Bureau of Industry and Security, 27233-27240 [2019-12396]
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 2019 / Notices
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Dated: June 6, 2019.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2019–12390 Filed 6–11–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
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Order Renewing Order Temporarily
Denying Export Privileges
17:00 Jun 11, 2019
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Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the
Export Administration Regulations, 15
CFR parts 730–774 (2019, (‘‘EAR’’ or
‘‘the Regulations’’), I hereby grant the
request of the Office of Export
Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’) to renew the
temporary denial order issued in this
matter on December 11, 2018. I find that
renewal of this order, as modified, is
necessary in the public interest to
prevent an imminent violation of the
Regulations.1
I. Procedural History
Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21,
Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way,
Tehran, Iran;
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a
Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates;
Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free
Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and Mohamed
Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum
Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates;
Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman
Aviation, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008,
Paris, France;
Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates;
Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor
Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road,
Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways- Istanbul
Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101
D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey;
Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/
k/a Al Naser Wings Airline, a/k/a Alnaser
Airlines and Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, AlKarrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21,
Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital,
Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street,
Section 309, St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour,
Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box
911399, Amman 11191, Jordan;
Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a
Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay, Home 46, AlKarrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21,
Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital,
Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif,
Saudi Arabia 61177;
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Bahar Safwa General Trading, P.O. Box
113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5, Office
#504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and P.O. Box 8709, Citadel
Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates;
Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird
Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Ltd, a/k/a
Sky Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al
Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab
Emirates;
Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam
Muhammad, Anwar Nur Shammout, a/k/a
Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor,
Al Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al
Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18
Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W
8RP, United Kingdom, and Cumhuriyet
Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar
Sok. No.14/A Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey
On March 17, 2008, Darryl W.
Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Enforcement
(‘‘Assistant Secretary’’), signed an order
denying Mahan Airways’ export
privileges for a period of 180 days on
the ground that issuance of the order
was necessary in the public interest to
prevent an imminent violation of the
Regulations. The order also named as
1 The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR
parts 730–774 (2019), originally issued pursuant to
the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601–
4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘EAA’’), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001
Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by
successive Presidential Notices, the most recent
being that of August 8, 2018 (83 FR 39,871 (Aug.
13, 2018)), continued the Regulations in effect
under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012))
(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
which includes the Export Control Reform Act of
2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of Pub. L. 115–232, 132
Stat. 2208 (‘‘ECRA’’). While Section 1766 of ECRA
repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three
sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768
of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders,
rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative
action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA,
and were in effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment
(August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according
to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside,
or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to
the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover,
Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance
of temporary denial orders.
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denied persons Blue Airways, of
Yerevan, Armenia (‘‘Blue Airways of
Armenia’’), as well as the ‘‘Balli Group
Respondents,’’ namely, Balli Group
PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings,
Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband,
Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd.,
Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd.,
Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six
Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The
order was issued ex parte pursuant to
Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations,
and went into effect on March 21, 2008,
the date it was published in the Federal
Register.
This temporary denial order (‘‘TDO’’)
was renewed in accordance with
Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.2
Subsequent renewals also have issued
pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including
most recently on December 11, 2018.3
Some of the renewal orders and the
modification orders that have issued
between renewals have added certain
parties as respondents or as related
persons, or effected the removal of
certain parties.4
2 Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek
renewal of a temporary denial order for additional
180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be
made in writing no later than 20 days before the
scheduled expiration date of a temporary denial
order. Renewal requests may include discussion of
any additional or changed circumstances, and may
seek appropriate modifications to the order,
including the addition of parties as respondents or
related persons, or the removal of parties previously
added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not
required to seek renewal as to all parties, and a
removal of a party can be effected if, without more,
BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any
party included or added to a temporary denial order
as a respondent may oppose a renewal request as
set forth in Section 766.24(d). Parties included or
added as related persons can at any time appeal
their inclusion as a related person, but cannot
challenge the underlying temporary denial order,
either as initially issued or subsequently renewed,
and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also note
4, infra.
3 The December 11, 2018 renewal order was
effective upon issuance and published in the
Federal Register on December 17, 2018 (83 FR
64,518). Prior renewal orders issued on September
17, 2008, March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009,
March 9, 2010, September 3, 2010, February 25,
2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August
9, 2012, February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24,
2014, July 22, 2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015,
January 7, 2016, July 7, 2016, December 30, 2016,
June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, and June 14,
2018, respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal
followed the issuance of a modification order that
issued on July 1, 2011, to add Zarand Aviation as
a respondent. The July 13, 2015 renewal followed
a modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and
added Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and
Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. Each
of the renewal orders and each of the modification
orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in
this order has been published in the Federal
Register.
4 Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the
Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or
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The September 11, 2009 renewal
order continued the denial order as to
Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli
Group Respondents or Blue Airways of
Armenia.5 As part of the February 25,
2011 renewal order, Pejman Mahmood
Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard),
Mahmoud Amini, and Gatewick LLC (a/
k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo
Services, a/k/a Gatewick Aviation
Services) were added as related persons
to prevent evasion of the TDO.6 A
modification order issued on July 1,
2011, adding Zarand Aviation as a
respondent in order to prevent an
imminent violation.7
As part of the August 24, 2011
renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were
added as related persons. Mahan Air
General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK)
Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added as
related persons by a modification order
issued on April 9, 2012. Mehdi Bahrami
was added as a related person as part of
the February 4, 2013 renewal order.
On May 21, 2015, a modification
order issued adding Al Naser Airlines,
Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa
General Trading as respondents. As
detailed in that order and discussed
further infra, these respondents were
added to the TDO based upon evidence
that they were acting together to, inter
business organization related to a denied person by
affiliation, ownership, control, or position of
responsibility in the conduct of trade or related
services may be added as a ‘‘related person’’ to a
temporary denial order to prevent evasion of the
order.
5 Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled
proposed BIS administrative charges as part of a
settlement agreement that was approved by a
settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The
sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and
order included, inter alia, a $15 million civil
penalty and a requirement to conduct five external
audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli
Group Respondents also settled related charges
with the Department of Justice and the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.
6 See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of
related persons to a temporary denial order.
Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini remain parties
to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick
resolved administrative charges against Gatewick,
including a charge for acting contrary to the terms
of a BIS denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)). In addition
to the payment of a civil penalty, the settlement
includes a seven-year denial order. The first two
years of the denial period were active, with the
remaining five years suspended conditioned upon
Gatewick’s full and timely payment of the civil
penalty and its compliance with the Regulations
during the seven-year denial order period. This
denial order, in effect, superseded the TDO as to
Gatewick, which was not included as part of the
January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC
Final Order was published in the Federal Register
on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR 49283 (Aug. 20,
2014).
7 Zarand Aviation’s export privileges remained
denied until July 22, 2014, when it was not
included as part of the renewal order issued on that
date.
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alia, obtain aircraft subject to the
Regulations for export or reexport to
Mahan in violation of the Regulations
and the TDO.
Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief
executive officer, Issam Shammout,
were added as related persons as part of
the July 13, 2015 renewal order.8 On
November 16, 2017, a modification
order issued to remove Ali Eslamian,
Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd.
as related persons following a request by
OEE for their removal.9
The December 11, 2018 renewal order
continued the denial of the export
privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman
Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud
Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General
Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, Bahar
Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird
Group, and Issam Shammout.
On May 16, 2019, BIS, through OEE,
submitted a written request for renewal
of the TDO that issued on December 11,
2018. The written request was made
more than 20 days before the TDO’s
scheduled expiration. Notice of the
renewal request was provided to Mahan
Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali
Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa
General Trading in accordance with
Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the
Regulations. No opposition to the
renewal of the TDO has been received.
Furthermore, no appeal of the related
person determinations made as part of
the September 3, 2010, February 25,
2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012,
February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015
renewal or modification orders has been
made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud
Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General
Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue
Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.10
8 The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) designated Sky
Blue Bird and Issam Shammout as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (‘‘SDGTs’’) on May 21,
2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for
‘‘providing support to Iran’s Mahan Air.’’ See 80 FR
30762 (May 29, 2015).
9 The November 16, 2017 modification was
published in the Federal Register on December 4,
2017. See 82 FR 57,203 (Dec. 4, 2017). On
September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved
an administrative charge for acting contrary to the
terms of the denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was
based upon Eslamian’s violation of the TDO after
his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011.
Equipco (UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two
companies owned and operated by Eslamian, also
were parties to settlement agreement and were
added to the settlement order as related persons. In
addition to other sanctions, the settlement provides
that Eslamian, Equipco, and Skyco shall be subject
to a conditionally-suspended denial order for a
period of four years from the date of the settlement
order.
10 A party named or added as a related person
may not oppose the issuance or renewal of the
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II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may
issue or renew an order temporarily
denying a respondent’s export privileges
upon a showing that the order is
necessary in the public interest to
prevent an ‘‘imminent violation’’ of the
Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and
766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be
‘imminent’ either in time or degree of
likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS
may show ‘‘either that a violation is
about to occur, or that the general
circumstances of the matter under
investigation or case under criminal or
administrative charges demonstrate a
likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As
to the likelihood of future violations,
BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ‘‘is significant,
deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur
again, rather than technical or negligent
[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of information
establishing the precise time a violation
may occur does not preclude a finding
that a violation is imminent, so long as
there is sufficient reason to believe the
likelihood of a violation.’’ Id.
