Safe and Secure Operations of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 3732-3739 [2019-00758]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 30 (Wednesday, February 13, 2019)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 3732-3739]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-00758]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 107

[Docket No.: 2018-1086; Notice No. 18-08]
RIN 2120-AL26


Safe and Secure Operations of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA is considering additional rulemaking in response to 
public safety and national security concerns associated with the 
ongoing integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the 
National Airspace System (NAS). The FAA is seeking information from the 
public in response to the questions contained in this ANPRM. 
Specifically, the FAA seeks comment on whether and in what 
circumstances the FAA should promulgate new rulemaking to require 
stand-off distances, additional operating and performance restrictions, 
the use of UAS Traffic Management (UTM), and additional payload 
restrictions. The FAA also seeks comment on whether it should prescribe 
design requirements and require that unmanned aircraft be equipped with 
critical safety systems.

DATES: Send comments on or before April 15, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2018-1086 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments 
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts 
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the 
commenter provides, to https://www.regulations.gov, as described in the 
system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 
https://www.dot.gov/privacy.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For small UAS policy questions 
concerning this ANPRM, contact Ben Walsh, Flight Technologies and 
Procedures Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 470 L'Enfant 
Plaza SW, Suite 4102, Washington, DC 20024; telephone 1-844-FLY-MY-UA; 
email UAS-Security@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    Tips for Preparing Your Comments. The FAA seeks public comment on 
the areas outlined within this ANPRM. The FAA also seeks comments on 
how this rulemaking could be implemented to meet the objective of the 
proposal in a manner that maximizes benefits without imposing 
excessive, unjustified, or unnecessary costs.
    Specific questions are included in this ANPRM immediately following 
the discussion of the relevant issues. The FAA asks that commenters 
provide as much information as possible on any questions of interest to 
the commenter. In some areas, the FAA requests very specific 
information. Whenever possible, please provide citations and copies of 
any relevant studies or reports on which you rely, including cost data 
as well as any additional data which supports your comment. It is also 
helpful to explain the basis and reasoning underlying your comment. 
Each commenting party should include the identifying number of the 
specific question(s) to which it is responding.
    The FAA will use comments to make decisions regarding the content 
and direction of potential notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) or 
other future rulemakings. Some proposals for addressing national 
security and other concerns may exceed the FAA's authority to regulate 
independently and may necessitate a broader Federal Executive or 
Legislative action. Comments, including proposals for rulemaking, will 
be considered within the context of the FAA's existing statutory 
authority.

I. Authority for This Rulemaking

    This ANPRM is promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and 
(2), which charge the FAA with issuing regulations: (1) To ensure the 
safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; and (2) to govern 
the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, protecting and 
identifying aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the 
ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) charges the FAA with 
prescribing regulations that the FAA finds necessary for safety in air 
commerce and national security.
    The primary authority for this ANPRM is 49 U.S.C. 44807, which 
directs the Secretary of Transportation to determine whether ``certain 
unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely in the national airspace 
system [NAS].'' Section 44807 directs the Secretary to use a risk-based 
approach in making such determinations and provides such determinations 
may occur notwithstanding the completion of the comprehensive plan and 
rulemaking required in other sections of the statute. Section 44807(b) 
directs the Secretary to consider a specific list of factors in 
determining which types of UAS may operate safely: The Secretary must 
consider size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity to 
airports and populated areas, operation over people, and operation 
within or beyond the visual line of sight, or operation during the day 
or night. The Secretary must determine, based on these factors, whether 
operations of the UAS do not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the 
public.
    This action also relies on other DOT and FAA statutory authorities.

II. Executive Summary

    The purpose of this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) 
is to seek comment regarding proposals for FAA rulemaking to reduce 
risks to public safety and national security as UAS are integrated into 
the NAS.
    Consistent with its statutory authority, the FAA seeks to ensure 
that

[[Page 3733]]

small UAS \1\ operations will not create a hazard to users of the NAS 
or the public or pose a threat to national security. This ANPRM is 
intended to gather information from the public to help inform the FAA's 
efforts to assess options for reducing risks to public safety and 
national security associated with further integration of UAS into the 
NAS. The FAA may consider initiating one or more rulemaking efforts 
based on the comments received in response to this ANPRM.
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    \1\ A small UAS is defined as a small unmanned aircraft and its 
associated elements (including communication links and the 
components that control the small unmanned aircraft) that are 
required for the safe and efficient operation of the small unmanned 
aircraft in the national airspace system (NAS). A small unmanned 
aircraft is defined as an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 
pounds on takeoff, including everything that is on board or 
otherwise attached to the aircraft. 14 CFR 107.3.
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    In a separate but related rulemaking action published elsewhere in 
this issue of the Federal Register, the Operation of Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems over People NPRM, the FAA is proposing to amend part 
107 to allow small UAS operations at night and over people. Because 
these operations have a potential impact on public safety and national 
security, the FAA does not intend to promulgate a final rule to allow 
these operations until a regulation finalizes the requirements 
regarding remote identification of small UAS, as discussed further in 
Related Agency Actions.

