thermally caused material degradation in the rearmost section of the TRU beam at certain latches. This proposed AD would require an inspection for heat damage of each lefthand and right-hand TRU beam. Depending on findings, this proposed AD might also require inspections of the TRU beam latches, the TRU beam clevises, and the thrust reverser outer fixed structure rear area; corrective actions; and replacement of TRU beams; as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which will be incorporated by reference. The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 12, 2019. SUMMARY: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods: ADDRESSES: E:\FR\FM\26JNP1.SGM 26JNP1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 123 (Wednesday, June 26, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 30050-30052]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-13651]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. FAA-2019-0106; Notice No. 27-046-SC]


Special Conditions: Robinson Helicopter Company, Model Robinson 
R66, Visual Flight Rules Autopilot and Stability Augmentation System 
(AP/SAS System)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action proposes special conditions for the Robinson 
Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R66 helicopter. This helicopter 
will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with 
installation of the autopilot and stability augmentation system (AP/SAS 
system). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain 
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These 
proposed special conditions contain the additional safety standards 
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of 
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness 
standards.

DATES: Send your comments on or before August 12, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [FAA-2019-XXXX] 
using any of the following methods:
    [squ] Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 
and follow the online instructions for sending your comments 
electronically.

[[Page 30051]]

    [squ] Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590-0001.
    [squ] Hand Delivery of Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations 
in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 8 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.
    [squ] Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal 
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the 
docket website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all 
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the 
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an 
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act 
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
http://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andy Shaw, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 
Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 10101 
Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5384; email 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested people to take part in this rulemaking 
by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    The FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before the 
closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed late if 
it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. The FAA may 
change these special conditions based on the comments it receives.

Background

    On June 8, 2018, Robinson applied to amend type certificate (TC) 
Number R00015LA to install an AP/SAS system on the Robinson Model R66 
helicopter. The Robinson Model R66 helicopter is a 14 CFR part 27 
normal category, single turbine engine, conventional helicopter 
designed for civil operation. This helicopter model is capable of 
carrying up to four passengers with one pilot and has a maximum gross 
weight of up to 2,700 pounds, depending on the model configuration. The 
major design features include a 2-blade main rotor, an anti-torque tail 
rotor system, a skid landing gear, and a visual flight rule basic 
avionics configuration. Robinson proposes to modify this model 
helicopter by installing an AP/SAS system.
    The AP/SAS system provides attitude stabilization in two or three 
axes (pitch and roll with optional yaw) as well as higher-level 
autopilot functions such as altitude hold, heading command and 
navigation tracking. However, the possible failure conditions for this 
system, and their effect on the continued safe flight and landing of 
the helicopter, are more severe than those envisioned by the present 
rules.
    The effect on safety is not adequately covered under 14 CFR 27.1309 
for the application of new technology and new application of standard 
technology. Specifically, the present provisions of Sec.  27.1309(c) do 
not adequately address the safety requirements for systems whose 
failures could result in catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major failure 
conditions, or for complex systems whose failures could result in major 
failure conditions. The current regulations are inadequate because when 
Sec.  27.1309(c) were promulgated, it was not envisioned that this type 
of rotorcraft would use systems that are complex or whose failure could 
result in ``catastrophic'' or ``hazardous/severe-major'' effects on the 
rotorcraft. This is particularly true with the application of new 
technology, new application of standard technology, or other 
applications not envisioned by the rule that affect safety.

Type Certification Basis

    Under 14 CFR 21.101, Robinson must show that the Model R66 
helicopter, as modified by the installed AP/SAS, continues to meet the 
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the 
change to the type certificate. The baseline certification basis for 
the unmodified Robinson Model R66 helicopter is listed in TC Number 
R00015LA. Additionally, compliance must be shown to any applicable 
equivalent level of safety findings, exemptions, and special conditions 
prescribed by the Administrator as part of the certification basis.
    The Administrator has determined the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain to this amended 
TC, do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 
Robinson Model R66 helicopter because of a novel or unusual design 
feature. Therefore, special conditions are prescribed under Sec.  
21.16.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, Robinson must show compliance of the AP/SAS amended TC 
altered model R66 helicopter with the noise certification requirements 
of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec.  11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38 and they become part of the type 
certification basis under Sec.  21.101(d).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Robinson Model R66 helicopter will incorporate the following 
novel or unusual design features: AP/SAS. The AP/SAS performs non-
critical control functions.

