Arms Sales Notification, 28016-28019 [2019-12665]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
• Office of the Secretary

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 116 (Monday, June 17, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 28016-28019]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-12665]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 19-14]


Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Arms sales notice.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text 
of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karma Job at [email protected] 
or (703) 697-8976.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is 
published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-
164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 19-14 with 
attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology.

    Dated: June 11, 2019.
Aaron T. Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P

[[Page 28017]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN17JN19.001

BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
Transmittal No. 19-14
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
    (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar
    (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment *...............................   $1.90 billion
Other...................................................   $1.10 billion
                                                         ---------------
  TOTAL.................................................   $3.00 billion
 

    (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
    Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Twenty-four (24) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters
Fifty-two (52) T700-GE-701D Engines (2 per aircraft, 4 spares)
Twenty-six (26) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and 
Designation Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares)
Twenty-six (26) AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (1 per 
aircraft, 2 spares)
Eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronics 
Unit (LONGBOW component)
Eight (8) AN/APR-48 Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI)
Twenty-nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (1 per 
aircraft, 5 spares)
Fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial 
Navigation (EGI) (2 per aircraft, 10 spares)
Two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-114R Hellfire Missiles
Twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM) (1 per 
aircraft, 1 spare)

    Non-MDE: Also included are twenty-eight (28) M230 30mm automatic 
chain guns (1 per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets, 
AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, 
M299 Hellfire missile launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra Rockets, 30mm 
cartridges, CCU-44 impulse cartridges, M206 and 211 countermeasure 
flares, M230 automatic guns and associated components, 2.75 inch rocket 
launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and AN/ARC-201D radios with associated 
components, AN/APX-123 transponders, image intensifiers, MUMT2i 
systems, AN/ARN-153 tactical airborne navigation systems, chaff, spare 
an repair parts, support equipment, training and training equipment, 
U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics 
support services, and other related elements of logistics and program 
support.
    (iv) Military Department: Army (QA-B-WAG)

[[Page 28018]]

    (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-WYX, QA-B-OAM, QA-B-HAA
    (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be 
Paid: None
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or 
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.
    (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 9, 2019

    * As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Qatar--AH-64E Apache Helicopters with Spare Parts and Related Equipment

    The Government of Qatar has requested to buy twenty-four (24) AH-
64E Apache Attack helicopters; fifty-two (52) T700-GE-701D engines (2 
per aircraft, 4 spares); twenty-six (26) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target 
Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares); 
twenty-six (26) AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (1 per 
aircraft, 2 spare); eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with 
Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component); eight (8) AN/APR-48 
Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); twenty-nine (29) AN/
AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (1 per aircraft, 5 spares); 
fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial 
Navigation (EGI) (2 per aircraft, 10 spares); two thousand five hundred 
(2,500) AGM-114R Hellfire missiles; and twenty-five (25) Hellfire 
Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare). Also 
included are twenty-eight (28) 30mm automatic chain guns (1 per 
aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets, AN/APR-39 Radar 
Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, M299 Hellfire 
missile launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44 
impulse cartridges, M206 and 211 countermeasure flares, M230 automatic 
guns and associated components, 2.75 inch rocket launcher tubes, AN/
ARC-231 and AN/ARC-201D radios with associated components, AN/APX-123 
transponders, image intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153 tactical 
airborne navigation systems, chaff, spare an repair parts, support 
equipment, training and training equipment, U.S. Government and 
contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and 
other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated 
cost is $3.0 billion.
    This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national 
security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a 
friendly country that continues to be an important force for political 
and economic progress in the Middle East. Qatar is host to the U.S. 
Central Command forces and serves as a critical forward-deployed 
location in the region. The acquisition of these helicopters will allow 
for integration with U.S. forces for training exercises, which 
contributes to regional security and interoperability.
    The proposed sale of the AH-64E Apache helicopters will supplement 
the Qatar Emiri Air Force's previous procurement of twenty-four (24) 
AH-64Es, which are capable of meeting its requirements for close air 
support, armed reconnaissance, and anti-tank warfare missions. The 
helicopters will provide a long-term defensive and offensive capability 
to the Qatar peninsula as well as enhance the protection of key oil and 
gas infrastructure and platforms. Qatar will have no difficulty 
absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.
    The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the 
basic military balance in the region.
    The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company, Mesa, Arizona; 
Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, Florida; General Electric, 
Cincinnati, Ohio; Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors, Owego, 
New York; Longbow Limited Liability Corporation, Orlando, Florida; 
Thales Corporation, Paris, France; and Raytheon Corporation. There are 
no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential 
sale.
    Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 
three (3) U.S. Government and five (5) contractor representatives to 
Qatar to support delivery of the Apache helicopters and provide support 
and equipment familiarization. In addition, Qatar has expressed an 
interest in expanding their planned Technical Assistance Fielding Team 
for additional in-country pilot and maintenance training to support 
this additional quantity of aircraft. To support the requirement a team 
of twenty (20) personnel (up to three military team members and 17 
contractors) would be deployed to Qatar for approximately three years.
    There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a 
result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 19-14
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex
Item No. vii
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
    1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system contains 
communications and target identification equipment, navigation 
equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, displays, and sensors. The 
airframe itself does not contain sensitive technology; however, the 
equipment listed below will be either installed on the aircraft or 
included in the sale and carries technology transfer significance. The 
highest level of information that could be disclosed through the sale 
of the Apache in the configuration proposed for sale to Qatar is 
SECRET.
    2. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low 
probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined with the AN/
APR-48, a passive Radar Frequency Interferometer (RFI) mounted on top 
of the helicopter mast. The FCR Targeting Mode detects, locates, 
classifies and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks 
and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering and moving 
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. The highest level 
of information associated with the FCR and RFI is classified SECRET.
    3. The AN/ASQ-170, Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation 
Sight (AN/AAQ-11), Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensor (M-TADS/M-PNVS) 
is an enhanced version of its predecessor. It provides second 
generation day, night, and limited adverse weather target information, 
as well as night navigation capabilities. The M-PNVS provides second 
generation thermal imaging that permits safer nap-of-the-earth flight 
to, from, and within the battle area. The M-TADS provides the co-pilot 
gunner with improved search, deletion, recognition, and designation by 
means of Direct View Optics (DVO), television, and second generation 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems that may be used 
singularly or in combinations. M-TAD/M-PNVS hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. 
The technical manuals for authorized maintenance levels are 
UNCLASSIFIED. Specific information related to effective system 
performance parameters (e.g. range, accuracy, etc.) is classified 
CONFIDENTIAL.
    4. The AN/AAR-57(V)7, Common Missile Warning System detects threat

