21st Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the ONC Health IT Certification Program, 7424-7610 [2019-02224]
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 42 / Monday, March 4, 2019 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Office of the Secretary
45 CFR Parts 170 and 171
RIN 0955–AA01
21st Century Cures Act:
Interoperability, Information Blocking,
and the ONC Health IT Certification
Program
Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology (ONC), Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
This proposed rule would
implement certain provisions of the 21st
Century Cures Act, including conditions
and maintenance of certification
requirements for health information
technology (health IT) developers under
the ONC Health IT Certification Program
(Program), the voluntary certification of
health IT for use by pediatric health care
providers, and reasonable and necessary
activities that do not constitute
information blocking. The
implementation of these provisions
would advance interoperability and
support the access, exchange, and use of
electronic health information. The
proposed rule would also modify the
2015 Edition health IT certification
criteria and Program in additional ways
to advance interoperability, enhance
health IT certification, and reduce
burden and costs.
DATES: To be assured consideration,
written or electronic comments must be
received at one of the addresses
provided below, no later than 5 p.m. on
May 3, 2019.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by RIN 0955–AA01, by any of
the following methods (please do not
submit duplicate comments). Because of
staff and resource limitations, we cannot
accept comments by facsimile (FAX)
transmission.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Follow
the instructions for submitting
comments. Attachments should be in
Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, or
Adobe PDF; however, we prefer
Microsoft Word. https://
www.regulations.gov.
• Regular, Express, or Overnight Mail:
Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology, Attention: 21st Century
Cures Act: Interoperability, Information
Blocking, and the ONC Health IT
Certification Program Proposed Rule,
SUMMARY:
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Mary E. Switzer Building, Mail Stop:
7033A, 330 C Street SW, Washington,
DC 20201. Please submit one original
and two copies.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Office of
the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, Attention: 21st
Century Cures Act: Interoperability,
Information Blocking, and the ONC
Health IT Certification Program
Proposed Rule, Mary E. Switzer
Building, Mail Stop: 7033A, 330 C
Street SW, Washington, DC 20201.
Please submit one original and two
copies. (Because access to the interior of
the Mary E. Switzer Building is not
readily available to persons without
federal government identification,
commenters are encouraged to leave
their comments in the mail drop slots
located in the main lobby of the
building.)
Enhancing the Public Comment
Experience: To facilitate public
comment on this proposed rule, a copy
will be made available in Microsoft
Word format on ONC’s website (https://
www.healthit.gov). We believe this
version will make it easier for
commenters to access and copy portions
of the proposed rule for use in their
individual comments. Additionally, a
separate document (‘‘public comment
template’’) will also be made available
on ONC’s website (https://
www.healthit.gov) for the public to use
in providing comments on the proposed
rule. This document is meant to provide
the public with a simple and organized
way to submit comments on proposals
and respond to specific questions posed
in the preamble of the proposed rule.
While use of this document is entirely
voluntary, we encourage commenters to
consider using the document in lieu of
unstructured comments, or to use it as
an addendum to narrative cover pages.
We believe that use of the document
may facilitate our review and
understanding of the comments
received. The public comment template
will be available shortly after the
proposed rule publishes in the Federal
Register. This short delay will permit
the appropriate citation in the public
comment template to pages of the
published version of the proposed rule.
Inspection of Public Comments: All
comments received before the close of
the comment period will be available for
public inspection, including any
personally identifiable or confidential
business information that is included in
a comment. Please do not include
anything in your comment submission
that you do not wish to share with the
general public. Such information
includes, but is not limited to: A
person’s social security number; date of
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birth; driver’s license number; state
identification number or foreign country
equivalent; passport number; financial
account number; credit or debit card
number; any personal health
information; or any business
information that could be considered
proprietary. We will post all comments
that are received before the close of the
comment period at https://
www.regulations.gov.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov or the Department
of Health and Human Services, Office of
the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, Mary E.
Switzer Building, Mail Stop: 7033A, 330
C Street SW, Washington, DC 20201
(call ahead to the contact listed below
to arrange for inspection).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Lipinski, Office of Policy,
Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology, 202–
690–7151.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of Regulatory Action
B. Summary of Major Provisions and
Clarifications
1. Deregulatory Actions for Previous
Rulemakings
2. Updates to the 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
a. Adoption of the United States Core Data
for Interoperability as a Standard
b. Electronic Prescribing
c. Clinical Quality Measures—Report
d. Electronic Health Information Export
e. Application Programming Interfaces
f. Privacy and Security Transparency
Attestations
g. Data Segmentation for Privacy and
Consent Management
3. Modifications to the ONC Health IT
Certification Program
4. Health IT for the Care Continuum
5. Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification
6. Information Blocking
C. Costs and Benefits
II. Background
A. Statutory Basis
1. Standards, Implementation
Specifications, and Certification Criteria
2. Health IT Certification Program(s)
B. Regulatory History
1. Standards, Implementation
Specifications, and Certification Criteria
Rules
2. ONC Health IT Certification Program
Rules
III. Deregulatory Actions for Previous
Rulemakings
A. Background
1. History of Burden Reduction and
Regulatory Flexibility
2. Executive Orders 13771 and 13777
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B. Proposed Deregulatory Actions
1. Removal of Randomized Surveillance
Requirements
2. Removal of the 2014 Edition From the
Code of Federal Regulations
3. Removal of the ONC-Approved
Accreditor From the Program
4. Removal of Certain 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria and Standards
a. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
Certification Criteria
b. Drug-Formulary and Preferred Drug Lists
c. Patient-Specific Education Resources
d. Common Clinical Data Set Summary
Record—Create; and Common Clinical
Data Set Summary Record—Receive
e. Secure Messaging
5. Removal of Certain ONC Health IT
Certification Program Requirements
a. Limitations Disclosures
b. Transparency and Mandatory
Disclosures Requirements
6. Recognition of Food and Drug
Administration Processes
a. FDA Software Pre-Certification Pilot
Program
b. Development of Similar Independent
Program Processes—Request for
Information
IV. Updates to the 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
A. Standards and Implementation
Specifications
1. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
2. Compliance with Adopted Standards
and Implementation Specifications
3. ‘‘Reasonably Available’’ to Interested
Parties
B. Revised and New 2015 Edition Criteria
1. The United States Core Data for
Interoperability Standard (USCDI)
a. USCDI 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
b. USCDI Standard—Data Classes Included
c. USCDI Standard—Relationship to
Content Exchange Standards and
Implementation Specifications
d. Clinical Notes C–CDA Implementation
Specification
2. Electronic Prescribing Criterion
3. Clinical Quality Measures—Report
Criterion
4. Electronic Health Information Export
Criterion
a. Patient Access
b. Transitions Between Health IT Systems
c. Scope of EHI
d. Export Format
e. Initial Step to Persistent Access to All of
a Patient’s EHI
f. Timeframes
g. Replaces the 2015 Edition ‘‘Data Export’’
Criterion in the 2015 Edition Base EHR
Definition
5. Standardized API for Patient and
Population Services Criterion
6. Privacy and Security Transparency
Attestations Criteria
a. Background
b. Encrypt Authentication Credentials
c. Multi-factor Authentication
7. Data Segmentation for Privacy and
Consent Management Criteria
a. Implementation With the Consolidated
CDA Release 2.1
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b. Implementation With FHIR Standard
C. Unchanged 2015 Edition Criteria—
Promoting Interoperability Programs
Reference Alignment
V. Modifications to the ONC Health IT
Certification Program
A. Corrections
1. Auditable Events and Tamper Resistance
2. Amendments
3. View, Download, and Transmit to 3rd
Party
4. Integrating Revised and New
Certification Criteria Into the 2015
Edition Privacy and Security
Certification Framework
B. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC–
ACBs
1. Records Retention
2. Conformance Methods for Certification
Criteria
3. ONC-ACBs to Accept Test Results From
Any ONC-ATL in Good Standing
4. Mandatory Disclosures and
Certifications
C. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC–
ATLs—Records Retention
VI. Health IT for the Care Continuum
A. Health IT for Pediatric Setting
1. Background and Stakeholder Convening
2. Recommendations for the Voluntary
Certification of Health IT for Use in
Pediatric Care
a. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
b. New or Revised Certification Criteria in
This Proposed Rule
B. Health IT and Opioid Use Disorder
Prevention and Treatment—Request for
Information
1. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
2. Revised or New 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria in This Proposed
Rule
3. Emerging Standards and Innovations
4. Additional Comment Areas
VII. Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification
A. Implementation
B. Provisions
1. Information Blocking
2. Assurances
a. Full Compliance and Unrestricted
Implementation of Certification Criteria
Capabilities
b. Certification to the ‘‘Electronic Health
Information Export’’ Criterion
c. Records and Information Retention
d. Trusted Exchange Framework and the
Common Agreement—Request for
Information
3. Communications
a. Background and Purpose
b. Condition of Certification Requirements
c. Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
4. Application Programming Interfaces
a. Statutory Interpretation and API Policy
Principles
b. Key Terms
c. Proposed API Standards,
Implementation Specifications, and
Certification Criterion
d. Condition of Certification Requirements
e. Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
f. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
5. Real World Testing
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6. Attestations
7. EHR Reporting Criteria Submission
C. Compliance
D. Enforcement
1. ONC Direct Review of the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
2. Review and Enforcement Only by ONC
3. Review Processes
a. Initiating Review and Health IT
Developer Notice
b. Relationship with ONC–ACBs and ONC–
ATLs
c. Records Access
d. Corrective Action
e. Certification Ban and Termination
f. Appeal
g. Suspension
h. Proposed Termination
4. Public Listing of Certification Ban and
Terminations
5. Effect on Existing Program Requirements
and Processes
6. Concurrent Enforcement by the Office of
Inspector General
7. Applicability of Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
Requirements for Self-Developers
VIII. Information Blocking
A. Statutory Basis
B. Legislative Background and Policy
Considerations
1. Purpose of the Information Blocking
Provision
2. Policy Considerations and Approach to
the Information Blocking Provisions
C. Relevant Statutory Terms and Provisions
1. ‘‘Required by Law’’
2. Health Care Providers, Health IT
Developers, Exchanges, and Networks
a. Health Care Providers
b. Health IT Developers of Certified Health
IT
c. Networks and Exchanges
3. Electronic Health Information
4. Interests Promoted by the Information
Blocking Provision
a. Access, Exchange, and Use of EHI
b. Interoperability Elements
5. Practices That May Implicate the
Information Blocking Provision
a. Prevention, Material Discouragement,
and Other Interference
b. Likelihood of Interference
c. Examples of Practices Likely To Interfere
With Access, Exchange, or Use of EHI
6. Applicability of Exceptions
a. Reasonable and Necessary Activities
b. Treatment of Different Types of Actors
c. Establishing That Activities and
Practices Meet the Conditions of an
Exception
D. Proposed Exceptions to the Information
Blocking Provision
1. Preventing Harm
2. Promoting the Privacy of EHI
3. Promoting the Security of EHI
4. Recovering Costs Reasonably Incurred
5. Responding to Requests That Are
Infeasible
6. Licensing of Interoperability Elements
on Reasonable and Non-discriminatory
Terms
7. Maintaining and Improving Health IT
Performance
E. Additional Exceptions—Request for
Information
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1. Exception for Complying With Common
Agreement for Trusted Exchange
2. New Exceptions
F. Complaint Process
G. Disincentives for Health Care
Providers—Request for Information
IX. Registries Request for Information
X. Patient Matching Request for Information
XI. Incorporation by Reference
XII. Response to Comments
XIII. Collection of Information Requirements
A. ONC–ACBs
B. Health IT Developers
XIV. Regulatory Impact Analysis
A. Statement of Need
B. Alternatives Considered
C. Overall Impact
1. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563—
Regulatory Planning and Review
Analysis
2. Executive Order 13771—Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
a. Costs and Benefits
b. Accounting Statement and Table
3. Regulatory Flexibility Act
4. Executive Order 13132—Federalism
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
6. Executive Order 13771 Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
Regulation Text
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of Regulatory Action
ONC is responsible for the
implementation of key provisions in
Title IV of the 21st Century Cures Act
(Cures Act) that are designed to advance
interoperability; support the access,
exchange, and use of electronic health
information; and address occurrences of
information blocking. This proposed
rule would implement certain
provisions of the Cures Act, including
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements for health
information technology (health IT)
developers, the voluntary certification
of health IT for use by pediatric health
providers, and reasonable and necessary
activities that do not constitute
information blocking. In addition, the
proposed rule would implement parts of
section 4006(a) of the Cures Act to
support patient access to their electronic
health information (EHI), such as
making a patient’s EHI more
electronically accessible through the
adoption of standards and certification
criteria and the implementation of
information blocking policies that
support patient electronic access to their
health information at no cost.
Additionally, the proposed rule would
modify the 2015 Edition health IT
certification criteria and ONC Health IT
Certification Program (Program) in other
ways to advance interoperability,
enhance health IT certification, and
reduce burden and costs.
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In addition to fulfilling the Cures
Act’s requirements, the proposed rule
would contribute to fulfilling Executive
Order (E.O.) 13813. The President
issued E.O. 13813 on October 12, 2017,
to promote health care choice and
competition across the United States.
Section 1(c) of the E.O., in relevant part,
states that government rules affecting
the United States health care system
should re-inject competition into the
health care markets by lowering barriers
to entry and preventing abuses of
market power. Section 1(c) also states
that government rules should improve
access to and the quality of information
that Americans need to make informed
health care decisions. For example, as
mentioned above, the proposed rule
focuses on establishing Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) for
several interoperability purposes,
including patient access to their health
information without special effort. The
API approach also supports health care
providers having the sole authority and
autonomy to unilaterally permit
connections to their health IT through
certified API technology the health care
providers have acquired. In addition,
the proposed rule provides ONC’s
interpretation of the information
blocking definition as established in the
Cures Act and the application of the
information blocking provision by
identifying reasonable and necessary
activities that would not constitute
information blocking. Many of these
activities focus on improving patient
and health care provider access to
electronic health information and
promoting competition.
B. Summary of Major Provisions and
Clarifications
1. Deregulatory Actions for Previous
Rulemakings
Since the inception of the Program,
we have aimed to implement and
administer the Program in the least
burdensome manner that supports our
policy goals. Throughout the years, we
have worked to improve the Program
with a focus on ways to reduce burden,
offer flexibility to both developers and
providers, and support innovation. This
approach has been consistent with the
principles of Executive Order 13563 on
Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review (February 2, 2011), which
instructs agencies to ‘‘determine
whether any [agency] regulations should
be modified, streamlined, expanded, or
repealed so as to make the agency’s
regulatory program more effective or
less burdensome in achieving the
regulatory objectives.’’ To that end, we
have historically, where feasible and
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appropriate, taken measures to reduce
burden within the Program and make
the Program more effective, flexible, and
streamlined.
ONC has reviewed and evaluated
existing regulations to identify ways to
administratively reduce burden and
implement deregulatory actions through
guidance. In this proposed rule, we also
propose potential new deregulatory
actions that will reduce burden for
health IT developers, providers, and
other stakeholders. We propose six
deregulatory actions in section III.B: (1)
Removal of a threshold requirement
related to randomized surveillance
which allows ONC-Authorized
Certification Bodies (ONC–ACBs) more
flexibility to identify the right approach
for surveillance actions, (2) removal of
the 2014 Edition from the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR), (3) removal
of the ONC-Approved Accreditor (ONC–
AA) from the Program, (4) removal of
certain 2015 Edition certification
criteria, (5) removal of certain Program
requirements, and (6) recognition of
relevant Food and Drug Administration
certification processes with a request for
comment on the potential development
of new processes for the Program.
2. Updates to the 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria
This rule proposes to update the 2015
Edition by not only proposing criteria
for removal, but by proposing to revise
and add new certification criteria that
would establish the capabilities and
related standards and implementation
specifications for the certification of
health IT.
a. Adoption of the United States Core
Data for Interoperability (USCDI) as a
Standard
As part of ONC’s continued efforts to
assure the availability of a minimum
baseline of data classes that could be
commonly available for interoperable
exchange, we adopted the 2015 Edition
‘‘Common Clinical Data Set’’ (CCDS)
definition and used the CCDS shorthand
in several certification criteria.
However, the CCDS definition also
began to be colloquially used for many
different purposes. As the CCDS
definition’s relevance grew outside of its
regulatory context, it became a symbolic
and practical limit to the industry’s
collective interests to go beyond the
CCDS data for access, exchange, and
use. In addition, as we move further
towards value-based care, the need for
the inclusion of additional data classes
that go beyond clinical data is
necessary. In order to advance
interoperability, we propose to remove
the CCDS definition and its references
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from the 2015 Edition and replace it
with the ‘‘United States Core Data for
Interoperability.’’ We propose to adopt
the USCDI as a standard, naming USCDI
Version 1 (USCDI v1) in § 170.213 and
incorporating it by reference in
§ 170.299. The USCDI standard, if
adopted, would establish a set of data
classes and constituent data elements
that would be required to be exchanged
in support of interoperability
nationwide. To achieve the goals set
forth in the Cures Act, ONC intends to
establish and follow a predictable,
transparent, and collaborative process to
expand the USCDI, including providing
stakeholders with the opportunity to
comment on the USCDI’s expansion.
Once the USCDI is adopted in
regulation naming USCDI v1, health IT
developers would be allowed to take
advantage of a flexibility under the
Maintenance of Certification real world
testing requirements, which we refer to
as the ‘‘Standards Version Advancement
Process’’ (described in section VII.B.5 of
this proposed rule). The Standards
Version Advancement Process would
permit health IT developers to
voluntarily implement and use a new
version of an adopted standard, such as
the USCDI, so long as the newer version
was approved by the National
Coordinator through the Standards
Version Advancement Process for use in
certification.
b. Electronic Prescribing
We propose to update the electronic
prescribing (e-Rx) SCRIPT standard in
45 CFR 170.205(b) to NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071, which would result in a new
e-Rx standard eventually becoming the
baseline for certification. We also
propose to adopt a new certification
criterion in § 170.315(b)(11) for e-Rx to
reflect these updated proposals. ONC
and CMS have historically maintained
complementary policies of maintaining
aligned e-Rx and medical history (MH)
standards to ensure that the current
standard for certification to the
electronic prescribing criterion permits
use of the current Part D e-Rx and MH
standards. This proposal is made to
ensure such alignment as CMS recently
finalized its Part D standards to NCPDP
SCRIPT 2017071 for e-RX and MH,
effective January 1, 2020 (83 FR 16440).
In addition to continuing to reference
the current transactions included in
§ 170.315(b)(3), in keeping with CMS’
final rule, we also propose to require all
of the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard
transactions CMS adopted at 42 CFR
423.160(b)(2)(iv).
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c. Clinical Quality Measures—Report
We propose to remove the HL7
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture (QRDA) standard
requirements from the 2015 Edition
‘‘CQMs—report’’ criterion in
§ 170.315(c)(3) and, in their place,
require Health IT Modules to support
the CMS QRDA Implementation Guide
(IGs).1 This would reduce the burden for
health IT developers by only having to
support one form of the QRDA standard
rather than two forms (i.e., the HL7 and
CMS forms).
d. Electronic Health Information Export
We propose a new 2015 Edition
certification criterion for ‘‘electronic
health information (EHI) export’’ in
§ 170.315(b)(10), which would replace
the 2015 Edition ‘‘data export’’
certification criterion (§ 170.315(b)(6))
and become part of the 2015 Edition
Base EHR definition. The proposed
criterion supports situations in which
we believe that all EHI produced and
electronically managed by a developer’s
health IT should be made readily
available for export as a standard
capability of certified health IT.
Specifically, this criterion would: (1)
Enable the export of EHI for a single
patient upon a valid request from that
patient or a user on the patient’s behalf,
and (2) support the export of EHI when
a health care provider chooses to
transition or migrate information to
another health IT system. This criterion
would also require that the export
include the data format, made publicly
available, to facilitate the receiving
health IT system’s interpretation and
use of the EHI to the extent reasonably
practicable using the developer’s
existing technology.
This criterion provides developers
with the ability to create innovative
export capabilities according to their
systems and data practices. We do not
propose that the export must be
executed according to any particular
standard, but propose to require that the
export must be accompanied by the data
format, including its structure and
syntax, to facilitate interpretation of the
EHI therein. Overall, this new criterion
is intended to provide patients and
health IT users, including providers, a
means to efficiently export the entire
electronic health record for a single
patient or all patients in a computable,
electronic format.
1 https://ecqi.healthit.gov/qrda-quality-reportingdocument-architecture.
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e. Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs)
We propose to adopt a new API
criterion in § 170.315(g)(10), which
would replace the ‘‘application access—
data category request’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(g)(8)) and become
part of the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. This new ‘‘standardized API
for patient and population services’’
certification criterion would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast
Healthcare Interoperability Resources
(FHIR®) standards 2 and several
implementation specifications. The new
criterion would focus on supporting two
types of API-enabled services: (1)
Services for which a single patient’s
data is the focus and (2) services for
which multiple patients’ data are the
focus.
f. Privacy and Security Transparency
Attestations
We propose to adopt two new privacy
and security transparency attestation
certification criteria, which would
identify whether certified health IT
supports encrypting authentication
credentials and/or multi-factor
authentication. In order to be issued a
certification, we propose to require that
a Health IT Module developer attest to
whether the Health IT Module encrypts
authentication credentials and whether
the Health IT Module supports multifactor authentication. These criteria are
not expected to place additional burden
on health IT developers since they do
not require net new development or
implementation to take place in order to
be met. However, certification to these
proposed criteria would provide
increased transparency and potentially
motivate health IT developers to encrypt
authentication credentials and support
multi- factor authentication, which
could help prevent exposure to
unauthorized persons/entities.
g. Data Segmentation for Privacy and
Consent Management
In the 2015 Edition, we adopted two
‘‘data segmentation for privacy’’ (DS4P)
certification criteria, one for creating a
summary record according to the DS4P
standard and one for receiving a
summary record according to the DS4P
standard. Certification to the 2015
Edition DS4P criteria focus on data
segmentation only at the document
level. As noted in the 2015 Edition final
rule (80 FR 62646)—and to our
knowledge still an accurate
assessment—certification to these
criteria is currently not required to meet
the Certified EHR Technology definition
2 https://www.hl7.org/fhir/overview.html.
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(CEHRT) or required by any other HHS
program. Since the 2015 Edition final
rule, the health care industry has
engaged in additional field testing and
implementation of the DS4P standard.
In addition, stakeholders shared with
ONC—through public forums, listening
sessions, and correspondence—that
focusing certification on segmentation
to only the document level does not
permit providers the flexibility to
address more granular segmentation
needs. Therefore, we propose to remove
the current 2015 Edition DS4P criteria.
We propose to replace these two criteria
with three new 2015 Edition ‘‘DS4P’’
certification criteria (two for C–CDA and
one for a FHIR-based API) that would
support a more granular approach to
privacy tagging data consent
management for health information
exchange supported by either the
C–CDA- or FHIR-based exchange
standards.
3. Modifications to the ONC Health IT
Certification Program
We propose to make corrections to the
2015 Edition privacy and security
certification framework (80 FR 62705)
and relevant regulatory provisions.
These corrections have already been
incorporated in the relevant
Certification Companion Guides (CCGs).
We propose new and revised
principles of proper conduct (PoPC) for
ONC-Authorized Certification Bodies
(ONC–ACBs). We propose to clarify that
the records retention provision includes
the ‘‘life of the edition’’ as well as after
the retirement of an edition related to
the certification of Complete EHRs and
Health IT Modules. We also propose to
revise the PoPC in § 170.523(h) to clarify
the basis for certification, including to
permit a certification decision to be
based on an evaluation conducted by
the ONC–ACB for Health IT Modules’
compliance with certification criteria by
use of conformity methods approved by
the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (National
Coordinator). We also propose to update
§ 170.523(h) to require ONC–ACBs to
accept test results from any ONC–ATL
that is in good standing under the
Program and is compliant with its ISO
17025 accreditation requirements. We
believe these proposed new and revised
PoPCs would provide necessary
clarifications for ONC–ACBs and would
promote stability among the ONC–
ACBs. We also propose to update
§ 170.523(k) to broaden the
requirements beyond just the Medicare
and Medicaid Electronic Health Record
(EHR) Incentive Programs (now
renamed the Promoting Interoperability
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Programs) and provide other necessary
clarifications.
We propose to revise a PoPC for
ONC–ATLs. We propose to clarify that
the records retention provision includes
the ‘‘life of the edition’’ as well as after
the retirement of an edition related to
the certification of Complete EHRs and
Health IT Modules.
4. Health IT for the Care Continuum
Section 4001(b) of the Cures Act
includes two provisions related to
supporting health IT across the care
continuum. The first instructs the
National Coordinator to encourage, keep
or recognize through existing
authorities, the voluntary certification of
health IT for use in medical specialties
and sites of service where more
technological advancement or
integration is needed. The second
outlines a provision related to the
voluntary certification of health IT for
use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children.
These provisions align closely with
ONC’s core purpose to promote
interoperability to support care
coordination, patient engagement, and
health care quality improvement
initiatives. Advancing health IT that
promotes and supports patient care
when and where it is needed continues
to be a primary goal of the Program.
This means health IT should support
patient populations, specialized care,
transitions of care, and practice settings
across the care continuum.
ONC has explored how we might
work with the health IT industry and
with specialty organizations to
collaboratively develop and promote
health IT that supports medical
specialties and sites of service. Over
time, ONC has taken steps to make the
Program modular, more open and
accessible to different types of health IT,
and able to advance functionality that is
generally applicable to a variety of care
and practice settings. Specific to the
provisions in the Cures Act to support
providers of health care for children, we
considered a wide range of factors.
These include: The evolution of health
IT across the care continuum, the costs
and benefits associated with health IT,
the potential regulatory burden and
compliance timelines, and the need to
help advance health IT that benefits
multiple medical specialties and sites of
service involved in the care of children.
In consideration of these factors, and to
advance implementation of Sections
4001(b) of the Cures Act specific to
pediatric care, we held a listening
session where stakeholders could share
their clinical knowledge and technical
expertise in pediatric care and pediatric
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sites of service. Through the information
learned at this listening session and our
analysis of the health IT landscape for
pediatric settings, we have identified
existing 2015 Edition criteria, as well as
new and revised 2015 Edition criteria
proposed in this rule, that we believe
could benefit providers of pediatric care
and pediatric settings. In this proposed
rule, we seek comment on our analysis
and the correlated certification criteria
that we believe would support the
health care of children.
We also recognize the significance of
the opioid epidemic confronting our
nation and the importance of helping to
support the health IT needs of health
care providers committed to preventing
inappropriate access to prescription
opioids and to providing safe,
appropriate treatment. We believe
health IT offers promising strategies to
help assist medical specialties and sites
of services impacted by the opioid
epidemic. Therefore, we request public
comment on how our existing Program
requirements and the proposals in this
rulemaking may support use cases
related to Opioid Use Disorder (OUD)
prevention and treatment and if there
are additional areas that ONC should
consider for effective implementation of
health IT to help address OUD
prevention and treatment.
5. Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification
We propose to establish certain
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements for health IT
developers based on the conditions and
maintenance of certification
requirements outlined in section 4002 of
the Cures Act. We propose an approach
whereby the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification express
both initial requirements for health IT
developers and their certified Health IT
Module(s) as well as ongoing
requirements that must be met by both
health IT developers and their certified
Health IT Module(s) under the Program.
In this regard, we propose to implement
the Cures Act Conditions of
Certification with further specificity as
it applies to the Program and propose to
implement any accompanying
Maintenance of Certification
requirements as standalone
requirements to ensure that not only are
the Conditions of Certification met, but
that they are continually being met
through the Maintenance of
Certification requirements. For ease of
reference and to distinguish from other
conditions, we propose to capitalize
‘‘Conditions of Certification’’ and
‘‘Maintenance of Certification’’ when
referring to Conditions and Maintenance
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of Certification requirements established
under the Cures Act.
Information Blocking
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, not take any action that
constitutes information blocking as
defined in section 3022(a) of the Public
Health Service Act (PHSA). We propose
to establish this information blocking
Condition of Certification in § 170.401.
The Condition of Certification would
prohibit any health IT developer under
the Program from taking any action that
constitutes information blocking as
defined by section 3022(a) of the PHSA
and proposed in § 171.103.
Assurances
Section 3001(c)(5)(D)(ii) of the Cures
Act requires that a health IT developer,
as a Condition of Certification under the
Program, provide assurances to the
Secretary that, unless for legitimate
purposes specified by the Secretary, the
developer will not take any action that
constitutes information blocking as
defined in section 3022(a) of the PHSA,
or any other action that may inhibit the
appropriate exchange, access, and use of
EHI. We propose to implement this
provision through several Conditions of
Certification and accompanying
Maintenance requirements, which are
set forth in proposed § 170.402. We also
propose to establish more specific
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements to provide
assurances that a health IT developer
does not take any other action that may
inhibit the appropriate exchange,
access, and use of EHI. These proposed
requirements serve to provide further
clarity under the Program as to how
health IT developers can provide such
broad assurances with more specific
actions.
Communications
As a Condition and Maintenance of
Certification under the Program, the
Cures Act requires that health IT
developers do not prohibit or restrict
communications about certain aspects
of the performance of health IT and the
developers’ related business practices.
We propose that developers will be
permitted to impose certain kinds of
limited prohibitions and restrictions
that we believe strike a reasonable
balance between the need to promote
open communication about health IT
and related developer business practices
and the need to protect the legitimate
interests of health IT developers and
other entities. However, certain
narrowly-defined types of
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communications—such as
communications required by law, made
to a government agency, or made to a
defined category of safety
organization—would receive
‘‘unqualified protection,’’ meaning that
developers would be absolutely
prohibited from imposing any
prohibitions or restrictions on such
protected communications.
We propose that to maintain
compliance with this Condition of
Certification, a health IT developer must
not impose or enforce any contractual
requirement or legal right that
contravenes this Condition of
Certification. Furthermore, we propose
that if a health IT developer has
contracts/agreements in existence that
contravene this condition, the developer
must notify all affected customers or
other persons or entities that the
prohibition or restriction will not be
enforced by the health IT developer.
Going forward, health IT developers
would be required to amend their
contracts/agreements to remove or make
void the provisions that contravene this
Condition of Certification within a
reasonable period of time, but not later
than two years from the effective date of
a subsequent final rule for this proposed
rule.
Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs)
The Cures Act’s API Condition of
Certification includes several key
phrases (including, for example,
‘‘without special effort’’) and
requirements for health IT developers
that indicate the Cures Act’s focus on
the technical requirements as well as
the actions and practices of health IT
developers in implementing the
certified API. In section VII.B.4 of the
preamble, we outline our proposals to
implement the Cures Act’s API
Condition of Certification. These
proposals include new standards, new
implementation specifications, a new
certification criterion, as well as
detailed Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements.
Real World Testing
The Cures Act adds a new Condition
and Maintenance of Certification
requirement that health IT developers
successfully test the real world use of
the technology for interoperability in
the type of setting in which such
technology would be marketed. In this
proposed rule, we outline what
successful ‘‘real world testing’’ means
for the purpose of this Condition of
Certification, as well as proposed
Maintenance requirements—including
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standards updates for widespread and
continued interoperability.
We propose to limit the applicability
of this Condition of Certification to
health IT developers with Health IT
Modules certified to one or more 2015
Edition certification criteria focused on
interoperability and data exchange
specified in section VII.B.5. We propose
Maintenance of Certification
requirements that would require health
IT developers to submit publicly
available annual real world testing plans
as well as annual real world testing
results for certified health IT products
focused on interoperability. We also
propose a Maintenance of Certification
flexibility we have named the Standards
Version Advancement Process, under
which health IT developers with health
IT certified to the criteria specified for
interoperability and data exchange
would have the option to update their
health IT to a more advanced version(s)
of the standard(s) or implementation
specification(s) included in the criteria
once such versions are approved by the
National Coordinator through the
Standards Version Advancement
Process for use in health IT certified
under the Program. Similarly, we
propose that health IT developers
presenting new health IT for
certification to one of the criteria
specified in Section VII.B.5 would have
the option to certify to a National
Coordinator-approved more advanced
version of the adopted standards or
implementation specifications included
in the criteria. We propose that health
IT developers voluntarily opting to avail
themselves of the Standards Version
Advancement Process must address
their planned and actual timelines for
implementation and rollout of standards
updates in their annual real world
testing plans and real world testing
results submissions. We also propose
that health IT developers of products
with existing certifications who plan to
avail themselves of the Standards
Version Advancement Process
flexibility notify both their ONC–ACB
and their affected customers of their
intention and plans to update their
certified health IT and its anticipated
impact on their existing certified health
IT and customers, specifically including
but not limited to whether, and if so for
how long, the health IT developer
intends to continue to support the
certificate for the health IT certified to
the prior version of the standard.
We propose a new PoPC for ONC–
ACBs that would require ONC–ACBs to
review and confirm that applicable
health IT developers submit real world
testing plans and real world results in
accordance with our proposals. Once
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completeness is confirmed, ONC–ACBs
would upload the plans and results via
hyperlinks to the Certified Health IT
Product List (CHPL). We propose to
revise the PoPC in § 170.523(m) to
require ONC–ACBs to collect, no less
than quarterly, all updates successfully
made to standards in certified health IT
pursuant to the developers having
voluntarily opted to avail themselves of
the Standards Version Advancement
Process flexibility under the real world
testing Condition of Certification. We
propose in § 170.523(t), a new PoPC for
ONC–ACBs requiring them to ensure
that developers seeking to take
advantage of the Standards Version
Advancement Process flexibility in
§ 170.405(b)(5) comply with the
applicable requirements.
Attestations
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, provide to the Secretary an
attestation to all the Conditions of
Certification specified in the Cures Act,
except for the ‘‘EHR reporting criteria
submission’’ Condition of Certification.
We propose to implement the Cures Act
‘‘attestations’’ Condition of Certification
in § 170.406. Health IT developers
would attest twice a year to compliance
with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements (except for
the EHR reporting criteria requirement,
which would be metrics reporting
requirements separately implemented
through a future rulemaking). The
6-month attestation period we propose
in § 170.406(b)(2) would properly
balance the need to support appropriate
enforcement with the attestation burden
placed on health IT developers. In this
regard, the proposed rule includes
provisions to make the process as
simple and efficient for health IT
developers as possible (e.g., 14-day
grace period, web-based form
submissions, and attestation alert
reminders).
We propose that attestations would be
submitted to ONC–ACBs on behalf of
ONC and the Secretary. We propose a
new PoPC in § 170.523(q) that an ONC–
ACB must review and submit the health
IT developers’ attestations to ONC. ONC
would then make the attestations
publicly available through the CHPL.
EHR Reporting Criteria Submission
The Cures Act specifies that health IT
developers be required, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under
the Program, to submit reporting criteria
on certified health IT in accordance
with the EHR reporting program
established under section 3009A of the
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PHSA, as added by the Cures Act. We
have not yet established an EHR
reporting program. Once ONC
establishes such program, we will
undertake rulemaking to propose and
implement the associated Condition and
Maintenance of Certification
requirement(s) for health IT developers.
Enforcement
Section 4002 of the Cures Act adds
Program requirements aimed at
addressing health IT developer actions
and business practices through the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements, which
expands the current focus of the
Program requirements beyond the
certified health IT itself. Equally
important, section 4002 also provides
that the Secretary of HHS may
encourage compliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements and take
action to discourage noncompliance.
We, therefore, propose a general
enforcement approach to encourage
consistent compliance with the
requirements. The proposed rule
outlines a corrective action process for
ONC to review potential or known
instances where a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification
requirement has not been or is not being
met by a health IT developer under the
Program. We propose, with minor
modifications, to utilize the processes
previously established for ONC direct
review of certified health IT and
codified in §§ 170.580 and 170.581 for
the enforcement of the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements. Where noncompliance is
identified, our first priority would be to
work with the health IT developer to
remedy the matter through a corrective
action process. However, we propose
that, under certain circumstances, ONC
may ban a health IT developer from the
Program or terminate the certification of
one or more of its Health IT Modules.
6. Information Blocking
Section 4004 of the Cures Act added
section 3022 of the PHSA (42 U.S.C.
300jj–52, ‘‘the information blocking
provision’’), which defines conduct by
health care providers, and health IT
developers of certified health IT,
exchanges, and networks that
constitutes information blocking.
Section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA defines
information blocking in broad terms,
while section 3022(a)(3) authorizes and
charges the Secretary to identify
reasonable and necessary activities that
do not constitute information blocking
(section 3022(a)(3) of the PHSA).
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We identify several reasonable and
necessary activities as exceptions to the
information blocking definition, each of
which we propose would not constitute
information blocking for purposes of
section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA. The
exceptions would extend to certain
activities that interfere with the access,
exchange, or use of EHI but that may be
reasonable and necessary if certain
conditions are met.
In developing the proposed
exceptions, we were guided by three
overarching policy considerations. First,
the exceptions would be limited to
certain activities that clearly advance
the aims of the information blocking
provision; promoting public confidence
in health IT infrastructure by supporting
the privacy and security of EHI, and
protecting patient safety; and promoting
competition and innovation in health IT
and its use to provide health care
services to consumers. Second, each
exception is intended to address a
significant risk that regulated
individuals and entities (i.e., health care
providers, health IT developers of
certified health IT, health information
networks, and health information
exchanges) will not engage in these
reasonable and necessary activities
because of potential uncertainty
regarding whether they would be
considered information blocking. Third,
and last, each exception is intended to
be tailored, through appropriate
conditions, so that it is limited to the
reasonable and necessary activities that
it is designed to exempt.
The seven proposed exceptions are set
forth in section VIII.D below. The first
three exceptions, set forth in VIII.D.1–
D.3 address activities that are reasonable
and necessary to promote public
confidence in the use of health IT and
the exchange of EHI. These exceptions
are intended to protect patient safety;
promote the privacy of EHI; and
promote the security of EHI. The next
three exceptions, set forth in VIII.D.4–
D.6, address activities that are
reasonable and necessary to promote
competition and consumer welfare.
These exceptions would allow for the
recovery of costs reasonably incurred;
excuse an actor from responding to
requests that are infeasible; and permit
the licensing of interoperability
elements on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The last
exception, set forth in VIII.D.7,
addresses activities that are reasonable
and necessary to promote the
performance of health IT. This proposed
exception recognizes that actors may
make health IT temporarily unavailable
for maintenance or improvements that
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benefit the overall performance and
usability of health IT.
To qualify for any of these exceptions,
we propose that an individual or entity
would, for each relevant practice and at
all relevant times, have to satisfy all of
the applicable conditions of the
exception. Additionally, we propose (in
section VIII.C of this preamble) to define
or interpret terms that are present in
section 3022 of the PHSA (such as the
types of individuals and entities
covered by the information blocking
provision). We also propose certain new
terms and definitions that are necessary
to implement the information blocking
provisions. We propose to codify the
proposed exceptions and other
information blocking proposals in a new
part of title 45 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, part 171.
C. Costs and Benefits
Executive Orders 12866 on Regulatory
Planning and Review (September 30,
1993) and 13563 on Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review
(February 2, 2011) direct agencies to
assess all costs and benefits of available
regulatory alternatives and, if regulation
is necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). A regulatory impact analysis
(RIA) must be prepared for major rules
with economically significant effects
($100 million or more in any one year).
OMB has determined that this proposed
rule is an economically significant rule
as the potential costs associated with
this proposed rule could be greater than
$100 million per year. Accordingly, we
have prepared an RIA that to the best of
our ability presents the costs and
benefits of this proposed rule.
We have estimated the potential
monetary costs and benefits of this
proposed rule for health IT developers,
health care providers, patients, ONC–
ACBs, ONC–ATLs, and the federal
government (i.e., ONC), and have
broken those costs and benefits out into
the following categories: (1)
Deregulatory actions (no associated
costs); (2) updates to the updates to the
2015 Edition health IT certification
criteria; (3) Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification for a health IT
developer; (4) oversight for the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification; and (5) information
blocking.
We note that we have rounded all
estimates to the nearest dollar and all
estimates are expressed in 2016 dollars
as it is the most recent data available to
address all cost and benefit estimates
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consistently. We also note that we did
not have adequate data to quantify some
of the costs and benefits within this
RIA. In those situations, we have
described the qualitative costs and
benefits of our proposals; however, such
qualitative costs and benefits have not
been accounted for in the monetary cost
and benefit totals below.
We estimate that the total annual cost
for this proposed rule for the first year
after it is finalized (including one-time
costs), based on the cost estimates
outlined above and throughout this RIA,
would, on average, range from $365
million to $919 million with an average
annual cost of $642 million. We
estimate that the total perpetual cost for
this proposed rule (starting in year two),
based on the cost estimates outlined
above, would, on average, range from
$228 million to $452 million with an
average annual cost of $340 million.
We estimate the total annual benefit
for this proposed rule would range from
$3.08 billion to $9.15 billion with an
average annual benefit of $6.1 billion.
We estimate the total annual net
benefit for this proposed rule for the
first year after it is finalized (including
one-time costs), based on the cost and
benefit estimates outlined above, would
range from $2.7 billion to $8.2 billion
with an average net benefit of $5.5
billion. We estimate the total perpetual
annual net benefit for this proposed rule
(starting in year two), based on the costbenefit estimates outlined above, would
range from $2.9 billion to $8.7 billion
with an average net benefit of $5.8
billion.
II. Background
A. Statutory Basis
The Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, Title XIII of Division A
and Title IV of Division B of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act) (Pub. L.
111–5), was enacted on February 17,
2009. The HITECH Act amended the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and
created ‘‘Title XXX—Health Information
Technology and Quality’’ (Title XXX) to
improve health care quality, safety, and
efficiency through the promotion of
health IT and electronic health
information (EHI) exchange.
The Cures Act was enacted on
December 13, 2016, to accelerate the
discovery, development, and delivery of
21st century cures, and for other
purposes. The Cures Act, through Title
IV—Delivery, amended the HITECH Act
(Title XIII of Division A of Pub. L. 111–
5) by modifying or adding certain
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provisions to the PHSA relating to
health IT.
1. Standards, Implementation
Specifications, and Certification Criteria
The HITECH Act established two new
federal advisory committees, the HIT
Policy Committee (HITPC) and the HIT
Standards Committee (HITSC). Each
was responsible for advising the
National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (National
Coordinator) on different aspects of
standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria.
Section 3002 of the Cures Act
amended the PHSA by replacing the
HITPC and HITSC with one committee,
the Health Information Technology
Advisory Committee (HIT Advisory
Committee or HITAC). Section 3002(a)
establishes that the HITAC shall advise
and recommend to the National
Coordinator on different aspects of
standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria,
relating to the implementation of a
health IT infrastructure, nationally and
locally, that advances the electronic
access, exchange, and use of health
information. Further described in
section 3002(b)(1)(A) of the PHSA, this
includes providing to the National
Coordinator recommendations on a
policy framework to advance
interoperable health IT infrastructure,
updating recommendations to the policy
framework, and making new
recommendations, as appropriate.
Section 3002(b)(2)(A) identifies that in
general, the HITAC shall recommend to
the National Coordinator for purposes of
adoption under section 3004, standards,
implementation specifications, and
certification criteria and an order of
priority for the development,
harmonization, and recognition of such
standards, specifications, and
certification criteria. Like the process
previously required of the former HITPC
and HITSC, the HITAC will develop a
schedule for the assessment of policy
recommendations for the Secretary to
publish in the Federal Register.
Section 3004 of the PHSA identifies a
process for the adoption of health IT
standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria
and authorizes the Secretary to adopt
such standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria.
As specified in section 3004(a)(1), the
Secretary is required, in consultation
with representatives of other relevant
federal agencies, to jointly review
standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria
endorsed by the National Coordinator
under section 3001(c) and subsequently
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determine whether to propose the
adoption of any grouping of such
standards, implementation
specifications, or certification criteria.
The Secretary is required to publish all
determinations in the Federal Register.
Section 3004(b)(3) of the PHSA titled,
Subsequent Standards Activity,
provides that the Secretary shall adopt
additional standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria
as necessary and consistent with the
schedule published by the HITAC. We
consider this provision in the broader
context of the HITECH Act and Cures
Act to grant the Secretary the authority
and discretion to adopt standards,
implementation specifications, and
certification criteria that have been
recommended by the HITAC and
endorsed by the National Coordinator,
as well as other appropriate and
necessary health IT standards,
implementation specifications, and
certification criteria.
2. Health IT Certification Program(s)
Under the HITECH Act, section
3001(c)(5) of the PHSA provides the
National Coordinator with the authority
to establish a certification program or
programs for the voluntary certification
of health IT. Specifically, section
3001(c)(5)(A) specifies that the National
Coordinator, in consultation with the
Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), shall
keep or recognize a program or
programs for the voluntary certification
of health IT that is in compliance with
applicable certification criteria adopted
under this subtitle (i.e., certification
criteria adopted by the Secretary under
section 3004 of the PHSA). The
certification program(s) must also
include, as appropriate, testing of the
technology in accordance with section
13201(b) of the HITECH Act. Overall,
section 13201(b) of the HITECH Act
requires that with respect to the
development of standards and
implementation specifications, the
Director of NIST shall support the
establishment of a conformance testing
infrastructure, including the
development of technical test beds. The
HITECH Act also indicates that the
development of this conformance
testing infrastructure may include a
program to accredit independent, nonfederal laboratories to perform testing.
Section 3001(c)(5) of the PHSA was
amended by the Cures Act, which
instructs the National Coordinator to
encourage, keep, or recognize, through
existing authorities, the voluntary
certification of health IT under the
Program for use in medical specialties
and sites of service for which no such
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technology is available or where more
technological advancement or
integration is needed. Section
3001(c)(5)(C)(iii) identifies that the
Secretary, in consultation with relevant
stakeholders, shall make
recommendations for the voluntary
certification of health IT for use by
pediatric health providers to support the
care of children, as well as adopt
certification criteria under section 3004
to support the voluntary certification of
health IT for use by pediatric health
providers. The Cures Act further
amended section 3001(c)(5) of the PHSA
by adding section 3001(c)(5)(D), which
provides the Secretary with the
authority, through notice and comment
rulemaking, to require conditions and
maintenance of certification
requirements for the Program.
B. Regulatory History
The Secretary issued an interim final
rule with request for comments (75 FR
2014, Jan. 13, 2010), which adopted an
initial set of standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria.
On March 10, 2010, ONC published a
proposed rule (75 FR 11328) that
proposed both a temporary and
permanent certification program for the
purposes of testing and certifying health
IT. A final rule establishing the
temporary certification program was
published on June 24, 2010 (75 FR
36158) and a final rule establishing the
permanent certification program was
published on January 7, 2011 (76 FR
1262). ONC issued multiple
rulemakings since these initial
rulemaking to update standards,
implementation specifications, and
certification criteria and the certification
program, a history of which can be
found in the final rule titled, ‘‘2015
Edition Health Information (Health IT)
Certification Criteria, 2015 Edition Base
Electronic Health Record (EHR)
Definition, and ONC Health IT
Certification Program Modifications’’
(Oct. 16, 2015, 80 FR 62602) (‘‘2015
Edition final rule’’). A correction notice
was published for the 2015 Edition final
rule on December 11, 2015 (80 FR
76868) to correct preamble and
regulatory text errors and clarify
requirements of the Common Clinical
Data Set (CCDS), the 2015 Edition
privacy and security certification
framework, and the mandatory
disclosures for health IT developers.
The 2015 Edition final rule
established a new edition of
certification criteria (‘‘2015 Edition
health IT certification criteria’’ or ‘‘2015
Edition’’) and a new 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition. The 2015 Edition
established the capabilities and
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specified the related standards and
implementation specifications that
CEHRT would need to include to, at a
minimum, support the achievement of
‘‘meaningful use’’ by eligible clinicians,
eligible hospitals, and critical access
hospitals under the Medicare and
Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs (EHR
Incentive Programs) (now referred to as
the Promoting Interoperability
Programs) 3 when the 2015 Edition is
required for use under these and other
programs referencing the CEHRT
definition. The 2015 Edition final rule
also made changes to the Program. The
final rule adopted a proposal to change
the Program’s name to the ‘‘ONC Health
IT Certification Program’’ from the ONC
HIT Certification Program, modified the
Program to make it more accessible to
other types of health IT beyond EHR
technology and for health IT that
supports care and practice settings
beyond the ambulatory and inpatient
settings, and adopted new and revised
Principles of Proper Conduct (PoPC) for
ONC–ACBs.
After issuing a proposed rule on
March 2, 2016 (81 FR 11056), ONC
published a final rule titled, ‘‘ONC
Health IT Certification Program:
Enhanced Oversight and
Accountability’’ (81 FR 72404) (‘‘EOA
final rule’’) on October 19, 2016. The
final rule finalized modifications and
new requirements under the Program,
including provisions related to ONC’s
role in the Program. The final rule
created a regulatory framework for
ONC’s direct review of health IT
certified under the Program, including,
when necessary, requiring the
correction of non-conformities found in
health IT certified under the Program
and suspending and terminating
certifications issued to Complete EHRs
and Health IT Modules. The final rule
also sets forth processes for ONC to
authorize and oversee accredited testing
laboratories under the Program. In
addition, it includes provisions for
expanded public availability of certified
health IT surveillance results.
III. Deregulatory Actions for Previous
Rulemakings
A. Background
1. History of Burden Reduction and
Flexibility
Since the inception of the ONC Health
IT Certification Program (Program), we
have aimed to implement and
administer the Program in the least
burdensome manner that supports our
policy goals. Throughout the years, we
3 https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2018-16766/
p-4.
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have worked to improve the Program
with a focus on ways to reduce burden,
offer flexibility to both developers and
providers, and support innovation. This
approach has been consistent with the
principles of Executive Order 13563 on
Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review (February 2, 2011), which
instructs agencies to ‘‘determine
whether any [agency] regulations should
be modified, streamlined, expanded, or
repealed so as to make the agency’s
regulatory program more effective or
less burdensome in achieving the
regulatory objectives.’’ To that end, we
have historically, where feasible and
appropriate, taken measures to reduce
burden within the Program and make
the Program more effective, flexible, and
streamlined.
For example, in the 2014 Edition final
rule (77 FR 54164), we revised the
certified electronic health record
technology (CEHRT) definition to
provide flexibility and create regulatory
efficiencies by narrowing required
functionality to a core set of capabilities
(i.e., the Base EHR definition) plus the
additional capabilities each eligible
clinician, eligible hospital, and critical
access hospital needed to successfully
achieve the applicable objective and
measures under the EHR Incentive
Programs (now referred to as the
Promoting Interoperability Programs).
ONC has also supported more efficient
testing and certification methods and
reduced regulatory burden through the
adoption of a gap certification policy.
As explained in the 2014 Edition final
rule (77 FR 54254) and the 2015 Edition
final rule (80 FR 62681), where
applicable, gap certification allows for
the use of a previously certified health
IT product’s test results to certification
criteria identified as unchanged.
Developers have been able to use gap
certification for the more efficient
certification of their health IT when
updating from the 2011 Edition to the
2014 Edition and from the 2014 Edition
to the 2015 Edition.
ONC introduced further means to
reduce regulatory burden, increase
regulatory flexibility, and promote
innovation in the 2014 Edition Release
2 final rule (79 FR 54430). The 2014
Edition Release 2 final rule established
a set of optional 2014 Edition
certification criteria that provided
flexibility and alternative certification
pathways for health IT developers and
providers based on their specific
circumstances. The 2014 Edition
Release 2 final rule also simplified the
Program by discontinuing the use of the
‘‘Complete EHR’’ certification concept
beginning with the 2015 Edition (79 FR
54443).
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In the 2015 Edition final rule, we did
not ‘‘carry forward’’ certain 2014
Edition certification criteria into the
2015 Edition, such as the ‘‘image
results,’’ ‘‘patient list creation,’’ and
‘‘electronic medication administration
record’’ criteria. We determined that
these criteria did not advance
functionality or support interoperability
(80 FR 62682–84). We also did not
require all health IT to be certified to the
‘‘meaningful use measurement’’
certification criteria for ‘‘automated
numerator recording’’ and ‘‘automated
measure calculation’’ (80 FR 62605),
which had been previously required for
the 2014 Edition. Based on stakeholder
feedback and Program administration
observations, we also permitted testing
efficiencies for the 2015 Edition
‘‘automated numerator recording’’ and
‘‘automated measure calculation’’
criteria by removing the live
demonstration requirement of recording
data and generating reports. Health IT
developers may now self-test their
Health IT Modules(s) and submit the
resulting reports to the ONCAuthorized Testing Laboratory (ONC–
ATL) to verify compliance with the
criterion.4 In order to further reduce
burden for health IT developers, we
adopted a simpler, straight-forward
approach to privacy and security
certification requirements, which
clarified which requirements are
applicable to each criterion within the
regulatory functional areas (80 FR
62605).
2. Executive Orders 13771 and 13777
On January 30, 2017, the President
issued Executive Order 13771 on
Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs, which requires
agencies to identify deregulatory
actions. This order was followed by
Executive Order 13777, titled
‘‘Enforcing the Regulatory Reform
Agenda’’ (February 24, 2017). Executive
Order 13777 provides further direction
on implementing regulatory reform by
identifying a process by which agencies
must review and evaluate existing
regulations and make recommendations
for repeal or simplification.
In order to implement these
regulatory reform initiatives and
policies, over the past year ONC
reviewed and evaluated existing
regulations. During our review, we
sought to identify ways to further
reduce administrative burden, to
implement deregulatory actions through
4 https://www.healthit.gov/test-method/
automated-numerator-recording and https://
www.healthit.gov/test-method/automated-measurecalculation.
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7433
guidance, and to propose potential new
deregulatory actions in this proposed
rule that will reduce burden for health
IT developer, providers, and other
stakeholders.
On August 21, 2017, ONC issued
Relied Upon Software Program
Guidance.5 Health IT developers are
permitted to use ‘‘relied upon software’’
(76 FR 1276) to demonstrate compliance
with certification criteria adopted at 45
CFR part 170, subpart C. Historically, in
cases where a Health IT Module is
paired with multiple ‘‘relied upon
software’’ products for the same
capability, health IT developers were
required to demonstrate compliance for
the same certification criterion with
each of those ‘‘relied upon software’’
products in order for the products to be
listed on the Certified Health IT Product
List (CHPL). With the issued guidance,
health IT developers may now
demonstrate compliance with only one
‘‘relied upon software’’ product for a
criterion/capability. Once the health IT
developer demonstrates compliance
with a minimum of one ‘‘relied upon
software’’ product, the developer can
have multiple, additional ‘‘relied upon
software’’ products for the same
criterion/capability listed on the CHPL
(https://chpl.healthit.gov/). This
approach reduces burden for health IT
developers, ONC–ATLs, and ONCAuthorized Certification Bodies (ONC–
ACBs).
On September 21, 2017, ONC reduced
the overall burden for testing health IT
to the 2015 Edition.6 ONC reviewed the
2015 Edition test procedures, which
identify minimum testing requirements
ONC–ATLs must evaluate during
testing. ONC changed 30 of the 2015
Edition test procedures to attestation
only (i.e., a ‘‘yes’’ self-declaration by the
health IT developer that their product
has capabilities conformant with those
specified in the associated certification
criterion/criteria).7 This deregulatory
action reduced burden and costs
program-wide, while still maintaining
the Program’s high level of integrity and
assurances. Health IT developers now
have reduced preparation and testing
costs for testing to these criteria.
Specifically, the cost savings for health
IT developers have been estimated
between $8.34 and $9.26 million. ONC–
ATLs also benefit by having more time
and resources to focus on tool-based
5 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
relieduponsoftwareguidance.pdf.
6 https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/healthitcertification/certification-program-updates-supportefficiency-reduce-burden/.
7 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
policy/selfdeclarationapproachprogramguidance1704.pdf.
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testing (for interoperability-oriented
criteria) and being responsive to any
retesting requirements that may arise
from ONC–ACB surveillance activities.
Furthermore, providers and users of
certified health IT do not lose
confidence in the Program because this
burden reduction effort in no way alters
the expectations of conformance and
responsibilities of Program participants.
Health IT developers are still required to
meet certification criteria requirements
and maintain their products’
conformance to the full scope of the
associated criteria, including when
implemented in the field and in
production use. Similarly, ONC and
ONC–ACBs continue to conduct
surveillance activities and respond to
end-user complaints.
B. Proposed Deregulatory Actions
We propose six deregulatory actions
below. We welcome comments on these
potential deregulatory actions and any
other potential deregulatory actions we
should consider. We also refer readers
to section XIV (Regulatory Impact
Analysis) of this proposed rule for a
discussion of the estimated cost savings
from these proposed deregulatory
actions.
1. Removal of Randomized Surveillance
Requirements
ONC–ACBs are required to conduct
surveillance of certified health IT under
the Program to ensure that health IT
continues to conform and function as
required by the full scope of the
certification requirements. Surveillance
is categorized as either reactive
surveillance (for example, complaintbased surveillance) or randomized
surveillance, which, by regulation,
requires ONC–ACBs to proactively
surveil 2% of the certificates they issue
annually. On September 21, 2017, we
exercised enforcement discretion with
respect to the implementation of
randomized surveillance by ONC–
ACBs.8 Consistent with this exercise of
enforcement discretion, we now
propose to eliminate certain regulatory
randomized surveillance requirements.
We propose to revise § 170.556(c) by
changing the requirement that ONC–
ACBs must conduct in-the-field,
randomized surveillance to specify that
ONC–ACBs may conduct in-the- field,
randomized surveillance. We further
propose to remove § 170.556(c)(2),
which specifies that ONC–ACBs must
conduct randomized surveillance for a
minimum of 2% of certified health IT
8 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
ONC_Enforcement_Discretion_Randomized_
Surveillance_8-30-17.pdf.
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products per year. We also propose to
remove the requirements in
§ 170.556(c)(5) regarding the exclusion
and exhaustion of selected locations for
randomized surveillance. Additionally,
we propose to remove the requirements
in § 170.556(c)(6) regarding the
consecutive selection of certified health
IT for randomized surveillance. Without
these regulatory requirements, ONC–
ACBs would still be required to perform
reactive surveillance, and would be
permitted to conduct randomized
surveillance of their own accord, using
the methodology identified by ONC
with respect to scope (§ 170.556(c)(1)),
selection method (§ 170.556(c)(3)), and
the number and types of locations for
in-the-field surveillance
(§ 170.556(c)(4)).
Stakeholders have expressed concern
that the benefits of in-the-field,
randomized surveillance may not
outweigh the time commitment required
by providers, particularly if no nonconformities are found. In general,
providers have expressed that reactive
surveillance (e.g., surveillance based on
user complaints) is a more logical and
economical approach to surveillance.
The removal of randomized surveillance
requirements would also give ONC–
ACBs the flexibility and time to focus
on other priorities, such as the
certification of health IT to the 2015
Edition. Therefore, as discussed above,
we propose to eliminate certain
regulatory randomized surveillance
requirements.
2. Removal of the 2014 Edition From the
Code of Federal Regulations
We propose to remove the 2014
Edition from the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). The 2014 Edition
was the result of rulemaking completed
in 2012 and includes standards and
functionality that are now significantly
outmoded. Removal of the 2014 Edition
would make the 2015 Edition the
baseline for health IT certification. The
2015 Edition, including the additional
certification criteria, standards, and
requirements proposed in this proposed
rule, better enables interoperability and
the access, exchange, and use of
electronic health information. Adoption
and implementation of the 2015 Edition,
including the proposals in this proposed
rule, would also lead to the benefits
outlined in the 2015 Edition final rule
(80 FR 62602–62603, 62605–62606,
62740) and in this proposed rule (see,
for example, the Executive Summary
and the ‘‘Assurances,’’ ‘‘API’’, and ‘‘Real
World Testing’’ Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification sections).
Equally important, adoption and
implementation of the 2015 Edition by
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providers would lead to the estimated
costs savings in this proposed rule
through improved interoperability
supporting the access, exchange, and
use of electronic health information.
Removal of the 2014 Edition would
eliminate inconsistencies and costs
caused by health IT certification and
implementation of two different
editions with different functionalities
and versions of standards. Patient care
could improve through the reduced risk
of error that comes with the health care
system’s consistent implementation and
use of health IT certified to the 2015
Edition. Innovation could also improve
with health IT developers (including
third-party software developers)
developing to only one set of newer
standards and implementation
specifications, which would be more
predictable and less costly.
Removal of the 2014 Edition would
also reduce regulatory burden by no
longer requiring the maintenance and
support of the 2014 Edition.
Maintaining compliance with only the
2015 Edition would reduce the cost and
burden for health IT developers, ONC–
ACBs, and ONC–ATLs because they
would no longer have to support two
increasingly distinct sets of
requirements as is the case now with
certification to both the 2014 and 2015
Editions. More specifically, health IT
developers would not have to support
two maintenance infrastructures and
updating for their customers; nor would
ONC–ATLs and ONC–ACBs have to
support testing, certification, and
surveillance for two separate editions of
certified health IT.
As referenced by the HHS Office of
Inspector General (OIG) and Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in
their rulemakings regarding donations
of EHR items and services, we
committed to retiring certification
criteria editions that are no longer
applicable.9 We first did this with the
removal of the 2011 Edition (79 FR
54447). Accordingly, our proposal to
remove the outdated 2014 Edition for
the reasons discussed above would also
streamline Program compliance
requirements and ensure there is no
regulatory confusion between ONC’s
rules and other HHS rules.
To implement the removal of the 2014
Edition from the CFR, we propose to
remove the 2014 Edition certification
9 CMS final rule ‘‘Medicare Program; Physicians’
Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They
Have Financial Relationships: Exception for Certain
Electronic Health Records Arrangements’’ (78 FR
78751).OIG final rule ‘‘Medicare and State Health
Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Electronic Health
Records Safe Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback
Statute’’ (78 FR 79202).
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criteria (§ 170.314) and related
standards, terms, and requirements from
the CFR. In regard to terms, we propose
to retire the 2014 Edition-related
definitions found in § 170.102,
including the ‘‘2014 Edition Base EHR,’’
‘‘2014 Edition EHR certification
criteria,’’ and ‘‘Complete EHR, 2014
Edition.’’ As explained in the 2015
Edition final rule (80 FR 62719), the
ability to maintain Complete EHR
certification is only permitted with
health IT certified to the 2014 Edition
certification criteria. Because this
concept was discontinued for the 2015
Edition, we propose to remove § 170.545
and any references to Complete EHR
from the regulation text in conjunction
with the removal of the 2014 Edition.
We also propose to remove references to
the 2014 Edition from the Common
Clinical Data Set (CCDS) definition.
However, as discussed later in section
IV.B.1 (‘‘United States Core Data for
Interoperability’’) of this proposed rule,
we propose to remove the CCDS
definition from the CFR and effectively
replace it with a new governmentunique standard, the United States Core
Data for Interoperability (USCDI),
proposing to adopt Version 1 (v1) in
§ 170.213. The new standard would be
applicable to certain 2015 Edition
certification criteria that currently
reference the CCDS, subject to any of
these criteria being removed through
this rulemaking).
We propose to remove the standards
and implementation specifications
found in §§ 170.200, 170.202, 170.204,
170.205, 170.207, 170.210, and 170.299
that are only referenced in the 2014
Edition certification criteria. Adopted
standards that are also referenced in the
2015 Edition would remain. We propose
to remove requirements in § 170.550(f)
and any other requirements in subpart
E, §§ 170.500 through 170.599, which
are specific to the 2014 Edition and do
not apply to the 2015 Edition.
In order to avoid regulatory conflicts,
we are taking into consideration the
final rule released by CMS on November
2, 2017, which makes payment and
policy changes to the second year of the
Quality Payment Program (QPP). The
CMS’s final rule, titled ‘‘Medicare
Program; CY 2018 Updates to the
Quality Payment Program: Extreme and
Uncontrollable Circumstance Policy for
the Transition Year’’ (82 FR 53568),
permits eligible clinicians to use health
IT certified to either the 2014 or 2015
Edition certification criteria, or a
combination of the two for the CY 2018
performance period. The QPP final rule
also states that the 2015 Edition will be
the sole edition permitted to meet the
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CEHRT definition starting with the CY
2019 program year.
Therefore, we propose that the
effective date of removal of the 2014
Edition certification criteria and related
standards, terms, and requirements from
the CFR would be the effective date of
a subsequent final rule for this proposed
rule, which we expect will be issued in
the latter half of 2019. We note that we
will continue to support Medicare and
Medicaid program attestations by
maintaining an archive on the CHPL
allowing the public to access historic
information on a product certified to the
2014 Edition.
3. Removal of the ONC-Approved
Accreditor From the Program
We propose to remove the ONCApproved Accreditor (ONC–AA) from
the Program. The ONC–AA’s role is to
accredit certification bodies for the
Program and to oversee the ONC–ACBs.
However, years of experience and
changes with the Program have led ONC
to conclude that, in many respects, the
role of the ONC–AA to oversee ONC–
ACBs is now duplicative of ONC’s
oversight. More specifically, ONC’s
experience with administering the
Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC–
ACBs as well as issuing necessary
regulatory changes (e.g., ONC–ACB
surveillance and reporting requirements
in the 2015 Edition final rule) has
demonstrated that ONC on its own has
the capacity to provide the appropriate
oversight of ONC–ACBs. Therefore, we
believe removal of the ONC–AA would
reduce the Program’s administrative
complexity and burden.
To implement this proposed
deregulatory action, we propose to
remove the definition for ‘‘ONCApproved Accreditor or ONC–AA’’
found in § 170.502. We also propose to
remove processes related to ONC–AAs
found in §§ 170.501(c), 170.503, and
170.504 regarding requests for ONC–AA
status, ONC–AA ongoing
responsibilities, and reconsideration for
requests for ONC–AA status. Regarding
correspondence and communication
with ONC, we propose to remove
specific references to the ‘‘ONC–AA’’
and ‘‘accreditation organizations
requesting ONC–AA status’’ by revising
§ 170.505. We also propose to remove
the final rule titled ‘‘Permanent
Certification Program for Health
Information Technology; Revisions to
ONC-Approved Accreditor Processes’’
(76 FR 72636) which established a
process for addressing instances where
the ONC–AA engages in improper
conduct or does not perform its
responsibilities under the Program.
Because this prior final rule relates
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solely to the role and removal of the
ONC–AA, we propose its removal and
§ 170.575, which codified the final rule
in the CFR.
These proposed deregulatory actions
would also provide an additional
benefit for ONC–ACBs. ONC–ACBs
would be able to obtain and maintain
accreditation to ISO/IEC 17065, with an
appropriate scope, from any
accreditation body that is a signatory to
the Multilateral Recognition
Arrangement (MLA) with the
International Accreditation Forum
(IAF). Accordingly, we propose to revise
the application process for ONC–ACB
status in § 170.520(a)(3) to require
documentation that confirms that the
applicant has been accredited to ISO/
IEC 17065, with an appropriate scope,
by any accreditation body that is a
signatory to the Multilateral Recognition
Arrangement (MLA) with the
International Accreditation Forum
(IAF), in place of the ONC–AA
accreditation documentation
requirements. Similarly, instead of
requiring the ONC–AA to evaluate the
conformance of ONC–ACBs to ISO/IEC
17065, we propose to revise § 170.523(a)
to simply require ONC–ACBs to
maintain accreditation in good standing
to ISO/IEC 17065 for the Program. This
means that ONC–ACBs would need to
continue to comply with ISO/IEC 17065
and requirements specific to the ONC
Health IT Certification Program scheme.
4. Removal of Certain 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria and Standards
We have reviewed and analyzed the
2015 Edition to determine whether there
are certification criteria we could
remove. We have identified both criteria
and standards for removal as proposed
below. We believe the removal of these
criteria and standards will reduce
burden and costs for health IT
developers and health care providers by
eliminating the need to: Design and
meet specific certification
functionalities; prepare, test, and certify
health IT in certain instances; adhere to
associated reporting and disclosure
requirements; maintain and update
certifications for certified
functionalities; and participate in
surveillance of certified health IT. To
these points, if our proposals are
finalized in a subsequent final rule, we
would expect any already issued 2015
Edition certificates to be updated to
reflect the removal of applicable 2015
Edition certification criteria. We
welcome comment on the proposed
removal of the identified criteria and
standards below and any other 2015
Edition criteria and standards we
should consider for removal.
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ii. Medication List
a. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
Criteria
We propose the removal of certain
certification criteria from the 2015
Edition that are included in the 2015
Edition Base EHR definition. The
removal of these criteria would support
burden and cost reductions for health IT
developers and health care providers as
noted above.
i. Problem List
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘problem list’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(a)(6)). The
functionality in this criterion was first
adopted as a 2011 Edition certification
criterion to support the associated
meaningful use Stage 1 objective and
measure for recording problem list
information. In this regard, SNOMED
CT® was adopted specifically to support
the measure. This 2015 Edition
‘‘problem list’’ criterion remains
relatively functionally the same as the
2011 Edition and has exactly the same
functionally as the 2014 Edition
‘‘problem list’’ criterion.
We propose to remove this criterion
for multiple reasons. First, this criterion
no longer supports the ‘‘recording’’
objective and measure of the CMS
Promoting Interoperability Programs as
such objective and measure no longer
exist. Second, the functionality is
sufficiently widespread among health
care providers since it has been part of
certification and the Certified EHR
Technology definition since the 2011
Edition and has not substantively
changed with the 2015 Edition. Third,
we do not believe this functionality
would be removed from health IT
systems because of our proposal to
remove it from the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition. This functionality is
essential to clinical care and would be
in EHR systems absent certification,
particularly considering the limited
certification requirements. Fourth, this
functionality does not directly support
interoperability as the capabilities are
focused on internally recording EHI. In
this regard, representing problems with
SNOMED CT® is part of the USCDI and,
thus, better supports interoperability
through its availability for access and
exchange. Accordingly, we propose to
remove the ‘‘problem list’’ criterion
from the 2015 Edition, including the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition. We
note that once removed from the 2015
Edition, the criterion would also no
longer be included in the 2015 Edition
‘‘safety-enhanced design’’ criterion.
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We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘medication list’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(a)(7)). The
functionality in this criterion was first
adopted as a 2011 Edition certification
criterion to support the associated
meaningful use Stage 1 objective and
measure for recording medication list
information. The criterion does not
require use of a vocabulary standard to
record medications. This 2015 Edition
‘‘medication list’’ criterion remains
functionally the same as the 2011
Edition and 2014 Edition ‘‘medication
list’’ criteria.
We propose to remove this criterion
for multiple reasons. First, this criterion
no longer supports a ‘‘recording’’
objective and measure of the CMS
Promoting Interoperability Programs as
such objective and measure no longer
exist. Second, the functionality is
sufficiently widespread among health
care providers since it has been part of
certification and the Certified EHR
Technology definition since the 2011
Edition and has not substantively
changed with the 2015 Edition. Third,
we do not believe this functionality
would be removed from EHR systems
because of our proposal to remove it
from the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. This functionality is
essential to clinical care and would be
in EHR systems absent certification,
particularly considering the limited
certification requirements. Fourth, this
functionality does not directly support
interoperability as the capabilities are
focused on internally recording EHI. In
this regard, this criterion does not even
require representation of medications in
standardized nomenclature. Fifth,
medications are included in the USCDI
and must be represented in RxNorm as
part of the USCDI. This approach better
supports interoperability through
medication information being
availability for access and exchange in
a structured format. Accordingly, we
propose to remove the ‘‘medications
list’’ criterion from the 2015 Edition,
including the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. We note that once removed
from the 2015 Edition, the criterion
would also no longer be included in the
2015 Edition ‘‘safety-enhanced design’’
criterion.
iii. Medication Allergy List
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘medication allergy list’’
certification criterion (§ 170.315(a)(8)).
The functionality in this criterion was
first adopted as a 2011 Edition
certification criterion to support the
associated meaningful use Stage 1
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objective and measure for recording this
information. The criterion does not
require use of a vocabulary standard to
record medication allergies. This 2015
Edition ‘‘medication allergy list’’
criterion remains functionally the same
as the 2011 Edition and 2014 Edition
‘‘medication allergy list’’ criteria.
We propose to remove this criterion
for multiple reasons. First, this criterion
no longer supports a ‘‘recording’’
objective and measure of the CMS
Promoting Interoperability Programs as
such objective and measure no longer
exist. Second, the functionality is
sufficiently widespread among health
care providers since it has been part of
certification and the Certified EHR
Technology definition since the 2011
Edition and has not substantively
changed with the 2015 Edition. Third,
we do not believe this functionality
would be removed from EHR systems
because of our proposal to remove it
from the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. This functionality is
essential to clinical care and would be
in EHR systems absent certification,
particularly considering the limited
certification requirements. Fourth, this
functionality does not directly support
interoperability as the capabilities are
focused on internally recording EHI. In
this regard, this criterion does not even
require representation of medication
allergies in standardized nomenclature.
Fifth, medication allergies are included
in the USCDI and must be represented
in RxNorm as part of the USCDI. This
approach better supports
interoperability through medication
allergy information being availability for
access and exchange in a structured
format. Accordingly, we propose to
remove the ‘‘medication allergy list’’
criterion from the 2015 Edition,
including the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. We note that once removed
from the 2015 Edition, the criterion
would also no longer be included in the
2015 Edition ‘‘safety- enhanced design’’
criterion.
iv. Smoking Status
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘smoking status’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(11)), which would include
removing it from the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition. We previously adopted
a 2015 Edition ‘‘smoking status’’
certification criterion that does not
reference a standard. However, the
CCDS definition requires smoking status
to be coded in accordance with
SNOMED CT®. While we continue to
believe that the capture of a patient’s
smoking status has significant value in
assisting providers with addressing the
number one cause of preventable death
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and disease in the United States, we no
longer believe that a criterion that
simply ensures this functionality exists
in health IT presented for certification is
the right focus. As with other 2014
Edition functionality, we believe this
functionality is fairly ubiquitous now
with the widespread adoption of health
IT certified to the 2014 Edition. Further,
we continue to believe that, for the
purposes of certification, having
smoking status available for access and
exchange via the USCDI is ultimately
the key requirement for supporting
interoperability.
Removal of Specific USCDI Smoking
Status Code Sets
As mentioned above, we believe
having smoking status available for
USCDI purposes is fundamentally
important for supporting
interoperability. We propose, however,
to remove the requirement to code
smoking status according to the adopted
eight smoking status SNOMED CT®
codes as referenced in the value set in
§ 170.207(h). These eight codes reflect
an attempt to capture smoking status in
a consistent manner. Stakeholder
feedback has, however, indicated that
these eight codes do not appropriately
and accurately capture all applicable
patients’ smoking statuses. Accordingly,
we propose to no longer require use of
only the specific eight SNOMED CT®
codes for representing smoking status
(and remove the standard from
§ 170.207). Rather, to continue to
promote interoperability while also
granting providers with flexibility to
better support clinical care, we propose
that health IT would simply be required
to be capable of representing smoking
status in SNOMED CT® when such
information is exchanged as part of the
USCDI.
b. Drug-Formulary and Preferred Drug
Lists
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘drug formulary and preferred
drug list checks’’ criterion in
§ 170.315(a)(10). We adopted a 2015
Edition ‘‘drug-formulary and preferred
drug list checks’’ criterion that separates
drug formulary and preferred drug list
functionality, but does not require any
standards or functionality beyond that
included in the 2014 Edition ‘‘drugformulary checks’’ criterion. First, we
believe this functionality is fairly
ubiquitous now with the widespread
adoption of health IT certified to the
2014 Edition, which included this
general functionality. Second, without
standards, this criterion does not
support or facilitate the critical goal of
health IT interoperability. Therefore,
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removal of this criterion could reduce
health IT developer and health care
provider burden.
c. Patient-Specific Education Resources
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘patient-specific education
resources’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(13)). ONC continues to
support patient and provider
interaction, and the identification and
dissemination of patient-specific
educational materials to promote
positive health outcomes. However, we
no longer believe that certification
focused on a health IT’s ability to
identifying the existence of patientspecific education materials encourages
the advancement of this functionality or
interoperability. First, this criterion
would no longer be associated with an
objective or measure under the
Promoting Interoperability Programs
based on proposals and determinations
in recent CMS rulemakings (83 FR
35928; 83 FR 41664). Second, based on
the number of health IT products that
have been certified for this functionality
as part of 2014 Edition certification and
already for 2015 Edition certification,
we believe that health IT’s ability to
identify appropriate patient education
materials is widespread now among
health IT developers and their
customers (e.g., health care providers).
Third, we have recently seen innovative
advancements in this field, including
the use of automation and algorithms to
provide appropriate educations
materials to patients in a timely manner.
These advancements help limit clinical
workflow interruptions and demonstrate
the use and promise of health IT to
create efficiencies and improve patient
care. As such, removal of this criterion
would prevent certification from
creating an unnecessary burden for
developers and providers and an
impediment to innovation.
d. CCDS Summary Record—Create; and
CCDS Summary Record—Receive
We assessed the number of products
certified to the 2015 Edition ‘‘Common
Clinical Data Set summary record—
create’’ (§ 170.315(b)(4)) and ‘‘Common
Clinical Data Set summary record—
receive’’ (§ 170.315(b)(5)) criteria that
have not also been certified to the 2015
Edition ‘‘transitions of care’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(1)). We did this because
the 2015 Edition ‘‘CCDS summary
record’’ criteria include the same
functionality as the 2015 Edition
‘‘transitions of care’’ criterion, except for
Direct-related transport functionality.
Based on our findings of only two
unique products certified to these
criteria at the time of the drafting of this
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7437
proposed rule, there appears to be little
market demand for certification to them.
This outcome is likely attributable to the
fact mentioned above regarding their
relationship to the 2015 Edition
‘‘transition of care’’ criterion, that they
are not included in the 2015 Edition
Base EHR definition, and that no HHS
program specifically requires the use of
health IT certified to the criteria.
Therefore, we propose to remove these
certification criteria from the 2015
Edition.
e. Secure Messaging
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘secure messaging’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(e)(2)). ONC strongly supports
patient and provider communication, as
well as protecting the privacy and
security of patient information.
However, we no longer believe that
separate certification focused on a
health IT’s ability to send and receive
secure messages between health care
providers and patients is necessary.
First, this criterion would no longer be
associated with an objective or measure
under the Promoting Interoperability
Programs based on proposals and
determinations in recent CMS
rulemakings (83 FR 41664; 83 FR
35929). Second, there are multiple other
2015 Edition certification criteria that
support patient engagement, such as the
2015 Edition ‘‘view, download, and
transmit to 3rd party,’’ ‘‘API,’’ and
‘‘patient health information capture’’
certification criteria. Third, we have
seen developers integrate this
functionality as part of other patient
engagement features, such as patient
portals. With these considerations in
mind and the lack of a negative impact
on health IT interoperability, we believe
that the removal of this criterion will
help reduce burden and costs, while
also spurring further innovations in
patient engagement.
5. Removal of Certain ONC Health IT
Certification Program Requirements
We propose to remove certain
mandatory disclosure requirements and
a related attestation requirement under
the Program. We believe removal of
these requirements will reduce costs
and burden for Program stakeholders,
particularly health IT developers and
ONC–ACBs. We welcome comment on
the proposed removal of these
requirements and any other certification
or Program requirements we should
consider for removal.
a. Limitations Disclosures
We propose to remove
§ 170.523(k)(1)(iii)(B), which requires
ONC–ACBs to ensure that certified
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health IT includes a detailed description
of all known material information
concerning limitations that a user may
encounter in the course of
implementing and using the certified
health IT, whether to meet ‘‘meaningful
use’’ objectives and measures or to
achieve any other use within the scope
of the health IT’s certification. We also
propose to remove § 170.523(k)(1)(iv)(B)
and (C), which state that the types of
information required to be disclosed
include, but are not limited to: (B)
Limitations, whether by contract or
otherwise, on the use of any capability
to which technology is certified for any
purpose within the scope of the
technology’s certification; or in
connection with any data generated in
the course of using any capability to
which health IT is certified; (C)
Limitations, including but not limited to
technical or practical limitations of
technology or its capabilities, that could
prevent or impair the successful
implementation, configuration,
customization, maintenance, support, or
use of any capabilities to which
technology is certified; or that could
prevent or limit the use, exchange, or
portability of any data generated in the
course of using any capability to which
technology is certified.
These disclosure requirements
regarding certified health IT limitations
are superseded by the Cures Act
information blocking provision and
Conditions of Certification, which we
are implementing with this proposed
rule. In particular, section
3001(c)(5)(D)(ii) of the Cures Act
requires that a health IT developer, as a
Condition of Certification under the
Program, provide assurances to the
Secretary that, unless for legitimate
purposes specified by the Secretary, the
developer will not take any action that
constitutes information blocking as
defined in section 3022(a) of the PHSA,
or any other action that may inhibit the
appropriate exchange, access, and use of
electronic health information. These
assurances specifically focus on
preventing information blocking and
promoting appropriate exchange, access,
and use of electronic health
information. We further propose adding
as a complementary Condition of
Certification that developers would be
prohibited from taking any action that
could interfere with a user’s ability to
access or use certified capabilities for
any purpose within the scope of the
technology’s certification. Such actions
may inhibit the appropriate access,
exchange, or use of electronic health
information and are therefore contrary
to this proposed Condition of
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Certification and the statutory provision
that it implements. Based on these
Conditions of Certification, we believe
that disclosures of limitations by health
IT developers would be unlikely and
unnecessary given their prohibition.
b. Transparency and Mandatory
Disclosures Requirements
We propose to remove the Principle of
Proper Conduct (PoPC) in
§ 170.523(k)(2), which requires a health
IT developer to submit an attestation
that it will disclose all of the
information in its mandatory
disclosures per § 170.523(k)(1) to
specified parties (e.g., potential
customers or anyone inquiring about a
product quote or description of
services). We propose that this
provision is no longer necessary and
that its removal is appropriate to further
reduce administrative burden for health
IT developers and ONC–ACBs. First, our
experience with developer attestations
to this requirement is that over 90% of
developers with certified health IT have
attested that they will provide
‘‘transparency information.’’ Second,
the information that developers would
be asked to attest to, whether our
proposal above to remove certain
disclosure requirements is finalized or
not, is now readily available on health
IT developers’ websites as the
mandatory disclosure requirements
were implemented almost three years
ago. Therefore, we believe removal of
this requirement is appropriate.
6. Recognition of Food and Drug
Administration Processes
Section 618 of the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation
Act (FDASIA), Public Law 112–144,
required that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), in consultation
with ONC and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)
(collectively referred to as ‘‘the
Agencies’’ 10 for this proposal), develop
a report that contains a proposed
strategy and recommendations on an
appropriate, risk-based regulatory
framework pertaining to health IT,
including mobile medical applications,
that promotes innovation, protects
patient safety, and avoids regulatory
duplication. The FDASIA Health IT
Report of April 2014 11 contains a
proposed strategy and recommendations
on an appropriate, risk-based regulatory
framework pertaining to health IT that
10 ONC is not an agency, but an Office, within the
Department of Health and Human Services.
11 https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedical
ProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/
UCM391521.pdf.
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promotes innovation, protects patient
safety, and avoids regulatory
duplication. Public comments, received
prior to the report and after,12
recommended that health IT
developers/manufacturers apply a single
process that satisfies the requirements of
all agencies and that existing safety and
quality-related processes, systems, and
standards should be leveraged for
patient safety in health IT. On July 27,
2017, FDA announced a voluntary
Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Pilot
Program as part of a broader Digital
Health Innovation Action Plan.13 It was
developed in order to create a tailored
approach toward recognizing the unique
characteristics of digital technology by
looking first at the firm, rather than
primarily at each product of the firm, as
is currently done for traditional medical
products. The FDA plans to explore
whether and how pre-certified
companies that have demonstrated a
culture of quality, patient safety, and
organizational excellence could bring
certain types of digital health products
to market either without FDA premarket
review or with a more streamlined FDA
premarket review.
a. FDA Software Pre-Certification Pilot
Program
ONC believes that health IT
developers that hold precertification
under the FDA Digital Health Software
Precertification Program (FDA Software
Precertification Program) when they
present health IT for certification under
the Program could qualify for, and
benefit from, further efficiencies under
the Program. Title IV of the Cures Act
provides ONC with authority under the
Program to oversee health IT developers
through Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements (see section
VII Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification of this proposed rule).
With this new authority and our
authority over health IT developers’
health IT certified under the Program,
we propose to establish processes that
would provide health IT developers that
can document holding precertification
under the FDA Software Precertification
Program with exemptions to the ONC
Health IT Certification Program’s
requirements for testing and
certification of its health IT to the 2015
12 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/
2013/05/30/2013-12817/food-and-drugadministration-safety-and-innovation-act-fdasiarequest-for-comments-on-the; https://blogs.fda.gov/
fdavoice/index.php/2014/04/fda-seeks-commenton-proposed-health-it-strategy-that-aims-topromote-innovation/; and https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-N-0339-0001.
13 https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DigitalHealth/DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/
Default.htm.
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Edition ‘‘quality management systems’’
criterion (§ 170.315(g)(4)) and the 2015
Edition ‘‘safety-enhanced design’’
criterion (§ 170.315(g)(3)), as these
criteria are applicable to the health IT
developer’s health IT presented for
certification. We also believe that such
a ‘‘recognition’’ could, depending on the
final framework of the FDA Software
Precertification Program (e.g., the key
performance indicators used to
demonstrate performance and outcomes
of excellence), be applicable to the
functionally-based 2015 Edition
‘‘clinical’’ certification criteria
(§ 170.315(a)). More specifically, this
could address the ‘‘computerized
provider order entry (CPOE)’’
(§ 170.315(a)(1), (2), and (3)), ‘‘drugdrug, drug-allergy interaction checks for
CPOE’’ (§ 170.315(a)(4)), ‘‘clinical
decision support’’ (§ 170.315(a)(9)), and
‘‘implantable device list’’
(§ 170.315(a)(14)) certification criteria.
Such ‘‘recognition’’ could also be
appropriate to address any or all of the
following functionally-based 2015
Edition criteria in the event their
proposed removal is not finalized:
‘‘problem list’’ (§ 170.315(a)(6)),
‘‘medication list’’ (§ 170.315(a)(7)),
‘‘medication allergy list’’
(§ 170.315(a)(8)), ‘‘drug-formulary and
preferred drug list checks’’
(§ 170.315(a)(10)),’’ and ‘‘smoking
status’’ (§ 170.315(a)(11)).
Our proposed ‘‘recognition’’ would
align with both Executive Orders 13563
and 13771 regarding deregulatory, less
burdensome, and more effective
initiatives. It would also serve as a
regulatory relief for those health IT
developers qualifying as small
businesses under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (see section XIV.C.3
Regulatory Flexibility Act of this
proposed rule). Furthermore, it would
closely align with FDASIA’s instruction
to promote innovation, protect patient
safety, and avoid regulatory duplication.
However, despite these proffered
benefits, there may be reasons not to
adopt such a ‘‘recognition’’ approach.
For example, stakeholders may not
agree that the FDA Software
Precertification Program (and/or
subsequent finalized program)
sufficiently aligns with our Program.
Developers and providers may have
varying and divergent views about the
benefits and detriments of such an
approach. Further, while we believe that
we could properly operationalize such
an approach by ensuring certifications
indicate which criteria have been
‘‘deemed certified’’ by ONC (but still
subject to ONC–ACB surveillance),
stakeholders may have other operational
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concerns. Accordingly, we welcome
comments on these and other aspects of
our proposed ‘‘recognition’’ approach,
including the 2015 Edition certification
criteria that should be eligible for
‘‘recognition.’’
b. Development of Similar Independent
Program Processes—Request for
Information
Recognition of the FDA Software PreCertification Program for purposes of
our Program, as noted above, may
eventually be determined to be
infeasible or insufficient to meet our
goals of reducing burden and promoting
innovation. With this in mind, we
request comment on whether ONC
should establish new regulatory
processes tailored towards recognizing
the unique characteristics of health IT
(e.g., EHR software) by looking first at
the health IT developer, rather than
primarily at the health IT presented for
certification, as is currently done under
the Program. For example, ONC could
possibly establish Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements, through rulemaking, that
facilitate the deeming of all of a health
IT developer’s health IT as ‘‘certified’’
under the Program for certification
criteria identified by ONC as solely
‘‘functionally-based’’ criteria (i.e., not
essential to interoperability, such as the
‘‘CPOE’’ criteria) or possibly broader in
scope. This approach could rely on, but
not be limited to, one or a combination
of the following: (1) Certain
demonstrated health IT developer
processes or health IT functionality; (2)
prior successful certification of a health
IT developer’s health IT under the
Program; (3) results of real world testing
for interoperability as required by the
Cures Act and the proposed
implementing regulatory Condition of
Certification (see section VII.B.5 of this
proposed rule); and/or (4) the results of
the EHR Reporting Program once
implemented (see section VII.B.7 of this
proposed rule). No matter the specifics,
we are most interested in whether
stakeholders believe this is an approach
we should pursue in conjunction with,
or in lieu of, the proposed approach of
recognizing the FDA Software PreCertification Pilot Program. We also
welcome more specific comments on
the health IT developer criteria for such
an approach and what the Conditions
and/or Maintenance of Certification
requirements should be to support such
an approach within the framework of
the proposed Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements discussed in section VII of
this proposed rule.
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7439
IV. Updates to the 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria
This rule proposes to update the 2015
Edition by revising and adding
certification criteria that would
establish the capabilities and related
standards and implementation
specifications for the certification of
health IT. The updates to the 2015
Edition would enhance interoperability
and improve the accessibility of patient
records consistent with section 4006(a)
of the Cures Act.
A. Standards and Implementation
Specifications
1. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
The National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act (NTTAA) of 1995
(15 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.) and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A–119 14 require the use of,
wherever practical, technical standards
that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies to
carry out policy objectives or activities,
with certain exceptions. The NTTAA
and OMB Circular A–119 provide
exceptions to electing only standards
developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, namely
when doing so would be inconsistent
with applicable law or otherwise
impractical. Agencies have the
discretion to decline the use of existing
voluntary consensus standards if
determined that such standards are
inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical, and instead use a
government-unique standard or other
standard. In addition to the
consideration of voluntary consensus
standards, the OMB Circular A–119
recognizes the contributions of
standardization activities that take place
outside of the voluntary consensus
standards process. Therefore, in
instances where use of voluntary
consensus standards would be
inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impracticable, other
standards should be considered that
meet the agency’s regulatory,
procurement or program needs, deliver
favorable technical and economic
outcomes, and are widely utilized in the
marketplace. In this proposed rule, we
use voluntary consensus standards
except for:
• The standard we propose to adopt in
§ 170.213. We propose to remove the
Common Clinical Data Set (CCDS) definition
and effectively replace it with a government
14 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A119/revised_
circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf.
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unique standard, the United States Core Data
for Interoperability (USCDI), Version 1(v1);
• The standard we propose to adopt in
§ 170.215(a)(2). We propose the government
unique API Resource Collection in Health
(ARCH) Version 1 implementation
specification;
• The standards we propose to adopt in
§ 170.215(a)(3) through (5) for application
programming interfaces (APIs). These market
driven consortia standards have been
developed through a streamlined process that
does not meet the full definition of voluntary
consensus standards development but still
includes representation from those interested
in the use cases supported by the standards
(e.g., health IT developers and health care
providers). In the absence of available
voluntary consensus standards that would
meet our needs, these standards deliver
favorable technical and economic outcomes,
particularly improved interoperability.
Further, some of these standards may
eventually proceed through a standards
development organization for approval; and
• The standards we propose to adopt in
§ 170.205(h)(3) and (k)(3). We propose to
replace the current HL7 QRDA standards
with government unique standards that more
effectively support the associated
certification criterion’s use case, which is
reporting eCQM data to CMS.
2. Compliance With Adopted Standards
and Implementation Specifications
In accordance with Office of the
Federal Register regulations related to
‘‘incorporation by reference,’’ 1 CFR
part 51, which we follow when we
adopt proposed standards and/or
implementation specifications in any
subsequent final rule, the entire
standard or implementation
specification document is deemed
published in the Federal Register when
incorporated by reference therein with
the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register. Once published,
compliance with the standard and
implementation specification includes
the entire document unless we specify
otherwise. For example, if we adopted
the Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide (IG) proposed in
this proposed rule (see section
VII.B.4.b), health IT certified to
certification criteria referencing this IG
would need to demonstrate compliance
with all mandatory elements and
requirements of the IG. If an element of
the IG is optional or permissive in any
way, it would remain that way for
testing and certification unless we
specified otherwise in regulation. In
such cases, the regulatory text would
preempt the permissiveness of the IG.
3. ‘‘Reasonably Available’’ to Interested
Parties
The Office of the Federal Register has
established requirements for materials
(e.g., standards and implementation
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specifications) that agencies propose to
incorporate by reference in the Code of
Federal Regulations (79 FR 66267; 1
CFR 51.5(a)). To comply with these
requirements, in section XI
(‘‘Incorporation by Reference’’) of this
preamble, we provide summaries of,
and uniform resource locators (URLs) to,
the standards and implementation
specifications we propose to adopt and
subsequently incorporate by reference
in the Code of Federal Regulations. To
note, we also provide relevant
information about these standards and
implementation specifications
throughout the relevant sections of the
proposed rule.
B. Revised and New 2015 Edition
Criteria
In order to capture and share patient
data efficiently, health care providers
need health IT that store data in
structured formats. Structured data
allows health care providers to easily
retrieve and transfer patient
information, and use health IT in ways
that can aid patient care. We propose to
adopt revised and new 2015 Edition
certification criteria, including new
standards, to support these objectives.
Some of these criteria and standards are
included in the Certified EHR
Technology (CEHRT) definition used for
participation in HHS Programs, such as
the Promoting Interoperability Programs
(formerly the EHR Incentive Programs),
some are required to be met for
participation in the ONC Health IT
Certification Program, and some, though
beneficial, are unassociated with the
CEHRT definition and not required for
participating in any HHS program,
including the ONC Health IT
Certification Program.
1. The United States Core Data for
Interoperability Standard (USCDI)
The initial focus of the Program was
to support the Medicare and Medicaid
EHR Incentive Programs (76 FR 1294)
now referred to as the Promoting
Interoperability Programs (and
referenced as such hereafter). As such,
the 2014 Edition certification criteria
mirrored those functions specified by
Promoting Interoperability Programs’
objectives and measures. In order to
improve efficiency and streamline the
common data within our Program’s
certification criteria, we created a single
definition for all the required data
which could be referenced for all
applicable certification criteria. We
created the term ‘‘Common MU Data
Set’’ to encompass the common set of
MU data types/elements (and associated
vocabulary standards) for which
certification would be required across
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several certification criteria (77 FR
54170).
The 2015 Edition final rule modified
the Program to make it open and
accessible to more types of health IT,
and health IT that supports various care
and practice settings beyond those
included in the Promoting
Interoperability Programs (80 FR 62604).
In comparison to the previous editions,
the 2015 Edition focused on identifying
health IT components necessary to
establish an interoperable nationwide
health information infrastructure,
fostering innovation and open new
market opportunities, and allowing for
more health care provider and patient
choices in electronic health information
access and exchange. In order to align
with this approach, we revised the
concept of the ‘‘Common MU Data Set’’
definition and changed the name to the
‘‘Common Clinical Data Set’’ (CCDS)
definition. The CCDS definition was
further revised in the 2015 Edition
rulemaking to account for new and
updated vocabulary and content
standards in order to improve and
advance interoperability and health
information exchange (80 FR 62604). It
further expanded accessibility and
availability of data exchanged by
updating the definition of Base
Electronic Health Record (EHR) (2015
Edition Base EHR definition) to include
enhanced data export, transitions of
care, and application programming
interface (API) capabilities, all of which
required that at a minimum the CCDS be
available (80 FR 62602–62604).
The regulatory approach to use and
reference a ‘‘definition’’ to identify
electronic health information, including
with associated vocabulary codes, for
access, exchange and use has had its
drawbacks. While the CCDS definition
served its designed purpose, to cut
down on repetitive text in each of the
certification criteria in which it is
referenced, it also began to be
colloquially used for many different
purposes. As the CCDS definition’s
relevance grew outside of its regulatory
context it became a symbolic and
practical limit to the industry’s
collective interests to go beyond the
CCDS data for access, exchange, and
use. As we move towards value-based
care and the inclusion of data classes
that go beyond clinical data, and as part
of ONC’s continued efforts to evaluate
the availability of a minimum baseline
of data classes that must be commonly
available for interoperable exchange, we
acknowledge the need to change and
improve our regulatory approach to the
CCDS. Therefore, in order to advance
interoperability by ensuring compliance
with new data and vocabulary codes
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sets that support the data, we propose
to remove the ‘‘Common Clinical Data
Set’’ definition and its references from
the 2015 Edition and replace it with the
‘‘United States Core Data for
Interoperability’’ (USCDI) standard. The
USCDI standard aims to achieve the
goals set forth in the Cures Act by
specifying a common set of data classes
for interoperable exchange.
We propose to adopt the USCDI as a
standard as such term is defined in
§ 170.102. In § 170.102, a ‘‘standard’’ is
defined as a ‘‘technical, functional, or
performance-based rule, condition,
requirement, or specification that
stipulates instructions, fields, codes,
data, materials, characteristics, or
actions.’’ The USCDI standard would
comprise data classes, which may be
further delineated into groupings of
specific data element(s). For example,
‘‘patient demographics’’ is a data class
and within that data class there is
‘‘patient name,’’ which is a data
element. As noted in section IV.B.1.b,
for the overall structure and
organization of the USCDI, please
consult www.healthIT.gov/USCDI.
ONC intends to establish and follow
a predictable, transparent, and
collaborative process to expand the
USCDI, including providing
stakeholders with the opportunity to
comment on the USCDI’s expansion.
Once the Secretary adopts the first
version of the USCDI through
rulemaking, which we propose in this
rulemaking, health IT developers would
be allowed to take advantage of the
‘‘Standards Version Advancement
Process’’ flexibility. The Standards
Version Advancement Process,
proposed in Section VII.B.5 (below),
would permit health IT developers to
voluntarily implement and use a new
version of an adopted standard (e.g., the
USCDI), subject to certain conditions
including a requirement that the new
version is approved for use by the
National Coordinator.
a. USCDI 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
We propose to adopt the USCDI
Version 1 (USCDI v1) in § 170.213. 15
The USCDI is a standardized set of
health data classes and constituent data
elements that would be required to
support nationwide electronic health
information exchange. Once adopted in
a final rule, health IT developers would
be required to update their certified
health IT to support the USCDI v1 for
15 We note that USCDI v1is an updated version
and distinguished from the Draft United States Core
Data for Interoperability (USCDI) previously made
available for public review and comment in the
course of its development as a prospective standard.
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all certification criteria affected by this
proposed change. We propose to revise
the following CCDS dependent 2015
Edition certification criteria to
incorporate the USCDI standard:
• ‘‘Transitions of care’’
(§ 170.315(b)(1));
• ‘‘view, download, and transmit to
3rd party’’ (§ 170.315(e)(1));
• ‘‘consolidated CDA creation
performance’’ (§ 170.315(g)(6));
• ‘‘transmission to public health
agencies—electronic case reporting’’
(§ 170.315(f)(5)); and
• ‘‘application access—all data
request’’ (§ 170.315(g)(9)).
We note that we did not include the
‘‘data export’’ criterion (§ 170.315(b)(6))
as we are proposing to remove it and
adopt instead the ‘‘EHI export’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(10)). For similar reasons,
we did not include the ‘‘application
access—data category request’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(g)(8)) because we are
proposing to replace it with the API
certification criterion (§ 170.315(g)(10)),
which derives its data requirements
from the USCDI.
We propose, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the real
world testing Condition of Certification,
that health IT developers with health IT
certified to the five above-identified
certification criteria prior to the
effective date of a subsequent final rule
would have to update such certified
health IT to the proposed revisions. We
further propose, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the real
world testing Condition of Certification,
that health IT developers must provide
the updated certified health IT to all
their customers with health IT
previously certified to the identified
criteria no later than 24 months after the
effective date of a final rule for this
proposed rule. For the purposes of
meeting this compliance timeline, we
expect health IT developers to update
their certified health IT without new
mandatory testing and notify their
ONC–ACB on the date at which they
have reached compliance. Developers
would also need to factor these updates
into their next real world testing plan as
discussed in section VII.B.5 of this
proposed rule. Further, we refer health
IT developer to the next section, which
describes how the USCDI differs from
the current CCDS.
b. USCDI Standard—Data Classes
Included
The USCDI Version 1 (USCDI v1) and
its constituent data elements account for
the public comments we received on the
Draft USCDI and Proposed Expansion
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Process16 published in January 2018 as
well as initial feedback from the Health
IT Advisory Committee. The standard as
we propose to adopt it in § 170.213 also
reflects and acknowledges the burden
that rapidly expanding the USCDI v1
beyond the CCDS could cause. As a
result, the USCDI v1 is a modest
expansion of the CCDS, which we
believe most health IT developers
already support, were already working
toward, or should be capable of
updating their health IT to support in a
timely manner. The following describes
only the delta between the CCDS and
the USCDI v1. For the overall structure
and organization of the USCDI standard,
please consult www.healthIT.gov/
USCDI.
i. Updated Versions of Vocabulary
Standard Code Sets
We propose that the USCDI Version 1
(USCDI v1) include the newest versions
of the ‘‘minimum standard’’ code sets
included in the CCDS available at
publication of a subsequent final rule.
We request comment on this proposal
and on whether this could result in any
interoperability concerns. To note,
criteria such as the 2015 Edition ‘‘family
health history’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(12)), the 2015 Edition
‘‘transmission to immunization
registries’’ criterion (§ 170.315(f)(1)),
and the 2015 Edition ‘‘transmission to
public health agencies—syndromic
surveillance’’ criterion (§ 170.315(f)(2))
reference ‘‘minimum standard’’ code
sets; however, we are considering
changing the certification baseline
versions of the code set for these criteria
from the versions adopted in the 2015
Edition final rule to ensure complete
interoperability alignment. We welcome
comment on whether we should adopt
such an approach.
We also note, for purposes of clarity,
that consistent with § 170.555, unless
the Secretary prohibits the use of a
newer version of an identified minimum
standard code set for certification,
health IT could continue to be certified
or upgraded to a newer version of an
identified minimum standard code set
than that included in USCDI v1 or the
most recent USCDI version that the
National Coordinator has approved for
use in the Program via the Standards
Version Advancement Process.
ii. Address and Phone Number
The USCDI v1 includes new data
elements for ‘‘address’’ and ‘‘phone
number.’’ The inclusion of ‘‘address’’ (to
represent the postal location for the
16 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
draft-uscdi.pdf.
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patient) and ‘‘phone number’’ (to
represent the patient’s telephone
number) would improve the
comprehensiveness of health
information for patient care. The
inclusion of these data elements is also
consistent with the list of patient
matching data elements already
specified in the 2015 Edition
‘‘transitions of care’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(1)(iii)(G)), which
supports the exchange of patient health
information between providers of
patient care.
iii. Pediatric Vital Signs
The USCDI v1 includes the pediatric
vital sign data elements, which are
specified as optional health information
in the 2015 Edition CCDS definition.
Pediatric vital signs include: Head
occipital-frontal circumference for
children less than 3 years of age, BMI
percentile per age and sex for youth 2–
20 years of age, weight for age per length
and sex for children less than 3 years of
age, and the reference range/scale or
growth curve, as appropriate. As
explained in section VI.A.2 of this
proposed rule, the inclusion of pediatric
vital sign data elements in the draft
USCDI v1 would align with the
provisions of the Cures Act related to
health IT to support the health care of
children. Stakeholders emphasized the
value of pediatric vital sign data
elements to better support the safety and
quality of care delivered to children. We
also note that, as discussed in the 2015
Edition proposed rule, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
recommends the use of these pediatric
vital signs for settings of care in which
pediatric and adolescent patients are
seen (80 FR 16818–16819) as part of best
practices. The availability of a reference
range/scale or growth curve would help
with proper interpretation of the
measurements for the BMI percentile
per age and sex and weight for age per
length and sex. Further, the inclusion of
this health information in the USCDI v1
is the appropriate next step after first
specifying them as optional in the CCDS
definition as part of the 2015 Edition
rulemaking and as a means of
supporting patient access to their EHI in
a longitudinal format through certified
health IT (see section 3009(e)(2)(A)(i) of
the PHSA as amended by the Cures
Act). We recognize, however, that
certain health IT developers and their
customers may not find these
capabilities and information useful.
Therefore, we request comment on the
inclusion of pediatric vital signs in the
USCDI v1, including the potential
benefits and costs for all stakeholders
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stemming from its inclusion in the
USCDI v1.
iv. Clinical Notes
The USCDI v1 includes a new data
class, titled ‘‘clinical notes.’’ ‘‘Clinical
notes’’ is included in the USCDI v1
based on significant feedback from the
industry since the 2015 Edition final
rule. We also received feedback during
the Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement (TEFCA)
stakeholder sessions and public
comment period. It has been identified
by stakeholders as highly desirable data
for interoperable exchange. The free text
portion of the clinical notes was most
often relayed by clinicians as the data
they sought, but were often missing
during electronic health information
exchange. Clinical notes can be
composed of text generated from
structured (pick-list and/or check the
box) fields as well as unstructured (free
text) data. A clinical note may include
the assessment, diagnosis, plan of care
and evaluation of plan, patient teaching,
and other relevant data points.
We recognize that a number of
different clinical notes could be useful
for stakeholders. It is our understanding
that work is being done in the
community to focus on a subset of
clinical notes. We considered three
options for identifying the different
‘‘note types’’ to adopt in USCDI v1. The
first option we considered would allow
for the community to offer any and all
recommended notes. The second option
we considered would set a minimum
standard of eight note types. This option
was derived from the eight note types
identified by the Argonaut Project
participants.17 The third option we
identified would look to the eleven HL7
Consolidated Clinical Data Architecture
(C–CDA) document types identified in
the C–CDA Release 2.1, which also
included the note types being identified
by the Argonaut Project participants. We
ultimately decided to move forward
with the second option because it unites
public and private interests toward the
same goal. The eight selected note types
are a minimum bar and, in the future,
the USCDI may be updated to include
other clinical notes. Specifically, we
propose to include the following
clinical note types for both inpatient
and outpatient (primary care, emergency
department, etc.) settings in USCDI v1
as a minimum standard: (1) Discharge
Summary note; (2) History & Physical;
(3) Progress Note; (4) Consultation Note;
17 Link to the Clinical Notes Argonaut Project
identified (to clarify: Seven bullets are listed,
however, we split laboratory and pathology note
types into their own note) https://wiki.hl7.org/
index.php?title=201805_Clinical_Notes_Track.
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(5) Imaging Narrative; (6) Laboratory
Report Narrative; (7) Pathology Report
Narrative; and (8) Procedures Note. We
seek comment on whether to include
additional note types as part of the
USCDI v1.
v. Provenance
The USCDI v1 also includes a new
data class, titled ‘‘provenance.’’
‘‘Provenance’’ has been identified by
stakeholders 18 as valuable for
interoperable exchange. The provenance
of data was also referenced by
stakeholders as a fundamental need to
improve the trustworthiness and
reliability of the data being exchanged.
Provenance describes the metadata, or
extra information about data, that can
help answer questions such as when
and who created the data.
The inclusion of ‘‘provenance’’ as a
data class in the USCDI v1 would also
complement the Cures Act requirement
to support the exchange of data through
the use of APIs. This approach differs
from the exchange of data via the C–
CDA. While C–CDAs are often critiqued
due to their relative ‘‘length,’’ the C–
CDA represents the output of a clinical
encounter and includes relevant
context. The same will not always be
true in an API context. APIs facilitate
the granular exchange of data and, as
noted in the 2015 Edition final rule,
offer the potential to aggregate data from
multiple sources in a web or mobile
application (80 FR 62675). The
inclusion of provenance would help
retain the relevant context so the
recipient can better understand the
origin of the data. As noted in section
VII.B.4, we are also proposing to include
provenance in our proposed ‘‘API
Resource Collection in Health’’ (ARCH)
Version 1 implementation specification
in § 170.215(a)(2), which would list a set
of base Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources (FHIR®) resources that Health
IT Modules certified to the proposed
API criterion (§ 170.315(g)(10)) would
need to support.
We propose to further delineate the
provenance data class into three data
elements: ‘‘the author,’’ which
represents the person(s) who is
responsible for the information; ‘‘the
author’s time stamp,’’ which indicates
the time the information was recorded;
and ‘‘the author’s organization,’’ which
would be the organization the author is
associated with at the time they
interacted with the data. We have
identified these three data elements as
fundamental for data recipients to have
18 https://www.healthit.gov/topic/interoperability/
trusted-exchange-framework-and-commonagreement.
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available and both are commonly
captured and currently available
through standards. We request comment
on the inclusion of these three data
elements and whether any other
provenance data elements, such as the
identity of the individual or entity the
data was obtained from or sent by
(sometimes discussed in standards
working groups as the provenance of the
data’s ‘‘last hop’’), would be essential to
include as part of the USCDI v1
standard. We acknowledge that there is
currently work to help define
provenance in a standard robust
manner, and we anticipate adopting the
industry consensus once it becomes
available.
vi. Unique Device Identifier(s) for a
Patient’s Implantable Device(s)
We are aware of a recently published
implementation guide (IG) within HL7
that provides further guidance on the
unique device identifier (UDI)
requirements. The IG, Health Level 7
(HL7®) CDA R2 Implementation Guide:
C–CDA Supplemental Templates for
Unique Device Identification (UDI) for
Implantable Medical Devices, Release
1–US Realm,19 identifies changes
needed to the C–CDA to better facilitate
the exchange of the individual UDI
components in the health care system
when devices are implanted in a
patient. The UDI components include
the Device Identifier (DI) and the
following individual production
identifiers: The lot or batch number,
serial number, manufacturing date,
expiration date, and distinct
identification code. However, as this
new IG has been recently published, we
request comment on whether we should
add this UDI IG as a requirement for
health IT to adopt in order to meet the
requirements for UDI USCDI Data Class.
In addition, we do not have a reliable
basis on which to estimate how much it
would cost to meet the requirements
outlined in the UDI IG; and, therefore,
we request comment on the cost and
burden of complying with this proposed
requirement.
class and creating a new data class
titled, ‘‘Substance Reactions,’’ which
would be meant to be inclusive of
‘‘Medication Allergies.’’ The new
‘‘Substance Reactions’’ data class would
include the following data elements:
‘‘Substance’’ and ‘‘Reaction,’’ and
include SNOMED CT as an additional
applicable standard for non-medication
substances.
c. USCDI Standard—Relationship to
Content Exchange Standards and
Implementation Specifications
In order to align with our approach to
be responsive to the evolution of
standards and to facilitate updates to
newer versions of standards, the USCDI
v1 (§ 170.213) is ‘‘content exchange’’
standard agnostic. It establishes ‘‘data
policy’’ and does not directly associate
with the content exchange standards
and implementation specifications
which, given a particular context, may
be necessary to exchange the entire
USCDI, a USCDI class, or elements
within it. To our knowledge, all data
classes in the USCDI v1 can be
supported by commonly used ‘‘content
exchange’’ standards, including HL7 C–
CDA Release 2.1 and FHIR®.
vii. Medication Data Request for
Comment
The USCDI v1 ‘‘Medication’’ data
class includes two constituent data
elements within it: Medications and
Medication Allergies. With respect to
the latter, Medication Allergies, we
request comment on an alternative
approach. This alternative would result
in removing the Medication Allergies
data element from the Medication data
d. Clinical Notes C–CDA
Implementation Specification
In conjunction with our proposal to
adopt the USCDI v1, we propose to
adopt the HL7 CDA® R2 IG: C–CDA
Templates for Clinical Notes R1
Companion Guide, Release 1 in
§ 170.205(a)(4)(i) (‘‘C–CDA Companion
Guide’’). The C–CDA Companion Guide
provides supplemental guidance and
additional technical clarification for
specifying data in the C–CDA Release
2.1.20 As noted above, the proposed
USCDI v1 includes new data classes,
such as ‘‘clinical notes,’’ which are
further supported through the C–CDA
Companion Guide. For example, the C–
CDA Companion Guide provides
specifications for clinical notes by
indicating that clinical notes should be
recorded in ‘‘note activity’’ and requires
references to other discrete data, such as
‘‘encounters.’’ The C–CDA Companion
Guide also enhances implementation of
the 2015 Edition certification criteria
that reference the C–CDA Release 2.1
(§ 170.205(a)(4)). As noted by
stakeholders, the C–CDA Release 2.1
includes some optionality and
ambiguity with respect to data element
components, such as the locations and
value sets. We attempted to address
some of this optionality by clarifying
requirements using Certification
19 https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/
product_brief.cfm?product_id=486.
20 https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/
product_brief.cfm?product_id=447.
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Companion Guides (CCGs) 21 and by
specifying in the CCDS definition where
certain data should be placed in the C–
CDA Release 2.1 templates (e.g., ‘‘goals’’
in the goals section).22 The C–CDA
Companion Guide, which was released
after the 2015 Edition final rule,
provides similar, but additional C–CDA
implementation structure. For example,
race and ethnicity are required data
elements in the USCDI (formerly the
CCDS) and must be included in C–CDA
exchanges if known, or they may be
marked with a nullFlavor of UNK
(unknown) if not known. The C–CDA
Release 2.1 is unclear on the location
and value set, but the C–CDA
Companion Guide clarifies the location
and value set. The adoption of the C–
CDA Companion Guide would align
with our goal to increase the consistent
implementation of standards among
health IT developers and improve
interoperability. We propose to adopt
this C–CDA Companion Guide to
support best practice implementation of
USCDI v1 data classes and 2015 Edition
certification criteria that reference C–
CDA Release 2.1 (§ 170.205(a)(4)). The
criteria include:
• ‘‘Transitions of care’’
(§ 170.315(b)(1));
• ‘‘clinical information reconciliation
and incorporation’’ (§ 170.315(b)(2));
• ‘‘care plan’’ (§ 170.315(b)(9));
• ‘‘view, download, and transmit to
3rd party’’ (§ 170.315(e)(1));
• ‘‘consolidated CDA creation
performance’’ (§ 170.315(g)(6)); and
• ‘‘application access—all data
request’’ (§ 170.315(g)(9)).
We propose, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the real
world testing Condition of Certification,
that health IT developers with health IT
certified to the six above-identified
certification criteria prior to the
effective date of a subsequent final rule
would have to update such certified
health IT to the proposed revisions. We
further propose, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the real
world testing Condition of Certification,
that health IT developers must provide
the updated certified health IT to all
their customers with health IT
previously certified to the identified
criteria no later than 24 months after the
effective date of a final rule for this
proposed rule. For the purposes of
meeting this compliance timeline, we
expect health IT developers to update
their certified health IT without new
mandatory testing and notify their
21 https://www.healthit.gov/topic/certificationehrs/2015-edition-test-method.
22 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
topiclanding/2018-04/2015Ed_CCG_CCDS.pdf.
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ONC–ACB on the date at which they
have reached compliance. Developers
would also need to factor these updates
into their next real world testing plan as
discussed in section VII.B.5 of this
proposed rule.
2. Electronic Prescribing Standard and
Certification Criterion
We propose to update the electronic
prescribing (e-Rx) SCRIPT standard
used for ‘‘electronic prescribing’’ in the
2015 Edition to NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071, which would result in a new
e-Rx standard becoming the baseline for
certification. We propose to adopt this
standard in § 170.205(b)(1). ONC and
CMS have historically maintained
complementary policies of aligning
health IT certification criteria and
associated standard for e-prescribing
with the CMS Medicare Part D e-Rx and
MH standards (75 FR 44589; 77 FR
54198). To this end, CMS has retired the
current standard (NCPDP SCRIPT
version 10.6) for e-RX and MH and
adopted NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 as the
standard for Part D e-Rx and MH
effective January 1, 2020, conditional on
ONC updating the Program to the
NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard for its
e-Rx certification criterion (see also 42
CFR 423.160(b)(1)(v) and (2)(iv)). In
addition, CMS recently sought comment
regarding whether the NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071 standard could facilitate future
reporting of the proposed Query of
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program
(PDMP) measure in both the 2019
Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule
(83 FR 35923) and Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems (IPPS)
Fiscal Year 2019 proposed rule (83 FR
20528).
As summarized in the IPPS Fiscal
Year 2019 final rule (83 FR 41144), CMS
received comments supportive of using
the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 medication
history transactions for PDMP queries
and responses, as well as comments
asking CMS to seek harmonizing of the
2015 Edition e-prescribing certification
criterion to the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071
standard specified in the part D program
portions of the recent ‘‘Medicare
Program; Contract Year 2019 Policy and
Technical Changes to the Medicare
Advantage, Medicare Cost Plan,
Medicare Fee-for-Service, the Medicare
Prescription Drug Benefit Programs, and
the PACE Program’’ final rule (83 FR
16440).
In addition to proposing to adopt the
NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard for
the transactions that are listed in the
current ‘‘electronic prescribing’’
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(3)), we propose to
adopt and require conformance to all of
the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard
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transactions CMS adopted at 42 CFR
423.160(b)(2)(iv) for NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071. Therefore, we propose to
adopt a new 2015 Edition ‘‘electronic
prescribing’’ criterion (§ 170.315(b)(11))
that includes the following transactions:
• Create new prescriptions (NewRx,
NewRxRequest,
NewRxResponseDenied)
A NewRx transaction is a new
prescription from a prescriber to a
pharmacy so that it can be dispensed to
a patient. A NewRxRequest is a request
from a pharmacy to a prescriber for a
new prescription for a patient. A
NewRxResponseDenied is a denied
response to a previously sent
NewRxRequest (if approved, a NewRx
would be sent). A
NewRxResponseDenied response may
occur when the NewRxRequest cannot
be processed or if information is
unavailable.
• Change prescriptions
(RxChangeRequest,
RxChangeResponse)
An RxChangeRequest transaction
originates from a pharmacy to request:
A change in the original prescription
(new or fillable), validation of prescriber
credentials, a prescriber to review the
drug requested, or a prior authorization
from the payer for the prescription. An
RxChangeResponse transaction
originates from a prescriber to respond:
To a prescription change request from a
pharmacy, to a request for a prior
authorization from a pharmacy, or to a
prescriber credential validation request
from a pharmacy.
• Cancel prescriptions (CancelRx,
CancelRxResponse)
A CancelRx transaction is a request
from a prescriber to a pharmacy to not
fill a previously sent prescription. A
CancelRx must contain pertinent
information for the pharmacy to be able
to find the prescription in their system
(patient, medication (name, strength,
dosage, form), prescriber, prescription
number if available). A
CancelRxResponse is a response from a
pharmacy to a prescriber to
acknowledge a CancelRx, and is used to
denote if the cancellation is Approved
or Denied.
• Renew prescriptions
(RxRenewalRequest,
RxRenewalResponse)
An RxRenewalRequest transaction
originates from a pharmacy to request
additional refills beyond those
originally prescribed.
RxRenewalResponse originates from a
prescriber to respond to the request.
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• Receive fill status notifications
(RxFill, RxFillIndicatorChange)
An RxFill transaction is sent from a
pharmacy to a prescriber or a long term
or post-acute care (LTPAC) facility
indicating the FillStatus (dispensed,
partially dispensed, not dispensed or
returned to stock, transferred to another
pharmacy) of the new, refill, or resupply
prescriptions for a patient.
RxFillIndicator informs the pharmacy of
the prescriber’s intent for fill status
notifications for a specific patient/
medication. An RxFillIndicatorChange
is sent by a prescriber to a pharmacy to
indicate that the prescriber is changing
the types of RxFill transactions that
were previously requested, where the
prescriber may modify the fill status of
transactions previously selected or
cancel future RxFill transactions.
• Request and receive medication
history (RxHistoryRequest,
RxHistoryResponse)
An RxHistoryRequest transaction is a
request from a prescriber for a list of
medications that have been prescribed,
dispensed, claimed, or indicated by a
patient. This request could be sent to a
state Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program (PDMP). An
RxHistoryResponse is a response to an
RxHistoryRequest containing a patient’s
medication history. It includes the
medications that were dispensed or
obtained within a certain timeframe,
and optionally includes the prescriber
that prescribed it. RxHistoryRequest and
RxHistoryResponse transactions may be
sent directly or through an
intermediary.
• Ask the Mailbox if there are any
transactions (GetMessage)
This transaction is used by the
prescriber or pharmacy asking the
mailbox if there are any transactions. It
is at the heart of the mechanism used by
a pharmacy or prescriber system to
receive transactions from each other or
from a payer or the REMS Administrator
via a Switch, acting as a Mailbox.
• Relay acceptance of a transaction back
to the sender (Status)
This transaction is used to relay
acceptance of a transaction back to the
sender. A Status in response to any
applicable transaction other than
GetMessage indicates acceptance and
responsibility for a request. A Status in
response to GetMessage indicates that
no mail is waiting for pickup. A Status
cannot be mailboxed and may not
contain an error.
• Respond that there was a problem
with the transaction (Error)
This transaction indicates an error has
occurred, indicating the request was
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terminated. An Error can be generated
when there is a communication problem
or when the transaction actually had an
error. An error can be mailboxed, as it
may be signifying to the originator that
a transaction was unable to be delivered
or encountered problems in the
acceptance. The Error must be a
different response than a Status, since
the communication between the system
and the Mailbox must clearly denote the
actions taking place. An Error is a
response being delivered on behalf of a
previous transaction, and the Status
signifies no more mail.
• Respond that a transaction requesting
a return receipt has been received
(Verify)
This transaction is a response to a
pharmacy or prescriber indicating that a
transaction requesting a return receipt
has been received. Verifications results
when a ‘‘return receipt requested’’ flag
is set in the original request. Upon
receiving a transaction with
ReturnReceipt set, it is the
responsibility of the receiver to either
generate a Verify in response to the
request (recommended) or generate a
Status in response to this request,
followed subsequently by a free
standing Verify. This transaction
notifies the originator that the
transaction was received at the software
system. It is not a notification of action
taking place, since time may elapse
before the ultimate answer to the
transaction may take place.
• Request to send an additional supply
of medication (Resupply)
This transaction is a request from a
Long Term or Post-Acute Care (LTPAC)
organization to a pharmacy to send an
additional supply of medication for an
existing order. An example use case is
when a medication supply for a resident
is running low (2–3 doses) and a new
supply is needed from the pharmacy,
the LTPAC organization need a way to
notify the pharmacy that an additional
supply for the medication is needed.
• Communicate drug administration
events (DrugAdministration)
This transaction communicates drug
administration events from a prescriber/
care facility to the pharmacy or other
entity. It is a notification from a
prescriber/care facility to a pharmacy or
other entity that a drug administration
event has occurred—for example, a
medication was suspended or
administration was resumed.
• Transfer one or more prescriptions
(RxTransferRequest,
RxTransferResponse,
RxTransferConfirm)
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The RxTransferRequest transaction is
used when the pharmacy is asking for
a transfer of one or more prescriptions
for a specific patient to the requesting
pharmacy. The RxTransferResponse
transaction is the response to the
RxTransferRequest which includes the
prescription(s) being transferred or a
rejection of the transfer request. It is
sent from the transferring pharmacy to
the requesting pharmacy. The
RxTransferConfirm transaction is used
by the pharmacy receiving (originally
requesting) the transfer to confirm that
the transfer prescription has been
received and the transfer is complete.
• Recertify the continued
administration of a medication order
(Recertification)
This transaction is a notification from
a facility, on behalf of a prescriber, to a
pharmacy recertifying the continued
administration of a medication order.
An example use is when an existing
medication order has been recertified by
the prescriber for continued use. Long
term or post-acute care use only.
• Complete Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS)
Transactions (REMSInitiationRequest,
REMSInitiationResponse,
REMSRequest, and REMSResponse)
With CMS’ recent adoption of these
transactions in their recently issued
final rule associated with e-prescribing
for Medicare Part D (42 CFR
423.160(b)(2)(iv)(W)–(Z)), we believe
that it would be equally beneficial to
include these four REMS transactions as
part of this proposed certification
criterion: REMSInitiationRequest,
REMSInitiationResponse,
REMSRequest, and REMSResponse.
The Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007
(Pub. L. 110–85) enables the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to require a
REMS from a pharmaceutical
manufacturer if the FDA determines that
a REMS is necessary to ensure the
benefits of a drug outweigh the risks
associated with the drug. The currently
approved REMS programs vary in levels
of complexity. Typically a Med Guide
and Communication Plan is required,
but some also require Elements to
Assure Safe Use (ETASU). The large
majority of existing REMS programs are
for drugs dispensed through specialty
pharmacies, clinics, and hospitals, but
as REMS become more common they
may ultimately have a greater impact on
retail-based products.
The impact of REMS is twofold. First,
REMS with ETASU may require the
pharmacist to verify prescriber, patient,
and/or pharmacy enrollment in a
registry and, in some cases, verify or
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7445
check certain information, such as lab
results. Second, all REMS, including
those without ETASU, must fulfill FDAapproved reporting requirements. Each
REMS program must also include a
program assessment schedule that
examines the program’s effectiveness on
intervals approved by the FDA as part
of the overall REMS program. The
results of these assessments are
submitted to the FDA as part of the
ongoing evaluation of REMS program
effectiveness. Accordingly, we propose
to include the REMS transactions as part
of this proposed certification criterion.
We would also note for commenters’
benefit that the SCRIPT 2017071 testing
tool under development is being
designed to support testing these REMS
transactions.
We believe that removing the 2015
Edition certification criterion (codified
in § 170.315(b)(3)) that references
NCPDP SCRIPT version 10.6 and
replacing it with an updated
e-prescribing criterion (proposed to be
codified in § 170.315(b)(11)) would
harmonize with relevant CMS program
timelines, including Part D e-prescribing
requirements and the option for eligible
clinicians, hospitals, and CAHs to report
on the Query of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program (PDMP) quality
measure for Promoting Interoperability
Programs. However, should our
proposal to adopt the new e-prescribing
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(11)) be finalized
prior to January 1, 2020, we also
propose to permit continued
certification to the current 2015 Edition
‘‘electronic prescribing’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(3)) for the period of time
in which it would continue to be used
as a program standard in the CMS
Medicare Part D Program or the CMS
Promoting Interoperability Programs.
Once it is no longer used in those
Programs, we would no longer permit
certification to that criterion and would
remove it from the Code of Federal
Regulations. We will consider setting an
effective date for such actions in a
subsequent final rule based on
stakeholder feedback and CMS policies
at the time. To this point, we note that
the continued acceptability of a Health
IT Module certified to the criterion
codified in § 170.315(b)(3) for purposes
of meeting the CEHRT definition and
participating in the CMS Promoting
Interoperability Programs would be a
matter of CMS policy.
3. Clinical Quality Measures—Report
Criterion
In the 2015 Edition final rule, ONC
adopted four clinical quality measure
(CQM) certification criteria,
§ 170.315(c)(1) CQMs—record and
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export, § 170.315(c)(2) CQMs—import
and calculate, § 170.315(c)(3) CQMs—
report, and § 170.315(c)(4) CQMs—filter
(80 FR 62649–62655). These four
criteria were adopted with the intent to
support providers’ quality improvement
activities and in electronically
generating CQM reports for reporting
with certified health IT to programs
such as the EHR Incentive Programs,
Quality Payment Program, and
Comprehensive Primary Care plus
initiative. All four CQM criteria require
certified health IT to be capable of
generating CQM reports using the HL7
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture (QRDA) Category I
standard, which provides CQM reports
for individual patients. Specifically, we
adopted HL7 CDA® Release 2
Implementation Guide for: Quality
Reporting Document Architecture—
Category I (QRDA I); Release 1, Draft
Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) Release
3 (US Realm)), Volume 1
(§ 170.205(h)(2)). Two of the CQM
criteria, CQMs—report (§ 170.315(c)(3))
and CQMs—filter (§ 170.315(c)(4)), also
require certified health IT to be capable
of generating CQM reports using the
QRDA Category III standard, which
provides aggregate CQM reports for a set
of patients. More specifically, we
adopted QRDA Category III,
Implementation Guide for CDA Release
2 (§ 170.205(k)(1)) and the Errata to the
HL7 Implementation Guide for CDA®
Release 2: QRDA Category III, DSTU
Release 1 (US Realm), September 2014
(§ 170.205(k)(2)).
The ‘‘CQMs—report’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(c)(3)) includes an
optional certification provision for
demonstrating that the health IT can
create QRDA reports in the form and
manner required for submission to CMS
programs, which is in accordance with
CMS’ QRDA Implementation Guide
(IGs).23 The CMS QRDA IGs include
specific requirements to support
providers participating in CMS
programs in addition to the HL7 IGs. At
the time of the finalization of the 2015
Edition final rule and in response to
public comment, we noted that there
was mixed feedback on whether this
criterion should require adherence to
the HL7 QRDA Category I and Category
III standards or solely to the CMS QRDA
IGs. As such, we adopted an approach
that allowed for flexibility and only
required that certified health IT support
the HL7 QRDA standards, which are
program-agnostic and can support a
number of use cases for exchanging
CQM data. Because the criterion has the
23 https://ecqi.healthit.gov/qrda-quality-reportingdocument-architecture.
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optional provision for CMS programspecific certification, developers can
also support their end-users who intend
to use their certified health IT to report
eCQMs to CMS in the ‘‘form and
manner’’ CMS requires (i.e., using the
format specified in the CMS QRDA IGs)
(80 FR 62652).
Since the 2015 Edition final rule was
published (October 16, 2015), we have
gained additional certification
experience and received feedback from
the industry that health IT certified to
the ‘‘CQMs-report’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(c)(3)) are only/primarily
being used to submit eCQMs to CMS for
participation in CMS programs.
Therefore, as a means of reducing
burden, we propose to remove the HL7
QRDA standard requirements from the
2015 Edition CQMs—report criterion in
§ 170.315(c)(3), but require that health
IT certified to the criterion support the
CMS QRDA IGs. This would directly
reduce burden on health IT developers
and indirectly providers as they would
no longer have to, in practice, develop
(health IT developers) and support (both
developers and providers) two forms of
the QRDA standard (i.e., the HL7 and
CMS forms). We note that the Fast
Health Interoperability Resources
(FHIR) standard offers the potential for
supporting quality improvement and
reporting needs and promises to be a
more efficient, modular, and
interoperable standard to develop,
implement, and utilize through APIs.
However, until the potential benefits of
FHIR APIs can be realized for quality
improvement and reporting, we believe
that solely requiring the CMS QRDA IGs
for the ‘‘CQMs—report’’ criterion
balances the burden to developers and
providers, while still meeting the goal of
facilitating quality improvement and
reporting to CMS.
To support the proposal, we propose
to incorporate by reference the latest
annual CMS QRDA IGs, specifically the
2019 CMS QRDA I Implementation
Guide for Hospital Quality Reporting 24
and the 2019 CMS QRDA III
Implementation Guide for Eligible
Professionals (EPs) and Eligible
Clinicians.25 A Health IT Module would
need to be certified to both standards to
provide flexibility to providers.
However, we solicit comment on
whether we should consider an
approach that permits certification to
only one of the standards depending on
the care setting for which the product is
24 https://ecqi.healthit.gov/system/files/QRDA_
HQR_2019_CMS_IG_final_508.pdf.
25 https://ecqi.healthit.gov/system/files/2019_
CMS_QRDA_III_Eligible_Clinicians_and_EP_IG508.pdf.
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designed and implemented. We also
solicit comment on the future
possibility of FHIR-enabled APIs
replacing or complementing QRDA
reports for quality reporting and
improvement.
If we finalize this proposal in a
subsequent final rule, we propose to
adopt the latest CMS QRDA IGs at the
time of final rule publication, as CMS
updates their QRDA IGs annually to
support the latest eCQM specifications
and only accepts eCQM reporting to the
latest version.
We note that this approach would
also facilitate a means for ONC to permit
developers to update its certified health
IT to newer versions of the CMS QRDA
IGs through the real world testing
Maintenance of Certification provision
for standards and implementation
specification updates in support of
ongoing interoperability (see section
VII.B.5 of this proposed rule).
4. Electronic Health Information Export
We propose to adopt a new 2015
Edition certification criterion for EHI
export in § 170.315(b)(10). This criterion
is intended to provide patients and
health IT users with a means to
efficiently export the entire electronic
health record for a single patient or all
patients in a computable, electronic
format, and facilitate the receiving
health IT system’s interpretation and
use of the EHI, to the extent reasonably
practicable using the developer’s
existing technology.
This outcome would promote access,
exchange, and use of EHI and facilitate
health care providers’ ability to switch
health IT systems or to migrate EHI for
use in other technologies. Additionally,
as discussed in section VII.B.2 of this
preamble, certification to this criterion
would provide some degree of assurance
that a health IT developer supports, and
does not inhibit, the access, exchange,
and use of EHI for the specific use cases
that the criterion addresses.
This proposed criterion supports two
specific use cases for which we believe
that all EHI produced and electronically
managed in a developer’s technology
should be made readily available for
export as a standard capability of
certified health IT.
First, we propose that health IT
certified to this criterion would have to
enable the export of EHI for a single
patient upon a valid request from that
patient or a user on the patient’s behalf.
This patient-focused export capability,
which is discussed in more detail
below, complements other provisions of
this proposed rule that support patients’
access to their EHI including
information that may eventually be
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accessible via the APIs described in
section VII.B.4 of this preamble.
Ultimately, we expect all data to be
transferred through APIs or other
advanced technologies. EHI export also
supports longitudinal data record
development, and aligns with section
4006(a) of the Cures Act, which requires
[t]he Secretary, in consultation with the
National Coordinator, [to] promote
policies that ensure that a patient’s EHI
is accessible to that patient and the
patient’s designees, in a manner that
facilitates communication with the
patient’s health care providers and other
individuals, including researchers,
consistent with such patient’s consent.
Second, this criterion would support
the export of EHI when a health care
provider chooses to transition or migrate
information to another health IT system.
As discussed in section VIII.C.5.c.iii of
this preamble, health IT developers are
in a unique position to block the export
and portability of data for use in
competing systems or applications, or to
charge rents for access to the basic
technical information needed to
facilitate the conversion or migration of
data for these purposes. By providing at
least a baseline capability for exporting
EHI in a commercially reasonable
format, we believe that this criterion
would help to address some of these
business practices and enable smoother
transitions between health IT systems.
This criterion is intended to further
the two use cases outlined above while
providing an incremental approach
given the known and anticipated health
IT landscape when ONC expects
certified health IT with this
functionality will be widely available in
the ecosystem. At the time of this
rulemaking, we believe a focused
certification criterion that is standardsagnostic will provide a useful first step
to enabling patients to request and
receive their EHI and for providers to
more readily switch or migrate
information between health IT systems.
Understanding that open, standardsbased APIs are an emerging technology
and that some health IT developers
today have implemented proprietary
APIs, this proposed criterion for EHI
export provides an initial method for
exporting patient health information in
these circumstances. Over time, ONC
may consider expanding the proposed
criterion or replacing it to achieve the
goals in § 170.402. It is also possible that
in the future, this criterion will no
longer be needed once standards-based
APIs are widely available in the health
IT ecosystem with the ability to
facilitate exchange of a wider set of
standardized data elements per the
predictable, transparent, and
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collaborative process to expand the
USCDI (see the discussion of the API
Condition of Certification and the
proposed API criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(10) in VII.B.4 for additional
information).
a. Patient Access
As noted above, the export
functionality required by this
certification criterion would support
both a patient’s access to their EHI and
a provider’s ability to switch to another
health IT system. In the patient access
context, we propose that a user must be
able to timely execute the single patient
EHI export at any time the user chooses
and without subsequent developer
assistance to operate. The health IT
developer should enable the user to
make data requests and receive the
export efficiently, without unreasonable
burden. For example, the health IT
developer should not: Require the user
to make a request multiple times for
different types of EHI; provide
unreasonable delays for the export; or
prohibit reasonable user access to the
system during the export process.
‘‘Timely’’ does not mean real-time;
however, we stress that any delays in
providing the export must be no longer
than reasonably necessary to avoid
interference with other clinical
functions of the health IT system. This
is similar to the approach we have taken
for export of clinical quality measure
data. The export capability does not
require that data be received
instantaneously. Rather, as we have
stated before (80 FR 62650) a nonconformity would exist if surveillance
revealed that processing or other delays
were likely to substantially interfere
with the ability of a provider or health
system to view and verify their CQM
results for quality improvement on a
near real-time basis. Similarly, a nonconformity would exist if delays were
causing or contributing to users being
presented with data files that no longer
contained current, accurate, or valid
data. To avoid these implementation
issues and ensure that capabilities
support all required outcomes, health IT
developers should seek to minimize
processing times and other delays to the
greatest extent possible.26
As previously defined under the
Program, ‘‘user’’ is a health care
professional or his or her office staff; or
a software program or service that
would interact directly with the
certified health IT (80 FR 62611, 77 FR
54168). We typically would expect the
‘‘user’’ in this case to be a provider or
26 https://www.healthit.gov/test-method/clinicalquality-measures-cqms-record-and-export#ccg.
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his or her office staff who will be
performing the request on behalf of the
patient given that a request of this
nature would likely occur in the context
of an individual exercising their right of
access under the HIPAA Privacy Rule
(45 CFR 164.524). In this regard, the
proposed 2015 Edition ‘‘EHI export’’
criterion could facilitate and support the
provision of a patient’s record in an
electronic format. In service to
innovative and patient-centric
approaches, a health IT developer could
develop a method that allows the
patient using a technology application
(e.g., portal or ‘‘app’’) to execute the
request without needing a provider to
do so on their behalf. We seek comment
on whether this portion of the criterion
should be made more prescriptive to
only allow the patient and his or her
authorized representative to be the
requestor of their EHI, similar to how
we have previously scoped such criteria
as ‘‘view, download, and transmit to 3rd
party’’ (§ 170.315(e)(1)).
Similar to the 2015 Edition ‘‘data
export’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(6)), which we propose for
removal below, we acknowledge
potential privacy and security concerns
may arise when EHI is exported and,
therefore, propose that for providermediated requests, a developer may
design the health IT to limit the type of
users that would be able to access and
initiate EHI export functions. However,
as we previously specified in the 2015
Edition final rule, the ability to ‘‘limit’’
the single patient EHI export
functionality is intended to be used by
and at the discretion of the provider
organization implementing the
technology, not a way for health IT
developers to implicitly prevent the
overarching user-driven aspect of this
capability (80 FR 62646).
b. Transitions Between Health IT
Systems
In addition to and separate from the
patient access use case described above,
health IT certified to this criterion
would facilitate the migration of EHI to
another health IT system. We propose
that a health IT developer of health IT
certified to this criterion must, at a
customer’s request, provide a complete
export of all EHI that is produced or
managed by means of the developer’s
certified health IT. Health IT developers
would have flexibility as to how this
outcome is achieved, so long as a
customer is able to receive the export in
a timely and efficient manner, and in a
format that is commercially reasonable.
For example, in contrast with the
patient export capability, which must be
available to a user without subsequent
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developer assistance to operate, the
‘‘database export’’ capability of this
criterion could require action or support
on the part of the health IT developer.
We note that while this criterion
focuses on the technical outcomes
supported by this capability, developers
of health IT certified to this criterion
would be required to provide the
assurances proposed in § 170.402,
which include providing reasonable
cooperation and assistance to other
persons (including customers, users,
and third-party developers) to enable
the use of interoperable products and
services. Thus, while developers would
have flexibility as to how they
implement the export functionality for
transitions between systems, they would
ultimately be responsible for ensuring
that the capability is deployed in a way
that enables a customer and their thirdparty contractors to successfully migrate
data. Such cooperation and assistance
could include, for example, assisting a
customer’s third-party developer to
automate the export of EHI to other
systems. We refer readers to section
VII.B.2 of the proposed rule for further
discussion of a health IT developer’s
assurances as proposed in § 170.402.
c. Scope of EHI
For both use cases supported by this
criterion, EHI export encompasses all
the EHI that the health IT system
produces and electronically manages for
a patient or group of patients. This
applies to the health IT’s entire
database, including but not limited to
clinical, administrative, and claims/
billing data. It would also include any
data that may be stored in separate data
warehouses that the system has access
to, can produce, and electronically
manages. For example, health IT
developers may store EHI in these
warehouses to prevent performance
impacts from data queries that may slow
down the ‘‘main’’ health IT system’s
(e.g., EHR) clinical performance. We
clarify that ‘‘EHI’’ also includes the
oldest EHI available on that patient to
the most recent, no matter the specific
electronic format (e.g., PDFs are
included). As mentioned above, our
intention is that ‘‘produces and
electronically manages’’ refers to a
health IT product’s entire database.
However, we seek comment on the
terminology used (‘‘produces and
electronically manages’’) and whether
that captures our intent or whether there
are any alternatives to the language we
should consider to further clarify our
intent. Alternative language we
considered included ‘‘produce and
electronically retain’’ data, which could
encompass more data.
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The use of the term ‘‘electronic health
information’’ (EHI) is deliberate and in
alignment with the Cures Act and the
proposed definition of this term in
§ 170.102. Its use supports consistency
and the breadth of types of data
envisioned by this criterion. Clinical
data would encompass imaging
information—both images and narrative
text about the image—as this is part of
the patient’s total record; however, we
understand that EHRs may not be the
standard storage location for images and
solicit comment on the feasibility,
practicality, and necessity of exporting
images and/or imaging information. We
request comment on what image
elements, at a minimum, should be
shared such as image quality, type, and
narrative text. It is understandable that
developers will not be able to export
every existing data element, nor that all
possible data elements are necessary for
transfer. For finalization in a subsequent
final rule, we solicit comment on
whether we should require, to support
transparency, health IT developers to
attest or publish as part of the export
format documentation the types of EHI
they cannot support for export.
We also propose the following
metadata categories that would be
excluded from this criterion, and have
listed examples for clarity below. We
seek comment on these exclusion
categories, and request feedback on
what metadata elements should remain
included for export, or be added to the
list of data that would be allowed to be
excluded in a subsequent final rule:
• Metadata present in internal
databases used for physically storing the
data. Examples include: Internal
database table names, field names,
schema, constraints, Triggers, Field size
(number of bytes), Field type (String,
integer, double, long), and Primary keys
or object identifiers used internally for
querying.
• Metadata that may not be necessary
to interpret EHI export, including
information that is typically required for
processing of transactions such as
encryption keys, internal user roles,
ancillary information such as
information stored in different formats,
local codes for internal use; audit logs,
record reviews, or history of change.
• Metadata that refers to data that is
not present in the EHI export, such as
links to files and other external
attachments that are not part of the
export, and information used in
conjunction with data from other
applications that is not part of the
health IT.
We also seek comment, for
consideration in finalizing this criterion
in a subsequent final rule, on types of
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EHI that may present challenges for
meeting the intent of this proposed
criterion.
d. Export Format
The proposed certification criterion
does not prescribe a content standard
for the EHI export. However, it requires
health IT developers to provide the
format, such as a data dictionary or
export support file, for the exported
information to assist the receiving
system in processing the EHI without
loss of information or its meaning to the
extent reasonably practicable using the
developer’s existing technology.
Providing EHI export information is
consistent with emerging industry
practices and capabilities to offer
requestors the ability to access,
download, and move their information
without unreasonable burden.
Companies such as Facebook,27
Google,28 and Twitter 29 offer publiclyavailable links which provide requestors
necessary information on how to
download their personal information
including, in some cases, several
download options for requestors
alongside their export instructions.
Public access to comparable EHI export
information would further support
third-party companies in this space, as
they would have additional information
and general knowledge for use of
available data. Accordingly, we propose
that the developer’s export format
should be made publicly available via a
hyperlink as part of certification to the
‘‘EHI export’’ criterion, including
keeping the hyperlink up-to-date with
the current export format.
We believe that by making the export
format publicly available at the time of
certification (and keeping the
information current) will stimulate a
vibrant, competitive market in which
third- party software developers can
specialize in processing the data
exported from certified health IT
products in support of patients and
providers. Moreover, we believe this
proposal will transform today’s current
guess-work, one-off processes into
something more predictable and
transparent such that greater industry
efficiencies can be realized. We note
and clarify that the export format need
not be the same format used internally
by the health IT system, and the health
IT developer would not need to make
public their proprietary data model. The
proposed certification criterion also
27 https://www.facebook.com/help/
1701730696756992?helpref=hc_global_nav.
28 https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/
3024190?hl=en.
29 https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-youraccount/how-to-download-your-twitter-archive.
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does not prescribe how the exported
EHI is made available to the user, as this
may depend on the size and type of
information. We would expect that the
information be made available to the
user or requestor in an acceptable
manner without placing unreasonable
burden on the user or requestor. Please
also generally see our discussion of
information blocking in section VIII and
particularly section VIII.D.5.
e. Initial Step To Persistent Access to
All of a Patient’s EHI
We believe that open, standards-based
APIs should provide persistent access to
patients’ EHI over time to achieve the
envisioned goals in § 170.404. In the
meantime, this proposed criterion in
§ 170.315(b)(10) will provide an initial
step toward achieving those goals. We
clarify that ‘‘persistent’’ or ‘‘continuous’’
access to EHI is not required to satisfy
this criterion’s requirements and that
the minimum requirement is for a
discrete data export capability.
Similarly, while the criterion requires
the timely export of all EHI, such export
need not occur instantaneously (or in
‘‘real-time’’). However, health IT
developers are encouraged to consider
persistent access and real-time
approaches as part of the step-wise
progression we see towards open,
standards-based APIs for a growing
number of data elements per the USCDI
in the proposed ‘‘standardized API for
patient and population services’’
criterion (§ 170.315(g)(10).’’ Further, we
caution that where it is reasonable for a
developer to provide persistent or realtime access to electronic health
information, the refusal to do so may be
inconsistent with the Conditions of
Certification in § 170.401 (information
blocking) and § 170.402 (assurances
related to this capability), as well as the
information blocking provision, as to
which readers should refer to sections
VII and VIII of this proposed rule.
Similarly, while this certification
criterion would provide a baseline
capability for exporting data for the
specific use cases described above,
health IT developers may need to
provide other data export and
conversion services or support
additional export use cases beyond
those encompassed by this criterion to
facilitate the appropriate access,
exchange, and use of electronic health
information and to avoid engaging in
information blocking.
f. Timeframes
ONC seeks input on EHI export and
timeframes. In particular, beyond
exporting all the EHI the health IT
system produces and electronically
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manages, should this criterion include
capabilities to permit health care
providers to set timeframes for EHI
export, such as only the ‘‘past two
years’’ or ‘‘past month’’ of EHI?
For discussion of the required
timeframe for developers of certified
health IT to certify to this proposed
criterion and make it available to their
customers, please see Section VII.B.2,
which addresses a health IT developer’s
required assurances regarding the
availability and provision of this EHI
export capability to its customers.
g. Replaces the 2015 Edition ‘‘Data
Export’’ Criterion in the 2015 Edition
Base EHR Definition
We propose to remove the ‘‘data
export’’ criterion (§ 170.315(b)(6)) from
the 2015 Edition, including the 2015
Edition Base EHR definition expressed
in § 170.102. Correspondingly, we
propose to include the proposed ‘‘EHI
export’’ criterion (§ 170.315(b)(10)) in
the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition,
which would affect health care
providers’ compliance responsibilities
when it comes to possessing CEHRT for
associated CMS programs. A specific C–
CDA data export criterion no longer
supports advancements in
interoperability in the evolving health
IT industry. The proposed ‘‘EHI export’’
certification criterion is standardsagnostic and supports a more open
approach to interoperability. More
specifically, the proposed ‘‘EHI export’’
criterion differs significantly from the
‘‘data export’’ certification criterion as
the latter is limited to clinical data as
specified in the C–CDA. Also, the
proposed ‘‘EHI export’’ criterion is not
limited to just the scope of the certified
capabilities in the certified Health IT
Module as it applies to all produced and
electronically managed EHI. Further, by
including this functionality in the 2015
Base EHR definition, we can be assured
that health care providers participating
in the CMS programs (e.g., Promoting
Interoperability Programs) have
functionality to both support patient
requests for their EHI and switching
health IT systems.
We propose to modify the Base EHR
definition to include the proposed ‘‘EHI
export’’ criterion 24 months from the
effective date of the final rule for this
proposed rule (which practically
speaking would be 25 months because
of the 30-day delayed effective date). We
believe this is sufficient time for health
IT developers to develop, test, certify,
and rollout this functionality to health
care providers based on the flexible
approach offered for meeting this
criterion. We also believe this timeframe
provides sufficient time for health care
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providers to adopt and implement the
functionality included in the ‘‘EHI
export’’ criterion. To note, we refer
readers to the ‘‘Assurances’’ Condition
and Maintenance of Certification
requirements in section VII.B.2, which
propose complementary requirements
on health IT developers to rollout health
IT certified ‘‘EHI export’’ within 24
months of the effective date of a final
rule for this proposed rule. We welcome
comments on our proposed compliance
timeline.
We note that we do not propose a
transition period for the ‘‘data export’’
criterion. We propose to remove the
criterion from the 2015 Edition upon the
effective date of a final rule for this
proposed rule. Unlike the ‘‘application
access—data category request’’ criterion
(which we propose to replace with the
new API criterion in this proposed rule),
the ‘‘data export’’ criterion does not
support an objective or measure under
the CMS Promoting Interoperability
Programs. Therefore, we do not believe
that health IT developers and health
care providers need to support the
functionality in the ‘‘data export’’
criterion while they transition to the
development, adoption, and
implementation of the EHI export
criterion. This approach should reduce
burden and costs for both health IT
developers and health care providers.
We welcome comments on this
approach, including whether this will
leave health care providers without an
export capability for an inordinate
period of time such that we should
require health IT developers to support
the ‘‘data export’’ functionality for
health care providers until the health IT
developer attests to providing the new
EHI export functionality to all of its
customers.
Readers are also referred to the
Regulatory Impact Analysis in section
XIV of this proposed rule for a
discussion of the estimated costs and
benefits of this proposed criterion, as
well as the impact of the proposed
removal of the 2015 Edition ‘‘data
export’’ criterion.
5. Standardized API for Patient and
Population Services Criterion
To implement the Cures Act, we
propose to adopt a new API criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(10), which would replace
the ‘‘application access—data category
request’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(g)(8)) and become part of the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition. This
new certification criterion would
require the use of FHIR standards,
several implementation specifications,
and focus on supporting two types of
API-enabled services: (1) Services for
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which a single patient’s data is at focus;
and (2) services for which multiple
patients’ data are at focus. Please refer
to the ‘‘Application Programming
Interfaces’’ section (VII.B.4) in this
preamble for a more detailed discussion
of the ‘‘API’’ certification criterion and
related Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements.
6. Privacy and Security Transparency
Attestations
a. Background
In 2015, the HIT Standards Committee
(HITSC) recommended the adoption of
two new certification criteria for the
Program. The National Coordinator
endorsed the HITSC recommendations
for consideration by the Secretary, and
the Secretary determined that it was
appropriate to propose adoption of the
two new certification criteria through
rulemaking (81 FR 10635). To
implement the Secretary’s
determination, we propose to add two
new 2015 Edition privacy and security
‘‘transparency attestation’’ certification
criteria for: (1) Encrypt authentication
credentials; and (2) multi-factor
authentication.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we
adopted a new, simpler, and
straightforward approach to privacy and
security (P&S) certification requirements
for Health IT Modules certified to the
2015 Edition, which we refer to as the
2015 Edition privacy and security
certification framework (80 FR 62705).
In this proposed rule, we propose
modifications to the 2015 Edition
privacy and security certification
framework in § 170.550(h) and propose
to add new criteria to which a health IT
developer would need to certify
pertaining to whether or not its product
encrypts authentication credentials
(specifically § 170.315(d)(12)) and
supports multi-factor authentication
(specifically § 170.315(d)(13)). To be
clear, we are not proposing to require
that health IT have the functionality
present to encrypt authentication
credentials or support multi-factor
authentication. Rather, we propose that
a health IT developer indicate whether
or not their certified health IT has those
capabilities by attesting yes or no.
b. Encrypt Authentication Credentials
We propose to adopt an ‘‘encrypt
authentication credentials’’ certification
criterion in § 170.315(d)(12) and include
it in the P&S certification framework
(§ 170.550(h)). We propose to make the
encrypt authentication credentials
certification criterion applicable to any
Health IT Module currently certified to
the 2015 Edition and any Health IT
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Module presented for certification due
to the fact that all health IT must meet
the ‘‘authentication, access control, and
authorization’’ certification criterion
adopted in § 170.315(d)(1) as part of
current Program requirements. While
the 2015 Edition ‘‘authentication, access
control, and authorization’’ certification
criterion criteria requires that patient
information saved on end user devices
is encrypted, those same protections are
not explicitly required through
certification for the authentication
credentials used to access that same
information. As such, we believe that
this proposal would address that gap
and encourage health IT developers to
take steps to ensure that authentication
credentials are protected consistent with
industry best practices.
To provide clarity as to what a ‘‘yes’’
attestation for ‘‘encrypt authentication
credentials’’ would mean, we provide
the following explanation. Encrypting
authentication credentials could include
password encryption or cryptographic
hashing, which is storing only
encrypted or cryptographically hashed
passwords. If a developer attests that its
Health IT Module encrypts
authentication credentials, we propose
that the attestation would mean that the
Health IT Module is capable of
cryptographically protecting stored
authentication credentials in accordance
with standards adopted in
§ 170.210(a)(2), Annex A: Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
Publication 140–2, Approved Security
Functions for FIPS PUB 140–2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules. We posit that FIPS Publication
140–2 is the seminal, comprehensive,
and most appropriate standard.
Moreover, in the specified FIPS 140–2
standard, there is an allowance for
various approved encryption methods,
and health IT developers would have
the flexibility to implement any of the
approved encryption methods in order
to attest yes to this criterion. Health IT
developers should keep apprised of
these standards as they evolve and are
updated to address vulnerabilities
identified in the current standard.
We do not believe it is necessary for
a Health IT Module to be required to be
tested to this criterion, so long as by
attesting yes to this criterion, the health
IT developer is attesting that if
authentication credentials are stored,
then the authentication credentials are
protected consistent with the
requirements above. To be clear, a ‘‘no’’
attestation is a sufficient response to
address this certification criterion;
however, health IT developers should
be aware that this ‘‘no’’ will be made
publicly available on the CHPL. Note
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that if a developer attested to encrypting
authentication credentials, a certified
Health IT Module would be subject to
ONC–ACB surveillance for any potential
non-conformity with the requirements
of this criterion. Specifically, if the
ONC–ACB becomes aware of situations
where the developer’s health IT is not
meeting the developer’s affirmative
attestation per the criterion’s
requirements, the ONC–ACB may use its
corrective action process to bring the
product back into conformance.
We propose that, for health IT
certified prior to a subsequent final
rule’s effective date, the health IT would
need to be certified to the ‘‘encrypt
authentication credentials’’ certification
criterion within six months after the
final rule’s effective date. For health IT
certified for the first time after the final
rule’s effective date, we propose that the
health IT must meet this criterion at the
time of certification. This should allow
sufficient time for health IT developers
to assess their Health IT Modules’
capabilities and attest ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to
the certification criterion.
For an assessment of this proposal’s
costs and benefits, please refer to the
Regulatory Impact Analysis in section
XIV of this preamble. We welcome
comments on this assessment and this
proposal in general. We also note that
some health IT presented for
certification is not designed to store
authentication credentials. Therefore,
we specifically request comment on
whether we should include an explicit
provision in this criterion to
accommodate such health IT. This
could be similar to the approach we
have taken with the 2015 Edition ‘‘enduser device encryption’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(d)(7)(ii)), where we permit
the criterion to be met if the health IT
developer indicates their technology is
designed to prevent electronic health
information from being locally stored on
end-user devices.
c. Multi-Factor Authentication
We propose to adopt a ‘‘multi-factor
authentication’’ (MFA) criterion in
§ 170.315(d)(13) and include it in the
P&S certification framework
(§ 170.550(h)). We propose to make the
‘‘multi-factor authentication’’
certification criterion applicable to any
Health IT Module currently certified to
the 2015 Edition and any Health IT
Module presented for certification.
Health IT developers have already been
implementing MFA to meet the
Electronic Prescribing of Controlled
Substances (EPCS) requirements set by
Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), and if adopted, this certification
criterion would be general in that its
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intended outcome would provide more
public transparency around the MFA
capabilities included in certified health
IT.
This proposal supports the
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) led initiative ‘‘STOP, THINK,
CONNECT’’ which strongly
recommends and runs campaigns to
promote stronger authentication,
typically related to MFA, going beyond
a username and password to log in.
MFA is also recommended by numerous
organizations and groups. In the ‘‘Report
on Improving Cybersecurity in the
Health Care Industry,’’ 30 the Health
Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force
recommended requiring strong
authentication to improve identity and
access management for health care
workers, patients, and medical devices/
EHRs. Using a single factor approach to
accessing information is particularly
prone to cyber-attack because one factor
passwords can be weak, stolen, and are
vulnerable to external phishing attacks,
malware, and social engineering threats.
In situations where the provider is
accessing a health IT product or health
information exchange external to the
hospital or clinical environment, the
Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task
Force recommended that the health care
industry adopt the NIST SP 800–46
guidelines for remote access, including
the use of two-factor authentication to
ensure a compromised password cannot
alone be used to gain access. Promoting
the use of MFA and leveraging
biometrics, mobile phones, and/or
wearables can help to establish a trust
relationship with the patient.
Additionally, NIST recommends any
personal data, whether self-asserted or
validated, require MFA.
However, despite the benefits of
adopting MFA, we are also aware of
some of the challenges. Specifically, in
health care, many providers are resistant
to adopt MFA because of the
inconvenience and loss of time of going
through another step to access the
patient’s EHI. Also, MFA has not been
deployed very long in the health care
setting, so it is not clear how much it
actually addresses the risk. In most
MFA implementations, passwords are
still present. In addition to having to
manage passwords, users also have to
manage an additional layer of security.
Another usability challenge is that
systems often require different types of
MFA, which adds to the complexity and
also may require providers to keep track
of tokens. MFA is often recommended
as a solution to password problems, but
30 https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/
CyberTF/Documents/report2017.pdf.
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it is still vulnerable to theft. These
alternative forms of authentication have
their own set of vulnerability issues.
The cost of implementing MFA and
ensuring it will be implemented in a
way that does not inhibit clinical
workflow is also an issue to be
considered.
To provide clarity as to what a ‘‘yes’’
attestation for ‘‘multi-factor
authentication’’ attestation would mean,
we provide the following explanation.
MFA requires users to authenticate
using multiple means to confirm they
are who they claim to be in order to
prove one’s identity, under the
assumption that it is unlikely that an
unauthorized individual or entity will
be able to succeed when more than one
token is required. MFA includes using
two or more of these: (i) Something
people know, such as a password or a
personal identification number (PIN);
(ii) something people have, such as a
phone, badge, card, RSA token or access
key; and (iii) something people are, such
as fingerprints, retina scan, heartbeat,
and other biometric information. Thus,
in order to be issued a certification, we
propose to require that a Health IT
Module developer attest to whether or
not its certified health IT supports MFA
consistent with industry recognized
standards (e.g., NIST Special
Publication 800–63B Digital
Authentication Guidelines, ISO 27001).
We propose that, for health IT
certified prior to a subsequent final
rule’s effective date, the health IT would
need to be certified to the ‘‘multi-factor
authentication’’ certification criterion
within six months after the final rule’s
effective date. For health IT certified for
the first time after the final rule’s
effective date, we propose that the
health IT must meet this criterion at the
time of certification. This should allow
sufficient time for health IT developers
to assess their Health IT Modules’
capabilities and attest ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to
the certification criterion.
We generally seek comment on
whether there is value in adopting the
proposed ‘‘multi- factor authentication’’
criterion. We also solicit comment on
the method of attestation and, if the
health IT developer does attest to
supporting MFA, whether we should
require the health IT developer to
explain how they support MFA. For
example, should the health IT developer
be required to identify the MFA
technique(s) used/supported by
submitting specific information on how
it is implemented, including identifying
the purpose(s)/use(s) to which MFA is
applied within their Health IT Module
(such as where in the clinical workflow
it is required), and, as applicable,
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whether the MFA solution complies
with industry standard? This
information could enable the health IT
developer to highlight their health IT’s
capabilities to support MFA.
7. Data Segmentation for Privacy and
Consent Management Criteria
We adopted two 2015 Edition ‘‘data
segmentation for privacy’’ (DS4P)
certification criteria in the 2015 Edition
final rule. One criterion (‘‘DS4P-send’’
(§ 170.315(b)(7)) includes capabilities
for creating a summary care record
formatted to the C–CDA 2.1 standard
and document-level tagging as restricted
(and subject to restrictions on redisclosure) according to the DS4P
standard. The other criterion (‘‘DS4Preceive’’ (§ 170.315(b)(8)) includes
capabilities for receiving a summary
care record formatted to the C–CDA 2.1
standard and document-level tagged as
restricted (and subject to restrictions on
re-disclosure) according to the DS4P
standard. As noted in the 2015 Edition
final rule (80 FR 62646)), certification to
these criteria is not required to meet the
CEHRT definition for CMS EHR
Incentive Programs, now referred to as
the Promoting Interoperability
Programs. The current 2015 Edition
DS4P certification criteria specify the
technical capabilities that the health IT
must have to apply and recognize
security labels in a summary document
(C–CDA) such that the recipient of a
summary document would be able to
recognize the existence of sensitive
elements within the summary document
(80 FR 62646). Security labeling
provides a way for computer systems to
properly handle data passed among
systems, to preserve the condition of
security, and to enable access control
decisions on the information, so that the
information is only accessed by the
appropriate entities. The HL7
Healthcare Classification System (HCS)
standard provides a common syntax and
semantics for interoperable security
labels in health care. The DS4P standard
makes use of the HCS specification and
describes a method for applying security
labels to HL7 CDA documents to ensure
that privacy policies established at a
record’s source can be understood and
enforced by the recipient of the record.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we
noted that the DS4P standard is not
restricted to data subject to the federal
regulations governing the
Confidentiality of Substance Use
Disorder Patient Records (42 CFR part 2)
(80 FR 62647). It may be implemented
to support other data exchange use cases
in which compliance with state or
federal legal frameworks require
sensitive health information to be tagged
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and segmented (80 FR 62647). We
further stated that we offered
certification to these criteria as an initial
step towards the ability of an
interoperable health care system to use
technical standards to compute and
persist security labels to permit access,
use, or disclosure of protected health
information in accordance with
applicable policies and patient
preferences. We understood and
acknowledged additional challenges
surrounding the prevalence of
unstructured data, sensitive images, and
potential issues around use of sensitive
health information by clinical decision
support systems. The adoption of
document level data segmentation for
structured documents would not solve
these issues, but we acknowledged it
would help move technology in the
direction where these issues could be
addressed (80 FR 16841).
Adoption of the current 2015 Edition
DS4P criteria was also consistent with
earlier HIT Policy Committee (HITPC)
recommendations on the use of DS4P
technology to enable the electronic
implementation and management of
disclosure policies that originate from
the patient, the law, or an organization,
in an interoperable manner, so that
electronic sensitive health information
may be appropriately shared.31 These
HITPC recommendations consisted of a
glide path for the exchange of 42 CFR
part 2-protected data starting with the
inclusion of Level 1 (document level
tagging) send and receive functionality.
The HITPC also recommended
advancing the exchange of 42 CFR part
2-protected data, by outlining additional
capabilities in sharing, viewing and
incorporating privacy restricted data at
a more granular level, as well as
managing computable patient consent
for the use of restricted data.32
Since the 2015 Edition final rule, the
health care industry has engaged in
additional field testing and
implementation of the DS4P standard.
As of the beginning of the third quarter
of the 2018 CY, only about 20 products
(products with multiple certified
versions were counted once) were
31 See HIT Policy Committee (HITPC)
Recommendation Letter to ONC, July 2014, https://
www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_
DS4P_Transmittal%20Letter_2014-07-03.pdf; see
also HITPC’s Privacy and Security Tiger Team
Public Meeting, Transcript, May 12, 2014, https://
www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_
Transcript_Final_2014-05-12.pdf; Public Meeting,
Transcript, May 27, 2014, https://www.healthit.gov/
facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_Transcript_Final_201405-27.pdf.
32 For more details on the two glide paths for part
2-protected data, see https://www.healthit.gov/facas/
sites/faca/files/PSTT_DS4P_Transmittal%20Letter_
2014-07-03.pdf.
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certified to the current 2015 Edition
DS4P certification criteria. In addition,
stakeholders shared with ONC—through
public forums, listening sessions, and
correspondence—that focusing
certification on segmentation to only the
document level does not permit
providers the flexibility to address more
granular segmentation needs.
Stakeholders noted that certain provider
types, such as providers of pediatric
care and behavioral health care, are
currently using a range of burdensome
manual workflows in order to meet
complex use cases for DS4P which are
also impacted by state and local laws.
Additionally, stakeholders have
expressed interest in ONC exploring
health IT standards that work with
DS4P to support the management of
consent for sharing documents that
include security labels such as through
the use of an API.
Therefore, in consideration of
stakeholder feedback and our stated
policy approach to adopt DS4P
certification criteria on a glide path, we
propose to remove the current 2015
Edition DS4P-send (§ 170.315(b)(7)) and
DS4P-receive (§ 170.315(b)(8))
certification criteria. The proposed
effective date of removal of these criteria
would be the effective date of a
subsequent final rule for this proposed
rule. We propose to replace these two
criteria with three new 2015 Edition
DS4P certification criteria (two for C–
CDA and one for a FHIR-based API) that
would support a more granular
approach to privacy tagging data and
consent management for health
information exchange supported by
either the C–CDA– or FHIR-based
exchange standards. Our primary
purpose for proposing to remove and
replace them, in lieu of proposing to
revise them, is to provide clarity to
stakeholders as to the additional
functionality enabled by health IT
certified to the new criteria. We note
resources released by ONC and OCR,
such as the HHS Security Risk
Assessment Tool 33 and the Guide to
Privacy and Security of Electronic
Health Information,34 as well as the
Office for Civil Rights’ security risk
analysis guidance 35 that entities may
employ to make risk-based decisions
33 HHS Security Risk Assessment Tool: https://
www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/securityrisk-assessment.
34 ONC Guide to Privacy and Security of
Electronic Health Information: https://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ pdf/privacy/
privacy-and-security-guide.pdf.
35 HHS Office for Civil Rights:https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/
guidance/; and https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/
guidance-risk-analysis/?language=es.
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regarding their implementation of the
proposed DS4P criteria. We also note
the availability of the Electronic
Consent Management Landscape
Assessment, Challenges, and
Technology report.36 The report
includes suggestions for overcoming
barriers associated with implementing
electronic consent management, which
may be considered for further research
and discussion.
a. Implementation With the
Consolidated CDA Release 2.1
In place of the removed 2015 Edition
DS4P criteria, we propose to adopt new
DS4P-send (§ 170.315(b)(12)) and DS4Preceive (§ 170.315(b)(13)) criteria that
would remain based on the C–CDA and
the HL7 DS4P standard. These criteria
would include capabilities for applying
the DS4P standard at the document,
section, and entry level. We believe this
offers more valuable functionality to
providers and patients, especially given
the complexities of the landscape of
privacy laws for multiple care and
specialty settings. We believe health IT
certified to these criteria could support
multiple practice settings and use cases.
For example, in section VI.A.2 of this
preamble, we explain how the proposed
capabilities included in these criteria
could support the pediatric health care
setting. We believe this proposal could
also reduce burden for providers by
leveraging health IT’s ability to
recognize and manage sensitive data
and patient consent directives, rather
than relying on case-by-case manual
redaction and subsequent workarounds
to transmit redacted documents. We
emphasize that health care providers
already have processes and workflows
to address their existing compliance
obligations which could be made more
efficient and cost effective through the
use of health IT. We recognize that more
granular privacy markings at the point
of data capture would further support
existing and future priorities of states
for multiple care and specialty settings,
including behavioral health and
pediatric health care settings.
We welcome public comment on our
proposals to replace the current 2015
Edition DS4P criteria and adopt new
2015 Edition DS4P-send
(§ 170.315(b)(12)) and DS4P-receive
(§ 170.315(b)(13)) criteria to support
improved options for data segmentation
for health care providers engaged in
complex use cases such as those
identified in pediatric care (see also
section VI.A) and behavioral health
36 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
privacy-security/ecm_finalreport_
forrelease62415.pdf.
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care, including for opioid use disorder
(OUD) (see also section VI.B).
b. Implementation With FHIR Standard
In collaboration with ONC, the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA)
developed the Consent2Share
application to address the specific
privacy protections of patients with
substance use disorders who are
covered by the federal confidentiality
regulation, 42 CFR part 2.
Consent2Share is an open source
application for data segmentation and
consent management. It is designed to
integrate with existing FHIR systems.
SAMHSA created a FHIR
implementation guide (the
Consent2Share Consent Profile Design,
hereafter referred to as ‘‘Consent
Implementation Guide’’) that describes
how the Consent2Share (C2S)
application and associated access
control solution uses the FHIR Consent
resource to represent and persist patient
consent for treatment, research, or
disclosure.37 The implementation guide
provides instructions for using the FHIR
Consent resource to capture a record of
a health care consumer’s privacy
preferences.
As discussed in section VII.B.4 of this
proposed rule, we are proposing
policies related to the implementation
of a standardized API to support the
exchange of health information between
providers and patients and among
members of a care team. We anticipate
that the proposed 2015 Edition
‘‘standardized API for patient and
population services’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(g)(10)) will result in
a proliferation of APIs that will enable
a more flexible and less burdensome
approach to exchanging EHI. We believe
the health care industry can leverage
this API infrastructure to share
segmented data in a secure and scalable
manner. Therefore, we propose to adopt
a 2015 Edition certification criterion
‘‘consent management for APIs’’ in
§ 170.315(g)(11) to support data
segmentation and consent management
through an API in accordance with the
Consent Implementation Guide.
Certification to this criterion would be
at a health IT developer’s discretion and
would indicate that a system is capable
of responding to requests through an
API for patient consent directives that
include standards-based security
labeling.
37 The
draft FHIR IG titled ‘‘Consent2Share FHIR
Profile Design.docx’’ can be accessed through the
Community- Based Care and Privacy (CBCP) HL7
workgroup, within the Package Name titled
‘‘BHITS_FHIR_Consent_IG,’’ at https://
gforge.hl7.org/gf/project/cbcc/frs/.
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We acknowledge that our proposed
implementation specification, the
Consent Implementation Guide, is based
on a different version of the FHIR
standard (FHIR Standard for Trial Use 3,
also known as FHIR Release 3) than the
proposed ‘‘standardized API for patient
and population services’’ criteria
(§ 170.315(g)(10)) which is proposed to
reference just FHIR Release 2.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that this
discrepancy may result in additional
implementation efforts for developers.
In ideal circumstances, we would have
proposed a data segmentation and
consent management standard for APIs
that was based on FHIR Release 2 and
aligned with the ‘‘standardized API for
patient and population services’’ criteria
proposed in this proposed rule.
However, although SAMHSA also
created a consent implementation guide
based on FHIR Release 2,38 the guide
used the FHIR ‘‘Contract’’ resource to
represent patient consent directives. It is
our understanding that an approach
based on the ‘‘Contract’’ resource has
since been abandoned by the industry in
favor of using the ‘‘Consent’’ resource
which was introduced in FHIR Release
3. Moreover, the FHIR Release 2 version
of the Consent Implementation Guide
went through relatively little testing and
was never formally implemented
because SAMHSA began developing an
update to the guide based on the
‘‘Consent’’ resource in FHIR Release 3.
Consequently, proposing an
implementation specification based on
FHIR Release 2 would not have aligned
with the more common implementation
of FHIR-based consent directives by the
health care industry. We do not
anticipate that the initial misalignment
between the proposed API criterion
(§ 170.315(g)(10)) and the proposed
third DS4P criterion (§ 170.315(g)(11))
will pose a significant burden on health
IT developers. Further, our proposal to
permit health IT developers to
voluntarily implement and use a new
version of an adopted standard or
implementation specification so long as
such version was approved by the
National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards
Version Advancement Process,
discussed in section VII.B.5, would
enable standards version alignment
between these two criteria in the future
as the FHIR standard matures.
38 The draft Behavioral Health Information
Technologies and Standards (BHITS) FHIR DSTU2
Consent Implementation Guide can be accessed
through the Community-Based Care and Privacy
(CBCP) HL7 workgroup at https://gforge.hl7.org/gf/
project/cbcc/frs/?action=FrsReleaseView&release_
id=1279.
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7453
SAMHSA created the ‘‘Consent
Implementation Guide’’ to support
developers in implementing the FHIR
Consent resource to represent patient
consent for treatment, research, and
disclosure. The Consent Implementation
Guide provides instructions for using
the FHIR ‘‘Consent’’ resource to capture
a record of a health care consumer’s
privacy preferences. Implementing an
instance of the FHIR Consent resource
based on this guide allows for a patient
consent to permit or deny identified
recipient(s) or recipient role(s) to
perform one or more actions, regarding
the patient’s health information for
specific purposes and periods of time.
For example the Consent
Implementation Guide supports consent
management for specific use cases to
permit or deny disclosure based on a
specific law, regulation, or policy under
which the patient consented. The
implementation guide uses security
labels as a mechanism for specifying a
patient’s preferences (e.g., permit
disclosure of EHI labeled ‘‘restricted’’).
The Consent Implementation Guide
provides a much simpler mechanism for
representing a patient’s consent
preferences than the old approach based
on FHIR Release 2 and has undergone
implementation and pilot testing by
SAMHSA’s Consent2Share (C2S)
application.
Our proposal to adopt the version
aligned with FHIR Release 3 and the
FHIR Release 3 standard for this
criterion reflects stakeholder interests
and efforts to support particular use
cases. C2S enables data segmentation
and consent management for disclosure
of several discrete categories of sensitive
health data related to conditions and
treatments including: Alcohol, tobacco
and substance use disorders (including
opioid use disorder), behavioral health,
HIV/AIDS, and sexuality and
reproductive health. These capabilities
support multiple use cases in both
primary and specialty care, and
specifically address priority needs
identified by stakeholders to support
pediatric care. We emphasize that
health care providers already have
processes and workflows to address
their existing compliance obligations
which could be made more efficient and
cost effective through the use of health
IT. Finally, given that the FHIR standard
is modular in nature, and especially
since the ‘‘Consent’’ resource did not
exist in FHIR Release 2, we anticipate
that health IT developers that elect to
certify to this criterion would be able to
support the Consent Implementation
Guide along with the API requirements
specified in ‘‘standardized API for
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patient and population services’’
(§ 170.315(g)(10)) with modest extra
effort.
We welcome comments on this
proposal. We specifically seek comment
on how the availability of this proposed
certification criterion might increase the
ability to support multiple care
coordination and privacy priorities,
including those associated with
pediatric care; and whether we should
consider other similar API based
options and resources as standards for
certification criteria. We also seek
comment on whether the misalignment
between the versions of the FHIR
standard used by our proposed ‘‘consent
management for APIs’’ and
‘‘standardized API for patient and
population services’’ criteria would
create excessive burden for developers
and implementers. Specifically, we seek
comment on if certification to the
‘‘consent management for APIs’’ should
only be available in conjunction with
the ‘‘standardized API for patient and
population services’’ criteria at such a
time as the criteria are aligned to one
version of the FHIR standard or if the
option to certify to the ‘‘consent
management for APIs’’ should be
allowed for those developers interested
in doing so even without current
standards alignment. We note that
SAMHSA is currently pursuing
additional work to expand use cases
related to data segmentation for privacy
and FHIR compatibility.
C. Unchanged 2015 Edition Criteria—
Program Reference Alignment
In the FY 2019 IPPS/LTCH PPS
proposed rule (83 FR 20516), CMS
proposed scoring and measurement
policies to move beyond the three stages
of meaningful use to a new phase of
EHR measurement with an increased
focus on interoperability and improving
patient access to health information. To
reflect this focus, CMS changed the
name of the Medicare and Medicaid
EHR Incentive Programs, to the
Medicare and Medicaid Promoting
Interoperability (PI) Programs. To align
with the renaming of the EHR Incentive
Programs, we propose to remove
references to the EHR Incentive
Programs and replace them with
‘‘Promoting Interoperability Programs’’
in the 2015 Edition ‘‘automated
numerator recording’’ criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(1) and the ‘‘automated
measure calculation’’ criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(2).
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V. Modifications to the ONC Health IT
Certification Program
A. Corrections
1. Auditable Events and Tamper
Resistance
Currently, § 170.315(d)(2), ‘‘auditable
events and tamper resistance,’’ includes
a cross- reference to § 170.315(d)(7).
However, the cross reference to
§ 170.315(d)(7), ‘‘end-user device
encryption,’’ does not always apply. We
propose to revise § 170.550(h)(3) to
apply the § 170.315(d)(7) cross reference
as appropriate and exempt
§ 170.315(d)(7) when the certificate
scope does not require § 170.315(d)(7)
certification (see § 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C)).
Paragraph 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C) is not
applicable for the privacy and security
testing and certification of a Health IT
Module required by § 170.550(h)(3)(iii),
(v), (vii), and (viii). This specific
requirement was intended to be
exempted. It would only apply if
§ 170.315(d)(7) was also required for
privacy and security testing and
certification, which it is not under the
aforementioned paragraphs. For
example, a developer that is seeking to
certify a Health IT Module to
§ 170.315(h) will not necessarily have
end-user device encryption features (see
§ 170.315(d)(7)). As such, certification
can proceed for the audit log process
without the Health IT Module
demonstrating that it can record an
encryption status as required by
§ 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C). We have
previously identified this error in
guidance and now propose to codify the
correction in regulation.39
2. Amendments
We propose to revise § 170.550(h) to
remove the ‘‘amendments’’ criterion’s
application to certain non-applicable
clinical criteria including: ‘‘Drug-drug,
drug-allergy interaction checks for
computerized provider order entry
(CPOE)’’ § 170.315(a)(4); ‘‘clinical
decision support’’ § 170.315(a)(9);
‘‘drug-formulary and preferred drug list
checks’’ § 170.315(a)(10); and ‘‘patientspecific education’’ § 170.315(a)(13).
Health IT Modules presented for
certification to these criteria would not
have to demonstrate the capabilities
required by the 2015 Edition
‘‘amendments’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(d)(4)), unless the health IT is
presented for certification to another
criterion that requires certification to
the 2015 Edition ‘‘amendments’’
criterion under the P&S certification
39 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
2015Ed_CCG_d2-Auditable-events-tamperresistance.pdf.
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framework. This has already been
incorporated into sub- regulatory
guidance, and we propose to codify this
clarification in regulation.40 The
revision was made upon further analysis
of the P&S certification framework and
the applicability of the ‘‘amendments’’
certification criterion § 170.315(d)(4) to
health IT capabilities that would not
necessarily have any patient data for
which a request for an amendment
would be relevant.
3. View, Download, and Transmit to 3rd
Party
We propose to remove
§ 170.315(e)(1)(ii)(B) which includes a
cross-reference to § 170.315(d)(2). This
cross-reference indicates that health IT
may demonstrate compliance with
activity history log requirements if it is
also certified to the 2015 Edition
‘‘auditable events and tamperresistance’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(d)(2)). However, we no longer
require testing of activity history log
when certifying for § 170.315(d)(2).
Therefore, this cross-reference is no
longer applicable to meet certification
requirements for the 2015 Edition
‘‘view, download, and transmit to 3rd
party’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(e)(1)) activity history log
requirements.
4. Integrating Revised and New
Certification Criteria Into the 2015
Edition Privacy and Security
Certification Framework
Consistent with the 2015 Edition
privacy and security certification
framework, each certification criterion
has a set of appropriate P&S
‘‘safeguards’’ that must be in place. In
the 2015 Edition, we required that an
ONC–ACB must ensure that a Health IT
Module presented for certification to
any of the certification criteria that fall
into each regulatory text ‘‘first level
paragraph’’ category of § 170.315 (e.g.,
§ 170.315(a)) identified below would be
certified to either Approach 1
(technically demonstrate) or Approach 2
(system documentation). In this
proposed rule, we propose to require the
new criteria (§ 170.315(d)(12) and
(d)(13)) to apply to all § 170.315
certification criteria. Therefore, given
these and the other modifications
discussed above, we propose to revise
the P&S certification framework as
40 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
2015Ed_CCG_a4-DD-DAI-checks-for-CPOE.pdf,
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015ed_
ccg_a9-clinical-decision-support.pdf, https://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015Ed_CCG_
a10-Drug-formulary-PDL-checks.pdf, and https://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015Ed_CCG_
a13-Patient-specific-ed-resources.pdf.
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noted in the table below. However, the
P&S Certification Framework would
need to be further updated depending
on finalization of the proposals
discussed in section III.B.4, which
7455
propose removal of certain 2015 Edition
certification criteria.
TABLE 1—PROPOSED 2015 EDITION PRIVACY AND SECURITY CERTIFICATION FRAMEWORK
If the Health IT Module
includes capabilities for
certification listed under:
It will need to be certified to approach 1 or approach 2 for each of the P&S certification criteria listed
in the ‘‘approach 1’’ column
§ 170.315(a)(1), through (2),
(5), through (8), (11), and
(12).
§ 170.315(d)(1) (authentica- For each applicable P&S certification criterion not certified using Approach 1, the
tion, access control, and
health IT developer submits system documentation that is sufficiently detailed to
authorization), (d)(2)
enable integration such that the Health IT Module has implemented service inter(auditable events and
faces for each applicable P&S certification criterion that enable the Health IT
tamper resistance), (d)(3)
Module to access external services necessary to meet the requirements of the
(audit reports), (d)(4)
P&S certification criterion.
(amendments), (d)(5)
(automatic log-off), (d)(6)
(emergency access), and
(d)(7) (end-user device
encryption).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) and (d)(5) through
(d)(7).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) and (d)(5) through
(d)(8) (integrity).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) and (d)(5) *.
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3), (d)(5), (d)(7), and
(d)(9)(trusted connection).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3), (d)(5), and (d)(9) *.
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) and (d)(7).
§ 170.315(d)(1) and (d)(9);
and (d)(2) or (d)(10) (auditing actions on health
information).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) *.
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) and (d)(5) through
(d)(8) (integrity).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3) and (d)(5).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3), (d)(5), (d)(7), and
(d)(9)(trusted connection).
§ 170.315(d)(1) through
(d)(3), (d)(5), and (d)(9).
§ 170.315(a)(4), (9), (10),
and (13).
§ 170.315(b) .........................
§ 170.315(c) .........................
§ 170.315(e)(1) .....................
§ 170.315(e)(2) and (3) ........
§ 170.315(f) ..........................
§ 170.315(g)(7) through
(g)(11).
§ 170.315(h) .........................
§ 170.315(b) .........................
§ 170.315(c) .........................
§ 170.315(e)(1) .....................
§ 170.315(e)(2) and (3) ........
Approach 1
Approach 2
§ 170.315(a)–(h) Certification Criterion
§ 170.315(a) through (h) Certification Criterion ........................................
§ 170.315(a) through (h) Certification Criterion ........................................
§ 170.315(d)(12)
§ 170.315(d)(13)
An ONC–ACB must ensure that a Health IT Module presented for certification to any of the certification criteria that fall into each regulatory text
‘‘first level paragraph’’ category of § 170.315 (e.g. § 170.315(a)) identified in the table above is certified to either Approach 1 (technically demonstrate) or Approach 2 (systemdocumentation). In addition, we propose that health IT developers seeking certification to any § 170.315 certification criterion for their Health IT Modules attest to whether they encrypt authentication credentials (§ 170.315(d)(12)) and support multifactor authentication (§ 170.315(d)(13))
We clarify that of the adopted 2015 Edition certification criteria, only the privacy and security criteria specified in § 170.315(g)(1) through (6) are
exempt from the 2015 Edition privacy and security certification framework due to the capabilities included in these criteria, which do not implicate privacy and security concerns.
In order to be issued a certification, a Health IT Module would only need to be tested once to each applicable privacy and security criterion
identified as part of Approach 1 or Approach 2 so long as the health IT developer attests that such privacy and security capabilities apply to
the full scope of capabilities included in the requested certification, except for the certification of a Health IT Module to § 170.315(e)(1) ‘‘view,
download, and transmit to 3rd party’’ and (e)(2) ‘‘secure messaging.’’ For each of these criteria, a Health IT Module must be separately tested
to § 170.315(d)(9) because of the specific capabilities for secure electronic transmission and secure electronic messaging included in each
criterion, respectively. We also propose the health IT developers seeking certification to any § 170.315 certification criterion for their Health IT
Modules attest to whether they encrypt authentication credentials (§ 170.315(d)(12)) and support multi-factor authentication (§ 170.315(d)(13))
* § 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C) is not required if the scope of the Health IT Module does not have end-user device encryption features.
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B. Principles of Proper Conduct for
ONC–ACBs
1. Records Retention
We propose to revise the records
retention requirement in § 170.523(g) to
include the ‘‘life of the edition’’ as well
as 3 years after the retirement of an
edition related to the certification of
Complete EHRs and Health IT
Module(s). In the 2015 Edition final rule
(80 FR 62602), we adopted a records
retention provision that required ONC–
ACBs to retain all records related to the
certification of Complete EHRs and
Health IT Module(s) for the ‘‘life of the
edition’’ plus an additional 3 years, and
the records would be available to HHS
upon request during this period of time.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, the ‘‘life
of the edition’’ was defined as beginning
with the codification of an edition of
certification criteria in regulation and
ending when the edition is removed
from regulation. We now propose to
clarify that HHS has the ability to access
certification records for the ‘‘life of the
edition,’’ which begins with the
codification of an edition of certification
criteria in the Code of Federal
Regulations through a minimum of 3
years from the effective date that
removes the applicable edition from the
Code of Federal Regulations, not solely
during the 3-year period after removal
from the CFR.
2. Conformance Methods for
Certification Criteria
The Principle of Proper Conduct
(PoPC) in § 170.523(h) specifies that
ONC–ACBs may only certify health IT
that has been tested by ONC–ATLs
using tools and test procedures
approved by the National Coordinator.
We propose to revise this PoPC in three
ways. First, we propose to revise this
PoPC to additionally permit ONC–ACBs
to certify Health IT Modules that they
have evaluated for conformance with
certification criteria without first
passing through an ONC–ATL.
However, we propose that such methods
to determine conformity must first be
approved by the National Coordinator.
This proposal provides valuable
Program flexibility and market
efficiencies for streamlining Health IT
Module certification, acknowledging the
broad spectrum of evidence of
conformance, from laboratory testing
with an ONC–ATL to developer selfdeclaration. This Program flexibility
will also allow us to leverage the
success we have seen in implementation
of our alternative test method process
where any entity can submit a test
procedure and/or test tool for approval
for use under the Program. For example,
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the National Coordinator may, under
this provision, approve a conformance
method for certification criteria where
evidence of a valid declaration of
conformity (e.g., certification) granted
under an external program can be
submitted directly to an ONC–ACB to
meet the requirement of that
certification criteria.
Second, we propose to revise the
PoPC to clarify that certifications can
only be issued to Health IT Modules and
not Complete EHRs. We are proposing
to remove the 2014 Edition from the
CFR (see section II.B.2 of this preamble)
and Complete EHR certifications are no
longer available for certification to the
2015 Edition (80 FR 62608; 79 FR
54443). We propose to remove the
provision that permits the use of test
results from National Voluntary
Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP)-accredited testing laboratories
under the Program because the
regulatory transition period from
NVLAP-accredited testing laboratories
to ONC–ATLs has expired (81 FR
72447).
Third, we propose to remove the
provision that permits the certification
of health IT previously certified to an
edition if the certification criterion or
criteria to which the Health IT
Module(s) was previously certified have
not been revised and no new
certification criteria are applicable
because the circumstances that this
provision seeks to address are no longer
feasible with certification to the 2015
Edition. Any Health IT Module
previously certified to the 2014 Edition
and presented for certification to the
2015 Edition would have at least one
new or revised 2015 Edition
certification criteria that would be
applicable. For example, the 2015
Edition ‘‘accessibility-centered design’’
criterion (§ 170.315(g)(5)) is applicable
to any Health IT Module presented for
certification to the 2015 Edition.
3. ONC–ACBs To Accept Test Results
From Any ONC–ATL in Good Standing
We propose to revise the PoPC for
ONC–ACBs in order to address business
relationships between ONC–ACBs and
ONC–ATLs. To encourage market
competition, we propose to require
ONC–ACBs to accept test results from
any ONC–ATL that is in good standing
under the Program and is compliant
with its ISO 17025 accreditation
requirements. However, if an ONC–ACB
has concerns about accepting test results
from a certain ONC–ATL, the ONC–ACB
would have an opportunity to explain
the potential issues to ONC and NVLAP,
and on a case-by-case basis, ONC could
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consider the facts and make the final
determination.
ONC–ATLs must be accredited by the
NVLAP and seek authorization from
ONC to participate in the ONC Health
IT Certification Program. ONC–ATLs
test products against the ONC-approved
test method for the standards and
certification criteria identified by the
Secretary using ONC-approved test
methods. ONC–ACBs make certification
determinations and conduct
surveillance for health IT originally
tested by an ONC–ATL. Based on the
process that all ONC-ATLs must
undergo, we believe that they are
capable of providing accurate test
results that should be accepted by any
ONC–ACB.
The intent of this proposal is to
ensure that ONC–ATLs are not
discriminated against and do not suffer
injury from ONC–ACBs not accepting
their test results if, in fact, they are in
good standing. This proposal may also
prevent harm to health IT developers,
who present their health IT to be tested
by ONC–ATLs and ultimately seek
certification by ONC–ACBs under the
Program. These situations may arise if a
health IT developer’s ONC–ACB leaves
the Program or goes out of business.
This proposal may also prevent
situations of preferential business
arrangements such as when one
organization is both an ONC–ATL and
ONC–ACB and will not enter into a
contract with another organization who
is also an ONC–ATL.
4. Mandatory Disclosures and
Certifications
We propose to revise the PoPC in
§ 170.523(k). We propose to remove
§ 170.523(k) (1)(ii)(B) because
certifications can only be issued to
Health IT Modules and not Complete
EHRs. We are proposing to remove the
2014 Edition from the CFR (see section
III.B.2 of this preamble) and Complete
EHR certifications are no longer
available for certification to the 2015
Edition (80 FR 62608; 79 FR 54443). We
also propose to revise § 170.523(k)(1)(iii)
to broaden the section beyond just the
Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive
Programs (now referred to as Promoting
Interoperability Programs). We propose
to revise the section to include a
detailed description of all known
material information concerning
additional types of costs or fees that a
user may be required to pay to
implement or use the Health IT
Module’s capabilities, whether to meet
provisions of HHS programs requiring
the use of certified health IT or to
achieve any other use within the scope
of the health IT’s certification.
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We also propose to remove the
provision in § 170.523(k)(3) that
requires a certification issued to a precoordinated, integrated bundle of Health
IT Modules to be treated the same as a
certification issued to a Complete EHR
for the purposes of § 170.523(k)(1),
except that the certification must also
indicate each Health IT Module that is
included in the bundle. We propose to
remove this provision because precoordinated, integrated bundles are no
longer applicable for certification under
Program.
We propose to revise § 170.523(k)(4)
to clarify that a certification issued to a
Health IT Module based solely on the
applicable certification criteria adopted
by the ONC Health IT Certification
Program must be separate and distinct
from any other certification(s) based on
other criteria or requirements. The
intent of this provision, as indicated in
the Establishment of the Permanent
Certification Program for Health
Information Technology final rule (76
FR 1272), is to ensure that any other
certifications an ONC–ACB may issue,
is separately indicated from the
applicable certification criteria adopted
by the ONC Health IT Certification
Program.
We also propose changes related to
transparency attestations and
limitations in section III.B.5. of this
preamble. Additionally, we propose
other new PoPCs for ONC–ACBs in
sections VII.B.5 and VII.D of this
preamble.
C. Principles of Proper Conduct for
ONC–ATLs—Records Retention
We propose to revise the records
retention requirement in § 170.524(f) to
include the ‘‘life of the edition’’ as well
as 3 years after the retirement of an
edition related to the certification of
Health IT Module(s). The circumstances
are the same as in section V.B.1 of this
preamble mentioned above, therefore,
we propose the same revisions for ONC–
ATLs as we did for ONC-ACBs.
VI. Health IT for the Care Continuum
ONC believes health IT should help
promote and support patient care when
and where it is needed. This means
health IT should help support patient
populations, specialized care,
transitions of care, and practice settings
across the care continuum. In the
Permanent Certification Program final
rule, we clarified that section 3001(c)(5)
of the PHSA provides the National
Coordinator with the authority to
establish a voluntary certification
program or programs for other types of
health IT beyond those which supported
the EHR Incentive Programs (now called
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the Promoting Interoperability
Programs). However, we decided that
the initial focus of the Program should
be on supporting the EHR Incentive
Programs, which focuses on EHR
technology for the ambulatory and
inpatient settings (76 FR 1294). As the
Program evolved and the adoption and
use of certified health IT increased
significantly, we modified the Program
in the 2015 Edition final rule to make
it more open and accessible to more
types of health IT, including health IT
that supports various care and practice
settings beyond those included in the
EHR Incentive Programs (80 FR 62604).
Our goal was then and is now to support
the advancement of interoperable health
IT and to promote health IT
functionality in care and practice
settings across the care continuum (see
also 80 FR 62604).
ONC’s efforts in the 2015 Edition to
make the Program more open and
accessible to other care settings also
aligned with fall 2013 recommendations
from the HIT Policy Committee (HITPC).
The HITPC examined the extension of
the Program to include functionalities
that would benefit settings not covered
by the EHR Incentive Programs. The
HITPC recommended that
considerations regarding functionality
should focus on whether the
functionality would:
• Advance a national priority or
legislative mandate
• Align with existing federal/state
programs
• Utilize the existing technology
pipeline
• Build on existing stakeholder support
• Appropriately balance the costs and
benefits of a certification program.
Taking into consideration the HITPC
recommendations, ONC’s 2015 Edition
focused on the adoption of certification
criteria that are standards-based,
applicable to a wide variety of care and
practice settings, and that advance the
structured recording, access, exchange,
and use of health information. ONC has
also encouraged users—including
specialty groups—to continue to work
with developers to innovate, develop,
and deploy health IT in specific clinical
settings in ways that promote safety,
effectiveness, and efficient health care
delivery while also reducing burden.
In the 2015 Edition final rule we
stated that we did not intend to develop
and issue separate regulatory
certification ‘‘paths’’ or ‘‘tracks’’ for
particular care or practice settings (e.g.,
a ‘‘long-term and post-acute care
(LTPAC) certification’’) because it
would be difficult to independently
construct such ‘‘paths’’ or ‘‘tracks’’ in a
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manner that would align with other
relevant programs and specific
stakeholder needs. While we never have
had intentions to adopt care- or
practice-specific certification tracks, or
additional voluntary program(s), in
parallel to the existing voluntary ONC
Health IT Certification Program, we
stated that we would welcome the
opportunity to work with HHS agencies,
other agencies, and provider
associations in identifying the
appropriate functionality and
certification criteria in the Program to
support their stakeholders (80 FR
62704). This approach is consistent with
the recommendations by the HITPC.
Since the publication of the 2015
Edition final rule, ONC has explored
how we might work with the industry
and with specialty organizations to
collaboratively advance health IT that
supports medical specialties and sites of
service. As a result, we have gained
insight from stakeholders regarding the
burdens associated with establishing a
specific set of required certification
criteria for all users—which may
include capabilities not applicable to
certain settings of care or specialties.
Stakeholders have also noted that the
adoption of a set of required criteria
without also enabling and incentivizing
innovation beyond those criteria may
have the unintended consequence of
stifling progress for that setting.
Stakeholders noted that the timeline for
testing and certifying to required criteria
and the subsequent deployment of
certification criteria in practice settings
is not always aligned with standards
updates, the emergence of new
standards, or technological innovation.
Finally, stakeholders have urged ONC to
leverage multiple means to advance
interoperability standards that are
widely applicable, to enable and
promote innovation that is supported by
these standards, and—in collaboration
with stakeholders to monitor and
support developments in emerging
standards and technologies for specialty
use cases.
Section 4001(b)(i) of the Cures Act
instructs the National Coordinator to
encourage, keep, or recognize, through
existing authorities, the voluntary
certification of health IT under the
Program for use in medical specialties
and sites of service for which no such
technology is available or where more
technological advancement or
integration is needed. This provision of
the Cures Act closely aligns with ONC’s
ongoing collaborative efforts with both
federal partners and stakeholders within
the health care and health IT
community to encourage and support
the advancement of health IT for a wide
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range of clinical settings. These
initiatives have included projects
related to clinical priorities beyond
those specifically included in the EHR
Incentive Programs (now called the
Promoting Interoperability Programs)
including efforts in public health,
behavioral health, and long-term and
post-acute care. We further note that
these initiatives often include the
development of non-regulatory
informational resources to support the
specific implementation goal and align
with the technical specifications already
available in the Program for
certification. To advance these efforts,
we generally consider a range of factors
including: stakeholder input and
identification of clinical needs and
clinical priorities, the evolution and
adoption of health IT across the care
continuum, the costs and benefits
associated with any policy or
implementation strategy related to care
settings and sites of service, and
potential regulatory burden and
compliance timelines. Generally, ONC’s
approach can be summarized in three
parts:
• First, ONC analyzes existing
certification criteria to identify how
such criteria may be applicable for
medical specialties and sites of service.
• Second, ONC focuses on the realtime evaluation of existing and
emerging standards to determine
applicability to medical specialties and
sites of service as well as to the broader
care continuum, including the
evaluation of such standards for
inclusion in the ONC Interoperability
Standards Advisory (ISA).41
• Third, ONC may work in
collaboration with stakeholders to
support the development of
informational resources for medical
specialties and sites of service for which
ONC identifies a need to advance the
effective implementation of certified
health IT.
We believe this approach provides an
economical, flexible, and responsive
option for both health care providers
and the health IT industry, which is also
in alignment with the provisions of the
Cures Act related to burden reduction
and promoting interoperability. We are
committed to continuing to work with
stakeholders in this manner to
encourage and advance the adoption of
health IT to support medical specialties
and sites of service, and to help ensure
that providers have the tools they need
to support patients at the point of care
and that essential patient health
information is available across a care
settings.
41 https://www.healthit.gov/isa/.
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This section outlines our approach to
implement Section 4001(b) of the Cures
Act, which requires that the Secretary
make recommendations for the
voluntary certification of health IT for
use by pediatric health providers and to
adopt certification criteria to support
the voluntary certification of health IT
for use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children. To
be clear, and consistent with past
practice, we do not recommend or
propose a ‘‘pediatric-specific track or
program’’ under the ONC Health IT
Certification Program. This proposed
rule outlines the certification criteria
adopted in the 2015 Edition which we
believe support the certification of
health IT for pediatric care. Finally, it
identifies the new and revised criteria
proposed in this rule which we believe
further support the voluntary
certification of health IT for pediatric
care. We have included in the appendix
of this proposed rule a set of technical
worksheets that can help inform your
comments on the recommendations, the
new and revised criteria in the Program
that would also support pediatric care
settings, and the overall approach we
have herein described. These
worksheets outline the following
information:
• The alignment of each
recommendation to the Children’s
Model EHR Format 42 as identified by
stakeholders (see also Section VI.A.1
and 2 for further detail on the Children’s
Model EHR Format and the
recommendations).
• The alignment of each
recommendation to the 2015 Edition
certification criteria and new or revised
criteria described in this proposed rule
(see also section VI.A.2.a and b).
• Potential supplemental items from
the Children’s Model EHR Format
identified by ONC which relate to the
primary recommendation and the
related certification criteria.
We invite readers to use these worksheets
to inform public comment on the
recommendations and criteria described in
Section VI.A.2 specifically as they relate to
pediatric health care use cases. The
comments received on these technical
worksheets through this proposed rule will
be used to inform the final recommendations
for voluntary certification of health IT criteria
for use in pediatric care. Furthermore, these
comments, and the detailed insights received
through stakeholder outreach, may inform
the future development of a non-binding
informational guide or resource to provide
useful information for health IT developers
and pediatric care providers seeking to
42 https://healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-andresources/pediatric-resources/childrens-electronichealth-record-ehr-format.
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successfully implement these health IT
solutions in a clinical setting.
A. Health IT for Pediatric Setting
Section 4001(b)(iii) of the Cures Act—
‘‘Health information technology for
pediatrics’’ requires that:
• First, that the Secretary, in
consultation with relevant stakeholders,
shall make recommendations for the
voluntary certification of health IT for
use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children, and
• Second, that the Secretary shall
adopt certification criteria to support
the voluntary certification of health IT
for use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children.
In this proposed rule, we describe our
approach to stakeholder engagement,
the analysis used to develop the
recommendations, and the specific
certification criteria we believe can
support each recommendation.
1. Background and Stakeholder
Convening
Over the past ten years, a number of
initiatives have focused on the
availability and use of effective health
IT tools and resources for pediatric care.
These have included a number of
public-private partnerships including
efforts between HHS, state agencies, and
health systems for innovative projects
that range from care coordination
enterprise solutions to immunization
information systems and to point of care
solutions for specialty needs. In order to
learn from and build upon these efforts,
ONC has engaged with stakeholders in
both the public and private sector
including other federal, state and local
government partners, health care
providers engaged in the care of
children, standards development
organizations, charitable foundations
engaged in children’s health care
research, and health IT developers
supporting pediatric care settings.
For example, significant work has
been done by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ), CMS, the
Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), and
organizations around the Children’s
Model EHR Format (Children’s Format),
which is critical to any discussion of the
pediatric health IT landscape.43 The
Children’s Format was authorized by
the 2009 Children’s Health Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act
(CHIPRA) 44 and developed by AHRQ in
43 Agency for Health Care Information and
Technology. Health Information Technology. https://
healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-and-resources/
childrens-electronic-health-record-ehr-format
Accessed September, 2017.
44 Public Law 111–3, section 401.
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2. Recommendations for the Voluntary
Certification of Health IT for Use in
Pediatric Care
To support the first part of Section
4001(b) of the Cures Act, ONC
considered the historical efforts on the
Children’s Model EHR Format, the input
from stakeholders, and our own
technical analysis and review of health
IT capabilities and standards to develop
a set of recommendations for voluntary
certification for health IT for pediatric
care. These include eight
recommendations related to the Priority
List:
• Recommendation 1: Use biometricspecific norms for growth curves and
support growth charts for children.
• Recommendation 2: Compute
weight-based drug dosage.
• Recommendation 3: Ability to
document all guardians and caregivers.
• Recommendation 4: Segmented
access to information.
• Recommendation 5: Synchronize
immunization histories with registries.
• Recommendation 6: Age- and
weight-specific single-dose range
checking.
• Recommendation 7: Transferrable
access authority.
• Recommendation 8: Associate
maternal health information and
demographics with newborn.
We also developed two additional
recommendations beyond the Priority
List which relate to other items within
the Children’s Format that are
considered important to pediatric
stakeholders. These additional
recommendations, which we believe
may be supported by certified health IT,
are as follows:
• Recommendation 9: Track
incomplete preventative care
opportunities.
• Recommendation 10: Flag special
health care needs.
In order to implement the second part
of Section 4001(b) of the Cures Act for
the adoption of certification criteria to
support the voluntary certification of
health IT for use by pediatric health care
providers, we have identified both the
2015 Edition certification criteria and
the new or revised criteria in this
proposed rule that we believe support
these 10 recommendations for health IT
for pediatric care and sites of service.
We direct readers to the appendix of
this proposed rule for a set of technical
worksheets which include a cross-walk
of the various criteria specifically
associated with each recommendation.
These worksheets outline the following
information:
• The alignment of each
recommendation to the primary
Children’s Format 46 item identified by
stakeholders.
• The alignment of each
recommendation to the 2015 Edition
certification criteria and new or revised
criteria described in this proposed rule.
• Supplemental items from the
Children’s Format for each
45 https://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/citation/children-ehr-format-enhancementfinal-recommendation-report-abridged.pdf.
46 https://healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-andresources/pediatric-resources/childrens-electronichealth-record-ehr-format.
close collaboration with CMS. It was
developed to bridge the gap between the
functionality present in most EHRs
currently available and the functionality
that could optimally support the care of
children. Specifically, the Children’s
Format provides information to EHR
system developers and others about
critical functionality and other
requirements that are helpful to include
in an EHR system to address health care
needs specific to the care of children.
The final version of the Children’s
Format,45 released in 2015, consists of
47 high priority functional requirements
in 19 topic areas that focus on
improvements that would better support
the safety and quality of care delivered
to children. The Children’s Format was
intended as a starting point for
developers, users, and purchasers for
informing an approach for pediatric
voluntary certification. We refer to the
Voluntary Edition proposed rule for a
description of ONC’s prior discussion
around the Children’s Format (79 FR
10930).
In the summer of 2017, the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) reviewed
the 2015 Format using a robust
analytical process and engagement with
their members. The result was a
prioritized list of eight clinical priorities
to support pediatric health care
(‘‘Priority List’’). In October 2017, ONC
held a technical discussion with
stakeholders titled ‘‘Health IT for
Pediatrics’’ with the specific purpose of
obtaining input from an array of
stakeholders in an effort to draw
correlations between the pediatric
providers’ clinical priorities identified
in the Priority List with the detailed
technical requirements outlined in the
Children’s Format and the capabilities
and standards that could be included in
certified health IT. Through this
collaborative approach, the meeting
participants identified a set of priority
needs for health IT to support pediatric
care based upon those identified by the
Priority List and the primary correlation
to the Children’s Format.
