Request for Information Regarding Potential Regulatory Changes to the Remittance Rule, 17971-17977 [2019-08455]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
• Should the OCC limit the types of
entities that a national bank or Federal
savings association may use as a subcustodian or limit the type of subcustodian for specific types of accounts?
For example, the Internal Revenue
Service limits which entities may act as
custodians for Individual Retirement
Accounts.29 If the OCC imposes a limit,
what types of accounts should be
subject to the limitation and why?
• What type of retail or commercial
custody and safe keeping activities
should an OCC non-fiduciary custody
rule exclude, if any, and why?
Finally, the OCC invites comment on
whether any of the possible provisions
listed above would be overly
burdensome, especially for community
institutions, and if so, whether there are
approaches that would address the same
issues in a less burdensome way. The
OCC also invites comment from clients
of national bank and Federal savings
association custodians on the
appropriateness of these suggested
provisions and whether the OCC should
consider additional provisions to
safeguard custody assets.
Dated: April 23, 2019.
Joseph M. Otting,
Comptroller of the Currency.
[FR Doc. 2019–08505 Filed 4–26–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–33–P
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
12 CFR Part 1005
[Docket No.: CFPB–2019–0018]
Request for Information Regarding
Potential Regulatory Changes to the
Remittance Rule
Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection.
ACTION: Request for information.
AGENCY:
The Electronic Fund
Transfers Act (EFTA), as amended by
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), establishes certain protections for
consumers sending international money
transfers, or remittance transfers. The
Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection’s (Bureau) remittance rules
(Remittance Rule or Rule) implement
these protections. This document seeks
information and evidence that may
inform possible changes to the Rule that
would not eliminate, but would mitigate
the effects of the expiration of a
statutory exception for certain financial
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
29 See
26 CFR 1.408–2.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
institutions. EFTA expressly limits the
length of the temporary exception to
July 21, 2020 and does not authorize the
Bureau to extend this term. Therefore,
the exception will expire on July 21,
2020 unless Congress changes the law.
In addition, the Bureau seeks
information and evidence related to the
scope of coverage of the Rule, including
whether to change a safe harbor
threshold in the Rule that determines
whether a person makes remittance
transfers in the normal course of its
business, and whether an exception for
small financial institutions may be
appropriate.
Comments must be received on
or before June 28, 2019.
ADDRESSES: You may submit responsive
information and other comments,
identified by Docket No. CFPB–2019–
0018, by any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Email: 2019-RFI-RemittanceRule@
cfpb.gov. Include Docket No. CFPB–
2019–0018 in the subject line of the
message.
• Mail: Comment Intake, Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection, 1700 G
St. NW, Washington, DC 20552.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Comment
Intake, Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, 1700 G Street NW,
Washington, DC 20552.
Instructions: Please note the number
associated with any question to which
you are responding at the top of each
response. You are not required to
answer all questions to receive
consideration of your comments. The
Bureau encourages the early submission
of comments. All submissions must
include the document title and docket
number. Because paper mail in the
Washington, DC area and at the Bureau
is subject to delay, commenters are
encouraged to submit comments
electronically. In general, all comments
received will be posted without change
to https://www.regulations.gov. In
addition, comments will be available for
public inspection and copying at 1700
G St. NW, Washington, DC 20552, on
official business days between the hours
of 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Standard
Time. You can make an appointment to
inspect the documents by telephoning
(202) 435–7275.
All submissions, including
attachments and other supporting
materials, will become part of the public
record and subject to public disclosure.
Please do not include in your
submissions sensitive personal
information, such as account numbers
or Social Security numbers, or names of
DATES:
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
17971
other individuals, or other information
that you would not ordinarily make
public, such as trade secrets or
confidential commercial information.
Submissions will not be edited to
remove any identifying or contact
information, or other information that
you would not ordinarily make public.
If you wish to submit trade secret or
confidential commercial information,
please contact the individuals listed in
the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section below. Information submitted to
the Bureau will be treated in accordance
with the Bureau’s Rule on the
Disclosure of Records and Information,
12 CFR part 1070 et seq.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jane
Raso, Senior Counsel; Yaritza Velez,
Counsel; Office of Regulations, at (202)
435–7309. If you require this document
in alternative electronic format, please
contact CFPB_Accessibility.cfpb.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Consumers in the United States send
‘‘remittance transfers’’ 1 in the billions
of dollars to recipients in foreign
countries each year. The funds that
consumers send abroad are commonly
referred to as remittances, and
consumers send remittances (often for a
fee) in a variety of ways, including by
using banks, credit unions, or money
services businesses (MSBs). The term
‘‘remittance transfers’’ is sometimes
limited to describing consumer-toconsumer transfers of small amounts of
money, often made by immigrants
supporting friends and relatives in other
countries. But ‘‘remittance transfers’’
may also include payments of larger
dollar amounts to pay, for instance,
bills, tuition, or other expenses.
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act,
remittance transfers fell largely outside
of the scope of Federal consumer
protection laws. Section 1073 of the
Dodd-Frank Act amended EFTA by
adding a new section 919 to EFTA to
create a comprehensive system for
consumer protection for remittance
transfers sent by consumers in the
United States to individuals and
businesses in foreign countries.2 EFTA
applies broadly in terms of the types of
‘‘remittance transfers’’ it covers and
persons and financial institutions
subject to it. EFTA section 919(g)(2)
defines ‘‘remittance transfer’’ as the
electronic transfer of funds by a sender
in any State to designated recipients
located in foreign countries that are
1 The definition of ‘‘remittance transfer’’ in the
Remittance Rule is described below.
2 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq. EFTA section 919 is
codified at 1693o–1.
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
17972
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
initiated by a remittance transfer
provider; only small dollar transactions
are excluded from this definition.3
EFTA section 919(g)(3) defines
‘‘remittance transfer provider’’ to be a
person or financial institution providing
remittance transfers in the ‘‘normal
course of its business.’’ The Rule
provides that whether a person
conducts transfers in the ‘‘normal
course of business’’ generally depends
on the ‘‘facts and circumstances.’’ 4
However, the Rule also contains a safe
harbor whereby a person that provides
100 or fewer remittance transfers in the
previous and current calendar years
would be deemed not to meet the
normal course of business definition,
and therefore be outside of the Rule’s
coverage.5 As noted above, remittance
transfer services may be provided by
banks, credit unions, and MSBs. In its
recent assessment of the Remittance
Rule, the Bureau found that in 2017,
MSBs conducted 95.6 percent of all
remittance transfers, banks made up 4.2
percent of remittance transfers, and
credit unions conducted 0.2 percent of
remittance transfers.6 Note that, because
the average transfer size for banks is
much larger than for MSBs, banks share
of dollars transferred is greater than
their share of number of transfers
made.7
An important requirement established
by EFTA section 919 is that remittance
transfer providers generally must
disclose (both prior to and at the time
the consumer pays for the transfer) the
actual exchange rate and the amount to
be received by the recipient of a
remittance transfer.8 EFTA provides two
exceptions to this general disclosure
3 15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(g)(2). As adopted in the
Remittance Rule, the term ‘‘remittance transfer’’
means: ‘‘[The] electronic transfer of funds requested
by a sender to a designated recipient that is sent by
a remittance transfer provider. The term applies
regardless of whether the sender holds an account
with the remittance transfer provider, and
regardless of whether the transaction is also an
electronic fund transfer, as defined in [subpart A of
Regulation E].’’ The Rule’s definition specifically
excludes the following transfers: (1) Transfer
amounts of $15 or less; and (2) certain securities
and commodities transfers. 12 CFR 1005.30(e).
4 Comment 30(f)(2)–i.
5 12 CFR 1005.30(f)(2)(i).
6 Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Remittance Rule
Assessment Report, at 4 (2018) (hereinafter
Assessment Report), available at https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/6963/bcfp_
remittance-rule-assessment_report.pdf. Section
1022(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Bureau
to conduct an assessment of each of its significant
rules and orders and to publish a report of each
assessment within five years of the effective date of
the rule or order.
7 Assessment Report, at 63–64.
8 15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(a)(1) and (2).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
requirement, a ‘‘temporary’’ exception
and a ‘‘permanent’’ exception.9
Remittance transfer providers qualify
for the temporary exception in EFTA
section 919 if: (i) They are an insured
depository institution or insured credit
union (collectively, ‘‘insured
institutions’’) that makes a transfer from
an account that the sender holds with
them; and (ii) they are unable to know,
for reasons beyond their control, the
amount of currency that will be made
available to the designated recipient. If
these conditions are met, EFTA’s
temporary exception provides that these
institutions need not disclose the
amount of currency that will be received
by the recipient but rather may disclose
‘‘a reasonably accurate estimate of the
foreign currency to be received.’’ 10
Specifically, under the Rule, insured
institutions may disclose estimates 11 of
the exchange rate (as applicable),12
certain third-party fees defined in the
Rule as ‘‘covered third-party fees,’’ 13 the
total amount that will be transferred to
the recipient inclusive of covered thirdparty fees,14 and the amount that will be
received by the recipient (after
deducting covered third-party fees).15
This exception from disclosing actual
amounts is temporary because EFTA
provides a one-time ability for the
Bureau to extend the exception up to
five years from the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act, or until July 21, 2020,
if the Bureau determined that the
expiration of the exception would
negatively affect the ability of insured
institutions to send remittances to
foreign countries. As EFTA section 919
expressly limits the length of the
temporary exception to the term
specified therein, and does not provide
the Bureau the authority to extend this
term beyond July 21, 2020, or make it
permanent, the temporary exception
will expire on July 21, 2020.
The Bureau implemented EFTA
section 919 (including the temporary
9 EFTA section 919(c) permits the Bureau to
except remittance transfer providers from having to
provide actual amounts for transfers to certain
nations if the Bureau determines that a recipient
country does not legally allow, or the method by
which transactions are made in the recipient
country do not allow, a remittance transfer provider
to know the amount of currency that will be
received by the designated recipient. 15 U.S.C.
1693o–1(c). Unlike the temporary exception, this
exception may be used by any remittance transfer
provider sending to a country that meets the
relevant conditions, not just insured institutions.