III. Background

A. Integration of UAS Into the NAS

    The FAA is working to safely integrate small UAS operations into 
the NAS using a phased, incremental, and risk-based approach to 
rulemaking within the FAA's existing statutory authority.\2\ In 2012, 
Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 
112-95). Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 \3\ directed the Secretary to 
determine which types of UAS do not create a hazard to users of the NAS 
or the public or pose a threat to national security. Based on such 
findings, Congress directed the Secretary to establish requirements for 
the safe operation of UAS. On June 28, 2016, the FAA published the 
final rule for Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (sUAS Operation and Certification final rule) (part 107 final 
rule),\4\ which was a first step in integrating civil small UAS 
operations that were not model aircraft under the statute in effect at 
the time of publication.\5\
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    \2\ For more information regarding the operation of small 
unmanned aircraft, see https://www.faa.gov/uas.
    \3\ Section 347 of Public Law 115-254 repealed Section 333, but 
replaced the relevant substantive provisions, codified at 49 U.S.C. 
44807.
    \4\ 81 FR 42063.
    \5\ Public Law 112-95, section 336 (Feb. 14, 2012). Section 336 
was repealed by Section 349 of Public Law 115-254 (Oct. 5, 2018) and 
replaced with 49 U.S.C. 44809. Section 44809 provides an exception 
for limited recreational UAS operations, provided the operations 
satisfy eight specific conditions. See 49 U.S.C. 44809(a)(1)-(8).
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    As the next step, the FAA's regulatory plan calls for the agency to 
issue an NPRM that would propose to allow small UAS operations at night 
and over people without a waiver issued under Sec.  107.200. During the 
development process, the FAA heard from a number of government and 
industry stakeholders expressing support for the potential increase in 
commercial viability of UAS operations, but also concerns over the 
potential impacts on public safety, national security, and law 
enforcement.

B. Public Safety and National Security Concerns

    As technology continues to improve and new uses for small UAS are 
identified, the FAA anticipates an increased demand for flexibility in 
operational restrictions under part 107. These new types of operations 
may have public safety and national security risks that were not 
anticipated or envisioned. This ANPRM seeks public comment on existing 
and future operational requirements and limitations in part 107 that 
may be necessary to reduce risks to the public and users of the NAS in 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 44807.
    In addition, public safety and national security entities have 
expressed a need to distinguish between small UAS that may pose a 
threat and those that do not, especially when operating in close 
proximity to large public gatherings, critical infrastructure or 
certain other facilities and assets.\6\ In light of this, the FAA is 
constantly assessing the ability of the regulations to ensure that 
small UAS operations do not pose a threat to public safety or national 
security.
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    \6\ The Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and 
Justice have authority to address threats posed by UAS under certain 
circumstances to certain facilities and assets identified by 
statute. 10 U.S.C. 130i; 50 U.S.C. 2661; and section 1602 of Public 
Law 115-254 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. 124n).
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C. Related Agency Actions

1. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People NPRM
    The Operations of Small UAS over People rulemaking would promulgate 
performance-based standards applicable to manufacturers of small UAS, 
as well as some requirements applicable to operators. The rule proposes 
three operational categories.\7\ Category 1 would limit the weight of 
the small unmanned aircraft. Categories 2 and 3 would limit the 
severity of potential injuries based on impact kinetic energy 
thresholds and exposed rotating parts limitations. For operations of 
small UAS at night, the rule would require the remote pilot in command 
to complete a knowledge test or the appropriate training prior to 
operating at night and would require that the small UAS be equipped 
with anti-collision lighting visible for at least 3 statute miles.
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    \7\ The 3 categories proposed for civil small UAS operations 
over people are unrelated to the Department of Defense UAS 
categories which are divided into 5 groups that distinguish UAS by 
weight and other characteristics.
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2. Remote Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee
    Section 2202 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 
(FESSA) required the FAA Administrator, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Transportation, the President of RTCA, Inc., and the 
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to 
convene industry stakeholders to facilitate the development of 
consensus standards for remotely identifying operators and owners of 
unmanned aircraft systems and associated unmanned aircraft.
    FESSA required that, as part of any standards developed, the 
Administrator shall consider requirements for remote identification of 
unmanned aircraft systems; appropriate requirements for different 
classifications of unmanned aircraft systems operations, including 
public and civil; and the feasibility of the development and operation 
of a publicly accessible online database of unmanned aircraft and the 
operators thereof, and any criteria for exclusion from the database.
    The FAA convened the UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to make recommendations for the 
identification and tracking of small UAS. The FAA has reviewed the ARC 
recommendations and initiated a separate rulemaking (RIN 2120-AL31) to 
propose remote identification requirements for UAS, but has not yet 
published any proposals in the Federal Register.\8\ As previously 
explained, the FAA does not intend to promulgate the Operations of 
Small UAS over People final rule until the