[[Page 28019]]

missiles in flight, evaluates potential false alarms, declares validity 
of threat, and selects appropriate Infrared Countermeasures (IRCM). It 
includes Electro Optical Missile Sensors, Electronic Control Unit 
(ECU), Sequencer, and the Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD) 
that consists of the Dispenser Assembly and the Payload Module. The 
ICMD dispenses decoy expendable objects (chaff, flares, etc.) to 
confuse threat radar devices. In-country repair capability will not be 
provided. Reverse engineering is not a major concern. The hardware is 
UNCLASSIFIED when the software is not loaded. The software is 
classified SECRET.
    5. The AN/APR-39, Radar Signal Detecting Set is designed to operate 
on rotary wing and slow moving fixed wing aircraft to detect, 
categorize, and prioritize pulse radio frequency emitter illuminating 
the host platform to allow appropriate countermeasures. This is the 
1553 data bus compatible configuration. In-country repair capability 
will not be provided. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is not 
loaded. The software is CONFIDENTIAL. The system can be programmed with 
threat data provided by the purchasing country.
    6. The AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Set is a passive laser warning 
system that receives processes, and displays threat information 
resulting from aircraft illumination by laser designators, 
rangefinders, and beamrider missile guidance systems. The AN/AVR-2B 
uses the existing AN/APR-39A/D interface for control status and crew 
warning. The threat information is processed by the AN/APR-39 RSDS, 
displayed on the aircraft multi-function display and announced by the 
AN/APR-39 RSDS via the aircraft Inter Communication System. In-country 
repair capability will not be provided. Reverse engineering is not a 
major concern. The hardware is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable 
technical manuals for operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
    7. Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation 
System (INS). GPS/INS utilize GPS satellite signals to correct or 
calibrate a solution from an INS. Inertial navigation systems usually 
can provide an accurate solution only for short duration. The INS 
accelerometers produce an unknown bias signal that appears as a genuine 
specific force. The EGI is Selective Available Anti-Spoofing Module 
(SAASM) based on navigation platform that combines an inertia sensor 
for position information and is UNCLASSIFIED. The GPS crypto variables 
need the highest GPS accuracy and are classified up to SECRET.
    8. The AGM-114R Hellfire missile is precision strike, Semi-Active 
Laser (SAL) guided missile and is the principle air to ground weapon 
for the AH-64 Apache. The SAL Hellfire missile is guided by laser 
energy reflected off the target. It has three warhead variants: a dual 
warhead, shape-charge, high explosive anti-tank capability for armored 
targets, a blast fragmentation warhead for urban patrol boat and other 
soft targets and metal augmented charge warhead for urban structures. 
AGM-114R allows selection of warhead effects corresponding to a 
specific target type. Hardware for the AGM-114R is UNCLASSIFIED.
    9. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R Hellfire III 
missile is Secret, based upon the software. The highest level of 
classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by 
testing of the end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be 
disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. 
Reverse engineering could reveal confidential information. 
Vulnerability data, countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility 
analyses, and threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.
    10. The M211-flare is a countermeasure decoy in a 1'' x 1'' x 8'' 
form factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It consists of case, piston, 
special material payload foils, and end cap. The special material is a 
pyrophoric metal (iron) foil that reacts with oxygen to generate 
infrared energy. The M211 decoys are dispersed from an aircraft to be 
used as a decoy in combination with the currently fielded M206 and M212 
countermeasure flares to protect against advanced air-to-air and 
surface-to-air missile threats. The hardware is Unclassified and 
releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are 
classified SECRET.
    11. The M36E9 Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) is a Hellfire 
training missile (Non-NATO) that consists of a functional guidance 
section coupled to an inert missile bus. The missile has an operational 
semi-active laser seeker that can search for and lock-on to laser 
designated targets for pilot training, but it does not have a warhead 
or propulsion section and cannot be launched.
    12. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain 
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the 
information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce 
weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system 
with similar or advanced capabilities.
    13. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide 
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive 
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is 
necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national 
security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
    14. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal 
are authorized for release and export to the Government of Qatar.

[FR Doc. 2019-12665 Filed 6-14-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 5001-06-P