B. The TDO and BIS’s Request for
Renewal
OEE’s request for renewal is based
upon the facts underlying the issuance
of the initial TDO, and the renewal and
modification orders subsequently issued
in this matter, including the May 21,
2015 modification order and the
renewal order issued on December 11,
2018, and the evidence developed over
the course of this investigation, which
indicate a blatant disregard of U.S.
export controls and the TDO. The initial
TDO was issued as a result of evidence
that showed that Mahan Airways and
other parties engaged in conduct
prohibited by the EAR by knowingly reexporting to Iran three U.S.-origin
aircraft, specifically Boeing 747s
(‘‘Aircraft 1–3’’), items subject to the
EAR and classified under Export
Control Classification Number
(‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.b, without the required
U.S. Government authorization. Further
evidence submitted by BIS indicated
that Mahan Airways was involved in the
attempted re-export of three additional
U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (‘‘Aircraft 4–6’’)
to Iran.
As discussed in the September 17,
2008 renewal order, evidence presented
by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1–3
continued to be flown on Mahan
Airways’ routes after issuance of the
underlying temporary denial order, but may file an
appeal of the related person determination in
accordance with Section 766.23(c). See also note 2,
supra.
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TDO, in violation of the Regulations and
the TDO itself.11 It also showed that
Aircraft 1–3 had been flown in further
violation of the Regulations and the
TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an
Iranian Government airline. Moreover,
as discussed in the March 16, 2009,
September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010
renewal orders, Mahan Airways
registered Aircraft 1–3 in Iran, obtained
Iranian tail numbers for them (EP–MNA,
EP–MNB, and EP–MNE, respectively),
and continued to operate at least two of
them in violation of the Regulations and
the TDO,12 while also committing an
additional knowing and willful
violation when it negotiated for and
acquired an additional U.S.-origin
aircraft. The additional acquired aircraft
was an MD–82 aircraft, which
subsequently was painted in Mahan
Airways’ livery and flown on multiple
Mahan Airways’ routes under tail
number TC–TUA.
The March 9, 2010 renewal order also
noted that a court in the United
Kingdom (‘‘U.K.’’) had found Mahan
Airways in contempt of court on
February 1, 2010, for failing to comply
with that court’s December 21, 2009 and
January 12, 2010 orders compelling
Mahan Airways to remove the Boeing
747s from Iran and ground them in the
Netherlands. Mahan Airways and the
Balli Group Respondents had been
litigating before the U.K. court
concerning ownership and control of
Aircraft 1–3. In a letter to the U.K. court
dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways’
Chairman indicated, inter alia, that
Mahan Airways opposes U.S.
Government actions against Iran, that it
continued to operate the aircraft on its
routes in and out of Tehran (and had
158,000 ‘‘forward bookings’’ for these
aircraft), and that it wished to continue
to do so and would pay damages if
required by that court, rather than
ground the aircraft.
The September 3, 2010 renewal order
discussed the fact that Mahan Airways’
violations of the TDO extended beyond
operating U.S.-origin aircraft and
attempting to acquire additional U.S.origin aircraft. In February 2009, while
subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways
participated in the export of computer
motherboards, items subject to the
Regulations and designated as EAR99,
from the United States to Iran, via the
United Arab Emirates (‘‘UAE’’), in
violation of both the TDO and the
11 Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial
order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and
(k).
12 The third Boeing 747 appeared to have
undergone significant service maintenance and may
not have been operational at the time of the March
9, 2010 renewal order.
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Regulations, by transporting and/or
forwarding the computer motherboards
from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways’
violations were facilitated by Gatewick
LLC, which not only participated in the
transaction, but also has stated to BIS
that it acted as Mahan Airways’ sole
booking agent for cargo and freight
forwarding services in the UAE.
Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing
in the U.K. court, Mahan Airways
asserted that Aircraft 1–3 were not being
used, but stated in pertinent part that
the aircraft were being maintained in
Iran especially ‘‘in an airworthy
condition’’ and that, depending on the
outcome of its U.K. court appeal, the
aircraft ‘‘could immediately go back into
service . . . on international routes into
and out of Iran.’’ Mahan Airways’
January 24, 2011 submission to U.K.
Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ¶¶ 108, 110.
This clearly stated intent, both on its
own and in conjunction with Mahan
Airways’ prior misconduct and
statements, demonstrated the need to
renew the TDO in order to prevent
imminent future violations. Two of
these three 747s subsequently were
removed from Iran and are no longer in
Mahan Airways’ possession. The third
of these 747s, with Manufacturer’s
Serial Number (‘‘MSN’’) 23480 and
Iranian tail number EP–MNE, remained
in Iran under Mahan’s control. Pursuant
to Executive Order 13224, it was
designated a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist (‘‘SDGT’’) by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) on
September 19, 2012.13 Furthermore, as
discussed in the February 4, 2013 Order,
open source information indicated that
this 747, painted in the livery and logo
of Mahan Airways, had been flown
between Iran and Syria, and was
suspected of ferrying weapons and/or
other equipment to the Syrian
Government from Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In addition, as first detailed in the
July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders,
and discussed in subsequent renewal
orders in this matter, Mahan Airways
also continued to evade U.S. export
control laws by operating two Airbus
A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways’
livery and logo, on flights into and out
of Iran.14 At the time of the July 1, 2011
13 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/
20120919.aspx.
14 The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin
engines. The engines are subject to the EAR and
classified under Export Control Classification
(‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain
controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10
percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR. They are classified
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and August 24, 2011 orders, these
Airbus A310s were registered in France,
with tail numbers F–OJHH and F–OJHI,
respectively.15
The August 2012 renewal order also
found that Mahan Airways had acquired
another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to
the Regulations, with MSN 499 and
Iranian tail number EP–VIP, in violation
of the TDO and the Regulations.16 On
September 19, 2012, all three Airbus
A310 aircraft (tail numbers F–OJHH, F–
OJHI, and EP–VIP) were designated as
SDGTs.17
The February 4, 2013 renewal order
laid out further evidence of continued
and additional efforts by Mahan
Airways and other persons acting in
concert with Mahan, including Kral
Aviation and another Turkish company,
to procure U.S.-origin engines—two GE
CF6–50C2 engines, with MSNs 517621
and 517738, respectively—and other
aircraft parts in violation of the TDO
and the Regulations.18 The February 4,
2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami
as a related person in accordance with
Section 766.23 of the Regulations.
Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President and
under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of
these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government
authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7
of the Regulations.
15 OEE subsequently presented evidence that after
the August 24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways
worked along with Kerman Aviation and others to
de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France
and to register both aircraft in Iran (with,
respectively, Iranian tail numbers EP–MHH and
EP–MHI). It was determined subsequent to the
February 15, 2012 renewal order that the
registration switch for these A310s was cancelled
and that Mahan Airways then continued to fly the
aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F–
OJHH and F–OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft
apparently remain in Mahan Airways’ possession.
16 See note 14, supra.
17 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/
20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously
designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18,
2011. 77 FR 64,427 (October 18, 2011).
18 Kral Aviation was referenced in the February
4, 2013 renewal order as ‘‘Turkish Company No. 1.’’
Kral Aviation purchased a GE CF6–50C2 aircraft
engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in July
2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able
to prevent this engine from reaching Mahan by
issuing a redelivery order to the freight forwarder
in accordance with Section 758.8 of the
Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a
redelivery order for the second CF6–50C2 engine
(MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner of the
second engine subsequently cancelled the item’s
sale to Kral Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was
alerted by a U.S. exporter that another Turkish
company (‘‘Turkish Company No. 2’’) was
attempting to purchase aircraft spare parts intended
for re-export by Turkish Company No. 2 to Mahan
Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order.
On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added
to BIS’s Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744
of the Regulations. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
Companies and individuals are added to the Entity
List for engaging in activities contrary to the
national security or foreign policy interests of the
United States. See 15 CFR 744.11.
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the head of Mahan’s Istanbul Office,
also was involved in Mahan’s
acquisition of the original three Boeing
747s (Aircraft 1–3) that resulted in the
original TDO, and has had a business
relationship with Mahan dating back to
1997.
The July 31, 2013 renewal order
detailed additional evidence obtained
by OEE showing efforts by Mahan
Airways to obtain another GE CF6–50C2
aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the
United States via Turkey. Multiple
Mahan employees, including Mehdi
Bahrami, were involved in or aware of
matters related to the engine’s arrival in
Turkey from the United States, plans to
visually inspect the engine, and prepare
it for shipment from Turkey.