[[Page 3734]]

remote identification rulemaking is finalized.
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    \8\ A copy of the report is available at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20ID%20ARC%20Final%20Report%20with%20Appendices.pdf.
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3. Section 2209 Process for UAS-Specific Airspace Restrictions
    Section 2209 of FESSA requires the Secretary of Transportation to 
establish a process to allow certain fixed-site facility owners or 
operators to petition the FAA to prohibit or restrict the operation of 
unmanned aircraft in close proximity to certain facilities, such as 
national security sites, critical infrastructure, amusement parks and 
other locations that warrant such a restriction. That process is 
currently under development.\9\
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    \9\ See RIN 2120-AL33.
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IV. Discussion and Questions Concerning Proposal Under Consideration

    This ANPRM is intended to gather information from the public to 
help inform the FAA's efforts to assess options for reducing risks to 
public safety and national security associated with further integration 
of UAS into the NAS, including options for additional rulemaking. 
Examples of subjects for additional rulemaking may include operating 
limitations, such as stand-off distances, payload restrictions, 
altitude, airspeed and performance limitations.

A. Stand-Off Distances

    Small UAS have the capability to operate in locations that are 
inaccessible to manned aircraft as well as operate at reduced 
horizontal and vertical stand-off distances from people and structures 
compared to manned aircraft. This capability is a major benefit of 
small UAS operations to both the public and private sectors, but also 
presents unique safety and security concerns. Because small UAS can 
operate in places that manned aircraft cannot, such as in confined 
locations, under bridges, or close to buildings, they are capable of 
capturing useful information for inspection, investigation, and other 
purposes. In certain cases, small UAS may be able to observe people, 
structures, and areas on the ground from a vantage point that cannot be 
achieved by manned aircraft or by persons on the ground. On the other 
hand, when small UAS are operated too close to sensitive locations; 
critical infrastructure; certain mobile assets, including vessels and 
ground vehicle convoys; government activities, such as firefighting, 
search and rescue operations; certain law enforcement activities; over 
large gatherings of people; or near manned aircraft, it raises safety 
and security concerns within the NAS.
    Stand-off distances are the amount of space between a small UAS and 
the closest person or object. They can have a horizontal component, a 
vertical component, or be measured directly using a slant range. Stand-
off distances are sometimes referred to as minimums, such as in a 
minimum separation or minimum stand-off distance, and are typically 
measured in feet. They may help to ensure a small UAS does not pose a 
hazard to people on the ground or assess whether a UAS poses a threat 
to national security.
    Currently, small UAS operated under part 107 do not have any 
prescriptive horizontal or vertical stand-off distances from people or 
structures. Rather, remote pilots must comply with performance-based 
rules that reduce risk by ensuring that small UAS will pose no undue 
hazard to people, aircraft, or property in the event of a loss of 
control of the small unmanned aircraft for any reason (Sec.  107.19(c)) 
and avoiding operations over any person who is not directly involved in 
the flight operation unless that person is under an appropriate covered 
structure or inside a vehicle (Sec.  107.39).
    In a separate rulemaking action, specifically the Operation of 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems over People NPRM, the FAA is proposing 
to amend Sec.  107.39 to allow certain small UAS to operate over people 
under specific conditions. Those small UAS would be required to meet 
safety thresholds that ensure the small UAS will not cause a serious 
injury to people if an impact occurs, and while the subject of stand-
off distances is addressed, the rule does not propose to establish any 
specific stand-off requirements.
    As discussed in the part 107 final rule, the FAA considered 
requiring minimum stand-off distances, but ultimately determined that, 
due to the wide range of possible small unmanned aircraft and small UAS 
operations, a prescriptive numerical stand-off distance requirement 
would be more burdensome than necessary for some operations while not 
being stringent enough for other operations. This decision by the FAA 
provided flexibility to small UAS operators to determine the 
appropriate stand-off distance, if any, for low-risk operations, but 
the FAA notes that as UAS operations continue to expand and the FAA 
works to integrate them into the NAS, stand-off distances may be 
considered to reduce public safety and national security hazards 
presented by higher-risk UAS operations.
    While part 107 currently does not contain any prescriptive stand-
off distances, there are examples of small UAS regulations from other 
countries that include stand-off distances. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, small UAS must be operated at least 150 feet away from people 
and property and 500 feet away from large crowds and built-up areas, 
unless given special permission.\10\ In addition, proposed rules from 
Canada and EASA both include prescriptive stand-off distances for small 
UAS operations.
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    \10\ https://www.caa.co.uk/Consumers/Unmanned-aircraft-and-drones/.
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    Questions for the Public: The FAA is considering rulemaking to 
address public safety and national security concerns associated with 
small UAS and invites input from the public as follows--
    A1. If the FAA were to establish specific horizontal or vertical 
stand-off distances for all small UAS operations, what should those 
stand-off distances be and why?
    A2. If the FAA were to establish horizontal or vertical stand-off 
distances for only certain types of small UAS operations, what types of 
operations should require a stand-off distance, what should the stand-
off distance be, and why? Examples of types of operations include, but 
are not limited to, night operations, operations in controlled airspace 
under an ATC authorization, and beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations.
    A3. What types of operations, if any, should be excluded from a 
proposed stand-off distance requirement and why?
    A4. How would a horizontal or vertical stand-off distance 
requirement help reduce hazards to public safety and national security?
    A5. What are the incremental costs \11\ of introducing a stand-off 
distance requirement compared to how operations are conducted today?
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    \11\ For the purposes of this ANPRM, the FAA is requesting 
incremental costs, which is the difference between current and 
future operations.
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    A6. Does requiring a minimum stand-off distance necessitate 
additional instrumentation? If yes, provide costs and other relevant 
information.
    A7. If minimum stand-off distances are required, would training or 
testing be necessary? If yes, provide estimate of time and cost.