Also unlike the temporary exception, this exception
has no sunset date and therefore is permanent.
10 15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(a)(4).
11 12 CFR 1005.32(c).
12 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(iv).
13 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(vi).
14 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(v).
15 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(vii).
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
exception) through its remittance rule
issued in 2012 which, as amended,
became effective on October 28, 2013.16
As noted above, the Bureau conducted
an assessment of its remittance rules as
effective as of November 2014 and in
late 2018 published a report of its
assessment. As discussed below, the
Assessment Report provided insights
into the effectiveness of the Rule and its
provisions, including the temporary
exception. In this RFI, the Bureau is
seeking information on the expiration of
the temporary exception on July 21,
2020, and potential options to mitigate
the impact of the expiration. Based on
comments and other feedback from
various remittance transfer providers
and their trade associations, as well as
its own analysis, the Bureau is
concerned about the potential negative
effects of the expiration of the
temporary exception.17 The Bureau is
also seeking information on possible
changes to the current safe harbor
threshold in the Rule’s ‘‘normal course
of business’’ definition 18 and whether
an exception for ‘‘small financial
institutions’’ in the Rule may be
appropriate. The Bureau is concerned
about the Rule’s effects on certain
remittance transfer providers that
account for a small number of
remittance transfers overall but
nonetheless fall within the Rule’s
coverage because the number of
remittance transfers they provide exceed
16 77 FR 6194 (Feb. 7, 2012); as amended on 77
FR 40459 (July 10, 2012); 77 FR 50243 (Aug. 20,
2012); 78 FR 6025 (Jan. 29, 2013); 78 FR 30661 (May
22, 2013); and 78 FR 49365 (Aug. 14, 2013).
17 The Bureau received approximately 40
comments on the Remittance Rule in response to a
RFI it issued in 2017 in connection with the
Assessment Report. Assessment Report, at 149. The
Bureau also received approximately 34 comments
on the Remittance Rule from two RFIs it issued in
2018. One of the 2018 RFIs concerns whether the
Bureau should amend any rules it has issued since
its creation or exercise new rulemaking authorities
provided for by the Dodd-Frank Act. See Bureau of
Consumer Fin. Prot., Request for Information
Regarding the Bureau’s Adopted Regulations and
New Rulemaking Authorities (2018), available at
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
cfpb_rfi_adopted-regulations_032018.pdf. The other
2018 RFI concerns whether the Bureau should
amend rules or exercise the rulemaking authorities
that it inherited from other Federal government
agencies. See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Request for Information Regarding the Bureau’s
Inherited Regulations and Inherited Rulemaking
Authorities (2018), available at https://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_rfi_
inherited-regulations_032018.pdf.
18 As discussed above, the phrase ‘‘normal course
of business’’ in the definition of ‘‘remittance
transfer provider’’ determines whether a person
providing remittance transfers is covered by the
Rule. Also as discussed, the Rule contains a safe
harbor that clarifies that certain persons do not
provide transfers in the ‘‘normal course of
business’’ because the number of transfers they
provide is below 100 transfers a year in the
previous and current calendar years.
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
100 transfers a year, and thus, are not
able to use the current safe harbor for
‘‘normal course of business.’’
The Bureau has received a number of
other suggestions for changes to the
Remittance Rule to improve its
effectiveness in helping consumers or
reduce the burden it may impose.
However, in light of the time sensitivity
of the expiration of the temporary
exception, this RFI is limited to seeking
information on the two issues described
above.
II. Expiration of the Temporary
Exception
A. Potential Challenges in Disclosing
Actual Amounts
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
There are a variety of methods used
to send remittance transfers. Generally,
these methods involve either a closed
network payment system or an open
network payment system, although
hybrids between open and closed
payment systems also exist. In a ‘‘closed
network’’ payment system, the
remittance transfer provider exerts a
high degree of end-to-end control over
a transfer. Although there are many
ways a closed network payment system
might be structured, the level of control
such a system affords the remittance
transfer provider means, among other
things, that the provider could disclose
precise and reliable information about
the terms and costs of transfers (e.g.,
fees and exchange rate) before the
sender pays for the transfer. Closed
network payment systems are relied on
by most MSBs that provide remittance
transfer services.
The other major type of system,
typically referred to as an ‘‘open
network’’ payment system, is one in
which no one entity necessarily exerts
end-to-end control over a remittance
transfer. Open network payment
systems are primarily utilized by banks
and credit unions, and include the
system by which consumers send wire
transfers 19 or other transfers from their
deposit accounts to overseas recipients.
The predominant open network
payment system model is the
correspondent banking network.20 The
19 79 FR 55970, 55971 (Sept. 18, 2014) (‘‘The most
common form of an open payment network
remittance transfer is a wire transfer, an
electronically transmitted order that directs a
receiving institution to deposit funds into an
identified beneficiary’s account.’’).
20 Generally speaking, a correspondent banking
network is made up of individual correspondent
banking relationships, which describe arrangements
under which one bank (correspondent) holds
deposits owned by other banks (respondents) and
provides payment and other services to those
respondent banks. See, e.g., Bank for International
Settlements, Correspondent Banking, at 9 (2016),
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
correspondent banking system lacks a
single, central operator, which
distinguishes it from closed network
payment systems. Instead, the
correspondent banking network is a
decentralized network of banking
relationships between the world’s tens
of thousands of banks and credit unions.
Most institutions only maintain
relationships with a relatively small
number of correspondent banks, but
could nonetheless reach a wide number
of recipient financial institutions
worldwide even if the institution does
not have control over, or a relationship
with, all of the participants in
transmitting a remittance transfer.
Because a sending institution does not
necessarily have a relationship with, or
control over, all the participants in
transmitting a remittance transfer in an
open network payment system, a
sending institution using an open
network payment system may face
greater difficulty in determining and
disclosing the exact amounts required
by the Rule, compared to remittance
transfer providers operating within a
closed network payment system. For
example, with respect to fees charged by
intermediary institutions, absent a
correspondent banking relationship or
other arrangement with an intermediary
institution in the transmittal chain, a
sending institution may not know with
certainty the amount of fees that
institution may impose on the
remittance transfer. Likewise, if the
sending institution does not conduct
any necessary currency exchange, any
institution through which the funds
pass could potentially perform the
currency exchange before the recipient’s
institution deposits the funds into the
recipient’s account. Again, absent a
correspondent banking or other
arrangement with the institution that
performs the currency exchange, the
sending institution may not know the
applicable exchange rate with certainty.
New market entrants may employ
business models that make it easier for
them to determine actual amounts. In
recent years, new types of remittance
transfer providers, and other businesses
that are not traditional MSBs or
financial institutions, have entered the
market. Their business models and
product offerings may eventually
provide greater transparency and
certainty over the terms and cost of a
remittance transfer. For example, new
remittance transfer providers that have
entered the market have adopted
variations of the closed payment
network system, and therefore, they can
available at https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/
d147.pdf.
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
17973
disclose precise and reliable
information about the terms and costs of
transfers before the sender pays for the
transfer.21
Existing market participants may also
be engaged in creating new ways of
facilitating cross-border transfers with
enhanced transparency and certainty
over certain terms and costs of
remittance transfers. The Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT)’s ‘‘global
payments innovation’’ (gpi) tracking
product is one such example. SWIFT
provides messaging services that
support a large share of all cross-border
interbank payments conducted via open
network payment systems. The gpi
tracking product could potentially bring
greater transparency and certainty over
payment terms to open network
payment transfers because it allows
financial institutions to track the fees
charged and the exchange rates applied
to a payment along its transmittal route.
The product, however, has not been
adopted by all SWIFT members. But in
October 2018, SWIFT released a version
of gpi that provides all banks on the
SWIFT network the ability to see and
track their payments, intending to
expand gpi adoption.22
B. Bureau Action Related to the
Temporary Exception
As discussed above, EFTA section 919
provides that the temporary exception
shall expire five years after the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act (i.e.,
July 21, 2015). It authorizes the Bureau
to extend the exception—but for no
more than an additional five years—if
the Bureau determined that the
expiration ‘‘would negatively affect the
ability of [covered insured institutions]
. . . to send remittances to locations in
foreign countries.’’ 23 In 2014, following
a notice-and-comment rulemaking
process, the Bureau made that
determination and extended the
temporary exception to July 21, 2020.24
The temporary exception will expire on
July 21, 2020. EFTA section 919
expressly limits the length of the
temporary exception to the term
specified therein and does not provide
the Bureau authority to extend this term
21 In addition to making it easier to determine
actual amounts, these new business models may
increase consumer choice by providing them with
alternatives to traditional MSBs and financial
institutions, such as higher limits on a transfer’s
transaction size to compete with transfers provided
by financial institutions.
22 See Press Release, SWIFT, SWIFT rolls out gpi
tracker for all as usage soars (Oct. 23, 2018), https://
www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swiftrolls-out-gpi-tracker-for-all-as-usage-soars.
23 15 U.S.C. 1693o–1(a)(4)(B).
24 79 FR 55970 (Sept. 18, 2014).
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
17974
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
beyond July 21, 2020. The Bureau,
therefore, will not be extending the
exception or making it permanent
unless Congress changes the law.
C. Assessment Findings and Additional
Analysis
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
Based on 2017 bank call report data,
it appears that approximately 886,000
remittance transfers (just over six
percent of total bank transfers sent in
2017 and 0.27 percent of all remittance
transfers sent in 2017) relied on the
temporary exception.25 Credit unions
are not required to report reliance on the
temporary exception on credit union
call reports, even though they may use
the exception. The Bureau conducted an
analysis in which it assumed that all of
the approximately 760,000 remittance
transfers sent by credit unions relied on
the temporary exception,26 and
determined that it would have meant
that approximately an additional 0.22
percent of all remittance transfers sent
in 2017 relied on the temporary
exception, making the total percentage
of transfers that rely on the temporary
exception approximately 0.5 percent.
