Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets, 59182-59230 [2018-25020]

Download as PDF 59182 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration 49 CFR Parts 229, 231, 236, and 238 [Docket No. FRA–2013–0060, Notice No. 3] RIN 2130–AC46 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: This final rule amends FRA’s passenger equipment safety standards using a performance-based approach to adopt new and modified requirements governing the construction of conventional- and high-speed passenger rail equipment. This final rule adds a new tier of passenger equipment safety standards (Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of nation-wide, interoperable high-speed passenger rail service at speeds up to 220 mph. While Tier III trainsets must operate in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds above 125 mph, these trainsets can share the right-ofway with freight trains and other tiers of passenger equipment at speeds not exceeding 125 mph. This final rule also establishes crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements in the alternative to those currently specified for Tier I passenger trainsets. Together, the Tier III requirements and Tier I alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements remove regulatory barriers and enable use of new technological designs, allowing a more open U.S. rail market. Additionally, the final rule increases from 150 mph to 160 mph the maximum speed for passenger equipment that complies with FRA’s Tier II requirements. DATES: Effective date. This final rule is effective January 22, 2019. Incorporation by reference. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 22, 2019. ADDRESSES: Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to https:// www.regulations.gov at any time or visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12–140 on the Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 SUMMARY: VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Devin Rouse, Staff Director, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, Passenger Rail Division, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202– 493–6185); or Michael Hunter, Attorney Adviser, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Chief Counsel, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202– 493–0368). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Common Abbreviations AAR Association of American Railroads APTA American Public Transportation Association AW0 ready-to-run weight, empty CEM crash energy management CFR Code of Federal Regulations CG center of gravity EN EuroNorm ETF Engineering Task Force FE finite element FEA finite element analysis FRA Federal Railroad Administration g gravitational acceleration (32.2 feet/ second/second) HSR high-speed rail in inch(es) kip kilopound(s) kN kilo-Newton(s) kph kilometer(s) per hour lbf pound(s)-force mph mile(s) per hour ms millisecond(s) MU multiple-unit OVI occupied volume integrity PTC positive train control RIA regulatory impact analysis ROW right-of-way RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee ITM inspection, testing, and maintenance PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness PESS Passenger Equipment Safety Standards U.S.C. United States Code UIC International Union of Railways Table of Contents I. Executive Summary II. Statutory and Regulatory Background A. Statutory Background B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate III. Development of the Final Rule IV. Discussion of Comments and Conclusions A. General Comments B. Proposed Subpart I and the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment C. Proposed Subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment D. Comments From the NTSB V. Section-by-Section Analysis VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272 C. Paperwork Reduction Act D. Federalism Implications E. International Trade Impact Assessment F. Environmental Impact G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice) H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation) I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 J. Energy Impact K. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51 I. Executive Summary Having considered the public comments in response to FRA’s December 6, 2016, proposed rule on standards for alternative compliance and high-speed trainsets, see 81 FR 88006, FRA issues this final rule amending the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 49 CFR part 238. This final rule is the product of consensus reached by FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which accepted the task of reviewing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending specific actions that could be useful to advance the safety of passenger service, including the development of regulatory requirements for the next generation of high-speed trainsets. The RSAC established the Passenger Safety Working Group (‘‘PSWG’’ or ‘‘Working Group’’) to handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. In September 2009, the Working Group in turn established the Engineering Task Force (‘‘ETF’’ or ‘‘Task Force’’) for the purpose of producing a set of technical criteria and procedures to evaluate passenger rail equipment based on alternative designs. This work led to the development of the report entitled ‘‘Technical Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail Equipment for Use in Tier I Service’’ (‘‘Technical Criteria and Procedures Report’’ or ‘‘Report’’).1 The guidance in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report has assisted railroads and rolling stock manufacturers who have petitioned FRA for waivers from strict compliance with FRA’s Tier I passenger equipment crashworthiness standards, and has been useful to FRA in 1 U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT–FRA–ORD–11/22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_ z50_gD_lRT. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 evaluating such petitions. In addition to developing the criteria in the Report, the ETF’s task was expanded to develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC for adopting these alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection criteria into FRA’s regulations and to establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-speed trainsets, capable of operating at speeds of up to 220 mph, classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The ETF reached consensus on recommending the adoption of these alternative crashworthiness criteria in 49 CFR part 238 for Tier I passenger equipment. The ETF also reached consensus on criteria for Tier III passenger equipment, specifically trainset structure, side-window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems and cab equipment, and cab glazing (with the exception of ballistic penetration resistance). The ETF further reached consensus on the definition of Tier III, including when Tier III equipment can operate on shared infrastructure and when the equipment must operate in an exclusive right-of-way. On June 14, 2013, the full RSAC voted to recommend the consensus items to FRA’s Administrator, as the basis for a formal rulemaking. This final rule is based on these RSAC recommendations. This final rule establishes requirements in three main subject areas: (1) Tier III trainset safety standards; (2) alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for Tier II passenger equipment. The following is a brief overview of the rule organized by subject area and a summary of its economic impact. Tier III Trainset Safety Standards This final rule defines Tier III passenger train operations and outlines the minimum safety standards for the use of such trainsets in the United States, focusing on core structural and critical system design criteria. FRA intends for this final rule to facilitate the safe implementation of interoperable high-speed rail service, and enable the use of common infrastructure and promote other efficiencies. The Tier III operating environment is unique by design. Tier III passenger trains are permitted to operate in a shared rightof-way (one shared with freight trains and other tiers of passenger equipment) at speeds up to 125 mph, but must operate in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph, up to 220 mph. The VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 requirements provide for the sharing of rail infrastructure among various types of rail equipment, especially in more urban areas, while providing for dedicated passenger rail service at maximum speeds up to 220 mph. This final rule also establishes requirements for Tier III trainset structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems (including window egress and rescue access requirements), and certain cab equipment. To support operational compatibility, the Tier III trainset crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements are predominantly based on the alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for Tier I passenger equipment and are intended to safely apply to operations at speeds up to 220 mph in a dedicated environment as approved by FRA. Specialized RSAC task groups developed the requirements for braking systems and cab glazing by focusing on the development of performance-based requirements that could be implemented in a technology-neutral manner, wherever possible. To develop their recommendations, the ETF and full RSAC considered the latest trainset designs and technology available globally, and adapted their recommendations in a manner consistent with the North American operating environment. The intent of these requirements is to ensure that safety and reliability are paramount, while incorporating elements from the most advanced, service-proven technology available throughout the world. Alternative Crashworthiness Requirements for Tier I Passenger Trainsets As noted above, FRA is codifying a set of technical evaluation criteria the ETF developed as guidance for those seeking to demonstrate that alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets provide a level of safety equivalent to the existing requirements in part 238. FRA intends for the alternative technical criteria to allow the industry greater flexibility to use more contemporary design techniques and more fully apply emerging technology, including crash energy management (CEM) technology, without requiring a waiver of compliance for operating the equipment. The technical criteria are based on established international standards and significant research and testing conducted by the industry and PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59183 DOT’s John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) over the past 25 years. Codifying the technical criteria dovetails with alternative crashworthiness performance requirements FRA earlier established in part 238 for the front-end structures of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives (75 FR 1180), thereby broadening application of such requirements to other main structures. Tier II Maximum Authorized Speed On March 13, 2013, FRA issued a final rule (78 FR 16052) to amend the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of rail vehicles and the tracks they operate on at speeds up to 220 mph. That final rule revised the track geometry and safety limits for various track classes, extended the limits for the highest track speeds from 200 to 220 mph (Class 9 track), and affirmed that the maximum authorized speed for Class 8 track is 160 mph. This final rule establishes the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II passenger equipment consistent with the limits for Class 8 track. However, it is important to note that existing Tier II operations FRA has approved to operate at speeds up to 150 mph are still required to provide sufficient testing and vehicle/track interaction performance data required under 49 CFR 213.329 and 238.111, and obtain FRA approval before any operations occur at the new maximum authorized speed of 160 mph. Economic Analysis This final rule expands and makes more flexible FRA’s Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. FRA believes this final rule will have a net cost savings effect on the passenger rail industry and society as a whole, along with safety benefits. Specifically, the final rule will generate cost savings benefits by enabling high-speed rail operators to avoid new right-of-way acquisition and infrastructure construction for dedicated rail lines in dense urban areas. This is possible because the final rule allows such trains to travel on existing, nondedicated rail lines, although at slower speeds than permissible for travel on dedicated rail lines. For traditional passenger rail operations, there are both operational and safety benefits resulting from this final rule. Not issuing the rule would increase costs associated with the acquisition of new passenger trains and could delay new U.S. passenger rail infrastructure projects. The final rule ensures existing and future alternative trainset designs can operate in the U.S. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59184 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations railroad environment on a widespread basis, beyond the constraints that have been imposed by FRA regulations. This helps avert perpetuating a patchwork of waivers in the U.S. passenger rail market that would, in turn, perpetuate the current unattractiveness of the U.S. passenger equipment market to manufacturers. The final rule allows U.S. trainsets to use technological advances for safety compliance purposes in a way that was previously restricted under the former regulations. There will also be safety benefits associated with improvement of the existing rail infrastructure to accommodate the operation of new high-speed rail equipment in shared rights-of-way.2 Additionally, as the requirements herein are largely performance-based standards and not prescriptive requirements, equipment benefits will be generated by passenger rail operators being able to adopt service-proven, safety-equivalent technology and practices and apply future technological advancements. Over a 30-year period, FRA estimates quantifiable cost savings range from a present value of between $512.5 million to $1.1 billion (when discounted at a 7percent rate) or between $790.1 million to $1.6 billion (when discounted at a 3percent rate).3 Annualized cost savings of this rule are expected to be between $41.3 million and $85.8 million when discounted at a 7-percent rate and between $40.3 million and $84.0 million when discounted at a 3-percent rate. Over the same 30-year period, FRA estimates the industry will incur costs ranging between $227.7 to $523.3 million (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $351.3 to $808.8 million (when discounted at a 3-percent rate). Annualized costs of this rule are expected to be between $18.4 million and $42.2 million when discounted at a 7-percent rate and between $17.9 million and $41.3 million when discounted at a 3-percent rate. All quantified costs would be for testing and analysis to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I alternative or Tier III standards. Over the 30-year period of the analysis, FRA estimates discounted net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8 million (low range) and $837.8 million (high range) discounted at 3 percent; net regulatory cost savings will be between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9 million (high range), discounted at 7 percent. Annualized net regulatory cost savings total between $22.4 million and $42.7 million when discounted at a 3-percent rate and between $22.9 million and $43.7 million when discounted at a 7-percent rate. NET REGULATORY COST SAVINGS [Quantified estimates using a 30-year period; $ in millions] Description Discounted 3% Discounted 7% $808.8 1,646.7 837.8 42.7 $523.3 1,065.2 541.9 43.7 351.3 790.1 438.8 22.4 227.7 512.5 284.8 22.9 High Range Total Costs ............................................................................................................................................................................................ Total Cost Savings ................................................................................................................................................................................ Total Net Cost Savings ......................................................................................................................................................................... Annualized Net Cost Savings ............................................................................................................................................................... Low Range khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Total Costs ............................................................................................................................................................................................ Total Cost Savings ................................................................................................................................................................................ Total Net Cost Savings ......................................................................................................................................................................... Annualized Net Cost Savings ............................................................................................................................................................... The rulemaking will provide an optional alternative, not a mandate, for railroads to use a different type or design of passenger equipment in Tier I service and will not impose any burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. Similarly, the rulemaking will provide a framework for railroads to operate equipment in new Tier III service—it will not impose any burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. Alternatives Considered One of the main purposes of the final rule is to provide a set of minimum Federal safety requirements for safe operation in the U.S. rail environment of passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary engineering standards outside of the U.S. Traditionally, U.S. railroad safety regulations evolved as a consequence of specific accidents scenarios, which have led to the identification of specific risks in the operating environment.4 As FRA stated in its 1999 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards (PESS) final rule, the railroad operating environment in the United States generally requires passenger equipment to operate commingled with very heavy and long freight trains, often over track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment. See 64 FR 25540, 25541 (May 12, 1999). European passenger operations, on the other hand, 2 For example, the shared rail infrastructure is presumed to be better maintained to accommodate the new Tier III equipment, and thus all rail traffic operating over that shared infrastructure will benefit from track maintained to tighter tolerances for higher speeds under FRA’s track safety standards at 49 CFR part 213. Track that was once maintained to Class 4 or 5 tolerances, may now be maintained to Class 6 or 7 tolerances. 3 Tier III costs and cost savings are uncertain because they are based on assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed rail operations and how those operations will be incorporated into the U.S. rail network. It is possible that all costs, cost savings, and benefits relating to Tier III systems, including equipment and infrastructure, will be zero. This could occur if no high-speed rail projects come to fruition over the forecasted horizon. Further, the estimated infrastructure cost savings depend on the assumption of not having to build dedicated HSR track for the whole system (i.e., they represent savings from being able to operate HSR using shared infrastructure). Tier I cost savings from adopting performance-based standards are challenging to quantify, as estimates are based on projecting future changes. However, given that the new regulation’s performance standards provide an alternative to more design-based standards, operators would voluntarily comply only if they found it beneficial to do so. The estimated figures in the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) are provided for expository purposes. For both Tier III and Tier I, if the actions that trigger cost savings are not taken, the costs would not be incurred, as the costs and cost savings are two sides of the same actions. 4 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 62 FR 49728, 49729– 49731 (Sep. 23, 1997) (discussing differences between the European and U.S. rail operating environments, and describing a range of passenger rail accidents demonstrating the need for comprehensive, passenger equipment safety standards). VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations are intermingled with freight equipment of lesser weight than in North America. In many cases, highway-rail grade crossings also pose lesser hazards to passenger trains in Europe due to lower highway vehicle weight. While FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are adequately addressed for the operating environment, the final rule places special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than simply mitigating them. Importantly, this final rule allows the use of additional types of rolling stock design, which will enable innovation and provide railroads the flexibility to purchase equipment designed to more performance-based and modern requirements. The rule also permits carriers to move forward with a new tier of higher speed rail. The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the safety requirements for Tier III trainsets are based on European and Japanese industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of regulation, market accessibility, benefits and costs, and operational efficiency and safety. FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of those options based on the key attributes of the alternatives and the effect of those attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory purpose. FRA compared the technical requirements of other established high-speed rail standards to illustrate the primary differences, not make a direct comparison between comparable requirements or standards. In Europe, passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant protection design standards have been largely standardized by EuroNorms.5 FRA concluded that there are no significant differences between trains built to the design standards contained in EuroNorms and trains built to meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the final rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset prices will increase $310,250 (0.62 percent) per trainset to meet the Tier III requirements in this final rule. In Japan, railroad safety regulation is governed by the Railway Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and is codified in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.6 These technical standards are primarily performance-based and railways have the obligation to conform their operations, equipment, and 59185 infrastructure to these standards. In the case of its high-speed rail system, the Tokaido Shinkansen, the railway transports only passengers; the rail line is entirely dedicated to high-speed rail with no conventional trains operating and has full grade separation. These are the significant differences underlying the design of Tokaido Shinkansen trainsets operating in Japan when compared to passenger trainsets currently operating in the U.S. The key to the Japanese high-speed rail network’s ongoing safety performance and reliability is the principle of crash avoidance. Modifying this advanced Japanese high-speed trainset to comply with the new Tier III requirements would result in significant additional costs to be interoperable in the U.S. rail system; FRA estimates $4.7 million per trainset. European trains generally would not need carbody, truck, suspension, or brake modifications to comply with the Tier III requirements. However, either the analysis used to demonstrate compliance of the train safety features or components would require modification, or minor design modification(s) would likely be needed, or both.7 These differences are illustrated in the following: SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL CHANGES FOR EQUIPMENT DESIGNED TO EUROPEAN STANDARDS TO COMPLY WITH FINAL RULE IN THE U.S. Engineering analysis difference khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 • • • • • • Minor modifications required Quasi static compression ...................................................................... Dynamic collision scenario ................................................................... Override protection ............................................................................... Fluid entry inhibition .............................................................................. Roof and side structure integrity ........................................................... Glazing .................................................................................................. • • • • • • • Structural integrity of non-cab end. Interior fixture attachment. Seat crashworthiness. Luggage racks. Emergency window egress & rescue access windows. Emergency lighting. Alerters. The RIA that accompanies this final rule contains an analysis of regulatory alternatives FRA considered. Specifically, the analysis compares at a general level the costs and benefits of the Tier III requirements to both European and Japanese standards for high-speed trains. The analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million European high-speed trainset could be modified to comply with the Tier III requirements with only minor structural modifications and, as indicated above, at little additional cost—about $310,000 per trainset. Modifications are expected to ensure such trainsets safely operate in a U.S. setting. Due to the lack of historical safety information for operations at Tier III speeds in the U.S., FRA was unable to estimate the incremental safety benefit that would be provided by the Tier III requirements as compared to the European technical standards. However, these new requirements are supported by the recommendation of the full RSAC and FRA is confident about the costbeneficial nature of the final rule. Additionally, the analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million Tokaido Shinkansen Japanese high-speed trainset would need significant structural modifications, including those to the carbody, trucks, and suspension, to comply with the Tier III requirements, and, as indicated above, would incur significant additional costs—about $4.7 million per trainset. FRA is unable to provide an estimate of the expected incremental benefit of the Tier III requirements over the alternatives, but FRA believes these additional costs are justified by the nature of the risks within the U.S. rail operating environment and RSAC’s recommendations. Tier III trains in the U.S. will share track with other rail operations, including heavy and long 5 EuroNorms title derived: ‘‘Standard’’ is ‘‘norme’’ in French and ‘‘norm’’ in German. https:// www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/ default.aspx. 6 https://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_ bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf. 7 A discussion of the rationale supporting each of the structural requirements under the ‘‘Minor modifications required’’ column in the ‘‘Summary of potential changes for equipment designed to European standards to comply with final rule in the U.S.’’ table is available under the section-by-section analysis contained in the NPRM. See 81 FR 88006, 88027–88028, 88034–88038 (Dec. 6, 2016). As discussed in the NPRM, each requirement was determined as necessary to achieve an equivalent level of safety as provided by conventional Tier I equipment under 49 CFR part 238, subpart C. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59186 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations freight trains, and operate on track with highway-rail grade crossings and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other highway vehicles. FRA conducted a qualitative analysis comparing the final rule’s Tier I alternative requirements to two alternatives: Not taking any regulatory action or adopting existing international design standards. As discussed in the RIA, trainsets compliant with international design standards (such as European or Japanese) would require extensive modifications to meet Tier I requirements if FRA elected to take no regulatory action. However, under the new Tier I alternative requirements, FRA believes the costs associated with compliance will be similar to those discussed for Tier III equipment. A second alternative would be to codify EuroNorms as Federal regulations, instead of the new Tier I alternative requirements. This option opens the possibility for manufacturers to accrue savings from fewer modifications; however, such an option would require manufacturers to expend resources that favor a particular technology or approach to equipment design. Additionally, codifying EuroNorms in lieu of the final rule would potentially have required equipment designed to a different standard to incur certain costs related to modifying the equipment to bring it into compliance. Consequently, regardless of the requirements codified, manufacturers would likely have to modify trainsets to meet the regulatory requirements specified. Importantly, trainsets meeting only a European standard (or Japanese or other international standard) would not be interoperable with existing U.S. passenger or freight equipment. Therefore, this equipment could only operate on an exclusive right-of-way, unable to take advantage of existing infrastructure. FRA requested and received no public comment on the alternatives presented and discussed. For further discussion, please also see the RIA’s ‘‘Alternatives Considered’’ section, in which FRA presents more detailed discussion of the impact of the alternatives considered. FRA did consider the alternative of standalone HSR systems (not physically connected to the general railroad system) operating on an exclusive rightof-way, which would use passenger equipment that complies with European or other international standards but not necessarily with FRA’s new requirements. For the reasons discussed below, FRA declined to pursue this alternative. A major tenet of this final rule is to safely facilitate the VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 implementation of nationwide, interoperable HSR service. Standalone systems operating equipment not compliant with FRA’s passenger equipment safety standards would significantly limit the interoperability of HSR service. When developing these requirements, FRA did not envision a network of standalone, noninteroperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide network. Additionally, it would be very costly for a standalone system to attempt to connect with major metropolitan areas because those standalone systems could not take advantage of a major regulatory savings—operating over existing infrastructure. FRA determined that two-thirds to four-fifths of the regulatory cost savings are due to infrastructure cost avoidance for operations electing to use Tier I alternative or Tier III equipment. In particular, interoperability will allow HSR operators to reach into major metropolitan areas where building new, exclusive rights-of-way may not be feasible due to land density, environmental, and other considerations. An advantage of the standalone alternative is that an individual railroad system could optimize its operations to high levels of performance without necessarily having to adhere to requirements generally applicable to railroad systems in the U.S. However, for such a project to attain that level of performance, it would have to optimize the design of the entire system, not only the passenger equipment. Basically, a standalone system would have to bring together all the other aspects of railroad safety (such as operating practices, signal and train control, and track) that must be applied to the individual system. Given that such an approach covers more than passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular right-of-way intrusion protection and other safety requirements not adequately addressed in FRA’s regulations, FRA continues to believe that addressing proposals for standalone HSR systems on a case-by-case basis and comprehensively (such as through a rule of particular applicability or other specific regulatory action(s)) is prudent because of the small number of potential operations and the potential for significant differences in their design. Entities considering such operations voluntarily assume the higher costs of building new infrastructure, knowing they cannot take advantage of the cost savings from sharing existing infrastructure. PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 II. Statutory and Regulatory Background A. Statutory Background In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one initiative of this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a fiveyear period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary’s schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Public Law 103–440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623–4624 (November 2, 1994). In the Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations and to issue orders under it. See section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133). B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate On May 4, 1998, under section 215 of the Act, FRA published the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (PTEP). See 63 FR 24629. The PTEP contained minimum Federal safety standards for the preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains, including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail service. The rule also established specific requirements for passenger train emergency systems and contained specific requirements for participation in debrief and critique sessions following emergency situations and full-scale simulations. On May 12, 1999, FRA published the PESS final rule. See 64 FR 25540. The PESS established comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment including requirements for carbody structure and fire safety. FRA subsequently amended the PESS to address petitions seeking FRA’s reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. In response to the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and published three sets of amendments to the final rule. See 65 FR 41284, Jul. 3, 2000; 67 FR 19970, Apr. 23, 2002; and 67 FR 42892, June 25, 2002. Since then, FRA has engaged in a number of rulemakings to amend and enhance its passenger safety requirements. On October 19, 2006, FRA E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 published a final rule addressing various requirements on the inspection, testing, and operation of passenger equipment, and the attachment of safety appliances. See 71 FR 61835. On February 1, 2008, FRA published the Passenger Train Emergency Systems final rule promoting passenger occupant safety by addressing emergency communication, emergency egress, and rescue access requirements. See 73 FR 6370. FRA also established additional requirements for passenger train emergency systems on November 29, 2013, see 78 FR 71785, revised and clarified its PTEP regulations on March 31, 2014, see 79 FR 18128, and established new standards to improve the integrity of passenger train exterior side door safety systems on December 7, 2015, see 80 FR 76118. On January 8, 2010, FRA published a final rule enhancing requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars and MU locomotives. See 75 FR 1180. FRA included energyabsorption requirements in the 2010 rulemaking to address traditional cab car and MU locomotive designs, with very strong underframes and relatively weaker superstructures, because it is vitally important to provide protection to crewmembers and passengers if the superstructure is impacted. In that rulemaking, FRA applied mature technology and design practice to extend requirements from linear-elastic to elastic-plastic and provided descriptions of allowable deformations without complete failure of the system. Although FRA believed at the time of the rulemaking that the alternative performance requirements would principally apply to shaped-nose equipment designs or CEM designs, or both, FRA also intended for them to apply to any conventional equipment design, as an alternative to the linearelastic approach. In particular, the alternative performance requirements allow innovative designs that protect the occupied volume for its full height, even without traditional full-height collision and corner post structures, and the rule has been applied to such innovative end frame designs and traditional end frame designs. III. Development of the Final Rule This final rule is primarily based on consensus recommendations from the RSAC.8 See 81 FR 88006, 88013. Those 8 The RSAC member groups are: American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council; American Petroleum Institute; American Public Transportation Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 recommendations were developed over many years, and began in 2009 when FRA elected to develop, in consultation with the RSAC, alternative criteria and procedures to assess the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance of rail passenger equipment applicable to a wide range of equipment designs to be used in Tier I service. Accordingly, the ETF 9 was established in September 2009, charged with the mission of producing a set of technical criteria and procedures for evaluating petitions for waivers from (or, as appropriate under § 238.201(b), approval of alternative compliance with) one or more of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. This work led to the development of the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, published in 2011. The technical evaluation criteria and procedures in the Report provided a means of Railroad Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA); Association of American Railroads (AAR); Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM); Association of Tourist Railroads and Railway Museums; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division (BMWED); Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine Institute; Federal Transit Administration (FTA);* Fertilizer Institute; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART), including the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association (SMWIA) and United Transportation Union (UTU); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);* League of Railway Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP); National Association of Railway Business Women;* National Conference of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association (NRCMA); National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);* Railway Supply Institute (RSI); Safe Travel America (STA); Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);* Transport Canada;* Transport Workers Union of America (TWU); Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and Transportation Security Administration (TSA).* *Indicates associate, non-voting membership. 9 The ETF member groups are: AAR; AAPRCO; AASHTO, including California Department of Transportation, and Interfleet; APTA, including Alstom, Ansaldo Breda, Bombardier, Central Japan Railway Company (JRC), China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR), Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD), East Japan Railway Company, Faiveley Transport, GE Transportation, Japan International Transport Institute, Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Kawasaki, Keolis, KPS N.A., LIRR, LTK Engineering Services, Marsh, Metro-North, Nippon Sharyo, Parsons Brinckerhoff, PS Consulting, Safetran Systems, SEPTA, Sharma & Associates, Siemens, Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA), Stadler, STV, Talgo, Texas Central Railway, Veolia, Voith Turbo, and Wabtec; Amtrak; ASLRRA; BLET; European Railway Agency (ERA); NTSB; RSI, including Battelle Memorial Institute, and ENSCO; SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; TCIU/BRC; and Transport Canada. PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59187 establishing whether equipment of an alternative design would result in at least equivalent performance to that of equipment designed in accordance with the structural standards in 49 CFR part 238. After the ETF developed the Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to: (1) Develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC to adopt the alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA’s regulations; and (2) establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-speed trainsets able to operate at speeds up to 220 mph,10 classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The work of the ETF and full RSAC culminated with the publication of the NPRM on December 6, 2016. Please see the Technical Background and Overview section of the NPRM, section III, for a more comprehensive discussion on the development of these requirements at 81 FR 88006, 88013–88017. The comment period was initially scheduled to close on February 6, 2017. However, in a December 12, 2016 letter, APTA requested a 30-day extension of the NPRM’s comment period. APTA stated it needed additional time to thoroughly review the NPRM, and review and consolidate comments on the NPRM from its members and affiliates. On February 13, 2017, FRA published a notice in the Federal Register reopening the comment period until March 21, 2017. See 82 FR 10449. A description and summary of the comments received on the NPRM is discussed below under section IV, Discussion of Comments and Conclusions. To further benefit from the input of the ETF, FRA convened a meeting of the ETF on May 16–18, 2017, in Washington, DC.11 During this meeting, FRA discussed proposed responses to the comments received, which was helpful to FRA in crafting the fuller responses to the comments contained in this final rule. Accordingly, FRA did not believe it necessary to bring any issues back to the full RSAC for a formal recommendation. The only issues for which there was no consensus either did not have consensus agreement initially (cab glazing ballistic requirements, which were deferred to FRA to develop) or were generally non10 FRA elected 220 mph as the maximum operating speed for Tier III equipment to remain harmonious with FRA’s track safety standards (49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013 (discussing the reasoning and research behind the 220-mph maximum track speed). 11 Minutes of this meeting is part of the docket in this proceeding and is available for public inspection. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59188 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 substantive in nature (the archival of AAR–RP–5104 for incorporation-byreference). Please see the fuller discussion of each of these topics under the section-by-section analysis of the respective sections (§ 238.721, Glazing, and § 238.735, Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew)). Please note that the RSAC did not expressly consider FRA’s removal of the requirement for a rule of particular applicability to conduct operations at speeds above 150 mph, as specified in subpart I of part 236 of this chapter. See the discussion of changes to § 236.1007 of this chapter in the section-by-section analysis, below. The RSAC also did not consider FRA’s changes to §§ 229.3, 229.5, and 231.0 of this chapter. These changes, harmonizing references to the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II equipment, were not expressly proposed in the NPRM as they were inadvertently omitted. See the discussion of changes to §§ 229.3, 229.5, and 231.0 of this chapter in the sectionby-section analysis, below. FRA nonetheless believes the removal of language from part 236 and the harmonization of parts 229 and 231 are consistent with the RSAC recommended approach in this rulemaking. IV. Discussion of Comments and Conclusions As noted above, on February 13, 2017, FRA reopened the comment period for the NPRM that closed on February 6, 2017, in response to a request received from APTA. See 82 FR 10449 (Feb. 13, 2017). During the entire comment period, FRA received comments from two individuals and the following seven entities: Alstom Transportation, Inc. (Alstom); APTA; East Japan Railway Company (JR East); Italcertifier, SPA; LTK Engineering Services (LTK); Siemens; and Texas Central Railroad, LLC (TCRR). The comments were all supportive of the rulemaking, and FRA appreciates the commenters for the time and effort put into each of the comments received. FRA will first discuss the comments that are applicable to the rulemaking, generally. Responses to comments on specific sections of the rule are discussed in the section-bysection analysis, or in the Regulatory Impact and Notices portion of this final rule, with the provisions and statements to which they specifically relate. FRA makes clear that the order of the discussion is not meant to imply that FRA is prioritizing one commenter over another. As noted above, following the submission of these written comments, FRA convened the Engineering Task Force to consider and discuss the VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 comments and to help achieve a fuller understanding of the comments received and recommendations for this final rule. As a result, certain of these comments have been superseded by changes made in the rule text from the NPRM to this final rule, and they should not necessarily be understood to reflect the positions of the commenters with respect to the requirements of the final rule. Nevertheless, FRA is setting out all the comments received and is responding to each of them, either here, or in the pertinent section-by-section analysis or Regulatory Impact Notice provision, so that FRA’s positions are clearly understood. In addressing these comments and developing this final rule, FRA has relied on information contained in comments, RSAC meeting minutes, memoranda, and other materials in the docket for this rulemaking. A. General Comments APTA, in its comment, stated that it is very supportive of the ‘‘Tier III approach.’’ APTA further stated that the Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements permit Tier III trainsets to operate in a shared right of way with conventional passenger and freight rail equipment at speeds below 125 mph (Tier I environment). This type of interoperability has the potential to have a safe and cost-effective approach to implementing high-speed rail as it permits the use of internationally service-proven high-speed rail equipment and also the use of existing infrastructure for lower speed operation. FRA appreciates APTA’s support on FRA’s approach to permit Tier III equipment to be interoperable at speeds not exceeding 125 mph. APTA further noted that FRA described very well an advantage of a standalone system to be the system’s potential to optimize its operations to a high level of performance. In both their comments, APTA and TCRR recommended that FRA adopt a definition for ‘‘Tier IV system.’’ For the reasons discussed in the section-bysection analysis for § 238.5, below, FRA is not including a definition for ‘‘Tier IV system’’ in this final rule. However, APTA’s and TCRR’s comments on this topic went beyond the definition of a Tier IV system and touched on FRA’s discussion in the NPRM of Alternatives Considered under the Executive Summary. 81 FR 88006, 88009. Additionally, APTA, as part of its comment, noted that the regulation references several APTA standards by a ‘‘date certain’’ for incorporation by reference. APTA further noted that many of those standards will be updated PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 ‘‘in the near future’’ and recommended that the latest versions of the standards be referenced. APTA also recommended, more generally, that all existing references to APTA standards within part 238 be updated in the final rule. FRA must incorporate by reference updated technical standards according to 1 CFR part 51. To the extent possible, FRA has included for incorporation by reference the most up-to-date APTA standards that were under consideration in this rulemaking. Under the sectionby-section analysis, FRA has indicated where it has revised references from the initial versions of APTA standards to refer to the most recent editions instead. With respect to updating references to APTA standards in part 238, generally, FRA will address this issue in another rulemaking effort in which FRA reviews and updates, as necessary, all references to relevant technical standards in part 238, because part 238 incorporates by reference technical standards from a number of different industry consensus organizations. Alstom commented on § 238.15, Movement of passenger equipment with power brake defects, asking FRA if a reference for Tier III equipment will be added where there is currently a reference to Tier II. Alstom also commented more generally whether Tier II requirements will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and extended to apply to Tier III equipment. Alstom comments on § 238.15 are outside the intended scope of this rulemaking. Due to the unique nature of Tier III equipment and operations, FRA believes that more consideration and analysis are necessary in developing appropriate regulatory requirements addressing the specific safety concerns implicated. Accordingly, FRA believes it appropriate to seek public comment on any proposal on this topic as part of a future rulemaking. In the interim, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure proper safeguards and procedures are in place to protect the movement of defective Tier III equipment. Italcertifier, SPA submitted a presentation to the docket in which it outlined six comments. None of those six comments proposed any changes to regulatory text or to FRA’s approach to Tier I alternative or Tier III requirements. Among its comments, Italcertifier stated that collision risk is mitigated ‘‘by the presence and efficiency of the train protection systems’’ and the crash-avoidance philosophy, and added that trains in Europe must be equipped with an onboard train control system that is integrated with the wayside signal E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations system. Italcertifier stated, though, that the proposed rule did not account for PTC or such other technology. However, FRA notes that PTC technology is not intended as a replacement for crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. PTC is a performance-based system requirement that provides collision avoidance and overspeed protection technology for certain accident scenarios that complement, but do not replace, crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. Additionally, not all accidents are PTC-preventable. Italcertifier also commented that in Italy ‘‘level crossings’’ (highway-rail grade crossings) are not permitted at speeds exceeding 200 km/h (approximately 124 mph) but there is a movement to eliminate such crossings from track with speeds exceeding 160 km/h (approximately 100 mph). Although this has no impact on the regulatory text, FRA notes that such an approach appears consistent with FRA’s treatment of grade crossings (permitted on Class 6 track, or at speeds up to 110 mph; permitted subject to FRA approval on Class 7 track, or at speeds up to 125 mph; and prohibited on Class 8 track and above, or at speeds exceeding 125 mph). See 49 CFR 213.347. Further, Italcertifier commented that the European standards bodies (e.g., CEN or CENELEC) create technology-neutral standards, which is consistent with FRA’s approach under this rule. Italcertifier also expressed its support for creating an interoperable passenger rail network, stating that the decision to have an interoperable high-speed rail system, and not a standalone system except on a case-by-case basis, is completely in line with the European position. Finally, Italcertifier commented that qualifying equipment in Italy requires a series of tests to demonstrate compliance with various European technical standards. This, too, is consistent with FRA’s approach. JR East’s comment focused on the economic impacts of the proposed rule. In its comment, JR East articulated that when FRA calculates the costs of modifying Japanese equipment to meet Tier III requirements, FRA should consider not only the initial cost (which FRA estimated at $4.7 million per trainset), but also ‘‘the total cost including operation cost, maintenance cost and the expenses for the suspension of transportation due to accidents.’’ FRA has addressed this comment in section 2.1.1 of the regulatory impact analysis, which is included in the docket, and in the economic analysis discussion contained in this final rule. For purposes of the VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 economic analysis, FRA chose to only consider the initial cost of modifying Japanese equipment to meet Tier III requirements. FRA considers that the operation, maintenance, and other related expenses would be unique to each railroad potentially operating the equipment, and therefore the differential cost would only be the expense to modify the equipment. LTK was very supportive of the rule and the effort put forth by all involved in the ETF. LTK also expressed that the publication of the proposed rule was timely in that industry ‘‘requires clarity’’ with respect to applicable safety standards for Tier I alternative and Tier III high-speed trainsets, noting both of which must be capable of operating in mixed service with conventional passenger and freight operations at speeds below 125 mph as a result of a number of ongoing trainset procurements. LTK went on to say that the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements contained in the proposed rule will facilitate the introduction of international passenger and high-speed trainset designs with minor modifications to enable operation in the North American rail environment. LTK also commented that it agrees with the comments APTA submitted to the docket, stating that the recommended edits in the APTA comments provide additional clarity and are consistent with the basis for consensus reached within the ETF. LTK further commented that APTA is currently in the process of reviewing and renewing its Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards and that, as FRA finalizes the rule, FRA should update the incorporation dates of APTA standards to the most recent dates if the standards are updated and approved through APTA prior to final rule publication. FRA makes clear it supports incorporating updated APTA standards and has incorporated by reference the most up-to-date APTA standards in this final rule consistent with the requirements of 1 CFR part 51. Siemens’ comment was very supportive of the rule and of the ETF’s work on it. Siemens expressed the belief that the rule’s defining of the new equipment tier, Tier III, was timely and is needed to clarify to the industry what types of trainset designs ‘‘can get approved by the FRA.’’ Siemens noted this significantly reduces risk for the industry and has its full support. Siemens also expressed its support for the comments submitted by APTA to the docket. Siemens stated it participated in the reviews leading to the submission of the APTA comments and believed they improve the NPRM. PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59189 TCRR also voiced support of the rulemaking and of the industrydeveloped comments submitted by APTA, noting they provide clarification on various requirements proposed in the NPRM and are consistent with the basis for consensus reached within the RSAC ETF. TCRR also submitted substantive comments on specific sections that are addressed in the section-by-section analysis, below. In addition, FRA received comments on the rulemaking from individuals. One individual stated that he ‘‘strongly support[s] modifying the regulations that make American trains much more expensive and slower than train across much of the rest of the world.’’ The commenter urged, to the extent possible, that FRA align its regulations with other major standards (especially European standards) to enable railroads to buy ‘‘off-the-shelf’’ trainsets at much lower cost. The commenter stated that this was an easy way to start to reduce regulatory burdens and suggested that FRA’s regulations be amended to grant a categorical safe harbor for any trainset that complies with the European safety requirements. FRA has long considered whether adopting European safety requirements would be practical in advancing passenger rail safety in the U.S., given the unique nature of the risks within the U.S. rail operating environment in which passenger trains share track with other rail operations, including heavy and long freight trains, and frequently operate on track with highway-rail grade crossings and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other highway vehicles. 62 FR 49728, 49729–49731 (Sep. 23, 1997). In addressing the safety concerns that are present in the U.S., FRA has instead focused on developing regulations in this rulemaking that are performancebased and technology-neutral to further open the U.S. market to international experience and contemporary design techniques and to harmonize the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements with those that are established internationally. Further, if a car builder can show that its equipment meets or exceeds the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements as established by this rule without structural modification through proper modeling and documentation, FRA would not exclude that equipment from operating in the U.S. Specifically, FRA noted in the NPRM that it is important to recognize that differences between the FRA requirements and international technical standards do not mean that in all cases structural modifications are E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59190 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations necessary. Equipment designed to international standards can meet these requirements; the equipment manufacturer must only validate and provide supporting documentation that it does. See 81 FR 88006, 88014. Further, FRA notes that in response to its solicitation for comments on the topic of alternative approaches to regulating Tier III equipment (i.e., fully adopting European standards), no international equipment manufacturer (some of whom are members of the ETF) stated that it would be better to simply adopt European crashworthiness standards or offered any other regulatory alternative to the ETF’s recommended approach. Accordingly, this supports FRA’s approach to addressing crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in this rule. Further, FRA notes that the commenter’s reference to a so-called ‘‘off-the-shelf’’ product is misleading, as all common product platforms are modified to fit the specific needs of the customer’s specifications, which often reflects varying regulatory standards for the country or service intended. FRA received a comment from another individual who expressed overall support for the proposed rule and wanted to accommodate NTSB recommendations to the extent possible without excluding the adoption of ‘‘EuroNorm-like trains.’’ FRA addresses NTSB’s recommendations and comments, below. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 B. Proposed Subpart I and the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment FRA is not adopting the proposed ITM requirements under proposed subpart I in the NPRM. FRA worked with the ETF to develop a more comprehensive set of ITM requirements for Tier III equipment. Indeed, in their comments on the NPRM, both APTA and TCRR cited the likelihood that the requirements in the subpart as proposed would be subject to change based on the ETF’s then-ongoing discussion of ITM requirements, and they recommended against including the requirements of proposed subpart I in this final rule. FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation so that ITM processes and procedures for an operation’s equipment are sufficient to address all safety-critical features. FRA will be guided by the ITM program elements the ETF developed, which may be codified in a future rulemaking. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 C. Proposed Subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment In the NPRM, FRA proposed to add and reserve a subpart J to contain the requirements for a Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment (or Tier III Safe Operation Plan). As noted below, APTA commented that this subpart is unnecessary as the information requested by FRA for inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan would be available to FRA through other regulatory means. Specifically, APTA prepared a matrix recommending changes to various proposed requirements in the NPRM where it believed the desired information should be provided, including the addition of a § 238.110 (Pre-revenue qualification plan) to review specific design review elements. FRA has adopted APTA’s recommendations, in whole or in part, in various sections of this final rule (see the specific section-by-section analysis, below), and has not adopted subpart J, as proposed. However, FRA intended the Tier III Safe Operation Plan to be a mechanism allowing flexibility for both the Tier III equipment manufacturer and operator to address, and FRA to review and approve, certain aspects of Tier III equipment or operations not prescriptively defined in the regulation so they can be appropriately tailored. To do so, the Tier III Safe Operation Plan would provide FRA a broad level of oversight during the equipment design period to ensure that safety issues are addressed. FRA therefore remains concerned that APTA’s comments do not offer an alternative that provides FRA the same approval oversight for all Tier III equipment or operations matters initially identified for the Tier III Safe Operation Plan. For instance, FRA does not approve railroad operating rules, so referencing a railroad’s operating rules to address various matters is not a suitable alternative. Without a Tier III Safe Operation Plan requirement in the rule, some other mechanism for FRA review and approval is necessary. As noted below, APTA has suggested the addition of a new § 238.110 to handle this review and approval oversight function. However, FRA believes that further work is necessary to develop this alternate approach. The process for how FRA would provide approval is not fully addressed in APTA’s proposal, including when that approval must be sought, and what, specifically, needs to be approved, including how certain Tier III operational aspects would be reviewed and approved by FRA. In the interim, FRA will work with any proposed Tier PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 III operation on a case-by-case basis to address safety-critical matters that would otherwise have been identified for inclusion in the proposed Tier III Safe Operation Plan. D. Comments From the NTSB The NTSB submitted a letter to the docket asking FRA to include in the final rule provisions to address safety recommendations the NTSB has issued. Specifically, the NTSB asked FRA to add language addressing safety recommendations R–12–41, R–14–74, R–15–01, and R–15–02. Recommendation R–12–41 arose from a grade crossing accident that occurred in Miriam, NV, in 2011, where a tractortrailer truck struck the side of an Amtrak train that was passing through the crossing. The NTSB recommended FRA ‘‘[r]equire that passenger railcar doors be designed to prevent fire and smoke from traveling between railcars.’’ FRA notes that adding weight or tighter seals to the doors to prevent fire and smoke from traveling between railcars could cause unintended harm. Both sliding and swinging doors interact closely with the surrounding car body structure, at the hinge, track, jamb, pocket, and/or latch. Even minor distortion of that structure due to the forces of collision or derailment, or simply a change in the orientation of the door due to a car being significantly displaced from its upright position, could cause the door to fail to operate as intended. Thus, during an emergency, additional time and effort would be needed to operate the doors, delaying egress and access through those doors. Recommendation R–14–74 arose from the overspeed derailment of a MetroNorth commuter train in Spuyten Duyvil, NY, in 2013. The derailment occurred in a 6-degree left-hand curve where the maximum authorized speed was 30 mph. The train was traveling at 82 mph when it derailed. As a result of the derailment, four people died and at least 61 persons were injured. MetroNorth estimated about 115 passengers were on the train at the time of the derailment. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the loss of the window glazing that resulted in the fatal ejection of four passengers from the train. The NTSB recommended FRA ‘‘[d]evelop a performance standard to ensure that windows (e.g., glazing, gaskets, and any retention hardware) are retained in the window opening structure during an accident and incorporate the standard into [49 CFR 238.221 and 238.421] to require that passenger railcars meet this standard.’’ As discussed in its responses to the E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 NTSB,12 FRA is taking steps to address this recommendation. However, the Metro-North accident was the result of overspeed.13 Implementation of positive train control should eliminate such overspeed occurrences in passenger service, thereby reducing the likelihood of rollover accidents and fatalities due to ejection through window openings similar to the events involved in the Metro-North accident. At this time, though, FRA is not amending § 238.221 or § 238.421, as the NTSB’s recommendations are outside the intended scope of this rulemaking. Recommendations R–15–01 and R– 15–02 arose from a train-to-train collision between two Metro-North commuter trains in Bridgeport, CT, in 2013. An eastbound train was struck by a westbound train after the eastbound had derailed. As a result of the collision, at least 65 persons were injured. MetroNorth estimated about 250 passengers were on each train at the time of the accident. In R–15–01, the NTSB recommended FRA ‘‘[r]evise [49 CFR 238.213] to require the existing forwardend corner post strength requirements for the back-end corner posts of passenger railcars.’’ In R–15–02, the NTSB recommended FRA ‘‘[r]evise [49 CFR part 238] to incorporate a certificate of construction, similar to the one found at [49 CFR 179.5], and require that the certificate be furnished prior to the inservice date of the railcar.’’ FRA recognizes the importance of structurally sound passenger cars and believes it has achieved the intent of these recommendations. After fully analyzing FRA’s current safety data, evaluating FRA’s existing safety regulations, and reviewing the NTSB’s findings, FRA determined that its current regulations do address the NTSB’s underlying safety concerns.14 FRA continues to use RSAC to identify and analyze potential safety issues and the need for further rulemaking. At this time, RSAC (and by extension, FRA) is not considering any changes to the strength requirements for passenger car corner posts. 12 https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_ layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation. aspx?Rec=R-14-074. 13 https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/ AccidentReports/Pages/RAB1412.aspx. 14 https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_ layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation. aspx?Rec=R-15-001 https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/ safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/ Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-15-002. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 V. Section-by-Section Analysis Part 229—Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards Subpart A—General Section 229.3 Definitions FRA is revising the definition of ‘‘Tier II’’ to conform the maximum authorized operating speed of Tier II passenger equipment in this section (150 mph) with the maximum authorized operating speed of Tier II equipment as specified under § 238.5 of this chapter (160 mph). As a result, the definition of ‘‘Tier II’’ under part 229 is revised to mean operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule; however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the regulated industry. Part 231—Railroad Safety Appliance Standards Section 231.0 Penalties Applicability and FRA is revising § 231.0(c) to conform the reference to Tier II maximum authorized speed with the revisions in this final rule. FRA is simply changing the reference to ‘‘150 mph’’ to ‘‘160 mph,’’ reflecting the changes to the maximum authorized speed of Tier II equipment under this rule. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule; however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the regulated industry. PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Part 236—Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems Applicability FRA is revising § 229.3(c) to conform the reference to Tier II maximum authorized speed with this final rule’s revision to the definition of ‘‘Tier II.’’ FRA is simply changing the reference to ‘‘150 mph’’ to ‘‘160 mph,’’ reflecting the changes to the maximum authorized speed of Tier II equipment under this rule. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule; however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the regulated industry. Section 229.5 59191 Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High-Speed Service FRA is removing paragraph (d) of this section as it is no longer relevant, and redesignating paragraph (e) as paragraph (d) of this section. FRA described the reasons for removing paragraph (d) of this section in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88017, and did not receive any comments on or objections to the paragraph’s removal. As this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, and FRA is adopting this change as proposed. Part 238—Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Subpart A—General Section 238.5 Definitions In this section, FRA is revising the definitions of ‘‘glazing, end-facing’’ and ‘‘glazing, side-facing,’’ and making technical revisions to the definitions of ‘‘Tier II’’ and ‘‘train, Tier II passenger’’ to reflect the change in the maximum authorized speed of Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA is also adding new definitions for ‘‘Associate Administrator,’’ ‘‘Tier III,’’ ‘‘trainset, Tier I alternative passenger,’’ ‘‘trainset, Tier III,’’ and ‘‘trainset unit.’’ For the reasons discussed below, FRA is placing the definition of ‘‘cab’’ in new § 238.702, and not under this section as proposed in the NPRM. FRA did not receive any comments on or objections to FRA’s proposed revisions or additions to the definitions of ‘‘glazing, end-facing,’’ ‘‘glazing, sidefacing,’’ ‘‘Tier II,’’ ‘‘train, Tier II passenger,’’ ‘‘Associate Administrator,’’ ‘‘Tier III,’’ ‘‘trainset, Tier I alternative passenger,’’ and ‘‘trainset, Tier III’’ and those definitions in this final rule are identical to the proposed versions. 81 FR 88006, 88018–88019. Accordingly, the analysis provided for these definitions in the NPRM is not being repeated here, and FRA is adopting these definitions as proposed. FRA did receive comments, however, on the proposed new definitions of ‘‘cab’’ and ‘‘trainset unit.’’ APTA submitted comments suggesting revisions to the proposed definitions of ‘‘cab’’ and ‘‘trainset unit,’’ and to FRA’s existing definition of ‘‘trainset, passenger.’’ Additionally, APTA, along E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59192 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations with Alstom, suggested adding a definition for ‘‘conventional locomotive.’’ Further, APTA, along with TCRR, suggested adding a definition for ‘‘Tier IV system.’’ However, as discussed more fully under new § 238.702, below, FRA is placing the definition of ‘‘cab’’ under subpart H to clarify the definition’s application. Accordingly, FRA’s discussion of APTA’s comment on the term ‘‘cab’’ is in the section-by-section analysis of new § 238.702, below. In its comment, APTA suggested that FRA amend its existing definition of ‘‘trainset, passenger’’ to provide a more robust definition to clarify when the term is used in other sections of the rule (e.g., § 238.705, Dynamic collision scenario). APTA suggested that the term ‘‘trainset’’ means: ‘‘a passenger train where all units within the trainset are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a single consist. A Tier I alternative trainset may be equipped with a conventional locomotive at either end that may not be semi-permanently coupled to the adjacent unit of the trainset.’’ APTA reasoned that the specific requirements proposed by the ETF for a Tier III trainset are based on the assumption that all units within the trainset are semi-permanently coupled together, such that units of the trainset can only be coupled or uncoupled at a maintenance facility or other location where personnel can safely get under or between units. Additionally, APTA commented that, because revenue operations can only be conducted using a complete trainset, the collision scenario defined in § 238.705 is based on the operation of a complete trainset, and mentioned that the specific requirements pertaining to safety appliances for Tier III trainsets are also based on the assumption that all units within a trainset are semi-permanently coupled. Further, APTA proposed allowing a passenger trainset, as it would define the term, to be equipped with an automatic coupler in the middle of the trainset configuration so it could be more easily disconnected in a maintenance facility, noting that for such configurations, the requirements of § 238.705(a) would apply to the complete trainset as operated in revenue service. At this time, FRA is not inclined to amend its current definitions of ‘‘trainset, passenger’’ or ‘‘train, passenger,’’ and is declining to adopt APTA’s proposed definition of ‘‘trainset.’’ The definition of passenger trainset in § 238.5 applies to all tiers of passenger equipment under part 238. Specifying that trainsets, generally, are all semi-permanently coupled together VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 places too broad a restriction on the method or manner for connecting individual trainset units. However, in this final rule, new § 238.705(a)(6) does include a reference to an ‘‘integrated trainset’’ as defined in new § 238.702, to clarify which initial velocity applies to a given trainset. Moreover, FRA recognizes APTA’s concern about allowing for an automatic coupler in the middle of a semi-permanently coupled trainset, but believes no change is needed. FRA makes clear that the rule does not preclude the use of automatic coupler arrangements within the consist of a semi-permanently coupled Tier III trainset to facilitate maintenance within a shop facility, provided the coupler arrangements are not used for switching or other operational purposes outside of the protected maintenance environment envisioned by the rule. Of course, if a coupling between Tier III vehicles is not intended to be semi-permanent in nature, then other requirements apply, such as those governing safety appliances. APTA also recommended clarifying the definition of ‘‘trainset unit,’’ which FRA proposed to mean a trainset segment located between connecting arrangements (articulations). In the NPRM, FRA explained this definition would clarify that the proposed requirements may apply to individual vehicles within a trainset consist, but not necessarily to the trainset as a whole. However, in its comment, APTA suggested restating the definition to mean ‘‘any car within a trainset that is semi-permanently coupled to an adjacent car within the trainset.’’ FRA is adopting its proposed definition of ‘‘trainset unit’’ in the final rule, not APTA’s. APTA’s suggested definition would be too narrow because, to be considered a trainset unit, a vehicle would require semi-permanent coupling to an adjacent unit. Yet, FRA intends the definition to apply to all tiers of passenger equipment, and therefore not require all configurations of trainsets to be semi-permanently coupled. FRA believes the definition addresses the essential elements constituting a trainset unit without being too specific. In their comments, both APTA and Alstom requested FRA add a definition of ‘‘conventional locomotive.’’ APTA recommended the rule define ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ to mean ‘‘a piece of on-track rail equipment with one or more control stands designed to transport a Tier I alternative compliant passenger trainset and which meets the crashworthiness requirements defined in § 229.205 [of this chapter] and the design requirements contained in § 229.206 [of this chapter].’’ APTA PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 stated that inclusion of such a definition would provide greater clarity with respect to application of the dynamic collision scenarios under § 238.705. As discussed below under § 238.705, APTA raised concern that because a conventional locomotive will not be used in Tier III service, requiring use of a conventional locomotive for a collision scenario under Tier III requirements would introduce confusion as to which is the correct collision scenario to apply. Alstom, in its comment, indicated that such a definition of ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ would clarify it is Tier I equipment governed by 49 CFR part 229 and that the front vehicle of a Tier III Trainset could therefore not be a conventional locomotive. However, FRA is not adding a definition of ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ to this § 238.5 of the final rule. APTA’s proposed definition would be too narrowly limited to a locomotive used to move Tier I alternative equipment under appendix G to this part. Instead, FRA believes it is more appropriate to more fully explain under § 238.705, below, FRA’s intent on how the two dynamic collision scenarios should be applied. As noted above, FRA is adding the term ‘‘integrated trainset’’ to § 238.705 to address any confusion about which initial velocity applies to a given trainset. As mentioned above in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, APTA and TCRR recommended that FRA include in the final rule a definition of ‘‘Tier IV system.’’ According to both APTA and TCRR, a ‘‘Tier IV system would mean ‘‘any passenger rail or ground transportation system that operates on an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings and is governed by a technology-specific rule of particular applicability, or other regulatory means.’’ Although amenable to undertaking the development of such a definition, FRA is not accepting APTA’s and TCRR’s recommendations to include a definition of a Tier IV system in this final rule. Adding such a broad-ranging definition is beyond the intended scope of this rulemaking at this final rule stage. Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure In commenting on this section in the NPRM, Alstom suggested that a reference to Tier III equipment be added in paragraph (a) where there is currently a reference to Tier II. Alstom noted that paragraph (a) includes a cross-reference to § 238.505, which governs approvals for Tier II ITM programs. While FRA agrees that a change to this paragraph will be warranted in the future, doing so E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations in this rulemaking is premature as there is no equivalent section to reference for Tier III equipment. However, in the interim, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the specific ITM program sufficiently addresses the inspection, testing, and maintenance of all safetycritical features of a Tier III trainset. FRA is revising paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section, as proposed in the NPRM. FRA did not receive any comments on these technical changes. As these paragraphs are identical to those FRA proposed in the NPRM, please see the NPRM for an analysis of the changes, 81 FR 88006, 88050, as it is not being repeated here. Subpart B—Safety Planning and General Requirements khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan This section contains requirements for pre-revenue service testing of passenger equipment. As proposed in the NPRM, FRA is amending paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), (7), and (c) of this section to require railroads to obtain FRA approval before using Tier III passenger equipment that either has not been used in revenue service in the U.S., or has been used in revenue service in the U.S. and is scheduled for a major upgrade or introduction of new technology that affects a safety system on such equipment. The explicit inclusion of a Tier III notification and approval process is consistent with FRA’s approach to the implementation of highspeed rail technology. It also provides a formal mechanism for FRA to ensure all required elements of this part are satisfactorily addressed and documented. In commenting on the NPRM, APTA stated that FRA should separate out from this section issues related to FRA approval of the design of Tier III equipment. APTA therefore suggested that FRA add a new § 238.110, titled ‘‘Pre-revenue qualification plan,’’ to require a plan addressing all documents required by subpart H to be submitted for review and approval for Tier III equipment.’’ According to APTA, new § 238.110 would contain the requirements of Tier III equipment design that FRA would need to review and approve before Tier III equipment could operate in revenue service. As discussed above under proposed subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment, the creation of this new section ties into APTA’s comment recommending excluding from this final rule the proposed references to a Tier III Safe VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Operation Plan. (Please see the discussion above, under proposed subpart J, for FRA’s response concerning removal of the Tier III Safe Operation Plan.) FRA recognizes that § 238.111 will need some further revision as new Tier III equipment requirements are established. However, APTA’s request to adopt a new § 238.110 exceeds the intended scope of this current rulemaking proceeding. Subpart C—Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment Section 238.201 Compliance Scope/Alternative This section sets out the scope of subpart C, which contains specific requirements for Tier I passenger equipment, and also provides compliance alternatives for the use of Tier I passenger equipment. In its comments on the NPRM, APTA agreed with FRA’s proposal to amend this section to allow Tier I equipment to comply with alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to this part, instead of certain requirements under subpart C (§§ 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219). APTA also urged that efforts be undertaken to complete and reach consensus on a separate guidance document for demonstrating the crashworthiness of passenger rail equipment, to assist with the implementation of this rule. FRA is working on generating such a document, as FRA recognizes the importance of providing guidance on the proper application of the alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements of appendix G to this part. FRA did not receive any additional comments on the proposed revisions to this section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88019–88020, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here. Sections 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209, 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219 These sections contain structural and equipment protection requirements for Tier I passenger equipment. FRA did not receive any comments on the proposed revisions to these sections as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88020, to reflect the addition of alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. As these PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59193 sections of the final rule are identical to the proposed versions, FRA is adopting them as proposed and the analysis provided in the NPRM for each section is not being repeated here. Subpart E—Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment Section 238.401 Scope As discussed in the NPRM, FRA is revising this section to increase the maximum allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. This change is consistent with FRA’s March 13, 2013, final rule amending and clarifying the Track Safety Standards, which affirmed that the maximum allowable speed on Class 8 track is 160 mph. See 78 FR 16052. Further, this change makes the speed range for Tier II passenger equipment consistent with that for Class 8 track in the Track Safety Standards. As specified in § 213.307 of this chapter, Class 8 track encompasses the speed range above 125 mph up to 160 mph—now the same speed range for Tier II passenger equipment. Nonetheless, FRA makes clear this change only increases the maximum operating speed to 160 mph. FRA approval to operate at 160 mph is still needed as this part and other FRA safety regulations require. In commenting on the NPRM, APTA expressed its support for this change and harmonizing the Track Safety Standards and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. Separately, APTA stated that it might be appropriate to reexamine Tier II requirements in the future because they were developed prior to the congressional mandate to implement PTC. APTA added that such a reexamination should take into consideration the incident and accident data since the introduction of Amtrak’s Acela Express trainsets, along with the corresponding risks associated with future operations and anticipated Northeast Corridor upgrades. FRA agrees with APTA that if it becomes necessary to reexamine Tier II requirements, it would be appropriate, as always, to consider all relevant safety data available. However, FRA makes clear that the mandate to implement PTC should not be viewed as a replacement for crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements but as a complementary safety measure. Indeed, around the time part 238 was originally published, FRA issued an order of particular applicability for use of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, a type of PTC system, on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor to support safe train operations at higher speeds. See 63 FR 39343 (Jul. 22, 1998) E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59194 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations and subsequent amendments thereto. Moreover, as discussed in the NPRM and in this final rule under § 238.705, not all accidents are PTC-preventable, such as collisions with trespassing highway equipment at grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or passenger equipment) during manual operations at speeds 20 mph or below. Accordingly, FRA does not intend to amend the Tier II occupant protection and crashworthiness requirements simply because PTC is installed on the equipment. FRA did not receive any comments objecting to the revision to this section as described in the NPRM. 81 FR 88006, 88020. As this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the complete analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here. set of alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger equipment as delineated in appendix G to this part. FRA considers this set of requirements to provide an equivalent level of safety to its counterpart set of Tier I requirements in subpart C of this part. As explained in greater detail in the discussion of appendix G below, the rule clarifies which specific Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirement should be applied as an alternative set of Tier I counterpart requirements. Specifically, FRA makes clear that if alternative Tier I compliance is sought under appendix G, then all the requirements in appendix G must be met so the integrity of the alternative requirements is maintained. Subpart F—Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment Section 238.701 Scope This section sets out the scope of new subpart H. Subpart H contains specific requirements for railroad passenger equipment operating in a shared rightof-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph, and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. FRA did not receive any comments on the exclusion of grade crossings or the 125-mph speed limit when grade crossings are present within the right-of-way, or on whether FRA should explicitly apply the 125-mph speed limit only to track located at or near each grade crossing within an exclusive right-of-way. As stated in the NPRM, FRA believes that in most cases new, exclusive rights-of-way designed for Tier III operations will be constructed without highway grade crossings, see 81 FR 88006, 88021. However, in the situation where exclusive rights-of-way include highway grade crossings, but may have long stretches of track without a grade crossing, FRA would expect appropriate operational safeguards to be in place to prevent trainsets from traversing highway grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph. In fact, FRA would expect those operations that include grade crossings in their exclusive rightsof-way to also comply with the requirements of § 213.347 of this chapter. Section 213.347(a) of this chapter prohibits any grade crossings on Class 8 or 9 track. Whereas Class 8 track is track with an operational speed range from above 125 mph not exceeding 160 mph, Class 9 track is track with an operational speed range from above 160 mph not exceeding 220 mph. Further, § 213.347(b) of this chapter requires a track owner of Class 7 track (track with Section 238.501 Scope FRA is revising this section to increase the maximum allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA did not receive any comments on the proposed revision to this section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88021, and FRA is adopting it as proposed. Please see the discussion of § 238.401 for further information on this speed change. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Subpart H—Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment This subpart contains specific requirements for Tier III passenger equipment. Many of the requirements under this subpart consider Tier III passenger equipment in terms of an integrated trainset, as that term is now defined under § 238.702, particularly for purposes of crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. This rule presumes that Tier III trainsets will consist of semi-permanently coupled, articulated, or otherwise ‘‘fixed’’ configurations, that are not intended to operate normally as individual vehicles, or in mixed consists (with equipment of another design or operational tier). The requirements in this subpart are organized into subject areas based on their general applicability: Trainset structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, emergency systems, and cab equipment. FRA intends that the requirements be applied in a manner that is performance-based and technologyneutral, where possible. FRA notes that it intends for certain sections of this subpart to be applied as an integrated VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 an operational speed range from above 110 mph not exceeding 125 mph) to submit for FRA’s approval a complete description of the proposed warning/ barrier system to address the protection of highway traffic and high-speed trains if the track will include highway grade crossings. Section 213.347(b) of this chapter prohibits operations on Class 7 track unless such an FRA-approved warning barrier system is in place and functioning as intended. Separately, FRA received comments on its proposal to allow passenger seating in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset provided safety issues associated with passengers occupying the leading unit are addressed and mitigated through a comprehensive Tier III Safe Operation Plan. (See the discussion of proposed subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above.) APTA stated that addressing safety concerns in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is unnecessary because those safety concerns are already addressed through other regulatory means. APTA maintained that when Tier III equipment is operating at speeds not exceeding 125 mph, the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements provide an equivalent level of safety to that of Tier I equipment and sufficient protection is already afforded passengers occupying leading units of Tier III trainsets. Additionally, APTA suggested that when operating above 125 mph, the right-of-way barrier plan required under § 213.361 of this chapter and the HSR– 125 plan required under § 236.1007 of this chapter address any additional safety concerns for passengers occupying the leading units of Tier III trainsets, as these two sections guard against unauthorized intrusions into the right-of-way. Accordingly, APTA believed that conducting an additional, comprehensive analysis for the Tier III Safe Operation Plan would be redundant. Alstom’s comment on this section mirrored APTA’s comment in substance. Alstom also suggested that the safety considerations that FRA initially sought to address in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan are adequately addressed just as APTA outlined in its comment. As explained under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, this section does not refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. This final rule does not require railroads to complete a comprehensive safety analysis specifically addressing and mitigating all safety conditions E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 associated with passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset. Instead, FRA’s regulations continue to require, before passengers can occupy the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, that railroads seeking to do so namely have an approved right-of-way plan that complies with the requirements of § 213.361 of this chapter, have an approved PTC Safety Plan that complies with § 236.1007(c) of this chapter, and, as appropriate, comply with § 213.347 of this chapter. These requirements should not place any additional regulatory burden on a Tier III operation as these are all existing regulatory requirements. However, FRA does make clear that prior to any train operation in which passengers other than assigned crew members (i.e., engineers and conductors) occupy the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, the above requirements must be met, regardless of whether operating in revenue service (i.e., whether or not the passengers have paid a fare to ride). Additionally, if a railroad does identify safety concerns involving passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, FRA expects the railroad to properly and adequately address the concerns. Similarly, FRA reserves the right to ensure that the railroad properly and adequately addresses safety concerns involving passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, if FRA’s inspection of a Tier III railroad operation identifies such safety concerns. Finally, as noted earlier, APTA suggested that FRA create a new section, § 238.110, to address compliance review and approval with the requirements of this subpart H. See FRA’s discussion of this suggestion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above. Section 238.702 Definitions FRA has added this new section to contain definitions applying specifically to subpart H of this part. This section defines the terms ‘‘cab,’’ which was proposed in the NPRM under § 238.5, and ‘‘integrated trainset,’’ which is a new term not expressly proposed in the NPRM. FRA determined it will be clearer and more useful to place definitions that are tailored to the application of subpart H in this section, rather than in this part’s general definitions section, § 238.5. In its comments on the proposed definition of ‘‘cab,’’ APTA recommended FRA remove the proposed statement that the term ‘‘cab’’ includes a locomotive cab for the purposes of subpart H. According to APTA, the Tier III trainsets subpart H addresses do not have locomotive cabs. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 APTA also commented that any analysis for a Tier I alternatively compliant trainset as governed by appendix G cannot include an analysis of the cab of a conventional locomotive because the collision model used for that analysis is insufficient. APTA suggested instead to revise the proposed definition of ‘‘cab’’ to mean ‘‘for the purposes of subpart H of this part, a compartment or space in a trainset designed to be occupied by the engineer and contain an operating console from which the engineer exercises control over the trainset.’’ When discussed at the May 2017 ETF meeting, APTA expanded on its comment saying that if the definition were to remain as proposed, there would need to be a way to differentiate between when the term ‘‘cab’’ applies to a Tier III trainset versus a conventional locomotive cab. APTA stated this is crucial when applying the dynamic collision scenario under § 238.705 because (as discussed more comprehensively below) a Tier III trainset cannot be led by a conventional North American locomotive in its intended service. FRA recognizes APTA’s underlying concern with the proposed definition of ‘‘cab.’’ FRA has therefore defined the term in this section of the final rule to better clarify how the term is applied to Tier III equipment, and by extension of appendix G to this part, Tier I alternative equipment. Accordingly, the term ‘‘cab’’ means a compartment or space within a trainset that is designed to be occupied by an engineer and contain an operating console for exercising control over the trainset. As the definition is contained in this new section, which applies specifically to subpart H, there is no need to add language to the definition expressly limiting its application. In addition, as fully discussed below, FRA has included the term ‘‘integrated trainset’’ in § 238.705 and is defining that term in this § 238.702. FRA believes that any confusion over which initial velocity applies to a given trainset undergoing evaluation in the dynamic collision scenario in § 238.705 is reconciled with the new term ‘‘integrated trainset.’’ The term ‘‘integrated trainset’’ is defined as a passenger trainset in which all units of the trainset are designed to operate as an integrated consist to achieve its structural crashworthiness performance. FRA intends the term ‘‘integrated trainset’’ to mean that each individual vehicle comprising the trainset is interdependent structurally with each other, specifically with respect to the collision load path and how the PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59195 collision loads are designed to be resolved. Trainset Structure Section 238.703 Quasi-Static Compression Load Requirements This section contains the quasi-static compression load requirements for Tier III equipment. This section also requires compliance with § 238.705 to demonstrate sufficient occupied volume integrity (OVI). The purpose of applying both requirements is to ensure the integrity of the occupied volume during a collision or other accident. Integrity of the occupied volume is a fundamental requirement of crashworthiness—the primary goal of which is preservation of space to protect occupants during an accident. Additionally, a strong occupied volume serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness features such as CEM components. And although the language of this section references only Tier III trainsets, the requirements of this section may also be applied to Tier I trainsets through the application of appendix G, in the alternative to the requirements of 49 CFR 238.203, Static end strength. Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate level of crashworthiness by complying with the quasi-static compression load requirements proposed in § 238.703(b). FRA received one comment on this section. The commenter, Alstom, stated that the methodology necessary to properly apply the collision load along the collision load path was not included in the proposal, and suggested FRA supply that methodology in some form of compliance manual or document. FRA does agree with Alstom that providing guidance on how to properly apply the requirements of this section would be beneficial to the regulated community. However, to remain technology neutral, FRA did not propose a specific methodology in the rule text. FRA understands there may be different methodologies that are equivalent, and thus putting one in the regulation over another could unintentionally limit the technology employed. FRA intends to address this issue in developing a guidance document, as discussed above. FRA did not receive any other comments on the requirements in this section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88021–88023, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Because this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the complete analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59196 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations Section 238.705 Dynamic Collision Scenario As discussed in the NPRM, this section contains the dynamic collision scenario analysis requirements as the second part of the OVI evaluation of a Tier III passenger trainset, in conjunction with § 238.703. Because PTC technology does not protect against all possible collision scenarios, such as collisions with trespassing highway equipment at grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or passenger equipment) during manual operations at 20 mph or below, compliance with this requirement is necessary to preserve the occupied volume, to protect all occupants on the trainset. As mentioned in the discussion of § 238.703, each vehicle in the trainset needs to demonstrate it meets both the OVI requirements in paragraph (b) of that section and the dynamic collision scenario requirements in paragraph (b) of this section. Further, as provided in § 238.703, and as outlined in appendix G, a Tier I passenger trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may comply with this section instead of the requirements applicable to Tier I passenger trainsets in § 238.203. In combination with the quasi-static compression load requirements in § 238.703, the purpose of this dynamic collision scenario requirement is to ensure that survivable space for the passengers and crew is preserved in up to moderately severe accident conditions (i.e., conditions comparable to a head-on collision at speeds of 20 to 25 mph, depending on the type of equipment, into a stationary train). This requirement also provides a baseline level of protection for scenarios that may be more severe, but less predictable with respect to loading conditions and historical accident data. Although the dynamic collision scenario is conducted at the trainset level, the requirements described in this section are evaluated at the level of the trainset’s individual vehicles so no vehicle in the trainset may exceed the parameters outlined in paragraph (b) as a result of the dynamic collision scenario. Paragraph (a) outlines the required conditions under which a dynamic collision scenario is performed. Generally, the collision scenario requires a dynamic impact to be simulated between an initially-moving trainset and an initially-standing train. The initially-moving trainset is the trainset undergoing evaluation, either Tier III equipment or, as provided in appendix G, Tier I equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards. The initially-standing train is VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 a locomotive-led consist of five conventionally-designed passenger cars. The conventionally-designed passenger cars have a prescribed weight and forceversus-displacement characteristic.15 The pass/fail criteria for the scenario determine whether there is sufficient preservation of occupied volume for passengers and crew in the trainset undergoing evaluation. FRA expects the collision scenario simulation to be executed for an impact duration sufficient to capture the most severe portion of the collision event. The actual amount of impact time required to simulate the collision sufficiently will vary based upon the characteristics of the trainset undergoing