Mahan Airways sought to obtain this
U.S.-origin engine through Pioneer
Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim
Danismanlik (‘‘Pioneer Logistics’’), an
aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey,
and its director/operator, Gulnihal
Yegane, a Turkish national who
previously had conducted Mahan
related business with Mehdi Bahrami
and Ali Eslamian. Moreover, as
referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal
order, a sworn affidavit by Kosol
Surinanda, also known as Kosol
Surinandha, Managing Director of
Mahan’s General Sales Agent in
Thailand, stated that the shares of
Pioneer Logistics for which he was the
listed owner were ‘‘actually the property
of and owned by Mahan.’’ He further
stated that he held ‘‘legal title to the
shares until otherwise required by
Mahan’’ but would ‘‘exercise the rights
granted to [him] exactly and only as
instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/
or decisions [would] only and
exclusively reflect the wills and
demands of Mahan[.]’’ 19
The January 24, 2014 renewal order
outlined OEE’s continued investigation
of Mahan Airways’ activities and
detailed an attempt by Mahan, which
OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an
Indonesian aircraft parts supplier, two
U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF–502R–5
aircraft engines (MSNs LF5660 and
LF5325), items subject to the
Regulations, from a U.S. company
located in Texas. An invoice of the
Indonesian aircraft parts supplier dated
March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways
as the purchaser of the engines and
included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE
also obtained a Mahan air waybill dated
March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.origin aircraft parts subject to the
19 Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol
Surinanda also were added to the Entity List on
December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12,
2013).
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17:00 Jun 11, 2019
Jkt 247001
Regulations—including, among other
items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a
transmitter, and a power control unit—
being transported by Mahan from
Turkey to Iran in violation of the TDO.
The July 22, 2014 renewal order
discussed open source evidence from
the March-June 2014 time period
regarding two BAE regional jets, items
subject to the Regulations, that were
painted in the livery and logo of Mahan
Airways and operating under Iranian
tail numbers EP–MOI and EP–MOK,
respectively.20 In addition, aviation
industry resources indicated that these
aircraft were obtained by Mahan
Airways in late November 2013 and
June 2014, from Ukrainian
Mediterranean Airline, a Ukrainian
airline that was added to BIS’s Entity
List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of
the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for
acting contrary to the national security
and foreign policy interests of the
United States.21 Open source
information indicated that at least EP–
MOI remained active in Mahan’s fleet,
and that the aircraft was being operated
on multiple flights in July 2014.
The January 16, 2015 renewal order
detailed evidence of additional attempts
by Mahan Airways to acquire items
subject the Regulations in further
violation of the TDO. Specifically, in
March 2014, OEE became aware of an
inertial reference unit bearing serial
number 1231 (‘‘the IRU’’) that had been
sent to the United States for repair. The
IRU is subject to the Regulations,
classified under ECCN 7A103, and
controlled for missile technology
reasons. Upon closer inspection, it was
determined that IRU came from or had
been installed on an Airbus A340
aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further
investigation revealed that as of
approximately February 2014, this
20 The
BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.origin engines. The engines are subject to the EAR
and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. These aircraft
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and
as a result are subject to the EAR. They are
classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or
reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S.
Government authorization pursuant to Sections
742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
21 See 76 FR 50407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22,
2014 renewal order also referenced two Airbus
A320 aircraft painted in the livery and logo of
Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail
numbers EP–MMK and EP–MML, respectively.
OEE’s investigation also showed that Mahan
obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from
Khors Air Company, another Ukrainian airline that,
like Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines, was added
to BIS’s Entity List on August 15, 2011. Open
source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320
aircraft may be been transferred by Mahan Airways
to another Iranian airline in October 2014, and
issued Iranian tail numbers EP–APE and EP–APF,
respectively.
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aircraft was registered under Iranian tail
number EP–MMB and had been painted
in the livery and logo of Mahan
Airways.
The January 16, 2015 renewal order
also described related efforts by the
Departments of Justice and Treasury to
further thwart Mahan’s illicit
procurement efforts. Specifically, on
August 14, 2014, the United States
Attorney’s Office for the District of
Maryland filed a civil forfeiture
complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22
U.S.C. 401(b) that resulted in the court
issuing an Order of Forfeiture on
December 2, 2014. EP–MMB remains
listed as active in Mahan Airways’ fleet
and has been used on flights into and
out of Iran as recently as December 19,
2017.
Additionally, on August 29, 2014,
OFAC blocked the property and
interests in property of Asian Aviation
Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan Airways
affiliate or front company, pursuant to
Executive Order 13224. In doing so,
OFAC described Mahan Airways’ use of
Asian Aviation Logistics to evade
sanctions by making payments on behalf
of Mahan for the purchase of engines
and other equipment.22
The May 21, 2015 modification order
detailed the acquisition of two aircraft,
specifically an Airbus A340 bearing
MSN 164 and an Airbus A321 bearing
MSN 550, that were purchased by Al
Naser Airlines in late 2014/early 2015
and were under the possession, control,
and/or ownership of Mahan Airways.23
The sales agreements for these two
aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah
Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.24 Payment
information reveals that multiple
electronic funds transfers (‘‘EFT’’) were
made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar
Safwa General Trading in order to
acquire MSNs 164 and 550. The May 21,
22 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55073 (Sep. 15, 2014).
OFAC also blocked the property and property
interests of Pioneer Logistics of Turkey on August
29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways’ use of Pioneer
Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the
Regulations was discussed in a prior renewal order,
as summarized, supra, at 14. BIS added both Asian
Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the
Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458
(Dec. 12, 2013).
23 Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.origin engines that are subject to the Regulations
and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. Both aircraft
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and
as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their
location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN
9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
24 The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali
Abdullah Alhay as a 25% owner of Al Naser
Airlines.
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2015 modification order also laid out
evidence showing the respondents’
attempts to obtain other controlled
aircraft, including aircraft physically
located in the United States in similarlypatterned transactions during the same
recent time period. Transactional
documents involving two Airbus A320s
bearing MSNs 82 and 99, respectively,
again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay
signing sales agreements for Al Naser
Airlines.25 A review of the payment
information for these aircraft similarly
revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay
and Bahar Safwa General Trading that
follow the pattern described for MSNs
164 and 550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99
were detained by OEE Special Agents
prior to their planned export from the
United States.
The July 13, 2015 renewal order
outlined evidence showing that Al
Naser Airlines’ attempts to acquire
aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways
extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to
include a total of nine aircraft.26 Four of
the aircraft, all of which are subject to
the Regulations and were obtained by
Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been
issued the following Iranian tail
numbers: EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–
MMG (MSN 383), EP–MMH (MSN 391)
and EP–MMR (MSN 416),
respectively.27 Publicly available flight
25 Both aircraft were physically located in the
United States and therefore are subject to the
Regulations pursuant to Section 734.3(a)(1).
Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.origin engines that are subject to the Regulations
and classified under Export Control Classification
Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s contain
controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10
percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR regardless of their
location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN
9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
26 This evidence included a press release dated
May 9, 2015, that appeared on Mahan Airways’
website and stated that Mahan ‘‘added 9 modern
aircraft to its air fleet [,]’’ and that the newly
acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and
one Airbus A321. See https://www.mahan.aero/en/
mahan-air/press-room/44. The press release was
subsequently removed from Mahan Airways’
website. Publicly available aviation databases
similarly showed that Mahan had obtained nine
additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May
2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also
discussed in the July 13, 2015 renewal order, Sky
Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was actively
involved in Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition of MSNs
164 and 550, and the attempted acquisition of
MSNs 82 and 99 (which were detained by OEE).
27 The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin
engines that are subject to the Regulations and
classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340s
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and
as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their
location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN
9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
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17:00 Jun 11, 2019
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tracking information provided evidence
that at the time of the July 13, 2015
renewal, both EP–MMH and EP–MMR
were being actively flown on routes into
and out of Iran in violation of the TDO
and Regulations.28 The January 7, 2016
renewal order discussed evidence that
Mahan Airways had begun actively
flying EP–MMD on international routes
into and out of Iran, including from/to
Bangkok, Thailand. Additionally, the
January 7, 2016 order described publicly
available aviation database and flight
tracking information indicating that
Mahan Airways continued efforts to
acquire Iranian tail numbers and press
into active service under Mahan’s livery
and logo at least two more of the Airbus
A340 aircraft it had obtained from or
through Al Naser Airlines: EP–MME
(MSN 371) and EP–MMF (MSN 376),
respectively. Since January 2016, EP–
MME has logged flights to and from
Tehran, Iran involving various
destinations, including Guangzhou,
China and Dubai, United Arab Emirates,
in further violation of the TDO and the
Regulations.
The July 7, 2016 renewal order
described Mahan Airways’ acquisition
of a BAE Avro RJ–85 aircraft (MSN
2392) in violation of the TDO and its
subsequent registration under Iranian
tail number EP–MOR.29 This
information was corroborated by
publicly available information on the
website of Iran’s civil aviation authority.
The July 7, 2016 order also outlined
Mahan’s continued operation of EP–
MMF in violation of the TDO on routes
from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and
Shanghai, China, respectively.
The December 30, 2016 renewal order
outlined Mahan’s continued operation
of multiple Airbus aircraft, including
EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–MMF (MSN
376), and EP–MMH (MSN 391), which
were acquired from or through Al Naser
Airlines in violation of the TDO, as
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
28 There is some publicly available information
indicating that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying
under Iranian tail number EP–MMR is now MSN
615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus
A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser
Airlines in violation of the TDO and the
Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft were
designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015,
pursuant to Executive Order 13224. See 80 FR
30762 (May 29, 2015).