The Assessment Report also found
that fewer banks relied on the temporary
exception in 2017 than in 2014, the year
banks began reporting remittance
25 Assessment Report, at 139. Bank call reports
provide data on bank reliance on the temporary
exception. Under the Rule, for purposes of
determining whether a bank or credit union may
rely on the temporary exception, an ‘‘insured
institution’’ means ‘‘insured depository institutions
. . . as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813), and insured credit
unions as defined in section 101 of the Federal
Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752). 12 CFR
1005.32(a)(3). But there is no similar information
for credit union reliance, as credit unions are not
required to report reliance on the temporary
exception on credit union call reports. Further,
broker-dealers may rely on the temporary exception
pursuant to a SEC no-action letter. However, the
Bureau does not have data on broker-dealers’ use
of the exception, but expects that to the extent they
are associated with banks, their reliance should
mirror that of the banks with whom they are
associated. Assessment Report, at 141.
26 The Bureau has information that suggests that
100 percent reliance on the temporary exception by
credit unions is unlikely. An industry survey the
Bureau conducted to support the assessment also
asked whether providers are relying on the
exception, and if so, whether they use it to estimate
fees, exchange rates, or both. Of the 41 banks and
credit unions that answered the question, six
respondents replied that they used the temporary
exception, similar to the proportion in the bank call
reports. Only one of the 17 credit unions that
answered the question reported using the temporary
exception. That credit union reported using it for
fees only. However, as the Assessment Report
cautioned, the survey is not statistically
representative of the market, even though the
Bureau sent the survey to a representative sample
of approximately 200 banks and credit unions, as
well as every remittance-sending MSB for which
the Bureau could find contact information.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
transfer activities on their call reports.27
The decline appears to be the result of
both fewer banks relying on the
exception for any transfers, and a
reduction in the reported percentage of
transfers for which the temporary
exception is used among the banks that
continue to rely on the exception. Based
on its analysis of 2017 call report data,
the Bureau found that only 80 banks
used the temporary exception. Among
these 80 banks, there appears to be
considerable variance in the rate of
reliance. For example, while four of the
five top remitting banks use the
exception, that reliance ranges from
approximately 0.4 percent to 27 percent
of the total number of remittance
transfers they sent.
While a substantial majority of
remittance transfers may not involve the
use of the temporary exception, the
Bureau also recognizes that a large
number of remittance transfers,
specifically, 886,000 of them in 2017,
could be affected by the expiration of
the exception, and these effects could be
particularly significant in some
countries or corridors. In these
instances, the Bureau recognizes the
value to consumers of being able to send
remittance transfers directly from their
checking account to the account of a
recipient in a foreign country through
their bank or credit union. While new
types of remittance transfer providers
and new product offerings may be
emerging that offer greater transparency
about certain terms and costs of a
remittance transfer, they may not be
able to bring such transparency to
certain corridors or specific financial
institutions, even if they become more
widely adopted in the near future.
However, the Bureau does not have
specific information as to why certain
insured institutions are able to provide
remittance transfers without relying on
the temporary exception while others
are not. The Bureau likewise does not
have specific information as to why,
among those using the temporary
exception, the rate of usage varies
widely. Lastly, although the Bureau
generally believes that institutions rely
more often on the temporary exception
to estimate fees than exchange rates, the
Bureau does not have information
related to the specific extent to which
institutions that rely on the temporary
exception are doing so to estimate fees,
exchange rates, or both.
27 Bank call report data from 2014 suggest that
around nine percent of transfers sent by banks
relied on the temporary exception. Assessment
Report, at 139.
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
III. Coverage of Certain Remittance
Transfer Providers
A. Persons That Do Not Provide
Remittance Transfers in the Normal
Course of Business
EFTA section 919(g)(3) defines
‘‘remittance transfer provider’’ to mean
a ‘‘person or financial institution that
provides remittance transfers for a
consumer in the normal course of its
business, whether or not the consumer
holds an account with such person or
financial institution.’’ 28 In its first
remittance rulemaking, finalized in
February 2012, the Bureau explained
that whether a person conducts transfers
in the ‘‘normal course of business’’
depends on the facts and
circumstances.29
To develop clearer and more
appropriately tailored standards for
determining whether providers of
remittance transfer services are
excluded from compliance with the
Rule’s requirements because they do not
provide remittance transfers in the
‘‘normal course of business,’’ the Bureau
issued a concurrent proposal in
February 2012 that would have
established a safe harbor wherein a
person that provided fewer than 25
remittance transfers in the previous and
current calendar years would be deemed
not to meet the normal course of
business definition and therefore, not be
covered by the Rule and be excluded
from having to comply with the Rule’s
requirements.
The Bureau adopted the safe harbor in
August 2012, with changes. In
reviewing the information provided by
commenters, including industry
participants, and other sources in
response to the proposal, the Bureau
determined in 2012 that the appropriate
safe harbor under which a person is
deemed not to be providing remittance
transfers for a consumer in the ‘‘normal
course of its business’’—thus falling
outside of the Rule’s coverage and being
exempt from its requirements—is if the
person provided 100 or fewer
remittance transfers in the previous
calendar year and provides 100 or fewer
remittance transfers in the current
calendar year.30 In setting this threshold
at 100, the Bureau believed that the
number was high enough that persons
will not risk exceeding the safe harbor
based on the needs of just two or three
customers seeking monthly transfers
while low enough to serve as a
reasonable basis for identifying persons
who occasionally provide remittance
28 15
U.S.C. 1693o–1(g)(3).
FR 6194, 6213 (Feb. 7, 2012).
30 12 CFR 1005.30(f)(2)(i).
29 77
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
transfers, but not in the normal course
of their business.31 At the same time,
the Bureau acknowledged that it did not
receive data on the overall distribution
and frequency of remittance transfers
across providers ‘‘to support treating
any particular number of transactions as
outside the normal course of
business.’’ 32 When the Bureau adopted
the normal course of business safe
harbor, it also stated that the Bureau
intended to monitor the threshold over
time to better understand business
structures and potential consumer
protection concerns.33
Additionally, although the Remittance
Rule does not have a small entity
exception, the Bureau notes that EFTA
section 904(c) contains a ‘‘small
financial institution’’ exception, which
permits the Bureau to modify EFTA’s
statutory requirements for such
institutions if the Bureau determines
that ‘‘such modifications are necessary
to alleviate any undue compliance
burden on small financial institutions
and such modifications are consistent
with the purpose and objective of
[EFTA].’’ 34 Over the years and in
comment letters responding to the RFIs
discussed above, a number of industry
commenters have suggested compliance
costs associated with the Rule caused an
increase in prices, an exodus of credit
unions from the market, and a reduction
in services offered to consumers in
order to stay within the safe harbor
threshold.35 Given this, the Bureau is
considering whether the threshold in
the normal course of business safe
harbor should be raised and whether an
exception for small financial
institutions may be appropriate.
B. Assessment Findings
The Assessment Report found that of
the banks and credit unions that offer
remittance transfers, approximately 80
percent of banks and 75 percent of
credit unions provide 100 or fewer
remittance transfers in any given year,
and accordingly are not covered by the
Rule.36 37 With respect to market exit,
the Assessment Report found that data
31 77
FR 50243, 50251 (Aug. 20, 2012).
FR 50243, 50251–52 (Aug. 20, 2012).
33 77 FR 50243, 50252 (Aug. 20, 2012).
34 15 U.S.C. 1963b(c).
35 See e.g., Assessment Report, at 154.
36 Assessment Report, at 134.
37 While the Bureau does not have sufficiently
complete evidence to make a conclusive
determination, available evidence strongly suggests
that very few, if any, MSBs send 100 or fewer
remittances in any given year. See also 77 FR
50243, 50252 (Aug. 20, 2012) (‘‘[The data sets
available] regarding state-licensed money
transmitters did not show that any licensees that
recorded some transaction volume also recorded
100 or fewer transfers per year nationally.’’).
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
32 77
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
from the call reports were inconsistent
with the assertion that there has been a
notable decrease in credit unions
offering remittance transfers since the
Rule took effect. There is no comparable
available evidence with respect to the
number of banks offering remittance
transfers since the Rule took effect.38
Lastly, with respect to reducing the
number of transfers they make to stay
within the safe harbor threshold, the
available evidence from the Assessment
Report does not indicate that banks or
credit unions are putting a ceiling on
the number of remittance transfers they
provide to avoid making more than 100
transfers and thereby not be subject to
the Rule.
Nonetheless, the Assessment Report
also found that the Rule covers a large
number of bank and credit union
providers whose number of remittance
transfers provided exceed the safe
harbor threshold, but still account for a
relatively small number of remittance
transfers overall. Of the roughly 700
banks within the scope of the Rule,
around 400 sent fewer than 500
remittance transfers a year and some
100 sent between 500 and 1,000
remittance transfers per year from 2014
to 2017.39 Similarly, of approximately
300 credit unions that are remittance
transfer providers under the Rule,
around 200 sent fewer than 500
remittance transfers per year from 2014
to 2017 and some 50 sent between 500
and 1,000 remittance transfers per year
over the same time period.40 Further,
the Assessment Report noted the
following relationship between the asset
size of a bank or credit union and the
number of remittance transfers it
provides: The smaller the asset size of
a financial institution, the fewer total
number of remittance transfers it offers
on average.41
Overall, remittance transfer providers
that provide relatively small numbers of
remittance transfers have fewer
transactions to produce revenues
through which to recover the fixed
compliance costs associated with the
Rule. Additionally, a number of credit
unions and banks have described how
the cost of providing remittance
transfers has gone up since the Rule
took effect. For example, a number of
38 Note that since the Rule took effect the share
of credit unions offering remittance transfers has
increased while the share of banks initially
declined but has been increasing.
39 Assessment Report, at 75–76.
40 Assessment Report, at 82–83.
41 For example, banks that make more than 100
remittance transfers per year have substantially
larger asset sizes than banks that transfer 100 or
fewer. A similar relationship exists for credit
unions. Assessment Report, at 74 and 81.