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recommendation and the related
certification criteria.
We invite readers to use these
worksheets to inform public comment
on the recommendations, the inclusion
of specific items from the Children’s
Format, and the identified certification
criteria as they relate specifically to use
cases for pediatric care and sites of
service. We also seek comment on the
following:
1. Relevant gaps, barriers, safety
concerns, and resources (including
available best practices, activities, and
tools) that may impact or support
feasibility of the recommendation in
practice.
2. Effective use of health IT itself in
support of each recommendation as
involves provider training, establishing
workflow, and other related safety and
usability considerations.
3. If any of the 10 recommendations
should not be included in ONC’s final
recommendations for voluntary
certification of health IT for pediatric
care.
4. Any certification criteria from the
Program that is identified for the 10
recommendations that should not be
included to support the specific
recommendation.
As stated in the worksheets located in
the appendix, commenters are
encouraged to reference the specific
‘‘recommendation number’’ (1–10) with
the corresponding technical worksheet
question number in their response. For
example, ‘‘Recommendation 1—
Question 3’’.
a. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
In order to implement the second part
of Section 4001(b) of the Cures Act to
adopt certification criteria to support
the voluntary certification of health IT
for use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children, we
identified the following 2015 Edition
certification criteria that support the
recommendations. Within the technical
worksheets in the appendix of this
proposed rule, these criteria are noted
under each recommendation to which
they are correlated. The 2015 Edition
criteria are as follows:
• ‘‘API functionality’’ criteria
(§ 170.315(g)(7)–(g)(9)) which addresses
many of the challenges currently faced
by patients and by caregivers such as
parents or guardians accessing child’s
health information, including the
‘‘multiple portal’’ problem, by
potentially allowing individuals to
aggregate health information from
multiple sources in a web or mobile
application of their choice.
• ‘‘Care plan’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(9)) which supports
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pediatric care by facilitating the
documentation of electronic health
information in a structured format to
improve care coordination (80 FR
62648–62649).
• ‘‘Clinical decision support’’ (CDS)
criterion (§ 170.315(a)(9)) which
supports pediatric care by enabling
interventions based on the capture of
biometric data.
• ‘‘Common Clinical Data Set’’
(adopted in (§ 170.315(b)(4) and
§ 170.315(b)(5)) which includes optional
pediatric vital sign data elements
including as optional the reference
range/growth curve for three pediatric
vital signs—BMI percent per LOINC
identifiers for age per sex, weight per
length/sex, and head occipital-frontal
circumference for children less than
three years of age.
• ‘‘Data segmentation for privacy’’
send criterion and receive criterion
(adopted in § 170.315(b)(7) and
§ 170.315(b)(8)) which provides the
ability to: Create a summary record that
is tagged at the document level as
restricted and subject to re-disclosure;
receive a summary record that is
document-level tagged as restricted;
separate the document-level tagged
document from other documents
received; and, view the restricted
document without having to incorporate
any of the data from the document.
• ‘‘Demographics’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(5)) which supports
pediatric care through the capture of
values and value sets relevant for the
pediatric health care setting as well as
allowing for improved patient matching
which is a key challenge for pediatric
care.
• ‘‘Electronic Prescribing’’ criterion
(adopted in § 170.315(b)(3)) which
includes an optional Structured and
Codified Sig Format, which has the
capability to exchange weight-based
dosing calculations within the NCPDP
SCRIPT 10.6 standard and limits the
ability to prescribe all oral, liquid
medications in only metric standard
units of mL (i.e., not cc) important for
enabling safe prescribing practices for
children.
• ‘‘Family health history’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(12)) which supports
pediatric care because it leverages
concepts or expressions for familial
conditions, which are especially
clinically relevant when caring for
children.
• ‘‘Patient health information
capture’’ criterion (§ 170.315(e)(3))
which supports providers’ ability to
accept health information from a patient
or authorized representative. This
criterion could support pediatric care
through documentation of decision-
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making authority of a patient
representative.
• ‘‘Social, psychological, and
behavioral data’’ criterion
§ 170.315(a)(15) which supports
integration of behavioral health data
into a child’s record across the care
continuum by enabling a user to record,
change, and access a patient’s social,
psychological, and behavioral data
based using SNOMED CT® and LOINC®
codes.
• ‘‘Transitions of care’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(1)) which supports
structured transition of care summaries
and referral summaries that help ensure
the coordination and continuity of
health care as children transfer between
different clinicians at different health
care organizations or different levels of
care within the same health care
organization;
• ‘‘Transmission to immunization
registries’’ criterion (§ 170.315(f)(1))
which supports the safe and effective
provision of child health care through
immunizations and registry linkages.
This criterion also provides the ability
to request, access, and display the
evaluated immunization history and
forecast from an immunization registry
for a patient. Immunization forecasting
recommendations allow for providers to
access the most complete and up-to-date
information on a patient’s immunization
history to inform discussions about
what vaccines a patient may need based
on nationally recommended
immunization recommendations (80 FR
62662–62664).
• ‘‘View, download, and transmit to
3rd party’’ (VDT) criterion
(§ 170.315(e)(1)) which supports
transferrable access authority for the
pediatric health care setting and
provides the ability for patients (and
their authorized representatives) 47 to
view, download, and transmit their
health information to a 3rd party.
We note that some of these criteria
may be updated based on proposals
contained in this proposed rule;
however, we believe that prior to any
such updates, technology that is
currently available and certified to these
2015 Edition criteria can make a
significant impact in supporting
providers engaged in the health care of
children. We invite readers to use the
technical worksheets in the appendix to
47 The VDT criterion includes a ‘‘patientauthorized representative’’ concept that aligns with
the use of the term under the EHR Incentive
Program. A ‘‘patient-authorized representative’’ is
defined as any individual to whom the patient has
granted access to their health information (see also
77 FR 13720). However, consent is not needed for
minors, for whom existing local, state, or federal
law grants their parents or guardians access (see
also 77 FR 13720).
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this proposed rule to inform their public
comment on the recommendations, the
inclusion of specific items from the
Children’s Format, and the identified
2015 Edition certification criteria as
they relate specifically to use cases for
pediatric care and sites of service.
b. New or Revised Certification Criteria
in This Proposed Rule
In order to implement the second part
of Section 4001(b)(iii) of the Cures Act
to adopt certification criteria to support
the voluntary certification of health
information technology for use by
pediatric health providers to support the
health care of children, we identified
new or revised certification criteria in
this proposed rule that support the
recommendations. These new or revised
criteria and standards in this proposed
rule that would support pediatric
settings include:
• New API criterion (§ 170.315(g)(10))
which would serve to implement the
Cures Act requirement to permit health
information to be accessed, exchanged,
and used from APIs without special
effort (see section IV.B.5 of this
proposed rule).
• New ‘‘DS4P’’ criteria (two for C–
CDA ((§ 170.315(b)(12)) and
(§ 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR
(§ 170.315(g)(11))) that would support a
more granular approach to privacy
tagging data for health information
exchange supported by either the C–
CDA- or FHIR-based exchange standards
(see section VI.A for a discussion of this
criteria in relation to pediatric settings
and section VI.B for discussion of these
criteria in relation to Opioid Use
Disorder).
• New electronic prescribing
certification criterion (§ 170.315(b)(11)),
which would supports improved patient
safety and prescription accuracy,
workflow efficiencies, and increased
configurability of systems including
functionality that could support
pediatric medication management.
• USCDI (§ 170.213) which enables
the inclusion of pediatric vital sign data
elements, including the reference range/
scale or growth curve for BMI percentile
per age and sex, weight for age per
length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference (and the criteria
that include the USCDI).
Each of these proposed criteria are
further described in other sections of
this proposed rule; however, in this
section of this proposed rule we
specifically seek comment on the
application of these criteria to pediatric
use cases in support of our
recommendations for the voluntary
certification of health IT for pediatric
care.
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For example, our proposal for three
new 2015 Edition DS4P certification
criteria (two for C–CDA
((§ 170.315(b)(12)) and (§ 170.315(b)(13))
and one for FHIR (§ 170.315(g)(11)))
could provide functionality to address
the concerns of multiple stakeholders in
a range of specialty use cases—
including pediatric care settings. In this
section of this proposed rule, we seek
comment specifically related to the
inclusion of these criteria in our
recommendations. Specifically,
stakeholders have expressed the need
to—based on the intended recipient of
the data—to restrict granular pediatric
health data at production. We believe
these criteria could, for example, help
enable providers to:
• Limit the sharing of reproductive
and sexual health data from an EHR in
order to protect the minor’s privacy;
• Prevent disclosure of an
emancipated minor’s sensitive health
information, while also permitting a
parent or legal guardian to provide
consent for treatment; and
• Segment child abuse information
based on jurisdictional laws, which may
have varying information sharing
requirements for parents, guardians,
and/or other possible legal
representatives.
While health care providers should
already have processes and workflows
in place to address their existing
compliance obligations, we recognize
that more granular privacy markings at
the point of data capture would further
support existing and future priorities of
pediatric health providers, as well as for
multiple medical specialties and sites of
service. We also recognize that such
point of data capture markings can
reduce administrative burden through
efficiencies gained in streamlined
compliance workflows.
We invite readers to use the technical
worksheets in the appendix of this
proposed rule to support public
comment on the recommendations, the
inclusion of specific items from the
Children’s Format, and the identified
proposed new or revised certification
criteria as they relate specifically to use
cases for pediatric care and sites of
service.
However, as discussed, through our
experience and engagement with health
care providers and health IT developers,
we believe that in some cases
information resources can aid in
implementation in clinical settings. In
the past, ONC has worked
collaboratively with federal partners,
health IT developers, and the health
care community to support the
development of non-regulatory
informational resources that can provide
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additional support for health IT
implementation (see, for example, the
ONC Patient Engagement Playbook).
Such a resource could include the
recommendations and certification
criteria here identified and synthesize
these technical recommendations with
information outside of the Program
related to patient safety, usability,
privacy and security, and other key
considerations for successful
implementation of a health IT system
within a clinical setting. We believe that
the creation of such a resource, in
collaboration with clinical and technical
stakeholders, would help support the
advancement of health IT solutions for
use in pediatric care and pediatric
settings. We further include additional
information on prior ONC initiatives
related to health IT for pediatric settings
as available on our website at
www.healthit.gov/pediatrics.
B. Health IT and Opioid Use Disorder
Prevention and Treatment—Request for
Information
We have identified a need to explore
ways to advance health IT across the
care continuum to support efforts to
fight the opioid epidemic. To that
purpose, we seek comment in this
proposed rule on a series of questions
related to health IT functionalities and
standards to support the effective
prevention and treatment of opioid use
disorder (OUD) across patient
populations and care settings.
We recognize the significance of the
opioid epidemic confronting our nation
and the importance of helping to
support health care providers
committed to preventing inappropriate
access to prescription opioids and
providing safe, appropriate treatment.
HHS has a comprehensive strategy to
combat the opioid crisis. It consists of
five points that are focused on better:
Addiction prevention, treatment, and
recovery services; data; pain
management; targeting of overdose
reversing drugs; and research.48 In
support of this strategy, HHS will
improve access to prevention, treatment,
and recovery support services; target the
availability and distribution of
overdose-reversing drugs; strengthen
public health data reporting and
collection; support cutting-edge
research; and advance the practice of
pain management. To combat the opioid
crisis, in October 2018, Congress passed
the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention
that Promotes Opioid Recovery and
Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and
Communities Act. It aims to expand
treatment, recovery, and prevention
48
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initiatives for substance use disorder
and also includes interoperability and
health IT tools as a key part of the
response to this crisis.
We believe health IT offers promising
strategies to help medical specialties
and sites of service as they combat
opioid use disorder (OUD). For
example, health IT has the potential to
improve adherence to opioid
prescribing guidelines and physician
adherence to treatment protocols, to
increase the safety of prescribing for
controlled substances, to enhance
clinician access to PDMPs, and to
expand access to addiction treatment
and recovery support services.
Additionally, through the Program, our
goal continues to be to improve access
to data from disparate sources and help
ensure that key data is consistently
available to the right person, at the right
place, and at the right time across the
care continuum. One component of
advancing that goal is through technical
standards for exchanging health
information that form an essential
foundation for interoperability.
ONC has heard from stakeholders
including policymakers, implementers,
health care providers and patient
advocacy groups that additional
information is needed to assist in
planning for the effective use of health
IT in OUD prevention and treatment.
We additionally recognize stakeholders’
interest in the new opioid measures
(Query of PDMP measure and Verify
Opioid Treatment Agreement measure)
included in CMS’s Promoting
Interoperability Programs (formerly
known as the Medicare and Medicaid
EHR Incentive Programs). These two
measures support HHS initiatives
related to the treatment of opioid and
substance use disorders by helping
health care providers avoid
inappropriate prescriptions, improve
coordination of prescribing amongst
health care providers, and focus on the
advanced use of certified health IT in
care coordination for OUD prevention
and treatment (83 FR 41644).
In order to support these efforts, in
this proposed rule we outline a brief
overview of some key areas of health IT
implementation that could support OUD
prevention and treatment. These
include consideration of current health
IT certification criteria included in the
2015 Edition, revised or new
certification criteria as outlined in this
proposed rule, and current health IT
initiatives underway in the health care
industry or health IT industry which
intersect with ONC policy goals. In this
section of the proposed rule, we request
public comment specifically from the
perspective of how our existing Program
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requirements and proposals in this
rulemaking may support use cases
related to OUD prevention and
treatment and if there are additional
areas that ONC should consider for
effective implementation of health ITenabled OUD prevention and treatment.
We seek comment from this perspective
on the identification of 2015 Edition
certification criteria, the proposals for
revised or new certification criteria, and
the potential future consideration of
emerging technologies described in
various initiatives.
1. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
We seek public comment on how the
existing 2015 Edition certification
criteria as well as proposals within this
proposed rule for revised or new criteria
support OUD prevention and treatment.
Specifically, we seek comment on
certification criteria previously adopted
in the 2015 Edition that can support
clinical priorities, advance
interoperability for OUD (including care
coordination and the effective use of
health IT for the treatment and
prevention of OUD). In this proposed
rule, we summarize some of these 2015
Edition certification criteria identified
and indicate how they support care
coordination, the prevention of OUD
and overdose, and the detection of
opioid misuse, abuse, and diversion.
We have also below identified the
proposals for revised or new 2015
Edition criteria within this proposed
rule that we believe can support clinical
priorities, advance interoperability for
OUD (including care coordination and
also the effective use of health IT for the
treatment and prevention of OUD). We
welcome input from stakeholders
specifically on these criteria within the
context of OUD prevention and
treatment, as well as input on the
identification of other criteria included
either in the 2015 Edition and/or that
are proposed in other parts of this rule
that may be considered a clinical and
interoperability priority for supporting
OUD treatment and prevention.
We have identified several 2015
Edition certification criteria available
now for certification in the Program
which could support care coordination
and the prevention and detection of
opioid misuse, abuse, and diversion.
They are:
• The ‘‘transitions of care’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(1)) supports structured
transition of care summaries and referral
summaries that help ensure the
coordination and continuity of health
care as patients transfer between
different clinicians at different health
care organizations or different levels of
care within the same health care
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organization. This criteria supports the
ability to transmit a summary care
record to support an individual with
OUD upon discharge from an inpatient
setting or from a primary care provider
to another setting for their care.
• The ‘‘clinical information
reconciliation and incorporation’’
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(2)) allows
clinicians to reconcile and incorporate
patient health information sent from
external sources to maintain a more
accurate and up-to-date patient record.
This process could help—for example—
reduce opioid related errors regarding
patients who use multiple pharmacies,
have co-morbidity factors, and visit
multiple clinicians.
• The ‘‘electronic prescribing’’
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(3)) provides a
way to write and transmit prescription
information electronically. This
criterion facilitates appropriate opioid
prescribing by simplifying the review of
prescription information during followup visits or transitions to other
clinicians, by allowing prescribers to
communicate prescription-related
messages to pharmacies electronically
and by capturing and transmitting
medication histories that are shared
with PDMPs. In this proposed rule, we
propose to update the existing
electronic prescribing certification
criterion as described in section IV.B.2
of this proposed rule.
• The ‘‘patient health information
capture’’ (§ 170.315(e)(3)) allows
clinicians to incorporate unstructured
patient generated health data or data
from a non-clinical setting into a patient
record. The CMS Promoting
Interoperability Programs for eligible
hospitals includes a new optional
measure which is focused on verifying
the existence of a signed Opioid
Treatment Agreement for certain
patients when a controlled substance is
prescribed and incorporating it into the
record. In the Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems final rule,
CMS recognized this certification
criterion’s potential to support this goal
within a certified health IT system (83
FR 41654).
• The ‘‘social, psychological, and
behavioral data’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(15)) can help to provide a
more complete view of a patient’s
overall health status. This is important
to help provide a ‘‘whole-patient’’
approach to the treatment of substance
use disorders included as part of
Medicated-Assisted Treatment (MAT)
that involves the use of FDA-approved
medications, in combination with
counseling and behavioral therapies, to
treat individuals recovering from OUD.
This data can help to improve care
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coordination and lead to the
identification of appropriate social
supports and community resources.
We seek comment on how these
criteria and what additional 2015
Edition certification criteria may be
considered a clinical and
interoperability priority for supporting
OUD treatment and prevention. We also
seek comment on the value of
developing a potential future nonbinding informational guide or resource
to provide useful information for OUD
providers and sites of service related to
specific clinical priorities and use cases
of focus.
2. Revised or New 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria in This Proposed
Rule
This proposed rule contains
additional proposals to revise or add
new criteria to the Program to better
support care across the continuum. We
believe these criteria and standards,
highlighted below, can also support
treatment and prevention of OUD. We
seek comment specifically on the
applicability of these criteria to the OUD
use case. They are:
• USCDI: As detailed in section
IV.B.1, we are proposing to adopt the
USCDI as a standard (§ 170.213) which
would establish a minimum set of data
classes (including structured data fields)
that are required to be interoperable
nationwide, and is designed to be
expanded in an iterative and predictable
way over time. The USCDI Version 1
(USCDI v1) builds upon the 2015
Edition CCDS and includes a common
set of data classes that can be supported
by commonly used standards. It
includes the 2015 Edition CCDS data
elements, such as medications. It also
includes two new data classes, titled
‘‘clinical notes’’ and ‘‘provenance,’’
which would help facilitate
interoperable exchange and the
trustworthiness of the data being
exchanged. These enhancements to the
comprehensiveness and reliability of the
data being exchanged could help
empower physicians in the prevention
and detection of opioid misuse, abuse,
and diversion.
In addition, because we propose to
adopt the USCDI as a standard, health
IT developers would be allowed to take
advantage of the Maintenance of
Certification requirements described in
section VII.B.5 of this proposed rule.
Therefore, the USCDI would have the
potential to further benefit clinical
priorities and interoperability for OUD,
including safe and appropriate opioid
prescribing, through the ability to
voluntarily implement and use a new
version of an adopted standard or
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implementation specification so long as
certain conditions are met, including
the new version being approved by the
National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards
Version Advancement Process. We seek
comment on how this proposal would
further support the access, exchange,
and use of additional and future data
classes (including structured data fields)
in more care and practice settings
specifically as related to the prevention
and treatment of OUD.
• Standardized API: We are
proposing new API functionality
through the adoption of a new API
certification criterion (§ 170.315(g)(10)),
which serves to implement the Cures
Act requirement to permit health
information to be accessed, exchanged,
and used from APIs without special
effort. This criterion would enable
efficient exchange of health information
using modern internet technologies and
thus enable collaborative, patientdriven, integrated care for individuals
recovering from OUD.
• Data Segmentation for Privacy and
Consent Management: As discussed in
section IV.B.7, we are also proposing to
remove the current 2015 Edition DS4P—
send (§ 170.315(b)(7)) and DS4P—
receive (§ 170.315(b)(8)) certification
criteria. We propose to replace these
two criteria with three new 2015 Edition
DS4P certification criteria (two for C–
CDA ((§ 170.315(b)(12)) and
(§ 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR
(§ 170.315(g)(11))) that would support a
more granular approach to privacy
tagging data for health information
exchange supported by either the C–
CDA- or FHIR-based exchange
standards. We believe this proposal
would offer functionality that is more
valuable to providers and patients,
especially given the complexities of the
privacy law landscape for multiple care
and specialty settings. We also believe
this proposal could lead to more
complete records, contribute to patient
safety, and enhance care coordination.
Additionally, we believe this proposal
may support a more usable display of
OUD information at the request of
patients within an EHR and we invite
input on best practices, including the
processes and methods by which OUD
information should be displayed.
• Electronic Prescribing and PDMPs:
As discussed in section IV.B.2, we are
proposing to remove the current 2015
Edition electronic prescribing
certification criterion (§ 170.315(b)(3))
and replace this criterion with a new
electronic prescribing certification
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(11)) that would
support improved patient safety and
prescription accuracy, create workflow
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efficiencies, reduce testing
requirements, and increase
configurability of systems. This new
proposed criterion includes the addition
of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy (REMS) messages. We believe
this proposal would help address
challenges discussed in the CMS
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems final rule (83 FR 41651) and
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule
proposed rule (83 FR 35704) by
strengthening clinical and
administrative efficiency, helping move
the industry forward by adopting more
current standards for electronic
prescribing, and harmonizing efforts
across federal agencies in the prevention
and treatment of OUD. In addition, the
FDA has enacted an opioids
medications REMS program for opioid
analgesics 49 mandating prescriber and
patient education to encourage proper
patient screening and appropriate
monitoring. Adoption of the new
proposed criterion also supports the
efficient and accurate exchange of
medication history transactions between
providers and pharmacies, and between
pharmacies and state PDMPs.
3. Emerging Standards and Innovations
In addition to the certification criteria
established in the 2015 Edition final
rule and proposed in this rule, ONC is
engaged in a number of health IT and
standards initiatives exploring
innovation and emerging standards to
inform future health IT policy. In some
cases, these efforts may not be mature
enough or best suited for adoption in
the Program; however, we seek
comment on the potential consideration
of these initiatives for future direction of
ONC policy.
• CDS Hooks: Improving how opioids
are prescribed through evidence-based
guidelines can ensure patients have
access to safer, more effective chronic
pain treatment while reducing the risk
of opioid misuse, abuse, or overdose
from these drugs. In response to the
critical need for consistent and current
opioid prescribing guidelines, the
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) released the Guideline
for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic
Pain.50 While progress has been made in
training prescribers and fostering the
adoption of the CDC guideline, the
President’s Opioid Commission 51
49 https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
InformationbyDrugClass/ucm163647.htm.
50 Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic
Pain: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/
rr6501e1.htm.
51 President’s Opioid Commission: https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
images/Final_Report_Draft_11-1-2017.pdf.
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7463
acknowledged that ‘‘not all states have
adopted the guideline, not all
physicians are aware of them, and
sound opioid prescribing guidelines are
far from universally followed.’’ Clinical
decision support (CDS) Hooks is a
health IT specification that has the
potential to positively affect prescriber
adoption of evidence-based prescribing
guidelines by invoking patient-specific
clinical support from within the
clinician’s EHR workflow. ONC is
currently collaborating with CDC on a
project to translate the CDC guideline
into standardized, shareable,
computable decision support artifacts
using CDS Hooks. We recognize that
CDS Hooks is still an emerging
technology and seek input on the
adoption of the CDS Hooks specification
for opioid prescribing and OUD
prevention and treatment. We also
request public comment on other health
IT solutions and effective approaches to
improve opioid prescription practices
and clinical decision support for OUD.
• Care Plan FHIR Resource: A shared
care plan is a critical concept for
managing an individual’s health across
a continuum that includes both clinical
and non-clinical settings 52 and can help
enable more informed and useful
connections among all the stakeholders
engaged in preventing or treating OUD.
For those in recovery from OUD, the
care plan can enable patients to access
their care plan information and
coordinate their care with approved
community care providers which is
critical and part of evidence-based
recovery treatment services. In 2015, the
ONC HITPC recommended that the
National Coordinator accelerate the
implementation of dynamic, shared,
longitudinal care plans that incorporate
information from both clinical and nonclinical services and empower
individuals to manage their own health
and care.53 A consideration for HHS as
part of this earlier recommendation
included looking at the future standards
development needed to transition from
the static care plan documentation
(document template in C–CDA R2.1) to
a dynamic shared care plan that
supports more robust care
coordination.54 We believe HL7
standards and standardized APIs can
elevate care coordination and care
management across the continuum,
52 https://www.healthit.gov/hitac/events/policyadvanced-health-models-and-meaningful-useworkgroup-8.
53 https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/
facas/HITPC_AHM_Hearing_Transmittal_08-112015_0.pdf.
54 https://www.healthit.gov/hitac/events/policyadvanced-health-models-and-meaningful-useworkgroup-8.
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including for those providers without
EHRs, whether for opioid use disorder
related treatment, primary health, or
other problems. Indeed, numerous
efforts are underway within HL7 and
other collaborations to standardize ‘‘care
plans’’ and their content using FHIR and
the C–CDA. From a technical
perspective and in the context of the
proposals focused on the USCDI
standard, the ARCH standard, the new
proposed API certification criterion at
170.315(g)(10), and the voluntary
Standards Version Advancement
Process Maintenance of Certification
requirement described in section VII.B.5
of this proposed rule, we can see a
future where a (g)(10)–certified API
would be capable of supporting care
plan data. We request public comment
on the current maturity of existing and
forthcoming technical specifications to
support care plan/care plan data as well
as specific information that could be
prioritized within a future USCDI data
class focused on care plans.
In addition to commenting on the
criteria noted in this section, we also
encourage stakeholders to participate in
the ISA process.55 The ISA represents
the model by which ONC coordinates
the identification, assessment, and
public awareness of interoperability
standards and implementation
specifications. ONC encourages all
stakeholders to implement and use the
standards and implementation
specifications identified in the ISA as
applicable to the specific
interoperability needs they seek to
address and encourages pilot testing and
other industry experience adopting
standards and implementation
specifications identified as ‘‘emerging’’
in the ISA. The web-based version of the
ISA documents known limitations,
preconditions, and dependencies, and
provide suggestions for security best
practices in the form of security patterns
for referenced standards and
implementation specifications when
they are used to address a specific
clinical health IT interoperability need.
Additionally, through the ISA
process, stakeholders are encouraged to
comment on the outlined standards and
implementation specifications, as ONC
updates the ISA regularly. ONC has
developed and has plans to develop
further ISA content to highlight
standards and implementation
specifications that support the
prevention and treatment of OUD/
substance use disorder (SUD). For
example, the NCPDP SCRIPT standard
55 To learn more about, and/or participate in, the
ISA process, please visit https://www.healthit.gov/
isa/.
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allows a prescriber to request a patient’s
medication history from a state PDMP
via the RxHistoryRequest and
RxHistoryResponse. ONC is also
working to enhance the ISA to make it
easier for stakeholders to find standards
and implementation specifications
related to high-priority use cases, such
as OUD/SUD. The ISA has a comment
process that occurs each year 56 and we
encourage stakeholders to participate in
that process to comment on other
standards and implementation
specifications that currently exist in the
ISA or that the industry and its
stakeholders feel should be added to the
ISA that support OUD/SUD prevention,
treatment, monitoring, and care
coordination.
4. Additional Comment Areas
We further seek comment on effective
approaches for the successful
dissemination and adoption of
standards including the NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071 standard (see section IV.B.2)
that can support the exchange of PDMP
data for integration into EHRs and also
enable further adoption and use of
Electronic Prescribing of Controlled
Substances (EPCS). Regarding
integration of health IT with PDMPs and
EPCS, we believe there are real and
perceived challenges and opportunities
that involve policy and technical
components. As we explore these issues
in collaboration with industry and
stakeholders, we seek comment on the
priority challenges and opportunities for
these topics and on any technical and
policy distinctions, as appropriate.
We also note that there are many
federal initiatives separate from ONC
proposed rulemaking and the Program
that exist within HHS programs
including, but not limited to, CMS
Medicaid and Medicare programs. For
example, Medicare now provides
separate payment for psychiatric
collaborative care model/behavioral
health integration and chronic care
management services (see 81 FR 80233,
and 80247), and Medicaid issued
guidance on leveraging technology to
address the opioid crisis at enhanced
funding matches 56 and also includes
SUD health IT in standard terms and
conditions as part of 1115 waiver
requirements.
In addition, CMS sought comment for
consideration through separate
rulemaking in both the 2019 Physician
Fee Schedule proposed rule (83 FR
35923) and Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems proposed
rule (83 FR 20528) regarding whether
56 https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policyguidance/downloads/smd18006.pdf.
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they should adopt the NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071 standard to facilitate future
reporting of the proposed Query of
PDMP quality measure. As noted in the
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems final rule, a few commenters
supported the use of NCPDP Script
Standard Implementation Guide Version
2017071 medication history transactions
for PDMP queries and response.
Additionally, CMS encourages advances
in standards and their use to deliver
innovative, interoperable solutions that
will seamlessly integrate PDMP query
functionality into clinician-friendly,
patient- centered CEHRT-enabled
workflows that facilitate safer, more
informed prescribing practices and
improved patient outcomes (83 FR
41651).
We seek comment on how successful
implementation of health IT that
supports OUD can aid in the
achievement of national and
programmatic goals, especially where
they may align with initiatives across
HHS and with stakeholder and industry
led efforts.
Finally, we seek comment on a topic
that involves health IT for both pediatric
care and OUD prevention and
treatment—Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome (or NAS). In its September
2018 report, Facing Addiction in
America: The Surgeon General’s
Spotlight on Opioids, the HHS Office of
the Surgeon General describes how the
incidence of Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome (or NAS), has increased
dramatically in the last decade along
with increased opioid misuse.
Newborns may experience NAS, a
withdrawal syndrome, following
exposure to drugs while in the mother’s
womb. NAS is an expected and treatable
condition following repeated maternal
substance use and abuse during
pregnancy, which may have long-term
health consequences for the infant.
Immediate newborn NAS signs
include neurological excitability,
gastrointestinal dysfunction, and
autonomic dysfunction. Newborns with
NAS are more likely than other babies
to have low birthweight and respiratory
complications. ONC believes the
pediatric clinical health IT
recommendations proposed in this rule
(including Priority 8, which includes
the linkage of health data in records of
the mother and newborn) are important
for supporting newborns at birth and as
they grow and receive care in various
settings. As such, we invite comment
on:
• The effective use of health IT itself
in support of the NAS use case as
involves provider training, establishing
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workflow, and other related safety and
usability considerations.
• Existing and potential tools, such as
decision support or clinical quality
measurement, for supporting children
with NAS and on the specific data
elements related to the care of these
children and use of these tools in
practice.
• Identification of any related criteria
and the respective corresponding
proposed pediatric recommendation for
the voluntary certification of health IT
for use in pediatric care that supports
the NAS use case including but not
limited to recommendation number 8
noted above.
We welcome public comment on
these health IT policies, functionalities
and standards to support providers
engaged in the treatment and prevention
of OUD.
VII. Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification
Section 4002 of the Cures Act requires
the Secretary of HHS, through notice
and comment rulemaking, to establish
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements for the
Program. Specifically, health IT
developers or entities must adhere to
certain Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements concerning
information blocking; appropriate
exchange, access, and use of electronic
health information; communications
regarding health IT; application
programming interfaces (APIs); real
world testing for interoperability;
attestations regarding certain Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
requirements; and submission of
reporting criteria under the EHR
reporting program.
A. Implementation
To implement Section 4002 of the
Cures Act, we propose an approach
whereby the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification express
both initial requirements for health IT
developers and their certified Health IT
Module(s) as well as ongoing
requirements that must be met by both
health IT developers and their certified
Health IT Module(s) under the Program.
If these requirements are not met, then
the health IT developer may no longer
be able to participate in the Program
and/or its certified health IT may have
its certification terminated. We propose
to implement each Cures Act Condition
of Certification with further specificity
as it applies to the Program. We also
propose to establish the Maintenance of
Certification requirements for each
Condition of Certification as standalone
requirements. This approach would
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establish clear baseline technical and
behavior Conditions of Certification
requirements with evidence that the
Conditions of Certification are
continually being met through the
Maintenance of Certification
requirements.
B. Provisions
1. Information Blocking
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, not take any action that
constitutes ‘‘information blocking’’ as
defined in section 3022(a) of the PHSA
(see 3001(c)(5)(D)(i) of the PHSA). We
propose to establish this information
blocking Condition of Certification in
§ 170.401. The Condition of
Certification prohibits any health IT
developer under the Program from
taking any action that constitutes
information blocking as defined by
section 3022(a) of the PHSA and
proposed in § 171.103.
We clarify that this proposed
‘‘information blocking’’ Condition of
Certification and its requirements would
be substantive requirements of the
Program and would use the definition of
‘‘information blocking’’ established by
section 3022(a) of the PHSA and as also
proposed in § 171.103, as it relates to
health IT developers of certified health
IT. In addition to ONC’s statutory
authority for this Condition of
Certification, the HHS Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) has both
investigatory and enforcement authority
over information blocking and may
issue civil money penalties for
information blocking conducted by
health IT developers of certified health
IT, health information networks and
health information exchanges. OIG may
also investigate health care providers for
information blocking for which health
care providers could be subject to
disincentives.
We refer readers to section VII.D of
this proposed rule for additional
discussion of ONC’s enforcement of this
and other proposed Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements. We also refer readers to
section VIII of this proposed rule for our
proposals to implement the information
blocking provisions of the Cures Act,
including proposed § 171.103.
We do not, at this time, propose any
associated Maintenance of Certification
requirements for this Condition of
Certification.
2. Assurances
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
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Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, provide assurances to the
Secretary, unless for legitimate purposes
specified by the Secretary, that it will
not take any action that constitutes
information blocking as defined in
section 3022(a) of the PHSA, or any
other action that may inhibit the
appropriate exchange, access, and use of
electronic health information (EHI). We
propose to implement this Condition of
Certification and accompanying
Maintenance of Certification
requirements in § 170.402. As a
Condition of Certification requirement,
a health IT developer must comply with
the Condition as recited here and in the
Cures Act. We refer readers to section
VIII of this proposed rule for the
proposed reasonable and necessary
activities specified by the Secretary,
which constitute the exceptions to the
information blocking definition.
We also propose to establish more
specific Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements for a health
IT developer to provide assurances that
it does not take any action that may
inhibit the appropriate exchange,
access, and use of EHI. These proposed
requirements serve to provide further
clarity under the Program as to how
health IT developers can provide such
broad assurances with more specific
actions.
a. Full Compliance and Unrestricted
Implementation of Certification Criteria
Capabilities
We propose, as a Condition of
Certification, that a health IT developer
must ensure that its health IT certified
under the ONC Health IT Certification
Program (Program) conforms to the full
scope of the certification criteria to
which its health IT is certified. This has
always been an expectation of ONC and
users of certified health IT and,
importantly, a requirement of the
Program. We believe, however, that by
incorporating this expectation and
requirement as a Condition of
Certification under the Program, there
would be assurances, and
documentation via the ‘‘Attestations’’
Condition and Maintenance of
Certification requirements proposed in
§ 170.406, that all health IT developers
fully understand their responsibilities
under the Program, including not to take
any action with their certified health IT
that may inhibit the appropriate
exchange, access, and use of EHI. To
this point, certification criteria are
designed and issued so that certified
health IT can support interoperability
and the appropriate exchange, access,
and use of electronic health
information.
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We propose that, as a complementary
Condition of Certification, health IT
developers of certified health IT must
provide an assurance that they have
made certified capabilities available in
ways that enable them to be
implemented and used in production
environments for their intended
purposes. More specifically, developers
would be prohibited from taking any
action that could interfere with a user’s
ability to access or use certified
capabilities for any purpose within the
scope of the technology’s certification.
Such actions may inhibit the
appropriate access, exchange, or use of
EHI and are therefore contrary to this
proposed Condition of Certification and
the statutory provision that it
implements. While such actions are
already prohibited under the Program
(80 FR 62711), making these existing
requirements explicit would ensure that
health IT developers are required to
attest to them on a regular basis
pursuant to the Condition of
Certification proposed in § 170.406,
which will in turn provide additional
assurances to the Secretary that
developers of certified health IT support
and do not inhibit appropriate access,
exchange, or use of EHI.
By way of example, actions that
would violate this aspect of the
proposed Condition include failing to
fully deploy or enable certified
capabilities; imposing limitations
(including restrictions) on the use of
certified capabilities once deployed; or
requiring subsequent developer
assistance to enable the use of certified
capabilities, contrary to the intended
uses and outcomes of those capabilities
(see 80 FR 62711). The Condition would
also be violated were a developer to
refuse to provide documentation,
support, or other assistance reasonably
necessary to enable the use of certified
capabilities for their intended purposes
(see 80 FR 62711). More generally, any
action that would be likely to
substantially impair the ability of one or
more users (or prospective users) to
implement or use certified capabilities
for any purpose within the scope of
applicable certification criteria would
be prohibited by this Condition (see 80
FR 62711). Such actions may include
imposing limitations or additional types
of costs, especially if these were not
disclosed when a customer purchased
or licensed the certified health IT (see
80 FR 62711).
b. Certification to the ‘‘Electronic Health
Information Export’’ Criterion
We propose, as a Condition of
Certification requirement, that a health
IT developer that produces and
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electronically manages EHI must certify
health IT to the 2015 Edition ‘‘electronic
health information export’’ certification
criterion in § 170.315(b)(10). We discuss
the proposed ‘‘electronic health
information (EHI) export’’ criterion in
section IV.B.4 of this proposed rule.
Further, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement, we propose
that a health IT developer that produces
and electronically manages EHI must
provide all of its customers of certified
health IT with health IT certified to the
functionality included in
§ 170.315(b)(10) within 24 months of a
subsequent final rule’s effective date or
within 12 months of certification for a
health IT developer that never
previously certified health IT to the
2015 Edition, whichever is longer.
Consistent with these proposals, we also
propose to amend § 170.550 to require
that ONC–ACBs certify health IT to the
proposed 2015 Edition ‘‘EHI export’’
when the health IT developer of the
health IT presented for certification
produces and electronically manages
EHI.
As discussed in section IV.C.1 of this
proposed rule, the availability of the
capabilities in the proposed 2015
Edition ‘‘EHI export’’ certification
criterion to providers and patients
would promote access, exchange, and
use of EHI to facilitate health care
providers in switching practices and
health IT systems and patients’
electronic access to all their health
information stored by a provider. As
such, health IT developers with health
IT certified to the proposed 2015
Edition ‘‘EHI export’’ certification
criterion that is made available to its
customers provides assurances that the
developer is not taking actions that
constitute information blocking or any
other action that may inhibit the
appropriate exchange, access, and use of
EHI.
c. Records and Information Retention
We propose that, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement, a health IT
developer must, for a period of 10 years
beginning from the date of certification,
retain all records and information
necessary that demonstrate initial and
ongoing compliance with the
requirements of the ONC Health IT
Certification Program. In other words,
records and information should be
retained starting from the date a
developer first certifies health IT under
the Program and applies separately to
each unique Health IT Module (or
Complete EHR, as applicable) certified
under the Program. This retention of
records is necessary to verify health IT
developer compliance with Program
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requirements, including certification
criteria and Conditions of Certification.
We believe that 10 years is an
appropriate period of time given that
many users of certified health IT
participate in various CMS programs, as
well as other programs, that require
similar periods of records retention. We
also refer readers to section VII.D.3.c of
this preamble for additional discussion
of records access to information
necessary to enforce the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification.
In an effort to reduce administrative
burden, we also propose, that in
situations where applicable certification
criteria are removed from the Code of
Federal Regulations before the 10 years
have expired, records must only be kept
for 3 years from the date of removal for
those certification criteria and related
Program provisions unless that
timeframe would exceed the overall 10year retention period. This ‘‘3-year from
the date of removal’’ records retention
period also aligns with the records
retention requirements for ONC–ACBs
and ONC–ATLs under the Program.
We encourage comment on these
proposals and whether the proposed
requirements can provide adequate
assurances that certified health IT
developers are demonstrating initial and
ongoing compliance with the
requirements of the Program; and
thereby ensuring that certified health IT
can support interoperability, and
appropriate exchange, access, and use of
EHI.
d. Trusted Exchange Framework and the
Common Agreement—Request for
Information
The Cures Act added section
3001(c)(9) to the PHSA, which requires
the National Coordinator to work with
stakeholders with the goal of developing
or supporting a Trusted Exchange
Framework and a Common Agreement
(collectively, ‘‘TEFCA’’) for the purpose
of ensuring full network-to-network
exchange of health information. Section
3001(c)(9)(B) outlines a process for
establishing a TEFCA between health
information networks (HINs)—including
provisions for the National Coordinator,
in collaboration with the NIST, to
provide technical assistance on
implementation and pilot testing of the
TEFCA. In accordance with section
3001(c)(9)(C), the National Coordinator
shall publish the TEFCA on its website
and in the Federal Register, as well as
annually publish on its website a
directory of the HINs that have adopted
the Common Agreement and are capable
of trusted exchange pursuant to the
Common Agreement. The process,
application, and construction of the
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TEFCA are further outlined in section
3001(c)(9)(D), including requiring that
the Secretary shall through notice and
comment rulemaking, establish a
process for HINs that voluntarily adopt
the TEFCA to attest to such adoption.
We request comment as to whether
certain health IT developers should be
required to participate in the TEFCA as
a means of providing assurances to their
customers and ONC that they are not
taking actions that constitute
information blocking or any other action
that may inhibit the appropriate
exchange, access, and use of EHI. We
would expect that such a requirement,
if proposed in a subsequent rulemaking,
would apply to health IT developers
that have a Health IT Module(s) certified
to any of the certification criteria in
§§ 170.315(b)(1), (c)(1) and (c)(2), (e)(1),
(f), and (g)(9) through (11); and provide
services for connection to health
information networks (HINs). These
services could be routing EHI through a
HIN or responding to requests for EHI
from a HIN.
We have identified health IT
developers that certify health IT to the
criteria above because the capabilities
included in the criteria support access
and exchange of EHI. Therefore, we
believe such health IT developers, as
opposed to a health IT developer that
only supports clinical decision support
(§ 170.315(a)(9)) with its certified health
IT, would be best suited to participate
in the Trusted Exchange Framework and
adhere to the Common Agreement.
Similarly, we believe that many such
health IT developers with the identified
certified health IT would be in position,
and requested by customers, to provide
connection services to HINs. When such
criteria are met (certified to the
identified criteria above and actually
providing connection services),
participation in the Trusted Exchange
Framework and adherence to the
Common Agreement are consistent with
this Condition and Maintenance of
Certification as specified by the Cures
Act, the intent of Congress to establish
widespread interoperability and
exchange of health information without
information blocking, and supports
ONC’s responsibility, as established by
the HITECH Act, to develop and support
a nationwide health IT infrastructure
that allows for the electronic use and
exchange of information. More
specifically, by participating in the
Trusted Exchange Framework and
adhering to the Common Agreement,
these health IT developers provide
assurances that they are not taking
actions that constitute information
blocking or any other action that may
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inhibit the appropriate exchange,
access, and use of EHI. For more
information on the Trusted Exchange
Framework and Common Agreement,
please visit: https://www.healthit.gov/
topic/interoperability/trusted-exchangeframework-and-common-agreement.
In consideration of this request for
comment, we welcome comment on the
certification criteria we have identified
as the basis for health IT developer
participation in the Trusted Exchange
Framework and adherence to the
Common Agreement, other certification
criteria that would serve as a basis for
health IT developer participation in the
Trusted Exchange Framework and
adherence to the Common Agreement,
and whether the current structure of the
Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement are conducive to
health IT developer participation and in
what manner.
3. Communications
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, does not prohibit or restrict
communication regarding the following
subjects:
• The usability of the health
information technology;
• The interoperability of the health
information technology;
• The security of the health
information technology;
• Relevant information regarding
users’ experiences when using the
health information technology;
• The business practices of
developers of health information
technology related to exchanging
electronic health information; and
• The manner in which a user of the
health information technology has used
such technology.
We propose to implement this
Condition of Certification and its
requirements in § 170.403. The Cures
Act placed no limitations on the
protection of the communications
delineated above (referred to hereafter
as ‘‘protected communications’’). As
such, we propose to broadly interpret
the subject matter of communications
that are protected from developer
prohibition or restriction as well as the
conduct of developers that implicate the
protection afforded to communications
by this Condition of Certification and
discuss this proposed approach in detail
below. While we propose to implement
a broad general prohibition against
developers imposing prohibitions and
restrictions on protected
communications, we also recognize that
there are circumstances where it is both
legitimate and reasonable for developers
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7467
to limit the sharing of information about
their products. As such, we propose to
allow developers to impose prohibitions
or restrictions on protected
communications in certain narrowly
defined circumstances. In order for a
prohibition or restriction on a protected
communication to be permitted, we
propose that it must pass a two-part test.
First, the communication that is being
prohibited or restricted must not fall
within a class of communication about
which no restriction or prohibition
would ever be legitimate or
reasonable—such as communications
required by law, made to a government
agency, or made to a defined category of
safety organizations—and which we
refer to hereafter as ‘‘communications
with unqualified protection.’’ Second, to
be permitted, a developer’s prohibition
or restriction must also fall within a
prescribed category of circumstances for
which we propose it is both legitimate
and reasonable for a developer to limit
the sharing of information about its
products. This would be because of the
nature of the relationship between the
developer and the communicator or
because of the nature of the information
that is, or could be, the subject of the
communication (referred to hereafter as
‘‘permitted prohibitions and
restrictions’’). A restriction or
prohibition that does not satisfy this
two-part test will contravene this
Condition of Certification. As discussed
in more detail below, we propose that
this two-part test strikes a reasonable
balance between the need to promote
open communication about health IT
and related business practices, and the
need to protect the legitimate interests
of health IT developers and other
entities.
a. Background and Purpose
This Condition of Certification
addresses industry practices that
severely limit the ability and
willingness of health IT customers,
users, researchers, and other
stakeholders who use and work with
health IT to openly discuss and share
their experiences and other relevant
information about the performance of
health IT, including the ability of health
IT to exchange health information
electronically. These practices result in
a lack of transparency around health IT
that can contribute to and exacerbate
patient safety risks, system security
vulnerabilities, and product
performance issues. As discussed
below, these issues have been
documented and reported on over a
number of years.
The challenges presented by health IT
developer actions that prohibit or
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restrict communications have been
examined for some time. The problem
was identified in a 2012 report by the
Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies (IOM) entitled ‘‘Health IT
and Patient Safety: Building Safer
Systems for Better Care’’ 57 (IOM
Report). The IOM Report stated that
health care providers, researchers,
consumer groups other health IT users
lack information regarding the
functionality of health IT.58 The IOM
Report observed, relatedly, that many
developers restrict the information that
users can communicate about
developers’ products through
nondisclosure clauses, confidentiality
clauses, intellectual property
protections, hold-harmless clauses, and
other boilerplate contract language.59
Importantly, the IOM Report found that
such clauses discourage users from
sharing information about patient safety
risks related to health IT, which
significantly limits the ability of health
IT users to understand how health IT
impacts patient safety.60 The report
stressed the need for health IT
developers to enable the free exchange
of information regarding the experience
of using their health IT products,
including the sharing of screenshots.61
Other close observers of health IT
have similarly noted that broad
restrictions on communications can
inhibit the communication of
information about errors and adverse
events.62 Concerns have also been
raised by researchers of health IT
products,63 who emphasize that
confidentiality and intellectual property
provisions in contracts often place
broad and unclear limits on authorized
uses of information related to health IT,
which in turn seriously impacts the
ability of researchers to conduct and
publish their research.64
57 IOM
(Institute of Medicine), Health IT and
Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better
Care (2012). Available at https://
www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2011/
Health-IT-and-Patient-Safety-Building-SaferSystems-for-Better-Care.aspx.
58 Id, 195.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 See Kathy Kenyon, Overcoming Contractual
Barriers to EHR Research, Health Affairs Blog
(October 14, 2015). Available at https://
healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/14/overcomingcontractual-barriers-to-ehr-research/.
63 See Hardeep Singh, David C. Classen, and Dean
F. Sittig, Creating an Oversight Infrastructure for
Electronic Health Record-Related Patient Safety
Hazards, 7(4) Journal of Patient Safety 169 (2011).
Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3677059/.
64 Kathy Kenyon, Overcoming Contractual
Barriers to EHR Research, Health Affairs Blog
(October 14, 2015). Available at https://
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The issue of health IT developers
prohibiting or restricting
communications about health IT has
been the subject of a series of hearings
by the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP
Committee), starting in the spring of
2015. During several hearings,
stakeholders emphasized the lack of
transparency around the performance of
health IT in a live environment, noting
that this can undermine a competitive
marketplace, hinder innovation, and
prevent improvements in the safety and
usability of the technology.65 66
Additionally, the HELP Committee
indicated serious concerns regarding the
reported efforts of health IT developers
to restrict, by contract and other means,
communications regarding user
experience, including information
relevant to safety and interoperability.67
When one Senator asked a panel of
experts—which included a health IT
developer—if there were any reasons for
health IT contracts to have
confidentiality clauses restricting users
of health information technology from
discussing their experience of using the
health IT, all panel members agreed that
such clauses should be prohibited.68
Prior to the HELP Committee hearings
described above, the issue of developers
prohibiting and restricting
communications about the performance
of their health IT was also addressed in
House Energy and Commerce
Committee hearings when committee
members heard testimony and held
discussions related to the Cures Act.69
Commentary by witnesses at the
hearings emphasized the need to ensure
that health IT products are safe and
encouraged the availability of
information around health IT products
to improve quality and ensure patient
safety.
Developer actions that prohibit or
restrict communications about health IT
have also been the subject of
healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/14/overcomingcontractual-barriers-to-ehr-research/.
65 HELP 6/10/15 pg 12; Available at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg25971/pdf/
CHRG-114shrg25971.pdf.
66 HELP 3/17/15 pg 47; Available at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg93864/pdf/
CHRG-114shrg93864.pdf.
67 HELP 7/23/15 pg 13, pg 27; Available at https://
www.help.senate.gov/hearings/achieving-thepromise-of-health-information-technologyinformation-blocking-and-potential-solutions.
68 HELP 7/23/15 pg 38; Available at https://
www.help.senate.gov/hearings/achieving-thepromise-of-health-information-technologyinformation-blocking-and-potential-solutions.
69 Energy and Commerce 7/17/14 pg 35; Available
at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/
20140717/102509/HHRG-113-IF16-20140717SD008.pdf.
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investigative reporting.70 A September
2015 report examined eleven contracts
between health systems and major
health IT developers and found that,
with one exception, all of the contracts
protected large amounts of information
from being disclosed, including
information related to safety and
performance issues.71 The report stated
that broad confidentiality and
intellectual property protection clauses
were the greatest barriers to allowing the
communication of information
regarding potential safety issues and
adverse events.72
Finally, ONC has itself been made
aware of health IT developer contract
language that purports to prohibit the
disclosure of information about health
IT, including even a customer’s or user’s
opinions and conclusions about the
performance and other aspects of the
technology. Our extensive interactions
with health care providers, researchers,
and other stakeholders consistently
indicate that such terms are not
uncommon and that some developers
may actively enforce them and engage
in other practices to discourage
communications regarding developers’
health IT products and related business
practices.
This proposed Condition of
Certification is needed to significantly
improve transparency around the
functioning of health IT in the field.
This will help ensure that the health IT
ultimately selected and used by health
care providers and others functions as
expected, is less likely to have safety
issues or implementation difficulties,
enables greater interoperability of health
information, and more fully allows
users to reap the benefits of health IT
utilization, including improvements in
care and quality, and reductions in
costs.
b. Condition of Certification
Requirements
i. Protected Communications and
Communicators
We propose that the protection
afforded to communicators under this
Condition of Certification would apply
irrespective of the form or medium in
which the communication is made.
Developers must not prohibit or restrict
communications whether written, oral,
electronic or by any other method if
they concern protected
communications, unless permitted
otherwise by this Condition of
70 D Tahir, POLITICO Investigation: EHR gag
clauses exist—and, critics say, threaten safety,
Politico, August 27, 2015.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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scope of communications that Congress
specified in the Act. We encourage
comment on whether the types of
subject matter we identify below are
adequate to protect the full range of
communications contemplated by the
Cures Act.
Certification. Similarly, this Condition
of Certification does not impose any
limit on the identity of the
communicators that are able to benefit
from the protection afforded, except that
employees and contractors of a health IT
developer may be treated differently
when making communications that are
not afforded unqualified protection
under § 170.403(a)(2)(i). This Condition
of Certification is not limited to
communications by health IT customers
(e.g., providers) who have contracts
with health IT developers. Entities or
individuals who enter into agreements
with a developer in connection with the
developer’s health IT—for example, a
data analytics vendor who is required to
sign a non-disclosure agreement before
being granted access to the developer’s
health IT—would also be covered by the
protection afforded to communicators
under this Condition of Certification.
Patients, health IT researchers, industry
groups, and health information
exchanges would be able to make
protected communications about the
health IT free of impermissible
prohibitions or restrictions. Similarly,
the Condition of Certification would
also extend to potential customers of
health IT who are provided with
product or software demonstrations,
irrespective of whether they proceed
with the acquisition of the technology.
Examples of other protected
communications include, but are not
limited to:
• A post made to an online forum;
• the sharing of screenshots, subject
to certain proposed restrictions on their
general publication;
• an unattributed written review by a
health IT user;
• a quote given by a health care
executive to a journalist;
• a presentation given at a trade
show;
• a social media post;
• a product review posted on a videosharing service such as YouTube;
• the statements and conclusions
made in a peer-reviewed journal; and
• private communications made
between health IT customers about the
health IT.
(A) Usability of Health Information
Technology
The term ‘‘usability’’ is not defined in
the Cures Act nor in any other relevant
statutory provisions. In the National
Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Usability Initiative, NIST
describes ‘‘usability’’ of health IT by
referencing the ISO 73 standard,
ISO9241: Usability is ‘‘the extent to
which a product can be used by
specified users to achieve specified
goals with effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction in a specified context of
use.’’ 74 Separately, HIMSS 75 has
recognized the following principles of
software usability: Simplicity;
Naturalness; Consistency; Forgiveness
and Feedback; Effective Use of
Language; Efficient Interactions;
Effective Information Presentation;
Preservation of Context; and Minimize
Cognitive Load.76 As these
organizations have expressed, there are
a multitude of factors that contribute to
any judgment about ‘‘usability,’’ and
any assessment about the usability of
health IT should appropriately rest on
the factors contributing to the
effectiveness, efficiency, and
performance offered. As such, we
propose that the ‘‘usability’’ of health IT
be construed broadly to include both an
overall judgment on the ‘‘usability’’ of a
particular health IT product, as well as
any factor that contributes to usability.
Factors of usability that could be the
subject of protected communications
include, but are not limited to: The user
interface (i.e., what a user sees on the
screen, such as layout, controls,
graphics and navigational elements);
ease of use (e.g., how many clicks); how
the technology supports users’
workflows; the organization of
information; cognitive burden; cognitive
support; error tolerance; clinical
decision support; alerts; error handling;
ii. Protected Subject Areas
The Cures Act (and § 170.403(a)(1))
identifies a list of subject areas about
which developers cannot prohibit or
restrict communications. These subject
areas address health IT performance and
usability, health IT security, and the
business practices related to exchanging
EHI. For the reasons discussed below,
we propose that the terms used to
describe the subject areas should be
construed broadly, consistent with the
73 The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) is an international standardsetting organization that develops, publishes, and
promotes proprietary, industrial, and commercial
standards. For more information see https://
www.iso.org/home.html.
74 See https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/
health-it-usability.
75 The Healthcare Information and Management
Systems Society (HIMSS) is a not-for-profit
organization that promotes the use of information
technology in health care. For more information,
see https://www.himss.org/.
76 See https://www.himss.org/what-ehr-usability.
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customizability; use of templates;
mandatory data elements; the use of text
fields; and customer support.
(B) Interoperability of Health
Information Technology
Section 3000(9) of the PHSA, as
amended by the Cures Act, provides a
definition of ‘‘interoperability’’ that
describes a type of health IT that
demonstrates the necessary capabilities
to be interoperable. For the purposes of
this Condition of Certification, we
propose that protected communications
regarding the ‘‘interoperability of health
IT’’ would include communications
about whether a health IT product and
associated developer business practices
meet the interoperability definition
described in section 3000(9) of the
PHSA, including communications about
aspects of the technology or developer
that fall short of the expectations found
in that definition. This will include
communications about the
interoperability capabilities of health IT
and the practices of a health IT
developer that may inhibit the access,
exchange, or use of EHI, including
information blocking.
(C) Security of Health IT
The security of health information
technology is primarily addressed under
the HIPAA Security Rule,77 which
establishes national standards to protect
individuals’ electronic protected health
information (ePHI) that is created,
received, maintained, or transmitted by
a covered entity or business associate.
Covered entities and business associates
must ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of all such
ePHI; protect against any reasonably
anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of such information;
and protect against any reasonably
anticipated uses or disclosures of such
information that are not permitted or
required under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule.78 HIPAA requires that health IT
developers, to the extent that they are
business associates of HIPAA-covered
entities, implement appropriate
administrative, physical, and technical
safeguards to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and security of ePHI.
We propose that the matters that fall
within the topic of health IT security
should be broadly construed to include
any safeguards, whether or not required
by the Security Rule, that may be
implemented (or not implemented) by a
developer to ensure the confidentiality,
77 45
CFR part 160 and subparts A and C of part
164.
78 45
CFR part 160 and subparts A and E of part
164.
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integrity, and security of the wider set
of EHI (including ePHI), together with
the health IT product’s performance
regarding security. For example, a
developer may not prohibit or restrict a
potential communicator from
communicating about, without
limitation:
• The approach to security adopted
for the health IT at issue (e.g.,
architectural approach or authentication
methodology);
• the resilience of the health IT;
• identified security flaws in the
developer’s health IT; or
• the response to cyber threats or
security breaches by the developer.
(D) User Experiences
The phrase ‘‘user experience’’ is not
defined in the Cures Act nor in any
other relevant statutory provisions. We
propose to afford these terms their
ordinary meaning. To qualify as a ‘‘user
experience,’’ the experience must be one
that is had by a user of health IT.
However, beyond this, we do not
propose to qualify the types of
experiences that would receive
protection under the Condition on the
basis of the ‘‘user experience’’ subject
area. This reflects the great variety of
experiences that users may have with
health IT and the often subjective nature
of such experiences. Thus, we believe
that if the user had the experience, the
experience is relevant.
To illustrate the breadth of potential
user experiences that would be
protected by this Condition of
Certification, we propose that
communications about ‘‘relevant
information regarding users’
experiences when using the health IT’’
would encompass, for example,
communications and information about
a person or organization’s experience
acquiring, implementing, using, or
otherwise interacting with health IT.
This includes experiences associated
with the use of the health IT in the
delivery of health care, together with
administrative functions performed
using the health IT. User experiences
would also include the experiences
associated with configuring and using
the technology throughout
implementation, training, and in
practice. Further, user experiences
would include patients’ and consumers’
user experiences with consumer apps,
patient portals, and other consumerfacing technologies. To be clear, a
‘‘relevant user experience’’ includes any
aspect of the health IT user experience
that could positively or negatively
impact the effectiveness or performance
of the health IT.
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(E) Manner in Which a User Has Used
Health IT
We propose that protected
communications regarding the ‘‘manner
in which a user has used health IT’’
would encompass any information
related to how the health IT has been
used in practice. This subject area
largely overlaps with the matters
covered under the ‘‘user experience’’
subject area but may include additional
perspectives or details beyond those
experienced by a user of health IT.
Types of information that would fall
within this subject area include but are
not limited to:
• Information about a work-around
implemented to overcome an issue in
the health IT;
• customizations built on top of core
health IT functionality;
• the specific conditions under which
a user used the health IT, such as
information about constraints imposed
on health IT functionality due to
implementation decisions; and
• information about the ways in
which health IT could not be used or
did not function as was represented by
the developer.
(F) Business Practices Related to
Exchange
We propose that the subject matter of
‘‘developer business practices related to
exchanging electronic health
information’’ should be broadly
construed to include developer policies
and practices that facilitate the
exchange of electronic health
information, and developer policies and
practices that impact the ability of
health IT to exchange health
information. We further propose That
the exchange of electronic health
information encompasses the
appropriate and timely sharing of
electronic health information.
We propose that protected
communications include, but are not
limited to:
• The costs charged by a developer
for products or services that support the
exchange of electronic health
information (e.g., interface costs, API
licensing fees and royalties,
maintenance and subscription fees,
transaction or usage-based costs for
exchanging information);
• the timeframes and terms on which
developers will or will not enable
connections and facilitate exchange
with other technologies, individuals, or
entities, including other health IT
developers, exchanges, and networks;
• the developer’s approach to
participation in health information
exchanges and/or networks;
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• the developer’s licensing practices
and terms as it relates to making
available APIs and other aspects of its
technology that enable the development
and deployment of interoperable
products and services; and
• the developer’s approach to creating
interfaces with third-party products or
services, including whether connections
are treated as ‘‘one off’’ customizations,
or whether similar types of connections
can be implemented at a reduced cost.
Importantly, we further propose that
information regarding business practices
related to exchanging electronic health
information would include information
about the switching costs imposed by a
developer, as we are aware that the cost
of switching health IT is a significant
factor impacting health care providers
adopting the most exchange-friendly
health IT products that are available.
iii. Meaning of ‘‘Prohibit or Restrict’’
The terms ‘‘prohibit’’ and ‘‘restrict’’
are not defined in the Cures Act or in
any other relevant statutory provisions.
As discussed in detail below,
communications can be prohibited or
restricted through contractual terms or
agreements (e.g., non-disclosure
agreements, non-disparagement clauses)
as well as through conduct, including
punitive or retaliatory business
practices that are designed to create
powerful disincentives to engaging in
communications about developers or
their products. Therefore, we propose
that this Condition of Certification
would not be limited to only formal
prohibitions or restrictions (such as by
means of contracts or agreements) and
would encompass any conduct by a
developer that would be likely to
restrict a communication or class of
communications protected by this
Condition, as discussed in detail below.
The conduct in question must have
some nexus to the making of a protected
communication or an attempted or
contemplated protected communication.
That is, conduct by a developer that
may be perceived as intimidating or
punitive would not implicate this
Condition of Certification unless that
conduct was designed to directly or
indirectly influence the making of a
protected communication. Similarly,
health IT contracts may include terms
that govern the manner in which the
parties conduct themselves, and those
terms would not implicate this
Condition of Certification unless the
operative effect of a term was to restrict
or prohibit a protected communication.
For abundant clarity, we note that the
fact that a customer’s health IT product
is not performing in the manner the
customer expected, or in the manner
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that the developer promised, would not,
in itself be evidence that the developer
is engaging in conduct that restricts or
prohibits a protected communication.
Rather, a nexus must exist between the
alleged poor performance and the
making of (or attempting or
contemplating to make) a protected
communication.
We note that contractual prohibitions
or restrictions on communications can,
in limited circumstances, be legitimate
and serve an important role in
protecting proprietary information and
intellectual property that are essential
for health IT developers to innovate and
compete. On this basis, we propose to
permit certain types of prohibitions and
restrictions, subject to strict conditions
to ensure that they are narrowly tailored
and do not restrict protected
communications. These permitted
prohibitions and restrictions are
discussed in section VII.B.3.b.v below.
(A) Prohibitions or Restrictions Arising
by Way of Contract
The principal way that health IT
developers can control the disclosure of
information about their health IT is
through contractual prohibitions or
restrictions. Such prohibitions or
restrictions can arise in contractual
provisions that address, for example,
confidentiality obligations, intellectual
property protections, hold-harmless
requirements, nondisclosure
obligations, non-compete obligations,
and publicity rights.
There are different ways that
contractual prohibitions or restrictions
arise. In some instances a contractual
prohibition or restriction will be
expressed, and the precise nature and
scope of the prohibition or restriction
will be explicit from the face of the
contract or agreement. For example, a
contract will say that the health IT
customer must not disclose screenshots
of the health IT. However, more often,
a contract will impose prohibitions or
restrictions in less precise terms. For
example, a health IT contract might use
broad language when describing the
information or materials that customers
and users are forbidden from disclosing
pursuant to a confidentiality clause,
casting a vague net over the developer’s
‘‘proprietary’’ information and
purporting to cover information that
may be neither confidential, secret, nor
protected by law. A contract does not
need to expressly prohibit or restrict a
protected communication in order to
have the effect of prohibiting or
restricting that protected
communication. The use of broad or
vague language that obfuscates the types
of communications that can and cannot
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be made may be treated as a prohibition
or restriction if it has the effect of
restricting legitimate communications
about health IT.
Restrictions and prohibitions found in
contracts used by developers to sell or
license their health IT products can
apply to customers directly and can
require that the customer ‘‘flow-down’’
obligations onto the customer’s
employees, contractors, and other
individuals or entities that use or work
with the developer’s health IT. Such
contract provisions would not comply
with this Condition of Certification if
they prohibit or restrict protected
communications. Prohibitions or
restrictions on communications can also
be found in separate nondisclosure
agreements (NDAs) that developers
require their customers—and in some
instances the users of the health IT—to
enter into in order to receive or access
the health IT. We propose that such
agreements are covered by this
Condition of Certification. Finally,
health IT developers typically may
require third-party contractors used by
their customers (such as a data analytics
vendor engaged by a health care
provider to analyze the provider’s data)
to enter into a NDA with the developer
before commencing their contract
activities. In some extreme cases, the
employees of these third-party
contractors are required to sign NDAs in
their personal capacities. These NDAs
typically include obligations that
prohibit or restrict communications
about the developer’s health IT
products, and we propose that any such
prohibitions or restrictions within the
context of protected communications as
defined here would be subject to this
Condition of Certification.
(B) Prohibitions or Restrictions That
Arise by Way of Conduct
We are aware that some health IT
developers engage in conduct that has
the effect of prohibiting or restricting
protected communications. This
conduct may arise despite the
developer’s contract and/or business
associate agreement being silent on, or
even expressly permitting, the protected
communication. The effect of such
conduct can be significant, as health
care providers are dependent on their
health IT developer in order to receive
critical software updates or other
maintenance services, and sometimes
have little bargaining power. Similarly,
a third-party developer is dependent on
a health IT developer’s authorization in
order to perform work in connection
with the developer’s health IT.
We propose that conduct that has the
effect of prohibiting or restricting a
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protected communication would be
subject to this Condition of
Certification. We emphasize that, as
discussed above, the conduct in
question must have some nexus to the
making of a protected communication or
an attempted or contemplated protected
communication. As such, developer
conduct that was alleged to be
intimidating, or health IT performance
that was perceived to be substandard,
would not, in and of itself, implicate
this Condition of Certification unless
there was some nexus between the
conduct or performance issue and the
making of (or attempting or threatening
to make) a protected communication.
Examples of conduct that could
implicate this Condition of Certification
include, but are not limited to:
• Taking steps to enforce, including
by threatening to enforce, a right arising
under contract that contravenes this
Condition of Certification.
• Taking steps to enforce, including
by threatening to enforce, a legal right
that purports to prohibit or restrict a
protected communication. This would
include, for example, the making of
threats, such as via a cease and desist
letter, to a researcher who has made a
protected communication.
• Employing a technological measure
(within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. 1201)
that a user would have to circumvent in
order to make a protected
communication, for example, a
technological measure that a health IT
user would need to circumvent in order
to take a screenshot of the developer’s
health IT.
• Discouraging the making of
protected communications by:
Æ Making threats against a health care
customer (e.g., by threatening to
withhold the latest version of the
developer’s software) in response to the
customer making or attempting to make
a protected communication.
Æ Taking retaliatory action against a
person or entity that has made a
protected communication (e.g.,
withholding support, delaying the
provider’s adoption of a new software
release, or removing a provider from the
developer’s ‘‘preferred customer’’ list).
• Having policies that disadvantage
persons or entities that make protected
communications (e.g., a policy that bars
a provider from qualifying for the
developer’s ‘‘preferred customer’’ list if
it shares screenshots in a manner
protected by this Condition of
Certification).
• Refusing to publish—or refusing to
remove or delete—protected
communications made in an online
forum that the developer moderates or
controls.
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• Causing the removal or deletion of
a protected communication from any
publication (e.g., a YouTube Copyright
Take-down Notice that does not raise a
legitimate copyright claim).
iv. Communications With Unqualified
Protection
We propose, and discuss below, a
narrow class of communications—
consisting of five specific types of
communications—that would receive
unqualified protection from developer
prohibitions or restrictions. With
respect to communications with
unqualified protection, a developer
would be prohibited from imposing any
prohibition or restriction. As discussed
below, we propose that this narrow
class of communications warrants
unqualified protection because of the
strength of the public policy interest
being advanced by the communication
and/or the sensitivity with which the
identified recipient treats, and
implements safeguards to protect the
confidentiality and security of, the
information received. A developer that
imposes a prohibition or restriction on
a communication with unqualified
protection would fail the first part of the
two-part test for allowable prohibitions
or restrictions, and as such would
contravene the Condition of
Certification.
(A) Disclosures Required by Law
We propose that where a
communication relates to subject areas
enumerated in § 170.403(a)(1) and there
are federal, state, or local laws that
would require the disclosure of
information related to health IT,
developers must not prohibit or restrict
in any way protected communications
made in compliance with those laws.
We note that we expect that most health
IT contracts would allow for, or at the
very least not prohibit or restrict, any
communication or disclosure that is
required by law, such as responding to
a court or Congressional subpoena, or a
valid warrant presented by law
enforcement. We further propose that if
required by law, a potential
communicator should not have to delay
any protected communication under
this Condition of Certification.
Furthermore, we propose that the
reasonable limitations and prohibitions
that are discussed below and permitted
by § 170.403(a)(2) do not apply to these
types of protected communications.
(B) Communicating Information About
Adverse Events, Hazards, and Other
Unsafe Conditions to Government
Agencies, Health Care Accreditation
Organizations, and Patient Safety
Organizations
It is well established that there is a
strong public interest in allowing open
communication of information
regarding health care hazards, adverse
events, and unsafe conditions. Given the
central role played by health IT in the
delivery of care, information about
health IT is a critical component of any
investigation into the cause of hazards,
adverse events, or unsafe conditions. On
the basis of this public policy interest
alone, we propose there is an
overwhelming interest in ensuring that
all communications about health IT that
are necessary to identify patient safety
risks, and to make health IT safer, not
be encumbered by prohibitions or
restrictions imposed by health IT
developers that may affect the extent or
timeliness of communications. In
addition to the public policy interest in
promoting uninhibited communications
about health IT safety, the recognized
communication channels for adverse
events, hazards, and unsafe conditions
provide protections that help ensure
that any disclosures made are
appropriately handled and kept
confidential and secure. Indeed, the
class of recipients to which the
information can be communicated
under this category of communications
with unqualified protection should
provide health IT developers with
comfort that there is very little risk of
such communications prejudicing the
developer’s intellectual property rights.
For example, government agencies
impose appropriate controls on
information they receive, mitigating any
risk that developers may feel arises from
the disclosure of information about their
health IT. Similarly, accrediting bodies
for health care delivery observe strict
confidentiality policies for information
received or developed during the
accreditation process and in connection
with complaints received.
Finally, the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA) 79
provides for privilege and
confidentiality protections for
information that meets the definition of
patient safety work product (PSWP).
This means that PSWP may only be
disclosed as permitted by the PSQIA
and its implementing regulations. We
clarify that to the extent activities are
conducted in accordance with the
79 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of
2005, 42 U.S.C. 299b–21–b–26 (Pub. L. 109–41).
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PSQIA, its implementing regulation,
and section 4005(c) of the Cures Act, no
such activities shall be construed as
constituting restrictions or prohibitions
that contravene this Condition of
Certification.
We understand that the nature of the
information about health IT that would
ordinarily be disclosed by a health care
provider when reporting an adverse
event, hazard, or unsafe conditions to
government agencies, health care
accreditation organizations, and patient
safety organizations, would not
ordinarily contain intellectual property
or trade secrets. Notwithstanding this,
in light of the public policy interest and
established reporting mechanisms
described above, we do not consider the
potential inclusion of intellectual
property or trade secrets in the
communication should prohibit or
restrict a health care provider from
making a complete and timely report.
For example, proposed
§ 170.403(a)(2)(ii)(D) permits developers
to impose certain restrictions on the
general publication of screenshots, but
we do not consider that such
restrictions should be permitted when
the communication is made for one of
the purposes, and to one of the
recipients, identified in
§ 170.403(a)(2)(i)(B).
We seek comment on whether the
unqualified protection afforded to
communications made to a patient
safety organizations about adverse
events, hazards, and other unsafe
conditions should be limited.
Specifically, we seek comment on
whether the unqualified protection
should be limited by the nature of the
patient safety organization to which a
communication can be made, or the
nature of the communication that can
made—such as limiting to only material
that was created as PSWP.
(C) Communicating Information About
Cybersecurity Threats and Incidents to
Government Agencies
We propose that if health IT
developers were to impose prohibitions
or restrictions on the ability of any
person or entity to communicate
information about cybersecurity threats
and incidents to government agencies,
such conduct would not comply with
this Condition of Certification.
Government agencies such as the United
States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US–CERT) respond to and
protect both the government and private
industry from cyber threats. Their work
helps protect the entire health care
system from cybersecurity threats and
relies on the timely reporting of security
issues and vulnerabilities by health care
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providers and health IT users. These
agencies impose appropriate controls on
information they receive, which
mitigates any risk that developers may
feel arises from the disclosure of
information about their health IT. The
US–CERT, for example, provides secure
forms for such reporting, and we are
confident that reporting security
incident information to US–CERT and
other government agencies would be
unlikely to pose any threat to health IT
developer intellectual property or trade
secrets. Additionally, the information
likely reported regarding such an
incident would generally not reveal
trade secrets. Where circumstances may
require collection of more sensitive and
confidential information related to a
developer’s intellectual property, we
believe that appropriate protections
would likely apply and that the public
benefit of thoroughly investigating and
addressing cybersecurity issues
outweighs any potential harm.
Communications about security issues
related to health IT may alert nefarious
individuals or entities to the existence
of a security vulnerability which could
be exploited before a developer has time
to fix the vulnerability. However, we
propose that this concern must be
balanced against the imperative of
ensuring that health IT customers are
aware of security vulnerabilities so that
they can respond by deploying reactive
measures independent of the developer,
such as ceasing health information
exchange with a compromised system.
We seek comment on whether it would
be reasonable to permit health IT
developers to impose limited
restrictions on communications about
security issues so as to safeguard the
confidentiality, integrity, and security of
eHI. For example, should health IT
developers be permitted to require that
health IT users notify the developer
about the existence of a security
vulnerability prior to, or simultaneously
with, any communication about the
issue to a government agency?
(D) Communicating Information About
Information Blocking and Other
Unlawful Practices to a Government
Agency
As in the circumstances described
above, we believe that the public benefit
associated with the communication of
information to government agencies on
information blocking, or any other
unlawful practice, outweighs any
concerns developers might have about
the disclosure of information about their
health IT. We believe that reporting
information blocking, as well as other
unlawful practices, to a government
agency would not cause an undue threat
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to a health IT developer’s intellectual
property or trade secrets. Generally
speaking, agencies collecting reports
would protect all information received
and keep it confidential to the extent
permitted by law.
(E) Communicating Information About a
Health IT Developer’s Failure To
Comply With a Condition of
Certification or Other Program
Requirement
We propose that the benefits to the
public and to users of health IT of
communicating information about a
health IT developer’s failure to comply
with a Condition of Certification or
other Program requirement (45 CFR part
170) justify prohibiting developers of
health IT from placing any restrictions
on such protected communications.
Information regarding the failure of a
health IT product to meet any Condition
of Certification or other Program
requirement is vital to the effective
performance and integrity of the
Program, which certifies that health IT
functions consistent with its
certification. While the current
procedures for reporting issues with
certified health IT encourage providers
to contact developers in the first
instance to address certification issues,
users of health IT should not hesitate to
contact ONC-Authorized Certification
Bodies (ONC–ACBs), or ONC itself, if
the developer does not provide an
appropriate response, or the matter is of
a nature that should be immediately
reported to an ONC–ACB or to ONC.
v. Permitted Prohibitions and
Restrictions
We propose that, except for
communications with unqualified
protection discussed above and
enumerated in § 170.403(a)(2)(i), health
IT developers would be permitted to
impose certain narrow kinds of
prohibitions and restrictions discussed
below and specified in
§ 170.403(a)(2)(ii). We believe this
policy strikes a reasonable balance
between the need to promote open
communication about health IT and
related business practices and the need
to protect the legitimate interests of
health IT developers and other entities.
Specifically, with the exception of
communications with unqualified
protection, developers would be
permitted to prohibit or restrict the
following communications, subject to
certain conditions:
• Communications of their own
employees;
• Disclosure of non-user-facing
aspects of the software;
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7473
• Certain communications that would
infringe the developer’s or another
person’s intellectual property rights;
• Publication of screenshots in very
narrow circumstances; and
• Communications of information
that a person or entity knows only
because of their participation in
developer-led product development and
testing.
As discussed in detail in the sections
that follow, the proposed Condition of
Certification carefully delineates the
circumstances under which these types
of prohibitions and restrictions would
be permitted, including certain
associated conditions that developers
would be required to meet. To be clear,
any prohibition or restriction not
expressly permitted would violate the
Condition. Additionally, it would be the
developer’s burden to demonstrate to
the satisfaction of ONC that the
developer has met all associated
requirements. Further, as an additional
safeguard, we propose that where a
developer seeks to avail itself of one of
the permitted types of prohibitions or
restrictions, the developer must ensure
that potential communicators are clearly
and explicitly notified about the
information and material that can be
communicated, and that which cannot.
We propose this would mean that the
language of health IT contracts must be
precise and specific. Contractual
provisions or public statements that
support a permitted prohibition or
restriction on communication should be
very specific about the rights and
obligations of the potential
communicator. Contract terms that are
vague and cannot be readily understood
by a reasonable health IT customer will
not benefit from the qualifications to
this Condition of Certification outlined
below.
(A) Developer Employees and
Contractors
We recognize that health IT developer
employees, together with the entities
and individuals who are contracted by
health IT developers to deliver products
and/or services (such as consultants),
may be exposed to highly sensitive,
proprietary, and valuable information in
the course of performing their duties.
We also recognize that the proper
functioning of a workforce depends, at
least in part, on the ability of an
employer to regulate how and when the
organization communicates information
to the public, and that employees owe
confidentiality obligations to their
employers. We propose that on this
basis, developers are permitted to
impose prohibitions or restrictions on
the communications of employees and
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contractors to the extent that those
communications fall outside of the class
of communications with unqualified
protection as discussed above.
(B) Non-User-Facing Aspects of Health
IT
The purpose of this Condition of
Certification is to ensure that health IT
users and other potential
communicators are not restrained in
their ability to communicate—publicly
or privately—about certain protected
subject areas. We propose that this
purpose can generally be achieved
without communicators disclosing
information about those parts of health
IT that are legally protected trade
secrets. As such, we propose this
Condition of Certification will permit
health IT developers to impose
prohibitions and restrictions on
communications that are not
communications with unqualified
protection to the extent necessary to
ensure that communications do not
disclose ‘‘non-user-facing aspects of
health IT.’’
A ‘‘non-user-facing aspect of health
IT’’ is, for the purpose of this Condition
of Certification, an aspect of health IT
that is not a ‘‘user-facing aspect of
health IT.’’ A ‘‘user-facing aspect of
health IT’’ means those aspects of health
IT that that are disclosed and evident to
anyone running, using, or observing the
operation of health IT. That is, a userfacing aspect of health IT comprises
those aspects of the health IT that are
manifest in how the health IT software
works. User-facing aspects of health IT
include the design concepts and
functionality that is readily
ascertainable from the health IT’s user
interface and screen display. They do
not include those parts of the health IT
that are not exposed to persons running,
using, or observing the operation of the
health IT. We propose that non-userfacing aspects of health IT would
include source and object code, software
documentation, design specifications,
flowcharts, and file and data formats.
We welcome comments on whether
these and other aspects of health IT
should be treated as not being userfacing.
For clarity, we note that the
terminology of ‘‘user-facing aspects of
health IT’’ is not intended to afford only
health IT users with specific protections
against developer prohibitions or
restrictions on communications. Rather,
the terminology is agnostic as to the
identity of the communicator and is
instead focused on describing those
aspects of health IT that are readily
ascertainable from the health IT’s user
interface and screen display. Numerous
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other potential communicators will also
be exposed to ‘‘user-facing aspects of
health IT,’’ such as third-party
contractors, health information
exchange organizations, recipients of a
software demonstration, and trade
groups or researchers that observe the
operation of health IT in the field.
We propose that this approach
reasonably implements the Cures Act,
which, in direct response to strict
confidentiality obligations, broad
intellectual property clauses, and nondisclosure provisions in EHR contracts,
identified a list of protected subject
areas for disclosure (enumerated at
section 3001(c)(5)(D)(iii) of the PHSA)
that largely targeted the aspects of
health IT that are apparent to, and
known by, individuals and entities that
use or interact with health IT. We
propose that if a health IT user were
prohibited from describing the userfacing aspects of their health IT product,
they could not sensibly communicate
useful information about the usability or
interoperability of the product, or their
experiences as a health IT user. These
subject areas are fundamentally tied to
the way that the health IT product
works, its design, and its functionality.
Protecting the communication of
‘‘user-facing aspects of health IT’’ is also
consistent with the treatment of
software products under trade secret
law, where the public-facing aspects of
software products are not generally
considered secret because they are
evident to anyone running the software
program. Moreover, this approach is
appropriate given the manner in which
health IT is deployed and used by
health IT customers. Unlike software
products that are deployed and used in
a cloistered setting where access to the
software is highly restricted, health IT is
typically deployed in a setting in which
the operation of the health IT can be
readily observed by a wide range of
persons. Health IT used in a physician’s
consulting room can be observed by the
patient. Health IT deployed in a hospital
can be observed by numerous
individuals in addition to those who are
‘‘authorized users’’ of the health IT
system, including, for example, the
patient, the patient’s family, volunteer
staff, law enforcement, and clergy. As
such, because health IT is of a nature
that license terms or nondisclosure
obligations do not act as a genuine
control over the disclosure of those
aspects of the software that are ‘‘userfacing,’’ communications about such
aspects should be afforded protection
from developer prohibitions and
restrictions under this proposed
Condition of Certification.
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(C) Intellectual Property
Many aspects of health IT—including
software and documentation—will
contain intellectual property that
belongs to the health IT developer (or a
third party) and is protected by law.
Health IT products may have portions in
which copyrighted works exist, or that
are subject to patent protection. As in
other technology sectors, health IT
developers place a high value on their
intellectual property and go to
significant lengths to protect it,
including intellectual property
provisions in their health IT contracts.
This Condition of Certification is not
intended to operate as a de facto license
for health IT users and others to act in
any way that might infringe the
legitimate intellectual property rights of
developers. Indeed, we propose that
health IT developers are permitted to
prohibit or restrict communications that
would infringe their intellectual
property rights so long as the
communication in question is not a
communication with unqualified
protection. However, any prohibition
and restriction imposed by a developer
must be no broader than legally
permissible and reasonably necessary to
protect the developer’s legitimate
intellectual property interests. We are
aware that some health IT contracts
contain broad intellectual property
provisions (and related terms, such as
nondisclosure provisions) that purport
to prevent health IT customers and
users from using copyright material in
ways that are lawful. On this basis,
while we are providing an exception for
the protection of intellectual property
interests, we want to clarify that under
this Condition of Certification health IT
developers are not permitted to prohibit
or restrict, or purport to prohibit or
restrict, communications that would be
a ‘‘fair use’’ of any copyright work
comprised in the developer’s health IT.
That is, a developer is not permitted to
prohibit or restrict communications
under the guise of copyright protection
(or under the guise of a confidentiality
or non-disclosure obligation) when the
communication in question makes a use
of the copyright material in a way that
would qualify that use as a ‘‘fair use.’’ 80
We welcome comments on whether
an appropriate balance has been struck
between protecting legitimate
intellectual property rights of
developers and ensuring that health IT
customers, users, researchers, and other
stakeholders who use and work with
health IT can openly discuss and share
their experiences and other relevant
80 See
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information about the performance of
health IT.
(D) Faithful Reproductions of Health IT
Screenshots
We propose that health IT developers
generally would not be permitted to
prohibit or restrict communications that
disclose screenshots of the developer’s
health IT. We consider screen displays
an essential component of health IT
performance and usability, and their
reproduction may be necessary in order
for a health IT user or other health IT
stakeholder to properly make
communications about the subject
matters enumerated in § 170.403(a)(1).
We acknowledge that some health IT
developers have historically and
aggressively sought to prohibit the
disclosure of such communications. We
consider that developers may benefit
from screen displays being faithfully
reproduced so that health IT users and
other stakeholders can form an objective
opinion on any question raised about
usability in communications protected
by this proposed Condition of
Certification. Moreover, we consider
that the reproduction of screenshots in
connection with the making of a
communication protected by this
Condition of Certification would
ordinarily represent a ‘‘fair use’’ of any
copyright subsisting in the screen
display, and developers should not
impose prohibitions or restrictions that
would limit that fair use.
Notwithstanding the above, we
propose to permit certain prohibitions
and restrictions on the communication
of screenshots. Except in connection
with communications with unqualified
protection, developers would be
permitted to impose certain restrictions
on the disclosure of screenshots, as
described below.
In order to ensure that disclosures of
screenshots are reasonable and
represent a faithful reproduction of the
developer’s screen design and health IT,
we propose that developers would be
permitted to prevent communicators
from altering screenshots, other than to
annotate the screenshot or to resize it for
the purpose of publication. We consider
this a reasonable limitation on the
disclosure of screenshots and one that
would help developers’ health IT avoid
being misrepresented by communicators
seeking to make a communication
protected by this proposed Condition of
Certification.
We also propose that health IT
developers could impose restrictions on
the disclosure of a screenshot on the
basis that it would infringe third-party
intellectual property rights (on their
behalf or as required by license).
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However, to take advantage of this
exception, the developer would need to
first put all potential communicators on
sufficient written notice of those parts of
the screen display that contain trade
secrets or intellectual property rights
and cannot be communicated, and
would still need to allow
communicators to communicate
redacted versions of screenshots that do
not reproduce those parts.
Finally, we also recognize that health
IT developers may have obligations
under HIPAA as a business associate
and that it would be reasonable for
developers to impose restrictions on the
communication of screenshots that
contain protected health information,
provided that developers permit the
communication of screenshots that have
been redacted to conceal protected
health information, or the relevant
individual’s consent or authorization
had been obtained.
(E) Testing and Development
We are aware that some health IT
developers expose aspects of their
health IT to health care providers and
others for the purpose of testing and
development prior to a product’s
‘‘general availability’’ release. Such
disclosures may relate to beta releases
that are shared with certain customers
for testing prior to the software being
made generally available to the market,
or may be made as part of a jointventure or cooperative development
process. In these circumstances, we
propose that a health IT developer
would be justified in keeping
information about its health IT
confidential, and we do not intend that
the protection afforded to
communicators under this Condition of
Certification would allow disclosures of
this information. This permitted
prohibition or restriction would allow
developers to seek appropriate
intellectual property protection and
freely discuss novel, ‘‘unreleased’’
product features with their customer
base, which has significant public
policy benefits for research and
innovation in the health IT industry.
As with the other allowable
restrictions listed above, we propose
that this permitted restriction would be
limited and does not apply to
communications which are
communications with unqualified
protection as described above and
specified in § 170.403(a)(2)(i). For
example, information that is learned as
part of development and testing, such as
the hard-coding of test procedure
processes that raise serious patient
safety concerns, could be communicated
for one of the limited purposes specified
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7475
in § 170.403(a)(2)(i) if the software is
certified or released to market. We
propose that this permitted restriction
would also not apply to
communications about the released
version of the health IT once the health
IT has been released to market or has
been certified, provided that the
communications otherwise meet all
other requirements to be afforded
protection under this Condition of
Certification and the information
communicated could be discovered by
any ordinary user of the health IT.
For example, a health IT developer
and a large health system enter into an
agreement for members of the health IT
developer’s engineering team to work
with members of the health system’s
clinical team to develop a customization
for the system’s use of the developer’s
EHR. In order to properly protect any
intellectual property rights, or
proprietary information, arising from
this work, the developer and health
system enter into a contract which
imposes on the system and affected
members of its clinical team strict
nondisclosure related to testing and
development of the health IT. This
would be reasonable and would not
contravene this Condition of
Certification, provided that: (1) The
nondisclosure obligations were
narrowly targeted toward the work
product associated with the testing and
development; and (2) the obligations
ceased immediately upon any resultant
software being deployed in the health
system, to the extent that the
information fell within one of the
subject areas enumerated in
§ 170.403(a)(1) and would be apparent
to an ordinary user of the health IT.
To ensure that this permitted
prohibition/restriction is not abused,
such as by maintaining a product in beta
release for an indefinite or lengthy
period of time, we request comment on
whether we should limit the time this
protection would apply for testing
purposes. This could be no longer than
a year after release of a product or
update. We also request comment on
whether we should set specific
parameters for covered testing. For
example, we note above our
expectations that a product would be
shared with certain customers for
testing prior to the software being made
generally available to the market. As
such, for this permitted prohibition/
restriction to apply, should we more
specifically limit the extent a product
can be distributed to customers for
testing purposes?
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c. Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
We propose that to maintain
compliance with this Condition of
Certification a health IT developer must
not establish or enforce any contract or
agreement provision that contravenes
this Condition of Certification. We are
aware that some developers currently
have in place health IT contracts that
contain provisions that contravene this
proposed Condition of Certification
because they impose impermissible
prohibitions or restrictions on
communications. In some instances, the
provisions in question will be expressly
at odds with this Condition, imposing
obligations on health IT customers, or
creating rights in favor of the developer,
that prohibit or restrict communications
that are protected. In other instances, a
contract will include a provision that
contravenes this Condition because it
has been drawn in such broad terms—
such as an overly-expansive definition
of confidential information—that a
reasonable reader of the provision
would consider the making of a
communication protected by this
Condition a breach of the contract.
Health IT contracts are typically for a
significant duration—e.g., 5 years or
more—or include an automatic renewal
whereby the then current terms roll over
for any renewal period. The
implementation of this proposed
Condition of Certification cannot
therefore wait until health IT contracts
that contravene this Condition expire in
the ordinary course. As such, we are
requiring that health IT developers take
immediate steps to become in
compliance with this Condition of
Certification.
We propose that a health IT developer
must notify all customers and those
with which it has contracts/agreements,
within six months of the effective date
of a subsequent final rule for this
proposed rule, that any communication
or contract/agreement provision that
contravenes this Condition of
Certification will not be enforced by the
health IT developer. Further, we
propose that this notice would need to
be provided annually up to and until
the health IT developer amends the
contract or agreement to remove or
make void any contractual provision
that contravenes this Condition of
Certification. We further propose as a
Maintenance of Certification
requirement in § 170.405(b)(2) that
health IT developers must amend their
contracts or agreements to remove or
make void any provisions that
contravene the Condition of
Certification within a reasonable period
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of time, but not later than two years
from the effective date of a subsequent
final rule for this proposed rule.
We believe this is an appropriate
approach as we understand that health
IT developers are in regular contact with
their customers, and so the provision of
a notice that satisfies this requirement
should not present an undue burden for
a developer. We would also expect that
developers have kept good records of
nondisclosure agreements that they
have entered into with other
organizations or individuals, such as
third-party developers, and can
communicate with those organizations
or individuals as necessary to satisfy
this requirement. In the event that a
health IT developer cannot, despite all
reasonable efforts, locate an entity or
individual that previously entered into
an agreement with the developer that
prohibits or restricts communications
protected by this Condition, the
developer would not be in
contravention of this Condition so long
as it takes no step to enforce the
prohibition or restriction. For clarity, we
do not propose that health IT developers
be required to furnish to ONC or their
ONC–ACB copies of notices made to
customers, or copies of contracts or
agreements revised, in satisfaction of
this Maintenance of Certification
requirement, although those
communications may be requested by
ONC or an ONC–ACB in the usual
course of business. To this point, under
the ‘‘Enforcement’’ section of this
proposed rule (VII.D), we describe our
general enforcement approach outlining
a corrective action process for ONC to
review instances where Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements are not being met by a
health IT developer under the Program.
We note that another approach we
considered proposing would have been
to require that developers amend their
current health IT contracts immediately.
We have, however, relied on the
proposed requirement that developers
not enforce contractual terms that
contravene this proposed Condition of
Certification until they can amend their
contracts in a reasonable period of time,
but not later than two years from the
effective date of a subsequent final rule
for this proposed rule. We seek
comment on whether this is an adequate
approach to removing prohibitions and
restrictions on protected
communications and ensuring that
health IT customers, users, researchers,
and other stakeholders are aware of
their right to engage in such
communications notwithstanding
existing contracts or agreements to the
contrary.
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4. Application Programming Interfaces
As a Condition of Certification (and
Maintenance thereof) under the
Program, the Cures Act requires health
IT developers to publish APIs that allow
‘‘health information from such
technology to be accessed, exchanged,
and used without special effort through
the use of APIs or successor technology
or standards, as provided for under
applicable law.’’ The Cures Act’s API
Condition of Certification also states
that a developer must, through an API,
‘‘provide access to all data elements of
a patient’s electronic health record to
the extent permissible under applicable
privacy laws.’’
The Cures Act’s API Condition of
Certification includes several key
phrases and requirements for health IT
developers that go beyond just the
technical functionality of the products
they present for certification. In this
section of the preamble we outline our
proposals to implement the Cures Act’s
API Condition of Certification in order
to provide compliance clarity for health
IT developers.
These proposals include new
standards, new implementation
specifications, and a new certification
criterion as well as detailed Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
requirements. We also propose to
modify the Base EHR definition. We
note that health IT developers should
also consider these proposals in the
context of what could warrant review
from an information blocking
perspective in so far as action (or
inaction) that would be inconsistent
with this proposed rule’s API
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements.
a. Statutory Interpretation and API
Policy Principles
One of the most significant phrases in
the Cures Act’s API Condition of
Certification concerns the deployment
and use of APIs ‘‘without special effort.’’
Specifically, the Cures Act requires
health IT developers to publish APIs
and allow health information from such
technology ‘‘to be accessed, exchanged,
and used without special effort.’’ In this
context, we interpret the ‘‘effort’’
exerted (i.e., by whom) to be focused on
the API users, which could include
third-party software developers, the
health care providers that acquired this
API technology, and patients, health
care providers, and payers that use
apps/services that connect to API
technology.
As we considered the meaning and
context associated with the phrase
‘‘without special effort’’ and what
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would make APIs included in certified
health IT truly ‘‘open,’’ we focused on
key attributes that could be used to
refine our interpretation and guide our
proposals. We interpret ‘‘without
special effort’’ to require that APIs, and
the health care ecosystem in which they
are deployed, have three attributes:
Standardized, transparent, and procompetitive. Each of these attributes is
briefly described in more detail below
and all of our subsequent proposals
address one or a combination of these
attributes.
• Standardized—meaning that all
health IT developers seeking
certification would have to implement
the same technical API capabilities in
their products (using modern,
computing standards such as RESTful
interfaces and XML/JSON). Technical
consistency and implementation
predictability are fundamental to scale
API-enabled interoperability and reduce
the level of custom development and
costs necessary to access, exchange, and
use health information. Further, from a
regulatory standpoint, health IT
developers would gain certainty in
regards to pre-certification testing
requirements and post-certification
‘‘real world testing’’ expectations.
Equally, from an industry standpoint, a
consistent and predictable set of API
functions would provide the health IT
ecosystem with known technical
requirements against which ‘‘app’’
developers and other innovative
services can be built.
• Transparent—meaning that all
health IT developers seeking
certification would need to make the
specific business and technical
documentation necessary to interact
with the APIs in production freely and
publicly accessible. Such transparency
and openness is commonplace in many
other industries and has fueled
innovation, growth, and competition.
• Pro-competitive—meaning that all
health IT developers seeking
certification would need to abide by
business practices that promote the
efficient access, exchange, and use of
EHI to support a competitive
marketplace that enhances consumer
value and choice. Moreover, health care
providers should have the sole authority
and autonomy to unilaterally permit
third-party software developers to
connect to the API technology they have
acquired. In other words, health IT
developers must not interfere with a
health care provider’s use of their
acquired API technology in any way,
especially ways that would impact its
equitable access and use based on (for
example) another software developer’s
size, current client base, or business
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line. It also means that developers
(together with health care providers that
deploy APIs) are accountable to patients
who, as consumers of health care
services, have paid for their care and the
information generated from such care.
Thus, patients should be able to access
their EHI via any API-enabled app they
choose without special effort, including
without incurring additional costs and
without encountering access
requirements that impede their ability to
access their information in a persistent
manner.
b. Key Terms
To clearly convey the stakeholders on
which our proposals focus and are
meant to support, we propose to use the
following terms to reflect these
meanings and/or roles:
• The term ‘‘API technology’’ (with a
lowercase ‘‘t’’) generally refers to the
capabilities of certified health IT that
fulfill the API-focused certification
criteria adopted or proposed for
adoption at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7)
through (g)(11).
• ‘‘API Technology Supplier’’ refers to
a health IT developer that creates the
API technology that is presented for
testing and certification to any of the
certification criteria adopted or
proposed for adoption at 45 CFR
170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11). We
propose to adopt this term in § 170.102.
• ‘‘API Data Provider’’ refers to the
organization that deploys the API
technology created by the ‘‘API
Technology Supplier’’ and provides
access via the API technology to data it
produces and electronically manages. In
some cases, the API Data Provider may
contract with the API Technology
Supplier to perform the API deployment
service on its behalf. However, in such
circumstances, the API Data Provider
retains control of what and how
information is disclosed and so for the
purposes of this definition is considered
to be the entity that deploys the API
technology. We propose to adopt this
term in § 170.102.
• ‘‘API User’’—refers to persons and
entities that use or create software
applications that interact with the APIs
developed by the ‘‘API Technology
Supplier’’ and deployed by the ‘‘API
Data Provider.’’ An API User includes,
but is not limited to, third-party
software developers, developers of
software applications used by API Data
Providers, patients, health care
providers, and payers that use apps/
services that connect to API technology.
We propose to adopt this term in
§ 170.102.
We also use:
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• The term ‘‘(g)(10)-certified API’’ for
ease of reference throughout the
preamble to refer to health IT certified
to the certification criterion proposed
for adoption in 45 CFR 170.315(g)(10).
• The term ‘‘app’’ for ease of
reference to describe any type of
software application that would be
designed to interact with the (g)(10)certified APIs. This generic term is
meant to include, but not be limited to,
a range of applications from mobile and
browser-based to comprehensive
business-to-business enterprise
applications administered by third
parties.
c. Proposed API Standards,
Implementation Specifications, and
Certification Criterion
APIs can be thought of as a set of
commands, functions, protocols, and/or
tools published by one software
developer (‘‘software developer A’’) that
enable other software developers (X, Y,
and Z) to create programs and
applications that interact with A’s
software without needing to know the
‘‘internal’’ workings of A’s software.
APIs can facilitate more seamless access
to health information and it is important
to note for context that ONC adopted
three 2015 Edition certification criteria
that specified API capabilities for Health
IT Modules (criteria adopted in 45 CFR
170.315(g)(7), (g)(8), and (g)(9)). The
following sections detail our proposals
to adopt standards, implementation
specifications, and a new API
certification criterion. Together, these
proposals account for the technical
requirements we propose to associate
with the Cures Act’s API Condition of
Certification and are reinforced through
the condition’s policy proposals.
i. Proposed Adoption of FHIR DSTU2
Standard
Overall, and on balance, we have
structured our standards and
implementation specifications proposals
to best meet the health IT industry
where it is most prepared to comply
today. As a result, we propose to adopt
the HL7® Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®)
standard as a foundational standard
within our suite of proposals.
Specifically, we propose to adopt FHIR
Draft Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) 2
(hereafter referred to as ‘‘FHIR Release
2’’) as a baseline standard conformance
requirement. In so doing, we can work
with industry to support a conformance
testing infrastructure for a full suite of
proposals focused on one FHIR release
(its associated implementation
specifications) and complementary
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security and app registration protocols,
compared to numerous versions.81
The 2015 Edition final rule did not
include specific standards or
implementation specifications to
describe the way in which APIs needed
to be designed to meet § 170.315(g)(8).
Instead, we specified a functional
certification criterion and encouraged
the industry to coalesce around a
standardized specification for its API
functionality, such as the FHIR
standard. We did, however, require
health IT developers to make their
technical API documentation publicly
available and we subsequently made
such information accessible via the
CHPL.
Upon reviewing health IT developers
certified to § 170.315(g)(8),
approximately 32% have published via
the CHPL that they are using FHIR,
specifically FHIR Release 2, as of midSeptember 2018. Additionally, nearly
51% of health IT developers appear to
be using a version of FHIR and OAuth
2.0 together. We also note that when
viewed from the perspective of how
many providers are served by these
FHIR implementers, we estimate that
approximate 87% of hospitals and 57%
of clinicians are served by developers
with a FHIR Release 2 API and 87% of
hospitals and 69% of clinicians are
served by developers with a FHIR API
of any version. In the years since the
2015 Edition final rule, industry
stakeholders have made rapid progress
to advance the FHIR standard. This
includes substantial investments in
industry pilots, specification
development led through the Argonaut
Project 82 production deployment of
APIs conformant to FHIR Release 2
following the Argonaut specifications,
and the support for FHIR Release 2 in
Apple’s iOS 11.3, which includes a new
‘‘health records’’ app for the iPhone
based on these specifications.83
Therefore, the industry is well prepared
and ready to adopt the FHIR standard.
Thus, we propose to adopt FHIR
Release 2 as the baseline standard in a
new API standards section of our rules
at 45 CFR 170.215(a)(1). Additionally, as
discussed in further detail below, we
reference FHIR Release 2 for use in the
new API certification criterion proposed
for adoption in § 170.315(g)(10).
Although FHIR Release 3 is published
and some health IT developers have
81 In October 2018, ONC released a first version
of a FHIR testing tool visit here for more details:
https://inferno.healthit.gov/.
82 https://argonautwiki.hl7.org/
index.php?title=Main_Page.
83 https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/01/
apple-announces-effortless-solution-bringinghealth-records-to-iPhone/.
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included varied support for it in their
product(s) at this time, there is limited
evidence that its production
deployment is as widespread as FHIR
Release 2. Thus, we believe that FHIR
Release 2 is the most appropriate
version to propose to adopt as part of
proposed § 170.315(g)(10)’s
conformance requirements. This
approach would provide a stable and
consistent direction in which the
industry can go when it comes to
deploying (g)(10)–certified APIs that
support data access to the USCDI. FHIR
Release 2 best reflects the industry’s
current maturity and implementation
readiness, it has been more rigorously
tested, and it is largely implemented in
most 2015 Edition health IT systems
that have and are being deployed in
production. Thus, the incremental
burden for many health IT developers to
get certified to the proposed criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(10) would be largely
limited to the added security and
registration conformance requirements
we have proposed to include. We
recognize, however, that some health IT
developers certified to § 170.315(g)(8)
chose not to use FHIR and will have
more substantial changes to make in
order to meet this proposal.
Additionally, FHIR Release 4 has now
been published 84 and updated
associated implementation
specifications are expected to follow.
FHIR Release 4 has several key
improvements, including certain
foundational aspects in the standard
and ‘‘FHIR resources’’ designated as
‘‘normative’’ for the first time. This will
lead to acycle of more mature US FHIR
Core profiles aligned with Release 4 and
additional implementation guidance
that explicitly specifies how to handle
populations of patient data (batch
exports) via FHIR to more efficiently
enable population and learning health
system-oriented services. Likewise, from
an industry update trajectory, we
believe that FHIR Release 4’s normative
resources will be compelling from a
maturity and stability perspective such
that many health IT developers will
either rapidly progress to FHIR Release
4 from Release 3 or skip wide-scale
production deployment of FHIR Release
3 altogether, making FHIR Release 4 the
next de facto version the industry would
move toward and coalesce behind.
Given FHIR Release 4’s public release
and that the industry will begin to
implement Release 4 in parallel with
this rulemaking, we request comment
on the following options we could
pursue for a final rule.
84 https://blog.hl7.org/hl7-publishes-fhir-release-4.
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Option 1 (proposed in regulation
text): Adopt just FHIR Release 2 for
reference in proposed § 170.315(g)(10).
This option would require health IT
developers seeking certification to
build, test, and certify systems solely to
FHIR Release 2 and its associated
implementation specifications. Under
this option, if the National Coordinator
approved the use of FHIR Release 3 or
4 (pursuant to the Standards Version
Advancement Process) it would occur,
at the earliest, one year after a final rule
was issued. Given that timing, and the
compliance deadlines proposed later in
this section, it would mean that health
IT developers would have no option but
to develop to FHIR Release 2 in order
to meet the proposed compliance
deadlines.
Option 2: Adopt FHIR Release 2 and
FHIR Release 3 in order to introduce
optionality into how health IT
developers are able to demonstrate
compliance with proposed
§ 170.315(g)(10). In other words, by
adopting and referencing both FHIR
Release 2 and 3 in proposed
§ 170.315(g)(10) it would permit a
health IT developer to use either one to
meet the criterion (i.e., both versions
would not be required to be supported
and demonstrating only one would be
needed to meet certification). Similarly,
under this option, if the National
Coordinator approved the use of FHIR
Release 4 (pursuant to the Standards
Version Advancement Process) it would
occur, at the earliest, one year after a
final rule was issued. Given that timing,
and the compliance deadlines proposed
later in this section, it would mean that
health IT developers would have no
option but to develop to FHIR Release
2 or Release 3 in order to meet the
proposed compliance deadlines.
Option 3: Adopt FHIR Release 2 and
FHIR Release 4 in order to introduce
flexibility into how health IT developers
are able to demonstrate compliance with
proposed § 170.315(g)(10). The full
implementation of this option would
depend on all applicable corresponding
FHIR Release 2 implementation
specifications also being published in
their FHIR Release 4 formats and
available prior to the issuance of a final
rule. Provided these FHIR Release 4
implementation specifications are
published in time for a final rule, this
option would appear to be the best nearand long-term option for the industry.
We anticipate this being the case
because it would let lagging health IT
developers catch up to the FHIR Release
2 baseline while at the same time enable
leading health IT developers to move
directly and immediately to FHIR
Release 4 as a means to meet proposed
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§ 170.315(g)(10)’s compliance timelines.
In other words, unlike Options 1 and 2,
the Standards Version Advancement
Process would not be necessary and the
trajectory of leading health IT
developers would be well supported by
the certification criterion. We also
request comment on a variant of Option
3 that would include a pre-defined cutover for the permitted use of and
certification to FHIR Release 2. We note
that if this variant were implemented as
part of Option 3, we would likely also
need to add a maintenance of
certification requirement in the final
rule to establish an upgrade timeline to
FHIR Release 4 for those health IT
developers who originally sought
certification for FHIR Release 2. Such a
maintenance requirement would seem
necessary in order to bring the industry
into closer alignment with respect to a
more up-to-date national baseline for
FHIR.
Option 4: Adopt solely FHIR Release
4 in the final rule for reference in
proposed § 170.315(g)(10). This option
would require health IT developers
seeking certification to build, test, and
certify systems solely to FHIR Release 4
and its associated implementation
specifications. Again, provided all
applicable FHIR Release 4
implementation specifications are
published in time for a final rule, this
option would appear to be a close
preference to Option 3 for industry. We
believe this would be the case because
by the time a final rule associated with
these proposals is issued, it is likely that
health IT developers would have close
to or over a year’s worth of development
experience with FHIR Release 4. As a
result, many may be poised to introduce
their first round of generally available
FHIR Release 4 products into
production. If ONC were to offer
certification to FHIR Release 2 (as in
Option 3) this flexibility could
unintentionally delay the industry’s
transition to FHIR Release 4 and slow
progress associated with FHIR-based
interoperability. The following
compliance timeline example attempts
to make this point clearer. If, for
example, the final rule was effective
January 2020, based on other proposals
associated with the API Conditions of
Certification, health IT developers
would have up to 2 years to rollout their
(g)(10)–certified API technology, which
would mean January 2022. At that
point, FHIR Release 4 would have been
published for nearly 3 years and FHIR
Release 2 would have been published
for nearly 6 years. Without a pre-defined
cut-over for FHIR Release 2 in Option 3,
that certification approach would
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permit FHIR Release 2 APIs to be
deployed in 2022 and used for an
indeterminate period of time.
In preparing your comments, please
fully review our proposed certification
criterion in § 170.315(g)(10) and the
accompanying Conditions of
Certification attributed to the APIoriented certification criteria. Notably, if
we were to adopt another FHIR Release
in a final rule as an alternative to FHIR
Release 2 for the proposed API criterion
in § 170.315(g)(10), then we would also
adopt the applicable implementation
specifications and FHIR profiles (the US
FHIR Core profiles) associated with the
FHIR Release in order to support USCDI
data access. We highly encourage
stakeholders to express their perspective
and explicitly note their preferred
option in comments.
ii. Proposed Adoption of Associated
FHIR Release 2 Implementation
Specifications
Our proposal to adopt the FHIR
standard alone, however, is insufficient
to provide the level of consistent
implementation that will be necessary
to realize the ‘‘without special effort’’
provision in this Condition of
Certification. FHIR, much like other
standards that are initially developed to
be internationally applicable, requires
additional implementation
specifications in order to further
constrain implementation choices and
reflect US-based standards policies
(such as the use of RxNorm for
representing medications). In FHIR, the
additional constraints placed on ‘‘base
FHIR resources’’ are expressed through
what are called ‘‘FHIR profiles.’’ FHIR
Profiles typically provide additional
rules about which resource elements
must be used and what additional
elements have been added that are not
part of the base FHIR resource. This can
include, but not be limited to, rules
about which API features are used and
how as well as rules about which
terminologies are used in particular
elements. The term ‘‘profile’’ is a
general term that is used in the FHIR
standard to describe either an
individual FHIR resource, or an entire
implementation specification consisting
of multiple FHIR resources.
Accordingly, we propose to adopt three
implementation specifications that will
establish a standardized baseline and
further constrain API conformance to
help assure that APIs can be used
‘‘without special effort.’’
We propose to adopt in
§ 170.215(a)(2) an implementation
specification that would list a set of base
FHIR resources that Health IT Modules
certified to the proposed criterion in
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§ 170.315(g)(10) would need to support.
We refer to this proposed initial set of
FHIR resources as the ‘‘API Resource
Collection in Health’’ or ‘‘the ARCH.’’
The ARCH would align with and be
directed by the data policy specified in
the proposed US Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI) standard
(discussed in section IV.B.1 of this
proposed rule).
As a result, we propose to include 15
FHIR resources in the ARCH’s first
version. Based on prior industry efforts,
including the Argonaut Project to map
FHIR resources to the previously
defined Common Clinical Data Set
(CCDS), we know that the following 13
FHIR resources map to and support the
equivalent data classes specified in the
USCDI: AllergyIntolerance; CarePlan;
Condition; Device; DiagnosticReport;
Goal; Immunization; Medication;
MedicationOrder; MedicationStatement;
Observation; Patient; and Procedure. We
also propose to include, specifically for
the Patient resource that the
‘‘Patient.address’’ and ‘‘Patient.telecom’’
elements must be supported as part of
the Patient resource. These elements are
neither required in the base FHIR
resource or additional implementation
specifications; however, they are
necessary to align with the USCDI’s data
requirements. With respect to the
Device resource, we propose to require
that the ‘‘Device.udi’’ element follow
the human readable representation of
the unique device identifier (UDI) found
in the recommendation, guidance, and
conformance requirements section of
the ‘‘HL7 Version 3 Cross Paradigm
Implementation Guide: Medical Devices
and Unique Device Identification (UDI)
Pattern, Release 1,’’ a document hosted
by HL7.85 Developers would be held
responsible only for the
recommendation, guidance, and
conformance requirements for HL7
FHIR in the implementation guide and
would not be held responsible for other
requirements in the implementation
guide specific to other standards,
including requirements for HL7 Version
2 and HL7 Version 3. For clarity, these
proposed requirements are part of the
ARCH Version 1 standard.
In addition to these 13 FHIR
resources, we have included two
additional FHIR resources:
(1) The Provenance resource; and (2)
the DocumentReference resource to
accommodate clinical notes. These
additions would make for a total of 15
FHIR resources to reflect the direction of
the USCDI v1. With respect to clinical
notes, we understand from our own
85 https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/
product_brief.cfm?product_id=487.
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analysis and technical discussions
within HL7 that the FHIR
DocumentReference resource is best
capable of handling the exchange of
clinical notes. Since the CCDS was
defined over two years ago, we have
most frequently heard from provider
stakeholders that access to ‘‘clinical
notes’’ is key, impactful, and highly
desirable data that should be accessible
via the C–CDAs they exchange as well
as via APIs. While we realize the
industry may need to develop
additional implementation guidance to
support clinical notes via FHIR, we
believe that including FHIR resources in
ARCH Version 1 directly addresses the
steady requests we have received from
providers to include a focus on the
access, exchange, and use of ‘‘clinical
notes’’ as part of certification. Thus, we
propose to include the FHIR
DocumentReference resource in the
ARCH to support clinical notes. We also
clarify that the clinical note text
included in this FHIR resource would
need to be represented in its ‘‘raw’’ text
form. In other words, it would be
unacceptable for the note text to be
converted to another file or format (e.g.,
.docx, PDF) when it is provided as part
of an API response. With respect to the
Provenance resource, we believe its
inclusion in the ARCH is paramount to
the long-term success and use of FHIRbased APIs. While C–CDA’s are often
critiqued due to their relative ‘‘length,’’
the C–CDA often represents the output
of a clinical event and includes relevant
context. The same will not always be
true in an API-context. This is due to
the fact that FHIR-based APIs make it
significantly easier for apps to request
specific data (e.g., just a patient’s active
medications). Thus, it is equally
important over the long-term that the
industry not lose sight of the metadata
(i.e., the who, what, when, where, why,
and how) behind the data that was
created. As a result, we believe that this
early stage of FHIR deployment is the
best time for the industry to build in
support for the Provenance resource.
Otherwise, if we were to expand the
ARCH in future years to include this
FHIR resource, we estimate that the
developer burden and overall industry
impact would be greater than building
this support in ‘‘from the start.’’
Specifically, and to remain consistent
with the USCDI, we propose to require
that the ‘‘Provenance.recorded’’ (for the
author’s time stamp) and
‘‘Provenance.agent.actor’’ (for the author
and author’s organization) elements be
supported as part of the Provenance
resource.
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Over time, and as the USCDI is
expanded, we also expect to update this
implementation specification to expand
the ARCH beyond these 15 FHIR
resources. Equally, consistent with the
Maintenance of Certification
requirements described in section
VII.B.5 of this proposed rule (the
Standards Version Advancement
Process proposals), which would permit
health IT developers to voluntarily
implement and use a new version of an
adopted standard or implementation
specification so long as certain
conditions are met including that the
new version is approved by the National
Coordinator for use in certification
through the Standards Version
Advancement Process, health IT
developers would be able to update
their certified health IT to include
(g)(10)-certified API access to a broader
set of data once a new version of the
ARCH is approved.
The next implementation
specification for the FHIR standard we
propose to adopt in § 170.215(a)(3) is
the Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide version 1
(Argonaut IG), hosted by HL7.86 This
implementation guide has been pilot
tested and is now being implemented
for production use by health IT
developers. Notably, it specifies FHIR
profile constraints for 13 of the
associated FHIR resources we propose
to include in the ARCH Version 1 and
these FHIR profiles support the data
included in the USCDI (v1).
The next implementation
specification for the FHIR standard we
propose the Secretary adopt in
§ 170.215(a)(4) is the specific portion of
the Argonaut IG that refers to the
‘‘Argonaut Data Query Implementation
Guide Server’’ conformance
requirements. While it could be implied
through our proposed adoption of the
Argonaut IG that these conformance
requirements would be included, we
seek to make this an explicit
requirement for the API certification
criterion proposed in § 170.315(g)(10).
Conformance to this implementation
specification is essential in order to
ensure that all FHIR servers are
consistently configured to support the
defined data queries and ‘‘supported
searches’’ associated with each
Argonaut profiled FHIR resource. For
clarity, conformance testing would
focus on and be limited to the ‘‘SHALL’’
requirements. We also note that the
Argonaut Data Query Implementation
Guide Server includes conformance
requirements for the
‘‘DocumentReference Profile,’’ which
86 https://www.fhir.org/guides/argonaut/r2/.
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defines ‘‘how a provider or patient can
retrieve a patient’s existing clinical
document.’’ This particular
specification was produced in support
of the 2015 Edition certification
criterion adopted in § 170.315(g)(9). As
a result, we clarify that this specific
portion of the Server IG and
conformance requirement would be out
of scope for the purposes of proposed
§ 170.315(g)(10).
We have separately proposed the
FHIR standard and each of these
implementation specifications so that
the National Coordinator may evaluate
industry progress and make a unique or
combined determination as to the
appropriate time to approve for
voluntary upgrade pursuant to the
standards version advancement process
discussed in more detail in section
VII.B.5 as well as subsequently go
through rulemaking to adopt a new
version of: The FHIR standard, the
ARCH, implementation specifications
that ‘‘profile’’ the resources in the
ARCH, and implementation
specifications for FHIR server
conformance capabilities. While the
proposed implementation specifications
relate to one another, they can also be
updated independently of each other as
time goes on. For instance, the National
Coordinator could approve a new
version of the FHIR standard ‘‘Release
5’’ in the future in accordance with the
standards version advancement process.
In so doing, the National Coordinator
could leave the scope of the ARCH the
same and update (necessarily) the
implementation specifications for the
FHIR profiles and FHIR server
conformance requirements accordingly
to align with the new FHIR version. As
an alternative example, the National
Coordinator could leave the FHIR
standard version the same and approve
a new version of the ARCH to include
more FHIR resources.
We note that other federal agencies
may be adopting the FHIR standard and
additional FHIR implementation guides
for their program requirements. We plan
to coordinate with such other agencies
to focus on strategic alignment among
the FHIR standard versions, applicable
implementation guides, and use cases.
iii. Proposed Adoption of Standards and
Implementation Specifications To
Support Persistent User Authentication
and App Authorization
To enable and support persistent user
authentication and app authorization
processes, we propose to adopt a
standards and additional
implementation specification for the
FHIR standard. First, we propose to
adopt the ‘‘OpenID Connect Core 1.0
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incorporating errata set 1’’ standard in
§ 170.215(b) as it complements the
SMART Application Launch Framework
Implementation Guide Release 1.0.0 87
(SMART Guide). The OpenID standard
is typically paired with OAuth 2.0
implementations and focuses on user
authentication. Second, we propose to
adopt the SMART Guide in
§ 170.215(a)(5) as an additional
implementation specification associated
with the FHIR standard. This guide is
referenced by the Argonaut IG and is
generally being implemented by the
health IT community as a security layer
with which FHIR deployment is being
combined (from both a FHIR server and
FHIR application perspective). Further,
while the SMART Guide includes
certain mandatory requirements, we
believe three specific aspects are
necessary to specifically require in order
for certification to enable consistent
industry-wide implementation.
The SMART Guide specifies the use
of ‘‘refresh tokens’’ as optional. We
believe that this requirement is
necessary in order to enable persistent
access by apps, especially in a patient
access context. Thus, we propose to
make their use mandatory with a
minimum refresh token life of 3 months.
While this technique would need to be
supported for both types of API-enabled
services we propose be supported
through § 170.315(g)(10), we wish to
emphasize that implementing refresh
token support is directly intended to
enable a patient’s ‘‘persistent access’’ to
their electronic health information
without special effort (i.e., without
having to frequently re-authenticate and
re-authorize while using their preferred
app). This proposal aligns with the
industry developed security best
practice guidelines for OAuth 2.0
implementations, which require support
for a short-lived ‘‘access token’’ and a
long-lived ‘‘refresh token’’ that could be
subsequently used by the app to obtain
a new ‘‘access token’’ after the original
‘‘access token’’ expires. We believe this
approach enhances the seamlessness of
a patient’s data access and reduces the
‘‘friction’’ they would otherwise
experience having to re-authenticate
and re-authorize. At the same time,
because the access token is short lived,
this minimizes the risk of a patient’s
information being accessed by
unauthorized users if for some reason
the access token is compromised. The
technical capabilities that we intend to
explicitly test are referenced as part of
the proposed API certification criterion
in § 170.315(g)(10).
87 https://build.fhir.org/ig/HL7/smart-applaunch/.
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We also propose to require that the
‘‘Standalone Launch’’ and ‘‘EHR
Launch’’ requirements specified in the
SMART Guide be supported. We believe
that requiring API Technology Suppliers
to demonstrate both of these capacities
will help ensure greater standardization
and ease of use among (g)(10)-certified
APIs. When a third-party ‘‘app’’ first
connects to a FHIR server, it often
requires some contextual data to make
the app more ‘‘user friendly.’’ This
information could include things such
as the most recent patient encounter or
hospital visit. The contextual
information depends on how the ‘‘app’’
is launched.
When an app is launched from
‘‘outside of an EHR,’’ such as from a
patient’s smartphone or web browser,
then the app is considered to be
launched in a ‘‘Standalone’’ mode. In
this mode, the app has to request that
the FHIR server provide appropriate
contextual information, which can then
be used to customize the app’s display
for the patient. The SMART Guide has
standardized the information that such
apps can request from FHIR servers and
defined it as ‘‘Standalone Launch.’’
In other contexts, apps can be
launched from ‘‘within the EHR.’’ This
is typically the case when a third-party
app is integrated as part of an EHR
technology. In this case, the app is
considered to have been launched in the
‘‘EHR’’ mode. Typically, when such an
app is launched from within an EHR,
the user (e.g., provider, nurse) has a
patient’s record ‘‘open’’ or ‘‘active’’ in
the EHR and expects the app to directly
open the same patient when it is
launched. In order for this to happen,
the app has to request that the FHIR
server provides information about the
patient record that is currently ‘‘open’’
in the EHR. The SMART Guide has
standardized this interaction and
defined it as ‘‘EHR Launch.’’
iv. Proposed Adoption of a New API
Certification Criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(10)
Proposal Overview
To implement the Cures Act, we
propose to adopt a new criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(10) to replace the
certification criterion adopted in
§ 170.315(g)(8). Currently, the criterion
adopted in § 170.315(g)(8) focuses on a
Health IT Module’s ability to provide
API functionality that can respond with
data for each of the data categories
specified in the Common Clinical Data
Set. Moreover, its focus on read-access/
response to requests for specific types of
data most directly aligns with the API
uses envisioned by industry
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stakeholders and the Cures Act, which
is why we believe it is necessary and
appropriate to replace § 170.315(g)(8). In
contrast, we do not propose that it is
necessary to replace the certification
criteria adopted in § 170.315(g)(7) and
(g)(9) because the former does not
prescribe specific technical approaches
(and can continue to be met as
technology evolves) and the latter
supports a discrete use case relative to
an API function that responds with a C–
CDA.
We propose our approach to adopt a
replacement for § 170.315(g)(8) that will
provide clear regulatory compliance
requirements for stakeholders because:
(1) 2015 Edition testing and certification
to § 170.315(g)(8) will continue
throughout this rulemaking; (2)
presuming we adopt this (or a modified
version of this) proposal in a final rule,
it will be easier for the industry to
distinguish compliance requirements
between two separate certification
criteria compared to a time/contextsensitive ‘‘version’’ of § 170.315(g)(8);
and (3) § 170.315(g)(8) is currently
specified in the Base EHR definition so
its replacement has compliance effects
on health care providers participating in
every program that requires the use of
Certified EHR Technology, which
references the Base EHR definition.
At a high-level, we propose that this
new API certification criterion would
require FHIR servers to support two
types of API-enabled services:
• Services for which a single
patient’s 88 data is at focus; and
• services for which multiple
patients’ data are at focus, which,
hereafter, we refer to as ‘‘populationlevel’’ to convey the grouped and cohort
scope on which the data associated with
these services would be focused (e.g., a
specific provider’s patient panel, all of
the patients covered by a particular
health plan, a group of patients cared for
through an alternative payment model).
This proposed certification criterion
would only require mandatory support
for ‘‘read’’ access for both identified
services, though we envision a future
version of this certification criterion that
could include specific ‘‘write’’
conformance requirements (for example,
to aid decision support) once FHIRbased APIs are widely adopted. In all
cases, this proposed criterion will
require that the two types of API
services have appropriate security
controls implemented. These controls
88 We recognize that individuals may not always
be in an active role as a ‘‘patient’’ when they use
an application to access their data. However, we
believe it is clearer for the purposes of readability
and policy intent to use the term ‘‘patient’’ as
opposed to ‘‘individual.’’
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would ensure a user fully authenticates
to the API-enabled data source to which
the request is being made and that the
user’s software application is
appropriately authorized to request
specified data.
API services that focus on a single
patient would include, but not be
limited to, those that interact with
software applications controlled and
used by a patient to access their data as
well as software applications
implemented by a provider to enhance
their own ‘‘internal’’ clinical care tools
and workflow (e.g., a specialized
calculation app). Most, if not all, of
these types of interactions are typically
orchestrated in a synchronous, real to
near-real-time mode via APIs.
Conversely, API services that focus on
multiple patients would include, but
not be limited to, software applications
used by a health care provider to
manage various internal patient
populations as well as external services
a health care provider may contract for
to support quality improvement,
population health management, and
cost accountability vis-a`-vis the
provider’s partners (e.g., health plans).
Historically, access to this kind of
computing has often been cumbersome,
opaque, and required one-off scripting
and significant engineering labor with
no overarching standardized methods.
By shifting this paradigm to a FHIRbased API, we anticipate that the market
will be able to respond with a new slate
of innovative solutions.
Across this spectrum of populationlevel uses, the scope or quantity of the
data may range from a small group to
many hundreds or thousands of
patients. Moreover, when ‘‘external’’
applications and services are provided
access to patient data by the provider,
we expect that such access and
associated privacy and security
protocols would be established
consistent with existing legal
requirements under the HIPAA Privacy
and Security Rules (including business
associate agreements), other data use
agreements (as applicable), and any
other state or federal applicable law.
Principally, for the purposes of the
proposed certification criterion, we seek
to include and ensure through testing
and certification that a set of baseline
API functionality exists and is deployed
for providers to use at their discretion
to support their own clinical priorities
as well as to use to engage with their
partners, such as software developers
and developers of third-party
applications.
We have explicitly proposed to
include support for API services that are
population-level focused in this
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certification criterion because the
current certification criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(8) has largely been tested,
certified, and deployed to support the
‘‘patient data request’’ use case. In
comparison, population-level focused
API services are envisioned to support
FHIR-based apps that not only improve
clinical workflow and decision support
but also help advance a learning health
system. In so doing, providers, payers,
and other stakeholders will be able to
make incrementally better use of FHIR’s
RESTful API and JSON payload to apply
modern computing techniques,
including big data analyses and
machine learning, to account for, assess,
and inform the quality and effectiveness
of care delivered. As noted in the
proposed API standards section, FHIR
Release 4 includes technical
specifications to enable standardized
population-level services via FHIRbased APIs in a more efficient manner
than currently possible. If ‘‘Option 3’’ or
‘‘Option 4’’ is preferred by industry in
terms of the FHIR standards options for
this certification criterion, these
approaches would be demonstrable.
Alternatively, if the National
Coordinator were to approve FHIR
Release 4 for use under this proposed
certification criterion (following the
Standards Version Advancement
Process described in Section VII.B.5 of
this preamble) then it would be able to
be used to meet these technical
expectations.
Lastly, as we considered the necessary
oversight responsibilities the Cures Act
adds to the Program, we have
determined that it would be essential to
include a specific population-level API
conformance requirement as part of this
criterion so that such capabilities could
be evaluated post-certification for
compliance with (among other
requirements) this API Condition of
Certification and the information
blocking and real world testing
Conditions of Certification.
Specific Proposals
In general, we have approached
framing § 170.315(g)(10) in the same
way we framed § 170.315(g)(8). This
new proposed criterion, however,
includes some important differences
and specificity compared to
§ 170.315(g)(8). Taken together, the
following proposals are designed to
establish a consistent set of API
implementation requirements aimed at
the API Condition of Certification’s
‘‘without special effort’’ requirement.
We propose that API technology
presented by a health IT developer
(otherwise considered an API
Technology Supplier in this context) for
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testing and certification to the proposed
certification criterion in § 170.315(g)(10)
would need to meet the requirements
outlined below. We seek comment on
all of the following proposals.
Data Response
We propose in § 170.315(g)(10)(i) that
the health IT presented for testing and
certification must be capable of
responding to requests for data on a
single patient and multiple patients
associated with each of the FHIR
resources specified in ARCH Version 1
and consistent with FHIR Release 2 and
the Argonaut IG implementation
specification. More specifically, we
clarify that all data elements indicated
as ‘‘mandatory’’ and ‘‘must support’’ by
the proposed standards and
implementation specifications must be
supported and would be in scope for
testing. Through this approach,
certification will provide for a
consistent and predictable starting
scope of data from which apps and
other services can be developed.
Search Support
We propose to require in
§ 170.315(g)(10)(ii) that the health IT
presented for testing and certification
must be capable of responding to all of
the ‘‘supported searches’’ specified in
the Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide Server, which as
a reminder we have proposed for
adoption as an implementation
specification in § 170.215(a)(4).89 Given
that there is not yet a consistent,
standardized specification for FHIR
servers to handle searches for multiple
patients, we clarify that a health IT
developer would be permitted to
approach searches for multiple patients
in the manner it deems most efficient to
meet this proposed certification
criterion. We note, consistent with the
implementation specifications current
scope, that conformance would focus on
search associated with a single patient’s
data. However, we reiterate the health
IT presented for testing and certification
and as implemented must support
searches for multiple patients
independent of a required standard for
such searches.
For the DocumentReference and
Provenance resources, which are
currently present in the base FHIR
standard, we request comments on the
minimum ‘‘search’’ parameters that
would need to be supported.
89 https://www.fhir.org/guides/argonaut/r2/
Conformance-server.html.
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App Registration
We propose in § 170.315(g)(10)(iii)
that health IT presented for testing and
certification must be capable of enabling
apps to register with an ‘‘authorization
server.’’ This proposed conformance
requirement would require an API
Technology Supplier to demonstrate its
registration process, but would not
require that it be done according to a
specific standard. We considered
proposing the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic
Client Registration Protocol (RFC 7591)
standard (‘‘Dynamic Registration’’) as
the only way to support registration for
this certification criterion and request
public comment on whether we should
require its support as part of a final
rule’s certification criterion. For clarity,
we note that while we have not
explicitly required Dynamic
Registration as the only way to
demonstrate conformance with this
specific portion of the certification
criterion, API Technology Suppliers
would still be allowed to use Dynamic
Registration if they so choose.
While requiring Dynamic Registration
could create a more consistent
registration experience for health IT
developers, we did not expressly
include this standard because of its
relatively low adoption and
implementation in the health IT
ecosystem. Notably, while the SMART
Guide covers a majority of technical
steps necessary for an app to connect a
FHIR server, it is neutral on the
registration process API Technology
Suppliers could take. Much like we did
with § 170.315(g)(8) in the initial 2015
Edition final rule by not requiring FHIR,
we believe that a prudent approach for
registration is to require that it be
addressed from a functional perspective
while the industry reaches consensus on
the best techniques to enable
registration.
Note, that while this portion of
proposed § 170.315(g)(10) focuses on the
technical standards conformance, we
have also included a specific
‘‘maintenance requirement’’ associated
with the API Condition of Certification
around the timeliness of this registration
process in production settings as
applicable to API Technology Suppliers.
This proposed requirement will ensure
that patients are able to use their apps
in a timely manner.
We do not intend to test registration
capabilities for apps that would be
executed within an API Data Provider’s
clinical environment. We believe this
discretion is warranted as API
Technology Suppliers and API Data
Providers are best poised to innovate
and execute various methods for app
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registration within a clinical
environment. However, we request
comment on this perspective.
Secure Connection, Authentication and
Authorization
We propose in § 170.315(g)(10)(iv)
that the health IT presented for testing
and certification must be capable of
establishing a secure and trusted
connection with an application that
requests patient data in accordance with
the SMART Guide. In the context of this
proposed criterion, this would require
that an ‘‘authorization server’’ be
deployed and support, at a minimum,
‘‘authorize’’ and ‘‘token’’ endpoints and
the publication of the endpoint URLs
via FHIR server’s metadata as specified
in the SMART Guide to enable
automated discovery by apps. Again, we
note, consistent with this
implementation specification’s current
scope, that initial conformance would
focus on the secure connection
parameters with a single patient’s data
in mind. Given that there is not yet a
consistent, standardized specification
for FHIR servers to handle secure
connection parameters for multiple
patients, we clarify that a health IT
developer would be permitted to
approach secure connections for
multiple patients in the manner it
deems most efficient to meet this
proposed certification criterion.
When an application connects to
request data for the first time, we
propose in § 170.315(g)(10)(v)(A) that
health IT presented for testing and
certification must be capable of
demonstrating support for user
authentication according to the OpenID
Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata
set 1 90 standard. It should be noted that
the OpenID Connect Standard is
agnostic to the actual authentication
mechanism used by the health IT while
providing a standard way for health IT
to exchange the authentication
information to the app. The primary
benefit being that it lets apps verify the
identity of the end-user based on the
authentication performed by the
Authorization Server without having the
apps to take additional responsibility for
authenticating the user. We also propose
in § 170.315(g)(10)(v)(B) that health IT
presented for testing and certification
must demonstrate that users can
authorize applications (in the
appropriate context) to access data in
accordance with the SMART Guide.
Pursuant to this proposed
implementation specification described
above, we also intend to test health IT
90 https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_
0.html.
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in the ‘‘Standalone Launch’’ and ‘‘EHR
Launch’’ modes. Additionally, we
clarify that for the purposes of testing
and certification, we propose to require
that health IT support only a limited set
of capabilities related to the OpenID
Connect Standard—specifically, only
those that are specified in the SMART
Guide.
Further, in order to enable patients
and providers to get persistent access to
health information without having to reauthenticate and re-authorize, we
propose to require that a ‘‘refresh token’’
must be provided with an expiration
period of at least 3 months from the date
issued. The ‘‘refresh token’’ could be
subsequently used by the app to obtain
a new ‘‘access token’’ after the
expiration of the original ‘‘access
token.’’ Note the proposed refresh token
requirement is different than providing
an ‘‘access token’’ with an extended life,
which is typically discouraged from a
security best practice perspective so as
to prevent unauthorized access if for
some reason the access token were to be
acquired for use by an unauthorized
application.
We propose in § 170.315(g)(10)(vi)
that health IT presented for testing and
certification must demonstrate that it
can support subsequent connections by
an app and requests data without
requiring the user to re-authorize and reauthenticate when a valid refresh token
is supplied. Further, we propose that
once a valid refresh token has been used
to get a new access token that the FHIR
server must demonstrate that it can
issue a new refresh token to the app,
which must be for a new period no
shorter than three months. For example,
if an application were issued a refresh
token that was good for three months
upon its first-ever connection and then
subsequently connected to the FHIR
server one month later, the FHIR server
would need to enable that connection to
occur without re-authentication and reauthorization, and it would need to
issue a new refresh token for a new
three-month period from that access
date. Again, we intend to test health IT
in the ‘‘Standalone Launch’’ and ‘‘EHR
Launch’’ contexts pursuant to the
SMART Guide.
We have proposed this renewal
requirement because industry
stakeholders at various meetings and
conferences at which we have attended
have indicated that a constant need for
patients to re-authenticate and reauthorize their apps creates usability
challenges and may otherwise
contradict the Cures Act’s intent
associated with the phrase ‘‘without
special effort.’’ Further, we are not
aware of a standard, consistent
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methodology for specifying the lifetime
of refresh tokens in published technical
specifications. As a result, we believe
our approach would improve the
current user experience for patients and
providers alike. Additionally,
authorization servers maintain binding
between the refresh token and the
application to whom it was issued, and
hence can protect against misuse by
unauthorized applications.
We believe that the three-month
period is a reasonable length given the
proposal for the re-issuance of a new
refresh token. However, we
acknowledge that this same policy
outcome we discuss above could be
achieved by, for example, having a twomonth period. Accordingly, we seek
comment on whether there are available
specifications we should review as well
as whether there should be a reasonable
upper bound from a timing perspective
(e.g., one year) after which the user
should be required to re-authenticate
and re-authorize.
For both the first time connection and
subsequent connection proposals, we
recognize that there is not yet a
consistent, standardized specification
for FHIR servers to handle data requests
for multiple patients. As noted above,
we expect that FHIR Release 4 will have
such specificity. However, for the
purposes of meeting this proposed
certification criterion, we clarify that a
health IT developer would be permitted
to approach requests for multiple
patients in the manner it deems most
efficient.
Transparency Through the Publication
of API Documentation
In the 2015 Edition final rule we
included transparent documentation
requirements for all three of the APIfocused certification criteria adopted in
§ 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(9). These
requirements specified that
documentation associated with API
syntax (and other technical descriptors),
the software components and
configurations that would be necessary
in order for a deployed API to
successfully work, and the terms of use
for the API be made publicly available.
We continue to believe that such a
requirement is important for proposed
§ 170.315(g)(10), especially in light of
the Cures Act’s ‘‘without special effort’’
provision. Such transparency and
openness is commonplace in many
other industries and has fueled
innovation, growth, and competition.
Further, we believe that full
transparency is necessary to ensure that
software developers building to a health
IT developer’s (g)(10)-certified API have
a thorough understanding of any
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requirements against which their
software will need to be designed.
In reconciling the 2015 Edition final
rule’s API documentation requirements
with the new expectations set forth by
the Cures Act regarding a health IT
developer’s practices, we have
determined that revisions are necessary.
Accordingly, we propose to revise the
documentation provision in the API
certification criteria adopted in
§ 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(9) as well as
reflect the same revision in proposed
§ 170.315(g)(10) and (11). Specifically,
we propose to focus the documentation
requirement set forth by the certification
criteria on solely the technical
documentation associated with the API
technology. As a result, we propose to
remove the provision in § 170.315(g)(7)
through (g)(9) associated with ‘‘terms of
use’’ as this type of documentation
could be considered more reflective of
business practice and better placed with
other similar requirements. Consistent
with the Cures Act’s API Condition of
Certification, we have proposed more
detailed Condition of Certification
requirements associated with a health IT
developer’s API terms of use in order to
address business practices that could
interfere with and create special effort
on the part of an API User.
With respect to the technical
documentation that would need to be
made publicly available, we recognize
that our proposed formal adoption of
the FHIR standard and the associated
implementation specifications (for
§ 170.315(g)(10)) would be consistent
across all health IT presented for
certification. As a result there may be
minimal additional documentation
needed for these capabilities beyond
what is already documented in these
standards and specifications. However,
pursuant to the limited mandatory
scope proposed for ‘‘data response’’ (for
§ 170.315(g)(10)), we believe that API
Technology Suppliers should disclose
any additional data their (g)(10)certified API supports in the context of
FHIR resources referenced in ARCH
Version1 and associated
implementation specifications. For
example, the Argonaut IG ‘‘Patient
Profile’’ includes optional elements for
marital status, photo, and contact (as in
contact person like a guardian or
friend). To the degree that a (g)(10)certified API supports such optional
data an API Technology Supplier would
be required to convey this support in its
published technical documentation.
Additionally, we note that other
specifications, like the RFC 7591,
provide developers some latitude in
terms of the information that could be
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supplied for the purposes of
registration.
Thus, we propose in
§ 170.315(g)(10)(vii) that an API
Technology Supplier would need to
provide detailed information for all
aspects of its (g)(10)-certified API,
especially for any unique technical
requirements and configurations, such
as how the FHIR server handles requests
for multiple patients (until such time as
there is an approved standardized
approach that can be cited) as well as
app registration requirements. For
aspects that are not unique and are fully
specified by the FHIR standard and
associated implementation
specifications, the developer could
include hyperlinks to this information
as part of its overall documentation.
Further, we propose to include the word
‘‘complete’’ in the documentation
provision in order to make this point
explicit and link this obligation to the
associated transparency conditions
proposed as part of the overall
Condition of Certification. We note for
health IT developers that the
documentation published must be of the
sort and to the level of specificity,
precision, and detail that the health IT
developer customarily provides to its
own employees, contractors, and/or
partners who develop software
applications for production
environments.
Lastly, we note that all of the
documentation referenced by this
criterion must be accessible to the
public via a hyperlink without
additional access requirements,
including, without limitation, any form
of registration, account creation, ‘‘clickthrough’’ agreements, or requirement to
provide contact details or other
information prior to accessing the
documentation. It would also require
that such documentation needs to be
submitted as part of testing for this
certification criterion and subsequently
to ONC–ACBs for review prior to
issuing a certification.
d. Condition of Certification
Requirements
To implement the Cures Act, we have
designed this API Condition of
Certification in a manner that will
complement the technical capabilities
described in our other proposals, while
addressing the broader technology and
business landscape in which these API
capabilities will be deployed and used.
Consistent with the attributes we have
identified for the statutory phrase
‘‘without special effort,’’ our
overarching vision for this Condition of
Certification is to ensure that (g)(10)certified APIs, among all API
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technology, are deployed in a manner
that supports an experience that is as
seamless and frictionless as possible. To
that end, we seek to promote a
standards-based ecosystem that is
transparent, scalable, and open to robust
competition and innovation.
The specific requirements of this
Condition of Certification are discussed
in several sections below. These
requirements would address certain
implementation, maintenance, and
business practices for which clear and
consistent parameters are needed to
ensure that API technology is deployed
in a manner that achieves the policy
goals we have described. The proposed
requirements would also align this
Condition of Certification with other
requirements and policies of the Cures
Act that promote interoperability and
deter information blocking, as discussed
in more detail in the sections that
follow.
i. Scope and Compliance
To start this Condition of
Certification, we propose in § 170.404 to
apply this Condition of Certification to
health IT developers with health IT
certified to any of the API-focused
certification criteria. These criteria
include the proposed ‘‘standardized API
for patient and population services’’
(§ 170.315(g)(10)) and ‘‘consent
management for APIs’’ (§ 170.315(g)(11))
as well as the current ‘‘application
access—patient selection’’
(§ 170.315(g)(7)), ‘‘application access—
data category request’’ (§ 170.315(g)(8)),
‘‘application access—all data request’’
(§ 170.315(g)(9)). In other words, this
entire Condition of Certification would
not apply to health IT developers that
do not have technology certified to any
of these API-focused certification
criteria. Similarly, this condition is
solely applicable to these API-focused
certification criteria. As a result, the
proposed policies for this Condition of
Certification would not apply to a
health IT developer’s practices
associated with, for example, the
immunization reporting certification
criterion adopted in § 170.315(f)(1)
because that criterion is not one of the
API-focused criteria. However, health IT
developers should remain mindful that
other proposals in this proposed rule,
especially those related to information
blocking, could still apply to its
practices associated with non-APIfocused certification criteria.
Given the proposed applicability of
this condition to current API-focused
criteria and that health IT developers
with products certified to
§§ 170.315(g)(7)–(9) would need to meet
new compliance requirements
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associated with such criteria, we also
propose certain compliance timelines
associated with this Condition of
Certification that would need to be met.
ii. Cures Act Condition and
Interpretation of Access to ‘‘All Data
Elements’’
First, we propose to adopt the Cures
Act’s API Condition of Certification in
§ 170.404(a)(1) to fully incorporate the
statute’s compliance requirements.
Second, strictly for the scope of the API
Condition of Certification, we propose
to interpret the meaning of the phrase
‘‘all data elements of a patient’s
electronic health record’’ as follows.
For the reasons discussed above, the
proposed § 170.315(g)(10) certification
criterion and associated standards and
implementation specifications would
facilitate API access to a limited set of
data elements (i.e., from the FHIR
resources that ARCH Version 1).
Accordingly, for the purposes of
meeting this portion of the Cures Act’s
API Condition of Certification, we
interpret the scope of: The ARCH; its
associated implementation
specifications; and the policy expressed
around the data elements that must be
supported by (g)(10)-certified APIs (i.e.,
FHIR servers) to constitute ‘‘all data
elements.’’ Given other proposals
related to permitting the use of updated
versions of adopted standards and
implementation specifications, we
expect that (g)(10)-certified APIs will be
able to support access to more data over
time in response to updates to the
USCDI and the ARCH. As these updates
occur, the industry would be able to
incrementally approach the totality of
data that can be electronically accessed,
exchanged, and used pursuant to the
Cures Act’s reference to ‘‘all data
elements.’’
Again, we reiterate that this specific
interpretation does not extend beyond
the API Condition of Certification and
cannot be inferred to reduce the scope
or applicability of other Cures Act
Conditions of Certification or the
information blocking proposals, which
necessarily will include a larger scope
of data. For example, other Conditions
of Certification will apply to health IT
developer behaviors associated with
data that are not part of the USCDI or
ARCH, such as the proposals at 45 CFR
170.402 and the proposals in Part 171,
which apply across several stakeholders
including health information networks
and health care providers.
iii. Transparency Conditions
We propose as part of this Condition
of Certification that API Technology
Suppliers be required to make specific
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business and technical documentation
freely and publicly accessible. Thus, we
propose to adopt several transparency
conditions as part of § 170.404(a)(2).
Similar to our policy associated with
the API-focused certification criteria, we
propose in § 170.404(a)(2)(i) that all
published documentation be complete
and available via a publicly accessible
hyperlink that allows any person to
directly access the information without
any preconditions or additional steps.
For example, the API Technology
Supplier cannot impose any access
requirements, including, without
limitation, any form of registration,
account creation, ‘‘click-through’’
agreements, or requirement to provide
contact details or other information
prior to accessing the documentation.
Terms and Conditions Transparency
In addition to technical
documentation, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(A) to require API
Technology Suppliers to publish all
terms and conditions for use of its API
technology. We believe that it is
important to make this information
readily accessible to API Data Providers,
API Users, app developers, and other
persons. This transparency would
ensure that these stakeholders do not
experience ‘‘special effort’’ in the form
of unnecessary costs or delays to obtain
the terms and conditions for API
technology. Further, we believe that full
transparency is necessary to ensure that
app developers have a thorough
understanding in advance of any terms
or conditions that might apply to them
and do not encounter unanticipated
hurdles once they have committed to
developing software or attempt to
implement or deploy such software in
production.
We note that this requirement would
apply to all terms and conditions that
apply to the API technology and its use.
As noted above, and for the purposes of
this proposal’s scope, ‘‘API technology’’
refers to the specified API capabilities
for Health IT Modules certified to
§ 170.315(g)(7) through (11) under the
Program. We consider ‘‘terms and
conditions’’ to include any fees,
restrictions, limitations, obligations,
registration process requirements, and
other terms or conditions that would be
material and needed to:
• Develop software applications to
interact with the API technology;
• distribute, deploy, and enable the
use of software applications in
production environments that use the
API technology;
• use software applications, including
to access, exchange, and use EHI by
means of the API technology;
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• use any EHI obtained by means of
the API technology; and
• register software applications (as
discussed in more below).
In addition, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(B) that any and all
permitted fees charged by an API
Technology Supplier for the use of its
API technology must be published and
described in detailed, plain language as
part of its publicly available terms and
conditions. The description of the fees
must include all material information,
including, but not limited to, the
persons or classes of persons to whom
the fee applies; the circumstances in
which the fee applies; and the amount
of the fee, which for variable fees must
include the specific variable(s) and
methodology(ies) that will be used to
calculate the fee.
For the purposes of the specific
transparency conditions proposed in
§ 170.404(a)(2) and their relationship
and applicability to API Technology
Suppliers with products already
certified to § 170.315(g)(7), (8), or (9), we
propose to establish a compliance date
of six months from the final rule’s
effective date (which would give
developers approximately eight months
from the final rule’s publication date) to
revise their existing API documentation
to come into compliance with the final
rule. We also recognize that API
Technology Suppliers will need to
update the proposed publicly available
information from time to time. Thus, for
the purposes of and with respect to
subsequent updates to this information,
we expect API technology suppliers to
make clear to the public the timing
information applicable to their
disclosures (e.g., effective/as of date or
last updated date) in order to prevent
out of sync discrepancies in what an
API Technology Supplier’s public
documentation states and what it may
be communicating directly to its
customers (e.g., a change in fees is
directly communicated to customers but
not reflected at the publicly available
hyperlink pursuant to its
responsibilities under this proposal). If
an API Technology Supplier’s actions
are out of sync with its publicly
provided documentation, the API
Technology Supplier would be at risk of
violating this Condition of Certification.
We request public comment on whether
this expectation should be formally
specified in regulation text or if these
‘‘effective date’’ approaches for changes
to transparency documentation are
common place such that it would be a
standard practice as part of making this
documentation available.
We also note that API Technology
Suppliers would be expected to revise
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and/or construct terms and conditions
for its API technology that account for
and reflect the proposals associated
with this API Condition of Certification
and information blocking policies. In so
far as an API Technology Supplier
would find it necessary to enforce its
published terms and conditions, we
caution API Technology Suppliers to be
mindful of whether such terms and
conditions would be acceptable and
consistent with the aforementioned
policies in the first place—as an
impermissible term or condition would
be problematic regardless of whether it
was actively enforced.
We propose in § 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(C) a
final transparency condition associated
with API Technology Suppliers’
application developer verification
processes that takes into account the
fact that we did not propose to adopt the
Dynamic Registration standard as part of
proposed § 170.315(g)(10). Had we
proposed requiring Dynamic
Registration, we would have also
proposed a specific Condition of
Certification that would have outright
prohibited API Technology Suppliers
from identity proofing or verifying
authenticity of an app developer when
it came to apps that were designed to
enable patient access.
On balance, however, we believe that
permitting API Technology Suppliers to
institute a process to verify the
authenticity of application developers
will foster additional trust in the
growing API ecosystem. We seek
comments and recommendations on
factors that would enable registration
with minimal barriers. For example,
permitting API Technology Suppliers to
do one- time verification of the app
developers (or even rely on centralized
vetting by a trusted third party), which
would allow the developer’s future apps
to automatically register without caseby- case checks (or checks for each API
Technology Supplier with which the
app developer interacts). One risk to
consider with Dynamic Registration
plus a prohibition on vetting, for
instance, is that it would be much easier
for a malicious app developer to spoof
another legitimate app developer’s app.
Such an action could ultimately lead to
confusion and distrust in the market.
However, the Dynamic Registration
option would minimize barriers to
registration especially for third-party
apps designed to enable patient access.
We seek comments on options and
trade-offs we should consider.
Accordingly, and weighing those
concerns with the Cures Act’s ‘‘without
special effort’’ provision and our
proposed information blocking policies,
we specifically propose to permit API
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Technology Suppliers to institute a
process to verify the authenticity of
application developers so long as such
process is completed within five
business days 91 of receipt of an
application developer’s request to
register their software application with
the API technology’s authorization
server. To clarify, this verification
process would need to focus specifically
on the application developer—not its
software application(s). We also clarify
that API Technology Suppliers would
have the discretion to establish their
verification process so long as the
process is objective and the same for all
application developers and it can
reasonably be completed within the five
business days—otherwise such a
process could risk implicating/violating
other elements of this proposed API
Condition of Certification as well as
information blocking behaviors. The
following includes a few non-exhaustive
examples of verification techniques that
could be used by an API Technology
Supplier to have additional certainty
about the application developer with
whom they are interacting: Instituting a
‘‘penny verification’’ process, requiring
some form of corporate documentation,
or requesting other forms of
authenticating documentation or
transactions.
We believe that five business days is
sufficient time for API Technology
Suppliers to weed out malicious
developers seeking to deceive the API
Technology Supplier, API Data
Providers or API Users, but request
public comment on other timing
considerations. Moreover, we clarify
that this proposed Condition of
Certification is meant to set the upper
bound for a verification process an API
Technology Supplier would be
permitted to take and should not be
interpreted as compelling API
Technology Suppliers to institute such
a process (i.e., API Technology
Suppliers would not be required to
institute a verification process). Rather,
for those API Technology Suppliers that
see it in their (as well as their customers
and patients) best interests to institute
such a process, we have laid out the
rules that we believe meet the Cures
Act’s without special effort
expectations. If an API Technology
Supplier chooses not to institute an app
developer verification process prior to
enabling the production use of an app,
it would solely need to meet the
Maintenance of Certification
91 We consider a ‘‘business day’’ to include the
normal work days and hours of operation during a
week (Monday through Friday), excluding federal
holidays and weekends.
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requirement associated with enabling
apps for production use discussed in
more detail below.
We remind stakeholders that even in
the case where an API Technology
Supplier chooses not to vet app
developers, the apps would not have
carte blanche access to a health care
provider’s data. To the contrary, such
apps will still be registered and thus be
identifiable and able to have their access
deactivated by an API Technology
Supplier or health care provider (API
Data Provider) if they behave in
anomalous or malicious ways (e.g.,
denial of service attack). And a patient
seeking access to their data using the
app will need to authenticate
themselves (using previously issued
credentials by a health care provider or
trusted source) and authorize: (1) The
app to connect to the FHIR server; and
(2) specify the scope of the data the app
may access.
As a separate matter, we also
recognize that in order to assure health
care providers that the apps they use
within their health IT will operate
appropriately, will fully integrate into
workflow, and will not degrade overall
system performance, that API
Technology Suppliers may establish
additional mechanisms to vet app
developers. Such mechanisms could fit
into the ‘‘value-added services’’
permitted fee and result in the app
being acknowledged or listed by the
health IT developer in some special
manner (e.g., in an ‘‘app store,’’
‘‘verified app’’ list). While our proposals
do not specify any explicit limits to the
nature and governance of these
approaches, we wish to caution health
IT developers that even though such
processes have a reasoned basis in
providing an added layer of trust above
and beyond the basic productionreadiness of an app, they can equally be
used as a means to prevent, limit, and
otherwise frustrate innovation,
competition, and access to the market.
Such an outcome would be inconsistent
with the Cures Act, could directly
violate the specific Condition of
Certification associated with fees
permitted for value-added services, and
could constitute information blocking.
iv. Permitted Fees Conditions
General Proposals Involving Fees
As part of this API Condition of
Certification, we propose to adopt
specific conditions that would set
boundaries for the fees API Technology
Suppliers would be permitted to charge
and to whom those permitted fees could
be charged. As a reminder, these
proposals would only apply to a health
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IT developer’s business practices
associated with its ‘‘API technology’’
(i.e., the capabilities certified to
§ 170.315(g)(7) through (11)). We seek
comment on all of the following
proposals.
In § 170.404(a)(3)(i)(A), we propose to
establish a general prohibition on API
Technology Suppliers imposing fees
associated with API technology. This
general prohibition is meant to ensure
that API Technology Suppliers do not
engage in pricing practices that create
barriers to entry and competition for
apps and API-based services that health
care providers seek to use. These
outcomes would be inconsistent with
the goal of enabling API-based access,
exchange, and use of EHI by patients
and other stakeholders without special
effort.
In establishing this general
prohibition, we have been mindful of
the need for API Technology Suppliers
to recover their costs and to earn a
reasonable return on their investments
in providing API technology that has
been certified under the Program.
Accordingly, we have identified
categories of ‘‘permitted fees’’ that API
Technology Suppliers would be
permitted to charge and still be
compliant with the Condition of
Certification and Program requirements,
and discuss these proposals below. We
emphasize, however, and propose in
detail below, that API Technology
Suppliers would not be permitted in
any way whatsoever to impose fees on
any person in connection with an API
Technology Supplier’s work to support
the use of API technology to facilitate a
patient’s ability to access, exchange, or
use their EHI.
We note that other than for fees
charged for ‘‘value-added services’’
(proposed in § 170.404(a)(3)(iv)), the
fees permitted under this Condition of
Certification must arise between an API
Technology Supplier and an API Data
Provider. Any fee that arises in
connection with an API User’s use of
API technology would need to exist
solely between the API Data Provider
and the API User. This policy reinforces
the autonomy that we believe API Data
Providers should have to establish
relationships with API Users. However,
as discussed in detail below, API
Technology Suppliers would be
permitted to charge API Data Providers
based on the usage activities of API
Users.
We also seek to clarify that while the
proposed permitted fees set the
boundaries for the fees API Technology
Suppliers would be permitted to charge
and to whom those permitted fees could
be charged, they do not prohibit who
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may pay the API Technology Supplier’s
permitted fee. In other words, these
conditions limit the party from which
an API Technology Supplier may
require payment, but they do not speak
to who may pay the fee. For example,
if through some type of relationship/
agreement an API User or other party
offered to pay the fee an API Data
Provider owed to an API Technology
Supplier, that practice would be
allowed and unaffected under these
conditions. This is an acceptable
practice because the fee is first arrived
at between the API Technology Supplier
and API Data Provider, and then API
Technology Supplier receives payment
from another party via the API Data
Provider or directly on behalf of the API
Data Provider. As a general matter, we
note that stakeholders should be
mindful of other federal and state laws
and regulations that could prohibit or
limit certain types of relationships
involving remuneration.
We note that the proposed ‘‘permitted
fees conditions’’ align with the
requirements of the information
blocking exceptions proposed in 45 CFR
171.204 and 171.206. Any fee that
would not be covered by those
exceptions, and that would, therefore,
be suspect under the information
blocking provision, would equally not
be permitted by this API Condition of
Certification. We strongly encourage
readers to review our proposals
associated with those exceptions, which
are contained in sections VIII.D.4 and
VIII.D.6 of this preamble, respectively.
Permitted Fees—General Conditions
We propose in § 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)
general conditions that an API
Technology Supplier’s fee must satisfy
in order for such fee to be expressly
permitted and thus not contravene the
proposed Condition of Certification.
First, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(1) that in order to
be a permitted fee, a fee imposed by an
API Technology Supplier must be based
on objective and verifiable criteria that
are uniformly applied for all
substantially similar or similarly
situated classes of persons and requests.
This would require an API Technology
Supplier to apply fee criteria that,
among other things, would lead an API
Technology Supplier to come to the
same conclusion with respect to the
permitted fee’s amount each time it
interacted with a class of persons or
responded to a request. Accordingly, the
fee could not be based on the API
Technology Supplier’s subjective
judgment or discretion.
Moreover, in order to be permitted,
the fee must not be based in any part on
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whether the API User is a competitor or
potential competitor, or on whether the
API Data Provider or API User will be
using the data accessed via the API
technology in a way that facilitates
competition with the API Technology
Supplier. This condition is intended to
ensure that any fee charged by an API
Technology Supplier does not have the
purpose or effect of excluding or
creating impediments for competitors,
business rivals, or other persons
engaged in developing or enabling the
use of API technology. We believe these
fee limitations are necessary in light of
the potential for API Technology
Suppliers to use their control over API
technology to engage in discriminatory
practices that create barriers to API
technology. These principles are
consistent with the approach described
in section VIII of this preamble
(‘‘information blocking’’).
Second, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(2) that in order to
be a permitted fee, a fee imposed by an
API Technology Supplier must be
reasonably related to the API
Technology Supplier’s costs of
supplying and, if applicable, supporting
the API technology to, or at the request
of, the API Data Provider to whom the
fee is charged. For example, the API
Technology Supplier would not be
permitted to charge a fee when the
underlying costs relevant to the supply
or service have already been accounted
for or recovered through other fees
(regardless of whether such fees were
charged to the API Data Provider or to
other persons). Moreover, an API
Technology Supplier that conditioned
access to its API technology on revenuesharing or the entry into a royalty
agreement would be at significant risk of
imposing a fee that bore no plausible
relation to the costs incurred by the API
Technology Supplier to develop the API
technology or support its use by API
Users.
Third, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(3) to require that in
order to be a permitted fee, the costs of
supplying, and if applicable, supporting
the API technology upon which the fee
is based must be reasonably allocated
among all customers to whom the API
technology is supplied or for whom it is
supported. A reasonable allocation of
costs would require that the API
Technology Supplier allocate its costs in
accordance with criteria that are
reasonable and between only those API
Data Providers that either cause the
costs to be incurred or benefit from the
associated supply or support of the API
technology. If an API Technology
Supplier developed API technology that
could be supplied to multiple customers
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with minimal tailoring, the core costs of
developing its API technology should be
allocated among those customers when
recovered as a fee. The API Technology
Supplier would not be permitted to
recover the total of its core costs from
each customer. Similarly, when an API
Technology Supplier uses shared
facilities and resources to support the
usage of API technology, it would need
to ensure that those shared costs were
reasonably allocated between all of the
customers that benefited from them.
However, whenever an API Technology
Supplier is required to provide services
and incur costs that are unique to a
particular customer, it would not need
to distribute those costs among other
customers that had deployed its API
technology.
Last, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(4) to require that in
order to be a permitted fee, the API
Technology Supplier must ensure that
fees are not be based in any part on
whether the requestor or other person is
a competitor, potential competitor, or
will be using the API technology in a
way that facilitates competition with the
API Technology Supplier. The use of
such criteria would be suspect because
it suggests the fee the API Technology
Supplier is charging is not based on its
reasonable costs to provide the API
technology or services and may have the
purpose or effect of excluding or
creating impediments for competitors,
business rivals, or other persons
engaged in developing or enabling the
use of API technologies and services.
We request comments on these
general conditions for permitted fees
and whether commenters believe we
have created effective guardrails to
ensure that fees do not prevent EHI from
being accessed, exchanged, and used
through the use of APIs without special
effort.
Specific Proposed Permitted Fees
As noted above, we propose that API
Technology Suppliers would be
prohibited from charging fees associated
with API technology unless such fees
are expressly permitted. Additionally,
as a reminder, the scope of ‘‘API
technology’’ subject to these proposals
would only include certified health IT
that fulfill the API-focused certification
criteria adopted or proposed for
adoption at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7)
through (g)(11). Thus, all other API
functionality provided by a health IT
developer with its product(s) that have
no link to these certified capabilities
would not be subject to this Condition
of Certification.
The following proposals outline the
specific circumstances in which an API
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Technology Supplier would be
permitted to charge fees associated with
API technology certified under the
Program. A fee that satisfies one of the
permitted fees in §§ 170.404(a)(3)(ii)–
(iv) must also satisfy each of the general
conditions in § 170.404(a)(3)(i) in order
to be permitted and for its recovery
compliant with this Condition of
Certification.
Permitted Fee for Developing,
Deploying, and Upgrading API
Technology
In § 170.404(a)(3)(ii), we propose to
permit an API Technology Supplier to
charge API Data Providers reasonable
fees for developing, deploying, and
upgrading API technology. Fees for
‘‘developing’’ API technology comprise
the API Technology Supplier’s costs of
designing, developing, and testing API
technology to specifications that fulfill
the requirements of the API-focused
certification criteria adopted or
proposed for adoption at 45 CFR
170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11). Fees for
developing API technology must not
include the API Technology Supplier’s
costs of updating the non-API related
capabilities of the API Technology
Supplier’s existing health IT, including
its databases, as part of its development
of the API technology. These costs
would be connected to past business
decisions made by the API Technology
Supplier and typically arise due to
health IT being designed or
implemented in nonstandard ways that
unnecessarily increase the complexity,
difficulty or burden of accessing,
exchanging, or using EHI. The recovery
of the costs associated with updating an
API Technology Supplier’s health IT
generally would be inconsistent with
the Cures Act requirement that API
technology be deployed ‘‘without
special effort.’’
The API Technology Supplier’s fees
for ‘‘deploying’’ API technology
comprise the API Technology Supplier’s
costs of operationalizing API technology
in a production environment. Such fees
include, but are not limited to, standing
up hosting infrastructure, software
installation and configuration, and the
creation and maintenance of API Data
Provider administrative functions. An
API Technology Supplier’s fees for
‘‘deploying’’ API technology does not
include the costs associated with
managing the traffic of API calls that
access the API technology, which an
API Technology Supplier can only
recover under the permitted fee for
usage support costs under
§ 170.404(a)(3)(iii). For clarity, we
reiterate that for the purpose of this
Condition of Certification, we consider
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that API technology is ‘‘deployed’’ by
the customer—the API Data Provider—
that purchased or licensed it.
The API Technology Supplier’s fees
for ‘‘upgrading’’ API technology
comprise the API Technology Supplier’s
costs of supplying an API Data Provider
with an updated version of API
technology. Such costs would include
the costs required to bring API
technology into conformity with new
requirements of the Program, upgrades
to implement general software updates
(not otherwise covered by development
fees or under warranty), or developing
and releasing newer versions of the API
technology at the request of an API Data
Provider.
The nature of the costs that can be
charged under this category of permitted
fees will depend on the scope of the
work to be undertaken by an API
Technology Supplier (i.e., how much or
how little labor an API Data Provider
requires of the API Technology Supplier
to deploy and upgrade the API
technology being supplied). For
example, where an API Data Provider
decides to fully outsource the
deployment of its API technology to its
API Technology Supplier, the API
Technology Supplier’s costs will
include the work associated with the
development of the API technology, the
work deploying the API technology, and
any work upgrading the API technology.
We propose that any fees that an API
Technology Supplier charges for
developing, deploying, or upgrading
API technology must be charged solely
to the API Data Provider(s) for whom
the capabilities are deployed. We
propose this limitation because we
believe that these costs should be
negotiated between the API Technology
Supplier that supplies the capabilities
and the API Data Provider (i.e., health
care provider) that implements them in
its production environment. In our
view, it is inappropriate to pass these
costs on to API Users as doing so would
impose considerable costs on the API
Data Provider’s current or potential
partners, such as those offering thirdparty applications and services, as well
as the end-users of API technology and
would amount to the kind of ‘‘special
effort’’ that the Cures Act’s API
Condition of Certification seeks to
prevent.
Subject to the general conditions
proposed in § 170.404(a)(3)(i) and
discussed above, API Technology
Suppliers can recover the full range of
reasonable costs associated with
developing, deploying, and upgrading
API technology over time. We believe it
is important that API Technology
Suppliers be able to recover these costs
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and earn a reasonable return on their
investments so that they have adequate
incentives to make continued
investments in these technologies. In
particular, we anticipate that API
Technology Suppliers will need to
continually expand the data elements
and upgrade the capabilities associated
with Certified APIs as the FHIR
standard and its implementation
specifications mature, and the National
Coordinator expands the USCDI and
ARCH.
Permitted Fee To Recover Costs of
Supporting API Usage for Purposes
Other Than Patient Access, Exchange,
and Use
In § 170.404(a)(3)(iii) we propose to
permit an API Technology Supplier to
charge usage-based fees to API Data
Providers to the extent that the API
technology is used for purposes other
than facilitating access, exchange, or use
of EHI by patients or their applications,
technologies, or services.
We consider ‘‘usage-based’’ fees to be
the fees imposed by an API Technology
Supplier to recover the costs that would
typically be incurred supporting API
interactions at increasing volumes and
scale within established service levels.
That is, ‘‘usage-based’’ fees recover costs
incurred by an API Technology Supplier
due to the actual use of the API
technology once it has been deployed
(e.g., costs to support a higher volume
of traffic, data, or number of apps via
the API technology). We acknowledge
that API Technology Suppliers could
adopt a range of pricing methodologies
when charging for the support of API
usage. We expect that API usage support
fees would only come into play when
the API Technology Supplier acts on
behalf of the API Data Provider to
deploy its API technology. Thus, the
costs recovered under ‘‘usage-based’’
fees would only be able to reflect ‘‘postdeployment’’ costs. As such, ‘‘usagebased’’ fees would not be allowed to
include any costs necessary to prepare
and ‘‘get the API technology up,
running, and ready for use,’’ which are
costs that we propose should be
recovered as part of the deployment
services delivered by the API
Technology Supplier if permitted under
§ 170.404(a)(3)(ii). We believe this
Condition of Certification offers the
flexibility necessary to accommodate
reasonable pricing methodologies and
will allow API Technology Suppliers to
explore innovative approaches to
recovering the costs associated with
supporting API use as a permitted fee.
As discussed above, we expect that
API usage support fees would only
come into play when the API
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Technology Supplier acts on behalf of
the API Data Provider to deploy its API
technology. Conversely, in scenarios
where the API Data Provider, such as a
large hospital system, assumes full
responsibility for the technical
infrastructure necessary to deploy and
host the API technology it has acquired,
the volume and scale of its usage would
be the API Data Provider’s sole
responsibility. As a result, in this
scenario and under our proposal’s
structure, an API Technology Supplier
would not be permitted to charge usagebased fees. Instead, the API Technology
Supplier would be limited to the fees it
would be permitted to recover through
the ‘‘development, deployment,
upgrade’’ permitted fee discussed above.
We reiterate, that ‘‘usage-based’’ fees
would need to be settled between an
API Technology Supplier and API Data
Provider. The API Technology Supplier
would have no standing to go around or
through the API Data Provider to issue
fees to, for example, a population health
analytics company engaged by an API
Data Provider who accesses the API
Data Provider’s data via the API
technology.
We propose that any usage-based fees
associated with API technology be
limited to the recovery of the API
Technology Supplier’s ‘‘incremental
costs.’’ An API Technology Supplier’s
‘‘incremental costs’’ comprise the API
Technology Supplier’s costs that are
directly attributable to supporting API
interactions at increasing volumes and
scale within established service levels.
We propose than an API Technology
Supplier should ‘‘price’’ its costs of
supporting access to the API technology
by reference to the additional costs that
the API Technology Supplier would
incur in supporting certain volumes of
API use. In practice, we expect that this
means that API Technology Suppliers
will offer a certain number of ‘‘free’’ API
calls based on the fact that, up to a
certain threshold, the API Technology
Supplier will not incur any material
costs in supporting API technology in
addition to the costs recovered for
deployment services. However, after
this threshold is exceeded, we expect
that the API Technology Supplier will
impose usage-based costs commensurate
to the additional costs that the API
Technology Supplier must incur to
support API technology use at
increasing volumes and scale.
We expect that API Technology
Suppliers would charge fees that are
correlated to the incremental ratchetting
up of the cost required to meet
increased demand. For example, if, at a
certain volume of API calls, the API
Technology Supplier needed to deploy
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additional server capacity, the
associated incremental cost of bringing
an additional server online could be
passed on to the API Data Provider
because the API technology deployed on
behalf of the API Data Provider was the
subject of the higher usage. Up until the
point that the threshold is reached, the
additional server capacity was not
required and so the API Technology
Supplier would not be permitted to
recover the cost associated with it.
Moreover, the additional server capacity
would support ongoing demand up to a
certain additional volume, and so the
API Technology Supplier would not be
permitted to recover the costs of further
additional server capacity until the then
current capacity was exhausted.
Notwithstanding the above, we note
that API Technology Suppliers may
choose to charge for their API usage
support services on a ‘‘pay as you go’’
basis, such as a fee-per-call pricing
structure. This approach could be
consistent with the requirement that the
API Technology Supplier only impose
its incremental costs, and the
requirements of this Condition of
Certification more generally. However,
depending on the amount being
charged, this pricing model is open to
abuse, with API Data Providers at risk
of paying unreasonably high fees if the
volume of API use is high and when the
API Data Provider does not share in the
benefits enjoyed by the API Technology
Supplier when delivering a service at
scale. As such, the API Technology
Supplier would need to be careful to
ensure that the total fees paid by an API
Data Provider were reasonably related to
the API Technology Supplier’s costs of
supporting the API technology. Where
the fees paid over a reasonable
measuring period were not reasonably
related to the API Technology
Supplier’s costs, they would not be
permitted.
We are also aware that API
Technology Suppliers may offer a
pricing structure for API usage support
based on unlimited API calls. That is,
the API Technology Supplier may
charge a flat-fee irrespective of the
volume of traffic accessing the API
technology. Such a pricing model would
be allowed under the proposed
condition provided that the API
Technology Supplier’s fee for API usage
support was reasonably related to the
cost of the services that it had agreed to
provide. This would mean that the API
Technology Supplier would need to
make a realistic estimate of the volume
of API calls that it would need to
support to fulfill any service level
promised, and calculate its fee based on
the costs of supporting that call volume.
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So long as the API Technology Supplier
made a realistic estimate of the
anticipated volume and support level,
the legitimacy of the API Technology
Supplier’s fees, and its ability to recover
them as permitted fees, would be
unaffected by API Users making lower
than expected use of API technology.
In the context of this proposed
permitted fee’s scope and the proposed
general prohibition on fees, we seek to
make clear that API Technology
Suppliers would be prohibited from
charging (or including in their contracts
and agreements with API Data
Providers) any usage-based fees for API
uses that are associated with the access,
exchange, and use of EHI by patients or
their applications, technologies, or
services. This would include, among
other things, API calls or other
transactions initiated by or on behalf of
a patient, including third parties (e.g.,
an application or any other technology
or service) authorized by the patient or
their representative to request data on
their behalf.
Usage fees associated with the access,
exchange, and use of EHI by patients is
a specific example of a prohibited fee
that would fit under the general
prohibition of a ‘‘fee not otherwise
permitted’’ and is based on several
considerations. First, such fees between
an API Technology Supplier and API
Data Provider would likely be passed on
directly to patients, creating a
significant impediment to their ability
to access, exchange, and use their EHI,
without special effort, through
applications and technologies of their
choice. More fundamentally, most of the
information contained in a patient’s
electronic record has been documented
during the practice of medicine or has
otherwise been captured in the course of
providing health care services to
patients. In our view, patients have
effectively paid for this information,
either directly or through their
employers, health plans, and other
entities that negotiate and purchase
health care items and services on their
behalf. Thus, our proposal reflects our
belief that it is inappropriate to charge
patients additional costs to access this
information, whether those costs are
charged directly to patients or passed on
as a result of fees charged to persons
that provide apps, technologies, and
services on a patient’s behalf.
To be clear, if an API Data Provider
sought to employ API technology for the
limited purpose of making EHI available
to patients and their apps, the API Data
Provider’s API Technology Supplier
would have no legitimate basis to charge
the API Data Provider, or any other
person, for the ‘‘patient access’’ usage-
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based costs associated with the API
technology.
Any unreasonable fees associated
with a patient’s access to their EHI may
be suspect under the information
blocking provision. Such fees may also
be inconsistent with an individual’s
right of access to their PHI under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR 164.524).)
In addition to our proposal in
§ 170.404(a)(3)(iii)(A) and detailed
above that this permitted fee would not
include any costs incurred by the API
Technology Supplier to support uses of
the API technology that facilitate a
patient’s ability to access, exchange, or
use their electronic health information,
we also propose to explicitly exclude
two additional costs from this permitted
fee. In § 170.404(a)(3)(iii)(B), we propose
that this permitted fee would not
include costs associated with intangible
assets (including depreciation or loss of
value), except the actual development or
acquisition costs of such assets. For
instance, an API Technology Supplier
could not charge an API Data Provider
a fee based on the purported ‘‘cost’’ of
allowing the API Data Provider to use
the API Technology Supplier’s patented
API technology. As discussed in more
detail in section VIII.D.4 (Information
Blocking), we believe it would be
inappropriate to permit an actor to
charge a fee based on these
considerations, which are inherently
subjective and could invite the kinds of
rent-seeking and opportunistic pricing
practices that create barriers to access,
use, and exchange of EHI and impede
interoperability.
In § 170.404(a)(3)(iii)(C), we propose
that this permitted fee would not
include opportunity costs, except for the
reasonable forward-looking cost of
capital. These speculative costs could
include revenues that an API
Technology Supplier could have earned
had it not provided the API technology.
We clarify that the exclusion of
opportunity costs would not preclude
an API Technology Supplier from
recovering its reasonable forwardlooking cost of capital. We believe these
costs are relatively concrete and that
permitting their recovery will protect
incentives for API Technology Suppliers
to invest in developing and providing
interoperability elements (as described
in section VIII.D.4).
Permitted Fee for Value-Added Services
In § 170.404(a)(3)(iv) we propose to
permit an API Technology Supplier to
charge fees to API Users 92 for value92 In this context a health care provider, which
could otherwise be an ‘‘API Data Provider’’ in one
context, may equally be an API User in a different
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added services supplied in connection
with software that can interact with the
API technology. These ‘‘value-added
services’’ would need to be provided in
connection with and supplemental to
the development, testing, and
deployment of software applications
that interact with API technology.
Critically, fees would not be permitted
if they interfere with an API User’s
ability to efficiently and effectively
develop and deploy production-ready
software. This means that in order to be
permitted, an API User could not be
required to incur the fee in order to
develop and deploy a production-ready
software application that interacts with
the API technology acquired by the API
Data Provider. Rather, a fee will only be
permitted if it relates to a service that a
software developer can elect to
purchase, but is not required to
purchase in order to develop and deploy
production-ready apps.
We believe it appropriate to permit
this type of fee because API Technology
Suppliers may offer a wide-range of
market differentiating services to make
it attractive for API Users to develop
software applications that can interact
with the API technology supplied by an
API Technology Supplier. Such services
could include advanced training,
premium development tools and
distribution channels, and enhanced
compatibility/integration testing
assessments. For example, an API
Technology Supplier would be
permitted to charge fees for value-added
services that would be associated with
but go beyond the scope set by the
(g)(10)–certified API, such as write
access, co-branded integration into the
API Technology Supplier’s product(s)
workflow, co-marketing arrangements,
and promoted placement in an API
Technology Supplier’s app store. That
said, we caution API Technology
Suppliers that value-added services
would have to be made available in a
manner that complies with other
requirements of this Condition of
Certification and with the information
blocking provision.
To illustrate the scope of the fees
permitted under this proposal, we
clarify that the permitted value-added
services fee would enable an API
Technology Supplier to recover certain
costs associated with operating an ‘‘app
store.’’ However, those fees cannot
interfere with an API User’s ability to
efficiently and effectively develop and
deploy production-ready apps without
context. Given this potential dual role for health
care providers, we have focused on API Users as the
party to whom a fee may be charged for the
purposes of this permitted fee.
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special effort. We are aware that API
Technology Suppliers offer services
associated with the listing and
promotion of apps beyond basic app
placement. Such fees would be
permitted, so long as the API
Technology Supplier ensured that basic
access and listing in the app store was
provided free of charge if an app
developer depended on such listing to
efficiently and effectively develop and
deploy production-ready apps without
special effort. Fees charged for
additional/specialized technical support
or promotion of the API User’s app
beyond these basic access and listing
services would also be permitted. In
contrast, if an API Technology Supplier
required, for example, a software
developer’s app to go through a paid
listing process as a dependency/
precondition to be able to be deployed
(and generally accessible) to the API
Technology Supplier’s health care
provider customers to use, this would
not be a permitted fee under this
Condition of Certification, would
constitute special effort, and could raise
information blocking concerns.
• Any fee for access to the
documentation that an API Technology
Supplier is required to publish or make
available under this Condition of
Certification.
• Any fee for access to other types of
documentation or information that a
software developer may reasonably
require to make effective use of API
technology for any legally permissible
purpose.
• Any fee in connection with any
services that would be essential to a
developer or other person’s ability to
develop and commercially distribute
production-ready applications that use
API technology. These services could
include, for example, access to ‘‘test
environments’’ and other resources that
an app developer would need to
efficiently design and develop apps. The
services could also include access to
distribution channels if they are
necessary to deploy production-ready
software and to production resources,
such as the information needed to
connect to FHIR servers (endpoints) or
the ability to dynamically register with
an authorization server.
Prohibited Fees
Permitted Fees Request for Comment
We request comment on any
additional specific ‘‘permitted fees’’ not
addressed above that API Technology
Suppliers should be able to recover in
order to assure a reasonable return on
investment. Furthermore, we request
comment on whether it would be
prudent to adopt specific, or more
granular, cost methodologies for the
calculation of the permitted fees.
Commenters are encouraged to consider,
in particular, whether the approach we
have described will be administrable
and appropriately balance the need to
ensure that patients, providers, app
developers, and other stakeholders do
not encounter unnecessary costs and
other special effort with the need to
provide adequate assurance to API
Technology Suppliers, investors, and
innovators that they will be able to earn
a reasonable return on their investments
in API technology. We welcome
comments on whether the approach
adequately balances these concerns or
would achieve our stated policy goals,
and we welcome comments on potential
revisions or alternative approaches. We
encourage detailed comments that
include, where possible, economic
justifications for suggested revisions or
alternative approaches.
As discussed above, we proposed that
any API-related fee imposed by an API
Technology Supplier that is not
expressly permitted is prohibited. This
approach is necessary because, as
discussed in section VIII.C.5.c of this
proposed rule, we continue to receive
evidence that some health IT developers
are engaging in practices that create
special effort when it comes to API
technology. These practices include fees
that create barriers to entry or
competition as well as rent-seeking and
other opportunistic behaviors. For
example, some health IT developers are
conditioning access to technical
interoperability documentation on
revenue-sharing or royalty agreements
that bear no plausible relation to the
costs incurred by the health IT
developer to provide or enable its use.
We are also aware of discriminatory
pricing policies that have the purpose or
effect of excluding competitors from the
use of APIs and other interoperability
elements. These practices close off the
market to innovative applications and
services that could empower patients
and enable providers to deliver greater
value and choice to health care
consumers and additional service
providers.
To address these concerns we provide
the following non-exhaustive examples
of fees for services that API Technology
Suppliers would be prohibited from
charging:
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Record-Keeping Requirements
To provide appropriate
accountability, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(3)(v) that API Technology
Suppliers must keep for inspection
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detailed records of all fees charged with
respect to API technology and all costs
that it claims to have incurred to
provide API technology to API Data
Providers. To provide assurance that the
API Technology Supplier’s fees are
reasonably related to the API
Technology Supplier’s costs, the API
Technology Supplier would need to
document, with the same level of detail,
any fees charged and associated costs
incurred to provide other services to
which any portion of the costs could
reasonably be attributed. For example, if
the API Technology Supplier charges a
fee that reflects its costs for internet
servers used to provide the API
technology, the API Technology
Supplier would need to document the
costs of any other internet-based
services it provides, as well as any other
purposes for which the internet servers
are used.
Separately, an API Technology
Supplier would need to document the
criteria it used to allocate any costs
across relevant customers, requestors, or
other persons. The criteria must be
documented in a level of detail that
would enable determination as to
whether the API Technology Supplier’s
cost allocations are objectively
reasonable and comply with the cost
accountability requirements, including
whether fees reflect the API Technology
Supplier’s actual costs reasonably
incurred, were allocated reasonably and
between only those API Data Providers
that either cause the costs to be incurred
or benefit from the associated supply or
support of the API technology, and were
distributed across customers and other
relevant persons in a permissible
manner, as described above.
We note that an API Technology
Supplier must retain its accounting
records consistent with the retention
requirement proposed for adoption as
part of the Assurances Condition of
Certification (proposed for adoption in
§ 170.402). In the event that a potential
violation of this Condition and
Maintenance of Certification creates a
conformance fact-finding scenario by
ONC or information blocking is
investigated, we believe that this period
of time would provide ONC with
appropriate visibility into the API
Technology Supplier’s business
practices.
We request comment on whether
these requirements provide adequate
traceability and accountability for costs
permitted under this API Condition of
Certification. We also seek comment on
whether to require more detailed
accounting records or to prescribe
specific accounting standards.
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iv. Openness and Pro-Competitive
Conditions
We propose that API Technology
Suppliers would have to comply with
certain requirements to promote an
open and competitive marketplace. As a
general condition, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(4) that API Technology
Suppliers must grant API Data Providers
(i.e., health care providers who
purchase or license API technology) the
sole authority and autonomy to permit
API Users to interact with the API
technology deployed by the API Data
Provider. We reinforce this general
condition through more specific
proposed conditions proposals
discussed below that would require API
Technology Suppliers to provide
equitable access to API technology,
which would include granting the rights
and providing the cooperation necessary
to enable apps to be deployed that use
the API technology to access, exchange,
and use EHI in production
environments.
As important context for these
proposals, we note that the API
technology required by this Condition of
Certification falls squarely within the
concept of ‘‘essential interoperability
elements’’ described in section
VIII.C.4.b of this preamble and, as such,
are subject to strict protections under
the information blocking provision. As
a corollary, to the extent that API
Technology Suppliers claim an
intellectual property right or other
proprietary interest in the API
technology, they must take care not to
impose any fees, require any license
terms, or engage in any other practices
that could add unnecessary cost,
difficulty, or other burden that could
impede the effective use of the API
technology for the purpose of enabling
or facilitating access, exchange, or use of
EHI. Moreover, even apart from these
information blocking considerations, we
believe that, as developers of technology
certified under the Program, API
Technology Suppliers owe a special
responsibility to patients, providers, and
other stakeholders to make API
technology available in a manner that is
truly ‘‘open’’ and minimizes any costs
or other burdens that could result in
special effort. The proposed conditions
set forth below are intended to provide
clear rules and expectations for API
Technology Suppliers so that they can
meet these obligations.
Non-Discrimination
We propose in § 170.404(a)(4)(i) that
an API Technology Supplier must
adhere to a strictly non-discriminatory
policy regarding the provision of API
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technology. As a starting point, we
propose to require in
§ 170.404(a)(4)(i)(A) that API
Technology Suppliers comply with all
of the requirements discussed in section
VIII.C.4.b of this proposed rule
regarding the non-discriminatory
provision of interoperability elements.
Accordingly, and consistent with
developers’ obligations under the
Program and our expectation that API
technology be truly ‘‘open,’’ we propose
to require that API Technology
Suppliers must provide API technology
to API Data Providers on terms that are
no less favorable than they would
provide to themselves and their
customers, suppliers, partners, and
other persons with whom they have a
business relationship. This requirement
would apply to both price and non-price
terms and thus would apply to any fees
that the API Technology Supplier is
permitted to charge under the
‘‘permitted charges conditions’’ of this
Condition of Certification. We believe
this requirement would ensure that API
Data Providers (i.e., health care
providers) who purchase or license API
technology have sole authority and
autonomy to permit third-party software
developers to connect to and use the
API technology they have acquired.
Next, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(4)(i)(B) that any terms and
conditions associated with API
technology would have to be based on
objective and verifiable criteria that are
uniformly applied for all substantially
similar or similarly situated classes of
persons and requests. For example, if
the API Technology Supplier applied an
‘‘app store’’ entry/listing process
unequally and added arbitrary criteria
based on the use case(s) an app was
focused on, such business practices
would not comply with this specific
condition and could also be in violation
of the information blocking provision.
Moreover, we propose in
§ 170.404(a)(4)(i)(C) that an API
Technology Supplier would be
prohibited from offering or varying such
terms or conditions on the basis of
impermissible criteria, such as whether
the API User with whom the API Data
Provider has a relationship is a
competitor, potential competitor, or will
be using EHI obtained via the API
technology in a way that facilitates
competition with the API Technology
Supplier. The API Technology Supplier
would also be prohibited from taking
into consideration the revenue or other
value the API User with whom the API
Data Provider has a relationship may
derive from access, exchange, or use of
EHI obtained by means of the API
technology. We believe these proposals
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will help promote greater equity and
competition in market as well as
prevent discriminatory business
practices by API Technology Suppliers.
Rights To Access and Use API
Technology
We propose in § 170.404(a)(4)(ii)(A)
that an API Technology Supplier would
have to make API technology available
in a manner that enables API Data
Providers and API Users to develop and
deploy apps to access, exchange, and
use EHI in production environments. To
this end, we propose that an API
Technology Supplier must have and,
upon request, must grant to API Data
Providers and their API Users all rights
that may be reasonably necessary to
access and use API technology in a
production environment. In other
words, this proposal is focused on the
provision of rights reasonably necessary
to access and use API technology and
does not extend to other intellectual
property maintained by the API
Technology Supplier, especially
intellectual property that has no nexus
with the access and use of API
technology. In situations where such a
nexus exists, even partially, the API
Technology Supplier would have the
duty to determine a method to grant the
applicable rights reasonably necessary
to access and use the API technology.
And if practicable, under these partial
cases, we note that it would be possible
for the API Technology Supplier to
exclude the intellectual property that
would have no impact on the access and
use of the API technology.
Accordingly, following our proposal,
API Technology Suppliers would need
to grant API Data Providers and their
API Users with rights that could include
but not be limited to the following in
order to sufficiently support the use of
the API technology:
• For the purposes of developing
products or services that are designed to
be interoperable with the API
Technology Supplier’s health IT or with
health IT under the API Technology
Supplier’s control.
• Any marketing, offering, and
distribution of interoperable products
and services to potential customers and
users that would be needed for the API
technology to be used in a production
environment. Note, API Technology
Suppliers, pursuant to the ‘‘value-added
services’’ permitted fee, would be able
to offer and charge for services such as
preferential marketing agreements, comarketing agreements, and other
business arrangements so long as such
services are beyond what is necessary
for the API technology to be put into use
in a production environment.
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• Enabling the use of the
interoperable products or services in
production environments, including
accessing and enabling the exchange
and use of electronic health
information.
Relatedly, in § 170.404(a)(4)(ii)(B) we
propose to prohibit an API Technology
Supplier from imposing any collateral
terms or agreements that could interfere
with or lead to special effort in the use
of API technology for any of the above
purposes. We note that these collateral
terms or agreements may also implicate
the information blocking provision for
the reasons described in section
VIII.D.3.c of this preamble. These
specific proposed conditions would
expressly prohibit an API Technology
Supplier from conditioning any of the
rights described above on the
requirement that the recipient of the
rights do, or agree to do, any of the
following:
• Pay a fee to license the rights
described above, including but not
limited to a license fee, royalty, or
revenue-sharing arrangement.
• Not compete with the API
Technology Supplier in any product,
service, or market.
• Deal exclusively with the API
Technology Supplier in any product,
service, or market.
• Obtain additional licenses,
products, or services that are not related
to or can be unbundled from the API
technology.
• License, grant, assign, or transfer
any intellectual property to the API
Technology Supplier.
• Meet additional developer or
product certification requirements.
• Provide the API Technology
Supplier or its technology with
reciprocal access to application data.
These prohibitions largely mirror
those proposed under the exception to
the information blocking definition in
§ 171.206 and reflect the same concerns
expressed in that context in section
VIII.D.3.c of this preamble. However, we
note the following important
distinction: Whereas proposed § 171.206
would permit a developer to charge a
reasonable royalty to license
interoperability elements, this API
Condition of Certification would not
permit any such royalty, license fee, or
other type of fee of any kind whatsoever
pursuant to the general fee prohibition
proposed in the ‘‘permitted charges
condition.’’ This additional limitation
reflects the more exacting standards that
apply to API Technology Suppliers with
respect to the provision of API
technology under this Condition of
Certification. While we believe that, for
the reasons described in section
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VIII.D.3.c of this preamble, health IT
developers should generally be
permitted to charge reasonable royalties
for the use of their intellectual property,
we consider API technology to be a
special case. Certified health IT
developers (i.e., API Technology
Suppliers) are required to provide these
capabilities as part of their statutory
duty to facilitate the access, exchange,
and use of patient health information
from EHRs ‘‘without special effort.’’ We
believe the language requiring that these
capabilities be ‘‘open’’ precludes an API
Technology Supplier from conditioning
access to API technology on the
payment of a royalty or other fee,
however ‘‘reasonable’’ the fee might
otherwise be.
We clarify that the prohibitions
explained above against additional
developer or Health IT Module
certification requirements and,
separately, against requirements for
reciprocal access to application data, are
within the scope of the collateral terms
prohibited by proposed § 171.206 even
though these additional API Technology
Supplier requirements are not explicitly
referenced by that exception because
they are not generally applicable to all
types of interoperability elements.
Nevertheless, permitting an API
Technology Supplier to impose these
kinds of additional requirements would
be inconsistent with the Cures Act’s
expectation that API technology be
made available openly and in a manner
that promotes competition. For the same
reason such practices may raise
information blocking concerns.
API Technology Suppliers—Additional
Obligations
To support the use of API technology
in production environments, we
propose in § 170.404(a)(4)(iii) that an
API Technology Supplier must provide
all support and other services that are
reasonably necessary to enable the
effective development, deployment, and
use of API technology by API Data
Providers and its API Users in
production environments. In general,
the precise nature of these obligations
will depend on the specifics of the API
Technology Supplier’s technology and
the manner in which it is implemented
and made available for specific
customers. Therefore, with the
following exceptions, we do not
delineate the API Technology Supplier’s
specific support obligations and instead
propose a general requirement to this
effect in § 170.404(a)(4)(iii).
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Changes and Updates to API
Technology and Terms and Conditions
We propose to require in
§ 170.404(a)(4)(iii)(A) that API
Technology Suppliers must make
reasonable efforts to maintain the
compatibility of the API technology they
develop and assist API Data Providers to
deploy in order to avoid disrupting the
use of API technology. Similarly, we
propose in § 170.404(a)(4)(iii)(B) that
prior to making changes or updates to
its API technology or to the terms or
conditions thereof, an API Technology
Supplier would need to provide notice
and a reasonable opportunity for its API
Data Provider customers and registered
application developers to update their
applications to preserve compatibility
with its API technology or to comply
with any revised terms or conditions.
Without this opportunity, clinical and
patient applications could be rendered
inoperable or operate in unexpected
ways unbeknownst to the users or
software developers.
Further, we note that this proposal
aligns with the exception to the
information blocking definition
proposed in § 171.206. As explained in
section VIII.D.3.c of this preamble, the
information blocking definition would
be implicated were an API Technology
Supplier to make changes to its API
technology that ‘‘break’’ compatibility or
otherwise degrade the performance or
interoperability of the licensee’s
products or services that incorporate the
licensed API technology. We propose
these additional safeguards are
important in light of the ease with
which an API Technology Supplier
could make subtle ‘‘tweaks’’ to its
technology or related services, which
could disrupt the use of the licensee’s
compatible technologies or services and
result in substantial competitive and
consumer injury.
We clarify that this requirement
would in no way prevent an API
Technology Supplier from making
improvements to its technology or
responding to the needs of its own
customers or users. However, the API
Technology Supplier would need to
demonstrate that whatever actions it
took were necessary to accomplish these
purposes and that it afforded the
licensee a reasonable opportunity under
the circumstances to update its
technology to maintain interoperability.
Relatedly, we recognize that an API
Technology Supplier may have to
suspend access or make other changes
immediately and without prior notice in
response to legitimate privacy, security,
or patient safety-related exigencies.
Such practices would be permitted by
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this Condition of Certification provided
they are tailored and do not
unnecessarily interfere with the use of
API technology. From an information
blocking standpoint, if such practices
interfered with access, exchange, or use
of EHI, the API Technology Supplier
could seek coverage under the
exceptions to the information blocking
provision described in section VIII.D of
this preamble. For instance, if the
suspended access was in response to a
privacy exigency, the API Technology
Supplier may be able to seek coverage
under the exception for promoting the
privacy of EHI at proposed § 171.202.
e. Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
We propose to adopt Maintenance
requirements for this Condition of
Certification. These maintenance
requirements would be duties that we
believe the Cures Act expected API
Technology Suppliers (i.e., health IT
developers) would need to comply with
in the course of maintaining their
Health IT Module(s)’ certification.
i. App Registration Timeliness
In the specific context of application
registration, we wish to underscore that
to provide a frictionless experience for
developers of these applications and
individuals that use them, an API
Technology Supplier would be required
to provide all services and other support
necessary to ensure that such apps can
be deployed and used in production
without any additional assistance or
intervention by the API Technology
Supplier. For this reason, we propose in
§ 170.404(b)(1) a specific requirement
for API Technology Suppliers that they
would need to ‘‘register’’ (in connection
with the API technology functionality
proposed in § 170.315(g)(10)(iii)) and
enable all applications for production
use within one business day of
completing its verification of an
application developer’s authenticity as
described in proposed
§ 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(C). We propose this
explicit requirement is necessary in
order to ensure that a patient’s ability to
use an app of their choice is not
artificially or intentionally slowed by an
API Technology Supplier, causing
special effort on the part of the patient
to gain access to their EHI. We also
emphasize that this is specific duty for
API Technology Suppliers in the course
of maintaining the Health IT Module(s)’
certificate to which their API technology
is associated. In instances where an API
Technology Supplier chooses not to
perform app developer verification
processes described in proposed
§ 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(C), it would need to
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solely meet this one business day
requirement from the point of having
received a request for registration.
ii. Publication of FHIR Endpoints
In order to interact with a FHIR
RESTful API, an app needs to know the
‘‘FHIR Service Base URL,’’ which is
often referred to colloquially as a ‘‘FHIR
server’s endpoint.’’ 93 The public
availability and easy accessibility of this
information is a central necessity to
assuring the use of FHIR-based APIs
without special effort, especially for
patient access apps. Accordingly, we
propose to adopt in § 170.404(b)(2) a
specific requirement that an API
Technology Supplier must support the
publication of Service Base URLs for all
of its customers, regardless of those that
are centrally managed by the API
Technology Supplier or locally
deployed, and make such information
publicly available (in a computable
format) at no charge. In instances where
an API Technology Supplier is
contracted by an API Data Provider to
manage its FHIR server, we expect that
this administrative duty will be
relatively easy to manage. In instances
where an API Data Provider assumes
full responsibility to ‘‘locally manage’’
its FHIR server, the API Technology
Supplier would be required, pursuant to
this proposed maintenance requirement,
to obtain this information from its
customers. We strongly encourage API
Technology Suppliers, health care
providers, HINs and patient advocacy
organizations to coalesce around the
development of a public resource or
service from which all stakeholders
could benefit. We believe this would
help scale and enhance the ease with
which Service Base URLs could be
obtained and used.
iii. Providing (g)(10)–Certified APIs to
API Data Providers
We propose in § 170.404(b)(3) that an
API Technology Supplier with API
technology previously certified to the
certification criterion in § 170.315(g)(8)
must provide all API Data Providers
with such API technology deployed
with API technology certified to the
certification criterion in § 170.315(g)(10)
within 24 months of this final rule’s
effective date. We believe this
Maintenance of Certification
requirement will permit ONC to monitor
and facilitate the rollout to health care
providers of this important
functionality. This is of particular
relevance as we propose below to
include this functionality in the 2015
Base EHR definition in place of the
93 https://hl7.org/fhir/http.html#general.
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current ‘‘application access—data
category request’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(g)(8)), which means health
care providers will need this
functionality to meet the Certified EHR
Technology (CEHRT) for associated
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) programs.
f. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
As described in detail above, we have
propose to adopt a new certification
criterion in § 170.315(g)(10) that would
replace the current criterion adopted in
§ 170.315(g)(8) and as referenced in the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition
expressed in § 170.102. This change is
necessary to fully implement the Cures
Act and ensure that API Technology
Suppliers have the requisite incentive to
deploy standardized APIs that can be
used ‘‘without special effort’’ and API
Data Providers have added incentive to
adopt such functionality. As result, we
propose to create a phase-in for the
proposed API certification criterion in
§ 170.315(g)(10) from the issuance of a
subsequent final rule. This phase-in
period includes separate and sequential
time for API Technology Suppliers and
API Data Providers.
Consistent with our proposed
compliance timing for the certification
criterion proposed for adoption in
§ 170.315(b)(10), we propose to add
compliance timeline language to the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition for
the transition from § 170.315(g)(8) to
§ 170.315(g)(10) that would reflect a
total of 24 months from the final rule’s
effective date (which practically
speaking would be 25 months because
of the 30-day delayed effective date). We
believe this approach is best because it
identifies a single, specific date for both
API Technology Suppliers and API Data
Providers by which upgraded API
technology needs to be deployed in
production. We also believe that 24
months is sufficient for this upgrade
because the scope and nature of our
proposals intersect and reflect a large
portion of capabilities API Technology
Suppliers have already developed and
deployed to meet § 170.315(g)(8).
Moreover, this single date enables API
Technology Suppliers (based on their
client base and IT architecture) to
determine the most appropriate timeline
for development, testing, certification,
and product release cycles in
comparison to having to meet an
arbitrary ‘‘must be certified by this date’’
requirement.
5. Real World Testing
The Cures Act requires, as a
Condition and Maintenance of
Certification under the Program, that
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health IT developers have successfully
tested the real world use of the
technology for interoperability in the
type of setting in which such technology
would be marketed. The Cures Act
defines interoperability as ‘‘health
information technology that enables the
secure exchange of electronic health
information with, and use of electronic
health information from, other health
information technology without special
effort on the part of the user; allows for
complete access, exchange, and use of
all electronically accessible health
information for authorized use under
applicable state or federal law; and does
not constitute information blocking as
also defined by the Cures Act.’’ 94 We
propose to codify this interoperability
definition in § 170.102. We further note
that we propose in section VIII of this
proposed rule to codify the definition of
information blocking included in the
Cures Act in § 171.103.
The Program issues, and will continue
to issue under our real world testing
approach, certifications to health IT
through a process whereby health IT is
assessed against the testing
requirements established by ONC.
Often, this means health IT is tested by
an ONC–ATL in a laboratory
environment through methods that
include a testing proctor’s visual
inspection of functions, review of
developer-provided documentation of
functions, and testing tools with
simulation test data. An ONC–ACB
evaluates the results of testing and
makes a determination, based on these
test results and an assessment of
compliance with other Program
requirements, to issue the health IT a
certificate. Over the course of the
Program’s existence, ONC has
emphasized the continued conformance
of certified health IT products postcertification in real world and clinical
settings. For example, ONC expanded
the responsibilities of ONC–ACBs in the
2015 Edition final rule to require that
they perform in-the-field surveillance.
We did this to affirm the Program’s
long-standing expectations that certified
health IT continue to operate in
accordance with certification
requirements when implemented in the
field (80 FR 62707–62719). These efforts
are also in line with the Cures Act’s real
world testing Condition of Certification
through their focus on system
interoperability and exchange of
information as deployed and used in
care environments—that is to say, in the
‘‘real world.’’
The objective of real world testing is
to verify the extent to which certified
94 Defined
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health IT deployed in operational
production settings is demonstrating
continued compliance to certification
criteria and functioning with the
intended use cases as part of the overall
maintenance of a health IT’s
certification. Real world testing should
ensure certified health IT has the ability
to share electronic health information
with other systems. Real world testing
should assess that the certified health IT
is meeting the intended use case(s) of
the certification criteria to which it is
certified within the workflow, health IT
architecture, and care/practice setting in
which the health IT is implemented.
Accordingly, we propose that successful
real world testing means for the purpose
of this Condition of Certification that:
• The certified health IT continues to
be compliant to the certification criteria
to which it is certified, including the
required technical standards and
vocabulary codes sets;
• The certified health IT is
exchanging electronic health
information in the care and practice
settings for which it is intended for use;
and
• Electronic health information is
received by and used in the certified
health IT.
We propose to limit the applicability
of this Condition of Certification to
health IT developers with Health IT
Modules certified to one or more 2015
Edition certification criteria focused on
interoperability and data exchange,
which are:
• The care coordination criteria in
§ 170.315(b);
• The clinical quality measures
(CQMs) criteria in § 170.315(c)(1)
through (c)(3);
• The ‘‘view, download, and transmit
to 3rd party’’ criterion in § 170.315(e)(1);
• The public health criteria in
§ 170.315(f);
• The application programming
interface criteria in § 170.315(g)(7)
through (g)(11); and
• The transport methods and other
protocols criteria in § 170.315(h).
The 2015 Edition certification criteria
that are not included in the proposed
list include many functionality-based
criteria, administrative criteria, and,
overall, criteria that do not focus on
interoperability and exchange of data. In
particular, we do not propose to include
the 2015 Edition paragraph (a)
‘‘clinical’’ certification criteria in this
list because they do not focus on
interoperability and exchange of data.
However, the data in the paragraph (a)
criteria largely will be covered through
the USCDI as a minimum data set
expected for exchange; the USCDI is
included in such criteria as ‘‘transitions
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of care’’ (§ 170.315(b)(1)), ‘‘view,
download, and transmit to 3rd party’’
(§ 170.315(e)(1)), and the API criteria
(i.e., § 170.315(g)(9) and (10)).
We solicit comment on whether to
include the ‘‘patient health information
capture’’ certification criteria in
§ 170.315(e)(3), including the value of
real world testing these functionalities
compared to the benefit for
interoperability and exchange. We also
solicit comment on whether any other
2015 Edition certification criteria
should be included or removed from the
applicability list for this Condition of
Certification.
To fully implement the real world
testing Condition of Certification as
described above, we propose
Maintenance of Certification
requirements that would require health
IT developers to submit publicly
available prospective annual real world
testing plans and retrospective annual
real world testing results for its certified
health IT that include certification
criteria focused on interoperability. As
we considered the various approaches
to implement this Cures Act
requirement on health IT developers, we
determined that health IT developers
would be best positioned to construct
how their certified health IT could be
tested in the real world. Moreover, by
requiring health IT developers to be
responsible for facilitating their certified
health IT testing in production settings
and being held accountable to publicly
publish their results, we would balance
the respective burden of this statutory
requirement with its intended
assurances for health care providers.
Additionally, ONC is not adequately
resourced to centrally administer a real
world testing regime among each health
IT developer and its customers, nor do
we have the specific relationships with
health care providers that health IT
developers do. Lastly, even if ONC were
positioned to support and scale a real
world testing regime, we would run the
risk of having one-size-fits-all tools that
would not necessarily get to the level of
detail and granularity necessary and
reflective of different health care
settings and different scopes of practice
that use certified health IT.
Given these considerations, we
propose that a health IT developer must
submit an annual real world testing plan
to its ONC–ACB via a publicly
accessible hyperlink no later than
December 15, of each calendar year for
each of its certified 2015 Edition Health
IT Modules that include certification
criteria specified for this Condition of
Certification. Prior to submission to the
ONC–ACB, the plan would need to be
approved by a health IT developer
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authorized representative capable of
binding the health IT developer for
execution of the plan and include the
representative’s contact information.
