Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 12065-12073 [2019-06103]

Agencies

• Commodity Futures Trading Commission

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 62 (Monday, April 1, 2019)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12065-12073]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-06103]


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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 23

[3038-AE85]


Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The United Kingdom (``UK'') has provided formal notice of its 
intention to withdraw from the European Union (``EU''). The withdrawal 
may happen as soon as April 12, 2019 and may transpire without a 
negotiated agreement between the UK and EU (``No-deal Brexit''). To the 
extent there is a No-deal Brexit, affected swap dealers (``SDs'') and 
major swap participants (``MSPs'') may need to effect legal transfers 
of uncleared swaps that were entered into before the relevant 
compliance dates under the CFTC Margin Rule or Prudential Margin Rule 
(each, as defined herein) and that are not now subject to such rules, 
in whole or in part. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(``Commission'' or ``CFTC'') is adopting, and invites comments on, an 
interim final rule amending its margin requirements for uncleared swaps 
for SDs and MSPs for which there is no prudential regulator (``CFTC 
Margin Rule'') such that the date used for purposes of determining 
whether an uncleared swap was entered into prior to an applicable 
compliance date will not change under the CFTC Margin Rule if the swap 
is transferred, and thereby amended, in accordance with the terms of 
the interim final rule in respect of any such transfer, including that 
the transfer be made solely in connection with a party to the swap's 
planning for or response to a No-deal Brexit. The interim final rule is 
designed to allow an uncleared swap to retain its legacy status under 
the CFTC Margin Rule or Prudential Margin Rule when so transferred.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective April 1, 2019.
    Comment Date: Comments must be received on or before May 31, 2019. 
Comments submitted by mail will be accepted as timely if they are 
postmarked on or before this comment due date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3038-AE85, by any 
of the following methods:
     CFTC Comments Portal: https://comments.cftc.gov. Select 
the ``Submit Comments'' link for this rulemaking and follow the 
instructions on the Public Comment Form.
     Mail: Send to Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary of the 
Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette 
Center, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Follow the same instructions as for 
Mail, above.
    Please submit your comments using only one of these methods. 
Submissions through the CFTC Comments Portal are encouraged.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and RIN number for this rulemaking. For additional details on 
submitting comments, see the ``Public Participation'' heading of the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Kulkin, Director, 202-418-
5213, [email protected]; Frank Fisanich, Chief Counsel, 202-418-5949,

[[Page 12066]]

[email protected]; or Jacob Chachkin, Special Counsel, 202-418-5496, 
[email protected], Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