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
17975
them have reported that they have
contracted with a corporate credit union
or a large bank to handle their wire
transfers.42 According to these
institutions, the amounts charged by
these larger corporate entities for
transfers are higher than their costs for
wire transfers before the Rule took
effect. Accordingly, the Bureau believes
it is appropriate to seek information and
evidence regarding whether the Rule’s
current definition of ‘‘normal course of
business’’ is appropriate and whether
creating a ‘‘small financial institution’’
exception in the Rule is appropriate.
IV. Request for Information
The Bureau seeks information from
the general public, including but not
necessarily limited to consumer groups,
individual consumers, banks and credit
unions, broker-dealers, MSBs, and other
businesses that offer remittance transfer
services.
A. Questions Related to the Expiration
of the Temporary Exception
Based on comments responding to the
Bureau’s RFIs on the Assessment Report
and its adopted and inherited
regulations, outreach the Bureau has
done, and the Bureau’s internal
analysis, the Bureau recognizes that the
expiration of the temporary exception
could have negative consequences if
insured institutions that rely on the
exception respond to its expiration by
reducing or curtailing services to certain
destinations. The Bureau believes that
any disruption will be small in terms of
the overall remittance transfer market,
but recognizes that a large number of
transfers are currently made using the
exception and that to the extent that the
temporary exception’s expiration causes
disruption, it may impact open network
transfers, particularly wire transfers,
which could restrict consumer choices.
Additionally, consumers may not have
readily-available substitutes should
insured institutions that rely on the
temporary exception decide to respond
by reducing or curtailing service.
In particular, the Bureau is interested
in whether reliance on the temporary
exception is necessary for certain
countries or destinations in certain
countries (collectively, ‘‘specific
destinations’’) due to some
characteristic or characteristics specific
to that destination. For example, the
Bureau has been told that there are
currencies for which a fixed exchange
42 The Bureau also understands that service
providers can include nonbanks that offer
specialized international fund transfer services,
which in turn may rely on other entities to generate
the information required on the disclosures, such as
lifting fees and exchange rates.
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
17976
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
rate applicable to a remittance transfer
cannot be provided at the time a
consumer requests the transfer because
foreign laws may bar the purchase of
that currency in the United States.43 The
Bureau is interested in learning more
information about which currencies fall
into this category. Such information
may point to a challenge for remittance
transfer providers regardless of whether
they are insured institutions. On the
other hand, if the reason for the inability
to provide accurate information for
transfers to a specific destination is due
to an insured institution’s lack of
correspondent banking or other
contractual relationships, this may be
because it is an inherent characteristic
of an open network payment system or
because there are specific reasons that
the establishment of correspondent
banking or contractual relationships to
such destinations infeasible. Lastly, the
Bureau is interested in learning more
about the specific impacts of the
expiration of the temporary exception
on smaller financial institutions.
The information requested will enable
the Bureau to evaluate possible changes
to the Rule to mitigate (but not
eliminate) the effects of the temporary
exception’s expiration on July 21, 2020.
The questions are as follows and are
grouped into six categories:
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
General Questions
1. As applicable, please describe or
list:
a. The characteristics of transactions
for which insured institutions are
relying on the temporary exception. For
example, does the dollar value of the
transfer relate to whether or not the
temporary exception will be used? Does
the type of transaction relate to whether
or not the temporary exception will be
used (e.g., wire transfer versus some
other type of open network transfer;
USD wire versus foreign currency wire)?
b. Circumstances under which
insured institutions are consistently
able to provide exact amounts. For
example, are there certain corridors for
which at least some insured institutions
can always provide exact amounts in
disclosures? Why are these institutions
able to provide exact amounts while
other remittance transfer providers
cannot?
c. Currencies for which a specific
exchange rate applicable to a remittance
transfer cannot be provided at the time
a consumer requests a remittance
transfer because foreign laws or other
obstacles bar the purchase of that
currency in the United States. What
43 79
FR 55970, 55982 (Sept. 18, 2014).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
factors preclude the purchase of such
currency?
d. Specific destinations for which
insured institutions cannot disclose fees
charged by third parties because of a
lack of correspondent banking or other
contractual relationships with financial
institutions in those destinations. What
factors preclude the development of
such relationships in those specific
destinations?
e. Foreign financial institutions to
which remittance transfers are directed
for which insured institutions have
found it necessary to rely on the
temporary exception because these
foreign financial institutions cannot, or
will not, provide information about the
fees they impose on a remittance
transfer. In what corridors are these
institutions found? What factors
contribute to their inability or
unwillingness to provide such
information?
f. Challenges to the further reduction
or elimination of need to provide
estimates rather than actual amounts in
disclosures.
2. Some insured institutions report
minimal or no reliance on the temporary
exception. Please describe the
characteristics and business practices of
these institutions that do not rely on the
temporary exception at all or rely on it
to a minimal extent. For example, are
these institutions generally able to send
most types of transactions to most
corridors without the need to estimate?
Are they restricting or limiting their
services in certain ways in order to
avoid relying on estimates? Do some
such institutions have few or no
customers who send transactions that
tend to entail the need to estimate?
3. For insured institutions that rely on
estimates, how do such institutions
obtain the information on which they
base estimates? How accurate do they
believe these estimates to be? Please
describe whether there are any
differences between the error rate of
remittance transfers for which the
temporary exception is not relied upon
and remittance transfers for which the
exception is relied upon. How large are
differences in absolute terms between
the estimates provided to consumers
and the actual amounts (e.g., for an
estimated fee of $3.00 is the actual fee
consumers incur $2.75, 3.05 or $3.50)?
Remaining Reliance
4. To the extent that reliance on the
temporary exception can be eliminated
or further reduced by July 21, 2020:
a. What methods (products, services,
or innovations) could insured
institutions put in place to avoid relying
on estimates by the time that the
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
temporary exception expires on July 21,
2020?
b. What would be the cost (one-time
and ongoing) of putting those methods
in place?
5. Are there specific types of
transactions for which elimination of
reliance on the temporary exception is
not feasible for the foreseeable future? If
so, for which categories of transaction
and why (e.g., cost-prohibitive, lack of
alternative methods of transmission)?
Corridors and Other Destination Issues
6. Are there certain market ‘‘niches’’
served only by insured institutions? For
example, are there types of remittance
transfer services offered by insured
institutions that are not offered by MSBs
(e.g., transactions over a certain transfer
amount)? Are there specific destinations
that insured institutions can service that
MSBs do not or cannot? Are these
destinations also niches where the
ability to estimate is necessary to
continue services? If so, why?
7. What specific destinations or other
factors that impact the ability of insured
institutions to provide precise
disclosures when sending remittance
transfers also impact MSBs that provide
remittance transfer services?
Correspondent Banking and Market
Structure
8. To the extent that small-to-midsize
insured institutions often rely on large
correspondent banks in the United
States to execute remittance transfers,
how and why do efforts made by those
large correspondent banks that reduce
their own reliance on the temporary
exception also allow smaller institutions
that use their correspondent services to
provide actual cost information?
9. To the extent an insured institution
maintains correspondent banking, or
other contractual or informal,
arrangements that reduce their reliance
on the temporary exception, what are
the possibilities (including the costs) for
that insured institution to facilitate
remittance transfers being sent by other
banks whose own arrangements do not
overlap with its arrangement?
10. Do insured institutions generally
use the same methods, systems,
partners, and vendors to execute
international commercial payments as
they use for remittance transfers? If so,
do they rely on estimation more, less, or
about the same for such commercial
transfers as they do for remittance
transfers? Do other aspects of the
patterns of reliance on estimation differ
between commercial and remittance
transfers? Do new business
arrangements, practices, or technologies
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 82 / Monday, April 29, 2019 / Proposed Rules
that impact one generally impact the
other?
Countries List
11. In connection with the Remittance
Rule, the Bureau has published a safe
harbor countries list containing five
countries (Aruba, Brazil, China,
Ethiopia, and Libya) where the laws of
those countries do not permit the
determination of exact amounts at the
time the pre-payment disclosure must
be provided. What other countries, if
any, should be added to this list because
their laws do not permit the
determination of exact amounts at the
time the pre-payment disclosure must
be provided? Please describe how the
relevant laws prevent such
determination. Are these countries for
which remittance transfer services are
not currently being provided, or where
providers are relying on estimates?
Miscellaneous
12. Is there any other information that
will help inform the Bureau as it
considers whether to mitigate the
impact of the expiration of the
temporary exception on July 21, 2020?
khammond on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
B. Questions Related to Coverage of
Certain Remittance Transfer Providers
As discussed above, the Bureau is
interested in obtaining information and
evidence to determine whether to
address coverage of certain remittance
transfer providers that provide
remittance transfers ‘‘in the normal
course of business’’ even though they
account for a relatively small number of
transfers overall. Also as discussed
above, the Bureau found that the smaller
the asset size of a financial institution,
the fewer total number of remittance
transfers it provides on average.
Accordingly, the Bureau seeks
information on the following:
13. For remittance transfer providers
that provide more than 100 remittance
transfers per year but account for a
relatively small number of remittance
transfers overall,44 what are the
economics of offering remittance
transfers? For example:
a. What are the fixed costs and
variable costs (e.g., how costly is it to
send the 201st transfer compared to the
200th?) of offering remittance transfers
in compliance with the Rule?
b. Has it become necessary for these
remittance transfer providers to contract
44 For example, in 2017, banks that provided
more than 100 but fewer than 1,001 remittance
transfers accounted for less than 0.063 percent of
the total remittance transfers that year. In the same
year, credit unions that provided more than 100 but
fewer than 1,001 remittance transfers accounted for
less than 0.03 percent of total remittance transfers.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:06 Apr 26, 2019
Jkt 247001
with a service provider to provide or
support all or a portion of their
remittance transfers covered by the
Rule? If so, what aspects of the Rule
require contracting with a service
provider?
c. For these remittance transfer
providers that contract with a service
provider to provide remittance transfers,
what are the per-transfer costs charged
by the service provider?
d. How does anticipated volume
factor into the decision to provide
remittance transfer services?
e. Please describe whether and how
the Rule’s costs are being passed on to
consumers (directly, indirectly, or both).
f. Please describe costs not related to
compliance with the Remittance Rule
(e.g., compliance with the requirements
under the Bank Secrecy Act, with
applicable State laws) that remittance
transfer providers incur in sending
transfers. Approximately how much are
these costs? How are they structured
(e.g., what portion of the cost is
attributable to fixed cost, variable cost)?