29 The BAE Avro RJ–85 is powered by U.S.-origin
engines that are subject to the Regulations and
classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The BAE Avro RJ–
85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at
more than 10 percent of the total value of the
aircraft and as a result is subject to the EAR
regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified
under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-export to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
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27237
previously detailed in pertinent part in
the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016
renewal orders. Publicly available flight
tracking information showed that the
aircraft were operated on flights into
and out of Iran, including from/to
Beijing, China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
and Istanbul, Turkey.30
The June 27, 2017 renewal order
included similar evidence regarding
Mahan Airways’ violation of the TDO by
operating multiple Airbus aircraft
subject to the Regulations, including,
but not limited to, aircraft procured
from or through Al Naser Airlines, on
flights into and out of Iran, including
from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai,
China and Kabul, Afghanistan.
The June 27, 2017 order also detailed
evidence concerning a suspected
planned or attempted diversion to
Mahan of an Airbus A340 subject to the
Regulations that had first been
mentioned in OEE’s December 13, 2016
renewal request.
The December 20, 2017 renewal order
presented evidence that a Mahan
employee attempted to initiate
negotiations with a U.S. company for
the purchase of an aircraft subject to the
Regulations and classified under ECCN
9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted
Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition, via lease,
of at least possession and/or control of
a Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail
number YR–SEB, and an Airbus A320
(MSN 357), bearing tail number YR–
SEA, from a Romanian company in
violation of the TDO.31 Open source
information indicates that after the
December 20, 2017 renewal order
publicly exposed Al Naser’s acquisition
of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and
357), the leases were subsequently
cancelled and the aircraft returned to
their owner.
The December 20, 2017 renewal order
also included evidence indicating that
Mahan Airways was continuing to
operate a number of aircraft subject to
the Regulations, including aircraft
originally procured from or through Al
Naser Airlines, on flights into and out
30 Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP–MMD
(MSN 164) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran.
Between December 20 and December 22, 2016, EP–
MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran
to Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively.
Between December 26 and December 28, 2016, EP–
MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran
to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
31 The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin
engines, which are subject to the EAR and classified
under Export Control Classification (‘‘ECCN’’)
9A991.d. The engines are valued at more than 10
percent of the total value of the aircraft, which
consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is
classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or
reexport to Iran would require U.S. Government
authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7
of the Regulations.
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of Iran from/to Lahore, Pakistan,
Shanghai, China, Ankara, Turkey,
Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq,
in violation of the TDO.
The June 14, 2018 renewal order
outlined evidence that Mahan began
actively operating EP–MMT, an Airbus
A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired in
2017 and previously registered in
Kazakhstan under tail number UP–
A4003, on international flights into and
out of Iran.32 It also discussed evidence
that Mahan continued to operate a
number of aircraft subject to the EAR,
including, but not limited to, EP–MME,
EP–MMF, and EP–MMH, on
international flights into and out of Iran
from/to Beijing, China, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, and Istanbul, Turkey.
The June 14, 2018 renewal order also
noted OFAC’s May 24, 2018 designation
of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik
Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, of
Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to
Executive Order 13224, for providing
material support to Mahan, as well as
OFAC’s designation as SDGTs of an
additional twelve aircraft in which
Mahan has an interest.33 The June 14,
2018 order also cited the April 2018
arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen
on a three-count criminal information
filed in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey involving
the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin
aircraft parts valued at over $2 million
to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.
The December 11, 2018 renewal order
detailed publicly available information
showing that Mahan Airways had
continued operating a number of aircraft
32 The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin
engines that are subject to the Regulations and
classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340
contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at
more than 10 percent of the total value of the
aircraft and as a result is subject to the EAR
regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified
under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of
this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government
authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7
of the Regulations. On June 4, 2018, EP–MMT (MSN
292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran.
33 See 83 FR 27,828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC’s
related press release states in part that ‘‘[o]ver the
last several years, Otik Aviation has procured and
delivered millions of dollars in aviation-related
spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some
of which are procured from the United States and
the European Union. As recently as 2017, Otik
Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with
replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per
shipment, such as aircraft brakes.’’ The twelve
additional Mahan-related aircraft that were
designated are: EP–MMA (MSN 20), EP–MMB
(MSN 56), EP–MMC (MSN 282), EP–MMJ (MSN
526), EP–MMV (MSN 2079), EP–MNF (MSN 547),
EP–MOD (MSN 3162), EP–MOM (MSN 3165), EP–
MOP (MSN 2257), EP–MOQ (MSN 2261), EP–MOR
(MSN 2392), and EP–MOS (MSN 2347). See https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See
also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
20180524.aspx.
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subject to the EAR, including, but not
limited to, EP–MMB, EP–MME, EP–
MMF, and EP–MMQ, on international
flights into and out of Iran from/to
Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China,
Bangkok, Thailand, and Dubai, United
Arab Emirates.34 It also discussed that
OEE’s continued investigation of Mahan
Airways and its affiliates had resulted in
an October 2018 guilty plea by Arzu
Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Columbia, stemming from her
involvement in a conspiracy to export a
U.S.-origin aircraft engine valued at
approximately $810,000 to Mahan.
The December 11, 2018 order also
noted OFAC’s September 14, 2018
designation of Mahan-related entities as
SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order
13224, namely, My Aviation Company
Limited, of Thailand, and Mahan Travel
and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan
Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel & Tourism
SDN BHD, of Malaysia.35 As general
sales agents for Mahan Airways, these
companies sold cargo space aboard
Mahan Airways’ flights, including on
flights to Iran, and provided other
services to or for benefit of Mahan
Airways and its operations.36
The May 16, 2019 renewal request
similarly outlines on-going violations of
the TDO and the Regulations by Mahan
Airways, as well as other evidence of
widespread efforts by Mahan and its
network of agents and affiliates to
unlawfully procure items subject to the
Regulations. Mahan continues to
unlawfully operate a number of aircraft
subject to the EAR, including, but not
limited to, EP–MMJ, EP–MMQ, and EP–
MNF, on international flights into and
out of Iran from/to Damascus, Syria,
34 Flight tracking information shows that on
December 10, 2018, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew from
Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran, and EP–MME
(MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran,
Iran. Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP–MMF
(MSN 376) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran,
Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP–MMQ (MSN
449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab
Emirates and Tehran, Iran.
35 See 83 FR 34,301 (July 19, 2018) (designation
of Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9,
2018), and 83 FR 53,359 (Oct. 22, 2018)
(designation of My Aviation Company Limited and
updating of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism
SDN BHD on September 14, 2018).
36 OFAC’s press release concerning its
designation of My Aviation Company Limited on
September 14, 2018, states in part that ‘‘[t]his
Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous
U.S. warnings, issued publicly and delivered
bilaterally to the Thai government, to sever ties
with Mahan Air.’’ My Aviation provides cargo
services to Mahan Airways, including freight
booking, and works with local freight forwarding
entities to ship cargo on regularly-scheduled Mahan
Airways’ flights to Tehran, Iran. My Aviation has
also provided Mahan Airways with passenger
booking services. See https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/sm484.
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Moscow, Russia, and Dubai, United
Arab Emirates. These flights have
continued since the renewal request was
submitted.37
In addition, an End-Use Check
conducted by BIS in Malaysia in March
2019, uncovered evidence that on
approximately ten occasions, Mahan
had aided and abetted the unlicensed
export of U.S.-origin items from the
United States to Iran via Malaysia. The
items are subject to the Regulations and
included helicopter shafts, transmitters,
and other aircraft parts, some of which
are listed on the Commerce Control List
and controlled on anti-terrorism
grounds. By transporting the items from
Malaysia to Iran, Mahan violated the
plain language of the TDO, which
specifically prohibits Mahan from, inter
alia, transporting any item that is
subject to the Regulations and has been
exported from the United States.
BIS added four parties located in the
United Arab Emirates to the Entity List
on May 14, 2019, based in part upon
another procurement scheme involving
Mahan Airways. Manohar Nair and
Basha Asmath Shaikh and two colocated companies that they operate,
Emirates Hermes General Trading and
Presto Freight International, LLC, were
added to the Entity List pursuant to
Section 744.11 of the Regulations,
including for engaging in activities to
procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan’s
behalf.38
Finally, two other Mahan-linked
entities were designated as SDGTs by
OFAC on January 24, 2019, namely,
Flight Travel LLC, which is Mahan’s
general service agent in Yerevan,
Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air, an
Iranian airline which operates two U.S.origin Boeing 747s,39 is owned or
controlled by Mahan, and also is linked
to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF).40
37 Publicly available flight tracking information
shows that on May 26, 2019, EP–MMJ (MSN 526)
flew from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran, and on
May 24, 2019, EP–MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes
between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran.
Additionally, on May 23, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN
376) flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to
Tehran, Iran.
38 See 84 FR 21,233 (May 14, 2019).
39 These 747s are registered in Iran with tail
numbers EP–FAA and EP–FAB, respectively.