A. The CFTC Margin Rule

    Section 731 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(``Dodd-Frank Act'') \1\ added a new section 4s to the Commodity 
Exchange Act (``CEA'') \2\ setting forth various requirements for SDs 
and MSPs. Section 4s(e) of the CEA directs the Commission to adopt 
rules establishing minimum initial and variation margin requirements on 
all swaps \3\ that are (i) entered into by an SD or MSP for which there 
is no Prudential Regulator \4\ (collectively, ``covered swap entities'' 
or ``CSEs'') and (ii) not cleared by a registered derivatives clearing 
organization (``uncleared swaps'').\5\ To offset the greater risk to 
the SD or MSP \6\ and the financial system arising from the use of 
uncleared swaps, these requirements must (i) help ensure the safety and 
soundness of the SD or MSP and (ii) be appropriate for the risk 
associated with the uncleared swaps held as an SD or MSP.\7\
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    \1\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
    \2\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
    \3\ For the definition of swap, see section 1a(47) of the CEA 
and Commission regulation 1.3. 7 U.S.C. 1a(47) and 17 CFR 1.3. It 
includes, among other things, an interest rate swap, commodity swap, 
credit default swap, and currency swap.
    \4\ See 7 U.S.C. 6s(e)(1)(B). SDs and MSPs for which there is a 
Prudential Regulator must meet the margin requirements for uncleared 
swaps established by the applicable Prudential Regulator. 7 U.S.C. 
6s(e)(1)(A). See also 7 U.S.C. 1a(39) (defining the term 
``Prudential Regulator'' to include the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Farm Credit 
Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency). The 
definition further specifies the entities for which these agencies 
act as Prudential Regulators. The Prudential Regulators published 
final margin requirements in November 2015. See Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 FR 74840 (Nov. 30, 2015) 
(``Prudential Margin Rule''). The Prudential Rule is similar to the 
CFTC Margin Rule, including with respect to the CFTC's phasing-in of 
margin requirements, as discussed herein.
    \5\ See 7 U.S.C. 6s(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Commission regulation 
23.151, the Commission further defined this statutory language to 
mean all swaps that are not cleared by a registered derivatives 
clearing organization or a derivatives clearing organization that 
the Commission has exempted from registration as provided under the 
CEA. 17 CFR 23.151.
    \6\ For the definitions of SD and MSP, see section 1a of the CEA 
and Commission regulation 1.3. 7 U.S.C. 1a and 17 CFR 1.3.
    \7\ 7 U.S.C. 6s(e)(3)(A).
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    To this end, the Commission promulgated the CFTC Margin Rule in 
January 2016,\8\ establishing requirements for a CSE to collect and 
post initial margin \9\ and variation margin \10\ for uncleared swaps. 
These requirements vary based on the type of counterparty to such swaps 
and the location of the CSE and its counterparty.\11\ These 
requirements also generally apply only to uncleared swaps entered into 
on or after the compliance date applicable to a particular CSE and its 
counterparty (``covered swap'').\12\ An uncleared swap entered into 
prior to a CSE's applicable compliance date for a particular 
counterparty (``legacy swap'') is generally not subject to the margin 
requirements in the CFTC Margin Rule.\13\
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    \8\ Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 636 (Jan. 6, 2016). The CFTC Margin 
Rule, which became effective April 1, 2016, is codified in part 23 
of the Commission's regulations. 17 CFR 23.150 through 23.159, 
23.161. In May 2016, the Commission amended the CFTC Margin Rule to 
add Commission regulation 23.160, providing rules on its cross 
border application. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap 
Dealers and Major Swap Participants--Cross-Border Application of the 
Margin Requirements, 81 FR 34818 (May 31, 2016). 17 CFR 23.160.
    \9\ Initial margin, as defined in Commission regulation 23.151 
(17 CFR 23.151), is the collateral (calculated as provided by Sec.  
23.154 of the Commission's regulations) that is collected or posted 
in connection with one or more uncleared swaps. Initial margin is 
intended to secure potential future exposure following default of a 
counterparty (i.e., adverse changes in the value of an uncleared 
swap that may arise during the period of time when it is being 
closed out), while variation margin is provided from one 
counterparty to the other in consideration of changes that have 
occurred in the mark-to-market value of the uncleared swap. See CFTC 
Margin Rule, 81 FR at 664 and 683.
    \10\ Variation margin, as defined in Commission regulation 
23.151 (17 CFR 23.151), is the collateral provided by a party to its 
counterparty to meet the performance of its obligation under one or 
more uncleared swaps between the parties as a result of a change in 
the value of such obligations since the trade was executed or the 
last time such collateral was provided.
    \11\ See Commission regulations 23.152 and 23.153, 17 CFR 23.152 
and 23.153. For example, the CFTC Margin Rule does not require a CSE 
to collect margin from, or post margin to, a counterparty that is 
neither a swap entity nor a financial end user (each as defined in 
17 CFR 23.151). Pursuant to section 2(e) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 2(e), 
each counterparty to an uncleared swap must be an eligible contract 
participant (``ECP''), as defined in section 1a(18) of the CEA, 7 
U.S.C. 1a(18). See Commission regulation 23.160 on the cross-border 
application of the CFTC Margin Rule. 17 CFR 23.160.
    \12\ Pursuant to Commission regulation 23.161, compliance dates 
for the CFTC Margin Rule are staggered such that CSEs must come into 
compliance in a series of phases over four years. The first phase 
affected CSEs and their counterparties, each with the largest 
aggregate outstanding notional amounts of uncleared swaps and 
certain other financial products. These CSEs began complying with 
both the initial and variation margin requirements of the CFTC 
Margin Rule on September 1, 2016. The second phase began March 1, 
2017, and required CSEs to comply with the variation margin 
requirements of Commission regulation 23.153 with all relevant 
counterparties not covered in the first phase. See 17 CFR 23.161. On 
each September 1 thereafter ending with September 1, 2020, CSEs must 
comply with the initial margin requirements with counterparties with 
successively lesser outstanding notional amounts.
    \13\ See CFTC Margin Rule, 81 FR at 651 and Commission 
regulation 23.161. 17 CFR 23.161.
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    To the extent that more than one uncleared swap is executed between 
a CSE and its covered counterparty, the CFTC Margin Rule permits the 
netting of required margin amounts of each swap under certain 
circumstances.\14\ In particular, the CFTC Margin Rule, subject to 
certain limitations, permits a CSE to calculate initial margin and 
variation margin, respectively, on an aggregate net basis across 
uncleared swaps that are executed under the same eligible master 
netting agreement (``EMNA'').\15\ Moreover, the CFTC Margin Rule 
permits swap counterparties to identify one or more separate netting 
portfolios (i.e., a specified group of uncleared swaps the margin 
obligations of which will be netted only against each other) under the 
same EMNA, including having separate netting portfolios for covered 
swaps and legacy swaps.\16\ A netting portfolio that contains only 
legacy swaps is not subject to the initial and variation margin 
requirements set out in the CFTC Margin Rule.\17\ However, if a netting 
portfolio contains any covered swaps, the entire netting portfolio 
(including all legacy swaps) is subject to such requirements.\18\
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    \14\ See CFTC Margin Rule, 81 FR at 651 and Commission 
regulations 23.152(c) and 23.153(d). 17 CFR 23.152(c) and 23.153(d).
    \15\ Id. The term EMNA is defined in Commission regulation 
23.151. 17 CFR 23.151. Generally, an EMNA creates a single legal 
obligation for all individual transactions covered by the agreement 
upon an event of default following certain specified permitted 
stays. For example, an International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association form Master Agreement may be an EMNA, if it meets the 
specified requirements in the EMNA definition.
    \16\ See CFTC Margin Rule, 81 FR at 651 and Commission 
regulations 23.152(c)(2)(ii) and 23.153(d)(2)(ii). 17 CFR 
23.152(c)(2)(ii) and 23.153(d)(2)(ii).
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
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    A legacy swap may lose its legacy treatment under the CFTC Margin 
Rule, causing it to become a covered swap and causing any netting 
portfolio in which it is included to be subject to the requirements of 
the CFTC Margin Rule. For reasons discussed in the CFTC Margin Rule, 
the Commission elected not to extend the meaning of legacy swaps to 
include (1) legacy swaps that

[[Page 12067]]

are amended in a material or nonmaterial manner; (2) novations of 
legacy swaps; and (3) new swaps that result from portfolio compression 
of legacy swaps.\19\ Therefore, and as relevant here, a legacy swap 
that is amended after the applicable compliance date may become a 
covered swap subject to the initial and variation margin requirements 
in the CFTC Margin Rule. In that case, netting portfolios that were 
intended to contain only legacy swaps and, thus, not be subject to the 
CFTC Margin Rule may become so subject.
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    \19\ See CFTC Margin Rule, 81 FR at 675. The Commission notes 
that certain limited relief has been given from this standard. See 
Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants, 83 FR 60341 (Nov. 26, 2018) and CFTC Staff Letter 
No. 17-52 (Oct. 27. 2017), available at https://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/17-52.pdf.
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B. Brexit and Transfers of Uncleared Swaps

