United States et al. v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Healthcare System; Response to Public Comment, 14675-14680 [2019-07195]
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 70 / Thursday, April 11, 2019 / Notices
Issued: April 9, 2019.
William Bishop,
Supervisory Hearings and Information
Officer.
[FR Doc. 2019–07329 Filed 4–9–19; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States et al. v. The CharlotteMecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a
Carolinas Healthcare System;
Response to Public Comment
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,
15 U.S.C. 16(b)–(h), that one comment
was received concerning the proposed
Final Judgment in this case, and that
comment together with the Response of
the United States to Public Comment
have been filed with the United States
District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina in United States and
State of North Carolina. v. The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital
Authority, d/b/a Carolinas HealthCare
System, Civil Action No. 3:16–cv–
00311–RJC–DCK. Copies of the
comment and the United States’
Response are available for inspection on
the Antitrust Division’s website at
https://www.justice.gov/atr and at the
Office of the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina. Copies of these
materials may be obtained from the
Antitrust Division upon request and
payment of the copying fee set by
Department of Justice regulations.
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil, Enforcement.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE
DIVISION
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United States of America and the State of
North Carolina, Plaintiffs, v. The CharlotteMecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a
Carolinas Healthcare System, Defendant.
Case No. 3:16–cv–00311–RJC–DCK
Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr.
RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFF UNITED
STATES TO PUBLIC COMMENT ON
THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT
As required by the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act (the
‘‘APPA’’ or ‘‘Tunney Act’’), 15 U.S.C. §§
16(b)–(h), the United States hereby
responds to the one public comment
received by the United States about the
proposed Final Judgment in this case.
After careful consideration of the
comment submitted, the United States
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continues to believe that the proposed
remedy will address the harm alleged in
the Complaint and is therefore in the
public interest. The proposed Final
Judgment will prevent Atrium from
impeding insurers’ steered plans and
transparency initiatives and restore
competition among healthcare providers
in the Charlotte area. The United States
will move the Court for entry of a
modified proposed Final Judgment 1
after this response and the public
comment have been published in the
Federal Register, pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(d).
I. Procedural History
On June 9, 2016, the United States
and the State of North Carolina filed a
civil antitrust lawsuit against The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital
Authority, formerly known as Carolinas
HealthCare System and now doing
business as Atrium Health (‘‘Atrium’’),
to enjoin it from using steering
restrictions in its agreements with
health insurers in the Charlotte, North
Carolina area. The Complaint alleges
that Atrium’s steering restrictions are
anticompetitive and violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
After over two years of litigation, on
November 15, 2018, the United States
filed a proposed Final Judgment and a
Stipulation signed by the parties that
consents to entry of the proposed Final
Judgment after compliance with the
requirements of the Tunney Act. (Dkt.
No. 87-1.) On December 4, 2018, the
United States filed a Competitive Impact
Statement describing the proposed Final
Judgment. (Dkt. No. 89.) The United
States caused the Complaint, the
proposed Final Judgment, and the
Competitive Impact Statement to be
published in the Federal Register on
December 11, 2018, see 83 Fed. Reg.
63,674, and caused notice regarding the
same, together with directions for the
submission of written comments
relating to the proposed Final Judgment,
to be published in The Charlotte
Observer and The Washington Post for
seven days beginning on December 7,
2018, and ending on December 13, 2018.
1 During the December 13, 2018 hearing in this
matter, the Court raised concerns regarding certain
aspects of Paragraph IX(B) of the proposed Final
Judgment. The United States and Atrium have
agreed to modify the proposed Final Judgment to
address the Court’s concerns. The modifications do
not alter the structure or substance of the remedy
and will not materially affect Atrium’s obligations
and therefore do not require an additional notice
and comment period under the Tunney Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16. The United States will describe in
detail the parties’ agreed-upon modifications and
discuss how those modifications address the
Court’s concerns regarding Paragraph IX(B) in its
forthcoming motion for entry of the modified
proposed Final Judgment.
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The 60-day period for public comment
ended on February 11, 2019. The United
States received only one comment,
which is described below in Section IV,
and attached as Exhibit A hereto.
II. Standard of Judicial Review
The Clayton Act, as amended by the
APPA, requires that proposed consent
judgments in antitrust cases brought by
the United States be subject to a 60-day
comment period, after which the court
shall determine whether entry of the
proposed Final Judgment ‘‘is in the
public interest.’’ 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1). In
making that determination, the court, in
accordance with the statute as amended
in 2004, is required to consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment,
including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement
and modification, duration of relief
sought, anticipated effects of alternative
remedies actually considered, whether
its terms are ambiguous, and any other
competitive considerations bearing upon
the adequacy of such judgment that the
court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent
judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment
upon competition in the relevant market
or markets, upon the public generally
and individuals alleging specific injury
from the violations set forth in the
complaint including consideration of the
public benefit, if any, to be derived from
a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In
considering these statutory factors, the
court’s inquiry is necessarily a limited
one as the government is entitled to
‘‘broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the
public interest.’’ United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461
(D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United
States v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing
public-interest standard under the
Tunney Act); United States v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., No. 2:163664, 2016 WL 6156172, at *2 (S.D. W.
Va. Oct. 21, 2016) (noting that in
evaluating whether the proposed final
judgment is in the public interest, the
inquiry is ‘‘a narrow one’’ and only
requires the court to determine if the
remedy effectively addresses the harm
identified in the complaint); United
States v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F.
Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014)
(explaining that the ‘‘court’s inquiry is
limited’’ in Tunney Act settlements);
United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No.
08-1965 (JR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009)
(noting that the court’s review of a
consent judgment is limited and only
inquires ‘‘into whether the government’s
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determination that the proposed
remedies will cure the antitrust
violations alleged in the complaint was
reasonable, and whether the
mechanisms to enforce the final
judgment are clear and manageable’’).
As the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has
held, under the APPA a court considers,
among other things, the relationship
between the remedy secured and the
specific allegations in the government’s
complaint, whether the decree is
sufficiently clear, whether its
enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively
harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the
adequacy of the relief secured by the
decree, a court may not ‘‘engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief
would best serve the public.’’ United
States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462
(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th
Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1460–62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc.,
152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001);
InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at
*3. Instead:
[t]he balancing of competing social and
political interests affected by a proposed
antitrust consent decree must be left, in the
first instance, to the discretion of the
Attorney General. The court’s role in
protecting the public interest is one of
insuring that the government has not
breached its duty to the public in consenting
to the decree. The court is required to
determine not whether a particular decree is
the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ‘‘within the reaches
of the public interest.’’ More elaborate
requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by
consent decree.2
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Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
In determining whether a proposed
settlement is in the public interest, a
district court ‘‘must accord deference to
the government’s predictions about the
efficacy of its remedies, and may not
require that the remedies perfectly
match the alleged violations.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see
also U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 74–
75 (noting that a court should not reject
the proposed remedies because it
believes others are preferable and that
room must be made for the government
to grant concessions in the negotiation
2 See
also BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the
court’s ‘‘ultimate authority under the [APPA] is
limited to approving or disapproving the consent
decree’’); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp.
713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way,
the court is constrained to ‘‘look at the overall
picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope,
but with an artist’s reducing glass’’).