The plan would need to include all
health IT certified to the 2015 Edition
through August 31 of the preceding
year. The plan would also need to
address the health IT developer’s real
world testing for the upcoming calendar
year and include, for each of the
certification criteria in scope:
• The testing method(s)/
methodology(ies) that will be used to
demonstrate real world interoperability,
including a mandatory focus on
scenario- and use case-focused testing;
• The care and practice setting(s) that
will be tested for real world
interoperability, including conformance
to certification criteria requirements,
and an explanation for the health IT
developer’s choice of care setting(s) to
test; 95
• The timeline and plans for
voluntary updates to standards and
implementation specifications that ONC
has approved (further discussed below);
• A schedule of key real world testing
milestones;
• A description of the expected
outcomes of real world testing;
• At least one measurement/metric
associated with the real world testing;
and
• A justification for the health IT
developer’s real world testing approach.
The intended testing methods/
methodologies would need to address
testing scenarios, use cases, and
workflows associated with
interoperability. Testing may occur in
the operational setting using real patient
data, in an environment that mirrors the
clinical setting using synthetic or real
patient data, or in the clinical setting
with synthetic data intermixed. Note
that when Health IT developers who are
HIPAA business associates are
conducting testing using ePHI, such
testing must be conducted consistent
with their business associate agreements
and other compliance responsibilities.
The health IT developer may also
partner with other health IT developers
to perform real world testing. We would
expect developers to consider such
factors as the size of the organization
that production systems support, the
95 We do not propose to specifically define or
limit the care settings and leave it to the health IT
developer to determine. As an example, health IT
developers can consider categories, including but
not limited to, those used in the EHR Incentive
Programs (https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/
Downloads/October2017_
MedicareEHRIncentivePayments.pdf); long-term
and post-acute care; pediatrics; behavioral health;
and small, rural, and underserved settings.
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type of organization and setting, the
number of patient records and users,
system components and integrations,
and the volume and types of data
exchange in planning for real world
testing. We would also expect
developers to explain how they will
incorporate voluntary standards updates
in their real world testing as discussed
further below. While we are not
proposing a minimum proportion of the
customer base that must be covered in
real world testing, we highly encourage
developers to find ways to ensure, to the
extent practical, proportionate coverage
of their customer base that balances the
goals of real world testing with burden
to providers. Health IT developers
would not be required to test the
certified health IT in each and every
setting in which it is intended for use
as this would likely not be feasible due
to the associated burden; however,
developers must address their choice of
care and/or practice settings to test and
ONC encourages developers test in as
many settings as feasible. Additionally,
health IT developers would be required
to provide a justification for their
chosen approach. Because our approach
provides great flexibility for health IT
developers with respect to
demonstrating compliance, we believe it
is imperative that they provide a
justification to explain their
methodology. Through the transparent
reporting of their real world testing
plans, the public will have an
opportunity to consider a health IT
developer’s chosen approach(es) and
whether it is sufficiently comprehensive
to provide assurance that the certified
health IT has satisfactorily
demonstrated its satisfaction of Program
requirements including interoperability
in real world settings relevant to their
needs.
Health IT developers should consider
existing testing tools and approaches
that may be used to assess real world
interoperability. For example, we
encourage health IT developers to
consider metrics of use and exchange
from existing networks, communities,
and tools including, but not limited to,
Surescripts, Carequality, CommonWell
Health Alliance, the C–CDA One-Click
Scorecard, and DirectTrust. We do not
believe that testing through the ONCapproved test procedures is sufficient to
demonstrate real world use as the test
procedures developed for initial
laboratory testing and certification are
generally setting agnostic, focused on
standards conformance, and do not
always test the full scope of the
certification criteria’s intended
functionality. We also clarify that the
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ONC-approved test procedures are not
intended for use in in-the-field
surveillance or for real world testing.
Further, we do not believe connect-athons are a valid approach to testing real
world use of health IT because they do
not necessarily assess interoperability
and functionality in live settings, but
rather test developer/vendor
connectivity in a closed test
environment. Health IT developers may
consider working with an ONC–ACB to
have the ONC–ACB oversee the
execution of the health IT developer’s
real world testing plans, which could
include in-the-field surveillance per
§ 170.556, as an acceptable approach to
meet the requirements of the real world
testing Condition of Certification.
We propose that health IT developers
with multiple certified health IT
products that may include the same
interoperability-focused certification
criteria intended to be implemented in
the same settings have the discretion to
design their real world testing plans in
a way that efficiently tests a
combination of products. Likewise,
health IT developers may find portions
of their real world testing plans are
transferrable to their other certified
products; thus a health IT developer
could choose to submit a real world
testing plan that covers multiple
certified products as appropriate and as
long as there is traceability to the
specific certified Health IT Modules. To
be clear, developers of health IT
products deployed through the cloud
who offer their products for multiple
types of settings would be required to
test the same capability for those
different settings. However, we solicit
comment on whether we should offer an
exemption for services that truly
support all of a developer’s customers
through a single interface/engine and
whether this would be sufficient to meet
the intent of the real world testing
Condition of Certification. Additionally,
while the developers’ plans must
address each of the interoperabilityfocused certification criteria in their
certified health IT, developers can and
should design scenario-based test cases
that incorporate multiple functionalities
as appropriate for the real world
workflow and setting.
We propose that a health IT developer
would submit annual real world testing
results to their ONC–ACBs via a
publicly accessible hyperlink no later
than January 31, of each calendar year
for the preceding calendar year’s real
world testing. Real world testing results
for each interoperability-focused
certification criterion must address the
elements required in the previous year’s
testing plan, describe the outcomes of
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real world testing with any challenges
encountered, and provide at least one
measurement or metric associated with
the real world testing. As noted above,
developers are encouraged to use
metrics demonstrating real world use
from existing networks and
communities. We seek comment on
whether ONC should require developers
submit real world testing results for a
minimum ‘‘core’’ set of general metrics/
measurements and examples of
suggested metrics/measurements. We
also invite comment on the proposed
annual frequency and timing of required
real world testing results reporting.
We acknowledge that a subsequent
final rule for this proposed rule may not
provide sufficient time for health IT
developers to develop and submit plans
for a full year of real world testing in
2020. If such a situation comes to
fruition, we expect to provide an
appropriate period of time for
developers to submit their plans and
potentially treat 2020 as a ‘‘pilot’’ year
for real world testing. We would expect
that such pilot testing conform to our
proposed real world testing to the extent
practical and feasible (e.g., same criteria
but for a shorter duration and without
the same consequences for noncompliance). We welcome comments on
this potential approach.
We clarify, and propose, that even if
a health IT developer does not have
customers or has not deployed their
certified Health IT Module at the time
the real world testing plan is due, the
health IT developer would still need to
submit a plan that addresses its
prospective testing for the coming year
for any health IT certified prior to
August 31 of the preceding calendar
year. If a health IT developer does not
have customers or has not deployed
their certified Health IT Module when
the annual real world testing results are
due, we propose that the developer
would need to report as such to meet
the proposed Maintenance of
Certification requirement. For further
clarity, a developer would not need to
report on any health IT certified after
August 31, in the preceding year.
Standards Version Advancement
Process
As new and more advanced
versions 96 become available for adopted
standards and implementation
specifications applicable to criteria
subject to the real world testing
Condition and Maintenance of
96 We note that standards development
organizations and consensus standards bodies use
various nomenclature, such as ‘‘versions,’’ to
identify updates to standards and implementation
specifications.
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Certification Requirements, we believe
that a health IT developer’s ability to
conduct ongoing maintenance on its
certified Health IT Module(s) to
incorporate these new versions is
essential to support interoperability in
the real world. Updated versions of
standards reflect insights gained from
real-world implementation and use.
They also reflect industry stakeholders’
interests to improve the capacity,
capability, and clarity of such standards
to meet new, innovative business needs,
which earlier standards versions cannot
support. Therefore, as part of the real
world testing Condition of Certification,
we propose a Maintenance of
Certification flexibility that we refer to
as the Standards Version Advancement
Process. The Standards Version
Advancement Process would permit
health IT developers to voluntarily use
in their certified Health IT Modules
newer versions of adopted standards so
long as certain conditions are met, not
limited to but notably including
successful real world testing of the
Health IT Module using the new
version(s).
We propose to establish the Standards
Version Advancement Processnot only
to meet the Cures Act’s goals for
interoperability, but also in response to
the continuous stakeholder feedback
that ONC has received through prior
rulemakings and engagements, which
requested that ONC establish a
predictable and timely approach within
the Program to keep pace with the
industry’s standards development
efforts. Rulemaking has not kept up
with the pace of standards development
and deployment in the health care
market. There is no better evidence of
this reality than by example from our
2015 Edition rulemaking finalized
approximately three years ago and
before the Cures Act added Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
provisions to the PHSA. Two version
updates of the National Health Care
Survey standard (versions 1.1 and 1.2)
have been issued since we adopted
version 1.0 in the 2015 Edition final rule
(October 16, 2015). Health IT developer
and health care provider compliance
and use of these versions has and will
be necessary for submission to Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) even though the certification
criterion adopted in § 170.315(f)(7)
continues to require conformance to
version 1.0. Similarly, many other
adopted standards have seen multiple
newer versions introduced to the market
since we issued the 2015 Edition final
rule, such as for eCQM reporting or eprescribing. The proposed Standards
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Version Advancement Process
flexibility gives health IT developers the
option to avoid such unnecessary costs
and can help reduce market confusion
by enabling certified Health IT Modules
keep pace with standards advancement
and market needs including but not
limited to those related to emerging
public health concerns.
We have also been informed by
stakeholders that, in other cases, ONC’s
inability to more nimbly identify and
incorporate newer versions to standards
and implementation specifications that
were already adopted by the Secretary
into the Program has perversely
impacted standards developing
organization (SDO) processes. Although
SDOs can rapidly iterate version
updates to standards and
implementation specifications to
address ambiguities and
implementation challenges reported
from the field and to particularly
address matters that adversely impact
interoperability, the lack of a clear path
for that work effort to be timely realized
as part of the Program’s certification
requirements has had a chilling effect
on the pace of change. It can also affect
the willingness of volunteers at these
SDOs to devote their time to make
updates that would be outdated by the
time ONC goes through a rulemaking,
which can be years. Stakeholders have
indicated that certified health IT
developers, customers and users of
certified health IT, and the SDO
industry have been technologically
restricted and innovation-stunted as a
result of our prior regulatory approach,
which focused on certification assuring
compliance only to the version of a
standard adopted in regulation and did
not provide an avenue for the Program
to accommodate iterative updates to
standards during the time between
rulemakings. With the passage of the
‘‘maintenance of certification’’ provision
in § 4002 of the Cures Act, we believe
the approach proposed here is in line
with our new statutory authority
regarding Conditions of Certification
and Maintenance of Certification and
would better and more timely support
market demands for widespread
interoperability.
In supporting more rapid
advancement of interoperability, we
believe the proposed Standards Version
Advancement Process approach will
benefit patient care, improve
competition, and spur additional
engagement in standards development.
To this point, currently, if the USCDI v1
were adopted as currently proposed in
§ 170.213 and then needed to be
updated to add just one data class or
data element (e.g., a new demographic
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element), we would need to initiate
notice and comment rulemaking to
incorporate that USCDI version change
into the Program. Likewise, similar
updates to standards included in our
2015 Edition final rule are made
annually (or more frequently) by SDOs.
In order to attempt to keep pace with
such updates, which are published at
different times of the year, ONC would
need to continuously engage in
rulemaking cycles, perhaps even more
than once per year. We believe that the
proposed Standards Version
Advancement Process would allow for
more advanced versions of standards
and implementation specifications to be
approved for use under the Program in
a more timely and flexible manner that
helps to ease the concerns stakeholders
have reported. Stakeholder input
throughout the Program’s existence has
informed ONC that updating large
groupings of standards’ versions while
also adopting new standards through
rulemakings that only occur about once
every three years can create an artificial
market impact in a number of ways.
Such ‘‘all-in-one’’ updates affect all
health IT developers and the vast
majority of health care providers at the
same time across all sectors rather than
enabling a more incremental and
market-based upgrade cycle in response
to interoperability, business, and
clinical needs.
The Standards Version Advancement
Process and corresponding proposed
revisions to §§ 170.550 and 170.555
would introduce two types of
administrative flexibility for health IT
developers participating in the Program.
First, for those health IT developers
with an existing certified Health IT
Module, the Health IT Modules would
be permitted to be upgraded (in the
course of ongoing maintenance) to a
new version of an adopted standard
within the scope of the certification
(without having to retest or recertify) so
long as such version was approved by
the National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards
Version Advancement Process. Second,
for those health IT developers seeking to
have a Health IT Module’s initial
certificate issued, the Health IT Module
would be permitted to be presented for
certification to a new version of an
adopted standard so long as such
version was approved by the National
Coordinator through the Standards
Version Advancement Process. This
policy flexibility is similar to the
flexibility we introduced several years
ago for ‘‘minimum standards’’ code sets,
but we would require ONC–ACBs to
offer certification under the Standards
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Version Advancement Process to
National-Coordinator-approved newer
versions of all standards to which Real
World Testing requirements apply.97
In order to ensure equitable treatment
under the Program and in order for ONC
to maintain the Program’s overall
integrity, each developer that chooses to
leverage the proposed Standards
Version Advancement Process
Maintenance of Certification Program
flexibilities would need to satisfy the
following.
Health IT Developers Updating Already
Certified Health IT
In instances where a health IT
developer has certified a Health IT
Module, including but not limited to
instances where its customers are
already using the certified Health IT
Module, if the developer intends to
update pursuant to the Standards
Version Advancement Process election,
the developer would be required to
provide advance notice to all affected
customers and its ONC–ACB: (a)
Expressing its intent to update the
software to the more advanced version
of the standard approved by the
National Coordinator through the
Standards Version Advancement
Process; (b) the developer’s expectations
for how the update will affect
interoperability of the affected Health IT
Module as it is used in the real world;
and (c) whether the developer intends to
continue to support the certificate for
the existing Health IT Module version
for some period of time and how long,
or if the existing version of the Health
IT Module certified to prior version(s) of
applicable standards will be deprecated
(e.g., that the developer will stop
supporting the earlier version of the
module and request to have the
certificate withdrawn). The notice
would be required to be provided
sufficiently in advance of the developer
establishing its planned timeframe for
implementation of the upgrade to the
more advanced standard(s) version(s) in
order to offer customers reasonable
opportunity to ask questions and plan
for the update. We request public
comment on the minimum time prior to
an anticipated implementation of an
updated standard or implementation
97 For purposes of clarity, we note that the
Standards Version Advancement Process would not
affect the established minimum standards code sets
flexibility. Consistent with § 170.555, under the
Program, health IT could continue to be certified or
upgraded to a newer version of identified minimum
standards code sets (see 80 FR 62612) than even the
most recent one the National Coordinator had
approved for use in the Program via the Standards
Version Advancement Process unless the Secretary
prohibits the use of the newer version for
certification.
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specification version update that should
be considered reasonable for purposes
of allowing customers, especially health
care providers using the Health IT
Module in their health care delivery
operations, to adequately plan for
potential implications of the update for
their operations and their exchange
relationships. We would also be
interested to know if commenters
believe that there are specific
certification criteria, standards,
characteristics of the certified Health IT
Module or its implementation (such as
locally hosted by the customer using it
versus software-as-a-service type of
implementation), or specific types or
characteristics of customers that could
affect the minimum advance notice that
should be considered reasonable across
variations in these factors.
We anticipate providing ONC–ACBs
(and/or health IT developers) with a
means to attribute this updated
information to the listings on the CHPL
for the Health IT Modules the ONC–
ACB has certified, and propose to
require in the Principles of Proper
Conduct for ONC–ACBs that they are
ultimately responsible for this
information being made publicly
available on the CHPL. We request
public comment on any additional
information about updated standards
versions that may be beneficial to have
listed with certified Health IT Modules
on the CHPL.
We clarify that a health IT developer
would be able to choose which of the
updated standards versions approved by
the National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards
Version Advancement Process the
developer seeks to include in its
updated certified Health IT Module and
would be able to do so on an itemized
basis. In other words, if the National
Coordinator were to approve for use
through the Standards Version
Advancement Process several different
new versions of adopted standards that
affected different certification criteria
within the scope of a certified Health IT
Module, the developer would be able to
just update one certification criterion to
one or more of the applicable new
standards and would not have to update
its Health IT Module to all of the
National Coordinator-approved new
versions all at once in order to be able
to take advantage of this proposed
flexibility.
Health IT Developers Presenting a New
Health IT Module for Certification and
Leveraging the Standards Version
Advancement Process
In instances where a health IT
developer presents a Health IT Module
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for certification for which no prior
certificate can serve as the basis for
using the Standards Version
Advancement Process, we propose that
the health IT developer would be
permitted to use and implement any
and all of the newer versions of adopted
standards the National Coordinator
approves through the Standards Version
Advancement Process. We have
implemented this proposed policy
through necessary adjustments to the
way in which ONC–ACBs process
certifications in § 170.550. We recognize
that this proposed flexibility reflects
certain programmatic and policy tradeoffs. On one hand, a health IT developer
would be permitted to use the most
recent version of standards approved by
the National Coordinator instead of
having to build in potentially
‘‘outdated’’ standards just to get
certified. On the other hand, the
Program’s testing infrastructure (which
is now inclusive of governmentdeveloped and non-governmentdeveloped tools) may experience certain
lag times in terms of when updated test
tools to support the approved version
advancements would be available to test
Health IT Modules for certification
purposes. As a result, we propose to
provide the ability for ONC–ACBs to
accept a developer self-declaration of
conformity as to the use,
implementation, and conformance to a
newer version of a standard (including
but not limited to implementation
specifications) as sufficient
demonstration of conformance in
circumstances where the National
Coordinator has approved a version
update of a standard for use in
certification through the Standards
Version Advancement Process but an
associated testing tool is not yet updated
to test to the newer version. Again, we
clarify that a health IT developer would
be able to choose which National
Coordinator-approved standard
version(s) it seeks to include in a new
or updated certified Health IT Module
and would be able to do so on an
itemized basis.
On balance, we believe that this
programmatic flexibility and the
potential interoperability improvements
from the use of newer versions of
standards outweighs the subsequent
oversight challenges. Moreover, these
oversight challenges can be mitigated by
the Standards Version Advancement
Process itself (i.e., the National
Coordinator not approving a new
version if the Program or industry is not
ready) and the corresponding
Conditions of Certification that continue
with the use of National Coordinator-
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7499
approved new versions of adopted
standards. We also believe that this
approach will continue to hold
developers accountable for, and shift the
focus of Health IT Module performance
demonstration to, real world testing for
interoperability for deployed Health IT
Modules. As described above, we
understand the limitations of test
methods used prior to certification and
further emphasize the importance of
continued conformance of Health IT
Modules in the field. However, we
request comment on specific Program
impacts we should consider.
General Requirements Associated With
Health IT Modules Certified Using the
Standards Version Advancement
Process
In all cases, regardless of whether a
health IT developer is updating an
existing certified Health IT Module or
presenting a new Health IT Module for
certification to new versions of adopted
standards approved by the National
Coordinator through the Standards
Version Advancement Process, it would
need to adhere to the following once it
elects to takes advantage of this
proposed flexibility:
• The developer would need to
ensure its mandatory disclosures in
§ 170.523(k)(1) appropriately reflect its
use of any National Coordinatorapproved newer versions of standards.
• The developer would need to
address and adhere to all Conditions of
Certification and Maintenance of
Certification requirements proposed that
are otherwise be applicable to its
certified Health IT Modules regardless
of whether those Health IT Modules
were certified to the exact same versions
of adopted standards that are listed in
the text of 45 CFR part 170 or National
Coordinator-approved newer version(s)
of the standard(s). For instance, the
developer would need to ensure that its
real world testing plan and performance
included the National Coordinatorapproved standards versions to which it
is claiming conformance.
In terms of compliance with the real
world testing Condition and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements, the attestations Condition
and Maintenance of Certification
requirements proposed in § 170.406,
and for the purposes of ONC–ACB
surveillance, we note that health IT
developers would be accountable for
maintaining all applicable certified
Health IT Modules in accordance with
approved versions of standards and
implementation specifications that they
voluntarily elect to use in their certified
health IT. If, at any point after initial
certification or updated certification for
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a Health IT Module using the National
Coordinator approved advanced
versions of standards or implementation
specifications, real world testing results
do not demonstrate the Health IT
Module’s conformance to each
applicable certification criterion had
been achieved and maintained using the
National Coordinator approved
advanced version update of any
applicable standard(s) and
implementation specification(s), then
the developer would not be allowed to
claim or characterize the Health IT
Module as conformant to the criterion
using such standard version, and the
standard or implementation
specification version could not be
indicated in the health IT Module’s
CHPL record as supported by any
version release of the Health IT Module,
until such time as they could
demonstrate through ONC–ATL or
results of real world testing that they
had successfully upgraded the Health IT
Module to fully conform to applicable
certification criteria while incorporating
the more advanced version of the
standard. Non-conformities associated
with the use of new versions of National
Coordinator-approved standards would
be found and enforced through the same
Program rules just like they would be
for non-conformities with the versions
of adopted standards that are codified in
regulation text. Further, we remind
health IT developers that they would be
required to make an attestation to their
real world testing results, including
(though not limited to) those that would
be used to support use of new versions
of National Coordinator-approved
standards.
Advanced Version Approval Approach
Once a standard has been adopted for
use in the Program through notice and
comment rulemaking, ONC would
undertake an annual, open and
transparent process, including
opportunity for public comment, to
timely ascertain whether a more recent
version of that standard or
implementation specification should be
approved for developers’ voluntary use.
ONC would identify updated versions of
previously adopted standards and
implementation specifications based on
our own monitoring of market trends
and interoperability needs, as well as
input received from external
stakeholders. Such external input may
include, but would not be limited to,
recommendations made by the Health
Information Technology Advisory
Committee as well as input received
from SDOs.
ONC expects to use an expanded
section of the Interoperability Standards
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Advisory (ISA) web platform to
facilitate the public transparency and
engagement process. At a particular
time of the year (e.g., early fall), ONC
would post a list of new versions of
adopted standards and implementation
specifications that appear timely and
appropriate for use within the Program
(for the subsequent calendar year) along
with accompanying descriptive context
(e.g., the types/nature of updates in the
new version of a standard). ONC would
then widely communicate to all
members of the public that the list was
available and make a general solicitation
of comments to any and all interested
parties for a period of 30 to 60 days. We
would generally expect to receive
comments on a range of issues related
to the version of the standard under
consideration, including its availability,
testing tools, maturity, implementation
burden, and overall impact on
interoperability. Health IT developers,
health information networks (HINs), and
the health care organizations that
purchase and use health IT are already
familiar with the process of commenting
through our existing ISA resource and
we believe this process is well suited to
support widespread engagement by all
stakeholders. Similar to the ISA, we
would expect to be open to receiving
comments on newer versions of adopted
standards throughout the year leading
up to the formal comment period.
Once the formal comment period
closes, ONC would review the
comments and consider the potential
impacts of a new version an adopted
standard or implementation
specification. We anticipate approving
newer versions of adopted standards
and implementation specifications
based on several interdependent
Program and market factors, such as its
ability to enhance interoperability and
overall compatibility with other adopted
versions, how burdensome it would be
to update to the newer version and the
scope and scale of the changes, whether
the new version would be required for
reporting by a corresponding program
(e.g., CMS or CDC), the availability of
test tools for the new version, and the
new version’s relationship to other
adopted standards and any
dependencies. Upon concluding our
review and analysis, ONC would
publish in this new ISA section a final
list of National Coordinator-approved
advanced versions that health IT
developers could electively use
consistent with the Standards Version
Advancement Process.
Within this proposed approach, we
expect that when it comes to a standard,
the National Coordinator would identify
version updates to an adopted standard
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consistent with that standard’s name
and version track. This method would
provide long-term consistency for health
IT developers in terms of the overall
technical conformance requirements on
which they will be focused.
With respect to adopted
implementation specifications, we
believe that more flexibility about the
precise name and version track
identifiers would be warranted given
that implementation specifications are
developed by market-driven industry
consortia (e.g., Argonaut project and
Direct project stakeholders) as well as
traditional SDOs. Similarly, authors of
implementation specifications
sometimes develop supplemental
documents to the ‘‘parent’’
implementation specification or split
the implementation specification to
form newly titled materials. In any of
these cases, the resulting
implementation specification may—on
its face—initially appear to bear no
relation to a previously adopted
implementation specification because of
changes to its title, version naming, or
numbering presentation. In reality, in
many of these cases, the implementation
specification retains substantially the
same purpose(s) and thus represents a
versioning update rather than
amounting to a novel specification.
Accordingly, regardless of its title and
author, the National Coordinator would
take into account whether any ‘‘new’’
implementation specification under
consideration is more accurately
characterized as novel to the Program or
instead is a derivative work that is
substantially a more advanced version
of a previously adopted implementation
specification(s). Stakeholders would
also be able to comment on the same
during the advanced version approval
process described here.
The public listing of these National
Coordinator determinations to approve
version updates to already adopted
standards and implementation
specifications would serve as the single,
comprehensive, and authoritative index
of the versions of adopted standards and
implementation specifications available
for use under the Program. We note,
however, that certain Program
administration steps would need to
occur (such as ONC–ACBs expanding
the scope of their accreditations) after
the National Coordinator has approved
newer versions of adopted standards. As
a result, there would likely be a
temporary delay between the National
Coordinator’s approval decision and
when certification to new standards
versions under the Program would start.
We welcome comments on any and
all aspects of our proposed standards
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version approval process as an option
available to developers through
maintenance requirements as part of the
real world testing Condition and
Maintenance of Certification. This
includes all aspects of our described
approach to standards and
implementation specification advanced
version approval processes. We also
invite comments on our proposal to
allow in conjunction with this
maintenance flexibility the opportunity
for developers to elect to present health
IT for initial testing and certification
either to more advanced versions or the
prior versions included in regulatory
text as of the date the technology is
presented.
Principle of Proper Conduct for ONC–
ACB for All Real World Testing
Proposals
We propose to include a new
Principle of Proper Conduct for ONC–
ACBs in § 170.523(p) that would require
ONC–ACBs to review and confirm that
applicable health IT developers submit
real world testing plans and results in
accordance with our proposals. We
expect that ONC–ACBs would review
the plans for completeness. Once
completeness is confirmed, ONC–ACBs
would provide the plans to ONC by
December 15 and results to ONC by
April 1. The December 15 date is the
same date as the health IT developer
requirement for submission of the real
world testing plan. For purposes of the
Program, this treats both regulated
entities equally and permits them to
work out a process that ensures all real
world testing plans are submitted to the
CHPL by December 15. For example, a
health IT developer that is confident in
its plan and does not anticipate any
further certification, may submit its plan
in July of the preceding year.
The submission of results, however,
does not present the same dynamic of
the potential need to work together to
ensure the plan is complete. As such,
we have proposed different dates. We
would expect the developers to submit
their results by January 31. We believe
this would provide sufficient time for
ONC–ACBs to review all plans and post
them to the CHPL by April 1, including
notifying ONC when the results were
not in compliance with requirements.
ONC would make both the plans and
results publicly available via the CHPL.
We note that ONC–ACBs will continue
to be required to perform in-the-field
surveillance of certified Health IT
Modules and results of real world
testing could be considered information
to inform ONC–ACB surveillance
activities.
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Because we are proposing to allow
health IT developers to implement
National Coordinator-approved
advanced versions of standards and
implementation specifications in
certified Health IT Modules through a
developer self-declaration of conformity
presented for certification if an
associated testing tool is not yet updated
to test to the newer version for the
standards and implementation
specification version updates they have
chosen to use in the Program, we
propose two requirements to ensure the
public and ONC–ACBs have knowledge
of the version of a standard that certified
health IT meets. First, we propose to
revise the Principle of Proper Conduct
in § 170.523(m) to require ONC–ACBs to
collect, no less than quarterly, all
version updates made to standards
successfully included in certified health
IT per the requirements within the real
world testing Condition of Certification
Standards Version Advancement
Process. This would ensure that ONC–
ACBs are aware of the version of a
standard that certified health IT meets
for the purposes of surveillance and
Program administration. Second, we
propose (as discussed above), that a
developer that chooses to avail itself of
the Standards Version Advancement
Process flexibility must address in its
real world testing plans and results
submissions the timeline and rollout of
applicable version updates for standards
and implementation specifications. This
addition to § 170.523(m) along with
existing requirements for weekly ONC–
ACB CHPL reporting to versions of
standards per § 170.523(f)(1)(xvii)
would allow for timely updates to
Health IT Module certificate
information in the CHPL. Together with
the requirements (discussed above) for
developers’ communication with their
current and potential customers, we
intend to ensure that the public and
end-users have transparency into
planned and actual standards and
implementation specifications updates
for their certified health IT.
In complement to the above
requirements to ensure transparency for
the public and end users, we propose in
§ 170.523(t) a new Principle of Proper
Conduct for ONC–ACBs requiring them
to ensure that developers seeking to take
advantage of the Standards Version
Advancement Process flexibility in
§ 170.405(b)(5) comply with the
applicable requirements, and that the
ONC–ACB both retain records of the
timing and content of developers’
§ 170.405(b)(5) notices and timely post
each notice’s content publicly on the
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7501
CHPL attributed to the certified Health
IT Modules to which it applies.
We seek comment on the proposed
additions to the Principles of Proper
Conduct for ONC–ACBs. More
specifically, we seek comment on
whether ONC–ACBs should be required
to perform an evaluation beyond a
completeness check for the real world
testing plans and results and the value
versus the burden of such an endeavor.
6. Attestations
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, provide to the Secretary an
attestation to all the Conditions of
Certification specified in the Cures Act,
except for the ‘‘EHR reporting criteria
submission’’ Condition of Certification.
We propose to implement the Cures Act
‘‘attestations’’ requirements Condition
of Certification in § 170.406. We also
propose that, as part of the
implementation of this statutory
provision, health IT developers would
attest, as applicable, to compliance with
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements described in
this section of the preamble and
proposed in §§ 170.401 through
170.405.
We propose that, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the
‘‘attestations’’ Condition of Certification,
health IT developers must submit their
attestations every 6 months (i.e.,
semiannually). We believe this would
provide an appropriate ‘‘attestation
period’’ to base any enforcement
actions, such as by ONC under the
Program or by the Office of the Inspector
General under its Cures Act authority.
We also believe this 6-month attestation
period properly balances the need to
support appropriate enforcement
actions with the attestation burden
placed on developers. We will
determine when the first attestation will
be due depending on when the final
rule is published. We require
attestations to be due twice a year, likely
in the middle and end of the calendar
year.
The process we plan to implement for
providing attestations should minimize
burden on health IT developers. First,
we propose to provide a 14-day
attestation period twice a year. For
health IT developers presenting health
IT for certification for the first time
under the Program, we propose that
they would be required to submit an
attestation at the time of certification
and then also comply with the
semiannual attestation periods. Second,
we would publicize and prompt
developers to complete their attestation
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during the required attestation periods.
Third, we propose to provide a method
for health IT developers to indicate their
compliance, non-compliance with, or
the inapplicability of each Condition
and Maintenance of Certification
requirement as it applies to all of their
health IT certified under the Program for
each attestation period. Last, we
propose to provide health IT developers
the flexibility to specify non-compliance
per certified Health IT Module, if
necessary. We note, however, that any
non-compliance with the proposed
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements, including
the ‘‘attestations’’ Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements, would be subject to ONC
direct review, corrective action, and
enforcement procedures under the
Program. We refer readers to section
VII.D of this preamble for discussion of
proposed ONC direct review, corrective
action, and enforcement procedures for
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements under the
Program.
We propose that attestations would be
submitted to ONC–ACBs on behalf of
ONC and the Secretary. We propose that
ONC–ACBs would have two
responsibilities related to attestations.
One responsibility we propose in
§ 170.523(q) is that an ONC–ACB must
review and submit the health IT
developers’ attestations to ONC. ONC
would then make the attestations
publicly available through the CHPL.
The other responsibility we propose in
§ 170.550(l) is that before issuing a
certification, an ONC–ACB would need
to ensure that the health IT developer of
the Health IT Module has met its
responsibilities related to the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements as solely
evidenced by its attestation. For
example, if a health IT developer with
an active certification under the
Program indicated non-compliant
designations in their attestation but is
already participating in a corrective
action plan under ONC direct review to
resolve the non-compliance,
certification would be able to proceed
while the issue is being resolved.
We welcome comments on the
proposed attestations Condition and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements, including the appropriate
frequency and timing of attestations. We
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also welcome comments on the
proposed responsibilities for ONC–
ACBs related to the attestations of
Condition and Maintenance of
Certification requirements.
7. EHR Reporting Criteria Submission
The Cures Act specifies that health IT
developers be required, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under
the Program, to submit reporting criteria
on certified health IT in accordance
with the EHR reporting program
established under section 3009A of the
PHSA, as added by the Cures Act. We
have not yet established an EHR
reporting program. Once ONC
establishes such program, we will
undertake future rulemaking to propose
and implement the associated Condition
and Maintenance of Certification
requirement(s) for health IT developers.
C. Compliance
The proposed Maintenance of
Certification requirements discussed
above do not necessarily define all the
outcomes necessary to meet the
Conditions of Certification. Rather, they
provide preliminary or baseline
evidence toward measuring whether a
Condition is being met. Thus, ONC
could determine that a Condition of
Certification is not being met through
reasons other than the Maintenance of
Certification requirements. For example,
meeting the proposed Maintenance of
Certification requirement that requires a
health IT developer to not establish or
enforce any contract or agreement that
contravenes the Communications
Condition of Certification does not
excuse a health IT developer from
meeting all the requirements specified
in the proposed Communications
Condition of Certification. This is
analogous to clarifications ONC has
previously provided about certification
criteria requirements whereby testing
prior to certification sometimes only
tests a subset of the full criterion’s
intended functions and scope. However,
for compliance and surveillance
purposes, we have stated that ONC and
its ONC–ACBs will examine whether
the certified health IT meets the full
scope of the certification criterion rather
than the subset of functions it was
tested against (80 FR 62709–10).
D. Enforcement
The Cures Act affirms ONC’s role in
using certification to improve health
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IT’s capabilities for the access, use, and
exchange of electronic health
information. The Cures Act provides
this affirmation through expanded
certification authority for ONC to
establish Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification requirements for health
IT developers that go beyond the
certified health IT itself. The new
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification provisions in section 4002
of the Cures Act focus on the actions
and business practices of health IT
developers (e.g., information blocking
and appropriate access, use, and
exchange of electronic health
information) as well as technical
interoperability of health IT (e.g., APIs
and real world testing). Furthermore
and equally important, section 4002 of
the Cures Act provides that the
Secretary of HHS may encourage
compliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements and take action to
discourage noncompliance. As
discussed in the 2015 Edition final rule,
ONC is not limited to enforcing Program
compliance solely through those
requirements expressed in certification
criteria adopted under the Program (80
FR 62710; see also 81 FR 72412).
Certification under the Program also
relies on a health IT developer’s
compliance with Program requirements
that ensure the basic integrity and
effectiveness of the Program, which is
further stressed through the addition of
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements in the Cures
Act (referred to jointly as the
‘‘Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification’’ in this section of the
preamble).
Given these considerations, we
propose a general enforcement approach
outlining a corrective action process for
ONC to review potential or known
instances where a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification
requirement has not been or is not being
met by a health IT developer under the
Program, including the requirement for
a health IT developer to attest to
meeting the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification. Table 2
below provides an overview of the
proposed approach to ONC enforcement
of the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification. We provide more specific
proposals following Table 2.
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TABLE 2—PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF CERTIFICATION
Proposed
regulatory
text
§ 170.401
§ 170.402
§ 170.403
§ 170.404
§ 170.405
§ 170.406
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
Condition of certification
Information Blocking .........
Assurances.
Communications.
APIs.
Real World Testing.
Attestations.
1. ONC Direct Review of the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
We propose to utilize the processes
previously established for ONC direct
review of certified health IT in the EOA
final rule (81 FR 72404) and codified in
§§ 170.580 and 170.581 for the
enforcement of the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification. We
propose this approach for multiple
reasons. First, these processes were
established to address non-conformities
with Program requirements. Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification are
proposed to be adopted as Program
requirements and, as such, any
noncompliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification would
constitute a Program non-conformity.
Second, health IT developers are
familiar with the ONC direct review
provisions as they were established in
October 2016. Third, §§ 170.580 and
170.581 provide thorough and
transparent processes for working with
health IT developers through notice and
corrective action to remedy Program
non-conformities. Last, the direct review
framework provides equitable
opportunities for health IT developers to
respond to ONC actions and appeal
certain ONC determinations.
2. Review and Enforcement Only by
ONC
We propose to retain use of the term
‘‘direct review’’ as previously adopted
in the EOA final rule to continue to
distinguish actions ONC takes to
directly review certified health IT or
health IT developers’ actions in
comparison to an ONC–ACB’s review of
certified health IT under surveillance.
We propose, however, that ONC would
be the sole party responsible for
enforcing compliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification. The Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification focus on
health IT developer behavior and
actions in addition to the certified
Health IT Module. ONC is more familiar
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Opportunity for
developer to take
corrective action
Consequences of not taking appropriate corrective
action
Yes .........................
Certification ban of all of a developer’s certified
Health IT Modules.
ONC may also consider termination of Health IT
Module certificates if there is a nexus between the
developer’s practices and a certified Health IT
Module.
................................
with the behavioral requirements based
on its expertise and experience.
Conversely, ONC–ACBs are generally
more suited, based on their
accreditation and current
responsibilities, to address nonconformities with technical and other
Program requirements. ONC also has the
necessary resources and the ability to
coordinate with other agencies to
enforce the Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification, such as with the
‘‘information blocking’’ Condition of
Certification (proposed § 170.401).
Further, ONC enforcement would
provide more predictability and
consistency, which would likely benefit
stakeholders in matters related to API
fees and information blocking. We do,
however, discuss below the scope of
ONC–ACB surveillance as it relates to
ONC’s proposed enforcement of the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification.
3. Review Processes
We propose to substantially adopt the
processes as they are currently codified
in §§ 170.580 and 170.581 for ONC’s
review and enforcement of the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification, but propose certain
revisions and additions to the processes
to properly incorporate the proposed
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification and effectuate
Congressional intent. These revisions
and additions include renaming and
restructuring headings for clarity, which
we do not discuss below.
a. Initiating Review and Health IT
Developer Notice
We propose to fully incorporate the
review of the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification into the
provisions of § 170.580(a) and (b). We
propose in § 170.580(a)(iii) that if ONC
has a reasonable belief that a health IT
developer has not complied with a
Condition of Certification, then it may
initiate direct review. Similarly, we
propose in § 170.580(b)(1) and (2) that
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Opportunity for
developer to
appeal ONC
determination to
terminate or
ban
Yes.
ONC may issue the health IT developer
a notice of potential non-conformity or
notice of non-conformity and provide
the health IT developer an opportunity
to respond with an explanation and
written documentation, including any
information ONC requests. These
processes, including relevant
timeframes, are specified in
§ 170.580(b).
i. Complaint Resolution
We note and recommend that
customers and end-users first work with
their health IT developers to resolve any
issues of potential non-compliance with
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification as prior Program
experience has shown that many issues
can be resolved at this step. If the issue
cannot be resolved, we then recommend
the end-user contact the ONC–ACB.
However, as discussed above and in
section VII.D.5 below, the ONC–ACB
purview for certified health IT generally
applies to certified capabilities and
limited requirements of developer
business practices. If neither of these
pathways resolves the issue, end-users
may provide feedback to ONC via the
Health IT Feedback Form.98
ii. Method of Correspondence With
Health IT Developers
Section 170.505 states that
correspondence and communication
with ONC or the National Coordinator
shall be conducted by email, unless
otherwise necessary or specified. In the
EOA final rule, we signaled our intent
to send notices of potential nonconformity, non-conformity,
suspension, proposed termination, and
termination via certified mail (81 FR
72429). However, in accordance with
§ 170.505, we propose that email should
be the default mode of correspondence
for direct review of non-compliance
with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification.
98 https://www.healthit.gov/form/healthitfeedback-form.
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Under the EOA final rule, ONC can
initiate direct review of certified health
IT in limited circumstances, namely
when there is a reasonable belief that
the certified health IT may be causing or
contributing to serious risks to public
health or safety or suspected nonconformities present practical
challenges that may prevent an ONC–
ACB from effectively investigating or
responding to the suspected nonconformity. In contrast, we propose in
this proposed rule to enable ONC to
initiate direct review to address a health
IT developer’s conduct under the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements in addition to
non-conformities in certified health IT.
This proposal would create an
expanded set of circumstances for ONC
to conduct direct review. Accordingly,
the type and extent of review by ONC
could vary significantly based on the
complexity and severity of each fact
pattern. For instance, ONC may be able
to address certain non-conformities
under the Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification quickly and with
minimal effort (e.g., failure to make
public a documentation hyperlink),
while others may be more complex and
require additional time and effort (e.g.,
violation of API fee prohibitions).
Considering this wide range of potential
non-conformities under the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification, we
believe it is appropriate for ONC to
retain discretion to decide, on a case-bycase basis, when to go beyond the
provisions of § 170.505 in providing
notices and correspondence for noncompliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification.
We solicit comment on the nature and
types of non-conformities with the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements that ONC
should consider in determining the
method of correspondence. We also
solicit comment on whether the type of
notice should affect the method of
correspondence and whether certain
types of notices under direct review
should be considered more critical than
others, thus requiring a specific method
of correspondence.
b. Relationship With ONC–ACBs and
ONC–ATLs
Section 170.580(a)(3) outlines ONC
direct review in relation to the roles of
ONC–ACBs and ONC–ATLs, which we
propose to revise to incorporate
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification. We note that we provide
situational examples below in section
VII.D.5 ‘‘Effect on Existing Program
Requirements and Processes’’ regarding
ONC direct review and the role of an
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ONC–ACB. As finalized in the EOA
final rule and per § 170.580(a)(3)(v), we
remind readers that ONC may refer the
applicable part of its review of certified
health IT to the relevant ONC–ACB(s) if
ONC determines this would serve the
effective administration or oversight of
the Program (81 FR 72427–72428).
c. Records Access
We propose to revise § 170.580(b)(3)
to ensure that ONC, or third parties
acting on its behalf, has access to the
information necessary to enforce the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification. As specified in
§ 170.580(b)(1)(ii)(A)(2), (b)(2)(ii)(A)(2)
and (b)(3), in response to a notice of
potential non-conformity or notice of
non-conformity, ONC must be granted
access to, and have the ability to share
within HHS, with other federal
agencies, and with appropriate entities,
all of a health IT developers’ records
and technology related to the
development, testing, certification,
implementation, maintenance, and use
of a health IT developers’ certified
health IT; and any complaint records
related to the certified health IT.
‘‘Complaint records’’ include, but are
not limited to issue logs and help desk
tickets (81 FR 72431). We propose to
supplement these requirements with a
requirement that a health IT developer
make available to ONC, and third
parties acting on its behalf, records
related to marketing and distribution,
communications, contracts, and any
other information relevant to
compliance with any of the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification or
other Program requirements. This
information would assist in reviewing
allegations that a health IT developer
violated, for example, the ‘‘prohibit and
restrict communications’’ Condition of
Certification. Further, it is possible that
multiple Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification may be implicated under a
review, and thus ONC believes it is
appropriate to require a developer make
available to ONC all records and other
relevant information concerning all the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification and Program requirements
to which it and its Health IT Modules
are subject.
If ONC determined that a health IT
developer was not cooperative with the
fact-finding process, we propose ONC
would have the ability to issue a
certification ban and/or terminate a
certificate (see proposed § 170.581
discussed below and
§ 170.580(f)(1)(iii)(A)(1)).
We understand that health IT
developers may have concerns regarding
the disclosure of proprietary, trade
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secret, competitively sensitive, or other
confidential information. As we stated
in the EOA final rule (81 FR 72429),
ONC would implement appropriate
safeguards to ensure, to the extent
permissible with federal law, that any
proprietary business information or
trade secrets ONC may encounter by
accessing the health IT developer’s
records, other information, or
technology, would be kept confidential
by ONC or any third parties working on
behalf of ONC. However, a health IT
developer would not be able to avoid
providing ONC access to relevant
records by asserting that such access
would require it to disclose trade secrets
or other proprietary or confidential
information. Therefore, health IT
developers must clearly mark, as
described in HHS Freedom of
Information Act regulations at 45 CFR
5.65(c), any information they regard as
trade secret or confidential commercial
or financial information which they
seek to keep confidential prior to
disclosing the information to ONC or
any third party working on behalf of
ONC.
d. Corrective Action
We propose that if ONC determines
that a health IT developer is
noncompliant with a Condition of
Certification (i.e., a non-conformity),
ONC would work with the health IT
developer to establish a corrective
action plan (CAP) to remedy the issue
through the processes specified in
§ 170.580(b)(2)(ii)(A)(4) and (c). We note
that a health IT developer may be in
noncompliance with more than one
Condition of Certification. In such cases,
ONC will follow the proposed
compliance enforcement process for
each Condition of Certification
accordingly, but may also require the
health IT developer to address all
violations in one CAP for efficiency of
process. We also propose, as we
currently do with CAPs for certified
health IT, to list health IT developers
under a CAP on ONC’s website.
e. Certification Ban and Termination
We propose in § 170.581 that if a
health IT developer under ONC direct
review for non-compliance with a
Condition of Certification failed to work
with ONC or was otherwise
noncompliant with the requirements of
the CAP and/or CAP process, ONC
could issue a certification ban for the
health IT developer (and its subsidiaries
and successors). A certification ban, as
it currently does for other matters under
§ 170.581, would prohibit prospective
certification activity by the health IT
developer.
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ONC would also consider
termination 99 of the certificate(s) of the
affected Health IT Module(s) should the
health IT developer fail to work with
ONC or is otherwise noncompliant with
the requirements of the CAP and/or CAP
process (see proposed
§ 170.580(f)(1)(iii)). ONC may consider
termination if there is a nexus between
the developer’s actions or business
practices and certified Health IT
Module(s) (see proposed
§ 170.580(f)(1)(iii)). For example, ONC
may determine that a health IT
developer is violating a Condition of
Certification due to a clause in its
contracts that prevents its users from
sharing or discussing technological
impediments to information exchange.
In this example, the health IT
developer’s conduct would violate the
‘‘prohibiting or restricting
communication’’ Condition of
Certification proposed in § 170.403. If
the same conduct were also found to
impair the functionality of the certified
Health IT Module (such as by
preventing the proper use of certified
capabilities for the exchange of EHI),
ONC may determine that a nexus exists
between the developer’s business
practices and the functionality of the
certified Health IT Module, and may
consider termination of the certificates
of that particular Health IT Module
under the proposed approach.
We propose this approach, which
allows ONC to initiate a certification
ban and/or certificate termination under
certain circumstances, to ensure that
health IT developers are acting in
accordance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification. However,
we stress that our first and foremost
priority is to work with health IT
developers to remedy any
noncompliance with Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification through a
corrective action process before taking
further action. This emphasizes ONC’s
desire to promote and support health IT
developer compliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification and ensure that certified
health IT is compliant with Program
requirements in order to foster an
environment where EHI is exchanged in
an interoperable way.
ONC does not believe that
noncompliance with a Condition of
Certification should always result in the
termination of the certificate of one or
more of a developer’s Health IT
Modules for a few reasons. A violation
99 As noted in the EOA final rule, ‘‘termination’’
means an ONC action to ‘‘terminate’’ or ‘‘revoke’’
the certification status of a Complete EHR or Health
IT Module. (81 FR 72443).
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of a Condition of Certification may
relate solely to health IT developer
business practices or actions that do not
affect the Health IT Module’s
conformance to the requirements of the
certification criteria. In this case,
termination of the certification could
unfairly and negatively affect a
provider’s ability to use the Health IT
Module for participation in CMS
programs that require certification
because the Health IT Module itself is
functioning in accordance with the
technical requirements of its
certificate.100 As such, ONC would
carefully consider on a case-by-case
basis the appropriateness of termination
of a Health IT Module’s certification(s)
based on the specific circumstances of
the noncompliance with the Condition
of Certification. The proposed
enforcement approach balances the
above stated goals and provides an
outlined process that can be
consistently followed.
In considering whether termination of
a Health IT Module’s certificate(s) and/
or a certification ban is appropriate,
ONC will consider factors including, but
not limited to: Whether the health IT
developer has previously been found in
noncompliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification or other
Program requirements; the severity and
pervasiveness of the noncompliance,
including the effect of the
noncompliance on widespread
interoperability and health information
exchange; the extent to which the health
IT developer cooperates with ONC to
review the noncompliance; the extent of
potential negative impact on providers
who may seek to use the certified health
IT to participate in CMS programs; and
whether termination and/or a
certification ban is necessary to ensure
the integrity of the certification process.
As under § 170.580(f)(2), ONC would
provide notice of the termination to the
health IT developer, including
providing reasons for, and information
supporting, the termination and
instructions for appealing the
termination. We propose to add similar
notice provisions to § 170.581 for
certification bans issued under ONC
direct review for non-compliance with
the Conditions and Maintenance of
100 Note that, in this example, an ONC–ACB may
investigate the technical functionalities of the
Health IT Module against its certificate and perform
surveillance under § 170.556 separate from ONC’s
process to enforce compliance with the Conditions
of Certification. If under ONC–ACB surveillance, a
health IT developer does not adequately or timely
fulfill a corrective action plan, the ONC–ACB may
suspend and withdraw the Health IT Module’s
certificate. The expectations of ONC–ACB duties as
relates to ONC’s enforcement of the conditions of
certification are described further in the preamble.
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7505
Certification, which would also include
instructions for requesting
reinstatement. In this regard, we
propose to apply the current
reinstatement procedures under
§ 170.581 to Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification bans, but
with an additional requirement that the
health IT developer has resolved the
non-compliance with the Condition of
Certification. In sum, a health IT
developer could seek ONC’s approval to
re-enter the Program and have the
certification ban lifted if it demonstrates
it has resolved the noncompliance with
the Condition of Certification and ONC
is satisfied that all affected customers
have been provided appropriate
remediation.
For clarity, a health IT developer
would have an opportunity to appeal an
ONC determination to issue a
certification ban and/or termination IT
resulting from a non-conformity with a
Condition of Certification as discussed
below and/or seek reinstatement in the
Program and have the certification ban
lifted. To note, we propose to make
terminations effective consistent with
current § 170.580(f)(2)(iii) and similarly
for certification bans (see proposed
§ 170.581(c)). We seek comment on
whether ONC should:
• Impose a minimum certification
ban length before a health IT developer
can request ONC remove the ban for
health IT developers who are
noncompliant with a Condition of
Certification more than once (e.g., a
minimum six months for two instances,
a minimum of one year for three
instances).
• Consider additional factors for a
certification ban and/or the termination
of a health IT developer’s certified
health IT resulting from a nonconformity with a Condition of
Certification.
f. Appeal
We propose to provide a health IT
developer an opportunity to appeal an
ONC determination to issue a
certification ban and/or termination
resulting from a non-conformity with a
Condition of Certification and would
follow the processes specified in
§ 170.580(g). As such, we propose to
revise § 170.580(g) to include ONC
direct review of the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification.
g. Suspension
Section 170.580 includes a process for
suspending the certification of a Health
IT Module at any time if ONC has a
reasonable belief that the certified
health IT may present a serious risk to
public health and safety. While this will
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remain the case for certified health IT
under ONC direct review (i.e.,
suspension of certification is always
available under ONC direct review
when the certified health IT presents a
serious risk to public health and safety),
we do not believe such circumstances
would apply to noncompliance with the
Conditions of Certification. Further, we
believe the more streamlined processes
proposed for addressing noncompliance
with Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification alleviates the need to
proceed through a suspension process.
Therefore, we do not propose to apply
the suspension processes under
§ 170.580 to our review of the
Conditions of Certification. We welcome
comments on this proposal, including
reasons for why we should apply
suspension processes to the Conditions
of Certification as part of a subsequent
final rule.
h. Proposed Termination
Section 170.580 includes an
intermediate step between a developer
failing to take appropriate and timely
corrective action and termination of a
certified Health IT Module’s certificate,
called ‘‘proposed termination’’ (see
§ 170.580(e) and 81 FR 72437)). We
propose to not include this step when
a health IT developer fails to take
appropriate and timely corrective action
for noncompliance with a Condition of
Certification. Rather, as discussed
above, ONC may proceed directly to
issuing a certification ban or notice of
termination if it determines a
certification ban and/or termination are
appropriate per the considerations
discussed above. The Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification include
requirements of developer business
practices and actions for which, as
previously discussed, noncompliance
with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification in these arenas are likely to
undermine the integrity of the Program
and impede widespread interoperability
and information exchange. As such,
ONC believes it is appropriate and
consistent with the Cures Act to proceed
immediately to a certification ban and/
or termination of the affected certified
Health IT Modules’ certificates if a
developer does not take appropriate and
timely corrective action. A certification
ban and/or termination are appropriate
disincentives for noncompliance with
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification.
4. Public Listing of Certification Ban
and Terminations
We propose to publicly list health IT
developers and certified Health IT
Modules on ONC’s website that are
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subject to a certification ban and/or
have been terminated, respectively, for
noncompliance with a Condition of
Certification or for reasons already
specified in § 170.581. We currently
take this same approach for health IT
with terminated certifications (see 81 FR
72438). Public listing serves to
discourage noncompliance with
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification, other Program
requirements, remediation of nonconformities, and cooperation with ONC
and the ONC–ACBs. It also serves to
provide notice to all ONC–ATLs, ONC–
ACBs, public and private programs
requiring the use of certified health IT,
and consumers of certified health IT of
the status of certified health IT and
health IT developers operating under
the Program.
We seek comment on this proposal,
including input on the appropriate
period of time to list health IT
developers and affected certified Health
IT Modules on healthit.gov. For
example, if a developer sought and
received reinstatement under the
Program (and lifting of the certification
ban), should the health IT developer no
longer be listed on the ONC website?
Alternatively, should we list health IT
developers who have been subject to the
certification ban under § 170.581 for a
certain period of time beyond the active
ban, including indefinitely (e.g., with
the timeframe when the ban was
active)?
5. Effect on Existing Program
Requirements and Processes
The Cures Act introduces new
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification that encompass technical
and functional requirements of health IT
and new actions and business practice
requirements for health IT developers,
which ONC proposes to adopt in
subpart D of Part 170. The pre-Cures Act
structure and requirements of the
Program provide processes to enforce
compliance with technical and
functional requirements of certified
health IT, and to a more limited extent,
requirements for the business practices
of health IT developers (see, e.g., 45 CFR
170.523(k)(1)) under subparts C
(Certification Criteria for Health
Information Technology) and E (ONC
Health IT Certification Program) of Part
170. ONC–ACBs are required to perform
surveillance on certified Health IT
Modules and may investigate reported
alleged non-conformities with Program
requirements under subparts A, B, C,
and E with the ultimate goal to work
with the health IT developer to correct
the non-conformity. Under certain
situations, such as unsafe conditions or
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impediments to ONC–ACB oversight,
ONC may directly review certified
health IT to determine whether it
conforms to the requirements of the
Program (see § 170.580 and the EOA
final rule at 81 FR 72404). These
avenues for investigating nonconformities with certified Health IT
Modules will continue to exist under
the Program and generally focus on
functionality and performance of
certified health IT or more limited
requirements of business practices of
health IT developers found in subparts
A, B, C and E of Part 170, respectively.
Thus, there may be instances where one
or more Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification are not being or have not
been met that also relate to certified
Health IT Modules non-conformities
under subparts A, B, C and E. Under
these situations, ONC could in parallel
implement both sets of processes—
existing processes to investigate Health
IT Module non-conformities and the
proposed process to enforce compliance
with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification.
We again note that under the
proposed enforcement approach, only
ONC would have the ability to
determine whether a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification
requirement per subpart D has been or
is being met. We propose to delineate
the scope of an ONC–ACB’s
requirements to perform surveillance on
certified Health IT Modules as related
only to the requirements of subparts A,
B, C and E of Part 170. Table 3 below
further illustrates the proposed
difference in scope of review activities
between ONC–ACBs and ONC. Given
our proposed approach that would
authorize solely ONC to determine
whether a Condition or Maintenance of
Certification requirement per subpart D
has been or is being met, we propose to
add a new Principle of Proper Conduct
for ONC–ACBs in § 170.523(s) that
would require ONC–ACBs to report to
ONC, no later than a week after
becoming aware, any information that
could inform whether ONC should
exercise direct review for
noncompliance with a Condition of
Certification or any matter within the
scope of ONC direct review. We believe
this is appropriate because ONC–ACBs
receive complaints and other
information about certified Health IT
Modules through their own channels; as
this information may relate to potential
noncompliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification or other
matters within the scope of ONC direct
review, ONC should be made aware of
this information.
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TABLE 3—SCOPE OF ONC–ACB SURVEILLANCE AND ONC DIRECT REVIEW FOR PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT APPROACH
FOR CONDITIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF CERTIFICATION
ONC purview for
enforcement
per 170.580
and 170.581
Condition of certification
ONC–ACB purview for surveillance per 170.556
170.401: Information Blocking .......
170.402: Assurances .....................
Only as it relates to Subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170 ...............................................
Only as it relates to Subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170, including the certification criterion in § 170.315(b)(10) ‘‘EHI export’’.
Only as it relates to Subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170 ...............................................
Only as it relates to Subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170, including the certification criterion in § 170.315(g)(10).
Only as it relates to Subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170 ...............................................
Only as it relates to Subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170 ...............................................
170.403: Communications .............
170.404: APIs ................................
170.405: Real World Testing .........
170.406: Attestations .....................
For example and further illustration
purposes, ONC may receive a complaint
of information blocking alleging that a
health IT developer has limited the
ability to receive secure Direct messages
from users of a competing developer’s
EHR. The complaint alleges the certified
health IT drops the incoming message
without alerting the user that a message
was ever received. ONC would consider
the information blocking concerns
(proposed § 170.401) as well as the
potential safety concerns presented by
dropped messages associated with
certified functionality of the 2015
Edition ‘‘transitions of care’’
certification criterion (§ 170.315(b)(1))
and standards for the secure Direct
messaging in its review. For the
potential safety concerns, ONC would
be exercising its authority to review
certified health IT that may be causing
or contributing to conditions that
present a serious risk to public health or
safety under § 170.580(a)(2)(i). In
contrast, the ONC–ACB would not be
responsible for reviewing the
information blocking or safety concerns
directly, but it would be responsible for
assessing whether surveillance needs to
be performed on the certified health IT
for the functionality in the 2015 Edition
‘‘transitions of care’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(b)(1)) and the 2015
Edition ‘‘Direct Project’’ certification
criterion (§ 170.315(h)(1)), as these
requirements are found within subpart
C of Part 170 and could be implicated
based on the complaint.
To provide another example, an
ONC–ACB could receive complaints
from users that a developer’s certified
health IT does not support the FHIR
DSTU 2 standard and associated API
resource collection in health (ARCH
Version 1) as required in the proposed
new 2015 Edition certification criterion
§ 170.315(g)(10) (proposed under
subparts B and C).The respective ONC–
ACB(s) responsible for the certification
of the certified health IT could surveil
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this health IT under the requirements of
§ 170.556 (under subpart E).
Additionally, ONC could follow the
CAP process under § 170.580(c) to
enforce the associated ‘‘API’’ Condition
of Certification proposed in
§ 170.404(a)(2). During the course of the
ONC–ACB surveillance, the ONC–ACB
subsequently discovers the developer
has implemented the FHIR DSTU 2
standard and associated resources in
such as a way that the patient’s
historical medications are being
accessed, but not the patient’s current
medications. The ONC–ACB would
notify ONC of its findings as it relates
to a Condition of Certification under
subpart D and pursue its own corrective
action process under the surveillance
requirements of § 170.556. Once ONC
receives information regarding the
complaints from the ONC–ACB, we
could consider the potential safety risks
for providers using the developer’s API
to access new or referred patients’
medical information for diagnostic and
treatment purposes. In this example,
ONC could review both the certified
health IT and the developer action
under § 170.580, which is proposed to
be expanded to account for developer
actions under the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification (see
proposed § 170.580(a)(2)(iii)) in addition
to ONC’s direct investigation of certified
health IT for potential safety risks (see
§ 170.580(a)(2)(i)).
6. Concurrent Enforcement by the Office
of Inspector General
We clarify that the enforcement
approach described in this proposal
would apply to ONC’s administration of
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification and other requirements
under the Program but would not apply
to other agencies or offices that have
independent authority to investigate
and take enforcement action against a
health IT developer of certified health
IT. Notably, section 3022(b)(1)(A)(ii) of
the PHSA, as added by the Cures Act,
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All of 170.401.
All of 170.402.
All of 170.403.
All of 170.404.
All of 170.405.
All of 170.406.
authorizes the OIG to investigate claims
that a health IT developer of certified
health IT has engaged in information
blocking, which is defined by section
3022(a)(1) of the PHSA subject to
reasonable and necessary activities
identified by the Secretary as exceptions
to the definition as proposed at part 171
(see section VIII. of this proposed rule).
Additionally, section 3022(b)(1)(A)(i)
authorizes OIG to investigate claims that
a health IT developer of certified health
IT has submitted a false attestation
under the Condition of Certification
described at section 3001(c)(5)(D)(vii).
We emphasize that ONC’s and OIG’s
respective authorities under the Cures
Act (and in general) are independent
and that either or both offices may
exercise those authorities at any time.
We anticipate, however, that ONC and
OIG may coordinate their respective
enforcement activities, as appropriate,
such as by sharing information about
claims or suggestions of possible
information blocking or false
attestations (including violations of
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification that may indicate that a
developer has falsely attested to meeting
a condition). Therefore, we propose that
we may coordinate our review of a
claim of information blocking with the
OIG or defer to the OIG to lead a review
of a claim of information blocking. In
addition, we propose that we may rely
on OIG findings to form the basis of a
direct review action.
7. Applicability of Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
Requirements for Self-Developers
The final rule establishing ONC’s
Permanent Certification Program,
‘‘Establishment of the Permanent
Certification for Health Information’’ (76
FR 1261), addresses self-developers. The
language in the final rule describes the
concept of ‘‘self-developed’’ as referring
to a Complete EHR or EHR Module
designed, created, or modified by an
entity that assumed the total costs for
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testing and certification and that will be
the primary user of the health IT (76 FR
1300). Therefore, self-developers differ
from other health IT developers in that
their products are not made
commercially available and they do not
have customers. While we propose that
all general Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification requirements apply to
such developers, we also seek comment
on which aspects of the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements may not be applicable to
self-developers. For example, when
considering the Communications
Condition of Certification, a selfdeveloper of health IT may not have
customer contracts, but could have
other agreements in place, such as
NDAs, that would be subject to the
Condition of Certification.
VIII. Information Blocking
A. Statutory Basis
Section 4004 of the Cures Act added
section 3022 of the PHSA (42 U.S.C.
300jj–52, ‘‘the information blocking
provision’’). Section 3022(a)(1) of the
PHSA defines practices that constitute
information blocking when engaged in
by a health care provider, or a health
information technology developer,
exchange, or network. Section
3022(a)(3) authorizes the Secretary to
identify, through notice and comment
rulemaking, reasonable and necessary
activities that do not constitute
information blocking for purposes of the
definition set forth in section 3022(a)(1).
We propose to establish seven
exceptions to the information blocking
definition, each of which would define
certain activities that would not
constitute information blocking for
purposes of section 3022(a)(1) of the
PHSA because they are reasonable and
necessary to further the ultimate policy
goals of the information blocking
provision. We also propose to interpret
or define certain statutory terms and
concepts that are ambiguous,
incomplete, or provide the Secretary
with discretion, and that we believe are
necessary to carry out the Secretary’s
rulemaking responsibilities under
section 3022(a)(3).
B. Legislative Background and Policy
Considerations
In this section, we outline the purpose
of the information blocking provision
and related policy and practical
considerations that we considered in
identifying the reasonable and necessary
activities that are proposed as
exceptions to the definition of
information blocking described
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subsequently in section VIII.D of this
preamble.
1. Purpose of the Information Blocking
Provision
The information blocking provision
was enacted in response to concerns
that some individuals and entities are
engaging in practices that unreasonably
limit the availability and use of
electronic health information (EHI) for
authorized and permitted purposes.
These practices undermine public and
private sector investments in the
nation’s health IT infrastructure and
frustrate efforts to use modern
technologies to improve health care
quality and efficiency, accelerate
research and innovation, and provide
greater value and choice to health care
consumers.
The nature and extent of information
blocking has come into sharp focus in
recent years. In 2015, at the request of
Congress, we submitted a Report on
Health Information Blocking 101
(‘‘Information Blocking Congressional
Report’’), in which we commented on
the then current state of technology and
of health IT and health care markets.
Notably, we observed that prevailing
market conditions create incentives for
some individuals and entities to
exercise their control over EHI in ways
that limit its availability and use.
Since that time, we have continued to
receive complaints and reports of
information blocking from patients,
clinicians, health care executives,
payers, app developers and other
technology companies, registries and
health information exchanges,
professional and trade associations, and
many other stakeholders. ONC has
listened to and reviewed these
complaints and reports, consulted with
stakeholders, and solicited input from
our federal partners in order to inform
our proposed information blocking
policies. Stakeholders described
discriminatory pricing policies that
have the obvious purpose and effect of
excluding competitors from the use of
interoperability elements. Many of the
industry stakeholders who shared their
perspectives with us in listening
sessions, including several health IT
developers of certified health IT,
condemned these practices and urged us
to swiftly address them. Our
engagement with stakeholders confirms
that, despite significant public and
private sector efforts to improve
interoperability and data accessibility,
101 ONC, Report to Congress on Health
Information Blocking (Apr. 2015), https://
www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/
info_blocking_040915.pdf [hereinafter ‘‘Information
Blocking Congressional Report’’].
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adverse incentives remain and continue
to undermine progress toward a more
connected health system.
Based on these economic realities and
our first-hand experience working with
the health IT industry and stakeholders,
in the Information Blocking
Congressional Report, we concluded
that information blocking is a serious
problem and recommended that
Congress prohibit information blocking
and provide penalties and enforcement
mechanisms to deter these harmful
practices.
Recent empirical and economic
research further underscores the
intractability of this problem and its
harmful effects. In a national survey of
health information organizations, half of
respondents reported that EHR
developers routinely engage in
information blocking, and a quarter of
respondents reported that hospitals and
health systems routinely do so. The
survey reported that perceived
motivations for such conduct included,
for EHR vendors, maximizing short-term
revenue and competing for new clients,
and for hospitals and health systems,
strengthening their competitive position
relative to other hospitals and health
systems.102 Other research suggests that
these practices weaken competition
among health care providers by limiting
patient mobility, encouraging
consolidation, and creating barriers to
entry for developers of new and
innovative applications and
technologies that enable more effective
uses of clinical data to improve
population health and the patient
experience.103
The information blocking provision
provides a comprehensive response to
these concerns. The information
blocking provision defines and creates
possible penalties and disincentives for
102 See, e.g., Julia Adler-Milstein and Eric Pfeifer,
Information Blocking: Is It Occurring And What
Policy Strategies Can Address It?, 95 Milbank
Quarterly 117, 124–25 (Mar. 2017), available at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/14680009.12247/full.
103 See, e.g., Martin Gaynor, Farzad Mostashari,
and Paul B. Ginsberg, Making Health Care Markets
Work: Competition Policy for Health Care, 16–17
(Apr. 2017), available at https://heinz.cmu.edu/
news/news-detail/index.aspx?nid=3930; Diego A.
Martinez et al., A Strategic Gaming Model For
Health Information Exchange Markets, Health Care
Mgmt. Science (Sept. 2016). (‘‘[S]ome healthcare
provider entities may be interfering with HIE across
disparate and unaffiliated providers to gain market
advantage.’’) Niam Yaraghi, A Sustainable Business
Model for Health Information Exchange Platforms:
The Solution to Interoperability in Healthcare IT
(2015), available at https://www.brookings.edu/
research/papers/2015/01/30-sustainable-businessmodel-health-information-exchange-yaraghi;
Thomas C. Tsai & Ashish K. Jha, Hospital
Consolidation, Competition, and Quality: Is Bigger
Necessarily Better?, 312 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 29,
29 (2014).
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information blocking in broad terms,
while working to deter the entire
spectrum of practices that unnecessarily
impede the flow of EHI or its use to
improve health and the delivery of care.
The information blocking provision
applies to the conduct of health care
providers, and to health IT developers
of certified health IT, exchanges, and
networks, and seeks to deter it with
substantial penalties, including civil
money penalties, and disincentives for
violations. Additionally, developers of
health IT certified under the Program
are prohibited from information
blocking under 3001(c)(5)(D)(i) of the
PHSA. To promote effective
enforcement, the information blocking
provision empowers the HHS Office of
Inspector General (OIG) to investigate
claims of information blocking and
provides referral processes to facilitate
coordination with other relevant
agencies, including ONC, the HHS
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The
information blocking provision also
provides for a complaint process and
corresponding confidentiality
protections to encourage and facilitate
the reporting of information blocking.
Enforcement of the information blocking
provision is buttressed by section
3001(c)(5)(D)(i) and (vi) of the PHSA,
which prohibits information blocking by
developers of certified health IT as a
Condition and Maintenance of
Certification requirement under the
Program and requires them to attest that
they have not engaged in such practices.
2. Policy Considerations and Approach
to the Information Blocking Provision
To ensure that individuals and
entities that engage in information
blocking are held accountable, the
information blocking provision
encompasses a relatively broad range of
potential practices. For example, it is
possible that some activities that are
innocuous, or even beneficial, could
technically implicate the information
blocking provision. Given the
possibility of these practices, Congress
authorized the Secretary to identify
reasonable and necessary activities that
do not constitute information blocking
(see section 3022(a)(3) of the PHSA) (in
this proposed rule, we refer to such
reasonable and necessary activities
identified by the Secretary as
‘‘exceptions’’ to the information
blocking provision). The information
blocking provision also excludes from
the definition of information blocking
practices that are required by law
(section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA) and
clarifies certain other practices that
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would not be penalized (sections
3022(a)(6) and (7) of the PHSA).
In considering potential exceptions to
the information blocking provision, we
must balance a number of policy and
practical considerations. To minimize
compliance and other burdens for
stakeholders, we seek to promote
policies that are clear, predictable, and
administrable. In addition, we seek to
implement the information blocking
provision in a way that is sensitive to
legitimate practical challenges that may
prevent access, exchange, or use of EHI
in certain situations. We must also
accommodate practices that, while they
may inhibit access, exchange, or use of
EHI, are reasonable and necessary to
advance other compelling policy
interests, such as preventing harm to
patients and others, promoting the
privacy and security of EHI, and
promoting competition and consumer
welfare.
At the same time, while pursuing
these objectives, we must adhere to
Congress’s plainly expressed intent to
provide a comprehensive response to
the information blocking problem.
Information blocking can occur through
a variety of business, technical, and
organizational practices that can be
difficult to detect and that are
constantly changing as technology and
industry conditions evolve. The statute
responds to these challenges by defining
information blocking broadly and in a
manner that allows for careful
consideration of relevant facts and
circumstances in individual cases.
Accordingly, we propose to establish
certain defined exceptions to the
information blocking provision. These
exceptions would be subject to strict
conditions that balance the
considerations described above. Based
on those considerations, in developing
the proposed exceptions, we applied
three overarching policy criteria. First,
each exception would be limited to
certain activities that are both
reasonable and necessary to advance the
aims of the information blocking
provision. These reasonable and
necessary activities include: Promoting
public confidence in the health IT
infrastructure by supporting the privacy
and security of EHI, and protecting
patient safety; and promoting
competition and innovation in health IT
and its use to provide health care
services to consumers. Second, we
believe that each exception addresses a
significant risk that regulated
individuals and entities will not engage
in these reasonable and necessary
activities because of uncertainty
regarding the breadth or applicability of
the information blocking provision.
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7509
Third, and last, each exception is
intended to be tailored, through
appropriate conditions, so that it is
limited to the reasonable and necessary
activities that it is designed to protect
and does not extend protection to other
activities or practices that could raise
information blocking concerns.
We discuss these policy
considerations in more detail in the
context of each of the exceptions
proposed in section VIII.D of this
preamble.
C. Relevant Statutory Terms and
Provisions
In this section of the preamble, we
discuss how we propose to interpret
certain aspects of the information
blocking provision that we believe are
ambiguous, incomplete, or that provide
the Secretary with discretion. We
propose to define or interpret certain
terms or concepts that are present in the
statute and, in a few instances, to
establish new regulatory terms or
definitions that we believe are necessary
to implement the Secretary’s authority
under section 3022(a)(3) to identify
reasonable and necessary activities that
do not constitute information blocking.
Our goal in interpreting the statute and
defining relevant terms is to provide
greater clarity concerning the types of
practices that could implicate the
information blocking provision and,
relatedly, to more effectively
communicate the applicability and
scope of the proposed exceptions
outlined in this proposed rule. We
believe that these proposals will provide
a more meaningful opportunity for the
public to comment on the proposed
exceptions and our overall approach to
interpreting and administering the
information blocking provision.
Additionally, we believe additional
interpretive clarity will assist regulated
actors to comply with the requirements
of the information blocking provision.
1. ‘‘Required by Law’’
With regard to the statute’s exclusion
of practices that are ‘‘required by law’’
from the definition of information
blocking, we emphasize that ‘‘required
by law’’ refers specifically to
interferences with access, exchange, or
use of EHI that are explicitly required by
state or federal law. By carving out
practices that are ‘‘required by law,’’ the
statute acknowledged that there are state
and federal laws that advance important
policy interests and objectives by
restricting access, exchange, and use of
their EHI, and that practices that follow
such laws should not be considered
information blocking.
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We note that for the purpose of
developing an exception for reasonable
and necessary privacy-protective
practices, we have distinguished
between interferences that are ‘‘required
by law’’ and those engaged in pursuant
to a privacy law, but which are not
‘‘required by law.’’ The former does not
fall within the definition of information
blocking, but the latter may implicate
the information blocking provision and
an exception may be necessary. For a
detailed discussion of this topic, please
see section VIII.D.2 of this preamble.
2. Health Care Providers, Health IT
Developers, Exchanges, and Networks
Section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA, in
defining information blocking, refers to
four classes of individuals and entities
that may engage in information blocking
and which include: Health care
providers, health IT developers of
certified health IT, networks, and
exchanges. We propose to adopt
definitions of these terms to provide
clarity regarding the types of
individuals and entities to whom the
information blocking provision applies.
We note that, for convenience and to
avoid repetition in this preamble, we
typically refer to these individuals and
entities covered by the information
blocking provision as ‘‘actors’’ unless it
is relevant or useful to refer to the
specific type of individual or entity.
That is, when the term ‘‘actor’’ appears
in this preamble, it means an individual
or entity that is a health care provider,
health IT developer, exchange, or
network. For the same reasons, we
propose to define ‘‘actor’’ in § 171.102.
a. Health Care Providers
The term ‘‘health care provider’’ is
defined in section 3000(3) of the PHSA.
We propose to adopt this definition for
purposes of section 3022 of the PHSA
when defining ‘‘health care provider’’ in
§ 171.102. We note that this definition is
different from the definition of ‘‘health
care provider’’ under the HIPAA Privacy
and Security Rules. We are considering
adjusting the information blocking
definition of ‘‘health care provider’’ to
cover all individuals and entities
covered by the HIPAA ‘‘health care
provider’’ definition. We seek comment
on whether this approach would be
justified, and commenters are
encouraged to specify reasons why
doing so might be necessary to ensure
that the information blocking provision
applies to all health care providers that
might engage in information blocking.
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b. Health IT Developers of Certified
Health IT
Section 3022(a)(1)(B) of the PHSA
defines information blocking, in part, by
reference to the conduct of ‘‘health
information technology developers.’’
Because title XXX of the PHSA does not
define ‘‘health information technology
developer,’’ we interpret section
3022(a)(1)(B) in light of the specific
authority provided to OIG in section
3022(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). Section
3022(b)(2) discusses developers,
networks, and exchanges in terms of an
‘‘individual or entity,’’ specifically
cross-referencing section 3022(b)(1)(A).
Sections 3002(b)(1) and (b)(1)(A) state,
in relevant part, that the OIG may
investigate information blocking claims
regarding a health information
technology developer of certified health
information technology or other entity
offering certified health information
technology. Together, these sections
make clear that the information blocking
provisions and OIG’s authority extend
to individuals or entities that develop or
offer certified health IT. That the
individual or entity must develop or
offer certified health IT is further
supported by section 3022(a)(7) of the
PHSA—which refers to developers’
responsibilities to meet the
requirements of certification—and
section 4002 of the Cures Act—which
identifies information blocking as a
Condition of Certification.
Notwithstanding this, the Cures Act
does not prescribe that conduct that
may implicate the information blocking
provisions be limited to practices
related to only certified health IT.
Rather, the information blocking
provisions would be implicated by any
practice engaged in by an individual or
entity that develops or offers certified
health IT that is likely to interfere with
the access, exchange, or use of EHI,
including practices associated with any
of the developer or offeror’s health IT
products that have not been certified
under the Program. This interpretation
is based primarily on section 3022(b)(1)
of the PHSA. If Congress had intended
that the enforcement of the information
blocking provisions were limited to
practices connected to certified health
IT, we believe the Cures Act would have
included language that tied enforcement
to the operation or performance of a
product certified under the Program.
Rather, the description of the practices
that OIG can investigate in section
3022(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the PHSA are not
tied to the certification status of the
health IT at issue, omitting any express
reference to a health IT developer’s
practice needing to be related to
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‘‘certified health information
technology.’’ That the scope of the
information blocking provision should
not be limited to practices that involve
only certified health IT is further
evidenced by no such limitation
applying to health care providers, health
information exchanges (HIEs), and
health information networks (HINs) as
listed in sections 3022(b)(1) of the
PHSA.
Additionally, the ‘‘practice described’’
in section 3022(a)(2) of the PHSA refers
to ‘‘certified health information
technologies’’ when illustrating
practices that restrict authorized access,
exchange, or use of EHI under
applicable state or federal laws (section
3022(a)(2)(A) of the PHSA), but omits
any reference to certification when
describing ‘‘health information
technology’’ in the practices described
in sections 3022(a)(2)(B) and (C) of the
PHSA. Importantly, sections
3022(a)(2)(B) and (C) of the PHSA
address practices that are particularly
relevant to health IT developers and
offerors, although they could be engaged
in by other types of actors. We interpret
this drafting as a deliberate decision not
to link the information blocking
provisions with only the performance or
use of certified health IT.
Finally, we note that the Cures Act
does not impose a temporal nexus that
would require that information blocking
be carried out at a time when an
individual or entity had health IT
certified under the Program. Ostensibly,
then, once an individual or entity has
health IT certified, or otherwise
maintains the certification of health IT,
the individual or entity becomes forever
subject to the information blocking
provision. We do not believe that,
understood in context, the Cures Act
supports such a broad interpretation.
Noting the above discussion concerning
OIG’s scope of authority under section
3022(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the PHSA, we
believe that to make developers and
offerors of certified health IT subject to
the information blocking provision in
perpetuity would be inconsistent with
the voluntary nature of the Program.
However, we also believe that the Cures
Act does not provide any basis for
interpreting the information blocking
provision so narrowly that a developer
or offeror of certified health IT could
escape penalty as a consequence of
having its certification terminated or by
withdrawing all of its extant
certifications.
We consider that in the circumstances
where a health IT developer has its
certification terminated, or withdraws
its certification, such that it no longer
has any health IT certified under the
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Program, it should nonetheless be
subject to penalties for information
blocking engaged in during the time that
it did have health IT certified under the
Program. Accordingly, we propose to
adopt a definition of ‘‘heath information
technology (IT) developer of certified
health IT’’ for the purposes of
interpretation and enforcement of the
information blocking provisions,
including those regulatory provisions
proposed under Title 45, part 171, of the
Code of Federal Regulations, that would
capture such developers or offerors. We
propose, in § 171.102, that ‘‘health IT
developer of certified health IT’’ means
an individual or entity that develops or
offers health information technology (as
that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
300jj(5)) and which had, at the time it
engaged in a practice that is the subject
of an information blocking claim, health
IT (one or more) certified under the
Program. To note, we propose that the
term ‘‘information blocking claim’’
within this definition should be read
broadly to encompass any statement of
information blocking or potential
information blocking. ‘‘Claims’’ of
information blocking within this
definition would not be limited, in any
way, to a specific form, format, or
submission approach or process.
We are also considering additional
approaches to help ensure that
developers and offerors of certified
health IT remain subject to the
information blocking provision for an
appropriate period of time after leaving
the Program. The rationale for this
approach would be that a developer or
offeror of certified health IT should be
subject to penalties if, following the
termination or withdrawal of
certification, it refused to provide its
customers with access to the EHI stored
in the decertified health IT, provided
that such interference was not required
by law and did not qualify for one of the
information blocking exceptions.
Adopting this broader approach would
help avoid the risk that a developer
would be able to engage in the practices
described in section 3022(a)(2) of the
PHSA in respect to EHI that was
collected on behalf of a health care
provider when that health care provider
would reasonably expect that the
information blocking provision would
protect against unreasonable and
unnecessary interferences with that EHI.
If the information blocking provision
did not extend to capture such conduct,
the protection afforded by the
information blocking provision could
become illusory, and providers would
need to consider securing contractual
rights to prevent interference, which we
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are aware they typically have great
difficulty doing.104
One way that this could be achieved
would be to define ‘‘health IT developer
of certified health IT’’ as including
developers and offerors of certified
health IT that continue to store EHI that
was previously stored in health IT
certified in the Program. Alternatively,
we are considering whether developers
and offerors of certified health IT should
remain subject to the information
blocking provision for an appropriate
period of time after leaving the Program.
Namely, that the information blocking
provision should apply for a specific
time period, say one year, after the
developer or offeror no longer has any
health IT certified in the Program. This
second approach has the attraction of
providing a more certain basis for
understanding which developers are
subject to the information blocking
provision. However, it also potentially
captures developers and offerors who
have fully removed themselves from the
Program and, for example, no longer
exercise control over EHI that was
stored in their certified health IT.
We seek comment on which of these
two models best achieves our policy
goal of ensuring that health IT
developers of certified health IT will
face consequences under the
information blocking provision if they
engage in information blocking in
connection with EHI that was stored or
controlled by the developer or offeror
whilst they were participating in the
program. Commenters are also
encouraged to identify alternative
models and approaches for identifying
when a developer or offeror should, and
should no longer, be subject to the
information blocking provision.
We note that a developer or offeror of
a single health IT product that has had
its certification suspended would be
considered to have certified health IT
for the purpose of the definition. We
also note that we interpret the
requirement that the health IT developer
of certified health IT ‘‘exercise control’’
over EHI broadly. A developer would
not necessarily need to have access to
the EHI in order to exercise control. For
example, a developer that implemented
a ‘‘kill-switch’’ for a decertified software
product that was locally hosted by a
health care provider, preventing that
provider from accessing its records,
would be exercising control over the
EHI for the purpose of this definition.
104 See ONC, EHR Contracts Untangled Selecting
Wisely, Negotiating Terms, And Understanding The
Fine Print, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/
files/EHR_Contracts_Untangled.pdf (September
2016).
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We clarify that we interpret
‘‘individual or entity that develops the
certified health IT’’ as the individual or
entity that is legally responsible for the
certification status of the health IT,
which would be the individual or entity
that entered into a binding agreement
that resulted in the certification status of
the health IT under the Program or, if
such rights are transferred, the
individual or entity that holds the rights
to the certified health IT. We also clarify
that an ‘‘individual or entity that offers
certified health IT’’ would include an
individual or entity that under any
arrangement makes certified health IT
available for purchase or license. We
seek comment on both of our
interpretations. More specifically, we
seek comment on whether there are
particular types of arrangements under
which certified health IT is ‘‘offered’’ in
which the offeror should not be
considered a ‘‘health IT developer of
certified health IT’’ for the purposes of
the information blocking provisions.
We also clarify that the proposed
definition of ‘‘health IT developer of
certified health IT’’ and our
interpretation of the use of ‘‘health
information technology developer’’
applies to Part 171 only and does not
apply to the implementation of any
other section of the PHSA or the Cures
Act, including section 4005(c)(1) of the
Cures Act.
We clarify that API Technology
Suppliers, as described in section VII.4
of this preamble and defined in
§ 170.102, would be considered health
IT developers of certified health IT
subject to the conditions described
above.
Last, we clarify that a ‘‘selfdeveloper’’ of certified health IT, as the
term has been used in the ONC Health
IT Certification Program (Program) and
described in this rulemaking (section
VII.D.7) and previous rulemaking,105
would be treated as a health care
provider for the purposes of information
blocking. This is because of our
description of a self-developer for
Program purposes 106 would essentially
mean that such developers would not be
supplying or offering their certified
health IT to other entities. To be clear,
self-developers would still be subject to
the proposed Conditions and
105 The final rule establishing ONC’s Permanent
Certification Program, ‘‘Establishment of the
Permanent Certification for Health Information’’ (76
FR 1261), addresses self-developers.
106 The language in the final rule describes the
concept of ‘‘self-developed’’ as referring to a
complete EHR or EHR Module designed, created, or
modified by an entity that assumed the total costs
for testing and certification and that will be the
primary user of the health IT (76 FR 1300).
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Maintenance of Certification
requirements because they have health
IT certified under the Program (see also
section VII.D.7). We welcome comments
on our determination regarding ‘‘selfdevelopers’’ for information blocking
purposes and whether there are other
factors we should consider in how we
treat ‘‘self-developers’’ of certified
health IT for the purposes of
information blocking.
We also seek comment generally on
the definition proposed for ‘‘health IT
developer of certified health IT.’’
c. Networks and Exchanges
The terms ‘‘network’’ and ‘‘exchange’’
are not defined in the information
blocking provision or in any other
relevant statutory provisions. We
propose to define these terms so that
these individuals and entities that are
covered by the information blocking
provision understand that they must
comply with its provisions. In
accordance with the meaning and intent
of the information blocking provision,
we believe it is necessary to define these
terms in a way that does not assume the
application or use of certain
technologies and is flexible enough to
apply to the full range and diversity of
exchanges and networks that exist today
and may arise in the future. We note
that in the past few years alone many
new types of exchanges and networks
that transmit EHI have emerged, and we
expect this trend to accelerate with
continued advancements in technology
and renewed efforts to advance trusted
exchange among networks and other
entities under the trusted exchange
framework and common agreement
provided for by section 4003(b) of the
Cures Act.
In considering the most appropriate
way to define these terms, we examined
how they are used throughout the Cures
Act and the HITECH Act. Additionally,
we considered dictionary and industry
definitions of ‘‘network’’ and
‘‘exchange.’’ While these terms have
varied usage and meaning in different
industry contexts, certain concepts are
common and have been incorporated
into the proposed definitions below.
i. Health Information Network
We propose a functional definition of
‘‘health information network’’ (HIN) that
focuses on the role of these actors in the
health information ecosystem. We
believe the defining attribute of a HIN
is that it enables, facilitates, or controls
the movement of information between
or among different individuals or
entities that are unaffiliated. For this
purpose, we propose that two parties are
affiliated if one has the power to control
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the other, or if both parties are under the
common control or ownership of a
common owner. We note that a
significant implication of this definition
is that a health care provider or other
entity that enables, facilitates, or
controls the movement of EHI within its
own organization, or between or among
its affiliated entities, is not a HIN in
connection with that movement of
information for the purposes of this
proposed rule.
More affirmatively, we propose that
an actor could be considered a HIN if it
performs any or any combination of the
following activities. First, the actor
would be a HIN if it were to determine,
oversee, administer, control, or
substantially influence policies or
agreements that define the business,
operational, technical, or other
conditions or requirements that enable
or facilitate the access, exchange, or use
of EHI between or among two or more
unaffiliated individuals or entities.
Second, an actor would be a HIN if it
were to provide, manage, control, or
substantially influence any technology
or service that enables or facilitates the
access, exchange, or use of EHI between
or among two or more unaffiliated
individuals or entities.
Typically, a HIN will influence the
sharing of EHI between many
unaffiliated individuals or entities.
However, we do not propose to establish
any minimum number of parties or
‘‘nodes’’ beyond the requirement that
there be some actual or contemplated
access, exchange, or use of information
between or among at least two
unaffiliated individuals or entities that
is enabled, facilitated, or controlled by
the HIN. We believe such a limitation
would be artificial and would not
capture the full range of entities that
should be considered networks under
the information blocking provision. To
be clear, any individual or entity that
enables, facilitates, or controls the
access, exchange, or use of EHI between
or among only itself and another
unaffiliated individual or entity would
not be considered a HIN in connection
with the movement of that EHI
(although that movement of EHI may
still be regulated under the information
blocking provision on the basis that the
individual or entity is a health care
provider or health IT developer of
certified health IT). To be a HIN, the
individual or entity would need to be
enabling, facilitating, or controlling the
access, exchange, or use of EHI between
or among two or more other individuals
or entities that were not affiliated with
it.
To illustrate how the proposed
definition would operate, we note the
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following examples. An entity is
established within a state for the
purpose of improving the movement of
EHI between the health care providers
operating in that state. The entity
identifies standards relating to security
and offers terms and conditions to be
entered into by health care providers
wishing to participate in the network.
The entity offering (and then overseeing
and administering) the terms and
conditions for participation in the
network would be considered a HIN for
the purpose of the information blocking
provision. We note that there is no need
for a separate entity to be created in
order that an entity be considered a
HIN. For instance, a health system that
administers business and operational
agreements for facilitating the exchange
of EHI that are adhered to by
unaffiliated family practices and
specialist clinicians in order to
streamline referrals between those
practices and specialists would likely be
considered a HIN.
We note that the proposed definition
would also encompass an individual or
entity that does not directly enable,
facilitate, or control the movement of
information, but nonetheless exercises
control or substantial influence over the
policies, technology, or services of a
network. In particular, there may be an
individual or entity that relies on
another entity—such as an entity
specifically created for the purpose of
managing a network—for policies and
technology, but nevertheless dictates the
movement of EHI over that network. For
example, a large health care provider
may decide to lead an effort to establish
a network that facilitates the movement
of EHI between a group of smaller
health care providers (as well as the
large health care provider) and through
the technology of health IT developers.
To achieve this outcome, the large
health care provider, together with some
of the participants, creates a new entity
that administers the network’s policies
and technology. In this scenario, the
large health care provider would come
within the functional definition of a
HIN and could be held accountable for
the conduct of the network if the large
health care provider used its control or
substantial influence over the new
entity—either in a legal sense, such as
via its control over the governance or
management of the entity, or in a less
formal sense, such as if the large health
care provider prescribed a policy to be
adopted—to interfere with the access,
exchange, or use of EHI. We note that
the large health care provider in this
example would be treated as a health
care provider when utilizing the
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network to move EHI via the network’s
policies, technology, or services, but
would be considered a HIN in
connection with the practices of the
network over which the large health
care provider exercises control or
substantial influence.
We seek comment on the proposed
definition of a HIN. In particular, we
request comment on whether the
proposed definition is broad enough (or
too broad) to cover the full range of
individuals and entities that could be
considered health information networks
within the meaning of the information
blocking provision. Additionally, we
specifically request comment on
whether the proposed definition would
effectuate our policy goal of defining
this term in a way that does not assume
particular technologies or arrangements
and is flexible enough to accommodate
changes in these and other conditions.
ii. Health Information Exchange
We propose to define a ‘‘health
information exchange’’ (HIE) as an
individual or entity that enables access,
exchange, or use of EHI primarily
between or among a particular class of
individuals or entities or for a limited
set of purposes. Our research and
experience in working with exchanges
drove the proposed definition of this
term. HIEs include but are not limited
to regional health information
organizations (RHIOs), state health
information exchanges (state HIEs), and
other types of organizations, entities, or
arrangements that enable EHI to be
accessed, exchanged, or used between
or among particular types of parties or
for particular purposes. For example, an
HIE might facilitate or enable the access,
exchange, or use of EHI exclusively
within a regional area (such as a RHIO),
or for a limited scope of participants
and purposes (such as a clinical data
registry or an exchange established by a
hospital-physician organization to
facilitate Admission, Discharge, and
Transfer (ADT) alerting). We note that
HIEs may be established under federal
or state laws or regulations but may also
be established for specific health care or
business purposes or use cases.
Additionally, we note that if an HIE
facilitates the access, exchange, or use of
EHI for more than a narrowly defined
set of purposes, then it may be both an
HIE and a HIN.
We seek comment on this proposed
definition of an HIE. Again, we
encourage commenters to consider
whether this proposed definition is
broad enough (or too broad) to cover the
full range of individuals and entities
that could be considered exchanges
within the meaning of the information
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blocking provision, and whether the
proposed definition is sufficiently
flexible to accommodate changing
technological and other conditions.
billing for health care services, and
payment information for services to be
provided or already provided, which
may include price information.
3. Electronic Health Information
The definition of information
blocking applies to electronic health
information (EHI) (section 3022(a)(1) of
the PHSA). While section 3000(4) of the
PHSA by reference to section 1171(4) of
the Social Security Act defines ‘‘health
information,’’ EHI is not specifically
defined in the Cures Act, HITECH Act,
or other relevant statutes. We propose to
define EHI to mean:
(i) Electronic protected health
information; and
(ii) any other information that—
• is transmitted by or maintained in
electronic media, as defined in 45 CFR
160.103;
• identifies the individual, or with
respect to which there is a reasonable
basis to believe the information can be
used to identify the individual; and
• relates to the past, present, or future
health or condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an
individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of
health care to an individual.
This definition of EHI includes, but is
not limited to, electronic protected
health information and health
information that is created or received
by a health care provider and those
operating on their behalf; health plan;
health care clearinghouse; public health
authority; employer; life insurer; school;
or university. In addition, we clarify
that under our proposed definition, EHI
includes, but is not limited to,
electronic protected health information
(ePHI) as defined in 45 CFR 160.103. In
particular, unlike ePHI and health
information, EHI is not limited to
information that is created or received
by a health care provider, health plan,
health care clearinghouse, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school,
or university. EHI may be provided,
directly from an individual, or from
technology that the individual has
elected to use, to an actor covered by the
information blocking provisions. We
propose that EHI does not include
health information that is de-identified
consistent with the requirements of 45
CFR 164.514(b). We generally request
comment on this proposed definition as
well as on whether the exclusion of
health information that is de-identified
is consistent with the requirements of
45 CFR 164.514(b).
To be clear, this definition provides
for an expansive set of EHI, which could
include information on an individual’s
health insurance eligibility and benefits,
Price Information
The fragmented and complex nature
of pricing within the health care system
has decreased the efficiency of the
health care system and has had negative
impacts on patients, health care
providers, health systems, plans, plan
sponsors and other key health care
stakeholders. Patients and plan sponsors
have trouble anticipating or planning for
costs, are not sure how they can lower
their costs, are not able to compare
costs, and have no practical way to
measure the quality of the care or
coverage they receive relative to the
price they pay. Pricing information
continues to grow in importance with
the increase of high deductible health
plans and surprise billing, which have
resulted in an increase in out-of-pocket
health care spending. Transparency in
the price and cost of health care would
help address the concerns outlined
above by empowering patients to make
informed health care decisions. Further,
the availability of price information
could help increase competition that is
based on the quality and value of the
services patients receive. Consistent
with its statutory authority, the
Department is considering subsequent
rulemaking to expand access to price
information for the public, prospective
patients, plan sponsors, and health care
providers.
Increased consumer demand, aligned
incentives, more accessible and
digestible information, and the
evolution of price transparency tools are
critical components to moving to a
health care system that pays for value.
However, the complex and
decentralized nature of how price
information is created, structured,
formatted, and stored presents many
challenges to achieving price
transparency. To this point, pricing
within health care demands a marketbased approach whereby, for example,
platforms are created that utilize raw
data to provide consumers with
digestible price information through
their preferred medium.
ONC has a unique role in setting the
stage for such future actions by
establishing the framework to prevent
the blocking of price information. Given
that price information impacts the
ability of patients to shop for and make
decisions about their care, we seek
comment on the parameters and
implications of including price
information within the scope of EHI for
purposes of information blocking. In
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addition, the overall Department seeks
comment on the technical, operational,
legal, cultural, environmental and other
challenges to creating price
transparency within health care.
• Should prices that are included in
EHI:
Æ Reflect the amount to be charged to
and paid for by the patient’s health plan
(if the patient is insured) and the
amount to be charged to and collected
from the patient (as permitted by the
provider’s agreement with the patient’s
health plan), including for drugs or
medical devices;
Æ Include various pricing information
such as charge master price, negotiated
prices, pricing based on CPT codes or
DRGs, bundled prices, and price to
payer;
Æ Be reasonably available in advance
and at the point of sale;
Æ Reflect all out-of-pocket costs such
as deductibles, copayments and
coinsurance (for insured patients); and/
or
Æ Include a reference price as a
comparison tool such as the Medicare
rate and, if so, what is the most
meaningful reference?
• For the purpose of informing
referrals for additional care and
prescriptions, should future rulemaking
by the Department require health IT
developers to include in their platforms
a mechanism for patients to see price
information, and for health care
providers to have access to price
information, tailored to an individual
patient, integrated into the practice or
clinical workflow through APIs?
• To the extent that patients have a
right to price information within a
reasonable time in advance of care, how
would such reasonableness be defined
for:
Æ Scheduled care, including how far
in advance should such pricing be
available for patients still shopping for
care, in addition to those who have
already scheduled care;
Æ Emergency care, including how and
when transparent prices should be
disclosed to patients and what sort of
exceptions might be appropriate, such
as for patients in need of immediate
stabilization;
Æ Ambulance services, including air
ambulance services; and
Æ Unscheduled inpatient care, such
as admissions subsequent to an
emergency visit?
• How would price information vary
based on the type of health insurance
and/or payment structure being utilized,
and what, if any, challenges would such
variation create to identifying the price
information that should be made
available for access, exchange, or use?
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• Are there electronic mechanisms/
processes available for providing price
information to patients who are not
registered (i.e., not in the provider
system) when they try to get price
information?
• Should price information be made
available on public websites so that
patients can shop for care without
having to contact individual providers,
and if so, who should be responsible for
posting such information? Additionally,
how would the public posting of pricing
information through API technology
help advance market competition and
the ability of patients to shop for care?
• If price information that includes a
provider’s negotiated rates for all plans
and the rates for the uninsured were to
be required to be posted on a public
website, is there technology currently
available or that could be easily
developed to translate that data into a
useful format for individuals? Are there
existing standards and code sets that
would facilitate such transmission and
translation? To the extent that some data
standards are lacking in this regard,
could developers make use of
unstandardized data?
• What technical standards currently
exist or may be needed to represent
price information electronically for
purposes of access, exchange, and use?
• Are there technical impediments
experienced by stakeholders regarding
price information flowing
electronically?
• Would updates to the CMSmanaged HIPAA transactions standards
and code sets be necessary to address
the movement of price information in a
standardized way?
• How can price transparency be
achieved for care delivered through
value based arrangements, including at
accountable care organizations,
demonstrations and other risk-sharing
arrangements?
• What future requirements should
the Department consider regarding the
inclusion of price information in a
patient’s EHI, particularly as it relates to
the amount paid to a health care
provider by a patient (or on behalf of a
patient) as well as payment calculations
for the future provision of health care to
such patient?
• If price information is included in
EHI, could that information be useful in
subsequent rulemaking that the
Department may consider in order to
reduce or prevent surprise medical
billing, such as requirements relating to:
Æ The provision of a single bill that
includes all health care providers
involved in a health care service,
including their network status;
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Æ The provision of a binding quote
reasonably in advance of scheduled care
(that is, non-emergent care) or some
subset of scheduled care, such as for the
most ‘‘shoppable’’ services;
Æ Ensuring that all health care
providers in an in-network facility
charge the in-network rate; and
Æ Notification of billing policies such
as timely invoice dates for all providers
and facilities, notwithstanding network
status, due date for invoice payments by
the prospective patient’s payers and outof-pocket obligations, date when unpaid
balances are referred for collections, and
appeals rights and procedures for
patients wishing to contest an invoice?
4. Interests Promoted by the Information
Blocking Provision
a. Access, Exchange, and Use of EHI
The information blocking provision
promotes the ability to access,
exchange, and use EHI, consistent with
the requirements of applicable law. We
interpret the terms ‘‘access,’’
‘‘exchange,’’ and ‘‘use’’ broadly,
consistent with their generally
understood meaning in the health IT
industry and their function and context
in the information blocking provision.
The concepts of access, exchange, and
use are closely related: EHI cannot be
used unless it can be accessed, and this
often requires that the EHI be exchanged
among different individuals or entities
and through various technological
means. Moreover, the technological and
other means necessary to facilitate
appropriate access and exchange of EHI
vary significantly depending on the
purpose for which the information will
be used. For example, the technologies
and services that support a payer’s
access to EHI to assess clinical value
will likely differ from those that support
a patient’s access to EHI via a
smartphone app. That is, to deter
information blocking in these and many
other potential uses of EHI—and, by
extension, the many and diverse means
of access and exchange that support
such uses.
This is consistent with the way these
terms are employed in the information
blocking provision and in other relevant
statutory provisions. For example,
section 3022(a)(2) of the PHSA
contemplates a broad range of purposes
for which EHI may be accessed,
exchanged, and used—from treatment,
care delivery, and other permitted
purposes, to exporting complete
information sets and transitioning
between health IT systems, to
supporting innovations and
advancements in health information
access, exchange, and use. Separately,
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the Cures Act and the HITECH Act
contemplate many different purposes
for and means of accessing, exchanging,
and using EHI, which include, but are
not limited to, quality improvement,
guiding medical decisions at the time
and place of care, reducing medical
errors and health disparities, delivering
patient-centered care, and supporting
public health and clinical research
activities.107
In addition to these statutory
provisions, we have considered how the
terms access, exchange, and use have
been defined or used in existing
regulations and other relevant health IT
industry contexts. While those
definitions have specialized meanings
and are not controlling here, they are
instructive insofar as they illustrate the
breadth with which these terms have
been understood in other contexts. For
example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule
defines an individual’s right of access to
include the right to have a copy of all
or part of their PHI transmitted directly
to them or any person or entity he or she
designates, in any form and format
(including electronically) that the
individual requests and that the covered
entity holding the information can
readily produce (45 CFR 164.524). In a
different context, the HIPAA Security
Rule defines ‘‘access’’ as the ability or
the means necessary to read, write,
modify, or communicate data/
information or otherwise use any system
resource (45 CFR 164.304). The HIPAA
Rules also define the term ‘‘use,’’ which
includes the sharing, employment,
application, utilization, examination, or
analysis of individually identifiable
health information within an entity that
maintains the information (45 CFR
160.103).
As the examples and discussion above
demonstrate, the concepts of access,
exchange, and use are used in a variety
of contexts to refer to a broad spectrum
of activities. We believe that the types
of access, exchange, and use described
above would be promoted under the
information blocking provision, as
would other types of access, exchange,
or use not specifically contemplated in
these or other regulations. Further, we
note that the information blocking
provision would also extend to
innovations and advancements in health
information access, exchange, and use
that may occur in the future (see section
3022(a)(2) of the PHSA).
Consistent with the above, and to
convey the full breadth of activities that
may implicate the information blocking
provision, we propose definitions of
access, exchange, and use in § 171.102.
We emphasize the interrelated nature of
the definitions. For example, the
definition of ‘‘use’’ includes the ability
to read, write, modify, manipulate, or
apply EHI to accomplish a desired
outcome or to achieve a desired
purpose, while ‘‘access’’ is defined as
the ability or means necessary to make
EHI available for use. As such,
interference with ‘‘access’’ would
include, for example, an interference
that prevented a health care provider
from writing EHI to its health IT or from
modifying EHI stored in health IT,
whether by the provider itself or by, or
via, a third-party app. We encourage
comment on these definitions. In
particular, commenters may wish to
consider whether these definitions are
broad enough to cover all of the
potential purposes for which EHI may
be needed and ways in which it could
conceivably be used, now and in the
future.
107 See section 3001(b) of the PHSA; see also
section 3009(a)(3) of the PHSA (enumerating
reporting criteria relating to access, exchange, and
use of EHI for a broad and diverse range of
purposes).
108 See ONC, Connecting Health and Care for the
Nation: A Shared Nationwide Interoperability
Roadmap at x–xi, https://www.healthit.gov/topic/
interoperability/interoperability-roadmap (Oct.
2015) [hereinafter ‘‘Interoperability Roadmap’’].
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b. Interoperability Elements
In this proposed rule, we use the term
‘‘interoperability element’’ to refer to
any means by which EHI can be
accessed, exchanged, or used. We clarify
that the means of accessing, exchanging,
and using EHI are not limited to
functional elements and technical
information but also encompass
technologies, services, policies, and
other conditions 108 necessary to
support the many potential uses of EHI
as described above. Because of the
evolving nature of technology and the
diversity of privacy laws and
regulations, institutional arrangements,
and policies that govern the sharing of
EHI, we will not provide an exhaustive
list of interoperability elements.
However, we believe that it is useful to
define this term, both because of its
importance for analyzing the likelihood
of interference under the information
blocking provision, and because some of
the proposed exceptions to the
provision contain conditions concerning
the availability and provision of
interoperability elements. Therefore, we
propose to define ‘‘interoperability
element’’ in § 171.102. As noted, our
intent is to capture all of the potential
means by which EHI may be accessed,
exchanged, or used for any relevant
purposes; both now and as technology
and other conditions evolve. We seek
comment on whether the proposed
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definition realizes that intent and, if not,
any changes we should consider.
5. Practices That May Implicate the
Information Blocking Provision
To meet the definition of information
blocking, a practice must be likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage access, exchange, or use of
EHI. In this section and elsewhere in
this preamble, we discuss various types
of hypothetical practices that could
implicate the provision. We do this to
illustrate the scope of the information
blocking provision and to explain our
interpretation of various statutory
concepts. However, we stress that the
types of practices discussed in this
preamble are illustrative, not
exhaustive, and that many other types of
practices could also implicate the
provision. Nor does the fact that we
have not identified or discussed a
particular type of practice imply that it
is less serious than those that are
discussed in this preamble. Indeed,
because information blocking may take
many forms, it is not possible—and we
do not attempt—to anticipate or catalog
the many potential types of practices
that may raise information blocking
concerns.
We emphasize that any analysis of
information blocking necessarily
requires a careful consideration of the
individual facts and circumstances,
including whether the practice was
required by law, whether the actor had
the requisite statutory knowledge, and
whether an exception applies. When we
state that a practice would implicate the
provision or could violate the provision,
we are expressing a conclusion that the
type of practice is one that would be
likely to interfere with, prevent, or
materially discourage access, exchange,
or use of EHI, and that further analysis
of these and other statutory elements
would therefore be warranted to
determine whether a violation has
occurred. We highlight this distinction
because to implicate the information
blocking provision is not necessarily to
violate it, and that each case will turn
on its own unique facts. For example, a
practice that seemingly meets the
statutory definition of information
blocking would not be information
blocking if it was required by law, if one
or more elements of the definition were
not met, or if was covered by one of the
proposed exceptions.
We propose in section VIII.D of this
preamble to establish seven exceptions
to the information blocking provision
for certain reasonable and necessary
activities. If an actor can establish that
an exception applies to each practice for
which a claim of information blocking
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has been made, including that the actor
satisfied all applicable conditions of the
exception at all relevant times, then the
practice would not constitute
information blocking.
Based on early discussions with
stakeholders during the development of
this proposed rule, we are aware that
the generality with which the
information blocking provision
describes practices that are likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage access, exchange, or use of
EHI may leave some uncertainty as to
the scope of the information blocking
provision and the types of practices that
will implicate enforcement by ONC
and/or OIG. To provide additional
clarity on this point, we elaborate our
understanding of these important
statutory concepts below.
a. Prevention, Material Discouragement,
and Other Interference
The information blocking provision
and its enforcement subsection do not
define the terms ‘‘interfere with,’’
‘‘prevent,’’ and ‘‘materially discourage,’’
and use these terms collectively and
without differentiation. Based on our
interpretation of the information
blocking provision and the ordinary
meanings of these terms in the context
of EHI, we do not believe they are
mutually exclusive, but that prevention
and material discouragement are best
understood as types of interference, and
that use of these terms in the statute to
define information blocking illustrates
the desire to reach all practices that an
actor knows, or should know, are likely
to prevent, materially discourage, or
otherwise interfere with the access,
exchange, or use of EHI. Consistent with
this understanding, in this preamble to
the proposed rule, we use the terms
‘‘interfere with’’ and ‘‘interference’’ as
inclusive of prevention, material
discouragement, and other forms of
interference that implicate the
information blocking provision.
We believe that interference could
take many forms. In addition to the
prevention or material discouragement
of access, exchange, or use, we propose
that interference could include practices
that increase the cost, complexity, or
other burden associated with accessing,
exchanging, or using EHI. Additionally,
interference could include practices that
limit the utility, efficacy, or value of EHI
that is accessed, exchanged, or used,
such as by diminishing the integrity,
quality, completeness, or timeliness of
the data. We refer readers to section
VIII.C.5.c of this preamble below for a
discussion of these and other potential
practices that could interfere with
access, exchange, or use and thereby
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implicate the information blocking
provision.
Relatedly, to avoid potential
ambiguity and clearly communicate the
full range of potential practices that
could implicate the information
blocking provision, we propose to
codify a definition of ‘‘interfere with’’ in
§ 171.102, consistent with our
interpretation set forth above.
b. Likelihood of Interference
The information blocking provision is
preventative in nature. That is, the
information blocking provision
proscribes practices that are likely to
interfere with (including preventing or
materially discouraging) access,
exchange, or use of EHI—whether or not
such harm actually materializes. By
including both the likely and the actual
effects of a practice, the information
blocking provision encourages
individuals and entities to avoid
engaging in practices that undermine
interoperability, and to proactively
promote access, exchange, and use of
EHI.
We believe that a practice would
satisfy the information blocking
provision’s ‘‘likelihood’’ requirement if,
under the circumstances, there is a
reasonably foreseeable risk that the
practice will interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI. For example,
where an actor refuses to share EHI or
to provide access to certain
interoperability elements, it is
reasonably foreseeable that such actions
will interfere with access, exchange, or
use of EHI. As another example, it is
reasonably foreseeable that a health care
provider may need to access
information recorded in a patient’s
electronic record that could be relevant
to the treatment of that patient. For this
reason, a policy or practice that limits
timely access to such information in an
appropriate electronic format creates a
reasonably foreseeable likelihood of
interfering with the use of the
information for these treatment
purposes.
Whether the risk of interference is
reasonably foreseeable will depend on
the particular facts and circumstances
attending the practice or practices at
issue. Because of the number and
diversity of potential practices, and the
fact that different practices will present
varying risks of interfering with access,
exchange, or use of EHI, we do not
attempt to anticipate all of the potential
ways in which the information blocking
provision could be implicated.
Nevertheless, to assist with compliance,
we clarify certain circumstances in
which, based on our experience, a
practice will almost always be likely to
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interfere with access, exchange, or use
of EHI. We caution that these situations
are not exhaustive and that other
circumstances may also give rise to a
very high likelihood of interference
under the information blocking
provision. In each case, ONC will
consider the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether a
practice is likely to implicate the statute
and to give rise to a violation.
i. Observational Health Information
Although the information blocking
provision applies to all EHI, we believe
that information blocking concerns are
especially pronounced when the
conduct at issue has the potential to
interfere with the access, exchange, or
use of EHI that is created or maintained
during the practice of medicine or the
delivery of health care services to
patients. We refer to such information in
this section of the preamble collectively
as ‘‘observational health information.’’
Such information includes, but is not
limited to, health information about a
patient that could be captured in a
patient record within an EHR and other
clinical information management
systems; as well as information
maintained in administrative and other
IT systems when the information is
clinically relevant, directly supports
patient care, or facilitates the delivery of
health care services to consumers. We
note that there is a special need for
timely, electronic access to this
information and that, moreover, the
clinical and operational utility of this
information is often highly dependent
on multiple actors exercising varying
forms and degrees of control over the
information itself or the technological,
contractual, or other means by which it
can be accessed, exchanged, and used.
Against these indications, practices that
adversely impact the access, exchange,
or use of observational health
information will almost always
implicate the information blocking
provision.
We note that observational health
information may be technically
structured or unstructured (such as
‘‘free text’’). Therefore, in general,
clinicians’ notes would constitute
observational health information, at
least insofar as the notes contain
observations or conclusions about a
patient or the patient’s care. In contrast,
we believe certain types of EHI are
qualitatively distinct from observational
health information, such as EHI that is
created through aggregation, algorithms,
and other techniques that transform
observational health information into
fundamentally new data or insights that
are not obvious from the observational
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information alone. This could include,
for example, population-level trends,
predictive analytics, risk scores, and
EHI used for comparisons and
benchmarking activities. Similarly,
internally developed quality measures
and care protocols are generally distinct
from observational health information.
In general, we believe that practices that
pertain solely to the creation or use of
these transformative data and insights
would not usually present the very high
likelihood of interference described
above. However, we emphasize that,
depending on the specific facts at issue,
practices related to electronic nonobservational health information (a type
of EHI), such as price information, could
still be subject to the information
blocking provision. We seek comment
on this proposed approach and
encourage commenters to identify
potential practices related to nonobservational health information that
could raise information blocking
concerns.
Finally, we clarify that merely
collecting, organizing, formatting, or
processing observational health
information maintained in EHRs and
other source systems does not change
the fundamental nature of that EHI or
obligations under the information
blocking provisions. Likewise, the mere
fact that EHI is stored in a proprietary
format or has been combined with
confidential or proprietary information
does not alter the actor’s obligations
under the information blocking
provisions to facilitate access, exchange,
and use of the EHI in response to a
request. For example, the information
blocking provision would be implicated
if an actor were to assert proprietary
rights in medical vocabularies or code
sets in a way that was likely to interfere
with the access, exchange, or use of
observational health information stored
in such formats. However, as noted in
section VIII.D.6 of this preamble, under
the exception for licensing of
interoperability elements on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms, an actor
could charge a royalty for access to
proprietary data or data coded in a
proprietary manner so long as that
royalty were offered on reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms pursuant to
the conditions outlined in the
exception.
ii. Purposes for Which Information May
be Needed
We believe the information blocking
provision will almost always be
implicated when a practice interferes
with access, exchange, or use of EHI for
certain purposes, including but not
limited to:
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• Providing patients with access to
their EHI and the ability to exchange
and use it without special effort (see
section VII.B.4).
• Ensuring that health care
professionals, care givers, and other
authorized persons have the EHI they
need, when and where they need it, to
make treatment decisions and
effectively coordinate and manage
patient care and can use the EHI they
may receive from other sources.
• Ensuring that payers and other
entities that purchase health care
services can obtain the information they
need to effectively assess clinical value
and promote transparency concerning
the quality and costs of health care
services.
• Ensuring that health care providers
can access, exchange, and use EHI for
quality improvement and population
health management activities.
• Supporting access, exchange, and
use of EHI for patient safety and public
health purposes.
The need to ensure that EHI is readily
available and usable for these purposes
is paramount. Therefore, practices that
increase the cost, difficulty, or other
burden of accessing, exchanging, or
using EHI for these purposes would
almost always implicate the information
blocking provision. Individuals and
entities that develop health IT or have
a role in making these technologies and
services available should consider the
impact of their actions and take steps to
support interoperability and avoid
impeding the availability or use of EHI.
iii. Control Over Essential
Interoperability Elements; Other
Circumstances of Reliance or
Dependence
An actor may have substantial control
over one or more interoperability
elements that provide the only
reasonable means of accessing,
exchanging, or using EHI for a particular
purpose. In these circumstances, any
practice by the actor that could impede
the use of the interoperability
elements—or that could unnecessarily
increase the cost or other burden of
using the elements—would almost
always implicate the information
blocking provision.
The situation described above is most
likely when customers or users are
dependent on an actor’s technology or
services, which can occur for any
number of reasons. For example,
technological dependence may arise
from legal or commercial relations, such
as a health care provider’s reliance on
its EHR developer to ensure that EHI
managed on its behalf is accessible and
usable when it is needed. Relatedly,
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most EHI is currently stored in EHRs
and other source systems that use
proprietary data models or formats.
Knowledge of the data models, formats,
or other relevant technical information
(e.g., proprietary APIs) is necessary to
understand the data and make efficient
use of it in other applications and
technologies. Because this information
is routinely treated as confidential or
proprietary, the developer’s cooperation
is required to enable uses of the EHI that
go beyond the capabilities provided by
the developer’s technology. This
includes the capability to export
complete information sets and to
migrate data in the event that a user
decides to switch to a different
technology.
Separate from these contractual and
intellectual property issues, users may
become ‘‘locked in’’ to a particular
technology, HIE, or HIN for financial or
business reasons. For example, many
health care providers have invested
significant resources to adopt EHR
technologies—including costs for
deployment, customization, data
migration, and training—and have
tightly integrated these technologies
into their information management
strategies, clinical workflows, and
business operations. As a result, they
may be reluctant to switch to other
technologies due to the significant cost
and disruption this would entail.
Another important driver of
technological dependence is the
‘‘network effects’’ of health IT adoption,
which are amplified by a reliance on
technologies and approaches that are
not standardized and do not enable
seamless interoperability. Consequently,
health care providers and other health
IT users may gravitate towards and
become reliant on the proprietary
technologies, HIEs, or HINs that have
been adopted by other individuals and
entities with whom they have the
greatest need to exchange EHI. These
effects may be especially pronounced
within particular product or geographic
areas. For example, a HIN that facilitates
certain types of exchange or transactions
may be so widely adopted that it is a de
facto industry standard. A similar
phenomenon may occur within a
particular geographic area once a critical
mass of hospitals, physicians, or other
providers adopt a particular EHR
technology, HIE, or HIN.
In these and other analogous
circumstances of reliance or
dependence, there is a heightened risk
that an actor’s conduct will interfere
with access, exchange, or use of EHI. To
assist with compliance, we highlight the
following common scenarios, based on
our outreach to stakeholders, in which
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actors exercise control over key
interoperability elements.109
• Health IT developers of certified
health IT that provide EHR systems or
other technologies used to capture EHI
at the point of care are in a unique
position to control subsequent access to
and use of that information.
• HINs and HIEs may be in a unique
position to control the flow of
information among particular persons or
for particular purposes, especially if the
HIN or HIE has achieved significant
adoption in a particular geographic area
or for a particular type of health
information use case.
• Similar control over EHI may be
exercised by other entities, such as
health IT developers of certified health
IT, that supply or control proprietary
technologies, platforms, or services that
are widely adopted by a class of users
or that are a ‘‘de facto standard’’ for
certain types of EHI exchanges or
transactions.
• Health care providers within health
systems and other entities that provide
health IT platforms, infrastructure, or
information sharing policies may have a
degree of control over interoperability or
the movement of data within a
geographic area that is functionally
equivalent to the control exercised by a
dominant health IT developer, HIN, or
HIE.
To avoid violating the information
blocking provision, actors with control
over interoperability elements should be
careful not to engage in practices that
exclude persons from the use of those
elements or create artificial costs or
other impediments to their use.
We encourage comment on these and
other circumstances that may present an
especially high likelihood that a
practice will interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI within the
meaning of the information blocking
provision.
c. Examples of Practices Likely To
Interfere With Access, Exchange, or Use
of EHI
To further clarify the scope of the
information blocking provision, below
we describe several types of practices
that would be likely to interfere with
access, exchange, or use of EHI. These
examples clarify and expand on those
set forth in section 3022(a)(2) of the
PHSA.
Because information blocking can
take many forms, we emphasize that the
categories of practices described below
109 As an important clarification, we note that
control over interoperability elements may exist
with or without the actor’s ability to manipulate the
price of the interoperability elements in the market.
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are illustrative only and do not provide
an exhaustive list or comprehensive
description of practices that may
implicate the information blocking
provision and its penalties. We also
reiterate that to implicate the provision
is not necessarily to violate it, and that
each case will turn on its own unique
facts. For instance, a practice that
seemingly meets the statutory definition
of information blocking would not be
information blocking if it was required
by law, if one or more elements of the
definition were not met, or if it was
covered by one of the proposed
exceptions for certain reasonable and
necessary activities detailed in section
VIII.D of this preamble. For the
purposes of the following discussion,
we do not consider the applicability of
any exceptions proposed in section
VIII.D of this preamble; we therefore
strongly encourage readers to review
that section in conjunction with the
discussion of practices in this section
below.
i. Restrictions on Access, Exchange, or
Use
The information blocking provision
establishes penalties, including civil
monetary penalties, or requires
appropriate disincentives, for practices
that restrict access, exchange, or use of
EHI for permissible purposes. For
example, section 3022(a)(2)(A) of the
PHSA states that information blocking
may include practices that restrict
authorized access, exchange, or use for
treatment and other permitted purposes
under applicable law. Section
3022(a)(2)(C)(i) of the PHSA states that
information blocking may include
implementing health IT in ways that are
likely to restrict the access, exchange, or
use of EHI with respect to exporting
complete information sets or in
transitioning between health IT systems.
One means by which actors may
restrict access, exchange, or use of EHI
is through formal restrictions. These
may be expressed in contract or license
terms, EHI sharing policies,
organizational policies or procedures, or
other instruments or documents that set
forth requirements related to EHI or
health IT. Additionally, in the absence
of an express contractual restriction, an
actor may achieve the same result by
exercising intellectual property or other
rights in ways that restrict access,
exchange, or use. As an illustration, the
following non-exhaustive examples
illustrate types of formal restrictions
that would likely implicate the
information blocking provision. As
stated above, the examples throughout
this section VIII.C.5.c. are presented
without consideration to whether a
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proposed exception applies, and readers
are encouraged to familiarize
themselves with section VIII.D of this
preamble.
• A health system’s internal policies
or procedures require staff to obtain an
individual’s written consent before
sharing any of a patient’s EHI with
unaffiliated providers for treatment
purposes even though obtaining an
individual’s consent is not required by
state or federal law.
• An EHR developer’s software
license agreement prohibits a customer
from disclosing to its IT contractors
certain technical interoperability
information without which the
customer and its IT contractors cannot
efficiently export and convert EHI for
use in other applications.
• A HIN’s participation agreement
prohibits entities that receive EHI
through the HIN from transmitting that
EHI to entities who are not participants
of the HIN.
• An EHR developer sues to prevent
a clinical data registry from providing
interfaces to physicians who use the
developer’s EHR technology and wish to
submit EHI to the registry. The EHR
developer claims that the registry is
infringing the developer’s copyright in
its database because the interface
incorporates data mapping that
references the table headings and rows
of the EHR database in which the EHI
is stored.
Access, exchange, or use of EHI can
also be restricted in less formal ways.
The information blocking provision
would be implicated, for example,
where an actor simply refuses to
exchange or to facilitate the access or
use of EHI, either as a general practice
or in isolated instances. The refusal may
be expressly stated, or it may be implied
from the actor’s conduct, as where the
actor ignores requests to share EHI or
provide interoperability elements; gives
implausible reasons for not doing so; or
insists on terms or conditions that are so
objectively unreasonable that they
amount to a refusal to provide access,
exchange, or use of the EHI. Some
examples of informal restrictions
include, but are not limited to:
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT refuses to license
interoperability elements that are
reasonably necessary for the developer’s
customers, their IT contractors, and
other health IT developers to develop
and deploy software that will work with
the certified health IT.
• A health system incorrectly claims
that the HIPAA Rules or other legal
requirements preclude it from
exchanging EHI with unaffiliated
providers.
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• An EHR developer ostensibly
allows third-party developers to deploy
apps that are interoperable with its EHR
system. However, as a condition of
doing so, the third-party developers
must provide their source code and
grant the EHR developer the right to use
it for its own purposes—terms that
almost no developer would willingly
accept.
• A provider notifies its EHR
developer of its intent to switch to
another EHR system and requests a
complete export of its EHI. The
developer will provide only the EHI in
a PDF format, even though it already
can and does produce the data in a
commercially reasonable structured
format.
We emphasize that restrictions on
access, exchange, or use that are
required by law would not implicate the
information blocking provision.
Moreover, we recognize that some
restrictions, while not required by law,
may be reasonable and necessary for the
privacy and security of individuals’ EHI;
such practices may qualify for
protection under the exceptions
proposed in section VIII.D.2 and 3 of
this preamble.
ii. Limiting or Restricting the
Interoperability of Health IT
The information blocking provision
includes practices that restrict the
access, exchange, or use of EHI in
various ways (see section 3022(a)(2) of
the PHSA). These practices could
include, for example, disabling or
restricting the use of a capability that
enables users to share EHI with users of
other systems or to provide access to
EHI to certain types of persons or for
certain purposes that are legally
permissible. In addition, the
information blocking provision would
be implicated where an actor configures
or otherwise implements technology in
ways that limit the types of data
elements that can be exported or used
from the technology. Other practices
that would be suspect include
configuring capabilities in a way that
removes important context, structure, or
meaning from the EHI, or that makes the
data less accurate, complete, or usable
for important purposes for which it may
be needed. Likewise, implementing
capabilities in ways that create
unnecessary delays or response times,
or that otherwise limit the timeliness of
EHI accessed or exchanged, would
interfere with the access, exchange, and
use of that information and would
therefore implicate the information
blocking provision. We note that any
conclusions regarding such interference
would be based on fact-finding specific
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to each case and would need to consider
the applicability of an exception.
We propose that the information
blocking provision would be implicated
if an actor were to deploy technological
measures that limit or restrict the ability
to reverse engineer the functional
aspects of technology in order to
develop means for extracting and using
EHI maintained in the technology. This
may include, for example, employing
technological protection measures that,
if circumvented, would trigger liability
under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (see 17 U.S.C. 1201) or other laws.
The following hypothetical situations
illustrate some (though not all) of the
types of practices described above and
which would implicate the information
blocking provision.
• A health system implements
locally-hosted EHR technology certified
to proposed § 170.315(g)(10) (the health
system acts as an API Data Provider as
defined by § 170.102). As required by
proposed § 170.404(b)(2), the technology
developer provides the health system
with the capability to automatically
publish its production endpoints (i.e.,
the internet servers that an app must
‘‘call’’ and interact with in order to
request and exchange patient data). The
health system chooses not to enable this
capability, however, and provides the
production endpoint information only
to apps it specifically approves. This
prevents other applications—and
patients that use them—from accessing
data that should be made readily
accessible via standardized APIs.
• A hospital directs its EHR
developer to configure its technology so
that users cannot easily send electronic
patient referrals and associated EHI to
unaffiliated providers, even when the
user knows the Direct address and/or
identity (i.e., National Provider
Identifier) of the unaffiliated provider.
• An EHR developer that prevents
(such as by way of imposing exorbitant
fees unrelated to the developer’s costs,
or by some technological means) a thirdparty clinical decision support (CDS)
app from writing EHI to the records
maintained by the EHR developer on
behalf of a health care provider (despite
the provider authorizing the third-party
app developer’s use of EHI) because the
EHR developer: (1) Offers a competing
CDS software to the third-party app; and
(2) includes functionality (e.g., APIs) in
its health IT that would provide the
third party with the technical capability
to modify those records as desired by
the health care provider.
• Although an EHR developer’s
patient portal offers the capability for
patients to directly transmit or request
for direct transmission of their EHI to a
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third party, the developer’s customers
(e.g., health care providers) choose not
to enable this capability.
• A health care provider has the
capability to provide same-day access to
EHI in a form and format requested by
a patient or a patient’s health care
provider, but takes several days to
respond.
iii. Impeding Innovations and
Advancements in Access, Exchange, or
Use or Health IT-Enabled Care Delivery
The information blocking provision
encompasses practices that create
impediments to innovations and
advancements to the access, exchange,
and use of EHI, including care delivery
enabled by health IT (section
3022(a)(2)(C)(ii) of the PHSA).
Importantly, the information blocking
provision would be implicated and
penalties may apply if an actor were to
engage in exclusionary, discriminatory,
or other practices that impede the
development, dissemination, or use of
interoperable technologies and services
that enhance access, exchange, or use of
EHI.
Most acutely, the information
blocking provision would be implicated
if an actor were to refuse to license or
allow the disclosure of interoperability
elements to persons who require those
elements to develop and provide
interoperable technologies or services—
including those that might complement
or compete with the actor’s own
technology or services. The same would
be true if the actor were to allow access
to interoperability elements but were to
restrict their use for these purposes. The
following examples, which are not
exhaustive, illustrate practices that
would likely implicate the information
blocking provision by interfering with
access, exchange, or use of EHI:
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT refuses to license an API’s
interoperability elements, to grant the
rights necessary to commercially
distribute applications that use the
API’s interoperability elements, or to
provide the related services necessary to
enable the use of such applications in
production environments.
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT requires third-party
applications to be ‘‘vetted’’ for security
before use but does not promptly
conduct the vetting or conducts the
vetting in a discriminatory or
exclusionary manner.
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT refuses to license
interoperability elements that other
software applications require to
efficiently access, exchange, and use
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EHI maintained in the developer’s
technology.
Rather than restricting
interoperability elements, an actor may
insist on terms or conditions that are
burdensome and discourage their use.
These practices would implicate the
information blocking provision for the
reasons described above. Consider the
following non-exhaustive examples:
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT maintains an ‘‘app store’’
through which other developers can
have ‘‘apps’’ listed that run natively on
the EHR developer’s platform. However,
if an app ‘‘competes’’ with the EHR
developer’s apps or apps it plans to
develop, the developer requires that the
app developer grant the developer the
right to use the app’s source code.
• A health care provider engages a
systems integrator to develop an
interface engine. However, the
provider’s license agreement with its
EHR developer prohibits it from
disclosing technical documentation that
the systems integrator needs to perform
the work. The EHR developer states that
it will only permit the systems
integrator to access the documentation if
all of its employees sign a broad noncompete agreement that would
effectively bar them from working for
any other health IT companies.
The information blocking provision
would be implicated also if an actor
were to discourage efforts to develop or
use interoperable technologies or
services by exercising its influence over
customers, users, or other persons, as in
the following non-exhaustive examples:
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT maintains an ‘‘app store’’
through which other developers can
have ‘‘apps’’ listed that run natively on
the EHR developer’s platform. The EHR
developer charges app developers a
substantial fee for this service unless an
app developer agrees not to deploy the
app in any other EHR developers’ app
stores.
• A hospital is working with several
health IT developers to develop an
application that will enable ambulatory
providers who use different EHR
systems to access and update patient
data in the hospital’s EHR system from
within their ambulatory EHR
workflows. The inpatient EHR
developer, being a health IT developer
of certified health IT, pressures the
hospital to abandon this project, stating
that if it does not it will no longer
receive the latest updates and features
for its inpatient EHR system.
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT discourages customers from
procuring data integration capabilities
from a third-party developer, claiming
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that it will be providing such
capabilities free of charge in the next
release of its product. In reality, the
capabilities it is developing are more
limited in scope and are still 12–18
months from being production-ready.
• A health system insists that local
physicians adopt its EHR platform,
which provides limited connectivity
with competing hospitals and facilities.
The health system threatens to revoke
admitting privileges for physicians that
do not comply.
Similar concerns would arise were an
actor to engage in discriminatory
practices—such as imposing
unnecessary and burdensome
administrative, technical, contractual, or
other requirements on certain persons or
classes of persons—that interfere with
access and exchange or EHI by
frustrating or discouraging efforts to
enable interoperability. The following
non-exhaustive examples illustrate
some ways this could occur:
• An HIN charges additional fees,
requires more stringent testing or
certification requirements, or imposes
additional terms for participants that are
competitors, are potential competitors,
or may use EHI obtained via the HIN in
a way that facilitates competition with
the HIN.
• A health care provider imposes one
set of fees and terms to establish
interfaces or data sharing arrangements
with several registries and exchanges,
but offers another more costly or
significantly onerous set of terms to
establish substantially similar interfaces
and arrangements with an HIE or HIN
that is used primarily by health plans
that purchase health care services from
the provider at negotiated reduced rates.
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT charges customers fees,
throttles speeds, or limits the number of
records they can export when
exchanging EHI with a regional HIE that
supports exchange among users of
competing health IT products, but does
not impose like fees or limitations when
its customers exchange EHI with
enterprise HIEs that primarily serve
users of the developer’s own
technology.
• As a condition of disclosing
interoperability elements to third-party
developers, an EHR developer requires
third-party developers to enter into
business associate agreements with all
of the EHR developer’s covered entity
customers, even if the work being done
is not for the benefit of the covered
entities.
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT takes significantly longer to
provide or update interfaces that
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facilitate the exchange of EHI with users
of competing technologies or services.
We clarify that not all instances of
differential treatment would necessarily
constitute a discriminatory practice that
implicates the information blocking
provision. For example, different fee
structures or other terms may reflect
genuine differences in the cost, quality,
or value of the EHI and the effort
required to provide access, exchange, or
use. We also note that, in certain
circumstances, it may be reasonable and
necessary for an actor to restrict or
impose reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms or conditions on
the use of interoperability elements,
even though such practices could
implicate the information blocking
provision. For this reason, we propose
in section VIII.D.6 of this preamble to
establish a narrow exception that would
apply to these types of practices.
iv. Rent-Seeking and Other
Opportunistic Pricing Practices
Certain practices that artificially
increase the cost and expense associated
with accessing, exchanging, and using
EHI will implicate the information
blocking provision. Such practices are
plainly contrary to the information
blocking provision and the concerns
that motivated its enactment.
An actor may seek to extract profits or
capture revenue streams that would be
unobtainable without control of a
technology or other interoperability
elements that are necessary to enable or
facilitate access, exchange, or use of
EHI. As discussed in section
VIII.C.5.b.iii of this proposed rule, most
EHI is currently stored in EHRs and
other source systems that use
proprietary data models or formats; this
puts EHR developers (and other actors
that control data models or standards) in
a unique position to block access to
(including the export and portability of)
EHI for use in competing systems or
applications, or to charge rents for
access to the basic technical information
needed to accomplish the access,
exchange, or use of EHI for these
purposes. These information blocking
concerns may be compounded to the
extent that EHR developers do not
disclose, in advance, the fees they will
charge for interfaces, data export, data
portability, and other interoperabilityrelated services (see 80 FR 62719; 80 FR
16880–81). We note that these concerns
are not limited to EHR developers.
Other actors who exercise substantial
control over EHI or essential
interoperability elements may engage in
analogous behaviors that would
implicate the information blocking
provision.
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To illustrate, we provide the
following non-exhaustive examples,
which reflect some of the more common
types of rent-seeking and opportunistic
behaviors of which we are aware and
that are likely to interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI:
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT charges customers a fee to
provide interfaces, connections, data
export, data conversion or migration, or
other interoperability services, where
the amount of the fee exceeds the actual
costs that the developer reasonably
incurred to provide the services to the
particular customer(s).
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT charges a fee to perform an
export using the EHI export capability
proposed in § 170.315(b)(10) for the
purposes of switching health IT systems
or to provide patients access to EHI.
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT charges more to export or use
EHI in certain situations or for certain
purposes, such as when a customer is
transitioning to a competing technology
or attempting to export data for use with
a HIE, third-party application, or other
technology or service that competes
with the revenue opportunities
associated with the EHR developer’s
own suite of products and services.
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT interposes itself between a
customer and a third-party developer,
insisting that the developer pay a
licensing fee, royalty, or other payment
in exchange for permission to access the
EHR system or related documentation,
where the fee is not reasonably
necessary to cover any additional costs
the EHR developer incurs from the
third-party developer’s activities.
• An analytics company provides
services to the customers of an EHR
developer of certified health IT,
including de-identifying customer EHI
and combining it with other data to
identify areas for quality improvement.
The EHR developer insists on a revenue
sharing arrangement whereby it would
receive a percentage of the revenue
generated from these activities in return
for facilitating access to its customers’
EHI, which turns out to be
disadvantageous to customers. The
revenue the EHR developer would
receive exceeds its reasonable costs of
facilitating the access to EHI.
The information blocking provision
would clearly be implicated by these
and other practices by which an actor
profits from its unreasonable control
over EHI or interoperability elements
without adding any efficiency to the
health care system or serving any other
procompetitive purpose. But the reach
of the information blocking provision is
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not limited to these types of practices.
We interpret the definition of
information blocking to encompass any
fee that materially discourages or
otherwise imposes a material
impediment to access, exchange, or use
of EHI. We use the term ‘‘fee’’ in the
broadest possible sense to refer to any
present or future obligation to pay
money or provide any other thing of
value and propose to include this
definition in § 171.102. We believe this
scope may be broader than necessary to
address genuine information blocking
concerns and could unnecessarily
diminish investment and innovation in
interoperable technologies and services.
Therefore, as discussed in section
VIII.D.4 of this preamble, we propose to
create an exception that, subject to
certain conditions, would permit the
recovery of costs that are reasonably
incurred to provide access, exchange,
and use of EHI. We refer readers to that
section for additional details regarding
this proposal.
v. Non-Standard Implementation
Practices
Section 3022(a)(2)(B) of the PHSA
states that information blocking may
include implementing health IT in nonstandard ways that substantially
increase the complexity or burden of
accessing, exchanging, or using EHI. In
general, this type of interference is
likely to occur when, despite the
availability of generally accepted
technical, policy, or other approaches
that are suitable for achieving a
particular implementation objective, an
actor does not implement the standard,
does not implement updates to the
standard, or implements the standard in
a way that materially deviates from its
formal specifications. These practices
lead to unnecessary complexity and
burden, such as the additional cost and
effort required to implement and
maintain ‘‘point-to-point’’ connections,
custom-built interfaces, and one-off
trust agreements.
While each case will necessarily
depend on its individual facts, and
while we recognize that the
development and adoption of standards
across the health IT industry is an
ongoing process, we propose that the
information blocking provision would
be implicated in at least two distinct
sets of circumstances. First, information
blocking may arise where an actor
chooses not to adopt, or to materially
deviate from, relevant standards,
implementation specifications, and
certification criteria adopted by the
Secretary under section 3004 of the
PHSA. Second, even where no federally
adopted or identified standard exists, if
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a particular implementation approach
has been broadly adopted in a relevant
industry segment, deviations from that
approach would be suspect unless
strictly necessary to achieve substantial
efficiencies.
To further illustrate these types of
practices that would implicate the
information blocking provision, we
provide the following non-exhaustive
examples of conduct that would be
likely to interfere with access, exchange,
or use of EHI:
• An EHR developer of certified
health IT implements the C–CDA for
receiving transitions of care summaries
but only sends transitions of care
summaries in a proprietary or outmoded
format.
• A health IT developer of certified
health IT adheres to the ‘‘required’’
portions of a widely adopted industry
standard but chooses to implement
proprietary approaches for ‘‘optional’’
parts of the standard when other
interoperable means are readily
available.
Even where no standards exist for a
particular purpose, actors should not
design or implement health IT in nonstandard ways that unnecessarily
increase the costs, complexity, and
other burden of accessing, exchanging,
or using EHI. For example, an EHR
developer of certified health IT designs
its database tables in a way that is
unreasonably difficult to ‘‘map’’ to a
non-proprietary format, which is a
necessary prerequisite to converting the
EHI to a format that can be used in other
software applications. When a customer
requests the capability to export EHI to
a clinical data registry, the EHR
developer quotes substantial costs
resulting from the need to write custom
code to enable this functionality. Based
on these facts, the fees do not reflect
costs that are reasonably incurred to
provide the service and are instead the
result of the developer’s impractical
design choices. We are aware that some
actors attribute certain non-standard
implementations on legacy systems that
the actor did not themselves design but
which have to be integrated into the
actor’s health IT. Such instances will be
considered on a case by case basis.
Again, we reiterate that information
blocking can take many forms and that
the practices (and categories of
practices) described above do not
provide an exhaustive list or
comprehensive description of practices
that may implicate the information
blocking provision.
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6. Applicability of Exceptions
a. Reasonable and Necessary Activities
As discussed above, section 3022(a)(3)
authorizes the Secretary to identify,
through notice and comment
rulemaking, reasonable and necessary
activities that do not constitute
information blocking for purposes of the
definition set forth in section 3022(a)(1).
Separately, the Cures Act identifies at
section 3022(a)(1) practices that
contravene the definition of information
blocking. Following this Cures Act
terminology, conduct that implicates the
information blocking provision and that
does not fall within one of the
exceptions described in section VIII.D of
this preamble, or does not meet all
conditions for an exception, would be
considered a ‘‘practice.’’ Conduct that
falls within an exception and meets all
the applicable conditions for that
exception would be considered an
‘‘activity.’’ The challenge with this
distinction is that when examining
conduct that is the subject of an
information blocking claim— an actor’s
actions that likely interfered with
access, exchange, or use of EHI—it can
be illusory to distinguish, on its face,
conduct that is a practice and conduct
that is an activity. Indeed, conduct that
implicates the information blocking
provision but falls within an exception
could nonetheless be considered
information blocking in the event that
the actor has not satisfied the conditions
applicable to that exception.
While we acknowledge the
terminology used in the Cures Act, we
propose to use the term ‘‘practice’’
throughout this proposed rule when we
describe conduct that is likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information, regardless
of whether that conduct meets the
conditions for an exception to the
information blocking provision.
Consistent with this approach, when
identifying reasonable and necessary
activities in §§ 171.200 through 171.206,
we describe practices that, if all the
applicable conditions are met, are
reasonable and necessary and not
information blocking. We have taken
this approach, in part, because we
believe that to adopt the terminology of
activity to describe conduct that may or
may not be information blocking would
confuse the reader and obfuscate our
intent in certain circumstances. As an
illustration, a health care provider may
implement an organizational security
policy that limits access, exchange, or
use of certain information to certain
users (e.g., role-based access). Prior to
determining whether the
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implementation of the security policy is
reasonable and necessary under the
circumstances, such conduct would be
considered a ‘‘practice’’ that implicates
the information blocking provision.
However, it may later be determined
that such conduct is reasonable and
necessary and would then be considered
an ‘‘activity.’’ Due to these types of
scenarios, we contend that the better
approach is to use one term—practice—
throughout the proposed rule and
clarify when describing the conduct at
issue whether it is a practice that is
information blocking, a practice that
implicates the information blocking
provision, or a practice that is
reasonable and necessary and not
information blocking.
b. Treatment of Different Types of
Actors
The proposed exceptions would apply
to health care providers, health IT
developers of certified health IT, HIEs,
and HINs who engage in certain
practices covered by an exception,
provided that all applicable conditions
of the exception are satisfied at all
relevant times and for each practice for
which the exception is sought. The
exceptions are generally applicable to
all actors. However, in some instances
we propose conditions within an
exception that apply to a particular type
of actor.
c. Establishing That Activities and
Practices Meet the Conditions of an
Exception
We propose that, in the event of an
investigation of an information blocking
complaint, an actor must demonstrate
that an exception is applicable and that
the actor met all relevant conditions of
the exception at all relevant times and
for each practice for which the
exception is sought. We consider this
allocation of proof to be a substantive
condition of the proposed exceptions.
As a practical matter, we propose that
actors are in the best position to
demonstrate compliance with the
conditions of the proposed exceptions
and to produce the detailed evidence
necessary to demonstrate that
compliance. We request comment about
the types of documentation and/or
standardized methods that an actor may
use to demonstrate compliance with the
exception conditions.
D. Proposed Exceptions to the
Information Blocking Provision
We propose to establish seven
exceptions to the information blocking
provision. The exceptions would apply
to certain activities that may technically
meet the definition of information
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blocking but that are reasonable and
necessary to further the underlying
public policies of the information
blocking provision.
The seven proposed exceptions are
based on three related policy
considerations. First, each exception is
limited to certain activities that clearly
advance the aims of the information
blocking provision. These reasonable
and necessary activities include
providing appropriate protections to
prevent harm to patients and others;
promoting the privacy and security of
EHI; promoting competition and
innovation in health IT and its use to
provide health care services to
consumers, and to develop more
efficient means of health care delivery;
and allowing system downtime in order
to implement upgrades, repairs, and
other changes to health IT. Second, each
exception addresses a significant risk
that regulated actors will not engage in
these beneficial activities because of
uncertainty concerning the breadth or
applicability of the information blocking
provision. Finally, each exception is
subject to strict conditions to ensure
that it is limited to activities that are
reasonable and necessary.
The first three exceptions, set forth in
VIII.D.1–D.3, extend to certain activities
that are reasonable and necessary to
prevent harm to patients and others;
promote the privacy of EHI; and
promote the security of EHI, subject to
strict conditions to prevent the
exceptions from being misused. We
believe that without these exceptions,
actors may be reluctant to engage in the
types of reasonable and necessary
activities described below, and that this
could erode trust in the health IT
ecosystem and undermine efforts to
provide access and facilitate the
exchange and use of EHI for important
purposes. Such a result would be
contrary to the purpose of the
information blocking provision and the
broader policies of the Cures Act.
The next three exceptions, set forth in
VIII.D.4–D.6, address activities that are
reasonable and necessary to promote
competition and consumer welfare.
First, we propose to permit the recovery
of certain types of reasonable costs
incurred to provide technology and
services that enable access to EHI and
facilitate the exchange and use of that
information, provided certain
conditions are met. Second, we propose
to permit an actor to decline to provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI in a
manner that is infeasible, subject to a
duty to provide a reasonable alternative.
And, third, we propose an exception
that would permit an actor to license
interoperability elements on reasonable
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and non-discriminatory terms. These
exceptions would be subject to strict
conditions to ensure that they do not
extend protection to practices that raise
information blocking concerns.
The last exception, set forth in
VIII.D.7, recognizes that it may be
reasonable and necessary for actors to
make health IT temporarily unavailable
for the benefit of the overall
performance of health IT. This
exception would permit an actor to
make the operation of health IT
unavailable in order to implement
upgrades, repairs, and other changes.
As context for the exceptions
proposed below in VIII.D.4–D.6, we note
that addressing information blocking is
critical for promoting competition and
innovation in health IT and for the
delivery of health care services to
consumers. Indeed, the information
blocking provision itself expressly
addresses practices that impede
innovations and advancements in health
information access, exchange, and use,
including care delivery enabled by
health IT (section 3022(a)(2)(C)(ii) of the
PHSA). As discussed in section
VIII.C.5.b.iii of this preamble, health IT
developers of certified health IT, HIEs,
HINs, and, in some instances, health
care providers may exploit their control
over interoperability elements to create
barriers to entry for competing
technologies and services that offer
greater value for health IT customers
and users, provide new or improved
capabilities, and enable more robust
access, exchange, and use of EHI.110
More than this, information blocking
may harm competition not just in health
IT markets, but also in markets for
health care services.111 Dominant
providers in these markets may leverage
their control over technology to limit
patient mobility and choice.112 They
may also pressure independent
providers to adopt expensive, hospitalcentric technologies that do not suit
their workflows, limit their ability to
share information with unaffiliated
providers, and make it difficult to adopt
or use alternative technologies that
could offer greater efficiency and other
110 See also Martin Gaynor, Farzad Mostashari,
and Paul B. Ginsberg, Making Health Care Markets
Work: Competition Policy for Health Care, 16–17
(Apr. 2017), available at https://heinz.cmu.edu/
news/news-detail/index.aspx?nid=3930.
111 See, e.g., Keynote Address of FTC
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Antitrust in Healthcare
Conference Arlington, VA (May 12, 2016), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/950143/160519antitrust
healthcarekeynote.pdf.
112 See, e.g., Martin Gaynor, Farzad Mostashari,
and Paul B. Ginsberg, Making Health Care Markets
Work: Competition Policy for Health Care, 16–17
(Apr. 2017), available at https://heinz.cmu.edu/
news/news-detail/index.aspx?nid=3930.
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benefits.113 The technological
dependence resulting from these
practices can be a barrier to entry by
would-be competitors. It can also make
independent providers vulnerable to
acquisition or induce them into
exclusive arrangements that enhance the
market power of incumbent providers,
while preventing the formation of
clinically-integrated products and
networks that offer more choice and
better value to consumers and
purchasers of health care services.
Section 3022(a)(5) of the PHSA
provides that the Secretary may consult
with the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in defining practices that do not
constitute information blocking because
they are necessary to promote
competition and consumer welfare. We
appreciate the expertise and informal
technical assistance of FTC staff, which
we have taken into consideration in
developing the exceptions described in
VIII.D.4–D.6 of this preamble. We note
that the language in the Cures Act
regarding information blocking is
substantively and substantially different
from the language and goals in the
antitrust laws enforced by the FTC. We
view the Cures Act as authorizing ONC
and OIG to regulate conduct that may be
considered permissible under the
antitrust laws. On this basis, this
proposed rule requires that actors who
control interoperability elements
cooperate with individuals and entities
that require those elements for the
purpose of developing, disseminating,
and enabling technologies and services
that can interoperate with the actor’s
technology.
We emphasize that ONC is taking this
approach because we view patients as
having an overwhelming interest in EHI
about themselves, and particularly
observational health information (see
the discussion in section VIII.C.4.b of
this preamble). As such, access to EHI,
and the EHI itself, should not be traded
or sold by those actors who are
custodians of EHI or who control its
access, exchange, or use. We emphasize
that such actors should not be able to
charge fees for providing electronic
access, exchange, or use of patients’
EHI. We propose that actors should be
required to share EHI unless they are
prohibited from doing so under an
existing law or are covered by one of the
exceptions detailed in this preamble. In
addition, any remedy sought or action
113 See, e.g., Healthcare Research Firm Toughens
Survey Standards as More CIOs Reap the Profits of
Reselling Vendor Software, Black Book, available at
https://www.prweb.com/releases/2015/02/
prweb12530856.htm; Arthur Allen, Connecticut
Law Bans EHR-linked Information Blocking,
Politico.com (Oct. 29, 2015).
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7523
taken by HHS under the information
blocking provision would be
independent from the antitrust laws and
would not prevent FTC or DOJ from
taking action with regard to the same
actor or conduct.
We request comment on the following
seven proposed exceptions, including
whether they will achieve our stated
policy goals.
1. Preventing Harm
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
for practices that are reasonable and
necessary to prevent harm to a patient
or another person, provided certain
conditions are met. The exception and
corresponding conditions are set forth
in the proposed regulation text in
§ 171.201.
This proposed exception would
acknowledge the public interest in
protecting patients and other persons
against unreasonable risks of harm that,
in certain narrowly defined
circumstances described below, justify
practices that are likely to interfere with
access, exchange, or use of EHI and that
would implicate the information
blocking provision in the absence of an
exception.
The exception would be subject to
strict conditions, which we believe are
necessary to prevent patient safety from
being used as a pretext for information
blocking or as a post hoc rationalization
for practices that are not reasonable and
necessary to address material risks of
harm to a patient or another person.
We have adopted the terminology of
‘‘patient’’ to denote the context in which
the threat of harm arises. That is, this
proposed exception has been designed
to recognize certain practices taken for
the benefit of recipients of health care—
those individuals whose EHI is at
issue—and other persons whose
information may be recorded in that EHI
or who may be at risk of harm because
of the access, use, or exchange of EHI.
The use of the term ‘‘patient’’ does not
require, other than in the context of the
risk of harm determined by a licensed
health care professional (see
§ 171.201(a)(3)), that an actor seeking to
benefit from this exception needs to
have a clinician-patient relationship
with the individual (or individuals) at
risk of harm. Indeed, a health IT
developer of certified health IT would
be able to benefit from this exception in
connection with practices undertaken
for the benefit of individuals receiving
(or having received, or expected to
receive) care from a health care provider
that uses the developer’s health IT.
Similarly, an HIE or HIN that exchanges
or facilitates the exchange of EHI would
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be able to benefit from this exception in
connection with the activities carried
out by the HIE or HIN for or at the
direction of a health care provider.
Patient Harm Risks That Would Be
Cognizable Under This Exception
Consistent with the definition of
information blocking, we have
identified certain risks to patient harm
that arise in the context of access,
exchange, or use of EHI. To qualify for
this proposed exception, an actor’s
practice must respond to a risk that is
cognizable under this exception.
Risk of Corrupt or Inaccurate Data Being
Recorded or Incorporated in a Patient’s
Electronic Health Record
The exception may apply to practices
that prevent harm arising from
corrupted or inaccurate EHI being
recorded or incorporated in a patient’s
electronic health record. Users of health
IT systems strive to maintain accurate
electronic health records by carefully
inputting EHI and verifying existing
EHI. Occasionally a clinician or other
user of health IT is presented with EHI
that, due to a failure of the technology,
is either entirely incorrect or contains
inaccurate information. At other times,
EHI could become corrupted. In these
cases, the sharing or integration of such
EHI could lead to inaccuracies in the
patient’s electronic health record that
then run the risk of being propagated
further. We note, however, that known
inaccuracies in some data within a
record may not be sufficient justification
to withhold the entire record if the
remainder of the patient’s EHI could be
effectively shared without also
presenting the known incorrect or
corrupted information as if it were
trustworthy. Also, we would expect that
once information is known to be
inaccurate or corrupted, a health care
provider holding that record would, for
example, take action to cure the
inaccuracy or corruption. We
understand that in the ordinary course
of practice, and consistent with
professional and legal standards for
clinical record keeping, health care
providers take appropriate action to
remediate known problems with EHI
and restore a record as a whole to be
safely usable, and therefore safely
sharable.
This recognized risk is limited to
corruption and inaccuracies caused by
performance and technical issues
affecting health IT. For example, this
exception may be relevant if certified
health IT were to incorrectly present an
old and superseded version of a
medication list, or when only partial
copies of laboratory tests are being
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linked to a patient when the patient’s
record is exchanged. However, this
recognized risk does not extend to
purported accuracy issues arising from
the incompleteness of a patient’s
electronic health record generally.
Electronic health records, like the paper
charts they replaced, are inevitably
imperfect records. Many patients see
multiple health care providers and so it
is unlikely that any single health care
provider’s record will provide a
complete picture of a patient’s health.
Some patients intentionally keep certain
information secret even from their
health care providers, and others fail to
share potentially critical information
with their health care providers because
they forget to, or simply do not
understand its clinical significance.
While the access, exchange, or use of
EHI in these situations could give rise
to the risk of harm if the EHI was relied
on without qualification, such reliance
does not accord with our understanding
of clinical practice, as the risk of
incompleteness resulting from patients
having multiple providers, or from
errors of omission by patients and their
care providers, is not unique to
electronic health records or their
interoperable exchange. Therefore, the
risk that the EHI a given health care
provider holds for a given patient may
not be a perfectly complete record of
that patient’s health or care will not be
recognized as being sufficient to support
an actor qualifying for this exception in
the face of a claim of information
blocking.
We also acknowledge that certain
federal and state laws, such as 42 CFR
part 2 and state medical record laws,
require an actor to obtain an
individual’s written consent before
sharing health information. However,
we propose that an actor would not be
able to benefit from this exception on
the basis of a perceived risk arising from
exchanging or providing access to EHI
when the EHI exchanged or made
accessible does not include certain
information due to a patient’s decision
not to consent to its disclosure. For
example, this exception would not
recognize an actor’s conduct in not
providing access, exchange, or use of a
patient’s electronic health record on the
basis that the patient’s failure to consent
to the disclosure of substance abuse
treatment information made the
patient’s record incomplete and thus
inaccurate.
Risk of Misidentifying a Patient or
Patient’s Electronic Health Information
The exception may apply to practices
that are designed to promote data
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quality and integrity and support health
IT applications properly identifying and
matching patient records or EHI.
Accurately identifying patients and
correctly attributing their EHI to them is
a complex task and involves layers of
safeguards, including verification of a
patient’s identity, proper registration in
health IT systems, physical
identification such as wristbands, and
usability and implementation decisions
such as ensuring the display of a
patient’s name and date of birth on
every screen of the patient’s electronic
chart. When a clinician or other health
IT user may know or reasonably suspect
that specific EHI in a patient’s record is
or may be misattributed, either within a
local record or as received through EHI
exchange, it would be reasonable for
them to avoid sharing or incorporating
the EHI that they know would, or
reasonably suspect could, propagate
errors in the patient’s records and thus
pose the attendant risks to the patient.
As discussed below, an actor’s response
to this risk would need to be no broader
than necessary to mitigate the risk of
harm arising from the potentially
misidentified record or misattributed
data. A health IT developer of certified
health IT could not, for example, refuse
to provide a batch export on the basis
that the exported records may contain a
misidentified record. Similarly, a health
care provider that identified that a
particular piece of information had been
misattributed to a patient would not be
excused from exchanging or providing
access to all other EHI about the patient
that had not been misattributed.
Determination by a Licensed Health
Care Professional That the Disclosure of
EHI Is Reasonably Likely To Endanger
Life or Physical Safety
The exception may permit certain
restrictions on the disclosure of an
individual’s EHI in circumstances
where a licensed health care
professional has determined, in the
exercise of professional judgment, that
the disclosure is reasonably likely to
endanger the life or physical safety of
the patient or another person. This
would include the situation where a
covered entity elected not to treat a
person as the personal representative of
an individual in situations of potential
abuse or endangerment, including in
accordance with 45 CFR 164.502(g)(5).
In certain cases, the clinician may have
individualized knowledge stemming
from the clinician-patient relationship
that, for a particular patient and for that
patient’s circumstances, harm could
result if certain EHI were shared or
transmitted electronically. Consistent
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a
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decision not to provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI on this basis
would be subject to any right that an
affected individual is afforded under
applicable federal or state laws to have
the determination reviewed and
potentially reversed.
We request comment on whether the
categories of harm described above
capture the full range of safety risks that
might arise directly from accessing,
exchanging, or using EHI. We also
request comment on whether we should
consider other types of patient safety
risks related to data quality and integrity
concerns, or that may have a less
proximate connection to EHI but that
could provide a reasonable and
necessary basis for an actor to restrict or
otherwise impede access, exchange, or
use of EHI in appropriate circumstances.
We ask that commenters provide
detailed rationale for any suggested
revisions to these categories, including
additional conditions that may be
necessary to ensure that the exception is
tailored and does not extend protection
to practices that are not reasonable and
necessary to promote patient safety and
that could present information blocking
concerns.
Reasonable Belief That Practice Was
Necessary to Directly and Substantially
Reduce the Likelihood of Harm
To qualify for this exception, an actor
must have had a reasonable belief that
the practice or practices will directly
and substantially reduce the likelihood
of harm to a patient or another person.
As discussed above, the type of risk
must also be cognizable under this
exception.
An actor could meet this condition in
two ways.
Qualifying Organizational Policy
In most cases, we anticipate that the
actor would demonstrate that the
practices it engaged in were consistent
with an organizational policy that was
objectively reasonable and no broader
than necessary for the type of patient
safety risks at issue. In these
circumstances, we propose that an
actor’s policy would need to satisfy the
following requirements.
First, we propose that the policy must
be in writing.
Second, it must have been developed
with meaningful input from clinical,
technical, and other appropriate staff or
others who have expertise or insight
relevant to the risk of harm that the
policy addresses. This condition would
not be met if, for example, a hospital
imposed top-down information sharing
policies or workflows established by the
hospital’s EHR developer and approved
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by hospital administrators without
meaningful input from the medical staff,
IT department, and front-line clinicians
who would implement, and thus be
affected by, the policy and are in the
best position to gauge how effective it
will be at mitigating patient safety risks.
Third, we propose that the policy
must have been implemented in a
consistent and non-discriminatory
manner. As part of this condition, the
actor must have taken reasonable steps
to educate its directors, officers,
employees, contractors, and authorized
personnel on how to apply the policy
and to provide appropriate oversight to
ensure that the policy is not applied in
an arbitrary, discriminatory, or
otherwise inappropriate manner. This
condition would not be met if, for
example, a policy or practice were based
on factors that lacked a direct and
substantial correlation with the
particular risk of harm at issue.
Last, we propose that the policy must
have been be no broader than necessary
for the specific risk or type of risk at
issue. For example, as evidence that the
policy is no broader than necessary, the
policy would need to identify the
relevant risks and follow an approach to
mitigating those risks that is based on
current patient safety evidence and best
practices, supplemented by input from
clinical, technical, and other staff or
others who are in the best position to
make judgments about the policy’s
effectiveness, as discussed above.
Further evidence that the policy was no
broader than necessary would be
whether the actor considered alternative
approaches and reasonably concluded
that, under the circumstances, those
approaches were either inadequate to
address the identified risks of harm or
would not have reduced the likelihood
of interference with access, exchange, or
use of EHI. For example, a tailored
response to the existence of corrupted
data would necessarily permit all
uncorrupted EHI to continue to be
accessed, used, and exchanged. This
condition would not be met, for
example, if an actor’s policy imposed a
blanket ban on the sharing of EHI with
users of different technologies or with
health care providers who are not part
of a particular health system, HIE, or
HIN.
Qualifying Individualized Finding
We recognize that some health care
providers (such as small practices) may
not have comprehensive and formal
policies governing all aspects of EHI and
patient safety. Additionally, even if an
organizational policy exists, it may not
anticipate all of the potential risks of
harm that could arise in real-world
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clinical or production environments of
health IT. In these circumstances, in
lieu of demonstrating that a practice
conformed to the actor’s policies and
that the policies met the conditions
described above, the actor could justify
the practice or practices directly by
making a finding in each case, based on
the particularized facts and
circumstances, that the practice is
necessary and no broader than
necessary to mitigate the risk of harm.
To do so, we propose that the actor
would need to show that the practices
were approved on a case-by-case basis
by an individual with direct knowledge
of the relevant facts and circumstances
and who had relevant clinical,
technical, or other appropriate
expertise. Such an individual would
need to reasonably conclude, on the
basis of those particularized facts and
circumstances and his/her expertise and
best professional judgment, that the
practice was necessary, and no broader
than necessary, to mitigate the risk of
harm to a patient or other persons.
We propose that a licensed health
care professional’s independent and
individualized judgment about the
safety of the actor’s patients or other
persons would be entitled to substantial
deference under this proposed
exception. So long as the clinician
actually considered all of the relevant
facts and determined that, under the
particular circumstances, the practice
was necessary to protect the safety of
the clinician’s patient or other person,
we would not second-guess the
clinician’s judgment. To provide further
clarity on this point, we provide the
following illustration.
A clinician suspects that a patient is
at risk of domestic abuse. The patient
has recently visited the clinic for a
pregnancy test, and tells the clinician
that the potential father is not her
current partner. The test returns a
positive result. The clinician notes that
in the patient’s electronic health record,
her partner has been given access to
view her test results. The clinician,
considering all factors for this particular
situation and particular patient, and
aware of the clinic’s policy towards the
restriction of electronic health
information sharing, concludes that
releasing this result electronically could
place the patient at risk of harm. The
clinician thus chooses not to release the
test result electronically and plans to
deliver the result to the patient in a safe
manner. The exception would apply in
this case because the clinician
reasonably believes, based on the
relationship with this particular patient
and the clinician’s best clinical
judgment, that the restriction is
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necessary to prevent harm to the
patient.
We seek public comment on whether
this proposed exception is appropriate
and adequately balances the interest of
promoting access, exchange, and use of
EHI with legitimate concerns about the
risk of harm to patients and others. In
addition to any other relevant issues, we
specifically request feedback on
whether the exception is broad enough
to prevent harm to patients and others
and, if not, what additional risks we
should address should we finalize this
proposal; and whether there are
additional safeguards the Secretary
should adopt in order to prevent
practices that attempt to undermine the
policy goal of the exception. We also
seek comment on whether there are
customary practices (e.g., standards of
care) that advance patient safety
concerns but which actors do not, as a
matter of practice, record in
documented policies, and which should
be taken into account when assessing
the reasonableness of a practice under
this exception.
2. Promoting the Privacy of EHI
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
for practices that are reasonable and
necessary to protect the privacy of an
individual’s EHI, provided certain
conditions are met. The exception and
corresponding conditions are set forth
in the proposed regulation text in
§ 171.202. We note that any practice
engaged in to protect the privacy of an
individual’s EHI must be consistent
with applicable laws related to health
information privacy, including the
HIPAA Privacy Rule as applicable, as
well as with other applicable laws and
regulations, such as the HITECH Act, 42
CFR part 2, and state laws. This
exception to the information blocking
provision does not alter an actor’s
obligation to comply with these and
other applicable laws.
We believe this exception is necessary
to support basic trust and confidence in
health IT infrastructure. Without this
exception, there would be a significant
risk that actors would share EHI in
inappropriate circumstances, such as
when an individual has taken
affirmative steps to request that the EHI
not be shared, or when an actor has
been unable to obtain reasonable
assurances as to an individual’s
identity.
In contrast to the other exceptions
defined in this proposed rule, this
proposed exception has been structured
with discrete ‘‘sub-exceptions.’’ An
actor’s practice must qualify for a subexception in order to be covered by this
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exception. The sub-exceptions have, to
a large extent, been crafted to closely
mirror privacy-protective practices that
are recognized under state and federal
privacy laws. In this way, the privacy
sub-exceptions to the information
blocking provision would recognize as
reasonable and necessary practices that
are engaged in by actors consistent with
privacy laws, provided that certain
conditions are met. We have proposed
four sub-exceptions that address the
following privacy protective practices:
(1) Not providing access, exchange, or
use of EHI when a state or federal law
requires that a condition be satisfied
before an actor provides access,
exchange, or use of EHI, and the
condition is not satisfied (proposed in
§ 171.202(b)); (2) not providing access,
exchange, or use of EHI when the actor
is a health IT developer of certified
health IT that is not covered by the
HIPAA Privacy Rule in respect to a
practice (proposed in § 171.202(c)); (3) a
covered entity, or a business associate
on behalf of a covered entity, denying
an individual’s request for access to
their electronic PHI in the
circumstances provided in 45 CFR
164.524(a)(1), (2), or (3) (proposed at
§ 171.202(d)); and (4) not providing
access, exchange, or use of EHI pursuant
to an individual’s request, in certain
situations (proposed in § 171.202(e)).
The rationale for each sub-exception is
described in detail below.
An actor would need to satisfy at least
one sub-exception in order that a
purportedly privacy-protective practice
that interferes with access, exchange, or
use of EHI not be subject to the
information blocking provision. Each
sub-exception has conditions that must
be met in order that an actor’s practice
qualifies for protection under the subexception.
Specific Terminology Used for the
Purposes of This Proposed Exception
We note that this proposed exception
and our discussion below uses certain
terms that are defined by the HIPAA
Rules 114 but that, for purposes of this
exception, may have a broader meaning
in the context of the information
blocking provision and its
implementing regulations as set forth in
this Proposed Rule. In general, the terms
‘‘access,’’ ‘‘exchange,’’ and ‘‘use’’ have
the meaning explained in section
VIII.C.4.a of this preamble. However, in
some instances we refer to ‘‘use’’ in the
context of a disclosure or use of ePHI
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, in
which case we have explicitly stated
114 45 CFR part 160 and subparts A, C, and E of
part 164.
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that the term ‘‘use’’ has the meaning
defined in 45 CFR 160.103. Similarly,
we refer in a few cases to an
individual’s right of access under 45
CFR 164.524, in which case the term
‘‘access’’ should be understood in that
HIPAA Privacy Rule context. For
purposes of section 3022 of the PHSA,
however, the term ‘‘access’’ includes,
but is broader than, an individual’s
access to their PHI as provided for by
the HIPAA Privacy Rule (see section
VIII.C.4.a of this preamble).
Finally, the term ‘‘individual’’ is
defined by the HIPAA Rules at 45 CFR
160.103. Separately, under the
information blocking enforcement
provision, the term ‘‘individual’’ is used
to refer to actors that are health IT
developers of certified health IT, HINs,
or HIEs, (see section 3022(b)(2)(A) of the
PHSA). For purposes of this exception
(and only this exception), we use
neither of these definitions. Instead, the
term ‘‘individual’’ encompasses any or
all of the following: (1) An individual
defined by 45 CFR 160.103; (2) a person
who is the subject of EHI that is being
accessed, exchanged or used; (3) a
person who legally acts on behalf of an
individual or person described in (1) or
(2), including as a personal
representative, in accordance with 45
CFR 164.502(g); or (4) a legal
representative authorized to make
health care decisions on behalf of a
person or an executor or administrator
who can act on behalf of the deceased’s
estate under state or other law.
We clarify that (2) varies from (1)
because there could be individuals who
could be the subject of EHI that is being
accessed, exchanged, or used under (2),
but who would not be the subject of PHI
under (1). The purpose of (2) is to
include EHI that would be accessed,
exchanged or used by entities that are
not subject to HIPAA (e.g., non-covered
entities and non-business associates).
These entities could include, for
example, health IT developers or data
analytics companies that have access to
EHI, but are not business associates.
We also clarify that (3) encompasses
a person with legal authority to act on
behalf of the individual, which includes
a person who is a personal
representative as defined under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule. We included the
component of legal authority to act in
(3) because the HIPAA Privacy Rule
gives rights to parents or legal guardians
in certain circumstances where they are
not the ‘‘personal representative’’ for
their child(ren). For instance, a noncustodial parent who has requested a
minor child’s medical records under a
court-ordered divorce decree may have
legal authority to act on behalf of the
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child even if he or she is not the child’s
‘‘personal representative.’’ Further, in
limited circumstances and if permitted
under state law, a family member may
have legal authority to act on behalf of
a patient to make health care decisions
in emergency situations even if that
family member may not be the ‘‘legal
representative’’ or ‘‘personal
representative’’ of the patient.
We have adopted this specialized
usage to ensure that this privacy
exception extends protection to
information about, and respects the
privacy preferences of, all individuals,
not only those individuals whose EHI is
protected as ePHI by HIPAA covered
entities and business associates.
Interaction Between Information
Blocking, the Exception for Promoting
the Privacy of EHI, and the HIPAA
Privacy Rule
Having consulted extensively with the
HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR), who
enforce the HIPAA Privacy, Security
and Breach Notification Rules, we have
developed the information blocking
provision to advance our shared goals of
preventing information blocking for
nefarious or self-interested purposes
while maintaining and upholding
existing privacy rights and protections
for individuals. The proposed exception
for promoting the privacy of EHI (also
referred to as ‘‘the privacy exception’’)
operates in a manner consistent with the
framework of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
We designed these exceptions to ensure
that individual privacy rights are not
diminished as a consequence of the
information blocking provision, and to
ensure that the information blocking
provision does not require the use or
disclosure of EHI in a way that would
not be permitted under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule. Our intent is that the
information blocking provision does not
conflict with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Indeed, the sub-exception proposed in
§ 171.202(d) reflects a policy judgment
that an actor’s denial of access to an
individual consistent with the limited
conditions for such denials that are
described in the HIPAA Privacy Rule at
45 CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2), and (3) is
reasonable under the circumstances. We
believe this resolves any potential
conflict between limitations on an
individual’s right of access under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule and the
information blocking provision.
We note that the information blocking
provision may operate to require that
actors provide access, exchange, or use
of EHI in situations that HIPAA does
not. This is because the HIPAA Privacy
Rule permits, but does not require,
covered entities to use and disclose
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ePHI in most circumstances. The
information blocking provision, on the
other hand, requires that an actor
provide access to, exchange, or use of
EHI unless they are prohibited from
doing so under an existing law or are
covered by one of the exceptions
detailed in this preamble. To illustrate,
the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits health
care providers to exchange ePHI for
treatment purposes, but does not require
them to do so. Under the information
blocking provision, unless an exception
to information blocking applies, or the
interference is required by law, a
primary care provider would be
required to exchange ePHI with a
specialist who requests it to treat an
individual who was a common patient
of the provider and the specialist, even
if the primary care provider offered
patient care services in competition
with the specialist’s practice, or would
usually refer its patients to another
specialist due to an existing business
relationship.
Promoting Patient Privacy Rights
As discussed above, the information
blocking provision would not require
that actors provide access, exchange, or
use of EHI in a manner that is not
permitted under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule or other privacy laws. As such, the
privacy-protective controls existing
under HIPAA would not be weakened
by the information blocking provision.
Moreover, we have structured the
privacy exception to ensure that actors
can engage in reasonable and necessary
practices that advance the privacy
interests of individuals.
For example, we believe that, unless
required by law, actors should not be
compelled to share EHI against patients’
wishes or without adequate safeguards
out of a concern that restricting the
access, exchange, or use of the EHI
would constitute information blocking.
This could seriously undermine
patients’ trust and confidence in the
privacy of their EHI and diminish the
willingness of patients, providers, and
other entities to provide or maintain
health information electronically in the
first place. In addition, such outcomes
would undermine and not advance the
goals of the information blocking
provision and be inconsistent with the
broader policy goal of the Cures Act to
facilitate trusted exchange of EHI.
Trusted exchange requires not only that
EHI be shared in accordance with
applicable law, but also that it be shared
in a manner that effectuates individuals’
expressed privacy preferences. We note
and discuss below that an individual’s
expressed privacy preferences will not
be controlling in all cases. An actor will
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not be able to rely on an individual’s
expressed privacy preference in
circumstances where the access,
exchange, or use is required by law.
For these reasons, we propose that the
proposed sub-exception in § 171.202(e)
would generally permit an actor to give
effect to individuals’ expressed privacy
preferences, including their desire not
to permit access, exchange, or use of
their EHI. For example, provided that
corresponding conditions have been
met, a health care provider could honor
a patient’s request not to share their EHI
in circumstances in which the HIPAA
Privacy Rule would permit (though not
require) the provider to disclose the
information, such as for treatment
purposes. At the same time, however,
we believe that the privacy exception
must be tailored to ensure that
protection of an individual’s privacy is
not used as a pretext for information
blocking. Accordingly, we propose that
this exception, which is discussed more
fully below, would be subject to strict
conditions.
Privacy Practices Required by Law
Because the information blocking
provision excludes from the definition
of information blocking practices that
are required by law (section 3022(a)(1)
of the PHSA), privacy-protective
practices that are required by law do not
implicate the information blocking
provision and do not require coverage
from an exception. For example, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule requires that a
covered entity must agree to the request
of an individual to restrict disclosure of
protected health information (PHI)
about the individual to a health plan if
the disclosure is for the purpose of
carrying out payment or health care
operations and not otherwise required
by law and the PHI pertains solely to a
health care item or service for which the
individual, or person other than the
health plan on behalf of the individual,
has paid the covered entity in full.115 If
an individual made such a request and
met all requirements of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, the actor would be
required by law not to exchange the
individual’s EHI to a health plan. In this
situation, the actor’s interference with
access, exchange, or use would not be
information blocking and as such, the
actor would not need to benefit from
this exception.
Practices that are ‘‘required by law’’
can be distinguished from other
practices that an actor engages in
pursuant to a privacy law, but which are
not ‘‘required by law.’’ Such privacy
laws are typically framed in a way that
115 45
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conditions the making of a ‘‘disclosure’’
on the satisfying of specific conditions,
but does not expressly require that the
actor engage in a practice that interferes
with access, exchange, or use of EHI.
For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule
provides that a covered entity may use
or disclose PHI in certain circumstances
where the individual concerned has
authorized the disclosure.116 The effect
of this requirement is that the covered
entity should not use or disclose the PHI
in the absence of an individual’s
authorization. However, because the
requirement does not prohibit the actor
from exchanging the EHI in all
circumstances, the actor would be at
risk of engaging in a practice that was
information blocking unless an
exception applied. For this reason, we
have included a sub-exception,
addressed in § 171.202(b) and discussed
below, that provides that an actor will
not be engaging in information blocking
if a state or federal privacy law imposes
a precondition to the provision of
access, exchange, or use, and that
precondition has not been satisfied.
Sub-Exception To Proposed Privacy
Exception: Precondition Not Satisfied
State and federal privacy laws that
permit the disclosure of PHI often
impose conditions that must be satisfied
prior to a disclosure being made. We
propose to establish a sub-exception to
the information blocking provision that
recognizes that an actor will not be
engaging in information blocking if an
actor does not provide access, exchange,
or use of EHI because a necessary
precondition required by law has not
been satisfied. This exception will apply
to all instances where an actor’s ability
to provide access, exchange, or use is
‘‘controlled’’ by a legal obligation to
satisfy a condition, or multiple
conditions, prior to providing that
access, exchange, or use. To be covered
by this exception, the actor must
comply with conditions, which are
discussed below.
The nature of the preconditions that
an actor must satisfy in order to provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI will
depend on the privacy laws that
regulate the actor. An actor that is
regulated by a restrictive state privacy
law may need to satisfy more conditions
than an actor regulated by a less
restrictive state privacy law, before
providing access, exchange, or use.
Similarly, certain state privacy laws
may impose standards for meeting
preconditions that are more rigorous
than the laws in force elsewhere.
116 45 CFR 164.508 (Uses and disclosures for
which an authorization is required).
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To illustrate how we propose this subexception would operate, we provide
the following examples. We note that
this list of examples is not exhaustive
and that preconditions required by law
that control access, exchange, or use of
EHI that are not listed below would still
qualify under this proposed subexception so long as all conditions are
met.
• Certain federal and state laws
require that a person provide consent
before his or her EHI can be accessed,
exchanged, or used for specific
purposes. Although the HIPAA Privacy
Rule does not have consent
requirements for an individual (as that
term is defined in the HIPAA Privacy
Rule) when a covered entity or business
associate is using or disclosing ePHI for
treatment, payment or health care
operations, some state laws and federal
laws and regulations do require that a
person’s consent be obtained by the
disclosing party/entity before disclosing
certain health information. For example,
for some sensitive health conditions
such as HIV/AIDS, mental health, or
genetic testing, state laws may impose a
higher standard for disclosure of such
information (i.e., require consent) than
is required under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule. Additionally, under 42 CFR part 2,
federally-assisted ‘‘Part 2 programs’’
generally are required to obtain a
person’s consent to disclose or redisclose patient-identifying information
related to the person’s substance use
disorder, such as treatment for
addiction. The exception would operate
to clarify an actor’s compliance
obligations in these situations. It would
not be considered information blocking
to refuse to provide access, exchange, or
use of EHI if the actor has not received
the person’s consent, subject to
conditions discussed herein.
• If an actor is required by law to
obtain an individual’s HIPAA
authorization before providing access,
exchange, or use of the individual’s EHI,
then the individual’s refusal to provide
an authorization would justify the
actor’s refusal to provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI. The actor’s
refusal would, subject to conditions
discussed herein, be protected under
this exception.
• The HIPAA Privacy Rule, and many
state privacy laws, authorize the
disclosure of PHI in certain
circumstances only once the identity
and authority of the person requesting
the information has been verified. We
acknowledge that it is reasonable and
necessary that actors take appropriate
steps, consistent with federal and state
laws, to ensure that EHI is not disclosed
to the wrong person or to a person who
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is not authorized to receive it. Where an
actor cannot verify the identity or
authority of a person requesting access
to EHI, and such verification is required
by law before the actor can provide
access, exchange, or use of the EHI, the
actor’s refusal to provide access,
exchange, or use will, subject to the
conditions discussed herein, be
reasonable and necessary and will not
be information blocking.
• Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a
health care provider may share
information with another health care
provider for a quality improvement
project if it has verified that the
requesting entity has a relationship with
the person whose information is being
requested. Where the actor could not
establish if the relationship existed, it
would not be information blocking for
the actor to refuse to provide access,
exchange, or use, subject to the
conditions discussed herein.
We seek comments generally on this
proposed sub-exception. More
specifically, we seek comment on how
this proposed sub-exception would be
exercised by actors in the context of
state laws. We are aware that actors that
operate across state lines or in multiple
jurisdictions sometimes adopt
organization-wide privacy practices that
conform with the most restrictive
privacy laws regulating their business.
In order to ensure that the information
blocking provision does not diminish
the privacy rights of individuals being
serviced by such actors, we are
considering the inclusion of an
accommodation in this sub-exception
that would recognize an actor’s
observance of a legal precondition that
the actor is required by law to satisfy in
at least one state in which it operates.
We believe this approach would be
consistent with practices already in
place for multi-state health care
systems. For example, some states
require specific consent requirements
before exchanging sensitive health
information such as a patient’s mental
health condition. As a result, the health
care system will utilize one consent
form for multi-jurisdiction purposes in
order to meet various federal and state
law requirements. However, in the event
that we did adopt such an
accommodation, we would also need to
carefully consider how to ensure that
before the use of the most stringent
restriction is applied in all jurisdictions,
the actor has provided all privacy
protections afforded by that law across
its entire business. This type of
approach would ensure that an actor
cannot take advantage of a morerestrictive privacy law for the benefit of
this exception while not also fulfilling
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the privacy-protective obligations of the
law being relied on. We seek comment
on whether there is a need for ONC to
adopt such an accommodation for actors
operating in multiple states, and
encourage commenters to identify any
additional conditions that should attach
to the provision of such an
accommodation. We also request
comment on our proposed approach to
dealing with varying state privacy laws
throughout this proposed sub-exception.
We also recognize that under the
patchwork of state privacy laws, some
states have enacted laws that more
comprehensively identify the
circumstance in which an individual or
entity can and cannot provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI. We are
considering to what extent health care
providers that are not regulated by the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, and would rely
instead on state laws for this subexception, would be able to benefit from
this sub-exception when engaging in
practices that interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI for the purpose
of promoting patient privacy. We seek
comment on any challenges that may be
encountered by health care providers
that are not regulated as covered entities
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule when
seeking to take advantage of this
proposed sub-exception. We also seek
comment on whether there exists a class
of health care provider that is not
regulated by any federal or state privacy
law that prescribes preconditions that
must be satisfied in connection with the
disclosure of EHI, and whether any such
class of health care provider would
benefit from a sub-exception similar to
that proposed in § 171.202(c) for health
IT developers of certified health IT.
Conditions To Be Met To Qualify for the
Sub-Exception
In most circumstances, an actor
would be in a position to influence
whether a precondition is satisfied. For
example, an actor could deprive a
person of the opportunity to take some
step that is a prerequisite for the
exchange of their EHI, could assume the
existence of a fact prejudicial to the
granting of access without seeking to
discover the truth or otherwise of the
fact, or could make a determination that
a precondition was not satisfied without
properly informing itself of all relevant
information. As such, we propose that
this exception would be subject to
conditions that ensure that the
protection of an individual’s privacy is
not used as a pretext for information
blocking.
We propose that an actor can qualify,
in part, for this sub-exception by
implementing and conforming to
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organizational policies and procedures
that identify the criteria to be used by
the actor and, as applicable, the steps
that the actor will take, in order to
satisfy the precondition. Most actors are
covered entities or business associates
for the purposes of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, and are already required to have
policies and procedures and training
programs in place that address how PHI
and ePHI is used (as that term is defined
in 45 CFR 160.103, as amended) and
disclosed. As such, we expect that the
overwhelming majority of actors will
already be in a position to meet this
condition, or would be able to meet this
condition with modest additional effort.
However, we acknowledge that some
actors may not, for whatever reason,
have privacy policies and practices in
place, or may have implemented
privacy policies and practices that do
not sufficiently address the criteria to be
used, and steps to be taken, to satisfy a
precondition relied on by the actor. As
such, we propose to provide an
alternative basis on which to qualify, in
part, for this sub-exception. We propose
to permit actors to instead document, on
a case-by-case basis, the criteria used by
the actor to determine when the
precondition will be satisfied, any
criteria that were not met, and the
reason why the criteria were not met.
These alternative conditions, which are
discussed in detail below, ensure that
this sub-exception does not protect
practices that are post hoc
rationalizations used to justify improper
practices, whilst also ensuring that
actors do not face any pressure to
disclose EHI in the situation where they
do not have privacy policies and
practices in place, or where their
privacy policies and practices do not
respond to the requirements of this
condition.
Separately, we propose that if the
precondition that an actor purports to
have been satisfied relies on the
provision of a consent or authorization
from an individual, it is a condition of
this sub-exception that the actor must
have done all things reasonably
necessary within its control to provide
the individual with a meaningful
opportunity to provide that consent or
authorization.
We reiterate, again, that the
information blocking provision does not
require the provision of access,
exchange, or use of EHI in a manner that
would not be permitted under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Organizational Policies and Procedures
If an actor seeks to qualify for this
sub-exception, in part, by implementing
and conforming to organizational
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policies and procedures, such policies
and procedures must be in writing, and
specify the criteria to be used by the
actor, and, if applicable, the steps that
the actor will take, in order to satisfy the
precondition relied on by the actor not
to provide access, exchange, or use of
EHI. It would not be sufficient for an
actor to simply identify the existence of
the precondition in their organizational
policies and procedures.
We acknowledge that certain
preconditions may be outside the direct
control of the actor. For example, the
requirement that an actor receive a valid
authorization before releasing EHI in
certain circumstances would be a
precondition to be satisfied by the
individual, and the actor may have little
ability to influence the nature of the
authorization that it receives. For
preconditions of this nature, the actor’s
policies and procedures would only
need to identify the criteria that the
actor will apply and the steps that the
actor will take to facilitate the
satisfaction of the precondition, such as
identifying the requirements for a valid
authorization and the follow up steps (if
any) to be taken in response to receipt
of an authorization that does not meet
those requirements. In contrast, where
the satisfaction of a precondition relies
solely on an actor, such as the
‘‘minimum necessary’’ determination
made by HIPAA covered entities (or
their business associates) when
exchanging EHI that is ePHI, the actor’s
policies and procedures would need to
particularize the steps that the actor will
take in order to ensure that it satisfies
the precondition. Where the
precondition falls somewhere in
between and relies on actions taken by
both the actor and an individual, the
actor’s policies and procedures would
need to address how the actor would do
the things necessary within its control,
which would include the steps it should
take to facilitate all actions needed to be
taken by an individual.
Take, for example, the situation where
an actor needed to determine whether
the subject individual had a relationship
with a requesting entity as a
precondition to exchanging EHI. The
actor’s policies and practices should, at
minimum, identify the criteria to be
applied, being the evidence that the
actor would need in order to satisfy
itself of the existence of a relationship,
such as receipt of a Medicare or other
insurance number, or other indicia of a
relationship such as the establishment
of a doctor-patient relationship.
An actor would only be eligible to
benefit from this sub-exception if it has
followed its processes and policies.
Continuing the above example, an actor
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that chose not to provide access to EHI
on the basis that insufficient evidence
had been provided to establish the
existence of the relationship, would
need to show that its decision was based
on the applicable criteria specified in
the actor’s policy and practices.
Using a different example, and as
discussed above, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule generally requires covered entities
(and their business associates) to take
reasonable steps to limit the use or
disclosure of, and requests for, PHI to
the minimum necessary to accomplish
the intended purpose.117 Satisfying the
‘‘minimum necessary’’ requirement is a
precondition to be met under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule before an actor
exchanges ePHI for many purposes. The
determination of what constitutes the
‘‘minimum necessary’’ is a fact based
judgment made by an actor. To allow
covered entities the flexibility to
address their unique circumstances, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered
entities (and their business associates)
to make their own assessment of what
ePHI is reasonably necessary for a
particular purpose, given the
characteristics of their business and
workforce. To qualify for this proposed
sub-exception, the actor’s privacy
policies and procedures would need to
identify criteria for making a ‘‘minimum
necessary’’ determination for both
routine and non-routine disclosures and
requests, including identifying the
circumstances under which disclosing
the entire medical record is reasonably
necessary. For actors that are covered
entities or business associates, the
development of policies and procedures
for the making of minimum necessary
determinations for requesting, using and
disclosing PHI is already a requirement
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, so we
expect that actors will already have
such policies and procedures in place.
If an actor implemented its
organizational policies and procedures
for making ‘‘minimum necessary’’
determinations consistent with the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, and otherwise met
the other conditions of this exception, a
decision to exchange the minimum
necessary information but less
information than requested by another
entity would satisfy this sub-exception
and not be considered information
blocking.
Finally, an actor’s policies and
procedures must be implemented. This
ensures that an actor can only satisfy
this condition by reference to privacy
policies and practices that individuals
in fact benefit from, and not by policies
and procedures that have been
117 45
CFR 164.502(b).
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documented but not applied. Proper
implementation would involve making
the policies and processes available to
all decision makers, and facilitating
workforce and contractor understanding
and consistent implementation of the
actor’s policies and procedures such as
by providing training. This condition
ensures that this sub-exception does not
protect practices that are post hoc
rationalizations used to justify improper
practices.
As discussed above, to the extent
existing state and federal laws apply to
a given actor, we expect an actor to
already have procedures in place to
address those legal requirements.
Indeed, the HIPAA Privacy Rule
requires that covered entities have
policies and procedures and training
programs in place that address how PHI
and ePHI are used (as those terms are
defined in 45 CFR 160.103) and
disclosed. Moreover, this exception is
only enlivened when an actor asserts
that its conduct was carried out to
satisfy a precondition, and we expect
that such conduct should be considered
and deliberate.
We seek comment on this proposed
condition generally, and specifically, on
whether an actor’s organizational
policies and procedures provide a
sufficiently robust and reliable basis for
evaluating the bona fides,
reasonableness, and necessity of
practices engaged in to satisfy
preconditions required by state or
federal privacy laws.
Documenting Criteria and Rationale
If an actor’s practice does not conform
to an actor’s organizational policies and
procedures as required by
§ 171.202(b)(1), we propose that that an
actor can seek to qualify for this subexception, in part, by documenting how
it reached its decision that it would not
provide access, use, or exchange of EHI
on the basis that a precondition had not
been satisfied. Such documentation
must be created on a case-by-case basis.
An actor will not satisfy this condition
if, for instance, it sought to document a
general practice that it had applied to all
instances where the precondition had
not been satisfied. Rather, the record
created by the actor must address the
specific circumstances of the specific
practice (or interference) at issue.
The record created by the actor must
identify the criteria used by the actor to
determine when the precondition is
satisfied. That is, it must identify the
objective criteria that the actor applied
to determine whether the precondition
had been satisfied. Consistent with the
condition to this sub-exception that the
practice must be tailored to the privacy
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interest at issue (discussed below), those
criteria would need to be directly
relevant to satisfying the precondition.
For example, if the precondition at issue
was the provision of a valid HIPAA
authorization, the actor’s documented
record should reflect, at minimum, that
the authorization would need to meet
each of the requirements specified for a
valid authorization at 45 CFR
164.508(c). The record would then need
to document the criteria that had not
been met, and the reason so. Continuing
the example, the actor could record that
the authorization did not contain the
name or other specific identification of
the person making the request because
the authorization only disclosed the
person’s first initial rather than first
name, and the actor had records about
multiple people with that same initial
and last name.
We believe that this condition will
provide the transparency necessary to
demonstrate whether the actor has
satisfied the conditions applicable to
this exception. Moreover, it will ensure
that a decision to not provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI is considered
and deliberate, and therefore reasonable
and necessary.
We seek comment on this proposed
condition.
Meaningful Opportunity To Provide
Consent or Authorization
If the precondition that an actor
purports to have satisfied relies on the
provision of a consent or authorization
from an individual, it is a condition of
this sub-exception that the actor must
have done all things reasonably
necessary within its control to provide
the individual with a meaningful
opportunity to provide that consent or
authorization. This condition will be
relevant when, for example, a state
privacy law or the HIPAA Privacy Rule
requires an individual to provide their
consent and/or HIPAA authorization
before identifiable information can be
accessed, exchanged, or used for
specific purposes. For instance, a state
law may require that an individual
provide consent before a hospital can
share her treatment information
electronically with another treating
health care provider. Under this
scenario, the hospital’s refusal to
exchange the EHI in the absence of the
individual’s consent would be
reasonable and necessary and would not
be information blocking, so long as the
hospital had provided the individual
with a meaningful opportunity to
provide that consent and where the
criteria and other conditions of this
proposed exception were met.
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In the context of the provision of
consent, a meaningful opportunity
would ordinarily require that an actor
provide the individual with a legally
compliant consent form; make a
reasonable effort to inform an individual
that she has the right to consent to the
disclosure of her EHI; and provide the
individual with sufficient information
and educational material
(commensurate with the circumstances
of the disclosure). It would be best
practice for an actor to also inform the
individual about the revocability of any
consent given, if and as provided in the
relevant state or federal privacy law,
and the actor’s processes for acting on
any revocation.
We are considering addressing this
condition in further detail, whether by
way of additional guidance or in
regulation text. To this end, we seek
comments regarding what actions an
actor should take, within the actor’s
control, to provide an individual with a
meaningful opportunity to provide a
required consent or authorization, and
whether different expectations should
arise in the context of a consent versus
a HIPAA authorization. For example,
commenters may wish to provide
comment on the actions to be taken to
ensure that an individual has a
meaningful opportunity to satisfy a
precondition that the individual provide
a HIPAA authorization. Specifically, in
the context of a requirement that the
authorization be signed, what effort
should be expected from actors in
seeking signatures from: (i) Persons
acting for the patient where the patient
is unable to sign a form; (ii) former
patients whose EHI is being requested
from third parties; or (iii) patients that
are not in a facility, such as patients of
individual physicians?
We clarify that after providing the
individual with a meaningful
opportunity to consent or provide
authorization, we believe that it is the
individual’s responsibility to complete
any required documentation before an
actor is able to access, exchange, or use
the individual’s EHI. We do not expect
the actor to ‘‘chase’’ the individual
despite using its best efforts provide the
individual with an opportunity to sign
a consent or authorization form. So long
as the actor has provided the individual
with a meaningful opportunity to
consent, the actor will have fulfilled this
aspect of the eligibility requirements of
this sub-exception.
Separately, to qualify for this subexception, to the extent that the
precondition at issue was the provision
of a consent or authorization by an
individual, the actor must not have
improperly encouraged or induced the
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individual to not provide the consent or
authorization. This does not mean that
the hospital cannot inform an
individual about the advantages and
disadvantages of exchanging EHI and
any associated risks, so long as the
information communicated is accurate
and legitimate. However, an actor would
not meet this condition in the event that
it misled an individual about the nature
of the consent to be provided, dissuaded
individuals from providing consent in
respect of disclosures to the actor’s
competitors, or imposed onerous
requirements to effectuate consent that
were unnecessary and not required by
law.
We seek comment on whether the
proposed condition requiring the
provision of a meaningful opportunity
and prohibiting improper
encouragement or inducement should
apply to preconditions beyond the
precondition that an individual provide
consent or authorization. We seek
comment on whether the conditions
specified for this sub-exception, when
taken in total, are sufficiently
particularized and sufficiently strict to
ensure that actors that are in a position
to influence whether a precondition is
satisfied will not be able to take
advantage of this sub-exception and
seek protection for practices that do not
promote the privacy of EHI. We also
seek comment on whether we should
adopt a more tailored approach to
conditioning the availability of this
exception. For example, we are
considering whether different
conditions should apply depending on:
(i) The nature of the EHI at issue; (ii) the
circumstances in which the EHI is being
access, exchanged, or used; (iii) the
interest being protected by the
precondition; or (iv) the nature of the
precondition to be satisfied.
Commenters are encouraged to identify
scenarios in which the application of
the conditions applicable to this subexception, as proposed, give rise to
unnecessary burden, or would require
activities that do not advance the dual
policy interests of preventing
information blocking and promoting
privacy and security.
Practice Must Be Tailored to the
Specific Privacy Risk or Interest Being
Addressed
To qualify for this sub-exception, an
actor’s privacy-protective practice must
be tailored to the specific privacy risks
that the practice actually addresses.
This condition necessarily presupposes
that an actor has carefully evaluated the
privacy requirements imposed on the
actor, the privacy interests to be
managed by the actor, and has
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developed a considered response that is
tailored to protecting and promoting the
privacy of EHI. For example, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule at 45 CFR 164.514(h)
requires that, in certain circumstances,
the disclosure of PHI is only authorized
once the identity and authority of the
person requesting the information has
been verified. The privacy issue to be
addressed in this instance is the risk
that PHI will be disclosed to the wrong
individual, or an unauthorized person.
If an actor chooses not to provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI on the
basis that the actor’s identity
verification requirements have not been
satisfied, the actor’s practice must be
tailored to the specific privacy risks at
issue. This would require that the actor
ensure that it does not impose identity
verification requirements that are
unreasonably onerous under the
circumstances.
To illustrate, a policy where a driver’s
license was the only accepted
government-issued form of
identification would not be a practice
that is tailored to the privacy risk at
issue because the provider’s preference
for one form of government-issued
identification over another does not
meaningfully manage the privacy risk.
Similarly, it may be unreasonable for an
actor to require the production of
documentation demonstrating the
parent-child relationship unless the
actor was in possession of information
that suggested that an adult might not
have authority to be the child’s legal
representative. To do otherwise would
be to apply an onerous requirement in
all instances of parent-child
relationships, which is insufficiently
tailored to the privacy risk being
managed. Finally, it may be
unreasonable for an actor to insist that
the individual produce original
identification if the individual was able
to furnish a scanned copy of their form
of identification that the actor could
reasonably rely on.
For the purposes of this subexception, we clarify that engaging in an
interference on the basis that a
precondition has not been satisfied
would be a practice that addresses a
privacy risk or interest, and so tailoring
that interference to satisfy a
precondition can satisfy this condition.
Controls on access, exchange, or use
arising under privacy laws serve a
privacy interest and so this condition
will be met so long as the actor’s
practice is tailored to the risk or interest
being addressed.
We seek comment on this proposed
condition.
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Practice Must Be Implemented in a
Consistent and Non-Discriminatory
Manner
We propose that in order for a
practice to qualify for this subexception, the practice must be
implemented in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner. This condition
would provide basic assurance that the
purported privacy practice is directly
related to a specific privacy risk and is
not being used to interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI for other
purposes to which this exception does
not apply.
This condition requires that the
actor’s privacy-protective practices must
be based on objective criteria that apply
uniformly for all substantially similar
privacy risks. An actor could not, for
example, implement an organizational
privacy policy that imposed
unreasonably onerous requirements on a
certain class of individuals or entities
without a legitimate justification for
doing so. For example, an actor that
offered a patient-facing software
application (app) would not be able to
benefit from this exception if it refused
to exchange EHI with a competitor app
on the basis of an individual’s failure to
meet onerous authorization
requirements that applied only to health
information exchange with the
competitor app and did not apply to, for
example, the exchange of EHI with
health care providers. This condition
provides basic assurance that the
purported privacy-protective practice is
not being used to interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI for other
purposes to which this proposed
exception does not apply.
We request comment on this proposed
condition.
Sub-Exception to Proposed Privacy
Exception: Health IT Developer of
Certified Health IT Not Covered by
HIPAA
The sub-exception proposed in
§ 171.202(b) recognizes as reasonable
and necessary the activities engaged in
by actors consistent with the controls
placed on access, exchange, or use of
EHI by federal and state privacy laws.
Importantly, that sub-exception is
limited to actors that are subject to those
federal and state privacy laws; an actor
that is not regulated by HIPAA or a state
privacy law cannot benefit from the
exception proposed in § 171.202(b).
We propose to establish a subexception to the information blocking
provision that would apply to actors
that are health IT developers of certified
health IT but not regulated by the
HIPAA Privacy Rule in respect to the
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operation of the actor’s health IT
product or service (referred to hereafter
as ‘‘non-covered actors’’). We expect
that the class of actors to which this
proposed sub-exception applies will be
very small. The vast majority of health
IT developers of certified health IT
operate as business associates to health
care providers or health plans, are
regulated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
and will be able to benefit from the
exception proposed in § 171.202(b) to
the extent that the HIPAA Privacy Rule
(or applicable state privacy law)
imposes preconditions to the provision
of access, exchange, or use of EHI.
However, we recognize that direct-toconsumer health IT products and
services are a growing sector of the
health IT market. This class of health IT
is often not regulated by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, but could be certified
under the Program. We note that the
privacy practices of consumer-facing
health IT products and services are
typically regulated by the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act). However,
the FTC Act applies to acts and
practices that are unfair and deceptive
(15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), and does not
prescribe privacy requirements to be
adopted or followed that can be
leveraged for the purpose of recognizing
reasonable and necessary privacyprotective practices in this proposed
rule.118
As discussed in section VIII.C.2.b,
where a health IT developer of certified
health IT offers a health IT product or
service not regulated by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, such product or service is
subject to the information blocking
provision. We want to ensure that noncovered actors that engage in reasonable
and necessary privacy-protective
practices that interfere with the access,
exchange, or use of EHI can seek
coverage under this proposed subexception. As such, we propose that a
non-covered actor will not engage in
information blocking if the actor does
not provide access, exchange, or use of
EHI where the practice implements a
process that is described in the actor’s
organizational privacy policy and has
been disclosed to any individual or
entity that uses the actor’s health IT.
This proposed sub-exception is
proposed in § 171.202(c).
As a threshold requirement of this
sub-exception, the actor’s practice of
interfering with access, exchange, or use
of EHI must comply with any applicable
state or federal privacy laws. While we
118 See HHS, Examining Oversight of the Privacy
& Security of Health Data Collected by Entities Not
Regulated by HIPAA, https://www.healthit.gov/
sites/default/files/non-covered_entities_report_
june_17_2016.pdf.
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have developed this sub-exception for
the express purpose of addressing
privacy-protective practices that are not
regulated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
we acknowledge that there may be other
privacy laws implicated by the practice
in question. If the actor’s practice
contravenes a state or federal privacy
law, but otherwise satisfies this
proposed sub-exception, the actor
would not be entitled to benefit from
this sub-exception.
Practice Must Implement Privacy Policy
In order to qualify for this subexception, the practice engaged in by
the non-covered actor—the interference
with access, exchange, or use of EHI—
must also implement a process
described in the actor’s organizational
privacy policy. This requires that a noncovered actor must have documented in
detail in its organizational privacy
policy the processes and procedures
that the actor will use to determine
when the actor will not provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI. For example, a
non-covered actor that proposed to
require the provision of written consent
for the use or disclosure of EHI would
need to describe in its organizational
privacy policy the processes and
procedures to be utilized by the actor to
implement that privacy-protective
practice in order that the practice be
considered reasonable and necessary
and qualify for this sub- exception. A
privacy policy that was prepared at a
high level—for example, that simply
stated that written consent was
required—would not qualify. To build
on this example, a non-covered actor’s
consent policy would need to describe
the specific requirements that are
imposed on individuals when giving
consent, together with the processes and
procedures to be followed by the noncovered actor to ensure that the
individual has a meaningful choice over
whether to consent. Compliance with
this condition ensures that this subexception recognizes only legitimate
practices that have been tailored to the
privacy needs of the individuals that
use the non-covered actor’s health IT,
and does not recognize practices that are
a pretext or after-the-fact rationalization
for actions that interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI.
It necessarily follows that the noncovered actor’s practice must implement
its documented organizational privacy
policy. For example, if a non-covered
actor chose not to provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI on the basis that
it could not verify the identity of the
individual requesting the EHI, the noncovered actor would need to be able to
demonstrate that it implemented the
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part of its organizational privacy policy
that dealt with identity verification.
Practices that diverge from an actor’s
documented policies or practices, or
which are not addressed in an actor’s
organizational privacy policy, would
not qualify for this proposed subexception.
Practice Must Have Been Disclosed to
Users
A non-covered actor that seeks to
benefit from this proposed subexception must also ensure that it has
previously disclosed the privacyprotective practice to the individuals
and entities that use, or will use, the
health IT. These users are affected by
the practices engaged in by a noncovered actor but may otherwise have
no visibility of the non-covered actor’s
approach to protecting the privacy of
EHI. We expect that non-covered actors
will seek to satisfy this condition by
using a privacy notice.119 We emphasize
that the disclosure must be meaningful.
In assessing whether a non-covered
actor’s disclosure was meaningful,
regard will be paid to whether the
disclosure was in plain language and
conspicuous, including whether the
disclosure was located in a place, and
presented in a manner, that is accessible
and obvious to the individuals and
entities that use, or will use, the health
IT.
To qualify for this sub-exception, a
non-covered actor would not be
required to disclose its organizational
privacy policy to its customers or to the
public generally. Rather, the noncovered actor need only describe, with
sufficient detail and precision to be
readily understood by users of the noncovered actor’s health IT, the privacyprotective practices that the noncovered actor has adopted and will
observe. This is necessary because a
non-covered actor that is not subject to
prescribed privacy standards in
connection with the provision of health
IT will have significant flexibility in the
privacy-protective practices that it
adopts. If an actor is not required to
inform the individuals and entities that
use, or will use, the health IT, about the
119 ONC has provided a Model Privacy Notice
(MPN) that is a voluntary, openly available resource
designed to help developers clearly convey
information about their privacy and security
policies to their users. Similar to the FDA Nutrition
Facts Label, the MPN provides a snapshot of a
company’s existing privacy practices encouraging
transparency and helping consumers make
informed choices when selecting products. The
MPN does not mandate specific policies or
substitute for more comprehensive or detailed
privacy policies. See https://www.healthit.gov/
topic/privacy-security-and-hipaa/model-privacynotice-mpn.
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privacy- protective practices that it will
implement in its product, or when
providing its service, there is a risk that
this proposed sub-exception will give
deference to policies and processes that
are post hoc rationalizations used to
justify improper practices. This
condition also serves as a check on the
nature of the interferences that a noncovered actor writes into its
organizational privacy policies;
transparency will help to ensure that a
non-covered actor takes a balanced
approach to protecting privacy interests
on one hand, and pursuing business
interests that might be inconsistent with
the information blocking provision, on
the other hand. We hope that this
requirement will foster a quasi-market
based measure of when a privacyprotective practice is ‘‘reasonable and
necessary,’’ and ensure that any
departure made by a non-covered actor
from privacy practices that are
recognized by state or federal law is
transparent and open.
It will be a matter for non-covered
actors to determine the most appropriate
way to communicate its privacy
practices to users. We believe that it
would be reasonable that non- covered
actors would, at minimum, post their
privacy notices, or otherwise describe
their privacy-protective practices, on
their websites.