    The UK has provided formal notice of its intention to withdraw from 
the EU (``Brexit''). The withdrawal may occur as soon as April 12, 
2019.\20\ Financial entities, including CSEs in the UK,\21\ face 
uncertainty about the applicable regulatory framework they will operate 
within after such withdrawal, especially a UK exit from the EU absent a 
negotiated agreement (a ``Withdrawal Agreement'') on the specific terms 
of the UK's exit (a ``No-deal Brexit'').\22\ These firms have been 
mindful that one consequence of a No-deal Brexit would be an inability 
of the firms, if located in the UK, to continue providing investment 
services in the EU under the current passporting regime. As a result, 
they might not be in a position to perform certain operations in 
relation to swaps they presently have with EU clients. In order to 
address this situation, these firms could attempt to transfer their 
swaps to a related establishment in an EU Member State, which in turn 
would benefit from the passporting regime,\23\ or to another related 
entity outside of the EU.
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    \20\ See Special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) (21 
March 2019)--Conclusions, at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20004-2019-INIT/en/pdf (visited March 22, 2019).
    \21\ In many instances, these firms made a strategic decision 
decades ago to use a UK establishment as their base of operations to 
provide financial services to customers across the EU, consistent 
with the EU's system of cross-border authorizations to engage in 
regulated financial activities (known as ``passporting'').
    \22\ See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759019/25_November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf (visited February 21, 2019). The 
Commission notes that if a No-deal Brexit occurs, it will be as a 
result of political events beyond the control of the parties to the 
legacy swap and not driven by U.S. regulatory policy.
    \23\ In recent months, for example, some financial entities have 
initiated processes under which a UK court sanctions a bulk transfer 
of their business, including derivatives, from the balance sheets of 
their UK establishments to a different location established by the 
dealer in another EU Member State. See, e.g., Barclays Bank plc Part 
VII Business transfer to Barclays Bank Ireland plc (2019) EWHC 129 
(Ch), at https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2019/129.pdf 
(visited February 21, 2019); ``Two Banks Begin Moving Swaps out of 
London, Pre-Brexit,'' Risk.net (November 30, 2018), at https://www.risk.net/derivatives/6168671/banks-begin-moving-swaps-out-of-london-pre-brexit (visited February 21, 2019); ``UBS Wins Approval 
for [euro]32bn Brexit Swaps Transfer,'' Risk.net (February 6, 2019), 
at https://www.risk.net/derivatives/6367306/ubs-wins-approval-for-eu32bn-brexit-swaps-transfer (visited February 21, 2019).
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    Similarly, EU financial entities, including CSEs, may also be 
directly affected by a No-deal Brexit if, for example, they have 
entered into uncleared swaps with financial entities located in the UK. 
They might face UK counterparties that request to transfer their swaps 
to an affiliate or other related establishment as discussed above or 
might themselves desire to transfer such swaps (e.g., to a U.K entity) 
in response to a No-deal Brexit.
    In addition, financial entities, including CSEs, regardless of 
their location may also be affected by a No-deal Brexit and choose to 
engage in various reorganizations or consolidations of their swaps 
business in planning for or responding to such an event.\24\
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    \24\ As discussed later in this Supplementary Information, the 
Commission has designed this Interim Final Rule to recognize the 
need for flexibility on the part of financial entities as they 
attempt to work through the unanticipated effects of a No-deal 
Brexit. For example, this Interim Final Rule, subject to its 
requirements, is designed to allow CSEs who, as a result of a No-
deal Brexit, make a strategic decision to refrain from opening a new 
EU establishment post-withdrawal, to pull their UK uncleared swap 
portfolios to related entities outside of the EU, or to otherwise 
restructure their swaps business as they deem appropriate.
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    Each of the transfers and reorganizations described above would 
require the amendment of transferred swaps. As discussed above, to the 
extent that these swaps are legacy swaps and a CSE is either a 
remaining party or a transferee of such swaps, these amendments may 
cause the swaps to lose their legacy status, thereby converting them 
into covered swaps and causing them and any uncleared swaps in the same 
netting portfolio to become subject to the applicable margin 
requirements of the CFTC Margin Rule. If these requirements were to 
apply to such swaps following a No-Deal Brexit, the change in the 
status of the swaps could cause CSEs and other market participants to 
incur significant costs, potentially in a short period of time 
following a No-deal Brexit, due to the additional requirement to post 
variation and possibly initial margin. This could cause disruptions or 
have unanticipated negative consequences for affected market 
participants and swap markets that could, for example, create cash flow 
or liquidity concerns for some swap counterparties.

II. Interim Final Rule

    The Commission is issuing this interim final rule (this ``Interim 
Final Rule'') in order to maintain the status quo for legacy swaps with 
respect to the CFTC Margin Rule to the extent any amendments thereto 
are made solely to transfer such swaps in response to a No-deal Brexit, 
as discussed above, and otherwise pursuant to the requirements of this 
Interim Final Rule.\25\ Specifically, this Interim Final Rule amends 
Commission regulation 23.161 \26\ to provide that in a No-Deal Brexit, 
subject to certain conditions,\27\ a legacy swap may be transferred and 
amended without revising the date (``swap date'') used for purposes of 
determining whether such uncleared swap was entered into prior to the 
applicable compliance date under the CFTC Margin Rule. By preserving 
the swap date and limiting the transferees of each party to its margin 
affiliate,\28\ or a