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process for settlements); Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts
to be ‘‘deferential to the government’s
predictions as to the effect of the
proposed remedies’’); United States v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that
the court should grant ‘‘due respect to
the government’s prediction as to the
effect of proposed remedies, its
perception of the market structure, and
its views of the nature of the case’’). The
ultimate question is whether ‘‘the
remedies [obtained in the decree are] so
inconsonant with the allegations
charged as to fall outside of the ‘reaches
of the public interest.’ ’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1461 (quoting United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 309
(D.C. Cir. 1990)). To meet this standard,
the United States ‘‘need only provide a
factual basis for concluding that the
settlements are reasonably adequate
remedies for the alleged harms.’’ SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court’s role under the
APPA is limited to reviewing the
remedy in relationship to the violations
that the United States has alleged in its
complaint, and does not authorize the
court to ‘‘construct [its] own
hypothetical case and then evaluate the
decree against that case.’’ Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways, 38
F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court
must simply determine whether there is
a factual foundation for the
government’s decisions such that its
conclusions regarding the proposed
settlements are reasonable); InBev, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (‘‘the
‘public interest’ is not to be measured by
comparing the violations alleged in the
complaint against those the court
believes could have, or even should
have, been alleged’’). Because the
‘‘court’s authority to review the decree
depends entirely on the government’s
exercising its prosecutorial discretion by
bringing a case in the first place,’’ it
follows that ‘‘the court is only
authorized to review the decree itself,’’
and not to ‘‘effectively redraft the
complaint’’ to inquire into other matters
that the United States did not pursue.
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459-60.
In its 2004 amendments to the
APPA 3, Congress made clear its intent
to preserve the practical benefits of
utilizing consent decrees in antitrust
3 The 2004 amendments substituted ‘‘shall’’ for
‘‘may’’ in directing relevant factors for a court to
consider and amended the list of factors to focus on
competitive considerations and to address
potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)
(2006); see also SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at
11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments ‘‘effected
minimal changes’’ to Tunney Act review).
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enforcement, adding the unambiguous
instruction that ‘‘[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to require the
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
or to require the court to permit anyone
to intervene.’’ 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2); see
also U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76
(indicating that a court is not required
to hold an evidentiary hearing or to
permit intervenors as part of its review
under the Tunney Act). This language
explicitly wrote into the statute what
Congress intended when it first enacted
the Tunney Act in 1974. As Senator
Tunney explained: ‘‘[t]he court is
nowhere compelled to go to trial or to
engage in extended proceedings which
might have the effect of vitiating the
benefits of prompt and less costly
settlement through the consent decree
process.’’ 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public-interest
determination is left to the discretion of
the court, with the recognition that the
court’s ‘‘scope of review remains
sharply proscribed by precedent and the
nature of Tunney Act proceedings.’’
SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
A court can make its public-interest
determination based on the competitive
impact statement and response to public
comments alone. U.S. Airways, 38 F.
Supp. 3d at 76; see also United States
v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ‘‘Tunney
Act expressly allows the court to make
its public interest determination on the
basis of the competitive impact
statement and response to comments
alone’’); S. Rep. No. 93–298 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (‘‘Where the public
interest can be meaningfully evaluated
simply on the basis of briefs and oral
arguments, that is the approach that
should be utilized.’’).
III. The Investigation, the Harm Alleged
in the Complaint, and the Proposed
Final Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment is the
culmination of a thorough,
comprehensive investigation conducted
by the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice and the North
Carolina Department of Justice and over
two years of litigation regarding
Atrium’s use of steering restrictions in
its contracts with health insurers in the
Charlotte, North Carolina area. These
steering restrictions either expressly
prohibited the insurers from steering
their members away from Atrium or
impeded steering through other means,
such as by imposing a financial penalty
on any steering by the insurer away
from Atrium or by allowing Atrium to
promptly terminate the insurer’s
contract if the insurer steered members
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away from Atrium. Based on the
evidence gathered during the
investigation and litigation, the United
States concluded that Atrium’s steering
restrictions were anticompetitive and
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1, because the restrictions
had detrimental effects on competition
among healthcare providers in the
Charlotte area. Specifically, the United
States concluded that Atrium, in order
to protect its dominant share and high
prices and to insulate itself from
competition, used its market power to
require every major insurer in the
Charlotte area to accept contract terms
that restrict the insurers from steering
their members to Atrium’s lower-cost
competitors. Atrium’s steering
restrictions reduced hospital
competition in the Charlotte area;
prevented transparency in the
communication of price, cost, quality, or
patient experience information to a
member; and prevented consumers from
benefitting from lower prices. The
proposed Final Judgment provides an
effective and appropriate remedy for
this competitive harm by enjoining
Atrium from (1) enforcing provisions in
its current insurer contracts that restrict
steering and transparency; (2) seeking or
obtaining contract provisions with an
insurer that would prohibit, prevent, or
penalize the insurer from using popular
steering methods or providing
transparency; and (3) penalizing, or
threatening to penalize, any insurer for
its use of these popular steering
methods and transparency.
The proposed Final Judgment has
several components, which Atrium
agreed to abide by during the pendency
of the Tunney Act proceedings and
which the Court ordered in the
Stipulation and Order of December 14,
2018 (Dkt. No. 92).
First, the proposed Final Judgment
eliminates the anti-steering language in
Atrium’s agreements with health
insurers. The proposed Final Judgment
voids contract provisions (listed in
Exhibit A to the proposed Final
Judgment) that expressly prevent
steering. The proposed Final Judgment
also prohibits Atrium from using certain
contract provisions that would require
an insurer to include Atrium in all of its
benefit plans (listed in Exhibit B to the
proposed Final Judgment) to prevent,
prohibit, or penalize steered plans and
transparency. Finally, the proposed
Final Judgment prevents Atrium from
enforcing a ‘‘material impact’’ provision
in its contract with Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of North Carolina (‘‘BCBS-NC’’)
in a manner that reduces BCBS-NC’s
incentives to steer to more efficient
providers.
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Second, the proposed Final Judgment
prevents Atrium from seeking or
obtaining new contract provisions that
would prohibit, prevent, or penalize
steering through steered plans or
transparency in the Charlotte area. The
proposed Final Judgment prohibits
Atrium from: (1) expressly prohibiting
steered plans or transparency; (2)
requiring prior approval of new benefit
plans; or (3) demanding to be included
in the most-preferred tier of benefit
plans regardless of price.
Third, the proposed Final Judgment
prohibits Atrium from seeking or
obtaining any contract provision, or
taking any other action, that would
penalize an insurer for steering away
from Atrium through steered plans or
transparency.
Finally, the proposed Final Judgment
includes robust mechanisms that will
allow the United States and the Court to
monitor the effectiveness of the relief
and to enforce compliance.
• The proposed Final Judgment requires
Atrium to provide certain health
insurers with a copy of the Final
Judgment and notify those insurers in
writing of the Court’s entry of the
proposed Final Judgment and its
requirements. Atrium is also required
to provide a copy of the proposed
Final Judgment to each of its
commissioners and officers as well as
each employee who has responsibility
for negotiating or approving contracts
with insurers.
• The proposed Final Judgment also
requires Atrium to develop and
implement procedures necessary to
ensure compliance with the proposed
Final Judgment, including procedures
to answer questions from Atrium’s
commissioners and employees about
abiding by the terms of the proposed
Final Judgment. Atrium must submit
to the United States and the State of
North Carolina a written report setting
forth its actions to comply with the
proposed Final Judgment and a copy
of any new or revised agreement or
amendment to any agreement with
any insurer that is executed during
the term of the proposed Final
Judgment. Atrium must also notify the
United States and the State of North
Carolina of when a provider which
Atrium controls has a contract with
any insurer with a provision that
prohibits, prevents, or penalizes
transparency or any steered plan.