Practice Must Be Tailored to Privacy
Risk and Implemented in a NonDiscriminatory Manner
Finally, we propose that in order for
a practice to qualify for this subexception, an actor’s practice must be
tailored to the specific privacy risks that
the practice actually addresses, and
must be implemented in a consistent
and non-discriminatory manner. These
conditions also apply to the exception
proposed in § 171.202(b), and the
discussion above addressing these
conditions in connection with
§ 171.202(b) applies to this proposed
exception in § 171.202(c). We refer
readers to the above discussion and
invite comments on these proposed
conditions.
We seek comment on this proposed
sub-exception generally. Specifically,
we seek comment on whether HIEs or
HINs would benefit from a similar subexception. We also seek comment on
whether the conditions applicable to
this sub-exception are sufficient to
ensure that non-covered actors cannot
take advantage of this exception by
engaging in practices that are
inconsistent with the promotion of
individual privacy. We also seek
comment on the level of detail that noncovered actors should be required to use
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when describing their privacy practices
and processes to user of health IT.
Sub-Exception to Proposed Privacy
Exception: Denial of an Individual’s
Request for Their Electronic Protected
Health Information in the
Circumstances Provided in 45 CFR
164.524(a)(1), (2), and (3)
We propose a limited sub-exception
to the information blocking provision
that would permit a covered entity or
business associate to deny an
individual’s request for access to their
PHI in the circumstances provided
under 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2), and (3).
We believe this exception would avoid
a potential conflict between the HIPAA
Privacy Rule and the information
blocking provision. Specifically, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule contemplates
circumstances under which covered
entities, and in some instances business
associates, may deny an individual
access to PHI and distinguishes those
grounds for denial which are reviewable
from those which are not. This
exception applies to both the
‘‘unreviewable grounds’’ and
‘‘reviewable grounds’’ of access. The
‘‘unreviewable grounds’’ for denial for
individuals include situations
involving: (1) Certain requests that are
made by inmates of correctional
institutions; (2) information created or
obtained during research that includes
treatment, if certain conditions are met;
(3) denials permitted by the Privacy Act;
and (4) information obtained from nonhealth care providers pursuant to
promises of confidentiality. In addition,
two categories of information are
expressly excluded from the individual
right of access: (1) Psychotherapy notes,
which are the personal notes of a mental
health care provider documenting or
analyzing the contents of a counseling
session that are maintained separate
from the rest of the patient’s medical
record (see 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1)); and
(2) information compiled in reasonable
anticipation of, or for use in, a civil,
criminal, or administrative action or
proceeding (see 45 CFR 164.501).
The ‘‘reviewable grounds’’ of access
as described in § 164.524(a)(3), which
provides that a covered entity may deny
access provided that the individual is
given a right to have such denials
reviewed under certain circumstances.
One such circumstance is when a
licensed health care professional, in the
exercise of professional judgment,
determines that the access requested is
reasonably likely to endanger the life or
physical safety of the individual or
another person. In addition, if access is
denied, then the individual has the right
to have the denial reviewed by a
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licensed health professional who is to
act as a reviewing official and did not
participate in the original decision to
deny access (see generally 45 CFR
164.524(a)(3)).
We propose that if an actor who is a
covered entity or business associate
denies an individual’s request for access
to their PHI on the basis of these
unreviewable and reviewable grounds,
and provided the denial of access
complies with the requirements of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule in each case, then
the actor would qualify for this
exception and these practices would not
constitute information blocking.
The following example illustrates this
proposed sub-exception. An individual
is a patient of a psychiatrist who is a
HIPAA covered entity. The patient has
requested all of his electronic health
files from the psychiatrist. The
psychiatrist maintains separately from
the electronic health record a file
containing psychotherapy notes
regarding the patient. The psychiatrist
grants access to the patient by providing
a copy of the information in his
electronic health record, but does not
provide the patient’s psychotherapy
notes. Under this example, the
psychiatrist would meet the
requirements of this proposed exception
since the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides
that covered entities can deny
individuals access to their
psychotherapy notes and provides that
this is an unreviewable grounds for
denial.
We seek comment on this proposed
sub-exception.
Sub-Exception to Proposed Privacy
Exception: Respecting an Individual’s
Request Not To Share Information
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
that would, in certain circumstances,
permit an actor not to provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI if an individual
has specifically requested that the actor
not do so. This sub-exception is
proposed in § 171.202(e). We believe
this sub-exception is necessary to
ensure that actors are confident that
they can respect individuals’ privacy
choices without engaging in information
blocking, and to promote public
confidence in the health IT
infrastructure by effectuating patients’
preference about how and under what
circumstances their EHI will be
accessed, exchanged, and used. We
recognize that individuals may have
concerns about permitting their EHI to
be accessed, exchanged, or used
electronically under certain
circumstances. As a matter of public
policy, we think that these privacy
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concerns, if expressed by an individual
and agreed to by an actor, would be
reasonable and necessary, and an actor’s
conduct in abiding by its agreement
would, if all conditions are met, be an
exception to the information blocking
provision.
This proposed sub-exception would
not apply under circumstances where
an actor interferes with a use or
disclosure of EHI that is required by
law, including when EHI is required by
the Secretary to enforce HIPAA under
45 CFR 164.502(a)(2)(ii) and 45 CFR
164.502(a)(4)(i). Stated differently, this
sub-exception would not operate to
permit an actor to refuse to provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI when
that access, exchange, or use is required
by law. This sub-exception recognizes
and supports the public policy objective
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which
identifies uses and disclosures of EHI
for which the public interest in the
disclosure of the individual’s
information outweighs the individual’s
interests in controlling the information.
This sub-exception would permit an
actor not to share EHI if the following
conditions are met: (1) The individual
made the request to the actor not to have
his or her EHI accessed, exchanged, or
used; (2) the individual’s request was
initiated by the individual without any
improper encouragement or inducement
by the actor; and (3) the actor or its
agent documents the request within a
reasonable time period.
To qualify for this sub-exception, the
request that the individual’s EHI not be
accessed, exchanged, or used must come
from the individual. Moreover, the
individual must have made the request
independently and without any
improper encouragement or inducement
by the actor. For example, it would be
improper to encourage individuals not
to share information with unaffiliated
providers on the basis of generalized or
speculative risks of unauthorized
disclosure. On the other hand, if the
actor was aware of a specific privacy or
security risk, it would not be improper
to inform individuals of that risk.
Likewise, an actor would be permitted
to provide an individual with general
information about her privacy rights and
options, including for example, the
option to not provide consent, provided
the information is presented accurately,
does not omit important information,
and is not presented in a way that is
likely to improperly influence the
individual’s decision about how to
exercise their rights.
If an individual submits a request to
an actor not to disclose her EHI, and the
actor agrees with and documents the
request, the request would be valid for
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purposes of this sub-exception unless
and until it is subsequently revoked by
the individual. We believe this
approach would minimize compliance
burdens for actors while also respecting
individuals’ requests. We propose that
once the individual makes the request,
she should not, subject to the
requirements of applicable federal or
state laws and regulations, have to
continually reiterate her privacy
preferences, such as having to re-submit
a request every year. Likewise, we
propose that once the actor has
documented an individual’s request, the
actor should not have to repeatedly
reconfirm and re-document the request.
We seek comment, however, regarding
whether this approach is too permissive
and could result in unintended
consequences. We also seek comment
on this proposed sub-exception
generally, including on effective ways
for an individual to revoke his or her
privacy request for purposes of this subexception.
We also propose that in order for a
practice to qualify for this subexception, an actor’s practice must be
implemented in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner. This condition
would provide basic assurance that the
purported privacy practice is directly
related to the risk of disclosing EHI
contrary to the wishes of an individual,
and is not being used to interfere with
access, exchange, or use of EHI for other
purposes to which this exception does
not apply. This condition requires that
the actor’s privacy-protective practice
must be based on objective criteria that
apply uniformly for all substantially
similar privacy risks.
We note that under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, individuals have the right
to request restrictions on how a covered
entity will use (as that term is defined
in 45 CFR160.103) and disclose PHI
about them for treatment, payment, and
health care operations pursuant to 45
CFR 164.522(a)(1). Under § 164.522(a), a
covered entity is not required to agree
to an individual’s request for a
restriction (other than in the case of a
disclosure to a health plan under
§ 164.522(a)(1)(vi)), but is bound by any
restrictions to which it agrees.
We wish to clarify that, for the
purposes of this proposed subexception, the actor may give effect to
an individual’s request not to have an
actor disclose EHI even if state or
federal laws would allow the actor not
to follow the individual’s request. This
is consistent with our position that,
absent improper encouragement or
inducement, and subject to appropriate
conditions, it should not be considered
information blocking to give effect to
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patients’ individual preferences about
how their EHI will be shared or not. As
an illustration, if an individual requests
that her EHI not be accessed, exchanged,
or used by a physician to help train new
staff at a hospital, the physician may
agree not to use the individual’s EHI for
this purpose despite the fact it would
not be required by law to agree to such
a restriction. Provided the physician has
not encouraged or induced the
individual to make this request, this
sub-exception would apply to the
physician’s refusal to disclose the
information to staff for training
purposes.
We seek comments on this subexception generally. Specifically, we
seek comment on what would be
considered a reasonable time frame for
documentation. In addition, we also
seek comment on how this subexception would affect public health
disclosures and health care research, if
an actor did not share a patient’s EHI
due to a privacy preference, including
any effects on preventing or controlling
diseases, injury, or disability, and the
reporting of disease, injury, and vital
events such as births or deaths, and the
conduct of public health surveillance
and health care research.
3. Promoting the Security of EHI
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
that would permit actors to engage in
practices that are reasonable and
necessary to promote the security of
EHI, subject to certain conditions.
Without this exception, actors may be
reluctant to implement security
measures or engage in other activities
that are reasonable and necessary for
safeguarding the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of EHI. This
could undermine the ultimate goals of
the information blocking provision by
discouraging best practice security
protocols and diminishing the reliability
of the health IT ecosystem.
Robust security protections are
critical to promoting patients’ and other
stakeholders’ trust and confidence that
EHI will be collected, used, and shared
in a manner that protects individuals’
privacy and complies with applicable
legal requirements. Public confidence in
the security of their EHI has been
challenged, however, by the growing
incidence of cyber-attacks in the health
care sector. More than ever, health care
providers, health IT developers, HIEs
and HINs must be vigilant to mitigate
security risks and implement
appropriate safeguards to secure the EHI
they collect, maintain, access, use, and
exchange.
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The Cures Act directs the National
Coordinator, in consultation with the
HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR), to
issue guidance on common ‘‘security
barriers’’ that prevent the trusted
exchange of EHI (section 3022(c)(2) of
the PHSA). However, the Cures Act also
seeks to promote the security of EHI,
which it defines as an element of
interoperability (section 3000(9)(A) of
the PHSA) and a target area for the
policy development to be undertaken by
the Health Information Technology
Advisory Committee (section
3002(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the PHSA). The
inclusion of these provisions promote
broader access, exchange, and use of
EHI while at the same time continuing
to promote the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of EHI through security
practices that are appropriate and
tailored to identified vulnerabilities and
risks.
To qualify for this exception, we
propose that an actor’s conduct must
satisfy threshold conditions. As
discussed in detail below, the particular
security-related practice must be
directly related to safeguarding the
confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of EHI, implemented
consistently and in a nondiscriminatory manner, and tailored to
identified security risks.
While the importance of security
practices cannot be overstated, this
proposed exception would not apply to
all practices that purport to secure EHI.
Rather, this exception will only be
available when the actor’s securitybased practice satisfies the conditions
applicable to this exception. We do not
believe it would be appropriate to
prescribe a ‘‘maximum’’ level of security
or to dictate a one-size-fits-all approach
for all actors that may not be
appropriate in all circumstances and
may not accommodate new threats,
countermeasures, and best practices in a
rapidly changing security landscape.
Indeed, security infrastructure varies
from organization to organization, and
there exist diverse approaches and
technology solutions to managing
security risks. We do not intend for this
proposed exception to dictate a specific
security approach when an actor’s
security posture must be agile and its
practices iterative. Moreover, effective
security best practices focus on the
mitigation and remediation of risks to a
reasonable and acceptable level, and not
the elimination of all vulnerabilities, so
organizations should have the flexibility
to assess what vulnerabilities to address
and how best to address them while
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of EHI.
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As such, we propose that actors
would be able to satisfy this exception
through practices that implement either
security policies and practices
developed by the actor, or case-by-case
determinations made by the actor.
Whether a security-motivated practice
meets this exception would be
determined on a case-by-case basis
using a fact-based analysis of the
conditions set forth below. This
approach offers the most appropriate
framework for analyzing security
practices, which are necessarily driven
by and must be tailored to actors’
individual circumstances.
We wish to emphasize that the
security-based practices implemented
by a single physician office with limited
technology resources, for example, will
be different to those implemented by a
large health system, and that this
difference does not affect an actor’s
ability to qualify for this exception. The
fact-based approach we propose will
allow each actor to implement policies,
procedures, and technologies that are
appropriate for its particular size,
organizational structure, and risks to
individuals’ EHI.
A fact-based analysis also aligns with
the HIPAA Security Rule 120 concerning
the security of ePHI. The HIPAA
Security Rule does not dictate the
security measures that a covered entity
or business associate must implement,
but instead requires the entity to
develop security practices and
implement administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards that take into
account the entity’s size, complexity,
and capabilities; technical, hardware,
and software infrastructure; the costs of
security measures; and the likelihood
and possible impact of potential risks to
ePHI. Under the HIPAA Security Rule,
covered entities and business associates
are required to conduct an accurate and
thorough assessment of the potential
risks and vulnerabilities to the
confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of ePHI held by the covered
entity or business associate. Once
covered entities and business associates
have completed the risk assessment,
they must take security measures
sufficient to reduce identified risks and
vulnerabilities to reasonable and
appropriate levels (45 CFR
164.308(a)(1)(ii)). We note, however,
that while our approach is consistent
with the regulation of security practices
under the HIPAA Security Rule, the fact
that a practice complies with the HIPAA
Security Rule does not establish that it
120 The HIPAA Security Rule is located at 45 CFR
part 160 and Subparts A and C of Part 164 and 68
FR 8333.
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meets the conditions of this proposed
exception to the information blocking
provision. The HIPAA Security Rule
and this proposed exception have
different focuses. The HIPAA Security
Rule establishes a baseline by requiring
certain entities to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of ePHI by implementing
security measures, among other
safeguards, that the entities determine
are sufficient to reduce risks and
vulnerabilities to a reasonable and
appropriate level. In contrast, the
purpose of this exception to the
information blocking provision is to
provide flexibility for reasonable and
necessary security practices while
screening out practices that purport to
promote the security of EHI but that are
unreasonably broad, onerous on those
seeking access to the EHI, are not
applied consistently across/within an
organization, or otherwise may
unreasonably interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI.
We propose the following conditions
that must be met for an activity or
practice to qualify for this exception.
The Practice Must Be Directly Related
To Safeguarding the Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability of EHI
As a threshold condition, the
proposed exception would not apply to
any practices that are not directly
related to safeguarding the security of
EHI. In assessing the practice, we would
consider whether and to what extent the
practice directly addressed specific
security risks or concerns. We would
also consider whether the practice
served any other purposes and, if so,
whether those purposes were merely
incidental to the overriding security
purpose or provided an objectively
distinct, non-security-related rationale
for engaging in the practice.
We note that it should not be
particularly difficult or onerous for an
actor to demonstrate, as contemplated
above, that its practice was directly
related to a specific security risk or
concern. For example, the actor may
show that the practice was a direct
response to a known security incident
or threat; or that the practice directly
related to the need to verify a person’s
identity before granting access to EHI; or
that the practice was directly related to
ensuring the integrity of EHI.
The salient issue under this
condition, therefore, would be whether
the security practice was actually
necessary and directly related to
safeguarding EHI. To that end, we
would consider the actor’s purported
basis for adopting the particular security
practice, which could be evidenced by
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the actor’s organizational security
policy, risk assessments, and other
relevant documentation, which most
actors are already required to develop
pursuant to requirements under the
HIPAA Rules.121 However, we propose
that the documentation of an actor’s
decision-making would not necessarily
be dispositive. For example, if the
practice had the practical effect of
disadvantaging competitors or steering
referrals, this could be evidence that the
practice was not directly related to the
safeguarding the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of EHI. We
propose that such an inference would
also not be warranted where the actor
has not met the other conditions of this
exception proposed below, as where the
actor’s policies were not developed or
implemented in a reasonable manner;
its security policies or practices were
not tailored to specific risks; or it
applied its security policies or practices
in an inconsistent or discriminatory
manner.
The Practice Must Be Tailored to the
Specific Security Risk Being Addressed
To qualify for this exception, we
propose that an actor’s security-related
practice must be tailored to specific
security risks that the practice actually
addressed. This condition necessarily
presupposes that an actor has carefully
evaluated the risk posed by the security
threat and developed a considered
response that is tailored to mitigating
the vulnerabilities of the actor’s health
IT or other related systems. For
example, the awareness of a security
vulnerability in a particular HIE’s
technology may justify a health care
provider’s suspending access to EHI
from that organization or by participants
of that HIE, but only for the period in
which the threat persists. In contrast, a
response that suspended access by all
HIEs or that persisted even after the HIE
had addressed the security vulnerability
in its technology would not be tailored
to address specific risks and would not
meet this condition.
As another example, it may be
reasonable for a health care provider to
refuse to grant access to EHI when an
individual has been unable to prove her
identity. However, the actor’s identity
proofing practice would have to be
tailored to address risks specifically
associated with the disclosure of EHI to
unauthorized individuals. For example,
identity proofing requirements might be
tailored if the practice is based on a risk
assessment and best practice policies
and procedures and is applied
121 45 CFR 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1); 45 CFR
164.316(b)(1).
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consistently and in a nondiscriminatory manner. However, we
believe an identity proofing requirement
would not be tailored if it were not
based on an objectively reasonable
security risk assessment and a careful
consideration of alternative approaches
that could adequately address the
specific risk of patient misidentification
in a less restrictive fashion.
As a final example, an actor’s decision
to deny access to the EHI it maintains
may be reasonable if the practice
responds to a request for EHI from a
patient-facing website or application
that causes the actor’s system to raise a
malicious software detection alert or if
the request comes from a website or
application listed on a security
‘‘blacklist.’’ However, we propose that
the actor’s response must be tailored to
the specific threat. Among other things,
the denial of access must be limited to
the patient and/or their personal
software. So as to ensure that the
response is properly tailored, it would
be best practice for actors to ensure that
they communicate to those persons
whose access was denied the reason for
the denial of access, and communicate
objective timeframes (if feasible to do
so) and other parameters for when
access would be granted or restored.
Moreover, we propose that, to the extent
that the practice implements an
organizational security policy, the
policy must align with applicable
consensus-based standards or best
practices for responding to these types
of incidents. Disagreement with the
individual about the worthiness of the
third party as a recipient of EHI, or even
concerns about what the third party
might do with the EHI, except for
reasons such as those listed in the
‘‘preventing harm’’ exception, are not
acceptable reasons to deny an
individual’s request.
Practice Must Be Implemented in a
Consistent and Non-Discriminatory
Manner
We propose that in order for a
practice to qualify for this proposed
exception, the actor’s practice must
have been implemented in a consistent
and non-discriminatory manner. This
condition would provide basic
assurance that the purported security
practice is directly related to a specific
security risk and is not being used to
interfere with access, exchange, or use
of EHI for other purposes to which this
exception does not apply.
As an illustration solely of the nondiscriminatory manner condition,
consider a health IT developer of
certified health IT that offers apps to its
customers via an app marketplace. If the
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developer requires that third-party apps
sold (or made available) via the
developer’s app marketplace meet
certain security requirements, those
security requirements must be imposed
in a non-discriminatory manner. This
would mean, for example, that if a
developer imposed a requirement that
third-party apps include two-factor
authentication for patient access, the
developer would need to ensure that the
same requirement was imposed on, and
met by, all other apps, including any
apps made available by the developer
itself. To note, such a developer
requirement must also meet the other
conditions of this exception (e.g., the
condition that the practice be tailored to
the specific security risk being
addressed).
Practices That Implement an
Organizational Security Policy
As discussed above, an actor’s
approach to information security
management will reflect the actor’s
particular size, organizational structure,
and risk posture. Because of this, it is
important that actors develop and
implement organizational policies that
secure EHI. We propose that, where an
actor has documented security policies
that align with applicable consensusbased standards, and where the policies
are implemented in a consistent and
non-discriminatory manner, a practice’s
conformity with such policies would
provide a degree of assurance that the
practice was reasonable and necessary
to address specific security risks and
thus should not constitute information
blocking. Conversely, a practice that
went beyond an actor’s established
policies or practices by imposing
security controls that were not
documented, would not qualify for this
exception under this condition
(although the actor may be able to
qualify under the alternative basis for
practices that do not implement a
security policy). Further, such practices
would be suspect under the information
blocking provision if there were
indications that the actor’s securityrelated justifications were a pretext or
after-the-fact rationalizations for its
actions or was otherwise unreasonable
under the circumstances.
We reiterate that, to the extent that an
actor seeks to justify a practice on the
basis of its organizational security
policies, such policies must be in
writing and implemented in a consistent
and non-discriminatory manner. As
noted above, what a policy requires will
depend on the facts and circumstances.
However, we propose that to support a
presumption that a practice conducted
pursuant to the actor’s security policy
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was reasonable, the policy would have
to meet the following conditions.
• Risks identified and assessed. The
actor’s security policy must be informed
by an assessment of the security risks
facing the actor. While we do not
propose any requirements as to a risk
assessment, we note that a good risk
assessment would use an approach
consistent with industry standards,122
and would incorporate elements such as
threat and vulnerability analysis, data
collection, security measures, likelihood
of occurrence, impact, level of risk, and
final reporting.123
• Consensus-based standards or best
practice guidance. The actor’s policy
must align with one or more applicable
consensus-based standards or best
practice guidance. At present, examples
of relevant best practices for
development of security policies
include, but are not limited to: NIST–
800–53 Rev. 5; the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework; and NIST SP 800–100, SP
800–37 Rev. 2, SP 800–39, as updated
and as interpreted through formal
guidance. Best practice guidance on
security policies is also developed by
consensus standards bodies such as ISO,
IETF, or IEC. HIPAA covered entities
and business associates may be able to
leverage their HIPAA Security Rule
compliance activities and can, if they
choose, align their security policy with
those parts of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework that are referenced in the
HIPAA Security Rule Crosswalk to NIST
Cybersecurity Framework to satisfy this
condition. Relevant consensus-based
standards and frameworks provide
actors of varying size and resources with
the flexibility needed to apply the right
security controls to the right
information systems at the right time to
adequately address risk.
• Objective timeframes and other
parameters. We propose that the actor’s
security policy must provide objective
timeframes and common terminology
used for identifying, responding to, and
addressing security incidents. Examples
of acceptable sources for development
of a security response plan include:
NIST Incident Response Procedure
(https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
detail/sp/800-61/rev-2/final), US–CERT
for interactions with government
systems (https://www.us-cert.gov/
government-users/reportingrequirements), and ISC–CERT for
122 See OCR, Guidance on Risk Analysis, https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/
guidance/guidance-risk-analysis/
index.html?language=es.
123 ONC and OCR have jointly launched the HHS
HIPAA Security Risk Assessment (SRA) Tool,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/
security-risk-assessment-tool.
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critical infrastructure (https://icscert.us-cert.gov/).
As a point of clarification, we note
that an actor’s compliance with the
HIPAA Security Rule (if applicable to
the actor) would be relevant to, but not
dispositive of, whether the actor’s
policies and procedures were
objectively reasonable for the purpose of
this exception. An actor’s
documentation of its security policies
and procedures for compliance with the
Security Rule may not offer a basis to
evaluate whether the actor’s security
practices unnecessarily interfere with
access, use, or exchange of EHI. For
example, it could be difficult to
determine whether a practice
unnecessary interferes with exchange of
EHI based on a review of the customized
PHI data flow diagram the actor
prepared as part of its Security Rule risk
analysis. We believe that a documented
policy that provides explicit references
to consensus-based standards and best
practice guidance (such as the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework) offer an
objective and robust means for ONC and
the OIG to evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular security control for the
purpose of this exception.
We recognize that, as a practical
matter, some actors (such as small
health care providers or those with
limited resources) may have
organizational security policies that are
less robust or that otherwise fall short of
the minimum conditions proposed
above. As discussed immediately below,
we propose that in these circumstances
an actor could still benefit from this
proposed exception by demonstrating
that the practice at issue was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances,
without regard to a formal policy.
Practices That Do Not Implement an
Organizational Security Policy
While we expect that most security
practices engaged in by an actor will
implement an organizational policy, we
recognize that EHI security may present
novel and unexpected threats that even
a best-practice risk assessment and
security policy cannot anticipate. If a
practice that does not implement an
organizational policy is to qualify for
this exception, however, it must meet
certain conditions. The actor’s practice
must, based on the particularized facts
and circumstances, be necessary to
mitigate the security risk. Importantly,
we propose that the actor would have to
demonstrate that it considered
reasonable and appropriate alternatives
that could have reduced the likelihood
of interference with access, exchange, or
use of EHI, and that there were no
reasonable and appropriate alternatives
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that were less likely to interfere with
access, exchange or use of EHI.
We note that an actor’s consideration
of reasonable and appropriate
alternatives will depend on the urgency
and nature of the security threat in
question. We anticipate that an actor’s
qualification for this exception would
accommodate exigent circumstances.
For example, we would not expect an
actor to delay the implementation of a
security measure in response to an
emergency on the basis that it has not
yet been able to initiate a fully realized
risk assessment process. However, we
expect that in these exigent
circumstances, where the actor has
implemented a security practice without
first considering whether there were
reasonable and appropriate alternatives
that were less likely to interfere with
access, exchange or use of EHI, the actor
would expeditiously make any
necessary changes to the practice based
on the actor’s consideration of
reasonable and appropriate alternatives
that are less likely to interfere with
access, exchange or use of EHI. We
propose that the exception would apply
in these instances so long as an actor
takes these steps and complies with all
other applicable conditions.
We encourage comment on these
conditions and our overall approach to
this proposed exception, including
whether our proposal provides adequate
flexibility for actors to implement
measures that are commensurate to the
threats they face, the technology
infrastructure they possess, and their
overall security profiles and, equally
important, whether this exception
adequately mitigates the risk that actors
will adopt security policies that are
unnecessarily restrictive or engage in
practices that unreasonably interfere
with access, exchange, or use of EHI.
Commenters are encouraged to propose
additional conditions that may be
necessary to ensure that the exception is
tailored and does not extend protection
to practices that are not reasonable and
necessary to promote the security of EHI
and that could present information
blocking concerns. We also seek
comment on whether the use of
consensus-based standards and
guidance provides an appropriate
reference point for the development of
security policies. Finally, commenters
may wish to offer an alternative basis for
identifying practices that do not offer a
security benefit (compared with
available alternatives) but that cause an
information blocking harm by
interfering with access, exchange, or use
of EHI.
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4. Recovering Costs Reasonably Incurred
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
that would permit the recovery of
certain costs reasonably incurred to
provide access, exchange, or use of EHI.
The exception and corresponding
conditions are set forth in the proposed
regulation text in § 171.204. We
interpret the definition of information
blocking to include any fee that is likely
to interfere with the access, exchange, or
use of EHI (see discussion in section
VIII.C.4.c.iv). We anticipate that this
interpretation may be broader than
necessary to address genuine
information blocking concerns and
could have unintended consequences
on innovation and competition.
Specifically, unless we establish an
exception, actors may be unable to
recover costs that they reasonably incur
to develop technologies and provide
services that enhance interoperability.
This could undermine the ultimate
goals of the information blocking
provision by diminishing incentives to
invest in, develop, and disseminate
interoperable technologies and services
that enable more robust access,
exchange, and use of EHI. Therefore, we
propose to establish an exception that
would permit the recovery of certain
costs that we believe are unlikely to
present information blocking concerns
and would generally promote
innovation, competition, and consumer
welfare, provided certain conditions are
met. We note that complying with the
requirements of this exception would
not prevent an actor from making a
profit in connection with the provision
of access, exchange, or use of EHI.
Indeed, the costs recoverable under this
proposed exception could include a
reasonable profit, provided that all
applicable conditions were met.
The exception would be subject to
strict conditions to prevent its potential
misuse. Specifically, we are concerned
that a broad or insufficiently tailored
exception for the recovery of costs could
protect rent-seeking, opportunistic fees,
and exclusionary practices that interfere
with the access, exchange, and use of
EHI. These practices fall within the
definition of information blocking and
reflect some of the most serious
concerns that motivated its enactment
(see section VIII.B of this preamble). For
example, in the Information Blocking
Congressional Report, we cited evidence
of wide variation in fees charged for
health IT products and services. While
we cautioned that the issue of fees is
nuanced, and that variations in fees
could be attributable in part to different
technology architectures, service
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models, capabilities, service levels, and
other factors, we concluded that these
factors alone could not adequately
explain all of the variation in prices that
we had observed. Based on these and
other indications, we concluded that
some actors were engaging in
opportunistic pricing practices or, in
some cases, charging prices designed to
deter connectivity or exchange with
competing technologies or services.
In the time since we published the
Information Blocking Congressional
Report, these practices have persisted
and, in certain respects, become more
pronounced. In a national survey of HIE
executives published in 2017, 47% of
respondents reported that EHR
developers ‘‘often/routinely’’ charge
high fees for exchange that are unrelated
to cost, and another 40% reported that
they ‘‘sometimes’’ do.124 Meanwhile, we
have continued to receive credible
evidence of rent-seeking and other
opportunistic behaviors, such as fees for
data export and data portability that are
not plausibly related to any reasonable
time, materials, or other costs that a
developer would reasonably incur to
provide these services. And, while some
practices described in the Information
Blocking Congressional Report have
become less prevalent (such as the
charging of per-transaction fees), other
practices have emerged that are equally
concerning.
As just one illustration, some EHR
developers have begun conditioning
access or use of customer EHI on
revenue-sharing or royalty agreements
that bear no plausible relation to the
costs incurred by the EHR developer to
grant access to the EHI. We have also
heard of discriminatory pricing policies
that have the obvious purpose and effect
of excluding competitors from the use of
interoperability elements. Many of the
industry stakeholders who shared their
perspectives with us in listening
sessions prior to this proposed rule,
including several health IT developers
of certified health IT, condemned these
practices and urged us to swiftly
address them.
In light of these concerns, we propose
that this exception would apply only to
the recovery of certain costs and only
when the actor’s methods for recovering
such costs comply with certain
conditions at all relevant times. As
discussed in more detail below, these
conditions would require that the costs
the actor recovered were reasonably
124 Julia Adler-Milstein and Eric Pfeifer,
Information Blocking: Is It Occurring And What
Policy Strategies Can Address It?, 95 Milbank
Quarterly 117, 124–25 (Mar. 2017), available at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/14680009.12247/full.
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incurred and did not reflect costs that
are speculative or subjective. Actors
would also be required to allocate costs
in an appropriate manner and to use
objective and permissible criteria when
charging fees to recover those costs.
Further, the exception would not apply
to certain fees, such as those based on
the profit or revenue associated with the
use of EHI (either being earned by the
actor, or that could be realized by
another individual or entity) that exceed
the actor’s reasonable costs for
providing access, exchange, or use of
the EHI. We specify certain prohibited
fees below.
Finally, the exception would provide
additional conditions applicable to fees
charged in connection with: (1) The
certified APIs described in § 170.404;
and (2) the EHI export capability
proposed in § 170.315(b)(10) for the
purposes of switching health IT or to
provide patients their electronic health
information. We emphasize that access
to EHI that is provisioned by supplying
some form of physical media, such as
paper copies (where the EHI is printed
out), or where EHI is copied onto a CD
or flash-drive, would not be a practice
that implicated the information blocking
provision provided that the fee(s)
charged for that access complied with
HIPAA (45 CFR 164.524(c)(4)).
Our intention with this exception is
not to set any particular cost that would
be considered ‘‘reasonably incurred,’’
but rather to allow the market to define
the appropriate price so long as certain
methods are followed and certain
criteria are met.
Requirement That Costs Be Reasonably
Incurred
Regardless of the type of cost at issue,
a basic condition of this proposed
exception is that any costs the actor
seeks to recover must have been
reasonably incurred to provide the
relevant interoperability elements to
enable access, exchange, or use of EHI.
Ultimately, whether a cost was
reasonably incurred will depend on the
particular facts and circumstances. We
believe this fact-based approach is
appropriate in light of the considerable
diversity in the types of costs that actors
might incur and the range of factors that
could bear on the reasonableness of
those costs. For example, the costs of
developing software may vary with the
purposes it is intended to serve, the
settings in which it will be deployed,
the types and scope of capabilities
included, and the extent to which these
development efforts build on existing
development efforts and know-how.
Additionally, the costs of providing
services, including the implementation
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of technology in production
environments, may vary based on the
technology design or architecture,
individual customer needs, local
implementation conditions, and other
factors. An analysis of costs would also
account for different distribution and
service models under which the costs
are calculated. We seek comment on
these and other considerations that may
be relevant to assessing the
reasonableness of costs incurred for
purposes of this exception.
Method for Recovering Costs
To qualify for the exception, we
propose that the method by which the
actor seeks to recover its costs must be
reasonable and non-discriminatory. This
would require that the actor base its
recovery of costs on objective and
verifiable criteria that are uniformly
applied for all substantially similar or
similarly situated classes of persons and
requests. We emphasize that this
proposal does not mean that the actor
must apply the same prices or price
terms for all persons or classes of
persons to whom it provides the
services. However, any differences in
prices or price terms would have to be
based on actual differences in the costs
that the actor incurred or other
reasonable and non-discriminatory
criteria. We further propose to require
that the method by which the actor
recovers its costs must be reasonably
related to the actor’s costs of providing
the type of access, exchange, or use to,
or at the request of, the person or entity
to whom the fee is charged.
We also propose that the method by
which the actor recovers its costs must
be reasonably allocated among all
customers to whom the technology or
service is supplied, or for whom the
technology is supported. A reasonable
allocation of costs would require that
the actor allocate its costs in accordance
with criteria that are reasonable and
between only those customers that
either cause the costs to be incurred or
benefit from the associated supply or
support of the technology. If an actor
developed technology that could be
supplied to multiple customers with
minimal tailoring, the core costs of
developing its technology should be
allocated between those customers
when recovered as a fee. The actor
would not be permitted to recover the
total of its core costs from each
customer. Similarly, when an actor uses
shared facilities and resources to
support the usage of technology, it
would need to ensure that those shared
costs were reasonably allocated between
all of the customers that benefited from
them. However, whenever an actor is
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required to provide services and incur
costs that are unique to a particular
customer, it would not need to
distribute those costs among other
customers that had deployed
technology.
In addition, the exception would not
apply if the method by which the actor
recovers its costs is based, in any part,
on whether the requestor or other
person is a competitor, potential
competitor, or will be using the EHI in
a way that facilitates competition with
the actor. The use of such criteria would
be suspect because it suggests the fee
the actor is charging is not based on its
reasonable costs to provide the services
and may have the purpose or effect of
excluding or creating impediments for
competitors, business rivals, or other
persons engaged in developing or
enabling the use of interoperable
technologies and services.
Last, we propose that the method by
which the actor recovers its costs must
not be based on the sales, profit,
revenue, or other value that the
requestor or other persons derive or may
derive from the access to, exchange of,
or use of electronic health information,
including the secondary use of such
information, that exceeds the actor’s
reasonable costs for providing access,
exchange, or use of electronic health
information. We emphasize that such
revenue-sharing or profit-sharing
arrangements would only be acceptable
and covered by the exception if such
arrangements are designed to provide an
alternative way to recover the costs
reasonably incurred for providing
services.
We seek comment on these conditions
and other issues we should consider in
assessing whether the methodology by
which an actor distributes costs and
charges fees should be considered
reasonable and necessary for purposes
of this exception. In particular we are
considering whether to introduce
specific factors and methods for
assessing when profit will be
reasonable. For example, should the
pro-competitive or efficiency-adding
aspect of an actor’s approach to
providing access, exchange, or use of
EHI be taken into account when
assessing the reasonableness of the
profit recovered by an actor? We also
ask commenters to consider whether
there are specific use cases for which
actors’ profits should be limited or
prohibited. We request that commenters
provide as much detail as possible when
describing methods for quantifying
profits and evaluating their
reasonableness.
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Costs Specifically Excluded
We propose that certain costs should
be explicitly excluded from this
exception regardless of the method for
recovering the costs. We have proposed
these excluded costs, which are detailed
below, in an effort to provide additional
clarity about the scope of this exception
and to create guardrails for preventing
potential misuse of the exception.
Costs Due to Non-Standard Design or
Implementation Choices
We propose that this exception would
not permit the recovery of any cost that
the actor incurred due to the health IT
being designed or implemented in nonstandard ways that unnecessarily
increase the complexity, difficulty or
burden of accessing, exchanging, or
using EHI. To the extent that such costs
can be reasonably avoided, we believe
that actors should internalize the costs
of such behaviors, which do not benefit
consumers, and which create
unnecessary impediments to access,
exchange, and use of EHI. As an
illustration, if a health IT developer of
certified health IT designed its database
tables or other aspects of its technology
in ways that make exporting or
converting EHI to other formats
difficult, the developer could not claim
that its costs to provide data conversion
services to customers are reasonably
incurred. Such costs would not be
eligible under this exception (and might
implicate the information blocking
provision for the reasons noted in
section VIII.C.4.c.v of this preamble).
We welcome comments on the
exclusion of these types of costs.
Subjective or Speculative Costs
We propose to limit this exception to
the recovery of costs that an actor
actually incurred to provide the relevant
interoperability element or group of
elements (which may comprise either
products or services). We propose that
this exception would not permit the
recovery of certain types of costs that
are subjective or speculative. We note
two important examples of this
limitation.
First, an actor would not be permitted
to recover any costs associated with
intangible assets (including depreciation
or loss of value), other than the actual
development or acquisition costs of
such assets. For example, an actor could
not charge a customer a fee based on the
purported ‘‘cost’’ of allowing the
customer to use the actor’s patented
technology, computer software,
databases, trade secrets, copyrighted
works, and the like. We understand that
the customer’s use of the asset could be
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considered a ‘‘cost’’ in the sense that,
were it not for the information blocking
provision, the actor could charge a
royalty or other fee for the use of its
intangible assets. For this reason, in
section VIII.D.6, we propose to permit
an actor to license most interoperability
elements on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, subject to certain
conditions. For purposes of this more
general exception, however, we believe
it would be inappropriate to permit an
actor to charge a fee based on these
considerations, which are inherently
subjective and could invite the kinds of
rent-seeking and opportunistic pricing
practices that fall squarely within the
definition of information blocking. We
clarify that an actor’s practices could
qualify for both this exception
(recovering costs reasonably incurred)
and the exception for licensing of
interoperability elements on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms in section
VIII.D.6. In that case, the actor could
recover costs under both exceptions.
Second, and for similar reasons, an
actor would not be permitted to recover
costs that are speculative. The exception
would not apply to ‘‘opportunity costs,’’
such as the revenues that an actor could
have earned had it not provided the
interoperability elements. We clarify
that the exclusion of opportunity costs
would not preclude an actor from
recovering its reasonable forwardlooking cost of capital. We believe these
costs are relatively concrete and that
permitting their recovery will protect
incentives for actors to invest in
developing and providing
interoperability elements.
Fee Prohibited by 45 CFR 164.524(c)(4)
We also propose that the exception
would not apply to fees prohibited by
45 CFR 164.524(c)(4). The HIPAA
Privacy Rule permits a covered entity to
impose a reasonable, cost-based fee if
the individual requests a copy of the
PHI (or agrees to receive a summary or
explanation of the information). The fee
may include only the cost of: (1) Labor
for copying the PHI requested by the
individual, whether in paper or
electronic form; (2) supplies for creating
the paper copy or electronic media (e.g.,
CD or USB drive) if the individual
requests that the electronic copy be
provided on portable media; (3) postage,
when the individual requests that the
copy, or the summary or explanation, be
mailed; and (4) preparation of an
explanation or summary of the PHI, if
agreed to by the individual (45 CFR
164.524(c)(4)). The fee may not include
costs associated with verification;
documentation; searching for and
retrieving the PHI; maintaining systems;
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recouping capital for data access,
storage, or infrastructure; or other costs
not listed above even if such costs are
authorized by state law.
Individual Electronic Access
We propose that this exception would
not apply if the actor charged a fee
based in any part on the electronic
access by an individual or their personal
representative, agent, or designee to the
individual’s EHI. Such fees are
distinguished from the cost-based fees
that a covered entity is permitted to
charge individuals for the provision of
copies of ePHI under HIPAA (45 CFR
164.524(c)(4)), and similar allowable
costs under state privacy laws, which
would not be excluded from the costs
recoverable under this exception. To be
clear, access to EHI that is provisioned
by supplying some form of physical
media, such as paper copies (where the
EHI is printed out), or where EHI is
copied onto a CD or flash-drive, would
not be a practice that implicated the
information blocking provision
provided that the fee(s) charged for that
access complied with HIPAA (45 CFR
164.524(c)(4)).
A fee based on electronic access by an
individual or their personal
representative, agent, or designee to the
individual’s EHI, in contrast, would
arise if an actor sought to impose on
individuals, or their personal
representatives, agents, or designees, a
fee that operated as a toll for the
provision of electronic access. For
example, a health care provider that
charges individuals a fee in order that
the individuals be given access to their
EHI via the health care provider’s
patient portal or another mode of webbased delivery, would not be able to
benefit from this exception. Similarly,
where an individual authorizes a
consumer-facing app to retrieve EHI on
the individual’s behalf, it would be
impermissible for an actor to charge the
app or its developer a fee to access or
use APIs that enable access to the
individual’s EHI. This would be true
whether the actor is a supplier of the
API technology or an individual or
entity that has deployed the API
technology, such as a health care
provider.
Export and Portability of EHI
Maintained in EHR Systems
The definition of information
blocking specifically mentions
transitions between health IT systems
and the export of complete information
sets as protected forms of access,
exchange, and use (see section
3022(a)(2)(C)(i) of the PHSA). In our
experience, health care providers
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frequently encounter rent-seeking and
opportunistic pricing practices in these
and other contexts in which they are
attempting to export EHI from their
systems for use in connection with other
technologies or services that compete
with or could reduce the revenue
opportunities associated with an EHR
developer’s own suite of products and
services. As discussed in section
VIII.C.5.b.iii of this preamble, most EHI
is currently maintained in EHRs and
other source systems that use
proprietary data models or formats; this
puts EHR developers in a unique
position to block the export and
portability of EHI for use in competing
systems or applications, or to charge
rents for access to the basic technical
information needed to facilitate the
conversion or migration of data for these
purposes. The concerns are
compounded by the fact that EHR
developers rarely disclose in advance
the fees they will charge for data export
and data portability services (see 80 FR
62719; 80 FR 16880–81).
For the reasons above, we propose
that fees charged for the export,
conversion, or migration of data from an
EHR technology would not qualify for
the exception unless they also meet two
additional conditions.
First, we propose that health IT
developers of certified health IT would,
for purposes of this exception, be
precluded from charging a fee to
perform an export of EHI via the
capability of health IT certified to the
proposed 2015 Edition ‘‘EHI export’’
certification criterion (§ 170.315(b)(10))
for the purposes of switching health IT
systems or to provide patients their EHI.
As part of the ‘‘Assurances’’ Condition
of Certification, health IT developers
that produce and electronically manage
EHI would need to be certified to the
‘‘EHI export’’ criterion and provider the
functionality to its customers (see
§ 170.402(a)(4) and section VII.B.2.b of
this preamble). As described in section
IV.C.1 of this preamble, the ‘‘EHI
export’’ certification criterion is
intended to provide a baseline
capability to export EHI from certified
health IT in a commercially reasonable
format in support of transitioning of EHI
between health IT systems and patient
access. Fees or limitations associated
with the use of this capability (as
distinguished from deployment or other
costs reasonably incurred by the
developer) would not receive protection
under the exception and may be suspect
under the information blocking
provision. We clarify that this condition
would not preclude a developer from
charging a fee to deploy the EHI export
capability in a health care provider’s
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production environment, or to provide
additional services in connection with
this capability other than those
reasonably necessary to enable its
intended use. For example, this
condition would not preclude a
developer from charging a fee to
perform an export of EHI via the
capability of health IT certified to the
proposed § 170.315(b)(10) for a thirdparty analytics company. We emphasize
once again that these excluded fees are
distinguished from the cost-based fees
that a covered entity is permitted to
charge individuals for the provision of
copies of ePHI under HIPAA (45 CFR
164.524(c)(4)), and similar allowable
costs under state privacy laws, which
would not be excluded from the costs
recoverable under this exception.
We note that, because this
certification criterion provides only a
baseline capability for exporting data,
we anticipate that health IT developers
of certified health IT will need to
provide other data portability services to
facilitate the smooth transition of health
care providers between different health
IT systems. We propose that such fees
may qualify for protection under the
exception, but only if they meet the
other conditions described above and in
proposed § 171.205(a).
Second, we propose that the
exception would not apply to a fee to
export or convert data from an EHR
technology unless such fee was agreed
to in writing at the time the technology
was acquired, meaning when the EHR
developer and the customer entered into
a contract or license agreement for the
EHR technology. This condition is
designed to promote the disclosure of
fees upfront and thereby reduce the
potential for actors to engage in
installed-base opportunism or
attempting to use fees to discourage data
portability.
Compliance With the Condition of
Certification Specific to API Technology
Suppliers and API Data Providers
We note that health IT developers of
certified health IT subject to the API
Condition of Certification proposed in
§ 170.404 may not charge certain types
of fees and are subject to more specific
cost accountability provisions than
apply generally under this proposed
exception. We believe that the failure of
developers to comply with these
additional requirements would impose
impediments to consumer and other
stakeholder access to EHI without
special effort and would be suspect
under the information blocking
provision. We propose, therefore, that a
health IT developer of certified health
IT subject to the API Condition of
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Certification must comply with all
requirements of that condition for all
practices and at all relevant times in
order to qualify for this exception.
We also believe that a health care
provider that acts as an API Data
Provider, should be subject to the same
constraints. For example, the API
Condition of Certification prohibits a
health IT developer from charging a
usage fee to patient-oriented apps. We
believe information blocking concerns
would arise if a provider were to charge
such a fee, notwithstanding the fact that
the provider is not subject to the
certification requirements. For this
reason, we propose that, if the actor is
an API Data Provider, the actor is only
permitted to charge the same fees that
an API Technology Supplier is
permitted to charge to recover costs
consistent with the permitted fees
specified in the Condition of
Certification in § 170.404. In other
words, to the extent that a provider is
an API Data Provider, the provider will
not qualify for this exception if it
charges any fee that a health IT
developer of certified health IT would
be prohibited from charging under the
API Condition of Certification.
Application of the Exception to
Individual Practices
We clarify that the conditions of this
exception, including those governing
the methodology and criteria by which
an actor calculates and distributes its
costs, must be satisfied for each and
every fee that an actor charges to a
customer, requestor, or other person.
For example, if an actor uses a cost
allocation methodology that does not
meet the requirements of the exception,
each fee charged on the basis of that
methodology would be a suspect
practice under the information blocking
provision. All applicable conditions of
the exception must be met at all relevant
times for each practice.
We request comment on this proposed
exception. Specifically, we ask
commenters to consider alternate
approaches to the exception that would
also achieve the goal of allowing actors
to recover certain types of costs that
would promote innovation, competition
and consumer welfare and that are
unlikely to present information blocking
concerns. In assessing other potential
approaches to this exception, we
encourage commenters to contemplate
such considerations as enforceability,
potential burden on the parties, and
overall effectiveness in meeting the
above stated goals.
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5. Responding To Requests That are
Infeasible
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
that would permit an actor to decline to
provide access, exchange, or use of EHI
in a manner that is infeasible, provided
certain conditions are met. The
exception and corresponding conditions
are set forth in the proposed regulation
text in § 171.205. We propose that this
exception would not apply when a
response is required by law. As
discussed in section VIII.C.5 of this
preamble, we propose that the
information blocking provision would
be implicated if an actor were to refuse
to facilitate access, exchange, or use of
EHI, either as a general practice or in
isolated instances. However, we believe
that in certain circumstances legitimate
practical challenges beyond an actor’s
control may limit its ability to comply
with requests for access, exchange, or
use. In some cases, the actor may not
have—and may be unable to obtain—the
requisite technological capabilities,
legal rights, financial resources, or other
means necessary to provide a particular
form of access, exchange, or use. In
other cases, the actor may be able to
comply with the request, but only by
incurring costs or other burdens that are
clearly unreasonable under the
circumstances.
Actors confronted with these types of
practical challenges may be concerned
about their exposure under the
information blocking provision, which
could lead to inefficient outcomes. For
example, health care providers may feel
compelled to entertain requests to
enable or support means of exchange or
use that would be disruptive to health
care operations or that are not
financially sustainable. In some of these
instances, the actor may be able, but
reluctant, to offer alternative means that
would meet the requestor’s needs while
reducing the burden on the actor,
leading to more efficient outcomes
overall. Actors could also be forced into
a ‘‘reactive’’ posture that limits their
ability to make holistic decisions and to
implement health IT in a considered,
scalable way that facilitates robust
interoperability and information
sharing. These outcomes would be
counterproductive to the policies the
information blocking provision
encompasses.
The proposed exception would
alleviate some of these concerns while
safeguarding against pretextual and
other unreasonable refusals to provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI. The
exception would permit an actor to
decline a request in certain narrowly-
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defined circumstances when doing so
would be infeasible (or impossible) and
when the actor otherwise did all that it
reasonably could do under the
circumstances to facilitate alternative
means of accessing, exchanging, and
using the EHI. We believe this approach
is principled and tailored in a manner
that will promote basic fairness and
encourage parties to work cooperatively
to implement efficient solutions to
interoperability challenges. Importantly,
to ensure that the exception is not used
inappropriately, we propose a
structured, fact-based approach for
determining whether a request was in
fact ‘‘infeasible’’ within the meaning of
this exception. This approach would be
limited to a consideration of factors
specifically delineated in the exception
and that focus the infeasibility inquiry
on the immediate and direct financial
and operational challenges of
facilitating access, exchange, and use, as
distinguished from more remote,
indirect, or speculative types of injuries.
We encourage comment on these and
other aspects of this proposal, which are
described in more detail below.
i. Infeasibility of Request
To qualify for this proposed
exception, in addition to meeting other
conditions, we propose that compliance
with the request for access, exchange, or
use must be infeasible. We propose a
two-step test that an actor would need
to meet in order to demonstrate that a
request was infeasible.
Complying With the Request Would
Impose a Substantial Burden on the
Actor
Under the first step of the infeasibility
test, the actor would need to show that
complying with the particular request in
the manner requested would impose a
substantial burden on the actor that is
unreasonable under the circumstances.
We anticipate that in most cases an
actor would meet this requirement by
showing that it did not have, and could
not readily obtain, the requisite
technological capabilities, legal rights,
or other means necessary to facilitate
the particular type of access, exchange,
or use requested. Additionally, the
requirement could be met by showing
that, had it complied with the request,
the actor would have experienced a
significant disruption to its health care
or business activities or would have
incurred significant unbudgeted costs.
We would also consider other analogous
outcomes that impact the actor’s health
care or business activities in a direct
and substantial way. We seek comment
on what those outcomes might be and
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encourage commenters to be as detailed
and specific as possible.
In determining whether these or other
types of burdens are substantial, we
would consider the actor’s particular
circumstances, including the type of
actor; the nature and purpose of its
business or other activities; and the
financial, technical, and other resources
and expertise at its disposal. In
addition, we would also consider any
offsetting benefits to the actor of
providing the requested access,
exchange, or use, such as facilitating the
actor’s compliance with statutory and
regulatory requirements. Due to the
variability of circumstances, ONC
would take a fact-specific approach to
these analyses.
As an illustration, a small physician
practice with limited financial and
technical resources may find it
burdensome to accommodate requests
from other providers to establish and
maintain outbound interfaces from the
practice’s EHR system that it neither
needs for its own health care activities
nor to comply with any regulatory
requirements. In contrast, a large health
system with a well-resourced IT
department may be in a position to
accommodate such requests without
significant disruption to its business
and at relatively minimal additional
expense relative to its overall IT budget.
Similarly, custom development or other
activities that might be burdensome for
a health care provider with limited
technical expertise may not result in a
substantial burden for a health IT
developer, exchange, or network whose
business is to develop and provide
technological solutions.
We clarify that the exception focuses
solely on the immediate and direct
financial and operational challenges of
facilitating access, exchange, or use. The
exception does not apply—and we
would give no weight—to any putative
burdens that an actor experiences that
relate primarily to the actor’s pursuit of
an economic advantage, such as its
ability to charge higher prices, capture
additional revenue streams, maintain or
increase its market share, or otherwise
pursue its own economic interests. To
the extent that these interests merit an
exception under the information
blocking provision, they are addressed
under the exceptions proposed in
§§ 171.204 and 171.206. In the same
way, the exception would not apply to
any putative burdens that are more
appropriately examined under another
proposed exception. For example, an
actor could not claim that it is
burdensome to implement a tailored
organizational patient safety policy
under proposed § 171.201(b) or to
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develop and implement policies and
procedures for satisfying preconditions
imposed by state or federal privacy laws
for the provision of access, exchange, or
use of EHI under proposed § 171.202(b).
The Burden Imposed on the Actor
Would Be Plainly Unreasonable Under
the Circumstances
To show that a request for access,
exchange, or use was infeasible, the
actor must not only demonstrate that
complying with the request would have
resulted in a substantial burden, as
described above; the actor must also
demonstrate that requiring it to comply
with the request—and thus to assume
the substantial burden demonstrated
under the first part of the test—would
have been plainly unreasonable under
the circumstances. Whether it would
have been plainly unreasonable for the
actor to assume the burden of providing
access, exchange, or use will be highly
dependent on the particular facts and
circumstances. While for this reason we
do not believe that bright-line rules
would be appropriate, we do propose to
rely primarily on the following key
factors enumerated in proposed
§ 171.205(a)(1):
• The type of EHI and the purposes
for which it may be needed;
• The cost to the actor of complying
with the request in the manner
requested;
• The financial, technical, and other
resources available to the actor;
• Whether the actor provides
comparable access, exchange, or use to
itself or to its customers, suppliers,
partners, and other persons with whom
it has a business relationship;
• Whether the actor owns or has
control over a predominant technology,
platform, health information exchange,
or health information network through
which EHI is accessed or exchanged;
• Whether the actor maintains ePHI
on behalf of a covered entity, as defined
in 45 CFR 160.103, or maintains EHI on
behalf of the requestor or another person
whose access, exchange, or use of EHI
will be enabled or facilitated by the
actor’s compliance with the request;
• Whether the requestor and other
relevant persons can reasonably access,
exchange, or use the information from
other sources or through other means;
and
• The additional cost and burden to
the requestor and other relevant persons
of relying on alternative means of
access, exchange, or use.
As these factors suggest, the starting
point for our inquiry would be to
identify the type of EHI at issue and the
purposes for which it may be needed.
As explained in section VIII.C.5.b.i. of
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this preamble, certain types of EHI—
namely, observational health
information—give rise to a heightened
risk of interference under the
information blocking provision. For
purposes of this exception and the
information blocking provision more
generally, the actor has a strong duty to
facilitate the availability and use of this
information, which may be needed for
important activities for which timely
and complete access to EHI is essential,
such as providing patients with their
EHI; enabling the use of EHI for
treatment and care coordination; and
making EHI available for quality
improvement and population health
management activities.
Next, we would consider the severity
of the burdens that the actor would have
experienced to provide the access,
exchange, or use of EHI in the manner
requested. For this purpose, we would
consider both the burden on the actor of
complying with the specific request at
issue as well as the burden the actor
would experience if it was required to
comply with similar types of requests.
We would also consider the observed or
likely frequency of such requests. As
already discussed, we anticipate that the
extent of any burden would depend in
part on the particular circumstances of
the actor. In addition, in considering the
burden to the actor, we would also
consider any offsetting benefits to the
actor of providing the requested access,
exchange, or use.
Having ascertained the nature and
severity of any burdens that the actor
would assume to provide the requested
access, exchange, or use, we would
balance these burdens against the
countervailing costs to the requestor and
other persons (including consumers)
who would be harmed by the actor’s
refusal to provide the requested access,
exchange, or use. Importantly, we
would consider whether the requestor
and other persons could have obtained
the EHI from other sources or through
other means, including those made
available by the actor as an
accommodation to the requestor, as
discussed in more detail below. If
alternative means were available, we
would examine the extent to which they
would have been appropriate for the
purposes for which the EHI or
interoperability elements were needed
and the extent to which requiring the
requestor to pursue these alternative
means would impose additional costs or
burdens on the requestor and other
persons. For example, if the EHI was
readily available through other means
that were equally efficacious, the actor’s
refusal to provide yet one more means
of access, exchange, or use might
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impose only a minimal burden on the
requestor and other persons’ use of the
EHI. In contrast, if the actor conditions
critical technology or infrastructure for
accessing, exchanging, or using EHI, or
if its control over other interoperability
elements means that EHI cannot be
efficiently accessed, exchanged, or used
without the actor’s cooperation,
requiring the requestor to pursue other
means of access, exchange, or use would
likely be unrealistic and represent an
insurmountable burden.
One final consideration would inform
our analysis. We would consider the
balancing of relative burdens in
conjunction with the actor’s control
over interoperability elements. As an
example, a dominant health IT
developer of certified health IT or
network that refuses to facilitate a
particular form of access, exchange, or
use with other entities would have to
demonstrate an extreme burden relative
to the need for access, exchange, or use
in order to qualify for this exception.
This exacting standard would also apply
in other circumstances of dependence or
reliance on the actor to facilitate access,
exchange, or use. For example, a
dominant health system that provides
local health IT infrastructure would
have to demonstrate an extreme
hardship to justify denying
interconnection requests or access to
interoperability elements. Likewise,
where the actor is a business associate
of a covered entity, or owes some other
special duty to the requestor, the actor
could not qualify for this exception
unless the cost or burden it would have
borne was so extreme in comparison to
the marginal benefits to the requestor
that the request was clearly
unreasonable by any objective measure.
We acknowledge that there may be
situations when complying with a
request for access, exchange, or use
would be considered infeasible because
an actor is unable to provide such
access, exchange, or use due to
unforeseeable or unavoidable
circumstances that are outside the
actor’s control. For example, an actor
could seek coverage under this
exception if it is unable to provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI due to
a natural disaster (such as a hurricane,
tornado or earthquake) or war. These are
just a couple examples of such
circumstances and are by no means an
exhaustive list.
We emphasize that, consistent with
the requirements for demonstrating that
activities and practices meet the
conditions of an exception proposed in
section VIII.C.6.c of this preamble, the
actor would need to produce evidence
and ultimately prove that complying
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with the request for access, exchange, or
use in the manner requested would have
imposed a clearly unreasonable burden
on the actor under the circumstances.
We note that there are certain
circumstances that we propose would
not constitute a burden to the actor for
purposes of this exception and shall not
be considered in determining whether
complying with a request would have
been infeasible. We propose that it
would not be considered a burden if
providing the requested access,
exchange, or use in the manner
requested would have (1) facilitated
competition with the actor; or (2)
prevented the actor from charging a fee.
Throughout this proposed rule, we have
highlighted that one of the goals of the
information blocking section is to
promote competition, and allowing the
argument that a request is infeasible
because it facilitates competition with
the actor would be antithetical to this
goal. Similarly, an argument that a
request is infeasible because it prevents
the actor from charging a fee would also
be outside the scope of this exception
because such a result would not
constitute a substantial, unreasonable
burden that this exception seeks to
address.
We request comment on the
structured, fact-based approach we have
proposed for determining whether a
request was in fact ‘‘infeasible’’ within
the meaning of this exception. We
encourage comment on, among other
issues, whether the factors we have
specifically delineated above properly
focus the infeasibility inquiry; whether
our approach to weighing these factors
is appropriate; and whether there are
additional burdens, distinct from the
immediate and direct financial and
operational challenges contemplated
above, that are similarly concrete and
should be considered under the factbased rubric of this exception.
ii. Duty to Timely Respond and Provide
Reasonable Cooperation
In addition to demonstrating that a
particular request or class of requests
was infeasible, we propose that an actor
would have to show that it satisfied
several additional conditions.
Specifically, to qualify for this
exception, the actor must have timely
responded to all requests relating to
access, exchange, and use of EHI,
including but not limited to requests to
establish connections and to provide
interoperability elements. Further, for
any request that the actor claims was
infeasible, the actor must have provided
the requestor with a detailed written
explanation of the reasons why the actor
could not accommodate the request.
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Finally, the actor must have worked
with the requesting party in a timely
manner to identify and provide a
reasonable alternative means of
accessing, exchanging, or using the EHI,
as applicable. The actor’s failure to meet
any of these conditions would
disqualify the actor from the exception
and could also be evidence that the
actor knew that it was engaging in
practices that contravened the
information blocking provision.
We clarify that the duty to timely
respond and provide reasonable
cooperation would necessarily be
assessed from the standpoint of what is
objectively reasonable for an individual
or entity in the actor’s position. For
example, we would not expect a small
physician practice to provide the same
level of engagement and technical
assistance to third parties as a large
hospital or health system with
considerable health IT resources and
expertise at its disposal. In some
circumstances, it may even be difficult
for a small practice to comply with any
request for access, exchange, and use
that is more complicated than a simple
request for a patient’s personal health
information. If there are such requests—
and there could be—then small
practices may be both unable to comply
with such requests and poorly situated
to assist requesting parties with
alternatives. We provide these examples
to emphasize that we will look at the
specific facts and circumstances of each
case to determine what is objectively
reasonable.
We believe that these conditions will
minimize the risk that this exception
could protect improper refusals to
provide interoperability elements,
including naked refusals to deal as well
as other practices, such as improper
delays in access or exchange that would
present information blocking concerns.
Additionally, the requirements for an
actor to timely respond and document
its justifications for declining a request
in writing would prevent an actor from
using post hoc rationalizations to justify
these and other improper practices.
Finally, we believe that establishing a
clear duty under the exception for actors
to deal on reasonable terms with parties
seeking to access, exchange, or use EHI
will encourage parties to cooperate to
identify and implement efficient
solutions to interoperability challenges,
thereby avoiding disputes that could
lead to information blocking.
We encourage comment on the
additional conditions and related
considerations described above.
Specifically, we request comment
regarding potential obstacles to
satisfying these conditions and
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improvements we could make to the
proposed process.
6. Licensing of Interoperability Elements
on Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
Terms
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
that would permit actors to license
interoperability elements on reasonable
and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms,
provided that certain conditions are
met. The exception and corresponding
conditions are set forth in the proposed
regulation text in § 171.206. As
discussed in section VIII.C.5.a of this
preamble, the information blocking
provision would be implicated if an
actor were to refuse to license or allow
the disclosure of interoperability
elements to persons who require those
elements to develop and provide
interoperable technologies or services—
including those that might complement
or compete with the actor’s own
technology or services. Moreover, the
information blocking provision would
be implicated if the actor licensed such
interoperability elements subject to
terms or conditions that have the
purpose or effect of excluding or
discouraging competitors, rivals, or
other persons from engaging in these
pro-competitive and interoperabilityenhancing activities. Thus, this
licensing requirement would apply in
both vertical and horizontal
relationships. For instance, it would
apply when a developer in a vertical
relationship to the actor—a network in
this example—wants to use
interoperability elements in order to
access the EHI maintained in the actor’s
network. The requirement would also
apply when a rival network in a
horizontal relationship to the actor
(network) wants to use interoperability
elements so that its network can be
compatible with the applications that
have already been developed for use
with the actor’s network.
We note that some licensees do not
require the interoperability elements to
develop products or services that can be
interoperable with the actor’s health IT.
For instance, there may be firms that
simply want to license the actor’s
technology for use in developing their
own interoperability elements. Their
interest would be for access to the
technology itself—not for the use of the
technology to interoperate with either
the actor or its customers. This may be
the case, for example, if the relevant
intellectual property included patents
that were applicable to other
information technology applications
outside of health IT. In such cases, the
actor’s licensing of its patents in such a
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context would not implicate the
information blocking provision.
Below are examples of situations that
would implicate the information
blocking provision (these examples are
not exhaustive):
• An actor refuses to negotiate a
license after receiving a request from a
developer.
• An actor offers a license at the
request of a developer, but only at a
royalty rate that exceeds a RAND rate.
• An actor offers a license to a
competitor at a royalty rate significantly
higher than was offered to a party not
in direct competition with the actor.
• An actor files a patent infringement
lawsuit against a developer without first
offering to negotiate a license on RAND
terms.
There are compelling reasons for this
prohibition. In our experience,
contractual and intellectual property
rights are frequently used to extract
rents for access to EHI or to prevent
competition from developers of
interoperable technologies and services
(see section VIII.C.5.c.iv. of this
preamble). These practices frustrate
access, exchange, and use of EHI and
stifle competition and innovation in the
health IT sector. As a case in point, even
following the enactment of the Cures
Act, some EHR developers are
selectively prohibiting—whether
expressly or through commercially
unreasonable terms—the disclosure or
use of technical interoperability
information required for third-party
applications to be able to access,
exchange, and use EHI maintained in
EHR systems. This limits health care
providers’ use of the EHI maintained on
their behalf to the particular capabilities
and use cases that their EHR developer
happens to support. More than this, by
limiting the ability of providers to
choose what applications and
technologies they can use with their
EHR systems, these practices close off
the market to innovative applications
and services that providers and other
stakeholders need to deliver greater
value and choice to health care
purchasers and consumers.
Despite these serious concerns, we
recognize that the definition of
information blocking may be broader
than necessary and could have
unintended consequences. In contrast to
the practices described above, we
believe it is generally appropriate for
actors to license their intellectual
property (IP) on RAND terms that do not
block interoperability. Provided certain
conditions are met, we believe that
these practices would further the goals
of the information blocking provision by
allowing actors to protect the value of
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their innovations and earn returns on
the investments they have made to
develop, maintain, and update those
innovations. This in turn will protect
future incentives to invest in, develop,
and disseminate interoperable
technologies and services. Conversely, if
actors cannot (or believe they cannot)
protect and commercialize their
innovations, they may not engage in
these productive activities that improve
access, exchange, and use of EHI.
While we believe this exception is
necessary to promote competition and
consumer welfare, we are highly
sensitive to the danger that actors will
continue to use their contractual and IP
rights to interfere with access, exchange,
and use of EHI, undermining the
information blocking provision’s
fundamental objectives. For this reason,
the exception would be subject to strict
conditions to ensure, among other
things, that actors license
interoperability elements on RAND
terms and that they do not impose
collateral terms or engage in other
practices that would impede the use of
the interoperability elements or
otherwise undermine the intent of this
exception.
We acknowledge that preventing
intellectual property holders from
extracting rents for access to EHI may
differ from standard intellectual
property policy. Absent specific
circumstances, IP holders are generally
free to negotiate with prospective
licensees to determine the royalty to
practice their IP, and this negotiated
royalty frequently reflects the value the
licensee would obtain from exercising
those rights. However, in the context of
EHI, we propose that a limitation on
rents is essential due to the likelihood
that rents will frustrate access,
exchange, and use of EHI, particularly
because of the power dynamics that
exist in the health IT market.
We remind readers that actors are not
required to seek the protection of this
(or any other) exception. If an actor does
not want to license a particular
technology, it may choose to comply
with the information blocking provision
in another way, such as by developing
and providing alternative means of
accessing, exchanging, and using EHI
that are similarly efficient and
efficacious. The purpose of this
exception is not to dictate a licensing
scheme for all, or even most, health IT,
but rather to provide a tailored ‘‘safe
harbor’’ that will provide clear
expectations for those who desire it.
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i. Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
(RAND) Terms
We propose to require, as a condition
of this exception, that any terms upon
which an actor licenses interoperability
elements must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND). As discussed
below, commitments to license
technology on RAND terms are
frequently required in the context of
standards development organizations
(SDOs), and we believe that the
practical and policy considerations that
have led SDOs to adopt these policies
are related in many respects to the
information blocking concerns
presented when an actor exploits
control over interoperability elements to
extract economic rents or impede the
development or use of interoperable
technologies and services.
We recognize that strong legal
protections for IP rights can promote
competition and innovation.125
Nevertheless, IP rights can also be
misused in ways that undermine these
goals.126 We believe this potential for
abuse is heightened when the IP rights
pertain to functional aspects of
technology that are essential to enabling
interoperability. As an important
example, a technology developer may
encourage the inclusion of its
technology in an industry standard
created by an SDO while not disclosing
that it has IP rights in that technology.
After the SDO incorporates the
technology into its standard, and
industry begins to make investments
tied to the standard, the IP-holder may
then assert its IP rights and demand
royalties or license terms that it could
not have achieved before the standard
was adopted because companies would
incur substantial switching costs to
abandon initial designs or adopt
different products.127 To address these
125 See FTC and DOJ Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property, at 2 (2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_
2017.pdf.
126 See Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 644–45 (7th Cir.
2003); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1520–28 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d
596, 602–08 (9th Cir. 2000); Bateman v.
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539–40 n. 18 (11th
Cir. 1996); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842–44 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
127 See DOJ and FTC, Antitrust Enforcement and
Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation
and Competition, at 37–40 (Apr. 2017), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-propertyrights-promoting-innovation-and-competitionreport.s.department-justice-and-federal-tradecommission/p040101promotinginnovationand
competitionrpt0704.pdf.
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types of concerns, while balancing the
legitimate interests and incentives of IP
owners, many SDOs now have policies
requiring members who contribute
technologies to a standard to voluntarily
commit to license that technology on
RAND terms and will consider whether
firms have made voluntary RAND
commitments when weighing whether
to include their technology in
standards.128 While this commitment to
license on RAND terms is voluntary as
compared to our proposed requirement
to use RAND terms, it serves to illustrate
how RAND terms can be used to address
such concerns.
Similar concerns arise when actors
who control proprietary interoperability
elements demand royalties or license
terms from competitors or other persons
who are technologically dependent on
the use of those interoperability
elements. As discussed in section
VIII.C.5 of this preamble, to the extent
that the interoperability elements are
essential to enable the efficient access,
exchange, or use of EHI by particular
persons or for particular purposes, any
practice by the actor that could impede
the use of the interoperability elements
for that purpose—or that could
unnecessarily increase the cost or other
burden of using the elements for that
purpose—would give rise to an obvious
risk of interference with access,
exchange, or use of EHI under the
information blocking provision.
We believe that a RAND requirement
would balance the need for robust IP
protections with the need to ensure that
this proposed exception does not permit
actors to exercise their IP or other
proprietary rights in inappropriate ways
that block the development, adoption,
or use of interoperable technologies and
services. The exercise of IP rights in
these ways is incompatible with the
information blocking provision, which
protects the investments that taxpayers
and the health care industry have made
to adopt technologies that will enable
the efficient sharing of EHI to benefit
consumers and the health care system.
While actors are entitled to protect and
exercise their IP rights, to benefit from
this exception to the information
blocking provision they must do so in
a reasonable and non-discriminatory
manner that does not undermine these
efforts and impede the appropriate flow
of EHI.
Accordingly, we propose that, to
qualify for this exception, an actor must
license requested interoperability
elements on RAND terms. To comply
128 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No.
C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *6 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 25, 2013).
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with this condition, any terms or
conditions under which the actor
discloses or allows the use of
interoperability elements must meet
several requirements set forth below.
These requirements apply to both price
terms (such as royalties and license fees)
and other terms, such as conditions or
limitations on access to interoperability
elements or the purposes for which they
can be used.
Responding To Requests
We propose that, upon receiving a
request to license or use interoperability
elements, an actor would be required to
respond to the requestor within 10
business days from receipt of the
request. We note that the request could
be made to ‘‘license’’ or ‘‘use’’ the
interoperability elements because a
requestor may not always know that
‘‘license’’ is the legal mechanism for
‘‘use’’ when making the request. This
provision is intended to ensure that a
requestor is given an opportunity to
license and use interoperability
elements. As such, the requirement for
responding to requests should not be
limited to requests to ‘‘license.’’
In order to meet this requirement, the
actor would be required to respond to
the requestor within 10 business days
from the receipt of the request by: (1)
Negotiating with the requestor in a
RAND fashion to identify the
interoperability elements that are
needed; and (2) offering an appropriate
license with RAND terms, consistent
with its other obligations under this
exception. We emphasize that, in order
to qualify for this proposed exception,
the actor is only required to negotiate
with the requestor in a RAND fashion
and to offer a license with RAND terms.
The actor is not required to grant a
license in all instances. For example,
the actor would not be required to grant
a license if the requestor refuses an
actor’s offer to license interoperability
elements on RAND terms.
We emphasize that there would be
circumstances under which the actor
could pursue legal action against parties
that infringe its intellectual property
whilst complying with this exception.
For instance, an actor could bring legal
action if a firm appropriates the actor’s
intellectual property without requesting
a license or after refusing to accept a
license on RAND terms.
We do not propose a set timeframe for
when the negotiations must be resolved
because it is difficult to predict the
duration of such negotiations. For
instance, there could be situations when
the actor and requestor meet once and
the actor makes a RAND offer that is
immediately accepted by the requestor.
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However, there could be other situations
when the requestor and actor each make
counteroffers, which would extend the
negotiations.
We request comment on whether 10
business days is an appropriate amount
of time for the actor to respond to the
requestor. In proposing this timeframe,
we considered the urgency of certain
requests to license interoperability
elements and our expectation that
developers would have standard
licenses at their disposal that could be
adapted in these situations. We
considered proposing response
timeframes ranging from 5 business
days to 15 business days. We also
considered proposing two separate
timeframes for: (1) Negotiating with the
requestor; and (2) offering the license. If
commenters prefer a different response
timeframe or approach than proposed,
we request that commenters explain
their rationale with as much detail as
possible.
In addition, we query whether we
should create set limits for: (1) The
amount of time the requestor has to
accept the actor’s initial offer or make a
counteroffer; (2) if the requestor makes
a counteroffer, the amount of time the
actor has to accept the requestor’s
counteroffer or make its own
counteroffer; and (3) an allowable
number of counteroffers in negotiations.
Scope of Rights
To qualify for this proposed
exception, we propose that the actor
must license the requested
interoperability elements with all rights
necessary to access and use the
interoperability elements for the
following purposes, as applicable:
• All rights necessary to access and
use the interoperability elements for the
purpose of developing products or
services that are interoperable with the
actor’s health IT or with health IT under
the actor’s control and/or any third
party who currently uses the actor’s
interoperability elements to interoperate
with the actor’s health IT or health IT
under the actor’s control. These rights
would include the right to incorporate
and use the interoperability elements in
the licensee’s own technology to the
extent necessary to accomplish this
purpose.
• All rights necessary to market, offer,
and distribute the interoperable
products and services described above
to potential customers and users,
including the right to copy or disclose
the interoperability elements as
necessary to accomplish this purpose.
• All rights necessary to enable the
use of the interoperable products or
services in production environments,
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including using the interoperability
elements to access and enable the
exchange and use of electronic health
information.
We request comment on whether
these rights are sufficiently inclusive to
support licensees in developing
interoperable technologies, bringing
them to market, and deploying them for
use in production environments. We
also request comment on the breadth of
these required rights and if they should
be subject to any limitations that would
not interfere with the uses we have
described above.
Reasonable Royalty
As a condition of this exception, we
propose that if an actor charges a royalty
for the use of interoperability elements,
the royalty base and rate must be
reasonable. Consistent with the
requirements for demonstrating that
activities and practices meet the
conditions of an exception proposed in
section VIII.C.6.c, the actor would need
to show that the royalty base was
reasonable and that the royalty was
within a reasonable range for the
interoperability elements at issue.
Importantly, we note that the
reasonableness of any royalties would
be assessed solely on basis of the
independent value of the actor’s
technology to the licensee’s
product,129 not on any strategic value
stemming from the actor’s control over
essential means of accessing,
exchanging, or using electronic health
information. For instance, the
reasonableness of royalties could not be
assessed based on the strategic value
stemming from the adoption of the
technology by customers or users, the
switching costs associated with the
technology, or other circumstances of
technological dependence described
elsewhere in this preamble (see section
VIII.C.5). We note that ‘‘strategic value’’
would stem from the actor’s control over
essential means of accessing,
exchanging, or using electronic health
information. Limiting a reasonable
royalty to the value of the technology
isolated from strategic value is similar
in concept to apportionment of
reasonable royalties for the infringement
of standard essential patents (SEPs).130
In our context, permitting an actor to
charge a royalty on the basis of these
considerations would effectively allow
the actor to extract rents on access,
exchange, and use of EHI, which is
129 See
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc., 773
F.3d 1201, 1226; 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
130 See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp 1116 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (utilizing the more common approach).
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contrary to the goals of the information
blocking provision.
In evaluating the actor’s assertions
and evidence that the royalty was
reasonable, we propose that ONC may
consider the following factors:
• The royalties received by the actor
for the licensing of the proprietary
elements in other circumstances
comparable to RAND-licensing
circumstances.
• The rates paid by the licensee for
the use of other comparable proprietary
elements.
• The nature and scope of the license.
• The effect of the proprietary
elements in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee and the
licensor, taking into account only the
contribution of the elements themselves
and not of the enhanced interoperability
that they enable.
• The utility and advantages of the
actor’s interoperability element over the
existing technology, if any, that had
been used to achieve a similar level of
access, exchange, or use of EHI.
• The contribution of the elements to
the technical capabilities of the
licensee’s products, taking into account
only the value of the elements
themselves and not the enhanced
interoperability that they enable.
• The portion of the profit or of the
selling price that may be customary in
the particular business or in comparable
businesses to allow for the use of the
proprietary elements or analogous
elements that are also covered by RAND
commitments.
• The portion of the realizable profit
that should be credited to the
proprietary elements as distinguished
from non-proprietary elements, the
manufacturing process, business risks,
significant features or improvements
added by the licensee, or the strategic
value resulting from the network effects,
switching costs, or other effects of the
adoption of the actor’s technology.
• The opinion testimony of qualified
experts.
• The amount that a licensor and a
licensee would have agreed upon (at the
time the licensee began using the
elements) if both were considering the
RAND obligation under this exception
and its purposes, and had been
reasonably and voluntarily trying to
reach an agreement.
These factors mirror those used by
courts that have examined the
reasonableness of royalties charged
pursuant to a commitment to an SDO to
license standard-essential technologies
on RAND terms (see Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc.; 131 In re Innovatio IP
131 Case No. 10–cv–1823 JLR, 2013 WL 2111217
(W.D.Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
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7547
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig.; 132 and
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI
Corp 133). However, we have adapted the
factors to the information blocking
context as follows. In the SDO context,
the RAND requirement mitigates the
risk that patent-holders will engage in
‘‘hold up’’—that is, charging excessive
royalties that do not reflect the value of
their contributions to the standard, but
rather reflect the costs associated with
switching to alternative technologies
after a standard is adopted—and that the
cumulative effect of such royalties will
make the standard too expensive to
implement—a problem called ‘‘royalty
stacking.’’ 134 To address the risks of
hold-up and royalty stacking in the
standards development context, a RAND
license should compensate a patentee
for their technical contribution to the
technology embodied in a standard, but
should not compensate them for mere
inclusion in the standard.
Similarly, in the context of
information blocking, we propose the
RAND inquiry focuses on whether the
royalty demanded by the actor
represents the independent value of the
actor’s proprietary technology. We
propose that if the actor has licensed the
interoperability element through a
standards development organization in
accordance with such organization’s
policies regarding the licensing of
standards-essential technologies on
reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms, the actor may charge a royalty
that is consistent with such policies.
Rather than asking whether the royalty
inappropriately captures additional
value derived from the technology’s
inclusion in the industry standard, we
would ask whether the actor is charging
a royalty that is not based on the value
of its technology (embodied in the
interoperability elements) but rather
includes the strategic value stemming
from the adoption of that technology by
customers or users. Thus, under this
proposed approach and the factors set
forth above, we would consider the
technical contribution of the actor’s
interoperability elements to the
licensee’s products—such as any
proprietary capabilities or features that
the licensee uses in its product—but
would screen out any functional aspects
of the actor’s technology that are used
only to establish interoperability and
enable EHI to be accessed, exchanged,
and used. Additionally, we propose that
132 MDL 2303, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 3,
2013).
133 Case No. 5:12–cv–03451–RMW, 2014 WL
46997 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 6, 2014).
134 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864
F.Supp.2d 1023, 1027 (W.D.Wash. 2012).
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to address the potential risk of royalty
stacking we would need to consider the
aggregate royalties that would apply if
owners of other essential
interoperability elements made royalty
demands of the implementer.
Specifically, we propose that, to qualify
for this exception, the actor must grant
licenses on terms that are objectively
commercially reasonable taking into
account the overall licensing situation,
including the cost to the licensee of
obtaining other interoperability
elements that are important for the
viability of the products for which it is
seeking to license interoperability
elements from the actor.
We clarify that, as proposed, this
condition would not preclude an actor
from licensing its interoperability
elements pursuant to an existing RAND
commitment to an SDO. We also note
that, in addition to complying with the
requirements described above, to meet
this proposed condition any royalties
charged must meet the condition,
proposed separately below, that any
license terms be non-discriminatory.
We request comment on these aspects
of the proposed exception. Commenters
are encouraged to consider, in
particular, whether the factors and
approach we have described will be
administrable and appropriately balance
the unreasonable blocking by actors of
the use of essential interoperability
elements with the need to provide
adequate assurance to investors and
innovators that they will be able to earn
a reasonable return on their investments
in interoperable technologies. If our
proposed approach does not adequately
balance these concerns or would not
achieve our stated policy goals, we ask
that commenters suggest revisions or
alternative approaches. We ask that
such comments be as detailed as
possible and provide rigorous economic
justifications for any suggested revisions
or alternative approaches.
Non-Discriminatory Terms
We propose that for this exception to
apply the terms on which an actor
licenses and otherwise provides
interoperability elements must be nondiscriminatory. This requirement would
apply to both price and non-price terms,
and thus would apply to the royalty
terms discussed immediately above as
well as other types of terms that may be
included in licensing agreements or
other agreements related to the
provision or use of interoperability
elements.
To comply with this condition, the
terms on which the actor licensed the
interoperability elements must be based
on criteria that the actor applied
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uniformly for all substantially similar or
similarly situated classes of persons and
requests. This requirement addresses a
root cause of information blocking. In
order to be considered nondiscriminatory, such criteria would
have to be objective and verifiable, not
based on the actor’s subjective judgment
or discretion. We emphasize that this
proposal does not mean that the actor
must apply the same terms for all
persons or classes of persons requesting
a license. However, any differences in
terms would have to be based on actual
differences in the costs that the actor
incurred or other reasonable and nondiscriminatory criteria. Moreover, we
propose that any criteria upon which an
actor varies its terms or conditions
would have to be both competitively
neutral—meaning that the criteria are
not based in any part on whether the
requestor or other person is a
competitor, potential competitor, or will
be using EHI obtained via the
interoperability elements in a way that
facilitates competition with the actor—
and neutral as to the revenue or other
value that the requestor may be derived
from access, exchange, or use of the EHI
obtained via the interoperability
elements, including any secondary use
of such EHI. We believe these
limitations are necessary in light of the
potential for actors to use their control
over interoperability elements to engage
in discriminatory practices that create
unreasonable barriers or costs for
persons seeking to develop, offer, or use
interoperable technologies to expand
access and enhance the exchange and
use of EHI.
To clarify our expectations for this
proposed condition, we provide the
following illustration. Consider an EHR
developer that establishes an ‘‘app
store’’ through which third-party
developers can license the EHR
developer’s proprietary APIs, which we
assume are separate from the APIs
required by the API Condition of
Certification proposed in § 170.404. The
EHR developer could charge a
reasonable royalty and impose other
reasonable terms to license these
interoperability elements. The terms
and conditions could vary based on
neutral, objectively verifiable, and
uniformly applied criteria. These might
include, for example, significantly
greater resources consumed by certain
types of apps, such as those that export
large volumes of data on a continuous
basis, or the heightened risks associated
with apps designed to ‘‘write’’ data to
the EHR database or to run natively
within the EHR’s user interface. In
contrast, the EHR developer could not
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vary its terms and conditions based on
subjective criteria, such as whether it
thinks an app will be ‘‘popular’’ or is a
‘‘good fit’’ for its ecosystem. Nor could
it offer different terms or conditions on
the basis of objective criteria that are not
competitively neutral, such as whether
an app ‘‘connects to’’ other technologies
or services, provides capabilities that
the EHR developer plans to incorporate
in a future release of its technology, or
enables an efficient means for customers
to export data for use in other databases
or technologies that compete directly
with the EHR developer. Similarly, the
EHR developer could not set different
terms or conditions based on how much
revenue or other value the app might
generate from the information it collects
through the APIs, such as by
introducing a revenue-sharing
requirement for apps that use data for
secondary purposes that are very
lucrative and for which the EHR
developer would like a ‘‘piece of the
pie.’’ Such practices would disqualify
the actor from this exception and would
implicate the information blocking
provision.
The foregoing conditions are not
intended to limit an actor’s flexibility to
set different terms based on legitimate
differences in the costs to different
classes of persons or in response to
different classes of requests, so long as
any such classification was in fact based
on neutral criteria (in the sense
described above) that are objectively
verifiable and were applied in a
consistent manner for persons and/or
requests within each class. As an
important example, the proposed
condition would not preclude a covered
actor from pursuing strategic
partnerships, joint ventures, comarketing agreements, cross-licensing
agreements, and other similar types of
commercial arrangements under which
it provides more favorable terms than
for other persons with whom it has a
more arms-length relationship. In these
instances the actor should have no
difficulty identifying substantial and
verifiable efficiencies that demonstrate
that any variations in its terms and
conditions were based on objective and
neutral criteria. We do note an
important caveat, however, specifically
that a health IT developer of certified
health IT who is an ‘‘API Technology
Supplier’’ under the Condition of
Certification proposed in § 170.404
would not be permitted to offer different
terms in connection with the APIs
required by that Condition of
Certification. As discussed in section
VII.B.4 of this preamble, we propose
that API Technology Suppliers are
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required to make these APIs available
on terms that are no less favorable than
provided to their own customers,
suppliers, partners, and other persons
with whom they have a business
relationship. As noted below towards
the end of our discussion of this
exception to the information blocking
provision, the exception incorporates
the API Condition of Certification’s
requirements in full for all health IT
developers subject to that condition.
We welcome comments on the
foregoing condition and requirements.
Collateral Terms
We propose five additional conditions
that would reinforce the requirements of
this exception discussed above. These
additional conditions would provide
bright-line prohibitions for certain types
of collateral terms or agreements that we
believe are inherently likely to interfere
with access, exchange, or use of EHI. We
propose that any attempt to require a
licensee or its agents or contractors to
do or agree to do any of the following
would disqualify the actor from this
exception and would be suspect under
the information blocking provision.
First, the actor must not require the
licensee or its agents or contractors to
not compete with the actor in any
product, service, or market, including
markets for goods and services,
technologies, and research and
development. We are aware that such
agreements have been used to either
directly exclude suppliers of
interoperable technologies and services
from the market or to create exclusivity
that reduces the range of technologies
and options available to health care
providers and other health IT customers
and users.
Second, and for similar reasons, the
actor must not require the licensee or its
agents or contractors to deal exclusively
with the actor in any product, service,
or market, including markets for goods
and services, technologies, and research
and development.
Third, the actor must not require the
licensee or its agents or contractors to
obtain additional licenses, products, or
services that are not related to or can be
unbundled from the requested
interoperability elements. This
condition reinforces the condition
described earlier requiring that any
royalties charged by the actor for the use
of interoperability elements be
reasonable. Without this condition, we
believe that an actor could require a
licensee to take a license to additional
interoperability elements that the
licensee does not need or want, which
could enable the actor to extract
royalties that are inconsistent with its
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RAND obligations under this exception.
We clarify that this condition would not
preclude an actor and a willing licensee
from agreeing to such an arrangement,
so long as the arrangement was not
required.
Fourth, the actor must not condition
the use of interoperability elements on
a requirement or agreement to license,
grant, assign, or transfer the licensee’s
own IP to the actor. We believe it is
inconsistent with the actor’s RAND
licensing obligations under this
exception, and would raise information
blocking concerns, for an actor to use its
control over interoperability elements as
leverage to obtain a ‘‘grant back’’ of IP
rights or other consideration whose
value may exceed that of a reasonable
royalty. Consistent with our approach
under other conditions of this
exception, this condition would not
preclude an actor and a willing licensee
from agreeing to a cross-licensing, comarketing, or other agreement if they so
choose. However, the actor cannot
require the licensee to enter into such an
agreement. The actor must offer the
option of licensing the interoperability
elements without a promise to provide
consideration beyond a reasonable
royalty. We note that in the SDO
context, it can sometimes be consistent
with RAND terms to require that an SEP
licensee also grant a cross-license to any
SEPs that it holds, provided that the
cross-license is limited to patents
essential to the licensed standard. In
this way, this condition differs from
licensing in the SDO context.
Finally, the actor must not condition
the use of interoperability elements on
a requirement or agreement to pay a fee
of any kind whatsoever unless the fee
meets either the narrowly crafted
condition to this exception for a
reasonable royalty, or, alternatively, the
fee satisfies the separate exception
proposed in § 171.204, which permits
the recovery of certain costs reasonably
incurred. As noted in section VIII.D.4,
that exception generally does not allow
for the recovery of royalties or other fees
associated with intangible assets.
However, the exception does allow for
the reasonable and actual development
and acquisition costs of such assets.
We request comment on the
categorical exclusions outlined above.
In particular, we encourage commenters
to weigh in on our assumption that
these practices are inherently likely to
interfere with access, exchange, or use
of EHI. We also encourage commenters
to suggest any conceivable benefits that
these practices might offer for
interoperability or for competition and
consumers that we might have
overlooked. Again, we ask that to the
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7549
extent possible commenters provide
detailed economic rationale in support
of their comments.
Non-Disclosure Agreement
We propose that an actor would be
permitted under this exception to
require a licensee to agree to a
confidentiality or non-disclosure
agreement (NDA) to protect the actor’s
trade secrets, provided that the NDA is
no broader than necessary to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of the actor’s
trade secrets. Further, we propose that
the actor would have to identify (in the
NDA) the specific information that it
claims as trade secrets, and that such
information would have to meet
definition of a trade secret under
applicable law. We believe these
safeguards are necessary to ensure that
the NDA is not used to impose
restrictions or burdensome requirements
that are not actually necessary to protect
the actor’s trade secrets and that impede
the use of the interoperability elements.
The use of an NDA for such purposes
would preclude an actor from qualifying
for this exception and would implicate
the information blocking provision. We
note that if the actor is a health IT
developer of certified health IT, it may
be subject to the Condition of
Certification proposed in § 170.403,
which prohibits certain health IT
developer prohibitions and restrictions
on communications about a health IT
developer’s technology and business
practices. This exception would not in
any way abrogate the developer’s
obligations to comply with that
condition.
We encourage comment on this
condition of the proposed exception.
ii. Additional Requirements Relating to
the Provision of Interoperability
Elements
In addition to the conditions
described above, we propose that an
actor’s practice would need to comply
with additional conditions that ensure
that actors who license interoperability
elements on RAND terms do not engage
in separate practices that impede the
use of those elements or otherwise
undermine the intent of this exception.
These conditions are analogous to the
conditions described in our proposal
above concerning collateral terms but
address a broader range of practices that
may not be effected through the license
agreements themselves or that occur
separately from the licensing
negotiations and other dealings between
the actor and the licensee. Specifically,
we propose that an actor would not
qualify for this exception if it engaged
in a practice that had the purpose or
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effect of impeding the efficient use of
the interoperability elements to access,
exchange, or use EHI for any
permissible purpose; or the efficient
development, distribution, deployment,
or use of an interoperable product or
service for which there is actual or
potential demand. As an illustration, the
exception would not apply if the
developer licensed its proprietary APIs
for use by third-party apps but then
prevented or delayed the use of those
apps in production environments by, for
example, restricting or discouraging
customers from enabling the use of the
apps, or engaging in ‘‘gate keeping’’
practices, such as requiring apps to go
through a vetting process and then
applying that process in a
discriminatory or unreasonable manner.
Finally, to ensure the actor’s
commitments under this exception are
durable, we propose one additional
safeguard: An actor cannot avail itself of
this exception if, having licensed the
interoperability elements, the actor
makes changes to the elements or its
technology that ‘‘break’’ compatibility or
otherwise degrade the performance or
interoperability of the licensee’s
products or services. We believe this
condition is crucial given the ease with
which an actor could make subtle
‘‘tweaks’’ to its technology or related
services that could disrupt the use of the
licensee’s compatible technologies or
services and result in substantial
competitive and consumer injury.
We clarify and emphasize that this
proposed condition would in no way
prevent an actor from making
improvements to its technology or
responding to the needs of its own
customers or users. However, to benefit
from the exception, the actor’s practice
would need to be necessary to
accomplish these purposes and the actor
must have afforded the licensee a
reasonable opportunity under the
circumstances to update its technology
to maintain interoperability. We also
recognize that an actor may have to
suspend access or make other changes
immediately and without prior notice in
response to legitimate privacy, security,
or patient safety-related exigencies.
Such practices would be governed by
the exceptions proposed in section
VIII.D of this preamble and thus would
not need to qualify for this exception.
iii. Compliance With Conditions of
Certification
As a final condition of this proposed
exception, we propose that health IT
developers of certified health IT who are
subject to the Conditions of Certification
proposed in §§ 170.402, 170.403, and
170.404 must comply with all
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requirements of those Conditions of
Certification for all practices and at all
relevant times. Several of the
requirements of these conditions mirror
those of this exception. However, in
some instances the Conditions of
Certification provide additional or more
specific requirements that apply to the
provision of interoperability elements
by developers of certified health IT. For
example, developers subject to the API
Condition of Certification must make
certain public APIs available on terms
that are royalty free and no less
favorable than provided to themselves
and their customers, suppliers, partners,
and other persons with whom they have
a business relationship. These more
prescriptive requirements reflect the
specific obligations of health IT
developers under the Program,
including the duty to facilitate the
access, exchange, and use of
information from patients’ electronic
health records without special effort. A
health IT developer of certified health
IT’s failure to comply with these and
other certification requirements that
specifically support interoperability
would, in addition to precluding the
developer from invoking this exception,
be significant evidence of information
blocking.
7. Maintaining and Improving Health IT
Performance
We propose to establish an exception
to the information blocking provision
for certain practices that are reasonable
and necessary to maintain and improve
the overall performance of health IT,
provided certain conditions are met.
The proposed exception would
recognize as reasonable and necessary
the practice of an actor making health IT
under its control temporarily
unavailable to maintain or improve the
health IT. The exception and
corresponding conditions are set forth
in the proposed regulation text in
§ 171.207.
EHI should be accessible and usable
on demand by those that need it.
However, in order for this to happen,
the health IT through which EHI is
accessed, exchanged, or used must
perform properly and efficiently. This
requires that health IT be maintained
and in some instances improved. The
performance of such maintenance and
improvements sometimes requires that
health IT is temporarily taken offline,
which can interfere with the access,
exchange, and use of EHI. We believe
this exception is necessary to ensure
that actors are not deterred from
maintaining and improving the overall
performance of health IT because
temporary unavailability of EHI may
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cause interference with its access,
exchange, and use. Without this specific
exception, there could be a significant
risk that actors may refrain from
conducting maintenance and
improvements of health IT out of fear
that if the purpose was not for
preventing harm, promoting security, or
for another reason covered by the other
exceptions, then their actions might
contravene the information blocking
provision.
This exception would apply to the
unavailability of health IT occasioned
by both planned and unplanned
maintenance and improvements.
Planned maintenance or improvements
are typically carried out at regular
intervals and address routine repairs,
updates, or new releases. Unplanned
maintenance or improvements respond
to urgent or time-sensitive issues, which
cannot wait for the occurrence of a preplanned time period to implement the
required maintenance or improvements.
This proposed exception
acknowledges that the performance of
health IT is often measured by service
level agreements that provide flexibility
to ensure that system availability is
balanced with essential maintenance
and improvements. Where the provision
of health IT is subject to an allowance
for maintenance or improvement that
has been agreed to by the recipient of
that health IT, we propose that neither
that agreement, nor the performance of
it, should constitute information
blocking, provided that certain
conditions are met.
To ensure that the actor’s practice of
making health IT, and in turn EHI,
unavailable for the purpose of carrying
out maintenance or improvements is
reasonable and necessary, we have
identified conditions that must be
satisfied at all relevant times to qualify
for this exception.
Unavailability of Health IT Must Be for
no Longer Than Necessary To Achieve
the Maintenance or Improvements for
Which the Health IT was Made
Unavailable
Any unavailability of health IT must
be for a period of time no longer than
necessary to achieve the maintenance or
improvement purpose for which the
health IT is made unavailable. This
condition recognizes the critical
importance of access to EHI and ensures
that health IT is not made unavailable
for longer than needed. For example, a
health IT developer of certified health
IT that has the right under its contract
with a large health system to take its
system offline for four hours each
month to conduct routine maintenance
would not qualify for this exception if
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an information blocking claim was
made about a period of unavailability
during which no maintenance was
performed.
Making this evaluation for unplanned
maintenance or improvements will be
more difficult, because unplanned
maintenance or improvements are
typically initiated in response to a threat
or risk that needs to be responded to on
an urgent basis and for so long as the
threat or risk persists. However, if, for
example, an HIE identified a software
failure (not identified as a safety or
security risk) that required immediate
remediation necessitating the actor take
its health IT offline, the actor would be
expected to bring the health IT back
online as soon as possible after the issue
was resolved.
Unavailability of Health IT for
Maintenance or Improvements Must Be
Implemented in a Consistent and NonDiscriminatory Manner
We propose that any unavailability of
health IT occasioned by the conduct of
maintenance or improvements must be
implemented in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner. This condition
provides a basic assurance that when
health IT is made unavailable for the
purpose of performing maintenance or
improvements that the unavailability is
not abused by the actor that controls the
health IT. For example, a health IT
developer of certified health IT would
not qualify for this exception if the
developer, using a standard contract
that provided a flexible allowance for
planned maintenance or improvements,
initiated planned maintenance or
improvements for a customer with an
expiring health IT contract during a
time when users might reasonably be
expected to access EHI, but conducted
planned maintenance or improvements
for new customers in the middle of the
night. However, this condition does not
require that actors conduct planned
maintenance or improvements
simultaneously, or require that every
health IT contract provide the same
promises in regard to planned
maintenance or improvements. Indeed,
a recipient of health IT may agree to a
longer window for unavailability in
exchange for a reduced fee for system
maintenance, which would not
contravene this condition.
Unavailability of Health IT for
Maintenance or Improvements Must Be
Agreed
In order to benefit from this
exception, we propose that the
unavailability of health IT due to
maintenance or improvements initiated
by a health IT developer of certified
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health IT, HIE, or HIN, must be agreed
to by the individual or entity to whom
the health IT is supplied. The
availability of health IT is typically
addressed in a written contract or other
written agreements, that puts the
recipient of the health IT on notice
about the level of EHI and health IT
unavailability that can be expected for
users of the health IT. By such
agreements, the recipient of the health
IT willfully agrees to that level of
planned and unplanned unavailability
(typically referred to in health IT
contracts as ‘‘downtime’’). Some health
IT contracts address the question of
system availability by way of an
‘‘uptime warranty’’ that specifies the
maximum amount of unavailability for
a specified period and the timing of any
planned unavailability.
We acknowledge that in some cases,
health IT needs to be taken offline or
maintenance or improvements on an
urgent basis and in a way that is not
expressly permitted under a health IT
contract. An actor may still satisfy this
proposed condition so long as the
maintenance or improvements are
agreed to by the recipient of the health
IT. This could be achieved by way of an
oral agreement reached between the
parties by telephone, but we note that
because an actor must demonstrate that
it satisfies the requirements of this
exception, it would be best practice for
an actor to ensure the agreement was in
writing or, at minimum,
contemporaneously documented.
This proposed condition of this
exception only applies when the
unavailability of health IT is caused by
a health IT developer of certified health
IT, HIE, or HIN. In these circumstances,
it is the supplier of the health IT that
controls if and when health IT is
intentionally taken offline for
maintenance or improvements. This
condition does not apply when health
IT is made unavailable for maintenance
or improvements at the initiative of a
recipient (or customer) of health IT,
because in that case, the unavailability
has, for the purpose of this exception,
nothing to do with the supplier. When
it is a customer of health IT that initiates
unavailability, the unavailability would
not need to be the subject of an
agreement with the supplier of that
health IT, nor anyone else, in order for
the customer of health IT to benefit from
this exception. For example, a health
care provider that locally hosts and
maintains its health IT (being software
supplied by a health IT developer)
would not need to satisfy this condition
if it interfered with access to EHI by
taking the health IT offline temporarily
to conduct maintenance. However, if the
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7551
same health care provider was to receive
a new release of the health IT
developer’s software, which was to be
implemented by the developer and
which required that the health IT be
taken offline by the developer for 6
hours, then that unavailability, or an
allowance for it, would need to be the
subject of prior agreement.
Unavailability of health IT initiated by
a recipient of health IT (rather than the
supplier of the health IT) would still
need to satisfy the other conditions of
this exception, including that the
unavailability be for a period of time no
longer than necessary to achieve the
maintenance or improvements for
which the health IT was made
unavailable.
We note that this condition would
need to be satisfied by any HIE or HIN
that sought to benefit from this
exception in connection with any
interference with access, exchange, or
use occasioned by an HIE or HIN
making its health IT unavailable for the
purposes of conducting maintenance or
improvements. An HIE would need to
have secured the agreement of those
individuals or entities that use its
exchange services, and a HIN would
need to have obtained the agreement of
the network’s participants.
Interaction With Preventing Harm and
Promoting Security Exceptions
When health IT is made unavailable
for maintenance or improvements aimed
at preventing harm to a patient or other
person, or securing EHI, an actor must
comply with the conditions specified in
proposed § 171.201 or § 171.203
respectively, in order to qualify for an
exception to the information blocking
provision. This condition ensures that
this exception cannot be used to avoid
compliance with conditions applicable
under other exceptions. For example, if
part of an EHR system was taken offline
in response to a health IT developer of
certified health IT being alerted to the
risk of corrupt or inaccurate data being
recorded or incorporated in a patient’s
health record, any decision to make the
EHR unavailable on this basis to
conduct unplanned maintenance or
improvements would need to accord
with the conditions of the proposed
exception for preventing harm (see
§ 171.201 and section VIII.D.1 of this
proposed rule). Similarly, unavailability
occasioned by maintenance or
improvements initiated to secure EHI in
response to a suspected malware attack
would need to either be implemented in
accordance with the actor’s
organizational security policy that
satisfied the requirements of the
proposed exception for promoting the
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security of EHI or if the practice did not
implement an organizational security
policy, the actor must have made a
determination in each case, based on the
particularized facts and circumstances,
consistent with the requirements of the
exception (see § 171.203(d) and section
VIII.D.3 of this proposed rule).
Request for Comment
We seek comment on this exception
generally. Specifically, we seek
comment on whether the proposed
conditions impose appropriate
limitations on actor-initiated health IT
maintenance or improvements that lead
to EHI unavailability. Our goal is to
ensure that the exception is not abused,
while at the same time recognizing
reasonable commercial arrangements
entered into by parties for the proper
maintenance and improvement of health
IT.
We are also considering whether to
expand this exception to capture a
broader class of practices that are the
subject of reasonable commercial
agreements and which, in the absence of
an exception, may be considered
information blocking. That is, to extend
this exception or create new exceptions
for additional types of practices that
interfere with access, exchange, or use
of EHI, but that are the subject of free
agreement and which are reasonable
and necessary. For example, we are
considering whether a practice taken by
an actor to throttle or meter the
availability or performance of health IT,
where agreed to by the recipient of that
health IT, could ever be a practice that
we recognize as not being information
blocking if such practice does not
otherwise qualify under an existing
exception.
As discussed in section VIII.C.5 of
this preamble, we are aware that actors
can use commercial agreements to
materially discourage, and in some
instances outright prohibit, certain
instances of access, exchange, or use of
EHI. For example, a HIN might use a
participation agreement to prohibit
entities that receive EHI through the
HIN from transmitting that EHI to
entities who are not participants of the
HIN. Such an arrangement would not be
reasonable or necessary because there is
no legitimate justification for it.
However, we are also aware of
commercial arrangements that are not
motivated by anti-competitive
considerations but that nonetheless
have the effect of interfering with the
access, exchange, or use of EHI. For
example, a health IT developer of
certified health IT may agree to
commercial terms with a customer that
have the effect of interfering with
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access, exchange, or use of EHI, but
which are designed to appropriately
accommodate the customer’s limited
resources, or to assure the performance
of certain health IT functionality.
We expect that most reasonable and
necessary commercial arrangements that
affect access, exchange, or use of EHI
could be recognized under one or more
of the existing exceptions. However, we
seek comment on whether there exists a
class of legitimate commercial
arrangements that could implicate the
information blocking provision, but
which would not benefit from the
existing proposed exceptions.
E. Additional Exceptions—Request for
Information
1. Exception for Complying With
Common Agreement for Trusted
Exchange
To support full network-to-network
exchange of EHI, section 3001(c)(9)(A)
of the PHSA, added by section 4003 of
the Cures Act, directs the National
Coordinator to convene public-private
partnerships to develop or support a
trusted exchange framework (Trusted
Exchange Framework), including a
common agreement for a common set of
rules for trusted exchange between HINs
(Common Agreement). The most recent
draft Trusted Exchange Framework was
released for public comment on January
5, 2018,135 however, a new draft will be
released in the coming months.
We are considering whether we
would should propose, in a future
rulemaking, a narrow exception to the
information blocking provision for
practices that are necessary to comply
with the requirements of the Common
Agreement. Such an exception may
support adoption of the Common
Agreement and encourage other entities
to participate in trusted exchange
through HINs that enter into the
Common Agreement. It would do so by
providing protection if there are
practices that are expressly required by
the Common Agreement, or that are
necessary to implement such
requirements, that might implicate the
information blocking provision and
would not qualify for another exception.
We note that such an exception would
be consistent with the complementary
roles of the information blocking
provision and other provisions of the
Cures Act that support interoperability
and enhance the trusted exchange of
EHI (including the interoperable
network exchange provisions at section
3001(c)(9) of the PHSA, the definition of
135 ONC, Draft Trusted Exchange Framework,
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/drafttrusted-exchange-framework.pdf.
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interoperability at section 3000(10) of
the PHSA, and the conditions of
certification required by section
3001(c)(5)(D) of the PHSA).
We expect that any proposal would be
narrowly framed such that contract
terms, policies, or other practices that
are not strictly necessary to comply with
the Common Agreement would not
qualify for the exception. Similarly, we
expect that the proposal would provide
that an actor could benefit from this
exception only if the practice or
practices that the actor pursued were no
broader than necessary under the
circumstances. These limitations would
ensure that the exception is narrowly
tailored to practices that are most likely
to promote trusted exchange without
unnecessarily impeding access,
exchange, or use of EHI.
We ask commenters to provide
feedback on this potential exception to
the information blocking provision to be
considered for inclusion in future
rulemaking. Commenters should
consider whether such an exception is
necessary, given the scope of the other
exceptions proposed in this NPRM, and
whether there could be any negative
effects of such an exception. We ask
commenters to consider the appropriate
scope of this exception, which could
include which actors could benefit from
the exception and the conditions that
should apply in order to qualify for the
exception.
2. New Exceptions
We welcome comment on any
potential new exceptions we should
consider for future rulemaking.
Commenters should consider the policy
goals and structure of the proposed
exceptions in this proposed rule when
providing comment. We ask that
commenters provide rationale for any
proffered exceptions to the information
blocking provisions and any conditions
an actor would need to meet to qualify
for the proffered exception.
F. Complaint Process
Section 3022(d)(3)(A) of the PHSA
directs the National Coordinator to
implement a standardized process for
the public to submit reports on claims
of health information blocking. Such
reports could be submitted regarding
any practice by health care providers,
health IT developers, exchanges, or
networks that may constitute
information blocking under section
3022(a). These practices include, but are
not limited to, health IT products or
developers of such products (or other
entities offering such products to health
care providers) not being interoperable
or resulting in information blocking;
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and false statements by developers of
certified health IT that they have not
engaged in information blocking.
Section 3022(d)(3)(B) further requires
that this complaint process provide for
the collection of such information as the
originating institution, location, type of
transaction, system and version,
timestamp, terminating institution,
locations, system and version, failure
notice, and other related information.
We intend to implement and evolve
this complaint process by building on
existing mechanisms, including the
complaint process currently available at
https://www.healthit.gov/healthitfeedback. However, we request
comment on this approach and any
alternative approaches that would best
effectuate this aspect of the Cures Act.
In addition to any other comments that
the public may wish to submit, we
specifically request comment on the
following issues:
• What types of information are most
important to collect in order to identify
potential instances of information
blocking?
• What types of information are
contemplated by the following
categories delineated in section
3022(d)(3)(B): The originating
institution; location; type of transaction;
system and version; timestamp;
terminating institution; locations;
system and version; failure notice; and
other related information?
• What types of information or data
elements should be collected under
each of the above categories?
• What additional types of
information beyond the above may be
relevant to complaints and allegations of
information blocking, especially
practices that involve contractual or
other business practices for which some
of the categories of technical or
transactional information above may not
apply?
• How can ONC encourage and
streamline the collection of such
information so as to minimize burden
and encourage the submission of
complaints, especially complaints about
practices that raise the types of
information blocking concerns
described in this proposed rule?
• How can ONC facilitate the
inclusion of sufficient detail and
granularity in complaints to enable
effective investigations?
• What safeguards should be
provided to support adequate
confidentiality and handling of
information that could: (1) Identify the
source of the complaint or allegation; (2)
contain other individually identifiable
information; and (3) contain
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confidential or proprietary business
information?
G. Disincentives for Health Care
Providers—Request for Information
Section 3022(b)(2)(B) of the PHSA
provides that any health care provider
determined by the OIG to have
committed information blocking shall
be referred to the appropriate agency to
be subject to appropriate disincentives
using authorities under applicable
federal law, as the Secretary sets forth
through notice and comment
rulemaking. However, we note that
these disincentives may not cover the
full range of conduct within the scope
of section 3022(a)(1). We request
information on disincentives or if
modifying disincentives already
available under existing HHS programs
and regulations would provide for more
effective deterrents.
We also seek information on the
implementation of section 3022(d)(4) of
the PHSA, which provides that in
carrying out section 3022(d) of the
PHSA, the Secretary shall, to the extent
possible, not duplicate penalty
structures that would otherwise apply
with respect to information blocking
and the type of individual or entity
involved as of the day before December
13, 2016—enactment of the Cures Act.
IX. Registries Request for Information
Section 4005 (a) and (b) of the Cures
Act focuses on interoperability and
bidirectional exchange between EHRs
and registries, including clinician-led
clinical data registries. ONC is
approaching these provisions from
several angles to address the technical
capability of EHRs to exchange data
with registries in accordance with
applicable recognized standards. Based
on stakeholder engagement and public
comments on prior ONC regulations, we
have identified a wide range of areas
where the use of standards could
significantly improve bidirectional
exchange with registries for a range of
purposes, including public health,
quality reporting, and care quality
improvement.
As discussed in the ‘‘Strategy on
Reducing Regulatory and
Administrative Burden Relating to the
Use of Health IT and EHRs’’ draft report
released by ONC for public comment in
December of 2018,136 health care
providers are faced with a myriad of
federal public health reporting
requirements and options that rely on
both bidirectional exchange and
136 https://www.healthit.gov/topic/usability-andprovider-burden/strategy-reducing-burden-relatinguse-health-it-and-ehrs.
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aggregation of clinical data. CDC,
SAMHSA, FDA, HRSA, and USDA also
fund state and local public health
jurisdictions to collect clinical data from
health care providers. As noted in the
Cures Act, there are also a wide range
of clinician-led quality and specialty
clinical data registries. Compounding
these reporting requirements and
options is, as reported by health care
providers, a lack of standardization
across electronic infrastructure that has
led to a comparatively slow adoption of
health IT systems among registries. This
lack of interoperability impacts not only
data exchange between health care
providers, but is a significant barrier to
the integration and potential use of
clinical data received from a registry for
quality improvement or clinical care.
For these reasons outlined above, we
believe it is appropriate to explore
multiple approaches to advancing
health IT interoperability for
bidirectional exchange with registries in
order to mitigate risks based on factors
like feasibility and readiness, potential
unintended burden on health care
providers, and the need to focus on
priority clinical use cases. ONC is in the
process of conducting research and
analysis to determine what evidencebased use cases should be supported
and what standards are available to
support such use cases. We are also
considering the overall maturity of
technology adoption within the market
to support identified standards and the
use of certified EHRs and clinical data
registries for these identified use cases
in the near term, as well as identifying
glide paths for the potential future
development of enterprise solutions.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we
included certification criteria and
standards that are applicable for specific
use cases for bidirectional exchange
such as Immunization Information
Systems. In this proposed rule, we have
proposed processes for updating
standards as well as new policies
related to real world testing that would
help ensure that functionalities are
implemented in a manner that is
technically feasible in a practice setting.
In addition, we have worked with
federal partners to advance health IT
policies related to bidirectional
exchange with registries in a manner
that supports and reflects the current
market place while encouraging
innovation and increased adoption. For
example, we have worked with CMS to
enhance guidance for QCDRs under the
MIPS to support health IT innovation
and partnership with health IT
organizations. We are also working with
the CDC and states to support
enhancements to PDMP integration as a
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priority use case for standards-based
health IT solutions. We believe these
efforts can help to address the near term
need to support high priority use cases
for bidirectional exchange between
health care providers and registries.
In this proposed rule, we propose to
adopt new standards and capabilities for
certified APIs that have the potential to
change how certain types of information
exchange are done, including the
potential to exchange information with
clinical data and public health
registries. In this request for information
(RFI), we are seeking information on
how health IT solutions and the
proposals throughout this rule can aid
bidirectional exchange with registries
for a wide range public health, quality
reporting, and clinical quality
improvement initiatives. For example,
in December of 2018, in the ‘‘Strategy on
Reducing Regulatory and
Administrative Burden Relating to the
Use of Health IT and EHRs’’ draft report,
we noted that HL7 was working on an
update to the FHIR standard to support
API access to request data on
populations of patients, which could
potentially address additional use cases,
including supporting payer needs,
public health and quality improvement
efforts, and health research
organizations. As discussed in section
VII.4, FHIR Release 4 has now been
published 85 and updated associated
implementation specifications are
expected to follow. FHIR Release 4 has
several key improvements, including
certain foundational aspects in the
standard and ‘‘FHIR resources’’
designated as ‘‘normative’’ for the first
time. This will lead to a cycle of more
mature US FHIR Core profiles aligned
with Release 4 and additional
implementation guidance that explicitly
specifies how to handle populations of
patient data (batch exports) via FHIR to
more efficiently enable population and
learning health system-oriented
services.
We seek comment on use cases where
an API using FHIR Release 4 might
support improved exchange between a
provider and a registry. Specifically, we
seek comment on how the use of this
standard might:
• Reduce the burden of implementing
multiple solutions for various types of
exchange, while still supporting the
variability needed to exchange
information with registries devoted to
the care of a population defined by a
particular disease, condition, exposure,
or therapy;
• Allow for the collection of detailed,
standardized data on an ongoing basis
for medical procedures, services, or
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therapies for particular diseases,
conditions, or exposures;
• Support an overall approach to data
quality, including the systematic
collection of clinical and other health
care data, using standardized data
elements and procedures to verify the
completeness and validity of those data;
• Improve and enhance the ability of
providers to leverage feedback from a
registry to improve patient care; and
• Address a sufficiently wide range of
use cases to warrant the prioritization of
technical innovation on API-based
options over the continued development
of use-case-specific solutions in future
rulemaking.
We also welcome any other comments
stakeholders may have on
implementation of the registries
provisions under section 4005 of the
Cures Act.
X. Patient Matching Request for
Information
Patient matching is a critical
component to interoperability and the
nation’s health information technology
infrastructure. Accurate patient
matching helps health care providers
access and share the right information
on the right patient when and where it
is needed.
Inaccurate patient matching can
compromise safety, privacy, and lead to
increased health care costs, as
acknowledged in the Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Bill, 2017: 137
The Committee is aware that one of the
most significant challenges inhibiting the
safe and secure electronic exchange of health
information is the lack of a consistent patient
data matching strategy. With the passage of
the HITECH Act, a clear mandate was placed
on the Nation’s healthcare community to
adopt electronic health records and health
exchange capability. Although the Committee
continues to carry a prohibition against HHS
using funds to promulgate or adopt any final
standard providing for the assignment of a
unique health identifier for an individual
until such activity is authorized, the
Committee notes that this limitation does not
prohibit HHS from examining the issues
around patient matching. Accordingly, the
Committee encourages the Secretary, acting
through the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology and CMS, to provide technical
assistance to private-sector led initiatives to
develop a coordinated national strategy that
will promote patient safety by accurately
identifying patients to their health
information.
137 https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt699/
CRPT-114hrpt699.pdf.
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Similarly, the Fiscal Year 2018
Appropriations Bill 138 also included
language regarding patient matching.
The Committee is aware that a challenge
inhibiting the safe and secure electronic
exchange of health information is the lack of
a consistent approach to matching patient
data. The Committee encourages ONC to
engage with stakeholders on private-sector
led initiatives to develop a coordinated
strategy that will promote patient safety by
accurately identifying patients to their health
information.
Section 4007 of the 21st Century
Cures Act (Pub. L. 114–255) directs the
Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to conduct a study on patient
matching. Specifically, the GAO was
charged to review the policies and
activities of the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology (ONC) and other relevant
stakeholders, including standards
development organizations, developers,
providers, suppliers, payers, quality
organizations, States, health information
technology policy and technical experts,
and other appropriate entities. The GAO
report, Approaches and Challenges to
Electronically Matching Patients’
Records across Providers, was released
in January 2019.139 In this report, GAO
describes (1) stakeholders’ patient
record matching approaches and related
challenges; and (2) efforts to improve
patient record matching identified by
stakeholders. Stakeholders said more
could be done to improve patient record
matching, and identified several efforts
that could improve matching. For
example, some said that implementing
common standards for recording
demographic data; sharing best practices
and other resources; and developing a
public-private collaboration effort could
each improve matching. Stakeholders’
views varied on the roles ONC and
others should play in these efforts and
the extent to which the efforts would
improve matching. Multiple
stakeholders emphasized that no single
effort would solve the challenge of
patient record matching.
Patient matching may be defined as
the linking of one patient’s data within
and across health care providers in
order to obtain a comprehensive and
longitudinal view of that patient’s
health care. At a minimum, this is
accomplished by linking multiple
demographic data fields such as name,
birth date, sex, phone number, and
138 https://appropriations.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/23920.pdf.
139 U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Approaches and Challenges to Electronically
Matching Patients’ Records across Providers, GAO–
19–197, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/
696426.pdf.
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address. For this reason, accurate and
standardized data capture and exchange
and optimized algorithm performance
are critical components to the accurate
patient matching. With this in mind,
ONC has taken several steps to better
understand the patient matching
landscape and to identify areas where
ONC can assist in standards and
technical development, coordination,
and innovation. For example, in 2017,
ONC launched the Patient Matching
Algorithm Challenge, where six winners
were awarded total prize winnings of
$75,000.140 The goals of this challenge
were to bring about greater transparency
and data on the performance of existing
patient matching algorithms, spur the
adoption of performance metrics for
patient matching algorithm developers,
and positively impact other aspects of
patient matching such as deduplication
and linking. In addition, in 2018, ONC
showcased innovative technical and
non-technical approaches to matching
through hosting a patient matching track
at ONC’s Second Interoperability
Forum.141
In this Request for Information (RFI),
we seek comment on additional
opportunities that may exist in the
patient matching space and ways that
ONC can lead and contribute to
coordination efforts with respect to
patient matching. ONC and CMS
collaborated to jointly issue
complementary requests for information
regarding patient matching. ONC is
particularly interested in ways that
patient matching can facilitate improved
patient safety, better care coordination,
and advanced interoperability.
Inaccurate patient matching can lead to
inappropriate and unnecessary care;
unnecessary burden on both patients
and providers to correct
misidentification, time consuming and
expensive burden on health systems to
detect and reconcile duplicate patient
records and improper record merges;
and poor oversite into fraud and abuse.
Per a survey by the College of
Healthcare Information Management
Executives, one in five providers named
lack of an appropriate patient matching
strategy as the primary reason for
inadvertent illness or injury.142 We
consider this a quality of care and
patient safety issue and seek stakeholder
input on creative, innovative, and
effective approaches to patient matching
140 https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/11/08/
hhs-names-patient-matching-algorithm-challengewinners.html.
141 https://www.healthit.gov/news/events/oncs2nd-interoperability-forum.
142 https://chimecentral.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/Summary_of_CHIME_Survey_on_Patient_
Data.pdf.
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within and across providers. We also
intend to review the responses to this
RFI in concert with the GAO report once
published.
We specifically seek input on the
following:
• It is a common misconception that
technology alone can solve the problem
of poor data quality, but even the most
advanced, innovative technical
approaches are unable to overcome data
quality issues. Thus, we seek input on
the potential effect that data collection
standards may have on the quality of
health data that is captured and stored
and the impact that such standards may
have on accurate patient matching. We
also seek input on other solutions that
may increase the likelihood of accurate
data capture, including the
implementation of technology that
supports the verification and
authentication of certain demographic
data elements such as mailing address,
as well as other efforts that support
ongoing data quality improvement
efforts.
• In concert with the GAO study
referenced above, we seek input on
what additional data elements could be
defined to assist in patient matching as
well as input on a required minimum
set of elements that need to be collected
and exchanged. We encourage
stakeholders to review the Patient
Demographic Record Matching section
of the Interoperability Standards
Advisory 143 and comment on the
standards and implementation
specifications outlined. Public
comments and subject matter feedback
on all sections of the Interoperability
Standards Advisory are accepted year
round.
• Also in alignment with the GAO
study, we seek input on whether and
what requirements for electronic health
records could be established to assure
data used for patient matching is
collected accurately and completely for
every patient. For instance, the adopted
2015 Edition ‘‘transitions of care’’
certification criterion (§ 170.315(b)(1))
currently includes patient matching
requirements for first name, last name,
previous name, middle name, suffix,
date of birth, address, phone number,
and sex. These requirement also include
format constraints for some of the data.
• There are unique matching issues
related to pediatrics and we seek
comment on innovative and effective
technical or non-technical approaches
that could support accurate pediatric
record matching.
143 https://www.healthit.gov/isa/patientdemographic-record-matching.
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• Recent research suggests that
involving patients in patient matching
may be a viable and effective solution to
increase the accuracy of matching, and
giving patients access to their own
clinical information empowers
engagements and improved health
outcomes. We seek comment on
potential solutions that include patients
through a variety of methods and
technical platforms in the capture,
update and maintenance of their own
demographic and health data, including
privacy criteria and the role of providers
as educators and advocates.
• In addition, we seek input on
standardized metrics for the
performance evaluation of available
patient matching algorithms. Health IT
developers are each relying on a number
of patient matching algorithms,
however, without the adoption of agreed
upon metrics for the evaluation of
algorithm performance across the
industry, existing matching approaches
cannot be accurately evaluated or
compared across systems or over time.
• At the same time, we seek input on
transparent patient matching indicators
such as database duplicate rate,
duplicate creation rate, and true match
rate, for example, that are necessary for
assessment and reporting. The current
lack of consensus, adoption, and
transparency of such indicators makes
communication, reporting, and crossprovider or cross-organizational
comparisons impossible, impedes a full
and accurate assessment of the extent of
the problem, prohibits informed
decision making, limits research on
complementary matching methods, and
inhibits progress and innovation in this
area.
• There are a number of emerging
private-sector led approaches in patient
matching that may prove to be effective,
and we seek input on these approaches,
in general. A number of matching
services that leverage referential
matching technology have emerged in
the market recently, yet evaluations of
this type of approach has either not
been conducted or has not been made
public. Other innovative technical
approaches such as biometrics, machine
learning and artificial intelligence, or
locally developed unique identifier
efforts, when used in combination with
non-technical approaches such as
patient engagement, supportive policies,
data governance, and ongoing data
quality improvement efforts may
enhance capacity for matching.
• Finally, ONC seeks input on new
data that could be added to the United
States Core Data for Interoperability
(USCDI) or further constrained within it
in order to support patient matching.
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XI. Incorporation by Reference
The Office of the Federal Register has
established requirements for materials
(e.g., standards and implementation
specifications) that agencies propose to
incorporate by reference in the Code of
Federal Regulations (79 FR 66267; 1
CFR 51.5(a)). Specifically, § 51.5(a)
requires agencies to discuss, in the
preamble of a proposed rule, the ways
that the materials it proposes to
incorporate by reference are reasonably
available to interested parties or how it
worked to make those materials
reasonably available to interested
parties; and summarize, in the preamble
of the proposed rule, the material it
proposes to incorporate by reference.
To make the materials we intend to
incorporate by reference reasonably
available, we provide a uniform
resource locator (URL) for the standards
and implementation specifications. In
many cases, these standards and
implementation specifications are
directly accessible through the URLs
provided. In instances where they are
not directly available, we note the steps
and requirements necessary to gain
access to the standard or
implementation specification. In most of
these instances, access to the standard
or implementation specification can be
gained through no-cost (monetary)
participation, subscription, or
membership with the applicable
standards developing organization
(SDO) or custodial organization. In
certain instances, where noted, access
requires a fee or paid membership. As
an alternative, a copy of the standards
may be viewed for free at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information
Technology, 330 C Street SW,
Washington, DC 20201. Please call (202)
690–7171 in advance to arrange
inspection.
The National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act (NTTAA) of 1995
(15 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.) and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A–119 require the use of,
wherever practical, technical standards
that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies to
carry out policy objectives or activities,
with certain exceptions. The NTTAA
and OMB Circular A–119 provide
exceptions to selecting only standards
developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, namely
when doing so would be inconsistent
with applicable law or otherwise
impractical. As discussed in section IV
of this preamble, we have followed the
NTTAA and OMB Circular A–119 in
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proposing standards and
implementation specifications for
adoption, including describing any
exceptions in the proposed adoption of
standards and implementation
specifications. Over the years of
adopting standards and implementation
specifications for certification, we have
worked with SDOs, such as HL7, to
make the standards we propose to
adopt, and subsequently adopt and
incorporate by reference in the Federal
Register, available to interested
stakeholders. As described above, this
includes making the standards and
implementation specifications available
through no-cost memberships and nocost subscriptions.
As required by § 51.5(a), we provide
summaries of the standards we propose
to adopt and subsequently incorporate
by reference in the Code of Federal
Regulations. We also provide relevant
information about these standards and
implementation specifications
throughout the preamble.
We have organized the following
standards and implementation
specifications that we propose to adopt
through this rulemaking according to
the sections of the Code of Federal
Regulation (CFR) in which they would
be codified and cross-referenced for
associated certification criteria and
requirements that we propose to adopt.
We note, in certain instances, that we
request comment in this proposed rule
on multiple standards or
implementation specifications that we
are considering for adoption and
incorporation by reference for particular
use cases. We include all of these
standards and implementation
specifications in this section of the
preamble.
Content Exchange Standards and
Implementation Specifications for
Exchanging Electronic Health
Information—45 CFR 170.205
• CMS Implementation Guide for
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category I Hospital Quality
Reporting Implementation Guide for
2019, May 4, 2018
URL: https://ecqi.healthit.gov/system/
files/QRDA_HQR_2019_CMS_IG_final_
508.pdf.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: This guide is a CMS
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category I (QRDA I)
implementation guide to the HL7
Implementation Guide for CDA Release
2: Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category I, Release 1, STU
Release 5 (published December 2017),
referred to as the HL7 QRDA I STU R5
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in this guide. This guide describes
additional conformance statements and
constraints for EHR data submissions
that are required for reporting
information to the CMS for the Hospital
Inpatient Quality Reporting Program
2019 Reporting Period. The purpose of
this guide is to serve as a companion to
the base HL7 QRDA I STU R5 for
entities such as Eligible Hospitals (EH),
Critical Access Hospitals (CAH), and
vendors to submit QRDA I data for
consumption by CMS systems including
for Hospital Quality Reporting (HQR).
• CMS Implementation Guide for
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category III Eligible
Clinicians and Eligible Professionals
Programs Implementation Guide for
2019, October 8, 2018
URL: https://ecqi.healthit.gov/system/
files/2019_CMS_QRDA_III_Eligible_
Clinicians_and_EP_IG-508.pdf.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The Health Level Seven
International (HL7) Quality Reporting
Document Architecture (QRDA) defines
constraints on the HL7 Clinical
Document Architecture Release 2 (CDA
R2). QRDA is a standard document
format for the exchange of electronic
clinical quality measure (eCQM) data.
QRDA reports contain data extracted
from electronic health records (EHRs)
and other information technology
systems. The reports are used for the
exchange of eCQM data between
systems for quality measurement and
reporting programs. This QRDA guide
contains the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) supplemental
implementation guide to the HL7
Implementation Guide for CDA Release
2: Quality Reporting Document
Architecture, Category III, STU Release
2.1 (June, 2017) for the 2019
performance period. This HL7 base
standard is referred to as the HL7
QRDA–III STU R2.1.
• Health Level 7 (HL7®) CDA R2 IG: C–
CDA Templates for Clinical Notes R1
Companion Guide, Release 1 (C–CDA
2.1 Companion Guide), March 2017
URL: https://www.hl7.org/implement/
standards/product_brief.cfm?product_
id=447.
Access requires a ‘‘user account’’ and
a license agreement. There is no
monetary cost for a user account and
license agreement.
Summary: The Companion Guide to
Consolidated Clinical Document
Architecture (C–CDA) provides
supplemental guidance to the Health
Level Seven (HL7) CDA® R2 IG: C–CDA
Templates for Clinical Notes STU
Release 2.1 in support of the ONC 2015
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Edition Health IT Certification Criteria
(2015 Edition) Certified Electronic
Health Record Technology
requirements. This guide provides
additional technical clarification and
practical guidance to assist
implementers to support best practice
implementations of the 2015 Edition
Health Information Technology (Health
IT) Certification Criteria, 2015 Edition
Base Electronic Health Record (EHR)
Definition, and ONC Health IT
Certification.
prescription requests, New prescription
response denials, Prescription transfer
message, Prescription fill indicator
change, Prescription recertification, Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
(REMS) initiation request, REMS
initiation response, REMS request, and
REMS response.
• Health Level 7(HL7®) CDA R2
Implementation Guide: C–CDA
Supplemental Templates for Unique
Device Identification (UDI) for
Implantable Medical Devices, Release
1–US Realm
URL: https://www.hl7.org/implement/
standards/product_brief.cfm?product_
id=486.
Access requires a ‘‘user account’’ and
a license agreement. There is no
monetary cost for a user account and
license agreement.
Summary: The Implementation Guide
contains guidance, supporting material
and new templates to implement
support for Unique Device Identifiers
(UDIs) for implantable medical devices.
The IG identifies changes needed to the
C–CDA to better facilitate the exchange
of the individual UDI components in the
health care system when devices are
implanted in a patient. The UDI
components include the Device
Identifier (DI) and the following
individual production identifiers (PI):
The lot or batch number, serial number,
manufacturing date, expiration date,
and distinct identification code.
URL: https://www.healthit.gov/
USCDI.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The United States Core
Data for Interoperability (USCDI)
establishes a minimum set of data
classes that are required to be
interoperable nationwide and is
designed to be expanded in an iterative
and predictable way over time. Data
classes listed in the USCDI are
represented in a technically agnostic
manner.
• National Council for Prescription
Drug Programs (NCPDP), Script
Standard Implementation Guide,
Version 2017071 (Approval Date for
ANSI: July 28, 2017)
URL: https://www.ncpdp.org/
Standards/Standards-Info.
Access requires registration,
membership fee, a user account, and
license agreement to obtain a copy of
the standard.
Summary: SCRIPT standards are
developed for transmitting prescription
information electronically between
prescribers, pharmacies, payers, and
other entities for new prescriptions,
changes of prescriptions, prescription
refill requests, prescription fill status
notifications, cancellation notifications,
relaying of medication history,
transactions for long-term care,
electronic prior authorization and other
transactions. New transactions in this
update include Prescription drug
administration message, New
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United States Core Data for
Interoperability—45 CFR 170.213
• The United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI), Version 1 (v1)
Application Programming Interface
Standards—45 CFR 170.215
• HL7® FHIR® Foundation, Argonaut
Data Query Implementation Guide
Server, Version 1.0.2, December 15,
2016
URL: https://www.fhir.org/guides/
argonaut/r2/Conformance-server.html.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: This profile defines the
expected capabilities of an Argonaut
Data Query server when conforming to
the Argonaut Data Query IG. The
conformance resource includes the
complete list of actual profiles, RESTful
operations, and search parameters
supported by Argonaut Data Query
Servers. Servers have the option of
choosing from this list to access
necessary data based on their local use
cases and other contextual
requirements.
• HL7® FHIR® Foundation, Argonaut
Data Query Implementation Guide,
Version 1.0.0, December 23, 2016
URL: https://www.fhir.org/guides/
argonaut/r2/.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide is based upon
the core FHIR DSTU Release 2.0 API
and documents security and
authorization, data element query of the
ONC Common Clinical Data Set, and
document query of static documents.
This specification describes four use
cases and sets search expectations for
each. Argonaut uses the SMART Guide
for apps that connect to EHR data.
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• Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®)
Release 2.0 Draft Standard for Trial Use
(DSTU), Version 1.0.2–7202, October 24,
2015
URL: https://hl7.org/fhir/DSTU2/
index.html.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) Draft
Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) Release
2.0, Version 1.0.2 is designed to enable
information exchange to support the
provision of health care in a wide
variety of settings. The specification
builds on and adapts modern, widely
used, RESTful practices to enable the
provision of integrated health care
across a wide range of teams and
organizations. HL7 FHIR solutions are
built from a set of modular components
called ‘‘Resources’’. These Resources
can easily be assembled into working
systems that solve real world clinical
and administrative problems at a
fraction of the price of existing
alternatives. HL7 FHIR is suitable for
use in a wide variety of contexts (e.g.,
mobile phone apps, cloud
communications, EHR-based data
sharing, and server communication in
large institutional health care
providers). All resources have the
following features in common: A URL
that identifies it; common metadata; a
human-readable XHTML summary; a set
of defined common data elements; and
an extensibility framework to support
variation in health care.
• Health Level 7 (HL7®) Version 3.0.1
Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources Specification (FHIR®) Release
3 Standard for Trial Use (STU), April
19, 2017
URL: https://hl7.org/fhir/STU3/
index.html.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®)
Standard for Trial Use (STU) Release 3
leverages the latest web standards and
applies a tight focus on implementation.
FHIR solutions are built from a set of
modular components called
‘‘Resources’’. These resources can easily
be assembled into working systems that
solve real world clinical and
administrative problems at a fraction of
the price of existing alternatives. FHIR
is suitable for use in a wide variety of
contexts—mobile phone apps, cloud
communications, EHR-based data
sharing, server communication in large
institutional health care providers, and
much more. This third STU release
includes a significant increase in the
number of supported resources as well
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Data for Interoperability (USCDI)
standard.
as revisions to previously published
resources reflecting implementer
feedback and increased maturity and
stability.
• Health Level 7 (HL7®) Version 4.0.0
Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources Specification (FHIR®) Release
4, December 27, 2018
URL: https://hl7.org/fhir/R4/.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®)
Release 4 provides the first set of
normative FHIR resources. This
normative designation means that the
future changes will be backward
compatible for the first time. These
resources define the content and
structure of core health data which can
be used by developers to build
standardized applications. Release 4
provides new standard operation on
how to obtain data from multiple
patients via FHIR. API services that
focus on multiple patients would enable
health care providers to manage various
internal patient populations as well as
external services a health care provider
may contract for to support quality
improvement, population health
management, and cost accountability
vis-a`-vis the provider’s partners (e.g.,
health plans).
• Health Level 7 (HL7®)
Implementation Specification—FHIR
Profile: Consent2Share FHIR Consent
Profile Design, December 11, 2017
URL: https://gforge.hl7.org/gf/project/
cbcc/frs/?action=FrsRelease
View&release_id=1259.
The standard can be accessed through
this link.
Summary: The Consent2Share FHIR
Consent Profile Design provides
instructions for using the FHIR
‘‘Consent’’ resource to capture a record
of a health care consumer’s privacy
preferences. Implementing an instance
of the FHIR Consent resource based on
this guide allows for a patient consent
to permit or deny identified recipient(s)
or recipient role(s) to perform one or
more actions regarding a patient’s health
information for specific purposes and
periods of time.
• API Resource Collection in Health
(ARCH) Version 1
URL: https://www.healthit.gov/ARCH.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: The API Resource
Collection in Health (ARCH) is an
implementation specification that list a
set of base FHIR resources that Health
IT Modules would need to support. The
ARCH aligns with, and is directed by,
the data policy specified in the US Core
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• SMART Application Launch
Framework Implementation Guide
Release 1.0.0, November 13, 2018
URL: https://hl7.org/fhir/smart-applaunch/.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: SMART on FHIR provides
reliable, secure authorization for a
variety of app architectures through the
use of the OAuth 2.0 standard. This
Authorization Guide supports the four
uses cases defined for Phase 1 of the
Argonaut Project. This profile is
intended to be used by developers of
apps that need to access FHIR resources
by requesting access tokens from OAuth
2.0 compliant authorization servers. The
profile defines a method through which
an app requests authorization to access
a FHIR resource, and then uses that
authorization to retrieve the resource.
Other Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)-mandated
security mechanisms, such as end-user
authentication, session time-out,
security auditing, and accounting of
disclosures, are outside the scope of this
profile.
• IETF OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client
Registration Protocol (RFC 7591), July
2015
URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc7591.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: This specification defines
mechanisms for dynamically registering
OAuth 2.0 clients with authorization
servers. Registration requests send a set
of desired client metadata values to the
authorization server. The resulting
registration responses return a client
identifier to use at the authorization
server and the client metadata values
registered for the client. The client can
then use this registration information to
communicate with the authorization
server using the OAuth 2.1 protocol.
This specification also defines a set of
common client metadata fields and
values for clients to use during
registration.
• OpenID Connect Core 1.0
Incorporating Errata Set 1, November 8,
2014
URL: https://openid.net/specs/openidconnect-core-1_0.html.
This is a direct access link.
Summary: OpenID Connect 1.0 is a
simple identity layer on top of the
OAuth 2.0 protocol. It enables Clients to
verify the identity of the End-User based
on the authentication performed by an
Authorization Server, as well as to
obtain basic profile information about
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the End-User in an interoperable and
REST-like manner. This specification
defines the core OpenID Connect
functionality: Authentication built on
top of OAuth 2.0 and the use of Claims
to communicate information about the
End-User. It also describes the security
and privacy considerations for using
OpenID Connect.
XII. Response to Comments
Because of the large number of public
comments normally received in
response to Federal Register
documents, we are not able to
acknowledge or respond to them
individually. We will consider all
comments we receive by the date and
time specified in the DATES section of
this preamble, and, when we proceed
with a subsequent document, we will
respond to the comments in the
preamble of that document.
We note that, throughout this
proposed rule, we identified areas
where we need more information before
making a proposal (i.e., requests for
information). We note that comments
we receive in response to these requests
for information will not necessarily be
addressed in the final rule, but will be
used to inform future rulemaking.
XIII. Collection of Information
Requirements
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA) requires agencies to provide a 60day notice in the Federal Register and
solicit public comment on a proposed
collection of information before it is
submitted to the Office of Management
and Budget for review and approval. In
order to fairly evaluate whether an
information collection should be
approved by the OMB, section
3506(c)(2)(A) of the PRA requires that
we solicit comment on the following
issues:
1. Whether the information collection
is necessary and useful to carry out the
proper functions of the agency;
2. The accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the information collection
burden;
3. The quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected; and
4. Recommendations to minimize the
information collection burden on the
affected public, including automated
collection techniques.
Under the PRA, the time, effort, and
financial resources necessary to meet
the information collection requirements
referenced in this section are to be
considered. We explicitly seek, and will
consider, public comment on our
assumptions as they relate to the PRA
requirements summarized in this
section. To comment on the collection
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of information or to obtain copies of the
supporting statements and any related
forms for the proposed paperwork
collections referenced in this section,
email your comment or request,
including your address and phone
number to Sherrette.funn@hhs.gov, or
call the Reports Clearance Office at
(202) 690–6162. Written comments and
recommendations for the proposed
information collections must be directed
to the OS Paperwork Clearance Officer
at the above email address within 60
days.
A. ONC–ACBs
We propose to add new ONC–ACB
collection and reporting requirements
for the certification of health IT to the
2015 Edition (and any subsequent
edition certification) in § 170.523(p), (q),
(t), and § 170.550(1).
As proposed for §§ 170.550(l), ONC–
ACBs would not be able to certify health
IT until they review and verify health IT
developers’ attestations confirming that
the developers are compliant with
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements. ONC–ACBs
would also submit the health IT
developer attestations to ONC as
proposed by § 170.523(q). We believe
this will require minimal effort on
behalf of ONC–ACBs as the ONC
submission part will be electronically
facilitated via the CHPL.
As proposed for § 170.523(p)(3),
ONC–ACBs would be required to collect
and report certain information to ONC
related to real world testing plans and
results. ONC–ACBs would be required
to verify that the health IT developer
submits an annual, publicly available
real world testing plan and perform a
completeness check for both real world
testing plans and results. We believe
ONC–ACBs will face minimum burden
in complying with these new proposed
requirements.
As proposed for § 170.523(t), ONC–
ACBs would ensure health IT
developers opting to take advantage of
the Standard Version Advancement
Process flexibility per § 170.405(b)(5)
provide timely advance written notice
to the ONC–ACB and all affected
customers. ONC–ACBs would maintain
a record of the date of issuance and the
content of developers’ notices, and
timely post content of each notice
received publicly on the CHPL
attributed to the certified Health IT
Module(s) to which it applies. We
believe this will require minimal effort
on behalf of ONC–ACBs as the
submission part will be electronically
facilitated via the CHPL.
In the 2015 Edition proposed rule (80
FR 16894), we estimated fewer than ten
annual respondents for all of the
regulatory ‘‘collection of information’’
requirements that applied to the ONC–
AA and ONC–ACBs, including those
previously approved by OMB. In the
2015 Edition final rule (80 FR 62733),
we concluded that the regulatory
‘‘collection of information’’
requirements for the ONC–AA and the
ONC–ACBs were not subject to the PRA
under 5 CFR 1320.3(c). We continue to
estimate less than ten annual
respondents for all of the proposed
regulatory ‘‘collection of information’’
requirements for ONC–ACBs under Part
170 of Title 45, including those
previously approved by OMB and
proposed in this proposed rule.
Accordingly, the regulatory ‘‘collection
of information’’ requirements under the
Program described in this section are
not subject to the PRA under 5 CFR
1320.3(c). We welcome comments on
these conclusions and the supporting
rationale on which they are based. For
costs estimates of these proposed new
regulatory requirements, we refer
readers to section XIV. (Regulatory
Impact Analysis) of this proposed rule.
B. Health IT Developers
We propose in 45 CFR
170.580(a)(2)(iii) that ONC may take
action against a health IT developer for
failure to comply with Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements. We proposed to generally
use the same processes previously
codified in regulation (§§ 170.580 and
170.581) to take administrative
enforcement action. These processes
would require health IT developers to
submit information to ONC to facilitate
and conclude its review. The PRA,
however, exempts these information
collections. Specifically, 44 U.S.C.
3518(c)(1)(B)(ii) excludes collection
activities during the conduct of
administrative actions or investigations
involving the agency against specific
individuals or entities.
We propose in 45 CFR 170.402(b)(1)
that a health IT developer must, for a
period of 10 years beginning from the
date each of a developer’s health IT is
first certified under the ONC Health IT
Certification Program, retain all records
and information necessary to
demonstrate initial and ongoing
compliance with the requirements of the
ONC Health IT Certification Program.
We believe it will take approximately
two hours per week on average to
comply with our proposed record
retention requirement. We welcome
comments if stakeholders believe more
or less time should be included in our
estimate.
TABLE 4—ESTIMATED ANNUALIZED TOTAL BURDEN HOURS FOR HEALTH IT DEVELOPERS TO COMPLY WITH RECORDS
RETENTION REQUIREMENTS
Number of
health IT
developers
Code of Federal regulations section
Average
burden hours
Total
45 CFR 170.402(b)(1) .................................................................................................................
458
104
47,632
Total Burden Hours ..............................................................................................................
........................
........................
47,632
XIV. Regulatory Impact Analysis
A. Statement of Need
This proposed rule is necessary to
meet our statutory responsibilities
under the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures
Act) and to advance HHS policy goals
to promote interoperability and mitigate
burden for stakeholders. Proposals that
could result in monetary costs for
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stakeholders include the: (1) Proposals
to update the 2015 Edition health IT
certification criteria; (2) proposals
related to Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification for a health IT
developer; (3) proposals related to
oversight for the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification; and (4)
proposals related to information
blocking.
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While much of the costs of this
proposed rule will fall on health IT
developers that seek to certify health IT
under the ONC Health IT Certification
Program (Program), we believe the
implementation and use of health IT
certified to the 2015 Edition (including
the new criteria in this proposed rule),
compliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification, and the
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limited exceptions to information
blocking proposed would ultimately
result in significant benefits for health
care providers and patients. We outline
some of these benefits below. We
emphasize in this regulatory impact
analysis (RIA) that we believe this
proposed rule would create
opportunities for new market entrants
and would remove barriers to
interoperability and electronic health
information exchange, which would
greatly benefit health care providers and
patients.
We note in this RIA that there were
instances in which we had difficulty
quantifying certain benefits due to a
lack of applicable studies and/or data.
However, in such instances, we
highlight the significant qualitative
benefits of our proposals to advance an
interoperable health system that
empowers individuals to use their
electronic health information (EHI) to
the fullest extent and enables health
care providers and communities to
deliver smarter, safer, and more efficient
care.
B. Alternatives Considered
We assessed whether there are
alternatives to our proposals,
specifically our proposals concerning
EHI export, application programming
interfaces (APIs), and real world testing.
We have been unable to identify
alternatives that would appropriately
implement our responsibilities under
the Cures Act and support
interoperability. We believe our
proposals take the necessary steps to
fulfill the mandates specified in the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA), as
amended by the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act and the Cures Act,
in the least burdensome way. We are,
however, open to less burdensome
alternatives that meet statutory
requirements and our goals.
Accordingly, we welcome comments on
our assessment and any alternatives we
should consider.
C. Overall Impact
We have examined the impact of this
proposed rule as required by Executive
Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning
and Review (September 30, 1993),
Executive Order 13563 on Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review
(February 2, 2011), Executive Order
13771 on Reducing Regulation and
Controlling Regulatory Costs, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601
et seq.), section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C.
1532), and Executive Order 13132 on
Federalism (August 4, 1999).
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1. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563—
Regulatory Planning and Review
Analysis
Executive Orders 12866 on Regulatory
Planning and Review and 13563 on
Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review direct agencies to assess all
costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). A regulatory impact analysis
(RIA) must be prepared for major rules
with economically significant effects
($100 million or more in any one year).
OMB has determined that this proposed
rule is an economically significant rule
as the potential costs associated with
this proposed rule could be greater than
$100 million per year. Accordingly, we
have prepared an RIA that to the best of
our ability presents the costs and
benefits of this proposed rule.
2. Executive Order 13771—Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
Executive Order 13771 on Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs was issued on January 30, 2017
and directs agencies to repeal two
existing regulations for each new
regulation issued in fiscal year (FY)
2017 and thereafter. It further directs
agencies, via guidance issued by the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), that the total incremental costs
of all regulations should be no greater
than zero in FY 2018. The analysis
required by Executive Order 13771, as
supplemented by Executive Order
13777, adds additional requirements for
analysis of regulatory actions. The new
requirements under Executive Orders
13771 and 13777 do not change or
reduce existing requirements under
Executive Orders 12866 or 13563.
a. Costs and Benefits
We have estimated the potential
monetary costs and benefits of this
proposed rule for health IT developers,
health care providers, patients, ONCAuthorized Certification Bodies (ONC–
ACBs), ONC-Authorized Testing
Laboratories (ONC–ATLs), and the
federal government (i.e., ONC), and
have broken those costs and benefits out
into the following categories: (1)
Deregulatory actions (no associated
costs); (2) updates the 2015 Edition
Health IT certification criteria; (3)
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification for a health IT developer;
(4) oversight for the Conditions and
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Maintenance of Certification; and (5)
information blocking.
In accordance with Executive Order
12866, we have included the RIA
summary table as Table 25. In addition,
we have included a summary to meet
the regulatory reform analysis
requirements under Executive Order
13771.
We note that we have rounded all
estimates to the nearest dollar and that
all estimates are expressed in 2016
dollars as it is the most recent data
available to address all cost and benefit
estimates consistently. We also note that
estimates presented in the following
‘‘Employee Assumptions and Hourly
Wage,’’ ‘‘Quantifying the Estimated
Number of Health IT Developers and
Products,’’ and ‘‘Number of End Users
that Might Be Impacted by ONC’s
Proposed Regulations’’ sections are used
throughout this RIA.
For proposals where research
supported direct estimates of impact, we
estimated the benefits. For proposals
where no such research was identified
to be available, we developed estimates
based on a reasonable proxy.
We note that interoperability can
positively impact patient safety, care
coordination, and improve health care
processes and health outcomes.144
However, achieving interoperability is a
function of a number of factors
including the capability of the
technology used by health care
providers. Therefore, to assess the
benefits of our proposals, we must first
consider how to assess their respective
effects on interoperability holding other
factors constant.
For the purpose of this analysis, we
used regression analysis to calculate the
impact of our real world testing and API
proposals on interoperability. We
assumed that the real world testing and
API proposals would collectively have
the same impact on interoperability as
health IT certified to the 2014 Edition.
Therefore, we estimated linear
probability models that identified the
impact of 2014 Edition certified health
IT on hospitals’ interoperability.145 We
used data from the 2014 and 2015
American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Survey Information Technology
Supplement (IT Supplement), which
consists of an analytic sample of 4,866
observations of non-federal acute care
144 https://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/
2017/09/Interoperability_2016-2017_Final_
Report.aspx.
145 The interoperability dependent variable is a
binary indicator for whether a hospital routinely
sends, receives, and integrates summary of care
records electronically outside of its system and
finds any health information electronically outside
of its system.
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hospitals that responded to the IT
Supplement.146 We controlled for
additional factors such as participation
in a health information exchange
organization, hospital characteristics,
and urban/rural status. More
specifically, we used the following
explanatory variables:
Edition = 1 if a hospital adopted 2014 Edition
EHR, 0 otherwise
RHIO = 1 if a hospital participates in health
information exchange organization, 0
otherwise
Government = 1 if a hospital is publically
owned, 0 otherwise
Alt_teaching = 1 if a hospital is teaching, 0
otherwise
Nonprofit = 1 if a hospital is not for profit,
0 otherwise
Largebed = 1 if a hospital has more than 399
beds, 0 otherwise
Medbed = 1 if a hospital’s number of beds
is between 100 and 399, 0 otherwise
Urban_rural = 1 if a hospital is urban, 0
otherwise
CAH = 1 if a hospital is critical access, 0
otherwise
Year = year of the data (2014 and 2015)
S = state fixed effects
We found a statistically significant
marginal effect of using 2014 Edition
certified health IT associated with a five
percentage point increase in
interoperability.147
While we acknowledge that there
might be shared benefits across
proposals, we have taken steps to ensure
that the benefits attributed to each
proposal is unique to the proposal
referenced. We assumed that this
marginal effect is true for our proposals
and distributed the 5% benefit across
our real world testing and API proposals
at (.1–1%) to (1–4%) respectively.
Moreover, the number of providers
impacted is proposal specific. Given
data limitations, we believe this
approach allows us to estimate the
benefits of our proposals without double
counting the impact each proposal
might have on interoperability.
Employee Assumptions and Hourly
Wage
We have made employee assumptions
about the level of expertise needed to
complete the proposed requirements in
this section. For wage calculations for
federal employees and ONC–ACBs, we
have correlated the employee’s expertise
with the corresponding grade and step
of an employee classified under the
General Schedule (GS) Federal Salary
Classification, relying on the associated
employee hourly rates for the
Washington, DC locality pay area as
published by the Office of Personnel
Management for 2016.148 We have
assumed that overhead costs (including
benefits) are equal to 100% of pre-tax
wages. Therefore, we have doubled the
employee’s hourly wage to account for
overhead costs. We have concluded that
a 100% expenditure on benefits is an
appropriate estimate based on research
conducted by HHS.149
We have used Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) data to calculate private
sector employee wage estimates (e.g.,
health IT developers, health care
providers, HINs, attorneys, etc.), as we
believe BLS provides the most accurate
and comprehensive wage data for
private sector positions. Just as with the
General Schedule Federal Salary
Classification calculations, we have
assumed that overhead costs (including
benefits) are equal to 100% of pre-tax
wages.
All wage estimates (GS and BLS) have
been calculated in 2016 dollars because
OMB requested that agencies generate
cost and benefit estimates in 2016
dollars under Executive Order 13771. If
we were to represent wage estimates in
2017 dollars, then costs and benefits,
including net benefits, would increase
by 4%. For our final rule, we will
consider using 2017 and even 2018
dollars, if available, for our cost and
benefit estimates.
We welcome comments on our
methodology for estimating labor costs.
Quantifying the Estimated Number of
Health IT Developers and Products
In this section, we describe the
methodology used to assess the
potential impact of new 2015 Edition
certification criteria on the availability
of certified products in the health IT
market. This analysis is based on the
number of certified health IT products
(i.e., Health IT Modules), product
capability, and the number of health IT
developers that left, merged, and/or
entered the health IT market between
the establishment of the Program and
implementation of the 2011 Edition and
the implementation of the 2014
Edition.150
Market consolidation may occur as a
result of a natural evolvement of a new
industry.151 We account for this factor
in our analysis. In Table 5 below, we
quantify the extent to which the
certified health IT market consolidated
between the 2011 Edition and 2014
Edition. We found that the number of
health IT developers certifying products
between the 2011 Edition and 2014
Edition decreased by 22.1% and the
number of products available decreased
by 23.2%.
TABLE 5—CERTIFIED HEALTH IT MARKET CONSOLIDATION FROM THE 2011 EDITION TO THE 2014 EDITION a
2011 Edition
Health IT Developers ...................................................................................................................
Products .......................................................................................................................................
1,017
1,408
2014 Edition
Market
consolidation
(%)
792
1,081
¥22.1
¥23.2
a For the purposes of these market consolidation calculations, we included the total number of active or suspended health IT products and their
developers. Withdrawn products and their developers were excluded from this total.
Not all products are certified to all of
the edition’s certification criteria
available in the Program. Modular
certification allows a health IT
developer to present a product for
certification to a narrower scope of
146 American Hospital Association Health IT
Supplement Survey, https://www.ahadata.com/ahahealthcare-database/.
147 Results were similar when we used logit or
Probit specifications.
148 https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/
pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2016/
DCB_h.pdf.
149 See U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Guidelines for
Regulatory Impact Analysis, at 28–30 (2016),
available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/
242926/HHS_RIAGuidance.pdf.
150 Availability of 2014 CEHRT for Meaningful
Users Providers, Health IT Policy Committee Data
Update (Sept. 9, 2015), available at https://
www.healthit.gov/FACAS/sites/faca/files/HITPC_
Data_Update_Presentation_Final_2015-09-09.pdf.
151 See Graeme K. Deans, Fritz Kroeger, and
Stefan Zeisel, The Consolidation Curve (Dec. 2002);
J. David Cummins and Maria Rubio-Misas,
Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency:
Evidence from the Spanish Insurance Industry,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 38, No.
2 (Mar. 2006), at 323–55; Martin Gaynor and
Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and
Competition in Health Care Markets, The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter
1999), at 141–64.
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specific use cases, which may be
impacted at differing levels or may not
be impacted by the proposals in this
proposed rule. Therefore, we have
estimated the number of 2015 Edition
certified health IT products and health
IT developers impacted by each
proposal using proxies from historical
data. Using the rates identified in Table
5, we then applied our estimate for
market consolidation to estimate the
number 2015 Edition certified health IT
products and health IT developers that
would be impacted by our policies in
this proposed rule. Specifically, to
estimate the number of 2015 Edition
products and health IT developers in
the market, we have assumed:
1. Products capable of recording EHI
will include new certification criteria.
We assume that products capable of
recording patient health data will be the
types of products most likely to be
impacted by and include the new
proposed certification criteria.
2. Products capable of recording EHI
data available in 2015 equal the number
of products available in 2014. In 2014,
there were 710 products by 588
developers capable of recording EHI.
Since the new criteria involve the access
to and movement and exchange of EHI,
we used only products that record EHI
as a basis for our estimates. We believe
the 2014 totals reflect a realistic
estimate of the currently available
products and their developers that
could include the new 2015 certification
criteria.
3. Market consolidation rates denoted
in Table 5 hold constant. We assume
that the rate of market consolidation for
products (¥23.2%) and health IT
developers (¥22.1%) from the 2011
Edition to the 2014 Edition holds
constant for the 2015 Edition.
As shown in Table 6 below, based on
the assumptions 1–3 above, we have
estimated the total number of 2015
products (545) and their developers
(458).
TABLE 6—TOTAL NUMBER OF HEALTH IT DEVELOPERS AND PRODUCTS BY SCENARIO
Number of
health IT
developers
Scenario
2015 Edition Projection—All Products .....................................................................................................................
2015 Edition Projection—Products Capable of Recording EHI ..............................................................................
Number of End Users That Might Be
Impacted by ONC’s Proposed
Regulations
practices 154 and 4,519 hospitals 155 will
be impacted.
For the purpose of this analysis, the
population of end users differs
according to the regulatory action
proposed. In many cases, the end user
population impacted is the number of
hospitals and health care providers that
possess certified health IT. Due to data
limitations, our analysis regarding the
number of hospitals and health care
providers impacted by the regulatory
action is based on the number of
hospitals and health care providers that
have historically participated in the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) EHR Incentive
Programs. Although there are
limitations to this approach,
participants in the CMS EHR Incentive
Programs represent an adequate sample
on which to base our estimates.152 We
estimate 439,187 health care
providers 153 in 95,470 clinical
Costs
We do not expect costs to be
associated with the deregulatory action
proposals.
(1) Deregulatory Actions
152 See Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology, Office-based
Health Care Professionals Participating in the CMS
EHR Incentive Programs (Aug. 2017),
dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIGHealth-Care-Professionals-EHR-IncentivePrograms.php; Office of the National Coordinator
for Health Information Technology, Hospitals
Participating in the CMS EHR Incentive Programs
(Aug. 2017), dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/
pages/FIG-Hospitals-EHR-Incentive-Programs.php.
153 This estimate is the total number of eligible
providers that ever participated in the CMS
Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record
Incentive Program.
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Benefits
We expect the proposals for
deregulatory actions to result in
significant benefits for health IT
developers, providers, ONC–ACBs,
ONC–ATLs, and ONC. These expected
benefits are detailed below.
1.1 Removal of the Randomized
Surveillance Minimum Threshold
Requirements
We have proposed to revise
§ 170.556(c) by revising the requirement
that ONC–ACBs must conduct in-thefield, randomized surveillance and in its
place specify that ONC–ACBs may
conduct in-the-field, randomized
surveillance. We have further proposed
to remove § 170.556(c)(2), which
specifies that ONC–ACBs must conduct
randomized surveillance for a minimum
of 2% of certified health IT products per
year. We have also proposed to remove
the requirement that ONC–ACBs make a
154 This number was estimated based on the deduplicated number of practices that had at least one
clinician participate in the CMS Medicare
Electronic Health Record Incentive Program.
155 This estimate is the total number of eligible
hospitals that ever participated in the CMS
Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive
Program.
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617
458
Number of
products
830
545
good faith effort to complete
randomized surveillance and the
circumstances permitted for exclusion
from this requirement found in
§ 170.556(c)(5).
These proposals would reduce burden
on health care providers by reducing
their exposure to randomized in-thefield surveillance of their health IT
products. Health care providers
expressed concern about the time
commitment to support ONC–ACB
randomized surveillance of health IT
products, particularly if no nonconformities with certified health IT
were found. Providers have generally
stated that reactive surveillance (e.g.,
complaint-based surveillance) is a more
logical and economical approach to
surveillance of health IT products
implemented in a health care setting.
The proposal in this proposed rule
would provide health IT developers
more time to focus on interoperability.
It would also provide ONC–ACBs more
time to respond to reactive surveillance,
including health care provider
complaints about certified health IT. In
the 2015 Edition final rule, we did not
independently estimate the costs for
randomized surveillance. Rather, we
relied on prior regulatory cost estimates
for all surveillance actions. One of our
ONC–ACBs charges a $3,000 annual fee
per product for surveillance due to the
new randomized surveillance
requirements and to help normalize
their revenue stream during down
cycles between certification editions.
Using this fee as a cost basis and
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assuming it would apply to all certified
health IT (as opposed to the marketadjusted universe of health IT that is
used in other calculations in this RIA),
we estimate that our proposal to remove
the randomized surveillance ‘‘2%
minimum threshold’’ requirements
would result in cost savings between
$6.8 and $13.7 million for all
stakeholders. To arrive at this estimate,
we multiplied the $3,000 annual fee per
product for surveillance by the total
number of products certified to the 2014
Edition which was 4,559 products at the
time ($3,000 * 4,559 = $13.7 million).
We anticipate the number of products
certified for 2014 to decrease to a little
as half of the original count over time.
Therefore, we estimated the low end to
be half of the $13.7 million (.5 * $13.7
million = $6.8 million). This estimate is
based on feedback we received from our
ONC–ATL and ONC–ACB stakeholders.
ONC–ACBs performed randomized
surveillance an average of 22 times the
first year the requirement was in effect.
The following year surveillance was
performed an average of 2 times. We
cannot predict how many randomized
surveillance events the ONC–ACBs will
perform now that we are not enforcing
the requirement. It will be completely at
the discretion of the ONC–ACBs.
We note that we considered other
potential benefits that we were unable
to quantify. We considered that health
care provider burden may decrease from
the elimination of the 2% minimum
threshold requirements because a
provider would previously aid the
ONC–ACB in software demonstrations.
However, we acknowledge that in the
long term and moving forward,
providers will likely be the party
reporting more of the complaints that
could result in reactive surveillance. We
also considered that an additional
benefit of the proposal would be
reduced burden on ONC–ACBs.
Feedback from ONC–ACBs indicates
that having to meet a set number of
surveillance activities in 12 months can
be quite burdensome, especially when
factoring in the active engagement
necessary from provider participants.
Last, we considered the potential benefit
to health IT developers in having more
surveillance focused on situations
dealing with actual end-user concerns
and/or difficulties. Health IT developers
have indicated that they benefit from
such surveillance, as feedback about
conformance and capability can
improve their products.
We welcome comments on potential
means, methods, and relevant
comparative studies and data that we
could use to better quantify these
benefits.
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1.2 Removal of the 2014 Edition From
the Code of Federal Regulations
We have proposed to remove the 2014
Edition certification criteria from the
Code of Federal Regulations, which
would directly benefit health IT
developers, ONC–ACBs, ONC–ATLs,
and ONC and indirectly benefit health
care providers. When looking at the cost
savings for removing the 2014 Edition
certification criteria, we considered the
current costs for maintaining those
certifications and their surveillance
(reactive), as well as the maintenance
and administrative costs associated with
supporting customer use of certified
health IT for CMS EHR Incentive
Program participation. The estimates
below consider ONC analysis of the
financial sustainability of ONC–ACBs
and reflect data from as late as 2015.
We estimate that health IT developers
would realize monetary savings from no
longer supporting the 2014 Edition
certification criteria due to a reduction
in activities related to maintaining
certification and surveillance. We are
aware that one of our ONC–ACBs
charges an inherited certified status
(ICS) fee of $1,000. This fee has been
applied over the last calendar year. Over
that time period, the number of new,
unique 2014 Edition products has been
declining (24 products in the last
calendar year, and no new products in
the last four months) compared to the
number of ICS certifications (569). Just
assuming the cost of continued ICS
certification, health IT developers
would be paying approximately
$569,000 each year to keep their 2014
Edition products up-to-date.
We are not aware of comparable fees
charged by ONC–ATLs; however, based
on our experience with the Program, we
expect health IT developers would
realize similar cost savings associated
with ONC–ATL maintenance of the
testing component associated with ICS.
Thus, we estimate an additional
$569,000 cost savings for health IT
developers due to the reduced testing
requirements.
A recent study conducted by ONC
indicates that 2014 Edition ICS
certification is not profitable for ONC–
ACBs, which is why one ONC–ACB
charged an additional $3,000 annual fee
per product for surveillance for 2015
Edition certifications. In 2015, the net
income for ONC–ACBs dropped 99%
from about $5,310,000 in 2014 to
$67,000 due to a decline in revenue
from a drop in new 2014 Edition
certified health IT products without a
significant drop in expenses. We do not
have enough information to calculate
what percentage of ONC–ACB expenses
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7563
are the direct result of 2014 Edition
certification maintenance; however, our
research indicates that it is significantly
less profitable for ONC–ACBs to
maintain 2014 Edition certification
criteria (e.g., through ICS attestation and
reactive surveillance) than to certify
new 2014 Edition certified health IT
products.
We also attempted to identify a
potential reduction in maintenance and
administrative costs as a result of
removing 2014 Edition certification
criteria. We could not obtain data to
conduct a full quantitative analysis
specific to the reduction of health IT
developer and health care provider costs
related to supporting and maintaining
the 2014 Edition. We seek comment on
methods to quantify potential costs for
maintaining and supporting products to
previous editions.
We did conduct a review of academic
literature and qualitative analysis
regarding potential savings from no
longer supporting the 2014 Edition. We
looked at data in IT industry systems as
whole, which showed that upgrading
outdated legacy systems saves resources
otherwise spent on maintaining
compatibilities to multiple systems and
also increases quality and efficiency.156
Furthermore, as technology evolves,
newer software and products allow for
smoother updates compared to their
predecessors. Newer products provide
better security features that are able to
address both new and existing issues. In
addition, older software has an
increased risk of failure, which, in the
health IT industry, increases risk to
patient safety.
From the implementer’s perspective,
the research indicates that retaining
legacy systems tends to inhibit
scalability and growth for businesses.
The perpetuity of outdated legacy
systems increases connection and
system integration costs and limits the
ability to realize increased efficiency
through IT implementation. Newer
products are developed to current
specifications and updated standards,
which decreases barriers and marginal
cost of ancillary product
implementation and increases the
accessibility of data in ancillary
systems—including via mobile devices
and the latest applications. Finally,
office staff in a health care setting would
no longer need to be trained to
accommodate differing data access
156 James Crotty and Ivan Horrocks, Managing
legacy system costs: A case study of a metaassessment model to identify solutions in a large
financial services company, Applied Computing
and Informatics (2017), at 1–9.
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needs or workarounds required to
integrate to the legacy product.157
The research also indicates that
retaining legacy software would not be
beneficial or profitable to the health IT
market. Prolonging backwards
compatibility of newer products to
legacy systems encourages market
fragmentation.158 Limiting
fragmentation encourages innovation
and attracts more developers by
reducing barriers and the marginal cost
of development to multiple platforms.
Health IT stakeholders have expressed
that system fragmentation increases the
cost to develop and maintain health IT
connectivity for data exchange and to
integrate software supporting
administrative and clinical processes, as
well as limiting the feasibility of
developing products to support
specialty clinical care. This direct
feedback suggests that fragmentation is
having a negative impact on the
interoperability and usability of health
IT systems for health care providers. We
intend to encourage the health IT
market to keep progressing with a
baseline expectation of functionalities
that evolve over time. This requires
limiting fragmentation by no longer
supporting outdated or obsolete legacy
software.159
We also estimate that additional
savings could be realized by reducing
regulatory complexity and burden
caused by having two certification
editions. For example, in the 2015
Edition final rule, we added new
requirements, such as disclosure and
transparency requirements, that applied
to all certified product editions. This
required significant effort by health IT
developers and ONC–ACBs to execute
the requirements, and both groups
found it challenging to complete the
task in the original timeframe provided
by ONC. We have observed that the task
of managing two different editions
within different rules increases
complexity and burden for ONC staff,
contractors, ONC–ACBs, CMS programs
referencing the certification criteria, and
other stakeholders, as compared to our
proposal to remove the 2014 Edition
certification criteria. However, we are
unable to estimate these benefits
because we have no means for
quantifying the benefits gained from
only using the 2015 Edition. We
welcome comments on potential means,
methods, and relevant comparative
157 Id.
158 Il-Horn Hann, Byungwan Koh, and Marius F.
Niculescu, The Double-Edged Sword of Backward
Compatibility: The Adoption of Multigenerational
Platforms in the Presence of Intergenerational
Services, Inform. Systems Res. (2016), at 112–30.
159 Id.
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studies and data that we could use to
quantify these benefits.
We also expect that health care
providers would benefit from this
proposal because such action would
likely motivate health IT developers to
certify health IT products to the 2015
Edition, thus enabling providers to use
the most up-to-date and supported
systems to care for patients. The 2015
Edition certification criteria facilitates
greater interoperability for several
clinical health information purposes
and enables health information
exchange, including APIs, through new
and enhanced certification criteria,
standards, and implementation
specifications. The certification criteria
also allow for updates to documents and
data standards and focus on the
establishment of an interoperable health
information infrastructure. We welcome
comments on potential means, methods,
and relevant comparative studies and
data that we could use to quantify these
benefits.
1.3 Removal of the ONC-Approved
Accreditor From the ONC Health IT
Certification Program
We expect ONC to realize monetary
cost savings from the proposal to
remove the ONC- Approved Accreditor
(ONC–AA) from the Program. We expect
ONC to realize costs savings from no
longer: (1) Developing and publishing a
Federal Register Notice and listserv; (2)
monitoring the open application period
and reviewing and making decisions
regarding applications; and (3) oversight
and enforcement of the ONC–AA. We
have calculated the estimated annual
cost savings for this proposal, taking
into consideration that the ONC–AA
renewed its status every three years.
The ONC–AA’s expertise is in the
ISO/IEC 17065 standard. Therefore, to
effectively collaborate with the ONC–
AA for Program activities, ONC
allocates resources for working with the
ONC–AA and informing the ONC–AA of
scheme requirements and applicable
policy interpretations, which we have
and can provide directly to the ONC–
ACBs. The amount of ONC resources
allocated depends on current Program
activities and need. For our
calculations, we used the estimated
hours for collaborating with and
informing an ONC–AA in 2017 (using
2016 wage estimates). We estimate that
ONC spent approximately 110 hours
collaborating with the ONC–AA in
2017, which includes (all at the GS–13,
Step 1 level): Annual assessments;
providing appropriate guidance;
implementing new requirements and
initiatives; and consultations as
necessary. The hourly wage with
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benefits for a GS–13, Step 1 employee
located in Washington, DC is
approximately $88.30. Therefore, we
estimate the annual cost savings to be
$3,238.
We estimate that ONC would commit
approximately eight hours of staff time
to develop the Federal Register Notice,
which would include approximately:
Four hours for drafting and review by an
analyst at the GS–13, Step 1 level; two
hours for review and analysis by senior
certification staff at the GS–14, Step 1
level; and two hours for review and
submittal for publication by Immediate
Office staff at the GS–15, Step 1 level.
The hourly wage with benefits for a GS–
13, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$88.30. The hourly wage with benefits
for a GS–14, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$104.34. The hourly wage with benefits
for a GS–15, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$122.74. Therefore, we estimate the
annual cost savings to be $269.
Additionally, we estimate a cost of $477
to publish each page in the Federal
Register, which includes operational
costs. The Federal Register Notice for
ONC–AAs requires, on average, one
page in the Federal Register (every three
years), so we estimate an additional
annual cost savings of $159.
We estimate that ONC would commit
approximately two hours of staff time by
an analyst at the GS–13, Step 1 level to
draft, review, and publish the listserv to
announce the Federal Register Notice.
The hourly wage with benefits for a GS–
13, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$88.30. Therefore, we estimate the
annual cost savings to be $59.
We estimate that ONC would commit
approximately 25 hours of staff time to
manage the open application process,
review applications and reach
application decisions, which would
include approximately: 20 hours by an
analyst at the GS–13, Step 1 level; three
hours by senior certification staff at the
GS–14, Step 1 level; and two hours for
review and approval by Immediate
Office staff at the GS–15, Step 1 level.
The hourly wage with benefits for a GS–
13, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$88.30. The hourly wage with benefits
for a GS–14, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$104.34. The hourly wage with benefits
for a GS–15, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$122.74. Therefore, we estimate the
annual cost savings to be $775.
Taking all of these potential costs
savings into consideration, we estimate
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the overall annual costs savings for our
proposal to remove the ONC–AA from
the Program to be $4,500.
1.4 Removal of Certain 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria
In section III.B.4 of this proposed rule,
we propose to remove the following
certification criteria from the 2015
Edition: § 170.315(b)(4) ‘‘Common
Clinical Data Set summary—create;’’
(b)(5) ‘‘Common Clinical Data Set
summary—receive’’, § 170.315(a)(10)
‘‘Drug formulary and preferred drug list
checks,’’ § 170.315(a)(11) ‘‘Smoking
status,’’§ 170.315(a)(13) ‘‘Patientspecific education resources’’ and
§ 170.315(e)(2) ‘‘Secure messaging.’’
For determining calculations for the
majority of the proposed removal of
certain 2015 Edition certification
criteria, we used the assumptions
below. For the proposed removal of
§ 170.315(b)(4) Common Clinical Data
Set summary—create and (b)(5)
Common Clinical Data Set summary—
receive, we took a slightly different
approach discussed in section 1.4.1.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we
estimated the costs for developing and
preparing health IT to meet the 2015
Edition certification criteria. The
development and preparation costs we
estimated were derived through a health
IT developer per criterion cost. We
estimated the development and
preparation costs over a four-year period
and we projected the costs would be
unevenly distributed. In figuring out the
cost savings for the deregulatory actions,
we initially used the distribution from
the 2015 Edition, but then adjusted the
percentages of development and
preparation costs due to current
empirical and anecdotal evidence. The
distribution was reevaluated to account
for 2019 and we estimate the actual
development and preparation
distribution for 2018 to be 35% and for
2019 to be 15%. We took the average
development and preparation cost
estimates (low and high) per criterion
from Table 14 of the 2015 Edition final
rule (80 FR 62737). We then used our
new distribution to figure out the cost
per year for years 2018 and 2019. We
took the total estimated costs for 2018
and 2019 and divided that by 12 to
determine the cost savings per month
and took a range of 6–12 months.
To determine the testing costs of the
deregulatory actions, we took the
number of health IT developers who
develop products for certification for the
identified criteria from the 2015 Edition
final rule and then figured out the
average cost per criterion. Based on the
costs that one of the ONC–ATLs charges
for testing, we estimated the average
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cost for testing per criterion and
determined subsequent cost savings. In
2017, only about five to ten percent of
products have been tested and certified
compared to the number of certified
2014 Edition products. Therefore, up to
90 to 95 percent of products remain to
be tested and certified to the 2015
Edition.
We estimate the total cost savings by
multiplying the number of health IT
developers who developed products for
certification to a certain criterion by the
estimated cost per criterion, $475. We
then took five percent of that number to
figure out the high end for the cost
savings. We then took 10 percent to
figure out the low end. The five percent
was derived from looking at the number
of unique developers who have at least
one active 2014 Edition product and the
number of unique developers who have
at least one active 2015 Edition. The
denominator is the number of unique
developers who have at least one active
2014 Edition product, which is 793. The
numerator is the number of unique
developers who have at least one active
2015 Edition product and one active
2014 edition product, which is 41. (41/
793 = 0.0517024 or 5 percent).
1.4.1 Common Clinical Data Set
Summary Record Criteria
We propose to remove the Common
Clinical Data Set summary—create
(§ 170.315(b)(4)) and Common Clinical
Data Set summary—receive
(§ 170.315(b)(5)) criteria.
We expect ONC to realize cost savings
associated with internal infrastructure
support and maintenance, which would
include actions such as (1) developing
and maintaining information regarding
these criteria on the ONC website; (2)
creating documents related to these
criteria and making those documents
508 compliant; (3) updating, revising,
and supporting Certification Companion
Guides, test procedures, and test tools;
and (4) responding to inquiries
concerning these criteria. Based on ONC
data on the number of inquiries received
since early 2016, we estimate
approximately 12 annual inquiries
about § 170.315(b)(4) and (5)
respectively (24 total inquiries for two
criteria). We estimate it will take an
analyst at the GS–13, Step 1 level an
average of two hours to conduct all tasks
associated with each inquiry. The
hourly wage with benefits for a GS–13,
Step 1 employee located in Washington,
DC is approximately $88.30. Therefore,
we estimate the annual cost savings to
be $4,238.
We do not expect cost savings
associated with software maintenance
because both of these criteria
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incorporate the Common Clinical Data
Set and essentially the same data input
and validation requirements as the
transitions of care criterion
(§ 170.315(b)(1)). The removal of these
two criteria would not affect the test
data and software maintenance costs, as
the same test data and software
validation elements remain in
§ 170.315(b)(1) and the Common
Clinical Data Set used in other criteria.
ONC–ACBs could realize minimal
savings, as they would need to conduct
slightly less surveillance based on the
two products that are currently certified
to these criteria. We expect these
potential cost savings to be de minimis
and have therefore not estimated them.
Taking all these potential costs
savings into consideration, we estimate
the overall annual costs savings for our
proposal to remove the Common
Clinical Data Set summary record
certification criteria from the 2015
Edition to be $4,238. We welcome
comments on the above estimates and
methods we could use to better quantify
these benefits.
1.4.2 Drug Formulary and Preferred
Drug List Checks
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘drug formulary and preferred
drug list checks’’ criterion in
§ 170.315(a)(10)). To calculate the cost
savings for removing this criterion, we
used the 2015 Edition estimated costs
for development and preparation for
this criterion which were between
$15,750 and $31,500. We believe that
35% of developers would be still newly
certifying in 2018 and 15% in 2019 and
applied the proportions respectively.
We estimated the cost of development
and preparation costs to be between
$5,512.50 and $11,025 for 2018 and
$2,362.50 and $4,725 for 2019. We
calculated the cost per month for years
2018 and 2019 and using the high point
estimates, estimated the development
and preparation costs over a 6 to 12
month period between August 2018 to
August 2019 to be between $4,068.75
and $6,825.
To calculate the cost for testing for
this criterion, we multiplied the 5
developers that we estimated in the
2015 Edition to develop products to this
criterion by our estimated cost to test
per criterion of $475. The estimated cost
per criterion was based on what one
ONC–ATL charged for testing and
averaged per criterion. To be
conservative in our calculations, we
reduced the number by 10% and 5%
respectively resulting in $2,137.50 and
$2,256.25.
Taking these estimated costs into
account we expect cost savings to
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remove the 2015 Edition ‘‘drug
formulary and preferred drug list
checks’’ criterion to be between
$8,962.50 and $9,081.25.
1.4.3 Smoking Status
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘smoking status’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(11)), which would include
removing it from the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition. To calculate the cost
savings for removing this criterion, we
used the 2015 Edition estimated costs of
developing and preparing the criterion
to the 2015 Edition, between $15,750
and $31,500 and estimated that 35% of
developers would be newly certified in
2018 and 15% in 2019. We estimated
the cost of development and preparation
costs to be between $5,512.50 and
$11,025 for 2018 and $2,362.50 and
$4,725 for 2019. We calculated the cost
per month for years 2018 and 2019 and
using the high point estimates,
estimated the development and
preparation costs over a 6 to 12 month
period between August 2018 and
August 2019. We estimated the costs to
be between $4,068.75 at 6 months and
$6,825 at 12 months.
To calculate the cost for testing for
this criterion, 5 developers were
estimated in the 2015 Edition to develop
products to this criterion. We multiplied
the 5 developers by our estimated cost
to test per criterion of $475. This
estimated cost per criterion was based
on what one ONC–ATL charged for
testing and averaged per criterion. To be
conservative, we reduced the number by
10% and 5% respectively resulting in
$2,137.50 and $2,256.25.
Taking these estimated costs into
account we expect cost savings to
remove the 2015 Edition ‘‘smoking
status’’ criterion to be between
$8,962.50 and $9,081.25.
1.4.4 Patient-Specific Education
Resources
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘patient-specific education
resources’’ certification criterion
(§ 170.315(a)(13)). To estimate the cost
of removing this criterion, we used the
2015 Edition estimated costs for
development and preparation which is
between $4,709,880 and $6,279,840. We
believe that 35% of developers would
be still newly certifying in 2018 and
15% in 2019 and applied the
proportions respectively. We estimated
the cost of development and preparation
to be between $1,648,458 and
$2,197,944 for 2018 and $706,482 and
$941,976 for 2019. We calculated the
cost per month for years 2018 and 2019
and using the high point estimates,
estimated the development and
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preparation costs over a 6 to 12 month
period, within August 2018 to August
2019. We estimated the costs to be
between $850,395 at 6 months and
$1,360,632 at 12 months. To calculate
the testing cost for this criterion, we
multiplied the estimates from the 2015
Edition of 249 developers that we
estimated would develop products to
this criterion by our estimated cost to
test per criterion of $475. The estimated
cost per criterion was based on what
one ONC–ATL charged for testing and
averaged per criterion. To be
conservative, we reduced the number by
10% and 5% respectively resulting in
$106,447.50 and $112,361.25. Taking
these estimated costs into account, we
expect the cost savings of removing the
2015 Edition ‘‘Patient-specific education
resources’’ criterion to be between
$1,467,079.50 and $1,472,993.25.
1.4.5 Secure Messaging
We propose to remove the 2015
Edition ‘‘secure messaging’’ criterion
(§ 170.315(e)(2)). To estimate the cost
savings of removing this criterion, we
used the estimates from the 2015
Edition final rule for development and
preparation costs which is between
$1,552,320 and $3,104,640. We
estimated that 35% of developers would
be still newly certifying in 2018 and
15% in 2019 and applied the
proportions respectively. We estimated
the cost of development and preparation
costs to be between $543,312 and
$1,086,624 for 2018 and $232,848 and
$465,696 for 2019. We then calculated
the cost per month for years 2018 and
2019 and using the high point estimates,
estimated the development and
preparation costs over a 6 to 12 month
period, between August 2018 to August
2019 to be between $401,016 at 6
months and $672,672 at 12 months. To
calculate the cost for testing this
criterion, we multiplied the 246
developers that we estimated in the
2015 Edition would develop products to
this criterion by our estimated cost to
test per criterion of $475. The estimated
cost per criterion was based on what
one ONC–ATL charged for testing and
averaged per criterion. To be
conservative, we reduced the number by
10% and 5%, respectively, resulting in
$105,165 and $111,007.50. Taking these
estimated costs into account, we
estimate the cost savings of removing
the 2015 Edition ‘‘Secure messaging’’
criterion to be between $777,837 and
$783,678.50.
1.5 Removal of Certain Certification
Requirements
We propose to remove
§ 170.523(k)(1)(iii)(B), which requires
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ONC–ACBs to ensure that certified
health IT includes a detailed description
of all known material information
concerning limitations that a user may
encounter in the course of
implementing and using the certified
health IT, whether to meet ‘‘meaningful
use’’ objectives and measures or to
achieve any other use within the scope
of the health IT’s certification. We also
propose to remove § 170.523(k)(1)(iv)(B)
and (C), which state that the types of
information required to be disclosed
include but are not limited to: (B)
Limitations, whether by contract or
otherwise, on the use of any capability
to which technology is certified for any
purpose within the scope of the
technology’s certification; or in
connection with any data generated in
the course of using any capability to
which health IT is certified; (C)
Limitations, including but not limited to
technical or practical limitations of
technology or its capabilities, that could
prevent or impair the successful
implementation, configuration,
customization, maintenance, support, or
use of any capabilities to which
technology is certified; or that could
prevent or limit the use, exchange, or
portability of any data generated in the
course of using any capability to which
technology is certified.
To calculate the savings related to
removing these two disclosure
requirements, we estimated 830
products certified to the 2015 Edition.
We did so by applying the market
consolidation rate of ¥23.2% which
was the rate observed between 2011 and
2014 Editions. Assuming that an ONC–
ACB spends 1 hour on average
reviewing costs, limitations and
mandatory disclosures, we estimate the
time saved by no longer having to
review the limitations to be two-thirds
of an hour. The hourly wage with
benefits for a GS–13, Step 1 employee
located in Washington, DC is
approximately $88.30 and we assume
this to be the hourly rate for an ONC–
ACB reviewer. We multiplied 830, the
projected number of certified products,
by two- thirds of an hour and the
assumed hourly rate and calculated the
cost savings to be $48,859.
(2) Updates to the 2015 Edition
Certification Criteria
The following section details the costs
and benefits for updates to the 2015
Edition health IT certification criteria,
which includes (1) costs and benefits to
update certain 2015 Edition criteria to
due to the adoption of the United States
Core Data for Interoperability (USCDI)
as a standard and (2) costs for new 2015
Edition criteria for electronic health
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information export, API, privacy and
security, and Data Segmentation for
Privacy (DS4P)-Send and Data
Segmentation for Privacy-Receive, and
consent management for APIs.
2.1 United States Core Data for
Interoperability
In order to advance interoperability
by ensuring compliance with new
structured data and code sets that
support the data, we propose in this
proposed rule to remove the ‘‘Common
Clinical Data Set’’ definition and its
references from the 2015 Edition and
replace it with the ‘‘United States Core
Data for Interoperability’’ (USCDI)
standard, naming Version 1 (v1) in
§ 170.213 and incorporating it by
reference in § 170.299. The USCDI v1
establishes a minimum set of data
classes (including structured data) that
are required for health IT to be
interoperable nationwide and is
designed to be expanded in an iterative
and predictable way over time.
The USCDI v1 adds 2 new data
classes, ‘‘Clinical Notes’’ and
‘‘Provenance’’ that were not defined in
the CCDS, which will require updates to
the Consolidated Clinical Document
Architecture (C–CDA) standard and
updates to the following certification
criteria: § 170.315(b)(1) (transitions of
care); (e)(1) (view, download, and
transmit to 3rd party); (g)(6)
(Consolidated CDA creation
performance); (f)(5) (transmission to
public health agencies—electronic case
reporting); and (g)(9) (application
access—all data request). From our
analysis of the C–CDA standard, we
conclude that the requirements of
‘‘Provenance’’ data class are already met
by the existing C–CDA standard, and
will not require any new development.
Therefore, we have estimated the
proposed cost to health IT developers to
add support for ‘‘Clinical Notes’’ data
class in C–CDA, and the necessary
updates to the affected certification
criteria. These estimates are detailed in
Table 7 below and are based on the
following assumptions:
1. Health IT developers will use the
same labor costs and data models. Table
7 shows the estimated labor costs per
product for a health IT developer to
develop support for the additional
USCDI data element in the C–CDA
standard and affected certification
criteria. We recognize that health IT
developer costs will vary; however, our
estimates in this section assume all
health IT developers will incur the costs
noted in Table 7.
2. A proxy is needed to project the
number of 2015 Edition certified health
IT products. We estimate that 545
products from 458 developers will be
affected by our proposal. Our proxy is
based on the number of 2014 Edition
certified health IT products that are
capable of recording patient data.160
There were 710 products by 588
developers with at least one 2014
Edition product capable of recording
patient data. We then multiplied these
numbers by our certified health IT
market consolidation estimates of
¥22.1% and ¥23.2% to project the
number of 2015 developers and
products, respectively.
3. According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a ‘‘Software
Developer’’ is $50.14.161
TABLE 7—COSTS TO HEALTH IT DEVELOPERS TO DEVELOP SUPPORT FOR THE ADDITIONAL USCDI DATA ELEMENT IN C–
CDA STANDARD AND AFFECTED CERTIFICATION CRITERIA
[2016 Dollars]
Lower
bound hours
Upper
bound hours
Tasks
Details
Update C–CDA creation) ................
New development to support
‘‘Clinical Notes’’ for C–CDA and
C–CDA 2.1 Companion Guide.
800
1,800
§ 170.315(b)(1) (transitions of care)
New development to support
‘‘Clinical Notes’’ for C–CDA and
C–CDA 2.1Companion Guide.
New development to support
‘‘Clinical Notes’’ for C–CDA and
C–CDA 2.1 Companion Guide.
New development to support
‘‘Clinical Notes’’ for C–CDA and
C–CDA 2.1Companion Guide.
New development to support
‘‘Clinical Notes’’ for C–CDA and
C–CDA 2.1 Companion Guide.
200
600
300
800
400
1,000
200
600
1,900
4,800
§ 170.315(b)(6) (data export) ..........
§ 170.315(e)(1) (view, download,
and transmit to 3rd party).
§ 170.315(g)(6) (Consolidated CDA
creation performance).
Total Hours ..............................
........................................................
Hourly Rate .............................
........................................................
Cost per Product .....................
........................................................
$190,532
$481,344
Total Cost (545 products) .......
........................................................
$103.8M
$262.3M
160 We defined ‘‘products capable of recording
patient data’’ as any 2014 Edition health IT product
that was certified for at least one of the following
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(1) Lower bound assumes health
IT already has developed C–
CDA R2.1 into their system and
only needs to be updated for
new data class.
(2) Upper bound estimates effort
for organizations that are on
older versions of C–CDA standard, for example C–CDA R1.1.
Necessary updates to health IT to
support the new data class to
meet the criteria requirements.
Necessary updates to health IT to
support the new data class to
meet the criteria requirements.
Necessary updates to health IT to
support the new data class to
meet the criteria requirements.
170.315(b)(1) and § 170.315(g)(6)
are related and may be developed together.
$100.28
criteria: Demographics ((a)(5)), Medication List
((a)(7)), Medication Allergy List ((a)(8)), Problem
List ((a)(6)), and Family Health History ((a)(12)).
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We estimate that the cost to a health
IT developer to develop support for the
additional USCDI data element would
range from $190,532 to $481,344.
Therefore, assuming 545 products, we
estimate that the total annual cost to all
health IT developers would, on average,
range from $103.8 million to $262.3
million. This would be a one-time cost
to developers per product that is
certified to the specified certification
criteria and would not be perpetual.
We believe this proposal would
benefit health care providers, patients,
and the industry as a whole. Clinical
notes and provenance were included in
the draft USCDI v1 based on significant
feedback from the industry, which
highly regarded their desirability as part
of interoperable exchanges. The free text
portion of the clinical notes was most
often relayed by clinicians as the data
they sought, but were often missing
during electronic health information
exchange. Similarly, the provenance of
data was also referenced by stakeholders
as a fundamental need to improve the
trustworthiness and reliability of the
data being exchanged. We expect
improvements to interoperable
exchange of information and data
provenance to significantly benefit
providers and patients. However, we are
not aware of an approach for
quantifying these benefits and welcome
comments on potential approaches to
quantifying these benefits.
2.2 Electronic Health Information
Export
We have proposed a new 2015 Edition
certification criterion for ‘‘electronic
health information export’’ in
§ 170.315(b)(10). The intent of this
criterion is to provide patients and
health IT users a means to efficiently
export the entire electronic record for a
single patient or all patients in a
computable, electronic format. Further,
it would facilitate the receiving health
IT system’s interpretation and use of the
EHI to the extent reasonably practicable
using the health IT developer’s existing
technology. This outcome would
promote exchange, access, and use of
electronic health information. It would
also facilitate health care providers’
ability to switch health IT systems or
migrate electronic health information
for use in other technologies. This
proposed criterion supports two specific
use cases. First, it supports the export
for a single patient that would need to
be enabled upon valid request from a
user or a patient. Second, the EHI export
functionality for all patients’ data would
support a health care provider or health
system in switching health IT systems.
Costs
This section describes the estimated
costs of the ‘‘electronic health
information export’’ certification
criterion. The cost estimates are based
on the following assumptions:
1. Health IT developers will use the
same labor costs and data models. Table
8 shows the estimated labor costs per
product for a health IT developer to
develop and maintain the electronic
health information export functionality.
We recognize that health IT developer
costs will vary; however, our estimates
in this section assume all health IT
developers will incur the costs noted in
Table 8.
2. A proxy is needed to project the
number of 2015 Edition certified health
IT products containing the ‘‘electronic
health information export’’ certification
criterion. We estimate that 545 products
from 458 developers will contain the
‘‘electronic health information export’’
criterion. To develop these estimates we
first identified a proxy for the number
of health IT developers that may create
a 2015 Edition certified health IT
product containing the ‘‘electronic
health information export’’ criterion.
Our proxy is based on the number of
2014 Edition certified health IT
products that are capable of recording
patient data.162 We based our estimates
on these products because data must be
captured to be exported under the
proposed criterion. There were 710
products by 588 developers with at least
one 2014 Edition product capable of
recording patient data. We then
multiplied these numbers by our
certified health IT market consolidation
estimates of ¥22.1% and ¥23.2% to
project the number of 2015 developers
and products, respectively.
3. According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a ‘‘Software
Developer’’ is $50.14.163
TABLE 8—ESTIMATED LABOR COSTS TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXPORT
CRITERION PER PRODUCT
Lower
bound hours
Activity
Upper
bound hours
Task 1: Developing the Data Dictionary and exporting the EHI in a
developer format (per product).
160
1,600
Task 2: Maintaining the Data Dictionary and performing export
when requested (per product).
80
800
162 We defined ‘‘products capable of recording
patient data’’ as any 2014 Edition product that was
certified for at least one of the following criteria:
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Remarks
This is the effort to document all the data exported by the product for a
single patient and for all patients. The lower bound assumes that the
health IT developer already has a standard format in which they are
exporting the data for either case (e.g., C–CDA for single patient,
CSV file or database dump for all data) and the effort is merely to
publish it to the users. On the other hand, the upper bound reflects
the case where the health IT has to develop the export capability de
novo into their product, and document the data output. This still assumes that the developer will be able to use the format of their
choice.
Note: This is a one-time cost to develop the export capability.
This is the annual maintenance cost charged by health IT developers to
provide C–CDA feed to providers. This is a yearly update to products
that are typically modest. The lower bound estimate assumes the effort when there are only minor changes to the product. The upper
bound estimate assumes the effort when the product supports a substantial number of new data classes.
Demographics ((a)(5)), Medication List ((a)(7)),
Medication Allergy List ((a)(8)), Problem List
((a)(6)), and Family Health History ((a)(12)).
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TABLE 8—ESTIMATED LABOR COSTS TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXPORT
CRITERION PER PRODUCT—Continued
Lower
bound hours
Activity
Upper
bound hours
Task 3: Maintaining the software to
perform the electronic health information export (per product).
80
800
Total Labor Hours .....................
320
3,200
Remarks
This is the annual cost to update the software that would generate the
data access files. The lower bound estimates the cost to maintain the
software when there are minor changes to the product, including updates to underlying software (e.g., database versions, operating systems, etc.). The upper bound estimate accounts for substantial reworking of the export software program to support new data classes
or new data formats.
TABLE 9—EXAMPLE CALCULATION FOR THE LOWER BOUND ESTIMATED COST TO HEALTH IT DEVELOPERS TO PERFORM
TASK 1 FOR THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXPORT CRITERION
[2016 Dollars]
Task 1 ..........................................................................................................................................
Estimated
labor hours
lower bound
Developer
salary
(per hour)
Projected
products
160
$100.28
545
Example Calculation:
160 hours × $100.28 × 545 products = $8,744,416.
TABLE 10—TOTAL COST TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXPORT CRITERION
[2016 Dollars]
Estimated cost
Activity
Lower bound
Upper bound
Task 1 (545 products) .............................................................................................................................................
Task 2 (545 products) .............................................................................................................................................
Task 3 (545 products) .............................................................................................................................................
$8,744,416
4,372,208
4,372,208
$87,444,160
43,722,080
43,722,080
Total (545 products) .........................................................................................................................................
17,488,832
174,888,320
Based on the stated assumptions and
costs outlined in Table 8, the total
estimated cost for health IT developers
to develop products to the electronic
health information export certification
criterion will range from $17.5 million
to $174.9 million. Assuming 458 health
IT developers, there would be an
average cost per health IT developer
ranging from $38,185 to $381,852. The
midpoint of ranges stated is used as the
primary estimate of costs and benefits.
We note that the development costs,
which equal half of the total, would be
a one-time cost and would not be
perpetual.
Benefits
There are a number of benefits to the
electronic health information export
functionality. In our analysis, we have
calculated the benefits in terms of the
reduced costs of the electronic health
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information export functionality
compared to performing data export
without the electronic health
information export functionality. The
benefit calculations below are based on
the following assumptions:
1. On average, 5% of providers and
hospitals switch their health IT
annually. Using CMS Medicare EHR
Incentive Program data from years
2013–2016, we estimate the rate of
providers (hospitals and eligible
professionals) that changed their health
IT developer. We believe that the
electronic health information export
functionality would help alleviate the
burden of switching between health IT
systems by making data more portable.
Thus, the benefit calculations are based
on assumptions regarding the number of
clinical practices (n = 4,774) and
hospitals (n = 226) that are projected to
switch products in a year.
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2. Health IT consultants 164 will use
the same labor costs and data models.
Table 11 shows the estimated labor
costs per product for a hospital or health
care provider to hire a health IT
consultant to perform data export
without the electronic health
information export functionality. We
recognize that these costs will vary
based on the size of the hospital or
clinical practice.
3. According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a ‘‘Software
Developer’’ is $50.14.165
164 ‘‘Health IT consultant’’ refers to a technical
expert that a hospital or provider will hire to
migrate their data from a legacy system to a new
EHR.
165 https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
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TABLE 11—COST PER PROVIDER TO PERFORM DATA EXPORT WITHOUT ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXPORT
FUNCTIONALITY WHEN SWITCHING HEALTH IT PRODUCTS
Estimated
cost per
health IT
switch
(lower bound)
(hour)
Estimated
cost per
health IT
switch
(upper bound)
(hour)
Task 1: Understanding and mapping the data in health IT database into standard terms.
320
3,200
Task 2: Exporting the data from the
health IT into a format that can be
subsequently used to import.
160
1,600
Total Labor Hours .....................
480
4,800
Activity
Remarks
The lower bound is an estimate for a small provider practice using the
standard instance of a certified health IT product with no
customization and use of nationally recognized content standards.
The upper bound estimates a medium to large practice with substantial local customization of content.
The lower bound assumes that the certified health IT product is capable
of exporting most of the data into standard output format such as C–
CDA. The upper bound estimates the case where a large amount of
data is not easily exported by the certified health IT product and
therefore substantial one-off software needs to be written to export
the data into a custom (de novo) format developed for the transition.
Table 12 provides an example
calculation for how we calculated our
total costs presented in table 13.
TABLE 12—EXAMPLE CALCULATION FOR THE LOWER BOUND ESTIMATED COST TO PROVIDERS TO HIRE A HEALTH IT
CONSULTANT TO PERFORM TASK 1 WITHOUT THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION FUNCTIONALITY
[2016 Dollars]
Task 1 ..........................................................................................................................................
Estimated
labor hours
lower bound
Developer
salary
(per hour)
Estimated
annual
number of
health IT
switches
320
$100.28
5,000
Example Calculation
320 hours × $100.28 × 5,000 switches = $160,448,000
TABLE 13—TOTAL COST TO PROVIDERS TO PERFORM DATA EXPORT WITHOUT THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION
EXPORT FUNCTIONALITY WHEN SWITCHING HEALTH IT PRODUCTS
[2016 Dollars]
Estimated cost
Activity
Lower bound
Upper bound
Task 1 ..............................................................................................................................................................
Task 2 ..............................................................................................................................................................
$160,448,000
80,224,000
$1,604,480,000
802,240,000
Total Cost Savings (5,000 switches) ........................................................................................................
240,672,000
2,406,720,000
We multiplied the costs to switch
health IT by the estimated number of
hospitals and clinical practices affected.
Thus the estimated annual benefit, in
terms of cost savings to hospitals and
clinical practices would range from
$240.7 million to $2.4 billion. If we
assume, based on our upper bound
estimates above, that the total cost to
health IT developers is $174.9 million
and that increased developer costs are
passed to customers, then the net
benefit to hospitals and clinical
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practices would range from $65.8
million to $2.2 billion. The midpoint of
ranges stated is used as the primary
estimate of costs and benefits.
2.3 Application Programming
Interfaces
Our proposals regarding APIs in this
proposed rule reflect the full depth and
scope of what we believe is necessary to
implement the API Condition of
Certification. We propose to include
new standards, new implementation
specifications, and a new certification
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criterion. Our proposal also includes a
detailed Condition of Certification and
associated Maintenance of Certification
requirements, as well as a proposal to
modify the Base EHR definition.
Costs
This section describes the potential
costs of the API certification criterion.
The cost estimates below are based on
the following assumptions:
1. Health IT developers will use the
same labor costs and data models. Table
14 shows the estimated labor costs per
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product for a health IT developer to
develop and maintain an API. We
recognize that health IT developer costs
will vary; however, we have assumed in
our calculations that all health IT
developers will incur the costs noted in
Table 14.
2. A proxy is needed to project
number of 2015 Edition certified health
IT products containing the API
certification criterion. We estimate that
459 products from 394 developers will
contain the API criterion. We used a
proxy to determine the number of health
IT developers that may develop an API
for the certification to the 2015 edition.
There were 598 products and 506
developers with at least one 2014
Edition certified health IT product that
could perform transitions of care. We
then multiplied this number by our
certified health IT market consolidation
estimates of ¥22.1% and ¥23.2% to
project the number of 2015 developers
and products, respectively. We believe
this estimate serves as a reasonable
7571
proxy for products capability of sending
patient data. The 2015 Edition required
API functionality achieves a similar end
by allowing providers to retrieve patient
data from secure data servers hosted by
other developers, as well as providing
patients access to their medical records
through third-party applications
connected to these same secure servers.
3. According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a ‘‘Software
Developer’’ is $50.14.166
TABLE 14—ESTIMATED LABOR HOURS TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN API
Estimated labor hours
Tasks
Details
Remarks
Lower bound
Task 1: Develop support for Fast
Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR®)
API and ARCH 1.0
(per product).
Task 2: Development
of App registration
Server and Portal
(per developer).
Upper bound
(1) New development to support ‘‘Clinical
Notes’’, ‘‘Provenance’’, ‘‘Address’’ and
‘‘Telecon’’. (2) Only ‘‘Mandatory’’ and
‘‘Must Support’’ elements are required
for each of the ARCH resources.
1,500
3,500
(1) Lower bound assumes health IT already has developed FHIR DSTU2 and
SMART for 2015 and only needs to be
updated for additional resources. (2)
Upper bound assumes new development for all resources.
(1) New registration server development
(or updates to existing server) to support registration timeliness and publication of FHIR endpoints. (2) Development of portal and managing the application registration system.
1,000
2,500
Task 3: Update
ARCH and FHIR
standards as part
of regular API
maintenance (per
product).
(1) This is an estimate for adding one or
two new data elements to USCDI and
making it a requirement. (2) Support for
API-enabled services for data on a single patient and multiple patients, as
well as SMART Backend Services as
part of FHIR 4.
1,200
2,000
Task 4: Update Application Registration
Server and Portal
(per developer).
This would be yearly updates and maintenance of the portal to keep it running.
We do not anticipate any major
changes to the standard and will be
primarily driven by usage and developer interest.
(1) Server costs. (2) Software costs (e.g.,
databases, application servers, portal
technology).
400
1,300
(1) Lower bound assumes that the developer already has existing application
registration infrastructure in place, and
only needs to update it to support the
API Maintenance of Certification requirements. (2) Upper bound is new
development of an application registration service and portal.
(1) Lower bound assumes developers are
already supporting the elements and
also have been testing API-enabled
services for data on a single patient
and multiple patients. (2) Upper bound
assumes new development for USCDI
updates and API-enabled services for
data on a single patient and multiple
patients.
(1) Lower bound estimates hours to keep
it running with junior staff. (2) Upper
bound estimates small updates and
adds in developer and quality assurance resources.
$5,000
$25,000
Other costs (50% per
product, 50% per
developer).
(1) Estimated as monetized costs and not
as hours; most of the costs would be
one-time procurement costs plus yearly
maintenance.
Note: One-time cost.
Table 15 provides an example
calculation for how we calculated our
total costs presented in Table 16.
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TABLE 15—EXAMPLE CALCULATION FOR THE LOWER BOUND ESTIMATED COST TO DEVELOPERS TO PERFORM TASK 1 TO
DEVELOP API
[2016 Dollars]
Task 1 ..........................................................................................................................................
Estimated
labor hours
lower bound
Developer
salary
(per hour)
Projected
products
1,500
$100.28
459
Example Calculation:
1,500 hours × $100.28 × 459 products = $69,042,780
TABLE 16—TOTAL COST TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN API
[2016 Dollars]
Estimated cost
Activity
Lower bound
Task 1 (459
Task 2 (394
Task 3 (459
Task 4 (394
Other Costs
Other Costs
Upper bound
products) .............................................................................................................................................
developers) ..........................................................................................................................................
products) .............................................................................................................................................
developers) ..........................................................................................................................................