14. With respect to remittance transfer
providers that provide more than 100
remittance transfers per year but
account for a relatively small number of
transfers overall, many times per year
does the typical remittance customer
send a remittance transfer? How often
does the typical remittance customer
cancel or assert an error?
15. For how many remittance
transfers per year is it necessary to have
the equivalent of one full-time staff
member supporting a remittance
transfer provider’s remittance transfer
services? How many transfers
necessitate two ‘‘full time equivalent’’
staff?
16. In addition to the total number
and frequency of remittance transfers
provided, what other factors should the
Bureau consider in determining whether
a person is providing remittance
transfers ‘‘in the normal course of its
business’’?
17. Please describe the asset size of
financial institutions that provide more
than 100 remittance transfers per year
but account for a relatively small
number of remittance transfers overall.
18. Is there any other information that
could help inform the Bureau as it
considers the burden of the Rule on
providers that provide more than 100
remittance transfers per year but
account for a relatively small number of
remittance transfers overall?
Kathleen L. Kraninger,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection.
[FR Doc. 2019–08455 Filed 4–26–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
17977
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA–2019–0236; Notice No. 25–
19–03–SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787
Series Airplanes; Seats With Inertia
Locking Devices
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed special
conditions.
AGENCY:
This action proposes special
conditions for Boeing Model 787 series
airplanes. These airplanes will have a
novel or unusual design feature when
compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport-category
airplanes. This design feature is seats
with inertia locking devices. The
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for this design feature.
These proposed special conditions
contain the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers
necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the
existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: Send comments on or before
May 29, 2019.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by Docket No. FAA–2019–0236 using
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/ and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
Privacy: The FAA will post all
comments it receives, without change,
to https://www.regulations.gov/,
including any personal information the
commenter provides. Using the search
function of the docket website, anyone
can find and read the electronic form of
all comments received into any FAA
docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\29APP1.SGM
29APP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 82 (Monday, April 29, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 17971-17977]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-08455]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
12 CFR Part 1005
[Docket No.: CFPB-2019-0018]
Request for Information Regarding Potential Regulatory Changes to
the Remittance Rule
AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
ACTION: Request for information.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA), as amended by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), establishes certain protections for consumers sending
international money transfers, or remittance transfers. The Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection's (Bureau) remittance rules (Remittance
Rule or Rule) implement these protections. This document seeks
information and evidence that may inform possible changes to the Rule
that would not eliminate, but would mitigate the effects of the
expiration of a statutory exception for certain financial institutions.
EFTA expressly limits the length of the temporary exception to July 21,
2020 and does not authorize the Bureau to extend this term. Therefore,
the exception will expire on July 21, 2020 unless Congress changes the
law. In addition, the Bureau seeks information and evidence related to
the scope of coverage of the Rule, including whether to change a safe
harbor threshold in the Rule that determines whether a person makes
remittance transfers in the normal course of its business, and whether
an exception for small financial institutions may be appropriate.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 28, 2019.
ADDRESSES: You may submit responsive information and other comments,
identified by Docket No. CFPB-2019-0018, by any of the following
methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Email: [email protected]. Include Docket
No. CFPB-2019-0018 in the subject line of the message.
Mail: Comment Intake, Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, 1700 G St. NW, Washington, DC 20552.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Comment Intake, Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20552.
Instructions: Please note the number associated with any question
to which you are responding at the top of each response. You are not
required to answer all questions to receive consideration of your
comments. The Bureau encourages the early submission of comments. All
submissions must include the document title and docket number. Because
paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the Bureau is subject to
delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments electronically. In
general, all comments received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov. In addition, comments will be available for public
inspection and copying at 1700 G St. NW, Washington, DC 20552, on
official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time. You can make an appointment to inspect the documents by
telephoning (202) 435-7275.
All submissions, including attachments and other supporting
materials, will become part of the public record and subject to public
disclosure. Please do not include in your submissions sensitive
personal information, such as account numbers or Social Security
numbers, or names of other individuals, or other information that you
would not ordinarily make public, such as trade secrets or confidential
commercial information. Submissions will not be edited to remove any
identifying or contact information, or other information that you would
not ordinarily make public. If you wish to submit trade secret or
confidential commercial information, please contact the individuals
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section below.
Information submitted to the Bureau will be treated in accordance with
the Bureau's Rule on the Disclosure of Records and Information, 12 CFR
part 1070 et seq.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jane Raso, Senior Counsel; Yaritza
Velez, Counsel; Office of Regulations, at (202) 435-7309. If you
require this document in alternative electronic format, please contact
CFPB_Accessibility.cfpb.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Consumers in the United States send ``remittance transfers'' \1\ in
the billions of dollars to recipients in foreign countries each year.
The funds that consumers send abroad are commonly referred to as
remittances, and consumers send remittances (often for a fee) in a
variety of ways, including by using banks, credit unions, or money
services businesses (MSBs). The term ``remittance transfers'' is
sometimes limited to describing consumer-to-consumer transfers of small
amounts of money, often made by immigrants supporting friends and
relatives in other countries. But ``remittance transfers'' may also
include payments of larger dollar amounts to pay, for instance, bills,
tuition, or other expenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The definition of ``remittance transfer'' in the Remittance
Rule is described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, remittance transfers fell largely
outside of the scope of Federal consumer protection laws. Section 1073
of the Dodd-Frank Act amended EFTA by adding a new section 919 to EFTA
to create a comprehensive system for consumer protection for remittance
transfers sent by consumers in the United States to individuals and
businesses in foreign countries.\2\ EFTA applies broadly in terms of
the types of ``remittance transfers'' it covers and persons and
financial institutions subject to it. EFTA section 919(g)(2) defines
``remittance transfer'' as the electronic transfer of funds by a sender
in any State to designated recipients located in foreign countries that
are
[[Page 17972]]
initiated by a remittance transfer provider; only small dollar
transactions are excluded from this definition.\3\ EFTA section
919(g)(3) defines ``remittance transfer provider'' to be a person or
financial institution providing remittance transfers in the ``normal
course of its business.'' The Rule provides that whether a person
conducts transfers in the ``normal course of business'' generally
depends on the ``facts and circumstances.'' \4\ However, the Rule also
contains a safe harbor whereby a person that provides 100 or fewer
remittance transfers in the previous and current calendar years would
be deemed not to meet the normal course of business definition, and
therefore be outside of the Rule's coverage.\5\ As noted above,
remittance transfer services may be provided by banks, credit unions,
and MSBs. In its recent assessment of the Remittance Rule, the Bureau
found that in 2017, MSBs conducted 95.6 percent of all remittance
transfers, banks made up 4.2 percent of remittance transfers, and
credit unions conducted 0.2 percent of remittance transfers.\6\ Note
that, because the average transfer size for banks is much larger than
for MSBs, banks share of dollars transferred is greater than their
share of number of transfers made.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq. EFTA section 919 is codified at
1693o-1.
\3\ 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1(g)(2). As adopted in the Remittance Rule,
the term ``remittance transfer'' means: ``[The] electronic transfer
of funds requested by a sender to a designated recipient that is
sent by a remittance transfer provider. The term applies regardless
of whether the sender holds an account with the remittance transfer
provider, and regardless of whether the transaction is also an
electronic fund transfer, as defined in [subpart A of Regulation
E].'' The Rule's definition specifically excludes the following
transfers: (1) Transfer amounts of $15 or less; and (2) certain
securities and commodities transfers. 12 CFR 1005.30(e).
\4\ Comment 30(f)(2)-i.
\5\ 12 CFR 1005.30(f)(2)(i).
\6\ Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Remittance Rule Assessment
Report, at 4 (2018) (hereinafter Assessment Report), available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/6963/bcfp_remittance-rule-assessment_report.pdf. Section 1022(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act
requires the Bureau to conduct an assessment of each of its
significant rules and orders and to publish a report of each
assessment within five years of the effective date of the rule or
order.
\7\ Assessment Report, at 63-64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An important requirement established by EFTA section 919 is that
remittance transfer providers generally must disclose (both prior to
and at the time the consumer pays for the transfer) the actual exchange
rate and the amount to be received by the recipient of a remittance
transfer.\8\ EFTA provides two exceptions to this general disclosure
requirement, a ``temporary'' exception and a ``permanent''
exception.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1(a)(1) and (2).
\9\ EFTA section 919(c) permits the Bureau to except remittance
transfer providers from having to provide actual amounts for
transfers to certain nations if the Bureau determines that a
recipient country does not legally allow, or the method by which
transactions are made in the recipient country do not allow, a
remittance transfer provider to know the amount of currency that
will be received by the designated recipient. 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1(c).
Unlike the temporary exception, this exception may be used by any
remittance transfer provider sending to a country that meets the
relevant conditions, not just insured institutions. Also unlike the
temporary exception, this exception has no sunset date and therefore
is permanent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remittance transfer providers qualify for the temporary exception
in EFTA section 919 if: (i) They are an insured depository institution
or insured credit union (collectively, ``insured institutions'') that
makes a transfer from an account that the sender holds with them; and
(ii) they are unable to know, for reasons beyond their control, the
amount of currency that will be made available to the designated
recipient. If these conditions are met, EFTA's temporary exception
provides that these institutions need not disclose the amount of
currency that will be received by the recipient but rather may disclose
``a reasonably accurate estimate of the foreign currency to be
received.'' \10\ Specifically, under the Rule, insured institutions may
disclose estimates \11\ of the exchange rate (as applicable),\12\
certain third-party fees defined in the Rule as ``covered third-party
fees,'' \13\ the total amount that will be transferred to the recipient
inclusive of covered third-party fees,\14\ and the amount that will be
received by the recipient (after deducting covered third-party
fees).\15\ This exception from disclosing actual amounts is temporary
because EFTA provides a one-time ability for the Bureau to extend the
exception up to five years from the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, or
until July 21, 2020, if the Bureau determined that the expiration of
the exception would negatively affect the ability of insured
institutions to send remittances to foreign countries. As EFTA section
919 expressly limits the length of the temporary exception to the term
specified therein, and does not provide the Bureau the authority to
extend this term beyond July 21, 2020, or make it permanent, the
temporary exception will expire on July 21, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1(a)(4).