• The proposed Final Judgment
provides the United States with the
ability to investigate Atrium’s
compliance with the Final Judgment
and enforce the provisions of the
proposed Final Judgment, including
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its rights to seek an order of contempt
from this Court.
IV. Summary of Public Comments and
the United States’ Response
The United States received only one
comment concerning the proposed Final
Judgment. The comment was submitted
by the North Carolina State Health Plan
for Teachers and State Employees 4 and
the State Treasurer of North Carolina,
Dale R. Folwell (collectively, the ‘‘State
Health Plan’’). Importantly, the State
Health Plan agrees with the purpose of
the proposed Final Judgment and does
not criticize the central components of
the relief obtained by the United States.
Rather, the State Health Plan suggests
limited changes to the proposed Final
Judgment relating to (1) the monitoring
of Atrium’s compliance with the
proposed Final Judgment, (2) the extent
of price transparency that the proposed
Final Judgment requires of Atrium, and
(3) the possible preclusion of monetary
relief and penalties. As explained
below, however, the proposed Final
Judgment provides strong mechanisms
for monitoring Atrium’s conduct and
ensuring its compliance with the
proposed Final Judgment, allows
effective transparency that patients can
use to compare quality and out-ofpocket costs, and does not preclude the
State Health Plan or any other party
from pursuing an action to recover
monetary damages or other relief against
Atrium.
Although the State Health Plan
contends that the compliance
mechanisms in the proposed Final
Judgment are insufficient and
recommends an independent auditor,
the proposed Final Judgment provides
strong mechanisms to monitor Atrium
and ensure its compliance with the
judgment. Paragraph VI of the proposed
Final Judgment requires Atrium to
provide a copy of the Final Judgment to
all of the major insurers in the Charlotte
area and to notify those insurers that (1)
the Final Judgment prohibits Atrium
from entering into or enforcing any
agreement provision that violates the
Final Judgment and (2) Atrium may not
enforce the steering restrictions in its
current contracts with those insurers.
Those insurers will have ample
incentive to alert the United States and
North Carolina should Atrium take any
action that may be deemed a violation
of the Final Judgment. Paragraph VII of
the proposed Final Judgment requires
4 The State Health Plan is a Division of the North
Carolina Department of State Treasurer. The
Treasurer and the State Health Plan’s Executive
Administrator and Board of Trustees are
responsible for administering the plan. See Exhibit
A at p. 1.
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Atrium to (1) provide a copy of the Final
Judgment to each of its commissioners,
officers, and employees responsible for
negotiating or approving contracts with
health insurers; (2) develop and
implement procedures to ensure
compliance with the Final Judgment; (3)
submit to the United States and North
Carolina a written report setting forth all
actions taken by Atrium to comply with
the Final Judgment, including a
description of the status of all contract
negotiations between Atrium and
insurers relating to healthcare services
rendered in the Charlotte area; and (4)
provide to the United States and North
Carolina a copy of each contract or
contract amendment with insurers that
covers healthcare services in the
Charlotte area within 30 days of
execution. Further, Paragraph VII(B)
provides that during the term of the
Final Judgment, the United States and
North Carolina may demand access to
Atrium’s books and records; interview
Atrium’s officers, employees, or agents;
and require Atrium to submit written
reports or responses to interrogatories
on matters related to the Final
Judgment.
The State Health Plan also
recommends that Atrium be required to
(1) begin implementation of procedures
to comply with the Final Judgment as
soon as possible, rather than the 60 days
specified in Paragraph VII(A)(3) of the
proposed Final Judgment 5 and (2)
submit its plan to comply with the Final
Judgment in 90 days, rather than the 270
days specified in Paragraph VII(C) of the
proposed Final Judgment.6 In the
Division’s experience, however, the
deadlines provided for in the proposed
5 Paragraph VII(A)(3) provides: It shall be the
responsibility of the Defendant’s designated counsel
to undertake the following: . . . within sixty (60)
calendar days of entry of this Final Judgment,
develop and implement procedures necessary to
ensure Defendant’s compliance with the Final
Judgment. Such procedures shall ensure that
questions from any of Defendant’s commissioners,
officers, or employees about this Final Judgment
can be answered by counsel (which may be outside
counsel) as the need arises. Paragraph 21.1. of the
Amended Protective Order Regarding
Confidentiality shall not be interpreted to prohibit
outside counsel from answering such questions.
6 Paragraph VII(C) provides: Within 270 calendar
days of entry of this Final Judgment, Defendant
must submit to the United States and the State of
North Carolina a written report setting forth its
actions to comply with this Final Judgment,
specifically describing (1) the status of all
negotiations between Managed Health Resources (or
any successor organization) and an Insurer relating
to contracts that cover Healthcare Services rendered
in the Charlotte Area since the entry of the Final
Judgment, and (2) the compliance procedures
adopted under Paragraph VII(A)(3) of this Final
Judgment.
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Final Judgment are reasonable to ensure
compliance.7 Given Atrium’s size, and
the time and effort that will be required
to develop and approve a compliance
plan that will be applicable throughout
a large and diverse health system, 60
days is a reasonable period for
developing such a plan. Further,
allowing Atrium an additional 210 days
to submit a written report will provide
Atrium time to describe the status of its
negotiations with insurers as required
by Paragraph VII(C). Finally, this timing
does not postpone Atrium’s obligations
to abide by the Final Judgment. In the
Joint Stipulation that the parties filed
with the Court on November 15, 2018,
Atrium agreed to abide by the terms of
the proposed Final Judgment during the
pendency of the Tunney Act process.
See Joint Stipulation (Dkt. No. 87), at ¶
3. The Court entered the Joint
Stipulation as an order of the Court on
December 14, 2018.
See Stipulation and Order, dated
December 14, 2018 (Dkt. No. 92), at ¶ 3.
Thus, consumers are already receiving
the benefits of the proposed Final
Judgment.
Concerning pricing transparency, the
United States agrees with the State
Health Plan that price information
enables consumers to make informed
healthcare decisions. The proposed
Final Judgment enables insurers to make
pricing and quality information
transparent to their members and to
employers. Specifically, the proposed
Final Judgment prohibits Atrium from
implementing contract provisions or
actions that restrict health insurers’
ability to provide their members with
information about the price, quality,
patient experience, and anticipated outof-pocket costs of Atrium’s healthcare
services compared to Atrium’s
competitors. This information will help
insurers to make steered plans more
effective by providing consumers with
information that enables them to choose
more cost-effective, high-quality
providers, thereby encouraging
competition among healthcare
providers.
The State Health Plan, however,
incorrectly argues that the Final
7 See United States v. United Reg’l Healthcare
Sys., No. 7:11–cv–ws0030–O (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2011) (entering Final Judgment enjoining hospital
from entering into contracts with insurers that
prevent insurers from contracting with hospital’s
competitors and providing hospital 60 days to
implement compliance procedures and 270 days to
submit written report regarding compliance)
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/514136/download.
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Judgment should not allow Atrium to
place any limitations on health insurers’
ability to disseminate Atrium’s prices.8
Limitless sharing of pricing information,
which contains competitively sensitive
negotiated pricing, is not needed to
redress the harm alleged in this case.
Allowing insurers to provide
information about price and quality to
their members and their employers is
sufficient to facilitate steering. Indeed,
the proposed Final Judgment enables
insurers to disclose to enrollees insurercalculated estimates of their out-ofpocket costs at alternative providers,
which accounts for negotiated provider
prices and enrollees’ insurance
coverage. This information gives
consumers the ability to make informed
healthcare decisions. For this reason,
the proposed Final Judgment does not
need to require Atrium to disclose
competitively sensitive price
information to Atrium’s competitors and
the general public.