(394 developers) .................................................................................................................................
(459 products) .....................................................................................................................................
$69,042,780
39,510,320
55,234,224
15,804,128
985,000
1,147,500
$161,099,820
98,775,800
92,057,040
51,363,416
4,925,000
5,737,500
Total (459 products and 394 developers) ........................................................................................................
181,723,952
413,958,576
We note that we have proposed to
adopt in § 170.404(b)(3) a specific
requirement that an API Technology
Supplier must support the publication
of Service Base URLs for all of its
customers regardless of whether they
are centrally managed by the API
Technology Supplier or locally
deployed. The API Technology Supplier
must make such information publicly
available at no charge. Thus, we are
placing the responsibility of publishing
the URLs on health IT developers and
those costs are captured in the
registration portal cost estimation in this
RIA.
Based on the stated assumptions and
costs outlined in Table 16, the total
estimated costs for health IT developers
to develop and maintain a product to
the API criterion would range from
$181.7 million to $414.0 million with an
average cost per developer ranging from
$461,228 to $1,050,656. We note that
the ‘‘other costs,’’ which account for
$2.1 million to $10.7 million of this
total are one-time costs and are not
perpetual. The midpoint of ranges stated
is used as the primary estimate of costs
and benefits.
the health IT industry.167 The
measurement concepts developed
include a multi-part approach analyzing
not only adoption of health IT
functionalities supporting information
exchange but the downstream impact of
these technologies on data
completeness, data integration, and
supports for core functions of patient
care. The benefits of our API proposal
are similarly multifaceted. In the
analysis below, we quantify benefits in
the following three areas:
• Reduction in provider burden
associated with locating patient data;
• Reduced costs related to reductions
in duplicate lab tests, readmissions,
emergency room (ER) visits, and adverse
drug events due to increased
interoperability. We focused on these
outcomes for two reasons: (i) Evidence
in literature indicates that health
information exchange impacts the
chosen measures; and (ii) cost of care
associated with these measures is high
and the impact of health information
exchange is likely to result in significant
benefits in the form of cost reduction.
• Increase in the number of
individuals with access to their health
information.
Benefits
167 Health IT Buzz Blog, Measuring
Interoperability: Listening and Learning, https://
www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-health-andmedical-records/interoperability-electronic-healthand-medical-records/measuring-interoperabilitylistening-learning/.
The Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act (MACRA) tasks
ONC with measuring interoperability in
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The benefit calculations are based on
the following assumptions:
1. Benefits noted in academic
literature are assumed accurate.
Estimates of the benefits are based on
estimates obtained from peer reviewed
academic literature. ONC reviewed
academic articles for validity; however,
models were not replicated.
2. Hospitals and eligible professionals
that have participated in the CMS EHR
Incentive Programs will be impacted:
Estimates are based on the assumption
that 439,187 health care providers and/
or 4,519 hospitals would be affected by
this regulatory action.
3. Estimates on the impact of APIs on
rates of interoperability (1% to 4%) are
based on ONC analysis. To identify the
impact of the API proposal on
interoperability, we used regression
analysis. Specifically, we estimated
linear probability models that identified
the impact of 2014 Edition certified EHR
on hospitals’ interoperability (whether a
hospital sends, receives, finds, and
integrates summary of care records).
Using data from the American Hospital
Association (AHA) from years 2014 to
2015 in the model, we controlled for
hospital size, profit status, participation
in a health information organization,
and state and year fixed effects. The
marginal effect of using a 2014 Edition
certified health IT equated to a 5%
increase in interoperability. This is an
upper bound estimate. For the purpose
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that the benefits attributed to each
proposal is unique to the proposal
referenced. We assumed that this
marginal effect is true for our proposals
and distributed the 5% benefit across
our real world testing and API proposals
at (.1–1%) to (1–4%) respectively.
Moreover, the number of providers
impacted is proposal specific. Given
data limitations, we believe this
approach allows us to estimate the
benefits of our proposals without double
counting the impact each proposal
might have on interoperability.
The first table below shows benefits of
APIs for providers where we monetize
the impact of APIs as total amount
saved by reducing provider time spent
with the health IT. Sinsky et al found
physicians spend 27% of their total time
on direct clinical face time with
patients, and 49.2% of their time on
EHR and desk work.169 Outside office
hours, physicians spend another 1 to 2
hours of personal time each night doing
additional computer and other clerical
work. Based on this study, we assume
that providers spend, on average, 6
hours per day with their EHR (4 hours
of an 8 hour work day and 2 hours
outside of office hours). Despite the
of this analysis, we assume that one to
four percentage points would be a
reasonable range for API’s marginal
impact on interoperability.
As noted previously, there might be
shared benefits across certain proposals
and we have taken steps to ensure that
the benefits attributed to each proposal
are unique to the proposal referenced.
Specifically, we used regression
analysis to calculate the impact of our
real world testing and API proposals on
interoperability. We assumed that the
collective impact of real world testing
and API proposals on interoperability
would not exceed the impact of 2014
Edition certified health IT. Therefore,
we estimated linear probability models
that identified the impact of 2014
Edition certified health IT on hospitals’
interoperability.168 We controlled for
additional factors such as participation
in a health information exchange
organization, hospital characteristics,
and urban/rural status. We found the
marginal effect of using 2014 Edition
certified health IT was a five percentage
point increase in interoperability.
While we acknowledge that there
might be shared benefits across
proposals, we have taken steps to ensure
number of hours providers spend in
their EHR, there is evidence that the
introduction of EHRs is associated with
time saved. Amusan et al found that
EHR and computerized provider order
entry (CPOE) implementation was
associated with 3.69 minutes of time
saved five months post
implementation.170 Additionally, AdlerMilstein et al found that an increase in
EHR use resulted in a 5.3% increase in
work relative value units per clinician
work day.171 Using this evidence, we
estimate the potential impact of APIs on
providers’ time ranges from 1%–5%.172
Because the benefit of time saved is not
limited to interoperable exchange of
health information among providers but
includes additional benefits such as
increased patient knowledge, we used
evidence from the literature to calculate
the time saved benefit. Thus, the impact
of APIs on provider time is expected to
represent a larger impact (5%) than the
impact of APIs on health outcomes
(1%–4%) and cost. This is primarily
because provider behavior is more
directly affected by this improvement.
Benefits of APIs
TABLE 17—BENEFIT OF API PROVIDERS
[2016 Dollars]
Benefit type
Number affected
Hours saved
(percent) a b
Hourly wage
Min
Reduction in provider time spent
in health IT by
improving
usability and
interoperability.
439,187 providers .......
95
Hours per day
with EHR
Max
1
Min
Max
260
$651M
$3.3B
d6
5
Total benefit c
(per year)
Number of
working days
in a year
a Julia
Adler-Milstein and Robert S. Huckman, The Impact of Electronic Health Record Use on Physician Productivity, Am J Manag Care (Nov. 19, 2013).
Tongen, Speedie, and Mellin, A time-motion study to evaluate the impact of EMR and CPOE implementation on physician efficiency, J. Healthcare Inf.
Manag. (Fall 2008), at 31–7.
c Total benefit is a product of number affected physicians, hourly wage, hours saved from EHR improvements, hours worked with EHR, and number of working
days in a year.
d Christine Sinsky et al., Allocation of Physician Time in Ambulatory Practice: A Time and Motion Study in 4 Specialties, Ann Intern Med. (Dec. 6, 2016), at 753–60.
b Amusan,
TABLE 18—BENEFIT OF API FOR PATIENTS AND PAYERS
[2016 Dollars]
Benefit type
Number affected
Overall
interop impact
(marginal
effect)
Impact of API
Total cost
Min
Max
Duplicate testing ........
439,187 providers .......
b 0.09
0.01
0.04
Avoidable hospitalizations and readmissions.
4,519 hospitals ...........
b 0.09
0.01
0.04
168 American Hospital Association Health IT
Supplement Survey, https://www.ahadata.com/ahahealthcare-database/.
169 Christine Sinsky et al., Allocation of Physician
Time in Ambulatory Practice: A Time and Motion
Study in 4 Specialties, Ann Intern Med. (Dec. 6,
2016), at 753–60.
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c 200
Billion.
d $41B ......
170 Amusan, Tongen, Speedie, and Mellin, A
time-motion study to evaluate the impact of EMR
and CPOE implementation on physician efficiency,
J. Healthcare Inf. Manag. (Fall 2008), at 31–7.
171 Julia Adler-Milstein and Robert S. Huckman,
The Impact of Electronic Health Record Use on
Physician Productivity, Am J Manag Care (Nov. 19,
2013).
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% of
total cost
impacted
Total benefit a
(per year)
Min
Max
100
$180M
$720M
100
37M
148M
172 The calculation for these estimates are as
follows: 1% leverages Amusan et al.’s lower bound
estimate of 3.69 minutes. Assuming 6 hours (or 360
minutes) per day, this amounts to approximately
1% of time saved. The upper bound estimate of 5%
leverages Adler-Milstein’s estimate of a 5.3%
estimate (rounded to 5%).
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TABLE 18—BENEFIT OF API FOR PATIENTS AND PAYERS—Continued
[2016 Dollars]
Benefit type
Number affected
Overall
interop impact
(marginal
effect)
Impact of API
Total cost
Min
Max
E visits ........................
100% of visits affected
b 0.09
0.01
0.04
Adverse drug events ..
20% of events affected
f 22%
0.01
0.04
e Cost
per
ER visit
$1,233,
131M
visits.
g $30 billion.
Total benefit a
(per year)
% of
total cost
impacted
Min
Max
100
48M
194M
20
13M
53M
a Total
benefit is a product of total cost, % of total cost impacted, overall impact of interoperability, and impact of API.
b Stephen E. Ross, Tiffany A. Radcliff, William G. Leblanc, L. Miriam Dickinson, Anne M. Libby, and Donald E. Nease Jr., Effects of health information exchange
adoption on ambulatory testing rates, J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. (2013), at 1137–1142; Bridget A. Stewart, Susan Fernandes, Elizabeth Rodriguez-Huertas, and Michael Landzberg, A preliminary look at duplicate testing associated with lack of electronic health record interoperability for transferred patients, J. of the Am. Med.
Informatics Assoc. (2010), at 341–344; Sezgin Ayabakan, Indranil R. Bardhan, Zhiqiang (Eric) Zheng, and Kirk Kirksey Value of health information sharing in reducing
healthcare waste: An analysis of duplicate testing across hospitals, MIS Quarterly (Jan. 1, 2017); Eric J. Lammers, Julia Adler-Milstein, and Keith E. Kocher, Does
health information exchange reduce redundant imaging? Evidence from emergency departments, Med Care (Mar. 2014), at 227–34.
c National Academy of Medicine. (2016), https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/20/news/economy/medical-tests/.
d Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Statistical Brief #199 (Dec. 2015), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb199-ReadmissionsPayer-Age.pdf; AHRQ Statistical Brief #72, Nationwide Frequency and Costs of Potentially Preventable Hospitalizations (Apr. 2009), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb72.pdf.
e National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief No. 252 (June 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db252.pdf; Nolan Caldwell, Tanja
Srebotnjak, Tiffany Wang, and Renee Hsia, ‘‘How Much Will I Get Charged for This?’’ Patient Charges for Top Ten Diagnoses in the Emergency Department (2013),
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055491.
f M.F. Furukawa, W.D. Spector, M.R. Limcangco, and W.E. Encinosa, Meaningful use of health information technology and declines in in-hospital adverse drug
events, J. of the Am. Med. Informatics Assoc. (2017).
g Janet Sultana, Paola Cutroneo, and Gianluca Trifiro
` , Clinical and economic burden of adverse drug reactions.
Based on the above calculations, we
estimate the annual benefit to health
care providers for the use of the
proposed API capabilities would, on
average, range from $651 million to $3.3
billion. We estimate the annual benefit
for patients and payers would, on
average, range from $278 million to
million to $1.1 billion. Therefore, we
estimate the total annual benefit of APIs
to, on average, range from $929 million
to $4.4 billion. If we assume, based on
our cost estimates, an annual cost to
health IT developers of $414 million
and that increased developer costs are
passed to customers, then the net
benefit to hospitals/providers would
range from $515 million to $3.3 billion.
The midpoint of ranges stated is used as
the primary estimate of benefits.
As we stated above, for Table 17, we
assume APIs provide both patients and
clinicians with increased access to EHI,
which will have a direct impact on
physicians by making their work more
efficient. Extrapolating the numbers
from literature, we assume this
technology will improve physicians’
time by 1%–5%. Also as stated above,
for Table 18, we assume APIs affect
utilization through marginal
improvements in interoperability. For
this reason, in addition to APIs, we
needed to incorporate the impact of
interoperability on each of the
outcomes. We request comment on
these assumptions. Specifically,
whether they are appropriate and
whether there are alternative
assumptions or bases upon which we
should make our assumptions.
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We expect additional benefits from
the use of APIs could be derived from
increased patient, and eventually payer,
access to EHI. APIs make it easier for
patients to transmit data to and from
different sources. According to the
Health Information National Trends
Survey,173 half of Americans were
offered access to an online medical
record by a provider or insurer in 2017.
However, among those who were
offered access, only 53% accessed their
record at least once within the last year,
and only 3.6% of individuals who
accessed their record reported
transmitting their data to a service or
application. The proportion of
individuals accessing their online
health information and transmitting
their information to third parties is
expected to grow as APIs become more
widespread and make more data
available in a computable format.
Growing evidence suggests that patients
who have access to their EHI are more
likely to adhere to medical orders
including screening
recommendations.174 Thus, we expect
such patients would ultimately realize
improved health outcomes.
In addition, the use of APIs to support
the exchange and analysis of payment
related data (including price
information) would improve cost
transparency in the market, increase the
availability of valuable information for
payers and patients, and likely drive
173 These estimates were derived from Health
Information National Trends Survey 5, Cycle 1
(2017).
174 See https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC5391175/.
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down health care prices. For instance, a
recent study by the Minnesota
Department of Health showed that the
pricing for knee replacement surgery,
which is a standard procedure in many
hospitals, can vary significantly across
practices in the same locality. The
Minnesota study showed that Minnesota
insurers paid as much as $47,000 for a
patient’s total knee replacement and as
little as $6,200—a nearly eight-fold
price difference. In addition to total
knee replacements, the study found that
total hip replacement costs ranged from
$6,700 to $44,000, a 61⁄2-fold difference.
Typical vaginal baby delivery ranged
from $2,900 to $12,300, while C-section
deliveries ranged from $4,700 to
$22,800. Another study by Premier in
conjunction with Wake Forest
University Medical Center found similar
results. Among 350 hospitals, the
average cost of primary knee implants
was $4,464. Yet, 50% of the hospitals
paid between $4,066 and $5,609 on the
devices. Further, the same group of
hospitals paid an average of $5,252 for
primary hip implants, but 50% of the
hospitals paid between $4,759 and
$6,463. The studies illustrated the
secretive nature of pricing in the health
care market, as well as the extreme
variations in price that can exist for the
same procedure within the same
locality.175 176 While this study was the
175 Glenn Howatt, That surgery will cost you
$6,200. Or maybe $47,000, Star Tribune (Jan. 3,
2018), available at https://www.startribune.com/
that-surgery-will-cost-you-6-200-or-maybe-47-000/
467894173/.
176 Bakalar, Catherine and Czajka, Robin (2018)
Margin of Excellence: Total Joint Replacements
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first-ever local study of insurance
company payments to hospitals for
those four common procedures, similar
pricing variations have been well
documented in other, broader studies in
recent years.177 We expect that making
such price information available to
insurers through APIs would drive
health care prices down, which could
lead to significant benefits across the
health care continuum.
While the examples above emphasize
procedures that tend to have defined
end points, the eventual population
health queries would more broadly
allow payers and analytics firms
working for employers to
computationally examine the care
providers render. Not only is price
transparency currently missing from the
marketplace, but for most inpatient care,
the actual details of care are largely
unobtainable through any APIs.
However, we are not aware of an
approach for quantifying these types of
benefits and welcome comments on
potential approaches to quantifying
these benefits.
2.4 New Privacy and Security
Certification Criteria
To be certified to the new privacy and
security certification criteria, encrypt
authentication credentials
(§ 170.315(d)(12)) and multi-factor
authentication (MFA) (§ 170.315(d)(13)),
we are proposing to require health IT
developers to assess their Health IT
Modules’ capabilities and attest ‘‘yes’’ or
‘‘no’’ to the certification criteria. As
specified in section IV.C.3 of this
proposed rule, we are proposing to
make these certification criteria
applicable to all Health IT Modules
under the Program. For encrypt
authentication credentials and multifactor authentication, we are proposing
to require a simple attestation. For MFA,
we are also proposing to require that if
the health IT developer attests to
supporting MFA, the health IT
developer would need to explain how it
supports MFA. We also request public
comment on whether there is value in
adopting an MFA criterion and whether
[White Paper] May 24, 2018, https://
offers.premierinc.com/rs/381-NBB-525/images/WC_
CM_TotalJoint_2018_05_04.pdf.
177 See e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Trillion
Medical Bill; Colonoscopies Explains Why U.S.
Leads the World in Health Expenditures, The New
York Times (June 1, 2013), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/
colonoscopies-explain-why-us-leads-the-world-inhealth-expenditures.html?pagewanted=all; Steve
Twedt, Hospitals’ charges can vary greatly for
similar services, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (May 9,
2013), available at https://www.post-gazette.com/
business/businessnews/2013/05/09/Hospitalscharges-can-vary-greatly-for-similar-services/
stories/201305090300.
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the health IT developer should explain
how it supports MFA.
Costs
These criteria are not intended to
place additional burden on health IT
developers as they do not require new
development or implementation. Rather,
a health IT developer is only required to
attest to whether they encrypt
authentication credentials or support
MFA. We expect the costs associated
with attesting to these criteria to be de
minimis because we do not expect
additional forms to be required and
expect minimal effort would be required
to complete the attestation. We welcome
comments on these expectations. The
midpoint of ranges stated is used as the
primary estimate of costs and benefits.
Benefits
As stated previously, we are not
requiring health IT developers to
encrypt authentication credentials or
support MFA. Instead, we are requiring
they attest to whether they support the
certification criteria or not. By requiring
an attestation, we are promoting
transparency, which might motivate
some health IT developers that do not
currently encrypt authentication
credentials or support MFA to do so. If
health IT developers are motivated by
this criteria and ultimately do encrypt
authentication credentials and/or
support MFA, we acknowledge that
there would be costs to do so; however,
we assume that the benefits would
substantially exceed the costs.
Encrypting authentication credentials
and adopting MFA would reduce the
likelihood that authentication
credentials would be compromised and
would eliminate an unnecessary use of
IT resources. Encrypting authentication
credentials and adopting MFA could
directly reduce providers’ operating/
support costs, which would reduce their
administrative and financial burden.
Encrypting authentication credentials
would also help decrease costs and
burden by reducing the number of
password resets due to possible
phishing or other vulnerabilities.
According to Verizon’s 2017 Data
Breach Investigations Report, 81% of
hacking-related breaches leveraged
either stolen and/or weak passwords.178
The Verizon report encourages
customers to vary their passwords and
use two-factor authentication. Also,
NIST Special Publication 800–63B:
Digital Identity Guidelines,
Authentication and Lifecycle
178 https://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizoninsights-lab/dbir/2017/.
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7575
Management,179 recommends the use of
and provides the requirements for using
multi-factor authenticators. Based on
these reports and other anecdotal
evidence, we believe encrypting
authentication credentials and
supporting MFA are established best
practices among industry developers,
including health IT developers. As
described above, we propose to require
health IT developers to attest to whether
they encrypt authentication credentials.
We do not have access to published
literature that details how health IT
developers are already encrypting
authentication credentials and
supporting MFA industry-wide, but we
believe the majority of health IT
developers, or around 80%, are taking
such actions. We assume that building
this functionality is in the future project
plans for the remaining 20% because, as
noted previously, adopting these
capabilities is an industry best practice.
Health IT developers that have not yet
adopted these capabilities are likely
already making financial investments to
get up to speed with industry standards.
We believe our proposal may motivate
these health IT developers to speed their
implementation process, but we have
not attributed a monetary estimate to
this potential benefit because our rule is
not a direct cause of health IT
developers adopting these capabilities.
By the time we release the final rule,
many more, or perhaps all, health IT
developers will likely already be
encrypting authentication credentials
and supporting MFA. We welcome
comments on this expectation and any
means or methods we could use to
quantify these benefits.
2.5 Data Segmentation for PrivacySend and Data Segmentation for
Privacy-Receive; and Consent
Management for APIs
We propose to remove the current
2015 Edition Data Segmentation for
Privacy (DS4P)-send (§ 170.315(b)(7))
and DS4P-receive (§ 170.315(b)(8))
certification criteria which apply the
DS4P standard at the document level.
We propose to replace these two criteria
with three new 2015 Edition DS4P
certification criteria (two for C–CDA and
one for FHIR) that would support a
more granular approach to privacy
tagging data for health information
exchange supported by either the C–
CDA- or FHIR-based exchange
standards. In place of the removed 2015
Edition DS4P criteria, we propose to
adopt new DS4P-send (§ 170.315(b)(12))
and DS4P-receive (§ 170.315(b)(13))
179 https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp80063b.html.
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criteria that would remain based on the
C–CDA and the HL7 DS4P standard.
These criteria would include
capabilities for applying the DS4P
standard at the document, section, and
entry level. We also propose to adopt a
third 2015 Edition DS4P certification
criterion ‘‘consent management for
APIs’’ (§ 170.315(g)(11)) that requires
health IT to be capable of responding to
requests for data through an API in
accordance with the Consent
Implementation Guide. Our primary
purpose for proposing to remove and
replace them, in lieu of proposing to
revise them, is to provide clarity to
stakeholders as to the additional
functionality enabled by health IT
certified to the new criteria.
Costs
We anticipate this proposal could
result in up-front costs to health IT
developers as this new criteria would
require the health IT to support all three
levels—document, section, and entry—
as specified in the current DS4P
standard. However, we note that these
criteria are not being required in any
program at this time. As of the
beginning of the third quarter of the
2018 CY, only about 20 products
(products with multiple certified
versions were counted once) were
certified to the current 2015 Edition
DS4P certification criteria. We estimate
that 10–15 products will implement the
new DS4P criteria. Developers may need
to perform fairly extensive health IT
upgrades to support the more complex
and granular data tagging requirements
under these criteria. We anticipate
developers will need approximately
1,500–2,500 hours to upgrade databases
and/or other backend infrastructure to
appropriately apply security labels to
data and/or develop access control
capabilities. Moreover, developers will
likely incur costs to upgrade health IT
to generate a security-labeled C–CDA
conforming to the DS4P standard. We
estimate developers will need 400–600
hours per criterion to make these
upgrades on systems that had
previously certified to the documentlevel DS4P criteria, or 720–1,220 hours
per criterion for systems that are
implementing these criteria for the first
time. We believe this work would be
performed by a ‘‘Software Developer.’’
According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for software
developer is $50.14. As noted
previously, we have assumed that
overhead costs (including benefits) are
equal to 100% of pre-tax wages, so the
hourly wage including overhead costs is
$100.28. Therefore, we estimate the total
cost to developers could range from
$2,306,440 to $7,430,748. We note that
this would be a one-time cost. The
midpoint of ranges stated is used as the
primary estimate of costs and benefits.
Additionally, our proposal supports
the capability to respond to requests for
patient consent information through an
API compatible with FHIR Release 3. In
order to meet the ‘‘consent management
for APIs’’ criteria, developers would
demonstrate compatibility with the
standards framework used for the
Consent Implementation Guide. We
have estimated costs associated with
this aspect of our proposal using the
following assumptions:
1. We estimate developers will require
1,500–3,500 hours to upgrade health IT
to align with the FHIR STU3 data model
and develop a STU3 compatible FHIR
server.
2. As with the two DS4P criteria, we
anticipate developers will need
approximately 1,500–2,500 hours to
upgrade databases and/or other backend
infrastructure to appropriately apply
security labels to data and/or develop
access control capabilities. We expect
that this would be a one-time cost.
3. Because certification to this
criterion is voluntary and because
supporting this criterion requires
implementation of a version of FHIR
(STU3) that does not align with the
other API criterion in this rule (based on
DSTU2), we estimate the number of
products that will support this criterion
is approximately 5% of the total number
of 2015 certified products. We used a
proxy to determine the number of health
IT developers that may develop an API
for the 2015 Edition. There were 598
products and 506 developers with at
least one 2014 Edition certified product
that could perform transitions of care.
We then multiplied this number by our
certified health IT market consolidation
estimates of ¥22.1% and ¥23.2% to
project the number of 2015 developers
and products, respectively; we estimate
that 459 products from 394 developers
will contain the API criterion.
Therefore, we anticipate 23 products
from 20 developers will certify to the
‘‘consent management for APIs’’
criterion. We believe this work would
be performed by a ‘‘Software
Developer.’’
4. According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a ‘‘Software
Developer’’ is $50.14.
Our cost estimates are explained in
the table below.
TABLE 19—COSTS RELATED TO DATA SEGMENTATION FOR PRIVACY USING API
[2016 Dollars]
Lower bound
hours
Upper bound
hours
Tasks
Details
Task 1: Enhance health IT to
align with the FHIR STU3 data
model and develop a STU3
compatible FHIR server.
Enhance health IT to align with
the FHIR STU3 data model
and develop a STU3 compatible FHIR server.
1,500
Task 2: Enhancements to health
IT to upgrade databases and/
or other backend infrastructure
to appropriately apply security
labels to data and/or develop
access control capabilities.
Enhancements to health IT to
upgrade databases and/or
other backend infrastructure
to appropriately apply security
labels to data and/or develop
access control capabilities.
Total Labor Hours ...............
....................................................
Hourly Rate .........................
....................................................
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Assumptions
Remarks
3,500
......................
1,500
2,500
......................
This is a one-time cost
for health IT systems
to align with the FHIR
STU3 data model and
develop a STU3 compatible FHIR server.
This is a one-time cost
for health IT systems
to support data segmentation for discrete
data.
3,000
6,000
$100.28
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TABLE 19—COSTS RELATED TO DATA SEGMENTATION FOR PRIVACY USING API—Continued
[2016 Dollars]
Tasks
Lower bound
hours
Details
Upper bound
hours
Cost per Product .................
....................................................
$300,840
$601,680
Total Cost (23 products) .....
....................................................
$6,919,320
$13,838,640
We believe this proposal involving
standardized APIs, as well as the
voluntary nature of the proposal, would
significantly mitigate health IT
developer costs. We also expect
developers to see a return on their
investment in developing and preparing
their health IT for these certification
criteria given the benefits to
interoperable exchange. We welcome
comments on this analysis.
We anticipate potential costs for ONC
related to this proposal associated with:
(1) Developing and maintaining
information regarding these new criteria
on the ONC website; (2) creating
documents related to these new criteria
and making those documents 508
compliant; (3) updating, revising, and
supporting Certification Companion
Guides, test procedures, and test tools;
and (4) responding to inquiries
concerning these criteria. We estimate
an ONC analyst at the GS–13, Step 1
level staff would devote, on average, 200
hours to the above tasks annually. The
hourly wage with benefits for a GS–13,
Step 1 employee located in Washington,
DC is approximately $88.30. Therefore,
we estimate the annual costs to be
$17,660.
Benefits
We believe leveraging the DS4P
standard’s ability to allow for both
document level and more granular
tagging would offer functionality that is
more valuable to providers and patients,
especially given the complexities of the
privacy landscape for multiple care and
specialty settings. We also believe this
proposal would benefit providers,
patients, and ONC because it would
support more complete records,
contribute to patient safety, and
enhance care coordination. We believe
this proposal could also reduce burden
for providers by enabling an automated
option, rather relying on case-by-case
manual redaction and subsequent
workarounds to transmit redacted
documents. We emphasize that health
care providers already have processes
and workflows to address their existing
compliance obligations, which could be
made more efficient and cost effective
through the use of health IT. We expect
these benefits for providers, patients,
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and ONC to be significant; however, we
are unable to quantify these benefits at
this time because we do not have
adequate information to support
quantitative estimates. We welcome
comments regarding potential
approaches for quantifying these
benefits.
(3) Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification
3.1 Information Blocking
For a discussion of the costs and
benefits of the exceptions to information
blocking proposed in this rule, please
see section (5) of this RIA.
3.2 Assurances
We are proposing that health IT
developers must make certain
assurances as Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification: (1)
Assurances regarding the electronic
health information export certification
criterion in § 170.315(b)(10) and (2)
assurances regarding retaining records
and information.
3.2.1 Electronic Health Information
Export
We propose, as a Condition of
Certification requirement, that a health
IT system that produces and
electronically manages electronic health
information must be certified to the
2015 Edition ‘‘electronic health
information export’’ certification
criterion in § 170.315(b)(10). Further, as
a Maintenance of Certification
requirement, health IT developers must
comply with this proposed Condition of
Certification requirement within 24
months of a subsequent final rule’s
effective date or at the time of
certification if the health IT developer
never previously certified health IT to
the 2015 Edition. As another
Maintenance of Certification
requirement, we propose that health IT
developers must provide all of their
customers with the functionality
included in § 170.315(b)(10).
For a detailed discussion of the costs
and benefits of the assurances regarding
the electronic health information export
certification criterion in
§ 170.315(b)(10), please see section 2.2
of this RIA above.
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Assumptions
Remarks
3.2.2 Records and Information
Retention
We propose that, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement, a health IT
developer must, for a period of 10 years
beginning from the date of certification,
retain all records and information
necessary that demonstrate initial and
ongoing compliance with the
requirements of the ONC Health IT
Certification Program. In an effort to
reduce administrative burden, we also
propose, that in situations where
applicable certification criteria are
removed from the Code of Federal
Regulations before the 10 years have
expired, records must only be kept for
3 years from the date of removal for
those certification criteria and related
Program provisions unless that
timeframe would exceed the overall 10year retention period. This ‘‘3-year from
the date of removal’’ records retention
period also aligns with the records
retention requirements for ONC–ACBs
and ONC–ATLs under the Program.
Currently, there are no existing
regulatory requirements regarding
record and information retention by
health IT developers. We expect the
costs to developers to retain the records
and information described above to be
mitigated due to the following factors.
First, we expect that health IT
developers are already keeping the
majority of their records and
information in an electronic format.
Second, we expect that health IT
developers already have systems in
place for retaining records and
information. Last, we expect that some
developers may already be retaining
records and information for extended
periods of time due to existing
requirements of other programs,
including for those programs their
customers participate in. For instance,
Medicaid managed care companies are
required to keep records for ten years
from the effective date of a contract.
We estimate that each health IT
developer will, on average, spend two
hours each week to comply with our
proposed record retention requirement.
We expect that a health IT developer’s
office clerk could complete the record
retention responsibilities. According to
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the May 2016 BLS occupational
employment statistics, the mean hourly
wage for an office clerk is $15.87.180 As
noted previously, we have assumed that
overhead costs (including benefits) are
equal to 100% of pre-tax wages, so the
hourly wage including overhead costs is
$31.74. Therefore, we estimate the
annual cost per developer would, on
average, be $3,301 and the total annual
cost for all health IT developers (458
health IT developers have products
certified to the 2015 Edition that are
capable of recording patient health data)
would, on average, be $1.5 million. We
note that this is a perpetual cost. We
welcome comments on these cost
estimates.
3.3 Prohibition or Restriction of
Communications Costs
Health IT developers would need to
notify their customers about the
unenforceability of communications and
contract provisions that violate this
Condition of Certification. Generally,
health IT developers should already
have mechanisms in place, whether via
online postings, email, mail, or phone,
for alerting customers to changes in
their policies and procedures. Such
alerts should be standard practice.
However, we have estimated the
potential costs for health IT developers
to draft the notice and mail the notice
as appropriate. We estimate that a
health IT developer’s office clerk will
commit (overall) approximately 40
hours to drafting and mailing notices
when necessary. According to the May
2016 BLS occupational employment
statistics, the mean hourly wage for an
office clerk is $15.87.181 As noted
previously, we have assumed that
overhead costs (including benefits) are
equal to 100% of pre-tax wages, so the
hourly wage including overhead costs is
$31.74. Therefore, we estimate the
annual cost per developer to be $1,270
and the total cost for all health IT
developers (792 health IT developers
certified to the 2014 Edition) to be $1
million. We note that this is a one-time
cost and would not be perpetual.
We also note that mailing is one
option for delivery, along with other
means such as email. We do not have
information concerning how health IT
developers will deliver their notices. We
have estimated a total cost for all
developers to mail the notices
(including postage) to be $80,000.
Again, we note that this is a one-time
180 See https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm.
181 See https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm.
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cost. We welcome comments on these
cost estimates.
In order to meet the Cures Act
requirement that health IT developers
do not prohibit or restrict
communication regarding health IT,
some health IT developers would
eventually need to amend their
contracts to reflect such a change. Many
standard form health IT contracts limit
the ability of users to voluntarily
discuss problems or report usability and
safety concerns that they experience
when using their health IT. This type of
discussion or reporting is typically
prohibited through broad
confidentiality, nondisclosure, and
intellectual property provisions in the
vendor’s standard form health IT
contract. Some standard form health IT
contracts may also include nondisparagement clauses that prohibit
customers from making statements that
could reflect negatively on the health IT
developer. These practices are often
referred to colloquially in the industry
as ‘‘gag clauses.’’ We expect
amendments to these clauses to be
accomplished in the normal course of
business, such as when renegotiating
contracts or updating them for HIPAA
or other compliance requirements. As
such, we do not estimate any direct or
indirect costs for health IT developers to
amend their contracts to comply with
this condition of certification.
Benefits
We expect health care providers to
benefit from this proposal. There is
growing recognition that these practices
of prohibiting or restricting
communication do not promote health
IT safety or good security hygiene and
that health IT contracts should support
and facilitate the transparent exchange
of information relating to patient care.
We are unable to estimate these benefits
because we do not have adequate
information to determine the prevalence
of gag clauses and other such restrictive
practices, nor do we have a means to
quantify the value to providers of being
able to freely communicate and share
information. We welcome comments on
approaches to quantify these benefits.
3.4 Application Programming
Interfaces
For a discussion of the costs and
benefits of the new API criterion, please
see section 2.3 of this RIA.
3.5 Transparency Requirements for
Application Programming Interfaces
We propose as part of the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification that
API Technology Suppliers be required
to make specific business and technical
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documentation necessary to interact
with the APIs in production freely and
publicly accessible. We expect that the
API Technology Suppliers would
perform the following tasks related to
transparency of business and technical
documentation and would devote the
following number of hours annually to
such task: (1) Health Level 7’s (HL7®)
Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources (FHIR®) API documentation
(the vendor would most likely point to
the HL7 FHIR standard for API
documentation) (estimated eight hours);
(2) patient application registration
documentation, which would include a
development effort to create a website
that manages the application
registration activity (estimated 40
hours); (3) publication of the FHIR
Endpoint—Base URLs for all centrally
managed providers (estimated 40
hours); (4) publication of FHIR
Endpoints for provider-managed APIs
(estimated 160 hours); and (5) API cost
information documentation, which
would typically be documented as a
tiered rate based on usage or some form
of monthly rate (estimated 40 hours).
We believe each of the above tasks
would be performed by a ‘‘Software
Developer.’’ According to the May 2016
BLS occupational employment
statistics, the mean hourly wage for
software developer is $50.14 182 As
noted previously, we have assumed that
overhead costs (including benefits) are
equal to 100% of pre-tax wages, so the
hourly wage including overhead costs is
$100.28. Therefore, we estimate the cost
per developer to be $28,881. As noted
in section 2.3 of this RIA, we estimate
that 459 products from 394 developers
will contain the API criterion.
Therefore, we estimate the total
developer total would be $11.4 million.
We note that this is a one-time cost and
would not be perpetual.
3.6 Real World Testing
The objective of real world testing is
to verify the extent to which deployed
health IT products in operational
production settings are demonstrating
compliance to certification criteria and
functioning with the intended use cases
for continued maintenance of
certification. Real world testing should
ensure certified health IT products have
the ability to share electronic health
information between other systems. Real
world testing should assess that the
certified health IT is meeting the
intended use case(s) of the certification
criteria to which it is certified within
the workflow, health IT architecture,
182 See https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm.
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and care/practice setting in which the
health IT is implemented. We note that
we expect real world testing would take
about three months of the year to
perform.
Costs
This section describes the potential
costs of the real world testing
requirements in this proposed rule. The
costs estimates are based on the
following assumptions:
1. Health IT developers will use the
same labor costs. Table 20 shows the
estimated labor costs for a health IT
developer to perform real world testing.
We recognize that health IT developer
costs will vary; however, our estimates
in this section assume all developers
will incur the costs noted in Table 20.
2. Proxy needed to project the number
of 2015 Edition products impacted by
real world testing. We estimate that 523
products from 429 developers will be
impacted by real world testing. We used
a proxy to determine developers that
would be subject to real world testing
There were 681 products and 551
developers with at least one of its 2014
Edition certified products that could
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perform either (or both) transitions of
care and/or send any type of public
health data. We then multiplied these
numbers by our estimates for certified
health IT market consolidation by
¥22.1% and ¥23.2% to project number
of 2015 developers and products,
respectively. We believe this estimate
serves as a reasonable proxy for
products impacted by real world testing,
as these products primarily focus on
interoperability.
The tables below describe the various
costs to health IT developers to perform
real world testing by task.
TABLE 20—ESTIMATED COST TO HEALTH IT DEVELOPERS TO PERFORM REAL WORLD TESTING a
[2016 Dollars]
Tasks and labor category
Hours
Rate
Task 1: Design Real World Testing Approach and Submit Plan (per developer) ......................
15–1133 Software Developers, Systems Software ...........................................................
15–1143 Computer Network Architects .............................................................................
15–1121 Computer Systems Analysts ...............................................................................
15–1199 Computer Occupations, All Other .......................................................................
27–3042 Technical Writers ................................................................................................
Task 2: Prepare Staff and Environments (per developer) ..........................................................
15–1121 Computer Systems Analysts ...............................................................................
15–1142 Network and Computer Systems Administrators ................................................
15–1152 Computer Network Support Specialists ..............................................................
15–1199 Computer Occupations, All Other .......................................................................
15–1122 Information Security Analysts .............................................................................
Task 3: Perform Testing (per product) ........................................................................................
15–1121 Computer Systems Analysts ...............................................................................
15–1133 Software Developers, Systems Software ...........................................................
15–1199 Computer Occupations, All Other .......................................................................
15–1142 Network and Computer Systems Administrators ................................................
15–1141 Database Administrators .....................................................................................
Task 4: Collect Results and Prepare-Submit Report (per developer) ........................................
15–1199 Computer Occupations, All Other .......................................................................
15–1121 Computer Systems Analysts ...............................................................................
27–3042 Technical Writers ................................................................................................
........................
80
120
80
40
40
........................
40
40
40
40
20
........................
80
40
160
40
40
........................
120
80
40
........................
106.34
100.24
88.10
85.46
70.36
........................
88.10
81.26
65.16
85.46
92.34
........................
88.10
106.34
85.46
81.26
83.78
........................
85.46
88.10
70.36
$33,817
8,507.20
12,028.80
7,048.00
3,418.40
2,814.40
14,646
3,524.00
3,250.40
2,606.40
3,418.40
1,846.80
31,577
7,048.00
4,253.60
13,673.60
3,250.40
3,351.20
20,118
10,255.20
7,048.00
2,814.40
Total Labor Hours .........................................................................................................
Other Direct Costs—printing, publishing (per product) .................................................
1,140
........................
........................
150.00
Total Cost ...............................................................................................................
........................
........................
100,307
a Labor
Total
rates in this chart are from the BLS. See https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/oes439061.htm.
TABLE 21—REAL WORLD TESTING TOTAL ANNUAL COST
[2016 Dollars]
Task
Calculation
Task 1 .........................................................................................
Task 2 .........................................................................................
Task 3 .........................................................................................
Task 4 .........................................................................................
Other Direct Costs ......................................................................
$33,817 × 429 developers .........................................................
$14,646 × 429 developers .........................................................
$31,577 × 523 products .............................................................
$20,118 × 429 developers .........................................................
$150 × 429 developers ..............................................................
$14,507,407
6,283,134
16,514,666
8,630,450
78,450
Total Cost ............................................................................
....................................................................................................
46,014,108
Based on the stated assumptions and
costs outlined in the above tables, we
estimate the total annual cost for real
world testing would, on average, be $46
million with an average cost per
developer of $107,259.
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Benefits
There are a number of benefits that
can be attributed to real world testing.
Real world testing may impact the
effective integration of varied health IT
systems, including integration of
certified health IT with non-certified
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Total cost
and ancillary technologies such as
picture archiving and communications
systems (PACS) or specialty specific
interfaces. Real world testing might also
have an effect on the effective
implementation of workflows in a
clinical setting. In this analysis, we have
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calculated the benefits in the following
categories:
1. Provider time saved documenting
in their EHR due to improved usability.
2. Increased provider satisfaction with
their EHR resulting in fewer providers
incurring the costs of switching
products.
3. Benefits related to reductions in
duplicate lab tests, readmissions, ER
visits, and adverse drug events due to
increased interoperability. We focused
on these outcomes for two reasons: (i)
Evidence in literature indicate that
health information exchange impacts
the chosen measures; and (ii) cost of
care associated with these measures is
high and the impact of health
information exchange is likely to result
in significant benefits in the form of
reduced costs.
The benefit calculations are based on
the following assumptions:
1. Benefits noted in academic
literature are assumed accurate and
results were not externally validated.
Estimates of the benefits associated with
the benefits are based on estimates
obtained from the academic literature.
Staff reviewed the academic articles for
validity, but estimates were not
replicated to confirm accuracy.
2. Hospitals and eligible professionals
that participate in the CMS EHR
Incentive Program will be impacted.
Estimates are based on the assumption
that 439,187 health care providers and/
or 4,519 hospitals will be affected by
this regulatory action.
3. Estimates of the impact of real
world testing on rates of interoperability
(0.1 to 1%) are based on ONC analysis.
To identify the impact of real world
testing on interoperability, we used
regression analysis. Specifically, we
estimated linear probability models that
identified impact of 2014 Edition
certified EHR on hospitals’
interoperability (whether a hospital
sends, receives, finds, and integrates
summary of care records). Using data
from the AHA from years 2014–2015 in
the model, we controlled for hospital
size, profit status, participation in a
health information organization, and
state and year fixed effects. The
marginal effect of using a 2014 Edition
was a five percentage point increase in
interoperability. This is an upper bound
estimate. For the purpose of this
analysis, we assume 0.1% to 1% would
be a reasonable range for real world
testing to impact interoperability.
4. Impact of real world testing is also
based on the estimated number of
providers that switch health IT
developers (rate = 5%). Using CMS
Medicare EHR Incentive Program data
from years 2013–2016, we estimate the
rate of providers (hospitals and eligible
professionals) that changed their health
IT developer.
5. Estimates of the rate of eligible
professionals (10%) and hospitals (5%)
that will be impacted by real world
testing are based on ONC complaint
data. Because real world testing is
designed to improve usability and
interoperability of products, we assume
that those eligible professionals and
hospitals most likely to be impacted are
those who currently use products by
health IT developers with complaints.
As noted previously in this analysis,
we acknowledge that there might be
shared benefits across certain proposals
and have taken steps to ensure that the
benefits attributed to each proposal are
unique to the proposal referenced.
Specifically, we used regression
analysis to calculate the impact of our
real world testing and API proposals on
interoperability. We assumed that the
real world testing and API proposals
would collectively have the same
impact on interoperability as use of
2014 Edition certified health IT.
Therefore, we estimated linear
probability models that identified the
impact of 2014 Edition certified health
IT on hospitals’ interoperability.183 We
controlled for additional factors such as
participation in a health information
exchange organization, hospital
characteristics, and urban/rural status.
We found the marginal effect of using
2014 Edition certified health IT was a
five percentage point increase in
interoperability.
While we acknowledge that there
might be shared benefits across
proposals, we have taken steps to ensure
that the benefits attributed to each
proposal is unique to the proposal
referenced. We assumed that this
marginal effect is true for our proposals
and distributed the 5% benefit across
our real world testing and API proposals
at (.1–1%) to (1–4%) respectively.
Moreover, the number of providers
impacted is proposal specific. Given
data limitations, we believe this
approach allows us to estimate the
benefits of our proposals without double
counting the impact each proposal
might have on interoperability.
The first table below shows benefits of
real world testing for providers where
we monetize the impact of real world
testing as total amount saved by
reducing provider time spent with the
health IT. The impact of real world
testing on provider time is expected to
represent a larger impact (5%) than the
impact of real world testing on health
outcomes (1%–4%) and cost. This is
primarily because provider behavior is
more directly affected by improvements
in interoperability.
Benefits of Real World Testing
TABLE 22—BENEFIT OF REAL WORLD TESTING FOR PROVIDERS
[2016 Dollars]
Benefit type
Number affected
Hours saved
(percent) a b
Hourly wage
Min
Reduction in provider 43,919 providers or
time spent in
10% d (based on
complaint data).
health IT by improving usability
and interoperability.
Administrative time
Using a rule of 0.75
spent in health IT
administrative
by improving billstaff per provider,f
32,939 personnel.
ing, patient matching, product integration.
Hours per day
with EHR
Max
Number of
working days
in a year
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Min
Max
95
1
5
e6
260
$65M
$325M
14.52
1
5
e6
260
7M
37M
183 American Hospital Association Health IT
Supplement Survey, https://www.ahadata.com/ahahealthcare-database/.
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Total benefit c
(per year)
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TABLE 22—BENEFIT OF REAL WORLD TESTING FOR PROVIDERS—Continued
[2016 Dollars]
Benefit type
Number affected
Number of providers
switching health
IT g.
Total Benefit .....
Hours saved
(percent) a b
Hourly wage
Hours per day
with EHR
Min
Max
Number of
working days
in a year
Total benefit c
(per year)
Min
Max
Number 2,195; Cost
of Switching Min =
$15,000, Max =
$70,000.
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
33M
154M
.................................
........................
........................
........................
........................
........................
105M
516M
a Julia
Adler-Milstein and Robert S. Huckman, The Impact of Electronic Health Record Use on Physician Productivity, Am J Manag Care (Nov. 19, 2013).
b Amusan, Tongen, Speedie, and Mellin, A time-motion study to evaluate the impact of EMR and CPOE implementation on physician efficiency, J. Healthcare Inf.
Manag. (Fall 2008), at 31–7.
c Total benefits for the provider and administrative time spent in health IT by improving usability and interoperability. Total benefits from switching EHR vendor is a
product of number providers switching and cost of EHR.
d The estimate is based on the number of providers that currently possess products with complaints. This is identified by flagging health IT developers and products
about whom/which complaints are logged on ONC’s database. These health IT developers are then matched to physicians using the Meaningful Use database.
e Christine Sinsky et al., Allocation of Physician Time in Ambulatory Practice: A Time and Motion Study in 4 Specialties, Ann Intern Med. (Dec. 6, 2016), at 753–60.
f Physician Practice, Calculating the Right Number of Staff for Your Medical Practice, available at https://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/calculating-right-numberstaff-your-medical-practice.
g This estimate was obtained from Meaningful Use data from years 2013–2016. ‘‘Switching’’ is defined as an annual change in all health IT developers by providers/
hospitals.
TABLE 23—BENEFIT OF REAL WORLD TESTING FOR PATIENTS AND PAYERS
[2016 Dollars]
Overall interop
impact
(marginal
effect)
Population
affected
Benefit type
Duplicate testing ...
Avoidable hospitalizations and
readmissions.
ER visits ................
35,607 providers ..
5% of hospitals (n
= 226).
Adverse drug
events.
5% of events affected.
Total Benefit ..
b 0.09
Min
Total benefit a
(per year)
Percent of
total cost
impacted
Total cost
Max
Billion c
Min
Max
b 0.09
0.001
0.001
0.01
0.01
200
..........
$41B d ..................
10
5
$18M
0.2M
$180M
1.8M
b 0.03
0.001
0.01
5
2M
2.4M
f 0.22
0.001
0.01
Cost per ER visit
$1,233, 131M
visits e.
$30 billion g ..........
5
0.33M
3.3M
........................
........................
........................
..............................
........................
2.6M
25.6M
5% of visits affected.
..............................
Impact of real world testing
a
Total benefit is a product of total cost, % of total cost impacted, overall impact of interoperability, and impact of real world testing.
b Stephen E. Ross, Tiffany A. Radcliff, William G. Leblanc, L. Miriam Dickinson, Anne M. Libby, and Donald E. Nease Jr., Effects of health information exchange
adoption on ambulatory testing rates, J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. (2013), at 1137–1142; Bridget A. Stewart, Susan Fernandes, Elizabeth Rodriguez-Huertas, and Michael Landzberg, A preliminary look at duplicate testing associated with lack of electronic health record interoperability for transferred patients, J. of the Am. Med.
Informatics Assoc. (2010), at 341–344; Sezgin Ayabakan, Indranil R. Bardhan, Zhiqiang (Eric) Zheng, and Kirk Kirksey Value of health information sharing in reducing
healthcare waste: An analysis of duplicate testing across hospitals, MIS Quarterly (Jan. 1, 2017); Eric J. Lammers, Julia Adler-Milstein, and Keith E. Kocher, Does
health information exchange reduce redundant imaging? Evidence from emergency departments, Med Care (Mar. 2014), at 227–34.
c National Academy of Medicine. (2016), https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/20/news/economy/medical-tests/.
d Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Statistical Brief #199 (Dec. 2015), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb199-ReadmissionsPayer-Age.pdf; AHRQ Statistical Brief #72, Nationwide Frequency and Costs of Potentially Preventable Hospitalizations (Apr. 2009), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb72.pdf.
e National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief No. 252 (June 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db252.pdf; Nolan Caldwell, Tanja
Srebotnjak, Tiffany Wang, and Renee Hsia, ‘‘How Much Will I Get Charged for This?’’ Patient Charges for Top Ten Diagnoses in the Emergency Department (2013),
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055491.
fM.F. Furukawa, W.D. Spector, M.R. Limcangco, and W.E. Encinosa, Meaningful use of health information technology and declines in in-hospital adverse drug
events, J. of the Am. Med. Informatics Assoc. (2017).
g Janet Sultana, Paola Cutroneo, and Gianluca Trifiro
` , Clinical and economic burden of adverse drug reactions (Dec. 2013).
Based on the stated assumptions and
benefits outlined in Table 22 above, we
estimate the total annual benefit for real
world testing to providers would, on
average, range from $105 million to
$516 million. Based on the stated
assumptions and benefits outlined in
Table 23 above, we estimate the total
annual benefit for patients and payers
would, on average, range from $4.3
million to $25.5 million. Therefore, we
estimate the total benefit of real world
testing would, on average, range from
$109.3 million to $541.5 million. If we
assume, based on our cost estimates, the
average annual costs to health IT
developers would be $46 million and
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that increased health IT developer costs
are passed to customers, then the net
benefit to hospitals/providers would
range from $63.3 million to $495.5
million.
We recognize that health IT
developers may deploy their systems in
a number of ways, including cloudbased deployments, and seek comment
on whether our cost estimates of real
world testing should factor in such
methods of system deployment. For
example, we request feedback about
whether health IT developers would
incur reduced real world testing costs
through cloud-based deployments as
opposed to other deployment methods.
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We specifically solicit comment on the
general ratio of cloud-based to noncloud-based deployments within the
health care ecosystem and specific cost
variations in performing real world
testing based on the type of deployment.
We also request comment on our
assumptions about the burden to
providers in time spent assisting health
IT developers since we encourage health
IT developers to come up with ways to
perform real world testing that mitigate
provider disruption.
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3.6.1 Real World Testing Maintenance
Requirements
We propose to revise the Principle of
Proper Conduct in § 170.523(m) to
require ONC–ACBs to collect, no less
than quarterly, all updates successfully
made to standards in certified health IT
pursuant to the developers having opted
to avail themselves of the Standards
Version Advancement Process
flexibility under the real world testing
Condition of Certification. Under
§ 170.523(p), ONC–ACBs will be
responsible for: (1) Reviewing and
confirming that applicable health IT
developers submit real world testing
plans in accordance with
§ 170.405(b)(1); (2) reviewing and
confirming that applicable health IT
developers submit real world testing
results in accordance with
§ 170.405(b)(2); and (3) submitting real
world testing plans by December 15 and
results by April 1 of each calendar year
to ONC for public availability. In
addition, under § 170.523(t), ONC–ACBs
will be required to: (1) Maintain a
record of the date of issuance and the
content of developers’ notices; and (2)
timely post content of each notice on
the CHPL.
Using the information from the ‘‘Real
World Testing’’ section of this RIA, we
estimate that 429 developers will be
impacted by real world testing. We
estimate that, on average, it will take an
ONC–ACB employee at the GS–13, Step
1 level approximately 30 minutes to
collect all updates made to standards in
Health IT Modules in accordance with
§ 170.523(m). The hourly wage with
benefits for a GS–13, Step 1 employee
located in Washington, DC is
approximately $88.30. Since the
collection must occur no less than
quarterly, we assume it occurs, on
average, four times per year. Therefore,
we estimate the annual cost to ONC–
ACBs to comply with the collection
requirements under § 170.523(m) to be
$139,867.
We estimate that, on average, it will
take an ONC–ACB employee at the GS–
13, Step 1 level approximately 1 hour to
review and confirm that applicable
health IT developers submit real world
testing plans in accordance with
§ 170.405(b)(1). We estimate that, on
average, it will take an ONC–ACB
employee at the GS–13, Step 1 level
approximately 30 minutes to review and
confirm that applicable health IT
developers submit real world testing
results in accordance with
§ 170.405(b)(2). We estimate that, on
average, it will take an ONC–ACB
employee at the GS–13, Step 1 level
approximately 30 minutes to submit real
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world testing plans and results to ONC
for public availability. The hourly wage
with benefits for a GS–13, Step 1
employee located in Washington, DC is
approximately $88.30. Therefore, we
estimate the annual cost to ONC–ACBs
to comply with the submission and
reporting requirements under
§§ 170.523(m) and 170.550(l) to be
$143,891.
Throughout the RIA we have used 830
products as our 2015 Edition Projection.
We came up with this projection by
multiplying a ¥23.2% market
consolidation rate from the total number
of products certified to 2014 Edition.
This assumption was based on the
market consolidation rate observed
between the 2011 and 2014 Editions.
We have estimated the number of 2015
Edition products that will certify each
criteria included in the real world
testing Condition of Certification. We
assume that there will be a cost
associated with a notice for each
certified criteria (even if an individual
product were to update the same
standard across multiple criteria that
use that standard). This estimation was
calculated by multiplying the current
percent of 2015 Edition products that
certify a criteria by the estimated
number of total 2015 Edition products
(830).
We assume that the amount of time
for an ONC–ACB staff person to (1)
maintain a record of the date of issuance
and the content of developers’ notices;
and (2) to timely post content of each
notice on the CHPL can be anywhere
from 30 minutes to 1 hour.
The hourly wage with benefits for a
GS–13, Step 1 employee located in
Washington, DC is approximately
$88.30. This was the hourly rate we
used for the RIA, so it’s consistent with
prior calculations. This wage is used to
determine the ONC–ACB time cost to
complete this requirement under
§ 170.523(t). Our minimum estimate for
the amount of time to comply is 30
minutes per notice. If 25% of certified
products update any of the applicable
standards, we estimate it will cost
$58,807. If all products update any of
the applicable standards, we estimate it
will cost $235,231. Our maximum
estimate for the amount of time to
comply is 1 hour per notice. If 25% of
certified products update any of the
applicable standards, we estimate it will
cost $117,615. If all products update any
of the applicable standards, we estimate
it will cost $470,462. Our lower bound
estimate for the cost of this requirement
is $58,807. Our upper bound estimate
for the cost of this requirement is
$470,462.
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3.8 Attestations
The Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification under the
Program, provide to the Secretary an
attestation to all the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification specified
in the Cures Act, except for the ‘‘EHR
reporting program’’ Condition of
Certification. It also requires that a
health IT developer attest to ensuring
that its health IT allows for health
information to be exchanged, accessed,
and used in the manner described by
the API Condition of Certification. We
propose to implement the Cures Act
‘‘attestations’’ Condition of Certification
in § 170.406 by requiring health IT
developers to attest to the
aforementioned conditions. For the
purposes of estimating the potential
burden of these attestations on health IT
developers, ONC–ACBs, and ONC, we
are estimating that all health IT
developers under the Program will
submit an attestation biannually. As
noted previously in this RIA, there are
792 health IT developers certified to the
2014 Edition.
We estimate it will take a health IT
developer employee approximately one
hour on average to prepare and submit
each attestation to the ONC–ACB.
According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a software
developer is $50.14 184 Therefore, we
estimate the annual cost including
overhead costs to be $79,422.
We propose that attestations would be
submitted to ONC–ACBs on behalf of
ONC and the Secretary. We assume
there will be three ONC–ACBs as this is
the current number of ONC–ACBs, and
we also assume an equal distribution in
responsibilities among ONC–ACBs.
ONC–ACBs would have two
responsibilities related to attestations.
One responsibility we propose in
§ 170.523(q) is that an ONC–ACB must
review and submit the health IT
developers’ attestations to ONC. We
estimate it will take an ONC–ACB
employee at the GS–13, Step 1 level
approximately 30 minutes on average to
review and submit each attestation to
ONC. The other responsibility we
propose in § 170.550(l) is that before
issuing a certification, an ONC–ACB
would need to ensure that the health IT
developer of the Health IT Module has
met its responsibilities related to the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements as solely
evidenced by its attestation. We
estimate it will take an ONC–ACB
184 See https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm.
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employee at the GS–13, Step 1 level
approximately one hour on average to
complete this task. The hourly wage
with benefits for a GS–13, Step 1
employee located in Washington, DC is
approximately $88.30. Therefore, we
estimate the annual cost to ONC–ACBs
to be $209,801.
We propose that ONC would make the
attestations publicly available on the
CHPL once they are submitted by the
ONC–ACBs. ONC posts information
regularly to the CHPL and we estimate
the added costs to post the attestation
will be de minimis. We welcome
comments if stakeholders believe more
or less networks should be included in
our estimate.
(4) Oversight for the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
ONC’s processes for overseeing the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification will, for the most part,
mirror ONC’s processes for direct
review of non-conformities in certified
health IT as described in current
§ 170.580. We have proposed that ONC
may directly review a health IT
developer’s actions to determine
whether they conform to the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
requirements proposed in this proposed
rule. The estimated costs and benefits
for such oversight and review are
detailed below.
Costs
We estimated the potential monetary
costs of our proposal to allow ONC to
directly review a health IT developer’s
actions to determine whether the
actions conform to the requirements of
the Program as follows: (1) Costs for
health IT developers to correct nonconforming actions identified by ONC;
(2) costs for health IT developers and
ONC related to ONC review and inquiry
into non-conforming actions by the
health IT developer; and (3) costs for
ONC–ACBs related to the new proposed
reporting requirement in the Principles
of Proper Conduct in § 170.523(s).
Costs for Health IT Developers To
Correct Non-Conforming Actions
Identified by ONC
We do not believe health IT
developers face additional direct costs
for the proposed ONC direct review of
health IT developer actions (see cost
estimates for the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification
requirements). However, we
acknowledge that this proposed rule
may eventually require health IT
developers to correct certain actions or
non-conformities with their health IT
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that do not conform to the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification.
If ONC identifies a non-conforming
action by a health IT developer, the
costs incurred by the health IT
developer to bring its actions into
conformance would be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Factors that would
be considered include, but are not
limited to: (1) The extent of customers
and/or business affected; (2) how
pervasive the action(s) is across the
health IT developer’s business; (3) the
period of time that the health IT
developer was taking the action(s) in
question; and (4) the corrective action
required to resolve the issue. We are
unable to reliably estimate these costs as
we do not have cost estimates for a
comparable situation. We request
comment on existing relevant data and
methods we could use to estimate these
costs.
Costs for Health IT Developers and ONC
Related to ONC Review and Inquiry Into
Health IT Developer Actions
In order to calculate the potential
costs to health IT developers and ONC
related to ONC review and inquiry into
health IT developer actions, we have
created the following categories for
potential costs: (1) ONC review and
inquiry prior to the issuance of a notice
of non-conformity; (2) ONC review and
inquiry following the issuance of a
notice of non-conformity and the health
IT developer does not contest ONC’s
findings (i.e., no appeal); and (3) ONC
review and inquiry following the
issuance of a notice of non-conformity
and the health IT developer contests
ONC’s findings (i.e., appeal).
ONC Review and Inquiry Prior to the
Issuance of a Notice of Non-Conformity
We anticipate that ONC will receive,
on average, between 100 and 200
complaints per year concerning the
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification that will warrant review
and inquiry by ONC. We estimate that
such initial review and inquiry by ONC
would require, on average, two to three
analysts at the GS–13 level working one
to two hours each per complaint. The
hourly wage with benefits for a GS–13,
Step 1 employee located in Washington,
DC is approximately $88.30. Therefore,
we estimate each review and inquiry
would cost ONC, on average, between
$177 and $529. We estimate the total
annual cost to ONC would, on average,
range from $17,700 and $105,800. This
range takes into account both the low
end of reviews that are resolved quickly
and the high end in which staff would
need to discuss issues with ONC
leadership or in some cases, HHS senior
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7583
leadership including the Office of
General Counsel. We have not estimated
health IT developer costs associated
with ONC review prior to the issuance
of a notice of non-conformity because,
in most cases, health IT developers are
not required to take action prior to the
notice of non-conformity.
ONC Review and Inquiry Following the
Issuance of a Notice of Non-Conformity
and the Health IT Developer Does Not
Contest ONC’s Findings
This category would capture cases
that require review and inquiry
following ONC’s issuance of a notice of
non-conformity, but that would not
proceed to the appeals process.
Examples of such situations would
include, but not be limited to: (1) A
health IT developer violates a Condition
of Certification and does not contest
ONC’s finding that it is in violation of
the Condition of Certification; or (2) a
health IT developer fails to meet a
deadline, such as for its corrective
action plan (CAP). We estimate that
ONC will, on average, conduct between
12 and 18 of these reviews annually.
We estimate that a health IT
developer may commit, on average and
depending on complexity, between 10
and 40 hours of staff time per case to
provide ONC with all requested records
and documentation that ONC would use
to review and conduct an inquiry into
health IT developer actions, and, when
necessary, make a certification ban and/
or termination determination. We
assumed that the work would be
performed by a ‘‘Computer Systems
Analyst.’’ According to the May 2016
BLS occupational employment
statistics, the mean hourly wage for
computer systems analyst is $44.05.185
As noted previously, we have assumed
that overhead costs (including benefits)
are equal to 100% of pre-tax wages, so
the hourly wage including overhead
costs would be $88.10. Therefore, we
estimate the average annual cost for
health IT developers would range from
$10,572 to $63,432. We note that some
health IT developers’ costs are expected
to be less and some health IT
developers’ costs are expected to be
more than this estimated cost range.
Further, we note that these costs would
be perpetual.
We estimate that ONC may commit,
on average and depending on
complexity, between 8 and 80 hours of
staff time to complete a review and
inquiry into health IT developer actions.
We assume that the expertise of a GS–
15, Step 1 federal employee(s) would be
185 https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm.
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necessary. The hourly wage with
benefits for a GS–15, Step 1 employee
located in Washington, DC is
approximately $122.74. Therefore,
based on the estimate of between 12 and
18 cases each year, we estimate ONC’s
annual costs would on, average range,
from $11,783 to $176,745. We note that
some reviews and inquiries may cost
less and some may cost more than this
estimated cost range. Further, we note
that these costs would be perpetual.
We welcome comments on our
estimated costs and any comparable
processes and costs that we could use to
improve our cost estimates.
ONC Review and Inquiry Following the
Issuance of a Notice of Non-Conformity
and the Health IT Developer Contests
ONC’s Findings
As discussed in section VII.C of this
preamble, we propose to permit a health
IT developer to appeal an ONC
determination to issue a certification
ban and/or terminate a certification
under § 170.581(a)(2)(iii). This category
of cost calculations captures cases that
require review and inquiry following
ONC’s issuance of a notice of nonconformity and where the health IT
developer contests ONC’s finding and
files an appeal. We estimate that ONC
will, on average, conduct between three
and five of these reviews annually.
We estimate that a ‘‘Computer
Systems Analyst’’ for the health IT
developer may commit, on average and
depending on complexity, between 20
and 80 hours to provide the required
information to appeal a certification ban
and/or termination under
§ 170.581(a)(2)(iii) and respond to any
requests from the hearing officer.
According to the May 2016 BLS
occupational employment statistics, the
mean hourly wage for a computer
systems analyst is $44.05.186 Assuming
that overhead costs (including benefits)
are equal to 100% of pre-tax wages, the
hourly wage including overhead costs is
$88.10. Therefore, we estimate the
annual cost, including overhead costs,
for a health IT developer to appeal a
certification ban and/or termination
under § 170.581(a)(2)(iii) would, on
average, range from $5,286 to $35,240.
We note that some health IT developers’
costs are expected to be less and some
health IT developers’ costs are expected
to be more than this estimated cost
range. Further, we note that these costs
would be perpetual.
We estimate that ONC would commit,
on average and depending on
186 See https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm. https://www.bls.gov/oes/2016/may/
oes439061.htm.
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complexity, between 40 and 160 hours
of staff time to conduct each appeal.
This would include the time to
represent ONC in the appeal and
support the costs for the hearing officer.
We assume that the expertise of a GS–
15, Step 1 federal employee(s) would be
necessary. The hourly wage with
benefits for a GS–15, Step 1 employee
located in Washington, DC is
approximately $122.74. Therefore,
based on the estimate on between three
and five cases each year, we estimate
the cost for ONC to conduct an appeal
would, on average, range from $14,729
to $98,192. We note that some appeals
may cost less and some may cost more
than this estimated cost range. Further,
we note that these costs would be
perpetual.
Based on the above estimates, we
estimate the total annual costs for health
IT developers related to ONC review
and inquiry into health IT developer
actions would, on average, range from
$15,858 to $98,672. We estimate the
total annual costs for ONC related to
ONC review and inquiry into health IT
developer actions would, on average,
range from $44,212 to $380,737.
We welcome comments on our
estimated costs and any comparable
processes and costs that we could use to
improve our cost estimates.
Costs for ONC–ACBs
We also note that ONC–ACBs could
realize costs associated with the new
proposed reporting requirement in the
Principles of Proper Conduct in
§ 170.523(s) that they report, at a
minimum, on a weekly basis to the
National Coordinator any circumstances
that could trigger ONC direct review per
§ 170.580(a)(2). We estimate that, on
average, it will take an ONC–ACB
employee at the GS–13, Step 1 level
approximately 30 minutes to prepare
the report. The hourly wage with
benefits for a GS–13, Step 1 employee
located in Washington, DC is
approximately $88.30. Since the
collection must occur no less than
weekly, we will assume it occurs, on
average, 52 times per year. Therefore,
given that there are currently three
ONC–ACBs, we estimate the annual cost
to ONC–ACBs to comply with the
reporting requirement under
§ 170.523(s) would, on average, be
$6,889.
Benefits
This proposed rule’s provisions for
ONC direct review of the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
requirements would promote health IT
developers’ accountability for their
actions and ensure that health IT
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developers’ actions conform with the
requirements of the Cures Act and
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements in
§§ 170.400–406. Specifically, ONC’s
direct review of health IT developer
actions will facilitate ONC’s ability to
require comprehensive corrective action
by health IT developers to address nonconforming actions determined by ONC.
If ONC ultimately implements a
certification ban and/or terminates a
certification(s), such action will serve to
protect the integrity of the Program and
users of health IT. While we do not have
available means to quantify the benefits
of ONC direct review of health IT
developer actions, we note that ONC
direct review supports and enables the
National Coordinator to fulfill his
responsibilities under the HITECH Act
and Cures Act, instills public
confidence in the Program, and protects
public health and safety.
(5) Information Blocking
Costs
We expect ONC to incur an annual
cost for issuing guidance related to the
information blocking ‘‘reasonable and
necessary’’ exceptions. We assume that
the guidance would be provided by
ONC staff with the expertise of a GS–15,
Step 1 federal employee(s). The hourly
wage with benefits for a GS–15, Step 1
employee located in Washington, DC is
approximately $122.74. We estimate it
would take ONC staff between 200 and
400 hours to develop the guidance.
Therefore, we estimate the annual cost
to ONC would, on average, range from
$98,192 to $196,384.
Benefits
Information blocking not only
interferes with effective health
information exchange, but also
negatively impacts many important
aspects of health and health care. To
make informed health care decisions,
providers and individuals must have
timely access to information in a form
that is usable. When health information
is unavailable, decisions can be
impaired—and so too the safety, quality,
and effectiveness of care provided to
patients. Information blocking impedes
progress towards reforming health care
delivery and payment because sharing
information seamlessly across the care
continuum is fundamental to moving to
a person-centered, high-performing
health care system. Information
blocking can undermine consumers’
confidence in their health care
providers by preventing individuals
from accessing their health information
and using it to make informed decisions
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about their health and health care.
Information blocking also prevents
advances in biomedical and public
health research, which require the
ability to analyze information from
many sources in order to identify public
health risks, develop new treatments
and cures, and enable precision
medicine.
In addition, information blocking is a
practice that is profoundly anticonsumer and anti-competition.
Information blocking can be used to
increase revenue, escalate prices, and
prevent market competition both for
current and future competitors and for
new services. For instance, a study
released in 2017 about the prevalence of
information blocking and how to
address it assessed the perceived
motivations for information blocking.
The study found that respondents
perceived that information-blocking
practices by health IT developers were
often motivated by a desire to maximize
short-term revenue and to increase the
likelihood that providers will select
their health IT instead of a competitor’s
health IT. Among hospitals and health
systems, the most frequent perceived
motivation was also related to
improving revenue, namely to
strengthen their competitive position in
the market, followed by accommodating
more important internal priorities than
health information exchange.187
According to leaders of health
information exchange efforts,
information blocking is relatively
widespread.188 Half of leaders of health
information exchange efforts (n = 60)
nationwide reported that they routinely
encountered information blocking by
health IT developers. The top three
types of information blocking practices
they encountered on a routine basis
included:
• Deployment of products with
limited interoperability (49%);
• High fees for health information
exchange unrelated to cost (47%); and
• Making third-party access to
standardized data difficult (42%).
Many hospitals have experienced the
negative impacts of health IT developer
information blocking practices. In 2015,
almost half of hospitals (46%)
nationwide reported difficulty
exchanging data with providers whose
health IT system differed from theirs
and one-quarter of hospitals reported
paying additional costs to exchange
187 Julia
Adler-Milstein and Eric Pfeifer,
Information Blocking: Is It Occurring And What
Policy Strategies Can Address It?, 95 Milbank
Quarterly 117 (Mar. 2017) at 124–5, available at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/14680009.12247/full.
188 Id.
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electronic health information with
providers outside their hospital
system.189 There is also emerging
evidence related to the negative impacts
of information blocking at the market
level on hospitals’ health information
exchange activity.190 Health information
exchange activity among hospitals who
are using a dominant health IT
developer within a given hospital
referral region was found to be
significantly higher compared to those
that are using a non-dominant health IT
developer, particularly in more
competitive markets where dominant
health IT developers had a smaller share
of the market. As information blocking
diminishes and information blocking
becomes less prevalent, such gaps in
rates of exchange and barriers to
exchange of health information should
diminish. Considering the above
motivations for and consequences of
information blocking, we believe health
care providers and patients will benefit
greatly from compliance with the
information blocking definition. Our
proposal would promote the free flow of
electronic health information when and
where it is needed.
We have also included provisions in
this proposed rule that would establish
exceptions to the definition of
information blocking, which we
estimate will generate significant net
benefits. As noted above, section 3022
of the PHSA defines information
blocking broadly section 3022(a)(3)
instructs authorizes the Secretary to
identify reasonable and necessary
activities that would be considered
establish exceptions to the definition of
information blocking. In this rule, we
propose to establish several exceptions.
The exceptions, if finalized, would
create clear guidelines for industry
regarding pro-competitive and other
beneficial activities and would enable
stakeholders to determine more easily
and with greater certainty whether their
activities are excepted from the
information blocking definition. The
additional clarity provided by the
exceptions would make it easier for
these regulated entities to comply with
the statute—resulting in reduced
compliance costs—and would result in
increased predictability, which would
allow regulated entities to more
effectively plan and invest resources in
189 Vaishali Patel, JaWanna Henry, Yuriy
Pylypchuk, and Talisha Searcy, Interoperability
among U.S. Non-federal Acute Care Hospitals in
2015, ONC Data Brief, No.36 (May 2016).
190 Jordan Everson and Julia Adler-Milstein,
Engagement In Hospital Health Information
Exchange Is Associated With Vendor Marketplace
Dominance, Health Affairs. 35, No. 7 (2016), at
1286–93.
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7585
developing and using interoperable
technologies and services to improve
health care efficiency and value.
Overall, the proposed exceptions are
accommodating to legitimate industry
practices for health IT developers,
hospitals, and health care providers
and, we believe, would ease the burden
and compliance costs for these parties.
Due to limited data and research
available, we have only estimated the
benefits of our information blocking
proposals for payers, specifically
patients and insurers. In order to
quantify the magnitude of information
blocking and the benefits of restricting
information blocking, we estimated the
following expression, which gives us
the imposed cost of information
blocking for each health outcome: [%
providers that engage in cross-vendor
exchange] × [marginal effect (ME) of
information blocking] × [ME effect of
interoperability] × [total cost of health
outcome].
We extracted the ‘‘ME effect of
interoperability’’ and ‘‘cost of health
outcomes’’ from academic literature (see
citations in Table 24). We used a proxy
of the ‘‘percent of providers engaged in
cross-vendor exchange’’ with the
‘‘percent of hospitals engaged in crossvendor referral of patients outside their
system’’ (82% in 2015).
We estimated the ‘‘ME of information
blocking’’ through the following
research design. We looked at hospitals
that switched vendors and examined
their referral patterns before and after
the switch. If hospitals that switched
vendors also had to change their referral
patterns, this could be evidence of
information blocking. To operationalize
this experiment, we estimated the
following equation:
Y = b * S + r + h + e.
In this equation, the variables are as
follows:
• Y = Percent of referrals to providers using
a vendor to which the hospital switched
• b = Estimate of interest, which reflects the
change in referral to the vendors after the
switch relative to hospitals that did not
switch. After controlling for hospital and
year fixed, this is essentially an interaction
effect of the year with the switch.
• S = Indicator for whether hospital switched
vendor
• r = Year
• h = Hospital fixed effects
• e = Error term (every regression has an
error term)
We used CMS referral data and linked
it with Healthcare Information and
Management Systems Society (HIMSS)
and AHA data for information on
hospitals’ vendors and other
characteristics. Our estimate for ‘‘b’’ is
0.4 percentage points, meaning if a
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hospital switches to vendor X, the
referrals to hospitals with that vendor
increases by a rate of 0.4 percentage
points. This number we interpret as a
proxy for the extent to which difficulties
in cross vendor exchange hinder patient
care. However, our finding does not
imply that difficulties in cross vendor
exchange can be entirely attributed to
information blocking. One source of
difficulties could be explained by
technological challenges where inherent
software differences among vendors
hinder cross vendor exchange. An
additional reason for this result could be
attributed to contractual agreements
where vendors may incentivize their
clients to exchange with other clients
having the same vendor. Nevertheless,
to keep our estimates conservative, we
reduced our estimates by a factor of five.
Hence, we use 0.08 percentage points as
the ‘‘ME of information blocking.’’
Our estimates are detailed in the table
below.
TABLE 24—BENEFITS OF PROHIBITING AND/OR DETERRING INFORMATION BLOCKING
[2016 Dollars]
Percent of
total cost
impacted
Benefit type
Overall
interop impact
(marginal
effect)
Total cost
Percent of
providers
susceptible to
information
blocking
Marginal
effect of
information
blocking
Benefit a
Duplicate testing .................
Avoidable hospitalizations
and readmissions.
ER visits ..............................
100
100
200 Billion b .........................
$41B d .................................
c 0.09
0.09
82
82
0.08
0.08
$1.1B
242M
100
0.03
82
0.08
317M
Adverse drug events ...........
100
Cost per ER visit $1,233,
131M visits e.
$30 billion f ..........................
0.22
82
0.08
86M
Total benefit per year ..
........................
.............................................
........................
........................
........................
1.8B
a Total benefit is a product of % of total cost impacted, total cost, overall interop impact, percent of providers susceptible to information blocking, and marginal effect of information blocking.
b National Academy of Medicine (2016), https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/20/news/economy/medical-tests/.
c Stephen E. Ross, Tiffany A. Radcliff, William G. Leblanc, L. Miriam Dickinson, Anne M. Libby, and Donald E. Nease Jr., Effects of health information exchange adoption on ambulatory testing rates, J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. (2013), at 1137–1142; Bridget A. Stewart, Susan
Fernandes, Elizabeth Rodriguez-Huertas, and Michael Landzberg, A preliminary look at duplicate testing associated with lack of electronic health
record interoperability for transferred patients, J. of the Am. Med. Informatics Assoc. (2010), at 341–344; Sezgin Ayabakan, Indranil R. Bardhan,
Zhiqiang (Eric) Zheng, and Kirk Kirksey Value of health information sharing in reducing healthcare waste: An analysis of duplicate testing across
hospitals, MIS Quarterly (Jan. 1, 2017); Eric J. Lammers, Julia Adler-Milstein, and Keith E. Kocher, Does health information exchange reduce redundant imaging? Evidence from emergency departments, Med Care (Mar. 2014), at 227–34.
d Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Statistical Brief #199 (Dec. 2015), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/
sb199-Readmissions-Payer-Age.pdf; AHRQ Statistical Brief #72, Nationwide Frequency and Costs of Potentially Preventable Hospitalizations
(Apr. 2009), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb72.pdf.
e National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief No. 252 (June 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db252.pdf; Nolan
Caldwell, Tanja Srebotnjak, Tiffany Wang, and Renee Hsia, ‘‘How Much Will I Get Charged for This?’’ Patient Charges for Top Ten Diagnoses in
the Emergency Department (2013), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055491.
f Janet Sultana, Paola Cutroneo, and Gianluca Trifiro
` , Clinical and economic burden of adverse drug reactions.
We request comment on our approach
to estimating these benefits, as well as
the benefit estimates in the table above.
(6) Total Annual Cost Estimate
We estimate that the total annual cost
for this proposed rule for the first year
after it is finalized (including one-time
costs), based on the cost estimates
outlined above and throughout this RIA,
would, on average, range from $365
million to $919 million with an average
annual cost of $642 million. We
estimate that the total perpetual cost for
this proposed rule (starting in year two),
based on the cost estimates outlined
above, would, on average, range from
$228 million to $452 million with an
average annual cost of $340 million. We
also include estimates based on the
stakeholder group affected. We estimate
the total costs to health IT developers to
be between $373 million and $933
million (including one-time and
perpetual costs) with $569,000 in cost
savings. We estimate the total costs to
ONC–ACBs to be between $213,000 and
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$311,000. We estimate the government
(ONC) costs to be between $44,800 and
$269,000 while saving $4,500. In
addition, to the above mentioned cost
savings that are attributable to specific
stakeholder groups, we estimate to an
additional cost savings of $6.8 million
to $13.7 million to all stakeholders
affected by this proposal. We are unable
to attribute these amounts to specific
stakeholder groups.
(7) Total Annual Benefit Estimate
We estimate the total annual benefit
for this proposed rule, based on the
benefit estimates outlined above, would
range from $3.08 billion to $9.15 billion
with an average annual benefit of $6.1
billion. We attribute between $756
million and $3.8 billion in benefits to
hospitals and clinicians. We attribute
between $2.1 billion and $2.9 billion to
payers and patients. Our estimates
include benefits attributed to the whole
health care system, not just to the
stakeholders mentioned above.
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(8) Total Annual Net Benefit
We estimate the total annual net
benefit for this proposed rule for the
first year after it is finalized (including
one-time costs), based on the estimates
outlined above, would range from $2.7
billion to $8.2 billion with an average
net benefit of $5.5 billion. We estimate
the total perpetual annual net benefit for
this proposed rule (starting in year two),
based on the estimates outlined above,
would range from $2.9 billion to $8.7
billion with an average net benefit of
$5.8 billion.
b. Accounting Statement and Table
When a rule is considered an
economically significant rule under
Executive Order 12866, we are required
to develop an accounting statement
indicating the classification of the
expenditures associated with the
provisions of the proposed rule.
Monetary annual benefits are presented
as discounted flows using 3% and 7%
factors in Table 25 below. We are not
able to explicitly define the universe of
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all costs, but have provided an average
of likely costs of this proposed rule as
well as a high and low range of likely
7587
costs. This proposed rule requires no
federal annual monetized transfers.
TABLE 25—E.O. 12866 SUMMARY TABLE
[In $ millions, 2016 time period]
Primary
(3%)
Present Value of Quantified Costs ..........
Non-quantified Costs ...............................
Present Value of Quantified Benefits ......
Non-quantified Benefits ............................
Present Value of Net Benefits .................
Annualized Quantified Costs ...................
Non-quantified Costs ...............................
Annualized Quantified Benefits ................
Non-quantified Benefits ............................
Annualized Net Quantified Benefits .........
1,557
Text
27,998
Text
2,456
330
Text
5,935
Text
5,184
Lower bound
(3%)
Upper bound
(3%)
Primary
(7%)
Lower bound
(7%)
Upper bound
(7%)
1,043
........................
14,100
........................
1,129
355
........................
2,989
........................
2,304
2,070
........................
41,896
........................
37,620
433
........................
8,881
........................
7,975
1,394
........................
25,067
........................
2,190
318
........................
5,714
........................
4,991
934
........................
12,624
........................
1,011
365
........................
2,878
........................
2,838
1,853
........................
37,509
........................
33,681
422
........................
8,550
........................
8,128
TABLE 26—E.O. 12866 SUMMARY TABLE NON-DISCOUNTED FLOWS
[2016 Dollars]
Costs ....................................................................................
Net Benefits .........................................................................
Costs ....................................................................................
Net Benefits .........................................................................
3. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
requires agencies to analyze options for
regulatory relief of small businesses if a
rule has a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The Small Business Administration
(SBA) establishes the size of small
businesses for federal government
programs based on average annual
receipts or the average employment of a
firm.191 The entities that are likely to be
directly affected by the requirements in
this proposed rule requirements are
health IT developers. We note that the
proposed reasonable and necessary
activities that do not constitute
information blocking provide
flexibilities and relief for health IT
developers of certified health IT, health
information networks, health
information exchanges, and health care
providers in relation to the information
blocking provision of the Cures Act.
These proposed reasonable and
necessary activities also take into
account the potential burden on small
entities to meet these ‘‘exceptions’’ to
information blocking, such as with
191 The SBA references that annual receipts
means ‘‘total income’’ (or in the case of a sole
proprietorship, ‘‘gross income’’) plus ‘‘cost of goods
sold’’ as these terms are defined and reported on
Internal Revenue Service tax return forms.
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Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
$641,853,087
5,471,742,914
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
$339,870,993
5,773,725,008
considering the size and resources of
small entities when meeting security
requirements to qualify for the
‘‘promoting the security of electronic
health information’’ exception. We refer
readers to section VIII for our
information blocking-related proposals
and welcome comments on their
impacts on small entities.
While health IT developers that
pursue certification of their health IT
under the Program represent a small
segment of the overall information
technology industry, we believe that
many health IT developers impacted by
the requirements proposed in this
proposed rule most likely fall under the
North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) code 541511 ‘‘Custom
Computer Programming Services.’’ 192
The SBA size standard associated with
this NAICS code is set at $27.5 million
annual receipts or less. There is enough
data generally available to establish that
between 75% and 90% of entities that
are categorized under the NAICS code
541511 are under the SBA size standard.
We also note that with the exception of
aggregate business information available
through the U.S. Census Bureau and the
192 https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/
Size_Standards_Table_2017.pdf. https://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_
Standards_Table_2017.pdf.
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SBA related to NAICS code 541511, it
appears that many health IT developers
that pursue certification of their health
IT under the Program are privately held
or owned and do not regularly, if at all,
make their specific annual receipts
publicly available. As a result, it is
difficult to locate empirical data related
to many of these health IT developers to
correlate to the SBA size standard.
However, although not perfectly
correlated to the size standard for
NAICS code 541511, we do have
information indicating that over 60% of
health IT developers that have had
Complete EHRs and/or Health IT
Modules certified to the 2011 Edition
have less than 51 employees.
We estimate that the proposed
requirements in this proposed rule
would have effects on health IT
developers, some of which may be small
entities, that have certified health IT or
are likely to pursue certification of their
health IT under the Program. We
believe, however, that we have
proposed the minimum amount of
requirements necessary to accomplish
our primary policy goal of enhancing
interoperability. Further, as discussed in
section XIV.B of this RIA above, there
are no appropriate regulatory or nonregulatory alternatives that could be
developed to lessen the compliance
burden associated with this proposed
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rule because many of the proposals are
derived directly form legislative
mandates in the Cures Act.
Additionally, we have attempted to
offset some of the burden imposed on
health IT developers in this proposed
rule with cost saving proposals through
deregulatory actions (see proposed
section III).
We do not believe that the proposed
requirements of this proposed rule
would create a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities, but
request comment on whether there are
small entities that we have not
identified that may be affected in a
significant way by this proposed rule.
Additionally, the Secretary proposes to
certify that this proposed rule would not
have a significant impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
4. Executive Order 13132—Federalism
Executive Order 13132 establishes
certain requirements that an agency
must meet when it promulgates a
proposed rule (and subsequent final
rule) that imposes substantial direct
requirement costs on state and local
governments, preempts state law, or
otherwise has federalism implications.
Nothing in this proposed rule imposes
substantial direct compliance costs on
state and local governments, preempts
state law, or otherwise has federalism
implications. We are not aware of any
state laws or regulations that are
contradicted or impeded by any of the
proposals in this proposed rule. We
welcome comments on this assessment.
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires
that agencies assess anticipated costs
and benefits before issuing any rule that
imposes unfunded mandates on state,
local, and tribal governments or the
private sector requiring spending in any
one year of $100 million in 1995 dollars,
updated annually for inflation. The
current inflation-adjusted statutory
threshold is approximately $150
million. While the estimated potential
cost effects of this proposed rule reach
the statutory threshold, we do not
believe this proposed rule imposes
unfunded mandates on state, local, and
tribal governments or the private sector.
We welcome comments on these
conclusions.
6. Executive Order 13771 Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
Executive Order 13771 (January 30,
2017) requires that the costs associated
with significant new regulations ‘‘to the
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extent permitted by law, be offset by the
elimination of existing costs associated
with at least two prior regulations.’’ The
Department believes that this rule is a
significant regulatory action as defined
by Executive Order 12866 which
imposes costs, and therefore is
considered a regulatory action under
Executive Order 13771. The Department
estimates that this rule generates $275
million in annualized costs at a 7%
discount rate, discounted relative to
2016, over a perpetual time horizon.
OMB reviewed this proposed rule.
List of Subjects
§ 170.102
45 CFR Part 170
Computer technology, Electronic
health record, Electronic information
system, Electronic transactions, Health,
Health care, Health information
technology, Health insurance, Health
records, Hospitals, Incorporation by
reference, Laboratories, Medicaid,
Medicare, Privacy, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Public
health, Security.
45 CFR Part 171
Computer technology, Electronic
health record, Electronic information
system, Electronic transactions, Health,
Health care, Health care provider,
Health information exchange, Health
information technology, Health
information network, Health insurance,
Health records, Hospitals, Privacy,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Public health, Security.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, 45 CFR subtitle A, subchapter
D, is proposed to be amended as
follows:
PART 170—HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS,
IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFICATIONS,
AND CERTIFICATION CRITERIA AND
CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS FOR
HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY
1. The authority citation for part 170
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 300jj–11; 42 U.S.C
300jj–14; 5 U.S.C. 552.
■
2. Revise § 170.101 to read as follows:
§ 170.101
Applicability.
The standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria
adopted in this part apply to Health IT
Modules and the testing and
certification of such Health IT Modules.
■ 3. Amend § 170.102 as follows:
■ a. Remove the definitions of ‘‘2014
Edition Base EHR’’, and ‘‘2014 Edition
EHR certification criteria’’;
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b. Amend the definition of ‘‘2015
Edition Base EHR’’ by revising
paragraph (3);
■ c. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions for ‘‘API Data Provider’’,
‘‘API Technology Supplier’’, and ‘‘API
User’’;
■ d. Remove the definitions of
‘‘Common Clinical Data Set’’, and
‘‘Complete EHR, 2014 Edition’’; and
■ e. Add, in alphabetical order, the
definitions for ‘‘Fee’’, ‘‘Interoperability’’,
and ‘‘Interoperability element’’.
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
■
Sfmt 4702
*
*
Definitions.
*
*
*
2015 Edition Base EHR * * *
(3) Has been certified to the
certification criteria adopted by the
Secretary in—
(i) Section 170.315(a)(1), (2), or (3);
(5); (9); (14); (b)(1); (c)(1); (g)(7) and (9);
and (h)(1) or (2);
(ii) Section 170.315(g)(8) or (10) until
[24 months from the final rule’s
effective date]; and
(iii) Section 170.315(b)(10) and (g)(10)
on and after [24 months from the final
rule’s effective date].
*
*
*
*
*
API Data Provider refers to the
organization that deploys the API
technology created by the ‘‘API
Technology Supplier’’ and provides
access via the API technology to data it
produces and electronically manages. In
some cases, the API Data Provider may
contract with the API Technology
Supplier to perform the API deployment
service on its behalf. However, in such
circumstances, the API Data Provider
retains control of what and how
information is disclosed and so for the
purposes of this definition is considered
to be the entity that deploys the API
technology.
API Technology Supplier refers to a
health IT developer that creates the API
technology that is presented for testing
and certification to any of the
certification criteria adopted or
proposed for adoption at § 170.315(g)(7)
through (11).
API User refers to persons and entities
that use or create software applications
that interact with the APIs developed by
the ‘‘API Technology Supplier’’ and
deployed by the ‘‘API Data Provider.’’
An API User includes, but is not limited
to, third-party software developers,
developers of software applications
used by API Data Providers, and
patients and health care providers that
use apps that connect to API technology
on their behalf.
*
*
*
*
*
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Fee is defined as it is in § 171.102 of
this subchapter.
*
*
*
*
*
Interoperability is, with respect to
health information technology, such
health information technology that—
(i) Enables the secure exchange of
electronic health information with, and
use of electronic health information
from, other health information
technology without special effort on the
part of the user;
(ii) Allows for complete access,
exchange, and use of all electronically
accessible health information for
authorized use under applicable state or
federal law; and
(iii) Does not constitute information
blocking as defined in § 171.103 of this
subchapter.
Interoperability element is defined as
it is in § 171.102 of this subchapter.
*
*
*
*
*
§ 170.200
[Amended]
[Amended]
5. Amend § 170.202 by removing and
reserving paragraph (a)(1).
■
§ 170.204
[Amended]
6. Amend § 170.204 by removing and
reserving paragraphs (b)(1) and (2), and
by removing paragraph (c).
■ 7. Amend § 170.205 as follows:
■ a. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(a)(1) and (2);
■ b. Add paragraph (a)(4)(i) and add and
reserve paragraph (a)(4)(ii);
■ c. Add paragraph (b)(1);
■ d. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(d)(2), (d)(3), (e)(3), (h)(1), (i)(1), and (j);
and
■ e. Add paragraphs (h)(3) and (k)(3).
The revisions read as follows:
■
§ 170.205 Content exchange standards
and implementation specifications for
exchanging electronic health information.
(a) * * *
(4) * * *
(i) Standard. HL7 CDA® R2
Implementation Guide: C–CDA
Templates for Clinical Notes R1
Companion Guide, Release 1
(incorporated by reference in § 170.299).
(ii) [Reserved]
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) Standard. National Council for
Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP),
Script Standard Implementation Guide,
Version 2017071 (incorporated by
reference in § 170.299).
*
*
*
*
*
(h) * * *
(3) CMS Implementation Guide for
Quality Reporting Document
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§ 170.207
[Amended]
8. Amend § 170.207 by removing and
reserving paragraphs (d)(2), (e)(2), (g)(1),
(h), and (j).
■
§ 170.210
[Amended]
9. Amend § 170.210 by removing and
reserving paragraphs (a)(1) and (c)(1).
■ 10. Add § 170.213 to read as follows:
■
§ 170.213 United States Core Data for
Interoperability
4. Amend § 170.200 by removing the
phrase ‘‘Complete EHRs and.’’
■
§ 170.202
Architecture Category I Hospital Quality
Reporting Implementation Guide for
2019 (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.299).
*
*
*
*
*
(k) * * *
(3) CMS Implementation Guide for
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category III Eligible
Clinicians and Eligible Professionals
Programs Implementation Guide for
2019 (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.299).
*
*
*
*
*
Standard. United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI), Version 1 (v1)
(incorporated by reference in § 170.299).
■ 11. Add § 170.215 to read as follows:
§ 170.215 Application Programming
Interface Standards.
The Secretary adopts the following
application programming interface (API)
standards and associated
implementation specifications:
(a)(1) Standard. HL7 Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) Draft
Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) 2
(v1.0.2–7202) (incorporated by reference
in § 170.299).
(2) Implementation specifications.
API Resource Collection in Health
(ARCH) Version 1 (incorporated by
reference in § 170.299).
(3) Implementation specifications—
FHIR profiles. Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide Version 1.0.0
(incorporated by reference in § 170.299).
(4) Implementation specifications—
FHIR server conformance. Argonaut
Data Query Implementation Guide
Server (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.299).
(5) Implementation specification—
Application authorization. HL7 SMART
Application Launch Framework
Implementation Guide Release 1.0.0,
including mandatory support for
‘‘refresh tokens,’’ ‘‘Standalone Launch,’’
and ‘‘EHR Launch’’ requirements
(incorporated by reference in § 170.299).
(b) Application authentication.
Standard. OpenID Connect Core 1.0
incorporating errata set 1 (incorporated
by reference in § 170.299).
(c)(1) Standard. HL7 Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR)
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7589
Release 3 Standard for Trial Use (STU)
3 (v3.0.1) (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.299).
(2) Implementation specification—
FHIR consent resources. HL7
Consent2Share FHIR Consent Profile
Design (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.299).
■ 12. Amend § 170.299 as follows:
■ a. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(c)(2), (3), (d)(2), (7), and (8);
■ b. Add paragraphs (e)(4) and (5);
■ c. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(f)(3), (6), (7), (10), and (11);
■ d. Add paragraphs (f)(30) through
(36);
■ e. Redesignate paragraphs (o) through
(r) and (g) through (n) as paragraphs (q)
through (t) and (h) through (o),
respectively;
■ f. Add new paragraph (g) and
paragraph (i)(4);
■ g. Remove and reserve newly
redesignated paragraph (k)(1);
■ h. Add paragraph (l)(3);
■ i. Remove and reserve newly
redesignated paragraph (m)(3);
■ j. Add paragraphs (n)(5) and (6);
■ k. Add new paragraph (p); and
■ l. Remove and reserve newly
redesignated paragraphs (s)(4), and (5).
The additions and revisions read as
follows:
§ 170.299
Incorporation by reference.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(4) CMS Implementation Guide for
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category I Hospital Quality
Reporting Implementation Guide for
2019, May 4, 2018, IBR approved for
§ 170.205(h).
(5) CMS Implementation Guide for
Quality Reporting Document
Architecture Category III Eligible
Clinicians and Eligible Professionals
Programs Implementation Guide for
2019, October 8, 2018, IBR approved for
§ 170.205(k).
(f) * * *
(30) HL7 CDA Release 2
Implementation Guide: C–CDA
Templates for Clinical Notes R1
Companion Guide, Release 1, March
2017, IBR approved for § 170.205(a).
(31) HL7 Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®)
Release 2.0, Draft Standard for Trial Use
(DSTU) Version 1.0.2–7202, October 24,
2015, IBR approved for § 170.215(a).
(32) HL7 Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resource Specification
(FHIR®) Release 3 Standard for Trial
Use (STU), Version 3.0.1, February 21,
2017, IBR approved for § 170.215(c).
(33) HL7 Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources Specification
(FHIR®) Release 4, Version 4.0.0,
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December 27, 2018, IBR approved for
§ 170.215.
(34) HL7 Implementation
Specification—FHIR Profile:
Consent2Share FHIR Consent Profile
Design, December 11, 2017, IBR
approved for § 170.215(c).
(35) HL7 CDA R2 Implementation
Guide: C–CDA Supplemental Templates
for Unique Device Identification (UDI)
for Implantable Medical Devices,
Release 1—US Realm, November 15,
2018, IBR approved for § 170.205.
(36) HL7 SMART Application Launch
Framework Implementation Guide
Release 1.0.0, November 13, 2018, IBR
approved for § 170.215(a).
(g) HL7® FHIR® Foundation. 3300
Washtenaw Avenue, Suite 227, Ann
Arbor, MI 48104; Telephone (734) 677–
7777 or https://www.fhir.org/.
(1) Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide. Version 1.0.0,
December 23, 2016, IBR approved for
§ 170.215(a).
(2) Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide Server, Version
1.0.2, December 15, 2016, IBR approved
for § 170.215(a).
*
*
*
*
*
(i) * * *
(4) OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client
Registration Protocol (RFC 7591), July
2015, IBR approved for § 170.215.
*
*
*
*
*
(l) * * *
(3) National Council for Prescription
Drug Programs (NCPDP), Script
Standard Implementation Guide,
Version 2017071 (Approval Date for
ANSI: July 28, 2017), IBR approved for
§ 170.205(b).
*
*
*
*
*
(n) * * *
(5) ONC United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI), Version 1 (v1),
February 11, 2019, IBR approved for
§ 170.213; available at https://
www.healthit.gov/USCDI.
(6) API Resource Collection in Health
(ARCH) Version 1, February 1, 2019,
IBR approved for § 170.215(a); available
at https://www.healthit.gov/ARCH.
*
*
*
*
*
(p) OpenID Foundation, 2400 Camino
Ramon, Suite 375, San Ramon, CA
94583, Telephone +1 925–275–6639,
https://openid.net/.
(1) OpenID Connect Core 1.0
Incorporating Errata Set 1, November 8,
2014, IBR approved for § 170.215(b).
(2) [Reserved]
*
*
*
*
*
§ 170.300
[Amended]
14. Amend § 170.300 in paragraphs (a)
and (c) by removing the phrase
‘‘Complete EHRs and’’.
■
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§ 170.314
[Removed and Reserved]
15. Remove and reserve § 170.314.
16. Amend § 170.315 as follows:
a. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(a)(6) through (8), (10); (11); and (13);
■ b. In paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(A)
introductory text, (b)(1)(ii)(A)(2), (3),
(b)(1)(ii)(B) and (C), remove the
reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(3) and
§ 170.205(a)(4)’’ and add in its place the
reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(3), (a)(4), and
(a)(4)(i)’’;
■ c. In paragraph (b)(1)(iii) introductory
text, remove the reference
‘‘§ 170.205(a)(4)’’ and add in its place
the reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(3), (a)(4),
and (a)(4)(i)’’;
■ d. Revise paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A);
■ e. In paragraph (b)(2)(i) and (ii),
remove the reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(3)
and § 170.205(a)(4)’’ and add in its place
the reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(3), (a)(4),
and (a)(4)(i)’’;
■ f. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(b)(4) through (8);
■ g. Revise paragraph (b)(9);
■ h. Add paragraphs (b)(10), (11), (12),
(13),
■ i. Revise paragraph (c)(3);
■ j. Add paragraphs (d)(12), and (13);
■ k. Revise paragraph (e)(1)(i)(A)(1);
■ l. In paragraph (e)(1)(i)(B)(1)(ii) and
(e)(1)(i)(B)(2) introductory text, remove
the reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(4)’’ and add
in its place the reference
‘‘§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i)’’;
■ m. Remove and reserve paragraph
(e)(1)(ii)(B);
■ n. Remove and reserve paragraph
(e)(2);
■ o. Revise paragraphs (f)(5)(iii)(B)(1),
(g)(6) introductory text, (g)(6)(i) and (iv);
■ p. Revise paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2)
by removing ‘‘EHR Incentive Programs’’
and adding in its place ‘‘Promoting
Interoperability Programs’’;
■ q. Revising paragraph (g)(3)(i);
■ r. In paragraphs (g)(6)(ii) and (iii),
Remove the reference ‘‘§ 170.205(a)(4)’’
and add in its place the reference
‘‘§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i)’’;
■ s. Revise paragraph (g)(6)(iv);
■ t. Remove paragraphs (g)(7)(ii)(A)(3);
■ u. Revise paragraph (g)(9)(i)(A);
■ v. Remove paragraph (g)(9)(ii)(A)(3);
and
■ w. Add paragraphs (g)(10) and (g)(11).
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
■
■
■
§ 170.315 2015 Edition health IT
certification criteria.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(iii) * * *
(A) The data classes expressed in the
standard in § 170.213 and, including as
specified for the following data:
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(1) Assessment and plan of treatment.
In accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
and Plan Section (V2)’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i);
or in accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
Section (V2)’’ and ‘‘Plan of Treatment
Section (V2)’’ of the standard specified
in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(2) Goals. In accordance with the
‘‘Goals Section’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(3) Health concerns. In accordance
with the ‘‘Health Concerns Section’’ of
the standard specified in § 170.205(a)(4)
and (a)(4)(i).
(4) Unique device identifier(s) for a
patient’s implantable device(s). In
accordance with the ‘‘Product Instance’’
in the ‘‘Procedure Activity Procedure
Section’’ of the standard specified in
§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
*
*
*
*
*
(4) [Reserved]
(5) [Reserved]
(6) [Reserved]
(7) [Reserved]
(8) [Reserved]
(9) Care plan. Enable a user to record,
change, access, create, and receive care
plan information in accordance with:
(i) The Care Plan document template,
including the Health Status Evaluations
and Outcomes Section and
Interventions Section (V2), in the
standard specified in § 170.205(a)(4);
and
(ii) The standard in § 170.205(a)(4)(i).
(10) Electronic health information
export. (i) Single patient electronic
health information export.
(A) Enable a user to timely create an
export file(s) with all of a single
patient’s electronic health information
the health IT produces and
electronically manages on that patient.
(B) A user must be able to execute this
capability at any time the user chooses
and without subsequent developer
assistance to operate.
(C) Limit the ability of users who can
create such export file(s) in at least one
of these two ways:
(1) To a specific set of identified
users.
(2) As a system administrative
function.
(D) The export file(s) created must be
electronic and in a computable format.
(E) The export file(s) format,
including its structure and syntax, must
be included with the exported file(s).
(ii) Database export. Create an export
of all the electronic health information
the health IT produces and
electronically manages.
(A) The export created must be
electronic and in a computable format.
(B) The export’s format, including its
structure and syntax must be included
with the export.
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(iii) Documentation. The export
format(s) used to support single patient
electronic health information export as
specified in paragraph (b)(10)(i) of this
section and database export as specified
in paragraph (b)(10)(ii) of this section
must be made available via a publicly
accessible hyperlink.
(11) Electronic prescribing. (i) Enable
a user to perform all of the following
prescription-related electronic
transactions in accordance with the
standard specified in § 170.205(b)(1)
and, at a minimum, the version of the
standard specified in § 170.207(d)(3) as
follows:
(A) Ask mailbox (GetMessage).
(B) Relay acceptance of transaction
(Status).
(C) Error response (Error).
(D) Create new prescriptions (NewRx,
NewRxRequest,
NewRxResponseDenied).
(E) Change prescriptions
(RxChangeRequest, RxChangeResponse).
(F) Renew prescriptions
(RxRenewalRequest,
RxRenewalResponse).
(G) Resupply (Resupply).
(H) Return receipt (Verify).
(I) Cancel prescriptions (CancelRx,
CancelRxResponse).
(J) Receive fill status notifications
(RxFill, RxFillIndicatorChange).
(K) Drug administration
(DrugAdministration).
(L) Transfer (RxTransferRequest,
RxTransferResponse,
RxTransferConfirm).
(M) Recertify (Recertification).
(N) Request and receive medication
history (RxHistoryRequest,
RxHistoryResponse).
(O) Complete risk evaluation and
mitigation strategy transactions
(REMSInitiationRequest,
REMSInitiationResponse,
REMSRequest, and REMSResponse).
(ii) For each transaction listed in
paragraph (b)(11)(i) of this section, the
technology must be able to receive and
transmit the reason for the prescription
using the diagnosis elements in DRU
Segment.
(iii) Optional. For each transaction
listed in paragraph (b)(11)(i) of this
section, the technology must be able to
receive and transmit the reason for the
prescription using the indication
elements in the SIG Segment.
(iv) Limit a user’s ability to prescribe
all oral liquid medications in only
metric standard units of mL (i.e., not cc).
(v) Always insert leading zeroes
before the decimal point for amounts
less than one and must not allow
trailing zeroes after a decimal point
when a user prescribes medications.
(12) Data segmentation for privacy—
send. Enable a user to create a summary
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record formatted in accordance with the
standard adopted in § 170.205(a)(4) and
(a)(4)(i) that is tagged as restricted at the
document, section, and entry (data
element) level and subject to restrictions
on re-disclosure according to the
standard adopted in § 170.205(o)(1).
(13) Data segmentation for privacy—
receive. Enable a user to:
(i) Receive a summary record that is
formatted in accordance with the
standard adopted in § 170.205(a)(4) and
(a)(4)(i) that is tagged as restricted at the
document, section, and entry (data
element) level and subject to restrictions
on re-disclosure according to the
standard adopted in § 170.205(o)(1); and
(ii) Preserve privacy markings to
ensure fidelity to the tagging based on
consent and with respect to sharing and
re-disclosure restrictions.
(c) * * *
(3) Clinical quality measures—report.
Enable a user to electronically create a
data file for transmission of clinical
quality measurement data in accordance
with the implementation specifications
specified in § 170.205(h)(3) and (k)(3).
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(12) Encrypt authentication
credentials. Health IT developers must
assess their Health IT Modules’
capabilities and make one of the
following attestations:
(i) ‘‘Yes.’’ Health IT Module encrypts
stored authentication credentials in
accordance with standards adopted in
§ 170.210(a)(2).
(ii) ‘‘No.’’ Health IT Module does not
encrypt stored authentication
credentials.
(13) Multi-factor Authentication.
Health IT developers must assess their
Health IT Modules’ capabilities and
make one of the following attestations:
(i) ‘‘Yes.’’ Health IT Module supports
authentication through multiple
elements the identity of the user with
industry recognized standards.
(ii) ‘‘No.’’ Health IT Module does not
support authentication through multiple
elements the identity of the user with
industry recognized standards.
(e) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) * * *
(1) The data classes expressed in the
standard in § 170.213 (which should be
in their English (i.e., non-coded)
representation if they associate with a
vocabulary/code set), including as
specified for the following data:
(i) Assessment and plan of treatment.
In accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
and Plan Section (V2)’’ of the standard
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specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i);
or in accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
Section (V2)’’ and ‘‘Plan of Treatment
Section (V2)’’ of the standard specified
in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(ii) Goals. In accordance with the
‘‘Goals Section’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(iii) Health concerns. In accordance
with the ‘‘Health Concerns Section’’ of
the standard specified in § 170.205(a)(4)
and (a)(4)(i).
(iv) Unique device identifier(s) for a
patient’s implantable device(s). In
accordance with the ‘‘Product Instance’’
in the ‘‘Procedure Activity Procedure
Section’’ of the standard specified in
§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
*
*
*
*
*
(ii) * * *
(B) [Reserved]
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(5) * * *
(iii) * * *
(B) * * *
(1) The data classes expressed in the
standard in § 170.213.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Design and performance—(1)
Automated numerator recording. For
each Promoting Interoperability
Programs percentage-based measure,
technology must be able to create a
report or file that enables a user to
review the patients or actions that
would make the patient or action
eligible to be included in the measure’s
numerator. The information in the
report or file created must be of
sufficient detail such that it enables a
user to match those patients or actions
to meet the measure’s denominator
limitations when necessary to generate
an accurate percentage.
(2) Automated measure Calculation.
For each Promoting Interoperability
Programs percentage-based measure that
is supported by a capability included in
a technology, record the numerator and
denominator and create a report
including the numerator, denominator,
and resulting percentage associated with
each applicable measure.
(3) * * *
(i) User-centered design processes
must be applied to each capability
technology includes that is specified in
the following certification criteria:
Paragraphs (a)(1) through (5), (9), and
(14); and (b)(2), (3), and (11).
*
*
*
*
*
(6) Consolidated CDA creation
performance. The following technical
and performance outcomes must be
demonstrated related to Consolidated
CDA creation. The capabilities required
under paragraphs (g)(6)(i) through (iv) of
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this section can be demonstrated in
tandem and do not need to be
individually addressed in isolation or
sequentially. This certification
criterion’s scope includes only the data
classes expressed in the standard in
§ 170.213.
(i) Reference C–CDA match. Create a
data file formatted in accordance with
the standard adopted in § 170.205(a)(4)
and (a)(4)(i) that matches a goldstandard, reference data file, including
as specified for the following data:
(A) Assessment and plan of treatment.
In accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
and Plan Section (V2)’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i);
or in accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
Section (V2)’’ and ‘‘Plan of Treatment
Section (V2)’’ of the standard specified
in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(B) Goals. In accordance with the
‘‘Goals Section’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(C) Health concerns. In accordance
with the ‘‘Health Concerns Section’’ of
the standard specified in § 170.205(a)(4)
and (a)(4)(i).
(D) Unique device identifier(s) for a
patient’s implantable device(s). In
accordance with the ‘‘Product Instance’’
in the ‘‘Procedure Activity Procedure
Section’’ of the standard specified in
§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
*
*
*
*
*
(iv) Completeness verification. Create
a data file for each of the applicable
document templates referenced in
paragraph (g)(6)(ii) of this section
without the omission of any of the data
classes expressed in the standard in
§ 170.213.
*
*
*
*
*
(8) [Reserved]
(9) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) Respond to requests for patient
data (based on an ID or other token) for
all of the data classes expressed in the
standard in § 170.213 at one time and
return such data (according to the
specified standards, where applicable)
in a summary record formatted
according to the standard specified in
§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i) following
the CCD document template, including
as specified for the following data:
(1) Assessment and plan of treatment.
In accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
and Plan Section (V2)’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i);
or in accordance with the ‘‘Assessment
Section (V2)’’ and ‘‘Plan of Treatment
Section (V2)’’ of the standard specified
in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
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(2) Goals. In accordance with the
‘‘Goals Section’’ of the standard
specified in § 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(3) Health concerns. In accordance
with the ‘‘Health Concerns Section’’ of
the standard specified in § 170.205(a)(4)
and (a)(4)(i).
(4) Unique device identifier(s) for a
patient’s implantable device(s). In
accordance with the ‘‘Product Instance’’
in the ‘‘Procedure Activity Procedure
Section’’ of the standard specified in
§ 170.205(a)(4) and (a)(4)(i).
(10) Standardized API for patient and
population services. The following
technical outcomes and conditions must
be met through the demonstration of
application programming interface
technology.
(i) Data response. Respond to requests
for data (based on an ID or other token)
for each of the resources referenced by
the standard adopted in § 170.215(a)(1)
and implementation specifications
adopted in § 170.215(a)(2) and (3).
(ii) Search support. Respond to search
requests for data consistent with the
search criteria included in the
implementation specification adopted
in § 170.215(a)(4).
(iii) App registration. Enable an
application to register with the
technology’s ‘‘authorization server.’’
(iv) Secure connection. Establish a
secure and trusted connection with an
application that requests data in
accordance with the standard adopted
in § 170.215(a)(5).
(v) Authentication and app
authorization—1st time connection. The
first time an application connects to
request data the technology:
(A) Authentication. Demonstrates that
user authentication occurs during the
process of authorizing the application to
access FHIR resources in accordance
with the standard adopted in
§ 170.215(b).
(B) App authorization. Demonstrates
that a user can authorize applications to
access a single patient’s data as well as
multiple patients data in accordance
with the implementation specification
adopted in § 170.215(a)(5) and issue a
refresh token that is valid for a period
of at least 3 months.
(vi) Authentication and app
authorization—Subsequent connections.
Demonstrates that an application can
access a single patient’s data as well as
multiple patients data in accordance
with the implementation specification
adopted in § 170.215(a)(5) without
requiring re-authorization and reauthentication when a valid refresh
token is supplied and issue a new
refresh token for new period no shorter
than 3 months.
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(vii) Documentation. (A) The API(s)
must include complete accompanying
documentation that contains, at a
minimum:
(1) API syntax, function names,
required and optional parameters
supported and their data types, return
variables and their types/structures,
exceptions and exception handling
methods and their returns.
(2) The software components and
configurations that would be necessary
for an application to implement in order
to be able to successfully interact with
the API and process its response(s).
(3) All applicable technical
requirements and attributes necessary
for an application to be registered with
an authorization server.
(B) The documentation used to meet
paragraph (g)(10)(vii)(A) of this section
must be available via a publicly
accessible hyperlink.
(11) Consent management for APIs. (i)
Respond to requests for data in
accordance with:
(A) The standard adopted in
§ 170.215(c)(1); and
(B) The implementation specification
adopted in § 170.215(c)(2).
(ii) Documentation. (A) The API(s)
must include complete accompanying
documentation that contains, at a
minimum:
(1) API syntax, function names,
required and optional parameters
supported and their data types, return
variables and their types/structures,
exceptions and exception handling
methods and their returns.
(2) The software components and
configurations that would be necessary
for an application to implement in order
to be able to successfully interact with
the API and process its response(s).
(3) All applicable technical
requirements and attributes necessary
for an application to be registered with
an authorization server.
(B) The documentation used to meet
paragraph (g)(11)(ii)(A) of this section
must be available via a publicly
accessible hyperlink.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 17. Add subpart D to part 170 to read
as follows:
Subpart D—Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification for Health IT Developers
Sec.
170.400 Basis and scope.
170.401 Information blocking.
170.402 Assurances.
170.403 Communications.
170.404 Application programming
interfaces.
170.405 Real world testing.
170.406 Attestations.
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Subpart D—Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification for Health
IT Developers
§ 170.400
Basis and scope.
This subpart implements section
3001(c)(5)(D) of the Public Health
Service Act by setting forth certain
Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements for health IT
developers participating in the ONC
Health IT Certification Program.
§ 170.401
Information blocking.
(a) Condition of Certification. A health
IT developer must not take any action
that constitutes information blocking as
defined in 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52 and
§ 171.103.
(b) Maintenance of Certification.
[Reserved]
§ 170.402
Assurances.
(a) Condition of Certification. (1) A
health IT developer must provide
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary
that the health IT developer will not
take any action that constitutes
information blocking as defined in 42
U.S.C. 300jj–52 and § 171.103, unless
for legitimate purposes specified by the
Secretary; or any other action that may
inhibit the appropriate exchange,
access, and use of electronic health
information.
(2) A health IT developer must ensure
that its health IT certified under the
ONC Health IT Certification Program
conforms to the full scope of the
certification criteria.
(3) A health IT developer must not
take any action that could interfere with
a user’s ability to access or use certified
capabilities for any purpose within the
scope of the technology’s certification.
(4) A health IT developer that
manages electronic health information
must certify health IT to the certification
criterion in § 170.315(b)(10).
(b) Maintenance of Certification. (1) A
health IT developer must retain all
records and information necessary to
demonstrate initial and ongoing
compliance with the requirements of the
ONC Health IT Certification Program
for:
(i) A period of 10 years beginning
from the date each of a developer’s
health IT is first certified under the
Program; or
(ii) If for a shorter period of time, a
period of 3 years from the effective date
that removes all of the certification
criteria to which the developer’s health
IT is certified from the Code of Federal
Regulations.
(2) A health IT developer that must
comply with the requirements of
paragraph (a)(4) of this section must
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provide all of its customers of certified
health IT with the health IT certified to
the certification criterion in
§ 170.315(b)(10) within 24 months of
this final rule’s effective date or within
12 months of certification for a health IT
developer that never previously
certified health IT to the 2015 Edition,
whichever is longer.
§ 170.403
Communications.
(a) Condition of Certification. (1) A
health IT developer may not prohibit or
restrict the communication regarding—
(i) The usability of its health IT;
(ii) The interoperability of its health
IT;
(iii) The security of its health IT;
(iv) Relevant information regarding
users’ experiences when using its health
IT;
(v) The business practices of
developers of health IT related to
exchanging electronic health
information; and
(vi) The manner in which a user of the
health IT has used such technology.
(2) A health IT developer must not
engage in any practice that prohibits or
restricts a communication regarding the
subject matters enumerated in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section, unless
the practice is specifically permitted by
this paragraph and complies with all
applicable requirements of this
paragraph.
(i) Unqualified protection for certain
communications. A health IT developer
must not prohibit or restrict any person
or entity from communicating any
information or materials whatsoever
(including proprietary information,
confidential information, and
intellectual property) when the
communication is about one or more of
the subject matters enumerated in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section and is
made for any of the following
purposes—
(A) Making a disclosure required by
law;
(B) Communicating information about
adverse events, hazards, and other
unsafe conditions to government
agencies, health care accreditation
organizations, and patient safety
organizations;
(C) Communicating information about
cybersecurity threats and incidents to
government agencies;
(D) Communicating information about
information blocking and other
unlawful practices to government
agencies; or
(E) Communicating information about
a health IT developer’s failure to comply
with a Condition of Certification, or
with any other requirement of this part,
to ONC or an ONC–ACB.
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(ii) Permitted prohibitions and
restrictions. For communications about
one or more of the subject matters
enumerated in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section that is not entitled to
unqualified protection under paragraph
(a)(2)(i) of this section, a health IT
developer may prohibit or restrict
communications only as expressly
permitted by paragraphs (a)(2)(ii)(A)
through (F) of this section.
(A) Developer employees and
contractors. A health IT developer may
prohibit or restrict the communications
of the developer’s employees or
contractors.
(B) Non-user-facing aspects of health
IT. A health IT developer may prohibit
or restrict communications that disclose
information about non-user-facing
aspects of the developer’s health IT.
(C) Intellectual property. A health IT
developer may prohibit or restrict
communications that would infringe the
intellectual property rights existing in
the developer’s health IT (including
third-party rights), provided that—
(1) A health IT developer does not
prohibit or restrict, or purport to
prohibit or restrict, communications
that would be a fair use of a copyright
work; and
(2) A health IT developer does not
prohibit the communication of
screenshots of the developer’s health IT,
subject to the limited restrictions
described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(D) of
this section.
(D) Screenshots. A health IT
developer may require persons who
communicate screenshots to—
(1) Not alter screenshots, except to
annotate the screenshot, resize it, or to
redact the screenshot in accordance
with § 170.403(a)(2)(ii)(D)(3) or to
conceal protected health information;
(2) Not infringe the intellectual
property rights of any third parties,
provided that—
(i) The developer has used all
reasonable endeavors to secure a license
(including the right to sublicense) in
respect to the use of the third-party
rights by communicators for purposes of
the communications protected by this
Condition of Certification;
(ii) The developer does not prohibit or
restrict, or purport to prohibit or restrict,
communications that would be a fair
use of a copyright work;
(iii) The developer has put all
potential communicators on sufficient
written notice of each aspect of its
screen display that contains third-party
content that cannot be communicated
because the reproduction would
infringe the third-party’s intellectual
property rights; and
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(iv) Communicators are permitted to
communicate screenshots that have
been redacted to not disclose third-party
content; and
(3) Redact protected health
information, unless the individual has
provided all necessary consents or
authorizations or the communicator is
otherwise authorized, permitted, or
required by law to disclose the
protected health information.
(E) Pre-market testing and
development. A health IT developer
may prohibit or restrict communications
that disclose information or knowledge
solely acquired in the course of
participating in pre-market product
development and testing activities
carried out for the benefit of the
developer or for the joint benefit of the
developer and communicator. A
developer must not, once the subject
health IT is released or marketed for
purposes other than product
development and testing, and subject to
the permitted prohibitions and
restrictions described in paragraph
(a)(2)(ii) of this section, prohibit or
restrict communications about matters
enumerated in paragraph (a)(1) of this
section.
(b) Maintenance of Certification. (1)
Notice. Health IT developers must issue
a written notice to all customers and
those with which it has agreements
containing provisions that contravene
paragraph (a) of this section:
(i) Within six months of the effective
date of the final rule that any
communication or contract provision
that contravenes paragraph (a) of this
section will not be enforced by the
health IT developer.
(ii) Within one year of the final rule,
and annually thereafter until paragraph
(b)(2)(ii) of this section is fulfilled, that
any communication or contract
provision that contravenes paragraph (a)
of this section will not be enforced by
the health IT developer.
(2) Contracts and agreements. (i) A
health IT developer must not establish
or enforce any contract or agreement
that contravenes paragraph (a) of this
section.
(ii) If a health IT developer has a
contract or agreement in existence at the
time of the effective date of this final
rule that contravenes paragraph (a) of
this section, then the developer must in
a reasonable period of time, but not later
than two years from the effective date of
this rule, amend the contract or
agreement to remove or void the
contractual provision that contravenes
paragraph (a) of this section.
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§ 170.404 Application programming
interfaces.
The following Condition of
Certification applies to developers of
Health IT Modules certified to any of
the certification criteria adopted in
§ 170.315(g)(7) through (11).
(a) Condition of Certification. (1)
General. An API Technology Supplier
must publish APIs and must allow
health information from such
technology to be accessed, exchanged,
and used without special effort through
the use of APIs or successor technology
or standards, as provided for under
applicable law, including providing
access to all data elements of a patient’s
electronic health record to the extent
permissible under applicable privacy
laws.
(2) Transparency conditions. (i)
General. The business and technical
documentation published by an API
Technology Supplier must be complete.
All documentation published pursuant
to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section
must be published via a publicly
accessible hyperlink that allows any
person to directly access the
information without any preconditions
or additional steps.
(ii) Terms and conditions. (A)
Material information. The API
Technology Supplier must publish all
terms and conditions for its API
technology, including any fees,
restrictions, limitations, obligations,
registration process requirements, or
other similar requirements that would
be needed to:
(1) Develop software applications to
interact with the API technology;
(2) Distribute, deploy, and enable the
use of software applications in
production environments that use the
API technology;
(3) Use software applications,
including to access, exchange, and use
electronic health information by means
of the API technology;
(4) Use any electronic health
information obtained by means of the
API technology; and
(5) Register software applications.
(B) API fees. Any and all fees charged
by an API Technology Supplier for the
use of its API technology must be
described in detailed, plain language.
The description of the fees must include
all material information, including but
not limited to:
(1) The persons or classes of persons
to whom the fee applies;
(2) The circumstances in which the
fee applies; and
(3) The amount of the fee, which for
variable fees must include the specific
variable(s) and methodology(ies) that
will be used to calculate the fee.
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(C) Application developer verification.
An API Technology Supplier is
permitted to institute a process to verify
the authenticity of application
developers so long as such process is
objective and the same for all
application developers and completed
within 5 business days of receipt of an
application developer’s request to
register their software application for
use with the API Technology Supplier’s
API technology.
(3) Permitted fees conditions. (i)
General conditions. (A) All fees related
to API technology not otherwise
permitted by this section are prohibited
from being imposed by an API
Technology Supplier.
(B) For all permitted fees, an API
Technology Supplier must:
(1) Ensure that fees are based on
objective and verifiable criteria that are
uniformly applied for all substantially
similar or similarly situated classes of
persons and requests.
(2) Ensure that fees imposed on API
Data Providers are reasonably related to
the API Technology Supplier’s costs of
supplying and, if applicable, supporting
API technology to, or at the request of,
the API Data Provider to whom the fee
is charged.
(3) Ensure that the costs of supplying
and, if applicable, supporting the API
technology upon which the fee is based
are reasonably allocated among all
customers to whom the API technology
is supplied, or for whom the API
technology is supported.
(4) Ensure that fees are not based in
any part on whether the requestor or
other person is a competitor, potential
competitor, or will be using the API
technology in a way that facilitates
competition with the API Technology
Supplier.
(ii) Permitted fee—Development,
deployment, and upgrades. An API
Technology Supplier is permitted to
charge fees to an API Data Provider to
recover the costs reasonably incurred by
the API Technology Supplier to
develop, deploy, and upgrade API
technology for the API Data Provider.
(iii) Permitted fee—Supporting API
uses for purposes other than patient
access. An API Technology Supplier is
permitted to charge fees to an API Data
Provider to recover the incremental
costs reasonably incurred by the API
Technology Supplier to support the use
of API technology deployed by or on
behalf of the API Data Provider. This
permitted fee does not include:
(A) Any costs incurred by the API
Technology Supplier to support uses of
the API technology that facilitate a
patient’s ability to access, exchange, or
use their electronic health information;
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(B) Costs associated with intangible
assets (including depreciation or loss of
value), except the actual development or
acquisition costs of such assets; or
(C) Opportunity costs, except for the
reasonable forward-looking cost of
capital.
(iv) Permitted fee—Value-added
services. An API Technology Supplier is
permitted to charge fees to an API User
for value-added services supplied in
connection with software that can
interact with the API technology,
provided that such services are not
necessary to efficiently and effectively
develop and deploy such software.
(v) Record-keeping requirements. An
API Technology Supplier must keep for
inspection detailed records of any fees
charged with respect to the API
technology, the methodology(ies) used
to calculate such fees, and the specific
costs to which such fees are attributed.
(4) Openness and pro-competitive
conditions. General condition. An API
Technology Supplier must grant an API
Data Provider the sole authority and
autonomy to permit API Users to
interact with the API technology
deployed by the API Data Provider.
(i) Non-discrimination. (A) An API
Technology Suppler must provide API
technology to API Data Providers on
terms that are no less favorable than it
provides to itself and its own customers,
suppliers, partners, and other persons
with whom it has a business
relationship.
(B) The terms on which an API
Technology Supplier provides API
technology must be based on objective
and verifiable criteria that are uniformly
applied for all substantially similar or
similarly situated classes of persons and
requests.
(C) An API Technology Supplier must
not offer different terms or service on
the basis of:
(1) Whether the API User with whom
an API Data Provider has a relationship
is a competitor, potential competitor, or
will be using electronic health
information obtained via the API
technology in a way that facilitates
competition with the API Technology
Supplier.
(2) The revenue or other value the API
User with whom an API Data Provider
has a relationship may derive from
access, exchange, or use of electronic
health information obtained by means of
API technology.
(ii) Rights to access and use API
technology. (A) An API Technology
Supplier must have and, upon request,
must grant to API Data Providers and
their API Users all rights that may be
reasonably necessary to access and use
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API technology in a production
environment, including:
(1) For the purposes of developing
products or services that are designed to
be interoperable with the API
Technology Supplier’s health
information technology or with health
information technology under the API
Technology Supplier’s control;
(2) Any marketing, offering, and
distribution of interoperable products
and services to potential customers and
users that would be needed for the API
technology to be used in a production
environment; and
(3) Enabling the use of the
interoperable products or services in
production environments, including
accessing and enabling the exchange
and use of electronic health
information.
(B) An API Technology Supplier must
not condition any of the rights described
in paragraph (a)(4)(ii)(A) of this section
on the requirement that the recipient of
the rights do, or agree to do, any of the
following:
(1) Pay a fee to license such rights,
including but not limited to a license
fee, royalty, or revenue-sharing
arrangement.
(2) Not compete with the API
Technology Supplier in any product,
service, or market.
(3) Deal exclusively with the API
Technology Supplier in any product,
service, or market.
(4) Obtain additional licenses,
products, or services that are not related
to or can be unbundled from the API
technology.
(5) License, grant, assign, or transfer
any intellectual property to the API
Technology Supplier.
(6) Meet additional developer or
product certification requirements.
(7) Provide the API Technology
Supplier or its technology with
reciprocal access to application data.
(iii) Service and support obligations.
An API Technology Supplier must
provide all support and other services
reasonably necessary to enable the
effective development, deployment, and
use of API technology by API Data
Providers and their API Users in
production environments.
(A) Changes and updates to API
technology. An API Technology
Supplier must make reasonable efforts
to maintain the compatibility of its API
technology and to otherwise avoid
disrupting the use of API technology in
production environments.
(B) Changes to terms and conditions.
Except as exigent circumstances require,
prior to making changes or updates to
its API technology or to the terms and
conditions thereof, an API Technology
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Supplier must provide notice and a
reasonable opportunity for its API Data
Provider customers and registered
application developers to update their
applications to preserve compatibility
with API technology and to comply
with applicable terms and conditions.
(b) Maintenance of Certification. (1)
Registration for production use. An API
Technology Supplier with health IT
certified to the certification criterion
adopted in § 170.315(g)(10) must
register and enable all applications for
production use within 1 business day of
completing its verification of an
application developer’s authenticity,
pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(C) of this
section.
(2) Service Base URL publication. API
Technology Supplier must support the
publication of Service Base URLs for all
of its customers, regardless of those that
are centrally managed by the API
Technology Supplier or locally
deployed by an API Data Provider, and
make such information publicly
available (in a computable format) at no
charge.
(3) Rollout of (g)(10)-Certified APIs.
An API Technology Supplier with API
technology previously certified to the
certification criterion in § 170.315(g)(8)
must provide all API Data Providers
with such API technology deployed
with API technology certified to the
certification criterion in § 170.315(g)(10)
within 24 months of this final rule’s
effective date.
§ 170.405
Real world testing.
(a) Condition of Certification. A health
IT developer with Health IT Modules to
be certified to any one or more 2015
Edition certification criteria in
§ 170.315(b), (c)(1) through (3), (e)(1), (f),
(g)(7) through (11), and (h) must
successfully test the real world use of
those Health IT Module(s) for
interoperability (as defined in 42 U.S.C.
300jj(9) and § 170.102) in the type of
setting in which such Health IT
Module(s) would be/is marketed.
(b) Maintenance of Certification. (1)
Real world testing plan submission. A
health IT developer must submit an
annual real world testing plan to its
ONC–ACB via a publicly accessible
hyperlink no later than December 15 of
each calendar year for each of its
certified 2015 Edition Health IT
Modules that include certification
criteria referenced in paragraph (a) of
this section.
(i) The plan must be approved by a
health IT developer authorized
representative capable of binding the
health IT developer for execution of the
plan and include the representative’s
contact information.
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(ii) The plan must include all health
IT certified to the 2015 Edition through
August 31st of the preceding year.
(iii) The plan must address the
following for each of the certification
criteria identified in paragraph (a) of
this section that are included in the
Health IT Module’s scope of
certification:
(A) The testing method(s)/
methodology(ies) that will be used to
demonstrate real world interoperability
and conformance to the certification
criteria’s requirements, including
scenario- and use case-focused testing;
(B) The care setting(s) that will be
tested for real world interoperability
and an explanation for the health IT
developer’s choice of care setting(s) to
test;
(C) The timeline and plans for any
voluntary updates to standards and
implementation specifications that the
National Coordinator has approved
through the Standards Version
Advancement Process.
(D) A schedule of key real world
testing milestones;
(E) A description of the expected
outcomes of real world testing;
(F) At least one measurement/metric
associated with the real world testing;
and
(G) A justification for the health IT
developer’s real world testing approach.
(2) Real world testing results
reporting. A health IT developer must
submit real world testing results to its
ONC–ACB via a publicly accessible
hyperlink no later than January 31 each
calendar year for each of its certified
2015 Edition Health IT Modules that
include certification criteria referenced
in paragraph (a) of this section. The real
world testing results must report the
following for each of the certification
criteria identified in paragraph (a) of
this section that are included in the
Health IT Module’s scope of
certification:
(i) The method(s) that was used to
demonstrate real world interoperability;
(ii) The care setting(s) that was tested
for real world interoperability;
(iii) The voluntary updates to
standards and implementation
specifications that the National
Coordinator has approved through the
Standards Version Advancement
Process.
(iv) A list of the key milestones met
during real world testing;
(v) The outcomes of real world testing
including a description of any
challenges encountered during real
world testing; and
(vi) At least one measurement/metric
associated with the real world testing.
(3) USCDI Updates for C–CDA. A
health IT developer with health IT
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certified to § 170.315(b)(1), (e)(1), (g)(6),
(f)(5), and/or (g)(9) prior to the effective
date of this final rule must:
(i) Update their certified health IT to
be compliant with the revised versions
of these criteria adopted in this final
rule; and
(ii) Provide its customers of the
previously certified health IT with
certified health IT that meets paragraph
(b)(3)(i) of this section within 24 months
of the effective date of this final rule.
(4) C–CDA Companion Guide
Updates. A health IT developer with
health IT certified to § 170.315(b)(1),
(b)(2), (b)(9), (e)(1), (g)(6), and/or (g)(9)
prior to the effective date of this final
rule must:
(i) Update their certified health IT to
be compliant with the revised versions
of these criteria adopted in this final
rule; and
(ii) Provide its customers of the
previously certified health IT with
certified health IT that meets paragraph
(b)(4)(i) of this section within 24 months
of the effective date of this final rule.
(5) Voluntary standards and
implementation specifications updates.
A health IT developer subject to
paragraph (a) of this section that
voluntary updates its certified health IT
to a new version of an adopted standard
that is approved by the National
Coordinator through the Standards
Version Advancement Process must:
(i) Provide advance notice to all
affected customers and its ONC–ACB—
(A) Expressing its intent to update the
software to the more advanced version
of the standard approved by the
National Coordinator;
(B) The developer’s expectations for
how the update will affect
interoperability of the affected Health IT
Module as it is used in the real world;
(C) Whether the developer intends to
continue to support the certificate for
the existing certified Health IT Module
version for some period of time and how
long or if the existing certified Health IT
Module version will be deprecated; and
(ii) Successfully demonstrate
conformance with approved more recent
versions of the standard(s) or
implementation specification(s)
included in applicable 2015 Edition
certification criterion specified in
paragraph (a) of this section.
§ 170.406
Attestations.
(a) Condition of Certification. A health
IT developer must provide the Secretary
with an attestation of compliance with
the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements specified in
§§ 170.401 through 170.405 at the time
of certification. Specifically, a health IT
developer must attest to:
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(1) Having not taken any action that
constitutes information blocking as
defined in 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52 and
§ 171.103;
(2) Having provided assurances
satisfactory to the Secretary that they
will not take any action that constitutes
information blocking as defined in 42
U.S.C. 300jj–52 and § 171.103, unless
for legitimate purposes specified by the
Secretary; or any other action that may
inhibit the appropriate exchange,
access, and use of electronic health
information;
(3) Not prohibiting or restricting the
communications regarding—
(i) The usability of its health IT;
(ii) The interoperability of its health
IT;
(iii) The security of its health IT;
(iv) Relevant information regarding
users’ experiences when using its health
IT;
(v) The business practices of
developers of health IT related to
exchanging electronic health
information; and
(vi) The manner in which a user of the
health IT has used such technology; and
(4) Having published application
programming interfaces (APIs) and
allowing health information from such
technology to be accessed, exchanged,
and used without special effort through
the use of application programming
interfaces or successor technology or
standards, as provided for under
applicable law, including providing
access to all data elements of a patient’s
electronic health record to the extent
permissible under applicable privacy
laws;
(5) Ensuring that its health IT allows
for health information to be exchanged,
accessed, and used, in the manner
described in paragraph (a)(4) of this
section; and
(6) Having undertaken real world
testing of its Health IT Module(s) for
interoperability (as defined in 42 U.S.C.
300jj(9)) in the type of setting in which
such Health IT Module(s) will be/is
marketed.
(b) Maintenance of Certification. (1) A
health IT developer must attest to
compliance with §§ 170.401 through
170.405 at the time of certification.
(2) A health IT developer must attest
semiannually to compliance with
§§ 170.401 through 170.405 for all its
health IT that had an active certification
at any time under the ONC Health IT
Certification Program during the prior
six months.
§ 170.501
[Amended]
18. Amend § 170.501 as follows:
a. In paragraph (a) remove the phrase
‘‘Complete EHRs’’;
■
■
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b. In paragraph (b) remove the phrase
‘‘Complete EHRs and’’; and
■ c. Remove and reserve paragraph (c).
■
§ 170.502
[Amended]
19. Amend § 170.502 as follows:
a. In the definition of ‘‘Deployment
site’’, remove the phrase ‘‘Complete
EHR,’’;
■ b. In the definition of ‘‘Development
site’’, remove the phrase ‘‘Complete
EHR,’’;
■ c. In the definition of ‘‘Gap
certification’’, remove the phrase
‘‘Complete EHR or’’;
■ d. Remove the definition of ‘‘ONCApproved Accreditor or ONC–AA’’;
■ e. In the definition of ‘‘ONCAuthorized Certification Body or ONC–
ACB’’, remove the phrase ‘‘Complete
EHRs,’’; and
■ f. In the definition of ‘‘ONCAuthorized Testing Lab or ONC–ATL’’,
remove the phrase ‘‘Complete EHRs
and’’.
■
■
§ 170.503
■
[Removed and Reserved]
20. Remove and reserve § 170.503.
§ 170.504
[Removed and Reserved]
21. Remove and reserve § 170.504.
22. Revise § 170.505 to read as
follows:
■
■
§ 170.505
Correspondence.
(a) Correspondence and
communication with ONC or the
National Coordinator shall be conducted
by email, unless otherwise necessary or
specified. The official date of receipt of
any email between ONC or the National
Coordinator and an applicant for ONC–
ACB status, an applicant for ONC–ATL
status, an ONC–ACB, an ONC–ATL,
health IT developer, or a party to any
proceeding under this subpart is the
date on which the email was sent.
(b) In circumstances where it is
necessary for an applicant for ONC–
ACB status, an applicant for ONC–ATL
status, an ONC–ACB, an ONC–ATL,
health IT developer, or a party to any
proceeding under this subpart to
correspond or communicate with ONC
or the National Coordinator by regular,
express, or certified mail, the official
date of receipt for all parties will be the
date of the delivery confirmation to the
address on record.
§ 170.510
[Amended]
23. Amend § 170.510 by removing
paragraph (a) and redesignating
paragraphs (b) and (c) as paragraphs (a)
and (b).
■ 24. Amend § 170.520 by revising
paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:
■
§ 170.520
Application.
(a) * * *
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(3) Documentation that confirms that
the applicant has been accredited to
ISO/IEC 17065, with an appropriate
scope, by any accreditation body that is
a signatory to the Multilateral
Recognition Arrangement (MLA) with
the International Accreditation Forum
(IAF) (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.599).
*
*
*
*
*
■ 25. Amend § 170.523 as follows:
■ a. Revise paragraph (a);
■ b. In paragraph (f) introductory text,
add a header and remove the phrase,
‘‘Complete EHRs,’’;
■ c. Removing and reserve paragraph
(f)(2);
■ d. Revise paragraphs (g) and (h);
■ e. In paragraph (k) introductory text,
remove the phrase ‘‘Complete EHRs
and’’;
■ f. In paragraph (k)(1) introductory
text, add a header and remove the
phrase ‘‘Complete EHR or’’;
■ g. Remove paragraphs (k)(1)(ii)(B), and
(k)(1)(iii)(B);
■ h. Revise paragraph (k)(1)(iii)(A);
■ i. Remove paragraphs (k)(1)(iv)(B) and
(C);
■ j. Remove and reserve paragraphs
(k)(2) and (3);
■ k. Revise paragraph (k)(4);
■ l. Revise paragraphs (m)(1) and (2);
■ m. Add paragraphs (m)(3) and (4));
■ n. In paragraph (o), remove the phrase
‘‘Complete EHR or’’; and
■ o. Add paragraphs (p) through (t).
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
§ 170.523 Principles of proper conduct for
ONC–ACBs.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) Accreditation. Maintain its
accreditation in good standing to ISO/
IEC 17065 (incorporated by reference in
§ 170.599).
*
*
*
*
*
(f) Reporting. * * *
(2) [Reserved]
(g) Records retention. (1) Retain all
records related to the certification of
Complete EHRs and Health IT Modules
to an edition of certification criteria
beginning with the codification of an
edition of certification criteria in the
Code of Federal Regulations through a
minimum of 3 years from the effective
date that removes the applicable edition
from the Code of Federal Regulations;
and
(2) Make the records available to HHS
upon request during the retention
period described in paragraph (g)(1) of
this section;
(h) Testing. Only certify Health IT
Modules that have been:
(1) Tested, using test tools and test
procedures approved by the National
Coordinator, by an:
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7597
(i) ONC–ATL;
(ii) ONC–ATL, NVLAP-accredited
testing laboratory under the ONC Health
IT Certification Program, and/or an
ONC–ATCB for the purposes of
performing gap certification; or
(2) Evaluated by it for compliance
with a conformance method approved
by the National Coordinator.
*
*
*
*
*
(k) Disclosures. * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) For a Health IT Module certified
to 2015 Edition health IT certification
criteria, the information specified by
paragraphs (f)(1)(i), (vi) through (viii),
(xv), and (xvi) of this section as
applicable for the specific Health IT
Module.
(iii) In plain language, a detailed
description of all known material
information concerning additional types
of costs or fees that a user may be
required to pay to implement or use the
Health IT Module’s capabilities,
whether to meet provisions of HHS
programs requiring the use of certified
health IT or to achieve any other use
within the scope of the health IT’s
certification. The additional types of
costs or fees required to be disclosed
include but are not limited to costs or
fees (whether fixed, recurring,
transaction-based, or otherwise)
imposed by a health IT developer (or
any third party from whom the
developer purchases, licenses, or
obtains any technology, products, or
services in connection with its certified
health IT) to purchase, license,
implement, maintain, upgrade, use, or
otherwise enable and support the use of
capabilities to which health IT is
certified; or in connection with any data
generated in the course of using any
capability to which health IT is
certified.
*
*
*
*
*
(2) [Reserved]
(3) [Reserved]
(4) A certification issued to a Health
IT Module based solely on the
applicable certification criteria adopted
by the ONC Health IT Certification
Program must be separate and distinct
from any other certification(s) based on
other criteria or requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(m) * * *
(1) All adaptations of certified Health
IT Modules;
(2) All updates made to certified
Health IT Modules affecting the
capabilities in certification criteria to
which the ‘‘safety-enhanced design’’
criteria apply;
(3) All updates made to certified
Health IT Modules in compliance with
§ 170.405(b)(3) and (4); and;
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(4) All voluntary standards updates
successfully made to certified Health IT
Modules per § 170.405(b)(5).
*
*
*
*
*
(p) Real world testing. (1) Review and
confirm that applicable health IT
developers submit real world testing
plans in accordance with
§ 170.405(b)(1).
(2) Review and confirm that
applicable health IT developers submit
real world testing results in accordance
with § 170.405(b)(2).
(3) Submit real world testing plans by
December 15 of each calendar year and
results by April 1 of each calendar year
to ONC for public availability.
(q) Attestations. Review and submit
health IT developer Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification attestations
made in accordance with § 170.406 to
ONC for public availability.
(r) Test results from ONC–ATLs.
Accept test results from any ONC–ATL
that is:
(1) In good standing under the ONC
Health IT Certification Program, and
(2) Compliant with its ISO 17025
accreditation requirements.
(s) Information for direct review.
Report to ONC, no later than a week
after becoming aware of, any
information that could inform whether
ONC should exercise direct review
under § 170.580(a).
(t) Standards Voluntary Advancement
Process Module Updates Notices.
Ensure health IT developers opting to
take advantage of the Standards Version
Advancement Process flexibility per
§ 170.405(b)(5) provide timely advance
written notice to the ONC–ACB and all
affected customers.
(1) Maintain a record of the date of
issuance and the content of developers’
§ 170.405(b)(5) notices; and
(2) Timely post content of each
§ 170.405(b)(5) notice received publicly
on the CHPL attributed to the certified
Health IT Module(s) to which it applies.
■ 26. Amend § 170.524 as follows:
■ a. Revise paragraph (f); and
■ b. In paragraph (h)(3), remove the
phrase ‘‘Complete EHRs and/or’’. The
revisions and additions read as follows:
§ 170.524 Principles of proper conduct for
ONC–ATLs.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) Records retention. (1) Retain all
records related to the testing of
Complete EHRs and/or Health IT
Modules to an edition of certification
criteria beginning with the codification
of an edition of certification criteria in
the Code of Federal Regulations through
a minimum of 3 years from the effective
date that removes the applicable edition
from the Code of Federal Regulations;
and
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(2) Make the records available to HHS
upon request during the retention
period described in paragraph (f)(1) of
this section;
*
*
*
*
*
§ 170.545
[Removed and Reserved]
27. Remove and reserve § 170.545.
28. Amend § 170.550 as follows:
a. Add paragraph (e);
b. Remove and reserve paragraph (f);
c. Add paragraph (g)(5);
d. Revise paragraphs (h)(3)(i), (iii), (v),
(vii); and
■ e. Add paragraphs (h)(3)(ix) and (l).
The additions and revisions read as
follows:
■
■
■
■
■
■
§ 170.550
Health IT Module certification.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) ONC–ACBs must provide an
option for certification of Health IT
Modules to any one or more of the
criteria referenced in § 170.405(a) based
on newer versions of standards included
in the criteria which have been
approved by the National Coordinator
for use in certification through the
Standards Version Advancement
Process.
(f) [Reserved]
(g) * * *
(5) Section 170.315(b)(10) when the
health IT developer of the health IT
presented for certification produces and
electronically manages electronic health
information.
(h) * * *
(3) * * *
(i) Section 170.315(a)(1) through (3),
(5) through (8), (11), and (12) are also
certified to the certification criteria
specified in § 170.315(d)(1) through (7).
Section 170.315(a)(4), (9), (10), and (13)
are also certified to the certification
criteria specified in § 170.315(d)(1)
through (3), and (5) through (7).
*
*
*
*
*
(iii) Section 170.315(c) is also
certified to the certification criteria
specified in § 170.315(d)(1), (2)(i)(A),
(B), (ii) through (v), (3), and (5);
*
*
*
*
*
(v) Section 170.315(e)(2) and (3) is
also certified to the certification criteria
specified in § 170.315(d)(1), (d)(2)(i)(A),
(B), (ii) through (v), (3), (5), and (9);
*
*
*
*
*
(vii) Section 170.315(g)(7) through
(11) is also certified to the certification
criteria specified in § 170.315(d)(1) and
(9); and (d)(2)(i)(A), (2)(i)(B), 2(ii)
through (v), or (10);
(viii) Section 170.315(h) is also
certified to the certification criteria
specified in § 170.315(d)(1), (2)(i)(A),
(2)(i)(B), (2)(ii) through (v), and (3); and
*
*
*
*
*
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(ix) If applicable, any criterion
adopted in § 170.315 is also certified to
the certification criteria specified in
§ 170.315(d)(12) and/or (13).
*
*
*
*
*
(l) Conditions of Certification
Attestations. Before issuing a
certification, ensure that the health IT
developer of the Health IT Module has
met its responsibilities under subpart D
of this part.
§ 170.555
[Amended]
29. Amend § 170.555 as follows:
a. In paragraph (a), remove the
reference ‘‘Complete EHRs and/or’’;
■ b. Revise paragraph (b)(1); and
■ c. In paragraph (b)(2), remove the
reference ‘‘certified Complete EHR or’’.
The revisions read as follows:
■
■
§ 170.555 Certification to newer versions
of certain standards.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) ONC–ACBs are not required to
certify Complete EHRs and/or Health IT
Module(s) according to newer versions
of standards adopted and named in
subpart B of this part, unless:
(i) The National Coordinator identifies
a new version through the Standards
Version Advancement Process and a
health IT developer voluntarily elects to
update its certified health IT to the new
version in accordance with
§ 170.405(b)(5); or
(ii) The new version is incorporated
by reference in § 170.299.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 30. Amend § 170.556 as follows:
■ a. Revise paragraph (a) introductory
text;
■ b. In paragraph (b) introductory text,
remove the phrase ‘‘certified Complete
EHR or’’;
■ c. Revise paragraph (c) introductory
text;
■ d. In paragraph (c)(1), remove the
phrases ‘‘certified Complete EHR or’’
and ‘‘Complete EHR or’’;
■ e. Remove and reserve paragraph
(c)(2);
■ f. In paragraph (c)(3), remove the
phrase ‘‘certified Complete EHRs and’’;
■ g. In paragraphs (c)(4)(i) and (ii),
remove the phrase ‘‘certified Complete
EHR or’’;
■ h. Remove paragraphs (c)(5) and (6);
■ i. In paragraph (d)(1), remove the
phrase ‘‘Complete EHR or’’;
■ j. In paragraph (d)(3)(ii), remove the
phrase ‘‘certified Complete EHR or’’;
■ k. In paragraph (d)(5) introductory
text, remove the phrase ‘‘Complete EHR
or’’;
■ l. In paragraph (d)(6), remove the
phrases ‘‘certified Complete EHR or’’
and ‘‘Complete EHR or’’;
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m. In paragraph (e)(3), remove the
phrase ‘‘Complete EHR or’’; and
■ n. In paragraph (f), remove the phrase
‘‘certified Complete EHR or’’. The
revisions and additions read as follows:
■
§ 170.556 In-the-field surveillance and
maintenance of certification for Health IT.
(a) In-the-field surveillance.
Consistent with its accreditation to ISO/
IEC 17065 and the requirements of this
subpart, an ONC–ACB must initiate
surveillance ‘‘in the field’’ as necessary
to assess whether a certified Health IT
Module continues to conform to the
requirements in subparts A, B, C and E
of this part once the certified Health IT
Module has been implemented and is in
use in a production environment.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Randomized surveillance. During
each calendar year surveillance period,
an ONC–ACB may conduct in-the-field
surveillance for certain randomly
Section
§ 170.560
§ 170.565
§ 170.565
§ 170.570
§ 170.575
31. In the table below, for each section
and paragraph indicated in the first two
columns, remove the phrase indicated
in the third column:
■
Remove
(a)(2) ...........................................................................................................
(d)(ii) and (d)(iii) .........................................................................................
(h)(2)(iii) ......................................................................................................
(a), (b)(2), (c) introductory text, (c)(1), and (c)(2) ......................................
[Removed and Reserved]
32. Remove and reserve § 170.575.
33. Amend § 170.580 as follows:
a. Revise paragraph (a)(1) and the
headings of paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (ii);
■ b. Add paragraph (a)(2)(iii);
■ c. Revise paragraphs (a)(3)(i), (iv), and
(v);
■ d. Add paragraph (a)(4);
■ e. Revise paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and
(iii)(D);
■ f. Revise paragraphs (b)(2)(i);
■ g. Revise paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii);
■ h. Add paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) and (iv);
■ i. Revise paragraph (c)(1);
■ j. In paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2)(i)(C), and
(d)(4), remove the phrase ‘‘Complete
EHR or’’;
■ k. In paragraph (d)(5), remove the
phrase ‘‘Complete EHRs or’’;
■ l. Revise paragraph (e)(1) introductory
text;
■ m. Revise paragraph (f)(1);
■ n. In paragraph (f)(2)(i)(C) by
removing the reference ‘‘Complete EHR
or’’;
■ o. Revise paragraphs (g)(1)
introductory text, (g)(1)(i), (g)(2),
(g)(3)(i), (g)(4), (g)(5)(i), and (g)(6)(v).
The additions and revisions read as
follows:
■
■
■
§ 170.580 ONC review of certified health IT
or a health IT developer’s actions.
(a) * * *
(1) Purpose. ONC may directly review
certified health IT or a health IT
developer’s actions or practices to
determine whether either conform to the
requirements of the ONC Health IT
Certification Program.
(2) * * *
(i) Certified health IT causing or
contributing to unsafe conditions. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(ii) Impediments to ONC–ACB
oversight of certified health IT. * * *
*
*
*
*
*
19:17 Mar 01, 2019
§§ 170.560, 170.565, and 170.570
[Amended]
Paragraphs
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
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selected Health IT Modules to which it
has issued a certification.
*
*
*
*
*
(2) [Reserved]
*
*
*
*
*
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(iii) Noncompliance with Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification. ONC
may initiate direct review under this
section if it has a reasonable belief that
a health IT developer has not complied
with a Condition or Maintenance of
Certification requirement under subpart
D of this part.
(3) * * *
(i) ONC’s review of certified health IT
or a health IT developer’s actions or
practices is independent of, and may be
in addition to, any surveillance of
certified health IT conducted by an
ONC–ACB.
(4) Coordination with the Office of
Inspector General. (i) ONC may
coordinate its review of a claim of
information blocking with the Office of
Inspector General or defer to the Office
of Inspector General to lead a review of
a claim of information blocking.
(ii) ONC may rely on Office of
Inspector General findings to form the
basis of a direct review action.
*
*
*
*
*
(iv) An ONC–ACB and ONC–ATL
shall provide ONC with any available
information that ONC deems relevant to
its review of certified health IT or a
health IT developer’s actions or
practices.
(v) ONC may end all or any part of its
review of certified health IT or a health
IT developer’s actions or practices
under this section at any time and refer
the applicable part of the review to the
relevant ONC–ACB(s) if ONC
determines that doing so would serve
the effective administration or oversight
of the ONC Health IT Certification
Program.
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) Circumstances that may trigger
notice of potential non-conformity. At
any time during its review of certified
health IT or a health IT developer’s
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‘‘Complete
‘‘Complete
‘‘Complete
‘‘Complete
EHRs
EHRs
EHRs
EHRs
and/or’’.
or’’.
and’’.
and/or’’.
actions or practices under paragraph (a)
of this section, ONC may send a notice
of potential non-conformity if it has a
reasonable belief that certified health IT
or a health IT developer may not
conform to the requirements of the ONC
Health IT Certification Program.
*
*
*
*
*
(iii) * * *
(D) Issue a notice of proposed
termination if the health IT is under
review in accordance with paragraphs
(a)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section.
(2) * * *
(i) Circumstances that may trigger
notice non-conformity. At any time
during its review of certified health IT
or a health IT developer’s actions or
practices under paragraph (a) of this
section, ONC may send a notice of nonconformity to the health IT developer if
it determines that certified health IT or
a health IT developer’s actions or
practices does not conform to the
requirements of the ONC Health IT
Certification Program.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) * * *
(i) All records related to the
development, testing, certification,
implementation, maintenance and use
of its certified health IT;
(ii) Any complaint records related to
the certified health IT;
(iii) All records related to the
Condition(s) and Maintenance of
Certification requirements, including
marketing and distribution records,
communications, and contracts; and
(iv) Any other relevant information.
(c) * * *
(1) Applicability. If ONC determines
that certified health IT or a health IT
developer’s action or practice does not
conform to requirements of the ONC
Health IT Certification Program, ONC
shall notify the health IT developer of
its determination and require the health
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IT developer to submit a proposed
corrective action plan.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(1) Applicability. Excluding situations
of noncompliance with a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification
requirement under subpart D of this
part, ONC may propose to terminate a
certification issued to a Health IT
Module if:
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(1) Applicability. The National
Coordinator may terminate a
certification if:
(i) A determination is made that
termination is appropriate after
considering the information provided by
the health IT developer in response to
the proposed termination notice;
(ii) The health IT developer does not
respond in writing to a proposed
termination notice within the timeframe
specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this
section; or
(iii) A determination is made that the
health IT developer is noncompliant
with a Condition or Maintenance of
Certification requirement under subpart
D of this part or for the following
circumstances when ONC exercises
direct review under paragraph (a)(2)(iii)
of this section:
(A) The health IT developer fails to
timely respond to any communication
from ONC, including, but not limited to:
(1) Fact-finding;
(2) A notice of potential nonconformity within the timeframe
established in accordance with
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A)(3) of this section;
or
(3) A notice of non-conformity within
the timeframe established in accordance
with paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A)(3) of this
section.
(B) The information or access
provided by the health IT developer in
response to any ONC communication,
including, but not limited to: Factfinding, a notice of potential nonconformity, or a notice of nonconformity is insufficient or incomplete;
(C) The health IT developer fails to
cooperate with ONC and/or a third party
acting on behalf of ONC;
(D) The health IT developer fails to
timely submit in writing a proposed
corrective action plan;
(E) The health IT developer fails to
timely submit a corrective action plan
that adequately addresses the elements
required by ONC as described in
paragraph (c) of this section;
(F) The health IT developer does not
fulfill its obligations under the
corrective action plan developed in
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accordance with paragraph (c) of this
section; or
(G) ONC concludes that the nonconformity(ies) cannot be cured.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) * * *
(1) Basis for appeal. A health IT
developer may appeal an ONC
determination to suspend or terminate a
certification issued to a Health IT
Module and/or an ONC determination
to issue a certification ban under
§ 170.581(a)(2) if the health IT developer
asserts:
(i) ONC incorrectly applied ONC
Health IT Certification Program
requirements for a
(A) Suspension;
(B) Termination; or
(C) Certification ban under
§ 170.581(a)(2); or
*
*
*
*
*
(2) Method and place for filing an
appeal. A statement of intent to appeal
followed by a request for appeal must be
submitted to ONC in writing by an
authorized representative of the health
IT developer subject to the
determination being appealed. The
statement of intent to appeal and
request for appeal must be filed in
accordance with the requirements
specified in the notice of:
(i) Termination;
(ii) Suspension; or
(iii) Certification ban under
§ 170.581(a)(2).
(3) * * *
(i) A statement of intent to appeal
must be filed within 10 days of a health
IT developer’s receipt of the notice of:
(A) Suspension;
(B) Termination; or
(C) Certification ban under
§ 170.581(a)(2).
*
*
*
*
*
(4) Effect of appeal. (i) A request for
appeal stays the termination of a
certification issued to a Health IT
Module, but the Health IT Module is
prohibited from being marketed,
licensed, or sold as ‘‘certified’’ during
the stay.
(ii) A request for appeal does not stay
the suspension of a Health IT Module.
(iii) A request for appeal stays a
certification ban issued under
§ 170.581(a)(2).
(5) * * *
(i) The hearing officer may not review
an appeal in which he or she
participated in the initial suspension,
termination, or certification ban
determination or has a conflict of
interest in the pending matter.
*
*
*
*
*
(6) * * *
(v) ONC will have an opportunity to
provide the hearing officer with a
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written statement and supporting
documentation on its behalf that
clarifies, as necessary, its determination
to suspend or terminate the certification
or issue a certification ban.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 34. Revise § 170.581 to read as
follows:
§ 170.581
Certification ban.
(a) Circumstances trigger a
certification ban. The certification of
any of a health IT developer’s health IT
is prohibited when:
(1) The certification of one or more of
the health IT developer’s Complete
EHRs or Health IT Modules is:
(i) Terminated by ONC under the
ONC Health IT Certification Program;
(ii) Withdrawn from the ONC Health
IT Certification Program by an ONC–
ACB because the health IT developer
requested it to be withdrawn when the
health IT developer’s health IT was the
subject of a potential non-conformity or
non-conformity as determined by ONC;
(iii) Withdrawn by an ONC–ACB
because of a non-conformity with any of
the certification criteria adopted by the
Secretary under subpart C of this part;
(iv) Withdrawn by an ONC–ACB
because the health IT developer
requested it to be withdrawn when the
health IT developer’s health IT was the
subject of surveillance for a certification
criterion or criteria adopted by the
Secretary under subpart C of this part,
including notice of pending
surveillance; or
(2) ONC determines a certification ban
is appropriate per its review under
§ 170.580(a)(2)(iii).
(b) Notice of certification ban. When
ONC decides to issue a certification ban
to a health IT developer, ONC will
notify the health IT developer of the
certification ban through a notice of
certification ban. The notice of
certification ban will include, but may
not be limited to:
(1) An explanation of the certification
ban;
(2) Information supporting the
certification ban;
(3) Instructions for appealing the
certification ban if banned in
accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of this
section; and
(4) Instructions for requesting
reinstatement into the ONC Health IT
Certification Program, which would lift
the certification ban.
(c) Effective date of certification ban.
(1) A certification ban will be effective
immediately if banned under
paragraphs (a)(1) of this section.
(2) For certification bans issued under
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the ban
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will be effective immediately after the
following applicable occurrence:
(i) The expiration of the 10-day period
for filing a statement of intent to appeal
in § 170.580(g)(3)(i) if the health IT
developer does not file a statement of
intent to appeal.
(ii) The expiration of the 30-day
period for filing an appeal in
§ 170.580(g)(3)(ii) if the health IT
developer files a statement of intent to
appeal, but does not file a timely appeal.
(iii) A final determination to issue a
certification ban per § 170.580(g)(7) if a
health IT developer files an appeal
timely.
(d) Reinstatement. The certification of
a health IT developer’s health IT subject
to the prohibition in paragraph (a) of
this section may commence once the
following conditions are met.
(1) A health IT developer must
request ONC’s permission in writing to
participate in the ONC Health IT
Certification Program.
(2) The request must demonstrate that
the customers affected by the certificate
termination, certificate withdrawal, or
non-compliance with a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification have been
provided appropriate remediation.
(3) For non-compliance with a
Condition or Maintenance of
Certification requirement, the noncompliance must be resolved.
(4) ONC is satisfied with the health IT
developer’s demonstration under
paragraph (d)(2) of this section that all
affected customers have been provided
with appropriate remediation and grants
reinstatement into the ONC Health IT
Certification Program.
■ 35. Add part 171 to read as follows:
PART 171—INFORMATION BLOCKING
Subpart A—General Provisions
Sec.
171.100 Basis and purpose.
171.101 Applicability.
171.102 Definitions.
171.103 Information blocking.
Subpart B—Exceptions for Reasonable and
Necessary Activities That Do Not Constitute
Information Blocking
171.200 Availability and effect of
exceptions.
171.201 Exception—Preventing harm.
171.202 Exception—Promoting the privacy
of electronic health information.
171.203 Exception—Promoting the security
of electronic health information.
171.204 Exception—Recovering costs
reasonably incurred.
171.205 Exception—Responding to requests
that are infeasible.
171.206 Exception—Licensing of
interoperability elements on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms.
§ 171.207 Exception—Maintaining and
improving health IT performance.
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Authority: 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52; 5 U.S.C.
552.
Subpart A—General Provisions
§ 171.100
Statutory basis and purpose.
(a) Basis. This part implements
section 3022 of the Public Health
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 300jj–52.
(b) Purpose. The purpose of this part
is to establish exceptions for reasonable
and necessary activities that do not
constitute ‘‘information blocking,’’ as
defined by section 3022(a)(1) of the
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
300jj–52.
§ 171.101
Applicability.
This part applies to health care
providers, health IT developers of
certified health IT, health information
exchanges, and health information
networks, as those terms are defined in
§ 171.102.
§ 171.102
Definitions.
For purposes of this part:
Access means the ability or means
necessary to make electronic health
information available for use, including
the ability to securely and efficiently
locate and retrieve information from any
and all source systems in which the
information may be recorded or
maintained.
Actor means a health care provider,
health IT developer of certified health
IT, health information exchange, or
health information network.
API Data Provider is defined as it is
in § 170.102.
API Technology Supplier is defined as
it is in § 170.102.
Electronic Health Information (EHI)
means—
(1) Electronic protected health
information; and
(2) Any other information that
identifies the individual, or with respect
to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe the information can be used to
identify the individual and is
transmitted by or maintained in
electronic media, as defined in 45 CFR
160.103, that relates to the past, present,
or future health or condition of an
individual; the provision of health care
to an individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of
health care to an individual.
Electronic media is defined as it is in
45 CFR 160.103.
Electronic protected health
information (ePHI) is defined as it is in
45 CFR 160.103.
Exchange means the ability for
electronic health information to be
transmitted securely and efficiently
between and among different
technologies, systems, platforms, or
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7601
networks in a manner that allows the
information to be accessed and used.
Fee means any present or future
obligation to pay money or provide any
other thing of value.
Health care provider has the same
meaning as ‘‘health care provider’’ at 42
U.S.C. 300jj.
Health Information Exchange or HIE
means an individual or entity that
enables access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information primarily
between or among a particular class of
individuals or entities or for a limited
set of purposes.
Health Information Network or HIN
means an individual or entity that
satisfies one or both of the following—
(1) Determines, oversees, administers,
controls, or substantially influences
policies or agreements that define
business, operational, technical, or other
conditions or requirements for enabling
or facilitating access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information between
or among two or more unaffiliated
individuals or entities.
(2) Provides, manages, controls, or
substantially influences any technology
or service that enables or facilitates the
access, exchange, or use of electronic
health information between or among
two or more unaffiliated individuals or
entities.
Health IT developer of certified health
IT means an individual or entity that
develops or offers health information
technology (as that term is defined in 42
U.S.C. 300jj(5)) and which had, at the
time it engaged in a practice that is the
subject of an information blocking
claim, health information technology
(one or more) certified under the ONC
Health IT Certification Program.
Information blocking is defined as it
is in § 171.103 and 42 U.S.C. 300jj–
52(a).
Interfere with means to prevent,
materially discourage, or otherwise
inhibit access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information.
Interoperability element means—
(1) Any functional element of a health
information technology, whether
hardware or software, that could be
used to access, exchange, or use
electronic health information for any
purpose, including information
transmitted by or maintained in
disparate media, information systems,
health information exchanges, or health
information networks.
(2) Any technical information that
describes the functional elements of
technology (such as a standard,
specification, protocol, data model, or
schema) and that a person of ordinary
skill in the art may require to use the
functional elements of the technology,
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including for the purpose of developing
compatible technologies that
incorporate or use the functional
elements.
(3) Any technology or service that
may be required to enable the use of a
compatible technology in production
environments, including but not limited
to any system resource, technical
infrastructure, or health information
exchange or health information network
element.
(4) Any license, right, or privilege that
may be required to commercially offer
and distribute compatible technologies
and make them available for use in
production environments.
(5) Any other means by which
electronic health information may be
accessed, exchanged, or used.
Permissible purpose means a purpose
for which a person is authorized,
permitted, or required to access,
exchange, or use electronic health
information under applicable law.
Person is defined as it is in 45 CFR
160.103.
Protected health information is
defined as it is in 45 CFR 160.103.
Practice means one or more related
acts or omissions by an actor.
Use means the ability of health IT or
a user of health IT to access relevant
electronic health information; to
comprehend the structure, content, and
meaning of the information; and to read,
write, modify, manipulate, or apply the
information to accomplish a desired
outcome or to achieve a desired
purpose.
§ 171.103
Information blocking.
Information blocking means a practice
that—
(a) Except as required by law or
covered by an exception set forth in
subpart B of this part, is likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information; and
(b) If conducted by a health
information technology developer,
health information exchange, or health
information network, such developer,
exchange, or network knows, or should
know, that such practice is likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage the access, exchange, or use
of electronic health information; or
(c) If conducted by a health care
provider, such provider knows that such
practice is unreasonable and is likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information.
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Subpart B—Exceptions for Reasonable
and Necessary Activities That Do Not
Constitute Information Blocking
§ 171.200 Availability and effect of
exceptions.
A practice shall not be treated as
information blocking if the actor
satisfies an exception to the information
blocking provision by meeting all
applicable requirements and conditions
of the exception at all relevant times.
§ 171.201
Exception—Preventing harm.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must meet the
following conditions at all relevant
times.
(a) The actor must have a reasonable
belief that the practice will directly and
substantially reduce the likelihood of
harm to a patient or another person
arising from—
(1) Corrupt or inaccurate data being
recorded or incorporated in a patient’s
electronic health record;
(2) Misidentification of a patient or
patient’s electronic health information;
or
(3) Disclosure of a patient’s electronic
health information in circumstances
where a licensed health care
professional has determined, in the
exercise of professional judgment, that
the disclosure is reasonably likely to
endanger the life or physical safety of
the patient or another person, provided
that, if required by applicable federal or
state law, the patient has been afforded
any right of review of that
determination.
(b) If the practice implements an
organizational policy, the policy must
be—
(1) In writing;
(2) Based on relevant clinical,
technical, and other appropriate
expertise;
(3) Implemented in a consistent and
non-discriminatory manner; and
(4) No broader than necessary to
mitigate the risk of harm.
(c) If the practice does not implement
an organizational policy, an actor must
make a finding in each case, based on
the particularized facts and
circumstances, and based on, as
applicable, relevant clinical, technical,
and other appropriate expertise, that the
practice is necessary and no broader
than necessary to mitigate the risk of
harm.
§ 171.202 Exception—Promoting the
privacy of electronic health information.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must satisfy at least
one of the sub-exceptions in paragraphs
(b) through (e) of this section at all
relevant times.
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(a) Meaning of ‘‘individual’’ in this
section. The term ‘‘individual’’ as used
in this section means one or more of the
following—
(1) An individual as defined by 45
CFR 160.103.
(2) Any other natural person who is
the subject of the electronic health
information being accessed, exchanged,
or used.
(3) A person who legally acts on
behalf of a person described in
paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section,
including as a personal representative,
in accordance with 45 CFR 164.502(g).
(4) A person who is a legal
representative of and can make health
care decisions on behalf of any person
described in paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of
this section.
(5) An executor, administrator or
other person having authority to act on
behalf of a deceased person described in
paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section or
the individual’s estate under State or
other law.
(b) Precondition not satisfied. If the
actor is required by a state or federal
privacy law to satisfy a condition prior
to providing access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information, the actor
may choose not to provide access,
exchange, or use of such electronic
health information if the precondition
has not been satisfied, provided that—
(1) The actor’s practice—
(i) Conforms to the actor’s
organizational policies and procedures
that:
(A) Are in writing;
(B) Specify the criteria to be used by
the actor and, as applicable, the steps
that the actor will take, in order that the
precondition can be satisfied; and
(C) Have been implemented,
including by taking reasonable steps to
ensure that its workforce members and
its agents understand and consistently
apply the policies and procedures; or
(ii) Has been documented by the
actor, on a case-by-case basis,
identifying the criteria used by the actor
to determine when the precondition
would be satisfied, any criteria that
were not met, and the reason why the
criteria were not met; and
(2) If the precondition relies on the
provision of consent or authorization
from an individual, the actor:
(i) Did all things reasonably necessary
within its control to provide the
individual with a meaningful
opportunity to provide the consent or
authorization; and
(ii) Did not improperly encourage or
induce the individual to not provide the
consent or authorization.
(3) The actor’s practice is—
(i) Tailored to the specific privacy risk
or interest being addressed; and
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(ii) Implemented in a consistent and
non-discriminatory manner.
(c) Health IT developer of certified
health IT not covered by HIPAA. If the
actor is a health IT developer of certified
health IT that is not required to comply
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule when
engaging in a practice that promotes the
privacy interests of an individual, the
actor may choose not to provide access,
exchange, or use of electronic health
information provided that the actor’s
practice—
(1) Complies with applicable state or
federal privacy laws;
(2) Implements a process that is
described in the actor’s organizational
privacy policy;
(3) Had previously been meaningfully
disclosed to the persons and entities
that use the actor’s product or service;
(4) Is tailored to the specific privacy
risk or interest being addressed; and
(5) Is implemented in a consistent and
non-discriminatory manner.
(d) Denial of an individual’s request
for their electronic protected health
information in the circumstances
provided in 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2),
and (3). If an individual requests their
electronic protected health information
under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(1)(i) or 45 CFR
164.524, the actor may deny the request
in the circumstances provided in 45
CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2), or (3).
(e) Respecting an individual’s request
not to share information. In
circumstances where not required or
prohibited by law, an actor may choose
not to provide access, exchange, or use
of an individual’s electronic health
information if—
(1) The individual requests that the
actor not provide such access, exchange,
or use;
(2) Such request is initiated by the
individual without any improper
encouragement or inducement by the
actor;
(3) The actor or its agent documents
the request within a reasonable time
period; and
(4) The actor’s practice is
implemented in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner.
§ 171.203 Exception—Promoting the
security of electronic health information.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must meet the
following conditions at all relevant
times.
(a) The practice must be directly
related to safeguarding the
confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of electronic health
information.
(b) The practice must be tailored to
the specific security risk being
addressed.
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(c) The practice must be implemented
in a consistent and non-discriminatory
manner.
(d) If the practice implements an
organizational security policy, the
policy must—
(1) Be in writing;
(2) Have been prepared on the basis
of, and directly respond to, security
risks identified and assessed by or on
behalf of the actor;
(3) Align with one or more applicable
consensus-based standards or best
practice guidance; and
(4) Provide objective timeframes and
other parameters for identifying,
responding to, and addressing security
incidents.
(e) If the practice does not implement
an organizational security policy, the
actor must have made a determination
in each case, based on the particularized
facts and circumstances, that:
(1) The practice is necessary to
mitigate the security risk to the
electronic health information; and
(2) There are no reasonable and
appropriate alternatives to the practice
that address the security risk that are
less likely to interfere with, prevent, or
materially discourage access, exchange
or use of electronic health information.
§ 171.204 Exception—Recovering costs
reasonably incurred.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must meet the
following conditions at all relevant
times.
(a) Types of costs to which this
exception applies. This exception is
limited to the actor’s costs reasonably
incurred to provide access, exchange, or
use of electronic health information.
(b) Method for recovering costs. The
method by which the actor recovers its
costs—
(1) Must be based on objective and
verifiable criteria that are uniformly
applied for all substantially similar or
similarly situated classes of persons and
requests;
(2) Must be reasonably related to the
actor’s costs of providing the type of
access, exchange, or use to, or at the
request of, the person or entity to whom
the fee is charged;
(3) Must be reasonably allocated
among all customers to whom the
technology or service is supplied, or for
whom the technology is supported;
(4) Must not be based in any part on
whether the requestor or other person is
a competitor, potential competitor, or
will be using the electronic health
information in a way that facilitates
competition with the actor; and
(5) Must not be based on the sales,
profit, revenue, or other value that the
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requestor or other persons derive or may
derive from the access to, exchange of,
or use of electronic health information,
including the secondary use of such
information, that exceeds the actor’s
reasonable costs for providing access,
exchange, or use of electronic health
information.
(c) Costs specifically excluded. This
exception does not apply to—
(1) Costs that the actor incurred due
to the health IT being designed or
implemented in non-standard ways that
unnecessarily increase the complexity,
difficulty or burden of accessing,
exchanging, or using electronic health
information;
(2) Costs associated with intangible
assets (including depreciation or loss of
value), other than the actual
development or acquisition costs of
such assets;
(3) Opportunity costs, except for the
reasonable forward-looking cost of
capital;
(4) A fee prohibited by 45 CFR
164.524(c)(4);
(5) A fee based in any part on the
electronic access by an individual or
their personal representative, agent, or
designee to the individual’s electronic
health information;
(6) A fee to perform an export of
electronic health information via the
capability of health IT certified to
§ 170.315(b)(10) of this subchapter for
the purposes of switching health IT or
to provide patients their electronic
health information; or
(7) A fee to export or convert data
from an EHR technology, unless such
fee was agreed to in writing at the time
the technology was acquired.
(d) Compliance with the Conditions of
Certification. (1) Notwithstanding any
other provision of this exception, if the
actor is a health IT developer subject to
the Conditions of Certification in
§ 170.402(a)(4) or § 170.404 of this
subchapter, the actor must comply with
all requirements of such conditions for
all practices and at all relevant times.
(2) If the actor is an API Data
Provider, the actor is only permitted to
charge the same fees that an API
Technology Supplier is permitted to
charge to recover costs consistent with
the permitted fees specified in the
Condition of Certification in § 170.404
of this subchapter.
§ 171.205 Exception—Responding to
requests that are infeasible.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must meet the
following conditions at all relevant
times.
(a) Request is infeasible. (1) The actor
must demonstrate, in accordance with
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paragraph (a)(2) of this section, that
complying with the request in the
manner requested would impose a
substantial burden on the actor that is
unreasonable under the circumstances,
taking into consideration—
(i) The type of electronic health
information and the purposes for which
it may be needed;
(ii) The cost to the actor of complying
with the request in the manner
requested;
(iii) The financial, technical, and
other resources available to the actor;
(iv) Whether the actor provides
comparable access, exchange, or use to
itself or to its customers, suppliers,
partners, and other persons with whom
it has a business relationship;
(v) Whether the actor owns or has
control over a predominant technology,
platform, health information exchange,
or health information network through
which electronic health information is
accessed or exchanged;
(vi) Whether the actor maintains
electronic protected health information
on behalf of a covered entity, as defined
in 45 CFR 160.103, or maintains
electronic health information on behalf
of the requestor or another person
whose access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information will be
enabled or facilitated by the actor’s
compliance with the request;
(vii) Whether the requestor and other
relevant persons can reasonably access,
exchange, or use the electronic health
information from other sources or
through other means; and
(viii) The additional cost and burden
to the requestor and other relevant
persons of relying on alternative means
of access, exchange, or use.
(2) The following circumstances do
not constitute a burden to the actor for
purposes of this exception and shall not
be considered in determining whether
the actor has demonstrated that
complying with a request would have
been infeasible.
(i) Providing the requested access,
exchange, or use in the manner
requested would have facilitated
competition with the actor.
(ii) Providing the requested access,
exchange, or use in the manner
requested would have prevented the
actor from charging a fee.
(b) Responding to requests. The actor
must timely respond to all requests
relating to access, exchange, or use of
electronic health information, including
but not limited to requests to establish
connections and to provide
interoperability elements.
(c) Written explanation. The actor
must provide the requestor with a
detailed written explanation of the
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reasons why the actor cannot
accommodate the request.
(d) Provision of a reasonable
alternative. The actor must work with
the requestor in a timely manner to
identify and provide a reasonable
alternative means of accessing,
exchanging, or using the electronic
health information.
§ 171.206 Exception—Licensing of
interoperability elements on reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must meet the
following conditions at all relevant
times.
(a) Responding to requests. Upon
receiving a request to license or use
interoperability elements, the actor must
respond to the requestor within 10
business days from receipt of the
request by:
(1) Negotiating with the requestor in
a reasonable and non-discriminatory
fashion to identify the interoperability
elements that are needed; and
(2) Offering an appropriate license
with reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms.
(b) Reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The actor must
license the interoperability elements
described in paragraph (a) of this
section on terms that are reasonable and
non-discriminatory.
(1) Scope of rights. The license must
provide all rights necessary to access
and use the interoperability elements for
the following purposes, as applicable.
(i) Developing products or services
that are interoperable with the actor’s
health IT, health IT under the actor’s
control, or any third party who
currently uses the actor’s
interoperability elements to interoperate
with the actor’s health IT or health IT
under the actor’s control.
(ii) Marketing, offering, and
distributing the interoperable products
and/or services to potential customers
and users.
(iii) Enabling the use of the
interoperable products or services in
production environments, including
accessing and enabling the exchange
and use of electronic health
information.
(2) Reasonable royalty. If the actor
charges a royalty for the use of the
interoperability elements described in
paragraph (a) of this section, the royalty
must be reasonable and comply with the
following requirements.
(i) The royalty must be nondiscriminatory, consistent with
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(ii) The royalty must be based solely
on the independent value of the actor’s
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technology to the licensee’s products,
not on any strategic value stemming
from the actor’s control over essential
means of accessing, exchanging, or
using electronic health information.
(iii) If the actor has licensed the
interoperability element through a
standards development organization in
accordance with such organization’s
policies regarding the licensing of
standards-essential technologies on
reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms, the actor may charge a royalty
that is consistent with such policies.
(3) Non-discriminatory terms. The
terms (including royalty terms) on
which the actor licenses and otherwise
provides the interoperability elements
must be non-discriminatory and comply
with the following requirements.
(i) The terms must be based on
objective and verifiable criteria that are
uniformly applied for all substantially
similar or similarly situated classes of
persons and requests.
(ii) The terms must not be based in
any part on—
(A) Whether the requestor or other
person is a competitor, potential
competitor, or will be using electronic
health information obtained via the
interoperability elements in a way that
facilitates competition with the actor; or
(B) The revenue or other value the
requestor may derive from access,
exchange, or use of electronic health
information obtained via the
interoperability elements, including the
secondary use of such electronic health
information.
(4) Collateral terms. The actor must
not require the licensee or its agents or
contractors to do, or to agree to do, any
of the following.
(i) Not compete with the actor in any
product, service, or market.
(ii) Deal exclusively with the actor in
any product, service, or market.
(iii) Obtain additional licenses,
products, or services that are not related
to or can be unbundled from the
requested interoperability elements.
(iv) License, grant, assign, or transfer
to the actor any intellectual property of
the licensee.
(v) Pay a fee of any kind whatsoever,
except as described in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section, unless the practice meets
the requirements of the exception in
§ 171.204.
(5) Non-disclosure agreement. The
actor may require a reasonable nondisclosure agreement that is no broader
than necessary to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the actor’s trade secrets,
provided—
(i) The agreement states with
particularity all information the actor
claims as trade secrets; and
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(ii) Such information meets the
definition of a trade secret under
applicable law.
(c) Additional requirements relating
to the provision of interoperability
elements. The actor must not engage in
any practice that has any of the
following purposes or effects.
(1) Impeding the efficient use of the
interoperability elements to access,
exchange, or use electronic health
information for any permissible
purpose.
(2) Impeding the efficient
development, distribution, deployment,
or use of an interoperable product or
service for which there is actual or
potential demand.
(3) Degrading the performance or
interoperability of the licensee’s
products or services, unless necessary to
improve the actor’s technology and after
affording the licensee a reasonable
opportunity to update its technology to
maintain interoperability.
(d) Compliance with conditions of
certification. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this exception, if the actor
is a health IT developer subject to the
conditions of certification in §§ 170.402,
170.403, or 170.404 of this subchapter,
the actor must comply with all
requirements of such conditions for all
practices and at all relevant times.
§ 171.207 Exception—Maintaining and
improving health IT performance.
To qualify for this exception, each
practice by an actor must meet the
following conditions at all relevant
times.
(a) Maintenance and improvements to
health IT. An actor may make health IT
under its control temporarily
unavailable in order to perform
maintenance or improvements to the
health IT, provided that the actor’s
practice is—
(1) For a period of time no longer than
necessary to achieve the maintenance or
improvements for which the health IT
was made unavailable;
(2) Implemented in a consistent and
non-discriminatory manner; and
(3) If the unavailability is initiated by
a health IT developer of certified health
IT, HIE, or HIN, agreed to by the
individual or entity to whom the health
IT developer of certified health IT, HIE,
or HIN supplied the health IT.
(b) Practices that prevent harm. If the
unavailability of health IT for
maintenance or improvements is
initiated by an actor in response to a
risk of harm to a patient or another
person, the actor does not need to
satisfy the requirements of this section,
but must comply with all requirements
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of § 171.201 at all relevant times to
qualify for an exception.
(c) Security-related practices. If the
unavailability of health IT for
maintenance or improvements is
initiated by an actor in response to a
security risk to electronic health
information, the actor does not need to
satisfy the requirements of this section,
but must comply with all requirements
of § 171.203 at all relevant times to
qualify for an exception.
Dated: January 22, 2019.
Alex M. Azar II,
Secretary, Department of Health and Human
Services.
Note: The following appendix will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendix: Pediatric Technical
Worksheets
These worksheets contain information on
how each recommendation corresponds to
the Children’s EHR Format and to the
existing or proposed new ONC certification
criteria. We invite readers to use these
worksheets to inform public comment on the
recommendations, the inclusion of specific
items from the Children’s EHR Format,193
and the identified certification criteria as
they relate specifically to use cases for
pediatric care and sites of service.
We welcome public comment on the
identified certification criteria for each
recommendation. Specifically, we seek
comment for each recommendation on the
following four broad questions:
• Q1. What relevant gaps, barriers, safety
concerns, and/or resources (including
available best practices, activities, and tools)
may impact or support feasibility of the
recommendation in practice?
• Q2. How can the effective use of IT
support each recommendation as involves
provider training, establishing workflow, and
other related safety and usability
considerations?
• Q3. Should any of the recommendations
not be included?
• Q4. Should any of the functional criteria
listed under the ‘‘Alignment with 2015
Edition Certification Criteria’’ and the
‘‘Alignment with Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria’’ be removed as a
correlated item to support any of the
recommendations?
Commenters are encouraged to reference
the specific recommendation number (110)
with the corresponding question number in
their response. For example,
‘‘Recommendation 1. Q3.’’ Commenters are
highly encouraged to use the template ONC
has created to support public comment on
the proposed rule.
193 https://healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-andresources/pediatric-resources/childrens-electronichealth-record-ehr-format.
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Recommendation 1: Use Biometric-Specific
Norms for Growth Curves and Support
Growth Charts for Children
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Use biometric-specific norms for
growth curves.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2044—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Primary Care Management, Well
Child/Preventive Care.
Description: The system shall include the
ability to use pediatric age-specific norms for
weight, height/length, head circumference,
and BMI to calculate and display growth
percentiles and plot them over time on
standardized Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention/World Health Organizations
(CDC/WHO) growth curves as appropriate.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition definition and
criteria listed below:
Common Clinical Data Set* (CCDS)
including optional pediatric vital sign data
elements with the reference range/scale or
growth curve for BMI percentile per age and
sex for youth 2–20 years of age, weight for
age per length and sex for children less than
three years of age, and head occipital-frontal
circumference for children less than three
years of age.
Demographic criterion requires the ability
to record birth sex in accordance with HL7
Version 3 (‘‘Administrative Gender’’) and a
null flavor value attributed as follows: Male
(M); female (F); and unknown (UNK).
Clinical Decision Support (CDS) can be
used to develop a variety of tools to enhance
decision-making in the pediatric clinical
workflow including contextually relevant
reference information, clinical guidelines,
condition-specific order sets, alerts, and
reminders, among other tools.
Application Programming Interfaces
criteria including the ‘‘application access—
patient selection’’, ‘‘application access—data
category request’’, and ‘‘application access—
all data request’’ which can help address
many of the challenges currently faced by
caregivers accessing pediatric health data.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the proposed new and updated
certification criteria in this proposed rule:
United States Core Data for Interoperability
(USCDI): The USCDI (§ 170.213) which
enables the inclusion of pediatric vital sign
data elements, including the reference range/
scale or growth curve for BMI percentile per
age and sex, weight for age per length and
sex, and head occipital-frontal
circumference.
Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
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interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Supplemental Children’s Format
Requirements for Recommendation 1
We seek feedback about the relevance of
the following potential supplemental
Children’s EHR Format requirements and
their correlation to Recommendation 1.
1. Title: Allow unknown patient sex.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2009—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Prenatal Screening, Birth
Information, Genetic information.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to record a patient’s sex as male,
female, or unknown, and shall allow it to be
updated.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Demographics.
New or Updated Criterion Alignment:
USCDI.
2. Title: Record Gestational Age
Assessment and Persist in the EHR.
Children’s EHR Format: Requirement Req2019—Release Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Well Child/Preventive Care,
Growth Data.
Description: The system shall capture and
display assigned gestational age as well as
the diagnosis of SGA (Small for Gestational
Age) or LGA (Large for Gestational Age)
when appropriate.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Common Clinical Data Set (CCDS).
New or Updated Criterion Alignment:
USCDI.
3. Title: Support growth charts for
children.
Children’s EHR Format: Requirement Req2042—Release Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Growth Data.
Description: The system shall support
display of growth charts that plot selected
growth parameters such as height, weight,
head circumference, and BMI (entered with
appropriate precision or computed as
described in Req-2019) along with
appropriate sets of norms provided by the
CDC or in a compatible tabular format
(typically based on Lambda-Mu-Sigma [LMS]
curve fitting computational method).
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Common Clinical Data Set (CCDS), Clinical
Decision Support (CDS).
New or Updated Criterion Alignment:
USCDI, API.
Title: Provide alerts for out-of-range
biometric data.
Children’s EHR Format: Requirement Req2045—Release Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Primary Care Management, Well
Child/Preventive Care.
Description: The system shall include the
ability to provide alerts for weight, length/
height, head circumference, and BMI data
points that fall outside two standard
deviations of CDC/WHO pediatric data.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment: Clinical
Decision Support (CDS).
New or Updated Criterion Alignment:
USCDI, API.
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Recommendation 2: Compute Weight-Based
Drug Dosage
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Compute weight-based drug dosage.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2012—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Medication Management.
Description: The system shall compute
drug dose, based on appropriate dosage
ranges, using the patient’s body weight and
body surface area, and shall display the
dosing weight and weight-based dosing
strategy (when applicable) on the
prescription.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criterion
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criterion listed
below:
• Electronic Prescribing criterion:
—Provides the ability to send and receive the
specified prescription transactions
electronically per the NCPDP SCRIPT
Version 10.6 Standard Implementation
Recommendations and using RxNorm
vocabulary codes
—Limits the ability to prescribe all oral,
liquid medications in only metric standard
units of mL (i.e., not cc)
Includes an optional Structured and
Codified Sig Format, which has the
capability to exchange weight-based dosing
calculations within the NCPDP SCRIPT 10.6
standard.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the proposed new and updated
certification criteria in this proposed rule:
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Electronic Prescribing: (§ 170.315(b)(11))
which supports improved patient safety and
prescription accuracy, workflow efficiencies,
and increase configurability of systems
including functionality that would support
pediatric medication management.
Supplemental Children’s Format
Requirements for Recommendation 2
We seek feedback about the relevance of
the following potential Children’s EHR
Format requirements and their correlation to
Recommendation 2.
1. Title: Rounding for administrable doses.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2035—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Medication Management.
Description: The system shall enable
calculated doses (e.g., weight-based) to be
rounded to optimize administration
convenience.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Electronic prescribing.
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New or Updated Criterion Alignment:
Electronic prescribing.
2. Title: Alert based on age-specific norms.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2013—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Primary Care Management, Well
Child/Preventive Care.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to present alerts for lab results outside
of pediatric-specific normal value ranges.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment: Clinical
decision support (CDS).
New or Updated Criterion Alignment: API.
Recommendation 3: Ability To Document All
Guardians and Caregivers
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Ability to access family history,
including all guardians and caregivers.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2006—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Child Abuse Reporting, Primary
Care Management, Parents and Guardians,
and Family Relationship Data.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to record information about all
guardians and caregivers (biological parents,
foster parents, adoptive parents, guardians,
surrogates, and custodians), siblings, and
case workers, with contact information for
each.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criteria listed
below, and ONC believes this priority also is
supported by health IT beyond what is
included in the certification program.
• Care Plan: Criteria includes the ability to
record, change, access, create, and receive
care plan information according to the care
plan document template in the HL7
implementation guide for CDA® Release 2:
Consolidated CDA Templates for Clinical
Notes (US Realm), draft standard for Trial
Use Release 2.1 (including the sections for
health status evaluations and outcomes and
for interventions (V2)).
• Transitions of Care: Criteria includes the
ability to create, receive, and properly
consumer interoperable documents using a
common content and transport standard that
include key health data that should be
accessible and available for exchange.
• Application Programming Interfaces
criteria including the ‘‘application access—
patient selection’’, ‘‘application access—data
category request’’, and ‘‘application access—
all data request’’ which can help address
many of the challenges currently faced by
caregivers accessing pediatric health data.
• Transitions of Care criteria includes the
ability to create and to receive interoperable
documents using a comment content
standard that include key health data that
should be accessible and available for
exchange to support the care of children
across care settings.
• Demographic criterion requires the
ability to record various demographic
information for a patient including potential
supports for patient and parental matching.
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Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
ONC believes tis priority is supported by
the proposed new and updated certification
criteria in this proposed rule:
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Data Segmentation for Privacy: (two for
C–CDA ((§ 170.315(b)(12)) and
(§ 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR
(§ 170.315(g)(11))) could provide
functionality to address the concerns
multiple stakeholders expressed regarding
the need to restrict granular pediatric health
data at production based on the intended
recipient of the data.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Supplemental Children’s EHR Format
Requirements for Recommendation 3
We seek feedback about the relevance of
the following potential supplemental
Children’s EHR Format requirements and
their correlation to Recommendation 3.
1. Title: Ability to document parental
(guardian) notification or permission.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2008: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Security and Confidentiality,
Parents and Guardians, and Family
Relationship Data.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to document parental (guardian)
notification or permission for consenting
minors to receive some treatments as
required by institutional policy or
jurisdictional law.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment: Data
segmentation for privacy—send criterion,
data segmentation for privacy—receive
criterion, and/or the patient health
information capture criterion, view,
download, and transmit (VDT) to third-party,
and Application Programming Interface
(API).
New or Updated Criterion Alignment: Data
segmentation for privacy.
2. Title: Record parental notification of
newborn screening diagnosis.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2016: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Newborn Screening.
Description: The system shall be able to
track that the child’s legal guardians were
notified of any newborn screening-related
diagnosis.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Question: View, download, and transmit
(VDT) to third-party, secure messaging,
Application Programming Interface (API).
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New or Updated Criterion Alignment: API.
3. Title: Authorized non-clinician viewers
of EHR data.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2032—Release
Package 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Child Welfare, Patient Portals
(PHR).
Description: The system shall have the
ability to identify members of the care team
(including professional and nonprofessional
members) and indicate their roles/
relationships to the child.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment: Care
plan criterion, authentication, access control,
and authorization.
New or Updated Criterion Alignment: API.
4. Title: Document decision-making
authority of patient representative.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2030: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Security and Confidentiality.
Description: The system shall have the
ability to store, retrieve, and display
information about an individual’s right to
authorize care, to release information, and to
authorize payment for care on behalf of the
patient, including time restrictions or other
limitations. This includes storing copies of
the relevant consent and authorization forms
in compliance with state and federal rules,
and also includes cases of child foster care,
state social services agencies, guardians,
guarantors, and those recognized to have full
or partial authority. The system shall allow
for multiple individuals.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment: Patient
health information capture.
New or Updated Criterion Alignment: Data
segmentation.
Recommendation 4: Segmented Access to
Information
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Segmented access to information.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2041: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Security and Confidentiality.
Description: The system shall provide
users the ability to segment health care data
in order to keep information about minor
consent services private and distinct from
other content of the record, such that it is not
exposed to parents/guardians without the
minor’s authorization.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition Criteria listed
below, and ONC believes this
recommendation is supported by health IT
beyond what is included in the certification
program
• Data Segmentation for Privacy criteria:
Æ Data segmentation for privacy—send
criterion provides the ability to create a
summary record (formatted to Consolidated
CDA (C–CDA) Release 2.1) that is tagged at
the document level as restricted and subject
to re-disclosure restrictions using the HL7
Implementation Guide: Data Segmentation
for Privacy (DS4P), Release 1.
Æ Data segmentation for privacy—receive
criterion requires the ability to receive a
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summary record (formatted to Consolidated
CDA Release 2.1) that is document—level
tagged as restricted and subject to redisclosure restrictions using the HL7
Implementation Guide: Data Segmentation
for Privacy (DS4P), Release 1. Requires the
ability to separate the document-level tagged
document from other documents received.
Requires the ability to view the restricted
document without having to incorporate any
of the data from the document.
• Transitions of Care criteria includes the
ability to create, receive, and properly
consumer interoperable documents using a
common content and transport standard that
include key health data that should be
accessible and available for exchange.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the proposed new and updated
certification criteria in this proposed rule:
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Data Segmentation for Privacy: (two for
C–CDA ((§ 170.315(b)(12)) and
(§ 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR
(§ 170.315(g)(11))) would provide
functionality to address the concerns
multiple stakeholders expressed regarding
the need to restrict granular pediatric health
data at production based on the intended
recipient of the data.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Supplemental Children’s Format
Requirements for Recommendation 4
We seek feedback about the relevance of
the following potential Children’s EHR
Format requirements and their correlation to
Recommendation 4.
1. Title: Problem-specific age of consent.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2039: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Security and Confidentiality.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to access legal guidelines on consent
requirements for reference, where available,
and to record the age of consent for a specific
treatment when these differ based on legal
guidelines.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Demographics, care plan criterion, data
segmentation for privacy—send, data
segmentation for privacy—receive.
New or Updated Criterion Alignment:
USCDI, data segmentation.
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Recommendation 5: Synchronize
Immunization Histories With Registries
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Synchronize immunization histories
with registry.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2011*:
Release Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Registry Linkages,
Immunizations.
Description: The system shall support
updating and reconciling a child’s
immunization record with information
received from immunization information
systems or other health information
exchanges (HIEs).
Title: Use established immunization
messaging standards.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2028 Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Registry Linkages,
Immunizations.
Description: (A) The system shall use the
messaging standards established through
meaningful use requirements to send data to
immunization information systems or other
HIEs. (B) The system shall use the messaging
standards established through meaningful
use requirements to receive data from
immunization information systems or other
HIEs.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criterion
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition Criterion
listed below:
• Transmission to Immunization Registries
criterion, which:
Æ Provides the ability to create
immunization information according to the
implementation guide for Immunization
Messaging Release 1.5, and the July 2015
addendum, using CVX codes for historical
vaccines and NDC codes for newly
administered vaccines.
Æ Provides the ability to request, access,
and display the evaluated immunization
history and forecast from an immunization
registry for a patient in accordance with the
HL7 2.5.1 standard, the HL7 2.5.1. IG for
Immunization Messaging, Release 1.5, and
July 2015 addendum.
• View, Download, and Transmit to Third
Party (VDT) criterion, which:
Æ Provides the ability for patients (and
their authorized representatives) to view,
download, and transmit their health
information to a third party via internetbased technology consistent with one of the
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines
(WCAG) 2.0 Levels A or AA.
Æ Requires the ability for patients (and
their authorized representatives) to view, at
a minimum, the Common Clinical Data Set,
laboratory test report(s), and diagnostic image
reports.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
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the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Supplemental Children’s Format
Requirements for Recommendation 5
We seek feedback about the relevance of
the following potential Children’s EHR
Format requirements and their correlation to
Recommendation 5.
1. Title: Produce completed forms from
EHR data.
The Children’s EHR Format: Req-2027
Release Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Well Child/Preventive Care,
Immunizations.
Description: The system shall produce
reports (e.g., for camp, school, or child care)
of a child’s immunization history, including
the following elements: Child’s name, date of
birth and sex, date the report was produced,
antigen administered, date administered,
route of administration (when available), and
an indication of whether a vaccine was
refused or contraindicated.
2015 Edition Certification Alignment:
Transmission to immunization registries,
View, Download and Transmit (VDT),
Application Programming Interface (API).
New or Updated Criterion Alignment: API.
Recommendation 6: Age- and WeightSpecific Single-Dose Range Checking
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirements as
follows:
Title: Age- and weight-specific single-dose
range checking.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2037: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Medication Management.
Description: The system shall provide
medication dosing decision support that
detects a drug dose that falls outside the
minimum-maximum range based on the
patient’s age, weight, and maximum
recommended adult dose (if known) or
maximum recommended pediatric dose (if
known), for a single dose of the medication.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criterion listed
below:
Clinical Decision Support (CDS) can be
used to develop a variety of tools to enhance
decision-making in the pediatric clinical
workflow including contextually relevant
reference information, clinical guidelines,
condition-specific order sets, alerts, and
reminders, among other tools.
Application Programming Interfaces
criteria including the ‘‘application access—
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patient selection’’, ‘‘application access—data
category request’’, and ‘‘application access—
all data request’’ which can help address
many of the challenges currently faced by
caregivers accessing pediatric health data.
ONC believes this priority could also be
supported by health IT beyond what is
included in the certification program.
ONC notes that per the National Council
for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP),
dose-range checking should be based on
industry drug database products and are not
intrinsic to SCRIPT.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Recommendation 7: Transferrable Access
Authority
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Transferrable access authority.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2026: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): School-Based Linkages, Security
and Confidentiality, Patient Portals and
Patient Health Records (PHR).
Description: The system shall provide a
mechanism to enable access control that
allows a transferrable access authority (e.g.,
to address change in guardian, child reaching
age of maturity, etc.).
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criterion
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criterion
below.
• View, Download, and Transmit to Third
Party (VDT) criterion, which:
Æ Provides the ability for patients (and
their authorized representatives) to view,
download, and transmit their health
information to a third party via internetbased technology consistent with one of the
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines
(WCAG) 2.0 Levels A or AA.
Æ Requires the ability for patients (and
their authorized representatives) to view, at
a minimum, the Common Clinical Data Set,
laboratory test report(s), and diagnostic image
reports.
Application Programming Interfaces
criteria including the ‘‘application access—
patient selection’’, ‘‘application access—data
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category request’’, and ‘‘application access—
all data request’’ which can help address
many of the challenges currently faced by
caregivers accessing pediatric health data.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criterion
• Data Segmentation for Privacy: (two for
C–CDA ((§ 170.315(b)(12)) and
(§ 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR
(§ 170.315(g)(11))) would provide
functionality to address the concerns
multiple stakeholders expressed regarding
the need to restrict granular pediatric health
data at production based on the intended
recipient of the data.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Supplemental Children’s Format
Requirements for Recommendation 7
We seek feedback about the relevance of
the following potential Children’s EHR
Format requirements and their correlation to
Recommendation 7.
1. Title: Age of emancipation.
The Children’s EHR Format: Requirement
Req-2040 Release Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Security and Confidentiality.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to record the patient’s emancipated
minor status.
2015 Edition Criterion Alignment:
Demographic.
New or Updated Criterion Alignment: Data
segmentation.
Recommendation 8: Associate Maternal
Health Information and Demographics With
Newborn
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Associate mother’s demographics
with newborn.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2021: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List
Topic(s): Patient Identifier, Parents and
Guardians and Family Relationship Data.
Description: The system shall provide the
ability to associate identifying parent or
guardian demographic information, such as
relationship to child, street address,
telephone number, and/or email address for
each individual child.
Alignment With the 2015 Edition
Certification Criterion
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criterion
below:
• Care Plan: Criteria includes the ability to
record, change, access, create, and receive
care plan information according to the care
plan document template in the HL7
implementation guide for CDA® Release 2:
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Consolidated CDA Templates for Clinical
Notes (US Realm), draft standard for Trial
Use Release 2.1 (including the sections for
health status evaluations and outcomes and
for interventions (V2)).
• Transitions of Care criteria includes the
ability to create and to receive interoperable
documents using a comment content
standard that include key health data that
should be accessible and available for
exchange to support the care of children
across care settings.
• Demographic criterion requires the
ability to record various demographic
information for a patient including potential
supports for patient and parental matching.
• Family Health History criterion permits
the ability to record, change, and access a
patient’s family health history (according to
the September 2015 release of SNOMED CT®,
U.S. edition).
• Social, Psychological, and Behavioral
Data criteria capture information (also
known as social determinants of health) that
can help to provide a more complete view of
a mother’s overall health status.
• Clinical Quality Measures criteria for
record and export, import and calculate, and
filter criteria:
Æ Record and export criterion ensures that
health IT systems can record and export
CQM data electronically; the export
functionality gives clinicians the ability to
export their results to multiple programs.
Æ import and calculate criterion supports
streamlined clinician processes through the
importing of CQM data in a standardized
format and ensures that health IT systems
can correctly calculate eCQM results using a
standardized format.
Æ filter criterion supports the capability for
a clinician to make a query for eCQM results
using or a combination of data captured by
the certified health IT for quality
improvement and quality reporting purposes.
• Application Programming Interfaces
criteria including the ‘‘application access—
patient selection’’, ‘‘application access—data
category request’’, and ‘‘application access—
all data request’’ which can help address
many of the challenges currently faced by
caregivers accessing pediatric health data.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the proposed new and updated
certification criteria in this proposed rule:
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
Recommendation 9: Track Incomplete
Preventative Care Opportunities
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Track incomplete preventive care
opportunities.
Children’s EHR Format: Req-2024: Release
Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Well Child/Preventive Care.
Description: The system shall generate a
list on demand for any children who have
missed recommended health supervision
visits (e.g., preventive opportunities),
according to the frequency of visits
recommended in Bright FuturesTM.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criterion
below:
Clinical Decision Support (CDS) criterion
includes configuration that enables
interventions based on various CCDS data
elements, including vital signs.
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Recommendation 10: Flag Special Health
Care Needs
Alignment With Children’s EHR Format
Stakeholders identified alignment with the
Children’s EHR Format Requirement as
follows:
Title: Flag special health care needs.
The Children’s EHR Format: Req-2014:
Release Package: 2015 Priority List.
Topic(s): Children with Special Health
Care Needs.
Description: The system shall support the
ability for providers to flag or un-flag
individuals with special health care needs or
complex conditions who may benefit from
care management, decision support, and care
planning, and shall support reporting.
Alignment With 2015 Edition Certification
Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the 2015 Edition criterion
below.
• Problem List criterion contains the
patient’s current health problems, injuries,
chronic conditions, and other factors that
affect the overall health and well-being of the
patient.
• Clinical Decision Support (CDS) can be
used to develop a variety of tools to enhance
decision-making in the pediatric clinical
workflow including contextually relevant
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reference information, clinical guidelines,
condition-specific order sets, alerts, and
reminders, among other tools.
• Clinical Quality Measures criteria for
record and export, import and calculate, and
filter criteria:
Æ Record and export criterion ensures that
health IT systems can record and export
CQM data electronically; the export
functionality gives clinicians the ability to
export their results to multiple programs.
Æ import and calculate criterion supports
streamlined clinician processes through the
importing of CQM data in a standardized
format and ensures that health IT systems
can correctly calculate eCQM results using a
standardized format.
Æ filter criterion supports the capability for
a clinician to make a query for eCQM results
using or a combination of data captured by
the certified health IT for quality
improvement and quality reporting purposes.
Alignment With Proposed New or Updated
Certification Criteria
ONC believes this recommendation is
supported by the proposed new and updated
certification criteria in this proposed rule:
• United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI): The USCDI
(§ 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including
the reference range/scale or growth curve for
BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for
age per length and sex, and head occipitalfrontal circumference.
• Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs): § 170.315(g)(10), would require the
use of Health Level 7 (HL7®) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR®) standards
and several implementation specifications to
establish standardized application
programming interfaces (APIs) for
interoperability purposes and to permit 3rd
party software developers to connect to the
electronic health record (EHR) through the
certified API technology.