B. Altitude, Airspeed, and Other Performance Limitations

    Due to their potential small size, light weight, and propulsion 
capabilities, small UAS can have relative performance that far exceeds 
that of conventional manned aircraft. These capabilities allow for 
operations that manned aircraft are not capable of or

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cannot conduct safely. Some small UAS are capable of speeds in excess 
of 150 knots (172 mph), altitudes of 10,000 feet or more, and climb 
rates in excess of 6,000 feet per minute. Some can accelerate from 0 to 
60 mph in less than 1 second. They can have extreme maneuverability and 
the capability to hover for extended periods of time. These performance 
capabilities provide considerable benefits and advantages to UAS 
operations but also create unique safety and security concerns.
    Because of their performance capabilities, small UAS can operate in 
confined areas with speed and agility and, with their maneuverability, 
are capable of operating in close proximity to buildings, vehicles, and 
people, which allows for the gathering of imagery and data that cannot 
otherwise be obtained from the air or ground. However, with their 
capability for speed, maneuverability, and extreme acceleration, both 
horizontally and vertically, they can pose a hazard to other aircraft 
or persons on the ground. Also, those performance capabilities could 
lead to risks when operating in close proximity to sensitive government 
locations, large gatherings of people, law enforcement activities, 
search and rescue operations, and other aircraft.
    Currently, small UAS operated under part 107 are limited to a 
maximum groundspeed of 87 knots (100 mph) and a maximum altitude of 400 
feet above ground level, unless operated within a 400-foot radius of a 
structure, in which case the limit is 400 feet above the structure's 
uppermost limit. As discussed in the part 107 final rule, a small UAS 
travelling at high speed poses a higher risk to persons, property, and 
other aircraft than one traveling at a lower speed. The rule also noted 
that a speed limit would have safety benefits outside of a loss-of-
positive-control scenario because a small unmanned aircraft traveling 
at a lower speed is generally easier to control. Also, the rule states 
that the speed and altitude limitations reduce the risk of collision 
with other aircraft. As stated in the part 107 final rule, a maximum 
speed limit of 87 knots is appropriate because the remote pilot in 
command will have to implement mitigations commensurate with the risk 
posed by his or her specific small UAS operation, such as operating at 
a speed less than 87 knots. Section 107.51 also includes limitations on 
flight visibility and cloud clearances, but does not have any operating 
limitations for vertical climb or descent rates or rates of 
acceleration.
    As new uses for small UAS are identified and new types of 
operations are introduced into the NAS, the FAA continues to assess 
possible performance limitations, such as airspeed and altitude, to 
mitigate potential hazards.
    Questions for the Public: The FAA is considering rulemaking to 
address public safety and national security concerns associated with 
small UAS and invites input from the public as follows--
    B1. If the FAA were to establish additional operating or 
performance limitations for small UAS, what should those operating or 
performance limitations be and why?
    B2. If the FAA were to establish additional operating or 
performance limitations for only certain types of small UAS operations, 
what types of small UAS operations should require additional operating 
or performance limitations, what should they be, and why?
    B3. How would additional operating or performance limitations help 
to reduce risks to public safety or national security?
    B4. What types of current small UAS operations would be impacted by 
establishing additional operating or performance limitations?
    B5. What are the incremental costs of altitude, airspeed, and other 
performance limitations?

C. Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) Operations

    Small UAS pose a unique public safety and security risk to other 
aircraft and persons and property on the ground because they can 
operate more readily in sensitive areas and it can be difficult to 
identify non-compliant operations. Applying more structure to the 
airspace and operations may reduce public safety or national security 
risks in the NAS by removing the anonymity of the operations and 
establishing operating norms, which can then be used to highlight 
anomalous activity that may indicate malicious intent.
    Many entities in both the public and private sector are developing 
a decentralized communication architecture identified as UAS Traffic 
Management (UTM), which could support more structured airspace and 
operations for small UAS without active control from the FAA's Air 
Traffic Organization. Increased communication between operators on 
planned and actual flight paths, deconfliction capability, additional 
information sources, and new service suppliers are intended to allow 
for optimized flight paths with increased safety. While UTM is focused 
on managing the safe and efficient operation of an increasing number of 
UAS operating in the NAS, especially beyond visual line of sight 
(BVLOS), there may be opportunities to mitigate public safety and 
national security risks at the same time.
    Section 2208 of the FESSA directed the FAA to conduct research and 
establish a pilot program with NASA regarding UTM, both of which are 
currently underway with the ultimate goal of informing future 
rulemaking. Further, in conjunction with completing the pilot program 
required by FESSA, Section 376 of Public Law 115-254 requires the FAA, 
in coordination with NASA and industry stakeholders, to develop an 
implementation plan for UTM services that expand operations beyond 
visual line of sight, have full operational capability, and ensure the 
safety and security of all aircraft. The UTM implementation plan, which 
must address safety standards among other matters and delineate the 
roles and responsibilities of public and private actors, is to be 
completed within one year of the conclusion of the UTM pilot program.
    In the part 107 rulemaking, the FAA found the risk to public safety 
and national security acceptable without requiring any type of UTM 
coordination, even considering the inherent structure it would provide. 
Because operations under part 107 (conducted without a waiver) are 
limited to visual line of sight and small UAS must yield the right-of-
way to all other aircraft, the FAA determined that a certificated 
remote pilot can operate a small UAS safely without the need to 
coordinate its flight path with other operators. Consistent with the 
direction in Section 376, however, as UAS operations in the NAS 
continue to evolve and increase in number, the FAA anticipates there 
will be a need for additional airspace coordination and management to 
ensure those operations do not pose a risk to public safety or national 
security.
    Questions for the Public: The FAA is considering rulemaking to 
address public safety and national security concerns associated with 
small UAS and invites input from the public as follows--
    C1. How can additional information sharing (e.g., intended flight 
path, operational boundary) via UTM help reduce risks to public safety 
and national security? What suite of capabilities should UTM have?
    C2. What types of small UAS operations should be subject to UTM 
requirements? Should any be excluded? Should the requirement be based 
on geographical location, the type of operation, or other factors? 
Please

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provide data or explanations to justify your response.
    C3. For small UAS subject to UTM requirements, what type of 
information should be available to the general public? What type of 
information should be available to security personnel?
    C4. What are the initial nonrecurring investment costs associated 
with establishing a UTM architecture? Once implemented, what are the 
annual recurring operation and maintenance costs?
    C5. For questions C.1., C.2., and C.3., please include information 
in your response identifying the costs that would be necessary to equip 
small UAS to comply with UTM requirements.
    C6. Would additional testing or training be required for a remote 
pilot to safely operate a small unmanned aircraft subject to UTM 
requirements? Please explain.
    C7. What would be the costs for information sharing if UAS 
operations are subject to UTM requirements?