Finally, the State Health Plan
expresses concern that the proposed
Final Judgment may preclude the State
Health Plan from pursuing an action for
damages against Atrium. As stated in
the Competitive Impact Statement,
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15, however, provides that any person
who has been injured as a result of
conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws
may bring suit in federal court to
recover three times the damages the
person has suffered, as well as costs and
reasonable attorneys’ fees. Entry of the
proposed Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist any private antitrust
damage action. Therefore, the State
Health Plan remains free to pursue an
action for monetary damages or other
remedies.
V. Conclusion
8 Paragraph V(C) of the proposed Final Judgment
provides:
[F]or an Insurer’s dissemination of price or cost
information (other than communication of an
individual consumer’s or member’s actual or
estimated out-of-pocket expense), nothing in the
Final Judgment will prevent or impair Defendant
from enforcing current or future provisions,
including but not limited to confidentiality
provisions, that (i) prohibit an Insurer from
disseminating price or cost information to
Defendant’s competitors, other Insurers, or the
general public; and/or (ii) require an Insurer to
obtain a covenant from any third party that receives
such price or cost information that such third party
will not disclose that information to Defendant’s
competitors, another Insurer, the general public, or
any other third party lacking a reasonable need to
obtain such competitively sensitive information.
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After careful consideration of the
State Health Plan’s comment, the United
States continues to believe that the
proposed Final Judgment provides an
effective and appropriate remedy for the
antitrust violations alleged in the
Complaint and is therefore in the public
interest. The United States will move
this Court to enter the modified
proposed Final Judgment after the
comment and this response are
published as required by 15 U.S.C. §
16(d).
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Respectfully submitted,
Dated: April 1, 2019
FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:
Catherine R. Reilly, Karl D. Knutsen,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Suite 4100,
Washington, D.C. 20530, (p) 202/598-2744,
Catherine.Reilly@usdoj.gov
EXHIBIT A
North Carolina, Department of State
Treasurer, Office of the Treasurer
Dale R. Folwell, CPA, State Treasurer of
North Carolina
February 8, 2019
Mr. Peter J. Mucchetti, Chief, Healthcare
and Consumer Products Section,
Antitrust Division, Department of
Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite
4100, Washington, DC 20530
The Honorable Josh Stein, N.C. Attorney
General, North Carolina Department
of Justice, P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, NC
27602
Chief Mucchetti and Attorney General
Stein,
The North Carolina State Health Plan
for Teachers and State Employees, a
Division of the North Carolina
Department of State Treasurer (State
Health Plan or the Plan), and I, submit
these comments in response to the
Notice of Proposed Final Judgment,
Stipulation, and Competitive Impact
Statement (Proposed Final Judgment)
published on December 11, 2018, in the
case of United States et al. v. The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital
Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Healthcare
System (Defendant Atrium). We believe
that the Proposed Final Judgment does
not promote and protect consumers
sufficiently and does not correct the
past harm inflicted on the State Health
Plan and its members. We request that
you set aside the Proposed Final
Judgment as contemplated and
incorporate, at a minimum, the
comprehensive relief we recommend.
The North Carolina General Assembly
created the State Health Plan to provide
comprehensive health coverage to over
720,000 teachers, state employees,
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current and former lawmakers, state
university and community college
personnel, local government employees,
retirees, and their dependents. The State
Health Plan spends over $3.3 billion
annually to provide these benefits. The
Plan’s mission is to improve the health
and health care of North Carolina
teachers, state employees, retirees, and
their dependents, in a financially
sustainable manner, thereby serving as a
model to the people of North Carolina
for improving their health and wellbeing. The Executive Administrator of
the Plan, the Plan’s Board of Trustees
and I are responsible for administering
the Plan and for carrying out these
duties as fiduciaries of the Plan and its
members. With such expansive coverage
and responsibility, the State Health Plan
is significantly affected by the Proposed
Final Judgment.
While we agree with the purpose of
the Proposed Final Judgment to promote
transparency and prevent Defendant
Atrium from impeding insurers’ steered
plans, we have concerns with how
3200 Atlantic Avenue• Raleigh, North
Carolina 27604
Courier #56-20-45 • Telephone: (919)
814-3800 • Fax: (919) 855-5805 •
www.NCTreasurer.com
Defendant Atrium will be monitored
to comply with the Proposed Final
Judgment, the level of transparency that
is being asked of Defendant Atrium, and
the possible preclusion of monetary
relief and penalties.
Compliance:
The Proposed Final Judgment requires
that, within 60 calendar days of entry of
the Final Judgment, Defendant Atrium
must develop and implement
procedures that comply with the terms
of the Final Judgment. Defendant
Atrium must submit its plan in writing
within 270 calendar days of entry of the
Final Judgment to the United States and
the State of North Carolina. The
Proposed Final Judgment also states that
the United States and State of North
Carolina, upon written request and
reasonable notice, can access and
review materials pertaining to the
implementation of the Proposed Final
Judgment, to ensure that the Defendant
Atrium is in compliance.
The compliance mechanisms
contained in the Proposed Final
Judgment are insufficient. To ensure
Defendant Atrium is not utilizing
contracts that prevent, prohibit, or
penalize steering, we recommend that
Defendant Atrium submit its
compliance plan in writing within 90
days, rather than 270 days, and begin
implementation of these compliance
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Sfmt 4703
14679
measurers as soon as possible. We also
recommend the appointment of an
independent auditor to monitor
compliance on a quarterly basis, at the
expense of Defendant Atrium.
Transparency:
There should be no exceptions to the
transparency requirement. The public
must be able to evaluate price, cost, and
quality to prevent future Sherman Act
violations. We object specifically to the
quoted language below, found within
the Permitted Conduct Section of the
Proposed Final Judgment:
Nothing in the Final Judgment will
prevent or impair Defendant from
enforcing current or future provisions,
including but not limited to
confidentiality provisions, that (i)
prohibit an Insurer from disseminating
price or cost information to Defendant’s
competitors, other Insurers, or the
general public; and/or (ii) require an
Insurer to obtain a covenant from any
third party that receives such price or
cost information that such third party
will not disclose that information to
Defendant’s competitors, another
Insurer, the general public, or any other
third party lacking a reasonable need to
obtain such competitively sensitive
information.
United States et al. v. The CharlotteMecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a
Carolinas Healthcare System, 83 Fed.
Reg. 63674 (published Dec. 11, 2018).
Consumers need price information to
make informed decisions about their
health care and to prevent future similar
restrictions that would create barriers to
competition.
Damages:
We are concerned that the Proposed
Final Judgment may preclude the State
Health Plan and its 720,000 members
from pursuing damages to both remedy
the harm they have incurred and to
discourage future anti-competitive
behavior. Over the past two decades, the
Plan and its members have paid
Defendant Atrium over $1.8 billion for
health care services. Even if, as a result
of Defendant Atrium’s anti-competitive
actions, the Plan and its members
overpaid Defendant Atrium by only 5%
over this time period, it would have cost
North Carolina taxpayers over $90
million. Not only should Defendant
Atrium not be allowed to retain such
amounts obtained through illegal
behavior, penalties to discourage future
activities make sense in this case. Thus,
we ask that the Proposed Final
Judgment be modified to make clear that
the State Health Plan or any of its
members are not precluded from
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 70 / Thursday, April 11, 2019 / Notices
pursuing damages, including those
intended to penalize the Defendant.
Conclusion:
Just recently, President Donald J.