\11\ 12 CFR 1005.32(c).
\12\ 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(iv).
\13\ 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(vi).
\14\ 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(v).
\15\ 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(1)(vii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bureau implemented EFTA section 919 (including the temporary
exception) through its remittance rule issued in 2012 which, as
amended, became effective on October 28, 2013.\16\ As noted above, the
Bureau conducted an assessment of its remittance rules as effective as
of November 2014 and in late 2018 published a report of its assessment.
As discussed below, the Assessment Report provided insights into the
effectiveness of the Rule and its provisions, including the temporary
exception. In this RFI, the Bureau is seeking information on the
expiration of the temporary exception on July 21, 2020, and potential
options to mitigate the impact of the expiration. Based on comments and
other feedback from various remittance transfer providers and their
trade associations, as well as its own analysis, the Bureau is
concerned about the potential negative effects of the expiration of the
temporary exception.\17\ The Bureau is also seeking information on
possible changes to the current safe harbor threshold in the Rule's
``normal course of business'' definition \18\ and whether an exception
for ``small financial institutions'' in the Rule may be appropriate.
The Bureau is concerned about the Rule's effects on certain remittance
transfer providers that account for a small number of remittance
transfers overall but nonetheless fall within the Rule's coverage
because the number of remittance transfers they provide exceed
[[Page 17973]]
100 transfers a year, and thus, are not able to use the current safe
harbor for ``normal course of business.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 77 FR 6194 (Feb. 7, 2012); as amended on 77 FR 40459 (July
10, 2012); 77 FR 50243 (Aug. 20, 2012); 78 FR 6025 (Jan. 29, 2013);
78 FR 30661 (May 22, 2013); and 78 FR 49365 (Aug. 14, 2013).
\17\ The Bureau received approximately 40 comments on the
Remittance Rule in response to a RFI it issued in 2017 in connection
with the Assessment Report. Assessment Report, at 149. The Bureau
also received approximately 34 comments on the Remittance Rule from
two RFIs it issued in 2018. One of the 2018 RFIs concerns whether
the Bureau should amend any rules it has issued since its creation
or exercise new rulemaking authorities provided for by the Dodd-
Frank Act. See Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Request for
Information Regarding the Bureau's Adopted Regulations and New
Rulemaking Authorities (2018), available at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_rfi_adopted-regulations_032018.pdf. The other 2018 RFI concerns whether the
Bureau should amend rules or exercise the rulemaking authorities
that it inherited from other Federal government agencies. See Bureau
of Consumer Fin. Prot., Request for Information Regarding the
Bureau's Inherited Regulations and Inherited Rulemaking Authorities
(2018), available at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_rfi_inherited-regulations_032018.pdf.
\18\ As discussed above, the phrase ``normal course of
business'' in the definition of ``remittance transfer provider''
determines whether a person providing remittance transfers is
covered by the Rule. Also as discussed, the Rule contains a safe
harbor that clarifies that certain persons do not provide transfers
in the ``normal course of business'' because the number of transfers
they provide is below 100 transfers a year in the previous and
current calendar years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bureau has received a number of other suggestions for changes
to the Remittance Rule to improve its effectiveness in helping
consumers or reduce the burden it may impose. However, in light of the
time sensitivity of the expiration of the temporary exception, this RFI
is limited to seeking information on the two issues described above.
II. Expiration of the Temporary Exception
A. Potential Challenges in Disclosing Actual Amounts
There are a variety of methods used to send remittance transfers.
Generally, these methods involve either a closed network payment system
or an open network payment system, although hybrids between open and
closed payment systems also exist. In a ``closed network'' payment
system, the remittance transfer provider exerts a high degree of end-
to-end control over a transfer. Although there are many ways a closed
network payment system might be structured, the level of control such a
system affords the remittance transfer provider means, among other
things, that the provider could disclose precise and reliable
information about the terms and costs of transfers (e.g., fees and
exchange rate) before the sender pays for the transfer. Closed network
payment systems are relied on by most MSBs that provide remittance
transfer services.
The other major type of system, typically referred to as an ``open
network'' payment system, is one in which no one entity necessarily
exerts end-to-end control over a remittance transfer. Open network
payment systems are primarily utilized by banks and credit unions, and
include the system by which consumers send wire transfers \19\ or other
transfers from their deposit accounts to overseas recipients. The
predominant open network payment system model is the correspondent
banking network.\20\ The correspondent banking system lacks a single,
central operator, which distinguishes it from closed network payment
systems. Instead, the correspondent banking network is a decentralized
network of banking relationships between the world's tens of thousands
of banks and credit unions. Most institutions only maintain
relationships with a relatively small number of correspondent banks,
but could nonetheless reach a wide number of recipient financial
institutions worldwide even if the institution does not have control
over, or a relationship with, all of the participants in transmitting a
remittance transfer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ 79 FR 55970, 55971 (Sept. 18, 2014) (``The most common form
of an open payment network remittance transfer is a wire transfer,
an electronically transmitted order that directs a receiving
institution to deposit funds into an identified beneficiary's
account.'').
\20\ Generally speaking, a correspondent banking network is made
up of individual correspondent banking relationships, which describe
arrangements under which one bank (correspondent) holds deposits
owned by other banks (respondents) and provides payment and other
services to those respondent banks. See, e.g., Bank for
International Settlements, Correspondent Banking, at 9 (2016),
available at https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because a sending institution does not necessarily have a
relationship with, or control over, all the participants in
transmitting a remittance transfer in an open network payment system, a
sending institution using an open network payment system may face
greater difficulty in determining and disclosing the exact amounts
required by the Rule, compared to remittance transfer providers
operating within a closed network payment system. For example, with
respect to fees charged by intermediary institutions, absent a
correspondent banking relationship or other arrangement with an
intermediary institution in the transmittal chain, a sending
institution may not know with certainty the amount of fees that
institution may impose on the remittance transfer. Likewise, if the
sending institution does not conduct any necessary currency exchange,
any institution through which the funds pass could potentially perform
the currency exchange before the recipient's institution deposits the
funds into the recipient's account. Again, absent a correspondent
banking or other arrangement with the institution that performs the
currency exchange, the sending institution may not know the applicable
exchange rate with certainty.
New market entrants may employ business models that make it easier
for them to determine actual amounts. In recent years, new types of
remittance transfer providers, and other businesses that are not
traditional MSBs or financial institutions, have entered the market.
Their business models and product offerings may eventually provide
greater transparency and certainty over the terms and cost of a
remittance transfer. For example, new remittance transfer providers
that have entered the market have adopted variations of the closed
payment network system, and therefore, they can disclose precise and
reliable information about the terms and costs of transfers before the
sender pays for the transfer.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ In addition to making it easier to determine actual
amounts, these new business models may increase consumer choice by
providing them with alternatives to traditional MSBs and financial
institutions, such as higher limits on a transfer's transaction size
to compete with transfers provided by financial institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing market participants may also be engaged in creating new
ways of facilitating cross-border transfers with enhanced transparency
and certainty over certain terms and costs of remittance transfers. The
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)'s
``global payments innovation'' (gpi) tracking product is one such
example. SWIFT provides messaging services that support a large share
of all cross-border interbank payments conducted via open network
payment systems. The gpi tracking product could potentially bring
greater transparency and certainty over payment terms to open network
payment transfers because it allows financial institutions to track the
fees charged and the exchange rates applied to a payment along its
transmittal route. The product, however, has not been adopted by all
SWIFT members. But in October 2018, SWIFT released a version of gpi
that provides all banks on the SWIFT network the ability to see and
track their payments, intending to expand gpi adoption.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See Press Release, SWIFT, SWIFT rolls out gpi tracker for
all as usage soars (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-rolls-out-gpi-tracker-for-all-as-usage-soars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Bureau Action Related to the Temporary Exception
As discussed above, EFTA section 919 provides that the temporary
exception shall expire five years after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act (i.e., July 21, 2015). It authorizes the Bureau to extend the
exception--but for no more than an additional five years--if the Bureau
determined that the expiration ``would negatively affect the ability of
[covered insured institutions] . . . to send remittances to locations
in foreign countries.'' \23\ In 2014, following a notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, the Bureau made that determination and extended the
temporary exception to July 21, 2020.\24\ The temporary exception will
expire on July 21, 2020. EFTA section 919 expressly limits the length
of the temporary exception to the term specified therein and does not
provide the Bureau authority to extend this term
[[Page 17974]]
beyond July 21, 2020. The Bureau, therefore, will not be extending the
exception or making it permanent unless Congress changes the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1(a)(4)(B).
\24\ 79 FR 55970 (Sept. 18, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Assessment Findings and Additional Analysis
Based on 2017 bank call report data, it appears that approximately
886,000 remittance transfers (just over six percent of total bank
transfers sent in 2017 and 0.27 percent of all remittance transfers
sent in 2017) relied on the temporary exception.\25\ Credit unions are
not required to report reliance on the temporary exception on credit
union call reports, even though they may use the exception. The Bureau
conducted an analysis in which it assumed that all of the approximately
760,000 remittance transfers sent by credit unions relied on the
temporary exception,\26\ and determined that it would have meant that
approximately an additional 0.22 percent of all remittance transfers
sent in 2017 relied on the temporary exception, making the total
percentage of transfers that rely on the temporary exception
approximately 0.5 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Assessment Report, at 139. Bank call reports provide data
on bank reliance on the temporary exception. Under the Rule, for
purposes of determining whether a bank or credit union may rely on
the temporary exception, an ``insured institution'' means ``insured
depository institutions . . . as defined in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813), and insured credit unions as
defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C.