D. Payload Restrictions

    Small UAS are readily available for purchase in home electronic and 
general merchandise stores by individuals who may have little or no 
familiarity with the civil aviation regulations that are applicable to 
them. Some of these small UAS have very small visual, radar, and 
acoustic signatures, which may make them more difficult to detect, 
identify, and track compared to manned aircraft. On the other hand, 
small UAS that weigh close to 55 pounds could carry a significant 
amount of internal or external payload. If a small UAS is determined to 
present a threat to public safety or national security, currently there 
are limited ways to mitigate the threat. As a result, the increased 
integration of UAS operations in the NAS poses unique public safety and 
national security concerns.
    Given their size, propulsion systems, and navigational 
capabilities, small UAS can operate in close proximity to buildings, 
persons, vehicles and other objects without anyone's awareness. With 
the current and expected improvements in technical capabilities 
available on small UAS, they can circumvent measures used to protect 
security-sensitive sites and operations, which, if accessed or damaged, 
could threaten national security or introduce hazards to public safety. 
The FAA is aware of situations where small UAS have been used to 
conduct illegal surveillance and industrial espionage; to deliver 
contraband to prison inmates; to deliver incendiary, explosive, 
chemical and radiological payloads; to damage or disrupt critical 
infrastructure, including communications networks; and to conduct 
malicious cyber activity. There have been instances in which small UAS 
were used in ways that interfere with law enforcement, firefighting, 
and aviation operations.
    Recently, Congress enacted section 363 of Public Law 115-254, 
responding to several payload and installed equipment concerns. Unless 
authorized by the Administrator, section 363 prohibits a person from 
operating a UAS equipped or armed with a dangerous weapon as defined in 
18 U.S.C. 930(g)(2).\12\
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    \12\ The term ``dangerous weapon'' as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
930(g)(2) means a weapon, device, instrument, material, or 
substance, animate or inanimate, that is used for, or is readily 
capable of, causing death or serious bodily injury, except that such 
term does not include a pocket knife with a blade of less than 2\1/
2\ inches in length.
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    Further, Sec.  107.36 prohibits the carriage of hazardous materials 
as defined in 49 CFR 171.8. This definition includes many types of 
hazardous substances, such as chemicals or hazardous waste, but does 
not address all types of payloads or sensors that could pose a threat 
to public safety or national security. Part 107 does allow for the 
transportation of property for compensation or hire, but only if the 
aircraft, including its attached systems, payload, and cargo weigh less 
than 55 pounds total; the flight is conducted within visual line of 
sight and not from a moving vehicle or aircraft; and the flight occurs 
wholly within the bounds of a State and does not involve transport 
between (1) Hawaii and another place in Hawaii through airspace outside 
Hawaii; (2) the District of Columbia and another place in the District 
of Columbia; or (3) a territory or possession of the United States and 
another place in the same territory or possession.
    Questions for the Public: The FAA is considering rulemaking to 
address public safety and national security concerns associated with 
small UAS and invites input from the public as follows--
    D1. Should the prohibition from carrying hazardous materials in 
Sec.  107.36 be expanded to include other types of payloads or 
installed equipment that could pose a threat to public safety or 
national security? If yes, what types of payloads should be prohibited 
and why?
    D2. Should the FAA consider rulemaking to restrict the use of 
certain types of small UAS payloads or installed equipment? If yes, 
what types of payloads should be restricted, under what conditions 
should they be restricted? Should there be exceptions or special 
provisions applicable to certain conditions or other factors such as 
location, time, population density, or purpose? Please provide data or 
explanations to justify your response.
    D3. What types of operations would be affected if additional 
restrictions are placed on the type of payloads and equipment that can 
be installed on a small UAS? Would there be any costs or lost revenues 
associated with those restrictions?

E. Small UAS Critical System Design Requirements

    Public safety and national security concerns have been raised 
regarding the potential failure of critical systems on small UAS, which 
could result in the loss of control of the aircraft and increase the 
risk to persons and property on the ground and other users of the 
airspace. One way of designing critical systems on small UAS that has 
the potential to address these concerns from both a public safety and 
national security perspective is the use of redundancy. From a safety 
standpoint, redundancy helps to mitigate the risk of critical single-
point system failures. For example, a battery failure on a UA with only 
one battery might result in a crash landing. If the UA was built with a 
redundant power system (multiple batteries or a backup), the UA could 
switch to the alternate power source and maintain safe flight. Another 
approach to increase safety is the use of fail-safe design features. A 
small UAS that has a fail-safe command and control (C2) link would 
improve the safety of the small UAS if a lost-link event occurs.
    From a national security standpoint, redundancy of critical systems 
plays a more indirect role. Failure of some functions on an unmanned 
aircraft may lead to unplanned airspace or security violations. For 
example, a loss of navigation or lost-link could lead to an unmanned 
aircraft entering unauthorized airspace. Having a redundant navigation 
system or a fail-safe C2 system could reduce the risk of this 
happening. Additionally, critical systems could be a piece of a larger 
security strategy ensuring a robust capability to strengthen the 
overall security of the system. An example would be having redundant 
positioning solutions (e.g., GPS, inertial) to ensure a high 
availability to broadcast the unmanned aircraft's position, if 
required.
    Currently, small UAS operated under 14 CFR part 107 are not 
required to have an airworthiness certificate. Furthermore, they do not 
have any prescribed design standards or required