Trump addressed the current State of
the Union. In his remarks, President
Trump asked Congress to pass
legislation that finally delivers fairness
and price transparency for American
patients. He remarked that drug
companies, insurance companies, and
hospitals should disclose real prices to
foster competition and bring costs
down.
The Proposed Final Judgment does
not promote or protect consumers
sufficiently and does not correct the
past harm inflicted on the State Health
Plan and its over 720,000 members. We
are opposed vehemently to anticompetitive policies and activities such
as those employed by Defendant
Atrium, and believe that strict
compliance standards, full
transparency, and payment of damages
to the fullest extent possible are vital to
promoting and protecting consumerism
in the North Carolina health care market
and to remedying past harm. We trust
that you will take our feedback into
consideration, and set aside the
Proposed Final Judgment, or modify it
as we have suggested.
llllllllllll
Dale R. Folwell, CPA
North Carolina State Treasurer
[FR Doc. 2019–07195 Filed 4–10–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–11–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[OMB Number 1121–0302]
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed eCollection
eComments Requested;
Reinstatement, Without Change, of a
Previously Approved Collection for
Which Approval has Expired: 2019
Supplemental Victimization Survey
(SVS) to the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS)
Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Department of Justice.
ACTION: 30-Day notice.
AGENCY:
The Department of Justice
(DOJ), Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, will be
submitting the following information
collection request to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval in accordance with
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
DATES: Comments are encouraged and
will be accepted for 30 days until May
13, 2019.
amozie on DSK9F9SC42PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
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16:50 Apr 10, 2019
Jkt 247001
If
you have additional comments
especially on the estimated public
burden or associated response time,
suggestions, or need a copy of the
proposed information collection
instrument with instructions or
additional information, please contact
Jennifer Truman or Rachel Morgan,
Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
810 Seventh Street NW, Washington, DC
20531 (email: jennifer.truman@
usdoj.gov; telephone: 202–514–5083;
email: rachel.morgan@usdoj.gov;
telephone: 202–616–1707).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Written
comments and suggestions from the
public and affected agencies concerning
the proposed collection of information
are encouraged. Your comments should
address one or more of the following
four points:
— Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
— Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
— Evaluate whether and if so how the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected can be
enhanced; and
— Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those
who are to respond, including
through the use of appropriate
automated, electronic, mechanical, or
other technological collection
techniques or other forms of
information technology, e.g.,
permitting electronic submission of
responses.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Overview of This Information
Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
Reinstatement of the Supplemental
Victimization Survey (SVS), without
changes, a previously approved
collection for which approval has
expired.
(2) The Title of the Form/Collection:
2019 Supplemental Victimization
Survey (SVS) to the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS).
(3) The agency form number, if any,
and the applicable component of the
Department sponsoring the collection:
The form number for the questionnaire
is SVS–1. The applicable component
within the Department of Justice is the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, in the Office
of Justice Programs.
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 9990
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract: Respondents will be persons
16 years or older living in households
located throughout the United States
sampled for the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS). The SVS
will be conducted as a supplement to
the NCVS in all sample households for
a six (6) month period from July through
December 2019. The SVS is primarily an
effort to measure the prevalence of
stalking victimization among persons,
the types of stalking victimization
experienced, the characteristics of
stalking victims, the nature and
consequences of stalking victimization,
and patterns of reporting to the police.
BJS plans to publish this information in
reports and reference it when
responding to queries from the U.S.
Congress, Executive Office of the
President, the U.S. Supreme Court, state
officials, international organizations,
researchers, students, the media, and
others interested in criminal justice
statistics.
(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimated for an average respondent to
respond: An estimate of the total
number of respondents is 119,526
persons age 16 or older. About 98.6%
(117,879) will have no stalking
victimization and will complete the SVS
screener only with an average burden of
three (3) minutes. Among the 1.4% of
respondents (1,647) who experience
stalking victimization, the time to ask
the screener plus the detailed questions
regarding the aspects of their stalking
victimization is estimated to take an
average of 18 minutes. Respondents will
be asked to respond to this survey only
once during the six month period from
July through December 2019. The
burden estimates are based on data from
the prior administration of the SVS.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: There are an estimated 6,388
annual burden hours associated with
this collection.
If additional information is required
contact: Melody Braswell, Department
Clearance Officer, United States
Department of Justice, Justice
Management Division, Policy and
Planning Staff, Two Constitution
Square, 145 N Street NE, 3E.405B,
Washington, DC 20530.
Dated: April 8, 2019.
Melody Braswell,
Department Clearance Officer for PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2019–07166 Filed 4–10–19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–18–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 70 (Thursday, April 11, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14675-14680]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-07195]
=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States et al. v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital
Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Healthcare System; Response to Public
Comment
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that one comment was received
concerning the proposed Final Judgment in this case, and that comment
together with the Response of the United States to Public Comment have
been filed with the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina in United States and State of North
Carolina. v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a
Carolinas HealthCare System, Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK.
Copies of the comment and the United States' Response are available for
inspection on the Antitrust Division's website at https://www.justice.gov/atr and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Copies of
these materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon
request and payment of the copying fee set by Department of Justice
regulations.
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil, Enforcement.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
United States of America and the State of North Carolina,
Plaintiffs, v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a
Carolinas Healthcare System, Defendant.
Case No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK
Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr.
RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES TO PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED
FINAL JUDGMENT
As required by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (the
``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 16(b)-(h), the United
States hereby responds to the one public comment received by the United
States about the proposed Final Judgment in this case. After careful
consideration of the comment submitted, the United States continues to
believe that the proposed remedy will address the harm alleged in the
Complaint and is therefore in the public interest. The proposed Final
Judgment will prevent Atrium from impeding insurers' steered plans and
transparency initiatives and restore competition among healthcare
providers in the Charlotte area. The United States will move the Court
for entry of a modified proposed Final Judgment \1\ after this response
and the public comment have been published in the Federal Register,
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ During the December 13, 2018 hearing in this matter, the
Court raised concerns regarding certain aspects of Paragraph IX(B)
of the proposed Final Judgment. The United States and Atrium have
agreed to modify the proposed Final Judgment to address the Court's
concerns. The modifications do not alter the structure or substance
of the remedy and will not materially affect Atrium's obligations
and therefore do not require an additional notice and comment period
under the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16. The United States will
describe in detail the parties' agreed-upon modifications and
discuss how those modifications address the Court's concerns
regarding Paragraph IX(B) in its forthcoming motion for entry of the
modified proposed Final Judgment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Procedural History
On June 9, 2016, the United States and the State of North Carolina
filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against The Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hospital Authority, formerly known as Carolinas HealthCare System and
now doing business as Atrium Health (``Atrium''), to enjoin it from
using steering restrictions in its agreements with health insurers in
the Charlotte, North Carolina area. The Complaint alleges that Atrium's
steering restrictions are anticompetitive and violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1.
After over two years of litigation, on November 15, 2018, the
United States filed a proposed Final Judgment and a Stipulation signed
by the parties that consents to entry of the proposed Final Judgment
after compliance with the requirements of the Tunney Act. (Dkt. No. 87-
1.) On December 4, 2018, the United States filed a Competitive Impact
Statement describing the proposed Final Judgment. (Dkt. No. 89.) The
United States caused the Complaint, the proposed Final Judgment, and
the Competitive Impact Statement to be published in the Federal
Register on December 11, 2018, see 83 Fed. Reg. 63,674, and caused
notice regarding the same, together with directions for the submission
of written comments relating to the proposed Final Judgment, to be
published in The Charlotte Observer and The Washington Post for seven
days beginning on December 7, 2018, and ending on December 13, 2018.