[FR Doc. 2019–02224 Filed 2–22–19; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4150–45–P
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services
42 CFR Parts 406, 407, 422, 423, 431,
438, 457, 482, and 485
Office of the Secretary
45 CFR Part 156
[CMS–9115–P]
RIN 0938–AT79
Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act; Interoperability and Patient
Access for Medicare Advantage
Organization and Medicaid Managed
Care Plans, State Medicaid Agencies,
CHIP Agencies and CHIP Managed
Care Entities, Issuers of Qualified
Health Plans in the FederallyFacilitated Exchanges and Health Care
Providers
Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
This proposed rule is
intended to move the health care
ecosystem in the direction of
interoperability, and to signal our
commitment to the vision set out in the
21st Century Cures Act and Executive
Order 13813 to improve access to, and
the quality of, information that
Americans need to make informed
health care decisions, including data
about health care prices and outcomes,
while minimizing reporting burdens on
affected plans, health care providers, or
payers.
DATES: To be assured consideration,
comments must be received at one of
the addresses provided below, no later
than 5 p.m. on May 3, 2019.
ADDRESSES: In commenting, please refer
to file code CMS–9115–P. Because of
staff and resource limitations, we cannot
accept comments by facsimile (FAX)
transmission.
Comments, including mass comment
submissions, must be submitted in one
of the following three ways (please
choose only one of the ways listed):
1. Electronically. You may submit
electronic comments on this regulation
to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow
the ‘‘Submit a comment’’ instructions.
2. By regular mail. You may mail
written comments to the following
address ONLY: Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, Department of
Health and Human Services, Attention:
SUMMARY:
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CMS–9115–P, P.O. Box 8016, Baltimore,
MD 21244–8016.
Please allow sufficient time for mailed
comments to be received before the
close of the comment period.
3. By express or overnight mail. You
may send written comments to the
following address ONLY: Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Department of Health and Human
Services, Attention: CMS–9115–P, Mail
Stop C4–26–05, 7500 Security
Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21244–1850.
For information on viewing public
comments, see the beginning of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Alexandra Mugge, (410) 786–4457, for
issues related to interoperability, CMS
health IT strategy, technical standards
and patient matching.
Natalie Albright, (410) 786–1671, for
issues related to Medicare Advantage.
John Giles, (410) 786–1255, for issues
related to Medicaid.
Emily Pedneau, (301) 492–4448, for
issues related to Qualified Health Plans.
Meg Barry, (410) 786–1536, for issues
related to CHIP.
Thomas Novak, (202) 322–7235, for
issues related to trust exchange
networks and payer to payer
coordination.
Sharon Donovan, (410) 786–9187, for
issues related to federal-state data
exchange.
Daniel Riner, (410) 786–0237, for
issues related to Physician Compare.
Ashley Hain, (410) 786–7603, for
issues related to hospital public
reporting.
Melissa Singer, (410) 786–0365, for
issues related to provider directories.
CAPT Scott Cooper, USPHS, (410)
786–9465, for issues related to hospital
and critical access hospital conditions
of participation.
Lisa Bari, (410) 786–0087, for issues
related to advancing interoperability in
innovative models.
Russell Hendel, (410) 786–0329, for
issues related to the Collection of
Information or the Regulation Impact
Analysis sections.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Inspection of Public Comments: All
comments received before the close of
the comment period are available for
viewing by the public, including any
personally identifiable or confidential
business information that is included in
a comment. We post all comments
received before the close of the
comment period on the following
website as soon as possible after they
have been received: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the search
instructions on that website to view
public comments.
E:\FR\FM\04MRP2.SGM
04MRP2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 42 (Monday, March 4, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 7424-7610]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-02224]
[[Page 7423]]
Vol. 84
Monday,
No. 42
March 4, 2019
Part II
Department of Health and Human Services
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Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
42 CFR Parts 406, 407, 422, et al.
45 CFR Parts 156, 170, and 171
21st Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the
ONC Health IT Certification Program; Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interoperability and
Patient Access for Medicare Advantage Organization and Medicaid Managed
Care Plans, State Medicaid Agencies, CHIP Agencies and CHIP Managed
Care Entities, Issuers of Qualified Health Plans in the Federally-
Facilitated Exchanges and Health Care Providers; Proposed Rules
Federal Register / Vol. 84 , No. 42 / Monday, March 4, 2019 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 7424]]
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Office of the Secretary
45 CFR Parts 170 and 171
RIN 0955-AA01
21st Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking,
and the ONC Health IT Certification Program
AGENCY: Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology (ONC), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This proposed rule would implement certain provisions of the
21st Century Cures Act, including conditions and maintenance of
certification requirements for health information technology (health
IT) developers under the ONC Health IT Certification Program (Program),
the voluntary certification of health IT for use by pediatric health
care providers, and reasonable and necessary activities that do not
constitute information blocking. The implementation of these provisions
would advance interoperability and support the access, exchange, and
use of electronic health information. The proposed rule would also
modify the 2015 Edition health IT certification criteria and Program in
additional ways to advance interoperability, enhance health IT
certification, and reduce burden and costs.
DATES: To be assured consideration, written or electronic comments must
be received at one of the addresses provided below, no later than 5
p.m. on May 3, 2019.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 0955-AA01, by any
of the following methods (please do not submit duplicate comments).
Because of staff and resource limitations, we cannot accept comments by
facsimile (FAX) transmission.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Follow the instructions for
submitting comments. Attachments should be in Microsoft Word, Microsoft
Excel, or Adobe PDF; however, we prefer Microsoft Word. https://www.regulations.gov.
Regular, Express, or Overnight Mail: Department of Health
and Human Services, Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, Attention: 21st Century Cures Act:
Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the ONC Health IT
Certification Program Proposed Rule, Mary E. Switzer Building, Mail
Stop: 7033A, 330 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20201. Please submit one
original and two copies.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, Attention: 21st Century
Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the ONC Health
IT Certification Program Proposed Rule, Mary E. Switzer Building, Mail
Stop: 7033A, 330 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20201. Please submit one
original and two copies. (Because access to the interior of the Mary E.
Switzer Building is not readily available to persons without federal
government identification, commenters are encouraged to leave their
comments in the mail drop slots located in the main lobby of the
building.)
Enhancing the Public Comment Experience: To facilitate public
comment on this proposed rule, a copy will be made available in
Microsoft Word format on ONC's website (https://www.healthit.gov). We
believe this version will make it easier for commenters to access and
copy portions of the proposed rule for use in their individual
comments. Additionally, a separate document (``public comment
template'') will also be made available on ONC's website (https://www.healthit.gov) for the public to use in providing comments on the
proposed rule. This document is meant to provide the public with a
simple and organized way to submit comments on proposals and respond to
specific questions posed in the preamble of the proposed rule. While
use of this document is entirely voluntary, we encourage commenters to
consider using the document in lieu of unstructured comments, or to use
it as an addendum to narrative cover pages. We believe that use of the
document may facilitate our review and understanding of the comments
received. The public comment template will be available shortly after
the proposed rule publishes in the Federal Register. This short delay
will permit the appropriate citation in the public comment template to
pages of the published version of the proposed rule.
Inspection of Public Comments: All comments received before the
close of the comment period will be available for public inspection,
including any personally identifiable or confidential business
information that is included in a comment. Please do not include
anything in your comment submission that you do not wish to share with
the general public. Such information includes, but is not limited to: A
person's social security number; date of birth; driver's license
number; state identification number or foreign country equivalent;
passport number; financial account number; credit or debit card number;
any personal health information; or any business information that could
be considered proprietary. We will post all comments that are received
before the close of the comment period at https://www.regulations.gov.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the Department
of Health and Human Services, Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology, Mary E. Switzer Building, Mail Stop:
7033A, 330 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20201 (call ahead to the contact
listed below to arrange for inspection).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Lipinski, Office of Policy,
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology,
202-690-7151.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of Regulatory Action
B. Summary of Major Provisions and Clarifications
1. Deregulatory Actions for Previous Rulemakings
2. Updates to the 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
a. Adoption of the United States Core Data for Interoperability
as a Standard
b. Electronic Prescribing
c. Clinical Quality Measures--Report
d. Electronic Health Information Export
e. Application Programming Interfaces
f. Privacy and Security Transparency Attestations
g. Data Segmentation for Privacy and Consent Management
3. Modifications to the ONC Health IT Certification Program
4. Health IT for the Care Continuum
5. Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
6. Information Blocking
C. Costs and Benefits
II. Background
A. Statutory Basis
1. Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification
Criteria
2. Health IT Certification Program(s)
B. Regulatory History
1. Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification
Criteria Rules
2. ONC Health IT Certification Program Rules
III. Deregulatory Actions for Previous Rulemakings
A. Background
1. History of Burden Reduction and Regulatory Flexibility
2. Executive Orders 13771 and 13777
[[Page 7425]]
B. Proposed Deregulatory Actions
1. Removal of Randomized Surveillance Requirements
2. Removal of the 2014 Edition From the Code of Federal
Regulations
3. Removal of the ONC-Approved Accreditor From the Program
4. Removal of Certain 2015 Edition Certification Criteria and
Standards
a. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition Certification Criteria
b. Drug-Formulary and Preferred Drug Lists
c. Patient-Specific Education Resources
d. Common Clinical Data Set Summary Record--Create; and Common
Clinical Data Set Summary Record--Receive
e. Secure Messaging
5. Removal of Certain ONC Health IT Certification Program
Requirements
a. Limitations Disclosures
b. Transparency and Mandatory Disclosures Requirements
6. Recognition of Food and Drug Administration Processes
a. FDA Software Pre-Certification Pilot Program
b. Development of Similar Independent Program Processes--Request
for Information
IV. Updates to the 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
A. Standards and Implementation Specifications
1. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
2. Compliance with Adopted Standards and Implementation
Specifications
3. ``Reasonably Available'' to Interested Parties
B. Revised and New 2015 Edition Criteria
1. The United States Core Data for Interoperability Standard
(USCDI)
a. USCDI 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
b. USCDI Standard--Data Classes Included
c. USCDI Standard--Relationship to Content Exchange Standards
and Implementation Specifications
d. Clinical Notes C-CDA Implementation Specification
2. Electronic Prescribing Criterion
3. Clinical Quality Measures--Report Criterion
4. Electronic Health Information Export Criterion
a. Patient Access
b. Transitions Between Health IT Systems
c. Scope of EHI
d. Export Format
e. Initial Step to Persistent Access to All of a Patient's EHI
f. Timeframes
g. Replaces the 2015 Edition ``Data Export'' Criterion in the
2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
5. Standardized API for Patient and Population Services
Criterion
6. Privacy and Security Transparency Attestations Criteria
a. Background
b. Encrypt Authentication Credentials
c. Multi-factor Authentication
7. Data Segmentation for Privacy and Consent Management Criteria
a. Implementation With the Consolidated CDA Release 2.1
b. Implementation With FHIR Standard
C. Unchanged 2015 Edition Criteria--Promoting Interoperability
Programs Reference Alignment
V. Modifications to the ONC Health IT Certification Program
A. Corrections
1. Auditable Events and Tamper Resistance
2. Amendments
3. View, Download, and Transmit to 3rd Party
4. Integrating Revised and New Certification Criteria Into the
2015 Edition Privacy and Security Certification Framework
B. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ACBs
1. Records Retention
2. Conformance Methods for Certification Criteria
3. ONC-ACBs to Accept Test Results From Any ONC-ATL in Good
Standing
4. Mandatory Disclosures and Certifications
C. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ATLs--Records Retention
VI. Health IT for the Care Continuum
A. Health IT for Pediatric Setting
1. Background and Stakeholder Convening
2. Recommendations for the Voluntary Certification of Health IT
for Use in Pediatric Care
a. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
b. New or Revised Certification Criteria in This Proposed Rule
B. Health IT and Opioid Use Disorder Prevention and Treatment--
Request for Information
1. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
2. Revised or New 2015 Edition Certification Criteria in This
Proposed Rule
3. Emerging Standards and Innovations
4. Additional Comment Areas
VII. Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
A. Implementation
B. Provisions
1. Information Blocking
2. Assurances
a. Full Compliance and Unrestricted Implementation of
Certification Criteria Capabilities
b. Certification to the ``Electronic Health Information Export''
Criterion
c. Records and Information Retention
d. Trusted Exchange Framework and the Common Agreement--Request
for Information
3. Communications
a. Background and Purpose
b. Condition of Certification Requirements
c. Maintenance of Certification Requirements
4. Application Programming Interfaces
a. Statutory Interpretation and API Policy Principles
b. Key Terms
c. Proposed API Standards, Implementation Specifications, and
Certification Criterion
d. Condition of Certification Requirements
e. Maintenance of Certification Requirements
f. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
5. Real World Testing
6. Attestations
7. EHR Reporting Criteria Submission
C. Compliance
D. Enforcement
1. ONC Direct Review of the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification Requirements
2. Review and Enforcement Only by ONC
3. Review Processes
a. Initiating Review and Health IT Developer Notice
b. Relationship with ONC-ACBs and ONC-ATLs
c. Records Access
d. Corrective Action
e. Certification Ban and Termination
f. Appeal
g. Suspension
h. Proposed Termination
4. Public Listing of Certification Ban and Terminations
5. Effect on Existing Program Requirements and Processes
6. Concurrent Enforcement by the Office of Inspector General
7. Applicability of Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
Requirements for Self-Developers
VIII. Information Blocking
A. Statutory Basis
B. Legislative Background and Policy Considerations
1. Purpose of the Information Blocking Provision
2. Policy Considerations and Approach to the Information
Blocking Provisions
C. Relevant Statutory Terms and Provisions
1. ``Required by Law''
2. Health Care Providers, Health IT Developers, Exchanges, and
Networks
a. Health Care Providers
b. Health IT Developers of Certified Health IT
c. Networks and Exchanges
3. Electronic Health Information
4. Interests Promoted by the Information Blocking Provision
a. Access, Exchange, and Use of EHI
b. Interoperability Elements
5. Practices That May Implicate the Information Blocking
Provision
a. Prevention, Material Discouragement, and Other Interference
b. Likelihood of Interference
c. Examples of Practices Likely To Interfere With Access,
Exchange, or Use of EHI
6. Applicability of Exceptions
a. Reasonable and Necessary Activities
b. Treatment of Different Types of Actors
c. Establishing That Activities and Practices Meet the
Conditions of an Exception
D. Proposed Exceptions to the Information Blocking Provision
1. Preventing Harm
2. Promoting the Privacy of EHI
3. Promoting the Security of EHI
4. Recovering Costs Reasonably Incurred
5. Responding to Requests That Are Infeasible
6. Licensing of Interoperability Elements on Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory Terms
7. Maintaining and Improving Health IT Performance
E. Additional Exceptions--Request for Information
[[Page 7426]]
1. Exception for Complying With Common Agreement for Trusted
Exchange
2. New Exceptions
F. Complaint Process
G. Disincentives for Health Care Providers--Request for
Information
IX. Registries Request for Information
X. Patient Matching Request for Information
XI. Incorporation by Reference
XII. Response to Comments
XIII. Collection of Information Requirements
A. ONC-ACBs
B. Health IT Developers
XIV. Regulatory Impact Analysis
A. Statement of Need
B. Alternatives Considered
C. Overall Impact
1. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563--Regulatory Planning and
Review Analysis
2. Executive Order 13771--Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
a. Costs and Benefits
b. Accounting Statement and Table
3. Regulatory Flexibility Act
4. Executive Order 13132--Federalism
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
6. Executive Order 13771 Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
Regulation Text
I. Executive Summary
A. Purpose of Regulatory Action
ONC is responsible for the implementation of key provisions in
Title IV of the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) that are designed to
advance interoperability; support the access, exchange, and use of
electronic health information; and address occurrences of information
blocking. This proposed rule would implement certain provisions of the
Cures Act, including Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
requirements for health information technology (health IT) developers,
the voluntary certification of health IT for use by pediatric health
providers, and reasonable and necessary activities that do not
constitute information blocking. In addition, the proposed rule would
implement parts of section 4006(a) of the Cures Act to support patient
access to their electronic health information (EHI), such as making a
patient's EHI more electronically accessible through the adoption of
standards and certification criteria and the implementation of
information blocking policies that support patient electronic access to
their health information at no cost. Additionally, the proposed rule
would modify the 2015 Edition health IT certification criteria and ONC
Health IT Certification Program (Program) in other ways to advance
interoperability, enhance health IT certification, and reduce burden
and costs.
In addition to fulfilling the Cures Act's requirements, the
proposed rule would contribute to fulfilling Executive Order (E.O.)
13813. The President issued E.O. 13813 on October 12, 2017, to promote
health care choice and competition across the United States. Section
1(c) of the E.O., in relevant part, states that government rules
affecting the United States health care system should re-inject
competition into the health care markets by lowering barriers to entry
and preventing abuses of market power. Section 1(c) also states that
government rules should improve access to and the quality of
information that Americans need to make informed health care decisions.
For example, as mentioned above, the proposed rule focuses on
establishing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for several
interoperability purposes, including patient access to their health
information without special effort. The API approach also supports
health care providers having the sole authority and autonomy to
unilaterally permit connections to their health IT through certified
API technology the health care providers have acquired. In addition,
the proposed rule provides ONC's interpretation of the information
blocking definition as established in the Cures Act and the application
of the information blocking provision by identifying reasonable and
necessary activities that would not constitute information blocking.
Many of these activities focus on improving patient and health care
provider access to electronic health information and promoting
competition.
B. Summary of Major Provisions and Clarifications
1. Deregulatory Actions for Previous Rulemakings
Since the inception of the Program, we have aimed to implement and
administer the Program in the least burdensome manner that supports our
policy goals. Throughout the years, we have worked to improve the
Program with a focus on ways to reduce burden, offer flexibility to
both developers and providers, and support innovation. This approach
has been consistent with the principles of Executive Order 13563 on
Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review (February 2, 2011), which
instructs agencies to ``determine whether any [agency] regulations
should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make
the agency's regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in
achieving the regulatory objectives.'' To that end, we have
historically, where feasible and appropriate, taken measures to reduce
burden within the Program and make the Program more effective,
flexible, and streamlined.
ONC has reviewed and evaluated existing regulations to identify
ways to administratively reduce burden and implement deregulatory
actions through guidance. In this proposed rule, we also propose
potential new deregulatory actions that will reduce burden for health
IT developers, providers, and other stakeholders. We propose six
deregulatory actions in section III.B: (1) Removal of a threshold
requirement related to randomized surveillance which allows ONC-
Authorized Certification Bodies (ONC-ACBs) more flexibility to identify
the right approach for surveillance actions, (2) removal of the 2014
Edition from the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), (3) removal of the
ONC-Approved Accreditor (ONC-AA) from the Program, (4) removal of
certain 2015 Edition certification criteria, (5) removal of certain
Program requirements, and (6) recognition of relevant Food and Drug
Administration certification processes with a request for comment on
the potential development of new processes for the Program.
2. Updates to the 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
This rule proposes to update the 2015 Edition by not only proposing
criteria for removal, but by proposing to revise and add new
certification criteria that would establish the capabilities and
related standards and implementation specifications for the
certification of health IT.
a. Adoption of the United States Core Data for Interoperability (USCDI)
as a Standard
As part of ONC's continued efforts to assure the availability of a
minimum baseline of data classes that could be commonly available for
interoperable exchange, we adopted the 2015 Edition ``Common Clinical
Data Set'' (CCDS) definition and used the CCDS shorthand in several
certification criteria. However, the CCDS definition also began to be
colloquially used for many different purposes. As the CCDS definition's
relevance grew outside of its regulatory context, it became a symbolic
and practical limit to the industry's collective interests to go beyond
the CCDS data for access, exchange, and use. In addition, as we move
further towards value-based care, the need for the inclusion of
additional data classes that go beyond clinical data is necessary. In
order to advance interoperability, we propose to remove the CCDS
definition and its references
[[Page 7427]]
from the 2015 Edition and replace it with the ``United States Core Data
for Interoperability.'' We propose to adopt the USCDI as a standard,
naming USCDI Version 1 (USCDI v1) in Sec. 170.213 and incorporating it
by reference in Sec. 170.299. The USCDI standard, if adopted, would
establish a set of data classes and constituent data elements that
would be required to be exchanged in support of interoperability
nationwide. To achieve the goals set forth in the Cures Act, ONC
intends to establish and follow a predictable, transparent, and
collaborative process to expand the USCDI, including providing
stakeholders with the opportunity to comment on the USCDI's expansion.
Once the USCDI is adopted in regulation naming USCDI v1, health IT
developers would be allowed to take advantage of a flexibility under
the Maintenance of Certification real world testing requirements, which
we refer to as the ``Standards Version Advancement Process'' (described
in section VII.B.5 of this proposed rule). The Standards Version
Advancement Process would permit health IT developers to voluntarily
implement and use a new version of an adopted standard, such as the
USCDI, so long as the newer version was approved by the National
Coordinator through the Standards Version Advancement Process for use
in certification.
b. Electronic Prescribing
We propose to update the electronic prescribing (e-Rx) SCRIPT
standard in 45 CFR 170.205(b) to NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071, which would
result in a new e-Rx standard eventually becoming the baseline for
certification. We also propose to adopt a new certification criterion
in Sec. 170.315(b)(11) for e-Rx to reflect these updated proposals.
ONC and CMS have historically maintained complementary policies of
maintaining aligned e-Rx and medical history (MH) standards to ensure
that the current standard for certification to the electronic
prescribing criterion permits use of the current Part D e-Rx and MH
standards. This proposal is made to ensure such alignment as CMS
recently finalized its Part D standards to NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 for e-
RX and MH, effective January 1, 2020 (83 FR 16440). In addition to
continuing to reference the current transactions included in Sec.
170.315(b)(3), in keeping with CMS' final rule, we also propose to
require all of the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard transactions CMS
adopted at 42 CFR 423.160(b)(2)(iv).
c. Clinical Quality Measures--Report
We propose to remove the HL7 Quality Reporting Document
Architecture (QRDA) standard requirements from the 2015 Edition
``CQMs--report'' criterion in Sec. 170.315(c)(3) and, in their place,
require Health IT Modules to support the CMS QRDA Implementation Guide
(IGs).\1\ This would reduce the burden for health IT developers by only
having to support one form of the QRDA standard rather than two forms
(i.e., the HL7 and CMS forms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://ecqi.healthit.gov/qrda-quality-reporting-document-architecture.
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d. Electronic Health Information Export
We propose a new 2015 Edition certification criterion for
``electronic health information (EHI) export'' in Sec. 170.315(b)(10),
which would replace the 2015 Edition ``data export'' certification
criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(6)) and become part of the 2015 Edition
Base EHR definition. The proposed criterion supports situations in
which we believe that all EHI produced and electronically managed by a
developer's health IT should be made readily available for export as a
standard capability of certified health IT. Specifically, this
criterion would: (1) Enable the export of EHI for a single patient upon
a valid request from that patient or a user on the patient's behalf,
and (2) support the export of EHI when a health care provider chooses
to transition or migrate information to another health IT system. This
criterion would also require that the export include the data format,
made publicly available, to facilitate the receiving health IT system's
interpretation and use of the EHI to the extent reasonably practicable
using the developer's existing technology.
This criterion provides developers with the ability to create
innovative export capabilities according to their systems and data
practices. We do not propose that the export must be executed according
to any particular standard, but propose to require that the export must
be accompanied by the data format, including its structure and syntax,
to facilitate interpretation of the EHI therein. Overall, this new
criterion is intended to provide patients and health IT users,
including providers, a means to efficiently export the entire
electronic health record for a single patient or all patients in a
computable, electronic format.
e. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
We propose to adopt a new API criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10),
which would replace the ``application access--data category request''
certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(8)) and become part of the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition. This new ``standardized API for
patient and population services'' certification criterion would require
the use of Health Level 7 (HL7[supreg]) Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR[supreg]) standards \2\ and several
implementation specifications. The new criterion would focus on
supporting two types of API-enabled services: (1) Services for which a
single patient's data is the focus and (2) services for which multiple
patients' data are the focus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.hl7.org/fhir/overview.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
f. Privacy and Security Transparency Attestations
We propose to adopt two new privacy and security transparency
attestation certification criteria, which would identify whether
certified health IT supports encrypting authentication credentials and/
or multi-factor authentication. In order to be issued a certification,
we propose to require that a Health IT Module developer attest to
whether the Health IT Module encrypts authentication credentials and
whether the Health IT Module supports multi-factor authentication.
These criteria are not expected to place additional burden on health IT
developers since they do not require net new development or
implementation to take place in order to be met. However, certification
to these proposed criteria would provide increased transparency and
potentially motivate health IT developers to encrypt authentication
credentials and support multi- factor authentication, which could help
prevent exposure to unauthorized persons/entities.
g. Data Segmentation for Privacy and Consent Management
In the 2015 Edition, we adopted two ``data segmentation for
privacy'' (DS4P) certification criteria, one for creating a summary
record according to the DS4P standard and one for receiving a summary
record according to the DS4P standard. Certification to the 2015
Edition DS4P criteria focus on data segmentation only at the document
level. As noted in the 2015 Edition final rule (80 FR 62646)--and to
our knowledge still an accurate assessment--certification to these
criteria is currently not required to meet the Certified EHR Technology
definition
[[Page 7428]]
(CEHRT) or required by any other HHS program. Since the 2015 Edition
final rule, the health care industry has engaged in additional field
testing and implementation of the DS4P standard. In addition,
stakeholders shared with ONC--through public forums, listening
sessions, and correspondence--that focusing certification on
segmentation to only the document level does not permit providers the
flexibility to address more granular segmentation needs. Therefore, we
propose to remove the current 2015 Edition DS4P criteria. We propose to
replace these two criteria with three new 2015 Edition ``DS4P''
certification criteria (two for C-CDA and one for a FHIR-based API)
that would support a more granular approach to privacy tagging data
consent management for health information exchange supported by either
the C-CDA- or FHIR-based exchange standards.
3. Modifications to the ONC Health IT Certification Program
We propose to make corrections to the 2015 Edition privacy and
security certification framework (80 FR 62705) and relevant regulatory
provisions. These corrections have already been incorporated in the
relevant Certification Companion Guides (CCGs).
We propose new and revised principles of proper conduct (PoPC) for
ONC-Authorized Certification Bodies (ONC-ACBs). We propose to clarify
that the records retention provision includes the ``life of the
edition'' as well as after the retirement of an edition related to the
certification of Complete EHRs and Health IT Modules. We also propose
to revise the PoPC in Sec. 170.523(h) to clarify the basis for
certification, including to permit a certification decision to be based
on an evaluation conducted by the ONC-ACB for Health IT Modules'
compliance with certification criteria by use of conformity methods
approved by the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
(National Coordinator). We also propose to update Sec. 170.523(h) to
require ONC-ACBs to accept test results from any ONC-ATL that is in
good standing under the Program and is compliant with its ISO 17025
accreditation requirements. We believe these proposed new and revised
PoPCs would provide necessary clarifications for ONC-ACBs and would
promote stability among the ONC-ACBs. We also propose to update Sec.
170.523(k) to broaden the requirements beyond just the Medicare and
Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Programs (now renamed
the Promoting Interoperability Programs) and provide other necessary
clarifications.
We propose to revise a PoPC for ONC-ATLs. We propose to clarify
that the records retention provision includes the ``life of the
edition'' as well as after the retirement of an edition related to the
certification of Complete EHRs and Health IT Modules.
4. Health IT for the Care Continuum
Section 4001(b) of the Cures Act includes two provisions related to
supporting health IT across the care continuum. The first instructs the
National Coordinator to encourage, keep or recognize through existing
authorities, the voluntary certification of health IT for use in
medical specialties and sites of service where more technological
advancement or integration is needed. The second outlines a provision
related to the voluntary certification of health IT for use by
pediatric health providers to support the health care of children.
These provisions align closely with ONC's core purpose to promote
interoperability to support care coordination, patient engagement, and
health care quality improvement initiatives. Advancing health IT that
promotes and supports patient care when and where it is needed
continues to be a primary goal of the Program. This means health IT
should support patient populations, specialized care, transitions of
care, and practice settings across the care continuum.
ONC has explored how we might work with the health IT industry and
with specialty organizations to collaboratively develop and promote
health IT that supports medical specialties and sites of service. Over
time, ONC has taken steps to make the Program modular, more open and
accessible to different types of health IT, and able to advance
functionality that is generally applicable to a variety of care and
practice settings. Specific to the provisions in the Cures Act to
support providers of health care for children, we considered a wide
range of factors. These include: The evolution of health IT across the
care continuum, the costs and benefits associated with health IT, the
potential regulatory burden and compliance timelines, and the need to
help advance health IT that benefits multiple medical specialties and
sites of service involved in the care of children. In consideration of
these factors, and to advance implementation of Sections 4001(b) of the
Cures Act specific to pediatric care, we held a listening session where
stakeholders could share their clinical knowledge and technical
expertise in pediatric care and pediatric sites of service. Through the
information learned at this listening session and our analysis of the
health IT landscape for pediatric settings, we have identified existing
2015 Edition criteria, as well as new and revised 2015 Edition criteria
proposed in this rule, that we believe could benefit providers of
pediatric care and pediatric settings. In this proposed rule, we seek
comment on our analysis and the correlated certification criteria that
we believe would support the health care of children.
We also recognize the significance of the opioid epidemic
confronting our nation and the importance of helping to support the
health IT needs of health care providers committed to preventing
inappropriate access to prescription opioids and to providing safe,
appropriate treatment. We believe health IT offers promising strategies
to help assist medical specialties and sites of services impacted by
the opioid epidemic. Therefore, we request public comment on how our
existing Program requirements and the proposals in this rulemaking may
support use cases related to Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) prevention and
treatment and if there are additional areas that ONC should consider
for effective implementation of health IT to help address OUD
prevention and treatment.
5. Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
We propose to establish certain Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements for health IT developers based on the
conditions and maintenance of certification requirements outlined in
section 4002 of the Cures Act. We propose an approach whereby the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification express both initial
requirements for health IT developers and their certified Health IT
Module(s) as well as ongoing requirements that must be met by both
health IT developers and their certified Health IT Module(s) under the
Program. In this regard, we propose to implement the Cures Act
Conditions of Certification with further specificity as it applies to
the Program and propose to implement any accompanying Maintenance of
Certification requirements as standalone requirements to ensure that
not only are the Conditions of Certification met, but that they are
continually being met through the Maintenance of Certification
requirements. For ease of reference and to distinguish from other
conditions, we propose to capitalize ``Conditions of Certification''
and ``Maintenance of Certification'' when referring to Conditions and
Maintenance
[[Page 7429]]
of Certification requirements established under the Cures Act.
Information Blocking
The Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, not take any action
that constitutes information blocking as defined in section 3022(a) of
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). We propose to establish this
information blocking Condition of Certification in Sec. 170.401. The
Condition of Certification would prohibit any health IT developer under
the Program from taking any action that constitutes information
blocking as defined by section 3022(a) of the PHSA and proposed in
Sec. 171.103.
Assurances
Section 3001(c)(5)(D)(ii) of the Cures Act requires that a health
IT developer, as a Condition of Certification under the Program,
provide assurances to the Secretary that, unless for legitimate
purposes specified by the Secretary, the developer will not take any
action that constitutes information blocking as defined in section
3022(a) of the PHSA, or any other action that may inhibit the
appropriate exchange, access, and use of EHI. We propose to implement
this provision through several Conditions of Certification and
accompanying Maintenance requirements, which are set forth in proposed
Sec. 170.402. We also propose to establish more specific Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification requirements to provide assurances
that a health IT developer does not take any other action that may
inhibit the appropriate exchange, access, and use of EHI. These
proposed requirements serve to provide further clarity under the
Program as to how health IT developers can provide such broad
assurances with more specific actions.
Communications
As a Condition and Maintenance of Certification under the Program,
the Cures Act requires that health IT developers do not prohibit or
restrict communications about certain aspects of the performance of
health IT and the developers' related business practices. We propose
that developers will be permitted to impose certain kinds of limited
prohibitions and restrictions that we believe strike a reasonable
balance between the need to promote open communication about health IT
and related developer business practices and the need to protect the
legitimate interests of health IT developers and other entities.
However, certain narrowly-defined types of communications--such as
communications required by law, made to a government agency, or made to
a defined category of safety organization--would receive ``unqualified
protection,'' meaning that developers would be absolutely prohibited
from imposing any prohibitions or restrictions on such protected
communications.
We propose that to maintain compliance with this Condition of
Certification, a health IT developer must not impose or enforce any
contractual requirement or legal right that contravenes this Condition
of Certification. Furthermore, we propose that if a health IT developer
has contracts/agreements in existence that contravene this condition,
the developer must notify all affected customers or other persons or
entities that the prohibition or restriction will not be enforced by
the health IT developer. Going forward, health IT developers would be
required to amend their contracts/agreements to remove or make void the
provisions that contravene this Condition of Certification within a
reasonable period of time, but not later than two years from the
effective date of a subsequent final rule for this proposed rule.
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
The Cures Act's API Condition of Certification includes several key
phrases (including, for example, ``without special effort'') and
requirements for health IT developers that indicate the Cures Act's
focus on the technical requirements as well as the actions and
practices of health IT developers in implementing the certified API. In
section VII.B.4 of the preamble, we outline our proposals to implement
the Cures Act's API Condition of Certification. These proposals include
new standards, new implementation specifications, a new certification
criterion, as well as detailed Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements.
Real World Testing
The Cures Act adds a new Condition and Maintenance of Certification
requirement that health IT developers successfully test the real world
use of the technology for interoperability in the type of setting in
which such technology would be marketed. In this proposed rule, we
outline what successful ``real world testing'' means for the purpose of
this Condition of Certification, as well as proposed Maintenance
requirements--including standards updates for widespread and continued
interoperability.
We propose to limit the applicability of this Condition of
Certification to health IT developers with Health IT Modules certified
to one or more 2015 Edition certification criteria focused on
interoperability and data exchange specified in section VII.B.5. We
propose Maintenance of Certification requirements that would require
health IT developers to submit publicly available annual real world
testing plans as well as annual real world testing results for
certified health IT products focused on interoperability. We also
propose a Maintenance of Certification flexibility we have named the
Standards Version Advancement Process, under which health IT developers
with health IT certified to the criteria specified for interoperability
and data exchange would have the option to update their health IT to a
more advanced version(s) of the standard(s) or implementation
specification(s) included in the criteria once such versions are
approved by the National Coordinator through the Standards Version
Advancement Process for use in health IT certified under the Program.
Similarly, we propose that health IT developers presenting new health
IT for certification to one of the criteria specified in Section
VII.B.5 would have the option to certify to a National Coordinator-
approved more advanced version of the adopted standards or
implementation specifications included in the criteria. We propose that
health IT developers voluntarily opting to avail themselves of the
Standards Version Advancement Process must address their planned and
actual timelines for implementation and rollout of standards updates in
their annual real world testing plans and real world testing results
submissions. We also propose that health IT developers of products with
existing certifications who plan to avail themselves of the Standards
Version Advancement Process flexibility notify both their ONC-ACB and
their affected customers of their intention and plans to update their
certified health IT and its anticipated impact on their existing
certified health IT and customers, specifically including but not
limited to whether, and if so for how long, the health IT developer
intends to continue to support the certificate for the health IT
certified to the prior version of the standard.
We propose a new PoPC for ONC-ACBs that would require ONC-ACBs to
review and confirm that applicable health IT developers submit real
world testing plans and real world results in accordance with our
proposals. Once
[[Page 7430]]
completeness is confirmed, ONC-ACBs would upload the plans and results
via hyperlinks to the Certified Health IT Product List (CHPL). We
propose to revise the PoPC in Sec. 170.523(m) to require ONC-ACBs to
collect, no less than quarterly, all updates successfully made to
standards in certified health IT pursuant to the developers having
voluntarily opted to avail themselves of the Standards Version
Advancement Process flexibility under the real world testing Condition
of Certification. We propose in Sec. 170.523(t), a new PoPC for ONC-
ACBs requiring them to ensure that developers seeking to take advantage
of the Standards Version Advancement Process flexibility in Sec.
170.405(b)(5) comply with the applicable requirements.
Attestations
The Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, provide to the
Secretary an attestation to all the Conditions of Certification
specified in the Cures Act, except for the ``EHR reporting criteria
submission'' Condition of Certification. We propose to implement the
Cures Act ``attestations'' Condition of Certification in Sec. 170.406.
Health IT developers would attest twice a year to compliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements (except for
the EHR reporting criteria requirement, which would be metrics
reporting requirements separately implemented through a future
rulemaking). The 6-month attestation period we propose in Sec.
170.406(b)(2) would properly balance the need to support appropriate
enforcement with the attestation burden placed on health IT developers.
In this regard, the proposed rule includes provisions to make the
process as simple and efficient for health IT developers as possible
(e.g., 14-day grace period, web-based form submissions, and attestation
alert reminders).
We propose that attestations would be submitted to ONC-ACBs on
behalf of ONC and the Secretary. We propose a new PoPC in Sec.
170.523(q) that an ONC-ACB must review and submit the health IT
developers' attestations to ONC. ONC would then make the attestations
publicly available through the CHPL.
EHR Reporting Criteria Submission
The Cures Act specifies that health IT developers be required, as a
Condition and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, to submit
reporting criteria on certified health IT in accordance with the EHR
reporting program established under section 3009A of the PHSA, as added
by the Cures Act. We have not yet established an EHR reporting program.
Once ONC establishes such program, we will undertake rulemaking to
propose and implement the associated Condition and Maintenance of
Certification requirement(s) for health IT developers.
Enforcement
Section 4002 of the Cures Act adds Program requirements aimed at
addressing health IT developer actions and business practices through
the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements, which
expands the current focus of the Program requirements beyond the
certified health IT itself. Equally important, section 4002 also
provides that the Secretary of HHS may encourage compliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements and take
action to discourage noncompliance. We, therefore, propose a general
enforcement approach to encourage consistent compliance with the
requirements. The proposed rule outlines a corrective action process
for ONC to review potential or known instances where a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification requirement has not been or is not being
met by a health IT developer under the Program. We propose, with minor
modifications, to utilize the processes previously established for ONC
direct review of certified health IT and codified in Sec. Sec. 170.580
and 170.581 for the enforcement of the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements. Where noncompliance is identified, our
first priority would be to work with the health IT developer to remedy
the matter through a corrective action process. However, we propose
that, under certain circumstances, ONC may ban a health IT developer
from the Program or terminate the certification of one or more of its
Health IT Modules.
6. Information Blocking
Section 4004 of the Cures Act added section 3022 of the PHSA (42
U.S.C. 300jj-52, ``the information blocking provision''), which defines
conduct by health care providers, and health IT developers of certified
health IT, exchanges, and networks that constitutes information
blocking. Section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA defines information blocking
in broad terms, while section 3022(a)(3) authorizes and charges the
Secretary to identify reasonable and necessary activities that do not
constitute information blocking (section 3022(a)(3) of the PHSA).
We identify several reasonable and necessary activities as
exceptions to the information blocking definition, each of which we
propose would not constitute information blocking for purposes of
section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA. The exceptions would extend to certain
activities that interfere with the access, exchange, or use of EHI but
that may be reasonable and necessary if certain conditions are met.
In developing the proposed exceptions, we were guided by three
overarching policy considerations. First, the exceptions would be
limited to certain activities that clearly advance the aims of the
information blocking provision; promoting public confidence in health
IT infrastructure by supporting the privacy and security of EHI, and
protecting patient safety; and promoting competition and innovation in
health IT and its use to provide health care services to consumers.
Second, each exception is intended to address a significant risk that
regulated individuals and entities (i.e., health care providers, health
IT developers of certified health IT, health information networks, and
health information exchanges) will not engage in these reasonable and
necessary activities because of potential uncertainty regarding whether
they would be considered information blocking. Third, and last, each
exception is intended to be tailored, through appropriate conditions,
so that it is limited to the reasonable and necessary activities that
it is designed to exempt.
The seven proposed exceptions are set forth in section VIII.D
below. The first three exceptions, set forth in VIII.D.1-D.3 address
activities that are reasonable and necessary to promote public
confidence in the use of health IT and the exchange of EHI. These
exceptions are intended to protect patient safety; promote the privacy
of EHI; and promote the security of EHI. The next three exceptions, set
forth in VIII.D.4-D.6, address activities that are reasonable and
necessary to promote competition and consumer welfare. These exceptions
would allow for the recovery of costs reasonably incurred; excuse an
actor from responding to requests that are infeasible; and permit the
licensing of interoperability elements on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms. The last exception, set forth in VIII.D.7,
addresses activities that are reasonable and necessary to promote the
performance of health IT. This proposed exception recognizes that
actors may make health IT temporarily unavailable for maintenance or
improvements that
[[Page 7431]]
benefit the overall performance and usability of health IT.
To qualify for any of these exceptions, we propose that an
individual or entity would, for each relevant practice and at all
relevant times, have to satisfy all of the applicable conditions of the
exception. Additionally, we propose (in section VIII.C of this
preamble) to define or interpret terms that are present in section 3022
of the PHSA (such as the types of individuals and entities covered by
the information blocking provision). We also propose certain new terms
and definitions that are necessary to implement the information
blocking provisions. We propose to codify the proposed exceptions and
other information blocking proposals in a new part of title 45 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, part 171.
C. Costs and Benefits
Executive Orders 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review (September
30, 1993) and 13563 on Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
(February 2, 2011) direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to
select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety effects,
distributive impacts, and equity). A regulatory impact analysis (RIA)
must be prepared for major rules with economically significant effects
($100 million or more in any one year). OMB has determined that this
proposed rule is an economically significant rule as the potential
costs associated with this proposed rule could be greater than $100
million per year. Accordingly, we have prepared an RIA that to the best
of our ability presents the costs and benefits of this proposed rule.
We have estimated the potential monetary costs and benefits of this
proposed rule for health IT developers, health care providers,
patients, ONC-ACBs, ONC-ATLs, and the federal government (i.e., ONC),
and have broken those costs and benefits out into the following
categories: (1) Deregulatory actions (no associated costs); (2) updates
to the updates to the 2015 Edition health IT certification criteria;
(3) Conditions and Maintenance of Certification for a health IT
developer; (4) oversight for the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification; and (5) information blocking.
We note that we have rounded all estimates to the nearest dollar
and all estimates are expressed in 2016 dollars as it is the most
recent data available to address all cost and benefit estimates
consistently. We also note that we did not have adequate data to
quantify some of the costs and benefits within this RIA. In those
situations, we have described the qualitative costs and benefits of our
proposals; however, such qualitative costs and benefits have not been
accounted for in the monetary cost and benefit totals below.
We estimate that the total annual cost for this proposed rule for
the first year after it is finalized (including one-time costs), based
on the cost estimates outlined above and throughout this RIA, would, on
average, range from $365 million to $919 million with an average annual
cost of $642 million. We estimate that the total perpetual cost for
this proposed rule (starting in year two), based on the cost estimates
outlined above, would, on average, range from $228 million to $452
million with an average annual cost of $340 million.
We estimate the total annual benefit for this proposed rule would
range from $3.08 billion to $9.15 billion with an average annual
benefit of $6.1 billion.
We estimate the total annual net benefit for this proposed rule for
the first year after it is finalized (including one-time costs), based
on the cost and benefit estimates outlined above, would range from $2.7
billion to $8.2 billion with an average net benefit of $5.5 billion. We
estimate the total perpetual annual net benefit for this proposed rule
(starting in year two), based on the cost-benefit estimates outlined
above, would range from $2.9 billion to $8.7 billion with an average
net benefit of $5.8 billion.
II. Background
A. Statutory Basis
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act)
(Pub. L. 111-5), was enacted on February 17, 2009. The HITECH Act
amended the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and created ``Title XXX--
Health Information Technology and Quality'' (Title XXX) to improve
health care quality, safety, and efficiency through the promotion of
health IT and electronic health information (EHI) exchange.
The Cures Act was enacted on December 13, 2016, to accelerate the
discovery, development, and delivery of 21st century cures, and for
other purposes. The Cures Act, through Title IV--Delivery, amended the
HITECH Act (Title XIII of Division A of Pub. L. 111-5) by modifying or
adding certain provisions to the PHSA relating to health IT.
1. Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria
The HITECH Act established two new federal advisory committees, the
HIT Policy Committee (HITPC) and the HIT Standards Committee (HITSC).
Each was responsible for advising the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (National Coordinator) on different aspects of
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria.
Section 3002 of the Cures Act amended the PHSA by replacing the
HITPC and HITSC with one committee, the Health Information Technology
Advisory Committee (HIT Advisory Committee or HITAC). Section 3002(a)
establishes that the HITAC shall advise and recommend to the National
Coordinator on different aspects of standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria, relating to the
implementation of a health IT infrastructure, nationally and locally,
that advances the electronic access, exchange, and use of health
information. Further described in section 3002(b)(1)(A) of the PHSA,
this includes providing to the National Coordinator recommendations on
a policy framework to advance interoperable health IT infrastructure,
updating recommendations to the policy framework, and making new
recommendations, as appropriate. Section 3002(b)(2)(A) identifies that
in general, the HITAC shall recommend to the National Coordinator for
purposes of adoption under section 3004, standards, implementation
specifications, and certification criteria and an order of priority for
the development, harmonization, and recognition of such standards,
specifications, and certification criteria. Like the process previously
required of the former HITPC and HITSC, the HITAC will develop a
schedule for the assessment of policy recommendations for the Secretary
to publish in the Federal Register.
Section 3004 of the PHSA identifies a process for the adoption of
health IT standards, implementation specifications, and certification
criteria and authorizes the Secretary to adopt such standards,
implementation specifications, and certification criteria. As specified
in section 3004(a)(1), the Secretary is required, in consultation with
representatives of other relevant federal agencies, to jointly review
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria
endorsed by the National Coordinator under section 3001(c) and
subsequently
[[Page 7432]]
determine whether to propose the adoption of any grouping of such
standards, implementation specifications, or certification criteria.
The Secretary is required to publish all determinations in the Federal
Register.
Section 3004(b)(3) of the PHSA titled, Subsequent Standards
Activity, provides that the Secretary shall adopt additional standards,
implementation specifications, and certification criteria as necessary
and consistent with the schedule published by the HITAC. We consider
this provision in the broader context of the HITECH Act and Cures Act
to grant the Secretary the authority and discretion to adopt standards,
implementation specifications, and certification criteria that have
been recommended by the HITAC and endorsed by the National Coordinator,
as well as other appropriate and necessary health IT standards,
implementation specifications, and certification criteria.
2. Health IT Certification Program(s)
Under the HITECH Act, section 3001(c)(5) of the PHSA provides the
National Coordinator with the authority to establish a certification
program or programs for the voluntary certification of health IT.
Specifically, section 3001(c)(5)(A) specifies that the National
Coordinator, in consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), shall keep or recognize a
program or programs for the voluntary certification of health IT that
is in compliance with applicable certification criteria adopted under
this subtitle (i.e., certification criteria adopted by the Secretary
under section 3004 of the PHSA). The certification program(s) must also
include, as appropriate, testing of the technology in accordance with
section 13201(b) of the HITECH Act. Overall, section 13201(b) of the
HITECH Act requires that with respect to the development of standards
and implementation specifications, the Director of NIST shall support
the establishment of a conformance testing infrastructure, including
the development of technical test beds. The HITECH Act also indicates
that the development of this conformance testing infrastructure may
include a program to accredit independent, non-federal laboratories to
perform testing.
Section 3001(c)(5) of the PHSA was amended by the Cures Act, which
instructs the National Coordinator to encourage, keep, or recognize,
through existing authorities, the voluntary certification of health IT
under the Program for use in medical specialties and sites of service
for which no such technology is available or where more technological
advancement or integration is needed. Section 3001(c)(5)(C)(iii)
identifies that the Secretary, in consultation with relevant
stakeholders, shall make recommendations for the voluntary
certification of health IT for use by pediatric health providers to
support the care of children, as well as adopt certification criteria
under section 3004 to support the voluntary certification of health IT
for use by pediatric health providers. The Cures Act further amended
section 3001(c)(5) of the PHSA by adding section 3001(c)(5)(D), which
provides the Secretary with the authority, through notice and comment
rulemaking, to require conditions and maintenance of certification
requirements for the Program.
B. Regulatory History
The Secretary issued an interim final rule with request for
comments (75 FR 2014, Jan. 13, 2010), which adopted an initial set of
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria.
On March 10, 2010, ONC published a proposed rule (75 FR 11328) that
proposed both a temporary and permanent certification program for the
purposes of testing and certifying health IT. A final rule establishing
the temporary certification program was published on June 24, 2010 (75
FR 36158) and a final rule establishing the permanent certification
program was published on January 7, 2011 (76 FR 1262). ONC issued
multiple rulemakings since these initial rulemaking to update
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria
and the certification program, a history of which can be found in the
final rule titled, ``2015 Edition Health Information (Health IT)
Certification Criteria, 2015 Edition Base Electronic Health Record
(EHR) Definition, and ONC Health IT Certification Program
Modifications'' (Oct. 16, 2015, 80 FR 62602) (``2015 Edition final
rule''). A correction notice was published for the 2015 Edition final
rule on December 11, 2015 (80 FR 76868) to correct preamble and
regulatory text errors and clarify requirements of the Common Clinical
Data Set (CCDS), the 2015 Edition privacy and security certification
framework, and the mandatory disclosures for health IT developers.
The 2015 Edition final rule established a new edition of
certification criteria (``2015 Edition health IT certification
criteria'' or ``2015 Edition'') and a new 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. The 2015 Edition established the capabilities and specified
the related standards and implementation specifications that CEHRT
would need to include to, at a minimum, support the achievement of
``meaningful use'' by eligible clinicians, eligible hospitals, and
critical access hospitals under the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive
Programs (EHR Incentive Programs) (now referred to as the Promoting
Interoperability Programs) \3\ when the 2015 Edition is required for
use under these and other programs referencing the CEHRT definition.
The 2015 Edition final rule also made changes to the Program. The final
rule adopted a proposal to change the Program's name to the ``ONC
Health IT Certification Program'' from the ONC HIT Certification
Program, modified the Program to make it more accessible to other types
of health IT beyond EHR technology and for health IT that supports care
and practice settings beyond the ambulatory and inpatient settings, and
adopted new and revised Principles of Proper Conduct (PoPC) for ONC-
ACBs.
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After issuing a proposed rule on March 2, 2016 (81 FR 11056), ONC
published a final rule titled, ``ONC Health IT Certification Program:
Enhanced Oversight and Accountability'' (81 FR 72404) (``EOA final
rule'') on October 19, 2016. The final rule finalized modifications and
new requirements under the Program, including provisions related to
ONC's role in the Program. The final rule created a regulatory
framework for ONC's direct review of health IT certified under the
Program, including, when necessary, requiring the correction of non-
conformities found in health IT certified under the Program and
suspending and terminating certifications issued to Complete EHRs and
Health IT Modules. The final rule also sets forth processes for ONC to
authorize and oversee accredited testing laboratories under the
Program. In addition, it includes provisions for expanded public
availability of certified health IT surveillance results.
III. Deregulatory Actions for Previous Rulemakings
A. Background
1. History of Burden Reduction and Flexibility
Since the inception of the ONC Health IT Certification Program
(Program), we have aimed to implement and administer the Program in the
least burdensome manner that supports our policy goals. Throughout the
years, we
[[Page 7433]]
have worked to improve the Program with a focus on ways to reduce
burden, offer flexibility to both developers and providers, and support
innovation. This approach has been consistent with the principles of
Executive Order 13563 on Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
(February 2, 2011), which instructs agencies to ``determine whether any
[agency] regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or
repealed so as to make the agency's regulatory program more effective
or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory objectives.'' To that
end, we have historically, where feasible and appropriate, taken
measures to reduce burden within the Program and make the Program more
effective, flexible, and streamlined.
For example, in the 2014 Edition final rule (77 FR 54164), we
revised the certified electronic health record technology (CEHRT)
definition to provide flexibility and create regulatory efficiencies by
narrowing required functionality to a core set of capabilities (i.e.,
the Base EHR definition) plus the additional capabilities each eligible
clinician, eligible hospital, and critical access hospital needed to
successfully achieve the applicable objective and measures under the
EHR Incentive Programs (now referred to as the Promoting
Interoperability Programs). ONC has also supported more efficient
testing and certification methods and reduced regulatory burden through
the adoption of a gap certification policy. As explained in the 2014
Edition final rule (77 FR 54254) and the 2015 Edition final rule (80 FR
62681), where applicable, gap certification allows for the use of a
previously certified health IT product's test results to certification
criteria identified as unchanged. Developers have been able to use gap
certification for the more efficient certification of their health IT
when updating from the 2011 Edition to the 2014 Edition and from the
2014 Edition to the 2015 Edition.
ONC introduced further means to reduce regulatory burden, increase
regulatory flexibility, and promote innovation in the 2014 Edition
Release 2 final rule (79 FR 54430). The 2014 Edition Release 2 final
rule established a set of optional 2014 Edition certification criteria
that provided flexibility and alternative certification pathways for
health IT developers and providers based on their specific
circumstances. The 2014 Edition Release 2 final rule also simplified
the Program by discontinuing the use of the ``Complete EHR''
certification concept beginning with the 2015 Edition (79 FR 54443).
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we did not ``carry forward''
certain 2014 Edition certification criteria into the 2015 Edition, such
as the ``image results,'' ``patient list creation,'' and ``electronic
medication administration record'' criteria. We determined that these
criteria did not advance functionality or support interoperability (80
FR 62682-84). We also did not require all health IT to be certified to
the ``meaningful use measurement'' certification criteria for
``automated numerator recording'' and ``automated measure calculation''
(80 FR 62605), which had been previously required for the 2014 Edition.
Based on stakeholder feedback and Program administration observations,
we also permitted testing efficiencies for the 2015 Edition ``automated
numerator recording'' and ``automated measure calculation'' criteria by
removing the live demonstration requirement of recording data and
generating reports. Health IT developers may now self-test their Health
IT Modules(s) and submit the resulting reports to the ONC- Authorized
Testing Laboratory (ONC-ATL) to verify compliance with the
criterion.\4\ In order to further reduce burden for health IT
developers, we adopted a simpler, straight-forward approach to privacy
and security certification requirements, which clarified which
requirements are applicable to each criterion within the regulatory
functional areas (80 FR 62605).
2. Executive Orders 13771 and 13777
On January 30, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13771 on
Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, which requires
agencies to identify deregulatory actions. This order was followed by
Executive Order 13777, titled ``Enforcing the Regulatory Reform
Agenda'' (February 24, 2017). Executive Order 13777 provides further
direction on implementing regulatory reform by identifying a process by
which agencies must review and evaluate existing regulations and make
recommendations for repeal or simplification.
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\4\ https://www.healthit.gov/test-method/automated-numerator-recording and https://www.healthit.gov/test-method/automated-measure-calculation.
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In order to implement these regulatory reform initiatives and
policies, over the past year ONC reviewed and evaluated existing
regulations. During our review, we sought to identify ways to further
reduce administrative burden, to implement deregulatory actions through
guidance, and to propose potential new deregulatory actions in this
proposed rule that will reduce burden for health IT developer,
providers, and other stakeholders.
On August 21, 2017, ONC issued Relied Upon Software Program
Guidance.\5\ Health IT developers are permitted to use ``relied upon
software'' (76 FR 1276) to demonstrate compliance with certification
criteria adopted at 45 CFR part 170, subpart C. Historically, in cases
where a Health IT Module is paired with multiple ``relied upon
software'' products for the same capability, health IT developers were
required to demonstrate compliance for the same certification criterion
with each of those ``relied upon software'' products in order for the
products to be listed on the Certified Health IT Product List (CHPL).
With the issued guidance, health IT developers may now demonstrate
compliance with only one ``relied upon software'' product for a
criterion/capability. Once the health IT developer demonstrates
compliance with a minimum of one ``relied upon software'' product, the
developer can have multiple, additional ``relied upon software''
products for the same criterion/capability listed on the CHPL (https://chpl.healthit.gov/). This approach reduces burden for health IT
developers, ONC-ATLs, and ONC-Authorized Certification Bodies (ONC-
ACBs).
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\5\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/relieduponsoftwareguidance.pdf.
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On September 21, 2017, ONC reduced the overall burden for testing
health IT to the 2015 Edition.\6\ ONC reviewed the 2015 Edition test
procedures, which identify minimum testing requirements ONC-ATLs must
evaluate during testing. ONC changed 30 of the 2015 Edition test
procedures to attestation only (i.e., a ``yes'' self-declaration by the
health IT developer that their product has capabilities conformant with
those specified in the associated certification criterion/criteria).\7\
This deregulatory action reduced burden and costs program-wide, while
still maintaining the Program's high level of integrity and assurances.
Health IT developers now have reduced preparation and testing costs for
testing to these criteria. Specifically, the cost savings for health IT
developers have been estimated between $8.34 and $9.26 million. ONC-
ATLs also benefit by having more time and resources to focus on tool-
based
[[Page 7434]]
testing (for interoperability-oriented criteria) and being responsive
to any retesting requirements that may arise from ONC-ACB surveillance
activities. Furthermore, providers and users of certified health IT do
not lose confidence in the Program because this burden reduction effort
in no way alters the expectations of conformance and responsibilities
of Program participants. Health IT developers are still required to
meet certification criteria requirements and maintain their products'
conformance to the full scope of the associated criteria, including
when implemented in the field and in production use. Similarly, ONC and
ONC-ACBs continue to conduct surveillance activities and respond to
end-user complaints.
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\6\ https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/healthit-certification/certification-program-updates-support-efficiency-reduce-burden/.
\7\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/policy/selfdeclarationapproachprogramguidance17-04.pdf.
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B. Proposed Deregulatory Actions
We propose six deregulatory actions below. We welcome comments on
these potential deregulatory actions and any other potential
deregulatory actions we should consider. We also refer readers to
section XIV (Regulatory Impact Analysis) of this proposed rule for a
discussion of the estimated cost savings from these proposed
deregulatory actions.
1. Removal of Randomized Surveillance Requirements
ONC-ACBs are required to conduct surveillance of certified health
IT under the Program to ensure that health IT continues to conform and
function as required by the full scope of the certification
requirements. Surveillance is categorized as either reactive
surveillance (for example, complaint-based surveillance) or randomized
surveillance, which, by regulation, requires ONC-ACBs to proactively
surveil 2% of the certificates they issue annually. On September 21,
2017, we exercised enforcement discretion with respect to the
implementation of randomized surveillance by ONC-ACBs.\8\ Consistent
with this exercise of enforcement discretion, we now propose to
eliminate certain regulatory randomized surveillance requirements.
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\8\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ONC_Enforcement_Discretion_Randomized_Surveillance_8-30-17.pdf.
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We propose to revise Sec. [thinsp]170.556(c) by changing the
requirement that ONC-ACBs must conduct in-the-field, randomized
surveillance to specify that ONC-ACBs may conduct in-the- field,
randomized surveillance. We further propose to remove Sec.
[thinsp]170.556(c)(2), which specifies that ONC-ACBs must conduct
randomized surveillance for a minimum of 2% of certified health IT
products per year. We also propose to remove the requirements in Sec.
170.556(c)(5) regarding the exclusion and exhaustion of selected
locations for randomized surveillance. Additionally, we propose to
remove the requirements in Sec. [thinsp]170.556(c)(6) regarding the
consecutive selection of certified health IT for randomized
surveillance. Without these regulatory requirements, ONC-ACBs would
still be required to perform reactive surveillance, and would be
permitted to conduct randomized surveillance of their own accord, using
the methodology identified by ONC with respect to scope (Sec.
[thinsp]170.556(c)(1)), selection method (Sec. [thinsp]170.556(c)(3)),
and the number and types of locations for in-the-field surveillance
(Sec. [thinsp]170.556(c)(4)).
Stakeholders have expressed concern that the benefits of in-the-
field, randomized surveillance may not outweigh the time commitment
required by providers, particularly if no non-conformities are found.
In general, providers have expressed that reactive surveillance (e.g.,
surveillance based on user complaints) is a more logical and economical
approach to surveillance. The removal of randomized surveillance
requirements would also give ONC-ACBs the flexibility and time to focus
on other priorities, such as the certification of health IT to the 2015
Edition. Therefore, as discussed above, we propose to eliminate certain
regulatory randomized surveillance requirements.
2. Removal of the 2014 Edition From the Code of Federal Regulations
We propose to remove the 2014 Edition from the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). The 2014 Edition was the result of rulemaking
completed in 2012 and includes standards and functionality that are now
significantly outmoded. Removal of the 2014 Edition would make the 2015
Edition the baseline for health IT certification. The 2015 Edition,
including the additional certification criteria, standards, and
requirements proposed in this proposed rule, better enables
interoperability and the access, exchange, and use of electronic health
information. Adoption and implementation of the 2015 Edition, including
the proposals in this proposed rule, would also lead to the benefits
outlined in the 2015 Edition final rule (80 FR 62602-62603, 62605-
62606, 62740) and in this proposed rule (see, for example, the
Executive Summary and the ``Assurances,'' ``API'', and ``Real World
Testing'' Conditions and Maintenance of Certification sections).
Equally important, adoption and implementation of the 2015 Edition by
providers would lead to the estimated costs savings in this proposed
rule through improved interoperability supporting the access, exchange,
and use of electronic health information.
Removal of the 2014 Edition would eliminate inconsistencies and
costs caused by health IT certification and implementation of two
different editions with different functionalities and versions of
standards. Patient care could improve through the reduced risk of error
that comes with the health care system's consistent implementation and
use of health IT certified to the 2015 Edition. Innovation could also
improve with health IT developers (including third-party software
developers) developing to only one set of newer standards and
implementation specifications, which would be more predictable and less
costly.
Removal of the 2014 Edition would also reduce regulatory burden by
no longer requiring the maintenance and support of the 2014 Edition.
Maintaining compliance with only the 2015 Edition would reduce the cost
and burden for health IT developers, ONC-ACBs, and ONC-ATLs because
they would no longer have to support two increasingly distinct sets of
requirements as is the case now with certification to both the 2014 and
2015 Editions. More specifically, health IT developers would not have
to support two maintenance infrastructures and updating for their
customers; nor would ONC-ATLs and ONC-ACBs have to support testing,
certification, and surveillance for two separate editions of certified
health IT.
As referenced by the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) and
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in their rulemakings
regarding donations of EHR items and services, we committed to retiring
certification criteria editions that are no longer applicable.\9\ We
first did this with the removal of the 2011 Edition (79 FR 54447).
Accordingly, our proposal to remove the outdated 2014 Edition for the
reasons discussed above would also streamline Program compliance
requirements and ensure there is no regulatory confusion between ONC's
rules and other HHS rules.
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\9\ CMS final rule ``Medicare Program; Physicians' Referrals to
Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships:
Exception for Certain Electronic Health Records Arrangements'' (78
FR 78751).OIG final rule ``Medicare and State Health Care Programs:
Fraud and Abuse; Electronic Health Records Safe Harbor Under the
Anti-Kickback Statute'' (78 FR 79202).
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To implement the removal of the 2014 Edition from the CFR, we
propose to remove the 2014 Edition certification
[[Page 7435]]
criteria (Sec. 170.314) and related standards, terms, and requirements
from the CFR. In regard to terms, we propose to retire the 2014
Edition-related definitions found in Sec. 170.102, including the
``2014 Edition Base EHR,'' ``2014 Edition EHR certification criteria,''
and ``Complete EHR, 2014 Edition.'' As explained in the 2015 Edition
final rule (80 FR 62719), the ability to maintain Complete EHR
certification is only permitted with health IT certified to the 2014
Edition certification criteria. Because this concept was discontinued
for the 2015 Edition, we propose to remove Sec. 170.545 and any
references to Complete EHR from the regulation text in conjunction with
the removal of the 2014 Edition. We also propose to remove references
to the 2014 Edition from the Common Clinical Data Set (CCDS)
definition. However, as discussed later in section IV.B.1 (``United
States Core Data for Interoperability'') of this proposed rule, we
propose to remove the CCDS definition from the CFR and effectively
replace it with a new government-unique standard, the United States
Core Data for Interoperability (USCDI), proposing to adopt Version 1
(v1) in Sec. 170.213. The new standard would be applicable to certain
2015 Edition certification criteria that currently reference the CCDS,
subject to any of these criteria being removed through this
rulemaking).
We propose to remove the standards and implementation
specifications found in Sec. Sec. 170.200, 170.202, 170.204, 170.205,
170.207, 170.210, and 170.299 that are only referenced in the 2014
Edition certification criteria. Adopted standards that are also
referenced in the 2015 Edition would remain. We propose to remove
requirements in Sec. [thinsp]170.550(f) and any other requirements in
subpart E, Sec. Sec. [thinsp]170.500 through 170.599, which are
specific to the 2014 Edition and do not apply to the 2015 Edition.
In order to avoid regulatory conflicts, we are taking into
consideration the final rule released by CMS on November 2, 2017, which
makes payment and policy changes to the second year of the Quality
Payment Program (QPP). The CMS's final rule, titled ``Medicare Program;
CY 2018 Updates to the Quality Payment Program: Extreme and
Uncontrollable Circumstance Policy for the Transition Year'' (82 FR
53568), permits eligible clinicians to use health IT certified to
either the 2014 or 2015 Edition certification criteria, or a
combination of the two for the CY 2018 performance period. The QPP
final rule also states that the 2015 Edition will be the sole edition
permitted to meet the CEHRT definition starting with the CY 2019
program year.
Therefore, we propose that the effective date of removal of the
2014 Edition certification criteria and related standards, terms, and
requirements from the CFR would be the effective date of a subsequent
final rule for this proposed rule, which we expect will be issued in
the latter half of 2019. We note that we will continue to support
Medicare and Medicaid program attestations by maintaining an archive on
the CHPL allowing the public to access historic information on a
product certified to the 2014 Edition.
3. Removal of the ONC-Approved Accreditor From the Program
We propose to remove the ONC-Approved Accreditor (ONC-AA) from the
Program. The ONC-AA's role is to accredit certification bodies for the
Program and to oversee the ONC-ACBs. However, years of experience and
changes with the Program have led ONC to conclude that, in many
respects, the role of the ONC-AA to oversee ONC-ACBs is now duplicative
of ONC's oversight. More specifically, ONC's experience with
administering the Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ACBs as well as
issuing necessary regulatory changes (e.g., ONC-ACB surveillance and
reporting requirements in the 2015 Edition final rule) has demonstrated
that ONC on its own has the capacity to provide the appropriate
oversight of ONC-ACBs. Therefore, we believe removal of the ONC-AA
would reduce the Program's administrative complexity and burden.
To implement this proposed deregulatory action, we propose to
remove the definition for ``ONC-Approved Accreditor or ONC-AA'' found
in Sec. 170.502. We also propose to remove processes related to ONC-
AAs found in Sec. Sec. [thinsp]170.501(c), 170.503, and 170.504
regarding requests for ONC-AA status, ONC-AA ongoing responsibilities,
and reconsideration for requests for ONC-AA status. Regarding
correspondence and communication with ONC, we propose to remove
specific references to the ``ONC-AA'' and ``accreditation organizations
requesting ONC-AA status'' by revising Sec. 170.505. We also propose
to remove the final rule titled ``Permanent Certification Program for
Health Information Technology; Revisions to ONC-Approved Accreditor
Processes'' (76 FR 72636) which established a process for addressing
instances where the ONC-AA engages in improper conduct or does not
perform its responsibilities under the Program. Because this prior
final rule relates solely to the role and removal of the ONC-AA, we
propose its removal and Sec. 170.575, which codified the final rule in
the CFR.
These proposed deregulatory actions would also provide an
additional benefit for ONC-ACBs. ONC-ACBs would be able to obtain and
maintain accreditation to ISO/IEC 17065, with an appropriate scope,
from any accreditation body that is a signatory to the Multilateral
Recognition Arrangement (MLA) with the International Accreditation
Forum (IAF). Accordingly, we propose to revise the application process
for ONC-ACB status in Sec. 170.520(a)(3) to require documentation that
confirms that the applicant has been accredited to ISO/IEC 17065, with
an appropriate scope, by any accreditation body that is a signatory to
the Multilateral Recognition Arrangement (MLA) with the International
Accreditation Forum (IAF), in place of the ONC-AA accreditation
documentation requirements. Similarly, instead of requiring the ONC-AA
to evaluate the conformance of ONC-ACBs to ISO/IEC 17065, we propose to
revise Sec. 170.523(a) to simply require ONC-ACBs to maintain
accreditation in good standing to ISO/IEC 17065 for the Program. This
means that ONC-ACBs would need to continue to comply with ISO/IEC 17065
and requirements specific to the ONC Health IT Certification Program
scheme.
4. Removal of Certain 2015 Edition Certification Criteria and Standards
We have reviewed and analyzed the 2015 Edition to determine whether
there are certification criteria we could remove. We have identified
both criteria and standards for removal as proposed below. We believe
the removal of these criteria and standards will reduce burden and
costs for health IT developers and health care providers by eliminating
the need to: Design and meet specific certification functionalities;
prepare, test, and certify health IT in certain instances; adhere to
associated reporting and disclosure requirements; maintain and update
certifications for certified functionalities; and participate in
surveillance of certified health IT. To these points, if our proposals
are finalized in a subsequent final rule, we would expect any already
issued 2015 Edition certificates to be updated to reflect the removal
of applicable 2015 Edition certification criteria. We welcome comment
on the proposed removal of the identified criteria and standards below
and any other 2015 Edition criteria and standards we should consider
for removal.
[[Page 7436]]
a. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition Criteria
We propose the removal of certain certification criteria from the
2015 Edition that are included in the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition.
The removal of these criteria would support burden and cost reductions
for health IT developers and health care providers as noted above.
i. Problem List
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``problem list''
certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(6)). The functionality in
this criterion was first adopted as a 2011 Edition certification
criterion to support the associated meaningful use Stage 1 objective
and measure for recording problem list information. In this regard,
SNOMED CT[supreg] was adopted specifically to support the measure. This
2015 Edition ``problem list'' criterion remains relatively functionally
the same as the 2011 Edition and has exactly the same functionally as
the 2014 Edition ``problem list'' criterion.
We propose to remove this criterion for multiple reasons. First,
this criterion no longer supports the ``recording'' objective and
measure of the CMS Promoting Interoperability Programs as such
objective and measure no longer exist. Second, the functionality is
sufficiently widespread among health care providers since it has been
part of certification and the Certified EHR Technology definition since
the 2011 Edition and has not substantively changed with the 2015
Edition. Third, we do not believe this functionality would be removed
from health IT systems because of our proposal to remove it from the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition. This functionality is essential to
clinical care and would be in EHR systems absent certification,
particularly considering the limited certification requirements.
Fourth, this functionality does not directly support interoperability
as the capabilities are focused on internally recording EHI. In this
regard, representing problems with SNOMED CT[supreg] is part of the
USCDI and, thus, better supports interoperability through its
availability for access and exchange. Accordingly, we propose to remove
the ``problem list'' criterion from the 2015 Edition, including the
2015 Edition Base EHR definition. We note that once removed from the
2015 Edition, the criterion would also no longer be included in the
2015 Edition ``safety-enhanced design'' criterion.
ii. Medication List
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``medication list''
certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(7)). The functionality in
this criterion was first adopted as a 2011 Edition certification
criterion to support the associated meaningful use Stage 1 objective
and measure for recording medication list information. The criterion
does not require use of a vocabulary standard to record medications.
This 2015 Edition ``medication list'' criterion remains functionally
the same as the 2011 Edition and 2014 Edition ``medication list''
criteria.
We propose to remove this criterion for multiple reasons. First,
this criterion no longer supports a ``recording'' objective and measure
of the CMS Promoting Interoperability Programs as such objective and
measure no longer exist. Second, the functionality is sufficiently
widespread among health care providers since it has been part of
certification and the Certified EHR Technology definition since the
2011 Edition and has not substantively changed with the 2015 Edition.
Third, we do not believe this functionality would be removed from EHR
systems because of our proposal to remove it from the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition. This functionality is essential to clinical care and
would be in EHR systems absent certification, particularly considering
the limited certification requirements. Fourth, this functionality does
not directly support interoperability as the capabilities are focused
on internally recording EHI. In this regard, this criterion does not
even require representation of medications in standardized
nomenclature. Fifth, medications are included in the USCDI and must be
represented in RxNorm as part of the USCDI. This approach better
supports interoperability through medication information being
availability for access and exchange in a structured format.
Accordingly, we propose to remove the ``medications list'' criterion
from the 2015 Edition, including the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition.
We note that once removed from the 2015 Edition, the criterion would
also no longer be included in the 2015 Edition ``safety-enhanced
design'' criterion.
iii. Medication Allergy List
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``medication allergy list''
certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(8)). The functionality in
this criterion was first adopted as a 2011 Edition certification
criterion to support the associated meaningful use Stage 1 objective
and measure for recording this information. The criterion does not
require use of a vocabulary standard to record medication allergies.
This 2015 Edition ``medication allergy list'' criterion remains
functionally the same as the 2011 Edition and 2014 Edition ``medication
allergy list'' criteria.
We propose to remove this criterion for multiple reasons. First,
this criterion no longer supports a ``recording'' objective and measure
of the CMS Promoting Interoperability Programs as such objective and
measure no longer exist. Second, the functionality is sufficiently
widespread among health care providers since it has been part of
certification and the Certified EHR Technology definition since the
2011 Edition and has not substantively changed with the 2015 Edition.
Third, we do not believe this functionality would be removed from EHR
systems because of our proposal to remove it from the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition. This functionality is essential to clinical care and
would be in EHR systems absent certification, particularly considering
the limited certification requirements. Fourth, this functionality does
not directly support interoperability as the capabilities are focused
on internally recording EHI. In this regard, this criterion does not
even require representation of medication allergies in standardized
nomenclature. Fifth, medication allergies are included in the USCDI and
must be represented in RxNorm as part of the USCDI. This approach
better supports interoperability through medication allergy information
being availability for access and exchange in a structured format.
Accordingly, we propose to remove the ``medication allergy list''
criterion from the 2015 Edition, including the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition. We note that once removed from the 2015 Edition, the
criterion would also no longer be included in the 2015 Edition
``safety- enhanced design'' criterion.
iv. Smoking Status
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``smoking status'' criterion
(Sec. 170.315(a)(11)), which would include removing it from the 2015
Edition Base EHR definition. We previously adopted a 2015 Edition
``smoking status'' certification criterion that does not reference a
standard. However, the CCDS definition requires smoking status to be
coded in accordance with SNOMED CT[supreg]. While we continue to
believe that the capture of a patient's smoking status has significant
value in assisting providers with addressing the number one cause of
preventable death
[[Page 7437]]
and disease in the United States, we no longer believe that a criterion
that simply ensures this functionality exists in health IT presented
for certification is the right focus. As with other 2014 Edition
functionality, we believe this functionality is fairly ubiquitous now
with the widespread adoption of health IT certified to the 2014
Edition. Further, we continue to believe that, for the purposes of
certification, having smoking status available for access and exchange
via the USCDI is ultimately the key requirement for supporting
interoperability.
Removal of Specific USCDI Smoking Status Code Sets
As mentioned above, we believe having smoking status available for
USCDI purposes is fundamentally important for supporting
interoperability. We propose, however, to remove the requirement to
code smoking status according to the adopted eight smoking status
SNOMED CT[supreg] codes as referenced in the value set in Sec.
170.207(h). These eight codes reflect an attempt to capture smoking
status in a consistent manner. Stakeholder feedback has, however,
indicated that these eight codes do not appropriately and accurately
capture all applicable patients' smoking statuses. Accordingly, we
propose to no longer require use of only the specific eight SNOMED
CT[supreg] codes for representing smoking status (and remove the
standard from Sec. 170.207). Rather, to continue to promote
interoperability while also granting providers with flexibility to
better support clinical care, we propose that health IT would simply be
required to be capable of representing smoking status in SNOMED
CT[supreg] when such information is exchanged as part of the USCDI.
b. Drug-Formulary and Preferred Drug Lists
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``drug formulary and
preferred drug list checks'' criterion in Sec. 170.315(a)(10). We
adopted a 2015 Edition ``drug-formulary and preferred drug list
checks'' criterion that separates drug formulary and preferred drug
list functionality, but does not require any standards or functionality
beyond that included in the 2014 Edition ``drug-formulary checks''
criterion. First, we believe this functionality is fairly ubiquitous
now with the widespread adoption of health IT certified to the 2014
Edition, which included this general functionality. Second, without
standards, this criterion does not support or facilitate the critical
goal of health IT interoperability. Therefore, removal of this
criterion could reduce health IT developer and health care provider
burden.
c. Patient-Specific Education Resources
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``patient-specific education
resources'' certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(13)). ONC
continues to support patient and provider interaction, and the
identification and dissemination of patient-specific educational
materials to promote positive health outcomes. However, we no longer
believe that certification focused on a health IT's ability to
identifying the existence of patient-specific education materials
encourages the advancement of this functionality or interoperability.
First, this criterion would no longer be associated with an objective
or measure under the Promoting Interoperability Programs based on
proposals and determinations in recent CMS rulemakings (83 FR 35928; 83
FR 41664). Second, based on the number of health IT products that have
been certified for this functionality as part of 2014 Edition
certification and already for 2015 Edition certification, we believe
that health IT's ability to identify appropriate patient education
materials is widespread now among health IT developers and their
customers (e.g., health care providers). Third, we have recently seen
innovative advancements in this field, including the use of automation
and algorithms to provide appropriate educations materials to patients
in a timely manner. These advancements help limit clinical workflow
interruptions and demonstrate the use and promise of health IT to
create efficiencies and improve patient care. As such, removal of this
criterion would prevent certification from creating an unnecessary
burden for developers and providers and an impediment to innovation.
d. CCDS Summary Record--Create; and CCDS Summary Record--Receive
We assessed the number of products certified to the 2015 Edition
``Common Clinical Data Set summary record--create'' (Sec.
170.315(b)(4)) and ``Common Clinical Data Set summary record--receive''
(Sec. 170.315(b)(5)) criteria that have not also been certified to the
2015 Edition ``transitions of care'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(1)).
We did this because the 2015 Edition ``CCDS summary record'' criteria
include the same functionality as the 2015 Edition ``transitions of
care'' criterion, except for Direct-related transport functionality.
Based on our findings of only two unique products certified to these
criteria at the time of the drafting of this proposed rule, there
appears to be little market demand for certification to them. This
outcome is likely attributable to the fact mentioned above regarding
their relationship to the 2015 Edition ``transition of care''
criterion, that they are not included in the 2015 Edition Base EHR
definition, and that no HHS program specifically requires the use of
health IT certified to the criteria. Therefore, we propose to remove
these certification criteria from the 2015 Edition.
e. Secure Messaging
We propose to remove the 2015 Edition ``secure messaging''
criterion (Sec. 170.315(e)(2)). ONC strongly supports patient and
provider communication, as well as protecting the privacy and security
of patient information. However, we no longer believe that separate
certification focused on a health IT's ability to send and receive
secure messages between health care providers and patients is
necessary. First, this criterion would no longer be associated with an
objective or measure under the Promoting Interoperability Programs
based on proposals and determinations in recent CMS rulemakings (83 FR
41664; 83 FR 35929). Second, there are multiple other 2015 Edition
certification criteria that support patient engagement, such as the
2015 Edition ``view, download, and transmit to 3rd party,'' ``API,''
and ``patient health information capture'' certification criteria.
Third, we have seen developers integrate this functionality as part of
other patient engagement features, such as patient portals. With these
considerations in mind and the lack of a negative impact on health IT
interoperability, we believe that the removal of this criterion will
help reduce burden and costs, while also spurring further innovations
in patient engagement.
5. Removal of Certain ONC Health IT Certification Program Requirements
We propose to remove certain mandatory disclosure requirements and
a related attestation requirement under the Program. We believe removal
of these requirements will reduce costs and burden for Program
stakeholders, particularly health IT developers and ONC-ACBs. We
welcome comment on the proposed removal of these requirements and any
other certification or Program requirements we should consider for
removal.
a. Limitations Disclosures
We propose to remove Sec. 170.523(k)(1)(iii)(B), which requires
ONC-ACBs to ensure that certified
[[Page 7438]]
health IT includes a detailed description of all known material
information concerning limitations that a user may encounter in the
course of implementing and using the certified health IT, whether to
meet ``meaningful use'' objectives and measures or to achieve any other
use within the scope of the health IT's certification. We also propose
to remove Sec. 170.523(k)(1)(iv)(B) and (C), which state that the
types of information required to be disclosed include, but are not
limited to: (B) Limitations, whether by contract or otherwise, on the
use of any capability to which technology is certified for any purpose
within the scope of the technology's certification; or in connection
with any data generated in the course of using any capability to which
health IT is certified; (C) Limitations, including but not limited to
technical or practical limitations of technology or its capabilities,
that could prevent or impair the successful implementation,
configuration, customization, maintenance, support, or use of any
capabilities to which technology is certified; or that could prevent or
limit the use, exchange, or portability of any data generated in the
course of using any capability to which technology is certified.
These disclosure requirements regarding certified health IT
limitations are superseded by the Cures Act information blocking
provision and Conditions of Certification, which we are implementing
with this proposed rule. In particular, section 3001(c)(5)(D)(ii) of
the Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition of
Certification under the Program, provide assurances to the Secretary
that, unless for legitimate purposes specified by the Secretary, the
developer will not take any action that constitutes information
blocking as defined in section 3022(a) of the PHSA, or any other action
that may inhibit the appropriate exchange, access, and use of
electronic health information. These assurances specifically focus on
preventing information blocking and promoting appropriate exchange,
access, and use of electronic health information. We further propose
adding as a complementary Condition of Certification that developers
would be prohibited from taking any action that could interfere with a
user's ability to access or use certified capabilities for any purpose
within the scope of the technology's certification. Such actions may
inhibit the appropriate access, exchange, or use of electronic health
information and are therefore contrary to this proposed Condition of
Certification and the statutory provision that it implements. Based on
these Conditions of Certification, we believe that disclosures of
limitations by health IT developers would be unlikely and unnecessary
given their prohibition.
b. Transparency and Mandatory Disclosures Requirements
We propose to remove the Principle of Proper Conduct (PoPC) in
Sec. 170.523(k)(2), which requires a health IT developer to submit an
attestation that it will disclose all of the information in its
mandatory disclosures per Sec. 170.523(k)(1) to specified parties
(e.g., potential customers or anyone inquiring about a product quote or
description of services). We propose that this provision is no longer
necessary and that its removal is appropriate to further reduce
administrative burden for health IT developers and ONC-ACBs. First, our
experience with developer attestations to this requirement is that over
90% of developers with certified health IT have attested that they will
provide ``transparency information.'' Second, the information that
developers would be asked to attest to, whether our proposal above to
remove certain disclosure requirements is finalized or not, is now
readily available on health IT developers' websites as the mandatory
disclosure requirements were implemented almost three years ago.
Therefore, we believe removal of this requirement is appropriate.
6. Recognition of Food and Drug Administration Processes
Section 618 of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and
Innovation Act (FDASIA), Public Law 112-144, required that the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), in consultation with ONC and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) (collectively referred to as ``the
Agencies'' \10\ for this proposal), develop a report that contains a
proposed strategy and recommendations on an appropriate, risk-based
regulatory framework pertaining to health IT, including mobile medical
applications, that promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and
avoids regulatory duplication. The FDASIA Health IT Report of April
2014 \11\ contains a proposed strategy and recommendations on an
appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework pertaining to health IT
that promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids
regulatory duplication. Public comments, received prior to the report
and after,\12\ recommended that health IT developers/manufacturers
apply a single process that satisfies the requirements of all agencies
and that existing safety and quality-related processes, systems, and
standards should be leveraged for patient safety in health IT. On July
27, 2017, FDA announced a voluntary Software Precertification (Pre-
Cert) Pilot Program as part of a broader Digital Health Innovation
Action Plan.\13\ It was developed in order to create a tailored
approach toward recognizing the unique characteristics of digital
technology by looking first at the firm, rather than primarily at each
product of the firm, as is currently done for traditional medical
products. The FDA plans to explore whether and how pre-certified
companies that have demonstrated a culture of quality, patient safety,
and organizational excellence could bring certain types of digital
health products to market either without FDA premarket review or with a
more streamlined FDA premarket review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ONC is not an agency, but an Office, within the Department
of Health and Human Services.
\11\ https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf.
\12\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/05/30/2013-12817/food-and-drug-administration-safety-and-innovation-act-fdasia-request-for-comments-on-the; https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2014/04/fda-seeks-comment-on-proposed-health-it-strategy-that-aims-to-promote-innovation/; and https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-N-0339-0001.
\13\ https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/Default.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. FDA Software Pre-Certification Pilot Program
ONC believes that health IT developers that hold precertification
under the FDA Digital Health Software Precertification Program (FDA
Software Precertification Program) when they present health IT for
certification under the Program could qualify for, and benefit from,
further efficiencies under the Program. Title IV of the Cures Act
provides ONC with authority under the Program to oversee health IT
developers through Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
requirements (see section VII Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification of this proposed rule). With this new authority and our
authority over health IT developers' health IT certified under the
Program, we propose to establish processes that would provide health IT
developers that can document holding precertification under the FDA
Software Precertification Program with exemptions to the ONC Health IT
Certification Program's requirements for testing and certification of
its health IT to the 2015
[[Page 7439]]
Edition ``quality management systems'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(4))
and the 2015 Edition ``safety-enhanced design'' criterion (Sec.
170.315(g)(3)), as these criteria are applicable to the health IT
developer's health IT presented for certification. We also believe that
such a ``recognition'' could, depending on the final framework of the
FDA Software Precertification Program (e.g., the key performance
indicators used to demonstrate performance and outcomes of excellence),
be applicable to the functionally-based 2015 Edition ``clinical''
certification criteria (Sec. 170.315(a)). More specifically, this
could address the ``computerized provider order entry (CPOE)'' (Sec.
170.315(a)(1), (2), and (3)), ``drug-drug, drug-allergy interaction
checks for CPOE'' (Sec. 170.315(a)(4)), ``clinical decision support''
(Sec. 170.315(a)(9)), and ``implantable device list'' (Sec.
170.315(a)(14)) certification criteria. Such ``recognition'' could also
be appropriate to address any or all of the following functionally-
based 2015 Edition criteria in the event their proposed removal is not
finalized: ``problem list'' (Sec. 170.315(a)(6)), ``medication list''
(Sec. 170.315(a)(7)), ``medication allergy list'' (Sec.
170.315(a)(8)), ``drug-formulary and preferred drug list checks''
(Sec. 170.315(a)(10)),'' and ``smoking status'' (Sec.
170.315(a)(11)).
Our proposed ``recognition'' would align with both Executive Orders
13563 and 13771 regarding deregulatory, less burdensome, and more
effective initiatives. It would also serve as a regulatory relief for
those health IT developers qualifying as small businesses under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (see section XIV.C.3 Regulatory Flexibility
Act of this proposed rule). Furthermore, it would closely align with
FDASIA's instruction to promote innovation, protect patient safety, and
avoid regulatory duplication. However, despite these proffered
benefits, there may be reasons not to adopt such a ``recognition''
approach. For example, stakeholders may not agree that the FDA Software
Precertification Program (and/or subsequent finalized program)
sufficiently aligns with our Program. Developers and providers may have
varying and divergent views about the benefits and detriments of such
an approach. Further, while we believe that we could properly
operationalize such an approach by ensuring certifications indicate
which criteria have been ``deemed certified'' by ONC (but still subject
to ONC-ACB surveillance), stakeholders may have other operational
concerns. Accordingly, we welcome comments on these and other aspects
of our proposed ``recognition'' approach, including the 2015 Edition
certification criteria that should be eligible for ``recognition.''
b. Development of Similar Independent Program Processes--Request for
Information
Recognition of the FDA Software Pre-Certification Program for
purposes of our Program, as noted above, may eventually be determined
to be infeasible or insufficient to meet our goals of reducing burden
and promoting innovation. With this in mind, we request comment on
whether ONC should establish new regulatory processes tailored towards
recognizing the unique characteristics of health IT (e.g., EHR
software) by looking first at the health IT developer, rather than
primarily at the health IT presented for certification, as is currently
done under the Program. For example, ONC could possibly establish
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements, through
rulemaking, that facilitate the deeming of all of a health IT
developer's health IT as ``certified'' under the Program for
certification criteria identified by ONC as solely ``functionally-
based'' criteria (i.e., not essential to interoperability, such as the
``CPOE'' criteria) or possibly broader in scope. This approach could
rely on, but not be limited to, one or a combination of the following:
(1) Certain demonstrated health IT developer processes or health IT
functionality; (2) prior successful certification of a health IT
developer's health IT under the Program; (3) results of real world
testing for interoperability as required by the Cures Act and the
proposed implementing regulatory Condition of Certification (see
section VII.B.5 of this proposed rule); and/or (4) the results of the
EHR Reporting Program once implemented (see section VII.B.7 of this
proposed rule). No matter the specifics, we are most interested in
whether stakeholders believe this is an approach we should pursue in
conjunction with, or in lieu of, the proposed approach of recognizing
the FDA Software Pre-Certification Pilot Program. We also welcome more
specific comments on the health IT developer criteria for such an
approach and what the Conditions and/or Maintenance of Certification
requirements should be to support such an approach within the framework
of the proposed Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
requirements discussed in section VII of this proposed rule.
IV. Updates to the 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
This rule proposes to update the 2015 Edition by revising and
adding certification criteria that would establish the capabilities and
related standards and implementation specifications for the
certification of health IT. The updates to the 2015 Edition would
enhance interoperability and improve the accessibility of patient
records consistent with section 4006(a) of the Cures Act.
A. Standards and Implementation Specifications
1. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) of
1995 (15 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.) and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-119 \14\ require the use of, wherever practical,
technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies to carry out policy objectives or
activities, with certain exceptions. The NTTAA and OMB Circular A-119
provide exceptions to electing only standards developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, namely when doing so would be
inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. Agencies
have the discretion to decline the use of existing voluntary consensus
standards if determined that such standards are inconsistent with
applicable law or otherwise impractical, and instead use a government-
unique standard or other standard. In addition to the consideration of
voluntary consensus standards, the OMB Circular A-119 recognizes the
contributions of standardization activities that take place outside of
the voluntary consensus standards process. Therefore, in instances
where use of voluntary consensus standards would be inconsistent with
applicable law or otherwise impracticable, other standards should be
considered that meet the agency's regulatory, procurement or program
needs, deliver favorable technical and economic outcomes, and are
widely utilized in the marketplace. In this proposed rule, we use
voluntary consensus standards except for:
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\14\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A119/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf.
The standard we propose to adopt in Sec. 170.213. We
propose to remove the Common Clinical Data Set (CCDS) definition and
effectively replace it with a government
[[Page 7440]]
unique standard, the United States Core Data for Interoperability
(USCDI), Version 1(v1);
The standard we propose to adopt in Sec.
170.215(a)(2). We propose the government unique API Resource
Collection in Health (ARCH) Version 1 implementation specification;
The standards we propose to adopt in Sec.
170.215(a)(3) through (5) for application programming interfaces
(APIs). These market driven consortia standards have been developed
through a streamlined process that does not meet the full definition
of voluntary consensus standards development but still includes
representation from those interested in the use cases supported by
the standards (e.g., health IT developers and health care
providers). In the absence of available voluntary consensus
standards that would meet our needs, these standards deliver
favorable technical and economic outcomes, particularly improved
interoperability. Further, some of these standards may eventually
proceed through a standards development organization for approval;
and
The standards we propose to adopt in Sec.
170.205(h)(3) and (k)(3). We propose to replace the current HL7 QRDA
standards with government unique standards that more effectively
support the associated certification criterion's use case, which is
reporting eCQM data to CMS.
2. Compliance With Adopted Standards and Implementation Specifications
In accordance with Office of the Federal Register regulations
related to ``incorporation by reference,'' 1 CFR part 51, which we
follow when we adopt proposed standards and/or implementation
specifications in any subsequent final rule, the entire standard or
implementation specification document is deemed published in the
Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with the
approval of the Director of the Federal Register. Once published,
compliance with the standard and implementation specification includes
the entire document unless we specify otherwise. For example, if we
adopted the Argonaut Data Query Implementation Guide (IG) proposed in
this proposed rule (see section VII.B.4.b), health IT certified to
certification criteria referencing this IG would need to demonstrate
compliance with all mandatory elements and requirements of the IG. If
an element of the IG is optional or permissive in any way, it would
remain that way for testing and certification unless we specified
otherwise in regulation. In such cases, the regulatory text would
preempt the permissiveness of the IG.
3. ``Reasonably Available'' to Interested Parties
The Office of the Federal Register has established requirements for
materials (e.g., standards and implementation specifications) that
agencies propose to incorporate by reference in the Code of Federal
Regulations (79 FR 66267; 1 CFR 51.5(a)). To comply with these
requirements, in section XI (``Incorporation by Reference'') of this
preamble, we provide summaries of, and uniform resource locators (URLs)
to, the standards and implementation specifications we propose to adopt
and subsequently incorporate by reference in the Code of Federal
Regulations. To note, we also provide relevant information about these
standards and implementation specifications throughout the relevant
sections of the proposed rule.
B. Revised and New 2015 Edition Criteria
In order to capture and share patient data efficiently, health care
providers need health IT that store data in structured formats.
Structured data allows health care providers to easily retrieve and
transfer patient information, and use health IT in ways that can aid
patient care. We propose to adopt revised and new 2015 Edition
certification criteria, including new standards, to support these
objectives. Some of these criteria and standards are included in the
Certified EHR Technology (CEHRT) definition used for participation in
HHS Programs, such as the Promoting Interoperability Programs (formerly
the EHR Incentive Programs), some are required to be met for
participation in the ONC Health IT Certification Program, and some,
though beneficial, are unassociated with the CEHRT definition and not
required for participating in any HHS program, including the ONC Health
IT Certification Program.
1. The United States Core Data for Interoperability Standard (USCDI)
The initial focus of the Program was to support the Medicare and
Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs (76 FR 1294) now referred to as the
Promoting Interoperability Programs (and referenced as such hereafter).
As such, the 2014 Edition certification criteria mirrored those
functions specified by Promoting Interoperability Programs' objectives
and measures. In order to improve efficiency and streamline the common
data within our Program's certification criteria, we created a single
definition for all the required data which could be referenced for all
applicable certification criteria. We created the term ``Common MU Data
Set'' to encompass the common set of MU data types/elements (and
associated vocabulary standards) for which certification would be
required across several certification criteria (77 FR 54170).
The 2015 Edition final rule modified the Program to make it open
and accessible to more types of health IT, and health IT that supports
various care and practice settings beyond those included in the
Promoting Interoperability Programs (80 FR 62604). In comparison to the
previous editions, the 2015 Edition focused on identifying health IT
components necessary to establish an interoperable nationwide health
information infrastructure, fostering innovation and open new market
opportunities, and allowing for more health care provider and patient
choices in electronic health information access and exchange. In order
to align with this approach, we revised the concept of the ``Common MU
Data Set'' definition and changed the name to the ``Common Clinical
Data Set'' (CCDS) definition. The CCDS definition was further revised
in the 2015 Edition rulemaking to account for new and updated
vocabulary and content standards in order to improve and advance
interoperability and health information exchange (80 FR 62604). It
further expanded accessibility and availability of data exchanged by
updating the definition of Base Electronic Health Record (EHR) (2015
Edition Base EHR definition) to include enhanced data export,
transitions of care, and application programming interface (API)
capabilities, all of which required that at a minimum the CCDS be
available (80 FR 62602-62604).
The regulatory approach to use and reference a ``definition'' to
identify electronic health information, including with associated
vocabulary codes, for access, exchange and use has had its drawbacks.
While the CCDS definition served its designed purpose, to cut down on
repetitive text in each of the certification criteria in which it is
referenced, it also began to be colloquially used for many different
purposes. As the CCDS definition's relevance grew outside of its
regulatory context it became a symbolic and practical limit to the
industry's collective interests to go beyond the CCDS data for access,
exchange, and use. As we move towards value-based care and the
inclusion of data classes that go beyond clinical data, and as part of
ONC's continued efforts to evaluate the availability of a minimum
baseline of data classes that must be commonly available for
interoperable exchange, we acknowledge the need to change and improve
our regulatory approach to the CCDS. Therefore, in order to advance
interoperability by ensuring compliance with new data and vocabulary
codes
[[Page 7441]]
sets that support the data, we propose to remove the ``Common Clinical
Data Set'' definition and its references from the 2015 Edition and
replace it with the ``United States Core Data for Interoperability''
(USCDI) standard. The USCDI standard aims to achieve the goals set
forth in the Cures Act by specifying a common set of data classes for
interoperable exchange.
We propose to adopt the USCDI as a standard as such term is defined
in Sec. 170.102. In Sec. 170.102, a ``standard'' is defined as a
``technical, functional, or performance-based rule, condition,
requirement, or specification that stipulates instructions, fields,
codes, data, materials, characteristics, or actions.'' The USCDI
standard would comprise data classes, which may be further delineated
into groupings of specific data element(s). For example, ``patient
demographics'' is a data class and within that data class there is
``patient name,'' which is a data element. As noted in section
IV.B.1.b, for the overall structure and organization of the USCDI,
please consult www.healthIT.gov/USCDI.
ONC intends to establish and follow a predictable, transparent, and
collaborative process to expand the USCDI, including providing
stakeholders with the opportunity to comment on the USCDI's expansion.
Once the Secretary adopts the first version of the USCDI through
rulemaking, which we propose in this rulemaking, health IT developers
would be allowed to take advantage of the ``Standards Version
Advancement Process'' flexibility. The Standards Version Advancement
Process, proposed in Section VII.B.5 (below), would permit health IT
developers to voluntarily implement and use a new version of an adopted
standard (e.g., the USCDI), subject to certain conditions including a
requirement that the new version is approved for use by the National
Coordinator.
a. USCDI 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
We propose to adopt the USCDI Version 1 (USCDI v1) in Sec.
170.213. \15\ The USCDI is a standardized set of health data classes
and constituent data elements that would be required to support
nationwide electronic health information exchange. Once adopted in a
final rule, health IT developers would be required to update their
certified health IT to support the USCDI v1 for all certification
criteria affected by this proposed change. We propose to revise the
following CCDS dependent 2015 Edition certification criteria to
incorporate the USCDI standard:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ We note that USCDI v1is an updated version and
distinguished from the Draft United States Core Data for
Interoperability (USCDI) previously made available for public review
and comment in the course of its development as a prospective
standard.
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``Transitions of care'' (Sec. 170.315(b)(1));
``view, download, and transmit to 3rd party'' (Sec.
170.315(e)(1));
``consolidated CDA creation performance'' (Sec.
170.315(g)(6));
``transmission to public health agencies--electronic case
reporting'' (Sec. 170.315(f)(5)); and
``application access--all data request'' (Sec.
170.315(g)(9)).
We note that we did not include the ``data export'' criterion
(Sec. 170.315(b)(6)) as we are proposing to remove it and adopt
instead the ``EHI export'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(10)). For
similar reasons, we did not include the ``application access--data
category request'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(8)) because we are
proposing to replace it with the API certification criterion (Sec.
170.315(g)(10)), which derives its data requirements from the USCDI.
We propose, as a Maintenance of Certification requirement for the
real world testing Condition of Certification, that health IT
developers with health IT certified to the five above-identified
certification criteria prior to the effective date of a subsequent
final rule would have to update such certified health IT to the
proposed revisions. We further propose, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the real world testing Condition of
Certification, that health IT developers must provide the updated
certified health IT to all their customers with health IT previously
certified to the identified criteria no later than 24 months after the
effective date of a final rule for this proposed rule. For the purposes
of meeting this compliance timeline, we expect health IT developers to
update their certified health IT without new mandatory testing and
notify their ONC-ACB on the date at which they have reached compliance.
Developers would also need to factor these updates into their next real
world testing plan as discussed in section VII.B.5 of this proposed
rule. Further, we refer health IT developer to the next section, which
describes how the USCDI differs from the current CCDS.
b. USCDI Standard--Data Classes Included
The USCDI Version 1 (USCDI v1) and its constituent data elements
account for the public comments we received on the Draft USCDI and
Proposed Expansion Process\16\ published in January 2018 as well as
initial feedback from the Health IT Advisory Committee. The standard as
we propose to adopt it in Sec. 170.213 also reflects and acknowledges
the burden that rapidly expanding the USCDI v1 beyond the CCDS could
cause. As a result, the USCDI v1 is a modest expansion of the CCDS,
which we believe most health IT developers already support, were
already working toward, or should be capable of updating their health
IT to support in a timely manner. The following describes only the
delta between the CCDS and the USCDI v1. For the overall structure and
organization of the USCDI standard, please consult www.healthIT.gov/USCDI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/draft-uscdi.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
i. Updated Versions of Vocabulary Standard Code Sets
We propose that the USCDI Version 1 (USCDI v1) include the newest
versions of the ``minimum standard'' code sets included in the CCDS
available at publication of a subsequent final rule. We request comment
on this proposal and on whether this could result in any
interoperability concerns. To note, criteria such as the 2015 Edition
``family health history'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(12)), the 2015
Edition ``transmission to immunization registries'' criterion (Sec.
170.315(f)(1)), and the 2015 Edition ``transmission to public health
agencies--syndromic surveillance'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(f)(2))
reference ``minimum standard'' code sets; however, we are considering
changing the certification baseline versions of the code set for these
criteria from the versions adopted in the 2015 Edition final rule to
ensure complete interoperability alignment. We welcome comment on
whether we should adopt such an approach.
We also note, for purposes of clarity, that consistent with Sec.
170.555, unless the Secretary prohibits the use of a newer version of
an identified minimum standard code set for certification, health IT
could continue to be certified or upgraded to a newer version of an
identified minimum standard code set than that included in USCDI v1 or
the most recent USCDI version that the National Coordinator has
approved for use in the Program via the Standards Version Advancement
Process.
ii. Address and Phone Number
The USCDI v1 includes new data elements for ``address'' and ``phone
number.'' The inclusion of ``address'' (to represent the postal
location for the
[[Page 7442]]
patient) and ``phone number'' (to represent the patient's telephone
number) would improve the comprehensiveness of health information for
patient care. The inclusion of these data elements is also consistent
with the list of patient matching data elements already specified in
the 2015 Edition ``transitions of care'' certification criterion (Sec.
170.315(b)(1)(iii)(G)), which supports the exchange of patient health
information between providers of patient care.
iii. Pediatric Vital Signs
The USCDI v1 includes the pediatric vital sign data elements, which
are specified as optional health information in the 2015 Edition CCDS
definition. Pediatric vital signs include: Head occipital-frontal
circumference for children less than 3 years of age, BMI percentile per
age and sex for youth 2-20 years of age, weight for age per length and
sex for children less than 3 years of age, and the reference range/
scale or growth curve, as appropriate. As explained in section VI.A.2
of this proposed rule, the inclusion of pediatric vital sign data
elements in the draft USCDI v1 would align with the provisions of the
Cures Act related to health IT to support the health care of children.
Stakeholders emphasized the value of pediatric vital sign data elements
to better support the safety and quality of care delivered to children.
We also note that, as discussed in the 2015 Edition proposed rule, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends the use of
these pediatric vital signs for settings of care in which pediatric and
adolescent patients are seen (80 FR 16818-16819) as part of best
practices. The availability of a reference range/scale or growth curve
would help with proper interpretation of the measurements for the BMI
percentile per age and sex and weight for age per length and sex.
Further, the inclusion of this health information in the USCDI v1 is
the appropriate next step after first specifying them as optional in
the CCDS definition as part of the 2015 Edition rulemaking and as a
means of supporting patient access to their EHI in a longitudinal
format through certified health IT (see section 3009(e)(2)(A)(i) of the
PHSA as amended by the Cures Act). We recognize, however, that certain
health IT developers and their customers may not find these
capabilities and information useful. Therefore, we request comment on
the inclusion of pediatric vital signs in the USCDI v1, including the
potential benefits and costs for all stakeholders stemming from its
inclusion in the USCDI v1.
iv. Clinical Notes
The USCDI v1 includes a new data class, titled ``clinical notes.''
``Clinical notes'' is included in the USCDI v1 based on significant
feedback from the industry since the 2015 Edition final rule. We also
received feedback during the Trusted Exchange Framework and Common
Agreement (TEFCA) stakeholder sessions and public comment period. It
has been identified by stakeholders as highly desirable data for
interoperable exchange. The free text portion of the clinical notes was
most often relayed by clinicians as the data they sought, but were
often missing during electronic health information exchange. Clinical
notes can be composed of text generated from structured (pick-list and/
or check the box) fields as well as unstructured (free text) data. A
clinical note may include the assessment, diagnosis, plan of care and
evaluation of plan, patient teaching, and other relevant data points.
We recognize that a number of different clinical notes could be
useful for stakeholders. It is our understanding that work is being
done in the community to focus on a subset of clinical notes. We
considered three options for identifying the different ``note types''
to adopt in USCDI v1. The first option we considered would allow for
the community to offer any and all recommended notes. The second option
we considered would set a minimum standard of eight note types. This
option was derived from the eight note types identified by the Argonaut
Project participants.\17\ The third option we identified would look to
the eleven HL7 Consolidated Clinical Data Architecture (C-CDA) document
types identified in the C-CDA Release 2.1, which also included the note
types being identified by the Argonaut Project participants. We
ultimately decided to move forward with the second option because it
unites public and private interests toward the same goal. The eight
selected note types are a minimum bar and, in the future, the USCDI may
be updated to include other clinical notes. Specifically, we propose to
include the following clinical note types for both inpatient and
outpatient (primary care, emergency department, etc.) settings in USCDI
v1 as a minimum standard: (1) Discharge Summary note; (2) History &
Physical; (3) Progress Note; (4) Consultation Note; (5) Imaging
Narrative; (6) Laboratory Report Narrative; (7) Pathology Report
Narrative; and (8) Procedures Note. We seek comment on whether to
include additional note types as part of the USCDI v1.
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\17\ Link to the Clinical Notes Argonaut Project identified (to
clarify: Seven bullets are listed, however, we split laboratory and
pathology note types into their own note) https://wiki.hl7.org/index.php?title=201805_Clinical_Notes_Track.
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v. Provenance
The USCDI v1 also includes a new data class, titled ``provenance.''
``Provenance'' has been identified by stakeholders \18\ as valuable for
interoperable exchange. The provenance of data was also referenced by
stakeholders as a fundamental need to improve the trustworthiness and
reliability of the data being exchanged. Provenance describes the
metadata, or extra information about data, that can help answer
questions such as when and who created the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ https://www.healthit.gov/topic/interoperability/trusted-exchange-framework-and-common-agreement.
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The inclusion of ``provenance'' as a data class in the USCDI v1
would also complement the Cures Act requirement to support the exchange
of data through the use of APIs. This approach differs from the
exchange of data via the C-CDA. While C-CDAs are often critiqued due to
their relative ``length,'' the C-CDA represents the output of a
clinical encounter and includes relevant context. The same will not
always be true in an API context. APIs facilitate the granular exchange
of data and, as noted in the 2015 Edition final rule, offer the
potential to aggregate data from multiple sources in a web or mobile
application (80 FR 62675). The inclusion of provenance would help
retain the relevant context so the recipient can better understand the
origin of the data. As noted in section VII.B.4, we are also proposing
to include provenance in our proposed ``API Resource Collection in
Health'' (ARCH) Version 1 implementation specification in Sec.
170.215(a)(2), which would list a set of base Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR[supreg]) resources that Health IT
Modules certified to the proposed API criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(10))
would need to support.
We propose to further delineate the provenance data class into
three data elements: ``the author,'' which represents the person(s) who
is responsible for the information; ``the author's time stamp,'' which
indicates the time the information was recorded; and ``the author's
organization,'' which would be the organization the author is
associated with at the time they interacted with the data. We have
identified these three data elements as fundamental for data recipients
to have
[[Page 7443]]
available and both are commonly captured and currently available
through standards. We request comment on the inclusion of these three
data elements and whether any other provenance data elements, such as
the identity of the individual or entity the data was obtained from or
sent by (sometimes discussed in standards working groups as the
provenance of the data's ``last hop''), would be essential to include
as part of the USCDI v1 standard. We acknowledge that there is
currently work to help define provenance in a standard robust manner,
and we anticipate adopting the industry consensus once it becomes
available.
vi. Unique Device Identifier(s) for a Patient's Implantable Device(s)
We are aware of a recently published implementation guide (IG)
within HL7 that provides further guidance on the unique device
identifier (UDI) requirements. The IG, Health Level 7 (HL7[supreg]) CDA
R2 Implementation Guide: C-CDA Supplemental Templates for Unique Device
Identification (UDI) for Implantable Medical Devices, Release 1-US
Realm,\19\ identifies changes needed to the C-CDA to better facilitate
the exchange of the individual UDI components in the health care system
when devices are implanted in a patient. The UDI components include the
Device Identifier (DI) and the following individual production
identifiers: The lot or batch number, serial number, manufacturing
date, expiration date, and distinct identification code. However, as
this new IG has been recently published, we request comment on whether
we should add this UDI IG as a requirement for health IT to adopt in
order to meet the requirements for UDI USCDI Data Class. In addition,
we do not have a reliable basis on which to estimate how much it would
cost to meet the requirements outlined in the UDI IG; and, therefore,
we request comment on the cost and burden of complying with this
proposed requirement.
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\19\ https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/product_brief.cfm?product_id=486.
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vii. Medication Data Request for Comment
The USCDI v1 ``Medication'' data class includes two constituent
data elements within it: Medications and Medication Allergies. With
respect to the latter, Medication Allergies, we request comment on an
alternative approach. This alternative would result in removing the
Medication Allergies data element from the Medication data class and
creating a new data class titled, ``Substance Reactions,'' which would
be meant to be inclusive of ``Medication Allergies.'' The new
``Substance Reactions'' data class would include the following data
elements: ``Substance'' and ``Reaction,'' and include SNOMED CT as an
additional applicable standard for non-medication substances.
c. USCDI Standard--Relationship to Content Exchange Standards and
Implementation Specifications
In order to align with our approach to be responsive to the
evolution of standards and to facilitate updates to newer versions of
standards, the USCDI v1 (Sec. 170.213) is ``content exchange''
standard agnostic. It establishes ``data policy'' and does not directly
associate with the content exchange standards and implementation
specifications which, given a particular context, may be necessary to
exchange the entire USCDI, a USCDI class, or elements within it. To our
knowledge, all data classes in the USCDI v1 can be supported by
commonly used ``content exchange'' standards, including HL7 C-CDA
Release 2.1 and FHIR[supreg].
d. Clinical Notes C-CDA Implementation Specification
In conjunction with our proposal to adopt the USCDI v1, we propose
to adopt the HL7 CDA[supreg] R2 IG: C-CDA Templates for Clinical Notes
R1 Companion Guide, Release 1 in Sec. 170.205(a)(4)(i) (``C-CDA
Companion Guide''). The C-CDA Companion Guide provides supplemental
guidance and additional technical clarification for specifying data in
the C-CDA Release 2.1.\20\ As noted above, the proposed USCDI v1
includes new data classes, such as ``clinical notes,'' which are
further supported through the C-CDA Companion Guide. For example, the
C-CDA Companion Guide provides specifications for clinical notes by
indicating that clinical notes should be recorded in ``note activity''
and requires references to other discrete data, such as ``encounters.''
The C-CDA Companion Guide also enhances implementation of the 2015
Edition certification criteria that reference the C-CDA Release 2.1
(Sec. 170.205(a)(4)). As noted by stakeholders, the C-CDA Release 2.1
includes some optionality and ambiguity with respect to data element
components, such as the locations and value sets. We attempted to
address some of this optionality by clarifying requirements using
Certification Companion Guides (CCGs) \21\ and by specifying in the
CCDS definition where certain data should be placed in the C-CDA
Release 2.1 templates (e.g., ``goals'' in the goals section).\22\ The
C-CDA Companion Guide, which was released after the 2015 Edition final
rule, provides similar, but additional C-CDA implementation structure.
For example, race and ethnicity are required data elements in the USCDI
(formerly the CCDS) and must be included in C-CDA exchanges if known,
or they may be marked with a nullFlavor of UNK (unknown) if not known.
The C-CDA Release 2.1 is unclear on the location and value set, but the
C-CDA Companion Guide clarifies the location and value set. The
adoption of the C-CDA Companion Guide would align with our goal to
increase the consistent implementation of standards among health IT
developers and improve interoperability. We propose to adopt this C-CDA
Companion Guide to support best practice implementation of USCDI v1
data classes and 2015 Edition certification criteria that reference C-
CDA Release 2.1 (Sec. 170.205(a)(4)). The criteria include:
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\20\ https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/product_brief.cfm?product_id=447.
\21\ https://www.healthit.gov/topic/certification-ehrs/2015-edition-test-method.
\22\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/topiclanding/2018-04/2015Ed_CCG_CCDS.pdf.
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``Transitions of care'' (Sec. 170.315(b)(1));
``clinical information reconciliation and incorporation''
(Sec. 170.315(b)(2));
``care plan'' (Sec. 170.315(b)(9));
``view, download, and transmit to 3rd party'' (Sec.
170.315(e)(1));
``consolidated CDA creation performance'' (Sec.
170.315(g)(6)); and
``application access--all data request'' (Sec.
170.315(g)(9)).
We propose, as a Maintenance of Certification requirement for the
real world testing Condition of Certification, that health IT
developers with health IT certified to the six above-identified
certification criteria prior to the effective date of a subsequent
final rule would have to update such certified health IT to the
proposed revisions. We further propose, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement for the real world testing Condition of
Certification, that health IT developers must provide the updated
certified health IT to all their customers with health IT previously
certified to the identified criteria no later than 24 months after the
effective date of a final rule for this proposed rule. For the purposes
of meeting this compliance timeline, we expect health IT developers to
update their certified health IT without new mandatory testing and
notify their
[[Page 7444]]
ONC-ACB on the date at which they have reached compliance. Developers
would also need to factor these updates into their next real world
testing plan as discussed in section VII.B.5 of this proposed rule.
2. Electronic Prescribing Standard and Certification Criterion
We propose to update the electronic prescribing (e-Rx) SCRIPT
standard used for ``electronic prescribing'' in the 2015 Edition to
NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071, which would result in a new e-Rx standard
becoming the baseline for certification. We propose to adopt this
standard in Sec. 170.205(b)(1). ONC and CMS have historically
maintained complementary policies of aligning health IT certification
criteria and associated standard for e-prescribing with the CMS
Medicare Part D e-Rx and MH standards (75 FR 44589; 77 FR 54198). To
this end, CMS has retired the current standard (NCPDP SCRIPT version
10.6) for e-RX and MH and adopted NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 as the standard
for Part D e-Rx and MH effective January 1, 2020, conditional on ONC
updating the Program to the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard for its e-Rx
certification criterion (see also 42 CFR 423.160(b)(1)(v) and (2)(iv)).
In addition, CMS recently sought comment regarding whether the NCPDP
SCRIPT 2017071 standard could facilitate future reporting of the
proposed Query of Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) measure
in both the 2019 Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule (83 FR 35923) and
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems (IPPS) Fiscal Year 2019
proposed rule (83 FR 20528).
As summarized in the IPPS Fiscal Year 2019 final rule (83 FR
41144), CMS received comments supportive of using the NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071 medication history transactions for PDMP queries and responses,
as well as comments asking CMS to seek harmonizing of the 2015 Edition
e-prescribing certification criterion to the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071
standard specified in the part D program portions of the recent
``Medicare Program; Contract Year 2019 Policy and Technical Changes to
the Medicare Advantage, Medicare Cost Plan, Medicare Fee-for-Service,
the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs, and the PACE Program''
final rule (83 FR 16440).
In addition to proposing to adopt the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard
for the transactions that are listed in the current ``electronic
prescribing'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(3)), we propose to adopt and
require conformance to all of the NCPDP SCRIPT 2017071 standard
transactions CMS adopted at 42 CFR 423.160(b)(2)(iv) for NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071. Therefore, we propose to adopt a new 2015 Edition ``electronic
prescribing'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(11)) that includes the
following transactions:
Create new prescriptions (NewRx, NewRxRequest,
NewRxResponseDenied)
A NewRx transaction is a new prescription from a prescriber to a
pharmacy so that it can be dispensed to a patient. A NewRxRequest is a
request from a pharmacy to a prescriber for a new prescription for a
patient. A NewRxResponseDenied is a denied response to a previously
sent NewRxRequest (if approved, a NewRx would be sent). A
NewRxResponseDenied response may occur when the NewRxRequest cannot be
processed or if information is unavailable.
Change prescriptions (RxChangeRequest, RxChangeResponse)
An RxChangeRequest transaction originates from a pharmacy to
request: A change in the original prescription (new or fillable),
validation of prescriber credentials, a prescriber to review the drug
requested, or a prior authorization from the payer for the
prescription. An RxChangeResponse transaction originates from a
prescriber to respond: To a prescription change request from a
pharmacy, to a request for a prior authorization from a pharmacy, or to
a prescriber credential validation request from a pharmacy.
Cancel prescriptions (CancelRx, CancelRxResponse)
A CancelRx transaction is a request from a prescriber to a pharmacy
to not fill a previously sent prescription. A CancelRx must contain
pertinent information for the pharmacy to be able to find the
prescription in their system (patient, medication (name, strength,
dosage, form), prescriber, prescription number if available). A
CancelRxResponse is a response from a pharmacy to a prescriber to
acknowledge a CancelRx, and is used to denote if the cancellation is
Approved or Denied.
Renew prescriptions (RxRenewalRequest, RxRenewalResponse)
An RxRenewalRequest transaction originates from a pharmacy to
request additional refills beyond those originally prescribed.
RxRenewalResponse originates from a prescriber to respond to the
request.
Receive fill status notifications (RxFill,
RxFillIndicatorChange)
An RxFill transaction is sent from a pharmacy to a prescriber or a
long term or post-acute care (LTPAC) facility indicating the FillStatus
(dispensed, partially dispensed, not dispensed or returned to stock,
transferred to another pharmacy) of the new, refill, or resupply
prescriptions for a patient. RxFillIndicator informs the pharmacy of
the prescriber's intent for fill status notifications for a specific
patient/medication. An RxFillIndicatorChange is sent by a prescriber to
a pharmacy to indicate that the prescriber is changing the types of
RxFill transactions that were previously requested, where the
prescriber may modify the fill status of transactions previously
selected or cancel future RxFill transactions.
Request and receive medication history (RxHistoryRequest,
RxHistoryResponse)
An RxHistoryRequest transaction is a request from a prescriber for
a list of medications that have been prescribed, dispensed, claimed, or
indicated by a patient. This request could be sent to a state
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP). An RxHistoryResponse is a
response to an RxHistoryRequest containing a patient's medication
history. It includes the medications that were dispensed or obtained
within a certain timeframe, and optionally includes the prescriber that
prescribed it. RxHistoryRequest and RxHistoryResponse transactions may
be sent directly or through an intermediary.
Ask the Mailbox if there are any transactions (GetMessage)
This transaction is used by the prescriber or pharmacy asking the
mailbox if there are any transactions. It is at the heart of the
mechanism used by a pharmacy or prescriber system to receive
transactions from each other or from a payer or the REMS Administrator
via a Switch, acting as a Mailbox.
Relay acceptance of a transaction back to the sender (Status)
This transaction is used to relay acceptance of a transaction back
to the sender. A Status in response to any applicable transaction other
than GetMessage indicates acceptance and responsibility for a request.
A Status in response to GetMessage indicates that no mail is waiting
for pickup. A Status cannot be mailboxed and may not contain an error.
Respond that there was a problem with the transaction (Error)
This transaction indicates an error has occurred, indicating the
request was
[[Page 7445]]
terminated. An Error can be generated when there is a communication
problem or when the transaction actually had an error. An error can be
mailboxed, as it may be signifying to the originator that a transaction
was unable to be delivered or encountered problems in the acceptance.
The Error must be a different response than a Status, since the
communication between the system and the Mailbox must clearly denote
the actions taking place. An Error is a response being delivered on
behalf of a previous transaction, and the Status signifies no more
mail.
Respond that a transaction requesting a return receipt has
been received (Verify)
This transaction is a response to a pharmacy or prescriber
indicating that a transaction requesting a return receipt has been
received. Verifications results when a ``return receipt requested''
flag is set in the original request. Upon receiving a transaction with
ReturnReceipt set, it is the responsibility of the receiver to either
generate a Verify in response to the request (recommended) or generate
a Status in response to this request, followed subsequently by a free
standing Verify. This transaction notifies the originator that the
transaction was received at the software system. It is not a
notification of action taking place, since time may elapse before the
ultimate answer to the transaction may take place.
Request to send an additional supply of medication (Resupply)
This transaction is a request from a Long Term or Post-Acute Care
(LTPAC) organization to a pharmacy to send an additional supply of
medication for an existing order. An example use case is when a
medication supply for a resident is running low (2-3 doses) and a new
supply is needed from the pharmacy, the LTPAC organization need a way
to notify the pharmacy that an additional supply for the medication is
needed.
Communicate drug administration events (DrugAdministration)
This transaction communicates drug administration events from a
prescriber/care facility to the pharmacy or other entity. It is a
notification from a prescriber/care facility to a pharmacy or other
entity that a drug administration event has occurred--for example, a
medication was suspended or administration was resumed.
Transfer one or more prescriptions (RxTransferRequest,
RxTransferResponse, RxTransferConfirm)
The RxTransferRequest transaction is used when the pharmacy is
asking for a transfer of one or more prescriptions for a specific
patient to the requesting pharmacy. The RxTransferResponse transaction
is the response to the RxTransferRequest which includes the
prescription(s) being transferred or a rejection of the transfer
request. It is sent from the transferring pharmacy to the requesting
pharmacy. The RxTransferConfirm transaction is used by the pharmacy
receiving (originally requesting) the transfer to confirm that the
transfer prescription has been received and the transfer is complete.
Recertify the continued administration of a medication order
(Recertification)
This transaction is a notification from a facility, on behalf of a
prescriber, to a pharmacy recertifying the continued administration of
a medication order. An example use is when an existing medication order
has been recertified by the prescriber for continued use. Long term or
post-acute care use only.
Complete Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS)
Transactions (REMSInitiationRequest, REMSInitiationResponse,
REMSRequest, and REMSResponse)
With CMS' recent adoption of these transactions in their recently
issued final rule associated with e-prescribing for Medicare Part D (42
CFR 423.160(b)(2)(iv)(W)-(Z)), we believe that it would be equally
beneficial to include these four REMS transactions as part of this
proposed certification criterion: REMSInitiationRequest,
REMSInitiationResponse, REMSRequest, and REMSResponse.
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007
(Pub. L. 110-85) enables the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
require a REMS from a pharmaceutical manufacturer if the FDA determines
that a REMS is necessary to ensure the benefits of a drug outweigh the
risks associated with the drug. The currently approved REMS programs
vary in levels of complexity. Typically a Med Guide and Communication
Plan is required, but some also require Elements to Assure Safe Use
(ETASU). The large majority of existing REMS programs are for drugs
dispensed through specialty pharmacies, clinics, and hospitals, but as
REMS become more common they may ultimately have a greater impact on
retail-based products.
The impact of REMS is twofold. First, REMS with ETASU may require
the pharmacist to verify prescriber, patient, and/or pharmacy
enrollment in a registry and, in some cases, verify or check certain
information, such as lab results. Second, all REMS, including those
without ETASU, must fulfill FDA-approved reporting requirements. Each
REMS program must also include a program assessment schedule that
examines the program's effectiveness on intervals approved by the FDA
as part of the overall REMS program. The results of these assessments
are submitted to the FDA as part of the ongoing evaluation of REMS
program effectiveness. Accordingly, we propose to include the REMS
transactions as part of this proposed certification criterion. We would
also note for commenters' benefit that the SCRIPT 2017071 testing tool
under development is being designed to support testing these REMS
transactions.
We believe that removing the 2015 Edition certification criterion
(codified in Sec. 170.315(b)(3)) that references NCPDP SCRIPT version
10.6 and replacing it with an updated e-prescribing criterion (proposed
to be codified in Sec. 170.315(b)(11)) would harmonize with relevant
CMS program timelines, including Part D e-prescribing requirements and
the option for eligible clinicians, hospitals, and CAHs to report on
the Query of Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) quality
measure for Promoting Interoperability Programs. However, should our
proposal to adopt the new e-prescribing criterion (Sec.
170.315(b)(11)) be finalized prior to January 1, 2020, we also propose
to permit continued certification to the current 2015 Edition
``electronic prescribing'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(3)) for the
period of time in which it would continue to be used as a program
standard in the CMS Medicare Part D Program or the CMS Promoting
Interoperability Programs. Once it is no longer used in those Programs,
we would no longer permit certification to that criterion and would
remove it from the Code of Federal Regulations. We will consider
setting an effective date for such actions in a subsequent final rule
based on stakeholder feedback and CMS policies at the time. To this
point, we note that the continued acceptability of a Health IT Module
certified to the criterion codified in Sec. 170.315(b)(3) for purposes
of meeting the CEHRT definition and participating in the CMS Promoting
Interoperability Programs would be a matter of CMS policy.
3. Clinical Quality Measures--Report Criterion
In the 2015 Edition final rule, ONC adopted four clinical quality
measure (CQM) certification criteria, Sec. 170.315(c)(1) CQMs--record
and
[[Page 7446]]
export, Sec. 170.315(c)(2) CQMs--import and calculate, Sec.
170.315(c)(3) CQMs--report, and Sec. 170.315(c)(4) CQMs--filter (80 FR
62649-62655). These four criteria were adopted with the intent to
support providers' quality improvement activities and in electronically
generating CQM reports for reporting with certified health IT to
programs such as the EHR Incentive Programs, Quality Payment Program,
and Comprehensive Primary Care plus initiative. All four CQM criteria
require certified health IT to be capable of generating CQM reports
using the HL7 Quality Reporting Document Architecture (QRDA) Category I
standard, which provides CQM reports for individual patients.
Specifically, we adopted HL7 CDA[supreg] Release 2 Implementation Guide
for: Quality Reporting Document Architecture--Category I (QRDA I);
Release 1, Draft Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) Release 3 (US Realm)),
Volume 1 (Sec. 170.205(h)(2)). Two of the CQM criteria, CQMs--report
(Sec. 170.315(c)(3)) and CQMs--filter (Sec. 170.315(c)(4)), also
require certified health IT to be capable of generating CQM reports
using the QRDA Category III standard, which provides aggregate CQM
reports for a set of patients. More specifically, we adopted QRDA
Category III, Implementation Guide for CDA Release 2 (Sec.
170.205(k)(1)) and the Errata to the HL7 Implementation Guide for
CDA[supreg] Release 2: QRDA Category III, DSTU Release 1 (US Realm),
September 2014 (Sec. 170.205(k)(2)).
The ``CQMs--report'' certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(c)(3))
includes an optional certification provision for demonstrating that the
health IT can create QRDA reports in the form and manner required for
submission to CMS programs, which is in accordance with CMS' QRDA
Implementation Guide (IGs).\23\ The CMS QRDA IGs include specific
requirements to support providers participating in CMS programs in
addition to the HL7 IGs. At the time of the finalization of the 2015
Edition final rule and in response to public comment, we noted that
there was mixed feedback on whether this criterion should require
adherence to the HL7 QRDA Category I and Category III standards or
solely to the CMS QRDA IGs. As such, we adopted an approach that
allowed for flexibility and only required that certified health IT
support the HL7 QRDA standards, which are program-agnostic and can
support a number of use cases for exchanging CQM data. Because the
criterion has the optional provision for CMS program- specific
certification, developers can also support their end-users who intend
to use their certified health IT to report eCQMs to CMS in the ``form
and manner'' CMS requires (i.e., using the format specified in the CMS
QRDA IGs) (80 FR 62652).
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\23\ https://ecqi.healthit.gov/qrda-quality-reporting-document-architecture.
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Since the 2015 Edition final rule was published (October 16, 2015),
we have gained additional certification experience and received
feedback from the industry that health IT certified to the ``CQMs-
report'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(c)(3)) are only/primarily being used
to submit eCQMs to CMS for participation in CMS programs. Therefore, as
a means of reducing burden, we propose to remove the HL7 QRDA standard
requirements from the 2015 Edition CQMs--report criterion in Sec.
170.315(c)(3), but require that health IT certified to the criterion
support the CMS QRDA IGs. This would directly reduce burden on health
IT developers and indirectly providers as they would no longer have to,
in practice, develop (health IT developers) and support (both
developers and providers) two forms of the QRDA standard (i.e., the HL7
and CMS forms). We note that the Fast Health Interoperability Resources
(FHIR) standard offers the potential for supporting quality improvement
and reporting needs and promises to be a more efficient, modular, and
interoperable standard to develop, implement, and utilize through APIs.
However, until the potential benefits of FHIR APIs can be realized for
quality improvement and reporting, we believe that solely requiring the
CMS QRDA IGs for the ``CQMs--report'' criterion balances the burden to
developers and providers, while still meeting the goal of facilitating
quality improvement and reporting to CMS.
To support the proposal, we propose to incorporate by reference the
latest annual CMS QRDA IGs, specifically the 2019 CMS QRDA I
Implementation Guide for Hospital Quality Reporting \24\ and the 2019
CMS QRDA III Implementation Guide for Eligible Professionals (EPs) and
Eligible Clinicians.\25\ A Health IT Module would need to be certified
to both standards to provide flexibility to providers. However, we
solicit comment on whether we should consider an approach that permits
certification to only one of the standards depending on the care
setting for which the product is designed and implemented. We also
solicit comment on the future possibility of FHIR-enabled APIs
replacing or complementing QRDA reports for quality reporting and
improvement.
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\24\ https://ecqi.healthit.gov/system/files/QRDA_HQR_2019_CMS_IG_final_508.pdf.
\25\ https://ecqi.healthit.gov/system/files/2019_CMS_QRDA_III_Eligible_Clinicians_and_EP_IG-508.pdf.
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If we finalize this proposal in a subsequent final rule, we propose
to adopt the latest CMS QRDA IGs at the time of final rule publication,
as CMS updates their QRDA IGs annually to support the latest eCQM
specifications and only accepts eCQM reporting to the latest version.
We note that this approach would also facilitate a means for ONC to
permit developers to update its certified health IT to newer versions
of the CMS QRDA IGs through the real world testing Maintenance of
Certification provision for standards and implementation specification
updates in support of ongoing interoperability (see section VII.B.5 of
this proposed rule).
4. Electronic Health Information Export
We propose to adopt a new 2015 Edition certification criterion for
EHI export in Sec. 170.315(b)(10). This criterion is intended to
provide patients and health IT users with a means to efficiently export
the entire electronic health record for a single patient or all
patients in a computable, electronic format, and facilitate the
receiving health IT system's interpretation and use of the EHI, to the
extent reasonably practicable using the developer's existing
technology.
This outcome would promote access, exchange, and use of EHI and
facilitate health care providers' ability to switch health IT systems
or to migrate EHI for use in other technologies. Additionally, as
discussed in section VII.B.2 of this preamble, certification to this
criterion would provide some degree of assurance that a health IT
developer supports, and does not inhibit, the access, exchange, and use
of EHI for the specific use cases that the criterion addresses.
This proposed criterion supports two specific use cases for which
we believe that all EHI produced and electronically managed in a
developer's technology should be made readily available for export as a
standard capability of certified health IT.
First, we propose that health IT certified to this criterion would
have to enable the export of EHI for a single patient upon a valid
request from that patient or a user on the patient's behalf. This
patient-focused export capability, which is discussed in more detail
below, complements other provisions of this proposed rule that support
patients' access to their EHI including information that may eventually
be
[[Page 7447]]
accessible via the APIs described in section VII.B.4 of this preamble.
Ultimately, we expect all data to be transferred through APIs or other
advanced technologies. EHI export also supports longitudinal data
record development, and aligns with section 4006(a) of the Cures Act,
which requires [t]he Secretary, in consultation with the National
Coordinator, [to] promote policies that ensure that a patient's EHI is
accessible to that patient and the patient's designees, in a manner
that facilitates communication with the patient's health care providers
and other individuals, including researchers, consistent with such
patient's consent.
Second, this criterion would support the export of EHI when a
health care provider chooses to transition or migrate information to
another health IT system. As discussed in section VIII.C.5.c.iii of
this preamble, health IT developers are in a unique position to block
the export and portability of data for use in competing systems or
applications, or to charge rents for access to the basic technical
information needed to facilitate the conversion or migration of data
for these purposes. By providing at least a baseline capability for
exporting EHI in a commercially reasonable format, we believe that this
criterion would help to address some of these business practices and
enable smoother transitions between health IT systems.
This criterion is intended to further the two use cases outlined
above while providing an incremental approach given the known and
anticipated health IT landscape when ONC expects certified health IT
with this functionality will be widely available in the ecosystem. At
the time of this rulemaking, we believe a focused certification
criterion that is standards-agnostic will provide a useful first step
to enabling patients to request and receive their EHI and for providers
to more readily switch or migrate information between health IT
systems. Understanding that open, standards-based APIs are an emerging
technology and that some health IT developers today have implemented
proprietary APIs, this proposed criterion for EHI export provides an
initial method for exporting patient health information in these
circumstances. Over time, ONC may consider expanding the proposed
criterion or replacing it to achieve the goals in Sec. 170.402. It is
also possible that in the future, this criterion will no longer be
needed once standards-based APIs are widely available in the health IT
ecosystem with the ability to facilitate exchange of a wider set of
standardized data elements per the predictable, transparent, and
collaborative process to expand the USCDI (see the discussion of the
API Condition of Certification and the proposed API criterion in Sec.
170.315(g)(10) in VII.B.4 for additional information).
a. Patient Access
As noted above, the export functionality required by this
certification criterion would support both a patient's access to their
EHI and a provider's ability to switch to another health IT system. In
the patient access context, we propose that a user must be able to
timely execute the single patient EHI export at any time the user
chooses and without subsequent developer assistance to operate. The
health IT developer should enable the user to make data requests and
receive the export efficiently, without unreasonable burden. For
example, the health IT developer should not: Require the user to make a
request multiple times for different types of EHI; provide unreasonable
delays for the export; or prohibit reasonable user access to the system
during the export process.
``Timely'' does not mean real-time; however, we stress that any
delays in providing the export must be no longer than reasonably
necessary to avoid interference with other clinical functions of the
health IT system. This is similar to the approach we have taken for
export of clinical quality measure data. The export capability does not
require that data be received instantaneously. Rather, as we have
stated before (80 FR 62650) a non-conformity would exist if
surveillance revealed that processing or other delays were likely to
substantially interfere with the ability of a provider or health system
to view and verify their CQM results for quality improvement on a near
real-time basis. Similarly, a non-conformity would exist if delays were
causing or contributing to users being presented with data files that
no longer contained current, accurate, or valid data. To avoid these
implementation issues and ensure that capabilities support all required
outcomes, health IT developers should seek to minimize processing times
and other delays to the greatest extent possible.\26\
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\26\ https://www.healthit.gov/test-method/clinical-quality-measures-cqms-record-and-export#ccg.
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As previously defined under the Program, ``user'' is a health care
professional or his or her office staff; or a software program or
service that would interact directly with the certified health IT (80
FR 62611, 77 FR 54168). We typically would expect the ``user'' in this
case to be a provider or his or her office staff who will be performing
the request on behalf of the patient given that a request of this
nature would likely occur in the context of an individual exercising
their right of access under the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR 164.524). In
this regard, the proposed 2015 Edition ``EHI export'' criterion could
facilitate and support the provision of a patient's record in an
electronic format. In service to innovative and patient-centric
approaches, a health IT developer could develop a method that allows
the patient using a technology application (e.g., portal or ``app'') to
execute the request without needing a provider to do so on their
behalf. We seek comment on whether this portion of the criterion should
be made more prescriptive to only allow the patient and his or her
authorized representative to be the requestor of their EHI, similar to
how we have previously scoped such criteria as ``view, download, and
transmit to 3rd party'' (Sec. 170.315(e)(1)).
Similar to the 2015 Edition ``data export'' certification criterion
(Sec. 170.315(b)(6)), which we propose for removal below, we
acknowledge potential privacy and security concerns may arise when EHI
is exported and, therefore, propose that for provider-mediated
requests, a developer may design the health IT to limit the type of
users that would be able to access and initiate EHI export functions.
However, as we previously specified in the 2015 Edition final rule, the
ability to ``limit'' the single patient EHI export functionality is
intended to be used by and at the discretion of the provider
organization implementing the technology, not a way for health IT
developers to implicitly prevent the overarching user-driven aspect of
this capability (80 FR 62646).
b. Transitions Between Health IT Systems
In addition to and separate from the patient access use case
described above, health IT certified to this criterion would facilitate
the migration of EHI to another health IT system. We propose that a
health IT developer of health IT certified to this criterion must, at a
customer's request, provide a complete export of all EHI that is
produced or managed by means of the developer's certified health IT.
Health IT developers would have flexibility as to how this outcome is
achieved, so long as a customer is able to receive the export in a
timely and efficient manner, and in a format that is commercially
reasonable. For example, in contrast with the patient export
capability, which must be available to a user without subsequent
[[Page 7448]]
developer assistance to operate, the ``database export'' capability of
this criterion could require action or support on the part of the
health IT developer.
We note that while this criterion focuses on the technical outcomes
supported by this capability, developers of health IT certified to this
criterion would be required to provide the assurances proposed in Sec.
170.402, which include providing reasonable cooperation and assistance
to other persons (including customers, users, and third-party
developers) to enable the use of interoperable products and services.
Thus, while developers would have flexibility as to how they implement
the export functionality for transitions between systems, they would
ultimately be responsible for ensuring that the capability is deployed
in a way that enables a customer and their third-party contractors to
successfully migrate data. Such cooperation and assistance could
include, for example, assisting a customer's third-party developer to
automate the export of EHI to other systems. We refer readers to
section VII.B.2 of the proposed rule for further discussion of a health
IT developer's assurances as proposed in Sec. 170.402.
c. Scope of EHI
For both use cases supported by this criterion, EHI export
encompasses all the EHI that the health IT system produces and
electronically manages for a patient or group of patients. This applies
to the health IT's entire database, including but not limited to
clinical, administrative, and claims/billing data. It would also
include any data that may be stored in separate data warehouses that
the system has access to, can produce, and electronically manages. For
example, health IT developers may store EHI in these warehouses to
prevent performance impacts from data queries that may slow down the
``main'' health IT system's (e.g., EHR) clinical performance. We
clarify that ``EHI'' also includes the oldest EHI available on that
patient to the most recent, no matter the specific electronic format
(e.g., PDFs are included). As mentioned above, our intention is that
``produces and electronically manages'' refers to a health IT product's
entire database. However, we seek comment on the terminology used
(``produces and electronically manages'') and whether that captures our
intent or whether there are any alternatives to the language we should
consider to further clarify our intent. Alternative language we
considered included ``produce and electronically retain'' data, which
could encompass more data.
The use of the term ``electronic health information'' (EHI) is
deliberate and in alignment with the Cures Act and the proposed
definition of this term in Sec. 170.102. Its use supports consistency
and the breadth of types of data envisioned by this criterion. Clinical
data would encompass imaging information--both images and narrative
text about the image--as this is part of the patient's total record;
however, we understand that EHRs may not be the standard storage
location for images and solicit comment on the feasibility,
practicality, and necessity of exporting images and/or imaging
information. We request comment on what image elements, at a minimum,
should be shared such as image quality, type, and narrative text. It is
understandable that developers will not be able to export every
existing data element, nor that all possible data elements are
necessary for transfer. For finalization in a subsequent final rule, we
solicit comment on whether we should require, to support transparency,
health IT developers to attest or publish as part of the export format
documentation the types of EHI they cannot support for export.
We also propose the following metadata categories that would be
excluded from this criterion, and have listed examples for clarity
below. We seek comment on these exclusion categories, and request
feedback on what metadata elements should remain included for export,
or be added to the list of data that would be allowed to be excluded in
a subsequent final rule:
Metadata present in internal databases used for physically
storing the data. Examples include: Internal database table names,
field names, schema, constraints, Triggers, Field size (number of
bytes), Field type (String, integer, double, long), and Primary keys or
object identifiers used internally for querying.
Metadata that may not be necessary to interpret EHI
export, including information that is typically required for processing
of transactions such as encryption keys, internal user roles, ancillary
information such as information stored in different formats, local
codes for internal use; audit logs, record reviews, or history of
change.
Metadata that refers to data that is not present in the
EHI export, such as links to files and other external attachments that
are not part of the export, and information used in conjunction with
data from other applications that is not part of the health IT.
We also seek comment, for consideration in finalizing this
criterion in a subsequent final rule, on types of EHI that may present
challenges for meeting the intent of this proposed criterion.
d. Export Format
The proposed certification criterion does not prescribe a content
standard for the EHI export. However, it requires health IT developers
to provide the format, such as a data dictionary or export support
file, for the exported information to assist the receiving system in
processing the EHI without loss of information or its meaning to the
extent reasonably practicable using the developer's existing
technology. Providing EHI export information is consistent with
emerging industry practices and capabilities to offer requestors the
ability to access, download, and move their information without
unreasonable burden. Companies such as Facebook,\27\ Google,\28\ and
Twitter \29\ offer publicly-available links which provide requestors
necessary information on how to download their personal information
including, in some cases, several download options for requestors
alongside their export instructions. Public access to comparable EHI
export information would further support third-party companies in this
space, as they would have additional information and general knowledge
for use of available data. Accordingly, we propose that the developer's
export format should be made publicly available via a hyperlink as part
of certification to the ``EHI export'' criterion, including keeping the
hyperlink up-to-date with the current export format.
We believe that by making the export format publicly available at
the time of certification (and keeping the information current) will
stimulate a vibrant, competitive market in which third- party software
developers can specialize in processing the data exported from
certified health IT products in support of patients and providers.
Moreover, we believe this proposal will transform today's current
guess-work, one-off processes into something more predictable and
transparent such that greater industry efficiencies can be realized. We
note and clarify that the export format need not be the same format
used internally by the health IT system, and the health IT developer
would not need to make public their proprietary data model. The
proposed certification criterion also
[[Page 7449]]
does not prescribe how the exported EHI is made available to the user,
as this may depend on the size and type of information. We would expect
that the information be made available to the user or requestor in an
acceptable manner without placing unreasonable burden on the user or
requestor. Please also generally see our discussion of information
blocking in section VIII and particularly section VIII.D.5.
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\27\ https://www.facebook.com/help/1701730696756992?helpref=hc_global_nav.
\28\ https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3024190?hl=en.
\29\ https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/how-to-download-your-twitter-archive.
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e. Initial Step To Persistent Access to All of a Patient's EHI
We believe that open, standards-based APIs should provide
persistent access to patients' EHI over time to achieve the envisioned
goals in Sec. 170.404. In the meantime, this proposed criterion in
Sec. 170.315(b)(10) will provide an initial step toward achieving
those goals. We clarify that ``persistent'' or ``continuous'' access to
EHI is not required to satisfy this criterion's requirements and that
the minimum requirement is for a discrete data export capability.
Similarly, while the criterion requires the timely export of all EHI,
such export need not occur instantaneously (or in ``real-time'').
However, health IT developers are encouraged to consider persistent
access and real-time approaches as part of the step-wise progression we
see towards open, standards-based APIs for a growing number of data
elements per the USCDI in the proposed ``standardized API for patient
and population services'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(10).'' Further,
we caution that where it is reasonable for a developer to provide
persistent or real-time access to electronic health information, the
refusal to do so may be inconsistent with the Conditions of
Certification in Sec. 170.401 (information blocking) and Sec. 170.402
(assurances related to this capability), as well as the information
blocking provision, as to which readers should refer to sections VII
and VIII of this proposed rule. Similarly, while this certification
criterion would provide a baseline capability for exporting data for
the specific use cases described above, health IT developers may need
to provide other data export and conversion services or support
additional export use cases beyond those encompassed by this criterion
to facilitate the appropriate access, exchange, and use of electronic
health information and to avoid engaging in information blocking.
f. Timeframes
ONC seeks input on EHI export and timeframes. In particular, beyond
exporting all the EHI the health IT system produces and electronically
manages, should this criterion include capabilities to permit health
care providers to set timeframes for EHI export, such as only the
``past two years'' or ``past month'' of EHI?
For discussion of the required timeframe for developers of
certified health IT to certify to this proposed criterion and make it
available to their customers, please see Section VII.B.2, which
addresses a health IT developer's required assurances regarding the
availability and provision of this EHI export capability to its
customers.
g. Replaces the 2015 Edition ``Data Export'' Criterion in the 2015
Edition Base EHR Definition
We propose to remove the ``data export'' criterion (Sec.
170.315(b)(6)) from the 2015 Edition, including the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition expressed in Sec. 170.102. Correspondingly, we propose
to include the proposed ``EHI export'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(10))
in the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition, which would affect health care
providers' compliance responsibilities when it comes to possessing
CEHRT for associated CMS programs. A specific C-CDA data export
criterion no longer supports advancements in interoperability in the
evolving health IT industry. The proposed ``EHI export'' certification
criterion is standards-agnostic and supports a more open approach to
interoperability. More specifically, the proposed ``EHI export''
criterion differs significantly from the ``data export'' certification
criterion as the latter is limited to clinical data as specified in the
C-CDA. Also, the proposed ``EHI export'' criterion is not limited to
just the scope of the certified capabilities in the certified Health IT
Module as it applies to all produced and electronically managed EHI.
Further, by including this functionality in the 2015 Base EHR
definition, we can be assured that health care providers participating
in the CMS programs (e.g., Promoting Interoperability Programs) have
functionality to both support patient requests for their EHI and
switching health IT systems.
We propose to modify the Base EHR definition to include the
proposed ``EHI export'' criterion 24 months from the effective date of
the final rule for this proposed rule (which practically speaking would
be 25 months because of the 30-day delayed effective date). We believe
this is sufficient time for health IT developers to develop, test,
certify, and rollout this functionality to health care providers based
on the flexible approach offered for meeting this criterion. We also
believe this timeframe provides sufficient time for health care
providers to adopt and implement the functionality included in the
``EHI export'' criterion. To note, we refer readers to the
``Assurances'' Condition and Maintenance of Certification requirements
in section VII.B.2, which propose complementary requirements on health
IT developers to rollout health IT certified ``EHI export'' within 24
months of the effective date of a final rule for this proposed rule. We
welcome comments on our proposed compliance timeline.
We note that we do not propose a transition period for the ``data
export'' criterion. We propose to remove the criterion from the 2015
Edition upon the effective date of a final rule for this proposed rule.
Unlike the ``application access--data category request'' criterion
(which we propose to replace with the new API criterion in this
proposed rule), the ``data export'' criterion does not support an
objective or measure under the CMS Promoting Interoperability Programs.
Therefore, we do not believe that health IT developers and health care
providers need to support the functionality in the ``data export''
criterion while they transition to the development, adoption, and
implementation of the EHI export criterion. This approach should reduce
burden and costs for both health IT developers and health care
providers. We welcome comments on this approach, including whether this
will leave health care providers without an export capability for an
inordinate period of time such that we should require health IT
developers to support the ``data export'' functionality for health care
providers until the health IT developer attests to providing the new
EHI export functionality to all of its customers.
Readers are also referred to the Regulatory Impact Analysis in
section XIV of this proposed rule for a discussion of the estimated
costs and benefits of this proposed criterion, as well as the impact of
the proposed removal of the 2015 Edition ``data export'' criterion.
5. Standardized API for Patient and Population Services Criterion
To implement the Cures Act, we propose to adopt a new API criterion
in Sec. 170.315(g)(10), which would replace the ``application access--
data category request'' certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(8))
and become part of the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition. This new
certification criterion would require the use of FHIR standards,
several implementation specifications, and focus on supporting two
types of API-enabled services: (1) Services for
[[Page 7450]]
which a single patient's data is at focus; and (2) services for which
multiple patients' data are at focus. Please refer to the ``Application
Programming Interfaces'' section (VII.B.4) in this preamble for a more
detailed discussion of the ``API'' certification criterion and related
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements.
6. Privacy and Security Transparency Attestations
a. Background
In 2015, the HIT Standards Committee (HITSC) recommended the
adoption of two new certification criteria for the Program. The
National Coordinator endorsed the HITSC recommendations for
consideration by the Secretary, and the Secretary determined that it
was appropriate to propose adoption of the two new certification
criteria through rulemaking (81 FR 10635). To implement the Secretary's
determination, we propose to add two new 2015 Edition privacy and
security ``transparency attestation'' certification criteria for: (1)
Encrypt authentication credentials; and (2) multi-factor
authentication.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we adopted a new, simpler, and
straightforward approach to privacy and security (P&S) certification
requirements for Health IT Modules certified to the 2015 Edition, which
we refer to as the 2015 Edition privacy and security certification
framework (80 FR 62705). In this proposed rule, we propose
modifications to the 2015 Edition privacy and security certification
framework in Sec. 170.550(h) and propose to add new criteria to which
a health IT developer would need to certify pertaining to whether or
not its product encrypts authentication credentials (specifically Sec.
170.315(d)(12)) and supports multi-factor authentication (specifically
Sec. 170.315(d)(13)). To be clear, we are not proposing to require
that health IT have the functionality present to encrypt authentication
credentials or support multi-factor authentication. Rather, we propose
that a health IT developer indicate whether or not their certified
health IT has those capabilities by attesting yes or no.
b. Encrypt Authentication Credentials
We propose to adopt an ``encrypt authentication credentials''
certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(d)(12) and include it in the
P&S certification framework (Sec. 170.550(h)). We propose to make the
encrypt authentication credentials certification criterion applicable
to any Health IT Module currently certified to the 2015 Edition and any
Health IT Module presented for certification due to the fact that all
health IT must meet the ``authentication, access control, and
authorization'' certification criterion adopted in Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
as part of current Program requirements. While the 2015 Edition
``authentication, access control, and authorization'' certification
criterion criteria requires that patient information saved on end user
devices is encrypted, those same protections are not explicitly
required through certification for the authentication credentials used
to access that same information. As such, we believe that this proposal
would address that gap and encourage health IT developers to take steps
to ensure that authentication credentials are protected consistent with
industry best practices.
To provide clarity as to what a ``yes'' attestation for ``encrypt
authentication credentials'' would mean, we provide the following
explanation. Encrypting authentication credentials could include
password encryption or cryptographic hashing, which is storing only
encrypted or cryptographically hashed passwords. If a developer attests
that its Health IT Module encrypts authentication credentials, we
propose that the attestation would mean that the Health IT Module is
capable of cryptographically protecting stored authentication
credentials in accordance with standards adopted in Sec.
170.210(a)(2), Annex A: Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
Publication 140-2, Approved Security Functions for FIPS PUB 140-2,
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. We posit that FIPS
Publication 140-2 is the seminal, comprehensive, and most appropriate
standard. Moreover, in the specified FIPS 140-2 standard, there is an
allowance for various approved encryption methods, and health IT
developers would have the flexibility to implement any of the approved
encryption methods in order to attest yes to this criterion. Health IT
developers should keep apprised of these standards as they evolve and
are updated to address vulnerabilities identified in the current
standard.
We do not believe it is necessary for a Health IT Module to be
required to be tested to this criterion, so long as by attesting yes to
this criterion, the health IT developer is attesting that if
authentication credentials are stored, then the authentication
credentials are protected consistent with the requirements above. To be
clear, a ``no'' attestation is a sufficient response to address this
certification criterion; however, health IT developers should be aware
that this ``no'' will be made publicly available on the CHPL. Note that
if a developer attested to encrypting authentication credentials, a
certified Health IT Module would be subject to ONC-ACB surveillance for
any potential non-conformity with the requirements of this criterion.
Specifically, if the ONC-ACB becomes aware of situations where the
developer's health IT is not meeting the developer's affirmative
attestation per the criterion's requirements, the ONC-ACB may use its
corrective action process to bring the product back into conformance.
We propose that, for health IT certified prior to a subsequent
final rule's effective date, the health IT would need to be certified
to the ``encrypt authentication credentials'' certification criterion
within six months after the final rule's effective date. For health IT
certified for the first time after the final rule's effective date, we
propose that the health IT must meet this criterion at the time of
certification. This should allow sufficient time for health IT
developers to assess their Health IT Modules' capabilities and attest
``yes'' or ``no'' to the certification criterion.
For an assessment of this proposal's costs and benefits, please
refer to the Regulatory Impact Analysis in section XIV of this
preamble. We welcome comments on this assessment and this proposal in
general. We also note that some health IT presented for certification
is not designed to store authentication credentials. Therefore, we
specifically request comment on whether we should include an explicit
provision in this criterion to accommodate such health IT. This could
be similar to the approach we have taken with the 2015 Edition ``end-
user device encryption'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(d)(7)(ii)), where we
permit the criterion to be met if the health IT developer indicates
their technology is designed to prevent electronic health information
from being locally stored on end-user devices.
c. Multi-Factor Authentication
We propose to adopt a ``multi-factor authentication'' (MFA)
criterion in Sec. 170.315(d)(13) and include it in the P&S
certification framework (Sec. 170.550(h)). We propose to make the
``multi-factor authentication'' certification criterion applicable to
any Health IT Module currently certified to the 2015 Edition and any
Health IT Module presented for certification. Health IT developers have
already been implementing MFA to meet the Electronic Prescribing of
Controlled Substances (EPCS) requirements set by Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and if adopted, this certification criterion
would be general in that its
[[Page 7451]]
intended outcome would provide more public transparency around the MFA
capabilities included in certified health IT.
This proposal supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
led initiative ``STOP, THINK, CONNECT'' which strongly recommends and
runs campaigns to promote stronger authentication, typically related to
MFA, going beyond a username and password to log in. MFA is also
recommended by numerous organizations and groups. In the ``Report on
Improving Cybersecurity in the Health Care Industry,'' \30\ the Health
Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force recommended requiring strong
authentication to improve identity and access management for health
care workers, patients, and medical devices/EHRs. Using a single factor
approach to accessing information is particularly prone to cyber-attack
because one factor passwords can be weak, stolen, and are vulnerable to
external phishing attacks, malware, and social engineering threats. In
situations where the provider is accessing a health IT product or
health information exchange external to the hospital or clinical
environment, the Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force
recommended that the health care industry adopt the NIST SP 800-46
guidelines for remote access, including the use of two-factor
authentication to ensure a compromised password cannot alone be used to
gain access. Promoting the use of MFA and leveraging biometrics, mobile
phones, and/or wearables can help to establish a trust relationship
with the patient. Additionally, NIST recommends any personal data,
whether self-asserted or validated, require MFA.
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\30\ https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Documents/report2017.pdf.
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However, despite the benefits of adopting MFA, we are also aware of
some of the challenges. Specifically, in health care, many providers
are resistant to adopt MFA because of the inconvenience and loss of
time of going through another step to access the patient's EHI. Also,
MFA has not been deployed very long in the health care setting, so it
is not clear how much it actually addresses the risk. In most MFA
implementations, passwords are still present. In addition to having to
manage passwords, users also have to manage an additional layer of
security. Another usability challenge is that systems often require
different types of MFA, which adds to the complexity and also may
require providers to keep track of tokens. MFA is often recommended as
a solution to password problems, but it is still vulnerable to theft.
These alternative forms of authentication have their own set of
vulnerability issues. The cost of implementing MFA and ensuring it will
be implemented in a way that does not inhibit clinical workflow is also
an issue to be considered.
To provide clarity as to what a ``yes'' attestation for ``multi-
factor authentication'' attestation would mean, we provide the
following explanation. MFA requires users to authenticate using
multiple means to confirm they are who they claim to be in order to
prove one's identity, under the assumption that it is unlikely that an
unauthorized individual or entity will be able to succeed when more
than one token is required. MFA includes using two or more of these:
(i) Something people know, such as a password or a personal
identification number (PIN); (ii) something people have, such as a
phone, badge, card, RSA token or access key; and (iii) something people
are, such as fingerprints, retina scan, heartbeat, and other biometric
information. Thus, in order to be issued a certification, we propose to
require that a Health IT Module developer attest to whether or not its
certified health IT supports MFA consistent with industry recognized
standards (e.g., NIST Special Publication 800-63B Digital
Authentication Guidelines, ISO 27001).
We propose that, for health IT certified prior to a subsequent
final rule's effective date, the health IT would need to be certified
to the ``multi-factor authentication'' certification criterion within
six months after the final rule's effective date. For health IT
certified for the first time after the final rule's effective date, we
propose that the health IT must meet this criterion at the time of
certification. This should allow sufficient time for health IT
developers to assess their Health IT Modules' capabilities and attest
``yes'' or ``no'' to the certification criterion.
We generally seek comment on whether there is value in adopting the
proposed ``multi- factor authentication'' criterion. We also solicit
comment on the method of attestation and, if the health IT developer
does attest to supporting MFA, whether we should require the health IT
developer to explain how they support MFA. For example, should the
health IT developer be required to identify the MFA technique(s) used/
supported by submitting specific information on how it is implemented,
including identifying the purpose(s)/use(s) to which MFA is applied
within their Health IT Module (such as where in the clinical workflow
it is required), and, as applicable, whether the MFA solution complies
with industry standard? This information could enable the health IT
developer to highlight their health IT's capabilities to support MFA.
7. Data Segmentation for Privacy and Consent Management Criteria
We adopted two 2015 Edition ``data segmentation for privacy''
(DS4P) certification criteria in the 2015 Edition final rule. One
criterion (``DS4P-send'' (Sec. 170.315(b)(7)) includes capabilities
for creating a summary care record formatted to the C-CDA 2.1 standard
and document-level tagging as restricted (and subject to restrictions
on re-disclosure) according to the DS4P standard. The other criterion
(``DS4P-receive'' (Sec. 170.315(b)(8)) includes capabilities for
receiving a summary care record formatted to the C-CDA 2.1 standard and
document-level tagged as restricted (and subject to restrictions on re-
disclosure) according to the DS4P standard. As noted in the 2015
Edition final rule (80 FR 62646)), certification to these criteria is
not required to meet the CEHRT definition for CMS EHR Incentive
Programs, now referred to as the Promoting Interoperability Programs.
The current 2015 Edition DS4P certification criteria specify the
technical capabilities that the health IT must have to apply and
recognize security labels in a summary document (C-CDA) such that the
recipient of a summary document would be able to recognize the
existence of sensitive elements within the summary document (80 FR
62646). Security labeling provides a way for computer systems to
properly handle data passed among systems, to preserve the condition of
security, and to enable access control decisions on the information, so
that the information is only accessed by the appropriate entities. The
HL7 Healthcare Classification System (HCS) standard provides a common
syntax and semantics for interoperable security labels in health care.
The DS4P standard makes use of the HCS specification and describes a
method for applying security labels to HL7 CDA documents to ensure that
privacy policies established at a record's source can be understood and
enforced by the recipient of the record.
In the 2015 Edition final rule, we noted that the DS4P standard is
not restricted to data subject to the federal regulations governing the
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records (42 CFR part
2) (80 FR 62647). It may be implemented to support other data exchange
use cases in which compliance with state or federal legal frameworks
require sensitive health information to be tagged
[[Page 7452]]
and segmented (80 FR 62647). We further stated that we offered
certification to these criteria as an initial step towards the ability
of an interoperable health care system to use technical standards to
compute and persist security labels to permit access, use, or
disclosure of protected health information in accordance with
applicable policies and patient preferences. We understood and
acknowledged additional challenges surrounding the prevalence of
unstructured data, sensitive images, and potential issues around use of
sensitive health information by clinical decision support systems. The
adoption of document level data segmentation for structured documents
would not solve these issues, but we acknowledged it would help move
technology in the direction where these issues could be addressed (80
FR 16841).
Adoption of the current 2015 Edition DS4P criteria was also
consistent with earlier HIT Policy Committee (HITPC) recommendations on
the use of DS4P technology to enable the electronic implementation and
management of disclosure policies that originate from the patient, the
law, or an organization, in an interoperable manner, so that electronic
sensitive health information may be appropriately shared.\31\ These
HITPC recommendations consisted of a glide path for the exchange of 42
CFR part 2-protected data starting with the inclusion of Level 1
(document level tagging) send and receive functionality. The HITPC also
recommended advancing the exchange of 42 CFR part 2-protected data, by
outlining additional capabilities in sharing, viewing and incorporating
privacy restricted data at a more granular level, as well as managing
computable patient consent for the use of restricted data.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See HIT Policy Committee (HITPC) Recommendation Letter to
ONC, July 2014, https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_DS4P_Transmittal%20Letter_2014-07-03.pdf; see also HITPC's
Privacy and Security Tiger Team Public Meeting, Transcript, May 12,
2014, https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_Transcript_Final_2014-05-12.pdf; Public Meeting, Transcript,
May 27, 2014, https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_Transcript_Final_2014-05-27.pdf.
\32\ For more details on the two glide paths for part 2-
protected data, see https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/PSTT_DS4P_Transmittal%20Letter_2014-07-03.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the 2015 Edition final rule, the health care industry has
engaged in additional field testing and implementation of the DS4P
standard. As of the beginning of the third quarter of the 2018 CY, only
about 20 products (products with multiple certified versions were
counted once) were certified to the current 2015 Edition DS4P
certification criteria. In addition, stakeholders shared with ONC--
through public forums, listening sessions, and correspondence--that
focusing certification on segmentation to only the document level does
not permit providers the flexibility to address more granular
segmentation needs. Stakeholders noted that certain provider types,
such as providers of pediatric care and behavioral health care, are
currently using a range of burdensome manual workflows in order to meet
complex use cases for DS4P which are also impacted by state and local
laws. Additionally, stakeholders have expressed interest in ONC
exploring health IT standards that work with DS4P to support the
management of consent for sharing documents that include security
labels such as through the use of an API.
Therefore, in consideration of stakeholder feedback and our stated
policy approach to adopt DS4P certification criteria on a glide path,
we propose to remove the current 2015 Edition DS4P-send (Sec.
170.315(b)(7)) and DS4P-receive (Sec. 170.315(b)(8)) certification
criteria. The proposed effective date of removal of these criteria
would be the effective date of a subsequent final rule for this
proposed rule. We propose to replace these two criteria with three new
2015 Edition DS4P certification criteria (two for C-CDA and one for a
FHIR-based API) that would support a more granular approach to privacy
tagging data and consent management for health information exchange
supported by either the C-CDA- or FHIR-based exchange standards. Our
primary purpose for proposing to remove and replace them, in lieu of
proposing to revise them, is to provide clarity to stakeholders as to
the additional functionality enabled by health IT certified to the new
criteria. We note resources released by ONC and OCR, such as the HHS
Security Risk Assessment Tool \33\ and the Guide to Privacy and
Security of Electronic Health Information,\34\ as well as the Office
for Civil Rights' security risk analysis guidance \35\ that entities
may employ to make risk-based decisions regarding their implementation
of the proposed DS4P criteria. We also note the availability of the
Electronic Consent Management Landscape Assessment, Challenges, and
Technology report.\36\ The report includes suggestions for overcoming
barriers associated with implementing electronic consent management,
which may be considered for further research and discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ HHS Security Risk Assessment Tool: https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/security-risk-assessment.
\34\ ONC Guide to Privacy and Security of Electronic Health
Information: https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ pdf/
privacy/privacy-and-security-guide.pdf.
\35\ HHS Office for Civil Rights:https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/; and https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-analysis/?language=es.
\36\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-security/ecm_finalreport_forrelease62415.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Implementation With the Consolidated CDA Release 2.1
In place of the removed 2015 Edition DS4P criteria, we propose to
adopt new DS4P-send (Sec. [thinsp]170.315(b)(12)) and DS4P-receive
(Sec. [thinsp]170.315(b)(13)) criteria that would remain based on the
C-CDA and the HL7 DS4P standard. These criteria would include
capabilities for applying the DS4P standard at the document, section,
and entry level. We believe this offers more valuable functionality to
providers and patients, especially given the complexities of the
landscape of privacy laws for multiple care and specialty settings. We
believe health IT certified to these criteria could support multiple
practice settings and use cases. For example, in section VI.A.2 of this
preamble, we explain how the proposed capabilities included in these
criteria could support the pediatric health care setting. We believe
this proposal could also reduce burden for providers by leveraging
health IT's ability to recognize and manage sensitive data and patient
consent directives, rather than relying on case-by-case manual
redaction and subsequent workarounds to transmit redacted documents. We
emphasize that health care providers already have processes and
workflows to address their existing compliance obligations which could
be made more efficient and cost effective through the use of health IT.
We recognize that more granular privacy markings at the point of data
capture would further support existing and future priorities of states
for multiple care and specialty settings, including behavioral health
and pediatric health care settings.
We welcome public comment on our proposals to replace the current
2015 Edition DS4P criteria and adopt new 2015 Edition DS4P-send (Sec.
[thinsp]170.315(b)(12)) and DS4P-receive (Sec. [thinsp]170.315(b)(13))
criteria to support improved options for data segmentation for health
care providers engaged in complex use cases such as those identified in
pediatric care (see also section VI.A) and behavioral health
[[Page 7453]]
care, including for opioid use disorder (OUD) (see also section VI.B).
b. Implementation With FHIR Standard
In collaboration with ONC, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA) developed the Consent2Share
application to address the specific privacy protections of patients
with substance use disorders who are covered by the federal
confidentiality regulation, 42 CFR part 2. Consent2Share is an open
source application for data segmentation and consent management. It is
designed to integrate with existing FHIR systems. SAMHSA created a FHIR
implementation guide (the Consent2Share Consent Profile Design,
hereafter referred to as ``Consent Implementation Guide'') that
describes how the Consent2Share (C2S) application and associated access
control solution uses the FHIR Consent resource to represent and
persist patient consent for treatment, research, or disclosure.\37\ The
implementation guide provides instructions for using the FHIR Consent
resource to capture a record of a health care consumer's privacy
preferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The draft FHIR IG titled ``Consent2Share FHIR Profile
Design.docx'' can be accessed through the Community- Based Care and
Privacy (CBCP) HL7 workgroup, within the Package Name titled
``BHITS_FHIR_Consent_IG,'' at https://gforge.hl7.org/gf/project/cbcc/frs/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in section VII.B.4 of this proposed rule, we are
proposing policies related to the implementation of a standardized API
to support the exchange of health information between providers and
patients and among members of a care team. We anticipate that the
proposed 2015 Edition ``standardized API for patient and population
services'' certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(10)) will result
in a proliferation of APIs that will enable a more flexible and less
burdensome approach to exchanging EHI. We believe the health care
industry can leverage this API infrastructure to share segmented data
in a secure and scalable manner. Therefore, we propose to adopt a 2015
Edition certification criterion ``consent management for APIs'' in
Sec. 170.315(g)(11) to support data segmentation and consent
management through an API in accordance with the Consent Implementation
Guide. Certification to this criterion would be at a health IT
developer's discretion and would indicate that a system is capable of
responding to requests through an API for patient consent directives
that include standards-based security labeling.
We acknowledge that our proposed implementation specification, the
Consent Implementation Guide, is based on a different version of the
FHIR standard (FHIR Standard for Trial Use 3, also known as FHIR
Release 3) than the proposed ``standardized API for patient and
population services'' criteria (Sec. 170.315(g)(10)) which is proposed
to reference just FHIR Release 2. Furthermore, we acknowledge that this
discrepancy may result in additional implementation efforts for
developers. In ideal circumstances, we would have proposed a data
segmentation and consent management standard for APIs that was based on
FHIR Release 2 and aligned with the ``standardized API for patient and
population services'' criteria proposed in this proposed rule. However,
although SAMHSA also created a consent implementation guide based on
FHIR Release 2,\38\ the guide used the FHIR ``Contract'' resource to
represent patient consent directives. It is our understanding that an
approach based on the ``Contract'' resource has since been abandoned by
the industry in favor of using the ``Consent'' resource which was
introduced in FHIR Release 3. Moreover, the FHIR Release 2 version of
the Consent Implementation Guide went through relatively little testing
and was never formally implemented because SAMHSA began developing an
update to the guide based on the ``Consent'' resource in FHIR Release
3. Consequently, proposing an implementation specification based on
FHIR Release 2 would not have aligned with the more common
implementation of FHIR-based consent directives by the health care
industry. We do not anticipate that the initial misalignment between
the proposed API criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(10)) and the proposed
third DS4P criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(11)) will pose a significant
burden on health IT developers. Further, our proposal to permit health
IT developers to voluntarily implement and use a new version of an
adopted standard or implementation specification so long as such
version was approved by the National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards Version Advancement Process,
discussed in section VII.B.5, would enable standards version alignment
between these two criteria in the future as the FHIR standard matures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ The draft Behavioral Health Information Technologies and
Standards (BHITS) FHIR DSTU2 Consent Implementation Guide can be
accessed through the Community-Based Care and Privacy (CBCP) HL7
workgroup at https://gforge.hl7.org/gf/project/cbcc/frs/?action=FrsReleaseView&release_id=1279.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAMHSA created the ``Consent Implementation Guide'' to support
developers in implementing the FHIR Consent resource to represent
patient consent for treatment, research, and disclosure. The Consent
Implementation Guide provides instructions for using the FHIR
``Consent'' resource to capture a record of a health care consumer's
privacy preferences. Implementing an instance of the FHIR Consent
resource based on this guide allows for a patient consent to permit or
deny identified recipient(s) or recipient role(s) to perform one or
more actions, regarding the patient's health information for specific
purposes and periods of time. For example the Consent Implementation
Guide supports consent management for specific use cases to permit or
deny disclosure based on a specific law, regulation, or policy under
which the patient consented. The implementation guide uses security
labels as a mechanism for specifying a patient's preferences (e.g.,
permit disclosure of EHI labeled ``restricted''). The Consent
Implementation Guide provides a much simpler mechanism for representing
a patient's consent preferences than the old approach based on FHIR
Release 2 and has undergone implementation and pilot testing by
SAMHSA's Consent2Share (C2S) application.
Our proposal to adopt the version aligned with FHIR Release 3 and
the FHIR Release 3 standard for this criterion reflects stakeholder
interests and efforts to support particular use cases. C2S enables data
segmentation and consent management for disclosure of several discrete
categories of sensitive health data related to conditions and
treatments including: Alcohol, tobacco and substance use disorders
(including opioid use disorder), behavioral health, HIV/AIDS, and
sexuality and reproductive health. These capabilities support multiple
use cases in both primary and specialty care, and specifically address
priority needs identified by stakeholders to support pediatric care. We
emphasize that health care providers already have processes and
workflows to address their existing compliance obligations which could
be made more efficient and cost effective through the use of health IT.
Finally, given that the FHIR standard is modular in nature, and
especially since the ``Consent'' resource did not exist in FHIR Release
2, we anticipate that health IT developers that elect to certify to
this criterion would be able to support the Consent Implementation
Guide along with the API requirements specified in ``standardized API
for
[[Page 7454]]
patient and population services'' (Sec. 170.315(g)(10)) with modest
extra effort.
We welcome comments on this proposal. We specifically seek comment
on how the availability of this proposed certification criterion might
increase the ability to support multiple care coordination and privacy
priorities, including those associated with pediatric care; and whether
we should consider other similar API based options and resources as
standards for certification criteria. We also seek comment on whether
the misalignment between the versions of the FHIR standard used by our
proposed ``consent management for APIs'' and ``standardized API for
patient and population services'' criteria would create excessive
burden for developers and implementers. Specifically, we seek comment
on if certification to the ``consent management for APIs'' should only
be available in conjunction with the ``standardized API for patient and
population services'' criteria at such a time as the criteria are
aligned to one version of the FHIR standard or if the option to certify
to the ``consent management for APIs'' should be allowed for those
developers interested in doing so even without current standards
alignment. We note that SAMHSA is currently pursuing additional work to
expand use cases related to data segmentation for privacy and FHIR
compatibility.
C. Unchanged 2015 Edition Criteria--Program Reference Alignment
In the FY 2019 IPPS/LTCH PPS proposed rule (83 FR 20516), CMS
proposed scoring and measurement policies to move beyond the three
stages of meaningful use to a new phase of EHR measurement with an
increased focus on interoperability and improving patient access to
health information. To reflect this focus, CMS changed the name of the
Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs, to the Medicare and
Medicaid Promoting Interoperability (PI) Programs. To align with the
renaming of the EHR Incentive Programs, we propose to remove references
to the EHR Incentive Programs and replace them with ``Promoting
Interoperability Programs'' in the 2015 Edition ``automated numerator
recording'' criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(1) and the ``automated
measure calculation'' criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(2).
V. Modifications to the ONC Health IT Certification Program
A. Corrections
1. Auditable Events and Tamper Resistance
Currently, Sec. 170.315(d)(2), ``auditable events and tamper
resistance,'' includes a cross- reference to Sec. 170.315(d)(7).
However, the cross reference to Sec. 170.315(d)(7), ``end-user device
encryption,'' does not always apply. We propose to revise Sec.
170.550(h)(3) to apply the Sec. 170.315(d)(7) cross reference as
appropriate and exempt Sec. 170.315(d)(7) when the certificate scope
does not require Sec. 170.315(d)(7) certification (see Sec.
170.315(d)(2)(i)(C)). Paragraph 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C) is not applicable
for the privacy and security testing and certification of a Health IT
Module required by Sec. 170.550(h)(3)(iii), (v), (vii), and (viii).
This specific requirement was intended to be exempted. It would only
apply if Sec. 170.315(d)(7) was also required for privacy and security
testing and certification, which it is not under the aforementioned
paragraphs. For example, a developer that is seeking to certify a
Health IT Module to Sec. 170.315(h) will not necessarily have end-user
device encryption features (see Sec. 170.315(d)(7)). As such,
certification can proceed for the audit log process without the Health
IT Module demonstrating that it can record an encryption status as
required by Sec. 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C). We have previously identified
this error in guidance and now propose to codify the correction in
regulation.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015Ed_CCG_d2-Auditable-events-tamper-resistance.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Amendments
We propose to revise Sec. 170.550(h) to remove the ``amendments''
criterion's application to certain non-applicable clinical criteria
including: ``Drug-drug, drug-allergy interaction checks for
computerized provider order entry (CPOE)'' Sec. 170.315(a)(4);
``clinical decision support'' Sec. 170.315(a)(9); ``drug-formulary and
preferred drug list checks'' Sec. 170.315(a)(10); and ``patient-
specific education'' Sec. 170.315(a)(13). Health IT Modules presented
for certification to these criteria would not have to demonstrate the
capabilities required by the 2015 Edition ``amendments'' certification
criterion (Sec. 170.315(d)(4)), unless the health IT is presented for
certification to another criterion that requires certification to the
2015 Edition ``amendments'' criterion under the P&S certification
framework. This has already been incorporated into sub- regulatory
guidance, and we propose to codify this clarification in
regulation.\40\ The revision was made upon further analysis of the P&S
certification framework and the applicability of the ``amendments''
certification criterion Sec. 170.315(d)(4) to health IT capabilities
that would not necessarily have any patient data for which a request
for an amendment would be relevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015Ed_CCG_a4-DD-DAI-checks-for-CPOE.pdf, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015ed_ccg_a9-clinical-decision-support.pdf, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015Ed_CCG_a10-Drug-formulary-PDL-checks.pdf, and https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/2015Ed_CCG_a13-Patient-specific-ed-resources.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. View, Download, and Transmit to 3rd Party
We propose to remove Sec. 170.315(e)(1)(ii)(B) which includes a
cross-reference to Sec. 170.315(d)(2). This cross-reference indicates
that health IT may demonstrate compliance with activity history log
requirements if it is also certified to the 2015 Edition ``auditable
events and tamper-resistance'' certification criterion (Sec.
170.315(d)(2)). However, we no longer require testing of activity
history log when certifying for Sec. 170.315(d)(2). Therefore, this
cross-reference is no longer applicable to meet certification
requirements for the 2015 Edition ``view, download, and transmit to 3rd
party'' certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(e)(1)) activity history
log requirements.
4. Integrating Revised and New Certification Criteria Into the 2015
Edition Privacy and Security Certification Framework
Consistent with the 2015 Edition privacy and security certification
framework, each certification criterion has a set of appropriate P&S
``safeguards'' that must be in place. In the 2015 Edition, we required
that an ONC-ACB must ensure that a Health IT Module presented for
certification to any of the certification criteria that fall into each
regulatory text ``first level paragraph'' category of Sec. 170.315
(e.g., Sec. 170.315(a)) identified below would be certified to either
Approach 1 (technically demonstrate) or Approach 2 (system
documentation). In this proposed rule, we propose to require the new
criteria (Sec. 170.315(d)(12) and (d)(13)) to apply to all Sec.
170.315 certification criteria. Therefore, given these and the other
modifications discussed above, we propose to revise the P&S
certification framework as
[[Page 7455]]
noted in the table below. However, the P&S Certification Framework
would need to be further updated depending on finalization of the
proposals discussed in section III.B.4, which propose removal of
certain 2015 Edition certification criteria.
Table 1--Proposed 2015 Edition Privacy and Security Certification Framework
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It will need to be certified to approach 1 or approach 2 for each of
If the Health IT Module includes the P&S certification criteria listed in the ``approach 1'' column
capabilities for certification listed -----------------------------------------------------------------------
under: Approach 1 Approach 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 170.315(a)(1), through (2), (5), Sec. 170.315(d)(1) For each applicable P&S certification
through (8), (11), and (12). (authentication, access criterion not certified using Approach
control, and 1, the health IT developer submits
authorization), (d)(2) system documentation that is
(auditable events and sufficiently detailed to enable
tamper resistance), (d)(3) integration such that the Health IT
(audit reports), (d)(4) Module has implemented service
(amendments), (d)(5) interfaces for each applicable P&S
(automatic log-off), certification criterion that enable the
(d)(6) (emergency access), Health IT Module to access external
and (d)(7) (end-user services necessary to meet the
device encryption). requirements of the P&S certification
criterion.
Sec. 170.315(a)(4), (9), (10), and Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
(13). through (d)(3) and (d)(5)
through (d)(7).
Sec. 170.315(b)....................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3) and (d)(5)
through (d)(8) (integrity).
Sec. 170.315(c)....................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3) and (d)(5)
*.
Sec. 170.315(e)(1).................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3), (d)(5),
(d)(7), and (d)(9)(trusted
connection).
Sec. 170.315(e)(2) and (3)............ Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3), (d)(5),
and (d)(9) *.
Sec. 170.315(f)....................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3) and (d)(7).
Sec. 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11).... Sec. 170.315(d)(1) and
(d)(9); and (d)(2) or
(d)(10) (auditing actions
on health information).
Sec. 170.315(h)....................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3) *.
Sec. 170.315(b)....................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3) and (d)(5)
through (d)(8) (integrity).
Sec. 170.315(c)....................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3) and (d)(5).
Sec. 170.315(e)(1).................... Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3), (d)(5),
(d)(7), and (d)(9)(trusted
connection).
Sec. 170.315(e)(2) and (3)............ Sec. 170.315(d)(1)
through (d)(3), (d)(5),
and (d)(9).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 170.315(a)-(h) Certification Criterion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 170.315(a) through (h) Sec. 170.315(d)(12)
Certification Criterion.
Sec. 170.315(a) through (h) Sec. 170.315(d)(13)
Certification Criterion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
An ONC-ACB must ensure that a Health IT Module presented for
certification to any of the certification criteria that fall into each
regulatory text ``first level paragraph'' category of Sec. 170.315
(e.g. Sec. 170.315(a)) identified in the table above is certified to
either Approach 1 (technically demonstrate) or Approach 2
(systemdocumentation). In addition, we propose that health IT
developers seeking certification to any Sec. 170.315 certification
criterion for their Health IT Modules attest to whether they encrypt
authentication credentials (Sec. 170.315(d)(12)) and support multi-
factor authentication (Sec. 170.315(d)(13)).
We clarify that of the adopted 2015 Edition certification criteria, only
the privacy and security criteria specified in Sec. 170.315(g)(1)
through (6) are exempt from the 2015 Edition privacy and security
certification framework due to the capabilities included in these
criteria, which do not implicate privacy and security concerns..
In order to be issued a certification, a Health IT Module would only
need to be tested once to each applicable privacy and security
criterion identified as part of Approach 1 or Approach 2 so long as the
health IT developer attests that such privacy and security capabilities
apply to the full scope of capabilities included in the requested
certification, except for the certification of a Health IT Module to
Sec. 170.315(e)(1) ``view, download, and transmit to 3rd party'' and
(e)(2) ``secure messaging.'' For each of these criteria, a Health IT
Module must be separately tested to Sec. 170.315(d)(9) because of the
specific capabilities for secure electronic transmission and secure
electronic messaging included in each criterion, respectively. We also
propose the health IT developers seeking certification to any Sec.
170.315 certification criterion for their Health IT Modules attest to
whether they encrypt authentication credentials (Sec. 170.315(d)(12))
and support multi-factor authentication (Sec. 170.315(d)(13)).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Sec. 170.315(d)(2)(i)(C) is not required if the scope of the Health
IT Module does not have end-user device encryption features.
[[Page 7456]]
B. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ACBs
1. Records Retention
We propose to revise the records retention requirement in Sec.
[thinsp]170.523(g) to include the ``life of the edition'' as well as 3
years after the retirement of an edition related to the certification
of Complete EHRs and Health IT Module(s). In the 2015 Edition final
rule (80 FR 62602), we adopted a records retention provision that
required ONC-ACBs to retain all records related to the certification of
Complete EHRs and Health IT Module(s) for the ``life of the edition''
plus an additional 3 years, and the records would be available to HHS
upon request during this period of time. In the 2015 Edition final
rule, the ``life of the edition'' was defined as beginning with the
codification of an edition of certification criteria in regulation and
ending when the edition is removed from regulation. We now propose to
clarify that HHS has the ability to access certification records for
the ``life of the edition,'' which begins with the codification of an
edition of certification criteria in the Code of Federal Regulations
through a minimum of 3 years from the effective date that removes the
applicable edition from the Code of Federal Regulations, not solely
during the 3-year period after removal from the CFR.
2. Conformance Methods for Certification Criteria
The Principle of Proper Conduct (PoPC) in Sec. 170.523(h)
specifies that ONC-ACBs may only certify health IT that has been tested
by ONC-ATLs using tools and test procedures approved by the National
Coordinator. We propose to revise this PoPC in three ways. First, we
propose to revise this PoPC to additionally permit ONC-ACBs to certify
Health IT Modules that they have evaluated for conformance with
certification criteria without first passing through an ONC-ATL.
However, we propose that such methods to determine conformity must
first be approved by the National Coordinator. This proposal provides
valuable Program flexibility and market efficiencies for streamlining
Health IT Module certification, acknowledging the broad spectrum of
evidence of conformance, from laboratory testing with an ONC-ATL to
developer self-declaration. This Program flexibility will also allow us
to leverage the success we have seen in implementation of our
alternative test method process where any entity can submit a test
procedure and/or test tool for approval for use under the Program. For
example, the National Coordinator may, under this provision, approve a
conformance method for certification criteria where evidence of a valid
declaration of conformity (e.g., certification) granted under an
external program can be submitted directly to an ONC-ACB to meet the
requirement of that certification criteria.
Second, we propose to revise the PoPC to clarify that
certifications can only be issued to Health IT Modules and not Complete
EHRs. We are proposing to remove the 2014 Edition from the CFR (see
section II.B.2 of this preamble) and Complete EHR certifications are no
longer available for certification to the 2015 Edition (80 FR 62608; 79
FR 54443). We propose to remove the provision that permits the use of
test results from National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP)-accredited testing laboratories under the Program because the
regulatory transition period from NVLAP-accredited testing laboratories
to ONC-ATLs has expired (81 FR 72447).
Third, we propose to remove the provision that permits the
certification of health IT previously certified to an edition if the
certification criterion or criteria to which the Health IT Module(s)
was previously certified have not been revised and no new certification
criteria are applicable because the circumstances that this provision
seeks to address are no longer feasible with certification to the 2015
Edition. Any Health IT Module previously certified to the 2014 Edition
and presented for certification to the 2015 Edition would have at least
one new or revised 2015 Edition certification criteria that would be
applicable. For example, the 2015 Edition ``accessibility-centered
design'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(5)) is applicable to any Health IT
Module presented for certification to the 2015 Edition.
3. ONC-ACBs To Accept Test Results From Any ONC-ATL in Good Standing
We propose to revise the PoPC for ONC-ACBs in order to address
business relationships between ONC-ACBs and ONC-ATLs. To encourage
market competition, we propose to require ONC-ACBs to accept test
results from any ONC-ATL that is in good standing under the Program and
is compliant with its ISO 17025 accreditation requirements. However, if
an ONC-ACB has concerns about accepting test results from a certain
ONC-ATL, the ONC-ACB would have an opportunity to explain the potential
issues to ONC and NVLAP, and on a case-by-case basis, ONC could
consider the facts and make the final determination.
ONC-ATLs must be accredited by the NVLAP and seek authorization
from ONC to participate in the ONC Health IT Certification Program.
ONC-ATLs test products against the ONC-approved test method for the
standards and certification criteria identified by the Secretary using
ONC-approved test methods. ONC-ACBs make certification determinations
and conduct surveillance for health IT originally tested by an ONC-ATL.
Based on the process that all ONC-ATLs must undergo, we believe that
they are capable of providing accurate test results that should be
accepted by any ONC-ACB.
The intent of this proposal is to ensure that ONC-ATLs are not
discriminated against and do not suffer injury from ONC-ACBs not
accepting their test results if, in fact, they are in good standing.
This proposal may also prevent harm to health IT developers, who
present their health IT to be tested by ONC-ATLs and ultimately seek
certification by ONC-ACBs under the Program. These situations may arise
if a health IT developer's ONC-ACB leaves the Program or goes out of
business. This proposal may also prevent situations of preferential
business arrangements such as when one organization is both an ONC-ATL
and ONC-ACB and will not enter into a contract with another
organization who is also an ONC-ATL.
4. Mandatory Disclosures and Certifications
We propose to revise the PoPC in Sec. 170.523(k). We propose to
remove Sec. 170.523(k) (1)(ii)(B) because certifications can only be
issued to Health IT Modules and not Complete EHRs. We are proposing to
remove the 2014 Edition from the CFR (see section III.B.2 of this
preamble) and Complete EHR certifications are no longer available for
certification to the 2015 Edition (80 FR 62608; 79 FR 54443). We also
propose to revise Sec. 170.523(k)(1)(iii) to broaden the section
beyond just the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs (now
referred to as Promoting Interoperability Programs). We propose to
revise the section to include a detailed description of all known
material information concerning additional types of costs or fees that
a user may be required to pay to implement or use the Health IT
Module's capabilities, whether to meet provisions of HHS programs
requiring the use of certified health IT or to achieve any other use
within the scope of the health IT's certification.
[[Page 7457]]
We also propose to remove the provision in Sec. 170.523(k)(3) that
requires a certification issued to a pre-coordinated, integrated bundle
of Health IT Modules to be treated the same as a certification issued
to a Complete EHR for the purposes of Sec. 170.523(k)(1), except that
the certification must also indicate each Health IT Module that is
included in the bundle. We propose to remove this provision because
pre-coordinated, integrated bundles are no longer applicable for
certification under Program.
We propose to revise Sec. 170.523(k)(4) to clarify that a
certification issued to a Health IT Module based solely on the
applicable certification criteria adopted by the ONC Health IT
Certification Program must be separate and distinct from any other
certification(s) based on other criteria or requirements. The intent of
this provision, as indicated in the Establishment of the Permanent
Certification Program for Health Information Technology final rule (76
FR 1272), is to ensure that any other certifications an ONC-ACB may
issue, is separately indicated from the applicable certification
criteria adopted by the ONC Health IT Certification Program.
We also propose changes related to transparency attestations and
limitations in section III.B.5. of this preamble. Additionally, we
propose other new PoPCs for ONC-ACBs in sections VII.B.5 and VII.D of
this preamble.
C. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ATLs--Records Retention
We propose to revise the records retention requirement in Sec.
[thinsp]170.524(f) to include the ``life of the edition'' as well as 3
years after the retirement of an edition related to the certification
of Health IT Module(s). The circumstances are the same as in section
V.B.1 of this preamble mentioned above, therefore, we propose the same
revisions for ONC-ATLs as we did for ONC-ACBs.
VI. Health IT for the Care Continuum
ONC believes health IT should help promote and support patient care
when and where it is needed. This means health IT should help support
patient populations, specialized care, transitions of care, and
practice settings across the care continuum. In the Permanent
Certification Program final rule, we clarified that section 3001(c)(5)
of the PHSA provides the National Coordinator with the authority to
establish a voluntary certification program or programs for other types
of health IT beyond those which supported the EHR Incentive Programs
(now called the Promoting Interoperability Programs). However, we
decided that the initial focus of the Program should be on supporting
the EHR Incentive Programs, which focuses on EHR technology for the
ambulatory and inpatient settings (76 FR 1294). As the Program evolved
and the adoption and use of certified health IT increased
significantly, we modified the Program in the 2015 Edition final rule
to make it more open and accessible to more types of health IT,
including health IT that supports various care and practice settings
beyond those included in the EHR Incentive Programs (80 FR 62604). Our
goal was then and is now to support the advancement of interoperable
health IT and to promote health IT functionality in care and practice
settings across the care continuum (see also 80 FR 62604).
ONC's efforts in the 2015 Edition to make the Program more open and
accessible to other care settings also aligned with fall 2013
recommendations from the HIT Policy Committee (HITPC). The HITPC
examined the extension of the Program to include functionalities that
would benefit settings not covered by the EHR Incentive Programs. The
HITPC recommended that considerations regarding functionality should
focus on whether the functionality would:
Advance a national priority or legislative mandate
Align with existing federal/state programs
Utilize the existing technology pipeline
Build on existing stakeholder support
Appropriately balance the costs and benefits of a
certification program.
Taking into consideration the HITPC recommendations, ONC's 2015
Edition focused on the adoption of certification criteria that are
standards-based, applicable to a wide variety of care and practice
settings, and that advance the structured recording, access, exchange,
and use of health information. ONC has also encouraged users--including
specialty groups--to continue to work with developers to innovate,
develop, and deploy health IT in specific clinical settings in ways
that promote safety, effectiveness, and efficient health care delivery
while also reducing burden.
In the 2015 Edition final rule we stated that we did not intend to
develop and issue separate regulatory certification ``paths'' or
``tracks'' for particular care or practice settings (e.g., a ``long-
term and post-acute care (LTPAC) certification'') because it would be
difficult to independently construct such ``paths'' or ``tracks'' in a
manner that would align with other relevant programs and specific
stakeholder needs. While we never have had intentions to adopt care- or
practice-specific certification tracks, or additional voluntary
program(s), in parallel to the existing voluntary ONC Health IT
Certification Program, we stated that we would welcome the opportunity
to work with HHS agencies, other agencies, and provider associations in
identifying the appropriate functionality and certification criteria in
the Program to support their stakeholders (80 FR 62704). This approach
is consistent with the recommendations by the HITPC.
Since the publication of the 2015 Edition final rule, ONC has
explored how we might work with the industry and with specialty
organizations to collaboratively advance health IT that supports
medical specialties and sites of service. As a result, we have gained
insight from stakeholders regarding the burdens associated with
establishing a specific set of required certification criteria for all
users--which may include capabilities not applicable to certain
settings of care or specialties. Stakeholders have also noted that the
adoption of a set of required criteria without also enabling and
incentivizing innovation beyond those criteria may have the unintended
consequence of stifling progress for that setting. Stakeholders noted
that the timeline for testing and certifying to required criteria and
the subsequent deployment of certification criteria in practice
settings is not always aligned with standards updates, the emergence of
new standards, or technological innovation. Finally, stakeholders have
urged ONC to leverage multiple means to advance interoperability
standards that are widely applicable, to enable and promote innovation
that is supported by these standards, and--in collaboration with
stakeholders to monitor and support developments in emerging standards
and technologies for specialty use cases.
Section 4001(b)(i) of the Cures Act instructs the National
Coordinator to encourage, keep, or recognize, through existing
authorities, the voluntary certification of health IT under the Program
for use in medical specialties and sites of service for which no such
technology is available or where more technological advancement or
integration is needed. This provision of the Cures Act closely aligns
with ONC's ongoing collaborative efforts with both federal partners and
stakeholders within the health care and health IT community to
encourage and support the advancement of health IT for a wide
[[Page 7458]]
range of clinical settings. These initiatives have included projects
related to clinical priorities beyond those specifically included in
the EHR Incentive Programs (now called the Promoting Interoperability
Programs) including efforts in public health, behavioral health, and
long-term and post-acute care. We further note that these initiatives
often include the development of non-regulatory informational resources
to support the specific implementation goal and align with the
technical specifications already available in the Program for
certification. To advance these efforts, we generally consider a range
of factors including: stakeholder input and identification of clinical
needs and clinical priorities, the evolution and adoption of health IT
across the care continuum, the costs and benefits associated with any
policy or implementation strategy related to care settings and sites of
service, and potential regulatory burden and compliance timelines.
Generally, ONC's approach can be summarized in three parts:
First, ONC analyzes existing certification criteria to
identify how such criteria may be applicable for medical specialties
and sites of service.
Second, ONC focuses on the real-time evaluation of
existing and emerging standards to determine applicability to medical
specialties and sites of service as well as to the broader care
continuum, including the evaluation of such standards for inclusion in
the ONC Interoperability Standards Advisory (ISA).\41\
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\41\ https://www.healthit.gov/isa/.
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Third, ONC may work in collaboration with stakeholders to
support the development of informational resources for medical
specialties and sites of service for which ONC identifies a need to
advance the effective implementation of certified health IT.
We believe this approach provides an economical, flexible, and
responsive option for both health care providers and the health IT
industry, which is also in alignment with the provisions of the Cures
Act related to burden reduction and promoting interoperability. We are
committed to continuing to work with stakeholders in this manner to
encourage and advance the adoption of health IT to support medical
specialties and sites of service, and to help ensure that providers
have the tools they need to support patients at the point of care and
that essential patient health information is available across a care
settings.
This section outlines our approach to implement Section 4001(b) of
the Cures Act, which requires that the Secretary make recommendations
for the voluntary certification of health IT for use by pediatric
health providers and to adopt certification criteria to support the
voluntary certification of health IT for use by pediatric health
providers to support the health care of children. To be clear, and
consistent with past practice, we do not recommend or propose a
``pediatric-specific track or program'' under the ONC Health IT
Certification Program. This proposed rule outlines the certification
criteria adopted in the 2015 Edition which we believe support the
certification of health IT for pediatric care. Finally, it identifies
the new and revised criteria proposed in this rule which we believe
further support the voluntary certification of health IT for pediatric
care. We have included in the appendix of this proposed rule a set of
technical worksheets that can help inform your comments on the
recommendations, the new and revised criteria in the Program that would
also support pediatric care settings, and the overall approach we have
herein described. These worksheets outline the following information:
The alignment of each recommendation to the Children's
Model EHR Format \42\ as identified by stakeholders (see also Section
VI.A.1 and 2 for further detail on the Children's Model EHR Format and
the recommendations).
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\42\ https://healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-and-resources/pediatric-resources/childrens-electronic-health-record-ehr-format.
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The alignment of each recommendation to the 2015 Edition
certification criteria and new or revised criteria described in this
proposed rule (see also section VI.A.2.a and b).
Potential supplemental items from the Children's Model EHR
Format identified by ONC which relate to the primary recommendation and
the related certification criteria.
We invite readers to use these worksheets to inform public
comment on the recommendations and criteria described in Section
VI.A.2 specifically as they relate to pediatric health care use
cases. The comments received on these technical worksheets through
this proposed rule will be used to inform the final recommendations
for voluntary certification of health IT criteria for use in
pediatric care. Furthermore, these comments, and the detailed
insights received through stakeholder outreach, may inform the
future development of a non-binding informational guide or resource
to provide useful information for health IT developers and pediatric
care providers seeking to successfully implement these health IT
solutions in a clinical setting.
A. Health IT for Pediatric Setting
Section 4001(b)(iii) of the Cures Act--``Health information
technology for pediatrics'' requires that:
First, that the Secretary, in consultation with relevant
stakeholders, shall make recommendations for the voluntary
certification of health IT for use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children, and
Second, that the Secretary shall adopt certification
criteria to support the voluntary certification of health IT for use by
pediatric health providers to support the health care of children.
In this proposed rule, we describe our approach to stakeholder
engagement, the analysis used to develop the recommendations, and the
specific certification criteria we believe can support each
recommendation.
1. Background and Stakeholder Convening
Over the past ten years, a number of initiatives have focused on
the availability and use of effective health IT tools and resources for
pediatric care. These have included a number of public-private
partnerships including efforts between HHS, state agencies, and health
systems for innovative projects that range from care coordination
enterprise solutions to immunization information systems and to point
of care solutions for specialty needs. In order to learn from and build
upon these efforts, ONC has engaged with stakeholders in both the
public and private sector including other federal, state and local
government partners, health care providers engaged in the care of
children, standards development organizations, charitable foundations
engaged in children's health care research, and health IT developers
supporting pediatric care settings.
For example, significant work has been done by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), CMS, the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA), and organizations around the Children's
Model EHR Format (Children's Format), which is critical to any
discussion of the pediatric health IT landscape.\43\ The Children's
Format was authorized by the 2009 Children's Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) \44\ and developed by AHRQ in
[[Page 7459]]
close collaboration with CMS. It was developed to bridge the gap
between the functionality present in most EHRs currently available and
the functionality that could optimally support the care of children.
Specifically, the Children's Format provides information to EHR system
developers and others about critical functionality and other
requirements that are helpful to include in an EHR system to address
health care needs specific to the care of children. The final version
of the Children's Format,\45\ released in 2015, consists of 47 high
priority functional requirements in 19 topic areas that focus on
improvements that would better support the safety and quality of care
delivered to children. The Children's Format was intended as a starting
point for developers, users, and purchasers for informing an approach
for pediatric voluntary certification. We refer to the Voluntary
Edition proposed rule for a description of ONC's prior discussion
around the Children's Format (79 FR 10930).
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\43\ Agency for Health Care Information and Technology. Health
Information Technology. https://healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-and-resources/childrens-electronic-health-record-ehr-format Accessed
September, 2017.
\44\ Public Law 111-3, section 401.
\45\ https://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/docs/citation/children-ehr-format-enhancement-final-recommendation-report-abridged.pdf.
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In the summer of 2017, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)
reviewed the 2015 Format using a robust analytical process and
engagement with their members. The result was a prioritized list of
eight clinical priorities to support pediatric health care (``Priority
List''). In October 2017, ONC held a technical discussion with
stakeholders titled ``Health IT for Pediatrics'' with the specific
purpose of obtaining input from an array of stakeholders in an effort
to draw correlations between the pediatric providers' clinical
priorities identified in the Priority List with the detailed technical
requirements outlined in the Children's Format and the capabilities and
standards that could be included in certified health IT. Through this
collaborative approach, the meeting participants identified a set of
priority needs for health IT to support pediatric care based upon those
identified by the Priority List and the primary correlation to the
Children's Format.
2. Recommendations for the Voluntary Certification of Health IT for Use
in Pediatric Care
To support the first part of Section 4001(b) of the Cures Act, ONC
considered the historical efforts on the Children's Model EHR Format,
the input from stakeholders, and our own technical analysis and review
of health IT capabilities and standards to develop a set of
recommendations for voluntary certification for health IT for pediatric
care. These include eight recommendations related to the Priority List:
Recommendation 1: Use biometric-specific norms for growth
curves and support growth charts for children.
Recommendation 2: Compute weight-based drug dosage.
Recommendation 3: Ability to document all guardians and
caregivers.
Recommendation 4: Segmented access to information.
Recommendation 5: Synchronize immunization histories with
registries.
Recommendation 6: Age- and weight-specific single-dose
range checking.
Recommendation 7: Transferrable access authority.
Recommendation 8: Associate maternal health information
and demographics with newborn.
We also developed two additional recommendations beyond the
Priority List which relate to other items within the Children's Format
that are considered important to pediatric stakeholders. These
additional recommendations, which we believe may be supported by
certified health IT, are as follows:
Recommendation 9: Track incomplete preventative care
opportunities.
Recommendation 10: Flag special health care needs.
In order to implement the second part of Section 4001(b) of the
Cures Act for the adoption of certification criteria to support the
voluntary certification of health IT for use by pediatric health care
providers, we have identified both the 2015 Edition certification
criteria and the new or revised criteria in this proposed rule that we
believe support these 10 recommendations for health IT for pediatric
care and sites of service. We direct readers to the appendix of this
proposed rule for a set of technical worksheets which include a cross-
walk of the various criteria specifically associated with each
recommendation. These worksheets outline the following information:
The alignment of each recommendation to the primary
Children's Format \46\ item identified by stakeholders.
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\46\ https://healthit.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-and-resources/pediatric-resources/childrens-electronic-health-record-ehr-format.
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The alignment of each recommendation to the 2015 Edition
certification criteria and new or revised criteria described in this
proposed rule.
Supplemental items from the Children's Format for each
recommendation and the related certification criteria.
We invite readers to use these worksheets to inform public comment
on the recommendations, the inclusion of specific items from the
Children's Format, and the identified certification criteria as they
relate specifically to use cases for pediatric care and sites of
service. We also seek comment on the following:
1. Relevant gaps, barriers, safety concerns, and resources
(including available best practices, activities, and tools) that may
impact or support feasibility of the recommendation in practice.
2. Effective use of health IT itself in support of each
recommendation as involves provider training, establishing workflow,
and other related safety and usability considerations.
3. If any of the 10 recommendations should not be included in ONC's
final recommendations for voluntary certification of health IT for
pediatric care.
4. Any certification criteria from the Program that is identified
for the 10 recommendations that should not be included to support the
specific recommendation.
As stated in the worksheets located in the appendix, commenters are
encouraged to reference the specific ``recommendation number'' (1-10)
with the corresponding technical worksheet question number in their
response. For example, ``Recommendation 1--Question 3''.
a. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
In order to implement the second part of Section 4001(b) of the
Cures Act to adopt certification criteria to support the voluntary
certification of health IT for use by pediatric health providers to
support the health care of children, we identified the following 2015
Edition certification criteria that support the recommendations. Within
the technical worksheets in the appendix of this proposed rule, these
criteria are noted under each recommendation to which they are
correlated. The 2015 Edition criteria are as follows:
``API functionality'' criteria (Sec. 170.315(g)(7)-
(g)(9)) which addresses many of the challenges currently faced by
patients and by caregivers such as parents or guardians accessing
child's health information, including the ``multiple portal'' problem,
by potentially allowing individuals to aggregate health information
from multiple sources in a web or mobile application of their choice.
``Care plan'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(9)) which
supports
[[Page 7460]]
pediatric care by facilitating the documentation of electronic health
information in a structured format to improve care coordination (80 FR
62648-62649).
``Clinical decision support'' (CDS) criterion (Sec.
170.315(a)(9)) which supports pediatric care by enabling interventions
based on the capture of biometric data.
``Common Clinical Data Set'' (adopted in (Sec.
170.315(b)(4) and Sec. 170.315(b)(5)) which includes optional
pediatric vital sign data elements including as optional the reference
range/growth curve for three pediatric vital signs--BMI percent per
LOINC identifiers for age per sex, weight per length/sex, and head
occipital-frontal circumference for children less than three years of
age.
``Data segmentation for privacy'' send criterion and
receive criterion (adopted in Sec. 170.315(b)(7) and Sec.
170.315(b)(8)) which provides the ability to: Create a summary record
that is tagged at the document level as restricted and subject to re-
disclosure; receive a summary record that is document-level tagged as
restricted; separate the document-level tagged document from other
documents received; and, view the restricted document without having to
incorporate any of the data from the document.
``Demographics'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(5)) which
supports pediatric care through the capture of values and value sets
relevant for the pediatric health care setting as well as allowing for
improved patient matching which is a key challenge for pediatric care.
``Electronic Prescribing'' criterion (adopted in Sec.
170.315(b)(3)) which includes an optional Structured and Codified Sig
Format, which has the capability to exchange weight-based dosing
calculations within the NCPDP SCRIPT 10.6 standard and limits the
ability to prescribe all oral, liquid medications in only metric
standard units of mL (i.e., not cc) important for enabling safe
prescribing practices for children.
``Family health history'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(12))
which supports pediatric care because it leverages concepts or
expressions for familial conditions, which are especially clinically
relevant when caring for children.
``Patient health information capture'' criterion (Sec.
170.315(e)(3)) which supports providers' ability to accept health
information from a patient or authorized representative. This criterion
could support pediatric care through documentation of decision-making
authority of a patient representative.
``Social, psychological, and behavioral data'' criterion
Sec. 170.315(a)(15) which supports integration of behavioral health
data into a child's record across the care continuum by enabling a user
to record, change, and access a patient's social, psychological, and
behavioral data based using SNOMED CT[supreg] and LOINC[supreg] codes.
``Transitions of care'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(1))
which supports structured transition of care summaries and referral
summaries that help ensure the coordination and continuity of health
care as children transfer between different clinicians at different
health care organizations or different levels of care within the same
health care organization;
``Transmission to immunization registries'' criterion
(Sec. 170.315(f)(1)) which supports the safe and effective provision
of child health care through immunizations and registry linkages. This
criterion also provides the ability to request, access, and display the
evaluated immunization history and forecast from an immunization
registry for a patient. Immunization forecasting recommendations allow
for providers to access the most complete and up-to-date information on
a patient's immunization history to inform discussions about what
vaccines a patient may need based on nationally recommended
immunization recommendations (80 FR 62662-62664).
``View, download, and transmit to 3rd party'' (VDT)
criterion (Sec. 170.315(e)(1)) which supports transferrable access
authority for the pediatric health care setting and provides the
ability for patients (and their authorized representatives) \47\ to
view, download, and transmit their health information to a 3rd party.