1752). 12 CFR 1005.32(a)(3). But there is no similar information for
credit union reliance, as credit unions are not required to report
reliance on the temporary exception on credit union call reports.
Further, broker-dealers may rely on the temporary exception pursuant
to a SEC no-action letter. However, the Bureau does not have data on
broker-dealers' use of the exception, but expects that to the extent
they are associated with banks, their reliance should mirror that of
the banks with whom they are associated. Assessment Report, at 141.
\26\ The Bureau has information that suggests that 100 percent
reliance on the temporary exception by credit unions is unlikely. An
industry survey the Bureau conducted to support the assessment also
asked whether providers are relying on the exception, and if so,
whether they use it to estimate fees, exchange rates, or both. Of
the 41 banks and credit unions that answered the question, six
respondents replied that they used the temporary exception, similar
to the proportion in the bank call reports. Only one of the 17
credit unions that answered the question reported using the
temporary exception. That credit union reported using it for fees
only. However, as the Assessment Report cautioned, the survey is not
statistically representative of the market, even though the Bureau
sent the survey to a representative sample of approximately 200
banks and credit unions, as well as every remittance-sending MSB for
which the Bureau could find contact information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Assessment Report also found that fewer banks relied on the
temporary exception in 2017 than in 2014, the year banks began
reporting remittance transfer activities on their call reports.\27\ The
decline appears to be the result of both fewer banks relying on the
exception for any transfers, and a reduction in the reported percentage
of transfers for which the temporary exception is used among the banks
that continue to rely on the exception. Based on its analysis of 2017
call report data, the Bureau found that only 80 banks used the
temporary exception. Among these 80 banks, there appears to be
considerable variance in the rate of reliance. For example, while four
of the five top remitting banks use the exception, that reliance ranges
from approximately 0.4 percent to 27 percent of the total number of
remittance transfers they sent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Bank call report data from 2014 suggest that around nine
percent of transfers sent by banks relied on the temporary
exception. Assessment Report, at 139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While a substantial majority of remittance transfers may not
involve the use of the temporary exception, the Bureau also recognizes
that a large number of remittance transfers, specifically, 886,000 of
them in 2017, could be affected by the expiration of the exception, and
these effects could be particularly significant in some countries or
corridors. In these instances, the Bureau recognizes the value to
consumers of being able to send remittance transfers directly from
their checking account to the account of a recipient in a foreign
country through their bank or credit union. While new types of
remittance transfer providers and new product offerings may be emerging
that offer greater transparency about certain terms and costs of a
remittance transfer, they may not be able to bring such transparency to
certain corridors or specific financial institutions, even if they
become more widely adopted in the near future.
However, the Bureau does not have specific information as to why
certain insured institutions are able to provide remittance transfers
without relying on the temporary exception while others are not. The
Bureau likewise does not have specific information as to why, among
those using the temporary exception, the rate of usage varies widely.
Lastly, although the Bureau generally believes that institutions rely
more often on the temporary exception to estimate fees than exchange
rates, the Bureau does not have information related to the specific
extent to which institutions that rely on the temporary exception are
doing so to estimate fees, exchange rates, or both.
III. Coverage of Certain Remittance Transfer Providers
A. Persons That Do Not Provide Remittance Transfers in the Normal
Course of Business
EFTA section 919(g)(3) defines ``remittance transfer provider'' to
mean a ``person or financial institution that provides remittance
transfers for a consumer in the normal course of its business, whether
or not the consumer holds an account with such person or financial
institution.'' \28\ In its first remittance rulemaking, finalized in
February 2012, the Bureau explained that whether a person conducts
transfers in the ``normal course of business'' depends on the facts and
circumstances.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1(g)(3).
\29\ 77 FR 6194, 6213 (Feb. 7, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To develop clearer and more appropriately tailored standards for
determining whether providers of remittance transfer services are
excluded from compliance with the Rule's requirements because they do
not provide remittance transfers in the ``normal course of business,''
the Bureau issued a concurrent proposal in February 2012 that would
have established a safe harbor wherein a person that provided fewer
than 25 remittance transfers in the previous and current calendar years
would be deemed not to meet the normal course of business definition
and therefore, not be covered by the Rule and be excluded from having
to comply with the Rule's requirements.
The Bureau adopted the safe harbor in August 2012, with changes. In
reviewing the information provided by commenters, including industry
participants, and other sources in response to the proposal, the Bureau
determined in 2012 that the appropriate safe harbor under which a
person is deemed not to be providing remittance transfers for a
consumer in the ``normal course of its business''--thus falling outside
of the Rule's coverage and being exempt from its requirements--is if
the person provided 100 or fewer remittance transfers in the previous
calendar year and provides 100 or fewer remittance transfers in the
current calendar year.\30\ In setting this threshold at 100, the Bureau
believed that the number was high enough that persons will not risk
exceeding the safe harbor based on the needs of just two or three
customers seeking monthly transfers while low enough to serve as a
reasonable basis for identifying persons who occasionally provide
remittance
[[Page 17975]]
transfers, but not in the normal course of their business.\31\ At the
same time, the Bureau acknowledged that it did not receive data on the
overall distribution and frequency of remittance transfers across
providers ``to support treating any particular number of transactions
as outside the normal course of business.'' \32\ When the Bureau
adopted the normal course of business safe harbor, it also stated that
the Bureau intended to monitor the threshold over time to better
understand business structures and potential consumer protection
concerns.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ 12 CFR 1005.30(f)(2)(i).
\31\ 77 FR 50243, 50251 (Aug. 20, 2012).
\32\ 77 FR 50243, 50251-52 (Aug. 20, 2012).
\33\ 77 FR 50243, 50252 (Aug. 20, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, although the Remittance Rule does not have a small
entity exception, the Bureau notes that EFTA section 904(c) contains a
``small financial institution'' exception, which permits the Bureau to
modify EFTA's statutory requirements for such institutions if the
Bureau determines that ``such modifications are necessary to alleviate
any undue compliance burden on small financial institutions and such
modifications are consistent with the purpose and objective of
[EFTA].'' \34\ Over the years and in comment letters responding to the
RFIs discussed above, a number of industry commenters have suggested
compliance costs associated with the Rule caused an increase in prices,
an exodus of credit unions from the market, and a reduction in services
offered to consumers in order to stay within the safe harbor
threshold.\35\ Given this, the Bureau is considering whether the
threshold in the normal course of business safe harbor should be raised
and whether an exception for small financial institutions may be
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ 15 U.S.C. 1963b(c).
\35\ See e.g., Assessment Report, at 154.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Assessment Findings
The Assessment Report found that of the banks and credit unions
that offer remittance transfers, approximately 80 percent of banks and
75 percent of credit unions provide 100 or fewer remittance transfers
in any given year, and accordingly are not covered by the
Rule.36 37 With respect to market exit, the Assessment
Report found that data from the call reports were inconsistent with the
assertion that there has been a notable decrease in credit unions
offering remittance transfers since the Rule took effect. There is no
comparable available evidence with respect to the number of banks
offering remittance transfers since the Rule took effect.\38\ Lastly,
with respect to reducing the number of transfers they make to stay
within the safe harbor threshold, the available evidence from the
Assessment Report does not indicate that banks or credit unions are
putting a ceiling on the number of remittance transfers they provide to
avoid making more than 100 transfers and thereby not be subject to the
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Assessment Report, at 134.
\37\ While the Bureau does not have sufficiently complete
evidence to make a conclusive determination, available evidence
strongly suggests that very few, if any, MSBs send 100 or fewer
remittances in any given year. See also 77 FR 50243, 50252 (Aug. 20,
2012) (``[The data sets available] regarding state-licensed money
transmitters did not show that any licensees that recorded some
transaction volume also recorded 100 or fewer transfers per year
nationally.'').
\38\ Note that since the Rule took effect the share of credit
unions offering remittance transfers has increased while the share
of banks initially declined but has been increasing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, the Assessment Report also found that the Rule covers
a large number of bank and credit union providers whose number of
remittance transfers provided exceed the safe harbor threshold, but
still account for a relatively small number of remittance transfers
overall. Of the roughly 700 banks within the scope of the Rule, around
400 sent fewer than 500 remittance transfers a year and some 100 sent
between 500 and 1,000 remittance transfers per year from 2014 to
2017.\39\ Similarly, of approximately 300 credit unions that are
remittance transfer providers under the Rule, around 200 sent fewer
than 500 remittance transfers per year from 2014 to 2017 and some 50
sent between 500 and 1,000 remittance transfers per year over the same
time period.\40\ Further, the Assessment Report noted the following
relationship between the asset size of a bank or credit union and the
number of remittance transfers it provides: The smaller the asset size
of a financial institution, the fewer total number of remittance
transfers it offers on average.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Assessment Report, at 75-76.
\40\ Assessment Report, at 82-83.
\41\ For example, banks that make more than 100 remittance
transfers per year have substantially larger asset sizes than banks
that transfer 100 or fewer. A similar relationship exists for credit
unions. Assessment Report, at 74 and 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall, remittance transfer providers that provide relatively
small numbers of remittance transfers have fewer transactions to
produce revenues through which to recover the fixed compliance costs
associated with the Rule. Additionally, a number of credit unions and
banks have described how the cost of providing remittance transfers has
gone up since the Rule took effect. For example, a number of them have
reported that they have contracted with a corporate credit union or a
large bank to handle their wire transfers.\42\ According to these
institutions, the amounts charged by these larger corporate entities
for transfers are higher than their costs for wire transfers before the
Rule took effect. Accordingly, the Bureau believes it is appropriate to
seek information and evidence regarding whether the Rule's current
definition of ``normal course of business'' is appropriate and whether
creating a ``small financial institution'' exception in the Rule is
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ The Bureau also understands that service providers can
include nonbanks that offer specialized international fund transfer
services, which in turn may rely on other entities to generate the
information required on the disclosures, such as lifting fees and
exchange rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Request for Information
The Bureau seeks information from the general public, including but
not necessarily limited to consumer groups, individual consumers, banks
and credit unions, broker-dealers, MSBs, and other businesses that
offer remittance transfer services.