The 60-day period for public comment ended on February 11, 2019. The
United States received only one comment, which is described below in
Section IV, and attached as Exhibit A hereto.
II. Standard of Judicial Review
The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be
subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(e)(1). In making that
determination, the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in
2004, is required to consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification,
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative
remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and
any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of
such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of
whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth
in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if
any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory
factors, the court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the
government is entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the
defendant within the reaches of the public interest.'' United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally
United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007)
(assessing public-interest standard under the Tunney Act); United
States v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., No. 2:16-3664, 2016 WL 6156172, at
*2 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 21, 2016) (noting that in evaluating whether the
proposed final judgment is in the public interest, the inquiry is ``a
narrow one'' and only requires the court to determine if the remedy
effectively addresses the harm identified in the complaint); United
States v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014)
(explaining that the ``court's inquiry is limited'' in Tunney Act
settlements); United States v. InBev N.V./S.A., No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the
court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires
``into whether the government's
[[Page 14676]]
determination that the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust
violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and whether the
mechanisms to enforce the final judgment are clear and manageable'').
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things,
the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific
allegations in the government's complaint, whether the decree is
sufficiently clear, whether its enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the
relief secured by the decree, a court may not ``engage in an
unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.''
United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152
F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787,
at *3. Instead:
[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's
role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See also BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co.,
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's
reducing glass'').
Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public
interest, a district court ``must accord deference to the government's
predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require
that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d
at 74-75 (noting that a court should not reject the proposed remedies
because it believes others are preferable and that room must be made
for the government to grant concessions in the negotiation process for
settlements); Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to
be ``deferential to the government's predictions as to the effect of
the proposed remedies''); United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court should grant
``due respect to the government's prediction as to the effect of
proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its
views of the nature of the case''). The ultimate question is whether
``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the
allegations charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of the public
interest.' '' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (quoting United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). To meet this
standard, the United States ``need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for
the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has
alleged in its complaint, and does not authorize the court to
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also U.S. Airways,
38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine
whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decisions
such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are
reasonable); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the `public
interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in
the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even
should have, been alleged''). Because the ``court's authority to review
the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its
prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it
follows that ``the court is only authorized to review the decree
itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire
into other matters that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1459-60.
In its 2004 amendments to the APPA \3\, Congress made clear its
intent to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees
in antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that
``[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone
to intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(e)(2); see also U.S. Airways, 38 F.
Supp. 3d at 76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review
under the Tunney Act). This language explicitly wrote into the statute
what Congress intended when it first enacted the Tunney Act in 1974. As
Senator Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to
trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect
of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through
the consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement
of Sen. Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public-interest
determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the
recognition that the court's ``scope of review remains sharply
proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11. A court can make its public-interest
determination based on the competitive impact statement and response to
public comments alone. U.S. Airways, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76; see also
United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000)
(noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the court to make its
public interest determination on the basis of the competitive impact
statement and response to comments alone''); S. Rep. No. 93-298 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (``Where the public interest can be
meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of briefs and oral
arguments, that is the approach that should be utilized.'').
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\3\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in
directing relevant factors for a court to consider and amended the
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also
SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004
amendments ``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
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III. The Investigation, the Harm Alleged in the Complaint, and the
Proposed Final Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment is the culmination of a thorough,
comprehensive investigation conducted by the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice and the North Carolina Department of Justice
and over two years of litigation regarding Atrium's use of steering
restrictions in its contracts with health insurers in the Charlotte,
North Carolina area. These steering restrictions either expressly
prohibited the insurers from steering their members away from Atrium or
impeded steering through other means, such as by imposing a financial
penalty on any steering by the insurer away from Atrium or by allowing
Atrium to promptly terminate the insurer's contract if the insurer
steered members
[[Page 14677]]
away from Atrium. Based on the evidence gathered during the
investigation and litigation, the United States concluded that Atrium's
steering restrictions were anticompetitive and violated Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, because the restrictions had
detrimental effects on competition among healthcare providers in the
Charlotte area. Specifically, the United States concluded that Atrium,
in order to protect its dominant share and high prices and to insulate
itself from competition, used its market power to require every major
insurer in the Charlotte area to accept contract terms that restrict
the insurers from steering their members to Atrium's lower-cost
competitors. Atrium's steering restrictions reduced hospital
competition in the Charlotte area; prevented transparency in the
communication of price, cost, quality, or patient experience
information to a member; and prevented consumers from benefitting from
lower prices. The proposed Final Judgment provides an effective and
appropriate remedy for this competitive harm by enjoining Atrium from
(1) enforcing provisions in its current insurer contracts that restrict
steering and transparency; (2) seeking or obtaining contract provisions
with an insurer that would prohibit, prevent, or penalize the insurer
from using popular steering methods or providing transparency; and (3)
penalizing, or threatening to penalize, any insurer for its use of
these popular steering methods and transparency.
The proposed Final Judgment has several components, which Atrium
agreed to abide by during the pendency of the Tunney Act proceedings
and which the Court ordered in the Stipulation and Order of December
14, 2018 (Dkt. No. 92).
First, the proposed Final Judgment eliminates the anti-steering
language in Atrium's agreements with health insurers. The proposed
Final Judgment voids contract provisions (listed in Exhibit A to the
proposed Final Judgment) that expressly prevent steering. The proposed
Final Judgment also prohibits Atrium from using certain contract
provisions that would require an insurer to include Atrium in all of
its benefit plans (listed in Exhibit B to the proposed Final Judgment)
to prevent, prohibit, or penalize steered plans and transparency.
Finally, the proposed Final Judgment prevents Atrium from enforcing a
``material impact'' provision in its contract with Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of North Carolina (``BCBS-NC'') in a manner that reduces BCBS-
NC's incentives to steer to more efficient providers.
Second, the proposed Final Judgment prevents Atrium from seeking or
obtaining new contract provisions that would prohibit, prevent, or
penalize steering through steered plans or transparency in the
Charlotte area. The proposed Final Judgment prohibits Atrium from: (1)
expressly prohibiting steered plans or transparency; (2) requiring
prior approval of new benefit plans; or (3) demanding to be included in
the most-preferred tier of benefit plans regardless of price.
Third, the proposed Final Judgment prohibits Atrium from seeking or
obtaining any contract provision, or taking any other action, that
would penalize an insurer for steering away from Atrium through steered
plans or transparency.
Finally, the proposed Final Judgment includes robust mechanisms
that will allow the United States and the Court to monitor the
effectiveness of the relief and to enforce compliance.
The proposed Final Judgment requires Atrium to provide certain
health insurers with a copy of the Final Judgment and notify those
insurers in writing of the Court's entry of the proposed Final Judgment
and its requirements. Atrium is also required to provide a copy of the
proposed Final Judgment to each of its commissioners and officers as
well as each employee who has responsibility for negotiating or
approving contracts with insurers.
The proposed Final Judgment also requires Atrium to develop
and implement procedures necessary to ensure compliance with the
proposed Final Judgment, including procedures to answer questions from
Atrium's commissioners and employees about abiding by the terms of the
proposed Final Judgment. Atrium must submit to the United States and
the State of North Carolina a written report setting forth its actions
to comply with the proposed Final Judgment and a copy of any new or
revised agreement or amendment to any agreement with any insurer that
is executed during the term of the proposed Final Judgment. Atrium must
also notify the United States and the State of North Carolina of when a
provider which Atrium controls has a contract with any insurer with a
provision that prohibits, prevents, or penalizes transparency or any
steered plan.