40 OFAC’s press release concerning these
designations states that Qeshm Fars Air was being
designated for ‘‘being owned or controlled by
Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring,
or providing financial, material or technological
support for, or financial or other services to or in
support of, the IRGC–QF,’’ and Flight Travel LLC
for ‘‘acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.’’ It further
states, inter alia, that ‘‘Mahan Air employees fill
Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan
Air provides technical and operational support for
Qeshm Fars Air, facilitating the airline’s illicit
operations.’’ See https://home.treasury.gov/news/
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C. Findings
Under the applicable standard set
forth in Section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire
record, I find that the evidence
presented by BIS convincingly
demonstrates that the denied persons
have acted in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO; that such
violations have been significant,
deliberate and covert; and that given the
foregoing and the nature of the matters
under investigation, there is a likelihood
of future violations. Therefore, renewal
of the TDO is necessary in the public
interest to prevent imminent violation
of the Regulations and to give notice to
companies and individuals in the
United States and abroad that they
should continue to cease dealing with
Mahan Airways and Al Naser Airlines
and the other denied persons in
connection with export and reexport
transactions involving items subject to
the Regulations and in connection with
any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered: First, that
MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No.
21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way,
Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD
KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A
KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
MAHMOUD AMINI, G#22 Dubai
Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O.
Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz
Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KERMAN
AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN
AVIATION, 42 Avenue Montaigne
75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO
TRADING LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR
GENERAL TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al
Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road,
Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan Airways–
Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil
Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli
Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES
A/K/A AL-NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL
NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A
ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR
FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada,
Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside
Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad,
Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309,
St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq,
and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman
press-releases/sm590. See also https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20190124.aspx.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:00 Jun 11, 2019
Jkt 247001
11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH ALHAY
A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI
ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home
46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District
929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private
Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak
Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177;
BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING,
P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box
8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY
BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE
BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE
BIRD LTD A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC,
P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade
Zone, United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM
SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD
ISAM MUHAMMAD ANWAR NUR
SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR,
Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous
Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa,
Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18
Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London,
W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and
Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya,
Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri,
Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or
on their behalf, any successors or
assigns, agents, or employees (each a
‘‘Denied Person’’ and collectively the
‘‘Denied Persons’’) may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any
transaction involving any commodity,
software or technology (hereinafter
collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)
exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the
Export Administration Regulations
(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject
to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using
any license, license exception, or export
control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations
concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering,
storing, disposing of, forwarding,
transporting, financing, or otherwise
servicing in any way, any transaction
involving any item exported or to be
exported from the United States that is
subject to the EAR, or engaging in any
other activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any
transaction involving any item exported
or to be exported from the United States
that is subject to the EAR, or from any
other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly
or indirectly, do any of the following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
of a Denied Person any item subject to
the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
a Denied Person of the ownership,
possession, or control of any item
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
27239
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States,
including financing or other support
activities related to a transaction
whereby a Denied Person acquires or
attempts to acquire such ownership,
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted
acquisition from a Denied Person of any
item subject to the EAR that has been
exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the
United States any item subject to the
EAR with knowledge or reason to know
that the item will be, or is intended to
be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service
any item subject to the EAR that has
been or will be exported from the
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person, or service any item, of whatever
origin, that is owned, possessed or
controlled by a Denied Person if such
service involves the use of any item
subject to the EAR that has been or will
be exported from the United States. For
purposes of this paragraph, servicing
means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and
opportunity for comment as provided in
section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
person, firm, corporation, or business
organization related to a Denied Person
by ownership, control, position of
responsibility, affiliation in the conduct
of trade or business may also be made
subject to the provisions of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not
prohibit any export, reexport, or other
transaction subject to the EAR where the
only items involved that are subject to
the EAR are the foreign-produced direct
product of U.S.-origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of
Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Mahan
Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali
Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa
General Trading may, at any time,
appeal this Order by filing a full written
statement in support of the appeal with
the Office of the Administrative Law
Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance
with the provisions of Sections
766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard,
Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation,
Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air
General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami,
Sky Blue Bird Group, and/or Issam
Shammout may, at any time, appeal
their inclusion as a related person by
filing a full written statement in support
of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast
E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM
12JNN1
27240
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 113 / Wednesday, June 12, 2019 / Notices
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South
Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–
4022.
In accordance with the provisions of
Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
seek renewal of this Order by filing a
written request not later than 20 days
before the expiration date. A renewal
request may be opposed by Mahan
Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali
Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa
General Trading as provided in Section
766.24(d), by filing a written submission
with the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Enforcement,
which must be received not later than
seven days before the expiration date of
the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided
to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines,
Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa
General Trading and each related
person, and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately
and shall remain in effect for 180 days.
Dated: June 5, 2019.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Director, Office of Export Enforcement
performing the non-exclusive functions and
duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2019–12396 Filed 6–11–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
jbell on DSK3GLQ082PROD with NOTICES
Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request
The Department of Commerce will
submit to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for clearance the
following proposal for collection of
information under the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35).
Agency: Bureau of Industry and
Security.
Title: License Exemptions and
Exclusions.
Form Number: N/A.
OMB Control Number: 0694–0137.
Type of Review: Regular submission.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 29,998.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
19,738.
Estimated Time per Response: 1.52
hours.
Needs and Uses: Over the years, BIS
has worked with other Government
agencies and the affected public to
identify areas where export licensing
requirements may be relaxed without
jeopardizing U.S. national security or
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:00 Jun 11, 2019
Jkt 247001
foreign policy. Many of these
relaxations have taken the form of
licensing exceptions and exclusions.
Some of these license exceptions and
exclusions have a reporting or
recordkeeping requirement to enable the
Government to continue to monitor
exports of these items. Exporters may
choose to utilize the license exception
and accept the reporting or
recordkeeping burden in lieu of
submitting a license application. These
exceptions and exclusions have allow
exporters to ship items quickly, without
having to wait for license approval.
These collections are designed to
reduce export licensing burden. It is up
to the individual company to decide
whether it is most advantageous to
continue to submit license applications
or to comply with the reporting or
recordkeeping requirements and take
advantage of the licensing exception or
exclusion.
Affected Public: Non-profit
institutions; State, local, or tribal
government; business or other for-profit
organizations.
Frequency: On Occasion.
Respondent’s Obligation: Voluntary.
This information collection request
may be viewed at reginfo.gov https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/. Follow the
instructions to view Department of
Commerce collections currently under
review by OMB.
Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed
information collection should be sent
within 30 days of publication of this
notice to OIRA_Submission@
omb.eop.gov.
Sheleen Dumas,
Departmental Lead PRA Officer, Office of the
Chief Information Officer, Commerce
Department.
[FR Doc. 2019–12355 Filed 6–11–19; 8:45 am]
certain steel nails from the People’s
Republic of China (China).
DATES: Applicable June 12, 2019.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Susan Pulongbarit or Benito Ballesteros,
AD/CVD Operations, Office V,
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington,
DC 20230; telephone 202–482–4031 or
202–482–7425, respectively.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
On May 29, 2019, Commerce
published in the Federal Register the
Amended Final Results of the 2016–
2017 administrative review on the
antidumping duty order on certain steel
nails from China.1 Commerce is
correcting the Amended Final Results to
address the misspelling of one nonselected respondent company name.
Specifically, the company, Hebei
Cangzhou New Century Foreign Trade
Co., Ltd., was misspelled in the
Amended Final Results. The correct
spelling of the company’s name is listed
in this notice. As a result, the Amended
Final Results are being corrected.
This correction to the Federal
Register notice is issued and published
in accordance with section 777(i)(1) of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
Dated: June 6, 2019.
Christian Marsh,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement
and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2019–12391 Filed 6–11–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[C–533–886]
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P
Polyester Textured Yarn From India:
Amended Preliminary Determination of
Countervailing Duty Determination
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AGENCY:
International Trade Administration
[A–570–909]
Certain Steel Nails From the People’s
Republic of China: Notice of
Correction of the Amended Final
Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review; 2016–2017
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce
(Commerce) is correcting the amended
final results of the administrative review
of the antidumping duty order on
AGENCY:
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Enforcement and Compliance,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce
(Commerce) is amending the
preliminary determination in the
countervailing duty investigation of
polyester textured yarn from India to
correct a significant ministerial error.
DATES: Applicable June 12, 2019.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Janae Martin or Jesus Saenz, AD/CVD
1 See Certain Steel Nails from the People’s
Republic of China: Amended Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2016–
2017, 84 FR 24751 (May 29, 2019) (Amended Final
Result).
E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM
12JNN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 113 (Wednesday, June 12, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27233-27240]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-12396]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.
Way, Tehran, Iran;
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al
Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, 42 Avenue Montaigne
75008, Paris, France;
Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik
Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways- Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil
Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey;
Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al Naser Wings
Airline, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, Al-
Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya
Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309,
St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan;
Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay,
Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al
Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif,
Saudi Arabia 61177;
Bahar Safwa General Trading, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-
5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O.
Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue
Bird Ltd, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah
Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates;
Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad, Anwar Nur Shammout, a/
k/a Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street,
Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17-18
Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and
Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A
Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey
Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (2019, (``EAR'' or ``the
Regulations''), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export
Enforcement (``OEE'') to renew the temporary denial order issued in
this matter on December 11, 2018. I find that renewal of this order, as
modified, is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent
violation of the Regulations.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774
(2019), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been
extended by successive Presidential Notices, the most recent being
that of August 8, 2018 (83 FR 39,871 (Aug. 13, 2018)), continued the
Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August
13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Title XVII, Subtitle B of Pub. L.