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\47\ The VDT criterion includes a ``patient-authorized
representative'' concept that aligns with the use of the term under
the EHR Incentive Program. A ``patient-authorized representative''
is defined as any individual to whom the patient has granted access
to their health information (see also 77 FR 13720). However, consent
is not needed for minors, for whom existing local, state, or federal
law grants their parents or guardians access (see also 77 FR 13720).
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We note that some of these criteria may be updated based on
proposals contained in this proposed rule; however, we believe that
prior to any such updates, technology that is currently available and
certified to these 2015 Edition criteria can make a significant impact
in supporting providers engaged in the health care of children. We
invite readers to use the technical worksheets in the appendix to this
proposed rule to inform their public comment on the recommendations,
the inclusion of specific items from the Children's Format, and the
identified 2015 Edition certification criteria as they relate
specifically to use cases for pediatric care and sites of service.
b. New or Revised Certification Criteria in This Proposed Rule
In order to implement the second part of Section 4001(b)(iii) of
the Cures Act to adopt certification criteria to support the voluntary
certification of health information technology for use by pediatric
health providers to support the health care of children, we identified
new or revised certification criteria in this proposed rule that
support the recommendations. These new or revised criteria and
standards in this proposed rule that would support pediatric settings
include:
New API criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(10)) which would serve
to implement the Cures Act requirement to permit health information to
be accessed, exchanged, and used from APIs without special effort (see
section IV.B.5 of this proposed rule).
New ``DS4P'' criteria (two for C-CDA ((Sec.
170.315(b)(12)) and (Sec. 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR (Sec.
170.315(g)(11))) that would support a more granular approach to privacy
tagging data for health information exchange supported by either the C-
CDA- or FHIR-based exchange standards (see section VI.A for a
discussion of this criteria in relation to pediatric settings and
section VI.B for discussion of these criteria in relation to Opioid Use
Disorder).
New electronic prescribing certification criterion (Sec.
170.315(b)(11)), which would supports improved patient safety and
prescription accuracy, workflow efficiencies, and increased
configurability of systems including functionality that could support
pediatric medication management.
USCDI (Sec. 170.213) which enables the inclusion of
pediatric vital sign data elements, including the reference range/scale
or growth curve for BMI percentile per age and sex, weight for age per
length and sex, and head occipital-frontal circumference (and the
criteria that include the USCDI).
Each of these proposed criteria are further described in other
sections of this proposed rule; however, in this section of this
proposed rule we specifically seek comment on the application of these
criteria to pediatric use cases in support of our recommendations for
the voluntary certification of health IT for pediatric care.
[[Page 7461]]
For example, our proposal for three new 2015 Edition DS4P
certification criteria (two for C-CDA ((Sec. 170.315(b)(12)) and
(Sec. 170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR (Sec. 170.315(g)(11))) could
provide functionality to address the concerns of multiple stakeholders
in a range of specialty use cases--including pediatric care settings.
In this section of this proposed rule, we seek comment specifically
related to the inclusion of these criteria in our recommendations.
Specifically, stakeholders have expressed the need to--based on the
intended recipient of the data--to restrict granular pediatric health
data at production. We believe these criteria could, for example, help
enable providers to:
Limit the sharing of reproductive and sexual health data
from an EHR in order to protect the minor's privacy;
Prevent disclosure of an emancipated minor's sensitive
health information, while also permitting a parent or legal guardian to
provide consent for treatment; and
Segment child abuse information based on jurisdictional
laws, which may have varying information sharing requirements for
parents, guardians, and/or other possible legal representatives.
While health care providers should already have processes and
workflows in place to address their existing compliance obligations, we
recognize that more granular privacy markings at the point of data
capture would further support existing and future priorities of
pediatric health providers, as well as for multiple medical specialties
and sites of service. We also recognize that such point of data capture
markings can reduce administrative burden through efficiencies gained
in streamlined compliance workflows.
We invite readers to use the technical worksheets in the appendix
of this proposed rule to support public comment on the recommendations,
the inclusion of specific items from the Children's Format, and the
identified proposed new or revised certification criteria as they
relate specifically to use cases for pediatric care and sites of
service.
However, as discussed, through our experience and engagement with
health care providers and health IT developers, we believe that in some
cases information resources can aid in implementation in clinical
settings. In the past, ONC has worked collaboratively with federal
partners, health IT developers, and the health care community to
support the development of non-regulatory informational resources that
can provide additional support for health IT implementation (see, for
example, the ONC Patient Engagement Playbook). Such a resource could
include the recommendations and certification criteria here identified
and synthesize these technical recommendations with information outside
of the Program related to patient safety, usability, privacy and
security, and other key considerations for successful implementation of
a health IT system within a clinical setting. We believe that the
creation of such a resource, in collaboration with clinical and
technical stakeholders, would help support the advancement of health IT
solutions for use in pediatric care and pediatric settings. We further
include additional information on prior ONC initiatives related to
health IT for pediatric settings as available on our website at
www.healthit.gov/pediatrics.
B. Health IT and Opioid Use Disorder Prevention and Treatment--Request
for Information
We have identified a need to explore ways to advance health IT
across the care continuum to support efforts to fight the opioid
epidemic. To that purpose, we seek comment in this proposed rule on a
series of questions related to health IT functionalities and standards
to support the effective prevention and treatment of opioid use
disorder (OUD) across patient populations and care settings.
We recognize the significance of the opioid epidemic confronting
our nation and the importance of helping to support health care
providers committed to preventing inappropriate access to prescription
opioids and providing safe, appropriate treatment.
HHS has a comprehensive strategy to combat the opioid crisis. It
consists of five points that are focused on better: Addiction
prevention, treatment, and recovery services; data; pain management;
targeting of overdose reversing drugs; and research.\48\ In support of
this strategy, HHS will improve access to prevention, treatment, and
recovery support services; target the availability and distribution of
overdose-reversing drugs; strengthen public health data reporting and
collection; support cutting-edge research; and advance the practice of
pain management. To combat the opioid crisis, in October 2018, Congress
passed the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid
Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act. It
aims to expand treatment, recovery, and prevention initiatives for
substance use disorder and also includes interoperability and health IT
tools as a key part of the response to this crisis.
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\48\ https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/.
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We believe health IT offers promising strategies to help medical
specialties and sites of service as they combat opioid use disorder
(OUD). For example, health IT has the potential to improve adherence to
opioid prescribing guidelines and physician adherence to treatment
protocols, to increase the safety of prescribing for controlled
substances, to enhance clinician access to PDMPs, and to expand access
to addiction treatment and recovery support services. Additionally,
through the Program, our goal continues to be to improve access to data
from disparate sources and help ensure that key data is consistently
available to the right person, at the right place, and at the right
time across the care continuum. One component of advancing that goal is
through technical standards for exchanging health information that form
an essential foundation for interoperability.
ONC has heard from stakeholders including policymakers,
implementers, health care providers and patient advocacy groups that
additional information is needed to assist in planning for the
effective use of health IT in OUD prevention and treatment. We
additionally recognize stakeholders' interest in the new opioid
measures (Query of PDMP measure and Verify Opioid Treatment Agreement
measure) included in CMS's Promoting Interoperability Programs
(formerly known as the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs).
These two measures support HHS initiatives related to the treatment of
opioid and substance use disorders by helping health care providers
avoid inappropriate prescriptions, improve coordination of prescribing
amongst health care providers, and focus on the advanced use of
certified health IT in care coordination for OUD prevention and
treatment (83 FR 41644).
In order to support these efforts, in this proposed rule we outline
a brief overview of some key areas of health IT implementation that
could support OUD prevention and treatment. These include consideration
of current health IT certification criteria included in the 2015
Edition, revised or new certification criteria as outlined in this
proposed rule, and current health IT initiatives underway in the health
care industry or health IT industry which intersect with ONC policy
goals. In this section of the proposed rule, we request public comment
specifically from the perspective of how our existing Program
[[Page 7462]]
requirements and proposals in this rulemaking may support use cases
related to OUD prevention and treatment and if there are additional
areas that ONC should consider for effective implementation of health
IT-enabled OUD prevention and treatment. We seek comment from this
perspective on the identification of 2015 Edition certification
criteria, the proposals for revised or new certification criteria, and
the potential future consideration of emerging technologies described
in various initiatives.
1. 2015 Edition Certification Criteria
We seek public comment on how the existing 2015 Edition
certification criteria as well as proposals within this proposed rule
for revised or new criteria support OUD prevention and treatment.
Specifically, we seek comment on certification criteria previously
adopted in the 2015 Edition that can support clinical priorities,
advance interoperability for OUD (including care coordination and the
effective use of health IT for the treatment and prevention of OUD). In
this proposed rule, we summarize some of these 2015 Edition
certification criteria identified and indicate how they support care
coordination, the prevention of OUD and overdose, and the detection of
opioid misuse, abuse, and diversion.
We have also below identified the proposals for revised or new 2015
Edition criteria within this proposed rule that we believe can support
clinical priorities, advance interoperability for OUD (including care
coordination and also the effective use of health IT for the treatment
and prevention of OUD). We welcome input from stakeholders specifically
on these criteria within the context of OUD prevention and treatment,
as well as input on the identification of other criteria included
either in the 2015 Edition and/or that are proposed in other parts of
this rule that may be considered a clinical and interoperability
priority for supporting OUD treatment and prevention.
We have identified several 2015 Edition certification criteria
available now for certification in the Program which could support care
coordination and the prevention and detection of opioid misuse, abuse,
and diversion. They are:
The ``transitions of care'' criterion (Sec.
170.315(b)(1)) supports structured transition of care summaries and
referral summaries that help ensure the coordination and continuity of
health care as patients transfer between different clinicians at
different health care organizations or different levels of care within
the same health care organization. This criteria supports the ability
to transmit a summary care record to support an individual with OUD
upon discharge from an inpatient setting or from a primary care
provider to another setting for their care.
The ``clinical information reconciliation and
incorporation'' criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(2)) allows clinicians to
reconcile and incorporate patient health information sent from external
sources to maintain a more accurate and up-to-date patient record. This
process could help--for example--reduce opioid related errors regarding
patients who use multiple pharmacies, have co-morbidity factors, and
visit multiple clinicians.
The ``electronic prescribing'' criterion (Sec.
170.315(b)(3)) provides a way to write and transmit prescription
information electronically. This criterion facilitates appropriate
opioid prescribing by simplifying the review of prescription
information during follow-up visits or transitions to other clinicians,
by allowing prescribers to communicate prescription-related messages to
pharmacies electronically and by capturing and transmitting medication
histories that are shared with PDMPs. In this proposed rule, we propose
to update the existing electronic prescribing certification criterion
as described in section IV.B.2 of this proposed rule.
The ``patient health information capture'' (Sec.
170.315(e)(3)) allows clinicians to incorporate unstructured patient
generated health data or data from a non-clinical setting into a
patient record. The CMS Promoting Interoperability Programs for
eligible hospitals includes a new optional measure which is focused on
verifying the existence of a signed Opioid Treatment Agreement for
certain patients when a controlled substance is prescribed and
incorporating it into the record. In the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems final rule, CMS recognized this certification
criterion's potential to support this goal within a certified health IT
system (83 FR 41654).
The ``social, psychological, and behavioral data''
criterion (Sec. 170.315(a)(15)) can help to provide a more complete
view of a patient's overall health status. This is important to help
provide a ``whole-patient'' approach to the treatment of substance use
disorders included as part of Medicated-Assisted Treatment (MAT) that
involves the use of FDA-approved medications, in combination with
counseling and behavioral therapies, to treat individuals recovering
from OUD. This data can help to improve care coordination and lead to
the identification of appropriate social supports and community
resources.
We seek comment on how these criteria and what additional 2015
Edition certification criteria may be considered a clinical and
interoperability priority for supporting OUD treatment and prevention.
We also seek comment on the value of developing a potential future non-
binding informational guide or resource to provide useful information
for OUD providers and sites of service related to specific clinical
priorities and use cases of focus.
2. Revised or New 2015 Edition Certification Criteria in This Proposed
Rule
This proposed rule contains additional proposals to revise or add
new criteria to the Program to better support care across the
continuum. We believe these criteria and standards, highlighted below,
can also support treatment and prevention of OUD. We seek comment
specifically on the applicability of these criteria to the OUD use
case. They are:
USCDI: As detailed in section IV.B.1, we are proposing to
adopt the USCDI as a standard (Sec. 170.213) which would establish a
minimum set of data classes (including structured data fields) that are
required to be interoperable nationwide, and is designed to be expanded
in an iterative and predictable way over time. The USCDI Version 1
(USCDI v1) builds upon the 2015 Edition CCDS and includes a common set
of data classes that can be supported by commonly used standards. It
includes the 2015 Edition CCDS data elements, such as medications. It
also includes two new data classes, titled ``clinical notes'' and
``provenance,'' which would help facilitate interoperable exchange and
the trustworthiness of the data being exchanged. These enhancements to
the comprehensiveness and reliability of the data being exchanged could
help empower physicians in the prevention and detection of opioid
misuse, abuse, and diversion.
In addition, because we propose to adopt the USCDI as a standard,
health IT developers would be allowed to take advantage of the
Maintenance of Certification requirements described in section VII.B.5
of this proposed rule. Therefore, the USCDI would have the potential to
further benefit clinical priorities and interoperability for OUD,
including safe and appropriate opioid prescribing, through the ability
to voluntarily implement and use a new version of an adopted standard
or
[[Page 7463]]
implementation specification so long as certain conditions are met,
including the new version being approved by the National Coordinator
for use in certification through the Standards Version Advancement
Process. We seek comment on how this proposal would further support the
access, exchange, and use of additional and future data classes
(including structured data fields) in more care and practice settings
specifically as related to the prevention and treatment of OUD.
Standardized API: We are proposing new API functionality
through the adoption of a new API certification criterion (Sec.
170.315(g)(10)), which serves to implement the Cures Act requirement to
permit health information to be accessed, exchanged, and used from APIs
without special effort. This criterion would enable efficient exchange
of health information using modern internet technologies and thus
enable collaborative, patient-driven, integrated care for individuals
recovering from OUD.
Data Segmentation for Privacy and Consent Management: As
discussed in section IV.B.7, we are also proposing to remove the
current 2015 Edition DS4P--send (Sec. 170.315(b)(7)) and DS4P--receive
(Sec. 170.315(b)(8)) certification criteria. We propose to replace
these two criteria with three new 2015 Edition DS4P certification
criteria (two for C-CDA ((Sec. 170.315(b)(12)) and (Sec.
170.315(b)(13)) and one for FHIR (Sec. 170.315(g)(11))) that would
support a more granular approach to privacy tagging data for health
information exchange supported by either the C-CDA- or FHIR-based
exchange standards. We believe this proposal would offer functionality
that is more valuable to providers and patients, especially given the
complexities of the privacy law landscape for multiple care and
specialty settings. We also believe this proposal could lead to more
complete records, contribute to patient safety, and enhance care
coordination. Additionally, we believe this proposal may support a more
usable display of OUD information at the request of patients within an
EHR and we invite input on best practices, including the processes and
methods by which OUD information should be displayed.
Electronic Prescribing and PDMPs: As discussed in section
IV.B.2, we are proposing to remove the current 2015 Edition electronic
prescribing certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(3)) and replace
this criterion with a new electronic prescribing certification
criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(11)) that would support improved patient
safety and prescription accuracy, create workflow efficiencies, reduce
testing requirements, and increase configurability of systems. This new
proposed criterion includes the addition of Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) messages. We believe this proposal would
help address challenges discussed in the CMS Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems final rule (83 FR 41651) and Medicare
Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule (83 FR 35704) by strengthening
clinical and administrative efficiency, helping move the industry
forward by adopting more current standards for electronic prescribing,
and harmonizing efforts across federal agencies in the prevention and
treatment of OUD. In addition, the FDA has enacted an opioids
medications REMS program for opioid analgesics \49\ mandating
prescriber and patient education to encourage proper patient screening
and appropriate monitoring. Adoption of the new proposed criterion also
supports the efficient and accurate exchange of medication history
transactions between providers and pharmacies, and between pharmacies
and state PDMPs.
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\49\ https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm163647.htm.
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3. Emerging Standards and Innovations
In addition to the certification criteria established in the 2015
Edition final rule and proposed in this rule, ONC is engaged in a
number of health IT and standards initiatives exploring innovation and
emerging standards to inform future health IT policy. In some cases,
these efforts may not be mature enough or best suited for adoption in
the Program; however, we seek comment on the potential consideration of
these initiatives for future direction of ONC policy.
CDS Hooks: Improving how opioids are prescribed through
evidence-based guidelines can ensure patients have access to safer,
more effective chronic pain treatment while reducing the risk of opioid
misuse, abuse, or overdose from these drugs. In response to the
critical need for consistent and current opioid prescribing guidelines,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released the
Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain.\50\ While progress
has been made in training prescribers and fostering the adoption of the
CDC guideline, the President's Opioid Commission \51\ acknowledged that
``not all states have adopted the guideline, not all physicians are
aware of them, and sound opioid prescribing guidelines are far from
universally followed.'' Clinical decision support (CDS) Hooks is a
health IT specification that has the potential to positively affect
prescriber adoption of evidence-based prescribing guidelines by
invoking patient-specific clinical support from within the clinician's
EHR workflow. ONC is currently collaborating with CDC on a project to
translate the CDC guideline into standardized, shareable, computable
decision support artifacts using CDS Hooks. We recognize that CDS Hooks
is still an emerging technology and seek input on the adoption of the
CDS Hooks specification for opioid prescribing and OUD prevention and
treatment. We also request public comment on other health IT solutions
and effective approaches to improve opioid prescription practices and
clinical decision support for OUD.
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\50\ Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm.
\51\ President's Opioid Commission: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Final_Report_Draft_11-1-2017.pdf.
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Care Plan FHIR Resource: A shared care plan is a critical
concept for managing an individual's health across a continuum that
includes both clinical and non-clinical settings \52\ and can help
enable more informed and useful connections among all the stakeholders
engaged in preventing or treating OUD. For those in recovery from OUD,
the care plan can enable patients to access their care plan information
and coordinate their care with approved community care providers which
is critical and part of evidence-based recovery treatment services. In
2015, the ONC HITPC recommended that the National Coordinator
accelerate the implementation of dynamic, shared, longitudinal care
plans that incorporate information from both clinical and non-clinical
services and empower individuals to manage their own health and
care.\53\ A consideration for HHS as part of this earlier
recommendation included looking at the future standards development
needed to transition from the static care plan documentation (document
template in C-CDA R2.1) to a dynamic shared care plan that supports
more robust care coordination.\54\ We believe HL7 standards and
standardized APIs can elevate care coordination and care management
across the continuum,
[[Page 7464]]
including for those providers without EHRs, whether for opioid use
disorder related treatment, primary health, or other problems. Indeed,
numerous efforts are underway within HL7 and other collaborations to
standardize ``care plans'' and their content using FHIR and the C-CDA.
From a technical perspective and in the context of the proposals
focused on the USCDI standard, the ARCH standard, the new proposed API
certification criterion at 170.315(g)(10), and the voluntary Standards
Version Advancement Process Maintenance of Certification requirement
described in section VII.B.5 of this proposed rule, we can see a future
where a (g)(10)-certified API would be capable of supporting care plan
data. We request public comment on the current maturity of existing and
forthcoming technical specifications to support care plan/care plan
data as well as specific information that could be prioritized within a
future USCDI data class focused on care plans.
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\52\ https://www.healthit.gov/hitac/events/policy-advanced-health-models-and-meaningful-use-workgroup-8.
\53\ https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/facas/HITPC_AHM_Hearing_Transmittal_08-11-2015_0.pdf.
\54\ https://www.healthit.gov/hitac/events/policy-advanced-health-models-and-meaningful-use-workgroup-8.
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In addition to commenting on the criteria noted in this section, we
also encourage stakeholders to participate in the ISA process.\55\ The
ISA represents the model by which ONC coordinates the identification,
assessment, and public awareness of interoperability standards and
implementation specifications. ONC encourages all stakeholders to
implement and use the standards and implementation specifications
identified in the ISA as applicable to the specific interoperability
needs they seek to address and encourages pilot testing and other
industry experience adopting standards and implementation
specifications identified as ``emerging'' in the ISA. The web-based
version of the ISA documents known limitations, preconditions, and
dependencies, and provide suggestions for security best practices in
the form of security patterns for referenced standards and
implementation specifications when they are used to address a specific
clinical health IT interoperability need.
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\55\ To learn more about, and/or participate in, the ISA
process, please visit https://www.healthit.gov/isa/.
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Additionally, through the ISA process, stakeholders are encouraged
to comment on the outlined standards and implementation specifications,
as ONC updates the ISA regularly. ONC has developed and has plans to
develop further ISA content to highlight standards and implementation
specifications that support the prevention and treatment of OUD/
substance use disorder (SUD). For example, the NCPDP SCRIPT standard
allows a prescriber to request a patient's medication history from a
state PDMP via the RxHistoryRequest and RxHistoryResponse. ONC is also
working to enhance the ISA to make it easier for stakeholders to find
standards and implementation specifications related to high-priority
use cases, such as OUD/SUD. The ISA has a comment process that occurs
each year \56\ and we encourage stakeholders to participate in that
process to comment on other standards and implementation specifications
that currently exist in the ISA or that the industry and its
stakeholders feel should be added to the ISA that support OUD/SUD
prevention, treatment, monitoring, and care coordination.
4. Additional Comment Areas
We further seek comment on effective approaches for the successful
dissemination and adoption of standards including the NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071 standard (see section IV.B.2) that can support the exchange of
PDMP data for integration into EHRs and also enable further adoption
and use of Electronic Prescribing of Controlled Substances (EPCS).
Regarding integration of health IT with PDMPs and EPCS, we believe
there are real and perceived challenges and opportunities that involve
policy and technical components. As we explore these issues in
collaboration with industry and stakeholders, we seek comment on the
priority challenges and opportunities for these topics and on any
technical and policy distinctions, as appropriate.
We also note that there are many federal initiatives separate from
ONC proposed rulemaking and the Program that exist within HHS programs
including, but not limited to, CMS Medicaid and Medicare programs. For
example, Medicare now provides separate payment for psychiatric
collaborative care model/behavioral health integration and chronic care
management services (see 81 FR 80233, and 80247), and Medicaid issued
guidance on leveraging technology to address the opioid crisis at
enhanced funding matches \56\ and also includes SUD health IT in
standard terms and conditions as part of 1115 waiver requirements.
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\56\ https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18006.pdf.
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In addition, CMS sought comment for consideration through separate
rulemaking in both the 2019 Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule (83 FR
35923) and Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems proposed rule
(83 FR 20528) regarding whether they should adopt the NCPDP SCRIPT
2017071 standard to facilitate future reporting of the proposed Query
of PDMP quality measure. As noted in the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems final rule, a few commenters supported the use of NCPDP
Script Standard Implementation Guide Version 2017071 medication history
transactions for PDMP queries and response. Additionally, CMS
encourages advances in standards and their use to deliver innovative,
interoperable solutions that will seamlessly integrate PDMP query
functionality into clinician-friendly, patient- centered CEHRT-enabled
workflows that facilitate safer, more informed prescribing practices
and improved patient outcomes (83 FR 41651).
We seek comment on how successful implementation of health IT that
supports OUD can aid in the achievement of national and programmatic
goals, especially where they may align with initiatives across HHS and
with stakeholder and industry led efforts.
Finally, we seek comment on a topic that involves health IT for
both pediatric care and OUD prevention and treatment--Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome (or NAS). In its September 2018 report, Facing
Addiction in America: The Surgeon General's Spotlight on Opioids, the
HHS Office of the Surgeon General describes how the incidence of
Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (or NAS), has increased dramatically in
the last decade along with increased opioid misuse. Newborns may
experience NAS, a withdrawal syndrome, following exposure to drugs
while in the mother's womb. NAS is an expected and treatable condition
following repeated maternal substance use and abuse during pregnancy,
which may have long-term health consequences for the infant.
Immediate newborn NAS signs include neurological excitability,
gastrointestinal dysfunction, and autonomic dysfunction. Newborns with
NAS are more likely than other babies to have low birthweight and
respiratory complications. ONC believes the pediatric clinical health
IT recommendations proposed in this rule (including Priority 8, which
includes the linkage of health data in records of the mother and
newborn) are important for supporting newborns at birth and as they
grow and receive care in various settings. As such, we invite comment
on:
The effective use of health IT itself in support of the
NAS use case as involves provider training, establishing
[[Page 7465]]
workflow, and other related safety and usability considerations.
Existing and potential tools, such as decision support or
clinical quality measurement, for supporting children with NAS and on
the specific data elements related to the care of these children and
use of these tools in practice.
Identification of any related criteria and the respective
corresponding proposed pediatric recommendation for the voluntary
certification of health IT for use in pediatric care that supports the
NAS use case including but not limited to recommendation number 8 noted
above.
We welcome public comment on these health IT policies,
functionalities and standards to support providers engaged in the
treatment and prevention of OUD.
VII. Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
Section 4002 of the Cures Act requires the Secretary of HHS,
through notice and comment rulemaking, to establish Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification requirements for the Program.
Specifically, health IT developers or entities must adhere to certain
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements concerning
information blocking; appropriate exchange, access, and use of
electronic health information; communications regarding health IT;
application programming interfaces (APIs); real world testing for
interoperability; attestations regarding certain Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification requirements; and submission of reporting
criteria under the EHR reporting program.
A. Implementation
To implement Section 4002 of the Cures Act, we propose an approach
whereby the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification express both
initial requirements for health IT developers and their certified
Health IT Module(s) as well as ongoing requirements that must be met by
both health IT developers and their certified Health IT Module(s) under
the Program. If these requirements are not met, then the health IT
developer may no longer be able to participate in the Program and/or
its certified health IT may have its certification terminated. We
propose to implement each Cures Act Condition of Certification with
further specificity as it applies to the Program. We also propose to
establish the Maintenance of Certification requirements for each
Condition of Certification as standalone requirements. This approach
would establish clear baseline technical and behavior Conditions of
Certification requirements with evidence that the Conditions of
Certification are continually being met through the Maintenance of
Certification requirements.
B. Provisions
1. Information Blocking
The Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, not take any action
that constitutes ``information blocking'' as defined in section 3022(a)
of the PHSA (see 3001(c)(5)(D)(i) of the PHSA). We propose to establish
this information blocking Condition of Certification in Sec. 170.401.
The Condition of Certification prohibits any health IT developer under
the Program from taking any action that constitutes information
blocking as defined by section 3022(a) of the PHSA and proposed in
Sec. 171.103.
We clarify that this proposed ``information blocking'' Condition of
Certification and its requirements would be substantive requirements of
the Program and would use the definition of ``information blocking''
established by section 3022(a) of the PHSA and as also proposed in
Sec. 171.103, as it relates to health IT developers of certified
health IT. In addition to ONC's statutory authority for this Condition
of Certification, the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has
both investigatory and enforcement authority over information blocking
and may issue civil money penalties for information blocking conducted
by health IT developers of certified health IT, health information
networks and health information exchanges. OIG may also investigate
health care providers for information blocking for which health care
providers could be subject to disincentives.
We refer readers to section VII.D of this proposed rule for
additional discussion of ONC's enforcement of this and other proposed
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements. We also refer
readers to section VIII of this proposed rule for our proposals to
implement the information blocking provisions of the Cures Act,
including proposed Sec. 171.103.
We do not, at this time, propose any associated Maintenance of
Certification requirements for this Condition of Certification.
2. Assurances
The Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, provide assurances
to the Secretary, unless for legitimate purposes specified by the
Secretary, that it will not take any action that constitutes
information blocking as defined in section 3022(a) of the PHSA, or any
other action that may inhibit the appropriate exchange, access, and use
of electronic health information (EHI). We propose to implement this
Condition of Certification and accompanying Maintenance of
Certification requirements in Sec. 170.402. As a Condition of
Certification requirement, a health IT developer must comply with the
Condition as recited here and in the Cures Act. We refer readers to
section VIII of this proposed rule for the proposed reasonable and
necessary activities specified by the Secretary, which constitute the
exceptions to the information blocking definition.
We also propose to establish more specific Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification requirements for a health IT developer to
provide assurances that it does not take any action that may inhibit
the appropriate exchange, access, and use of EHI. These proposed
requirements serve to provide further clarity under the Program as to
how health IT developers can provide such broad assurances with more
specific actions.
a. Full Compliance and Unrestricted Implementation of Certification
Criteria Capabilities
We propose, as a Condition of Certification, that a health IT
developer must ensure that its health IT certified under the ONC Health
IT Certification Program (Program) conforms to the full scope of the
certification criteria to which its health IT is certified. This has
always been an expectation of ONC and users of certified health IT and,
importantly, a requirement of the Program. We believe, however, that by
incorporating this expectation and requirement as a Condition of
Certification under the Program, there would be assurances, and
documentation via the ``Attestations'' Condition and Maintenance of
Certification requirements proposed in Sec. 170.406, that all health
IT developers fully understand their responsibilities under the
Program, including not to take any action with their certified health
IT that may inhibit the appropriate exchange, access, and use of EHI.
To this point, certification criteria are designed and issued so that
certified health IT can support interoperability and the appropriate
exchange, access, and use of electronic health information.
[[Page 7466]]
We propose that, as a complementary Condition of Certification,
health IT developers of certified health IT must provide an assurance
that they have made certified capabilities available in ways that
enable them to be implemented and used in production environments for
their intended purposes. More specifically, developers would be
prohibited from taking any action that could interfere with a user's
ability to access or use certified capabilities for any purpose within
the scope of the technology's certification. Such actions may inhibit
the appropriate access, exchange, or use of EHI and are therefore
contrary to this proposed Condition of Certification and the statutory
provision that it implements. While such actions are already prohibited
under the Program (80 FR 62711), making these existing requirements
explicit would ensure that health IT developers are required to attest
to them on a regular basis pursuant to the Condition of Certification
proposed in Sec. 170.406, which will in turn provide additional
assurances to the Secretary that developers of certified health IT
support and do not inhibit appropriate access, exchange, or use of EHI.
By way of example, actions that would violate this aspect of the
proposed Condition include failing to fully deploy or enable certified
capabilities; imposing limitations (including restrictions) on the use
of certified capabilities once deployed; or requiring subsequent
developer assistance to enable the use of certified capabilities,
contrary to the intended uses and outcomes of those capabilities (see
80 FR 62711). The Condition would also be violated were a developer to
refuse to provide documentation, support, or other assistance
reasonably necessary to enable the use of certified capabilities for
their intended purposes (see 80 FR 62711). More generally, any action
that would be likely to substantially impair the ability of one or more
users (or prospective users) to implement or use certified capabilities
for any purpose within the scope of applicable certification criteria
would be prohibited by this Condition (see 80 FR 62711). Such actions
may include imposing limitations or additional types of costs,
especially if these were not disclosed when a customer purchased or
licensed the certified health IT (see 80 FR 62711).
b. Certification to the ``Electronic Health Information Export''
Criterion
We propose, as a Condition of Certification requirement, that a
health IT developer that produces and electronically manages EHI must
certify health IT to the 2015 Edition ``electronic health information
export'' certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(b)(10). We discuss
the proposed ``electronic health information (EHI) export'' criterion
in section IV.B.4 of this proposed rule. Further, as a Maintenance of
Certification requirement, we propose that a health IT developer that
produces and electronically manages EHI must provide all of its
customers of certified health IT with health IT certified to the
functionality included in Sec. 170.315(b)(10) within 24 months of a
subsequent final rule's effective date or within 12 months of
certification for a health IT developer that never previously certified
health IT to the 2015 Edition, whichever is longer. Consistent with
these proposals, we also propose to amend Sec. 170.550 to require that
ONC-ACBs certify health IT to the proposed 2015 Edition ``EHI export''
when the health IT developer of the health IT presented for
certification produces and electronically manages EHI.
As discussed in section IV.C.1 of this proposed rule, the
availability of the capabilities in the proposed 2015 Edition ``EHI
export'' certification criterion to providers and patients would
promote access, exchange, and use of EHI to facilitate health care
providers in switching practices and health IT systems and patients'
electronic access to all their health information stored by a provider.
As such, health IT developers with health IT certified to the proposed
2015 Edition ``EHI export'' certification criterion that is made
available to its customers provides assurances that the developer is
not taking actions that constitute information blocking or any other
action that may inhibit the appropriate exchange, access, and use of
EHI.
c. Records and Information Retention
We propose that, as a Maintenance of Certification requirement, a
health IT developer must, for a period of 10 years beginning from the
date of certification, retain all records and information necessary
that demonstrate initial and ongoing compliance with the requirements
of the ONC Health IT Certification Program. In other words, records and
information should be retained starting from the date a developer first
certifies health IT under the Program and applies separately to each
unique Health IT Module (or Complete EHR, as applicable) certified
under the Program. This retention of records is necessary to verify
health IT developer compliance with Program requirements, including
certification criteria and Conditions of Certification. We believe that
10 years is an appropriate period of time given that many users of
certified health IT participate in various CMS programs, as well as
other programs, that require similar periods of records retention. We
also refer readers to section VII.D.3.c of this preamble for additional
discussion of records access to information necessary to enforce the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification.
In an effort to reduce administrative burden, we also propose, that
in situations where applicable certification criteria are removed from
the Code of Federal Regulations before the 10 years have expired,
records must only be kept for 3 years from the date of removal for
those certification criteria and related Program provisions unless that
timeframe would exceed the overall 10-year retention period. This ``3-
year from the date of removal'' records retention period also aligns
with the records retention requirements for ONC-ACBs and ONC-ATLs under
the Program.
We encourage comment on these proposals and whether the proposed
requirements can provide adequate assurances that certified health IT
developers are demonstrating initial and ongoing compliance with the
requirements of the Program; and thereby ensuring that certified health
IT can support interoperability, and appropriate exchange, access, and
use of EHI.
d. Trusted Exchange Framework and the Common Agreement--Request for
Information
The Cures Act added section 3001(c)(9) to the PHSA, which requires
the National Coordinator to work with stakeholders with the goal of
developing or supporting a Trusted Exchange Framework and a Common
Agreement (collectively, ``TEFCA'') for the purpose of ensuring full
network-to-network exchange of health information. Section
3001(c)(9)(B) outlines a process for establishing a TEFCA between
health information networks (HINs)--including provisions for the
National Coordinator, in collaboration with the NIST, to provide
technical assistance on implementation and pilot testing of the TEFCA.
In accordance with section 3001(c)(9)(C), the National Coordinator
shall publish the TEFCA on its website and in the Federal Register, as
well as annually publish on its website a directory of the HINs that
have adopted the Common Agreement and are capable of trusted exchange
pursuant to the Common Agreement. The process, application, and
construction of the
[[Page 7467]]
TEFCA are further outlined in section 3001(c)(9)(D), including
requiring that the Secretary shall through notice and comment
rulemaking, establish a process for HINs that voluntarily adopt the
TEFCA to attest to such adoption. We request comment as to whether
certain health IT developers should be required to participate in the
TEFCA as a means of providing assurances to their customers and ONC
that they are not taking actions that constitute information blocking
or any other action that may inhibit the appropriate exchange, access,
and use of EHI. We would expect that such a requirement, if proposed in
a subsequent rulemaking, would apply to health IT developers that have
a Health IT Module(s) certified to any of the certification criteria in
Sec. Sec. 170.315(b)(1), (c)(1) and (c)(2), (e)(1), (f), and (g)(9)
through (11); and provide services for connection to health information
networks (HINs). These services could be routing EHI through a HIN or
responding to requests for EHI from a HIN.
We have identified health IT developers that certify health IT to
the criteria above because the capabilities included in the criteria
support access and exchange of EHI. Therefore, we believe such health
IT developers, as opposed to a health IT developer that only supports
clinical decision support (Sec. 170.315(a)(9)) with its certified
health IT, would be best suited to participate in the Trusted Exchange
Framework and adhere to the Common Agreement. Similarly, we believe
that many such health IT developers with the identified certified
health IT would be in position, and requested by customers, to provide
connection services to HINs. When such criteria are met (certified to
the identified criteria above and actually providing connection
services), participation in the Trusted Exchange Framework and
adherence to the Common Agreement are consistent with this Condition
and Maintenance of Certification as specified by the Cures Act, the
intent of Congress to establish widespread interoperability and
exchange of health information without information blocking, and
supports ONC's responsibility, as established by the HITECH Act, to
develop and support a nationwide health IT infrastructure that allows
for the electronic use and exchange of information. More specifically,
by participating in the Trusted Exchange Framework and adhering to the
Common Agreement, these health IT developers provide assurances that
they are not taking actions that constitute information blocking or any
other action that may inhibit the appropriate exchange, access, and use
of EHI. For more information on the Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement, please visit: https://www.healthit.gov/topic/interoperability/trusted-exchange-framework-and-common-agreement.
In consideration of this request for comment, we welcome comment on
the certification criteria we have identified as the basis for health
IT developer participation in the Trusted Exchange Framework and
adherence to the Common Agreement, other certification criteria that
would serve as a basis for health IT developer participation in the
Trusted Exchange Framework and adherence to the Common Agreement, and
whether the current structure of the Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement are conducive to health IT developer participation and
in what manner.
3. Communications
The Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, does not prohibit
or restrict communication regarding the following subjects:
The usability of the health information technology;
The interoperability of the health information technology;
The security of the health information technology;
Relevant information regarding users' experiences when
using the health information technology;
The business practices of developers of health information
technology related to exchanging electronic health information; and
The manner in which a user of the health information
technology has used such technology.
We propose to implement this Condition of Certification and its
requirements in Sec. 170.403. The Cures Act placed no limitations on
the protection of the communications delineated above (referred to
hereafter as ``protected communications''). As such, we propose to
broadly interpret the subject matter of communications that are
protected from developer prohibition or restriction as well as the
conduct of developers that implicate the protection afforded to
communications by this Condition of Certification and discuss this
proposed approach in detail below. While we propose to implement a
broad general prohibition against developers imposing prohibitions and
restrictions on protected communications, we also recognize that there
are circumstances where it is both legitimate and reasonable for
developers to limit the sharing of information about their products. As
such, we propose to allow developers to impose prohibitions or
restrictions on protected communications in certain narrowly defined
circumstances. In order for a prohibition or restriction on a protected
communication to be permitted, we propose that it must pass a two-part
test. First, the communication that is being prohibited or restricted
must not fall within a class of communication about which no
restriction or prohibition would ever be legitimate or reasonable--such
as communications required by law, made to a government agency, or made
to a defined category of safety organizations--and which we refer to
hereafter as ``communications with unqualified protection.'' Second, to
be permitted, a developer's prohibition or restriction must also fall
within a prescribed category of circumstances for which we propose it
is both legitimate and reasonable for a developer to limit the sharing
of information about its products. This would be because of the nature
of the relationship between the developer and the communicator or
because of the nature of the information that is, or could be, the
subject of the communication (referred to hereafter as ``permitted
prohibitions and restrictions''). A restriction or prohibition that
does not satisfy this two-part test will contravene this Condition of
Certification. As discussed in more detail below, we propose that this
two-part test strikes a reasonable balance between the need to promote
open communication about health IT and related business practices, and
the need to protect the legitimate interests of health IT developers
and other entities.
a. Background and Purpose
This Condition of Certification addresses industry practices that
severely limit the ability and willingness of health IT customers,
users, researchers, and other stakeholders who use and work with health
IT to openly discuss and share their experiences and other relevant
information about the performance of health IT, including the ability
of health IT to exchange health information electronically. These
practices result in a lack of transparency around health IT that can
contribute to and exacerbate patient safety risks, system security
vulnerabilities, and product performance issues. As discussed below,
these issues have been documented and reported on over a number of
years.
The challenges presented by health IT developer actions that
prohibit or
[[Page 7468]]
restrict communications have been examined for some time. The problem
was identified in a 2012 report by the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academies (IOM) entitled ``Health IT and Patient Safety:
Building Safer Systems for Better Care'' \57\ (IOM Report). The IOM
Report stated that health care providers, researchers, consumer groups
other health IT users lack information regarding the functionality of
health IT.\58\ The IOM Report observed, relatedly, that many developers
restrict the information that users can communicate about developers'
products through nondisclosure clauses, confidentiality clauses,
intellectual property protections, hold-harmless clauses, and other
boilerplate contract language.\59\ Importantly, the IOM Report found
that such clauses discourage users from sharing information about
patient safety risks related to health IT, which significantly limits
the ability of health IT users to understand how health IT impacts
patient safety.\60\ The report stressed the need for health IT
developers to enable the free exchange of information regarding the
experience of using their health IT products, including the sharing of
screenshots.\61\
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\57\ IOM (Institute of Medicine), Health IT and Patient Safety:
Building Safer Systems for Better Care (2012). Available at https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2011/Health-IT-and-Patient-Safety-Building-Safer-Systems-for-Better-Care.aspx.
\58\ Id, 195.
\59\ Ibid.
\60\ Ibid.
\61\ Ibid.
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Other close observers of health IT have similarly noted that broad
restrictions on communications can inhibit the communication of
information about errors and adverse events.\62\ Concerns have also
been raised by researchers of health IT products,\63\ who emphasize
that confidentiality and intellectual property provisions in contracts
often place broad and unclear limits on authorized uses of information
related to health IT, which in turn seriously impacts the ability of
researchers to conduct and publish their research.\64\
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\62\ See Kathy Kenyon, Overcoming Contractual Barriers to EHR
Research, Health Affairs Blog (October 14, 2015). Available at
https://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/14/overcoming-contractual-barriers-to-ehr-research/.
\63\ See Hardeep Singh, David C. Classen, and Dean F. Sittig,
Creating an Oversight Infrastructure for Electronic Health Record-
Related Patient Safety Hazards, 7(4) Journal of Patient Safety 169
(2011). Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3677059/.
\64\ Kathy Kenyon, Overcoming Contractual Barriers to EHR
Research, Health Affairs Blog (October 14, 2015). Available at
https://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/14/overcoming-contractual-barriers-to-ehr-research/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The issue of health IT developers prohibiting or restricting
communications about health IT has been the subject of a series of
hearings by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions (HELP Committee), starting in the spring of 2015. During
several hearings, stakeholders emphasized the lack of transparency
around the performance of health IT in a live environment, noting that
this can undermine a competitive marketplace, hinder innovation, and
prevent improvements in the safety and usability of the technology.\65\
\66\ Additionally, the HELP Committee indicated serious concerns
regarding the reported efforts of health IT developers to restrict, by
contract and other means, communications regarding user experience,
including information relevant to safety and interoperability.\67\ When
one Senator asked a panel of experts--which included a health IT
developer--if there were any reasons for health IT contracts to have
confidentiality clauses restricting users of health information
technology from discussing their experience of using the health IT, all
panel members agreed that such clauses should be prohibited.\68\
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\65\ HELP 6/10/15 pg 12; Available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg25971/pdf/CHRG-114shrg25971.pdf.
\66\ HELP 3/17/15 pg 47; Available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg93864/pdf/CHRG-114shrg93864.pdf.
\67\ HELP 7/23/15 pg 13, pg 27; Available at https://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/achieving-the-promise-of-health-information-technology-information-blocking-and-potential-solutions.
\68\ HELP 7/23/15 pg 38; Available at https://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/achieving-the-promise-of-health-information-technology-information-blocking-and-potential-solutions.
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Prior to the HELP Committee hearings described above, the issue of
developers prohibiting and restricting communications about the
performance of their health IT was also addressed in House Energy and
Commerce Committee hearings when committee members heard testimony and
held discussions related to the Cures Act.\69\ Commentary by witnesses
at the hearings emphasized the need to ensure that health IT products
are safe and encouraged the availability of information around health
IT products to improve quality and ensure patient safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Energy and Commerce 7/17/14 pg 35; Available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF16/20140717/102509/HHRG-113-IF16-20140717-SD008.pdf.
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Developer actions that prohibit or restrict communications about
health IT have also been the subject of investigative reporting.\70\ A
September 2015 report examined eleven contracts between health systems
and major health IT developers and found that, with one exception, all
of the contracts protected large amounts of information from being
disclosed, including information related to safety and performance
issues.\71\ The report stated that broad confidentiality and
intellectual property protection clauses were the greatest barriers to
allowing the communication of information regarding potential safety
issues and adverse events.\72\
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\70\ D Tahir, POLITICO Investigation: EHR gag clauses exist--
and, critics say, threaten safety, Politico, August 27, 2015.
\71\ Ibid.
\72\ Ibid.
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Finally, ONC has itself been made aware of health IT developer
contract language that purports to prohibit the disclosure of
information about health IT, including even a customer's or user's
opinions and conclusions about the performance and other aspects of the
technology. Our extensive interactions with health care providers,
researchers, and other stakeholders consistently indicate that such
terms are not uncommon and that some developers may actively enforce
them and engage in other practices to discourage communications
regarding developers' health IT products and related business
practices.
This proposed Condition of Certification is needed to significantly
improve transparency around the functioning of health IT in the field.
This will help ensure that the health IT ultimately selected and used
by health care providers and others functions as expected, is less
likely to have safety issues or implementation difficulties, enables
greater interoperability of health information, and more fully allows
users to reap the benefits of health IT utilization, including
improvements in care and quality, and reductions in costs.
b. Condition of Certification Requirements
i. Protected Communications and Communicators
We propose that the protection afforded to communicators under this
Condition of Certification would apply irrespective of the form or
medium in which the communication is made. Developers must not prohibit
or restrict communications whether written, oral, electronic or by any
other method if they concern protected communications, unless permitted
otherwise by this Condition of
[[Page 7469]]
Certification. Similarly, this Condition of Certification does not
impose any limit on the identity of the communicators that are able to
benefit from the protection afforded, except that employees and
contractors of a health IT developer may be treated differently when
making communications that are not afforded unqualified protection
under Sec. 170.403(a)(2)(i). This Condition of Certification is not
limited to communications by health IT customers (e.g., providers) who
have contracts with health IT developers. Entities or individuals who
enter into agreements with a developer in connection with the
developer's health IT--for example, a data analytics vendor who is
required to sign a non-disclosure agreement before being granted access
to the developer's health IT--would also be covered by the protection
afforded to communicators under this Condition of Certification.
Patients, health IT researchers, industry groups, and health
information exchanges would be able to make protected communications
about the health IT free of impermissible prohibitions or restrictions.
Similarly, the Condition of Certification would also extend to
potential customers of health IT who are provided with product or
software demonstrations, irrespective of whether they proceed with the
acquisition of the technology. Examples of other protected
communications include, but are not limited to:
A post made to an online forum;
the sharing of screenshots, subject to certain proposed
restrictions on their general publication;
an unattributed written review by a health IT user;
a quote given by a health care executive to a journalist;
a presentation given at a trade show;
a social media post;
a product review posted on a video-sharing service such as
YouTube;
the statements and conclusions made in a peer-reviewed
journal; and
private communications made between health IT customers
about the health IT.
ii. Protected Subject Areas
The Cures Act (and Sec. 170.403(a)(1)) identifies a list of
subject areas about which developers cannot prohibit or restrict
communications. These subject areas address health IT performance and
usability, health IT security, and the business practices related to
exchanging EHI. For the reasons discussed below, we propose that the
terms used to describe the subject areas should be construed broadly,
consistent with the scope of communications that Congress specified in
the Act. We encourage comment on whether the types of subject matter we
identify below are adequate to protect the full range of communications
contemplated by the Cures Act.
(A) Usability of Health Information Technology
The term ``usability'' is not defined in the Cures Act nor in any
other relevant statutory provisions. In the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Usability Initiative, NIST describes
``usability'' of health IT by referencing the ISO \73\ standard,
ISO9241: Usability is ``the extent to which a product can be used by
specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness,
efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use.'' \74\
Separately, HIMSS \75\ has recognized the following principles of
software usability: Simplicity; Naturalness; Consistency; Forgiveness
and Feedback; Effective Use of Language; Efficient Interactions;
Effective Information Presentation; Preservation of Context; and
Minimize Cognitive Load.\76\ As these organizations have expressed,
there are a multitude of factors that contribute to any judgment about
``usability,'' and any assessment about the usability of health IT
should appropriately rest on the factors contributing to the
effectiveness, efficiency, and performance offered. As such, we propose
that the ``usability'' of health IT be construed broadly to include
both an overall judgment on the ``usability'' of a particular health IT
product, as well as any factor that contributes to usability. Factors
of usability that could be the subject of protected communications
include, but are not limited to: The user interface (i.e., what a user
sees on the screen, such as layout, controls, graphics and navigational
elements); ease of use (e.g., how many clicks); how the technology
supports users' workflows; the organization of information; cognitive
burden; cognitive support; error tolerance; clinical decision support;
alerts; error handling; customizability; use of templates; mandatory
data elements; the use of text fields; and customer support.
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\73\ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is
an international standard-setting organization that develops,
publishes, and promotes proprietary, industrial, and commercial
standards. For more information see https://www.iso.org/home.html.
\74\ See https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/health-it-usability.
\75\ The Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society
(HIMSS) is a not-for-profit organization that promotes the use of
information technology in health care. For more information, see
https://www.himss.org/.
\76\ See https://www.himss.org/what-ehr-usability.
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(B) Interoperability of Health Information Technology
Section 3000(9) of the PHSA, as amended by the Cures Act, provides
a definition of ``interoperability'' that describes a type of health IT
that demonstrates the necessary capabilities to be interoperable. For
the purposes of this Condition of Certification, we propose that
protected communications regarding the ``interoperability of health
IT'' would include communications about whether a health IT product and
associated developer business practices meet the interoperability
definition described in section 3000(9) of the PHSA, including
communications about aspects of the technology or developer that fall
short of the expectations found in that definition. This will include
communications about the interoperability capabilities of health IT and
the practices of a health IT developer that may inhibit the access,
exchange, or use of EHI, including information blocking.
(C) Security of Health IT
The security of health information technology is primarily
addressed under the HIPAA Security Rule,\77\ which establishes national
standards to protect individuals' electronic protected health
information (ePHI) that is created, received, maintained, or
transmitted by a covered entity or business associate. Covered entities
and business associates must ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of all such ePHI; protect against any reasonably
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such
information; and protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or
disclosures of such information that are not permitted or required
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.\78\ HIPAA requires that health IT
developers, to the extent that they are business associates of HIPAA-
covered entities, implement appropriate administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
security of ePHI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ 45 CFR part 160 and subparts A and C of part 164.
\78\ 45 CFR part 160 and subparts A and E of part 164.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We propose that the matters that fall within the topic of health IT
security should be broadly construed to include any safeguards, whether
or not required by the Security Rule, that may be implemented (or not
implemented) by a developer to ensure the confidentiality,
[[Page 7470]]
integrity, and security of the wider set of EHI (including ePHI),
together with the health IT product's performance regarding security.
For example, a developer may not prohibit or restrict a potential
communicator from communicating about, without limitation:
The approach to security adopted for the health IT at
issue (e.g., architectural approach or authentication methodology);
the resilience of the health IT;
identified security flaws in the developer's health IT; or
the response to cyber threats or security breaches by the
developer.
(D) User Experiences
The phrase ``user experience'' is not defined in the Cures Act nor
in any other relevant statutory provisions. We propose to afford these
terms their ordinary meaning. To qualify as a ``user experience,'' the
experience must be one that is had by a user of health IT. However,
beyond this, we do not propose to qualify the types of experiences that
would receive protection under the Condition on the basis of the ``user
experience'' subject area. This reflects the great variety of
experiences that users may have with health IT and the often subjective
nature of such experiences. Thus, we believe that if the user had the
experience, the experience is relevant.
To illustrate the breadth of potential user experiences that would
be protected by this Condition of Certification, we propose that
communications about ``relevant information regarding users'
experiences when using the health IT'' would encompass, for example,
communications and information about a person or organization's
experience acquiring, implementing, using, or otherwise interacting
with health IT. This includes experiences associated with the use of
the health IT in the delivery of health care, together with
administrative functions performed using the health IT. User
experiences would also include the experiences associated with
configuring and using the technology throughout implementation,
training, and in practice. Further, user experiences would include
patients' and consumers' user experiences with consumer apps, patient
portals, and other consumer-facing technologies. To be clear, a
``relevant user experience'' includes any aspect of the health IT user
experience that could positively or negatively impact the effectiveness
or performance of the health IT.
(E) Manner in Which a User Has Used Health IT
We propose that protected communications regarding the ``manner in
which a user has used health IT'' would encompass any information
related to how the health IT has been used in practice. This subject
area largely overlaps with the matters covered under the ``user
experience'' subject area but may include additional perspectives or
details beyond those experienced by a user of health IT. Types of
information that would fall within this subject area include but are
not limited to:
Information about a work-around implemented to overcome an
issue in the health IT;
customizations built on top of core health IT
functionality;
the specific conditions under which a user used the health
IT, such as information about constraints imposed on health IT
functionality due to implementation decisions; and
information about the ways in which health IT could not be
used or did not function as was represented by the developer.
(F) Business Practices Related to Exchange
We propose that the subject matter of ``developer business
practices related to exchanging electronic health information'' should
be broadly construed to include developer policies and practices that
facilitate the exchange of electronic health information, and developer
policies and practices that impact the ability of health IT to exchange
health information. We further propose That the exchange of electronic
health information encompasses the appropriate and timely sharing of
electronic health information.
We propose that protected communications include, but are not
limited to:
The costs charged by a developer for products or services
that support the exchange of electronic health information (e.g.,
interface costs, API licensing fees and royalties, maintenance and
subscription fees, transaction or usage-based costs for exchanging
information);
the timeframes and terms on which developers will or will
not enable connections and facilitate exchange with other technologies,
individuals, or entities, including other health IT developers,
exchanges, and networks;
the developer's approach to participation in health
information exchanges and/or networks;
the developer's licensing practices and terms as it
relates to making available APIs and other aspects of its technology
that enable the development and deployment of interoperable products
and services; and
the developer's approach to creating interfaces with
third-party products or services, including whether connections are
treated as ``one off'' customizations, or whether similar types of
connections can be implemented at a reduced cost.
Importantly, we further propose that information regarding business
practices related to exchanging electronic health information would
include information about the switching costs imposed by a developer,
as we are aware that the cost of switching health IT is a significant
factor impacting health care providers adopting the most exchange-
friendly health IT products that are available.
iii. Meaning of ``Prohibit or Restrict''
The terms ``prohibit'' and ``restrict'' are not defined in the
Cures Act or in any other relevant statutory provisions. As discussed
in detail below, communications can be prohibited or restricted through
contractual terms or agreements (e.g., non-disclosure agreements, non-
disparagement clauses) as well as through conduct, including punitive
or retaliatory business practices that are designed to create powerful
disincentives to engaging in communications about developers or their
products. Therefore, we propose that this Condition of Certification
would not be limited to only formal prohibitions or restrictions (such
as by means of contracts or agreements) and would encompass any conduct
by a developer that would be likely to restrict a communication or
class of communications protected by this Condition, as discussed in
detail below.
The conduct in question must have some nexus to the making of a
protected communication or an attempted or contemplated protected
communication. That is, conduct by a developer that may be perceived as
intimidating or punitive would not implicate this Condition of
Certification unless that conduct was designed to directly or
indirectly influence the making of a protected communication.
Similarly, health IT contracts may include terms that govern the manner
in which the parties conduct themselves, and those terms would not
implicate this Condition of Certification unless the operative effect
of a term was to restrict or prohibit a protected communication. For
abundant clarity, we note that the fact that a customer's health IT
product is not performing in the manner the customer expected, or in
the manner
[[Page 7471]]
that the developer promised, would not, in itself be evidence that the
developer is engaging in conduct that restricts or prohibits a
protected communication. Rather, a nexus must exist between the alleged
poor performance and the making of (or attempting or contemplating to
make) a protected communication.
We note that contractual prohibitions or restrictions on
communications can, in limited circumstances, be legitimate and serve
an important role in protecting proprietary information and
intellectual property that are essential for health IT developers to
innovate and compete. On this basis, we propose to permit certain types
of prohibitions and restrictions, subject to strict conditions to
ensure that they are narrowly tailored and do not restrict protected
communications. These permitted prohibitions and restrictions are
discussed in section VII.B.3.b.v below.
(A) Prohibitions or Restrictions Arising by Way of Contract
The principal way that health IT developers can control the
disclosure of information about their health IT is through contractual
prohibitions or restrictions. Such prohibitions or restrictions can
arise in contractual provisions that address, for example,
confidentiality obligations, intellectual property protections, hold-
harmless requirements, nondisclosure obligations, non-compete
obligations, and publicity rights.
There are different ways that contractual prohibitions or
restrictions arise. In some instances a contractual prohibition or
restriction will be expressed, and the precise nature and scope of the
prohibition or restriction will be explicit from the face of the
contract or agreement. For example, a contract will say that the health
IT customer must not disclose screenshots of the health IT. However,
more often, a contract will impose prohibitions or restrictions in less
precise terms. For example, a health IT contract might use broad
language when describing the information or materials that customers
and users are forbidden from disclosing pursuant to a confidentiality
clause, casting a vague net over the developer's ``proprietary''
information and purporting to cover information that may be neither
confidential, secret, nor protected by law. A contract does not need to
expressly prohibit or restrict a protected communication in order to
have the effect of prohibiting or restricting that protected
communication. The use of broad or vague language that obfuscates the
types of communications that can and cannot be made may be treated as a
prohibition or restriction if it has the effect of restricting
legitimate communications about health IT.
Restrictions and prohibitions found in contracts used by developers
to sell or license their health IT products can apply to customers
directly and can require that the customer ``flow-down'' obligations
onto the customer's employees, contractors, and other individuals or
entities that use or work with the developer's health IT. Such contract
provisions would not comply with this Condition of Certification if
they prohibit or restrict protected communications. Prohibitions or
restrictions on communications can also be found in separate
nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) that developers require their
customers--and in some instances the users of the health IT--to enter
into in order to receive or access the health IT. We propose that such
agreements are covered by this Condition of Certification. Finally,
health IT developers typically may require third-party contractors used
by their customers (such as a data analytics vendor engaged by a health
care provider to analyze the provider's data) to enter into a NDA with
the developer before commencing their contract activities. In some
extreme cases, the employees of these third-party contractors are
required to sign NDAs in their personal capacities. These NDAs
typically include obligations that prohibit or restrict communications
about the developer's health IT products, and we propose that any such
prohibitions or restrictions within the context of protected
communications as defined here would be subject to this Condition of
Certification.
(B) Prohibitions or Restrictions That Arise by Way of Conduct
We are aware that some health IT developers engage in conduct that
has the effect of prohibiting or restricting protected communications.
This conduct may arise despite the developer's contract and/or business
associate agreement being silent on, or even expressly permitting, the
protected communication. The effect of such conduct can be significant,
as health care providers are dependent on their health IT developer in
order to receive critical software updates or other maintenance
services, and sometimes have little bargaining power. Similarly, a
third-party developer is dependent on a health IT developer's
authorization in order to perform work in connection with the
developer's health IT.
We propose that conduct that has the effect of prohibiting or
restricting a protected communication would be subject to this
Condition of Certification. We emphasize that, as discussed above, the
conduct in question must have some nexus to the making of a protected
communication or an attempted or contemplated protected communication.
As such, developer conduct that was alleged to be intimidating, or
health IT performance that was perceived to be substandard, would not,
in and of itself, implicate this Condition of Certification unless
there was some nexus between the conduct or performance issue and the
making of (or attempting or threatening to make) a protected
communication. Examples of conduct that could implicate this Condition
of Certification include, but are not limited to:
Taking steps to enforce, including by threatening to
enforce, a right arising under contract that contravenes this Condition
of Certification.
Taking steps to enforce, including by threatening to
enforce, a legal right that purports to prohibit or restrict a
protected communication. This would include, for example, the making of
threats, such as via a cease and desist letter, to a researcher who has
made a protected communication.
Employing a technological measure (within the meaning of
17 U.S.C. 1201) that a user would have to circumvent in order to make a
protected communication, for example, a technological measure that a
health IT user would need to circumvent in order to take a screenshot
of the developer's health IT.
Discouraging the making of protected communications by:
[cir] Making threats against a health care customer (e.g., by
threatening to withhold the latest version of the developer's software)
in response to the customer making or attempting to make a protected
communication.
[cir] Taking retaliatory action against a person or entity that has
made a protected communication (e.g., withholding support, delaying the
provider's adoption of a new software release, or removing a provider
from the developer's ``preferred customer'' list).
Having policies that disadvantage persons or entities that
make protected communications (e.g., a policy that bars a provider from
qualifying for the developer's ``preferred customer'' list if it shares
screenshots in a manner protected by this Condition of Certification).
Refusing to publish--or refusing to remove or delete--
protected communications made in an online forum that the developer
moderates or controls.
[[Page 7472]]
Causing the removal or deletion of a protected
communication from any publication (e.g., a YouTube Copyright Take-down
Notice that does not raise a legitimate copyright claim).
iv. Communications With Unqualified Protection
We propose, and discuss below, a narrow class of communications--
consisting of five specific types of communications--that would receive
unqualified protection from developer prohibitions or restrictions.
With respect to communications with unqualified protection, a developer
would be prohibited from imposing any prohibition or restriction. As
discussed below, we propose that this narrow class of communications
warrants unqualified protection because of the strength of the public
policy interest being advanced by the communication and/or the
sensitivity with which the identified recipient treats, and implements
safeguards to protect the confidentiality and security of, the
information received. A developer that imposes a prohibition or
restriction on a communication with unqualified protection would fail
the first part of the two-part test for allowable prohibitions or
restrictions, and as such would contravene the Condition of
Certification.
(A) Disclosures Required by Law
We propose that where a communication relates to subject areas
enumerated in Sec. 170.403(a)(1) and there are federal, state, or
local laws that would require the disclosure of information related to
health IT, developers must not prohibit or restrict in any way
protected communications made in compliance with those laws. We note
that we expect that most health IT contracts would allow for, or at the
very least not prohibit or restrict, any communication or disclosure
that is required by law, such as responding to a court or Congressional
subpoena, or a valid warrant presented by law enforcement. We further
propose that if required by law, a potential communicator should not
have to delay any protected communication under this Condition of
Certification. Furthermore, we propose that the reasonable limitations
and prohibitions that are discussed below and permitted by Sec.
170.403(a)(2) do not apply to these types of protected communications.
(B) Communicating Information About Adverse Events, Hazards, and Other
Unsafe Conditions to Government Agencies, Health Care Accreditation
Organizations, and Patient Safety Organizations
It is well established that there is a strong public interest in
allowing open communication of information regarding health care
hazards, adverse events, and unsafe conditions. Given the central role
played by health IT in the delivery of care, information about health
IT is a critical component of any investigation into the cause of
hazards, adverse events, or unsafe conditions. On the basis of this
public policy interest alone, we propose there is an overwhelming
interest in ensuring that all communications about health IT that are
necessary to identify patient safety risks, and to make health IT
safer, not be encumbered by prohibitions or restrictions imposed by
health IT developers that may affect the extent or timeliness of
communications. In addition to the public policy interest in promoting
uninhibited communications about health IT safety, the recognized
communication channels for adverse events, hazards, and unsafe
conditions provide protections that help ensure that any disclosures
made are appropriately handled and kept confidential and secure.
Indeed, the class of recipients to which the information can be
communicated under this category of communications with unqualified
protection should provide health IT developers with comfort that there
is very little risk of such communications prejudicing the developer's
intellectual property rights. For example, government agencies impose
appropriate controls on information they receive, mitigating any risk
that developers may feel arises from the disclosure of information
about their health IT. Similarly, accrediting bodies for health care
delivery observe strict confidentiality policies for information
received or developed during the accreditation process and in
connection with complaints received.
Finally, the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005
(PSQIA) \79\ provides for privilege and confidentiality protections for
information that meets the definition of patient safety work product
(PSWP). This means that PSWP may only be disclosed as permitted by the
PSQIA and its implementing regulations. We clarify that to the extent
activities are conducted in accordance with the PSQIA, its implementing
regulation, and section 4005(c) of the Cures Act, no such activities
shall be construed as constituting restrictions or prohibitions that
contravene this Condition of Certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 42
U.S.C. 299b-21-b-26 (Pub. L. 109-41).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We understand that the nature of the information about health IT
that would ordinarily be disclosed by a health care provider when
reporting an adverse event, hazard, or unsafe conditions to government
agencies, health care accreditation organizations, and patient safety
organizations, would not ordinarily contain intellectual property or
trade secrets. Notwithstanding this, in light of the public policy
interest and established reporting mechanisms described above, we do
not consider the potential inclusion of intellectual property or trade
secrets in the communication should prohibit or restrict a health care
provider from making a complete and timely report. For example,
proposed Sec. 170.403(a)(2)(ii)(D) permits developers to impose
certain restrictions on the general publication of screenshots, but we
do not consider that such restrictions should be permitted when the
communication is made for one of the purposes, and to one of the
recipients, identified in Sec. 170.403(a)(2)(i)(B).
We seek comment on whether the unqualified protection afforded to
communications made to a patient safety organizations about adverse
events, hazards, and other unsafe conditions should be limited.
Specifically, we seek comment on whether the unqualified protection
should be limited by the nature of the patient safety organization to
which a communication can be made, or the nature of the communication
that can made--such as limiting to only material that was created as
PSWP.
(C) Communicating Information About Cybersecurity Threats and Incidents
to Government Agencies
We propose that if health IT developers were to impose prohibitions
or restrictions on the ability of any person or entity to communicate
information about cybersecurity threats and incidents to government
agencies, such conduct would not comply with this Condition of
Certification. Government agencies such as the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) respond to and protect both the
government and private industry from cyber threats. Their work helps
protect the entire health care system from cybersecurity threats and
relies on the timely reporting of security issues and vulnerabilities
by health care
[[Page 7473]]
providers and health IT users. These agencies impose appropriate
controls on information they receive, which mitigates any risk that
developers may feel arises from the disclosure of information about
their health IT. The US-CERT, for example, provides secure forms for
such reporting, and we are confident that reporting security incident
information to US-CERT and other government agencies would be unlikely
to pose any threat to health IT developer intellectual property or
trade secrets. Additionally, the information likely reported regarding
such an incident would generally not reveal trade secrets. Where
circumstances may require collection of more sensitive and confidential
information related to a developer's intellectual property, we believe
that appropriate protections would likely apply and that the public
benefit of thoroughly investigating and addressing cybersecurity issues
outweighs any potential harm.
Communications about security issues related to health IT may alert
nefarious individuals or entities to the existence of a security
vulnerability which could be exploited before a developer has time to
fix the vulnerability. However, we propose that this concern must be
balanced against the imperative of ensuring that health IT customers
are aware of security vulnerabilities so that they can respond by
deploying reactive measures independent of the developer, such as
ceasing health information exchange with a compromised system. We seek
comment on whether it would be reasonable to permit health IT
developers to impose limited restrictions on communications about
security issues so as to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and
security of eHI. For example, should health IT developers be permitted
to require that health IT users notify the developer about the
existence of a security vulnerability prior to, or simultaneously with,
any communication about the issue to a government agency?
(D) Communicating Information About Information Blocking and Other
Unlawful Practices to a Government Agency
As in the circumstances described above, we believe that the public
benefit associated with the communication of information to government
agencies on information blocking, or any other unlawful practice,
outweighs any concerns developers might have about the disclosure of
information about their health IT. We believe that reporting
information blocking, as well as other unlawful practices, to a
government agency would not cause an undue threat to a health IT
developer's intellectual property or trade secrets. Generally speaking,
agencies collecting reports would protect all information received and
keep it confidential to the extent permitted by law.
(E) Communicating Information About a Health IT Developer's Failure To
Comply With a Condition of Certification or Other Program Requirement
We propose that the benefits to the public and to users of health
IT of communicating information about a health IT developer's failure
to comply with a Condition of Certification or other Program
requirement (45 CFR part 170) justify prohibiting developers of health
IT from placing any restrictions on such protected communications.
Information regarding the failure of a health IT product to meet any
Condition of Certification or other Program requirement is vital to the
effective performance and integrity of the Program, which certifies
that health IT functions consistent with its certification. While the
current procedures for reporting issues with certified health IT
encourage providers to contact developers in the first instance to
address certification issues, users of health IT should not hesitate to
contact ONC-Authorized Certification Bodies (ONC-ACBs), or ONC itself,
if the developer does not provide an appropriate response, or the
matter is of a nature that should be immediately reported to an ONC-ACB
or to ONC.
v. Permitted Prohibitions and Restrictions
We propose that, except for communications with unqualified
protection discussed above and enumerated in Sec. 170.403(a)(2)(i),
health IT developers would be permitted to impose certain narrow kinds
of prohibitions and restrictions discussed below and specified in Sec.
170.403(a)(2)(ii). We believe this policy strikes a reasonable balance
between the need to promote open communication about health IT and
related business practices and the need to protect the legitimate
interests of health IT developers and other entities. Specifically,
with the exception of communications with unqualified protection,
developers would be permitted to prohibit or restrict the following
communications, subject to certain conditions:
Communications of their own employees;
Disclosure of non-user-facing aspects of the software;
Certain communications that would infringe the developer's
or another person's intellectual property rights;
Publication of screenshots in very narrow circumstances;
and
Communications of information that a person or entity
knows only because of their participation in developer-led product
development and testing.
As discussed in detail in the sections that follow, the proposed
Condition of Certification carefully delineates the circumstances under
which these types of prohibitions and restrictions would be permitted,
including certain associated conditions that developers would be
required to meet. To be clear, any prohibition or restriction not
expressly permitted would violate the Condition. Additionally, it would
be the developer's burden to demonstrate to the satisfaction of ONC
that the developer has met all associated requirements. Further, as an
additional safeguard, we propose that where a developer seeks to avail
itself of one of the permitted types of prohibitions or restrictions,
the developer must ensure that potential communicators are clearly and
explicitly notified about the information and material that can be
communicated, and that which cannot. We propose this would mean that
the language of health IT contracts must be precise and specific.
Contractual provisions or public statements that support a permitted
prohibition or restriction on communication should be very specific
about the rights and obligations of the potential communicator.
Contract terms that are vague and cannot be readily understood by a
reasonable health IT customer will not benefit from the qualifications
to this Condition of Certification outlined below.
(A) Developer Employees and Contractors
We recognize that health IT developer employees, together with the
entities and individuals who are contracted by health IT developers to
deliver products and/or services (such as consultants), may be exposed
to highly sensitive, proprietary, and valuable information in the
course of performing their duties. We also recognize that the proper
functioning of a workforce depends, at least in part, on the ability of
an employer to regulate how and when the organization communicates
information to the public, and that employees owe confidentiality
obligations to their employers. We propose that on this basis,
developers are permitted to impose prohibitions or restrictions on the
communications of employees and
[[Page 7474]]
contractors to the extent that those communications fall outside of the
class of communications with unqualified protection as discussed above.
(B) Non-User-Facing Aspects of Health IT
The purpose of this Condition of Certification is to ensure that
health IT users and other potential communicators are not restrained in
their ability to communicate--publicly or privately--about certain
protected subject areas. We propose that this purpose can generally be
achieved without communicators disclosing information about those parts
of health IT that are legally protected trade secrets. As such, we
propose this Condition of Certification will permit health IT
developers to impose prohibitions and restrictions on communications
that are not communications with unqualified protection to the extent
necessary to ensure that communications do not disclose ``non-user-
facing aspects of health IT.''
A ``non-user-facing aspect of health IT'' is, for the purpose of
this Condition of Certification, an aspect of health IT that is not a
``user-facing aspect of health IT.'' A ``user-facing aspect of health
IT'' means those aspects of health IT that that are disclosed and
evident to anyone running, using, or observing the operation of health
IT. That is, a user-facing aspect of health IT comprises those aspects
of the health IT that are manifest in how the health IT software works.
User-facing aspects of health IT include the design concepts and
functionality that is readily ascertainable from the health IT's user
interface and screen display. They do not include those parts of the
health IT that are not exposed to persons running, using, or observing
the operation of the health IT. We propose that non-user-facing aspects
of health IT would include source and object code, software
documentation, design specifications, flowcharts, and file and data
formats. We welcome comments on whether these and other aspects of
health IT should be treated as not being user-facing.
For clarity, we note that the terminology of ``user-facing aspects
of health IT'' is not intended to afford only health IT users with
specific protections against developer prohibitions or restrictions on
communications. Rather, the terminology is agnostic as to the identity
of the communicator and is instead focused on describing those aspects
of health IT that are readily ascertainable from the health IT's user
interface and screen display. Numerous other potential communicators
will also be exposed to ``user-facing aspects of health IT,'' such as
third-party contractors, health information exchange organizations,
recipients of a software demonstration, and trade groups or researchers
that observe the operation of health IT in the field.
We propose that this approach reasonably implements the Cures Act,
which, in direct response to strict confidentiality obligations, broad
intellectual property clauses, and non-disclosure provisions in EHR
contracts, identified a list of protected subject areas for disclosure
(enumerated at section 3001(c)(5)(D)(iii) of the PHSA) that largely
targeted the aspects of health IT that are apparent to, and known by,
individuals and entities that use or interact with health IT. We
propose that if a health IT user were prohibited from describing the
user-facing aspects of their health IT product, they could not sensibly
communicate useful information about the usability or interoperability
of the product, or their experiences as a health IT user. These subject
areas are fundamentally tied to the way that the health IT product
works, its design, and its functionality.
Protecting the communication of ``user-facing aspects of health
IT'' is also consistent with the treatment of software products under
trade secret law, where the public-facing aspects of software products
are not generally considered secret because they are evident to anyone
running the software program. Moreover, this approach is appropriate
given the manner in which health IT is deployed and used by health IT
customers. Unlike software products that are deployed and used in a
cloistered setting where access to the software is highly restricted,
health IT is typically deployed in a setting in which the operation of
the health IT can be readily observed by a wide range of persons.
Health IT used in a physician's consulting room can be observed by the
patient. Health IT deployed in a hospital can be observed by numerous
individuals in addition to those who are ``authorized users'' of the
health IT system, including, for example, the patient, the patient's
family, volunteer staff, law enforcement, and clergy. As such, because
health IT is of a nature that license terms or nondisclosure
obligations do not act as a genuine control over the disclosure of
those aspects of the software that are ``user-facing,'' communications
about such aspects should be afforded protection from developer
prohibitions and restrictions under this proposed Condition of
Certification.
(C) Intellectual Property
Many aspects of health IT--including software and documentation--
will contain intellectual property that belongs to the health IT
developer (or a third party) and is protected by law. Health IT
products may have portions in which copyrighted works exist, or that
are subject to patent protection. As in other technology sectors,
health IT developers place a high value on their intellectual property
and go to significant lengths to protect it, including intellectual
property provisions in their health IT contracts.
This Condition of Certification is not intended to operate as a de
facto license for health IT users and others to act in any way that
might infringe the legitimate intellectual property rights of
developers. Indeed, we propose that health IT developers are permitted
to prohibit or restrict communications that would infringe their
intellectual property rights so long as the communication in question
is not a communication with unqualified protection. However, any
prohibition and restriction imposed by a developer must be no broader
than legally permissible and reasonably necessary to protect the
developer's legitimate intellectual property interests. We are aware
that some health IT contracts contain broad intellectual property
provisions (and related terms, such as nondisclosure provisions) that
purport to prevent health IT customers and users from using copyright
material in ways that are lawful. On this basis, while we are providing
an exception for the protection of intellectual property interests, we
want to clarify that under this Condition of Certification health IT
developers are not permitted to prohibit or restrict, or purport to
prohibit or restrict, communications that would be a ``fair use'' of
any copyright work comprised in the developer's health IT. That is, a
developer is not permitted to prohibit or restrict communications under
the guise of copyright protection (or under the guise of a
confidentiality or non-disclosure obligation) when the communication in
question makes a use of the copyright material in a way that would
qualify that use as a ``fair use.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See 17 U.S.C. 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We welcome comments on whether an appropriate balance has been
struck between protecting legitimate intellectual property rights of
developers and ensuring that health IT customers, users, researchers,
and other stakeholders who use and work with health IT can openly
discuss and share their experiences and other relevant
[[Page 7475]]
information about the performance of health IT.
(D) Faithful Reproductions of Health IT Screenshots
We propose that health IT developers generally would not be
permitted to prohibit or restrict communications that disclose
screenshots of the developer's health IT. We consider screen displays
an essential component of health IT performance and usability, and
their reproduction may be necessary in order for a health IT user or
other health IT stakeholder to properly make communications about the
subject matters enumerated in Sec. 170.403(a)(1). We acknowledge that
some health IT developers have historically and aggressively sought to
prohibit the disclosure of such communications. We consider that
developers may benefit from screen displays being faithfully reproduced
so that health IT users and other stakeholders can form an objective
opinion on any question raised about usability in communications
protected by this proposed Condition of Certification. Moreover, we
consider that the reproduction of screenshots in connection with the
making of a communication protected by this Condition of Certification
would ordinarily represent a ``fair use'' of any copyright subsisting
in the screen display, and developers should not impose prohibitions or
restrictions that would limit that fair use.
Notwithstanding the above, we propose to permit certain
prohibitions and restrictions on the communication of screenshots.
Except in connection with communications with unqualified protection,
developers would be permitted to impose certain restrictions on the
disclosure of screenshots, as described below.
In order to ensure that disclosures of screenshots are reasonable
and represent a faithful reproduction of the developer's screen design
and health IT, we propose that developers would be permitted to prevent
communicators from altering screenshots, other than to annotate the
screenshot or to resize it for the purpose of publication. We consider
this a reasonable limitation on the disclosure of screenshots and one
that would help developers' health IT avoid being misrepresented by
communicators seeking to make a communication protected by this
proposed Condition of Certification.
We also propose that health IT developers could impose restrictions
on the disclosure of a screenshot on the basis that it would infringe
third-party intellectual property rights (on their behalf or as
required by license). However, to take advantage of this exception, the
developer would need to first put all potential communicators on
sufficient written notice of those parts of the screen display that
contain trade secrets or intellectual property rights and cannot be
communicated, and would still need to allow communicators to
communicate redacted versions of screenshots that do not reproduce
those parts.
Finally, we also recognize that health IT developers may have
obligations under HIPAA as a business associate and that it would be
reasonable for developers to impose restrictions on the communication
of screenshots that contain protected health information, provided that
developers permit the communication of screenshots that have been
redacted to conceal protected health information, or the relevant
individual's consent or authorization had been obtained.
(E) Testing and Development
We are aware that some health IT developers expose aspects of their
health IT to health care providers and others for the purpose of
testing and development prior to a product's ``general availability''
release. Such disclosures may relate to beta releases that are shared
with certain customers for testing prior to the software being made
generally available to the market, or may be made as part of a joint-
venture or cooperative development process. In these circumstances, we
propose that a health IT developer would be justified in keeping
information about its health IT confidential, and we do not intend that
the protection afforded to communicators under this Condition of
Certification would allow disclosures of this information. This
permitted prohibition or restriction would allow developers to seek
appropriate intellectual property protection and freely discuss novel,
``unreleased'' product features with their customer base, which has
significant public policy benefits for research and innovation in the
health IT industry.
As with the other allowable restrictions listed above, we propose
that this permitted restriction would be limited and does not apply to
communications which are communications with unqualified protection as
described above and specified in Sec. 170.403(a)(2)(i). For example,
information that is learned as part of development and testing, such as
the hard-coding of test procedure processes that raise serious patient
safety concerns, could be communicated for one of the limited purposes
specified in Sec. 170.403(a)(2)(i) if the software is certified or
released to market. We propose that this permitted restriction would
also not apply to communications about the released version of the
health IT once the health IT has been released to market or has been
certified, provided that the communications otherwise meet all other
requirements to be afforded protection under this Condition of
Certification and the information communicated could be discovered by
any ordinary user of the health IT.
For example, a health IT developer and a large health system enter
into an agreement for members of the health IT developer's engineering
team to work with members of the health system's clinical team to
develop a customization for the system's use of the developer's EHR. In
order to properly protect any intellectual property rights, or
proprietary information, arising from this work, the developer and
health system enter into a contract which imposes on the system and
affected members of its clinical team strict nondisclosure related to
testing and development of the health IT. This would be reasonable and
would not contravene this Condition of Certification, provided that:
(1) The nondisclosure obligations were narrowly targeted toward the
work product associated with the testing and development; and (2) the
obligations ceased immediately upon any resultant software being
deployed in the health system, to the extent that the information fell
within one of the subject areas enumerated in Sec. 170.403(a)(1) and
would be apparent to an ordinary user of the health IT.
To ensure that this permitted prohibition/restriction is not
abused, such as by maintaining a product in beta release for an
indefinite or lengthy period of time, we request comment on whether we
should limit the time this protection would apply for testing purposes.
This could be no longer than a year after release of a product or
update. We also request comment on whether we should set specific
parameters for covered testing. For example, we note above our
expectations that a product would be shared with certain customers for
testing prior to the software being made generally available to the
market. As such, for this permitted prohibition/restriction to apply,
should we more specifically limit the extent a product can be
distributed to customers for testing purposes?
[[Page 7476]]
c. Maintenance of Certification Requirements
We propose that to maintain compliance with this Condition of
Certification a health IT developer must not establish or enforce any
contract or agreement provision that contravenes this Condition of
Certification. We are aware that some developers currently have in
place health IT contracts that contain provisions that contravene this
proposed Condition of Certification because they impose impermissible
prohibitions or restrictions on communications. In some instances, the
provisions in question will be expressly at odds with this Condition,
imposing obligations on health IT customers, or creating rights in
favor of the developer, that prohibit or restrict communications that
are protected. In other instances, a contract will include a provision
that contravenes this Condition because it has been drawn in such broad
terms--such as an overly-expansive definition of confidential
information--that a reasonable reader of the provision would consider
the making of a communication protected by this Condition a breach of
the contract.
Health IT contracts are typically for a significant duration--e.g.,
5 years or more--or include an automatic renewal whereby the then
current terms roll over for any renewal period. The implementation of
this proposed Condition of Certification cannot therefore wait until
health IT contracts that contravene this Condition expire in the
ordinary course. As such, we are requiring that health IT developers
take immediate steps to become in compliance with this Condition of
Certification.
We propose that a health IT developer must notify all customers and
those with which it has contracts/agreements, within six months of the
effective date of a subsequent final rule for this proposed rule, that
any communication or contract/agreement provision that contravenes this
Condition of Certification will not be enforced by the health IT
developer. Further, we propose that this notice would need to be
provided annually up to and until the health IT developer amends the
contract or agreement to remove or make void any contractual provision
that contravenes this Condition of Certification. We further propose as
a Maintenance of Certification requirement in Sec. 170.405(b)(2) that
health IT developers must amend their contracts or agreements to remove
or make void any provisions that contravene the Condition of
Certification within a reasonable period of time, but not later than
two years from the effective date of a subsequent final rule for this
proposed rule.
We believe this is an appropriate approach as we understand that
health IT developers are in regular contact with their customers, and
so the provision of a notice that satisfies this requirement should not
present an undue burden for a developer. We would also expect that
developers have kept good records of nondisclosure agreements that they
have entered into with other organizations or individuals, such as
third-party developers, and can communicate with those organizations or
individuals as necessary to satisfy this requirement. In the event that
a health IT developer cannot, despite all reasonable efforts, locate an
entity or individual that previously entered into an agreement with the
developer that prohibits or restricts communications protected by this
Condition, the developer would not be in contravention of this
Condition so long as it takes no step to enforce the prohibition or
restriction. For clarity, we do not propose that health IT developers
be required to furnish to ONC or their ONC-ACB copies of notices made
to customers, or copies of contracts or agreements revised, in
satisfaction of this Maintenance of Certification requirement, although
those communications may be requested by ONC or an ONC-ACB in the usual
course of business. To this point, under the ``Enforcement'' section of
this proposed rule (VII.D), we describe our general enforcement
approach outlining a corrective action process for ONC to review
instances where Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
requirements are not being met by a health IT developer under the
Program.
We note that another approach we considered proposing would have
been to require that developers amend their current health IT contracts
immediately. We have, however, relied on the proposed requirement that
developers not enforce contractual terms that contravene this proposed
Condition of Certification until they can amend their contracts in a
reasonable period of time, but not later than two years from the
effective date of a subsequent final rule for this proposed rule. We
seek comment on whether this is an adequate approach to removing
prohibitions and restrictions on protected communications and ensuring
that health IT customers, users, researchers, and other stakeholders
are aware of their right to engage in such communications
notwithstanding existing contracts or agreements to the contrary.
4. Application Programming Interfaces
As a Condition of Certification (and Maintenance thereof) under the
Program, the Cures Act requires health IT developers to publish APIs
that allow ``health information from such technology to be accessed,
exchanged, and used without special effort through the use of APIs or
successor technology or standards, as provided for under applicable
law.'' The Cures Act's API Condition of Certification also states that
a developer must, through an API, ``provide access to all data elements
of a patient's electronic health record to the extent permissible under
applicable privacy laws.''
The Cures Act's API Condition of Certification includes several key
phrases and requirements for health IT developers that go beyond just
the technical functionality of the products they present for
certification. In this section of the preamble we outline our proposals
to implement the Cures Act's API Condition of Certification in order to
provide compliance clarity for health IT developers.
These proposals include new standards, new implementation
specifications, and a new certification criterion as well as detailed
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements. We also
propose to modify the Base EHR definition. We note that health IT
developers should also consider these proposals in the context of what
could warrant review from an information blocking perspective in so far
as action (or inaction) that would be inconsistent with this proposed
rule's API Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements.
a. Statutory Interpretation and API Policy Principles
One of the most significant phrases in the Cures Act's API
Condition of Certification concerns the deployment and use of APIs
``without special effort.'' Specifically, the Cures Act requires health
IT developers to publish APIs and allow health information from such
technology ``to be accessed, exchanged, and used without special
effort.'' In this context, we interpret the ``effort'' exerted (i.e.,
by whom) to be focused on the API users, which could include third-
party software developers, the health care providers that acquired this
API technology, and patients, health care providers, and payers that
use apps/services that connect to API technology.
As we considered the meaning and context associated with the phrase
``without special effort'' and what
[[Page 7477]]
would make APIs included in certified health IT truly ``open,'' we
focused on key attributes that could be used to refine our
interpretation and guide our proposals. We interpret ``without special
effort'' to require that APIs, and the health care ecosystem in which
they are deployed, have three attributes: Standardized, transparent,
and pro-competitive. Each of these attributes is briefly described in
more detail below and all of our subsequent proposals address one or a
combination of these attributes.
Standardized--meaning that all health IT developers
seeking certification would have to implement the same technical API
capabilities in their products (using modern, computing standards such
as RESTful interfaces and XML/JSON). Technical consistency and
implementation predictability are fundamental to scale API-enabled
interoperability and reduce the level of custom development and costs
necessary to access, exchange, and use health information. Further,
from a regulatory standpoint, health IT developers would gain certainty
in regards to pre-certification testing requirements and post-
certification ``real world testing'' expectations. Equally, from an
industry standpoint, a consistent and predictable set of API functions
would provide the health IT ecosystem with known technical requirements
against which ``app'' developers and other innovative services can be
built.
Transparent--meaning that all health IT developers seeking
certification would need to make the specific business and technical
documentation necessary to interact with the APIs in production freely
and publicly accessible. Such transparency and openness is commonplace
in many other industries and has fueled innovation, growth, and
competition.
Pro-competitive--meaning that all health IT developers
seeking certification would need to abide by business practices that
promote the efficient access, exchange, and use of EHI to support a
competitive marketplace that enhances consumer value and choice.
Moreover, health care providers should have the sole authority and
autonomy to unilaterally permit third-party software developers to
connect to the API technology they have acquired. In other words,
health IT developers must not interfere with a health care provider's
use of their acquired API technology in any way, especially ways that
would impact its equitable access and use based on (for example)
another software developer's size, current client base, or business
line. It also means that developers (together with health care
providers that deploy APIs) are accountable to patients who, as
consumers of health care services, have paid for their care and the
information generated from such care. Thus, patients should be able to
access their EHI via any API-enabled app they choose without special
effort, including without incurring additional costs and without
encountering access requirements that impede their ability to access
their information in a persistent manner.
b. Key Terms
To clearly convey the stakeholders on which our proposals focus and
are meant to support, we propose to use the following terms to reflect
these meanings and/or roles:
The term ``API technology'' (with a lowercase ``t'')
generally refers to the capabilities of certified health IT that
fulfill the API-focused certification criteria adopted or proposed for
adoption at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11).
``API Technology Supplier'' refers to a health IT
developer that creates the API technology that is presented for testing
and certification to any of the certification criteria adopted or
proposed for adoption at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11). We
propose to adopt this term in Sec. 170.102.
``API Data Provider'' refers to the organization that
deploys the API technology created by the ``API Technology Supplier''
and provides access via the API technology to data it produces and
electronically manages. In some cases, the API Data Provider may
contract with the API Technology Supplier to perform the API deployment
service on its behalf. However, in such circumstances, the API Data
Provider retains control of what and how information is disclosed and
so for the purposes of this definition is considered to be the entity
that deploys the API technology. We propose to adopt this term in Sec.
170.102.
``API User''--refers to persons and entities that use or
create software applications that interact with the APIs developed by
the ``API Technology Supplier'' and deployed by the ``API Data
Provider.'' An API User includes, but is not limited to, third-party
software developers, developers of software applications used by API
Data Providers, patients, health care providers, and payers that use
apps/services that connect to API technology. We propose to adopt this
term in Sec. 170.102.
We also use:
The term ``(g)(10)-certified API'' for ease of reference
throughout the preamble to refer to health IT certified to the
certification criterion proposed for adoption in 45 CFR 170.315(g)(10).
The term ``app'' for ease of reference to describe any
type of software application that would be designed to interact with
the (g)(10)-certified APIs. This generic term is meant to include, but
not be limited to, a range of applications from mobile and browser-
based to comprehensive business-to-business enterprise applications
administered by third parties.
c. Proposed API Standards, Implementation Specifications, and
Certification Criterion
APIs can be thought of as a set of commands, functions, protocols,
and/or tools published by one software developer (``software developer
A'') that enable other software developers (X, Y, and Z) to create
programs and applications that interact with A's software without
needing to know the ``internal'' workings of A's software. APIs can
facilitate more seamless access to health information and it is
important to note for context that ONC adopted three 2015 Edition
certification criteria that specified API capabilities for Health IT
Modules (criteria adopted in 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7), (g)(8), and (g)(9)).
The following sections detail our proposals to adopt standards,
implementation specifications, and a new API certification criterion.
Together, these proposals account for the technical requirements we
propose to associate with the Cures Act's API Condition of
Certification and are reinforced through the condition's policy
proposals.
i. Proposed Adoption of FHIR DSTU2 Standard
Overall, and on balance, we have structured our standards and
implementation specifications proposals to best meet the health IT
industry where it is most prepared to comply today. As a result, we
propose to adopt the HL7[supreg] Fast Healthcare Interoperability
Resources (FHIR[supreg]) standard as a foundational standard within our
suite of proposals. Specifically, we propose to adopt FHIR Draft
Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) 2 (hereafter referred to as ``FHIR
Release 2'') as a baseline standard conformance requirement. In so
doing, we can work with industry to support a conformance testing
infrastructure for a full suite of proposals focused on one FHIR
release (its associated implementation specifications) and
complementary
[[Page 7478]]
security and app registration protocols, compared to numerous
versions.\81\
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\81\ In October 2018, ONC released a first version of a FHIR
testing tool visit here for more details: https://inferno.healthit.gov/.
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The 2015 Edition final rule did not include specific standards or
implementation specifications to describe the way in which APIs needed
to be designed to meet Sec. 170.315(g)(8). Instead, we specified a
functional certification criterion and encouraged the industry to
coalesce around a standardized specification for its API functionality,
such as the FHIR standard. We did, however, require health IT
developers to make their technical API documentation publicly available
and we subsequently made such information accessible via the CHPL.
Upon reviewing health IT developers certified to Sec.
170.315(g)(8), approximately 32% have published via the CHPL that they
are using FHIR, specifically FHIR Release 2, as of mid- September 2018.
Additionally, nearly 51% of health IT developers appear to be using a
version of FHIR and OAuth 2.0 together. We also note that when viewed
from the perspective of how many providers are served by these FHIR
implementers, we estimate that approximate 87% of hospitals and 57% of
clinicians are served by developers with a FHIR Release 2 API and 87%
of hospitals and 69% of clinicians are served by developers with a FHIR
API of any version. In the years since the 2015 Edition final rule,
industry stakeholders have made rapid progress to advance the FHIR
standard. This includes substantial investments in industry pilots,
specification development led through the Argonaut Project \82\
production deployment of APIs conformant to FHIR Release 2 following
the Argonaut specifications, and the support for FHIR Release 2 in
Apple's iOS 11.3, which includes a new ``health records'' app for the
iPhone based on these specifications.\83\ Therefore, the industry is
well prepared and ready to adopt the FHIR standard.
Thus, we propose to adopt FHIR Release 2 as the baseline standard
in a new API standards section of our rules at 45 CFR 170.215(a)(1).
Additionally, as discussed in further detail below, we reference FHIR
Release 2 for use in the new API certification criterion proposed for
adoption in Sec. 170.315(g)(10).
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\82\ https://argonautwiki.hl7.org/index.php?title=Main_Page.
\83\ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/01/apple-announces-effortless-solution-bringing-health-records-to-iPhone/.
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Although FHIR Release 3 is published and some health IT developers
have included varied support for it in their product(s) at this time,
there is limited evidence that its production deployment is as
widespread as FHIR Release 2. Thus, we believe that FHIR Release 2 is
the most appropriate version to propose to adopt as part of proposed
Sec. 170.315(g)(10)'s conformance requirements. This approach would
provide a stable and consistent direction in which the industry can go
when it comes to deploying (g)(10)-certified APIs that support data
access to the USCDI. FHIR Release 2 best reflects the industry's
current maturity and implementation readiness, it has been more
rigorously tested, and it is largely implemented in most 2015 Edition
health IT systems that have and are being deployed in production. Thus,
the incremental burden for many health IT developers to get certified
to the proposed criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10) would be largely
limited to the added security and registration conformance requirements
we have proposed to include. We recognize, however, that some health IT
developers certified to Sec. 170.315(g)(8) chose not to use FHIR and
will have more substantial changes to make in order to meet this
proposal.
Additionally, FHIR Release 4 has now been published \84\ and
updated associated implementation specifications are expected to
follow. FHIR Release 4 has several key improvements, including certain
foundational aspects in the standard and ``FHIR resources'' designated
as ``normative'' for the first time. This will lead to acycle of more
mature US FHIR Core profiles aligned with Release 4 and additional
implementation guidance that explicitly specifies how to handle
populations of patient data (batch exports) via FHIR to more
efficiently enable population and learning health system-oriented
services. Likewise, from an industry update trajectory, we believe that
FHIR Release 4's normative resources will be compelling from a maturity
and stability perspective such that many health IT developers will
either rapidly progress to FHIR Release 4 from Release 3 or skip wide-
scale production deployment of FHIR Release 3 altogether, making FHIR
Release 4 the next de facto version the industry would move toward and
coalesce behind.
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\84\ https://blog.hl7.org/hl7-publishes-fhir-release-4.
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Given FHIR Release 4's public release and that the industry will
begin to implement Release 4 in parallel with this rulemaking, we
request comment on the following options we could pursue for a final
rule.
Option 1 (proposed in regulation text): Adopt just FHIR Release 2
for reference in proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10). This option would
require health IT developers seeking certification to build, test, and
certify systems solely to FHIR Release 2 and its associated
implementation specifications. Under this option, if the National
Coordinator approved the use of FHIR Release 3 or 4 (pursuant to the
Standards Version Advancement Process) it would occur, at the earliest,
one year after a final rule was issued. Given that timing, and the
compliance deadlines proposed later in this section, it would mean that
health IT developers would have no option but to develop to FHIR
Release 2 in order to meet the proposed compliance deadlines.
Option 2: Adopt FHIR Release 2 and FHIR Release 3 in order to
introduce optionality into how health IT developers are able to
demonstrate compliance with proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10). In other
words, by adopting and referencing both FHIR Release 2 and 3 in
proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10) it would permit a health IT developer to
use either one to meet the criterion (i.e., both versions would not be
required to be supported and demonstrating only one would be needed to
meet certification). Similarly, under this option, if the National
Coordinator approved the use of FHIR Release 4 (pursuant to the
Standards Version Advancement Process) it would occur, at the earliest,
one year after a final rule was issued. Given that timing, and the
compliance deadlines proposed later in this section, it would mean that
health IT developers would have no option but to develop to FHIR
Release 2 or Release 3 in order to meet the proposed compliance
deadlines.
Option 3: Adopt FHIR Release 2 and FHIR Release 4 in order to
introduce flexibility into how health IT developers are able to
demonstrate compliance with proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10). The full
implementation of this option would depend on all applicable
corresponding FHIR Release 2 implementation specifications also being
published in their FHIR Release 4 formats and available prior to the
issuance of a final rule. Provided these FHIR Release 4 implementation
specifications are published in time for a final rule, this option
would appear to be the best near- and long-term option for the
industry. We anticipate this being the case because it would let
lagging health IT developers catch up to the FHIR Release 2 baseline
while at the same time enable leading health IT developers to move
directly and immediately to FHIR Release 4 as a means to meet proposed
[[Page 7479]]
Sec. 170.315(g)(10)'s compliance timelines. In other words, unlike
Options 1 and 2, the Standards Version Advancement Process would not be
necessary and the trajectory of leading health IT developers would be
well supported by the certification criterion. We also request comment
on a variant of Option 3 that would include a pre-defined cut-over for
the permitted use of and certification to FHIR Release 2. We note that
if this variant were implemented as part of Option 3, we would likely
also need to add a maintenance of certification requirement in the
final rule to establish an upgrade timeline to FHIR Release 4 for those
health IT developers who originally sought certification for FHIR
Release 2. Such a maintenance requirement would seem necessary in order
to bring the industry into closer alignment with respect to a more up-
to-date national baseline for FHIR.
Option 4: Adopt solely FHIR Release 4 in the final rule for
reference in proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10). This option would require
health IT developers seeking certification to build, test, and certify
systems solely to FHIR Release 4 and its associated implementation
specifications. Again, provided all applicable FHIR Release 4
implementation specifications are published in time for a final rule,
this option would appear to be a close preference to Option 3 for
industry. We believe this would be the case because by the time a final
rule associated with these proposals is issued, it is likely that
health IT developers would have close to or over a year's worth of
development experience with FHIR Release 4. As a result, many may be
poised to introduce their first round of generally available FHIR
Release 4 products into production. If ONC were to offer certification
to FHIR Release 2 (as in Option 3) this flexibility could
unintentionally delay the industry's transition to FHIR Release 4 and
slow progress associated with FHIR-based interoperability. The
following compliance timeline example attempts to make this point
clearer. If, for example, the final rule was effective January 2020,
based on other proposals associated with the API Conditions of
Certification, health IT developers would have up to 2 years to rollout
their (g)(10)-certified API technology, which would mean January 2022.
At that point, FHIR Release 4 would have been published for nearly 3
years and FHIR Release 2 would have been published for nearly 6 years.
Without a pre-defined cut-over for FHIR Release 2 in Option 3, that
certification approach would permit FHIR Release 2 APIs to be deployed
in 2022 and used for an indeterminate period of time.
In preparing your comments, please fully review our proposed
certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10) and the accompanying
Conditions of Certification attributed to the API-oriented
certification criteria. Notably, if we were to adopt another FHIR
Release in a final rule as an alternative to FHIR Release 2 for the
proposed API criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10), then we would also
adopt the applicable implementation specifications and FHIR profiles
(the US FHIR Core profiles) associated with the FHIR Release in order
to support USCDI data access. We highly encourage stakeholders to
express their perspective and explicitly note their preferred option in
comments.
ii. Proposed Adoption of Associated FHIR Release 2 Implementation
Specifications
Our proposal to adopt the FHIR standard alone, however, is
insufficient to provide the level of consistent implementation that
will be necessary to realize the ``without special effort'' provision
in this Condition of Certification. FHIR, much like other standards
that are initially developed to be internationally applicable, requires
additional implementation specifications in order to further constrain
implementation choices and reflect US-based standards policies (such as
the use of RxNorm for representing medications). In FHIR, the
additional constraints placed on ``base FHIR resources'' are expressed
through what are called ``FHIR profiles.'' FHIR Profiles typically
provide additional rules about which resource elements must be used and
what additional elements have been added that are not part of the base
FHIR resource. This can include, but not be limited to, rules about
which API features are used and how as well as rules about which
terminologies are used in particular elements. The term ``profile'' is
a general term that is used in the FHIR standard to describe either an
individual FHIR resource, or an entire implementation specification
consisting of multiple FHIR resources. Accordingly, we propose to adopt
three implementation specifications that will establish a standardized
baseline and further constrain API conformance to help assure that APIs
can be used ``without special effort.''
We propose to adopt in Sec. 170.215(a)(2) an implementation
specification that would list a set of base FHIR resources that Health
IT Modules certified to the proposed criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)
would need to support. We refer to this proposed initial set of FHIR
resources as the ``API Resource Collection in Health'' or ``the ARCH.''
The ARCH would align with and be directed by the data policy specified
in the proposed US Core Data for Interoperability (USCDI) standard
(discussed in section IV.B.1 of this proposed rule).
As a result, we propose to include 15 FHIR resources in the ARCH's
first version. Based on prior industry efforts, including the Argonaut
Project to map FHIR resources to the previously defined Common Clinical
Data Set (CCDS), we know that the following 13 FHIR resources map to
and support the equivalent data classes specified in the USCDI:
AllergyIntolerance; CarePlan; Condition; Device; DiagnosticReport;
Goal; Immunization; Medication; MedicationOrder; MedicationStatement;
Observation; Patient; and Procedure. We also propose to include,
specifically for the Patient resource that the ``Patient.address'' and
``Patient.telecom'' elements must be supported as part of the Patient
resource. These elements are neither required in the base FHIR resource
or additional implementation specifications; however, they are
necessary to align with the USCDI's data requirements. With respect to
the Device resource, we propose to require that the ``Device.udi''
element follow the human readable representation of the unique device
identifier (UDI) found in the recommendation, guidance, and conformance
requirements section of the ``HL7 Version 3 Cross Paradigm
Implementation Guide: Medical Devices and Unique Device Identification
(UDI) Pattern, Release 1,'' a document hosted by HL7.\85\ Developers
would be held responsible only for the recommendation, guidance, and
conformance requirements for HL7 FHIR in the implementation guide and
would not be held responsible for other requirements in the
implementation guide specific to other standards, including
requirements for HL7 Version 2 and HL7 Version 3. For clarity, these
proposed requirements are part of the ARCH Version 1 standard.
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\85\ https://www.hl7.org/implement/standards/product_brief.cfm?product_id=487.
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In addition to these 13 FHIR resources, we have included two
additional FHIR resources:
(1) The Provenance resource; and (2) the DocumentReference resource
to accommodate clinical notes. These additions would make for a total
of 15 FHIR resources to reflect the direction of the USCDI v1. With
respect to clinical notes, we understand from our own
[[Page 7480]]
analysis and technical discussions within HL7 that the FHIR
DocumentReference resource is best capable of handling the exchange of
clinical notes. Since the CCDS was defined over two years ago, we have
most frequently heard from provider stakeholders that access to
``clinical notes'' is key, impactful, and highly desirable data that
should be accessible via the C-CDAs they exchange as well as via APIs.
While we realize the industry may need to develop additional
implementation guidance to support clinical notes via FHIR, we believe
that including FHIR resources in ARCH Version 1 directly addresses the
steady requests we have received from providers to include a focus on
the access, exchange, and use of ``clinical notes'' as part of
certification. Thus, we propose to include the FHIR DocumentReference
resource in the ARCH to support clinical notes. We also clarify that
the clinical note text included in this FHIR resource would need to be
represented in its ``raw'' text form. In other words, it would be
unacceptable for the note text to be converted to another file or
format (e.g., .docx, PDF) when it is provided as part of an API
response. With respect to the Provenance resource, we believe its
inclusion in the ARCH is paramount to the long-term success and use of
FHIR-based APIs. While C-CDA's are often critiqued due to their
relative ``length,'' the C-CDA often represents the output of a
clinical event and includes relevant context. The same will not always
be true in an API-context. This is due to the fact that FHIR-based APIs
make it significantly easier for apps to request specific data (e.g.,
just a patient's active medications). Thus, it is equally important
over the long-term that the industry not lose sight of the metadata
(i.e., the who, what, when, where, why, and how) behind the data that
was created. As a result, we believe that this early stage of FHIR
deployment is the best time for the industry to build in support for
the Provenance resource. Otherwise, if we were to expand the ARCH in
future years to include this FHIR resource, we estimate that the
developer burden and overall industry impact would be greater than
building this support in ``from the start.'' Specifically, and to
remain consistent with the USCDI, we propose to require that the
``Provenance.recorded'' (for the author's time stamp) and
``Provenance.agent.actor'' (for the author and author's organization)
elements be supported as part of the Provenance resource.
Over time, and as the USCDI is expanded, we also expect to update
this implementation specification to expand the ARCH beyond these 15
FHIR resources. Equally, consistent with the Maintenance of
Certification requirements described in section VII.B.5 of this
proposed rule (the Standards Version Advancement Process proposals),
which would permit health IT developers to voluntarily implement and
use a new version of an adopted standard or implementation
specification so long as certain conditions are met including that the
new version is approved by the National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards Version Advancement Process, health
IT developers would be able to update their certified health IT to
include (g)(10)-certified API access to a broader set of data once a
new version of the ARCH is approved.
The next implementation specification for the FHIR standard we
propose to adopt in Sec. 170.215(a)(3) is the Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide version 1 (Argonaut IG), hosted by HL7.\86\ This
implementation guide has been pilot tested and is now being implemented
for production use by health IT developers. Notably, it specifies FHIR
profile constraints for 13 of the associated FHIR resources we propose
to include in the ARCH Version 1 and these FHIR profiles support the
data included in the USCDI (v1).
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\86\ https://www.fhir.org/guides/argonaut/r2/.
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The next implementation specification for the FHIR standard we
propose the Secretary adopt in Sec. 170.215(a)(4) is the specific
portion of the Argonaut IG that refers to the ``Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide Server'' conformance requirements. While it could
be implied through our proposed adoption of the Argonaut IG that these
conformance requirements would be included, we seek to make this an
explicit requirement for the API certification criterion proposed in
Sec. 170.315(g)(10). Conformance to this implementation specification
is essential in order to ensure that all FHIR servers are consistently
configured to support the defined data queries and ``supported
searches'' associated with each Argonaut profiled FHIR resource. For
clarity, conformance testing would focus on and be limited to the
``SHALL'' requirements. We also note that the Argonaut Data Query
Implementation Guide Server includes conformance requirements for the
``DocumentReference Profile,'' which defines ``how a provider or
patient can retrieve a patient's existing clinical document.'' This
particular specification was produced in support of the 2015 Edition
certification criterion adopted in Sec. 170.315(g)(9). As a result, we
clarify that this specific portion of the Server IG and conformance
requirement would be out of scope for the purposes of proposed Sec.
170.315(g)(10).
We have separately proposed the FHIR standard and each of these
implementation specifications so that the National Coordinator may
evaluate industry progress and make a unique or combined determination
as to the appropriate time to approve for voluntary upgrade pursuant to
the standards version advancement process discussed in more detail in
section VII.B.5 as well as subsequently go through rulemaking to adopt
a new version of: The FHIR standard, the ARCH, implementation
specifications that ``profile'' the resources in the ARCH, and
implementation specifications for FHIR server conformance capabilities.
While the proposed implementation specifications relate to one another,
they can also be updated independently of each other as time goes on.
For instance, the National Coordinator could approve a new version of
the FHIR standard ``Release 5'' in the future in accordance with the
standards version advancement process. In so doing, the National
Coordinator could leave the scope of the ARCH the same and update
(necessarily) the implementation specifications for the FHIR profiles
and FHIR server conformance requirements accordingly to align with the
new FHIR version. As an alternative example, the National Coordinator
could leave the FHIR standard version the same and approve a new
version of the ARCH to include more FHIR resources.
We note that other federal agencies may be adopting the FHIR
standard and additional FHIR implementation guides for their program
requirements. We plan to coordinate with such other agencies to focus
on strategic alignment among the FHIR standard versions, applicable
implementation guides, and use cases.
iii. Proposed Adoption of Standards and Implementation Specifications
To Support Persistent User Authentication and App Authorization
To enable and support persistent user authentication and app
authorization processes, we propose to adopt a standards and additional
implementation specification for the FHIR standard. First, we propose
to adopt the ``OpenID Connect Core 1.0
[[Page 7481]]
incorporating errata set 1'' standard in Sec. 170.215(b) as it
complements the SMART Application Launch Framework Implementation Guide
Release 1.0.0 \87\ (SMART Guide). The OpenID standard is typically
paired with OAuth 2.0 implementations and focuses on user
authentication. Second, we propose to adopt the SMART Guide in Sec.
170.215(a)(5) as an additional implementation specification associated
with the FHIR standard. This guide is referenced by the Argonaut IG and
is generally being implemented by the health IT community as a security
layer with which FHIR deployment is being combined (from both a FHIR
server and FHIR application perspective). Further, while the SMART
Guide includes certain mandatory requirements, we believe three
specific aspects are necessary to specifically require in order for
certification to enable consistent industry-wide implementation.
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\87\ https://build.fhir.org/ig/HL7/smart-app- launch/.
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The SMART Guide specifies the use of ``refresh tokens'' as
optional. We believe that this requirement is necessary in order to
enable persistent access by apps, especially in a patient access
context. Thus, we propose to make their use mandatory with a minimum
refresh token life of 3 months. While this technique would need to be
supported for both types of API-enabled services we propose be
supported through Sec. 170.315(g)(10), we wish to emphasize that
implementing refresh token support is directly intended to enable a
patient's ``persistent access'' to their electronic health information
without special effort (i.e., without having to frequently re-
authenticate and re-authorize while using their preferred app). This
proposal aligns with the industry developed security best practice
guidelines for OAuth 2.0 implementations, which require support for a
short-lived ``access token'' and a long-lived ``refresh token'' that
could be subsequently used by the app to obtain a new ``access token''
after the original ``access token'' expires. We believe this approach
enhances the seamlessness of a patient's data access and reduces the
``friction'' they would otherwise experience having to re-authenticate
and re-authorize. At the same time, because the access token is short
lived, this minimizes the risk of a patient's information being
accessed by unauthorized users if for some reason the access token is
compromised. The technical capabilities that we intend to explicitly
test are referenced as part of the proposed API certification criterion
in Sec. 170.315(g)(10).
We also propose to require that the ``Standalone Launch'' and ``EHR
Launch'' requirements specified in the SMART Guide be supported. We
believe that requiring API Technology Suppliers to demonstrate both of
these capacities will help ensure greater standardization and ease of
use among (g)(10)-certified APIs. When a third-party ``app'' first
connects to a FHIR server, it often requires some contextual data to
make the app more ``user friendly.'' This information could include
things such as the most recent patient encounter or hospital visit. The
contextual information depends on how the ``app'' is launched.
When an app is launched from ``outside of an EHR,'' such as from a
patient's smartphone or web browser, then the app is considered to be
launched in a ``Standalone'' mode. In this mode, the app has to request
that the FHIR server provide appropriate contextual information, which
can then be used to customize the app's display for the patient. The
SMART Guide has standardized the information that such apps can request
from FHIR servers and defined it as ``Standalone Launch.''
In other contexts, apps can be launched from ``within the EHR.''
This is typically the case when a third-party app is integrated as part
of an EHR technology. In this case, the app is considered to have been
launched in the ``EHR'' mode. Typically, when such an app is launched
from within an EHR, the user (e.g., provider, nurse) has a patient's
record ``open'' or ``active'' in the EHR and expects the app to
directly open the same patient when it is launched. In order for this
to happen, the app has to request that the FHIR server provides
information about the patient record that is currently ``open'' in the
EHR. The SMART Guide has standardized this interaction and defined it
as ``EHR Launch.''
iv. Proposed Adoption of a New API Certification Criterion in Sec.
170.315(g)(10)
Proposal Overview
To implement the Cures Act, we propose to adopt a new criterion in
Sec. 170.315(g)(10) to replace the certification criterion adopted in
Sec. 170.315(g)(8). Currently, the criterion adopted in Sec.
170.315(g)(8) focuses on a Health IT Module's ability to provide API
functionality that can respond with data for each of the data
categories specified in the Common Clinical Data Set. Moreover, its
focus on read-access/response to requests for specific types of data
most directly aligns with the API uses envisioned by industry
stakeholders and the Cures Act, which is why we believe it is necessary
and appropriate to replace Sec. 170.315(g)(8). In contrast, we do not
propose that it is necessary to replace the certification criteria
adopted in Sec. 170.315(g)(7) and (g)(9) because the former does not
prescribe specific technical approaches (and can continue to be met as
technology evolves) and the latter supports a discrete use case
relative to an API function that responds with a C-CDA.
We propose our approach to adopt a replacement for Sec.
170.315(g)(8) that will provide clear regulatory compliance
requirements for stakeholders because: (1) 2015 Edition testing and
certification to Sec. 170.315(g)(8) will continue throughout this
rulemaking; (2) presuming we adopt this (or a modified version of this)
proposal in a final rule, it will be easier for the industry to
distinguish compliance requirements between two separate certification
criteria compared to a time/context-sensitive ``version'' of Sec.
170.315(g)(8); and (3) Sec. 170.315(g)(8) is currently specified in
the Base EHR definition so its replacement has compliance effects on
health care providers participating in every program that requires the
use of Certified EHR Technology, which references the Base EHR
definition.
At a high-level, we propose that this new API certification
criterion would require FHIR servers to support two types of API-
enabled services:
Services for which a single patient's \88\ data is at
focus; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ We recognize that individuals may not always be in an
active role as a ``patient'' when they use an application to access
their data. However, we believe it is clearer for the purposes of
readability and policy intent to use the term ``patient'' as opposed
to ``individual.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
services for which multiple patients' data are at focus,
which, hereafter, we refer to as ``population-level'' to convey the
grouped and cohort scope on which the data associated with these
services would be focused (e.g., a specific provider's patient panel,
all of the patients covered by a particular health plan, a group of
patients cared for through an alternative payment model).
This proposed certification criterion would only require mandatory
support for ``read'' access for both identified services, though we
envision a future version of this certification criterion that could
include specific ``write'' conformance requirements (for example, to
aid decision support) once FHIR-based APIs are widely adopted. In all
cases, this proposed criterion will require that the two types of API
services have appropriate security controls implemented. These controls
[[Page 7482]]
would ensure a user fully authenticates to the API-enabled data source
to which the request is being made and that the user's software
application is appropriately authorized to request specified data.
API services that focus on a single patient would include, but not
be limited to, those that interact with software applications
controlled and used by a patient to access their data as well as
software applications implemented by a provider to enhance their own
``internal'' clinical care tools and workflow (e.g., a specialized
calculation app). Most, if not all, of these types of interactions are
typically orchestrated in a synchronous, real to near-real-time mode
via APIs.
Conversely, API services that focus on multiple patients would
include, but not be limited to, software applications used by a health
care provider to manage various internal patient populations as well as
external services a health care provider may contract for to support
quality improvement, population health management, and cost
accountability vis-[agrave]-vis the provider's partners (e.g., health
plans). Historically, access to this kind of computing has often been
cumbersome, opaque, and required one-off scripting and significant
engineering labor with no overarching standardized methods. By shifting
this paradigm to a FHIR-based API, we anticipate that the market will
be able to respond with a new slate of innovative solutions.
Across this spectrum of population-level uses, the scope or
quantity of the data may range from a small group to many hundreds or
thousands of patients. Moreover, when ``external'' applications and
services are provided access to patient data by the provider, we expect
that such access and associated privacy and security protocols would be
established consistent with existing legal requirements under the HIPAA
Privacy and Security Rules (including business associate agreements),
other data use agreements (as applicable), and any other state or
federal applicable law. Principally, for the purposes of the proposed
certification criterion, we seek to include and ensure through testing
and certification that a set of baseline API functionality exists and
is deployed for providers to use at their discretion to support their
own clinical priorities as well as to use to engage with their
partners, such as software developers and developers of third-party
applications.
We have explicitly proposed to include support for API services
that are population-level focused in this certification criterion
because the current certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(8) has
largely been tested, certified, and deployed to support the ``patient
data request'' use case. In comparison, population-level focused API
services are envisioned to support FHIR-based apps that not only
improve clinical workflow and decision support but also help advance a
learning health system. In so doing, providers, payers, and other
stakeholders will be able to make incrementally better use of FHIR's
RESTful API and JSON payload to apply modern computing techniques,
including big data analyses and machine learning, to account for,
assess, and inform the quality and effectiveness of care delivered. As
noted in the proposed API standards section, FHIR Release 4 includes
technical specifications to enable standardized population-level
services via FHIR-based APIs in a more efficient manner than currently
possible. If ``Option 3'' or ``Option 4'' is preferred by industry in
terms of the FHIR standards options for this certification criterion,
these approaches would be demonstrable. Alternatively, if the National
Coordinator were to approve FHIR Release 4 for use under this proposed
certification criterion (following the Standards Version Advancement
Process described in Section VII.B.5 of this preamble) then it would be
able to be used to meet these technical expectations.
Lastly, as we considered the necessary oversight responsibilities
the Cures Act adds to the Program, we have determined that it would be
essential to include a specific population-level API conformance
requirement as part of this criterion so that such capabilities could
be evaluated post-certification for compliance with (among other
requirements) this API Condition of Certification and the information
blocking and real world testing Conditions of Certification.
Specific Proposals
In general, we have approached framing Sec. 170.315(g)(10) in the
same way we framed Sec. 170.315(g)(8). This new proposed criterion,
however, includes some important differences and specificity compared
to Sec. 170.315(g)(8). Taken together, the following proposals are
designed to establish a consistent set of API implementation
requirements aimed at the API Condition of Certification's ``without
special effort'' requirement. We propose that API technology presented
by a health IT developer (otherwise considered an API Technology
Supplier in this context) for testing and certification to the proposed
certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10) would need to meet the
requirements outlined below. We seek comment on all of the following
proposals.
Data Response
We propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(i) that the health IT presented
for testing and certification must be capable of responding to requests
for data on a single patient and multiple patients associated with each
of the FHIR resources specified in ARCH Version 1 and consistent with
FHIR Release 2 and the Argonaut IG implementation specification. More
specifically, we clarify that all data elements indicated as
``mandatory'' and ``must support'' by the proposed standards and
implementation specifications must be supported and would be in scope
for testing. Through this approach, certification will provide for a
consistent and predictable starting scope of data from which apps and
other services can be developed.
Search Support
We propose to require in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(ii) that the health
IT presented for testing and certification must be capable of
responding to all of the ``supported searches'' specified in the
Argonaut Data Query Implementation Guide Server, which as a reminder we
have proposed for adoption as an implementation specification in Sec.
170.215(a)(4).\89\ Given that there is not yet a consistent,
standardized specification for FHIR servers to handle searches for
multiple patients, we clarify that a health IT developer would be
permitted to approach searches for multiple patients in the manner it
deems most efficient to meet this proposed certification criterion. We
note, consistent with the implementation specifications current scope,
that conformance would focus on search associated with a single
patient's data. However, we reiterate the health IT presented for
testing and certification and as implemented must support searches for
multiple patients independent of a required standard for such searches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ https://www.fhir.org/guides/argonaut/r2/Conformance-server.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the DocumentReference and Provenance resources, which are
currently present in the base FHIR standard, we request comments on the
minimum ``search'' parameters that would need to be supported.
[[Page 7483]]
App Registration
We propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(iii) that health IT presented
for testing and certification must be capable of enabling apps to
register with an ``authorization server.'' This proposed conformance
requirement would require an API Technology Supplier to demonstrate its
registration process, but would not require that it be done according
to a specific standard. We considered proposing the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic
Client Registration Protocol (RFC 7591) standard (``Dynamic
Registration'') as the only way to support registration for this
certification criterion and request public comment on whether we should
require its support as part of a final rule's certification criterion.
For clarity, we note that while we have not explicitly required Dynamic
Registration as the only way to demonstrate conformance with this
specific portion of the certification criterion, API Technology
Suppliers would still be allowed to use Dynamic Registration if they so
choose.
While requiring Dynamic Registration could create a more consistent
registration experience for health IT developers, we did not expressly
include this standard because of its relatively low adoption and
implementation in the health IT ecosystem. Notably, while the SMART
Guide covers a majority of technical steps necessary for an app to
connect a FHIR server, it is neutral on the registration process API
Technology Suppliers could take. Much like we did with Sec.
170.315(g)(8) in the initial 2015 Edition final rule by not requiring
FHIR, we believe that a prudent approach for registration is to require
that it be addressed from a functional perspective while the industry
reaches consensus on the best techniques to enable registration.
Note, that while this portion of proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10)
focuses on the technical standards conformance, we have also included a
specific ``maintenance requirement'' associated with the API Condition
of Certification around the timeliness of this registration process in
production settings as applicable to API Technology Suppliers. This
proposed requirement will ensure that patients are able to use their
apps in a timely manner.
We do not intend to test registration capabilities for apps that
would be executed within an API Data Provider's clinical environment.
We believe this discretion is warranted as API Technology Suppliers and
API Data Providers are best poised to innovate and execute various
methods for app registration within a clinical environment. However, we
request comment on this perspective.
Secure Connection, Authentication and Authorization
We propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(iv) that the health IT presented
for testing and certification must be capable of establishing a secure
and trusted connection with an application that requests patient data
in accordance with the SMART Guide. In the context of this proposed
criterion, this would require that an ``authorization server'' be
deployed and support, at a minimum, ``authorize'' and ``token''
endpoints and the publication of the endpoint URLs via FHIR server's
metadata as specified in the SMART Guide to enable automated discovery
by apps. Again, we note, consistent with this implementation
specification's current scope, that initial conformance would focus on
the secure connection parameters with a single patient's data in mind.
Given that there is not yet a consistent, standardized specification
for FHIR servers to handle secure connection parameters for multiple
patients, we clarify that a health IT developer would be permitted to
approach secure connections for multiple patients in the manner it
deems most efficient to meet this proposed certification criterion.
When an application connects to request data for the first time, we
propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(v)(A) that health IT presented for
testing and certification must be capable of demonstrating support for
user authentication according to the OpenID Connect Core 1.0
incorporating errata set 1 \90\ standard. It should be noted that the
OpenID Connect Standard is agnostic to the actual authentication
mechanism used by the health IT while providing a standard way for
health IT to exchange the authentication information to the app. The
primary benefit being that it lets apps verify the identity of the end-
user based on the authentication performed by the Authorization Server
without having the apps to take additional responsibility for
authenticating the user. We also propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(v)(B)
that health IT presented for testing and certification must demonstrate
that users can authorize applications (in the appropriate context) to
access data in accordance with the SMART Guide. Pursuant to this
proposed implementation specification described above, we also intend
to test health IT in the ``Standalone Launch'' and ``EHR Launch''
modes. Additionally, we clarify that for the purposes of testing and
certification, we propose to require that health IT support only a
limited set of capabilities related to the OpenID Connect Standard--
specifically, only those that are specified in the SMART Guide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, in order to enable patients and providers to get
persistent access to health information without having to re-
authenticate and re-authorize, we propose to require that a ``refresh
token'' must be provided with an expiration period of at least 3 months
from the date issued. The ``refresh token'' could be subsequently used
by the app to obtain a new ``access token'' after the expiration of the
original ``access token.'' Note the proposed refresh token requirement
is different than providing an ``access token'' with an extended life,
which is typically discouraged from a security best practice
perspective so as to prevent unauthorized access if for some reason the
access token were to be acquired for use by an unauthorized
application.
We propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(vi) that health IT presented for
testing and certification must demonstrate that it can support
subsequent connections by an app and requests data without requiring
the user to re-authorize and re-authenticate when a valid refresh token
is supplied. Further, we propose that once a valid refresh token has
been used to get a new access token that the FHIR server must
demonstrate that it can issue a new refresh token to the app, which
must be for a new period no shorter than three months. For example, if
an application were issued a refresh token that was good for three
months upon its first-ever connection and then subsequently connected
to the FHIR server one month later, the FHIR server would need to
enable that connection to occur without re-authentication and re-
authorization, and it would need to issue a new refresh token for a new
three-month period from that access date. Again, we intend to test
health IT in the ``Standalone Launch'' and ``EHR Launch'' contexts
pursuant to the SMART Guide.
We have proposed this renewal requirement because industry
stakeholders at various meetings and conferences at which we have
attended have indicated that a constant need for patients to re-
authenticate and re-authorize their apps creates usability challenges
and may otherwise contradict the Cures Act's intent associated with the
phrase ``without special effort.'' Further, we are not aware of a
standard, consistent
[[Page 7484]]
methodology for specifying the lifetime of refresh tokens in published
technical specifications. As a result, we believe our approach would
improve the current user experience for patients and providers alike.
Additionally, authorization servers maintain binding between the
refresh token and the application to whom it was issued, and hence can
protect against misuse by unauthorized applications.
We believe that the three-month period is a reasonable length given
the proposal for the re-issuance of a new refresh token. However, we
acknowledge that this same policy outcome we discuss above could be
achieved by, for example, having a two-month period. Accordingly, we
seek comment on whether there are available specifications we should
review as well as whether there should be a reasonable upper bound from
a timing perspective (e.g., one year) after which the user should be
required to re-authenticate and re-authorize.
For both the first time connection and subsequent connection
proposals, we recognize that there is not yet a consistent,
standardized specification for FHIR servers to handle data requests for
multiple patients. As noted above, we expect that FHIR Release 4 will
have such specificity. However, for the purposes of meeting this
proposed certification criterion, we clarify that a health IT developer
would be permitted to approach requests for multiple patients in the
manner it deems most efficient.
Transparency Through the Publication of API Documentation
In the 2015 Edition final rule we included transparent
documentation requirements for all three of the API-focused
certification criteria adopted in Sec. 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(9).
These requirements specified that documentation associated with API
syntax (and other technical descriptors), the software components and
configurations that would be necessary in order for a deployed API to
successfully work, and the terms of use for the API be made publicly
available. We continue to believe that such a requirement is important
for proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10), especially in light of the Cures
Act's ``without special effort'' provision. Such transparency and
openness is commonplace in many other industries and has fueled
innovation, growth, and competition. Further, we believe that full
transparency is necessary to ensure that software developers building
to a health IT developer's (g)(10)-certified API have a thorough
understanding of any requirements against which their software will
need to be designed.
In reconciling the 2015 Edition final rule's API documentation
requirements with the new expectations set forth by the Cures Act
regarding a health IT developer's practices, we have determined that
revisions are necessary. Accordingly, we propose to revise the
documentation provision in the API certification criteria adopted in
Sec. 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(9) as well as reflect the same revision
in proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10) and (11). Specifically, we propose to
focus the documentation requirement set forth by the certification
criteria on solely the technical documentation associated with the API
technology. As a result, we propose to remove the provision in Sec.
170.315(g)(7) through (g)(9) associated with ``terms of use'' as this
type of documentation could be considered more reflective of business
practice and better placed with other similar requirements. Consistent
with the Cures Act's API Condition of Certification, we have proposed
more detailed Condition of Certification requirements associated with a
health IT developer's API terms of use in order to address business
practices that could interfere with and create special effort on the
part of an API User.
With respect to the technical documentation that would need to be
made publicly available, we recognize that our proposed formal adoption
of the FHIR standard and the associated implementation specifications
(for Sec. 170.315(g)(10)) would be consistent across all health IT
presented for certification. As a result there may be minimal
additional documentation needed for these capabilities beyond what is
already documented in these standards and specifications. However,
pursuant to the limited mandatory scope proposed for ``data response''
(for Sec. 170.315(g)(10)), we believe that API Technology Suppliers
should disclose any additional data their (g)(10)-certified API
supports in the context of FHIR resources referenced in ARCH Version1
and associated implementation specifications. For example, the Argonaut
IG ``Patient Profile'' includes optional elements for marital status,
photo, and contact (as in contact person like a guardian or friend). To
the degree that a (g)(10)-certified API supports such optional data an
API Technology Supplier would be required to convey this support in its
published technical documentation. Additionally, we note that other
specifications, like the RFC 7591, provide developers some latitude in
terms of the information that could be supplied for the purposes of
registration.
Thus, we propose in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(vii) that an API
Technology Supplier would need to provide detailed information for all
aspects of its (g)(10)-certified API, especially for any unique
technical requirements and configurations, such as how the FHIR server
handles requests for multiple patients (until such time as there is an
approved standardized approach that can be cited) as well as app
registration requirements. For aspects that are not unique and are
fully specified by the FHIR standard and associated implementation
specifications, the developer could include hyperlinks to this
information as part of its overall documentation. Further, we propose
to include the word ``complete'' in the documentation provision in
order to make this point explicit and link this obligation to the
associated transparency conditions proposed as part of the overall
Condition of Certification. We note for health IT developers that the
documentation published must be of the sort and to the level of
specificity, precision, and detail that the health IT developer
customarily provides to its own employees, contractors, and/or partners
who develop software applications for production environments.
Lastly, we note that all of the documentation referenced by this
criterion must be accessible to the public via a hyperlink without
additional access requirements, including, without limitation, any form
of registration, account creation, ``click-through'' agreements, or
requirement to provide contact details or other information prior to
accessing the documentation. It would also require that such
documentation needs to be submitted as part of testing for this
certification criterion and subsequently to ONC-ACBs for review prior
to issuing a certification.
d. Condition of Certification Requirements
To implement the Cures Act, we have designed this API Condition of
Certification in a manner that will complement the technical
capabilities described in our other proposals, while addressing the
broader technology and business landscape in which these API
capabilities will be deployed and used.
Consistent with the attributes we have identified for the statutory
phrase ``without special effort,'' our overarching vision for this
Condition of Certification is to ensure that (g)(10)- certified APIs,
among all API
[[Page 7485]]
technology, are deployed in a manner that supports an experience that
is as seamless and frictionless as possible. To that end, we seek to
promote a standards-based ecosystem that is transparent, scalable, and
open to robust competition and innovation.
The specific requirements of this Condition of Certification are
discussed in several sections below. These requirements would address
certain implementation, maintenance, and business practices for which
clear and consistent parameters are needed to ensure that API
technology is deployed in a manner that achieves the policy goals we
have described. The proposed requirements would also align this
Condition of Certification with other requirements and policies of the
Cures Act that promote interoperability and deter information blocking,
as discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.
i. Scope and Compliance
To start this Condition of Certification, we propose in Sec.
170.404 to apply this Condition of Certification to health IT
developers with health IT certified to any of the API-focused
certification criteria. These criteria include the proposed
``standardized API for patient and population services'' (Sec.
170.315(g)(10)) and ``consent management for APIs'' (Sec.
170.315(g)(11)) as well as the current ``application access--patient
selection'' (Sec. 170.315(g)(7)), ``application access--data category
request'' (Sec. 170.315(g)(8)), ``application access--all data
request'' (Sec. 170.315(g)(9)). In other words, this entire Condition
of Certification would not apply to health IT developers that do not
have technology certified to any of these API-focused certification
criteria. Similarly, this condition is solely applicable to these API-
focused certification criteria. As a result, the proposed policies for
this Condition of Certification would not apply to a health IT
developer's practices associated with, for example, the immunization
reporting certification criterion adopted in Sec. 170.315(f)(1)
because that criterion is not one of the API-focused criteria. However,
health IT developers should remain mindful that other proposals in this
proposed rule, especially those related to information blocking, could
still apply to its practices associated with non-API-focused
certification criteria.
Given the proposed applicability of this condition to current API-
focused criteria and that health IT developers with products certified
to Sec. Sec. 170.315(g)(7)-(9) would need to meet new compliance
requirements associated with such criteria, we also propose certain
compliance timelines associated with this Condition of Certification
that would need to be met.
ii. Cures Act Condition and Interpretation of Access to ``All Data
Elements''
First, we propose to adopt the Cures Act's API Condition of
Certification in Sec. 170.404(a)(1) to fully incorporate the statute's
compliance requirements. Second, strictly for the scope of the API
Condition of Certification, we propose to interpret the meaning of the
phrase ``all data elements of a patient's electronic health record'' as
follows.
For the reasons discussed above, the proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10)
certification criterion and associated standards and implementation
specifications would facilitate API access to a limited set of data
elements (i.e., from the FHIR resources that ARCH Version 1).
Accordingly, for the purposes of meeting this portion of the Cures
Act's API Condition of Certification, we interpret the scope of: The
ARCH; its associated implementation specifications; and the policy
expressed around the data elements that must be supported by (g)(10)-
certified APIs (i.e., FHIR servers) to constitute ``all data
elements.'' Given other proposals related to permitting the use of
updated versions of adopted standards and implementation
specifications, we expect that (g)(10)-certified APIs will be able to
support access to more data over time in response to updates to the
USCDI and the ARCH. As these updates occur, the industry would be able
to incrementally approach the totality of data that can be
electronically accessed, exchanged, and used pursuant to the Cures
Act's reference to ``all data elements.''
Again, we reiterate that this specific interpretation does not
extend beyond the API Condition of Certification and cannot be inferred
to reduce the scope or applicability of other Cures Act Conditions of
Certification or the information blocking proposals, which necessarily
will include a larger scope of data. For example, other Conditions of
Certification will apply to health IT developer behaviors associated
with data that are not part of the USCDI or ARCH, such as the proposals
at 45 CFR 170.402 and the proposals in Part 171, which apply across
several stakeholders including health information networks and health
care providers.
iii. Transparency Conditions
We propose as part of this Condition of Certification that API
Technology Suppliers be required to make specific business and
technical documentation freely and publicly accessible. Thus, we
propose to adopt several transparency conditions as part of Sec.
170.404(a)(2).
Similar to our policy associated with the API-focused certification
criteria, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(2)(i) that all published
documentation be complete and available via a publicly accessible
hyperlink that allows any person to directly access the information
without any preconditions or additional steps. For example, the API
Technology Supplier cannot impose any access requirements, including,
without limitation, any form of registration, account creation,
``click-through'' agreements, or requirement to provide contact details
or other information prior to accessing the documentation.
Terms and Conditions Transparency
In addition to technical documentation, we propose in Sec.
170.404(a)(2)(ii)(A) to require API Technology Suppliers to publish all
terms and conditions for use of its API technology. We believe that it
is important to make this information readily accessible to API Data
Providers, API Users, app developers, and other persons. This
transparency would ensure that these stakeholders do not experience
``special effort'' in the form of unnecessary costs or delays to obtain
the terms and conditions for API technology. Further, we believe that
full transparency is necessary to ensure that app developers have a
thorough understanding in advance of any terms or conditions that might
apply to them and do not encounter unanticipated hurdles once they have
committed to developing software or attempt to implement or deploy such
software in production.
We note that this requirement would apply to all terms and
conditions that apply to the API technology and its use. As noted
above, and for the purposes of this proposal's scope, ``API
technology'' refers to the specified API capabilities for Health IT
Modules certified to Sec. 170.315(g)(7) through (11) under the
Program. We consider ``terms and conditions'' to include any fees,
restrictions, limitations, obligations, registration process
requirements, and other terms or conditions that would be material and
needed to:
Develop software applications to interact with the API
technology;
distribute, deploy, and enable the use of software
applications in production environments that use the API technology;
use software applications, including to access, exchange,
and use EHI by means of the API technology;
[[Page 7486]]
use any EHI obtained by means of the API technology; and
register software applications (as discussed in more
below).
In addition, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(B) that any and
all permitted fees charged by an API Technology Supplier for the use of
its API technology must be published and described in detailed, plain
language as part of its publicly available terms and conditions. The
description of the fees must include all material information,
including, but not limited to, the persons or classes of persons to
whom the fee applies; the circumstances in which the fee applies; and
the amount of the fee, which for variable fees must include the
specific variable(s) and methodology(ies) that will be used to
calculate the fee.
For the purposes of the specific transparency conditions proposed
in Sec. 170.404(a)(2) and their relationship and applicability to API
Technology Suppliers with products already certified to Sec.
170.315(g)(7), (8), or (9), we propose to establish a compliance date
of six months from the final rule's effective date (which would give
developers approximately eight months from the final rule's publication
date) to revise their existing API documentation to come into
compliance with the final rule. We also recognize that API Technology
Suppliers will need to update the proposed publicly available
information from time to time. Thus, for the purposes of and with
respect to subsequent updates to this information, we expect API
technology suppliers to make clear to the public the timing information
applicable to their disclosures (e.g., effective/as of date or last
updated date) in order to prevent out of sync discrepancies in what an
API Technology Supplier's public documentation states and what it may
be communicating directly to its customers (e.g., a change in fees is
directly communicated to customers but not reflected at the publicly
available hyperlink pursuant to its responsibilities under this
proposal). If an API Technology Supplier's actions are out of sync with
its publicly provided documentation, the API Technology Supplier would
be at risk of violating this Condition of Certification. We request
public comment on whether this expectation should be formally specified
in regulation text or if these ``effective date'' approaches for
changes to transparency documentation are common place such that it
would be a standard practice as part of making this documentation
available.
We also note that API Technology Suppliers would be expected to
revise and/or construct terms and conditions for its API technology
that account for and reflect the proposals associated with this API
Condition of Certification and information blocking policies. In so far
as an API Technology Supplier would find it necessary to enforce its
published terms and conditions, we caution API Technology Suppliers to
be mindful of whether such terms and conditions would be acceptable and
consistent with the aforementioned policies in the first place--as an
impermissible term or condition would be problematic regardless of
whether it was actively enforced.
We propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(C) a final transparency
condition associated with API Technology Suppliers' application
developer verification processes that takes into account the fact that
we did not propose to adopt the Dynamic Registration standard as part
of proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10). Had we proposed requiring Dynamic
Registration, we would have also proposed a specific Condition of
Certification that would have outright prohibited API Technology
Suppliers from identity proofing or verifying authenticity of an app
developer when it came to apps that were designed to enable patient
access.
On balance, however, we believe that permitting API Technology
Suppliers to institute a process to verify the authenticity of
application developers will foster additional trust in the growing API
ecosystem. We seek comments and recommendations on factors that would
enable registration with minimal barriers. For example, permitting API
Technology Suppliers to do one- time verification of the app developers
(or even rely on centralized vetting by a trusted third party), which
would allow the developer's future apps to automatically register
without case-by- case checks (or checks for each API Technology
Supplier with which the app developer interacts). One risk to consider
with Dynamic Registration plus a prohibition on vetting, for instance,
is that it would be much easier for a malicious app developer to spoof
another legitimate app developer's app. Such an action could ultimately
lead to confusion and distrust in the market. However, the Dynamic
Registration option would minimize barriers to registration especially
for third-party apps designed to enable patient access. We seek
comments on options and trade-offs we should consider.
Accordingly, and weighing those concerns with the Cures Act's
``without special effort'' provision and our proposed information
blocking policies, we specifically propose to permit API Technology
Suppliers to institute a process to verify the authenticity of
application developers so long as such process is completed within five
business days \91\ of receipt of an application developer's request to
register their software application with the API technology's
authorization server. To clarify, this verification process would need
to focus specifically on the application developer--not its software
application(s). We also clarify that API Technology Suppliers would
have the discretion to establish their verification process so long as
the process is objective and the same for all application developers
and it can reasonably be completed within the five business days--
otherwise such a process could risk implicating/violating other
elements of this proposed API Condition of Certification as well as
information blocking behaviors. The following includes a few non-
exhaustive examples of verification techniques that could be used by an
API Technology Supplier to have additional certainty about the
application developer with whom they are interacting: Instituting a
``penny verification'' process, requiring some form of corporate
documentation, or requesting other forms of authenticating
documentation or transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ We consider a ``business day'' to include the normal work
days and hours of operation during a week (Monday through Friday),
excluding federal holidays and weekends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that five business days is sufficient time for API
Technology Suppliers to weed out malicious developers seeking to
deceive the API Technology Supplier, API Data Providers or API Users,
but request public comment on other timing considerations. Moreover, we
clarify that this proposed Condition of Certification is meant to set
the upper bound for a verification process an API Technology Supplier
would be permitted to take and should not be interpreted as compelling
API Technology Suppliers to institute such a process (i.e., API
Technology Suppliers would not be required to institute a verification
process). Rather, for those API Technology Suppliers that see it in
their (as well as their customers and patients) best interests to
institute such a process, we have laid out the rules that we believe
meet the Cures Act's without special effort expectations. If an API
Technology Supplier chooses not to institute an app developer
verification process prior to enabling the production use of an app, it
would solely need to meet the Maintenance of Certification
[[Page 7487]]
requirement associated with enabling apps for production use discussed
in more detail below.
We remind stakeholders that even in the case where an API
Technology Supplier chooses not to vet app developers, the apps would
not have carte blanche access to a health care provider's data. To the
contrary, such apps will still be registered and thus be identifiable
and able to have their access deactivated by an API Technology Supplier
or health care provider (API Data Provider) if they behave in anomalous
or malicious ways (e.g., denial of service attack). And a patient
seeking access to their data using the app will need to authenticate
themselves (using previously issued credentials by a health care
provider or trusted source) and authorize: (1) The app to connect to
the FHIR server; and (2) specify the scope of the data the app may
access.
As a separate matter, we also recognize that in order to assure
health care providers that the apps they use within their health IT
will operate appropriately, will fully integrate into workflow, and
will not degrade overall system performance, that API Technology
Suppliers may establish additional mechanisms to vet app developers.
Such mechanisms could fit into the ``value-added services'' permitted
fee and result in the app being acknowledged or listed by the health IT
developer in some special manner (e.g., in an ``app store,'' ``verified
app'' list). While our proposals do not specify any explicit limits to
the nature and governance of these approaches, we wish to caution
health IT developers that even though such processes have a reasoned
basis in providing an added layer of trust above and beyond the basic
production-readiness of an app, they can equally be used as a means to
prevent, limit, and otherwise frustrate innovation, competition, and
access to the market. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the
Cures Act, could directly violate the specific Condition of
Certification associated with fees permitted for value-added services,
and could constitute information blocking.
iv. Permitted Fees Conditions
General Proposals Involving Fees
As part of this API Condition of Certification, we propose to adopt
specific conditions that would set boundaries for the fees API
Technology Suppliers would be permitted to charge and to whom those
permitted fees could be charged. As a reminder, these proposals would
only apply to a health IT developer's business practices associated
with its ``API technology'' (i.e., the capabilities certified to Sec.
170.315(g)(7) through (11)). We seek comment on all of the following
proposals.
In Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)(A), we propose to establish a general
prohibition on API Technology Suppliers imposing fees associated with
API technology. This general prohibition is meant to ensure that API
Technology Suppliers do not engage in pricing practices that create
barriers to entry and competition for apps and API-based services that
health care providers seek to use. These outcomes would be inconsistent
with the goal of enabling API-based access, exchange, and use of EHI by
patients and other stakeholders without special effort.
In establishing this general prohibition, we have been mindful of
the need for API Technology Suppliers to recover their costs and to
earn a reasonable return on their investments in providing API
technology that has been certified under the Program. Accordingly, we
have identified categories of ``permitted fees'' that API Technology
Suppliers would be permitted to charge and still be compliant with the
Condition of Certification and Program requirements, and discuss these
proposals below. We emphasize, however, and propose in detail below,
that API Technology Suppliers would not be permitted in any way
whatsoever to impose fees on any person in connection with an API
Technology Supplier's work to support the use of API technology to
facilitate a patient's ability to access, exchange, or use their EHI.
We note that other than for fees charged for ``value-added
services'' (proposed in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(iv)), the fees permitted
under this Condition of Certification must arise between an API
Technology Supplier and an API Data Provider. Any fee that arises in
connection with an API User's use of API technology would need to exist
solely between the API Data Provider and the API User. This policy
reinforces the autonomy that we believe API Data Providers should have
to establish relationships with API Users. However, as discussed in
detail below, API Technology Suppliers would be permitted to charge API
Data Providers based on the usage activities of API Users.
We also seek to clarify that while the proposed permitted fees set
the boundaries for the fees API Technology Suppliers would be permitted
to charge and to whom those permitted fees could be charged, they do
not prohibit who may pay the API Technology Supplier's permitted fee.
In other words, these conditions limit the party from which an API
Technology Supplier may require payment, but they do not speak to who
may pay the fee. For example, if through some type of relationship/
agreement an API User or other party offered to pay the fee an API Data
Provider owed to an API Technology Supplier, that practice would be
allowed and unaffected under these conditions. This is an acceptable
practice because the fee is first arrived at between the API Technology
Supplier and API Data Provider, and then API Technology Supplier
receives payment from another party via the API Data Provider or
directly on behalf of the API Data Provider. As a general matter, we
note that stakeholders should be mindful of other federal and state
laws and regulations that could prohibit or limit certain types of
relationships involving remuneration.
We note that the proposed ``permitted fees conditions'' align with
the requirements of the information blocking exceptions proposed in 45
CFR 171.204 and 171.206. Any fee that would not be covered by those
exceptions, and that would, therefore, be suspect under the information
blocking provision, would equally not be permitted by this API
Condition of Certification. We strongly encourage readers to review our
proposals associated with those exceptions, which are contained in
sections VIII.D.4 and VIII.D.6 of this preamble, respectively.
Permitted Fees--General Conditions
We propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B) general conditions that an
API Technology Supplier's fee must satisfy in order for such fee to be
expressly permitted and thus not contravene the proposed Condition of
Certification. First, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(1) that
in order to be a permitted fee, a fee imposed by an API Technology
Supplier must be based on objective and verifiable criteria that are
uniformly applied for all substantially similar or similarly situated
classes of persons and requests. This would require an API Technology
Supplier to apply fee criteria that, among other things, would lead an
API Technology Supplier to come to the same conclusion with respect to
the permitted fee's amount each time it interacted with a class of
persons or responded to a request. Accordingly, the fee could not be
based on the API Technology Supplier's subjective judgment or
discretion.
Moreover, in order to be permitted, the fee must not be based in
any part on
[[Page 7488]]
whether the API User is a competitor or potential competitor, or on
whether the API Data Provider or API User will be using the data
accessed via the API technology in a way that facilitates competition
with the API Technology Supplier. This condition is intended to ensure
that any fee charged by an API Technology Supplier does not have the
purpose or effect of excluding or creating impediments for competitors,
business rivals, or other persons engaged in developing or enabling the
use of API technology. We believe these fee limitations are necessary
in light of the potential for API Technology Suppliers to use their
control over API technology to engage in discriminatory practices that
create barriers to API technology. These principles are consistent with
the approach described in section VIII of this preamble (``information
blocking'').
Second, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(2) that in order to
be a permitted fee, a fee imposed by an API Technology Supplier must be
reasonably related to the API Technology Supplier's costs of supplying
and, if applicable, supporting the API technology to, or at the request
of, the API Data Provider to whom the fee is charged. For example, the
API Technology Supplier would not be permitted to charge a fee when the
underlying costs relevant to the supply or service have already been
accounted for or recovered through other fees (regardless of whether
such fees were charged to the API Data Provider or to other persons).
Moreover, an API Technology Supplier that conditioned access to its API
technology on revenue-sharing or the entry into a royalty agreement
would be at significant risk of imposing a fee that bore no plausible
relation to the costs incurred by the API Technology Supplier to
develop the API technology or support its use by API Users.
Third, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(3) to require that
in order to be a permitted fee, the costs of supplying, and if
applicable, supporting the API technology upon which the fee is based
must be reasonably allocated among all customers to whom the API
technology is supplied or for whom it is supported. A reasonable
allocation of costs would require that the API Technology Supplier
allocate its costs in accordance with criteria that are reasonable and
between only those API Data Providers that either cause the costs to be
incurred or benefit from the associated supply or support of the API
technology. If an API Technology Supplier developed API technology that
could be supplied to multiple customers with minimal tailoring, the
core costs of developing its API technology should be allocated among
those customers when recovered as a fee. The API Technology Supplier
would not be permitted to recover the total of its core costs from each
customer. Similarly, when an API Technology Supplier uses shared
facilities and resources to support the usage of API technology, it
would need to ensure that those shared costs were reasonably allocated
between all of the customers that benefited from them. However,
whenever an API Technology Supplier is required to provide services and
incur costs that are unique to a particular customer, it would not need
to distribute those costs among other customers that had deployed its
API technology.
Last, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)(B)(4) to require that in
order to be a permitted fee, the API Technology Supplier must ensure
that fees are not be based in any part on whether the requestor or
other person is a competitor, potential competitor, or will be using
the API technology in a way that facilitates competition with the API
Technology Supplier. The use of such criteria would be suspect because
it suggests the fee the API Technology Supplier is charging is not
based on its reasonable costs to provide the API technology or services
and may have the purpose or effect of excluding or creating impediments
for competitors, business rivals, or other persons engaged in
developing or enabling the use of API technologies and services.
We request comments on these general conditions for permitted fees
and whether commenters believe we have created effective guardrails to
ensure that fees do not prevent EHI from being accessed, exchanged, and
used through the use of APIs without special effort.
Specific Proposed Permitted Fees
As noted above, we propose that API Technology Suppliers would be
prohibited from charging fees associated with API technology unless
such fees are expressly permitted. Additionally, as a reminder, the
scope of ``API technology'' subject to these proposals would only
include certified health IT that fulfill the API-focused certification
criteria adopted or proposed for adoption at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7)
through (g)(11). Thus, all other API functionality provided by a health
IT developer with its product(s) that have no link to these certified
capabilities would not be subject to this Condition of Certification.
The following proposals outline the specific circumstances in which
an API Technology Supplier would be permitted to charge fees associated
with API technology certified under the Program. A fee that satisfies
one of the permitted fees in Sec. Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(ii)-(iv) must
also satisfy each of the general conditions in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(i)
in order to be permitted and for its recovery compliant with this
Condition of Certification.
Permitted Fee for Developing, Deploying, and Upgrading API Technology
In Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(ii), we propose to permit an API Technology
Supplier to charge API Data Providers reasonable fees for developing,
deploying, and upgrading API technology. Fees for ``developing'' API
technology comprise the API Technology Supplier's costs of designing,
developing, and testing API technology to specifications that fulfill
the requirements of the API-focused certification criteria adopted or
proposed for adoption at 45 CFR 170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11). Fees for
developing API technology must not include the API Technology
Supplier's costs of updating the non-API related capabilities of the
API Technology Supplier's existing health IT, including its databases,
as part of its development of the API technology. These costs would be
connected to past business decisions made by the API Technology
Supplier and typically arise due to health IT being designed or
implemented in nonstandard ways that unnecessarily increase the
complexity, difficulty or burden of accessing, exchanging, or using
EHI. The recovery of the costs associated with updating an API
Technology Supplier's health IT generally would be inconsistent with
the Cures Act requirement that API technology be deployed ``without
special effort.''
The API Technology Supplier's fees for ``deploying'' API technology
comprise the API Technology Supplier's costs of operationalizing API
technology in a production environment. Such fees include, but are not
limited to, standing up hosting infrastructure, software installation
and configuration, and the creation and maintenance of API Data
Provider administrative functions. An API Technology Supplier's fees
for ``deploying'' API technology does not include the costs associated
with managing the traffic of API calls that access the API technology,
which an API Technology Supplier can only recover under the permitted
fee for usage support costs under Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(iii). For
clarity, we reiterate that for the purpose of this Condition of
Certification, we consider
[[Page 7489]]
that API technology is ``deployed'' by the customer--the API Data
Provider--that purchased or licensed it.
The API Technology Supplier's fees for ``upgrading'' API technology
comprise the API Technology Supplier's costs of supplying an API Data
Provider with an updated version of API technology. Such costs would
include the costs required to bring API technology into conformity with
new requirements of the Program, upgrades to implement general software
updates (not otherwise covered by development fees or under warranty),
or developing and releasing newer versions of the API technology at the
request of an API Data Provider.
The nature of the costs that can be charged under this category of
permitted fees will depend on the scope of the work to be undertaken by
an API Technology Supplier (i.e., how much or how little labor an API
Data Provider requires of the API Technology Supplier to deploy and
upgrade the API technology being supplied). For example, where an API
Data Provider decides to fully outsource the deployment of its API
technology to its API Technology Supplier, the API Technology
Supplier's costs will include the work associated with the development
of the API technology, the work deploying the API technology, and any
work upgrading the API technology.
We propose that any fees that an API Technology Supplier charges
for developing, deploying, or upgrading API technology must be charged
solely to the API Data Provider(s) for whom the capabilities are
deployed. We propose this limitation because we believe that these
costs should be negotiated between the API Technology Supplier that
supplies the capabilities and the API Data Provider (i.e., health care
provider) that implements them in its production environment. In our
view, it is inappropriate to pass these costs on to API Users as doing
so would impose considerable costs on the API Data Provider's current
or potential partners, such as those offering third-party applications
and services, as well as the end-users of API technology and would
amount to the kind of ``special effort'' that the Cures Act's API
Condition of Certification seeks to prevent.
Subject to the general conditions proposed in Sec.
170.404(a)(3)(i) and discussed above, API Technology Suppliers can
recover the full range of reasonable costs associated with developing,
deploying, and upgrading API technology over time. We believe it is
important that API Technology Suppliers be able to recover these costs
and earn a reasonable return on their investments so that they have
adequate incentives to make continued investments in these
technologies. In particular, we anticipate that API Technology
Suppliers will need to continually expand the data elements and upgrade
the capabilities associated with Certified APIs as the FHIR standard
and its implementation specifications mature, and the National
Coordinator expands the USCDI and ARCH.
Permitted Fee To Recover Costs of Supporting API Usage for Purposes
Other Than Patient Access, Exchange, and Use
In Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(iii) we propose to permit an API Technology
Supplier to charge usage-based fees to API Data Providers to the extent
that the API technology is used for purposes other than facilitating
access, exchange, or use of EHI by patients or their applications,
technologies, or services.
We consider ``usage-based'' fees to be the fees imposed by an API
Technology Supplier to recover the costs that would typically be
incurred supporting API interactions at increasing volumes and scale
within established service levels. That is, ``usage-based'' fees
recover costs incurred by an API Technology Supplier due to the actual
use of the API technology once it has been deployed (e.g., costs to
support a higher volume of traffic, data, or number of apps via the API
technology). We acknowledge that API Technology Suppliers could adopt a
range of pricing methodologies when charging for the support of API
usage. We expect that API usage support fees would only come into play
when the API Technology Supplier acts on behalf of the API Data
Provider to deploy its API technology. Thus, the costs recovered under
``usage-based'' fees would only be able to reflect ``post-deployment''
costs. As such, ``usage-based'' fees would not be allowed to include
any costs necessary to prepare and ``get the API technology up,
running, and ready for use,'' which are costs that we propose should be
recovered as part of the deployment services delivered by the API
Technology Supplier if permitted under Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(ii). We
believe this Condition of Certification offers the flexibility
necessary to accommodate reasonable pricing methodologies and will
allow API Technology Suppliers to explore innovative approaches to
recovering the costs associated with supporting API use as a permitted
fee.
As discussed above, we expect that API usage support fees would
only come into play when the API Technology Supplier acts on behalf of
the API Data Provider to deploy its API technology. Conversely, in
scenarios where the API Data Provider, such as a large hospital system,
assumes full responsibility for the technical infrastructure necessary
to deploy and host the API technology it has acquired, the volume and
scale of its usage would be the API Data Provider's sole
responsibility. As a result, in this scenario and under our proposal's
structure, an API Technology Supplier would not be permitted to charge
usage-based fees. Instead, the API Technology Supplier would be limited
to the fees it would be permitted to recover through the ``development,
deployment, upgrade'' permitted fee discussed above.
We reiterate, that ``usage-based'' fees would need to be settled
between an API Technology Supplier and API Data Provider. The API
Technology Supplier would have no standing to go around or through the
API Data Provider to issue fees to, for example, a population health
analytics company engaged by an API Data Provider who accesses the API
Data Provider's data via the API technology.
We propose that any usage-based fees associated with API technology
be limited to the recovery of the API Technology Supplier's
``incremental costs.'' An API Technology Supplier's ``incremental
costs'' comprise the API Technology Supplier's costs that are directly
attributable to supporting API interactions at increasing volumes and
scale within established service levels. We propose than an API
Technology Supplier should ``price'' its costs of supporting access to
the API technology by reference to the additional costs that the API
Technology Supplier would incur in supporting certain volumes of API
use. In practice, we expect that this means that API Technology
Suppliers will offer a certain number of ``free'' API calls based on
the fact that, up to a certain threshold, the API Technology Supplier
will not incur any material costs in supporting API technology in
addition to the costs recovered for deployment services. However, after
this threshold is exceeded, we expect that the API Technology Supplier
will impose usage-based costs commensurate to the additional costs that
the API Technology Supplier must incur to support API technology use at
increasing volumes and scale.
We expect that API Technology Suppliers would charge fees that are
correlated to the incremental ratchetting up of the cost required to
meet increased demand. For example, if, at a certain volume of API
calls, the API Technology Supplier needed to deploy
[[Page 7490]]
additional server capacity, the associated incremental cost of bringing
an additional server online could be passed on to the API Data Provider
because the API technology deployed on behalf of the API Data Provider
was the subject of the higher usage. Up until the point that the
threshold is reached, the additional server capacity was not required
and so the API Technology Supplier would not be permitted to recover
the cost associated with it. Moreover, the additional server capacity
would support ongoing demand up to a certain additional volume, and so
the API Technology Supplier would not be permitted to recover the costs
of further additional server capacity until the then current capacity
was exhausted.
Notwithstanding the above, we note that API Technology Suppliers
may choose to charge for their API usage support services on a ``pay as
you go'' basis, such as a fee-per-call pricing structure. This approach
could be consistent with the requirement that the API Technology
Supplier only impose its incremental costs, and the requirements of
this Condition of Certification more generally. However, depending on
the amount being charged, this pricing model is open to abuse, with API
Data Providers at risk of paying unreasonably high fees if the volume
of API use is high and when the API Data Provider does not share in the
benefits enjoyed by the API Technology Supplier when delivering a
service at scale. As such, the API Technology Supplier would need to be
careful to ensure that the total fees paid by an API Data Provider were
reasonably related to the API Technology Supplier's costs of supporting
the API technology. Where the fees paid over a reasonable measuring
period were not reasonably related to the API Technology Supplier's
costs, they would not be permitted.
We are also aware that API Technology Suppliers may offer a pricing
structure for API usage support based on unlimited API calls. That is,
the API Technology Supplier may charge a flat-fee irrespective of the
volume of traffic accessing the API technology. Such a pricing model
would be allowed under the proposed condition provided that the API
Technology Supplier's fee for API usage support was reasonably related
to the cost of the services that it had agreed to provide. This would
mean that the API Technology Supplier would need to make a realistic
estimate of the volume of API calls that it would need to support to
fulfill any service level promised, and calculate its fee based on the
costs of supporting that call volume. So long as the API Technology
Supplier made a realistic estimate of the anticipated volume and
support level, the legitimacy of the API Technology Supplier's fees,
and its ability to recover them as permitted fees, would be unaffected
by API Users making lower than expected use of API technology.
In the context of this proposed permitted fee's scope and the
proposed general prohibition on fees, we seek to make clear that API
Technology Suppliers would be prohibited from charging (or including in
their contracts and agreements with API Data Providers) any usage-based
fees for API uses that are associated with the access, exchange, and
use of EHI by patients or their applications, technologies, or
services. This would include, among other things, API calls or other
transactions initiated by or on behalf of a patient, including third
parties (e.g., an application or any other technology or service)
authorized by the patient or their representative to request data on
their behalf.
Usage fees associated with the access, exchange, and use of EHI by
patients is a specific example of a prohibited fee that would fit under
the general prohibition of a ``fee not otherwise permitted'' and is
based on several considerations. First, such fees between an API
Technology Supplier and API Data Provider would likely be passed on
directly to patients, creating a significant impediment to their
ability to access, exchange, and use their EHI, without special effort,
through applications and technologies of their choice. More
fundamentally, most of the information contained in a patient's
electronic record has been documented during the practice of medicine
or has otherwise been captured in the course of providing health care
services to patients. In our view, patients have effectively paid for
this information, either directly or through their employers, health
plans, and other entities that negotiate and purchase health care items
and services on their behalf. Thus, our proposal reflects our belief
that it is inappropriate to charge patients additional costs to access
this information, whether those costs are charged directly to patients
or passed on as a result of fees charged to persons that provide apps,
technologies, and services on a patient's behalf.
To be clear, if an API Data Provider sought to employ API
technology for the limited purpose of making EHI available to patients
and their apps, the API Data Provider's API Technology Supplier would
have no legitimate basis to charge the API Data Provider, or any other
person, for the ``patient access'' usage-based costs associated with
the API technology.
Any unreasonable fees associated with a patient's access to their
EHI may be suspect under the information blocking provision. Such fees
may also be inconsistent with an individual's right of access to their
PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR 164.524).)
In addition to our proposal in Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(iii)(A) and
detailed above that this permitted fee would not include any costs
incurred by the API Technology Supplier to support uses of the API
technology that facilitate a patient's ability to access, exchange, or
use their electronic health information, we also propose to explicitly
exclude two additional costs from this permitted fee. In Sec.
170.404(a)(3)(iii)(B), we propose that this permitted fee would not
include costs associated with intangible assets (including depreciation
or loss of value), except the actual development or acquisition costs
of such assets. For instance, an API Technology Supplier could not
charge an API Data Provider a fee based on the purported ``cost'' of
allowing the API Data Provider to use the API Technology Supplier's
patented API technology. As discussed in more detail in section
VIII.D.4 (Information Blocking), we believe it would be inappropriate
to permit an actor to charge a fee based on these considerations, which
are inherently subjective and could invite the kinds of rent-seeking
and opportunistic pricing practices that create barriers to access,
use, and exchange of EHI and impede interoperability.
In Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(iii)(C), we propose that this permitted fee
would not include opportunity costs, except for the reasonable forward-
looking cost of capital. These speculative costs could include revenues
that an API Technology Supplier could have earned had it not provided
the API technology. We clarify that the exclusion of opportunity costs
would not preclude an API Technology Supplier from recovering its
reasonable forward-looking cost of capital. We believe these costs are
relatively concrete and that permitting their recovery will protect
incentives for API Technology Suppliers to invest in developing and
providing interoperability elements (as described in section VIII.D.4).
Permitted Fee for Value-Added Services
In Sec. 170.404(a)(3)(iv) we propose to permit an API Technology
Supplier to charge fees to API Users \92\ for value-
[[Page 7491]]
added services supplied in connection with software that can interact
with the API technology. These ``value-added services'' would need to
be provided in connection with and supplemental to the development,
testing, and deployment of software applications that interact with API
technology. Critically, fees would not be permitted if they interfere
with an API User's ability to efficiently and effectively develop and
deploy production-ready software. This means that in order to be
permitted, an API User could not be required to incur the fee in order
to develop and deploy a production-ready software application that
interacts with the API technology acquired by the API Data Provider.
Rather, a fee will only be permitted if it relates to a service that a
software developer can elect to purchase, but is not required to
purchase in order to develop and deploy production-ready apps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ In this context a health care provider, which could
otherwise be an ``API Data Provider'' in one context, may equally be
an API User in a different context. Given this potential dual role
for health care providers, we have focused on API Users as the party
to whom a fee may be charged for the purposes of this permitted fee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe it appropriate to permit this type of fee because API
Technology Suppliers may offer a wide-range of market differentiating
services to make it attractive for API Users to develop software
applications that can interact with the API technology supplied by an
API Technology Supplier. Such services could include advanced training,
premium development tools and distribution channels, and enhanced
compatibility/integration testing assessments. For example, an API
Technology Supplier would be permitted to charge fees for value-added
services that would be associated with but go beyond the scope set by
the (g)(10)-certified API, such as write access, co-branded integration
into the API Technology Supplier's product(s) workflow, co-marketing
arrangements, and promoted placement in an API Technology Supplier's
app store. That said, we caution API Technology Suppliers that value-
added services would have to be made available in a manner that
complies with other requirements of this Condition of Certification and
with the information blocking provision.
To illustrate the scope of the fees permitted under this proposal,
we clarify that the permitted value-added services fee would enable an
API Technology Supplier to recover certain costs associated with
operating an ``app store.'' However, those fees cannot interfere with
an API User's ability to efficiently and effectively develop and deploy
production-ready apps without special effort. We are aware that API
Technology Suppliers offer services associated with the listing and
promotion of apps beyond basic app placement. Such fees would be
permitted, so long as the API Technology Supplier ensured that basic
access and listing in the app store was provided free of charge if an
app developer depended on such listing to efficiently and effectively
develop and deploy production-ready apps without special effort. Fees
charged for additional/specialized technical support or promotion of
the API User's app beyond these basic access and listing services would
also be permitted. In contrast, if an API Technology Supplier required,
for example, a software developer's app to go through a paid listing
process as a dependency/precondition to be able to be deployed (and
generally accessible) to the API Technology Supplier's health care
provider customers to use, this would not be a permitted fee under this
Condition of Certification, would constitute special effort, and could
raise information blocking concerns.
Prohibited Fees
As discussed above, we proposed that any API-related fee imposed by
an API Technology Supplier that is not expressly permitted is
prohibited. This approach is necessary because, as discussed in section
VIII.C.5.c of this proposed rule, we continue to receive evidence that
some health IT developers are engaging in practices that create special
effort when it comes to API technology. These practices include fees
that create barriers to entry or competition as well as rent-seeking
and other opportunistic behaviors. For example, some health IT
developers are conditioning access to technical interoperability
documentation on revenue-sharing or royalty agreements that bear no
plausible relation to the costs incurred by the health IT developer to
provide or enable its use. We are also aware of discriminatory pricing
policies that have the purpose or effect of excluding competitors from
the use of APIs and other interoperability elements. These practices
close off the market to innovative applications and services that could
empower patients and enable providers to deliver greater value and
choice to health care consumers and additional service providers.
To address these concerns we provide the following non-exhaustive
examples of fees for services that API Technology Suppliers would be
prohibited from charging:
Any fee for access to the documentation that an API
Technology Supplier is required to publish or make available under this
Condition of Certification.
Any fee for access to other types of documentation or
information that a software developer may reasonably require to make
effective use of API technology for any legally permissible purpose.
Any fee in connection with any services that would be
essential to a developer or other person's ability to develop and
commercially distribute production-ready applications that use API
technology. These services could include, for example, access to ``test
environments'' and other resources that an app developer would need to
efficiently design and develop apps. The services could also include
access to distribution channels if they are necessary to deploy
production-ready software and to production resources, such as the
information needed to connect to FHIR servers (endpoints) or the
ability to dynamically register with an authorization server.
Permitted Fees Request for Comment
We request comment on any additional specific ``permitted fees''
not addressed above that API Technology Suppliers should be able to
recover in order to assure a reasonable return on investment.
Furthermore, we request comment on whether it would be prudent to adopt
specific, or more granular, cost methodologies for the calculation of
the permitted fees. Commenters are encouraged to consider, in
particular, whether the approach we have described will be
administrable and appropriately balance the need to ensure that
patients, providers, app developers, and other stakeholders do not
encounter unnecessary costs and other special effort with the need to
provide adequate assurance to API Technology Suppliers, investors, and
innovators that they will be able to earn a reasonable return on their
investments in API technology. We welcome comments on whether the
approach adequately balances these concerns or would achieve our stated
policy goals, and we welcome comments on potential revisions or
alternative approaches. We encourage detailed comments that include,
where possible, economic justifications for suggested revisions or
alternative approaches.
Record-Keeping Requirements
To provide appropriate accountability, we propose in Sec.
170.404(a)(3)(v) that API Technology Suppliers must keep for inspection
[[Page 7492]]
detailed records of all fees charged with respect to API technology and
all costs that it claims to have incurred to provide API technology to
API Data Providers. To provide assurance that the API Technology
Supplier's fees are reasonably related to the API Technology Supplier's
costs, the API Technology Supplier would need to document, with the
same level of detail, any fees charged and associated costs incurred to
provide other services to which any portion of the costs could
reasonably be attributed. For example, if the API Technology Supplier
charges a fee that reflects its costs for internet servers used to
provide the API technology, the API Technology Supplier would need to
document the costs of any other internet-based services it provides, as
well as any other purposes for which the internet servers are used.
Separately, an API Technology Supplier would need to document the
criteria it used to allocate any costs across relevant customers,
requestors, or other persons. The criteria must be documented in a
level of detail that would enable determination as to whether the API
Technology Supplier's cost allocations are objectively reasonable and
comply with the cost accountability requirements, including whether
fees reflect the API Technology Supplier's actual costs reasonably
incurred, were allocated reasonably and between only those API Data
Providers that either cause the costs to be incurred or benefit from
the associated supply or support of the API technology, and were
distributed across customers and other relevant persons in a
permissible manner, as described above.
We note that an API Technology Supplier must retain its accounting
records consistent with the retention requirement proposed for adoption
as part of the Assurances Condition of Certification (proposed for
adoption in Sec. 170.402). In the event that a potential violation of
this Condition and Maintenance of Certification creates a conformance
fact-finding scenario by ONC or information blocking is investigated,
we believe that this period of time would provide ONC with appropriate
visibility into the API Technology Supplier's business practices.
We request comment on whether these requirements provide adequate
traceability and accountability for costs permitted under this API
Condition of Certification. We also seek comment on whether to require
more detailed accounting records or to prescribe specific accounting
standards.
iv. Openness and Pro-Competitive Conditions
We propose that API Technology Suppliers would have to comply with
certain requirements to promote an open and competitive marketplace. As
a general condition, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4) that API
Technology Suppliers must grant API Data Providers (i.e., health care
providers who purchase or license API technology) the sole authority
and autonomy to permit API Users to interact with the API technology
deployed by the API Data Provider. We reinforce this general condition
through more specific proposed conditions proposals discussed below
that would require API Technology Suppliers to provide equitable access
to API technology, which would include granting the rights and
providing the cooperation necessary to enable apps to be deployed that
use the API technology to access, exchange, and use EHI in production
environments.
As important context for these proposals, we note that the API
technology required by this Condition of Certification falls squarely
within the concept of ``essential interoperability elements'' described
in section VIII.C.4.b of this preamble and, as such, are subject to
strict protections under the information blocking provision. As a
corollary, to the extent that API Technology Suppliers claim an
intellectual property right or other proprietary interest in the API
technology, they must take care not to impose any fees, require any
license terms, or engage in any other practices that could add
unnecessary cost, difficulty, or other burden that could impede the
effective use of the API technology for the purpose of enabling or
facilitating access, exchange, or use of EHI. Moreover, even apart from
these information blocking considerations, we believe that, as
developers of technology certified under the Program, API Technology
Suppliers owe a special responsibility to patients, providers, and
other stakeholders to make API technology available in a manner that is
truly ``open'' and minimizes any costs or other burdens that could
result in special effort. The proposed conditions set forth below are
intended to provide clear rules and expectations for API Technology
Suppliers so that they can meet these obligations.
Non-Discrimination
We propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(i) that an API Technology
Supplier must adhere to a strictly non-discriminatory policy regarding
the provision of API technology. As a starting point, we propose to
require in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(i)(A) that API Technology Suppliers
comply with all of the requirements discussed in section VIII.C.4.b of
this proposed rule regarding the non-discriminatory provision of
interoperability elements. Accordingly, and consistent with developers'
obligations under the Program and our expectation that API technology
be truly ``open,'' we propose to require that API Technology Suppliers
must provide API technology to API Data Providers on terms that are no
less favorable than they would provide to themselves and their
customers, suppliers, partners, and other persons with whom they have a
business relationship. This requirement would apply to both price and
non-price terms and thus would apply to any fees that the API
Technology Supplier is permitted to charge under the ``permitted
charges conditions'' of this Condition of Certification. We believe
this requirement would ensure that API Data Providers (i.e., health
care providers) who purchase or license API technology have sole
authority and autonomy to permit third-party software developers to
connect to and use the API technology they have acquired.
Next, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(i)(B) that any terms and
conditions associated with API technology would have to be based on
objective and verifiable criteria that are uniformly applied for all
substantially similar or similarly situated classes of persons and
requests. For example, if the API Technology Supplier applied an ``app
store'' entry/listing process unequally and added arbitrary criteria
based on the use case(s) an app was focused on, such business practices
would not comply with this specific condition and could also be in
violation of the information blocking provision.
Moreover, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(i)(C) that an API
Technology Supplier would be prohibited from offering or varying such
terms or conditions on the basis of impermissible criteria, such as
whether the API User with whom the API Data Provider has a relationship
is a competitor, potential competitor, or will be using EHI obtained
via the API technology in a way that facilitates competition with the
API Technology Supplier. The API Technology Supplier would also be
prohibited from taking into consideration the revenue or other value
the API User with whom the API Data Provider has a relationship may
derive from access, exchange, or use of EHI obtained by means of the
API technology. We believe these proposals
[[Page 7493]]
will help promote greater equity and competition in market as well as
prevent discriminatory business practices by API Technology Suppliers.
Rights To Access and Use API Technology
We propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(ii)(A) that an API Technology
Supplier would have to make API technology available in a manner that
enables API Data Providers and API Users to develop and deploy apps to
access, exchange, and use EHI in production environments. To this end,
we propose that an API Technology Supplier must have and, upon request,
must grant to API Data Providers and their API Users all rights that
may be reasonably necessary to access and use API technology in a
production environment. In other words, this proposal is focused on the
provision of rights reasonably necessary to access and use API
technology and does not extend to other intellectual property
maintained by the API Technology Supplier, especially intellectual
property that has no nexus with the access and use of API technology.
In situations where such a nexus exists, even partially, the API
Technology Supplier would have the duty to determine a method to grant
the applicable rights reasonably necessary to access and use the API
technology. And if practicable, under these partial cases, we note that
it would be possible for the API Technology Supplier to exclude the
intellectual property that would have no impact on the access and use
of the API technology.
Accordingly, following our proposal, API Technology Suppliers would
need to grant API Data Providers and their API Users with rights that
could include but not be limited to the following in order to
sufficiently support the use of the API technology:
For the purposes of developing products or services that
are designed to be interoperable with the API Technology Supplier's
health IT or with health IT under the API Technology Supplier's
control.
Any marketing, offering, and distribution of interoperable
products and services to potential customers and users that would be
needed for the API technology to be used in a production environment.
Note, API Technology Suppliers, pursuant to the ``value-added
services'' permitted fee, would be able to offer and charge for
services such as preferential marketing agreements, co-marketing
agreements, and other business arrangements so long as such services
are beyond what is necessary for the API technology to be put into use
in a production environment.
Enabling the use of the interoperable products or services
in production environments, including accessing and enabling the
exchange and use of electronic health information.
Relatedly, in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(ii)(B) we propose to prohibit an
API Technology Supplier from imposing any collateral terms or
agreements that could interfere with or lead to special effort in the
use of API technology for any of the above purposes. We note that these
collateral terms or agreements may also implicate the information
blocking provision for the reasons described in section VIII.D.3.c of
this preamble. These specific proposed conditions would expressly
prohibit an API Technology Supplier from conditioning any of the rights
described above on the requirement that the recipient of the rights do,
or agree to do, any of the following:
Pay a fee to license the rights described above, including
but not limited to a license fee, royalty, or revenue-sharing
arrangement.
Not compete with the API Technology Supplier in any
product, service, or market.
Deal exclusively with the API Technology Supplier in any
product, service, or market.
Obtain additional licenses, products, or services that are
not related to or can be unbundled from the API technology.
License, grant, assign, or transfer any intellectual
property to the API Technology Supplier.
Meet additional developer or product certification
requirements.
Provide the API Technology Supplier or its technology with
reciprocal access to application data.
These prohibitions largely mirror those proposed under the
exception to the information blocking definition in Sec. 171.206 and
reflect the same concerns expressed in that context in section
VIII.D.3.c of this preamble. However, we note the following important
distinction: Whereas proposed Sec. 171.206 would permit a developer to
charge a reasonable royalty to license interoperability elements, this
API Condition of Certification would not permit any such royalty,
license fee, or other type of fee of any kind whatsoever pursuant to
the general fee prohibition proposed in the ``permitted charges
condition.'' This additional limitation reflects the more exacting
standards that apply to API Technology Suppliers with respect to the
provision of API technology under this Condition of Certification.
While we believe that, for the reasons described in section VIII.D.3.c
of this preamble, health IT developers should generally be permitted to
charge reasonable royalties for the use of their intellectual property,
we consider API technology to be a special case. Certified health IT
developers (i.e., API Technology Suppliers) are required to provide
these capabilities as part of their statutory duty to facilitate the
access, exchange, and use of patient health information from EHRs
``without special effort.'' We believe the language requiring that
these capabilities be ``open'' precludes an API Technology Supplier
from conditioning access to API technology on the payment of a royalty
or other fee, however ``reasonable'' the fee might otherwise be.
We clarify that the prohibitions explained above against additional
developer or Health IT Module certification requirements and,
separately, against requirements for reciprocal access to application
data, are within the scope of the collateral terms prohibited by
proposed Sec. 171.206 even though these additional API Technology
Supplier requirements are not explicitly referenced by that exception
because they are not generally applicable to all types of
interoperability elements. Nevertheless, permitting an API Technology
Supplier to impose these kinds of additional requirements would be
inconsistent with the Cures Act's expectation that API technology be
made available openly and in a manner that promotes competition. For
the same reason such practices may raise information blocking concerns.
API Technology Suppliers--Additional Obligations
To support the use of API technology in production environments, we
propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(iii) that an API Technology Supplier
must provide all support and other services that are reasonably
necessary to enable the effective development, deployment, and use of
API technology by API Data Providers and its API Users in production
environments. In general, the precise nature of these obligations will
depend on the specifics of the API Technology Supplier's technology and
the manner in which it is implemented and made available for specific
customers. Therefore, with the following exceptions, we do not
delineate the API Technology Supplier's specific support obligations
and instead propose a general requirement to this effect in Sec.
170.404(a)(4)(iii).
[[Page 7494]]
Changes and Updates to API Technology and Terms and Conditions
We propose to require in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(iii)(A) that API
Technology Suppliers must make reasonable efforts to maintain the
compatibility of the API technology they develop and assist API Data
Providers to deploy in order to avoid disrupting the use of API
technology. Similarly, we propose in Sec. 170.404(a)(4)(iii)(B) that
prior to making changes or updates to its API technology or to the
terms or conditions thereof, an API Technology Supplier would need to
provide notice and a reasonable opportunity for its API Data Provider
customers and registered application developers to update their
applications to preserve compatibility with its API technology or to
comply with any revised terms or conditions. Without this opportunity,
clinical and patient applications could be rendered inoperable or
operate in unexpected ways unbeknownst to the users or software
developers.
Further, we note that this proposal aligns with the exception to
the information blocking definition proposed in Sec. 171.206. As
explained in section VIII.D.3.c of this preamble, the information
blocking definition would be implicated were an API Technology Supplier
to make changes to its API technology that ``break'' compatibility or
otherwise degrade the performance or interoperability of the licensee's
products or services that incorporate the licensed API technology. We
propose these additional safeguards are important in light of the ease
with which an API Technology Supplier could make subtle ``tweaks'' to
its technology or related services, which could disrupt the use of the
licensee's compatible technologies or services and result in
substantial competitive and consumer injury.
We clarify that this requirement would in no way prevent an API
Technology Supplier from making improvements to its technology or
responding to the needs of its own customers or users. However, the API
Technology Supplier would need to demonstrate that whatever actions it
took were necessary to accomplish these purposes and that it afforded
the licensee a reasonable opportunity under the circumstances to update
its technology to maintain interoperability. Relatedly, we recognize
that an API Technology Supplier may have to suspend access or make
other changes immediately and without prior notice in response to
legitimate privacy, security, or patient safety-related exigencies.
Such practices would be permitted by this Condition of Certification
provided they are tailored and do not unnecessarily interfere with the
use of API technology. From an information blocking standpoint, if such
practices interfered with access, exchange, or use of EHI, the API
Technology Supplier could seek coverage under the exceptions to the
information blocking provision described in section VIII.D of this
preamble. For instance, if the suspended access was in response to a
privacy exigency, the API Technology Supplier may be able to seek
coverage under the exception for promoting the privacy of EHI at
proposed Sec. 171.202.
e. Maintenance of Certification Requirements
We propose to adopt Maintenance requirements for this Condition of
Certification. These maintenance requirements would be duties that we
believe the Cures Act expected API Technology Suppliers (i.e., health
IT developers) would need to comply with in the course of maintaining
their Health IT Module(s)' certification.
i. App Registration Timeliness
In the specific context of application registration, we wish to
underscore that to provide a frictionless experience for developers of
these applications and individuals that use them, an API Technology
Supplier would be required to provide all services and other support
necessary to ensure that such apps can be deployed and used in
production without any additional assistance or intervention by the API
Technology Supplier. For this reason, we propose in Sec. 170.404(b)(1)
a specific requirement for API Technology Suppliers that they would
need to ``register'' (in connection with the API technology
functionality proposed in Sec. 170.315(g)(10)(iii)) and enable all
applications for production use within one business day of completing
its verification of an application developer's authenticity as
described in proposed Sec. 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(C). We propose this
explicit requirement is necessary in order to ensure that a patient's
ability to use an app of their choice is not artificially or
intentionally slowed by an API Technology Supplier, causing special
effort on the part of the patient to gain access to their EHI. We also
emphasize that this is specific duty for API Technology Suppliers in
the course of maintaining the Health IT Module(s)' certificate to which
their API technology is associated. In instances where an API
Technology Supplier chooses not to perform app developer verification
processes described in proposed Sec. 170.404(a)(2)(ii)(C), it would
need to solely meet this one business day requirement from the point of
having received a request for registration.
ii. Publication of FHIR Endpoints
In order to interact with a FHIR RESTful API, an app needs to know
the ``FHIR Service Base URL,'' which is often referred to colloquially
as a ``FHIR server's endpoint.'' \93\ The public availability and easy
accessibility of this information is a central necessity to assuring
the use of FHIR-based APIs without special effort, especially for
patient access apps. Accordingly, we propose to adopt in Sec.
170.404(b)(2) a specific requirement that an API Technology Supplier
must support the publication of Service Base URLs for all of its
customers, regardless of those that are centrally managed by the API
Technology Supplier or locally deployed, and make such information
publicly available (in a computable format) at no charge. In instances
where an API Technology Supplier is contracted by an API Data Provider
to manage its FHIR server, we expect that this administrative duty will
be relatively easy to manage. In instances where an API Data Provider
assumes full responsibility to ``locally manage'' its FHIR server, the
API Technology Supplier would be required, pursuant to this proposed
maintenance requirement, to obtain this information from its customers.
We strongly encourage API Technology Suppliers, health care providers,
HINs and patient advocacy organizations to coalesce around the
development of a public resource or service from which all stakeholders
could benefit. We believe this would help scale and enhance the ease
with which Service Base URLs could be obtained and used.
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\93\ https://hl7.org/fhir/http.html#general.
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iii. Providing (g)(10)-Certified APIs to API Data Providers
We propose in Sec. 170.404(b)(3) that an API Technology Supplier
with API technology previously certified to the certification criterion
in Sec. 170.315(g)(8) must provide all API Data Providers with such
API technology deployed with API technology certified to the
certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10) within 24 months of
this final rule's effective date. We believe this Maintenance of
Certification requirement will permit ONC to monitor and facilitate the
rollout to health care providers of this important functionality. This
is of particular relevance as we propose below to include this
functionality in the 2015 Base EHR definition in place of the
[[Page 7495]]
current ``application access--data category request'' certification
criterion (Sec. 170.315(g)(8)), which means health care providers will
need this functionality to meet the Certified EHR Technology (CEHRT)
for associated Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) programs.
f. 2015 Edition Base EHR Definition
As described in detail above, we have propose to adopt a new
certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10) that would replace the
current criterion adopted in Sec. 170.315(g)(8) and as referenced in
the 2015 Edition Base EHR definition expressed in Sec. 170.102. This
change is necessary to fully implement the Cures Act and ensure that
API Technology Suppliers have the requisite incentive to deploy
standardized APIs that can be used ``without special effort'' and API
Data Providers have added incentive to adopt such functionality. As
result, we propose to create a phase-in for the proposed API
certification criterion in Sec. 170.315(g)(10) from the issuance of a
subsequent final rule. This phase-in period includes separate and
sequential time for API Technology Suppliers and API Data Providers.
Consistent with our proposed compliance timing for the
certification criterion proposed for adoption in Sec. 170.315(b)(10),
we propose to add compliance timeline language to the 2015 Edition Base
EHR definition for the transition from Sec. 170.315(g)(8) to Sec.
170.315(g)(10) that would reflect a total of 24 months from the final
rule's effective date (which practically speaking would be 25 months
because of the 30-day delayed effective date). We believe this approach
is best because it identifies a single, specific date for both API
Technology Suppliers and API Data Providers by which upgraded API
technology needs to be deployed in production. We also believe that 24
months is sufficient for this upgrade because the scope and nature of
our proposals intersect and reflect a large portion of capabilities API
Technology Suppliers have already developed and deployed to meet Sec.
170.315(g)(8). Moreover, this single date enables API Technology
Suppliers (based on their client base and IT architecture) to determine
the most appropriate timeline for development, testing, certification,
and product release cycles in comparison to having to meet an arbitrary
``must be certified by this date'' requirement.
5. Real World Testing
The Cures Act requires, as a Condition and Maintenance of
Certification under the Program, that health IT developers have
successfully tested the real world use of the technology for
interoperability in the type of setting in which such technology would
be marketed. The Cures Act defines interoperability as ``health
information technology that enables the secure exchange of electronic
health information with, and use of electronic health information from,
other health information technology without special effort on the part
of the user; allows for complete access, exchange, and use of all
electronically accessible health information for authorized use under
applicable state or federal law; and does not constitute information
blocking as also defined by the Cures Act.'' \94\ We propose to codify
this interoperability definition in Sec. 170.102. We further note that
we propose in section VIII of this proposed rule to codify the
definition of information blocking included in the Cures Act in Sec.
171.103.
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\94\ Defined in Section 3022 of the Cures Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Program issues, and will continue to issue under our real world
testing approach, certifications to health IT through a process whereby
health IT is assessed against the testing requirements established by
ONC. Often, this means health IT is tested by an ONC-ATL in a
laboratory environment through methods that include a testing proctor's
visual inspection of functions, review of developer-provided
documentation of functions, and testing tools with simulation test
data. An ONC-ACB evaluates the results of testing and makes a
determination, based on these test results and an assessment of
compliance with other Program requirements, to issue the health IT a
certificate. Over the course of the Program's existence, ONC has
emphasized the continued conformance of certified health IT products
post-certification in real world and clinical settings. For example,
ONC expanded the responsibilities of ONC-ACBs in the 2015 Edition final
rule to require that they perform in-the-field surveillance. We did
this to affirm the Program's long-standing expectations that certified
health IT continue to operate in accordance with certification
requirements when implemented in the field (80 FR 62707-62719). These
efforts are also in line with the Cures Act's real world testing
Condition of Certification through their focus on system
interoperability and exchange of information as deployed and used in
care environments--that is to say, in the ``real world.''
The objective of real world testing is to verify the extent to
which certified health IT deployed in operational production settings
is demonstrating continued compliance to certification criteria and
functioning with the intended use cases as part of the overall
maintenance of a health IT's certification. Real world testing should
ensure certified health IT has the ability to share electronic health
information with other systems. Real world testing should assess that
the certified health IT is meeting the intended use case(s) of the
certification criteria to which it is certified within the workflow,
health IT architecture, and care/practice setting in which the health
IT is implemented. Accordingly, we propose that successful real world
testing means for the purpose of this Condition of Certification that:
The certified health IT continues to be compliant to the
certification criteria to which it is certified, including the required
technical standards and vocabulary codes sets;
The certified health IT is exchanging electronic health
information in the care and practice settings for which it is intended
for use; and
Electronic health information is received by and used in
the certified health IT.
We propose to limit the applicability of this Condition of
Certification to health IT developers with Health IT Modules certified
to one or more 2015 Edition certification criteria focused on
interoperability and data exchange, which are:
The care coordination criteria in Sec. 170.315(b);
The clinical quality measures (CQMs) criteria in Sec.
170.315(c)(1) through (c)(3);
The ``view, download, and transmit to 3rd party''
criterion in Sec. 170.315(e)(1);
The public health criteria in Sec. 170.315(f);
The application programming interface criteria in Sec.
170.315(g)(7) through (g)(11); and
The transport methods and other protocols criteria in
Sec. 170.315(h).
The 2015 Edition certification criteria that are not included in
the proposed list include many functionality-based criteria,
administrative criteria, and, overall, criteria that do not focus on
interoperability and exchange of data. In particular, we do not propose
to include the 2015 Edition paragraph (a) ``clinical'' certification
criteria in this list because they do not focus on interoperability and
exchange of data. However, the data in the paragraph (a) criteria
largely will be covered through the USCDI as a minimum data set
expected for exchange; the USCDI is included in such criteria as
``transitions
[[Page 7496]]
of care'' (Sec. 170.315(b)(1)), ``view, download, and transmit to 3rd
party'' (Sec. 170.315(e)(1)), and the API criteria (i.e., Sec.
170.315(g)(9) and (10)).
We solicit comment on whether to include the ``patient health
information capture'' certification criteria in Sec. 170.315(e)(3),
including the value of real world testing these functionalities
compared to the benefit for interoperability and exchange. We also
solicit comment on whether any other 2015 Edition certification
criteria should be included or removed from the applicability list for
this Condition of Certification.
To fully implement the real world testing Condition of
Certification as described above, we propose Maintenance of
Certification requirements that would require health IT developers to
submit publicly available prospective annual real world testing plans
and retrospective annual real world testing results for its certified
health IT that include certification criteria focused on
interoperability. As we considered the various approaches to implement
this Cures Act requirement on health IT developers, we determined that
health IT developers would be best positioned to construct how their
certified health IT could be tested in the real world. Moreover, by
requiring health IT developers to be responsible for facilitating their
certified health IT testing in production settings and being held
accountable to publicly publish their results, we would balance the
respective burden of this statutory requirement with its intended
assurances for health care providers. Additionally, ONC is not
adequately resourced to centrally administer a real world testing
regime among each health IT developer and its customers, nor do we have
the specific relationships with health care providers that health IT
developers do. Lastly, even if ONC were positioned to support and scale
a real world testing regime, we would run the risk of having one-size-
fits-all tools that would not necessarily get to the level of detail
and granularity necessary and reflective of different health care
settings and different scopes of practice that use certified health IT.
Given these considerations, we propose that a health IT developer
must submit an annual real world testing plan to its ONC-ACB via a
publicly accessible hyperlink no later than December 15, of each
calendar year for each of its certified 2015 Edition Health IT Modules
that include certification criteria specified for this Condition of
Certification. Prior to submission to the ONC-ACB, the plan would need
to be approved by a health IT developer authorized representative
capable of binding the health IT developer for execution of the plan
and include the representative's contact information. The plan would
need to include all health IT certified to the 2015 Edition through
August 31 of the preceding year. The plan would also need to address
the health IT developer's real world testing for the upcoming calendar
year and include, for each of the certification criteria in scope:
The testing method(s)/methodology(ies) that will be used
to demonstrate real world interoperability, including a mandatory focus
on scenario- and use case-focused testing;
The care and practice setting(s) that will be tested for
real world interoperability, including conformance to certification
criteria requirements, and an explanation for the health IT developer's
choice of care setting(s) to test; \95\
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\95\ We do not propose to specifically define or limit the care
settings and leave it to the health IT developer to determine. As an
example, health IT developers can consider categories, including but
not limited to, those used in the EHR Incentive Programs (https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/October2017_MedicareEHRIncentivePayments.pdf); long-term and post-
acute care; pediatrics; behavioral health; and small, rural, and
underserved settings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The timeline and plans for voluntary updates to standards
and implementation specifications that ONC has approved (further
discussed below);
A schedule of key real world testing milestones;
A description of the expected outcomes of real world
testing;
At least one measurement/metric associated with the real
world testing; and
A justification for the health IT developer's real world
testing approach.
The intended testing methods/methodologies would need to address
testing scenarios, use cases, and workflows associated with
interoperability. Testing may occur in the operational setting using
real patient data, in an environment that mirrors the clinical setting
using synthetic or real patient data, or in the clinical setting with
synthetic data intermixed. Note that when Health IT developers who are
HIPAA business associates are conducting testing using ePHI, such
testing must be conducted consistent with their business associate
agreements and other compliance responsibilities. The health IT
developer may also partner with other health IT developers to perform
real world testing. We would expect developers to consider such factors
as the size of the organization that production systems support, the
type of organization and setting, the number of patient records and
users, system components and integrations, and the volume and types of
data exchange in planning for real world testing. We would also expect
developers to explain how they will incorporate voluntary standards
updates in their real world testing as discussed further below. While
we are not proposing a minimum proportion of the customer base that
must be covered in real world testing, we highly encourage developers
to find ways to ensure, to the extent practical, proportionate coverage
of their customer base that balances the goals of real world testing
with burden to providers. Health IT developers would not be required to
test the certified health IT in each and every setting in which it is
intended for use as this would likely not be feasible due to the
associated burden; however, developers must address their choice of
care and/or practice settings to test and ONC encourages developers
test in as many settings as feasible. Additionally, health IT
developers would be required to provide a justification for their
chosen approach. Because our approach provides great flexibility for
health IT developers with respect to demonstrating compliance, we
believe it is imperative that they provide a justification to explain
their methodology. Through the transparent reporting of their real
world testing plans, the public will have an opportunity to consider a
health IT developer's chosen approach(es) and whether it is
sufficiently comprehensive to provide assurance that the certified
health IT has satisfactorily demonstrated its satisfaction of Program
requirements including interoperability in real world settings relevant
to their needs.
Health IT developers should consider existing testing tools and
approaches that may be used to assess real world interoperability. For
example, we encourage health IT developers to consider metrics of use
and exchange from existing networks, communities, and tools including,
but not limited to, Surescripts, Carequality, CommonWell Health
Alliance, the C-CDA One-Click Scorecard, and DirectTrust. We do not
believe that testing through the ONC-approved test procedures is
sufficient to demonstrate real world use as the test procedures
developed for initial laboratory testing and certification are
generally setting agnostic, focused on standards conformance, and do
not always test the full scope of the certification criteria's intended
functionality. We also clarify that the
[[Page 7497]]
ONC-approved test procedures are not intended for use in in-the-field
surveillance or for real world testing. Further, we do not believe
connect-a-thons are a valid approach to testing real world use of
health IT because they do not necessarily assess interoperability and
functionality in live settings, but rather test developer/vendor
connectivity in a closed test environment. Health IT developers may
consider working with an ONC-ACB to have the ONC-ACB oversee the
execution of the health IT developer's real world testing plans, which
could include in-the-field surveillance per Sec. 170.556, as an
acceptable approach to meet the requirements of the real world testing
Condition of Certification.
We propose that health IT developers with multiple certified health
IT products that may include the same interoperability-focused
certification criteria intended to be implemented in the same settings
have the discretion to design their real world testing plans in a way
that efficiently tests a combination of products. Likewise, health IT
developers may find portions of their real world testing plans are
transferrable to their other certified products; thus a health IT
developer could choose to submit a real world testing plan that covers
multiple certified products as appropriate and as long as there is
traceability to the specific certified Health IT Modules. To be clear,
developers of health IT products deployed through the cloud who offer
their products for multiple types of settings would be required to test
the same capability for those different settings. However, we solicit
comment on whether we should offer an exemption for services that truly
support all of a developer's customers through a single interface/
engine and whether this would be sufficient to meet the intent of the
real world testing Condition of Certification. Additionally, while the
developers' plans must address each of the interoperability-focused
certification criteria in their certified health IT, developers can and
should design scenario-based test cases that incorporate multiple
functionalities as appropriate for the real world workflow and setting.
We propose that a health IT developer would submit annual real
world testing results to their ONC-ACBs via a publicly accessible
hyperlink no later than January 31, of each calendar year for the
preceding calendar year's real world testing. Real world testing
results for each interoperability-focused certification criterion must
address the elements required in the previous year's testing plan,
describe the outcomes of real world testing with any challenges
encountered, and provide at least one measurement or metric associated
with the real world testing. As noted above, developers are encouraged
to use metrics demonstrating real world use from existing networks and
communities. We seek comment on whether ONC should require developers
submit real world testing results for a minimum ``core'' set of general
metrics/measurements and examples of suggested metrics/measurements. We
also invite comment on the proposed annual frequency and timing of
required real world testing results reporting.
We acknowledge that a subsequent final rule for this proposed rule
may not provide sufficient time for health IT developers to develop and
submit plans for a full year of real world testing in 2020. If such a
situation comes to fruition, we expect to provide an appropriate period
of time for developers to submit their plans and potentially treat 2020
as a ``pilot'' year for real world testing. We would expect that such
pilot testing conform to our proposed real world testing to the extent
practical and feasible (e.g., same criteria but for a shorter duration
and without the same consequences for non-compliance). We welcome
comments on this potential approach.
We clarify, and propose, that even if a health IT developer does
not have customers or has not deployed their certified Health IT Module
at the time the real world testing plan is due, the health IT developer
would still need to submit a plan that addresses its prospective
testing for the coming year for any health IT certified prior to August
31 of the preceding calendar year. If a health IT developer does not
have customers or has not deployed their certified Health IT Module
when the annual real world testing results are due, we propose that the
developer would need to report as such to meet the proposed Maintenance
of Certification requirement. For further clarity, a developer would
not need to report on any health IT certified after August 31, in the
preceding year.
Standards Version Advancement Process
As new and more advanced versions \96\ become available for adopted
standards and implementation specifications applicable to criteria
subject to the real world testing Condition and Maintenance of
Certification Requirements, we believe that a health IT developer's
ability to conduct ongoing maintenance on its certified Health IT
Module(s) to incorporate these new versions is essential to support
interoperability in the real world. Updated versions of standards
reflect insights gained from real-world implementation and use. They
also reflect industry stakeholders' interests to improve the capacity,
capability, and clarity of such standards to meet new, innovative
business needs, which earlier standards versions cannot support.
Therefore, as part of the real world testing Condition of
Certification, we propose a Maintenance of Certification flexibility
that we refer to as the Standards Version Advancement Process. The
Standards Version Advancement Process would permit health IT developers
to voluntarily use in their certified Health IT Modules newer versions
of adopted standards so long as certain conditions are met, not limited
to but notably including successful real world testing of the Health IT
Module using the new version(s).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ We note that standards development organizations and
consensus standards bodies use various nomenclature, such as
``versions,'' to identify updates to standards and implementation
specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We propose to establish the Standards Version Advancement
Processnot only to meet the Cures Act's goals for interoperability, but
also in response to the continuous stakeholder feedback that ONC has
received through prior rulemakings and engagements, which requested
that ONC establish a predictable and timely approach within the Program
to keep pace with the industry's standards development efforts.
Rulemaking has not kept up with the pace of standards development and
deployment in the health care market. There is no better evidence of
this reality than by example from our 2015 Edition rulemaking finalized
approximately three years ago and before the Cures Act added Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification provisions to the PHSA. Two version
updates of the National Health Care Survey standard (versions 1.1 and
1.2) have been issued since we adopted version 1.0 in the 2015 Edition
final rule (October 16, 2015). Health IT developer and health care
provider compliance and use of these versions has and will be necessary
for submission to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) even
though the certification criterion adopted in Sec. 170.315(f)(7)
continues to require conformance to version 1.0. Similarly, many other
adopted standards have seen multiple newer versions introduced to the
market since we issued the 2015 Edition final rule, such as for eCQM
reporting or e-prescribing. The proposed Standards
[[Page 7498]]
Version Advancement Process flexibility gives health IT developers the
option to avoid such unnecessary costs and can help reduce market
confusion by enabling certified Health IT Modules keep pace with
standards advancement and market needs including but not limited to
those related to emerging public health concerns.
We have also been informed by stakeholders that, in other cases,
ONC's inability to more nimbly identify and incorporate newer versions
to standards and implementation specifications that were already
adopted by the Secretary into the Program has perversely impacted
standards developing organization (SDO) processes. Although SDOs can
rapidly iterate version updates to standards and implementation
specifications to address ambiguities and implementation challenges
reported from the field and to particularly address matters that
adversely impact interoperability, the lack of a clear path for that
work effort to be timely realized as part of the Program's
certification requirements has had a chilling effect on the pace of
change. It can also affect the willingness of volunteers at these SDOs
to devote their time to make updates that would be outdated by the time
ONC goes through a rulemaking, which can be years. Stakeholders have
indicated that certified health IT developers, customers and users of
certified health IT, and the SDO industry have been technologically
restricted and innovation-stunted as a result of our prior regulatory
approach, which focused on certification assuring compliance only to
the version of a standard adopted in regulation and did not provide an
avenue for the Program to accommodate iterative updates to standards
during the time between rulemakings. With the passage of the
``maintenance of certification'' provision in Sec. 4002 of the Cures
Act, we believe the approach proposed here is in line with our new
statutory authority regarding Conditions of Certification and
Maintenance of Certification and would better and more timely support
market demands for widespread interoperability.
In supporting more rapid advancement of interoperability, we
believe the proposed Standards Version Advancement Process approach
will benefit patient care, improve competition, and spur additional
engagement in standards development. To this point, currently, if the
USCDI v1 were adopted as currently proposed in Sec. 170.213 and then
needed to be updated to add just one data class or data element (e.g.,
a new demographic element), we would need to initiate notice and
comment rulemaking to incorporate that USCDI version change into the
Program. Likewise, similar updates to standards included in our 2015
Edition final rule are made annually (or more frequently) by SDOs. In
order to attempt to keep pace with such updates, which are published at
different times of the year, ONC would need to continuously engage in
rulemaking cycles, perhaps even more than once per year. We believe
that the proposed Standards Version Advancement Process would allow for
more advanced versions of standards and implementation specifications
to be approved for use under the Program in a more timely and flexible
manner that helps to ease the concerns stakeholders have reported.
Stakeholder input throughout the Program's existence has informed ONC
that updating large groupings of standards' versions while also
adopting new standards through rulemakings that only occur about once
every three years can create an artificial market impact in a number of
ways. Such ``all-in-one'' updates affect all health IT developers and
the vast majority of health care providers at the same time across all
sectors rather than enabling a more incremental and market-based
upgrade cycle in response to interoperability, business, and clinical
needs.
The Standards Version Advancement Process and corresponding
proposed revisions to Sec. Sec. 170.550 and 170.555 would introduce
two types of administrative flexibility for health IT developers
participating in the Program. First, for those health IT developers
with an existing certified Health IT Module, the Health IT Modules
would be permitted to be upgraded (in the course of ongoing
maintenance) to a new version of an adopted standard within the scope
of the certification (without having to retest or recertify) so long as
such version was approved by the National Coordinator for use in
certification through the Standards Version Advancement Process.
Second, for those health IT developers seeking to have a Health IT
Module's initial certificate issued, the Health IT Module would be
permitted to be presented for certification to a new version of an
adopted standard so long as such version was approved by the National
Coordinator through the Standards Version Advancement Process. This
policy flexibility is similar to the flexibility we introduced several
years ago for ``minimum standards'' code sets, but we would require
ONC-ACBs to offer certification under the Standards Version Advancement
Process to National-Coordinator-approved newer versions of all
standards to which Real World Testing requirements apply.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ For purposes of clarity, we note that the Standards Version
Advancement Process would not affect the established minimum
standards code sets flexibility. Consistent with Sec. 170.555,
under the Program, health IT could continue to be certified or
upgraded to a newer version of identified minimum standards code
sets (see 80 FR 62612) than even the most recent one the National
Coordinator had approved for use in the Program via the Standards
Version Advancement Process unless the Secretary prohibits the use
of the newer version for certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to ensure equitable treatment under the Program and in
order for ONC to maintain the Program's overall integrity, each
developer that chooses to leverage the proposed Standards Version
Advancement Process Maintenance of Certification Program flexibilities
would need to satisfy the following.
Health IT Developers Updating Already Certified Health IT
In instances where a health IT developer has certified a Health IT
Module, including but not limited to instances where its customers are
already using the certified Health IT Module, if the developer intends
to update pursuant to the Standards Version Advancement Process
election, the developer would be required to provide advance notice to
all affected customers and its ONC-ACB: (a) Expressing its intent to
update the software to the more advanced version of the standard
approved by the National Coordinator through the Standards Version
Advancement Process; (b) the developer's expectations for how the
update will affect interoperability of the affected Health IT Module as
it is used in the real world; and (c) whether the developer intends to
continue to support the certificate for the existing Health IT Module
version for some period of time and how long, or if the existing
version of the Health IT Module certified to prior version(s) of
applicable standards will be deprecated (e.g., that the developer will
stop supporting the earlier version of the module and request to have
the certificate withdrawn). The notice would be required to be provided
sufficiently in advance of the developer establishing its planned
timeframe for implementation of the upgrade to the more advanced
standard(s) version(s) in order to offer customers reasonable
opportunity to ask questions and plan for the update. We request public
comment on the minimum time prior to an anticipated implementation of
an updated standard or implementation
[[Page 7499]]
specification version update that should be considered reasonable for
purposes of allowing customers, especially health care providers using
the Health IT Module in their health care delivery operations, to
adequately plan for potential implications of the update for their
operations and their exchange relationships. We would also be
interested to know if commenters believe that there are specific
certification criteria, standards, characteristics of the certified
Health IT Module or its implementation (such as locally hosted by the
customer using it versus software-as-a-service type of implementation),
or specific types or characteristics of customers that could affect the
minimum advance notice that should be considered reasonable across
variations in these factors.