The proposed Final Judgment provides the United States with
the ability to investigate Atrium's compliance with the Final Judgment
and enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment, including
its rights to seek an order of contempt from this Court.
IV. Summary of Public Comments and the United States' Response
The United States received only one comment concerning the proposed
Final Judgment. The comment was submitted by the North Carolina State
Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees \4\ and the State
Treasurer of North Carolina, Dale R. Folwell (collectively, the ``State
Health Plan''). Importantly, the State Health Plan agrees with the
purpose of the proposed Final Judgment and does not criticize the
central components of the relief obtained by the United States. Rather,
the State Health Plan suggests limited changes to the proposed Final
Judgment relating to (1) the monitoring of Atrium's compliance with the
proposed Final Judgment, (2) the extent of price transparency that the
proposed Final Judgment requires of Atrium, and (3) the possible
preclusion of monetary relief and penalties. As explained below,
however, the proposed Final Judgment provides strong mechanisms for
monitoring Atrium's conduct and ensuring its compliance with the
proposed Final Judgment, allows effective transparency that patients
can use to compare quality and out-of-pocket costs, and does not
preclude the State Health Plan or any other party from pursuing an
action to recover monetary damages or other relief against Atrium.
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\4\ The State Health Plan is a Division of the North Carolina
Department of State Treasurer. The Treasurer and the State Health
Plan's Executive Administrator and Board of Trustees are responsible
for administering the plan. See Exhibit A at p. 1.
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Although the State Health Plan contends that the compliance
mechanisms in the proposed Final Judgment are insufficient and
recommends an independent auditor, the proposed Final Judgment provides
strong mechanisms to monitor Atrium and ensure its compliance with the
judgment. Paragraph VI of the proposed Final Judgment requires Atrium
to provide a copy of the Final Judgment to all of the major insurers in
the Charlotte area and to notify those insurers that (1) the Final
Judgment prohibits Atrium from entering into or enforcing any agreement
provision that violates the Final Judgment and (2) Atrium may not
enforce the steering restrictions in its current contracts with those
insurers. Those insurers will have ample incentive to alert the United
States and North Carolina should Atrium take any action that may be
deemed a violation of the Final Judgment. Paragraph VII of the proposed
Final Judgment requires
[[Page 14678]]
Atrium to (1) provide a copy of the Final Judgment to each of its
commissioners, officers, and employees responsible for negotiating or
approving contracts with health insurers; (2) develop and implement
procedures to ensure compliance with the Final Judgment; (3) submit to
the United States and North Carolina a written report setting forth all
actions taken by Atrium to comply with the Final Judgment, including a
description of the status of all contract negotiations between Atrium
and insurers relating to healthcare services rendered in the Charlotte
area; and (4) provide to the United States and North Carolina a copy of
each contract or contract amendment with insurers that covers
healthcare services in the Charlotte area within 30 days of execution.
Further, Paragraph VII(B) provides that during the term of the Final
Judgment, the United States and North Carolina may demand access to
Atrium's books and records; interview Atrium's officers, employees, or
agents; and require Atrium to submit written reports or responses to
interrogatories on matters related to the Final Judgment.
The State Health Plan also recommends that Atrium be required to
(1) begin implementation of procedures to comply with the Final
Judgment as soon as possible, rather than the 60 days specified in
Paragraph VII(A)(3) of the proposed Final Judgment \5\ and (2) submit
its plan to comply with the Final Judgment in 90 days, rather than the
270 days specified in Paragraph VII(C) of the proposed Final
Judgment.\6\ In the Division's experience, however, the deadlines
provided for in the proposed Final Judgment are reasonable to ensure
compliance.\7\ Given Atrium's size, and the time and effort that will
be required to develop and approve a compliance plan that will be
applicable throughout a large and diverse health system, 60 days is a
reasonable period for developing such a plan. Further, allowing Atrium
an additional 210 days to submit a written report will provide Atrium
time to describe the status of its negotiations with insurers as
required by Paragraph VII(C). Finally, this timing does not postpone
Atrium's obligations to abide by the Final Judgment. In the Joint
Stipulation that the parties filed with the Court on November 15, 2018,
Atrium agreed to abide by the terms of the proposed Final Judgment
during the pendency of the Tunney Act process. See Joint Stipulation
(Dkt. No. 87), at ] 3. The Court entered the Joint Stipulation as an
order of the Court on December 14, 2018.
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\5\ Paragraph VII(A)(3) provides: It shall be the responsibility
of the Defendant's designated counsel to undertake the following: .
. . within sixty (60) calendar days of entry of this Final Judgment,
develop and implement procedures necessary to ensure Defendant's
compliance with the Final Judgment. Such procedures shall ensure
that questions from any of Defendant's commissioners, officers, or
employees about this Final Judgment can be answered by counsel
(which may be outside counsel) as the need arises. Paragraph 21.1.
of the Amended Protective Order Regarding Confidentiality shall not
be interpreted to prohibit outside counsel from answering such
questions.
\6\ Paragraph VII(C) provides: Within 270 calendar days of entry
of this Final Judgment, Defendant must submit to the United States
and the State of North Carolina a written report setting forth its
actions to comply with this Final Judgment, specifically describing
(1) the status of all negotiations between Managed Health Resources
(or any successor organization) and an Insurer relating to contracts
that cover Healthcare Services rendered in the Charlotte Area since
the entry of the Final Judgment, and (2) the compliance procedures
adopted under Paragraph VII(A)(3) of this Final Judgment.
\7\ See United States v. United Reg'l Healthcare Sys., No. 7:11-
cv-ws0030-O (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2011) (entering Final Judgment
enjoining hospital from entering into contracts with insurers that
prevent insurers from contracting with hospital's competitors and
providing hospital 60 days to implement compliance procedures and
270 days to submit written report regarding compliance) available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/514136/download.
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See Stipulation and Order, dated December 14, 2018 (Dkt. No. 92),
at ] 3. Thus, consumers are already receiving the benefits of the
proposed Final Judgment.
Concerning pricing transparency, the United States agrees with the
State Health Plan that price information enables consumers to make
informed healthcare decisions. The proposed Final Judgment enables
insurers to make pricing and quality information transparent to their
members and to employers. Specifically, the proposed Final Judgment
prohibits Atrium from implementing contract provisions or actions that
restrict health insurers' ability to provide their members with
information about the price, quality, patient experience, and
anticipated out-of-pocket costs of Atrium's healthcare services
compared to Atrium's competitors. This information will help insurers
to make steered plans more effective by providing consumers with
information that enables them to choose more cost-effective, high-
quality providers, thereby encouraging competition among healthcare
providers.
The State Health Plan, however, incorrectly argues that the Final
Judgment should not allow Atrium to place any limitations on health
insurers' ability to disseminate Atrium's prices.\8\ Limitless sharing
of pricing information, which contains competitively sensitive
negotiated pricing, is not needed to redress the harm alleged in this
case. Allowing insurers to provide information about price and quality
to their members and their employers is sufficient to facilitate
steering. Indeed, the proposed Final Judgment enables insurers to
disclose to enrollees insurer-calculated estimates of their out-of-
pocket costs at alternative providers, which accounts for negotiated
provider prices and enrollees' insurance coverage. This information
gives consumers the ability to make informed healthcare decisions. For
this reason, the proposed Final Judgment does not need to require
Atrium to disclose competitively sensitive price information to
Atrium's competitors and the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Paragraph V(C) of the proposed Final Judgment provides:
[F]or an Insurer's dissemination of price or cost information
(other than communication of an individual consumer's or member's
actual or estimated out-of-pocket expense), nothing in the Final
Judgment will prevent or impair Defendant from enforcing current or
future provisions, including but not limited to confidentiality
provisions, that (i) prohibit an Insurer from disseminating price or
cost information to Defendant's competitors, other Insurers, or the
general public; and/or (ii) require an Insurer to obtain a covenant
from any third party that receives such price or cost information
that such third party will not disclose that information to
Defendant's competitors, another Insurer, the general public, or any
other third party lacking a reasonable need to obtain such
competitively sensitive information.