115-232, 132 Stat. 2208 (``ECRA''). While Section 1766 of ECRA
repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections which
are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent
part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of
administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall
continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Procedural History
On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Enforcement (``Assistant Secretary''), signed an
order denying Mahan Airways' export privileges for a period of 180 days
on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public
interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order
also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (``Blue
Airways of Armenia''), as well as the ``Balli Group Respondents,''
namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky
Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The order was issued ex parte
pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations, and went into effect
on March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register.
This temporary denial order (``TDO'') was renewed in accordance
with Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.\2\ Subsequent renewals also
have issued pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including most recently on
December 11, 2018.\3\ Some of the renewal orders and the modification
orders that have issued between renewals have added certain parties as
respondents or as related persons, or effected the removal of certain
parties.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a
temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it
believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent
an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no
later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a
temporary denial order. Renewal requests may include discussion of
any additional or changed circumstances, and may seek appropriate
modifications to the order, including the addition of parties as
respondents or related persons, or the removal of parties previously
added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not required to seek
renewal as to all parties, and a removal of a party can be effected
if, without more, BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any
party included or added to a temporary denial order as a respondent
may oppose a renewal request as set forth in Section 766.24(d).
Parties included or added as related persons can at any time appeal
their inclusion as a related person, but cannot challenge the
underlying temporary denial order, either as initially issued or
subsequently renewed, and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also
note 4, infra.
\3\ The December 11, 2018 renewal order was effective upon
issuance and published in the Federal Register on December 17, 2018
(83 FR 64,518). Prior renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008,
March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009, March 9, 2010, September 3,
2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August
9, 2012, February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24, 2014, July 22,
2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015, January 7, 2016, July 7,
2016, December 30, 2016, June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, and June
14, 2018, respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal followed the
issuance of a modification order that issued on July 1, 2011, to add
Zarand Aviation as a respondent. The July 13, 2015 renewal followed
a modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and added Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as
respondents. Each of the renewal orders and each of the modification
orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in this order has
been published in the Federal Register.
\4\ Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the
Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization
related to a denied person by affiliation, ownership, control, or
position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related
services may be added as a ``related person'' to a temporary denial
order to prevent evasion of the order.
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[[Page 27234]]
The September 11, 2009 renewal order continued the denial order as
to Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli Group Respondents or Blue
Airways of Armenia.\5\ As part of the February 25, 2011 renewal order,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), Mahmoud Amini, and
Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick
Aviation Services) were added as related persons to prevent evasion of
the TDO.\6\ A modification order issued on July 1, 2011, adding Zarand
Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled proposed BIS
administrative charges as part of a settlement agreement that was
approved by a settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The
sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and order included,
inter alia, a $15 million civil penalty and a requirement to conduct
five external audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli
Group Respondents also settled related charges with the Department
of Justice and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
\6\ See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of related
persons to a temporary denial order. Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini
remain parties to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick
resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge
for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR
764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the
settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years
of the denial period were active, with the remaining five years
suspended conditioned upon Gatewick's full and timely payment of the
civil penalty and its compliance with the Regulations during the
seven-year denial order period. This denial order, in effect,
superseded the TDO as to Gatewick, which was not included as part of
the January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC Final Order was
published in the Federal Register on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR
49283 (Aug. 20, 2014).
\7\ Zarand Aviation's export privileges remained denied until
July 22, 2014, when it was not included as part of the renewal order
issued on that date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were added as related persons. Mahan Air
General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added
as related persons by a modification order issued on April 9, 2012.
Mehdi Bahrami was added as a related person as part of the February 4,
2013 renewal order.
On May 21, 2015, a modification order issued adding Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as
respondents. As detailed in that order and discussed further infra,
these respondents were added to the TDO based upon evidence that they
were acting together to, inter alia, obtain aircraft subject to the
Regulations for export or reexport to Mahan in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO.
Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive officer, Issam
Shammout, were added as related persons as part of the July 13, 2015
renewal order.\8\ On November 16, 2017, a modification order issued to
remove Ali Eslamian, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. as related
persons following a request by OEE for their removal.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (``OFAC'') designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam
Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (``SDGTs'') on
May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for ``providing
support to Iran's Mahan Air.'' See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
\9\ The November 16, 2017 modification was published in the
Federal Register on December 4, 2017. See 82 FR 57,203 (Dec. 4,
2017). On September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved an
administrative charge for acting contrary to the terms of the denial
order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was based upon Eslamian's violation of
the TDO after his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. Equipco
(UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two companies owned and operated by
Eslamian, also were parties to settlement agreement and were added
to the settlement order as related persons. In addition to other
sanctions, the settlement provides that Eslamian, Equipco, and Skyco
shall be subject to a conditionally-suspended denial order for a
period of four years from the date of the settlement order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The December 11, 2018 renewal order continued the denial of the
export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard,
Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General
Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay,
Bahar Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird Group, and Issam Shammout.
On May 16, 2019, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for
renewal of the TDO that issued on December 11, 2018. The written
request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled
expiration. Notice of the renewal request was provided to Mahan
Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General
Trading in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the
Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.
Furthermore, no appeal of the related person determinations made as
part of the September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011,
April 9, 2012, February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 renewal or
modification orders has been made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud Amini,
Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC,
Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ A party named or added as a related person may not oppose
the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order,
but may file an appeal of the related person determination in
accordance with Section 766.23(c). See also note 2, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order
temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing
that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
``imminent violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and
766.24(d). ``A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of
likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a
violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the
matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative
charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' Id. A
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal
OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the
issuance of the initial TDO, and the renewal and modification orders
subsequently issued in this matter, including the May 21, 2015
modification order and the renewal order issued on December 11, 2018,
and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which
indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The
initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan
Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by
knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically
Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 1-3''), items subject to the EAR and classified
under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991.b, without
the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted
by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-
export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 4-6'')
to Iran.
As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence
presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1-3 continued to be flown on
Mahan Airways' routes after issuance of the
[[Page 27235]]
TDO, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.\11\ It also
showed that Aircraft 1-3 had been flown in further violation of the
Regulations and the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian
Government airline. Moreover, as discussed in the March 16, 2009,
September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010 renewal orders, Mahan Airways
registered Aircraft 1-3 in Iran, obtained Iranian tail numbers for them
(EP-MNA, EP-MNB, and EP-MNE, respectively), and continued to operate at
least two of them in violation of the Regulations and the TDO,\12\
while also committing an additional knowing and willful violation when
it negotiated for and acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The
additional acquired aircraft was an MD-82 aircraft, which subsequently
was painted in Mahan Airways' livery and flown on multiple Mahan
Airways' routes under tail number TC-TUA.
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\11\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
\12\ The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant
service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of
the March 9, 2010 renewal order.
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The March 9, 2010 renewal order also noted that a court in the
United Kingdom (``U.K.'') had found Mahan Airways in contempt of court
on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply with that court's December
21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders compelling Mahan Airways to remove
the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground them in the Netherlands. Mahan
Airways and the Balli Group Respondents had been litigating before the
U.K. court concerning ownership and control of Aircraft 1-3. In a
letter to the U.K. court dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways'
Chairman indicated, inter alia, that Mahan Airways opposes U.S.
Government actions against Iran, that it continued to operate the
aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 158,000 ``forward
bookings'' for these aircraft), and that it wished to continue to do so
and would pay damages if required by that court, rather than ground the
aircraft.
The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan
Airways' violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin
aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.-origin aircraft. In
February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways participated in
the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations
and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United
Arab Emirates (``UAE''), in violation of both the TDO and the
Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer
motherboards from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways' violations were
facilitated by Gatewick LLC, which not only participated in the
transaction, but also has stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airways'
sole booking agent for cargo and freight forwarding services in the
UAE.
Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan
Airways asserted that Aircraft 1-3 were not being used, but stated in
pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran
especially ``in an airworthy condition'' and that, depending on the
outcome of its U.K. court appeal, the aircraft ``could immediately go
back into service . . . on international routes into and out of Iran.''
Mahan Airways' January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at
p. 25, ]] 108, 110. This clearly stated intent, both on its own and in
conjunction with Mahan Airways' prior misconduct and statements,
demonstrated the need to renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent
future violations. Two of these three 747s subsequently were removed
from Iran and are no longer in Mahan Airways' possession. The third of
these 747s, with Manufacturer's Serial Number (``MSN'') 23480 and
Iranian tail number EP-MNE, remained in Iran under Mahan's control.
Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, it was designated a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT'') by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') on September 19,
2012.\13\ Furthermore, as discussed in the February 4, 2013 Order, open
source information indicated that this 747, painted in the livery and
logo of Mahan Airways, had been flown between Iran and Syria, and was
suspected of ferrying weapons and/or other equipment to the Syrian
Government from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
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\13\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx.
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In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24,
2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter,
Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by
operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways' livery and
logo, on flights into and out of Iran.\14\ At the time of the July 1,
2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in
France, with tail numbers F-OJHH and F-OJHI, respectively.\15\
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\14\ The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The
engines are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control
Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain
controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the
total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR.
They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of
these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\15\ OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August
24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation
and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and
to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail
numbers EP-MHH and EP-MHI). It was determined subsequent to the
February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for
these A310s was cancelled and that Mahan Airways then continued to
fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F-OJHH and
F-OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan
Airways' possession.