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branch or other authorized form of establishment \29\ of the party (an 
``Eligible Transferee''), the Interim Final Rule allows an uncleared 
swap to retain its legacy status under the CFTC Margin Rule or 
Prudential Margin Rule when transferred.\30\
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    \25\ The Commission notes that the Prudential Regulators and the 
European Supervisory Authorities (``ESAs'') have provided or 
proposed similar relief for certain swaps subject to their 
respective margin requirements. See Margin and Capital Requirements 
for Covered Swap Entities, 84 FR 9940 (Mar. 19, 2019) and ESAs 
Propose to Amend Bilateral Margin Requirements to Assist Brexit 
Preparations for OTC Derivative Contracts (November 29, 2018), at 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esas-propose-amend-bilateral-margin-requirements-assist-brexit-preparations-otc 
(visited February 21, 2019). In addition, certain EU Member states 
are providing related relief. See British Banks Are Getting a Last-
Minute Break From the EU (February 20, 2018), at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-20/brexit-fears-drive-eu-nations-to-seek-reprieve-for-london-banks (visited February 21, 
2019).
    \26\ 17 CFR 23.161.
    \27\ See 17 CFR 23.161(d)(2).
    \28\ As defined in Commission regulation 23.151 (17 CFR 23.151), 
a company is a margin affiliate of another company if: (1) Either 
company consolidates the other on a financial statement prepared in 
accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, or other similar 
standards, (2) Both companies are consolidated with a third company 
on a financial statement prepared in accordance with such principles 
or standards, or (3) For a company that is not subject to such 
principles or standards, if consolidation as described in paragraph 
(1) or (2) of this definition would have occurred if such principles 
or standards had applied.
    Under Commission regulation 23.161, 17 CFR 23.161, a margin 
affiliate's relevant swaps are included in determining the 
applicable compliance date for the CSE and counterparty under 
Commission regulation 23.161, 17 CFR 23.161, and thus the compliance 
date of a CSE and its margin affiliates facing the same counterparty 
(or its margin affiliates) should generally be the same.
    \29\ The text of this Interim Final Rule is intended to be 
flexible as to the nature of the legal establishment of the 
financial entity to which a legacy swap is transferred so long as 
that financial entity is the party or a margin affiliate of that 
party to the swap. See Sec.  23.161(d)(2)(ii). The Commission's 
references to an establishment of a financial entity is intended to 
be flexible as to whether the relationship of the financial entity 
to the business unit is due to an affiliation between separately-
incorporated entities, branching of a single business entity in 
different jurisdictions, or some other form of business 
establishment through which an arm of the financial entity may be 
legally authorized to conduct business in that location. A financial 
entity may, for example, use its establishment in the EU to take on 
uncleared swap portfolios from its swap dealing affiliate in the UK. 
In a different case, the financial entity's establishments in the EU 
and the UK may both be branches of the same financial entity. 
Alternatively, there may be yet a different relationship due to the 
structure of the specific financial entity involved. On the other 
hand, the financial entity may not move its operations in any way, 
but it may have existing portfolios of uncleared swaps facing 
counterparties who are themselves relocating out of or into the UK, 
to an affiliate, or a branch, or some other type of form of 
establishment of the party outside of or in the UK.
    \30\ The Commission notes that to the extent that the parties to 
a transferred legacy swap are subject to the Prudential Margin Rule 
in addition to the CFTC Margin Rule, the legacy swap may become 
subject to the margin requirements of the Prudential Margin Rule 
notwithstanding this Interim Final Rule.
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    To be effective, the Commission believes this Interim Final Rule 
must cover all the different scenarios that would trigger the need for 
a CSE or its counterparty to participate in amending an uncleared swap 
in order to ``relocate'' the swap in preparation for or in response to 
a No-deal Brexit. However, to benefit from the treatment of this 
amendment, the financial entity must arrange to make the amendments to 
the uncleared swap solely for the purpose of transferring the uncleared 
swap to an Eligible Transferee once the UK has withdrawn from the EU, 
as further discussed herein.\31\ This purpose test also contains a 
requirement that the transfer be made in connection with the entity's 
planning for the possibility of a No-deal Brexit, or the entity's 
response to such event.\32\
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    \31\ See Sec.  23.161(d)(2)(ii).
    \32\ Id.
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    For compliance purposes, this Interim Final Rule makes one 
distinction between a transfer initiated by the financial entity 
standing as the CSE at the completion of the transaction, versus a 
transfer initiated by the CSE's counterparty. For the latter, the 
transferor must make a representation to the CSE that the transferee is 
an Eligible Transferee, and the transfer was made solely in connection 
with the transferor's planning for or response to a No-deal Brexit.\33\
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    \33\ See Sec.  23.161(d)(2)(ii)(B).
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    The Interim Final Rule is designed to permit only such amendments 
as financial entities find necessary to relocate uncleared swap 
portfolios under the purpose test. These changes may be carried out 
using any of the methods typically employed for effecting uncleared 
swap transfers, including industry protocols, contractual amendments, 
or contractual tear-up and replacement. To the extent they would 
otherwise trigger margin requirements, judicially-supervised changes 
that result in an uncleared swap being booked at or held by a related 
establishment, including by means of the court-sanctioned process 
available under Part VII of the UK's Financial Services and Markets Act 
of 2000, are similarly within the scope of this Interim Final Rule.
    However, the Commission does not believe the relief being provided 
for relocation purposes should be expansively applied to encompass 
economic changes to a legacy swap. Accordingly, the benefits of this 
Interim Final Rule are unavailable if the amendments to an uncleared 
swap modify the payment amount calculation methods, the maturity date, 
or the notional amount of the uncleared swap.\34\ Thus, for example, if 
the day count convention of an uncleared swap changes as a consequence 
of re-locating a uncleared interest rate swap several time zones away 
from the UK, the parties to the swap would not be changing the payment 
amount calculation methods. On the other hand, a change to one of the 
payment amount calculation economic factors (e.g., an interest rate 
margin or base rate) would be a change outside the scope of this 
Interim Final Rule and could trigger application of the CFTC's margin 
requirements.
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    \34\ See 17 CFR 23.161(d)(2)(iii). The Commission does not 
intend that this Interim Final Rule provide an opportunity for 
parties to renegotiate the economic terms of their legacy swaps, but 
rather is providing the Interim Final Rule solely to allow a party 
to a legacy swap to transfer the swap to an Eligible Transferee in 
connection with the transferor's planning for the possibility of a 
No-deal Brexit, or its response to such event. See Sec.  
23.161(d)(2)(ii). If any amendment to a legacy swap does not meet 
this purpose test in the Interim Final Rule, the legacy swap would 
not be eligible for the relief provided by it.
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    The Commission also seeks to establish a reasonable period of time 
for the necessary work to achieve the transfers to be performed. The 
Interim Final Rule permits transfers for a period of one year after a 
UK withdrawal.\35\ The 1-year period commences at the point at which 
the law of the EU ceases to apply in the UK pursuant to Article 50(3) 
of the Treaty on European Union, without conclusion of a Withdrawal 
Agreement between the UK and EU pursuant to Article 50(2).\36\ If the 
present withdrawal date is extended, and withdrawal later occurs at the 
end of that extension without a Withdrawal Agreement, this Interim 
Final Rule's 1-year period would begin at that time.\37\ The Commission 
contemplates that, if the withdrawal date is extended, financial 
entities may negotiate and document their desired transfers during the 
intervening period, under terms that delay consummation of any transfer 
until withdrawal takes place without an agreement and this Interim 
Final Rule's substantive provisions are thereby triggered.
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    \35\ See Sec.  23.161(d)(2)(iv) and (v).
    \36\ See Sec.  23.161(d)(2)(iv). For an overview of the process 
by which an EU Member State may withdraw from the EU, see the 
European Parliament Briefing, Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member 
State from the EU (February 2016), available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf (visited February 21, 2019).
    \37\ Id.
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    The Commission believes that this Interim Final Rule would be most 
effective if the timeframe allowed takes into account the timeframe 
under corresponding EU legislation. The ESAs have submitted novation 
amendments for their margin rules in proposed form to the European 
Commission, but the relief that would be afforded thereby has not yet 
been finalized under the EU process.\38\ The ESAs' draft Regulatory 
Technical Standards provides relief for one year after the amendments 
are finalized by official publication, after parliamentary approval. If 
the EU amendments are not yet finalized at the time of a UK withdrawal, 
affected financial entities may delay consummation of their uncleared 
swap transfers until the ESA's proposed amendments apply. The 
Commission anticipates some transferring financial entities will 
operate under both sets of