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Finally, the State Health Plan expresses concern that the proposed
Final Judgment may preclude the State Health Plan from pursuing an
action for damages against Atrium. As stated in the Competitive Impact
Statement, Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 15, however,
provides that any person who has been injured as a result of conduct
prohibited by the antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to
recover three times the damages the person has suffered, as well as
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final
Judgment will neither impair nor assist any private antitrust damage
action. Therefore, the State Health Plan remains free to pursue an
action for monetary damages or other remedies.
V. Conclusion
[[Page 14679]]
After careful consideration of the State Health Plan's comment, the
United States continues to believe that the proposed Final Judgment
provides an effective and appropriate remedy for the antitrust
violations alleged in the Complaint and is therefore in the public
interest. The United States will move this Court to enter the modified
proposed Final Judgment after the comment and this response are
published as required by 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(d).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: April 1, 2019
FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Catherine R. Reilly, Karl D. Knutsen, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Suite 4100, Washington,
D.C. 20530, (p) 202/598-2744, [email protected]
EXHIBIT A
North Carolina, Department of State Treasurer, Office of the Treasurer
Dale R. Folwell, CPA, State Treasurer of North Carolina
February 8, 2019
Mr. Peter J. Mucchetti, Chief, Healthcare and Consumer Products
Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street
NW, Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530
The Honorable Josh Stein, N.C. Attorney General, North Carolina
Department of Justice, P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602
Chief Mucchetti and Attorney General Stein,
The North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State
Employees, a Division of the North Carolina Department of State
Treasurer (State Health Plan or the Plan), and I, submit these comments
in response to the Notice of Proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation, and
Competitive Impact Statement (Proposed Final Judgment) published on
December 11, 2018, in the case of United States et al. v. The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Healthcare
System (Defendant Atrium). We believe that the Proposed Final Judgment
does not promote and protect consumers sufficiently and does not
correct the past harm inflicted on the State Health Plan and its
members. We request that you set aside the Proposed Final Judgment as
contemplated and incorporate, at a minimum, the comprehensive relief we
recommend.
The North Carolina General Assembly created the State Health Plan
to provide comprehensive health coverage to over 720,000 teachers,
state employees, current and former lawmakers, state university and
community college personnel, local government employees, retirees, and
their dependents. The State Health Plan spends over $3.3 billion
annually to provide these benefits. The Plan's mission is to improve
the health and health care of North Carolina teachers, state employees,
retirees, and their dependents, in a financially sustainable manner,
thereby serving as a model to the people of North Carolina for
improving their health and well-being. The Executive Administrator of
the Plan, the Plan's Board of Trustees and I are responsible for
administering the Plan and for carrying out these duties as fiduciaries
of the Plan and its members. With such expansive coverage and
responsibility, the State Health Plan is significantly affected by the
Proposed Final Judgment.
While we agree with the purpose of the Proposed Final Judgment to
promote transparency and prevent Defendant Atrium from impeding
insurers' steered plans, we have concerns with how
3200 Atlantic Avenue Raleigh, North Carolina 27604
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Defendant Atrium will be monitored to comply with the Proposed
Final Judgment, the level of transparency that is being asked of
Defendant Atrium, and the possible preclusion of monetary relief and
penalties.
Compliance:
The Proposed Final Judgment requires that, within 60 calendar days
of entry of the Final Judgment, Defendant Atrium must develop and
implement procedures that comply with the terms of the Final Judgment.
Defendant Atrium must submit its plan in writing within 270 calendar
days of entry of the Final Judgment to the United States and the State
of North Carolina. The Proposed Final Judgment also states that the
United States and State of North Carolina, upon written request and
reasonable notice, can access and review materials pertaining to the
implementation of the Proposed Final Judgment, to ensure that the
Defendant Atrium is in compliance.
The compliance mechanisms contained in the Proposed Final Judgment
are insufficient. To ensure Defendant Atrium is not utilizing contracts
that prevent, prohibit, or penalize steering, we recommend that
Defendant Atrium submit its compliance plan in writing within 90 days,
rather than 270 days, and begin implementation of these compliance
measurers as soon as possible. We also recommend the appointment of an
independent auditor to monitor compliance on a quarterly basis, at the
expense of Defendant Atrium.
Transparency:
There should be no exceptions to the transparency requirement. The
public must be able to evaluate price, cost, and quality to prevent
future Sherman Act violations. We object specifically to the quoted
language below, found within the Permitted Conduct Section of the
Proposed Final Judgment:
Nothing in the Final Judgment will prevent or impair Defendant from
enforcing current or future provisions, including but not limited to
confidentiality provisions, that (i) prohibit an Insurer from
disseminating price or cost information to Defendant's competitors,
other Insurers, or the general public; and/or (ii) require an Insurer
to obtain a covenant from any third party that receives such price or
cost information that such third party will not disclose that
information to Defendant's competitors, another Insurer, the general
public, or any other third party lacking a reasonable need to obtain
such competitively sensitive information.
United States et al. v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority,
d/b/a Carolinas Healthcare System, 83 Fed. Reg. 63674 (published Dec.
11, 2018).
Consumers need price information to make informed decisions about
their health care and to prevent future similar restrictions that would
create barriers to competition.
Damages:
We are concerned that the Proposed Final Judgment may preclude the
State Health Plan and its 720,000 members from pursuing damages to both
remedy the harm they have incurred and to discourage future anti-
competitive behavior. Over the past two decades, the Plan and its
members have paid Defendant Atrium over $1.8 billion for health care
services. Even if, as a result of Defendant Atrium's anti-competitive
actions, the Plan and its members overpaid Defendant Atrium by only 5%
over this time period, it would have cost North Carolina taxpayers over
$90 million. Not only should Defendant Atrium not be allowed to retain
such amounts obtained through illegal behavior, penalties to discourage
future activities make sense in this case. Thus, we ask that the
Proposed Final Judgment be modified to make clear that the State Health
Plan or any of its members are not precluded from
[[Page 14680]]
pursuing damages, including those intended to penalize the Defendant.
Conclusion:
Just recently, President Donald J. Trump addressed the current
State of the Union. In his remarks, President Trump asked Congress to
pass legislation that finally delivers fairness and price transparency
for American patients. He remarked that drug companies, insurance
companies, and hospitals should disclose real prices to foster
competition and bring costs down.
The Proposed Final Judgment does not promote or protect consumers
sufficiently and does not correct the past harm inflicted on the State
Health Plan and its over 720,000 members. We are opposed vehemently to
anti-competitive policies and activities such as those employed by
Defendant Atrium, and believe that strict compliance standards, full
transparency, and payment of damages to the fullest extent possible are
vital to promoting and protecting consumerism in the North Carolina
health care market and to remedying past harm. We trust that you will
take our feedback into consideration, and set aside the Proposed Final
Judgment, or modify it as we have suggested.
____________
Dale R. Folwell, CPA
North Carolina State Treasurer
[FR Doc. 2019-07195 Filed 4-10-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P