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The August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had
acquired another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with
MSN 499 and Iranian tail number EP-VIP, in violation of the TDO and the
Regulations.\16\ On September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 aircraft
(tail numbers F-OJHH, F-OJHI, and EP-VIP) were designated as SDGTs.\17\
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\16\ See note 14, supra.
\17\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously
designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64,427
(October 18, 2011).
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The February 4, 2013 renewal order laid out further evidence of
continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons
acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Aviation and another
Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines--two GE CF6-50C2
engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively--and other aircraft
parts in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\18\ The February 4,
2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance
with Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President
and
[[Page 27236]]
the head of Mahan's Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan's
acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1-3) that
resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business relationship with
Mahan dating back to 1997.
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\18\ Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013
renewal order as ``Turkish Company No. 1.'' Kral Aviation purchased
a GE CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in
July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this
engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the
freight forwarder in accordance with Section 758.8 of the
Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for
the second CF6-50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner
of the second engine subsequently cancelled the item's sale to Kral
Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that
another Turkish company (``Turkish Company No. 2'') was attempting
to purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish
Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order.
On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS's Entity
List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. See 78 FR
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the
Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15
CFR 744.11.
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The July 31, 2013 renewal order detailed additional evidence
obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE
CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States via
Turkey. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were
involved in or aware of matters related to the engine's arrival in
Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine,
and prepare it for shipment from Turkey.
Mahan Airways sought to obtain this U.S.-origin engine through
Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim Danismanlik (``Pioneer
Logistics''), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its
director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turkish national who previously
had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali
Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal order, a
sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinanda, also known as Kosol Surinandha,
Managing Director of Mahan's General Sales Agent in Thailand, stated
that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner
were ``actually the property of and owned by Mahan.'' He further stated
that he held ``legal title to the shares until otherwise required by
Mahan'' but would ``exercise the rights granted to [him] exactly and
only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/or decisions [would]
only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of Mahan[.]'' \19\
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\19\ Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol Surinanda
also were added to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
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The January 24, 2014 renewal order outlined OEE's continued
investigation of Mahan Airways' activities and detailed an attempt by
Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts
supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF-502R-5 aircraft engines (MSNs
LF5660 and LF5325), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S.
company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts
supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of
the engines and included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE also obtained a
Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.-origin
aircraft parts subject to the Regulations--including, among other
items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power
control unit--being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in
violation of the TDO.
The July 22, 2014 renewal order discussed open source evidence from
the March-June 2014 time period regarding two BAE regional jets, items
subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of
Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP-MOI and EP-
MOK, respectively.\20\ In addition, aviation industry resources
indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan Airways in late
November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian Mediterranean Airline, a
Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS's Entity List (Supplement No. 4
to Part 744 of the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for acting contrary
to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States.\21\ Open source information indicated that at least EP-MOI
remained active in Mahan's fleet, and that the aircraft was being
operated on multiple flights in July 2014.
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\20\ The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.-origin engines.
The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN
9A991.d. These aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN
9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires
U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7
of the Regulations.
\21\ See 76 FR 50407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 2014 renewal
order also referenced two Airbus A320 aircraft painted in the livery
and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers
EP-MMK and EP-MML, respectively. OEE's investigation also showed
that Mahan obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from Khors Air
Company, another Ukrainian airline that, like Ukrainian
Mediterranean Airlines, was added to BIS's Entity List on August 15,
2011. Open source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 aircraft
may be been transferred by Mahan Airways to another Iranian airline
in October 2014, and issued Iranian tail numbers EP-APE and EP-APF,
respectively.
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The January 16, 2015 renewal order detailed evidence of additional
attempts by Mahan Airways to acquire items subject the Regulations in
further violation of the TDO. Specifically, in March 2014, OEE became
aware of an inertial reference unit bearing serial number 1231 (``the
IRU'') that had been sent to the United States for repair. The IRU is
subject to the Regulations, classified under ECCN 7A103, and controlled
for missile technology reasons. Upon closer inspection, it was
determined that IRU came from or had been installed on an Airbus A340
aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further investigation revealed that as of
approximately February 2014, this aircraft was registered under Iranian
tail number EP-MMB and had been painted in the livery and logo of Mahan
Airways.
The January 16, 2015 renewal order also described related efforts
by the Departments of Justice and Treasury to further thwart Mahan's
illicit procurement efforts. Specifically, on August 14, 2014, the
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland filed a
civil forfeiture complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(b)
that resulted in the court issuing an Order of Forfeiture on December
2, 2014. EP-MMB remains listed as active in Mahan Airways' fleet and
has been used on flights into and out of Iran as recently as December
19, 2017.
Additionally, on August 29, 2014, OFAC blocked the property and
interests in property of Asian Aviation Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan
Airways affiliate or front company, pursuant to Executive Order 13224.
In doing so, OFAC described Mahan Airways' use of Asian Aviation
Logistics to evade sanctions by making payments on behalf of Mahan for
the purchase of engines and other equipment.\22\
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\22\ See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55073 (Sep. 15, 2014).
OFAC also blocked the property and property interests of Pioneer
Logistics of Turkey on August 29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways' use of
Pioneer Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the Regulations
was discussed in a prior renewal order, as summarized, supra, at 14.
BIS added both Asian Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the
Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
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The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two
aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus
A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late
2014/early 2015 and were under the possession, control, and/or
ownership of Mahan Airways.\23\ The sales agreements for these two
aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.\24\
Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers
(``EFT'') were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General
Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550. The May 21,
[[Page 27237]]
2015 modification order also laid out evidence showing the respondents'
attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, including aircraft
physically located in the United States in similarly-patterned
transactions during the same recent time period. Transactional
documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99,
respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales agreements
for Al Naser Airlines.\25\ A review of the payment information for
these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay and
Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern described for MSNs
164 and 550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99 were detained by OEE Special Agents
prior to their planned export from the United States.
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\23\ Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.-origin engines
that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN
9A991.d. Both aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The
aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export
of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\24\ The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali Abdullah Alhay as a
25% owner of Al Naser Airlines.
\25\ Both aircraft were physically located in the United States
and therefore are subject to the Regulations pursuant to Section
734.3(a)(1). Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.-origin
engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under
Export Control Classification Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent
of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to
the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified
under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections
742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
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The July 13, 2015 renewal order outlined evidence showing that Al
Naser Airlines' attempts to acquire aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways
extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to include a total of nine
aircraft.\26\ Four of the aircraft, all of which are subject to the
Regulations and were obtained by Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been
issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-MMG
(MSN 383), EP-MMH (MSN 391) and EP-MMR (MSN 416), respectively.\27\
Publicly available flight tracking information provided evidence that
at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both EP-MMH and EP-MMR were
being actively flown on routes into and out of Iran in violation of the
TDO and Regulations.\28\ The January 7, 2016 renewal order discussed
evidence that Mahan Airways had begun actively flying EP-MMD on
international routes into and out of Iran, including from/to Bangkok,
Thailand. Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order described publicly
available aviation database and flight tracking information indicating
that Mahan Airways continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail numbers
and press into active service under Mahan's livery and logo at least
two more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it had obtained from or through Al
Naser Airlines: EP-MME (MSN 371) and EP-MMF (MSN 376), respectively.
Since January 2016, EP-MME has logged flights to and from Tehran, Iran
involving various destinations, including Guangzhou, China and Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, in further violation of the TDO and the
Regulations.
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\26\ This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015,
that appeared on Mahan Airways' website and stated that Mahan
``added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet [,]'' and that the newly
acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321.
See https://www.mahan.aero/en/mahan-air/press-room/44. The press
release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways' website.
Publicly available aviation databases similarly showed that Mahan
had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May
2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13,
2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was
actively involved in Al Naser Airlines' acquisition of MSNs 164 and
550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were
detained by OEE).
\27\ The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d.
The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result
are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft
are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these
aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\28\ There is some publicly available information indicating
that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number
EP-MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus
A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines in
violation of the TDO and the Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft
were designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015, pursuant to
Executive Order 13224. See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
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The July 7, 2016 renewal order described Mahan Airways' acquisition
of a BAE Avro RJ-85 aircraft (MSN 2392) in violation of the TDO and its
subsequent registration under Iranian tail number EP-MOR.\29\ This
information was corroborated by publicly available information on the
website of Iran's civil aviation authority. The July 7, 2016 order also
outlined Mahan's continued operation of EP-MMF in violation of the TDO
on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Shanghai, China,
respectively.
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\29\ The BAE Avro RJ-85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d.
The BAE Avro RJ-85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at
more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-
export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
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The December 30, 2016 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued
operation of multiple Airbus aircraft, including EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-
MMF (MSN 376), and EP-MMH (MSN 391), which were acquired from or
through Al Naser Airlines in violation of the TDO, as previously
detailed in pertinent part in the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016
renewal orders. Publicly available flight tracking information showed
that the aircraft were operated on flights into and out of Iran,
including from/to Beijing, China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Istanbul,
Turkey.\30\
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\30\ Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew
from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. Between December 20 and December
22, 2016, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to
Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. Between December
26 and December 28, 2016, EP-MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from
Tehran, Iran to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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The June 27, 2017 renewal order included similar evidence regarding
Mahan Airways' violation of the TDO by operating multiple Airbus
aircraft subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to,
aircraft procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into
and out of Iran, including from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai, China and
Kabul, Afghanistan.