[[Page 3737]]

system redundancies. As a result, many small UAS operating today, 
especially those with relatively small size, do not have redundancies 
in their design. However, the FAA, through policy, may condition the 
grant of waiver from certain operational limitations in part 107 on 
equipage with redundant systems. For example, Sec.  107.31--Visual line 
of sight aircraft operations and Sec.  107.39--Operation over people, 
are both subject to waiver as prescribed in Sec. Sec.  107.200 and 
107.205. In evaluating waiver requests for Sec. Sec.  107.31 and 
107.39, the FAA may consider the need for design requirements, 
including redundancy, for critical UAS systems based upon the nature of 
the request and the need to mitigate any risks associated with the 
proposed operation.
    In a related rulemaking action, specifically the Operation of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems over People NPRM, the FAA is proposing to 
amend Sec.  107.39 to allow small UAS to operate over people if they 
are tested and shown to fulfill certain safety standards intended to 
limit the severity of injuries to people on the ground. While 
manufacturers of small UAS qualified to operate over people may choose 
to have redundancy for critical systems in their designs, it is not 
required by the proposed rule.
    Questions for the Public: The FAA is considering rulemaking to 
address public safety and national security concerns associated with 
small UAS and invites input from the public as follows--
    E1. For small UAS operations beyond the visual line of sight of the 
remote pilot, should the FAA establish design requirements, such as 
redundancy, for systems critical to safety of flight? If yes, what 
should these requirements be and why? Are there other means the FAA 
should consider to address public safety and national security risk for 
BVLOS operations?
    E2. For small UAS operations over people that exceed the NPRM 
safety thresholds indicated above and therefore still must seek a 
waiver to Sec.  107.39 to operate over people, should the FAA establish 
design requirements, such as redundancy, for systems critical to safety 
of flight? If yes, what should these requirements be and why? Are there 
other means the FAA should consider to address public safety and 
national security risk for operations over people?
    E3. Are there other types of small UAS operations besides BVLOS and 
operations over people that the FAA should establish design 
requirements for, such as redundancy, to address public safety and 
national security risk?
    E4. What are the costs and benefits to incorporate redundant 
systems critical to safety of flight for BVLOS operations or operations 
over people that exceed the NPRM safety thresholds indicated above?

V. Regulatory Requirements and Executive Order Determinations

    The FAA will address the following requirements in future small UAS 
safety and security rulemakings. Please provide comments that would 
assist the FAA in its consideration and analyses of these requirements.

A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT Regulatory 
Policies and Procedures

    This ANPRM is considered a significant regulatory action under 
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). It is considered a significant regulatory 
action under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures order issued by the 
Department of Transportation. 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979).
    Executive Orders 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' 58 FR 
51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), and 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory 
Review,'' 76 FR 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), require agencies to regulate in 
the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,'' and 
to develop regulations that ``impose the least burden on society.'' 
Executive Order 13610, ``Identifying and reducing Regulatory Burdens,'' 
77 FR 28469 (May 14, 2012), urges agencies to conduct retrospective 
analyses of existing rules to examine whether they remain justified and 
whether they should be modified or streamlined in light of changed 
circumstances, including the rise of new technologies.
    Additionally, Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require 
agencies to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation. 
Accordingly, FAA invites comments on these considerations, including 
any cost or benefit figures or factors, alternative approaches, and 
relevant scientific, technical and economic data. These comments will 
help FAA evaluate whether regulatory action is warranted and 
appropriate.

B. Executive Order 13771

    On January 30, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13771 
(E.O. 13771), ``Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.'' 
Under Section 2 of this Executive Order, unless prohibited by law, 
whenever an executive department or agency publicly proposes for notice 
and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it must identify 
at least two existing regulations to be repealed and offset any new 
incremental costs associated with new regulations by the elimination of 
existing costs associated with at least two prior regulations. FAA will 
need to determine if a future rulemaking is an E.O. 13771 regulatory or 
deregulatory action.

C. Executive Order 13132

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism,'' 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999), 
requires agencies to assure meaningful and timely input by State and 
local officials in the development of regulatory policies that may have 
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' FAA 
invites State and local governments with an interest in this rulemaking 
to comment on any effect that may result.

D. Executive Order 13175

    Consistent with Executive Order 13175, ``Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,'' and FAA Order 1210.20, 
``American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Consultation Policy and 
Procedures,'' the FAA ensures that Federally Recognized Tribes (Tribes) 
are given the opportunity to provide meaningful and timely input 
regarding proposed Federal actions that have the potential to uniquely 
or significantly affect their respective Tribes. At this point, the FAA 
has not identified any unique or significant effects, environmental or 
otherwise, on tribes resulting from this advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking. As it contemplated in the sUAS Operation and Certification 
final rule, the FAA has conducted outreach to tribes and responded to 
those tribes seeking information about small UAS operations conducted 
within their territory to see how their concerns can be addressed 
within the broader UAS integration effort.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ 81 FR 42063 at 42189.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since publication of the sUAS Operation and Certification final 
rule, the FAA has conducted outreach to tribes to ensure that they are 
familiar with the rules' provisions and how they might apply in Indian 
country, and that they are aware of FAA's plans for additional 
rulemakings to integrate UAS into the NAS. As part of that outreach the 
FAA has:

[[Page 3738]]

     Provided material on the sUAS Operation and Certification 
final rule to participants at the mid-year conference of the National 
Congress of American Indians (Spokane, WA, June 27-30, 2016);
     Presented at a workshop at the National Tribal 
Transportation Conference (Anaheim, CA October 4, 2016);
     Responded to inquiries from the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes 
and Muscogee (Creek) Nation regarding use of UAS;
     Presented information on UAS at a meeting of the Tribal 
Transportation Self-Governance Program Negotiated Rulemaking Meeting 
(Shawnee, OK October 18, 2016); and
     Provided information to The Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, 
which is participating in the UAS Integration Pilot Program.\14\ 
Through this program, the FAA will work with The Choctaw Nation to 
ensure safe UAS operations for the purposes of agriculture, public 
safety, and infrastructure inspections. Such operations may include 
operations over people and operations at night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Federal Aviation Administration UAS Integration Pilot 
Program (May 7, 2018), available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnership/uas_integration_pilot_program/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA will continue to respond to tribes expressing interest in 
or concerns about UAS operations, and will engage in government-to-
government consultation with tribes as appropriate, in accordance with 
Executive Orders and FAA guidance.

E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies 
and Procedures

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601, et 
seq., FAA must consider whether a rulemaking would have a ``significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.'' ``Small 
entities'' include small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that 
are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their 
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations under 50,000.
    Any future rulemaking would be developed in accordance with 
Executive Order 13272, ``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in 
Agency Rulemaking,'' 68 FR 7990 (Feb. 19, 2003), and DOT's procedures 
and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
to ensure that potential impacts on small entities of a regulatory 
action are properly considered.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et 
seq., 5 CFR 1320.8(d) requires that FAA provide interested members of 
the public and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on 
information collection and recordkeeping requests. This ANPRM does not 
impose new information collection requirements. FAA would have to 
consider information collection requirements for future rulemakings.

G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) 
governs the issuance of Federal regulations that require unfunded 
mandates. An unfunded mandate is a regulation that requires a state, 
local, or tribal government or the private sector to incur direct costs 
without the Federal government's having first provided the funds to pay 
those costs. The FAA will need to determine if this rulemaking would 
result in costs of $155 million or more, adjusted for inflation, to 
either state, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the 
private sector in any one year.

H. National Environmental Policy Act

    The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4375, 
requires that Federal agencies analyze proposed actions to determine 
whether the action will have a significant impact on the human 
environment. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations 
require Federal agencies to conduct an environmental review considering 
(1) the need for the proposed action, (2) alternatives to the proposed 
action, (3) probable environmental impacts of the proposed action and 
alternatives, and (4) the agencies and persons consulted during the 
consideration process. See 40 CFR 1508.9(b). FAA welcomes any data or 
information related to environmental impacts that may result from any 
future rulemaking.

I. Privacy Act

    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any written 
communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the 
name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the 
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor 
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in 
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000, see 65 FR 19477, or 
you may visit https://www.regulations.gov.

J. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis

    Under Executive Order 13609, ``Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation,'' 77 FR 26413 (May 4, 2012), agencies must consider 
whether the impacts associated with significant variations between 
domestic and international regulatory approaches are unnecessary or may 
impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete 
internationally. In meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, 
labor, security, environmental, and other issues, regulatory approaches 
developed through international cooperation can provide equivalent 
protection to standards developed independently while also minimizing 
unnecessary differences.
    Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Public Law 96-39, as 
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law 103-465, 
prohibits Federal agencies from establishing any standards or engaging 
in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. For purposes of these requirements, 
Federal agencies may participate in the establishment of international 
standards, so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude 
imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards. FAA welcomes any data or 
information related to international impacts that may result from 
future rulemaking.

K. Executive Order 13211

    Executive Order 13211, 66 FR 28355 (May 22, 2001), requires Federal 
agencies to prepare a Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant 
energy action.'' Under the executive order, a ``significant energy 
action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally published in 
the Federal Register) that promulgates, or is expected to lead to the 
promulgation of, a final rule or regulation (including a notice of 
inquiry, ANPRM, and NPRM) that (1)(i) is a significant regulatory 
action under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order and (ii) is 
likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) is designated by the 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a 
significant energy action. The FAA would have to consider this 
executive order for future rulemaking.


[[Page 3739]]


    Issued under the authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101 
note, and 44807, in Washington, DC, on January 28, 2019.
Daniel K. Elwell,
Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
[FR Doc. 2019-00758 Filed 2-12-19; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P