A. Questions Related to the Expiration of the Temporary Exception
Based on comments responding to the Bureau's RFIs on the Assessment
Report and its adopted and inherited regulations, outreach the Bureau
has done, and the Bureau's internal analysis, the Bureau recognizes
that the expiration of the temporary exception could have negative
consequences if insured institutions that rely on the exception respond
to its expiration by reducing or curtailing services to certain
destinations. The Bureau believes that any disruption will be small in
terms of the overall remittance transfer market, but recognizes that a
large number of transfers are currently made using the exception and
that to the extent that the temporary exception's expiration causes
disruption, it may impact open network transfers, particularly wire
transfers, which could restrict consumer choices. Additionally,
consumers may not have readily-available substitutes should insured
institutions that rely on the temporary exception decide to respond by
reducing or curtailing service.
In particular, the Bureau is interested in whether reliance on the
temporary exception is necessary for certain countries or destinations
in certain countries (collectively, ``specific destinations'') due to
some characteristic or characteristics specific to that destination.
For example, the Bureau has been told that there are currencies for
which a fixed exchange
[[Page 17976]]
rate applicable to a remittance transfer cannot be provided at the time
a consumer requests the transfer because foreign laws may bar the
purchase of that currency in the United States.\43\ The Bureau is
interested in learning more information about which currencies fall
into this category. Such information may point to a challenge for
remittance transfer providers regardless of whether they are insured
institutions. On the other hand, if the reason for the inability to
provide accurate information for transfers to a specific destination is
due to an insured institution's lack of correspondent banking or other
contractual relationships, this may be because it is an inherent
characteristic of an open network payment system or because there are
specific reasons that the establishment of correspondent banking or
contractual relationships to such destinations infeasible. Lastly, the
Bureau is interested in learning more about the specific impacts of the
expiration of the temporary exception on smaller financial
institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ 79 FR 55970, 55982 (Sept. 18, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The information requested will enable the Bureau to evaluate
possible changes to the Rule to mitigate (but not eliminate) the
effects of the temporary exception's expiration on July 21, 2020. The
questions are as follows and are grouped into six categories:
General Questions
1. As applicable, please describe or list:
a. The characteristics of transactions for which insured
institutions are relying on the temporary exception. For example, does
the dollar value of the transfer relate to whether or not the temporary
exception will be used? Does the type of transaction relate to whether
or not the temporary exception will be used (e.g., wire transfer versus
some other type of open network transfer; USD wire versus foreign
currency wire)?
b. Circumstances under which insured institutions are consistently
able to provide exact amounts. For example, are there certain corridors
for which at least some insured institutions can always provide exact
amounts in disclosures? Why are these institutions able to provide
exact amounts while other remittance transfer providers cannot?
c. Currencies for which a specific exchange rate applicable to a
remittance transfer cannot be provided at the time a consumer requests
a remittance transfer because foreign laws or other obstacles bar the
purchase of that currency in the United States. What factors preclude
the purchase of such currency?
d. Specific destinations for which insured institutions cannot
disclose fees charged by third parties because of a lack of
correspondent banking or other contractual relationships with financial
institutions in those destinations. What factors preclude the
development of such relationships in those specific destinations?
e. Foreign financial institutions to which remittance transfers are
directed for which insured institutions have found it necessary to rely
on the temporary exception because these foreign financial institutions
cannot, or will not, provide information about the fees they impose on
a remittance transfer. In what corridors are these institutions found?
What factors contribute to their inability or unwillingness to provide
such information?
f. Challenges to the further reduction or elimination of need to
provide estimates rather than actual amounts in disclosures.
2. Some insured institutions report minimal or no reliance on the
temporary exception. Please describe the characteristics and business
practices of these institutions that do not rely on the temporary
exception at all or rely on it to a minimal extent. For example, are
these institutions generally able to send most types of transactions to
most corridors without the need to estimate? Are they restricting or
limiting their services in certain ways in order to avoid relying on
estimates? Do some such institutions have few or no customers who send
transactions that tend to entail the need to estimate?
3. For insured institutions that rely on estimates, how do such
institutions obtain the information on which they base estimates? How
accurate do they believe these estimates to be? Please describe whether
there are any differences between the error rate of remittance
transfers for which the temporary exception is not relied upon and
remittance transfers for which the exception is relied upon. How large
are differences in absolute terms between the estimates provided to
consumers and the actual amounts (e.g., for an estimated fee of $3.00
is the actual fee consumers incur $2.75, 3.05 or $3.50)?
Remaining Reliance
4. To the extent that reliance on the temporary exception can be
eliminated or further reduced by July 21, 2020:
a. What methods (products, services, or innovations) could insured
institutions put in place to avoid relying on estimates by the time
that the temporary exception expires on July 21, 2020?
b. What would be the cost (one-time and ongoing) of putting those
methods in place?
5. Are there specific types of transactions for which elimination
of reliance on the temporary exception is not feasible for the
foreseeable future? If so, for which categories of transaction and why
(e.g., cost-prohibitive, lack of alternative methods of transmission)?
Corridors and Other Destination Issues
6. Are there certain market ``niches'' served only by insured
institutions? For example, are there types of remittance transfer
services offered by insured institutions that are not offered by MSBs
(e.g., transactions over a certain transfer amount)? Are there specific
destinations that insured institutions can service that MSBs do not or
cannot? Are these destinations also niches where the ability to
estimate is necessary to continue services? If so, why?
7. What specific destinations or other factors that impact the
ability of insured institutions to provide precise disclosures when
sending remittance transfers also impact MSBs that provide remittance
transfer services?
Correspondent Banking and Market Structure
8. To the extent that small-to-midsize insured institutions often
rely on large correspondent banks in the United States to execute
remittance transfers, how and why do efforts made by those large
correspondent banks that reduce their own reliance on the temporary
exception also allow smaller institutions that use their correspondent
services to provide actual cost information?
9. To the extent an insured institution maintains correspondent
banking, or other contractual or informal, arrangements that reduce
their reliance on the temporary exception, what are the possibilities
(including the costs) for that insured institution to facilitate
remittance transfers being sent by other banks whose own arrangements
do not overlap with its arrangement?
10. Do insured institutions generally use the same methods,
systems, partners, and vendors to execute international commercial
payments as they use for remittance transfers? If so, do they rely on
estimation more, less, or about the same for such commercial transfers
as they do for remittance transfers? Do other aspects of the patterns
of reliance on estimation differ between commercial and remittance
transfers? Do new business arrangements, practices, or technologies
[[Page 17977]]
that impact one generally impact the other?
Countries List
11. In connection with the Remittance Rule, the Bureau has
published a safe harbor countries list containing five countries
(Aruba, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, and Libya) where the laws of those
countries do not permit the determination of exact amounts at the time
the pre-payment disclosure must be provided. What other countries, if
any, should be added to this list because their laws do not permit the
determination of exact amounts at the time the pre-payment disclosure
must be provided? Please describe how the relevant laws prevent such
determination. Are these countries for which remittance transfer
services are not currently being provided, or where providers are
relying on estimates?
Miscellaneous
12. Is there any other information that will help inform the Bureau
as it considers whether to mitigate the impact of the expiration of the
temporary exception on July 21, 2020?
B. Questions Related to Coverage of Certain Remittance Transfer
Providers
As discussed above, the Bureau is interested in obtaining
information and evidence to determine whether to address coverage of
certain remittance transfer providers that provide remittance transfers
``in the normal course of business'' even though they account for a
relatively small number of transfers overall. Also as discussed above,
the Bureau found that the smaller the asset size of a financial
institution, the fewer total number of remittance transfers it provides
on average. Accordingly, the Bureau seeks information on the following:
13. For remittance transfer providers that provide more than 100
remittance transfers per year but account for a relatively small number
of remittance transfers overall,\44\ what are the economics of offering
remittance transfers? For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ For example, in 2017, banks that provided more than 100 but
fewer than 1,001 remittance transfers accounted for less than 0.063
percent of the total remittance transfers that year. In the same
year, credit unions that provided more than 100 but fewer than 1,001
remittance transfers accounted for less than 0.03 percent of total
remittance transfers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. What are the fixed costs and variable costs (e.g., how costly is
it to send the 201st transfer compared to the 200th?) of offering
remittance transfers in compliance with the Rule?
b. Has it become necessary for these remittance transfer providers
to contract with a service provider to provide or support all or a
portion of their remittance transfers covered by the Rule? If so, what
aspects of the Rule require contracting with a service provider?
c. For these remittance transfer providers that contract with a
service provider to provide remittance transfers, what are the per-
transfer costs charged by the service provider?
d. How does anticipated volume factor into the decision to provide
remittance transfer services?
e. Please describe whether and how the Rule's costs are being
passed on to consumers (directly, indirectly, or both).
f. Please describe costs not related to compliance with the
Remittance Rule (e.g., compliance with the requirements under the Bank
Secrecy Act, with applicable State laws) that remittance transfer
providers incur in sending transfers. Approximately how much are these
costs? How are they structured (e.g., what portion of the cost is
attributable to fixed cost, variable cost)?
14. With respect to remittance transfer providers that provide more
than 100 remittance transfers per year but account for a relatively
small number of transfers overall, many times per year does the typical
remittance customer send a remittance transfer? How often does the
typical remittance customer cancel or assert an error?
15. For how many remittance transfers per year is it necessary to
have the equivalent of one full-time staff member supporting a
remittance transfer provider's remittance transfer services? How many
transfers necessitate two ``full time equivalent'' staff?
16. In addition to the total number and frequency of remittance
transfers provided, what other factors should the Bureau consider in
determining whether a person is providing remittance transfers ``in the
normal course of its business''?
17. Please describe the asset size of financial institutions that
provide more than 100 remittance transfers per year but account for a
relatively small number of remittance transfers overall.
18. Is there any other information that could help inform the
Bureau as it considers the burden of the Rule on providers that provide
more than 100 remittance transfers per year but account for a
relatively small number of remittance transfers overall?
Kathleen L. Kraninger,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
[FR Doc. 2019-08455 Filed 4-26-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AM-P