The June 27, 2017 order also detailed evidence concerning a
suspected planned or attempted diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340
subject to the Regulations that had first been mentioned in OEE's
December 13, 2016 renewal request.
The December 20, 2017 renewal order presented evidence that a Mahan
employee attempted to initiate negotiations with a U.S. company for the
purchase of an aircraft subject to the Regulations and classified under
ECCN 9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted Al Naser Airlines'
acquisition, via lease, of at least possession and/or control of a
Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail number YR-SEB, and an Airbus A320
(MSN 357), bearing tail number YR-SEA, from a Romanian company in
violation of the TDO.\31\ Open source information indicates that after
the December 20, 2017 renewal order publicly exposed Al Naser's
acquisition of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and 357), the leases were
subsequently cancelled and the aircraft returned to their owner.
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\31\ The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin engines, which
are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control
Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The engines are valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft, which
consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is classified under
ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or reexport to Iran would require U.S.
Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
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The December 20, 2017 renewal order also included evidence
indicating that Mahan Airways was continuing to operate a number of
aircraft subject to the Regulations, including aircraft originally
procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out
[[Page 27238]]
of Iran from/to Lahore, Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara, Turkey,
Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq, in violation of the TDO.
The June 14, 2018 renewal order outlined evidence that Mahan began
actively operating EP-MMT, an Airbus A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired
in 2017 and previously registered in Kazakhstan under tail number UP-
A4003, on international flights into and out of Iran.\32\ It also
discussed evidence that Mahan continued to operate a number of aircraft
subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP-MME, EP-MMF, and
EP-MMH, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Beijing,
China, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Istanbul, Turkey.
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\32\ The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are
subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The
Airbus A340 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result
is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The aircraft is
classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of this
aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. On June 4, 2018, EP-MMT
(MSN 292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran.
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The June 14, 2018 renewal order also noted OFAC's May 24, 2018
designation of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret
Limited Sirketi, of Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order
13224, for providing material support to Mahan, as well as OFAC's
designation as SDGTs of an additional twelve aircraft in which Mahan
has an interest.\33\ The June 14, 2018 order also cited the April 2018
arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen on a three-count criminal
information filed in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey involving the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin aircraft
parts valued at over $2 million to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.
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\33\ See 83 FR 27,828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC's related press
release states in part that ``[o]ver the last several years, Otik
Aviation has procured and delivered millions of dollars in aviation-
related spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some of which are
procured from the United States and the European Union. As recently
as 2017, Otik Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with
replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per shipment, such as
aircraft brakes.'' The twelve additional Mahan-related aircraft that
were designated are: EP-MMA (MSN 20), EP-MMB (MSN 56), EP-MMC (MSN
282), EP-MMJ (MSN 526), EP-MMV (MSN 2079), EP-MNF (MSN 547), EP-MOD
(MSN 3162), EP-MOM (MSN 3165), EP-MOP (MSN 2257), EP-MOQ (MSN 2261),
EP-MOR (MSN 2392), and EP-MOS (MSN 2347). See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180524.aspx.
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The December 11, 2018 renewal order detailed publicly available
information showing that Mahan Airways had continued operating a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP-MMB,
EP-MME, EP-MMF, and EP-MMQ, on international flights into and out of
Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, Bangkok, Thailand, and
Dubai, United Arab Emirates.\34\ It also discussed that OEE's continued
investigation of Mahan Airways and its affiliates had resulted in an
October 2018 guilty plea by Arzu Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, stemming from her
involvement in a conspiracy to export a U.S.-origin aircraft engine
valued at approximately $810,000 to Mahan.
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\34\ Flight tracking information shows that on December 10,
2018, EP-MMB (MSN 56) flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran,
and EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran.
Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from
Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP-MMQ
(MSN 449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and
Tehran, Iran.
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The December 11, 2018 order also noted OFAC's September 14, 2018
designation of Mahan-related entities as SDGTs pursuant to Executive
Order 13224, namely, My Aviation Company Limited, of Thailand, and
Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel
& Tourism SDN BHD, of Malaysia.\35\ As general sales agents for Mahan
Airways, these companies sold cargo space aboard Mahan Airways'
flights, including on flights to Iran, and provided other services to
or for benefit of Mahan Airways and its operations.\36\
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\35\ See 83 FR 34,301 (July 19, 2018) (designation of Mahan
Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 2018), and 83 FR 53,359 (Oct.
22, 2018) (designation of My Aviation Company Limited and updating
of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on September 14,
2018).
\36\ OFAC's press release concerning its designation of My
Aviation Company Limited on September 14, 2018, states in part that
``[t]his Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous U.S.
warnings, issued publicly and delivered bilaterally to the Thai
government, to sever ties with Mahan Air.'' My Aviation provides
cargo services to Mahan Airways, including freight booking, and
works with local freight forwarding entities to ship cargo on
regularly-scheduled Mahan Airways' flights to Tehran, Iran. My
Aviation has also provided Mahan Airways with passenger booking
services. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm484.
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The May 16, 2019 renewal request similarly outlines on-going
violations of the TDO and the Regulations by Mahan Airways, as well as
other evidence of widespread efforts by Mahan and its network of agents
and affiliates to unlawfully procure items subject to the Regulations.
Mahan continues to unlawfully operate a number of aircraft subject to
the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP-MMJ, EP-MMQ, and EP-MNF, on
international flights into and out of Iran from/to Damascus, Syria,
Moscow, Russia, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. These flights have
continued since the renewal request was submitted.\37\
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\37\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on May 26, 2019, EP-MMJ (MSN 526) flew from Damascus, Syria to
Tehran, Iran, and on May 24, 2019, EP-MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes
between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on May 23,
2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to
Tehran, Iran.
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In addition, an End-Use Check conducted by BIS in Malaysia in March
2019, uncovered evidence that on approximately ten occasions, Mahan had
aided and abetted the unlicensed export of U.S.-origin items from the
United States to Iran via Malaysia. The items are subject to the
Regulations and included helicopter shafts, transmitters, and other
aircraft parts, some of which are listed on the Commerce Control List
and controlled on anti-terrorism grounds. By transporting the items
from Malaysia to Iran, Mahan violated the plain language of the TDO,
which specifically prohibits Mahan from, inter alia, transporting any
item that is subject to the Regulations and has been exported from the
United States.
BIS added four parties located in the United Arab Emirates to the
Entity List on May 14, 2019, based in part upon another procurement
scheme involving Mahan Airways. Manohar Nair and Basha Asmath Shaikh
and two co-located companies that they operate, Emirates Hermes General
Trading and Presto Freight International, LLC, were added to the Entity
List pursuant to Section 744.11 of the Regulations, including for
engaging in activities to procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan's
behalf.\38\
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\38\ See 84 FR 21,233 (May 14, 2019).
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Finally, two other Mahan-linked entities were designated as SDGTs
by OFAC on January 24, 2019, namely, Flight Travel LLC, which is
Mahan's general service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air,
an Iranian airline which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing 747s,\39\ is
owned or controlled by Mahan, and also is linked to the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).\40\
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\39\ These 747s are registered in Iran with tail numbers EP-FAA
and EP-FAB, respectively.
\40\ OFAC's press release concerning these designations states
that Qeshm Fars Air was being designated for ``being owned or
controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material or technological support for, or
financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF,'' and
Flight Travel LLC for ``acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.'' It
further states, inter alia, that ``Mahan Air employees fill Qeshm
Fars Air management positions, and Mahan Air provides technical and
operational support for Qeshm Fars Air, facilitating the airline's
illicit operations.'' See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm590. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190124.aspx.
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[[Page 27239]]
C. Findings
Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied
persons have acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that
such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that
given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation,
there is a likelihood of future violations. Therefore, renewal of the
TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation
of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in
the United States and abroad that they should continue to cease dealing
with Mahan Airways and Al Naser Airlines and the other denied persons
in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items
subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity
subject to the Regulations.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered: First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower,
No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD
KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates; MAHMOUD AMINI, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al
Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KERMAN AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN
AVIATION, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO TRADING
LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR GENERAL
TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai
40594, United Arab Emirates; MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan Airways-Istanbul
Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli
Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL-NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL
NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home
46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya
Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St.
3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH
ALHAY A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 46, Al-
Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private
Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177;
BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5,
Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box
8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY
BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD LTD A/
K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone,
United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD ISAM MUHAMMAD
ANWAR NUR SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al
Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515,
and 17-18 Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom,
and Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A
Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or on their behalf, any
successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a ``Denied Person''
and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to
as ``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the Export Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license
exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or engaging in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item
subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control,
position of responsibility, affiliation in the conduct of trade or
business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar
Safwa General Trading may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a
full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022. In accordance with
the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue
Bird Group, and/or Issam Shammout may, at any time, appeal their
inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge,
U.S. Coast
[[Page 27240]]
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland
21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be
opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or
Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing
a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days
before the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading and each
related person, and shall be published in the Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Dated: June 5, 2019.
Douglas R. Hassebrock,
Director, Office of Export Enforcement performing the non-exclusive
functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2019-12396 Filed 6-11-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