[[Page 12069]]

regulations and will accordingly seek to coordinate their transfer 
operations for compliance purposes under both sets of amendments. To 
facilitate this, this Interim Final Rule has a ``tacking'' provision 
that will extend the provided 1-year period by the amount of any 
additional time available under the ESAs' 1-year period.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See Final Report on EMIR RTS on the novation of bilateral 
contracts not subject to bilateral margins, ESAs 2018 25 (November 
27, 2018), at https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/ESAs%202018%2025%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Bilateral%20margining%20%28novation%29.pdf (visited February 21, 
2019).
    \39\ See Sec.  23.161(d)(2)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Public Participation

    The Commission is issuing this Interim Final Rule to revise 
Commission regulation 23.161 to address certain concerns relating to a 
No-deal Brexit, as discussed above. This approach enables these 
regulatory changes to take effect sooner than would be possible with 
the publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking in advance. 
Nonetheless, the Commission welcomes public comments from interested 
persons regarding any aspect of the changes made by this Interim Final 
Rule as well as on the following specific questions.
    (1) This Interim Final Rule permits certain amendments to uncleared 
swaps without changing their swap date in order to facilitate the 
transfer of uncleared swaps in response to a No-deal Brexit. As 
explained above, the Commission seeks to encompass changes through a 
variety of methods, including industry protocols, contractual 
amendments, transfers permitted by judicial proceedings, and 
contractual tear-up and replacement. What, if any, additional 
clarification in the rule as to types of permissible amendments should 
the Commission provide? What specifically should be added or clarified, 
and why is it necessary in order to achieve the Commission's policy 
objectives in the context of a No-deal Brexit?
    (2) This Interim Final Rule only accommodates transfers to an 
Eligible Transferee. The Commission does not intend the relief provided 
by this Interim Final Rule to provide an opportunity for financial 
entities to seek out a new dealer relationship and retain legacy swap 
treatment. However, the Commission requests comment on whether there 
may be financial entities that are unable to arrange a transfer of 
legacy swaps unless the transfer is to an entity that is not an 
Eligible Transferee and are thus not covered under the terms of this 
Interim Final Rule. Commenters should provide descriptions of the 
factual circumstances, including the frequency of its occurrence.
    (3) This Interim Final Rule is intended to limit relief to only 
those amendments to legacy swaps that satisfy the purpose test in this 
Interim Final Rule (i.e., that are made to transfer them to an Eligible 
Transferee in connection with the transferor's planning for the 
possibility of a No-deal Brexit, or its response to such event). Should 
any of the conditions be modified or should other conditions be 
included to achieve this limitation?
    All comments must be submitted in English, or if not, accompanied 
by an English translation. Please refer to the ADDRESSES section above. 
Except as described herein regarding confidential business information, 
all comments are considered part of the public record and will be 
posted as received to https://comments.cftc.gov for public inspection. 
The information made available online includes personal identifying 
information (such as name and address) which is voluntarily submitted 
by the commenter. You should submit only information that you wish to 
make available publicly.
    If you want to submit material that you consider to be confidential 
business information as part of your comment, but do not want it to be 
posted online, you must submit your comment by mail or hand delivery/
courier and include a petition for confidential treatment as described 
in Sec.  145.9 of the Commission's regulations.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 17 CFR 145.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission reserves the right, but shall have no obligation, to 
review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse or remove any or all of your 
submission from https://comments.cftc.gov that it may deem to be 
inappropriate for publication, such as obscene language. All 
submissions that have been redacted or removed that contain comments on 
the merits of the rulemaking will be retained in the rulemaking record 
and will be considered as required under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (``APA'') \41\ and other applicable laws, and may be accessible 
under the Freedom of Information Act.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ 5 U.S.C. 553 et seq.
    \42\ 5 U.S.C. 552.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Related Matters

A. Administrative Procedure Act

    The APA generally requires federal agencies to publish a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and provide an opportunity for public comment 
before issuing a new rule.\43\ However, an agency may issue a new rule 
without a pre-publication public comment period when it for ``good 
cause'' finds that prior notice and comment is ``impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' \44\ The Commission 
has determined that there is good cause to find that a pre-publication 
comment period is impracticable and contrary to the public interest 
here. The UK's exit may occur on April 12, 2019, or soon thereafter, 
and the Interim Final Rule addresses a potential impact of a No-deal 
Brexit. The Interim Final Rule facilitates the ability of financial 
entities with uncleared swaps to relocate existing swap portfolios over 
to an Eligible Transferee, without causing the swap dates of legacy 
swaps in their portfolios to change. As such, this Interim Final Rule 
benefits financial entities by removing an impediment to the transfer, 
and allowing them to maintain the status quo, of certain of their 
legacy swaps. The Interim Final Rule does not impose any requirements 
or mandatory burden on any financial entity, including CSEs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b).
    \44\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the public interest is best served by 
making this Interim Final Rule effective as soon as possible as a 
result of the potential timing of events in the UK. The Commission 
believes that issuing this Interim Final Rule will provide the 
certainty necessary to facilitate the industry's efforts to begin 
arranging their transfers immediately upon a No-deal Brexit. In 
addition, the Commission believes that providing a notice and comment 
period prior to issuance of this Interim Final Rule is impracticable 
given the potential need for relief to begin on April 12, 2019. For 
these reasons, the Commission's implementation of this rule as an 
Interim Final Rule, with provision for post-promulgation public 
comment, is in accordance with section 553(b) of the APA.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B); 553(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, for the same reasons set forth above under the 
discussion of section 553(b)(B) of the APA, the Commission, for good 
cause, finds that no transitional period, after publication in the 
Federal Register, is necessary before the amendment to Sec.  23.161 
made by this Interim Final Rule becomes effective. Accordingly, this 
Interim Final Rule shall be effective immediately upon publication in 
the Federal Register.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act \46\ requires federal agencies to 
consider whether the rules they propose will have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities

[[Page 12070]]

and, if so, to provide a regulatory flexibility analysis regarding the 
economic impact on those entities. Because, as discussed above, the 
Commission is not required to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking 
for this rule, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \47\ See 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \48\ imposes certain 
requirements on Federal agencies, including the Commission, in 
connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of 
information, as defined by the PRA. The Commission may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of 
information unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management 
and Budget (``OMB'') control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that this Interim Final Rule does not 
affect the current recordkeeping or information collection requirements 
in a significant manner. However, by requiring that in certain 
transfers of legacy swaps the transferor makes certain representations 
to a CSE that is a party to the swap, this Interim Final Rule modifies 
a collection of information for which the Commission has previously 
received a control number from OMB. The title for this collection of 
information is ``Confirmation, Portfolio Reconciliation, Portfolio 
Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship Documentation Requirements 
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, OMB control number 3038-
0088,'' \49\ which is currently in force with its control number having 
been provided by OMB. Collection 3038-0088 already includes 
requirements for creating and maintaining swap trading relationship 
documentation, and this Interim Final Rule would require only that an 
additional standard representation be added to that documentation if 
amendments are entered into, and the Commission estimates that the 
burden change required by this Interim Final Rule is de minimis. 
Nevertheless, the Commission will, by separate action, publish in the 
Federal Register a notice and request for comment on the amended PRA 
burden associated with the Interim Final Rule, and submit to OMB an 
information collection request to amend the information collection, in 
accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(c) and 5 CFR 1320.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See OMB Control No. 3038-0088, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAOMBHistory?ombControlNumber=3038-0055# (last visited 
June 12, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Cost-Benefit Considerations

    Section 15(a) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the 
costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a regulation 
under the CEA. Section 15(a) further specifies that the costs and 
benefits shall be evaluated in light of the following five broad areas 
of market and public concern: (1) Protection of market participants and 
the public; (2) efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of 
futures markets; (3) price discovery; (4) sound risk management 
practices; and (5) other public interest considerations. The Commission 
considers the costs and benefits resulting from its discretionary 
determinations with respect to the section 15(a) considerations.
    This Interim Final Rule provides that an amendment to transfer a 
legacy swap, subject to certain limitations, and solely in planning for 
or responding to a No-deal Brexit will not cause its swap date to 
change.\50\ The purpose of this Interim Final Rule is to allow market 
participants to maintain the status quo of their legacy swaps with 
respect to the CFTC Margin Rule or Prudential Margin Rule when so 
transferred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The Commission notes that in a Brexit with a Withdrawal 
Agreement or where there is no Brexit this Interim Final Rule does 
not provide any relief. In these cases, there are no costs and 
benefits other than the costs of requiring parties to read and 
understand this Interim Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The baseline against which the benefits and costs associated with 
this Interim Final Rule is compared is the uncleared swaps markets as 
they exist today.\51\ With this as the baseline for this Interim Final 
Rule, the following are the benefits and costs of this Interim Final 
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ The Commission notes that the consideration of costs and 
benefits below is based on the understanding that the markets 
function internationally, with many transactions involving United 
States firms taking place across international boundaries; with some 
Commission registrants being organized outside of the United States; 
with leading industry members typically conducting operations both 
within and outside the United States; and with industry members 
commonly following substantially similar business practices wherever 
located. Where the Commission does not specifically refer to matters 
of location, the below discussion of costs and benefits refers to 
the effects of this Interim Final Rule on all activity subject to 
it, whether by virtue of the activity's physical location in the 
United States or by virtue of the activity's connection with or 
effect on United States commerce under CEA section 2(i). In 
particular, the Commission notes that some persons affected by this 
rulemaking are located outside of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Benefits
    As described above, this Interim Final Rule allows legacy swaps to 
maintain their swap date, notwithstanding that they are transferred and 
amended as provided in the rule text to this release in connection with 
a No-deal Brexit, so that they can maintain their legacy status with 
respect to the CFTC Margin Rule or Prudential Margin Rule, as 
applicable. This Interim Final Rule provides certainty to CSEs and 
their counterparties about the treatment of certain of their legacy 
swaps and any applicable netting arrangements in light of amendments to 
legacy swaps that may be made in connection with their transfer in a 
No-deal Brexit. In addition, the Interim Final Rule can be expected to 
benefit the parties to the affected legacy swaps by allowing them to 
maintain the existing margin status for the legacy swaps. Without this 
Interim Final Rule, the imposition of margin requirements on these 
legacy swaps and swaps in the same netting portfolio could have 
negative consequences for some of the affected parties, which could 
include, for example, changing the cash flow and liquidity 
characteristics of those parties.
2. Costs
    Because this Interim Final Rule does not require market 
participants to take any action, the Commission believes that this 
Interim Final Rule will not impose any additional required costs on 
market participants. Nevertheless, some market participants that elect 
to rely on this Interim Final Rule may incur legal costs to include the 
representations required by it in their transfer documentation.
3. Section 15(a) Considerations
    In light of the foregoing, the CFTC has evaluated the costs and 
benefits of this Interim Final Rule pursuant to the five considerations 
identified in section 15(a) of the CEA as follows:
(a) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    As noted above, this Interim Final Rule will allow market 
participants, subject to certain limitations, to transfer their legacy 
swaps in connection with a No-deal Brexit without being disadvantaged 
under the CFTC Margin Rule. As such, this Interim Final Rule should 
give affected market participants more flexibility in negotiating the 
transfer of their legacy swaps but it is unclear whether or not 
participants who might use this Interim Final Rule are better protected 
by facing the new counterparty or not relative to their current 
counterparty. If this Interim Final Rule were not adopted and some of 
these legacy swaps and swaps in the same netting portfolio became 
subject to