We anticipate providing ONC-ACBs (and/or health IT developers) with
a means to attribute this updated information to the listings on the
CHPL for the Health IT Modules the ONC-ACB has certified, and propose
to require in the Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ACBs that they
are ultimately responsible for this information being made publicly
available on the CHPL. We request public comment on any additional
information about updated standards versions that may be beneficial to
have listed with certified Health IT Modules on the CHPL.
We clarify that a health IT developer would be able to choose which
of the updated standards versions approved by the National Coordinator
for use in certification through the Standards Version Advancement
Process the developer seeks to include in its updated certified Health
IT Module and would be able to do so on an itemized basis. In other
words, if the National Coordinator were to approve for use through the
Standards Version Advancement Process several different new versions of
adopted standards that affected different certification criteria within
the scope of a certified Health IT Module, the developer would be able
to just update one certification criterion to one or more of the
applicable new standards and would not have to update its Health IT
Module to all of the National Coordinator-approved new versions all at
once in order to be able to take advantage of this proposed
flexibility.
Health IT Developers Presenting a New Health IT Module for
Certification and Leveraging the Standards Version Advancement Process
In instances where a health IT developer presents a Health IT
Module for certification for which no prior certificate can serve as
the basis for using the Standards Version Advancement Process, we
propose that the health IT developer would be permitted to use and
implement any and all of the newer versions of adopted standards the
National Coordinator approves through the Standards Version Advancement
Process. We have implemented this proposed policy through necessary
adjustments to the way in which ONC-ACBs process certifications in
Sec. 170.550. We recognize that this proposed flexibility reflects
certain programmatic and policy trade-offs. On one hand, a health IT
developer would be permitted to use the most recent version of
standards approved by the National Coordinator instead of having to
build in potentially ``outdated'' standards just to get certified. On
the other hand, the Program's testing infrastructure (which is now
inclusive of government-developed and non-government-developed tools)
may experience certain lag times in terms of when updated test tools to
support the approved version advancements would be available to test
Health IT Modules for certification purposes. As a result, we propose
to provide the ability for ONC-ACBs to accept a developer self-
declaration of conformity as to the use, implementation, and
conformance to a newer version of a standard (including but not limited
to implementation specifications) as sufficient demonstration of
conformance in circumstances where the National Coordinator has
approved a version update of a standard for use in certification
through the Standards Version Advancement Process but an associated
testing tool is not yet updated to test to the newer version. Again, we
clarify that a health IT developer would be able to choose which
National Coordinator-approved standard version(s) it seeks to include
in a new or updated certified Health IT Module and would be able to do
so on an itemized basis.
On balance, we believe that this programmatic flexibility and the
potential interoperability improvements from the use of newer versions
of standards outweighs the subsequent oversight challenges. Moreover,
these oversight challenges can be mitigated by the Standards Version
Advancement Process itself (i.e., the National Coordinator not
approving a new version if the Program or industry is not ready) and
the corresponding Conditions of Certification that continue with the
use of National Coordinator-approved new versions of adopted standards.
We also believe that this approach will continue to hold developers
accountable for, and shift the focus of Health IT Module performance
demonstration to, real world testing for interoperability for deployed
Health IT Modules. As described above, we understand the limitations of
test methods used prior to certification and further emphasize the
importance of continued conformance of Health IT Modules in the field.
However, we request comment on specific Program impacts we should
consider.
General Requirements Associated With Health IT Modules Certified Using
the Standards Version Advancement Process
In all cases, regardless of whether a health IT developer is
updating an existing certified Health IT Module or presenting a new
Health IT Module for certification to new versions of adopted standards
approved by the National Coordinator through the Standards Version
Advancement Process, it would need to adhere to the following once it
elects to takes advantage of this proposed flexibility:
The developer would need to ensure its mandatory
disclosures in Sec. 170.523(k)(1) appropriately reflect its use of any
National Coordinator-approved newer versions of standards.
The developer would need to address and adhere to all
Conditions of Certification and Maintenance of Certification
requirements proposed that are otherwise be applicable to its certified
Health IT Modules regardless of whether those Health IT Modules were
certified to the exact same versions of adopted standards that are
listed in the text of 45 CFR part 170 or National Coordinator-approved
newer version(s) of the standard(s). For instance, the developer would
need to ensure that its real world testing plan and performance
included the National Coordinator-approved standards versions to which
it is claiming conformance.
In terms of compliance with the real world testing Condition and
Maintenance of Certification requirements, the attestations Condition
and Maintenance of Certification requirements proposed in Sec.
170.406, and for the purposes of ONC-ACB surveillance, we note that
health IT developers would be accountable for maintaining all
applicable certified Health IT Modules in accordance with approved
versions of standards and implementation specifications that they
voluntarily elect to use in their certified health IT. If, at any point
after initial certification or updated certification for
[[Page 7500]]
a Health IT Module using the National Coordinator approved advanced
versions of standards or implementation specifications, real world
testing results do not demonstrate the Health IT Module's conformance
to each applicable certification criterion had been achieved and
maintained using the National Coordinator approved advanced version
update of any applicable standard(s) and implementation
specification(s), then the developer would not be allowed to claim or
characterize the Health IT Module as conformant to the criterion using
such standard version, and the standard or implementation specification
version could not be indicated in the health IT Module's CHPL record as
supported by any version release of the Health IT Module, until such
time as they could demonstrate through ONC-ATL or results of real world
testing that they had successfully upgraded the Health IT Module to
fully conform to applicable certification criteria while incorporating
the more advanced version of the standard. Non-conformities associated
with the use of new versions of National Coordinator-approved standards
would be found and enforced through the same Program rules just like
they would be for non-conformities with the versions of adopted
standards that are codified in regulation text. Further, we remind
health IT developers that they would be required to make an attestation
to their real world testing results, including (though not limited to)
those that would be used to support use of new versions of National
Coordinator-approved standards.
Advanced Version Approval Approach
Once a standard has been adopted for use in the Program through
notice and comment rulemaking, ONC would undertake an annual, open and
transparent process, including opportunity for public comment, to
timely ascertain whether a more recent version of that standard or
implementation specification should be approved for developers'
voluntary use. ONC would identify updated versions of previously
adopted standards and implementation specifications based on our own
monitoring of market trends and interoperability needs, as well as
input received from external stakeholders. Such external input may
include, but would not be limited to, recommendations made by the
Health Information Technology Advisory Committee as well as input
received from SDOs.
ONC expects to use an expanded section of the Interoperability
Standards Advisory (ISA) web platform to facilitate the public
transparency and engagement process. At a particular time of the year
(e.g., early fall), ONC would post a list of new versions of adopted
standards and implementation specifications that appear timely and
appropriate for use within the Program (for the subsequent calendar
year) along with accompanying descriptive context (e.g., the types/
nature of updates in the new version of a standard). ONC would then
widely communicate to all members of the public that the list was
available and make a general solicitation of comments to any and all
interested parties for a period of 30 to 60 days. We would generally
expect to receive comments on a range of issues related to the version
of the standard under consideration, including its availability,
testing tools, maturity, implementation burden, and overall impact on
interoperability. Health IT developers, health information networks
(HINs), and the health care organizations that purchase and use health
IT are already familiar with the process of commenting through our
existing ISA resource and we believe this process is well suited to
support widespread engagement by all stakeholders. Similar to the ISA,
we would expect to be open to receiving comments on newer versions of
adopted standards throughout the year leading up to the formal comment
period.
Once the formal comment period closes, ONC would review the
comments and consider the potential impacts of a new version an adopted
standard or implementation specification. We anticipate approving newer
versions of adopted standards and implementation specifications based
on several interdependent Program and market factors, such as its
ability to enhance interoperability and overall compatibility with
other adopted versions, how burdensome it would be to update to the
newer version and the scope and scale of the changes, whether the new
version would be required for reporting by a corresponding program
(e.g., CMS or CDC), the availability of test tools for the new version,
and the new version's relationship to other adopted standards and any
dependencies. Upon concluding our review and analysis, ONC would
publish in this new ISA section a final list of National Coordinator-
approved advanced versions that health IT developers could electively
use consistent with the Standards Version Advancement Process.
Within this proposed approach, we expect that when it comes to a
standard, the National Coordinator would identify version updates to an
adopted standard consistent with that standard's name and version
track. This method would provide long-term consistency for health IT
developers in terms of the overall technical conformance requirements
on which they will be focused.
With respect to adopted implementation specifications, we believe
that more flexibility about the precise name and version track
identifiers would be warranted given that implementation specifications
are developed by market-driven industry consortia (e.g., Argonaut
project and Direct project stakeholders) as well as traditional SDOs.
Similarly, authors of implementation specifications sometimes develop
supplemental documents to the ``parent'' implementation specification
or split the implementation specification to form newly titled
materials. In any of these cases, the resulting implementation
specification may--on its face--initially appear to bear no relation to
a previously adopted implementation specification because of changes to
its title, version naming, or numbering presentation. In reality, in
many of these cases, the implementation specification retains
substantially the same purpose(s) and thus represents a versioning
update rather than amounting to a novel specification. Accordingly,
regardless of its title and author, the National Coordinator would take
into account whether any ``new'' implementation specification under
consideration is more accurately characterized as novel to the Program
or instead is a derivative work that is substantially a more advanced
version of a previously adopted implementation specification(s).
Stakeholders would also be able to comment on the same during the
advanced version approval process described here.
The public listing of these National Coordinator determinations to
approve version updates to already adopted standards and implementation
specifications would serve as the single, comprehensive, and
authoritative index of the versions of adopted standards and
implementation specifications available for use under the Program. We
note, however, that certain Program administration steps would need to
occur (such as ONC-ACBs expanding the scope of their accreditations)
after the National Coordinator has approved newer versions of adopted
standards. As a result, there would likely be a temporary delay between
the National Coordinator's approval decision and when certification to
new standards versions under the Program would start.
We welcome comments on any and all aspects of our proposed
standards
[[Page 7501]]
version approval process as an option available to developers through
maintenance requirements as part of the real world testing Condition
and Maintenance of Certification. This includes all aspects of our
described approach to standards and implementation specification
advanced version approval processes. We also invite comments on our
proposal to allow in conjunction with this maintenance flexibility the
opportunity for developers to elect to present health IT for initial
testing and certification either to more advanced versions or the prior
versions included in regulatory text as of the date the technology is
presented.
Principle of Proper Conduct for ONC-ACB for All Real World Testing
Proposals
We propose to include a new Principle of Proper Conduct for ONC-
ACBs in Sec. 170.523(p) that would require ONC-ACBs to review and
confirm that applicable health IT developers submit real world testing
plans and results in accordance with our proposals. We expect that ONC-
ACBs would review the plans for completeness. Once completeness is
confirmed, ONC-ACBs would provide the plans to ONC by December 15 and
results to ONC by April 1. The December 15 date is the same date as the
health IT developer requirement for submission of the real world
testing plan. For purposes of the Program, this treats both regulated
entities equally and permits them to work out a process that ensures
all real world testing plans are submitted to the CHPL by December 15.
For example, a health IT developer that is confident in its plan and
does not anticipate any further certification, may submit its plan in
July of the preceding year.
The submission of results, however, does not present the same
dynamic of the potential need to work together to ensure the plan is
complete. As such, we have proposed different dates. We would expect
the developers to submit their results by January 31. We believe this
would provide sufficient time for ONC-ACBs to review all plans and post
them to the CHPL by April 1, including notifying ONC when the results
were not in compliance with requirements. ONC would make both the plans
and results publicly available via the CHPL. We note that ONC-ACBs will
continue to be required to perform in-the-field surveillance of
certified Health IT Modules and results of real world testing could be
considered information to inform ONC-ACB surveillance activities.
Because we are proposing to allow health IT developers to implement
National Coordinator-approved advanced versions of standards and
implementation specifications in certified Health IT Modules through a
developer self-declaration of conformity presented for certification if
an associated testing tool is not yet updated to test to the newer
version for the standards and implementation specification version
updates they have chosen to use in the Program, we propose two
requirements to ensure the public and ONC-ACBs have knowledge of the
version of a standard that certified health IT meets. First, we propose
to revise the Principle of Proper Conduct in Sec. 170.523(m) to
require ONC-ACBs to collect, no less than quarterly, all version
updates made to standards successfully included in certified health IT
per the requirements within the real world testing Condition of
Certification Standards Version Advancement Process. This would ensure
that ONC-ACBs are aware of the version of a standard that certified
health IT meets for the purposes of surveillance and Program
administration. Second, we propose (as discussed above), that a
developer that chooses to avail itself of the Standards Version
Advancement Process flexibility must address in its real world testing
plans and results submissions the timeline and rollout of applicable
version updates for standards and implementation specifications. This
addition to Sec. 170.523(m) along with existing requirements for
weekly ONC-ACB CHPL reporting to versions of standards per Sec.
170.523(f)(1)(xvii) would allow for timely updates to Health IT Module
certificate information in the CHPL. Together with the requirements
(discussed above) for developers' communication with their current and
potential customers, we intend to ensure that the public and end-users
have transparency into planned and actual standards and implementation
specifications updates for their certified health IT.
In complement to the above requirements to ensure transparency for
the public and end users, we propose in Sec. 170.523(t) a new
Principle of Proper Conduct for ONC-ACBs requiring them to ensure that
developers seeking to take advantage of the Standards Version
Advancement Process flexibility in Sec. 170.405(b)(5) comply with the
applicable requirements, and that the ONC-ACB both retain records of
the timing and content of developers' Sec. 170.405(b)(5) notices and
timely post each notice's content publicly on the CHPL attributed to
the certified Health IT Modules to which it applies.
We seek comment on the proposed additions to the Principles of
Proper Conduct for ONC-ACBs. More specifically, we seek comment on
whether ONC-ACBs should be required to perform an evaluation beyond a
completeness check for the real world testing plans and results and the
value versus the burden of such an endeavor.
6. Attestations
The Cures Act requires that a health IT developer, as a Condition
and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, provide to the
Secretary an attestation to all the Conditions of Certification
specified in the Cures Act, except for the ``EHR reporting criteria
submission'' Condition of Certification. We propose to implement the
Cures Act ``attestations'' requirements Condition of Certification in
Sec. 170.406. We also propose that, as part of the implementation of
this statutory provision, health IT developers would attest, as
applicable, to compliance with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification requirements described in this section of the preamble
and proposed in Sec. Sec. 170.401 through 170.405.
We propose that, as a Maintenance of Certification requirement for
the ``attestations'' Condition of Certification, health IT developers
must submit their attestations every 6 months (i.e., semiannually). We
believe this would provide an appropriate ``attestation period'' to
base any enforcement actions, such as by ONC under the Program or by
the Office of the Inspector General under its Cures Act authority. We
also believe this 6-month attestation period properly balances the need
to support appropriate enforcement actions with the attestation burden
placed on developers. We will determine when the first attestation will
be due depending on when the final rule is published. We require
attestations to be due twice a year, likely in the middle and end of
the calendar year.
The process we plan to implement for providing attestations should
minimize burden on health IT developers. First, we propose to provide a
14-day attestation period twice a year. For health IT developers
presenting health IT for certification for the first time under the
Program, we propose that they would be required to submit an
attestation at the time of certification and then also comply with the
semiannual attestation periods. Second, we would publicize and prompt
developers to complete their attestation
[[Page 7502]]
during the required attestation periods. Third, we propose to provide a
method for health IT developers to indicate their compliance, non-
compliance with, or the inapplicability of each Condition and
Maintenance of Certification requirement as it applies to all of their
health IT certified under the Program for each attestation period.
Last, we propose to provide health IT developers the flexibility to
specify non-compliance per certified Health IT Module, if necessary. We
note, however, that any non-compliance with the proposed Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification requirements, including the
``attestations'' Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
requirements, would be subject to ONC direct review, corrective action,
and enforcement procedures under the Program. We refer readers to
section VII.D of this preamble for discussion of proposed ONC direct
review, corrective action, and enforcement procedures for the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements under the
Program.
We propose that attestations would be submitted to ONC-ACBs on
behalf of ONC and the Secretary. We propose that ONC-ACBs would have
two responsibilities related to attestations. One responsibility we
propose in Sec. 170.523(q) is that an ONC-ACB must review and submit
the health IT developers' attestations to ONC. ONC would then make the
attestations publicly available through the CHPL. The other
responsibility we propose in Sec. 170.550(l) is that before issuing a
certification, an ONC-ACB would need to ensure that the health IT
developer of the Health IT Module has met its responsibilities related
to the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements as
solely evidenced by its attestation. For example, if a health IT
developer with an active certification under the Program indicated non-
compliant designations in their attestation but is already
participating in a corrective action plan under ONC direct review to
resolve the non-compliance, certification would be able to proceed
while the issue is being resolved.
We welcome comments on the proposed attestations Condition and
Maintenance of Certification requirements, including the appropriate
frequency and timing of attestations. We also welcome comments on the
proposed responsibilities for ONC-ACBs related to the attestations of
Condition and Maintenance of Certification requirements.
7. EHR Reporting Criteria Submission
The Cures Act specifies that health IT developers be required, as a
Condition and Maintenance of Certification under the Program, to submit
reporting criteria on certified health IT in accordance with the EHR
reporting program established under section 3009A of the PHSA, as added
by the Cures Act. We have not yet established an EHR reporting program.
Once ONC establishes such program, we will undertake future rulemaking
to propose and implement the associated Condition and Maintenance of
Certification requirement(s) for health IT developers.
C. Compliance
The proposed Maintenance of Certification requirements discussed
above do not necessarily define all the outcomes necessary to meet the
Conditions of Certification. Rather, they provide preliminary or
baseline evidence toward measuring whether a Condition is being met.
Thus, ONC could determine that a Condition of Certification is not
being met through reasons other than the Maintenance of Certification
requirements. For example, meeting the proposed Maintenance of
Certification requirement that requires a health IT developer to not
establish or enforce any contract or agreement that contravenes the
Communications Condition of Certification does not excuse a health IT
developer from meeting all the requirements specified in the proposed
Communications Condition of Certification. This is analogous to
clarifications ONC has previously provided about certification criteria
requirements whereby testing prior to certification sometimes only
tests a subset of the full criterion's intended functions and scope.
However, for compliance and surveillance purposes, we have stated that
ONC and its ONC-ACBs will examine whether the certified health IT meets
the full scope of the certification criterion rather than the subset of
functions it was tested against (80 FR 62709-10).
D. Enforcement
The Cures Act affirms ONC's role in using certification to improve
health IT's capabilities for the access, use, and exchange of
electronic health information. The Cures Act provides this affirmation
through expanded certification authority for ONC to establish
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements for health IT
developers that go beyond the certified health IT itself. The new
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification provisions in section 4002
of the Cures Act focus on the actions and business practices of health
IT developers (e.g., information blocking and appropriate access, use,
and exchange of electronic health information) as well as technical
interoperability of health IT (e.g., APIs and real world testing).
Furthermore and equally important, section 4002 of the Cures Act
provides that the Secretary of HHS may encourage compliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements and take
action to discourage noncompliance. As discussed in the 2015 Edition
final rule, ONC is not limited to enforcing Program compliance solely
through those requirements expressed in certification criteria adopted
under the Program (80 FR 62710; see also 81 FR 72412). Certification
under the Program also relies on a health IT developer's compliance
with Program requirements that ensure the basic integrity and
effectiveness of the Program, which is further stressed through the
addition of the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
requirements in the Cures Act (referred to jointly as the ``Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification'' in this section of the preamble).
Given these considerations, we propose a general enforcement
approach outlining a corrective action process for ONC to review
potential or known instances where a Condition or Maintenance of
Certification requirement has not been or is not being met by a health
IT developer under the Program, including the requirement for a health
IT developer to attest to meeting the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification. Table 2 below provides an overview of the proposed
approach to ONC enforcement of the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification. We provide more specific proposals following Table 2.
[[Page 7503]]
Table 2--Proposed Approach for Enforcement of the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opportunity for
Proposed regulatory Condition of Opportunity for developer Consequences of not developer to appeal ONC
text certification to take corrective action taking appropriate determination to
corrective action terminate or ban
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 170.401..... Information Yes...................... Certification ban of Yes.
Sec. 170.402..... Blocking. all of a
Assurances...... developer's
certified Health IT
Modules.
Sec. 170.403..... Communications. ......................... ONC may also
Sec. 170.404..... APIs............ consider
Sec. 170.405..... Real World termination of
Sec. 170.406..... Testing.. Health IT Module
Attestations.... certificates if
there is a nexus
between the
developer's
practices and a
certified Health IT
Module.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. ONC Direct Review of the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
Requirements
We propose to utilize the processes previously established for ONC
direct review of certified health IT in the EOA final rule (81 FR
72404) and codified in Sec. Sec. 170.580 and 170.581 for the
enforcement of the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification. We
propose this approach for multiple reasons. First, these processes were
established to address non-conformities with Program requirements.
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification are proposed to be adopted
as Program requirements and, as such, any noncompliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification would constitute a Program
non-conformity. Second, health IT developers are familiar with the ONC
direct review provisions as they were established in October 2016.
Third, Sec. Sec. 170.580 and 170.581 provide thorough and transparent
processes for working with health IT developers through notice and
corrective action to remedy Program non-conformities. Last, the direct
review framework provides equitable opportunities for health IT
developers to respond to ONC actions and appeal certain ONC
determinations.
2. Review and Enforcement Only by ONC
We propose to retain use of the term ``direct review'' as
previously adopted in the EOA final rule to continue to distinguish
actions ONC takes to directly review certified health IT or health IT
developers' actions in comparison to an ONC-ACB's review of certified
health IT under surveillance. We propose, however, that ONC would be
the sole party responsible for enforcing compliance with the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification. The Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification focus on health IT developer behavior and actions in
addition to the certified Health IT Module. ONC is more familiar with
the behavioral requirements based on its expertise and experience.
Conversely, ONC-ACBs are generally more suited, based on their
accreditation and current responsibilities, to address non-conformities
with technical and other Program requirements. ONC also has the
necessary resources and the ability to coordinate with other agencies
to enforce the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification, such as
with the ``information blocking'' Condition of Certification (proposed
Sec. 170.401). Further, ONC enforcement would provide more
predictability and consistency, which would likely benefit stakeholders
in matters related to API fees and information blocking. We do,
however, discuss below the scope of ONC-ACB surveillance as it relates
to ONC's proposed enforcement of the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification.
3. Review Processes
We propose to substantially adopt the processes as they are
currently codified in Sec. Sec. 170.580 and 170.581 for ONC's review
and enforcement of the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification, but
propose certain revisions and additions to the processes to properly
incorporate the proposed Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
and effectuate Congressional intent. These revisions and additions
include renaming and restructuring headings for clarity, which we do
not discuss below.
a. Initiating Review and Health IT Developer Notice
We propose to fully incorporate the review of the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification into the provisions of Sec. 170.580(a)
and (b). We propose in Sec. 170.580(a)(iii) that if ONC has a
reasonable belief that a health IT developer has not complied with a
Condition of Certification, then it may initiate direct review.
Similarly, we propose in Sec. 170.580(b)(1) and (2) that ONC may issue
the health IT developer a notice of potential non-conformity or notice
of non-conformity and provide the health IT developer an opportunity to
respond with an explanation and written documentation, including any
information ONC requests. These processes, including relevant
timeframes, are specified in Sec. 170.580(b).
i. Complaint Resolution
We note and recommend that customers and end-users first work with
their health IT developers to resolve any issues of potential non-
compliance with the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification as
prior Program experience has shown that many issues can be resolved at
this step. If the issue cannot be resolved, we then recommend the end-
user contact the ONC-ACB. However, as discussed above and in section
VII.D.5 below, the ONC-ACB purview for certified health IT generally
applies to certified capabilities and limited requirements of developer
business practices. If neither of these pathways resolves the issue,
end-users may provide feedback to ONC via the Health IT Feedback
Form.\98\
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\98\ https://www.healthit.gov/form/healthit-feedback-form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Method of Correspondence With Health IT Developers
Section 170.505 states that correspondence and communication with
ONC or the National Coordinator shall be conducted by email, unless
otherwise necessary or specified. In the EOA final rule, we signaled
our intent to send notices of potential non-conformity, non-conformity,
suspension, proposed termination, and termination via certified mail
(81 FR 72429). However, in accordance with Sec. 170.505, we propose
that email should be the default mode of correspondence for direct
review of non-compliance with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification.
[[Page 7504]]
Under the EOA final rule, ONC can initiate direct review of
certified health IT in limited circumstances, namely when there is a
reasonable belief that the certified health IT may be causing or
contributing to serious risks to public health or safety or suspected
non-conformities present practical challenges that may prevent an ONC-
ACB from effectively investigating or responding to the suspected non-
conformity. In contrast, we propose in this proposed rule to enable ONC
to initiate direct review to address a health IT developer's conduct
under the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements in
addition to non-conformities in certified health IT. This proposal
would create an expanded set of circumstances for ONC to conduct direct
review. Accordingly, the type and extent of review by ONC could vary
significantly based on the complexity and severity of each fact
pattern. For instance, ONC may be able to address certain non-
conformities under the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
quickly and with minimal effort (e.g., failure to make public a
documentation hyperlink), while others may be more complex and require
additional time and effort (e.g., violation of API fee prohibitions).
Considering this wide range of potential non-conformities under the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification, we believe it is
appropriate for ONC to retain discretion to decide, on a case-by-case
basis, when to go beyond the provisions of Sec. 170.505 in providing
notices and correspondence for non-compliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification.
We solicit comment on the nature and types of non-conformities with
the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements that ONC
should consider in determining the method of correspondence. We also
solicit comment on whether the type of notice should affect the method
of correspondence and whether certain types of notices under direct
review should be considered more critical than others, thus requiring a
specific method of correspondence.
b. Relationship With ONC-ACBs and ONC-ATLs
Section 170.580(a)(3) outlines ONC direct review in relation to the
roles of ONC-ACBs and ONC-ATLs, which we propose to revise to
incorporate Conditions and Maintenance of Certification. We note that
we provide situational examples below in section VII.D.5 ``Effect on
Existing Program Requirements and Processes'' regarding ONC direct
review and the role of an ONC-ACB. As finalized in the EOA final rule
and per Sec. 170.580(a)(3)(v), we remind readers that ONC may refer
the applicable part of its review of certified health IT to the
relevant ONC-ACB(s) if ONC determines this would serve the effective
administration or oversight of the Program (81 FR 72427-72428).
c. Records Access
We propose to revise Sec. 170.580(b)(3) to ensure that ONC, or
third parties acting on its behalf, has access to the information
necessary to enforce the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification.
As specified in Sec. 170.580(b)(1)(ii)(A)(2), (b)(2)(ii)(A)(2) and
(b)(3), in response to a notice of potential non-conformity or notice
of non-conformity, ONC must be granted access to, and have the ability
to share within HHS, with other federal agencies, and with appropriate
entities, all of a health IT developers' records and technology related
to the development, testing, certification, implementation,
maintenance, and use of a health IT developers' certified health IT;
and any complaint records related to the certified health IT.
``Complaint records'' include, but are not limited to issue logs and
help desk tickets (81 FR 72431). We propose to supplement these
requirements with a requirement that a health IT developer make
available to ONC, and third parties acting on its behalf, records
related to marketing and distribution, communications, contracts, and
any other information relevant to compliance with any of the Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification or other Program requirements. This
information would assist in reviewing allegations that a health IT
developer violated, for example, the ``prohibit and restrict
communications'' Condition of Certification. Further, it is possible
that multiple Conditions and Maintenance of Certification may be
implicated under a review, and thus ONC believes it is appropriate to
require a developer make available to ONC all records and other
relevant information concerning all the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification and Program requirements to which it and its Health IT
Modules are subject.
If ONC determined that a health IT developer was not cooperative
with the fact-finding process, we propose ONC would have the ability to
issue a certification ban and/or terminate a certificate (see proposed
Sec. 170.581 discussed below and Sec. 170.580(f)(1)(iii)(A)(1)).
We understand that health IT developers may have concerns regarding
the disclosure of proprietary, trade secret, competitively sensitive,
or other confidential information. As we stated in the EOA final rule
(81 FR 72429), ONC would implement appropriate safeguards to ensure, to
the extent permissible with federal law, that any proprietary business
information or trade secrets ONC may encounter by accessing the health
IT developer's records, other information, or technology, would be kept
confidential by ONC or any third parties working on behalf of ONC.
However, a health IT developer would not be able to avoid providing ONC
access to relevant records by asserting that such access would require
it to disclose trade secrets or other proprietary or confidential
information. Therefore, health IT developers must clearly mark, as
described in HHS Freedom of Information Act regulations at 45 CFR
5.65(c), any information they regard as trade secret or confidential
commercial or financial information which they seek to keep
confidential prior to disclosing the information to ONC or any third
party working on behalf of ONC.
d. Corrective Action
We propose that if ONC determines that a health IT developer is
noncompliant with a Condition of Certification (i.e., a non-
conformity), ONC would work with the health IT developer to establish a
corrective action plan (CAP) to remedy the issue through the processes
specified in Sec. 170.580(b)(2)(ii)(A)(4) and (c). We note that a
health IT developer may be in noncompliance with more than one
Condition of Certification. In such cases, ONC will follow the proposed
compliance enforcement process for each Condition of Certification
accordingly, but may also require the health IT developer to address
all violations in one CAP for efficiency of process. We also propose,
as we currently do with CAPs for certified health IT, to list health IT
developers under a CAP on ONC's website.
e. Certification Ban and Termination
We propose in Sec. 170.581 that if a health IT developer under ONC
direct review for non-compliance with a Condition of Certification
failed to work with ONC or was otherwise noncompliant with the
requirements of the CAP and/or CAP process, ONC could issue a
certification ban for the health IT developer (and its subsidiaries and
successors). A certification ban, as it currently does for other
matters under Sec. 170.581, would prohibit prospective certification
activity by the health IT developer.
[[Page 7505]]
ONC would also consider termination \99\ of the certificate(s) of
the affected Health IT Module(s) should the health IT developer fail to
work with ONC or is otherwise noncompliant with the requirements of the
CAP and/or CAP process (see proposed Sec. 170.580(f)(1)(iii)). ONC may
consider termination if there is a nexus between the developer's
actions or business practices and certified Health IT Module(s) (see
proposed Sec. 170.580(f)(1)(iii)). For example, ONC may determine that
a health IT developer is violating a Condition of Certification due to
a clause in its contracts that prevents its users from sharing or
discussing technological impediments to information exchange. In this
example, the health IT developer's conduct would violate the
``prohibiting or restricting communication'' Condition of Certification
proposed in Sec. 170.403. If the same conduct were also found to
impair the functionality of the certified Health IT Module (such as by
preventing the proper use of certified capabilities for the exchange of
EHI), ONC may determine that a nexus exists between the developer's
business practices and the functionality of the certified Health IT
Module, and may consider termination of the certificates of that
particular Health IT Module under the proposed approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ As noted in the EOA final rule, ``termination'' means an
ONC action to ``terminate'' or ``revoke'' the certification status
of a Complete EHR or Health IT Module. (81 FR 72443).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We propose this approach, which allows ONC to initiate a
certification ban and/or certificate termination under certain
circumstances, to ensure that health IT developers are acting in
accordance with the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification.
However, we stress that our first and foremost priority is to work with
health IT developers to remedy any noncompliance with Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification through a corrective action process before
taking further action. This emphasizes ONC's desire to promote and
support health IT developer compliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification and ensure that certified health IT is
compliant with Program requirements in order to foster an environment
where EHI is exchanged in an interoperable way.
ONC does not believe that noncompliance with a Condition of
Certification should always result in the termination of the
certificate of one or more of a developer's Health IT Modules for a few
reasons. A violation of a Condition of Certification may relate solely
to health IT developer business practices or actions that do not affect
the Health IT Module's conformance to the requirements of the
certification criteria. In this case, termination of the certification
could unfairly and negatively affect a provider's ability to use the
Health IT Module for participation in CMS programs that require
certification because the Health IT Module itself is functioning in
accordance with the technical requirements of its certificate.\100\ As
such, ONC would carefully consider on a case-by-case basis the
appropriateness of termination of a Health IT Module's certification(s)
based on the specific circumstances of the noncompliance with the
Condition of Certification. The proposed enforcement approach balances
the above stated goals and provides an outlined process that can be
consistently followed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Note that, in this example, an ONC-ACB may investigate the
technical functionalities of the Health IT Module against its
certificate and perform surveillance under Sec. 170.556 separate
from ONC's process to enforce compliance with the Conditions of
Certification. If under ONC-ACB surveillance, a health IT developer
does not adequately or timely fulfill a corrective action plan, the
ONC-ACB may suspend and withdraw the Health IT Module's certificate.
The expectations of ONC-ACB duties as relates to ONC's enforcement
of the conditions of certification are described further in the
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In considering whether termination of a Health IT Module's
certificate(s) and/or a certification ban is appropriate, ONC will
consider factors including, but not limited to: Whether the health IT
developer has previously been found in noncompliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification or other Program
requirements; the severity and pervasiveness of the noncompliance,
including the effect of the noncompliance on widespread
interoperability and health information exchange; the extent to which
the health IT developer cooperates with ONC to review the
noncompliance; the extent of potential negative impact on providers who
may seek to use the certified health IT to participate in CMS programs;
and whether termination and/or a certification ban is necessary to
ensure the integrity of the certification process.
As under Sec. 170.580(f)(2), ONC would provide notice of the
termination to the health IT developer, including providing reasons
for, and information supporting, the termination and instructions for
appealing the termination. We propose to add similar notice provisions
to Sec. 170.581 for certification bans issued under ONC direct review
for non-compliance with the Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification, which would also include instructions for requesting
reinstatement. In this regard, we propose to apply the current
reinstatement procedures under Sec. 170.581 to Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification bans, but with an additional requirement
that the health IT developer has resolved the non-compliance with the
Condition of Certification. In sum, a health IT developer could seek
ONC's approval to re-enter the Program and have the certification ban
lifted if it demonstrates it has resolved the noncompliance with the
Condition of Certification and ONC is satisfied that all affected
customers have been provided appropriate remediation.
For clarity, a health IT developer would have an opportunity to
appeal an ONC determination to issue a certification ban and/or
termination IT resulting from a non-conformity with a Condition of
Certification as discussed below and/or seek reinstatement in the
Program and have the certification ban lifted. To note, we propose to
make terminations effective consistent with current Sec.
170.580(f)(2)(iii) and similarly for certification bans (see proposed
Sec. 170.581(c)). We seek comment on whether ONC should:
Impose a minimum certification ban length before a health
IT developer can request ONC remove the ban for health IT developers
who are noncompliant with a Condition of Certification more than once
(e.g., a minimum six months for two instances, a minimum of one year
for three instances).
Consider additional factors for a certification ban and/or
the termination of a health IT developer's certified health IT
resulting from a non-conformity with a Condition of Certification.
f. Appeal
We propose to provide a health IT developer an opportunity to
appeal an ONC determination to issue a certification ban and/or
termination resulting from a non-conformity with a Condition of
Certification and would follow the processes specified in Sec.
170.580(g). As such, we propose to revise Sec. 170.580(g) to include
ONC direct review of the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification.
g. Suspension
Section 170.580 includes a process for suspending the certification
of a Health IT Module at any time if ONC has a reasonable belief that
the certified health IT may present a serious risk to public health and
safety. While this will
[[Page 7506]]
remain the case for certified health IT under ONC direct review (i.e.,
suspension of certification is always available under ONC direct review
when the certified health IT presents a serious risk to public health
and safety), we do not believe such circumstances would apply to
noncompliance with the Conditions of Certification. Further, we believe
the more streamlined processes proposed for addressing noncompliance
with Conditions and Maintenance of Certification alleviates the need to
proceed through a suspension process. Therefore, we do not propose to
apply the suspension processes under Sec. 170.580 to our review of the
Conditions of Certification. We welcome comments on this proposal,
including reasons for why we should apply suspension processes to the
Conditions of Certification as part of a subsequent final rule.
h. Proposed Termination
Section 170.580 includes an intermediate step between a developer
failing to take appropriate and timely corrective action and
termination of a certified Health IT Module's certificate, called
``proposed termination'' (see Sec. 170.580(e) and 81 FR 72437)). We
propose to not include this step when a health IT developer fails to
take appropriate and timely corrective action for noncompliance with a
Condition of Certification. Rather, as discussed above, ONC may proceed
directly to issuing a certification ban or notice of termination if it
determines a certification ban and/or termination are appropriate per
the considerations discussed above. The Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification include requirements of developer business practices and
actions for which, as previously discussed, noncompliance with the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification in these arenas are likely
to undermine the integrity of the Program and impede widespread
interoperability and information exchange. As such, ONC believes it is
appropriate and consistent with the Cures Act to proceed immediately to
a certification ban and/or termination of the affected certified Health
IT Modules' certificates if a developer does not take appropriate and
timely corrective action. A certification ban and/or termination are
appropriate disincentives for noncompliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification.
4. Public Listing of Certification Ban and Terminations
We propose to publicly list health IT developers and certified
Health IT Modules on ONC's website that are subject to a certification
ban and/or have been terminated, respectively, for noncompliance with a
Condition of Certification or for reasons already specified in Sec.
170.581. We currently take this same approach for health IT with
terminated certifications (see 81 FR 72438). Public listing serves to
discourage noncompliance with Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification, other Program requirements, remediation of non-
conformities, and cooperation with ONC and the ONC-ACBs. It also serves
to provide notice to all ONC-ATLs, ONC-ACBs, public and private
programs requiring the use of certified health IT, and consumers of
certified health IT of the status of certified health IT and health IT
developers operating under the Program.
We seek comment on this proposal, including input on the
appropriate period of time to list health IT developers and affected
certified Health IT Modules on healthit.gov. For example, if a
developer sought and received reinstatement under the Program (and
lifting of the certification ban), should the health IT developer no
longer be listed on the ONC website? Alternatively, should we list
health IT developers who have been subject to the certification ban
under Sec. 170.581 for a certain period of time beyond the active ban,
including indefinitely (e.g., with the timeframe when the ban was
active)?
5. Effect on Existing Program Requirements and Processes
The Cures Act introduces new Conditions and Maintenance of
Certification that encompass technical and functional requirements of
health IT and new actions and business practice requirements for health
IT developers, which ONC proposes to adopt in subpart D of Part 170.
The pre-Cures Act structure and requirements of the Program provide
processes to enforce compliance with technical and functional
requirements of certified health IT, and to a more limited extent,
requirements for the business practices of health IT developers (see,
e.g., 45 CFR 170.523(k)(1)) under subparts C (Certification Criteria
for Health Information Technology) and E (ONC Health IT Certification
Program) of Part 170. ONC-ACBs are required to perform surveillance on
certified Health IT Modules and may investigate reported alleged non-
conformities with Program requirements under subparts A, B, C, and E
with the ultimate goal to work with the health IT developer to correct
the non-conformity. Under certain situations, such as unsafe conditions
or impediments to ONC-ACB oversight, ONC may directly review certified
health IT to determine whether it conforms to the requirements of the
Program (see Sec. 170.580 and the EOA final rule at 81 FR 72404).
These avenues for investigating non-conformities with certified Health
IT Modules will continue to exist under the Program and generally focus
on functionality and performance of certified health IT or more limited
requirements of business practices of health IT developers found in
subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170, respectively. Thus, there may be
instances where one or more Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
are not being or have not been met that also relate to certified Health
IT Modules non-conformities under subparts A, B, C and E. Under these
situations, ONC could in parallel implement both sets of processes--
existing processes to investigate Health IT Module non-conformities and
the proposed process to enforce compliance with the Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification.
We again note that under the proposed enforcement approach, only
ONC would have the ability to determine whether a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification requirement per subpart D has been or is
being met. We propose to delineate the scope of an ONC-ACB's
requirements to perform surveillance on certified Health IT Modules as
related only to the requirements of subparts A, B, C and E of Part 170.
Table 3 below further illustrates the proposed difference in scope of
review activities between ONC-ACBs and ONC. Given our proposed approach
that would authorize solely ONC to determine whether a Condition or
Maintenance of Certification requirement per subpart D has been or is
being met, we propose to add a new Principle of Proper Conduct for ONC-
ACBs in Sec. 170.523(s) that would require ONC-ACBs to report to ONC,
no later than a week after becoming aware, any information that could
inform whether ONC should exercise direct review for noncompliance with
a Condition of Certification or any matter within the scope of ONC
direct review. We believe this is appropriate because ONC-ACBs receive
complaints and other information about certified Health IT Modules
through their own channels; as this information may relate to potential
noncompliance with the Conditions and Maintenance of Certification or
other matters within the scope of ONC direct review, ONC should be made
aware of this information.
[[Page 7507]]
Table 3--Scope of ONC-ACB Surveillance and ONC Direct Review for Proposed Enforcement Approach for Conditions
and Maintenance of Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ONC-ACB purview for surveillance ONC purview for enforcement per
Condition of certification per 170.556 170.580 and 170.581
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
170.401: Information Blocking............ Only as it relates to Subparts All of 170.401.
A, B, C and E of Part 170.
170.402: Assurances...................... Only as it relates to Subparts All of 170.402.
A, B, C and E of Part 170,
including the certification
criterion in Sec.
170.315(b)(10) ``EHI export''.
170.403: Communications.................. Only as it relates to Subparts All of 170.403.
A, B, C and E of Part 170.
170.404: APIs............................ Only as it relates to Subparts All of 170.404.
A, B, C and E of Part 170,
including the certification
criterion in Sec.
170.315(g)(10).
170.405: Real World Testing.............. Only as it relates to Subparts All of 170.405.
A, B, C and E of Part 170.
170.406: Attestations.................... Only as it relates to Subparts All of 170.406.
A, B, C and E of Part 170.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example and further illustration purposes, ONC may receive a
complaint of information blocking alleging that a health IT developer
has limited the ability to receive secure Direct messages from users of
a competing developer's EHR. The complaint alleges the certified health
IT drops the incoming message without alerting the user that a message
was ever received. ONC would consider the information blocking concerns
(proposed Sec. 170.401) as well as the potential safety concerns
presented by dropped messages associated with certified functionality
of the 2015 Edition ``transitions of care'' certification criterion
(Sec. 170.315(b)(1)) and standards for the secure Direct messaging in
its review. For the potential safety concerns, ONC would be exercising
its authority to review certified health IT that may be causing or
contributing to conditions that present a serious risk to public health
or safety under Sec. 170.580(a)(2)(i). In contrast, the ONC-ACB would
not be responsible for reviewing the information blocking or safety
concerns directly, but it would be responsible for assessing whether
surveillance needs to be performed on the certified health IT for the
functionality in the 2015 Edition ``transitions of care'' certification
criterion (Sec. 170.315(b)(1)) and the 2015 Edition ``Direct Project''
certification criterion (Sec. 170.315(h)(1)), as these requirements
are found within subpart C of Part 170 and could be implicated based on
the complaint.
To provide another example, an ONC-ACB could receive complaints
from users that a developer's certified health IT does not support the
FHIR DSTU 2 standard and associated API resource collection in health
(ARCH Version 1) as required in the proposed new 2015 Edition
certification criterion Sec. 170.315(g)(10) (proposed under subparts B
and C).The respective ONC-ACB(s) responsible for the certification of
the certified health IT could surveil this health IT under the
requirements of Sec. 170.556 (under subpart E). Additionally, ONC
could follow the CAP process under Sec. 170.580(c) to enforce the
associated ``API'' Condition of Certification proposed in Sec.
170.404(a)(2). During the course of the ONC-ACB surveillance, the ONC-
ACB subsequently discovers the developer has implemented the FHIR DSTU
2 standard and associated resources in such as a way that the patient's
historical medications are being accessed, but not the patient's
current medications. The ONC-ACB would notify ONC of its findings as it
relates to a Condition of Certification under subpart D and pursue its
own corrective action process under the surveillance requirements of
Sec. 170.556. Once ONC receives information regarding the complaints
from the ONC-ACB, we could consider the potential safety risks for
providers using the developer's API to access new or referred patients'
medical information for diagnostic and treatment purposes. In this
example, ONC could review both the certified health IT and the
developer action under Sec. 170.580, which is proposed to be expanded
to account for developer actions under the Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification (see proposed Sec. 170.580(a)(2)(iii)) in addition to
ONC's direct investigation of certified health IT for potential safety
risks (see Sec. 170.580(a)(2)(i)).
6. Concurrent Enforcement by the Office of Inspector General
We clarify that the enforcement approach described in this proposal
would apply to ONC's administration of the Conditions and Maintenance
of Certification and other requirements under the Program but would not
apply to other agencies or offices that have independent authority to
investigate and take enforcement action against a health IT developer
of certified health IT. Notably, section 3022(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the PHSA,
as added by the Cures Act, authorizes the OIG to investigate claims
that a health IT developer of certified health IT has engaged in
information blocking, which is defined by section 3022(a)(1) of the
PHSA subject to reasonable and necessary activities identified by the
Secretary as exceptions to the definition as proposed at part 171 (see
section VIII. of this proposed rule). Additionally, section
3022(b)(1)(A)(i) authorizes OIG to investigate claims that a health IT
developer of certified health IT has submitted a false attestation
under the Condition of Certification described at section
3001(c)(5)(D)(vii). We emphasize that ONC's and OIG's respective
authorities under the Cures Act (and in general) are independent and
that either or both offices may exercise those authorities at any time.
We anticipate, however, that ONC and OIG may coordinate their
respective enforcement activities, as appropriate, such as by sharing
information about claims or suggestions of possible information
blocking or false attestations (including violations of Conditions and
Maintenance of Certification that may indicate that a developer has
falsely attested to meeting a condition). Therefore, we propose that we
may coordinate our review of a claim of information blocking with the
OIG or defer to the OIG to lead a review of a claim of information
blocking. In addition, we propose that we may rely on OIG findings to
form the basis of a direct review action.
7. Applicability of Conditions and Maintenance of Certification
Requirements for Self-Developers
The final rule establishing ONC's Permanent Certification Program,
``Establishment of the Permanent Certification for Health Information''
(76 FR 1261), addresses self-developers. The language in the final rule
describes the concept of ``self-developed'' as referring to a Complete
EHR or EHR Module designed, created, or modified by an entity that
assumed the total costs for
[[Page 7508]]
testing and certification and that will be the primary user of the
health IT (76 FR 1300). Therefore, self-developers differ from other
health IT developers in that their products are not made commercially
available and they do not have customers. While we propose that all
general Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements apply
to such developers, we also seek comment on which aspects of the
Conditions and Maintenance of Certification requirements may not be
applicable to self-developers. For example, when considering the
Communications Condition of Certification, a self-developer of health
IT may not have customer contracts, but could have other agreements in
place, such as NDAs, that would be subject to the Condition of
Certification.
VIII. Information Blocking
A. Statutory Basis
Section 4004 of the Cures Act added section 3022 of the PHSA (42
U.S.C. 300jj-52, ``the information blocking provision''). Section
3022(a)(1) of the PHSA defines practices that constitute information
blocking when engaged in by a health care provider, or a health
information technology developer, exchange, or network. Section
3022(a)(3) authorizes the Secretary to identify, through notice and
comment rulemaking, reasonable and necessary activities that do not
constitute information blocking for purposes of the definition set
forth in section 3022(a)(1). We propose to establish seven exceptions
to the information blocking definition, each of which would define
certain activities that would not constitute information blocking for
purposes of section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA because they are reasonable
and necessary to further the ultimate policy goals of the information
blocking provision. We also propose to interpret or define certain
statutory terms and concepts that are ambiguous, incomplete, or provide
the Secretary with discretion, and that we believe are necessary to
carry out the Secretary's rulemaking responsibilities under section
3022(a)(3).
B. Legislative Background and Policy Considerations
In this section, we outline the purpose of the information blocking
provision and related policy and practical considerations that we
considered in identifying the reasonable and necessary activities that
are proposed as exceptions to the definition of information blocking
described subsequently in section VIII.D of this preamble.
1. Purpose of the Information Blocking Provision
The information blocking provision was enacted in response to
concerns that some individuals and entities are engaging in practices
that unreasonably limit the availability and use of electronic health
information (EHI) for authorized and permitted purposes. These
practices undermine public and private sector investments in the
nation's health IT infrastructure and frustrate efforts to use modern
technologies to improve health care quality and efficiency, accelerate
research and innovation, and provide greater value and choice to health
care consumers.
The nature and extent of information blocking has come into sharp
focus in recent years. In 2015, at the request of Congress, we
submitted a Report on Health Information Blocking \101\ (``Information
Blocking Congressional Report''), in which we commented on the then
current state of technology and of health IT and health care markets.
Notably, we observed that prevailing market conditions create
incentives for some individuals and entities to exercise their control
over EHI in ways that limit its availability and use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ ONC, Report to Congress on Health Information Blocking
(Apr. 2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf [hereinafter ``Information Blocking
Congressional Report''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since that time, we have continued to receive complaints and
reports of information blocking from patients, clinicians, health care
executives, payers, app developers and other technology companies,
registries and health information exchanges, professional and trade
associations, and many other stakeholders. ONC has listened to and
reviewed these complaints and reports, consulted with stakeholders, and
solicited input from our federal partners in order to inform our
proposed information blocking policies. Stakeholders described
discriminatory pricing policies that have the obvious purpose and
effect of excluding competitors from the use of interoperability
elements. Many of the industry stakeholders who shared their
perspectives with us in listening sessions, including several health IT
developers of certified health IT, condemned these practices and urged
us to swiftly address them. Our engagement with stakeholders confirms
that, despite significant public and private sector efforts to improve
interoperability and data accessibility, adverse incentives remain and
continue to undermine progress toward a more connected health system.
Based on these economic realities and our first-hand experience
working with the health IT industry and stakeholders, in the
Information Blocking Congressional Report, we concluded that
information blocking is a serious problem and recommended that Congress
prohibit information blocking and provide penalties and enforcement
mechanisms to deter these harmful practices.
Recent empirical and economic research further underscores the
intractability of this problem and its harmful effects. In a national
survey of health information organizations, half of respondents
reported that EHR developers routinely engage in information blocking,
and a quarter of respondents reported that hospitals and health systems
routinely do so. The survey reported that perceived motivations for
such conduct included, for EHR vendors, maximizing short-term revenue
and competing for new clients, and for hospitals and health systems,
strengthening their competitive position relative to other hospitals
and health systems.\102\ Other research suggests that these practices
weaken competition among health care providers by limiting patient
mobility, encouraging consolidation, and creating barriers to entry for
developers of new and innovative applications and technologies that
enable more effective uses of clinical data to improve population
health and the patient experience.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ See, e.g., Julia Adler-Milstein and Eric Pfeifer,
Information Blocking: Is It Occurring And What Policy Strategies Can
Address It?, 95 Milbank Quarterly 117, 124-25 (Mar. 2017), available
at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0009.12247/full.
\103\ See, e.g., Martin Gaynor, Farzad Mostashari, and Paul B.
Ginsberg, Making Health Care Markets Work: Competition Policy for
Health Care, 16-17 (Apr. 2017), available at https://heinz.cmu.edu/news/news-detail/index.aspx?nid=3930; Diego A. Martinez et al., A
Strategic Gaming Model For Health Information Exchange Markets,
Health Care Mgmt. Science (Sept. 2016). (``[S]ome healthcare
provider entities may be interfering with HIE across disparate and
unaffiliated providers to gain market advantage.'') Niam Yaraghi, A
Sustainable Business Model for Health Information Exchange
Platforms: The Solution to Interoperability in Healthcare IT (2015),
available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/01/30-sustainable-business-model-health-information-exchange-yaraghi;
Thomas C. Tsai & Ashish K. Jha, Hospital Consolidation, Competition,
and Quality: Is Bigger Necessarily Better?, 312 J. AM. MED. ASSOC.
29, 29 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The information blocking provision provides a comprehensive
response to these concerns. The information blocking provision defines
and creates possible penalties and disincentives for
[[Page 7509]]
information blocking in broad terms, while working to deter the entire
spectrum of practices that unnecessarily impede the flow of EHI or its
use to improve health and the delivery of care. The information
blocking provision applies to the conduct of health care providers, and
to health IT developers of certified health IT, exchanges, and
networks, and seeks to deter it with substantial penalties, including
civil money penalties, and disincentives for violations. Additionally,
developers of health IT certified under the Program are prohibited from
information blocking under 3001(c)(5)(D)(i) of the PHSA. To promote
effective enforcement, the information blocking provision empowers the
HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to investigate claims of
information blocking and provides referral processes to facilitate
coordination with other relevant agencies, including ONC, the HHS
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The information blocking provision also provides for a complaint
process and corresponding confidentiality protections to encourage and
facilitate the reporting of information blocking. Enforcement of the
information blocking provision is buttressed by section
3001(c)(5)(D)(i) and (vi) of the PHSA, which prohibits information
blocking by developers of certified health IT as a Condition and
Maintenance of Certification requirement under the Program and requires
them to attest that they have not engaged in such practices.
2. Policy Considerations and Approach to the Information Blocking
Provision
To ensure that individuals and entities that engage in information
blocking are held accountable, the information blocking provision
encompasses a relatively broad range of potential practices. For
example, it is possible that some activities that are innocuous, or
even beneficial, could technically implicate the information blocking
provision. Given the possibility of these practices, Congress
authorized the Secretary to identify reasonable and necessary
activities that do not constitute information blocking (see section
3022(a)(3) of the PHSA) (in this proposed rule, we refer to such
reasonable and necessary activities identified by the Secretary as
``exceptions'' to the information blocking provision). The information
blocking provision also excludes from the definition of information
blocking practices that are required by law (section 3022(a)(1) of the
PHSA) and clarifies certain other practices that would not be penalized
(sections 3022(a)(6) and (7) of the PHSA).
In considering potential exceptions to the information blocking
provision, we must balance a number of policy and practical
considerations. To minimize compliance and other burdens for
stakeholders, we seek to promote policies that are clear, predictable,
and administrable. In addition, we seek to implement the information
blocking provision in a way that is sensitive to legitimate practical
challenges that may prevent access, exchange, or use of EHI in certain
situations. We must also accommodate practices that, while they may
inhibit access, exchange, or use of EHI, are reasonable and necessary
to advance other compelling policy interests, such as preventing harm
to patients and others, promoting the privacy and security of EHI, and
promoting competition and consumer welfare.
At the same time, while pursuing these objectives, we must adhere
to Congress's plainly expressed intent to provide a comprehensive
response to the information blocking problem. Information blocking can
occur through a variety of business, technical, and organizational
practices that can be difficult to detect and that are constantly
changing as technology and industry conditions evolve. The statute
responds to these challenges by defining information blocking broadly
and in a manner that allows for careful consideration of relevant facts
and circumstances in individual cases.
Accordingly, we propose to establish certain defined exceptions to
the information blocking provision. These exceptions would be subject
to strict conditions that balance the considerations described above.
Based on those considerations, in developing the proposed exceptions,
we applied three overarching policy criteria. First, each exception
would be limited to certain activities that are both reasonable and
necessary to advance the aims of the information blocking provision.
These reasonable and necessary activities include: Promoting public
confidence in the health IT infrastructure by supporting the privacy
and security of EHI, and protecting patient safety; and promoting
competition and innovation in health IT and its use to provide health
care services to consumers. Second, we believe that each exception
addresses a significant risk that regulated individuals and entities
will not engage in these reasonable and necessary activities because of
uncertainty regarding the breadth or applicability of the information
blocking provision. Third, and last, each exception is intended to be
tailored, through appropriate conditions, so that it is limited to the
reasonable and necessary activities that it is designed to protect and
does not extend protection to other activities or practices that could
raise information blocking concerns.
We discuss these policy considerations in more detail in the
context of each of the exceptions proposed in section VIII.D of this
preamble.
C. Relevant Statutory Terms and Provisions
In this section of the preamble, we discuss how we propose to
interpret certain aspects of the information blocking provision that we
believe are ambiguous, incomplete, or that provide the Secretary with
discretion. We propose to define or interpret certain terms or concepts
that are present in the statute and, in a few instances, to establish
new regulatory terms or definitions that we believe are necessary to
implement the Secretary's authority under section 3022(a)(3) to
identify reasonable and necessary activities that do not constitute
information blocking. Our goal in interpreting the statute and defining
relevant terms is to provide greater clarity concerning the types of
practices that could implicate the information blocking provision and,
relatedly, to more effectively communicate the applicability and scope
of the proposed exceptions outlined in this proposed rule. We believe
that these proposals will provide a more meaningful opportunity for the
public to comment on the proposed exceptions and our overall approach
to interpreting and administering the information blocking provision.
Additionally, we believe additional interpretive clarity will assist
regulated actors to comply with the requirements of the information
blocking provision.
1. ``Required by Law''
With regard to the statute's exclusion of practices that are
``required by law'' from the definition of information blocking, we
emphasize that ``required by law'' refers specifically to interferences
with access, exchange, or use of EHI that are explicitly required by
state or federal law. By carving out practices that are ``required by
law,'' the statute acknowledged that there are state and federal laws
that advance important policy interests and objectives by restricting
access, exchange, and use of their EHI, and that practices that follow
such laws should not be considered information blocking.
[[Page 7510]]
We note that for the purpose of developing an exception for
reasonable and necessary privacy-protective practices, we have
distinguished between interferences that are ``required by law'' and
those engaged in pursuant to a privacy law, but which are not
``required by law.'' The former does not fall within the definition of
information blocking, but the latter may implicate the information
blocking provision and an exception may be necessary. For a detailed
discussion of this topic, please see section VIII.D.2 of this preamble.
2. Health Care Providers, Health IT Developers, Exchanges, and Networks
Section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA, in defining information blocking,
refers to four classes of individuals and entities that may engage in
information blocking and which include: Health care providers, health
IT developers of certified health IT, networks, and exchanges. We
propose to adopt definitions of these terms to provide clarity
regarding the types of individuals and entities to whom the information
blocking provision applies. We note that, for convenience and to avoid
repetition in this preamble, we typically refer to these individuals
and entities covered by the information blocking provision as
``actors'' unless it is relevant or useful to refer to the specific
type of individual or entity. That is, when the term ``actor'' appears
in this preamble, it means an individual or entity that is a health
care provider, health IT developer, exchange, or network. For the same
reasons, we propose to define ``actor'' in Sec. 171.102.
a. Health Care Providers
The term ``health care provider'' is defined in section 3000(3) of
the PHSA. We propose to adopt this definition for purposes of section
3022 of the PHSA when defining ``health care provider'' in Sec.
171.102. We note that this definition is different from the definition
of ``health care provider'' under the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.
We are considering adjusting the information blocking definition of
``health care provider'' to cover all individuals and entities covered
by the HIPAA ``health care provider'' definition. We seek comment on
whether this approach would be justified, and commenters are encouraged
to specify reasons why doing so might be necessary to ensure that the
information blocking provision applies to all health care providers
that might engage in information blocking.
b. Health IT Developers of Certified Health IT
Section 3022(a)(1)(B) of the PHSA defines information blocking, in
part, by reference to the conduct of ``health information technology
developers.'' Because title XXX of the PHSA does not define ``health
information technology developer,'' we interpret section 3022(a)(1)(B)
in light of the specific authority provided to OIG in section
3022(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). Section 3022(b)(2) discusses developers,
networks, and exchanges in terms of an ``individual or entity,''
specifically cross-referencing section 3022(b)(1)(A). Sections
3002(b)(1) and (b)(1)(A) state, in relevant part, that the OIG may
investigate information blocking claims regarding a health information
technology developer of certified health information technology or
other entity offering certified health information technology.
Together, these sections make clear that the information blocking
provisions and OIG's authority extend to individuals or entities that
develop or offer certified health IT. That the individual or entity
must develop or offer certified health IT is further supported by
section 3022(a)(7) of the PHSA--which refers to developers'
responsibilities to meet the requirements of certification--and section
4002 of the Cures Act--which identifies information blocking as a
Condition of Certification.
Notwithstanding this, the Cures Act does not prescribe that conduct
that may implicate the information blocking provisions be limited to
practices related to only certified health IT. Rather, the information
blocking provisions would be implicated by any practice engaged in by
an individual or entity that develops or offers certified health IT
that is likely to interfere with the access, exchange, or use of EHI,
including practices associated with any of the developer or offeror's
health IT products that have not been certified under the Program. This
interpretation is based primarily on section 3022(b)(1) of the PHSA. If
Congress had intended that the enforcement of the information blocking
provisions were limited to practices connected to certified health IT,
we believe the Cures Act would have included language that tied
enforcement to the operation or performance of a product certified
under the Program. Rather, the description of the practices that OIG
can investigate in section 3022(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the PHSA are not tied
to the certification status of the health IT at issue, omitting any
express reference to a health IT developer's practice needing to be
related to ``certified health information technology.'' That the scope
of the information blocking provision should not be limited to
practices that involve only certified health IT is further evidenced by
no such limitation applying to health care providers, health
information exchanges (HIEs), and health information networks (HINs) as
listed in sections 3022(b)(1) of the PHSA.
Additionally, the ``practice described'' in section 3022(a)(2) of
the PHSA refers to ``certified health information technologies'' when
illustrating practices that restrict authorized access, exchange, or
use of EHI under applicable state or federal laws (section
3022(a)(2)(A) of the PHSA), but omits any reference to certification
when describing ``health information technology'' in the practices
described in sections 3022(a)(2)(B) and (C) of the PHSA. Importantly,
sections 3022(a)(2)(B) and (C) of the PHSA address practices that are
particularly relevant to health IT developers and offerors, although
they could be engaged in by other types of actors. We interpret this
drafting as a deliberate decision not to link the information blocking
provisions with only the performance or use of certified health IT.
Finally, we note that the Cures Act does not impose a temporal
nexus that would require that information blocking be carried out at a
time when an individual or entity had health IT certified under the
Program. Ostensibly, then, once an individual or entity has health IT
certified, or otherwise maintains the certification of health IT, the
individual or entity becomes forever subject to the information
blocking provision. We do not believe that, understood in context, the
Cures Act supports such a broad interpretation. Noting the above
discussion concerning OIG's scope of authority under section
3022(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the PHSA, we believe that to make
developers and offerors of certified health IT subject to the
information blocking provision in perpetuity would be inconsistent with
the voluntary nature of the Program. However, we also believe that the
Cures Act does not provide any basis for interpreting the information
blocking provision so narrowly that a developer or offeror of certified
health IT could escape penalty as a consequence of having its
certification terminated or by withdrawing all of its extant
certifications.
We consider that in the circumstances where a health IT developer
has its certification terminated, or withdraws its certification, such
that it no longer has any health IT certified under the
[[Page 7511]]
Program, it should nonetheless be subject to penalties for information
blocking engaged in during the time that it did have health IT
certified under the Program. Accordingly, we propose to adopt a
definition of ``heath information technology (IT) developer of
certified health IT'' for the purposes of interpretation and
enforcement of the information blocking provisions, including those
regulatory provisions proposed under Title 45, part 171, of the Code of
Federal Regulations, that would capture such developers or offerors. We
propose, in Sec. 171.102, that ``health IT developer of certified
health IT'' means an individual or entity that develops or offers
health information technology (as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
300jj(5)) and which had, at the time it engaged in a practice that is
the subject of an information blocking claim, health IT (one or more)
certified under the Program. To note, we propose that the term
``information blocking claim'' within this definition should be read
broadly to encompass any statement of information blocking or potential
information blocking. ``Claims'' of information blocking within this
definition would not be limited, in any way, to a specific form,
format, or submission approach or process.
We are also considering additional approaches to help ensure that
developers and offerors of certified health IT remain subject to the
information blocking provision for an appropriate period of time after
leaving the Program. The rationale for this approach would be that a
developer or offeror of certified health IT should be subject to
penalties if, following the termination or withdrawal of certification,
it refused to provide its customers with access to the EHI stored in
the decertified health IT, provided that such interference was not
required by law and did not qualify for one of the information blocking
exceptions. Adopting this broader approach would help avoid the risk
that a developer would be able to engage in the practices described in
section 3022(a)(2) of the PHSA in respect to EHI that was collected on
behalf of a health care provider when that health care provider would
reasonably expect that the information blocking provision would protect
against unreasonable and unnecessary interferences with that EHI. If
the information blocking provision did not extend to capture such
conduct, the protection afforded by the information blocking provision
could become illusory, and providers would need to consider securing
contractual rights to prevent interference, which we are aware they
typically have great difficulty doing.\104\
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\104\ See ONC, EHR Contracts Untangled Selecting Wisely,
Negotiating Terms, And Understanding The Fine Print, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/EHR_Contracts_Untangled.pdf
(September 2016).
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One way that this could be achieved would be to define ``health IT
developer of certified health IT'' as including developers and offerors
of certified health IT that continue to store EHI that was previously
stored in health IT certified in the Program. Alternatively, we are
considering whether developers and offerors of certified health IT
should remain subject to the information blocking provision for an
appropriate period of time after leaving the Program. Namely, that the
information blocking provision should apply for a specific time period,
say one year, after the developer or offeror no longer has any health
IT certified in the Program. This second approach has the attraction of
providing a more certain basis for understanding which developers are
subject to the information blocking provision. However, it also
potentially captures developers and offerors who have fully removed
themselves from the Program and, for example, no longer exercise
control over EHI that was stored in their certified health IT.
We seek comment on which of these two models best achieves our
policy goal of ensuring that health IT developers of certified health
IT will face consequences under the information blocking provision if
they engage in information blocking in connection with EHI that was
stored or controlled by the developer or offeror whilst they were
participating in the program. Commenters are also encouraged to
identify alternative models and approaches for identifying when a
developer or offeror should, and should no longer, be subject to the
information blocking provision.
We note that a developer or offeror of a single health IT product
that has had its certification suspended would be considered to have
certified health IT for the purpose of the definition. We also note
that we interpret the requirement that the health IT developer of
certified health IT ``exercise control'' over EHI broadly. A developer
would not necessarily need to have access to the EHI in order to
exercise control. For example, a developer that implemented a ``kill-
switch'' for a decertified software product that was locally hosted by
a health care provider, preventing that provider from accessing its
records, would be exercising control over the EHI for the purpose of
this definition.
We clarify that we interpret ``individual or entity that develops
the certified health IT'' as the individual or entity that is legally
responsible for the certification status of the health IT, which would
be the individual or entity that entered into a binding agreement that
resulted in the certification status of the health IT under the Program
or, if such rights are transferred, the individual or entity that holds
the rights to the certified health IT. We also clarify that an
``individual or entity that offers certified health IT'' would include
an individual or entity that under any arrangement makes certified
health IT available for purchase or license. We seek comment on both of
our interpretations. More specifically, we seek comment on whether
there are particular types of arrangements under which certified health
IT is ``offered'' in which the offeror should not be considered a
``health IT developer of certified health IT'' for the purposes of the
information blocking provisions.
We also clarify that the proposed definition of ``health IT
developer of certified health IT'' and our interpretation of the use of
``health information technology developer'' applies to Part 171 only
and does not apply to the implementation of any other section of the
PHSA or the Cures Act, including section 4005(c)(1) of the Cures Act.
We clarify that API Technology Suppliers, as described in section
VII.4 of this preamble and defined in Sec. 170.102, would be
considered health IT developers of certified health IT subject to the
conditions described above.
Last, we clarify that a ``self-developer'' of certified health IT,
as the term has been used in the ONC Health IT Certification Program
(Program) and described in this rulemaking (section VII.D.7) and
previous rulemaking,\105\ would be treated as a health care provider
for the purposes of information blocking. This is because of our
description of a self-developer for Program purposes \106\ would
essentially mean that such developers would not be supplying or
offering their certified health IT to other entities. To be clear,
self-developers would still be subject to the proposed Conditions and
[[Page 7512]]
Maintenance of Certification requirements because they have health IT
certified under the Program (see also section VII.D.7). We welcome
comments on our determination regarding ``self-developers'' for
information blocking purposes and whether there are other factors we
should consider in how we treat ``self-developers'' of certified health
IT for the purposes of information blocking.
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\105\ The final rule establishing ONC's Permanent Certification
Program, ``Establishment of the Permanent Certification for Health
Information'' (76 FR 1261), addresses self-developers.
\106\ The language in the final rule describes the concept of
``self-developed'' as referring to a complete EHR or EHR Module
designed, created, or modified by an entity that assumed the total
costs for testing and certification and that will be the primary
user of the health IT (76 FR 1300).
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We also seek comment generally on the definition proposed for
``health IT developer of certified health IT.''
c. Networks and Exchanges
The terms ``network'' and ``exchange'' are not defined in the
information blocking provision or in any other relevant statutory
provisions. We propose to define these terms so that these individuals
and entities that are covered by the information blocking provision
understand that they must comply with its provisions. In accordance
with the meaning and intent of the information blocking provision, we
believe it is necessary to define these terms in a way that does not
assume the application or use of certain technologies and is flexible
enough to apply to the full range and diversity of exchanges and
networks that exist today and may arise in the future. We note that in
the past few years alone many new types of exchanges and networks that
transmit EHI have emerged, and we expect this trend to accelerate with
continued advancements in technology and renewed efforts to advance
trusted exchange among networks and other entities under the trusted
exchange framework and common agreement provided for by section 4003(b)
of the Cures Act.
In considering the most appropriate way to define these terms, we
examined how they are used throughout the Cures Act and the HITECH Act.
Additionally, we considered dictionary and industry definitions of
``network'' and ``exchange.'' While these terms have varied usage and
meaning in different industry contexts, certain concepts are common and
have been incorporated into the proposed definitions below.
i. Health Information Network
We propose a functional definition of ``health information
network'' (HIN) that focuses on the role of these actors in the health
information ecosystem. We believe the defining attribute of a HIN is
that it enables, facilitates, or controls the movement of information
between or among different individuals or entities that are
unaffiliated. For this purpose, we propose that two parties are
affiliated if one has the power to control the other, or if both
parties are under the common control or ownership of a common owner. We
note that a significant implication of this definition is that a health
care provider or other entity that enables, facilitates, or controls
the movement of EHI within its own organization, or between or among
its affiliated entities, is not a HIN in connection with that movement
of information for the purposes of this proposed rule.
More affirmatively, we propose that an actor could be considered a
HIN if it performs any or any combination of the following activities.
First, the actor would be a HIN if it were to determine, oversee,
administer, control, or substantially influence policies or agreements
that define the business, operational, technical, or other conditions
or requirements that enable or facilitate the access, exchange, or use
of EHI between or among two or more unaffiliated individuals or
entities. Second, an actor would be a HIN if it were to provide,
manage, control, or substantially influence any technology or service
that enables or facilitates the access, exchange, or use of EHI between
or among two or more unaffiliated individuals or entities.
Typically, a HIN will influence the sharing of EHI between many
unaffiliated individuals or entities. However, we do not propose to
establish any minimum number of parties or ``nodes'' beyond the
requirement that there be some actual or contemplated access, exchange,
or use of information between or among at least two unaffiliated
individuals or entities that is enabled, facilitated, or controlled by
the HIN. We believe such a limitation would be artificial and would not
capture the full range of entities that should be considered networks
under the information blocking provision. To be clear, any individual
or entity that enables, facilitates, or controls the access, exchange,
or use of EHI between or among only itself and another unaffiliated
individual or entity would not be considered a HIN in connection with
the movement of that EHI (although that movement of EHI may still be
regulated under the information blocking provision on the basis that
the individual or entity is a health care provider or health IT
developer of certified health IT). To be a HIN, the individual or
entity would need to be enabling, facilitating, or controlling the
access, exchange, or use of EHI between or among two or more other
individuals or entities that were not affiliated with it.
To illustrate how the proposed definition would operate, we note
the following examples. An entity is established within a state for the
purpose of improving the movement of EHI between the health care
providers operating in that state. The entity identifies standards
relating to security and offers terms and conditions to be entered into
by health care providers wishing to participate in the network. The
entity offering (and then overseeing and administering) the terms and
conditions for participation in the network would be considered a HIN
for the purpose of the information blocking provision. We note that
there is no need for a separate entity to be created in order that an
entity be considered a HIN. For instance, a health system that
administers business and operational agreements for facilitating the
exchange of EHI that are adhered to by unaffiliated family practices
and specialist clinicians in order to streamline referrals between
those practices and specialists would likely be considered a HIN.
We note that the proposed definition would also encompass an
individual or entity that does not directly enable, facilitate, or
control the movement of information, but nonetheless exercises control
or substantial influence over the policies, technology, or services of
a network. In particular, there may be an individual or entity that
relies on another entity--such as an entity specifically created for
the purpose of managing a network--for policies and technology, but
nevertheless dictates the movement of EHI over that network. For
example, a large health care provider may decide to lead an effort to
establish a network that facilitates the movement of EHI between a
group of smaller health care providers (as well as the large health
care provider) and through the technology of health IT developers. To
achieve this outcome, the large health care provider, together with
some of the participants, creates a new entity that administers the
network's policies and technology. In this scenario, the large health
care provider would come within the functional definition of a HIN and
could be held accountable for the conduct of the network if the large
health care provider used its control or substantial influence over the
new entity--either in a legal sense, such as via its control over the
governance or management of the entity, or in a less formal sense, such
as if the large health care provider prescribed a policy to be
adopted--to interfere with the access, exchange, or use of EHI. We note
that the large health care provider in this example would be treated as
a health care provider when utilizing the
[[Page 7513]]
network to move EHI via the network's policies, technology, or
services, but would be considered a HIN in connection with the
practices of the network over which the large health care provider
exercises control or substantial influence.
We seek comment on the proposed definition of a HIN. In particular,
we request comment on whether the proposed definition is broad enough
(or too broad) to cover the full range of individuals and entities that
could be considered health information networks within the meaning of
the information blocking provision. Additionally, we specifically
request comment on whether the proposed definition would effectuate our
policy goal of defining this term in a way that does not assume
particular technologies or arrangements and is flexible enough to
accommodate changes in these and other conditions.
ii. Health Information Exchange
We propose to define a ``health information exchange'' (HIE) as an
individual or entity that enables access, exchange, or use of EHI
primarily between or among a particular class of individuals or
entities or for a limited set of purposes. Our research and experience
in working with exchanges drove the proposed definition of this term.
HIEs include but are not limited to regional health information
organizations (RHIOs), state health information exchanges (state HIEs),
and other types of organizations, entities, or arrangements that enable
EHI to be accessed, exchanged, or used between or among particular
types of parties or for particular purposes. For example, an HIE might
facilitate or enable the access, exchange, or use of EHI exclusively
within a regional area (such as a RHIO), or for a limited scope of
participants and purposes (such as a clinical data registry or an
exchange established by a hospital-physician organization to facilitate
Admission, Discharge, and Transfer (ADT) alerting). We note that HIEs
may be established under federal or state laws or regulations but may
also be established for specific health care or business purposes or
use cases. Additionally, we note that if an HIE facilitates the access,
exchange, or use of EHI for more than a narrowly defined set of
purposes, then it may be both an HIE and a HIN.
We seek comment on this proposed definition of an HIE. Again, we
encourage commenters to consider whether this proposed definition is
broad enough (or too broad) to cover the full range of individuals and
entities that could be considered exchanges within the meaning of the
information blocking provision, and whether the proposed definition is
sufficiently flexible to accommodate changing technological and other
conditions.
3. Electronic Health Information
The definition of information blocking applies to electronic health
information (EHI) (section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA). While section
3000(4) of the PHSA by reference to section 1171(4) of the Social
Security Act defines ``health information,'' EHI is not specifically
defined in the Cures Act, HITECH Act, or other relevant statutes. We
propose to define EHI to mean:
(i) Electronic protected health information; and
(ii) any other information that--
is transmitted by or maintained in electronic media, as
defined in 45 CFR 160.103;
identifies the individual, or with respect to which there
is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to
identify the individual; and
relates to the past, present, or future health or
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision
of health care to an individual.
This definition of EHI includes, but is not limited to, electronic
protected health information and health information that is created or
received by a health care provider and those operating on their behalf;
health plan; health care clearinghouse; public health authority;
employer; life insurer; school; or university. In addition, we clarify
that under our proposed definition, EHI includes, but is not limited
to, electronic protected health information (ePHI) as defined in 45 CFR
160.103. In particular, unlike ePHI and health information, EHI is not
limited to information that is created or received by a health care
provider, health plan, health care clearinghouse, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school, or university. EHI may be
provided, directly from an individual, or from technology that the
individual has elected to use, to an actor covered by the information
blocking provisions. We propose that EHI does not include health
information that is de-identified consistent with the requirements of
45 CFR 164.514(b). We generally request comment on this proposed
definition as well as on whether the exclusion of health information
that is de-identified is consistent with the requirements of 45 CFR
164.514(b).
To be clear, this definition provides for an expansive set of EHI,
which could include information on an individual's health insurance
eligibility and benefits, billing for health care services, and payment
information for services to be provided or already provided, which may
include price information.
Price Information
The fragmented and complex nature of pricing within the health care
system has decreased the efficiency of the health care system and has
had negative impacts on patients, health care providers, health
systems, plans, plan sponsors and other key health care stakeholders.
Patients and plan sponsors have trouble anticipating or planning for
costs, are not sure how they can lower their costs, are not able to
compare costs, and have no practical way to measure the quality of the
care or coverage they receive relative to the price they pay. Pricing
information continues to grow in importance with the increase of high
deductible health plans and surprise billing, which have resulted in an
increase in out-of-pocket health care spending. Transparency in the
price and cost of health care would help address the concerns outlined
above by empowering patients to make informed health care decisions.
Further, the availability of price information could help increase
competition that is based on the quality and value of the services
patients receive. Consistent with its statutory authority, the
Department is considering subsequent rulemaking to expand access to
price information for the public, prospective patients, plan sponsors,
and health care providers.
Increased consumer demand, aligned incentives, more accessible and
digestible information, and the evolution of price transparency tools
are critical components to moving to a health care system that pays for
value. However, the complex and decentralized nature of how price
information is created, structured, formatted, and stored presents many
challenges to achieving price transparency. To this point, pricing
within health care demands a market-based approach whereby, for
example, platforms are created that utilize raw data to provide
consumers with digestible price information through their preferred
medium.
ONC has a unique role in setting the stage for such future actions
by establishing the framework to prevent the blocking of price
information. Given that price information impacts the ability of
patients to shop for and make decisions about their care, we seek
comment on the parameters and implications of including price
information within the scope of EHI for purposes of information
blocking. In
[[Page 7514]]
addition, the overall Department seeks comment on the technical,
operational, legal, cultural, environmental and other challenges to
creating price transparency within health care.
Should prices that are included in EHI:
[cir] Reflect the amount to be charged to and paid for by the
patient's health plan (if the patient is insured) and the amount to be
charged to and collected from the patient (as permitted by the
provider's agreement with the patient's health plan), including for
drugs or medical devices;
[cir] Include various pricing information such as charge master
price, negotiated prices, pricing based on CPT codes or DRGs, bundled
prices, and price to payer;
[cir] Be reasonably available in advance and at the point of sale;
[cir] Reflect all out-of-pocket costs such as deductibles,
copayments and coinsurance (for insured patients); and/or
[cir] Include a reference price as a comparison tool such as the
Medicare rate and, if so, what is the most meaningful reference?
For the purpose of informing referrals for additional care
and prescriptions, should future rulemaking by the Department require
health IT developers to include in their platforms a mechanism for
patients to see price information, and for health care providers to
have access to price information, tailored to an individual patient,
integrated into the practice or clinical workflow through APIs?
To the extent that patients have a right to price
information within a reasonable time in advance of care, how would such
reasonableness be defined for:
[cir] Scheduled care, including how far in advance should such
pricing be available for patients still shopping for care, in addition
to those who have already scheduled care;
[cir] Emergency care, including how and when transparent prices
should be disclosed to patients and what sort of exceptions might be
appropriate, such as for patients in need of immediate stabilization;
[cir] Ambulance services, including air ambulance services; and
[cir] Unscheduled inpatient care, such as admissions subsequent to
an emergency visit?
How would price information vary based on the type of
health insurance and/or payment structure being utilized, and what, if
any, challenges would such variation create to identifying the price
information that should be made available for access, exchange, or use?
Are there electronic mechanisms/processes available for
providing price information to patients who are not registered (i.e.,
not in the provider system) when they try to get price information?
Should price information be made available on public
websites so that patients can shop for care without having to contact
individual providers, and if so, who should be responsible for posting
such information? Additionally, how would the public posting of pricing
information through API technology help advance market competition and
the ability of patients to shop for care?
If price information that includes a provider's negotiated
rates for all plans and the rates for the uninsured were to be required
to be posted on a public website, is there technology currently
available or that could be easily developed to translate that data into
a useful format for individuals? Are there existing standards and code
sets that would facilitate such transmission and translation? To the
extent that some data standards are lacking in this regard, could
developers make use of unstandardized data?
What technical standards currently exist or may be needed
to represent price information electronically for purposes of access,
exchange, and use?
Are there technical impediments experienced by
stakeholders regarding price information flowing electronically?
Would updates to the CMS-managed HIPAA transactions
standards and code sets be necessary to address the movement of price
information in a standardized way?
How can price transparency be achieved for care delivered
through value based arrangements, including at accountable care
organizations, demonstrations and other risk-sharing arrangements?
What future requirements should the Department consider
regarding the inclusion of price information in a patient's EHI,
particularly as it relates to the amount paid to a health care provider
by a patient (or on behalf of a patient) as well as payment
calculations for the future provision of health care to such patient?
If price information is included in EHI, could that
information be useful in subsequent rulemaking that the Department may
consider in order to reduce or prevent surprise medical billing, such
as requirements relating to:
[cir] The provision of a single bill that includes all health care
providers involved in a health care service, including their network
status;
[cir] The provision of a binding quote reasonably in advance of
scheduled care (that is, non-emergent care) or some subset of scheduled
care, such as for the most ``shoppable'' services;
[cir] Ensuring that all health care providers in an in-network
facility charge the in-network rate; and
[cir] Notification of billing policies such as timely invoice dates
for all providers and facilities, notwithstanding network status, due
date for invoice payments by the prospective patient's payers and out-
of-pocket obligations, date when unpaid balances are referred for
collections, and appeals rights and procedures for patients wishing to
contest an invoice?
4. Interests Promoted by the Information Blocking Provision
a. Access, Exchange, and Use of EHI
The information blocking provision promotes the ability to access,
exchange, and use EHI, consistent with the requirements of applicable
law. We interpret the terms ``access,'' ``exchange,'' and ``use''
broadly, consistent with their generally understood meaning in the
health IT industry and their function and context in the information
blocking provision.
The concepts of access, exchange, and use are closely related: EHI
cannot be used unless it can be accessed, and this often requires that
the EHI be exchanged among different individuals or entities and
through various technological means. Moreover, the technological and
other means necessary to facilitate appropriate access and exchange of
EHI vary significantly depending on the purpose for which the
information will be used. For example, the technologies and services
that support a payer's access to EHI to assess clinical value will
likely differ from those that support a patient's access to EHI via a
smartphone app. That is, to deter information blocking in these and
many other potential uses of EHI--and, by extension, the many and
diverse means of access and exchange that support such uses.
This is consistent with the way these terms are employed in the
information blocking provision and in other relevant statutory
provisions. For example, section 3022(a)(2) of the PHSA contemplates a
broad range of purposes for which EHI may be accessed, exchanged, and
used--from treatment, care delivery, and other permitted purposes, to
exporting complete information sets and transitioning between health IT
systems, to supporting innovations and advancements in health
information access, exchange, and use. Separately,
[[Page 7515]]
the Cures Act and the HITECH Act contemplate many different purposes
for and means of accessing, exchanging, and using EHI, which include,
but are not limited to, quality improvement, guiding medical decisions
at the time and place of care, reducing medical errors and health
disparities, delivering patient-centered care, and supporting public
health and clinical research activities.\107\
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\107\ See section 3001(b) of the PHSA; see also section
3009(a)(3) of the PHSA (enumerating reporting criteria relating to
access, exchange, and use of EHI for a broad and diverse range of
purposes).
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In addition to these statutory provisions, we have considered how
the terms access, exchange, and use have been defined or used in
existing regulations and other relevant health IT industry contexts.
While those definitions have specialized meanings and are not
controlling here, they are instructive insofar as they illustrate the
breadth with which these terms have been understood in other contexts.
For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule defines an individual's right of
access to include the right to have a copy of all or part of their PHI
transmitted directly to them or any person or entity he or she
designates, in any form and format (including electronically) that the
individual requests and that the covered entity holding the information
can readily produce (45 CFR 164.524). In a different context, the HIPAA
Security Rule defines ``access'' as the ability or the means necessary
to read, write, modify, or communicate data/information or otherwise
use any system resource (45 CFR 164.304). The HIPAA Rules also define
the term ``use,'' which includes the sharing, employment, application,
utilization, examination, or analysis of individually identifiable
health information within an entity that maintains the information (45
CFR 160.103).
As the examples and discussion above demonstrate, the concepts of
access, exchange, and use are used in a variety of contexts to refer to
a broad spectrum of activities. We believe that the types of access,
exchange, and use described above would be promoted under the
information blocking provision, as would other types of access,
exchange, or use not specifically contemplated in these or other
regulations. Further, we note that the information blocking provision
would also extend to innovations and advancements in health information
access, exchange, and use that may occur in the future (see section
3022(a)(2) of the PHSA).
Consistent with the above, and to convey the full breadth of
activities that may implicate the information blocking provision, we
propose definitions of access, exchange, and use in Sec. 171.102. We
emphasize the interrelated nature of the definitions. For example, the
definition of ``use'' includes the ability to read, write, modify,
manipulate, or apply EHI to accomplish a desired outcome or to achieve
a desired purpose, while ``access'' is defined as the ability or means
necessary to make EHI available for use. As such, interference with
``access'' would include, for example, an interference that prevented a
health care provider from writing EHI to its health IT or from
modifying EHI stored in health IT, whether by the provider itself or
by, or via, a third-party app. We encourage comment on these
definitions. In particular, commenters may wish to consider whether
these definitions are broad enough to cover all of the potential
purposes for which EHI may be needed and ways in which it could
conceivably be used, now and in the future.
b. Interoperability Elements
In this proposed rule, we use the term ``interoperability element''
to refer to any means by which EHI can be accessed, exchanged, or used.
We clarify that the means of accessing, exchanging, and using EHI are
not limited to functional elements and technical information but also
encompass technologies, services, policies, and other conditions \108\
necessary to support the many potential uses of EHI as described above.
Because of the evolving nature of technology and the diversity of
privacy laws and regulations, institutional arrangements, and policies
that govern the sharing of EHI, we will not provide an exhaustive list
of interoperability elements. However, we believe that it is useful to
define this term, both because of its importance for analyzing the
likelihood of interference under the information blocking provision,
and because some of the proposed exceptions to the provision contain
conditions concerning the availability and provision of
interoperability elements. Therefore, we propose to define
``interoperability element'' in Sec. 171.102. As noted, our intent is
to capture all of the potential means by which EHI may be accessed,
exchanged, or used for any relevant purposes; both now and as
technology and other conditions evolve. We seek comment on whether the
proposed definition realizes that intent and, if not, any changes we
should consider.
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\108\ See ONC, Connecting Health and Care for the Nation: A
Shared Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap at x-xi, https://www.healthit.gov/topic/interoperability/interoperability-roadmap
(Oct. 2015) [hereinafter ``Interoperability Roadmap''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Practices That May Implicate the Information Blocking Provision
To meet the definition of information blocking, a practice must be
likely to interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage access,
exchange, or use of EHI. In this section and elsewhere in this
preamble, we discuss various types of hypothetical practices that could
implicate the provision. We do this to illustrate the scope of the
information blocking provision and to explain our interpretation of
various statutory concepts. However, we stress that the types of
practices discussed in this preamble are illustrative, not exhaustive,
and that many other types of practices could also implicate the
provision. Nor does the fact that we have not identified or discussed a
particular type of practice imply that it is less serious than those
that are discussed in this preamble. Indeed, because information
blocking may take many forms, it is not possible--and we do not
attempt--to anticipate or catalog the many potential types of practices
that may raise information blocking concerns.
We emphasize that any analysis of information blocking necessarily
requires a careful consideration of the individual facts and
circumstances, including whether the practice was required by law,
whether the actor had the requisite statutory knowledge, and whether an
exception applies. When we state that a practice would implicate the
provision or could violate the provision, we are expressing a
conclusion that the type of practice is one that would be likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage access, exchange, or
use of EHI, and that further analysis of these and other statutory
elements would therefore be warranted to determine whether a violation
has occurred. We highlight this distinction because to implicate the
information blocking provision is not necessarily to violate it, and
that each case will turn on its own unique facts. For example, a
practice that seemingly meets the statutory definition of information
blocking would not be information blocking if it was required by law,
if one or more elements of the definition were not met, or if was
covered by one of the proposed exceptions.
We propose in section VIII.D of this preamble to establish seven
exceptions to the information blocking provision for certain reasonable
and necessary activities. If an actor can establish that an exception
applies to each practice for which a claim of information blocking
[[Page 7516]]
has been made, including that the actor satisfied all applicable
conditions of the exception at all relevant times, then the practice
would not constitute information blocking.
Based on early discussions with stakeholders during the development
of this proposed rule, we are aware that the generality with which the
information blocking provision describes practices that are likely to
interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage access, exchange, or
use of EHI may leave some uncertainty as to the scope of the
information blocking provision and the types of practices that will
implicate enforcement by ONC and/or OIG. To provide additional clarity
on this point, we elaborate our understanding of these important
statutory concepts below.
a. Prevention, Material Discouragement, and Other Interference
The information blocking provision and its enforcement subsection
do not define the terms ``interfere with,'' ``prevent,'' and
``materially discourage,'' and use these terms collectively and without
differentiation. Based on our interpretation of the information
blocking provision and the ordinary meanings of these terms in the
context of EHI, we do not believe they are mutually exclusive, but that
prevention and material discouragement are best understood as types of
interference, and that use of these terms in the statute to define
information blocking illustrates the desire to reach all practices that
an actor knows, or should know, are likely to prevent, materially
discourage, or otherwise interfere with the access, exchange, or use of
EHI. Consistent with this understanding, in this preamble to the
proposed rule, we use the terms ``interfere with'' and ``interference''
as inclusive of prevention, material discouragement, and other forms of
interference that implicate the information blocking provision.
We believe that interference could take many forms. In addition to
the prevention or material discouragement of access, exchange, or use,
we propose that interference could include practices that increase the
cost, complexity, or other burden associated with accessing,
exchanging, or using EHI. Additionally, interference could include
practices that limit the utility, efficacy, or value of EHI that is
accessed, exchanged, or used, such as by diminishing the integrity,
quality, completeness, or timeliness of the data. We refer readers to
section VIII.C.5.c of this preamble below for a discussion of these and
other potential practices that could interfere with access, exchange,
or use and thereby implicate the information blocking provision.
Relatedly, to avoid potential ambiguity and clearly communicate the
full range of potential practices that could implicate the information
blocking provision, we propose to codify a definition of ``interfere
with'' in Sec. 171.102, consistent with our interpretation set forth
above.
b. Likelihood of Interference
The information blocking provision is preventative in nature. That
is, the information blocking provision proscribes practices that are
likely to interfere with (including preventing or materially
discouraging) access, exchange, or use of EHI--whether or not such harm
actually materializes. By including both the likely and the actual
effects of a practice, the information blocking provision encourages
individuals and entities to avoid engaging in practices that undermine
interoperability, and to proactively promote access, exchange, and use
of EHI.
We believe that a practice would satisfy the information blocking
provision's ``likelihood'' requirement if, under the circumstances,
there is a reasonably foreseeable risk that the practice will interfere
with access, exchange, or use of EHI. For example, where an actor
refuses to share EHI or to provide access to certain interoperability
elements, it is reasonably foreseeable that such actions will interfere
with access, exchange, or use of EHI. As another example, it is
reasonably foreseeable that a health care provider may need to access
information recorded in a patient's electronic record that could be
relevant to the treatment of that patient. For this reason, a policy or
practice that limits timely access to such information in an
appropriate electronic format creates a reasonably foreseeable
likelihood of interfering with the use of the information for these
treatment purposes.
Whether the risk of interference is reasonably foreseeable will
depend on the particular facts and circumstances attending the practice
or practices at issue. Because of the number and diversity of potential
practices, and the fact that different practices will present varying
risks of interfering with access, exchange, or use of EHI, we do not
attempt to anticipate all of the potential ways in which the
information blocking provision could be implicated. Nevertheless, to
assist with compliance, we clarify certain circumstances in which,
based on our experience, a practice will almost always be likely to
interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI. We caution that these
situations are not exhaustive and that other circumstances may also
give rise to a very high likelihood of interference under the
information blocking provision. In each case, ONC will consider the
totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether a practice is
likely to implicate the statute and to give rise to a violation.
i. Observational Health Information
Although the information blocking provision applies to all EHI, we
believe that information blocking concerns are especially pronounced
when the conduct at issue has the potential to interfere with the
access, exchange, or use of EHI that is created or maintained during
the practice of medicine or the delivery of health care services to
patients. We refer to such information in this section of the preamble
collectively as ``observational health information.'' Such information
includes, but is not limited to, health information about a patient
that could be captured in a patient record within an EHR and other
clinical information management systems; as well as information
maintained in administrative and other IT systems when the information
is clinically relevant, directly supports patient care, or facilitates
the delivery of health care services to consumers. We note that there
is a special need for timely, electronic access to this information and
that, moreover, the clinical and operational utility of this
information is often highly dependent on multiple actors exercising
varying forms and degrees of control over the information itself or the
technological, contractual, or other means by which it can be accessed,
exchanged, and used. Against these indications, practices that
adversely impact the access, exchange, or use of observational health
information will almost always implicate the information blocking
provision.
We note that observational health information may be technically
structured or unstructured (such as ``free text''). Therefore, in
general, clinicians' notes would constitute observational health
information, at least insofar as the notes contain observations or
conclusions about a patient or the patient's care. In contrast, we
believe certain types of EHI are qualitatively distinct from
observational health information, such as EHI that is created through
aggregation, algorithms, and other techniques that transform
observational health information into fundamentally new data or
insights that are not obvious from the observational
[[Page 7517]]
information alone. This could include, for example, population-level
trends, predictive analytics, risk scores, and EHI used for comparisons
and benchmarking activities. Similarly, internally developed quality
measures and care protocols are generally distinct from observational
health information. In general, we believe that practices that pertain
solely to the creation or use of these transformative data and insights
would not usually present the very high likelihood of interference
described above. However, we emphasize that, depending on the specific
facts at issue, practices related to electronic non-observational
health information (a type of EHI), such as price information, could
still be subject to the information blocking provision. We seek comment
on this proposed approach and encourage commenters to identify
potential practices related to non-observational health information
that could raise information blocking concerns.
Finally, we clarify that merely collecting, organizing, formatting,
or processing observational health information maintained in EHRs and
other source systems does not change the fundamental nature of that EHI
or obligations under the information blocking provisions. Likewise, the
mere fact that EHI is stored in a proprietary format or has been
combined with confidential or proprietary information does not alter
the actor's obligations under the information blocking provisions to
facilitate access, exchange, and use of the EHI in response to a
request. For example, the information blocking provision would be
implicated if an actor were to assert proprietary rights in medical
vocabularies or code sets in a way that was likely to interfere with
the access, exchange, or use of observational health information stored
in such formats. However, as noted in section VIII.D.6 of this
preamble, under the exception for licensing of interoperability
elements on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, an actor could
charge a royalty for access to proprietary data or data coded in a
proprietary manner so long as that royalty were offered on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms pursuant to the conditions outlined in the
exception.
ii. Purposes for Which Information May be Needed
We believe the information blocking provision will almost always be
implicated when a practice interferes with access, exchange, or use of
EHI for certain purposes, including but not limited to:
Providing patients with access to their EHI and the
ability to exchange and use it without special effort (see section
VII.B.4).
Ensuring that health care professionals, care givers, and
other authorized persons have the EHI they need, when and where they
need it, to make treatment decisions and effectively coordinate and
manage patient care and can use the EHI they may receive from other
sources.
Ensuring that payers and other entities that purchase
health care services can obtain the information they need to
effectively assess clinical value and promote transparency concerning
the quality and costs of health care services.
Ensuring that health care providers can access, exchange,
and use EHI for quality improvement and population health management
activities.
Supporting access, exchange, and use of EHI for patient
safety and public health purposes.
The need to ensure that EHI is readily available and usable for
these purposes is paramount. Therefore, practices that increase the
cost, difficulty, or other burden of accessing, exchanging, or using
EHI for these purposes would almost always implicate the information
blocking provision. Individuals and entities that develop health IT or
have a role in making these technologies and services available should
consider the impact of their actions and take steps to support
interoperability and avoid impeding the availability or use of EHI.
iii. Control Over Essential Interoperability Elements; Other
Circumstances of Reliance or Dependence
An actor may have substantial control over one or more
interoperability elements that provide the only reasonable means of
accessing, exchanging, or using EHI for a particular purpose. In these
circumstances, any practice by the actor that could impede the use of
the interoperability elements--or that could unnecessarily increase the
cost or other burden of using the elements--would almost always
implicate the information blocking provision.
The situation described above is most likely when customers or
users are dependent on an actor's technology or services, which can
occur for any number of reasons. For example, technological dependence
may arise from legal or commercial relations, such as a health care
provider's reliance on its EHR developer to ensure that EHI managed on
its behalf is accessible and usable when it is needed. Relatedly, most
EHI is currently stored in EHRs and other source systems that use
proprietary data models or formats. Knowledge of the data models,
formats, or other relevant technical information (e.g., proprietary
APIs) is necessary to understand the data and make efficient use of it
in other applications and technologies. Because this information is
routinely treated as confidential or proprietary, the developer's
cooperation is required to enable uses of the EHI that go beyond the
capabilities provided by the developer's technology. This includes the
capability to export complete information sets and to migrate data in
the event that a user decides to switch to a different technology.
Separate from these contractual and intellectual property issues,
users may become ``locked in'' to a particular technology, HIE, or HIN
for financial or business reasons. For example, many health care
providers have invested significant resources to adopt EHR
technologies--including costs for deployment, customization, data
migration, and training--and have tightly integrated these technologies
into their information management strategies, clinical workflows, and
business operations. As a result, they may be reluctant to switch to
other technologies due to the significant cost and disruption this
would entail.
Another important driver of technological dependence is the
``network effects'' of health IT adoption, which are amplified by a
reliance on technologies and approaches that are not standardized and
do not enable seamless interoperability. Consequently, health care
providers and other health IT users may gravitate towards and become
reliant on the proprietary technologies, HIEs, or HINs that have been
adopted by other individuals and entities with whom they have the
greatest need to exchange EHI. These effects may be especially
pronounced within particular product or geographic areas. For example,
a HIN that facilitates certain types of exchange or transactions may be
so widely adopted that it is a de facto industry standard. A similar
phenomenon may occur within a particular geographic area once a
critical mass of hospitals, physicians, or other providers adopt a
particular EHR technology, HIE, or HIN.
In these and other analogous circumstances of reliance or
dependence, there is a heightened risk that an actor's conduct will
interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI. To assist with
compliance, we highlight the following common scenarios, based on our
outreach to stakeholders, in which
[[Page 7518]]
actors exercise control over key interoperability elements.\109\
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\109\ As an important clarification, we note that control over
interoperability elements may exist with or without the actor's
ability to manipulate the price of the interoperability elements in
the market.
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Health IT developers of certified health IT that provide
EHR systems or other technologies used to capture EHI at the point of
care are in a unique position to control subsequent access to and use
of that information.
HINs and HIEs may be in a unique position to control the
flow of information among particular persons or for particular
purposes, especially if the HIN or HIE has achieved significant
adoption in a particular geographic area or for a particular type of
health information use case.
Similar control over EHI may be exercised by other
entities, such as health IT developers of certified health IT, that
supply or control proprietary technologies, platforms, or services that
are widely adopted by a class of users or that are a ``de facto
standard'' for certain types of EHI exchanges or transactions.
Health care providers within health systems and other
entities that provide health IT platforms, infrastructure, or
information sharing policies may have a degree of control over
interoperability or the movement of data within a geographic area that
is functionally equivalent to the control exercised by a dominant
health IT developer, HIN, or HIE.
To avoid violating the information blocking provision, actors with
control over interoperability elements should be careful not to engage
in practices that exclude persons from the use of those elements or
create artificial costs or other impediments to their use.
We encourage comment on these and other circumstances that may
present an especially high likelihood that a practice will interfere
with access, exchange, or use of EHI within the meaning of the
information blocking provision.
c. Examples of Practices Likely To Interfere With Access, Exchange, or
Use of EHI
To further clarify the scope of the information blocking provision,
below we describe several types of practices that would be likely to
interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI. These examples clarify
and expand on those set forth in section 3022(a)(2) of the PHSA.
Because information blocking can take many forms, we emphasize that
the categories of practices described below are illustrative only and
do not provide an exhaustive list or comprehensive description of
practices that may implicate the information blocking provision and its
penalties. We also reiterate that to implicate the provision is not
necessarily to violate it, and that each case will turn on its own
unique facts. For instance, a practice that seemingly meets the
statutory definition of information blocking would not be information
blocking if it was required by law, if one or more elements of the
definition were not met, or if it was covered by one of the proposed
exceptions for certain reasonable and necessary activities detailed in
section VIII.D of this preamble. For the purposes of the following
discussion, we do not consider the applicability of any exceptions
proposed in section VIII.D of this preamble; we therefore strongly
encourage readers to review that section in conjunction with the
discussion of practices in this section below.
i. Restrictions on Access, Exchange, or Use
The information blocking provision establishes penalties, including
civil monetary penalties, or requires appropriate disincentives, for
practices that restrict access, exchange, or use of EHI for permissible
purposes. For example, section 3022(a)(2)(A) of the PHSA states that
information blocking may include practices that restrict authorized
access, exchange, or use for treatment and other permitted purposes
under applicable law. Section 3022(a)(2)(C)(i) of the PHSA states that
information blocking may include implementing health IT in ways that
are likely to restrict the access, exchange, or use of EHI with respect
to exporting complete information sets or in transitioning between
health IT systems.
One means by which actors may restrict access, exchange, or use of
EHI is through formal restrictions. These may be expressed in contract
or license terms, EHI sharing policies, organizational policies or
procedures, or other instruments or documents that set forth
requirements related to EHI or health IT. Additionally, in the absence
of an express contractual restriction, an actor may achieve the same
result by exercising intellectual property or other rights in ways that
restrict access, exchange, or use. As an illustration, the following
non-exhaustive examples illustrate types of formal restrictions that
would likely implicate the information blocking provision. As stated
above, the examples throughout this section VIII.C.5.c. are presented
without consideration to whether a proposed exception applies, and
readers are encouraged to familiarize themselves with section VIII.D of
this preamble.
A health system's internal policies or procedures require
staff to obtain an individual's written consent before sharing any of a
patient's EHI with unaffiliated providers for treatment purposes even
though obtaining an individual's consent is not required by state or
federal law.
An EHR developer's software license agreement prohibits a
customer from disclosing to its IT contractors certain technical
interoperability information without which the customer and its IT
contractors cannot efficiently export and convert EHI for use in other
applications.
A HIN's participation agreement prohibits entities that
receive EHI through the HIN from transmitting that EHI to entities who
are not participants of the HIN.
An EHR developer sues to prevent a clinical data registry
from providing interfaces to physicians who use the developer's EHR
technology and wish to submit EHI to the registry. The EHR developer
claims that the registry is infringing the developer's copyright in its
database because the interface incorporates data mapping that
references the table headings and rows of the EHR database in which the
EHI is stored.
Access, exchange, or use of EHI can also be restricted in less
formal ways. The information blocking provision would be implicated,
for example, where an actor simply refuses to exchange or to facilitate
the access or use of EHI, either as a general practice or in isolated
instances. The refusal may be expressly stated, or it may be implied
from the actor's conduct, as where the actor ignores requests to share
EHI or provide interoperability elements; gives implausible reasons for
not doing so; or insists on terms or conditions that are so objectively
unreasonable that they amount to a refusal to provide access, exchange,
or use of the EHI. Some examples of informal restrictions include, but
are not limited to:
A health IT developer of certified health IT refuses to
license interoperability elements that are reasonably necessary for the
developer's customers, their IT contractors, and other health IT
developers to develop and deploy software that will work with the
certified health IT.
A health system incorrectly claims that the HIPAA Rules or
other legal requirements preclude it from exchanging EHI with
unaffiliated providers.
[[Page 7519]]
An EHR developer ostensibly allows third-party developers
to deploy apps that are interoperable with its EHR system. However, as
a condition of doing so, the third-party developers must provide their
source code and grant the EHR developer the right to use it for its own
purposes--terms that almost no developer would willingly accept.
A provider notifies its EHR developer of its intent to
switch to another EHR system and requests a complete export of its EHI.
The developer will provide only the EHI in a PDF format, even though it
already can and does produce the data in a commercially reasonable
structured format.
We emphasize that restrictions on access, exchange, or use that are
required by law would not implicate the information blocking provision.
Moreover, we recognize that some restrictions, while not required by
law, may be reasonable and necessary for the privacy and security of
individuals' EHI; such practices may qualify for protection under the
exceptions proposed in section VIII.D.2 and 3 of this preamble.
ii. Limiting or Restricting the Interoperability of Health IT
The information blocking provision includes practices that restrict
the access, exchange, or use of EHI in various ways (see section
3022(a)(2) of the PHSA). These practices could include, for example,
disabling or restricting the use of a capability that enables users to
share EHI with users of other systems or to provide access to EHI to
certain types of persons or for certain purposes that are legally
permissible. In addition, the information blocking provision would be
implicated where an actor configures or otherwise implements technology
in ways that limit the types of data elements that can be exported or
used from the technology. Other practices that would be suspect include
configuring capabilities in a way that removes important context,
structure, or meaning from the EHI, or that makes the data less
accurate, complete, or usable for important purposes for which it may
be needed. Likewise, implementing capabilities in ways that create
unnecessary delays or response times, or that otherwise limit the
timeliness of EHI accessed or exchanged, would interfere with the
access, exchange, and use of that information and would therefore
implicate the information blocking provision. We note that any
conclusions regarding such interference would be based on fact-finding
specific to each case and would need to consider the applicability of
an exception.
We propose that the information blocking provision would be
implicated if an actor were to deploy technological measures that limit
or restrict the ability to reverse engineer the functional aspects of
technology in order to develop means for extracting and using EHI
maintained in the technology. This may include, for example, employing
technological protection measures that, if circumvented, would trigger
liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (see 17 U.S.C.
1201) or other laws.
The following hypothetical situations illustrate some (though not
all) of the types of practices described above and which would
implicate the information blocking provision.
A health system implements locally-hosted EHR technology
certified to proposed Sec. 170.315(g)(10) (the health system acts as
an API Data Provider as defined by Sec. 170.102). As required by
proposed Sec. 170.404(b)(2), the technology developer provides the
health system with the capability to automatically publish its
production endpoints (i.e., the internet servers that an app must
``call'' and interact with in order to request and exchange patient
data). The health system chooses not to enable this capability,
however, and provides the production endpoint information only to apps
it specifically approves. This prevents other applications--and
patients that use them--from accessing data that should be made readily
accessible via standardized APIs.
A hospital directs its EHR developer to configure its
technology so that users cannot easily send electronic patient
referrals and associated EHI to unaffiliated providers, even when the
user knows the Direct address and/or identity (i.e., National Provider
Identifier) of the unaffiliated provider.
An EHR developer that prevents (such as by way of imposing
exorbitant fees unrelated to the developer's costs, or by some
technological means) a third-party clinical decision support (CDS) app
from writing EHI to the records maintained by the EHR developer on
behalf of a health care provider (despite the provider authorizing the
third-party app developer's use of EHI) because the EHR developer: (1)
Offers a competing CDS software to the third-party app; and (2)
includes functionality (e.g., APIs) in its health IT that would provide
the third party with the technical capability to modify those records
as desired by the health care provider.
Although an EHR developer's patient portal offers the
capability for patients to directly transmit or request for direct
transmission of their EHI to a third party, the developer's customers
(e.g., health care providers) choose not to enable this capability.
A health care provider has the capability to provide same-
day access to EHI in a form and format requested by a patient or a
patient's health care provider, but takes several days to respond.
iii. Impeding Innovations and Advancements in Access, Exchange, or Use
or Health IT-Enabled Care Delivery
The information blocking provision encompasses practices that
create impediments to innovations and advancements to the access,
exchange, and use of EHI, including care delivery enabled by health IT
(section 3022(a)(2)(C)(ii) of the PHSA). Importantly, the information
blocking provision would be implicated and penalties may apply if an
actor were to engage in exclusionary, discriminatory, or other
practices that impede the development, dissemination, or use of
interoperable technologies and services that enhance access, exchange,
or use of EHI.
Most acutely, the information blocking provision would be
implicated if an actor were to refuse to license or allow the
disclosure of interoperability elements to persons who require those
elements to develop and provide interoperable technologies or
services--including those that might complement or compete with the
actor's own technology or services. The same would be true if the actor
were to allow access to interoperability elements but were to restrict
their use for these purposes. The following examples, which are not
exhaustive, illustrate practices that would likely implicate the
information blocking provision by interfering with access, exchange, or
use of EHI:
A health IT developer of certified health IT refuses to
license an API's interoperability elements, to grant the rights
necessary to commercially distribute applications that use the API's
interoperability elements, or to provide the related services necessary
to enable the use of such applications in production environments.
An EHR developer of certified health IT requires third-
party applications to be ``vetted'' for security before use but does
not promptly conduct the vetting or conducts the vetting in a
discriminatory or exclusionary manner.
A health IT developer of certified health IT refuses to
license interoperability elements that other software applications
require to efficiently access, exchange, and use
[[Page 7520]]
EHI maintained in the developer's technology.
Rather than restricting interoperability elements, an actor may
insist on terms or conditions that are burdensome and discourage their
use. These practices would implicate the information blocking provision
for the reasons described above. Consider the following non-exhaustive
examples:
An EHR developer of certified health IT maintains an ``app
store'' through which other developers can have ``apps'' listed that
run natively on the EHR developer's platform. However, if an app
``competes'' with the EHR developer's apps or apps it plans to develop,
the developer requires that the app developer grant the developer the
right to use the app's source code.
A health care provider engages a systems integrator to
develop an interface engine. However, the provider's license agreement
with its EHR developer prohibits it from disclosing technical
documentation that the systems integrator needs to perform the work.
The EHR developer states that it will only permit the systems
integrator to access the documentation if all of its employees sign a
broad non-compete agreement that would effectively bar them from
working for any other health IT companies.
The information blocking provision would be implicated also if an
actor were to discourage efforts to develop or use interoperable
technologies or services by exercising its influence over customers,
users, or other persons, as in the following non-exhaustive examples:
An EHR developer of certified health IT maintains an ``app
store'' through which other developers can have ``apps'' listed that
run natively on the EHR developer's platform. The EHR developer charges
app developers a substantial fee for this service unless an app
developer agrees not to deploy the app in any other EHR developers' app
stores.
A hospital is working with several health IT developers to
develop an application that will enable ambulatory providers who use
different EHR systems to access and update patient data in the
hospital's EHR system from within their ambulatory EHR workflows. The
inpatient EHR developer, being a health IT developer of certified
health IT, pressures the hospital to abandon this project, stating that
if it does not it will no longer receive the latest updates and
features for its inpatient EHR system.
A health IT developer of certified health IT discourages
customers from procuring data integration capabilities from a third-
party developer, claiming that it will be providing such capabilities
free of charge in the next release of its product. In reality, the
capabilities it is developing are more limited in scope and are still
12-18 months from being production-ready.
A health system insists that local physicians adopt its
EHR platform, which provides limited connectivity with competing
hospitals and facilities. The health system threatens to revoke
admitting privileges for physicians that do not comply.
Similar concerns would arise were an actor to engage in
discriminatory practices--such as imposing unnecessary and burdensome
administrative, technical, contractual, or other requirements on
certain persons or classes of persons--that interfere with access and
exchange or EHI by frustrating or discouraging efforts to enable
interoperability. The following non-exhaustive examples illustrate some
ways this could occur:
An HIN charges additional fees, requires more stringent
testing or certification requirements, or imposes additional terms for
participants that are competitors, are potential competitors, or may
use EHI obtained via the HIN in a way that facilitates competition with
the HIN.
A health care provider imposes one set of fees and terms
to establish interfaces or data sharing arrangements with several
registries and exchanges, but offers another more costly or
significantly onerous set of terms to establish substantially similar
interfaces and arrangements with an HIE or HIN that is used primarily
by health plans that purchase health care services from the provider at
negotiated reduced rates.
A health IT developer of certified health IT charges
customers fees, throttles speeds, or limits the number of records they
can export when exchanging EHI with a regional HIE that supports
exchange among users of competing health IT products, but does not
impose like fees or limitations when its customers exchange EHI with
enterprise HIEs that primarily serve users of the developer's own
technology.
As a condition of disclosing interoperability elements to
third-party developers, an EHR developer requires third-party
developers to enter into business associate agreements with all of the
EHR developer's covered entity customers, even if the work being done
is not for the benefit of the covered entities.
A health IT developer of certified health IT takes
significantly longer to provide or update interfaces that facilitate
the exchange of EHI with users of competing technologies or services.
We clarify that not all instances of differential treatment would
necessarily constitute a discriminatory practice that implicates the
information blocking provision. For example, different fee structures
or other terms may reflect genuine differences in the cost, quality, or
value of the EHI and the effort required to provide access, exchange,
or use. We also note that, in certain circumstances, it may be
reasonable and necessary for an actor to restrict or impose reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms or conditions on the use of
interoperability elements, even though such practices could implicate
the information blocking provision. For this reason, we propose in
section VIII.D.6 of this preamble to establish a narrow exception that
would apply to these types of practices.
iv. Rent-Seeking and Other Opportunistic Pricing Practices
Certain practices that artificially increase the cost and expense
associated with accessing, exchanging, and using EHI will implicate the
information blocking provision. Such practices are plainly contrary to
the information blocking provision and the concerns that motivated its
enactment.
An actor may seek to extract profits or capture revenue streams
that would be unobtainable without control of a technology or other
interoperability elements that are necessary to enable or facilitate
access, exchange, or use of EHI. As discussed in section VIII.C.5.b.iii
of this proposed rule, most EHI is currently stored in EHRs and other
source systems that use proprietary data models or formats; this puts
EHR developers (and other actors that control data models or standards)
in a unique position to block access to (including the export and
portability of) EHI for use in competing systems or applications, or to
charge rents for access to the basic technical information needed to
accomplish the access, exchange, or use of EHI for these purposes.
These information blocking concerns may be compounded to the extent
that EHR developers do not disclose, in advance, the fees they will
charge for interfaces, data export, data portability, and other
interoperability-related services (see 80 FR 62719; 80 FR 16880-81). We
note that these concerns are not limited to EHR developers. Other
actors who exercise substantial control over EHI or essential
interoperability elements may engage in analogous behaviors that would
implicate the information blocking provision.
[[Page 7521]]
To illustrate, we provide the following non-exhaustive examples,
which reflect some of the more common types of rent-seeking and
opportunistic behaviors of which we are aware and that are likely to
interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI:
An EHR developer of certified health IT charges customers
a fee to provide interfaces, connections, data export, data conversion
or migration, or other interoperability services, where the amount of
the fee exceeds the actual costs that the developer reasonably incurred
to provide the services to the particular customer(s).
An EHR developer of certified health IT charges a fee to
perform an export using the EHI export capability proposed in Sec.
170.315(b)(10) for the purposes of switching health IT systems or to
provide patients access to EHI.
An EHR developer of certified health IT charges more to
export or use EHI in certain situations or for certain purposes, such
as when a customer is transitioning to a competing technology or
attempting to export data for use with a HIE, third-party application,
or other technology or service that competes with the revenue
opportunities associated with the EHR developer's own suite of products
and services.
An EHR developer of certified health IT interposes itself
between a customer and a third-party developer, insisting that the
developer pay a licensing fee, royalty, or other payment in exchange
for permission to access the EHR system or related documentation, where
the fee is not reasonably necessary to cover any additional costs the
EHR developer incurs from the third-party developer's activities.
An analytics company provides services to the customers of
an EHR developer of certified health IT, including de-identifying
customer EHI and combining it with other data to identify areas for
quality improvement. The EHR developer insists on a revenue sharing
arrangement whereby it would receive a percentage of the revenue
generated from these activities in return for facilitating access to
its customers' EHI, which turns out to be disadvantageous to customers.
The revenue the EHR developer would receive exceeds its reasonable
costs of facilitating the access to EHI.
The information blocking provision would clearly be implicated by
these and other practices by which an actor profits from its
unreasonable control over EHI or interoperability elements without
adding any efficiency to the health care system or serving any other
procompetitive purpose. But the reach of the information blocking
provision is not limited to these types of practices. We interpret the
definition of information blocking to encompass any fee that materially
discourages or otherwise imposes a material impediment to access,
exchange, or use of EHI. We use the term ``fee'' in the broadest
possible sense to refer to any present or future obligation to pay
money or provide any other thing of value and propose to include this
definition in Sec. 171.102. We believe this scope may be broader than
necessary to address genuine information blocking concerns and could
unnecessarily diminish investment and innovation in interoperable
technologies and services. Therefore, as discussed in section VIII.D.4
of this preamble, we propose to create an exception that, subject to
certain conditions, would permit the recovery of costs that are
reasonably incurred to provide access, exchange, and use of EHI. We
refer readers to that section for additional details regarding this
proposal.
v. Non-Standard Implementation Practices
Section 3022(a)(2)(B) of the PHSA states that information blocking
may include implementing health IT in non-standard ways that
substantially increase the complexity or burden of accessing,
exchanging, or using EHI. In general, this type of interference is
likely to occur when, despite the availability of generally accepted
technical, policy, or other approaches that are suitable for achieving
a particular implementation objective, an actor does not implement the
standard, does not implement updates to the standard, or implements the
standard in a way that materially deviates from its formal
specifications. These practices lead to unnecessary complexity and
burden, such as the additional cost and effort required to implement
and maintain ``point-to-point'' connections, custom-built interfaces,
and one-off trust agreements.
While each case will necessarily depend on its individual facts,
and while we recognize that the development and adoption of standards
across the health IT industry is an ongoing process, we propose that
the information blocking provision would be implicated in at least two
distinct sets of circumstances. First, information blocking may arise
where an actor chooses not to adopt, or to materially deviate from,
relevant standards, implementation specifications, and certification
criteria adopted by the Secretary under section 3004 of the PHSA.
Second, even where no federally adopted or identified standard exists,
if a particular implementation approach has been broadly adopted in a
relevant industry segment, deviations from that approach would be
suspect unless strictly necessary to achieve substantial efficiencies.
To further illustrate these types of practices that would implicate
the information blocking provision, we provide the following non-
exhaustive examples of conduct that would be likely to interfere with
access, exchange, or use of EHI:
An EHR developer of certified health IT implements the C-
CDA for receiving transitions of care summaries but only sends
transitions of care summaries in a proprietary or outmoded format.
A health IT developer of certified health IT adheres to
the ``required'' portions of a widely adopted industry standard but
chooses to implement proprietary approaches for ``optional'' parts of
the standard when other interoperable means are readily available.
Even where no standards exist for a particular purpose, actors
should not design or implement health IT in non-standard ways that
unnecessarily increase the costs, complexity, and other burden of
accessing, exchanging, or using EHI. For example, an EHR developer of
certified health IT designs its database tables in a way that is
unreasonably difficult to ``map'' to a non-proprietary format, which is
a necessary prerequisite to converting the EHI to a format that can be
used in other software applications. When a customer requests the
capability to export EHI to a clinical data registry, the EHR developer
quotes substantial costs resulting from the need to write custom code
to enable this functionality. Based on these facts, the fees do not
reflect costs that are reasonably incurred to provide the service and
are instead the result of the developer's impractical design choices.
We are aware that some actors attribute certain non-standard
implementations on legacy systems that the actor did not themselves
design but which have to be integrated into the actor's health IT. Such
instances will be considered on a case by case basis.
Again, we reiterate that information blocking can take many forms
and that the practices (and categories of practices) described above do
not provide an exhaustive list or comprehensive description of
practices that may implicate the information blocking provision.
[[Page 7522]]
6. Applicability of Exceptions
a. Reasonable and Necessary Activities
As discussed above, section 3022(a)(3) authorizes the Secretary to
identify, through notice and comment rulemaking, reasonable and
necessary activities that do not constitute information blocking for
purposes of the definition set forth in section 3022(a)(1). Separately,
the Cures Act identifies at section 3022(a)(1) practices that
contravene the definition of information blocking. Following this Cures
Act terminology, conduct that implicates the information blocking
provision and that does not fall within one of the exceptions described
in section VIII.D of this preamble, or does not meet all conditions for
an exception, would be considered a ``practice.'' Conduct that falls
within an exception and meets all the applicable conditions for that
exception would be considered an ``activity.'' The challenge with this
distinction is that when examining conduct that is the subject of an
information blocking claim-- an actor's actions that likely interfered
with access, exchange, or use of EHI--it can be illusory to
distinguish, on its face, conduct that is a practice and conduct that
is an activity. Indeed, conduct that implicates the information
blocking provision but falls within an exception could nonetheless be
considered information blocking in the event that the actor has not
satisfied the conditions applicable to that exception.
While we acknowledge the terminology used in the Cures Act, we
propose to use the term ``practice'' throughout this proposed rule when
we describe conduct that is likely to interfere with, prevent, or
materially discourage access, exchange, or use of electronic health
information, regardless of whether that conduct meets the conditions
for an exception to the information blocking provision. Consistent with
this approach, when identifying reasonable and necessary activities in
Sec. Sec. 171.200 through 171.206, we describe practices that, if all
the applicable conditions are met, are reasonable and necessary and not
information blocking. We have taken this approach, in part, because we
believe that to adopt the terminology of activity to describe conduct
that may or may not be information blocking would confuse the reader
and obfuscate our intent in certain circumstances. As an illustration,
a health care provider may implement an organizational security policy
that limits access, exchange, or use of certain information to certain
users (e.g., role-based access). Prior to determining whether the
implementation of the security policy is reasonable and necessary under
the circumstances, such conduct would be considered a ``practice'' that
implicates the information blocking provision. However, it may later be
determined that such conduct is reasonable and necessary and would then
be considered an ``activity.'' Due to these types of scenarios, we
contend that the better approach is to use one term--practice--
throughout the proposed rule and clarify when describing the conduct at
issue whether it is a practice that is information blocking, a practice
that implicates the information blocking provision, or a practice that
is reasonable and necessary and not information blocking.
b. Treatment of Different Types of Actors
The proposed exceptions would apply to health care providers,
health IT developers of certified health IT, HIEs, and HINs who engage
in certain practices covered by an exception, provided that all
applicable conditions of the exception are satisfied at all relevant
times and for each practice for which the exception is sought. The
exceptions are generally applicable to all actors. However, in some
instances we propose conditions within an exception that apply to a
particular type of actor.
c. Establishing That Activities and Practices Meet the Conditions of an
Exception
We propose that, in the event of an investigation of an information
blocking complaint, an actor must demonstrate that an exception is
applicable and that the actor met all relevant conditions of the
exception at all relevant times and for each practice for which the
exception is sought. We consider this allocation of proof to be a
substantive condition of the proposed exceptions. As a practical
matter, we propose that actors are in the best position to demonstrate
compliance with the conditions of the proposed exceptions and to
produce the detailed evidence necessary to demonstrate that compliance.
We request comment about the types of documentation and/or standardized
methods that an actor may use to demonstrate compliance with the
exception conditions.
D. Proposed Exceptions to the Information Blocking Provision
We propose to establish seven exceptions to the information
blocking provision. The exceptions would apply to certain activities
that may technically meet the definition of information blocking but
that are reasonable and necessary to further the underlying public
policies of the information blocking provision.
The seven proposed exceptions are based on three related policy
considerations. First, each exception is limited to certain activities
that clearly advance the aims of the information blocking provision.
These reasonable and necessary activities include providing appropriate
protections to prevent harm to patients and others; promoting the
privacy and security of EHI; promoting competition and innovation in
health IT and its use to provide health care services to consumers, and
to develop more efficient means of health care delivery; and allowing
system downtime in order to implement upgrades, repairs, and other
changes to health IT. Second, each exception addresses a significant
risk that regulated actors will not engage in these beneficial
activities because of uncertainty concerning the breadth or
applicability of the information blocking provision. Finally, each
exception is subject to strict conditions to ensure that it is limited
to activities that are reasonable and necessary.
The first three exceptions, set forth in VIII.D.1-D.3, extend to
certain activities that are reasonable and necessary to prevent harm to
patients and others; promote the privacy of EHI; and promote the
security of EHI, subject to strict conditions to prevent the exceptions
from being misused. We believe that without these exceptions, actors
may be reluctant to engage in the types of reasonable and necessary
activities described below, and that this could erode trust in the
health IT ecosystem and undermine efforts to provide access and
facilitate the exchange and use of EHI for important purposes. Such a
result would be contrary to the purpose of the information blocking
provision and the broader policies of the Cures Act.
The next three exceptions, set forth in VIII.D.4-D.6, address
activities that are reasonable and necessary to promote competition and
consumer welfare. First, we propose to permit the recovery of certain
types of reasonable costs incurred to provide technology and services
that enable access to EHI and facilitate the exchange and use of that
information, provided certain conditions are met. Second, we propose to
permit an actor to decline to provide access, exchange, or use of EHI
in a manner that is infeasible, subject to a duty to provide a
reasonable alternative. And, third, we propose an exception that would
permit an actor to license interoperability elements on reasonable
[[Page 7523]]
and non-discriminatory terms. These exceptions would be subject to
strict conditions to ensure that they do not extend protection to
practices that raise information blocking concerns.
The last exception, set forth in VIII.D.7, recognizes that it may
be reasonable and necessary for actors to make health IT temporarily
unavailable for the benefit of the overall performance of health IT.
This exception would permit an actor to make the operation of health IT
unavailable in order to implement upgrades, repairs, and other changes.
As context for the exceptions proposed below in VIII.D.4-D.6, we
note that addressing information blocking is critical for promoting
competition and innovation in health IT and for the delivery of health
care services to consumers. Indeed, the information blocking provision
itself expressly addresses practices that impede innovations and
advancements in health information access, exchange, and use, including
care delivery enabled by health IT (section 3022(a)(2)(C)(ii) of the
PHSA). As discussed in section VIII.C.5.b.iii of this preamble, health
IT developers of certified health IT, HIEs, HINs, and, in some
instances, health care providers may exploit their control over
interoperability elements to create barriers to entry for competing
technologies and services that offer greater value for health IT
customers and users, provide new or improved capabilities, and enable
more robust access, exchange, and use of EHI.\110\ More than this,
information blocking may harm competition not just in health IT
markets, but also in markets for health care services.\111\ Dominant
providers in these markets may leverage their control over technology
to limit patient mobility and choice.\112\ They may also pressure
independent providers to adopt expensive, hospital-centric technologies
that do not suit their workflows, limit their ability to share
information with unaffiliated providers, and make it difficult to adopt
or use alternative technologies that could offer greater efficiency and
other benefits.\113\ The technological dependence resulting from these
practices can be a barrier to entry by would-be competitors. It can
also make independent providers vulnerable to acquisition or induce
them into exclusive arrangements that enhance the market power of
incumbent providers, while preventing the formation of clinically-
integrated products and networks that offer more choice and better
value to consumers and purchasers of health care services.
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\110\ See also Martin Gaynor, Farzad Mostashari, and Paul B.
Ginsberg, Making Health Care Markets Work: Competition Policy for
Health Care, 16-17 (Apr. 2017), available at https://heinz.cmu.edu/news/news-detail/index.aspx?nid=3930.
\111\ See, e.g., Keynote Address of FTC Chairwoman Edith
Ramirez, Antitrust in Healthcare Conference Arlington, VA (May 12,
2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/950143/160519antitrusthealthcarekeynote.pdf.
\112\ See, e.g., Martin Gaynor, Farzad Mostashari, and Paul B.
Ginsberg, Making Health Care Markets Work: Competition Policy for
Health Care, 16-17 (Apr. 2017), available at https://heinz.cmu.edu/news/news-detail/index.aspx?nid=3930.
\113\ See, e.g., Healthcare Research Firm Toughens Survey
Standards as More CIOs Reap the Profits of Reselling Vendor
Software, Black Book, available at https://www.prweb.com/releases/2015/02/prweb12530856.htm; Arthur Allen, Connecticut Law Bans EHR-
linked Information Blocking, Politico.com (Oct. 29, 2015).
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Section 3022(a)(5) of the PHSA provides that the Secretary may
consult with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in defining practices
that do not constitute information blocking because they are necessary
to promote competition and consumer welfare. We appreciate the
expertise and informal technical assistance of FTC staff, which we have
taken into consideration in developing the exceptions described in
VIII.D.4-D.6 of this preamble. We note that the language in the Cures
Act regarding information blocking is substantively and substantially
different from the language and goals in the antitrust laws enforced by
the FTC. We view the Cures Act as authorizing ONC and OIG to regulate
conduct that may be considered permissible under the antitrust laws. On
this basis, this proposed rule requires that actors who control
interoperability elements cooperate with individuals and entities that
require those elements for the purpose of developing, disseminating,
and enabling technologies and services that can interoperate with the
actor's technology.
We emphasize that ONC is taking this approach because we view
patients as having an overwhelming interest in EHI about themselves,
and particularly observational health information (see the discussion
in section VIII.C.4.b of this preamble). As such, access to EHI, and
the EHI itself, should not be traded or sold by those actors who are
custodians of EHI or who control its access, exchange, or use. We
emphasize that such actors should not be able to charge fees for
providing electronic access, exchange, or use of patients' EHI. We
propose that actors should be required to share EHI unless they are
prohibited from doing so under an existing law or are covered by one of
the exceptions detailed in this preamble. In addition, any remedy
sought or action taken by HHS under the information blocking provision
would be independent from the antitrust laws and would not prevent FTC
or DOJ from taking action with regard to the same actor or conduct.
We request comment on the following seven proposed exceptions,
including whether they will achieve our stated policy goals.
1. Preventing Harm
We propose to establish an exception to the information blocking
provision for practices that are reasonable and necessary to prevent
harm to a patient or another person, provided certain conditions are
met. The exception and corresponding conditions are set forth in the
proposed regulation text in Sec. 171.201.
This proposed exception would acknowledge the public interest in
protecting patients and other persons against unreasonable risks of
harm that, in certain narrowly defined circumstances described below,
justify practices that are likely to interfere with access, exchange,
or use of EHI and that would implicate the information blocking
provision in the absence of an exception.
The exception would be subject to strict conditions, which we
believe are necessary to prevent patient safety from being used as a
pretext for information blocking or as a post hoc rationalization for
practices that are not reasonable and necessary to address material
risks of harm to a patient or another person.
We have adopted the terminology of ``patient'' to denote the
context in which the threat of harm arises. That is, this proposed
exception has been designed to recognize certain practices taken for
the benefit of recipients of health care--those individuals whose EHI
is at issue--and other persons whose information may be recorded in
that EHI or who may be at risk of harm because of the access, use, or
exchange of EHI. The use of the term ``patient'' does not require,
other than in the context of the risk of harm determined by a licensed
health care professional (see Sec. 171.201(a)(3)), that an actor
seeking to benefit from this exception needs to have a clinician-
patient relationship with the individual (or individuals) at risk of
harm. Indeed, a health IT developer of certified health IT would be
able to benefit from this exception in connection with practices
undertaken for the benefit of individuals receiving (or having
received, or expected to receive) care from a health care provider that
uses the developer's health IT. Similarly, an HIE or HIN that exchanges
or facilitates the exchange of EHI would
[[Page 7524]]
be able to benefit from this exception in connection with the
activities carried out by the HIE or HIN for or at the direction of a
health care provider.
Patient Harm Risks That Would Be Cognizable Under This Exception
Consistent with the definition of information blocking, we have
identified certain risks to patient harm that arise in the context of
access, exchange, or use of EHI. To qualify for this proposed
exception, an actor's practice must respond to a risk that is
cognizable under this exception.
Risk of Corrupt or Inaccurate Data Being Recorded or Incorporated in a
Patient's Electronic Health Record
The exception may apply to practices that prevent harm arising from
corrupted or inaccurate EHI being recorded or incorporated in a
patient's electronic health record. Users of health IT systems strive
to maintain accurate electronic health records by carefully inputting
EHI and verifying existing EHI. Occasionally a clinician or other user
of health IT is presented with EHI that, due to a failure of the
technology, is either entirely incorrect or contains inaccurate
information. At other times, EHI could become corrupted. In these
cases, the sharing or integration of such EHI could lead to
inaccuracies in the patient's electronic health record that then run
the risk of being propagated further. We note, however, that known
inaccuracies in some data within a record may not be sufficient
justification to withhold the entire record if the remainder of the
patient's EHI could be effectively shared without also presenting the
known incorrect or corrupted information as if it were trustworthy.
Also, we would expect that once information is known to be inaccurate
or corrupted, a health care provider holding that record would, for
example, take action to cure the inaccuracy or corruption. We
understand that in the ordinary course of practice, and consistent with
professional and legal standards for clinical record keeping, health
care providers take appropriate action to remediate known problems with
EHI and restore a record as a whole to be safely usable, and therefore
safely sharable.
This recognized risk is limited to corruption and inaccuracies
caused by performance and technical issues affecting health IT. For
example, this exception may be relevant if certified health IT were to
incorrectly present an old and superseded version of a medication list,
or when only partial copies of laboratory tests are being linked to a
patient when the patient's record is exchanged. However, this
recognized risk does not extend to purported accuracy issues arising
from the incompleteness of a patient's electronic health record
generally. Electronic health records, like the paper charts they
replaced, are inevitably imperfect records. Many patients see multiple
health care providers and so it is unlikely that any single health care
provider's record will provide a complete picture of a patient's
health. Some patients intentionally keep certain information secret
even from their health care providers, and others fail to share
potentially critical information with their health care providers
because they forget to, or simply do not understand its clinical
significance.
While the access, exchange, or use of EHI in these situations could
give rise to the risk of harm if the EHI was relied on without
qualification, such reliance does not accord with our understanding of
clinical practice, as the risk of incompleteness resulting from
patients having multiple providers, or from errors of omission by
patients and their care providers, is not unique to electronic health
records or their interoperable exchange. Therefore, the risk that the
EHI a given health care provider holds for a given patient may not be a
perfectly complete record of that patient's health or care will not be
recognized as being sufficient to support an actor qualifying for this
exception in the face of a claim of information blocking.
We also acknowledge that certain federal and state laws, such as 42
CFR part 2 and state medical record laws, require an actor to obtain an
individual's written consent before sharing health information.
However, we propose that an actor would not be able to benefit from
this exception on the basis of a perceived risk arising from exchanging
or providing access to EHI when the EHI exchanged or made accessible
does not include certain information due to a patient's decision not to
consent to its disclosure. For example, this exception would not
recognize an actor's conduct in not providing access, exchange, or use
of a patient's electronic health record on the basis that the patient's
failure to consent to the disclosure of substance abuse treatment
information made the patient's record incomplete and thus inaccurate.
Risk of Misidentifying a Patient or Patient's Electronic Health
Information
The exception may apply to practices that are designed to promote
data quality and integrity and support health IT applications properly
identifying and matching patient records or EHI. Accurately identifying
patients and correctly attributing their EHI to them is a complex task
and involves layers of safeguards, including verification of a
patient's identity, proper registration in health IT systems, physical
identification such as wristbands, and usability and implementation
decisions such as ensuring the display of a patient's name and date of
birth on every screen of the patient's electronic chart. When a
clinician or other health IT user may know or reasonably suspect that
specific EHI in a patient's record is or may be misattributed, either
within a local record or as received through EHI exchange, it would be
reasonable for them to avoid sharing or incorporating the EHI that they
know would, or reasonably suspect could, propagate errors in the
patient's records and thus pose the attendant risks to the patient. As
discussed below, an actor's response to this risk would need to be no
broader than necessary to mitigate the risk of harm arising from the
potentially misidentified record or misattributed data. A health IT
developer of certified health IT could not, for example, refuse to
provide a batch export on the basis that the exported records may
contain a misidentified record. Similarly, a health care provider that
identified that a particular piece of information had been
misattributed to a patient would not be excused from exchanging or
providing access to all other EHI about the patient that had not been
misattributed.
Determination by a Licensed Health Care Professional That the
Disclosure of EHI Is Reasonably Likely To Endanger Life or Physical
Safety
The exception may permit certain restrictions on the disclosure of
an individual's EHI in circumstances where a licensed health care
professional has determined, in the exercise of professional judgment,
that the disclosure is reasonably likely to endanger the life or
physical safety of the patient or another person. This would include
the situation where a covered entity elected not to treat a person as
the personal representative of an individual in situations of potential
abuse or endangerment, including in accordance with 45 CFR
164.502(g)(5). In certain cases, the clinician may have individualized
knowledge stemming from the clinician-patient relationship that, for a
particular patient and for that patient's circumstances, harm could
result if certain EHI were shared or transmitted electronically.
Consistent with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a
[[Page 7525]]
decision not to provide access, exchange, or use of EHI on this basis
would be subject to any right that an affected individual is afforded
under applicable federal or state laws to have the determination
reviewed and potentially reversed.
We request comment on whether the categories of harm described
above capture the full range of safety risks that might arise directly
from accessing, exchanging, or using EHI. We also request comment on
whether we should consider other types of patient safety risks related
to data quality and integrity concerns, or that may have a less
proximate connection to EHI but that could provide a reasonable and
necessary basis for an actor to restrict or otherwise impede access,
exchange, or use of EHI in appropriate circumstances. We ask that
commenters provide detailed rationale for any suggested revisions to
these categories, including additional conditions that may be necessary
to ensure that the exception is tailored and does not extend protection
to practices that are not reasonable and necessary to promote patient
safety and that could present information blocking concerns.
Reasonable Belief That Practice Was Necessary to Directly and
Substantially Reduce the Likelihood of Harm
To qualify for this exception, an actor must have had a reasonable
belief that the practice or practices will directly and substantially
reduce the likelihood of harm to a patient or another person. As
discussed above, the type of risk must also be cognizable under this
exception.
An actor could meet this condition in two ways.
Qualifying Organizational Policy
In most cases, we anticipate that the actor would demonstrate that
the practices it engaged in were consistent with an organizational
policy that was objectively reasonable and no broader than necessary
for the type of patient safety risks at issue. In these circumstances,
we propose that an actor's policy would need to satisfy the following
requirements.
First, we propose that the policy must be in writing.
Second, it must have been developed with meaningful input from
clinical, technical, and other appropriate staff or others who have
expertise or insight relevant to the risk of harm that the policy
addresses. This condition would not be met if, for example, a hospital
imposed top-down information sharing policies or workflows established
by the hospital's EHR developer and approved by hospital administrators
without meaningful input from the medical staff, IT department, and
front-line clinicians who would implement, and thus be affected by, the
policy and are in the best position to gauge how effective it will be
at mitigating patient safety risks.
Third, we propose that the policy must have been implemented in a
consistent and non-discriminatory manner. As part of this condition,
the actor must have taken reasonable steps to educate its directors,
officers, employees, contractors, and authorized personnel on how to
apply the policy and to provide appropriate oversight to ensure that
the policy is not applied in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise
inappropriate manner. This condition would not be met if, for example,
a policy or practice were based on factors that lacked a direct and
substantial correlation with the particular risk of harm at issue.
Last, we propose that the policy must have been be no broader than
necessary for the specific risk or type of risk at issue. For example,
as evidence that the policy is no broader than necessary, the policy
would need to identify the relevant risks and follow an approach to
mitigating those risks that is based on current patient safety evidence
and best practices, supplemented by input from clinical, technical, and
other staff or others who are in the best position to make judgments
about the policy's effectiveness, as discussed above. Further evidence
that the policy was no broader than necessary would be whether the
actor considered alternative approaches and reasonably concluded that,
under the circumstances, those approaches were either inadequate to
address the identified risks of harm or would not have reduced the
likelihood of interference with access, exchange, or use of EHI. For
example, a tailored response to the existence of corrupted data would
necessarily permit all uncorrupted EHI to continue to be accessed,
used, and exchanged. This condition would not be met, for example, if
an actor's policy imposed a blanket ban on the sharing of EHI with
users of different technologies or with health care providers who are
not part of a particular health system, HIE, or HIN.
Qualifying Individualized Finding
We recognize that some health care providers (such as small
practices) may not have comprehensive and formal policies governing all
aspects of EHI and patient safety. Additionally, even if an
organizational policy exists, it may not anticipate all of the
potential risks of harm that could arise in real-world clinical or
production environments of health IT. In these circumstances, in lieu
of demonstrating that a practice conformed to the actor's policies and
that the policies met the conditions described above, the actor could
justify the practice or practices directly by making a finding in each
case, based on the particularized facts and circumstances, that the
practice is necessary and no broader than necessary to mitigate the
risk of harm. To do so, we propose that the actor would need to show
that the practices were approved on a case-by-case basis by an
individual with direct knowledge of the relevant facts and
circumstances and who had relevant clinical, technical, or other
appropriate expertise. Such an individual would need to reasonably
conclude, on the basis of those particularized facts and circumstances
and his/her expertise and best professional judgment, that the practice
was necessary, and no broader than necessary, to mitigate the risk of
harm to a patient or other persons.
We propose that a licensed health care professional's independent
and individualized judgment about the safety of the actor's patients or
other persons would be entitled to substantial deference under this
proposed exception. So long as the clinician actually considered all of
the relevant facts and determined that, under the particular
circumstances, the practice was necessary to protect the safety of the
clinician's patient or other person, we would not second-guess the
clinician's judgment. To provide further clarity on this point, we
provide the following illustration.
A clinician suspects that a patient is at risk of domestic abuse.
The patient has recently visited the clinic for a pregnancy test, and
tells the clinician that the potential father is not her current
partner. The test returns a positive result. The clinician notes that
in the patient's electronic health record, her partner has been given
access to view her test results. The clinician, considering all factors
for this particular situation and particular patient, and aware of the
clinic's policy towards the restriction of electronic health
information sharing, concludes that releasing this result
electronically could place the patient at risk of harm. The clinician
thus chooses not to release the test result electronically and plans to
deliver the result to the patient in a safe manner. The exception would
apply in this case because the clinician reasonably believes, based on
the relationship with this particular patient and the clinician's best
clinical judgment, that the restriction is
[[Page 7526]]
necessary to prevent harm to the patient.
We seek public comment on whether this proposed exception is
appropriate and adequately balances the interest of promoting access,
exchange, and use of EHI with legitimate concerns about the risk of
harm to patients and others. In addition to any other relevant issues,
we specifically request feedback on whether the exception is broad
enough to prevent harm to patients and others and, if not, what
additional risks we should address should we finalize this proposal;
and whether there are additional safeguards the Secretary should adopt
in order to prevent practices that attempt to undermine the policy goal
of the exception. We also seek comment on whether there are customary
practices (e.g., standards of care) that advance patient safety
concerns but which actors do not, as a matter of practice, record in
documented policies, and which should be taken into account when
assessing the reasonableness of a practice under this exception.
2. Promoting the Privacy of EHI
We propose to establish an exception to the information blocking
provision for practices that are reasonable and necessary to protect
the privacy of an individual's EHI, provided certain conditions are
met. The exception and corresponding conditions are set forth in the
proposed regulation text in Sec. 171.202. We note that any practice
engaged in to protect the privacy of an individual's EHI must be
consistent with applicable laws related to health information privacy,
including the HIPAA Privacy Rule as applicable, as well as with other
applicable laws and regulations, such as the HITECH Act, 42 CFR part 2,
and state laws. This exception to the information blocking provision
does not alter an actor's obligation to comply with these and other
applicable laws.
We believe this exception is necessary to support basic trust and
confidence in health IT infrastructure. Without this exception, there
would be a significant risk that actors would share EHI in
inappropriate circumstances, such as when an individual has taken
affirmative steps to request that the EHI not be shared, or when an
actor has been unable to obtain reasonable assurances as to an
individual's identity.
In contrast to the other exceptions defined in this proposed rule,
this proposed exception has been structured with discrete ``sub-
exceptions.'' An actor's practice must qualify for a sub-exception in
order to be covered by this exception. The sub-exceptions have, to a
large extent, been crafted to closely mirror privacy-protective
practices that are recognized under state and federal privacy laws. In
this way, the privacy sub-exceptions to the information blocking
provision would recognize as reasonable and necessary practices that
are engaged in by actors consistent with privacy laws, provided that
certain conditions are met. We have proposed four sub-exceptions that
address the following privacy protective practices: (1) Not providing
access, exchange, or use of EHI when a state or federal law requires
that a condition be satisfied before an actor provides access,
exchange, or use of EHI, and the condition is not satisfied (proposed
in Sec. 171.202(b)); (2) not providing access, exchange, or use of EHI
when the actor is a health IT developer of certified health IT that is
not covered by the HIPAA Privacy Rule in respect to a practice
(proposed in Sec. 171.202(c)); (3) a covered entity, or a business
associate on behalf of a covered entity, denying an individual's
request for access to their electronic PHI in the circumstances
provided in 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2), or (3) (proposed at Sec.
171.202(d)); and (4) not providing access, exchange, or use of EHI
pursuant to an individual's request, in certain situations (proposed in
Sec. 171.202(e)). The rationale for each sub-exception is described in
detail below.
An actor would need to satisfy at least one sub-exception in order
that a purportedly privacy-protective practice that interferes with
access, exchange, or use of EHI not be subject to the information
blocking provision. Each sub-exception has conditions that must be met
in order that an actor's practice qualifies for protection under the
sub-exception.
Specific Terminology Used for the Purposes of This Proposed Exception
We note that this proposed exception and our discussion below uses
certain terms that are defined by the HIPAA Rules \114\ but that, for
purposes of this exception, may have a broader meaning in the context
of the information blocking provision and its implementing regulations
as set forth in this Proposed Rule. In general, the terms ``access,''
``exchange,'' and ``use'' have the meaning explained in section
VIII.C.4.a of this preamble. However, in some instances we refer to
``use'' in the context of a disclosure or use of ePHI under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, in which case we have explicitly stated that the term
``use'' has the meaning defined in 45 CFR 160.103. Similarly, we refer
in a few cases to an individual's right of access under 45 CFR 164.524,
in which case the term ``access'' should be understood in that HIPAA
Privacy Rule context. For purposes of section 3022 of the PHSA,
however, the term ``access'' includes, but is broader than, an
individual's access to their PHI as provided for by the HIPAA Privacy
Rule (see section VIII.C.4.a of this preamble).
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\114\ 45 CFR part 160 and subparts A, C, and E of part 164.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the term ``individual'' is defined by the HIPAA Rules at
45 CFR 160.103. Separately, under the information blocking enforcement
provision, the term ``individual'' is used to refer to actors that are
health IT developers of certified health IT, HINs, or HIEs, (see
section 3022(b)(2)(A) of the PHSA). For purposes of this exception (and
only this exception), we use neither of these definitions. Instead, the
term ``individual'' encompasses any or all of the following: (1) An
individual defined by 45 CFR 160.103; (2) a person who is the subject
of EHI that is being accessed, exchanged or used; (3) a person who
legally acts on behalf of an individual or person described in (1) or
(2), including as a personal representative, in accordance with 45 CFR
164.502(g); or (4) a legal representative authorized to make health
care decisions on behalf of a person or an executor or administrator
who can act on behalf of the deceased's estate under state or other
law.
We clarify that (2) varies from (1) because there could be
individuals who could be the subject of EHI that is being accessed,
exchanged, or used under (2), but who would not be the subject of PHI
under (1). The purpose of (2) is to include EHI that would be accessed,
exchanged or used by entities that are not subject to HIPAA (e.g., non-
covered entities and non-business associates). These entities could
include, for example, health IT developers or data analytics companies
that have access to EHI, but are not business associates.
We also clarify that (3) encompasses a person with legal authority
to act on behalf of the individual, which includes a person who is a
personal representative as defined under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. We
included the component of legal authority to act in (3) because the
HIPAA Privacy Rule gives rights to parents or legal guardians in
certain circumstances where they are not the ``personal
representative'' for their child(ren). For instance, a non-custodial
parent who has requested a minor child's medical records under a court-
ordered divorce decree may have legal authority to act on behalf of the
[[Page 7527]]
child even if he or she is not the child's ``personal representative.''
Further, in limited circumstances and if permitted under state law, a
family member may have legal authority to act on behalf of a patient to
make health care decisions in emergency situations even if that family
member may not be the ``legal representative'' or ``personal
representative'' of the patient.
We have adopted this specialized usage to ensure that this privacy
exception extends protection to information about, and respects the
privacy preferences of, all individuals, not only those individuals
whose EHI is protected as ePHI by HIPAA covered entities and business
associates.
Interaction Between Information Blocking, the Exception for Promoting
the Privacy of EHI, and the HIPAA Privacy Rule
Having consulted extensively with the HHS Office for Civil Rights
(OCR), who enforce the HIPAA Privacy, Security and Breach Notification
Rules, we have developed the information blocking provision to advance
our shared goals of preventing information blocking for nefarious or
self-interested purposes while maintaining and upholding existing
privacy rights and protections for individuals. The proposed exception
for promoting the privacy of EHI (also referred to as ``the privacy
exception'') operates in a manner consistent with the framework of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule. We designed these exceptions to ensure that
individual privacy rights are not diminished as a consequence of the
information blocking provision, and to ensure that the information
blocking provision does not require the use or disclosure of EHI in a
way that would not be permitted under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Our
intent is that the information blocking provision does not conflict
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Indeed, the sub-exception proposed in
Sec. 171.202(d) reflects a policy judgment that an actor's denial of
access to an individual consistent with the limited conditions for such
denials that are described in the HIPAA Privacy Rule at 45 CFR
164.524(a)(1), (2), and (3) is reasonable under the circumstances. We
believe this resolves any potential conflict between limitations on an
individual's right of access under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the
information blocking provision.
We note that the information blocking provision may operate to
require that actors provide access, exchange, or use of EHI in
situations that HIPAA does not. This is because the HIPAA Privacy Rule
permits, but does not require, covered entities to use and disclose
ePHI in most circumstances. The information blocking provision, on the
other hand, requires that an actor provide access to, exchange, or use
of EHI unless they are prohibited from doing so under an existing law
or are covered by one of the exceptions detailed in this preamble. To
illustrate, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits health care providers to
exchange ePHI for treatment purposes, but does not require them to do
so. Under the information blocking provision, unless an exception to
information blocking applies, or the interference is required by law, a
primary care provider would be required to exchange ePHI with a
specialist who requests it to treat an individual who was a common
patient of the provider and the specialist, even if the primary care
provider offered patient care services in competition with the
specialist's practice, or would usually refer its patients to another
specialist due to an existing business relationship.
Promoting Patient Privacy Rights
As discussed above, the information blocking provision would not
require that actors provide access, exchange, or use of EHI in a manner
that is not permitted under the HIPAA Privacy Rule or other privacy
laws. As such, the privacy-protective controls existing under HIPAA
would not be weakened by the information blocking provision. Moreover,
we have structured the privacy exception to ensure that actors can
engage in reasonable and necessary practices that advance the privacy
interests of individuals.
For example, we believe that, unless required by law, actors should
not be compelled to share EHI against patients' wishes or without
adequate safeguards out of a concern that restricting the access,
exchange, or use of the EHI would constitute information blocking. This
could seriously undermine patients' trust and confidence in the privacy
of their EHI and diminish the willingness of patients, providers, and
other entities to provide or maintain health information electronically
in the first place. In addition, such outcomes would undermine and not
advance the goals of the information blocking provision and be
inconsistent with the broader policy goal of the Cures Act to
facilitate trusted exchange of EHI. Trusted exchange requires not only
that EHI be shared in accordance with applicable law, but also that it
be shared in a manner that effectuates individuals' expressed privacy
preferences. We note and discuss below that an individual's expressed
privacy preferences will not be controlling in all cases. An actor will
not be able to rely on an individual's expressed privacy preference in
circumstances where the access, exchange, or use is required by law.
For these reasons, we propose that the proposed sub-exception in
Sec. 171.202(e) would generally permit an actor to give effect to
individuals' expressed privacy preferences, including their desire not
to permit access, exchange, or use of their EHI. For example, provided
that corresponding conditions have been met, a health care provider
could honor a patient's request not to share their EHI in circumstances
in which the HIPAA Privacy Rule would permit (though not require) the
provider to disclose the information, such as for treatment purposes.
At the same time, however, we believe that the privacy exception must
be tailored to ensure that protection of an individual's privacy is not
used as a pretext for information blocking. Accordingly, we propose
that this exception, which is discussed more fully below, would be
subject to strict conditions.
Privacy Practices Required by Law
Because the information blocking provision excludes from the
definition of information blocking practices that are required by law
(section 3022(a)(1) of the PHSA), privacy-protective practices that are
required by law do not implicate the information blocking provision and
do not require coverage from an exception. For example, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule requires that a covered entity must agree to the request
of an individual to restrict disclosure of protected health information
(PHI) about the individual to a health plan if the disclosure is for
the purpose of carrying out payment or health care operations and not
otherwise required by law and the PHI pertains solely to a health care
item or service for which the individual, or person other than the
health plan on behalf of the individual, has paid the covered entity in
full.\115\ If an individual made such a request and met all
requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the actor would be required by
law not to exchange the individual's EHI to a health plan. In this
situation, the actor's interference with access, exchange, or use would
not be information blocking and as such, the actor would not need to
benefit from this exception.
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\115\ 45 CFR 164.522(a)(1)(vi).
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Practices that are ``required by law'' can be distinguished from
other practices that an actor engages in pursuant to a privacy law, but
which are not ``required by law.'' Such privacy laws are typically
framed in a way that
[[Page 7528]]
conditions the making of a ``disclosure'' on the satisfying of specific
conditions, but does not expressly require that the actor engage in a
practice that interferes with access, exchange, or use of EHI. For
example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides that a covered entity may use
or disclose PHI in certain circumstances where the individual concerned
has authorized the disclosure.\116\ The effect of this requirement is
that the covered entity should not use or disclose the PHI in the
absence of an individual's authorization. However, because the
requirement does not prohibit the actor from exchanging the EHI in all
circumstances, the actor would be at risk of engaging in a practice
that was information blocking unless an exception applied. For this
reason, we have included a sub-exception, addressed in Sec. 171.202(b)
and discussed below, that provides that an actor will not be engaging
in information blocking if a state or federal privacy law imposes a
precondition to the provision of access, exchange, or use, and that
precondition has not been satisfied.
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\116\ 45 CFR 164.508 (Uses and disclosures for which an
authorization is required).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub-Exception To Proposed Privacy Exception: Precondition Not Satisfied
State and federal privacy laws that permit the disclosure of PHI
often impose conditions that must be satisfied prior to a disclosure
being made. We propose to establish a sub-exception to the information
blocking provision that recognizes that an actor will not be engaging
in information blocking if an actor does not provide access, exchange,
or use of EHI because a necessary precondition required by law has not
been satisfied. This exception will apply to all instances where an
actor's ability to provide access, exchange, or use is ``controlled''
by a legal obligation to satisfy a condition, or multiple conditions,
prior to providing that access, exchange, or use. To be covered by this
exception, the actor must comply with conditions, which are discussed
below.
The nature of the preconditions that an actor must satisfy in order
to provide access, exchange, or use of EHI will depend on the privacy
laws that regulate the actor. An actor that is regulated by a
restrictive state privacy law may need to satisfy more conditions than
an actor regulated by a less restrictive state privacy law, before
providing access, exchange, or use. Similarly, certain state privacy
laws may impose standards for meeting preconditions that are more
rigorous than the laws in force elsewhere.
To illustrate how we propose this sub-exception would operate, we
provide the following examples. We note that this list of examples is
not exhaustive and that preconditions required by law that control
access, exchange, or use of EHI that are not listed below would still
qualify under this proposed sub-exception so long as all conditions are
met.
Certain federal and state laws require that a person
provide consent before his or her EHI can be accessed, exchanged, or
used for specific purposes. Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not
have consent requirements for an individual (as that term is defined in
the HIPAA Privacy Rule) when a covered entity or business associate is
using or disclosing ePHI for treatment, payment or health care
operations, some state laws and federal laws and regulations do require
that a person's consent be obtained by the disclosing party/entity
before disclosing certain health information. For example, for some
sensitive health conditions such as HIV/AIDS, mental health, or genetic
testing, state laws may impose a higher standard for disclosure of such
information (i.e., require consent) than is required under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule. Additionally, under 42 CFR part 2, federally-assisted
``Part 2 programs'' generally are required to obtain a person's consent
to disclose or re-disclose patient-identifying information related to
the person's substance use disorder, such as treatment for addiction.
The exception would operate to clarify an actor's compliance
obligations in these situations. It would not be considered information
blocking to refuse to provide access, exchange, or use of EHI if the
actor has not received the person's consent, subject to conditions
discussed herein.
If an actor is required by law to obtain an individual's
HIPAA authorization before providing access, exchange, or use of the
individual's EHI, then the individual's refusal to provide an
authorization would justify the actor's refusal to provide access,
exchange, or use of EHI. The actor's refusal would, subject to
conditions discussed herein, be protected under this exception.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, and many state privacy laws,
authorize the disclosure of PHI in certain circumstances only once the
identity and authority of the person requesting the information has
been verified. We acknowledge that it is reasonable and necessary that
actors take appropriate steps, consistent with federal and state laws,
to ensure that EHI is not disclosed to the wrong person or to a person
who is not authorized to receive it. Where an actor cannot verify the
identity or authority of a person requesting access to EHI, and such
verification is required by law before the actor can provide access,
exchange, or use of the EHI, the actor's refusal to provide access,
exchange, or use will, subject to the conditions discussed herein, be
reasonable and necessary and will not be information blocking.
Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a health care provider may
share information with another health care provider for a quality
improvement project if it has verified that the requesting entity has a
relationship with the person whose information is being requested.
Where the actor could not establish if the relationship existed, it
would not be information blocking for the actor to refuse to provide
access, exchange, or use, subject to the conditions discussed herein.
We seek comments generally on this proposed sub-exception. More
specifically, we seek comment on how this proposed sub-exception would
be exercised by actors in the context of state laws. We are aware that
actors that operate across state lines or in multiple jurisdictions
sometimes adopt organization-wide privacy practices that conform with
the most restrictive privacy laws regulating their business. In order
to ensure that the information blocking provision does not diminish the
privacy rights of individuals being serviced by such actors, we are
considering the inclusion of an accommodation in this sub-exception
that would recognize an actor's observance of a legal precondition that
the actor is required by law to satisfy in at least one state in which
it operates. We believe this approach would be consistent with
practices already in place for multi-state health care systems. For
example, some states require specific consent requirements before
exchanging sensitive health information such as a patient's mental
health condition. As a result, the health care system will utilize one
consent form for multi-jurisdiction purposes in order to meet various
federal and state law requirements. However, in the event that we did
adopt such an accommodation, we would also need to carefully consider
how to ensure that before the use of the most stringent restriction is
applied in all jurisdictions, the actor has provided all privacy
protections afforded by that law across its entire business. This type
of approach would ensure that an actor cannot take advantage of a more-
restrictive privacy law for the benefit of this exception while not
also fulfilling
[[Page 7529]]
the privacy-protective obligations of the law being relied on. We seek
comment on whether there is a need for ONC to adopt such an
accommodation for actors operating in multiple states, and encourage
commenters to identify any additional conditions that should attach to
the provision of such an accommodation. We also request comment on our
proposed approach to dealing with varying state privacy laws throughout
this proposed sub-exception.
We also recognize that under the patchwork of state privacy laws,
some states have enacted laws that more comprehensively identify the
circumstance in which an individual or entity can and cannot provide
access, exchange, or use of EHI. We are considering to what extent
health care providers that are not regulated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
and would rely instead on state laws for this sub-exception, would be
able to benefit from this sub-exception when engaging in practices that
interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI for the purpose of
promoting patient privacy. We seek comment on any challenges that may
be encountered by health care providers that are not regulated as
covered entities under the HIPAA Privacy Rule when seeking to take
advantage of this proposed sub-exception. We also seek comment on
whether there exists a class of health care provider that is not
regulated by any federal or state privacy law that prescribes
preconditions that must be satisfied in connection with the disclosure
of EHI, and whether any such class of health care provider would
benefit from a sub-exception similar to that proposed in Sec.
171.202(c) for health IT developers of certified health IT.
Conditions To Be Met To Qualify for the Sub-Exception
In most circumstances, an actor would be in a position to influence
whether a precondition is satisfied. For example, an actor could
deprive a person of the opportunity to take some step that is a
prerequisite for the exchange of their EHI, could assume the existence
of a fact prejudicial to the granting of access without seeking to
discover the truth or otherwise of the fact, or could make a
determination that a precondition was not satisfied without properly
informing itself of all relevant information. As such, we propose that
this exception would be subject to conditions that ensure that the
protection of an individual's privacy is not used as a pretext for
information blocking.
We propose that an actor can qualify, in part, for this sub-
exception by implementing and conforming to organizational policies and
procedures that identify the criteria to be used by the actor and, as
applicable, the steps that the actor will take, in order to satisfy the
precondition. Most actors are covered entities or business associates
for the purposes of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and are already required to
have policies and procedures and training programs in place that
address how PHI and ePHI is used (as that term is defined in 45 CFR
160.103, as amended) and disclosed. As such, we expect that the
overwhelming majority of actors will already be in a position to meet
this condition, or would be able to meet this condition with modest
additional effort. However, we acknowledge that some actors may not,
for whatever reason, have privacy policies and practices in place, or
may have implemented privacy policies and practices that do not
sufficiently address the criteria to be used, and steps to be taken, to
satisfy a precondition relied on by the actor. As such, we propose to
provide an alternative basis on which to qualify, in part, for this
sub-exception. We propose to permit actors to instead document, on a
case-by-case basis, the criteria used by the actor to determine when
the precondition will be satisfied, any criteria that were not met, and
the reason why the criteria were not met. These alternative conditions,
which are discussed in detail below, ensure that this sub-exception
does not protect practices that are post hoc rationalizations used to
justify improper practices, whilst also ensuring that actors do not
face any pressure to disclose EHI in the situation where they do not
have privacy policies and practices in place, or where their privacy
policies and practices do not respond to the requirements of this
condition.
Separately, we propose that if the precondition that an actor
purports to have been satisfied relies on the provision of a consent or
authorization from an individual, it is a condition of this sub-
exception that the actor must have done all things reasonably necessary
within its control to provide the individual with a meaningful
opportunity to provide that consent or authorization.
We reiterate, again, that the information blocking provision does
not require the provision of access, exchange, or use of EHI in a
manner that would not be permitted under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Organizational Policies and Procedures
If an actor seeks to qualify for this sub-exception, in part, by
implementing and conforming to organizational policies and procedures,
such policies and procedures must be in writing, and specify the
criteria to be used by the actor, and, if applicable, the steps that
the actor will take, in order to satisfy the precondition relied on by
the actor not to provide access, exchange, or use of EHI. It would not
be sufficient for an actor to simply identify the existence of the
precondition in their organizational policies and procedures.
We acknowledge that certain preconditions may be outside the direct
control of the actor. For example, the requirement that an actor
receive a valid authorization before releasing EHI in certain
circumstances would be a precondition to be satisfied by the
individual, and the actor may have little ability to influence the
nature of the authorization that it receives. For preconditions of this
nature, the actor's policies and procedures would only need to identify
the criteria that the actor will apply and the steps that the actor
will take to facilitate the satisfaction of the precondition, such as
identifying the requirements for a valid authorization and the follow
up steps (if any) to be taken in response to receipt of an
authorization that does not meet those requirements. In contrast, where
the satisfaction of a precondition relies solely on an actor, such as
the ``minimum necessary'' determination made by HIPAA covered entities
(or their business associates) when exchanging EHI that is ePHI, the
actor's policies and procedures would need to particularize the steps
that the actor will take in order to ensure that it satisfies the
precondition. Where the precondition falls somewhere in between and
relies on actions taken by both the actor and an individual, the
actor's policies and procedures would need to address how the actor
would do the things necessary within its control, which would include
the steps it should take to facilitate all actions needed to be taken
by an individual.
Take, for example, the situation where an actor needed to determine
whether the subject individual had a relationship with a requesting
entity as a precondition to exchanging EHI. The actor's policies and
practices should, at minimum, identify the criteria to be applied,
being the evidence that the actor would need in order to satisfy itself
of the existence of a relationship, such as receipt of a Medicare or
other insurance number, or other indicia of a relationship such as the
establishment of a doctor-patient relationship.
An actor would only be eligible to benefit from this sub-exception
if it has followed its processes and policies. Continuing the above
example, an actor
[[Page 7530]]
that chose not to provide access to EHI on the basis that insufficient
evidence had been provided to establish the existence of the
relationship, would need to show that its decision was based on the
applicable criteria specified in the actor's policy and practices.
Using a different example, and as discussed above, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule generally requires covered entities (and their business
associates) to take reasonable steps to limit the use or disclosure of,
and requests for, PHI to the minimum necessary to accomplish the
intended purpose.\117\ Satisfying the ``minimum necessary'' requirement
is a precondition to be met under the HIPAA Privacy Rule before an
actor exchanges ePHI for many purposes. The determination of what
constitutes the ``minimum necessary'' is a fact based judgment made by
an actor. To allow covered entities the flexibility to address their
unique circumstances, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities
(and their business associates) to make their own assessment of what
ePHI is reasonably necessary for a particular purpose, given the
characteristics of their business and workforce. To qualify for this
proposed sub-exception, the actor's privacy policies and procedures
would need to identify criteria for making a ``minimum necessary''
determination for both routine and non-routine disclosures and
requests, including identifying the circumstances under which
disclosing the entire medical record is reasonably necessary. For
actors that are covered entities or business associates, the
development of policies and procedures for the making of minimum
necessary determinations for requesting, using and disclosing PHI is
already a requirement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, so we expect that
actors will already have such policies and procedures in place. If an
actor implemented its organizational policies and procedures for making
``minimum necessary'' determinations consistent with the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, and otherwise met the other conditions of this exception, a
decision to exchange the minimum necessary information but less
information than requested by another entity would satisfy this sub-
exception and not be considered information blocking.
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\117\ 45 CFR 164.502(b).
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Finally, an actor's policies and procedures must be implemented.
This ensures that an actor can only satisfy this condition by reference
to privacy policies and practices that individuals in fact benefit
from, and not by policies and procedures that have been documented but
not applied. Proper implementation would involve making the policies
and processes available to all decision makers, and facilitating
workforce and contractor understanding and consistent implementation of
the actor's policies and procedures such as by providing training. This
condition ensures that this sub-exception does not protect practices
that are post hoc rationalizations used to justify improper practices.
As discussed above, to the extent existing state and federal laws
apply to a given actor, we expect an actor to already have procedures
in place to address those legal requirements. Indeed, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule requires that covered entities have policies and procedures and
training programs in place that address how PHI and ePHI are used (as
those terms are defined in 45 CFR 160.103) and disclosed. Moreover,
this exception is only enlivened when an actor asserts that its conduct
was carried out to satisfy a precondition, and we expect that such
conduct should be considered and deliberate.
We seek comment on this proposed condition generally, and
specifically, on whether an actor's organizational policies and
procedures provide a sufficiently robust and reliable basis for
evaluating the bona fides, reasonableness, and necessity of practices
engaged in to satisfy preconditions required by state or federal
privacy laws.
Documenting Criteria and Rationale
If an actor's practice does not conform to an actor's
organizational policies and procedures as required by Sec.
171.202(b)(1), we propose that that an actor can seek to qualify for
this sub-exception, in part, by documenting how it reached its decision
that it would not provide access, use, or exchange of EHI on the basis
that a precondition had not been satisfied. Such documentation must be
created on a case-by-case basis. An actor will not satisfy this
condition if, for instance, it sought to document a general practice
that it had applied to all instances where the precondition had not
been satisfied. Rather, the record created by the actor must address
the specific circumstances of the specific practice (or interference)
at issue.
The record created by the actor must identify the criteria used by
the actor to determine when the precondition is satisfied. That is, it
must identify the objective criteria that the actor applied to
determine whether the precondition had been satisfied. Consistent with
the condition to this sub-exception that the practice must be tailored
to the privacy interest at issue (discussed below), those criteria
would need to be directly relevant to satisfying the precondition. For
example, if the precondition at issue was the provision of a valid
HIPAA authorization, the actor's documented record should reflect, at
minimum, that the authorization would need to meet each of the
requirements specified for a valid authorization at 45 CFR 164.508(c).
The record would then need to document the criteria that had not been
met, and the reason so. Continuing the example, the actor could record
that the authorization did not contain the name or other specific
identification of the person making the request because the
authorization only disclosed the person's first initial rather than
first name, and the actor had records about multiple people with that
same initial and last name.
We believe that this condition will provide the transparency
necessary to demonstrate whether the actor has satisfied the conditions
applicable to this exception. Moreover, it will ensure that a decision
to not provide access, exchange, or use of EHI is considered and
deliberate, and therefore reasonable and necessary.
We seek comment on this proposed condition.
Meaningful Opportunity To Provide Consent or Authorization
If the precondition that an actor purports to have satisfied relies
on the provision of a consent or authorization from an individual, it
is a condition of this sub-exception that the actor must have done all
things reasonably necessary within its control to provide the
individual with a meaningful opportunity to provide that consent or
authorization. This condition will be relevant when, for example, a
state privacy law or the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires an individual to
provide their consent and/or HIPAA authorization before identifiable
information can be accessed, exchanged, or used for specific purposes.
For instance, a state law may require that an individual provide
consent before a hospital can share her treatment information
electronically with another treating health care provider. Under this
scenario, the hospital's refusal to exchange the EHI in the absence of
the individual's consent would be reasonable and necessary and would
not be information blocking, so long as the hospital had provided the
individual with a meaningful opportunity to provide that consent and
where the criteria and other conditions of this proposed exception were
met.
[[Page 7531]]
In the context of the provision of consent, a meaningful
opportunity would ordinarily require that an actor provide the
individual with a legally compliant consent form; make a reasonable
effort to inform an individual that she has the right to consent to the
disclosure of her EHI; and provide the individual with sufficient
information and educational material (commensurate with the
circumstances of the disclosure). It would be best practice for an
actor to also inform the individual about the revocability of any
consent given, if and as provided in the relevant state or federal
privacy law, and the actor's processes for acting on any revocation.
We are considering addressing this condition in further detail,
whether by way of additional guidance or in regulation text. To this
end, we seek comments regarding what actions an actor should take,
within the actor's control, to provide an individual with a meaningful
opportunity to provide a required consent or authorization, and whether
different expectations should arise in the context of a consent versus
a HIPAA authorization. For example, commenters may wish to provide
comment on the actions to be taken to ensure that an individual has a
meaningful opportunity to satisfy a precondition that the individual
provide a HIPAA authorization. Specifically, in the context of a
requirement that the authorization be signed, what effort should be
expected from actors in seeking signatures from: (i) Persons acting for
the patient where the patient is unable to sign a form; (ii) former
patients whose EHI is being requested from third parties; or (iii)
patients that are not in a facility, such as patients of individual
physicians?
We clarify that after providing the individual with a meaningful
opportunity to consent or provide authorization, we believe that it is
the individual's responsibility to complete any required documentation
before an actor is able to access, exchange, or use the individual's
EHI. We do not expect the actor to ``chase'' the individual despite
using its best efforts provide the individual with an opportunity to
sign a consent or authorization form. So long as the actor has provided
the individual with a meaningful opportunity to consent, the actor will
have fulfilled this aspect of the eligibility requirements of this sub-
exception.
Separately, to qualify for this sub-exception, to the extent that
the precondition at issue was the provision of a consent or
authorization by an individual, the actor must not have improperly
encouraged or induced the individual to not provide the consent or
authorization. This does not mean that the hospital cannot inform an
individual about the advantages and disadvantages of exchanging EHI and
any associated risks, so long as the information communicated is
accurate and legitimate. However, an actor would not meet this
condition in the event that it misled an individual about the nature of
the consent to be provided, dissuaded individuals from providing
consent in respect of disclosures to the actor's competitors, or
imposed onerous requirements to effectuate consent that were
unnecessary and not required by law.
We seek comment on whether the proposed condition requiring the
provision of a meaningful opportunity and prohibiting improper
encouragement or inducement should apply to preconditions beyond the
precondition that an individual provide consent or authorization. We
seek comment on whether the conditions specified for this sub-
exception, when taken in total, are sufficiently particularized and
sufficiently strict to ensure that actors that are in a position to
influence whether a precondition is satisfied will not be able to take
advantage of this sub-exception and seek protection for practices that
do not promote the privacy of EHI. We also seek comment on whether we
should adopt a more tailored approach to conditioning the availability
of this exception. For example, we are considering whether different
conditions should apply depending on: (i) The nature of the EHI at
issue; (ii) the circumstances in which the EHI is being access,
exchanged, or used; (iii) the interest being protected by the
precondition; or (iv) the nature of the precondition to be satisfied.
Commenters are encouraged to identify scenarios in which the
application of the conditions applicable to this sub-exception, as
proposed, give rise to unnecessary burden, or would require activities
that do not advance the dual policy interests of preventing information
blocking and promoting privacy and security.
Practice Must Be Tailored to the Specific Privacy Risk or Interest
Being Addressed
To qualify for this sub-exception, an actor's privacy-protective
practice must be tailored to the specific privacy risks that the
practice actually addresses. This condition necessarily presupposes
that an actor has carefully evaluated the privacy requirements imposed
on the actor, the privacy interests to be managed by the actor, and has
developed a considered response that is tailored to protecting and
promoting the privacy of EHI. For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule at 45
CFR 164.514(h) requires that, in certain circumstances, the disclosure
of PHI is only authorized once the identity and authority of the person
requesting the information has been verified. The privacy issue to be
addressed in this instance is the risk that PHI will be disclosed to
the wrong individual, or an unauthorized person. If an actor chooses
not to provide access, exchange, or use of EHI on the basis that the
actor's identity verification requirements have not been satisfied, the
actor's practice must be tailored to the specific privacy risks at
issue. This would require that the actor ensure that it does not impose
identity verification requirements that are unreasonably onerous under
the circumstances.
To illustrate, a policy where a driver's license was the only
accepted government-issued form of identification would not be a
practice that is tailored to the privacy risk at issue because the
provider's preference for one form of government-issued identification
over another does not meaningfully manage the privacy risk. Similarly,
it may be unreasonable for an actor to require the production of
documentation demonstrating the parent-child relationship unless the
actor was in possession of information that suggested that an adult
might not have authority to be the child's legal representative. To do
otherwise would be to apply an onerous requirement in all instances of
parent-child relationships, which is insufficiently tailored to the
privacy risk being managed. Finally, it may be unreasonable for an
actor to insist that the individual produce original identification if
the individual was able to furnish a scanned copy of their form of
identification that the actor could reasonably rely on.
For the purposes of this sub-exception, we clarify that engaging in
an interference on the basis that a precondition has not been satisfied
would be a practice that addresses a privacy risk or interest, and so
tailoring that interference to satisfy a precondition can satisfy this
condition. Controls on access, exchange, or use arising under privacy
laws serve a privacy interest and so this condition will be met so long
as the actor's practice is tailored to the risk or interest being
addressed.
We seek comment on this proposed condition.
[[Page 7532]]
Practice Must Be Implemented in a Consistent and Non-Discriminatory
Manner
We propose that in order for a practice to qualify for this sub-
exception, the practice must be implemented in a consistent and non-
discriminatory manner. This condition would provide basic assurance
that the purported privacy practice is directly related to a specific
privacy risk and is not being used to interfere with access, exchange,
or use of EHI for other purposes to which this exception does not
apply.
This condition requires that the actor's privacy-protective
practices must be based on objective criteria that apply uniformly for
all substantially similar privacy risks. An actor could not, for
example, implement an organizational privacy policy that imposed
unreasonably onerous requirements on a certain class of individuals or
entities without a legitimate justification for doing so. For example,
an actor that offered a patient-facing software application (app) would
not be able to benefit from this exception if it refused to exchange
EHI with a competitor app on the basis of an individual's failure to
meet onerous authorization requirements that applied only to health
information exchange with the competitor app and did not apply to, for
example, the exchange of EHI with health care providers. This condition
provides basic assurance that the purported privacy-protective practice
is not being used to interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI for
other purposes to which this proposed exception does not apply.
We request comment on this proposed condition.
Sub-Exception to Proposed Privacy Exception: Health IT Developer of
Certified Health IT Not Covered by HIPAA
The sub-exception proposed in Sec. 171.202(b) recognizes as
reasonable and necessary the activities engaged in by actors consistent
with the controls placed on access, exchange, or use of EHI by federal
and state privacy laws. Importantly, that sub-exception is limited to
actors that are subject to those federal and state privacy laws; an
actor that is not regulated by HIPAA or a state privacy law cannot
benefit from the exception proposed in Sec. 171.202(b).
We propose to establish a sub-exception to the information blocking
provision that would apply to actors that are health IT developers of
certified health IT but not regulated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule in
respect to the operation of the actor's health IT product or service
(referred to hereafter as ``non-covered actors''). We expect that the
class of actors to which this proposed sub-exception applies will be
very small. The vast majority of health IT developers of certified
health IT operate as business associates to health care providers or
health plans, are regulated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and will be able
to benefit from the exception proposed in Sec. 171.202(b) to the
extent that the HIPAA Privacy Rule (or applicable state privacy law)
imposes preconditions to the provision of access, exchange, or use of
EHI. However, we recognize that direct-to-consumer health IT products
and services are a growing sector of the health IT market. This class
of health IT is often not regulated by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, but
could be certified under the Program. We note that the privacy
practices of consumer-facing health IT products and services are
typically regulated by the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).
However, the FTC Act applies to acts and practices that are unfair and
deceptive (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), and does not prescribe privacy
requirements to be adopted or followed that can be leveraged for the
purpose of recognizing reasonable and necessary privacy-protective
practices in this proposed rule.\118\
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\118\ See HHS, Examining Oversight of the Privacy & Security of
Health Data Collected by Entities Not Regulated by HIPAA, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/non-covered_entities_report_june_17_2016.pdf.
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As discussed in section VIII.C.2.b, where a health IT developer of
certified health IT offers a health IT product or service not regulated
by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, such product or service is subject to the
information blocking provision. We want to ensure that non-covered
actors that engage in reasonable and necessary privacy-protective
practices that interfere with the access, exchange, or use of EHI can
seek coverage under this proposed sub-exception. As such, we propose
that a non-covered actor will not engage in information blocking if the
actor does not provide access, exchange, or use of EHI where the
practice implements a process that is described in the actor's
organizational privacy policy and has been disclosed to any individual
or entity that uses the actor's health IT. This proposed sub-exception
is proposed in Sec. 171.202(c).
As a threshold requirement of this sub-exception, the actor's
practice of interfering with access, exchange, or use of EHI must
comply with any applicable state or federal privacy laws. While we have
developed this sub-exception for the express purpose of addressing
privacy-protective practices that are not regulated by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, we acknowledge that there may be other privacy laws
implicated by the practice in question. If the actor's practice
contravenes a state or federal privacy law, but otherwise satisfies
this proposed sub-exception, the actor would not be entitled to benefit
from this sub-exception.
Practice Must Implement Privacy Policy
In order to qualify for this sub-exception, the practice engaged in
by the non-covered actor--the interference with access, exchange, or
use of EHI--must also implement a process described in the actor's
organizational privacy policy. This requires that a non-covered actor
must have documented in detail in its organizational privacy policy the
processes and procedures that the actor will use to determine when the
actor will not provide access, exchange, or use of EHI. For example, a
non-covered actor that proposed to require the provision of written
consent for the use or disclosure of EHI would need to describe in its
organizational privacy policy the processes and procedures to be
utilized by the actor to implement that privacy-protective practice in
order that the practice be considered reasonable and necessary and
qualify for this sub- exception. A privacy policy that was prepared at
a high level--for example, that simply stated that written consent was
required--would not qualify. To build on this example, a non-covered
actor's consent policy would need to describe the specific requirements
that are imposed on individuals when giving consent, together with the
processes and procedures to be followed by the non-covered actor to
ensure that the individual has a meaningful choice over whether to
consent. Compliance with this condition ensures that this sub-exception
recognizes only legitimate practices that have been tailored to the
privacy needs of the individuals that use the non-covered actor's
health IT, and does not recognize practices that are a pretext or
after-the-fact rationalization for actions that interfere with access,
exchange, or use of EHI.
It necessarily follows that the non-covered actor's practice must
implement its documented organizational privacy policy. For example, if
a non-covered actor chose not to provide access, exchange, or use of
EHI on the basis that it could not verify the identity of the
individual requesting the EHI, the non-covered actor would need to be
able to demonstrate that it implemented the
[[Page 7533]]
part of its organizational privacy policy that dealt with identity
verification. Practices that diverge from an actor's documented
policies or practices, or which are not addressed in an actor's
organizational privacy policy, would not qualify for this proposed sub-
exception.
Practice Must Have Been Disclosed to Users
A non-covered actor that seeks to benefit from this proposed sub-
exception must also ensure that it has previously disclosed the
privacy-protective practice to the individuals and entities that use,
or will use, the health IT. These users are affected by the practices
engaged in by a non-covered actor but may otherwise have no visibility
of the non-covered actor's approach to protecting the privacy of EHI.
We expect that non-covered actors will seek to satisfy this condition
by using a privacy notice.\119\ We emphasize that the disclosure must
be meaningful. In assessing whether a non-covered actor's disclosure
was meaningful, regard will be paid to whether the disclosure was in
plain language and conspicuous, including whether the disclosure was
located in a place, and presented in a manner, that is accessible and
obvious to the individuals and entities that use, or will use, the
health IT.
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\119\ ONC has provided a Model Privacy Notice (MPN) that is a
voluntary, openly available resource designed to help developers
clearly convey information about their privacy and security policies
to their users. Similar to the FDA Nutrition Facts Label, the MPN
provides a snapshot of a company's existing privacy practices
encouraging transparency and helping consumers make informed choices
when selecting products. The MPN does not mandate specific policies
or substitute for more comprehensive or detailed privacy policies.
See https://www.healthit.gov/topic/privacy-security-and-hipaa/model-privacy-notice-mpn.
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To qualify for this sub-exception, a non-covered actor would not be
required to disclose its organizational privacy policy to its customers
or to the public generally. Rather, the non- covered actor need only
describe, with sufficient detail and precision to be readily understood
by users of the non-covered actor's health IT, the privacy-protective
practices that the non-covered actor has adopted and will observe. This
is necessary because a non-covered actor that is not subject to
prescribed privacy standards in connection with the provision of health
IT will have significant flexibility in the privacy-protective
practices that it adopts. If an actor is not required to inform the
individuals and entities that use, or will use, the health IT, about
the privacy- protective practices that it will implement in its
product, or when providing its service, there is a risk that this
proposed sub-exception will give deference to policies and processes
that are post hoc rationalizations used to justify improper practices.
This condition also serves as a check on the nature of the
interferences that a non-covered actor writes into its organizational
privacy policies; transparency will help to ensure that a non-covered
actor takes a balanced approach to protecting privacy interests on one
hand, and pursuing business interests that might be inconsistent with
the information blocking provision, on the other hand. We hope that
this requirement will foster a quasi-market based measure of when a
privacy-protective practice is ``reasonable and necessary,'' and ensure
that any departure made by a non-covered actor from privacy practices
that are recognized by state or federal law is transparent and open.
It will be a matter for non-covered actors to determine the most
appropriate way to communicate its privacy practices to users. We
believe that it would be reasonable that non- covered actors would, at
minimum, post their privacy notices, or otherwise describe their
privacy-protective practices, on their websites.
Practice Must Be Tailored to Privacy Risk and Implemented in a Non-
Discriminatory Manner
Finally, we propose that in order for a practice to qualify for
this sub-exception, an actor's practice must be tailored to the
specific privacy risks that the practice actually addresses, and must
be implemented in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner. These
conditions also apply to the exception proposed in Sec. 171.202(b),
and the discussion above addressing these conditions in connection with
Sec. 171.202(b) applies to this proposed exception in Sec.
171.202(c). We refer readers to the above discussion and invite
comments on these proposed conditions.
We seek comment on this proposed sub-exception generally.
Specifically, we seek comment on whether HIEs or HINs would benefit
from a similar sub-exception. We also seek comment on whether the
conditions applicable to this sub-exception are sufficient to ensure
that non-covered actors cannot take advantage of this exception by
engaging in practices that are inconsistent with the promotion of
individual privacy. We also seek comment on the level of detail that
non-covered actors should be required to use when describing their
privacy practices and processes to user of health IT.
Sub-Exception to Proposed Privacy Exception: Denial of an Individual's
Request for Their Electronic Protected Health Information in the
Circumstances Provided in 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2), and (3)
We propose a limited sub-exception to the information blocking
provision that would permit a covered entity or business associate to
deny an individual's request for access to their PHI in the
circumstances provided under 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1), (2), and (3). We
believe this exception would avoid a potential conflict between the
HIPAA Privacy Rule and the information blocking provision.
Specifically, the HIPAA Privacy Rule contemplates circumstances under
which covered entities, and in some instances business associates, may
deny an individual access to PHI and distinguishes those grounds for
denial which are reviewable from those which are not. This exception
applies to both the ``unreviewable grounds'' and ``reviewable grounds''
of access. The ``unreviewable grounds'' for denial for individuals
include situations involving: (1) Certain requests that are made by
inmates of correctional institutions; (2) information created or
obtained during research that includes treatment, if certain conditions
are met; (3) denials permitted by the Privacy Act; and (4) information
obtained from non-health care providers pursuant to promises of
confidentiality. In addition, two categories of information are
expressly excluded from the individual right of access: (1)
Psychotherapy notes, which are the personal notes of a mental health
care provider documenting or analyzing the contents of a counseling
session that are maintained separate from the rest of the patient's
medical record (see 45 CFR 164.524(a)(1)); and (2) information compiled
in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or
administrative action or proceeding (see 45 CFR 164.501).
The ``reviewable grounds'' of access as described in Sec.
164.524(a)(3), which provides that a covered entity may deny access
provided that the individual is given a right to have such denials
reviewed under certain circumstances. One such circumstance is when a
licensed health care professional, in the exercise of professional
judgment, determines that the access requested is reasonably likely to
endanger the life or physical safety of the individual or another
person. In addition, if access is denied, then the individual has the
right to have the denial reviewed by a
[[Page 7534]]
licensed health professional who is to act as a reviewing official and
did not participate in the original decision to deny access (see
generally 45 CFR 164.524(a)(3)).
We propose that if an actor who is a covered entity or business
associate denies an individual's request for access to their PHI on the
basis of these unreviewable and reviewable grounds, and provided the
denial of access complies with the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule in each case, then the actor would qualify for this exception and
these practices would not constitute information blocking.
The following example illustrates this proposed sub-exception. An
individual is a patient of a psychiatrist who is a HIPAA covered
entity. The patient has requested all of his electronic health files
from the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist maintains separately from the
electronic health record a file containing psychotherapy notes
regarding the patient. The psychiatrist grants access to the patient by
providing a copy of the information in his electronic health record,
but does not provide the patient's psychotherapy notes. Under this
example, the psychiatrist would meet the requirements of this proposed
exception since the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides that covered entities
can deny individuals access to their psychotherapy notes and provides
that this is an unreviewable grounds for denial.
We seek comment on this proposed sub-exception.
Sub-Exception to Proposed Privacy Exception: Respecting an Individual's
Request Not To Share Information
We propose to establish an exception to the information blocking
provision that would, in certain circumstances, permit an actor not to
provide access, exchange, or use of EHI if an individual has
specifically requested that the actor not do so. This sub-exception is
proposed in Sec. 171.202(e). We believe this sub-exception is
necessary to ensure that actors are confident that they can respect
individuals' privacy choices without engaging in information blocking,
and to promote public confidence in the health IT infrastructure by
effectuating patients' preference about how and under what
circumstances their EHI will be accessed, exchanged, and used. We
recognize that individuals may have concerns about permitting their EHI
to be accessed, exchanged, or used electronically under certain
circumstances. As a matter of public policy, we think that these
privacy concerns, if expressed by an individual and agreed to by an
actor, would be reasonable and necessary, and an actor's conduct in
abiding by its agreement would, if all conditions are met, be an
exception to the information blocking provision.
This proposed sub-exception would not apply under circumstances
where an actor interferes with a use or disclosure of EHI that is
required by law, including when EHI is required by the Secretary to
enforce HIPAA under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(2)(ii) and 45 CFR
164.502(a)(4)(i). Stated differently, this sub-exception would not
operate to permit an actor to refuse to provide access, exchange, or
use of EHI when that access, exchange, or use is required by law. This
sub-exception recognizes and supports the public policy objective of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which identifies uses and disclosures of EHI
for which the public interest in the disclosure of the individual's
information outweighs the individual's interests in controlling the
information.
This sub-exception would permit an actor not to share EHI if the
following conditions are met: (1) The individual made the request to
the actor not to have his or her EHI accessed, exchanged, or used; (2)
the individual's request was initiated by the individual without any
improper encouragement or inducement by the actor; and (3) the actor or
its agent documents the request within a reasonable time period.
To qualify for this sub-exception, the request that the
individual's EHI not be accessed, exchanged, or used must come from the
individual. Moreover, the individual must have made the request
independently and without any improper encouragement or inducement by
the actor. For example, it would be improper to encourage individuals
not to share information with unaffiliated providers on the basis of
generalized or speculative risks of unauthorized disclosure. On the
other hand, if the actor was aware of a specific privacy or security
risk, it would not be improper to inform individuals of that risk.
Likewise, an actor would be permitted to provide an individual with
general information about her privacy rights and options, including for
example, the option to not provide consent, provided the information is
presented accurately, does not omit important information, and is not
presented in a way that is likely to improperly influence the
individual's decision about how to exercise their rights.
If an individual submits a request to an actor not to disclose her
EHI, and the actor agrees with and documents the request, the request
would be valid for purposes of this sub-exception unless and until it
is subsequently revoked by the individual. We believe this approach
would minimize compliance burdens for actors while also respecting
individuals' requests. We propose that once the individual makes the
request, she should not, subject to the requirements of applicable
federal or state laws and regulations, have to continually reiterate
her privacy preferences, such as having to re-submit a request every
year. Likewise, we propose that once the actor has documented an
individual's request, the actor should not have to repeatedly reconfirm
and re-document the request. We seek comment, however, regarding
whether this approach is too permissive and could result in unintended
consequences. We also seek comment on this proposed sub-exception
generally, including on effective ways for an individual to revoke his
or her privacy request for purposes of this sub-exception.
We also propose that in order for a practice to qualify for this
sub-exception, an actor's practice must be implemented in a consistent
and non-discriminatory manner. This condition would provide basic
assurance that the purported privacy practice is directly related to
the risk of disclosing EHI contrary to the wishes of an individual, and
is not being used to interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI for
other purposes to which this exception does not apply. This condition
requires that the actor's privacy-protective practice must be based on
objective criteria that apply uniformly for all substantially similar
privacy risks.
We note that under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, individuals have the
right to request restrictions on how a covered entity will use (as that
term is defined in 45 CFR160.103) and disclose PHI about them for
treatment, payment, and health care operations pursuant to 45 CFR
164.522(a)(1). Under Sec. 164.522(a), a covered entity is not required
to agree to an individual's request for a restriction (other than in
the case of a disclosure to a health plan under Sec.
164.522(a)(1)(vi)), but is bound by any restrictions to which it
agrees.
We wish to clarify that, for the purposes of this proposed sub-
exception, the actor may give effect to an individual's request not to
have an actor disclose EHI even if state or federal laws would allow
the actor not to follow the individual's request. This is consistent
with our position that, absent improper encouragement or inducement,
and subject to appropriate conditions, it should not be considered
information blocking to give effect to
[[Page 7535]]
patients' individual preferences about how their EHI will be shared or
not. As an illustration, if an individual requests that her EHI not be
accessed, exchanged, or used by a physician to help train new staff at
a hospital, the physician may agree not to use the individual's EHI for
this purpose despite the fact it would not be required by law to agree
to such a restriction. Provided the physician has not encouraged or
induced the individual to make this request, this sub-exception would
apply to the physician's refusal to disclose the information to staff
for training purposes.
We seek comments on this sub-exception generally. Specifically, we
seek comment on what would be considered a reasonable time frame for
documentation. In addition, we also seek comment on how this sub-
exception would affect public health disclosures and health care
research, if an actor did not share a patient's EHI due to a privacy
preference, including any effects on preventing or controlling
diseases, injury, or disability, and the reporting of disease, injury,
and vital events such as births or deaths, and the conduct of public
health surveillance and health care research.
3. Promoting the Security of EHI
We propose to establish an exception to the information blocking
provision that would permit actors to engage in practices that are
reasonable and necessary to promote the security of EHI, subject to
certain conditions. Without this exception, actors may be reluctant to
implement security measures or engage in other activities that are
reasonable and necessary for safeguarding the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of EHI. This could undermine the ultimate
goals of the information blocking provision by discouraging best
practice security protocols and diminishing the reliability of the
health IT ecosystem.
Robust security protections are critical to promoting patients' and
other stakeholders' trust and confidence that EHI will be collected,
used, and shared in a manner that protects individuals' privacy and
complies with applicable legal requirements. Public confidence in the
security of their EHI has been challenged, however, by the growing
incidence of cyber-attacks in the health care sector. More than ever,
health care providers, health IT developers, HIEs and HINs must be
vigilant to mitigate security risks and implement appropriate
safeguards to secure the EHI they collect, maintain, access, use, and
exchange.
The Cures Act directs the National Coordinator, in consultation
with the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR), to issue guidance on common
``security barriers'' that prevent the trusted exchange of EHI (section
3022(c)(2) of the PHSA). However, the Cures Act also seeks to promote
the security of EHI, which it defines as an element of interoperability
(section 3000(9)(A) of the PHSA) and a target area for the policy
development to be undertaken by the Health Information Technology
Advisory Committee (section 3002(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the PHSA). The
inclusion of these provisions promote broader access, exchange, and use
of EHI while at the same time continuing to promote the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of EHI through security
practices that are appropriate and tailored to identified
vulnerabilities and risks.
To qualify for this exception, we propose that an actor's conduct
must satisfy threshold conditions. As discussed in detail below, the
particular security-related practice must be directly related to
safeguarding the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of EHI,
implemented consistently and in a non-discriminatory manner, and
tailored to identified security risks.
While the importance of security practices cannot be overstated,
this proposed exception would not apply to all practices that purport
to secure EHI. Rather, this exception will only be available when the
actor's security-based practice satisfies the conditions applicable to
this exception. We do not believe it would be appropriate to prescribe
a ``maximum'' level of security or to dictate a one-size-fits-all
approach for all actors that may not be appropriate in all
circumstances and may not accommodate new threats, countermeasures, and
best practices in a rapidly changing security landscape. Indeed,
security infrastructure varies from organization to organization, and
there exist diverse approaches and technology solutions to managing
security risks. We do not intend for this proposed exception to dictate
a specific security approach when an actor's security posture must be
agile and its practices iterative. Moreover, effective security best
practices focus on the mitigation and remediation of risks to a
reasonable and acceptable level, and not the elimination of all
vulnerabilities, so organizations should have the flexibility to assess
what vulnerabilities to address and how best to address them while
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of EHI.
As such, we propose that actors would be able to satisfy this
exception through practices that implement either security policies and
practices developed by the actor, or case-by-case determinations made
by the actor. Whether a security-motivated practice meets this
exception would be determined on a case-by-case basis using a fact-
based analysis of the conditions set forth below. This approach offers
the most appropriate framework for analyzing security practices, which
are necessarily driven by and must be tailored to actors' individual
circumstances.
We wish to emphasize that the security-based practices implemented
by a single physician office with limited technology resources, for
example, will be different to those implemented by a large health
system, and that this difference does not affect an actor's ability to
qualify for this exception. The fact-based approach we propose will
allow each actor to implement policies, procedures, and technologies
that are appropriate for its particular size, organizational structure,
and risks to individuals' EHI.
A fact-based analysis also aligns with the HIPAA Security Rule
\120\ concerning the security of ePHI. The HIPAA Security Rule does not
dictate the security measures that a covered entity or business
associate must implement, but instead requires the entity to develop
security practices and implement administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards that take into account the entity's size,
complexity, and capabilities; technical, hardware, and software
infrastructure; the costs of security measures; and the likelihood and
possible impact of potential risks to ePHI. Under the HIPAA Security
Rule, covered entities and business associates are required to conduct
an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
ePHI held by the covered entity or business associate. Once covered
entities and business associates have completed the risk assessment,
they must take security measures sufficient to reduce identified risks
and vulnerabilities to reasonable and appropriate levels (45 CFR
164.308(a)(1)(ii)). We note, however, that while our approach is
consistent with the regulation of security practices under the HIPAA
Security Rule, the fact that a practice complies with the HIPAA
Security Rule does not establish that it
[[Page 7536]]
meets the conditions of this proposed exception to the information
blocking provision. The HIPAA Security Rule and this proposed exception
have different focuses. The HIPAA Security Rule establishes a baseline
by requiring certain entities to ensure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of ePHI by implementing security measures, among other
safeguards, that the entities determine are sufficient to reduce risks
and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level. In contrast,
the purpose of this exception to the information blocking provision is
to provide flexibility for reasonable and necessary security practices
while screening out practices that purport to promote the security of
EHI but that are unreasonably broad, onerous on those seeking access to
the EHI, are not applied consistently across/within an organization, or
otherwise may unreasonably interfere with access, exchange, or use of
EHI.
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\120\ The HIPAA Security Rule is located at 45 CFR part 160 and
Subparts A and C of Part 164 and 68 FR 8333.
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We propose the following conditions that must be met for an
activity or practice to qualify for this exception.
The Practice Must Be Directly Related To Safeguarding the
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of EHI
As a threshold condition, the proposed exception would not apply to
any practices that are not directly related to safeguarding the
security of EHI. In assessing the practice, we would consider whether
and to what extent the practice directly addressed specific security
risks or concerns. We would also consider whether the practice served
any other purposes and, if so, whether those purposes were merely
incidental to the overriding security purpose or provided an
objectively distinct, non-security-related rationale for engaging in
the practice.
We note that it should not be particularly difficult or onerous for
an actor to demonstrate, as contemplated above, that its practice was
directly related to a specific security risk or concern. For example,
the actor may show that the practice was a direct response to a known
security incident or threat; or that the practice directly related to
the need to verify a person's identity before granting access to EHI;
or that the practice was directly related to ensuring the integrity of
EHI.
The salient issue under this condition, therefore, would be whether
the security practice was actually necessary and directly related to
safeguarding EHI. To that end, we would consider the actor's purported
basis for adopting the particular security practice, which could be
evidenced by the actor's organizational security policy, risk
assessments, and other relevant documentation, which most actors are
already required to develop pursuant to requirements under the HIPAA
Rules.\121\ However, we propose that the documentation of an actor's
decision-making would not necessarily be dispositive. For example, if
the practice had the practical effect of disadvantaging competitors or
steering referrals, this could be evidence that the practice was not
directly related to the safeguarding the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of EHI. We propose that such an inference would also
not be warranted where the actor has not met the other conditions of
this exception proposed below, as where the actor's policies were not
developed or implemented in a reasonable manner; its security policies
or practices were not tailored to specific risks; or it applied its
security policies or practices in an inconsistent or discriminatory
manner.
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\121\ 45 CFR 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1); 45 CFR 164.316(b)(1).
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The Practice Must Be Tailored to the Specific Security Risk Being
Addressed
To qualify for this exception, we propose that an actor's security-
related practice must be tailored to specific security risks that the
practice actually addressed. This condition necessarily presupposes
that an actor has carefully evaluated the risk posed by the security
threat and developed a considered response that is tailored to
mitigating the vulnerabilities of the actor's health IT or other
related systems. For example, the awareness of a security vulnerability
in a particular HIE's technology may justify a health care provider's
suspending access to EHI from that organization or by participants of
that HIE, but only for the period in which the threat persists. In
contrast, a response that suspended access by all HIEs or that
persisted even after the HIE had addressed the security vulnerability
in its technology would not be tailored to address specific risks and
would not meet this condition.
As another example, it may be reasonable for a health care provider
to refuse to grant access to EHI when an individual has been unable to
prove her identity. However, the actor's identity proofing practice
would have to be tailored to address risks specifically associated with
the disclosure of EHI to unauthorized individuals. For example,
identity proofing requirements might be tailored if the practice is
based on a risk assessment and best practice policies and procedures
and is applied consistently and in a non-discriminatory manner.
However, we believe an identity proofing requirement would not be
tailored if it were not based on an objectively reasonable security
risk assessment and a careful consideration of alternative approaches
that could adequately address the specific risk of patient
misidentification in a less restrictive fashion.
As a final example, an actor's decision to deny access to the EHI
it maintains may be reasonable if the practice responds to a request
for EHI from a patient-facing website or application that causes the
actor's system to raise a malicious software detection alert or if the
request comes from a website or application listed on a security
``blacklist.'' However, we propose that the actor's response must be
tailored to the specific threat. Among other things, the denial of
access must be limited to the patient and/or their personal software.
So as to ensure that the response is properly tailored, it would be
best practice for actors to ensure that they communicate to those
persons whose access was denied the reason for the denial of access,
and communicate objective timeframes (if feasible to do so) and other
parameters for when access would be granted or restored. Moreover, we
propose that, to the extent that the practice implements an
organizational security policy, the policy must align with applicable
consensus-based standards or best practices for responding to these
types of incidents. Disagreement with the individual about the
worthiness of the third party as a recipient of EHI, or even concerns
about what the third party might do with the EHI, except for reasons
such as those listed in the ``preventing harm'' exception, are not
acceptable reasons to deny an individual's request.
Practice Must Be Implemented in a Consistent and Non-Discriminatory
Manner
We propose that in order for a practice to qualify for this
proposed exception, the actor's practice must have been implemented in
a consistent and non-discriminatory manner. This condition would
provide basic assurance that the purported security practice is
directly related to a specific security risk and is not being used to
interfere with access, exchange, or use of EHI for other purposes to
which this exception does not apply.
As an illustration solely of the non-discriminatory manner
condition, consider a health IT developer of certified health IT that
offers apps to its customers via an app marketplace. If the
[[Page 7537]]
developer requires that third-party apps sold (or made available) via
the developer's app marketplace meet certain security requirements,
those security requirements must be imposed in a non-discriminatory
manner. This would mean, for example, that if a developer imposed a
requirement that third-party apps include two-factor authentication for
patient access, the developer would need to ensure that the same
requirement was imposed on, and met by, all other apps, including any
apps made available by the developer itself. To note, such a developer
requirement must also meet the other conditions of this exception
(e.g., the condition that the practice be tailored to the specific
security risk being addressed).
Practices That Implement an Organizational Security Policy
As discussed above, an actor's approach to information security
management will reflect the actor's particular size, organizational
structure, and risk posture. Because of this, it is important that
actors develop and implement organizational policies that secure EHI.
We propose that, where an actor has documented security policies that
align with applicable consensus-based standards, and where the policies
are implemented in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner, a
practice's conformity with such policies would provide a degree of
assurance that the practice was reasonable and necessary to address
specific security risks and thus should not constitute information
blocking. Conversely, a practice that went beyond an actor's
established policies or practices by imposing security controls that
were not documented, would not qualify for this exception under this
condition (although the actor may be able to qualify under the
alternative basis for practices that do not implement a security
policy). Further, such practices would be suspect under the information
blocking provision if there were indications that the actor's security-
related justifications were a pretext or after-the-fact
rationalizations for its actions or was otherwise unreasonable under
the circumstances.
We reiterate that, to the extent that an actor seeks to justify a
practice on the basis of its organizational security policies, such
policies must be in writing and implemented in a consistent and non-
discriminatory manner. As noted above, what a policy requires will
depend on the facts and circumstances. However, we propose that to
support a presumption that a practice conducted pursuant to the actor's
security policy was reasonable, the policy would have to meet the
following conditions.
Risks identified and assessed. The actor's security policy
must be informed by an assessment of the security risks facing the
actor. While we do not propose any requirements as to a risk
assessment, we note that a good risk assessment would use an approach
consistent with industry standards,\122\ and would incorporate elements
such as threat and vulnerability analysis, data collection, security
measures, likelihood of occurrence, impact, level of risk, and final
reporting.\123\
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\122\ See OCR, Guidance on Risk Analysis, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-analysis/?language=es.
\123\ ONC and OCR have jointly launched the HHS HIPAA Security
Risk Assessment (SRA) Tool, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/security-risk-assessment-tool.
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Consensus-based standards or best practice guidance. The
actor's policy must align with one or more applicable consensus-based
standards or best practice guidance. At present, examples of relevant
best practices for development of security policies include, but are
not limited to: NIST-800-53 Rev. 5; the NIST Cybersecurity Framework;
and NIST SP 800-100, SP 800-37 Rev. 2, SP 800-39, as updated and as
interpreted through formal guidance. Best practice guidance on security
policies is also developed by consensus standards bodies such as ISO,
IETF, or IEC. HIPAA covered entities and business associates may be
able to leverage their HIPAA Security Rule compliance activities and
can, if they choose, align their security policy with those parts of
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework that are referenced in the HIPAA
Security Rule Crosswalk to NIST Cybersecurity Framework to satisfy this
condition. Relevant consensus-based standards and frameworks provide
actors of varying size and resources with the flexibility needed to
apply the right security controls to the right information systems at
the right time to adequately address risk.