Discussion

    To comply with the provisions of the special conditions, the FAA 
proposes to require that Robinson provide the FAA with a systems safety 
assessment (SSA) for the final AP/SAS installation configuration that 
will adequately address the safety objectives established by a 
functional hazard assessment (FHA). This process will ensure that all 
failure conditions and their resulting effects are adequately addressed 
for the installed AP/SAS. The SSA process is part of the overall safety 
assessment process discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 27-1B, 
Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, and Society of Automotive 
Engineers document Aerospace Recommended Practice 4761, Guidelines and 
Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne 
Systems and Equipment.
    These proposed special conditions would require that the AP/SAS 
installed on a Robinson Model R66 helicopter meet the requirements to 
adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and 
subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity 
requirements.
    Failure conditions are classified according to the severity of 
their effects on the rotorcraft. Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document DO-178C, Software

[[Page 30052]]

Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, 
provides software design assurance levels most commonly used for the 
major, hazardous/severe-major, and catastrophic failure condition 
categories. The AP/SAS system equipment must be qualified for the 
expected installation environment. The test procedures prescribed in 
RTCA Document DO-160G, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for 
Airborne Equipment, are recognized by the FAA as acceptable 
methodologies for finding compliance with the environmental 
requirements. Equivalent environment test standards may also be 
acceptable. Environmental qualification provides data to show that the 
AP/SAS system can perform its intended function under the expected 
operating condition. Some of the main considerations for environmental 
concerns are installation locations and the resulting exposure to 
environmental conditions for the AP/SAS system equipment, including 
considerations for other equipment that may also be affected 
environmentally by the AP/SAS equipment installation. The level of 
environmental qualification must be related to the severity of the 
considered failure conditions and effects on the rotorcraft.

Applicability

    These special conditions are applicable to the AP/SAS installed as 
an amended TC approval in Robinson Model R66 helicopter, TC Number 
R00015LA.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
for an AP/SAS amended TC installed on one model helicopter. It is not a 
rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who 
applied to the FAA for approval of these features.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Proposed Special Conditions

    Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the 
following special conditions as part of the amended type certification 
basis for installation of the AP/SAS system on Robinson Model R66 
helicopters.
    Instead of the requirements of 14 CFR 27.1309(b) and (c), the 
following must be met for certification of the AP/SAS system installed 
on Robinson Model R66 helicopters:
    a. The equipment and systems must be designed and installed so that 
any equipment and systems do not adversely affect the safety of the 
rotorcraft or its occupants.
    b. The rotorcraft systems and associated components considered 
separately and in relation to others systems, must be designed and 
installed so that:
    (1) The occurrence of any catastrophic failure condition is 
extremely improbable;
    (2) The occurrence of any hazardous failure condition is extremely 
remote; and
    (3) The occurrence of any major failure condition is remote.
    c. Compliance with the requirements of these special conditions may 
be shown by a variety of methods, which typically consist of analysis, 
flight tests, ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. Compliance 
methodology is related to the associated failure condition category. 
Compliance with the requirements for failure conditions classified as 
``major'' may be shown by analysis, in combination with appropriate 
testing to validate the analysis. Compliance with the requirements for 
failure conditions classified as ``hazardous/severe-major'' may be 
shown by flight-testing in combination with analysis and simulation, 
and the appropriate testing to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 
be limited for ``hazardous/severe-major'' failure conditions and 
effects due to safety considerations. Compliance with the requirements 
for failure conditions classified as ``catastrophic'' may be shown by 
analysis, and appropriate testing in combination with simulation to 
validate the analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with 
simulation are used as a part of a showing of compliance for 
``catastrophic'' failure conditions. Flight tests are performed only in 
circumstances that use operational variations, or extrapolations from 
other flight performance aspects to address flight safety.
    d. These special conditions require that the AP/SAS system 
installed on a Robinson Model R66 helicopter, Type Certificate Number 
R00015LA, meet these requirements to adequately address the failure 
effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, 
within the defined design system integrity requirements.
    e. Information concerning an unsafe system operating condition must 
be provided in a timely manner to the crew to enable them to take 
appropriate corrective action. An appropriate alert must be provided if 
immediate pilot awareness and immediate or subsequent corrective action 
is required. Systems and controls, including indications and 
annunciations, must be designed to minimize crew errors that could 
create additional hazards.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 19, 2019.
Stephen Barbini,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2019-13651 Filed 6-25-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P