[[Page 12071]]

the CFTC Margin Rule's margin requirements and, thus, required more 
collateral to be posted by counterparties, there would be a reduction 
in counterparty credit risk in the financial system overall. However, 
as noted above, the imposition of such margin requirements on these 
swaps could negatively impact the cash flow and liquidity 
characteristics of those parties.
(b) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of Markets
    Absent this Interim Final Rule, market participants that transfer 
their legacy swaps in a No-deal Brexit may thereafter be required to 
comply with the applicable margin requirements of the CFTC Margin Rule 
for such swaps, and may be placed at a competitive disadvantage as 
compared to those market participants that do not transfer their legacy 
swaps in a No-deal Brexit. Therefore, this Interim Final Rule may 
increase the competitiveness of the uncleared swaps markets. In 
addition, providing the relief may increase efficiency by reducing the 
impact of a No-deal Brexit by allowing the parties to undertake swap 
transfers without having to establish new margining arrangements that 
were not contemplated for the legacy swaps.
(c) Price Discovery
    The Commission has not identified an impact on price discovery as a 
result of this Interim Final Rule. To the extent that a transfer of a 
legacy swap in accordance with the conditions of this Interim Final 
Rule triggers a real-time public reporting obligation of pricing 
information under part 43 of the Commission's rules,\52\ such rules 
require that transfers of swaps carry a notation so that the public 
will be aware that the swap is not a new swap and can consider the 
reported pricing information of such swap accordingly.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See paragraph 1(ii) of the definition of ``publicly 
reportable swap transaction'' in Sec.  43.2, 17 CFR 43.2.
    \53\ See Table A1 to Appendix A to Part 43. The data field in 
such table labeled ``Price-forming continuation data'' requires an 
indication of whether a publicly reportable swap transaction is a 
post-execution event that affects the price of such transaction, 
including whether the event was a transfer or novation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(d) Sound Risk Management
    The Commission has not identified a significant impact on sound 
risk management as a result of this Interim Final Rule. The Commission 
notes that without this Interim Final Rule, some market participants 
may have to pay and collect margin on certain legacy swaps, which may 
lower the overall credit risk in the financial system. However, as 
discussed above, these are legacy swaps that were not intended to be 
covered by the CFTC Margin Rule and, but for a No-deal Brexit, would 
not be amended pursuant to the terms of the Interim Final Rule. 
Further, the Commission notes that a market participant might be facing 
a counterparty with better or worse credit standing as a result of the 
transfers. Inasmuch as there is no collateral required to be posted as 
collateral in these transactions to mitigate credit risk, there may be 
a change in the credit risk for some of these legacy swaps when the 
counterparties change.
(e) Other Public Interest Considerations
    The Commission has not identified an impact on other public 
interest considerations as a result of this Interim Final Rule.
4. Request for Comments on Cost-Benefit Considerations
    The Commission invites public comment on its cost-benefit 
considerations, including the section 15(a) factors described herein. 
Commenters are also invited to submit any data or other information 
that they may have quantifying or qualifying the costs and benefits of 
the proposed amendments with their comment letters.

D. Antitrust Laws

    Section 15(b) of the CEA requires the Commission to take into 
consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws 
and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achieving the 
purposes of the CEA, in issuing any order or adopting any Commission 
rule or regulation (including any exemption under section 4(c) or 4c(b) 
of the CEA), or in requiring or approving any bylaw, rule, or 
regulation of a contract market or registered futures association 
established pursuant to section 17 of the CEA.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ 7 U.S.C. 19(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the public interest to be protected by 
the antitrust laws is generally to protect competition. The Commission 
requests comment on whether this Interim Final Rule implicates any 
other specific public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws.
    The Commission has considered this Interim Final Rule to determine 
whether it is anticompetitive and has preliminarily identified no 
anticompetitive effects. The Commission requests comment on whether 
this Interim Final Rule is anticompetitive and, if it is, what the 
anticompetitive effects are.
    Because the Commission has preliminarily determined that this 
Interim Final Rule is not anticompetitive and has no anticompetitive 
effects, the Commission has not identified any less anticompetitive 
means of achieving the purposes of the CEA. The Commission requests 
comment on whether there are less anticompetitive means of achieving 
the relevant purposes of the CEA that would otherwise be served by 
adopting this Interim Final Rule.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 23

    Capital and margin requirements, Major swap participants, Swap 
dealers, Swaps.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR chapter I as follows:

PART 23--SWAP DEALERS AND MAJOR SWAP PARTICIPANTS

0
1. The authority citation for part 23 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6b, 6b-1,6c, 6p, 6r, 6s, 6t, 
9, 9a, 12, 12a, 13b, 13c, 16a, 18, 19, 21.

    Section 23.160 also issued under 7 U.S.C. 2(i); Sec. 721(b), 
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1641 (2010).

0
2. In Sec.  23.161, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  23.161   Compliance dates.

* * * * *
    (d) For purposes of determining whether an uncleared swap was 
entered into prior to the applicable compliance date under this 
section, a covered swap entity may disregard:
    (1) Amendments to the uncleared swap that were entered into solely 
to comply with the requirements of 12 CFR part 47; 12 CFR part 252, 
subpart I; or 12 CFR part 382, as applicable; or
    (2) Amendments to the uncleared swap that were entered into in 
compliance with each of the following conditions:
    (i) The law of the European Union ceases to apply to the United 
Kingdom pursuant to Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union, 
without conclusion of a withdrawal agreement between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union pursuant to Article 50(2) thereof; and
    (ii) Solely in connection with a party to the swap's planning for 
or response to the event described in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this 
section, one or both parties to the swap transfers the swap to its 
margin affiliate, or a branch or other

[[Page 12072]]

authorized form of establishment of the transferor, and the parties 
make no other transfers of the swap; and
    (A) A covered swap entity is a transferee from a party to the swap; 
or
    (B) A covered swap entity is a remaining party to the swap, and the 
transferor represents to the covered swap entity that the transferee is 
a margin affiliate, or a branch or other authorized form of 
establishment of the transferor, and the transfer was made solely in 
connection with the transferor's planning for or response to the event 
described in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section; and
    (iii) The amendments do not modify any of the following: the 
payment amount calculation methods, the maturity date, or the notional 
amount of the swap; and
    (iv) The amendments take effect no earlier than the date of the 
event described in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section transpires; and
    (v) The amendments take effect no later than:
    (A) The date that is one year after the date of the event described 
in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section; or
    (B) Such other date permitted by transitional provisions under 
Article 35 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2016/2251, as 
amended.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 26, 2019, by the Commission.
Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.

    Note:  The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendices to Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers 
and Major Swap Participants--Commission Voting Summary, Chairman's 
Statement, and Commissioners' Statements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Giancarlo and Commissioners Quintenz, 
Behnam, Stump, and Berkovitz voted in the affirmative. No 
Commissioner voted in the negative.

Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo

    As we well know at the CFTC, trading markets crave certainty. 
Thus, market regulators have a responsibility to avoid creating 
market apprehension and doubt, whenever possible.
    At a time of heightened market uncertainty caused by Brexit, 
this Commission has worked over the past several weeks to bring 
clarity to participants in global derivatives markets by a series of 
separate actions and statements with its regulatory counterparts in 
London, Brussels and Singapore.
    Four weeks ago, the Commission and the Bank of England, 
including the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial 
Conduct Authority, issued a statement regarding derivatives trading 
and clearing activities between the United Kingdom and the United 
States after the UK's withdrawal from the European Union.
    The statement assured market participants of the continuity of 
derivatives trading and clearing activities between the UK and U.S., 
after the UK's withdrawal from the EU.
    Today the Commission takes another important step to bring 
certainty to the global derivatives markets.
    Consistent with actions already taken by U.S. prudential 
regulators, we are providing regulatory certainty regarding the 
transfer of uncleared legacy swaps to facilitate global swaps market 
participants' needs in the event that the UK withdraws from the EU 
without a negotiated withdrawal agreement.
    Soon the Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority intend 
to sign two memoranda of understanding related to the UK's 
withdrawal from the EU.
    The two signed MOUs will update existing MOUs originally signed 
in 2016 and 2013 to provide for continued supervisory cooperation 
with respect to certain firms in the derivatives and the alternative 
investment fund industry.
    The signing of these supervisory MOUs with the FCA will ensure 
continuity in effective cross-border oversight of derivatives 
markets and participants.
    These measures will help support financial stability and the 
sound functioning of financial markets. They also will give 
confidence to market participants about their ability to trade and 
manage risk through these markets.
    I compliment the DSIO staff for putting together this interim 
final rule and request for comment.
    I commend them for their many hours of hard work, the quality of 
the results and their thoughtfulness and engagement throughout.
    I also am grateful to my fellow Commissioners for their 
commitment and engagement in these critical actions.

Appendix 3--Statement of Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz

    I support today's interim final rule providing relief from the 
Commission's uncleared margin requirements \1\ for legacy swaps 
transferred to counterparties outside of the UK, in the case of a 
British exit from the European Union in the absence of a withdrawal 
agreement (``No-deal Brexit'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Commission regulations 23.150 through 23.161 (17 CFR 23.150 
through 23.161).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I believe the rule will provide necessary legal certainty to 
market participants as they consider how they will respond to the 
possibility of a No-deal Brexit. I believe it is correct for the 
rule to exempt a legacy swap from the Commission's uncleared margin 
requirements if the swap is amended due to a No-deal Brexit. When 
the Commission issued margin regulations for uncleared swaps in 
2016, the Commission adopted a compliance timetable such that swaps 
entered into prior to a particular compliance date would not be 
subject to the new margin requirements.\2\ An event such as a No-
deal Brexit, one that is outside of counterparties' control, should 
not cause counterparties to bear the costs and operational 
challenges of margining a swap that the Commission had previously 
exempted. I note that last year, the Commission similarly granted 
relief to a legacy swap that is amended to comply with the 
``Qualified Financial Contracts'' rules issued by the U.S. 
prudential regulators in 2017.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 636, 674-677 (Jan. 6, 2016) (new 
regulation 23.161).
    \3\ Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 83 FR 60341, 60344 (Nov. 26, 2018) (new 
regulation 23.161(d)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I would like to thank the CFTC staff for having coordinated with 
the U.S. prudential regulators on this matter to ensure that their 
interim final rule \4\ and ours are consistent. I look forward to 
supporting any future efforts by the CFTC to assist derivatives 
market participants address complications arising from Brexit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Farm Credit 
Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, March 15, 
2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20190315a.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix 4--Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz

    I am voting in favor of the Interim Final Rule (``IFR''), which 
provides relief from certain margin requirements for certain legacy 
swap transfers in case of a ``No-deal Brexit.''
    Although we do not yet know the date of the United Kingdom's 
withdrawal from the European Union (``EU''), the form it will take, 
or whether it will even take place, market participants worldwide 
are preparing for Brexit. The Commission is committed to working 
with our domestic and international partners to facilitate 
regulatory continuity and provide stability to the derivatives 
markets if and when Brexit occurs. Today's action is a continuation 
of that effort.
    I commend the Chairman and Commission staff for their efforts to 
address these and other Brexit-related cross-border issues. I note 
in particular that these actions are all taken pursuant to, and are 
consistent with, the existing regulations and guidance in place at 
the CFTC governing cross-border activities.
    The IFR will maintain the legacy status of swaps that were 
executed prior to the relevant compliance dates for the CFTC swap 
margin rule if those swaps are legally transferred solely as a 
result of a No-deal Brexit. The transfer of these swaps to 
affiliates outside the United Kingdom would be needed so that the 
swaps can continue to be properly serviced under EU law.
    A No-deal Brexit would be the result of political events beyond 
the control or anticipation of the parties at the time they first 
entered into the legacy swaps in question. Under these 
circumstances, if the

[[Page 12073]]

CFTC's margin rules were applied, the transfer of these legacy swaps 
could entail significant expenses, which could impede such 
transfers. The failure to effectively and efficiently accomplish 
these transfers could introduce new systemic risks globally.
    The IFR release makes clear that legacy swap transfers get 
relief solely if they are undertaken in connection with a No-deal 
Brexit. The release also makes clear that the IFR does not create an 
opportunity for the parties to renegotiate the economic terms of 
legacy swaps. Swaps that are amended or renegotiated, other than to 
the extent permitted by the IFR, would still be subject to the CFTC 
margin rules. These limitations are important as they prevent abuse 
of the flexibility provided by the IFR.

[FR Doc. 2019-06103 Filed 3-29-19; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6351-01-P