evaluation. Typically, the collision scenario will be executed until all the equipment, including the initially-standing train and initiallymoving trainset, is moving in the same direction at approximately the same velocity. If all the equipment is moving together at approximately the same speed, no further vehicle-to-vehicle impacts will occur, and the simulation will then have been executed for a sufficient duration to capture the most severe decelerations. There are various types of analyses that may be used to evaluate the collision scenario requirements. These analyses include fully-detailed FE models, lumped-parameter analyses, or a hybrid approach where a combination of detailed FE modeling and lumpedparameter techniques are used within the same simulation. An FEA of the scenario is generally a highly-detailed simulation of the actual trainset geometry. The parts making up the trainset are meshed into a large number of elements, with each element having its own mass, stiffness, and connection properties to the adjacent elements. A lumped parameter analysis represents each car or section of a car within a trainset using a small number of masses and a small number of non-linear springs. At its extreme, each vehicle consists of a single mass and a single spring characteristic. A hybrid approach may utilize an FE mesh to represent some structures (e.g., CEM structures that undergo large deformations) and lumped-parameter representations of other structures (e.g., vehicles far from the impacting interface that experience little deformation). Any of the three types of analyses is capable of developing the information needed to verify a trainset’s ability to meet the 15 Appropriate weights and force-versusdisplacement characteristics for the conventionallydesigned passenger cars can be found in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 requirements of the collision scenario. Additionally, because the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train are aligned with one another during this scenario, a halfsymmetric model may be used to represent the colliding vehicles, as appropriate. FRA received comments from APTA recommending revisions to several paragraphs of this section in the NPRM. In its comments on the NPRM, APTA recommended that FRA replace the references made to ‘‘train’’ in paragraphs (a)(1)–(3), (6), and (8), and replace them with the term ‘‘trainset,’’ to clarify the application of the collision scenario under paragraph (a) of this section. APTA proposed that the term trainset be defined to mean a passenger train where all units within the trainset are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a single consist. As stated under the discussion of § 238.5, FRA has not adopted APTA’s proposal definition of ‘‘trainset.’’ However, FRA does agree that reference to a trainset is more appropriate than to a ‘‘train’’ in this section. Accordingly, the abovereferenced paragraphs of paragraph (a) use the term ‘‘trainset,’’ instead of ‘‘train,’’ and FRA intends the term ‘‘trainset’’ to mean either a Tier I alternative or Tier III trainset, as those terms are defined in § 238.5. However, with reference to the initially-standing train, as FRA envisions it being reflective of a conventional Tier I passenger train, FRA is using the term ‘‘train’’ for clarity. Although not specifically requested by APTA, paragraphs (a)(4) and (9) use the term ‘‘trainset’’ in conformance with these changes. In commenting on the NPRM, APTA recommended that paragraph (a)(3) be placed in appendix G to part 238, consistent with its other comments that requirements for conventional locomotive led equipment are not appropriate in subpart H because Tier III equipment will not utilize conventional locomotive power. APTA also suggested that the text adopt APTA’s proposed definition of ‘‘trainset’’ instead of ‘‘train,’’ as proposed. Paragraph (a)(3) of this section, as proposed in the NPRM, stated that if the trainset is intended for use in push-pull service, then both the locomotive-led and cab-car-led configurations would require separate evaluation. This proposal was intended to ensure sufficient OVI for all occupied spaces in the trainset regardless of whether led by a cab car or a conventional locomotive. FRA’s discussion of the use of the term ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ in paragraph (a)(6) of this section applies E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations here, in response to APTA’s concern, as discussed below. In the final rule, this paragraph (a)(3) omits specific references to ‘‘locomotive’’ or ‘‘cab car’’ and requires that if the initially-moving trainset is intended for use in push-pull service, then, as applicable, each configuration of leading vehicle shall be evaluated separately. By requiring that each lead vehicle be evaluated separately, FRA intends to capture situations where the lead vehicles of a push-pull operation could be two different styles of vehicle that could potentially have different designs and structural characteristics, and thus have different crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities. This paragraph eliminates any reference to a specific technology and only requires separate evaluation if the lead vehicles are different. FRA recognizes that some push-pull operations do not necessarily require a locomotive-like vehicle on one end with a cab car-like vehicle on the other. But when the two vehicles are different, in design or structural makeup, then the crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities of each vehicle must be evaluated. In its comments on this section, Alstom also raised concern about how to implement the force-versus-crush requirements in proposed paragraph (a)(4)(ii) and Table 1 to this section. Proposed paragraph (a)(4)(ii) stated that the rigid locomotive and each passenger coach in the initially-standing train crush in response to applied force as specified in Table 1, which in turn provided the non-linear, force-versuscrush relationships for the passenger cars and locomotive comprising the initially-standing train. In particular, Alstom found it unclear whether the paragraph made it necessary to combine characteristics at ‘‘inter-trailers,’’ and, if so, how to do so. Alstom therefore suggested that the force-crush characteristics to be used at each interface between vehicles be included in this paragraph instead of Table 1. FRA makes clear that the force-crush characteristics described in Table 1 are intended for use as inputs to a lumpedparameter simulation model of a trainto-train collision. The data in Table 1 describe the resulting force when the equipment moves into a rigid fixed barrier. In the initial position, when the crush is 0 inches, the passenger coach is just touching the barrier and the force is also 0 lbf. The length of the coach is reduced as the coach moves towards the barrier and crushes. When the coach has crushed by 3 inches, the force has increased linearly to 80,000 lbf. When the coach has crushed by 6 inches, the force again increases linearly to 250,000 VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 lbf, from 80,000 lbf. For the rigid locomotive, the force is 0 lbf when the crush is 0 inches and the rigid locomotive is just touching the barrier. After 2.5 inches of crush, the force increases linearly to 100,000 lbf. When the rigid locomotive has crushed by 5 inches, the force again increases linearly to 2,500,000 lbf, from 100,000 lbf. Depending on the details of the software used to implement the lumpedparameter model, the data in Table 1 may need to be re-formatted. Some software may allow the data to be input simply as it is presented in Table 1. Other software may require coach-tocoach force crush characteristics for input. For coach-to-coach crush, the crush distances simply double for the corresponding force. Accordingly, 6 inches of crush between coaches are required to reach 80,000 lbf, and 12 inches of crush are required to reach 2,500,000 lbf. For rigid locomotive-tocoach crush, some calculations are required. At 80,000 lbf between the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 2 inches, while the coach has crushed by 3 inches. The rigid locomotive-to-coach crush is then 5 inches when there is 80,000 lbf between the rigid locomotive and coach. At 100,000 lbf between the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 2.5 inches and the coach has crushed by 3.35 inches. The rigid locomotive-to-coach crush is 5.85 inches at 100,000 lbf. At 2,500,000 lbf between the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 5 inches and the coach has crushed by 6 inches. The rigid locomotive-to-coach crush is 11 inches at 2,500,000 lbf. Calculations may be necessary to determine the force-crush characteristic between the rigid locomotive described in Table 1 and the new equipment under evaluation. The details of such calculations will likely depend on the software modeling choices. One possibility, of many, is to calculate the force-crush response of the new equipment with a rigid fixed barrier, and use those results in combination with the rigid locomotive data in Table 1. The force-crush characteristic for the rigid locomotive to the new equipment may then be calculated in a manner similar to the force crush characteristic for the rigid locomotive to the coaches. Most notably, APTA recommended revising paragraph (a)(6), which specifically describes the initial velocities to be assigned to the initiallymoving trainset in the dynamic collision scenario. FRA makes clear that, although the collision scenario in paragraph (a)(6) references ‘‘initial PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59197 velocities’’ for the scenario, FRA expects that the actual velocity at the colliding interface be the same as the initial velocity, as generally models do not account for loss of velocity. However, if a model includes loss of velocity due to friction, or other velocity-reducing forces, FRA would expect the initial velocity to be increased so that the collision velocity remains either 20 mph or 25 mph, depending on the equipment undergoing evaluation. As proposed in the NPRM, if the initially-moving trainset were led by a cab car or an MU locomotive, its initial velocity would be 20 mph; if the initially-moving trainset were led by a conventional locomotive, its initial velocity would be 25 mph. These speeds were chosen based upon estimates of the upper limit of the ability of conventionally-designed Tier I equipment to maintain its occupied volume in a similar collision scenario. APTA commented that, although it is probable for a Tier I alternative trainset, it is not possible for a Tier III trainset to be led by a conventional North American locomotive. APTA stated that a Tier III trainset could never meet its performance capabilities with a conventional locomotive on the leading and trailing ends, because the end units must be low-profile, aerodynamic designs that are an integral part of the trainset design. APTA therefore suggested that the portion of the rule text involving an initially-moving consist led by a conventional locomotive be placed in appendix G to this part and not contained in this section. Alstom also provided comments on paragraph (a)(6) of this section. Specifically, Alstom sought clarification of the application of the 20-mph and 25mph initial velocities. Alstom did not believe having two initial velocities makes sense and suggested there should instead be only one initial velocity applicable to all equipment—an initial velocity for all Tier III trainsets. FRA carefully considered both APTA’s and Alstom’s comments on this paragraph. FRA recognizes the importance of ensuring that the intent of the section’s application is clearly understood so that equipment designed to the Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements, or the Tier I alternative requirements, properly preserves the occupied volume in the event of a collision. As discussed above, the collision scenario speeds were chosen based upon estimates of the upper limit of the ability of conventionally-designed Tier I equipment to maintain its occupied volume in a similar collision scenario. FRA did not intend inclusion of two E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59198 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations collision scenario speeds to create ambiguity but rather to clarify and refine the application of this paragraph depending on the type of equipment used. Nonetheless, FRA recognizes that use of the term ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ for purposes of applying the dynamic collision scenario requirements could cause confusion. FRA did not intend for the reference to a ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ to necessarily mean a conventional North American locomotive. Instead, FRA intended the reference to refer more generally to the use of a rigid locomotive, especially a surrogate model of a rigid locomotive when the leading unit is unknown. This is why FRA included in the proposed rule text a rigid locomotive model, as described and depicted in appendix H to this part, Rigid locomotive design computer model input data and geometrical depiction. Accordingly, FRA has holistically revised this section from that proposed in the NPRM to remove the term ‘‘conventional locomotive’’ and replace it with the term ‘‘rigid locomotive,’’ referencing the rigid locomotive model in appendix H. FRA notes that it also considered drafting the regulatory text so that the 20-mph initial velocity would apply to a trainset led by a vehicle designed to be occupied by passengers, and the 25mph initial velocity would apply to a trainset led by equipment not designed to be occupied by passengers. When this issue was discussed at the May 2017 ETF meeting, the ETF members rejected this approach. Simply referencing a locomotive not designed to be occupied by passengers instead of a conventional locomotive did not fully resolve the issue, because of concern that a Tier III trainset may not be powered by a standalone power unit but rather through an integrated system in which powered axles are distributed throughout the trainset. Additionally, a question arose whether a control cab in the lead unit of such an integrated and powered trainset design made that lead unit an MU, further clouding which initial velocity would apply. Moreover, to the extent passengers do not occupy the lead unit in such a trainset, there would be a large mass in front of passengeroccupied units that allows for more absorption of energy not being transferred to the passenger-occupied units, and the ETF raised concern that the lead unit in such a trainset not be subjected to more stringent requirements. In discussing how best to clarify the application of the requirements of this paragraph, ETF industry representatives mentioned that the requirements, when VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 developed for the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, were intended to apply to integrated trainsets, not trainsets led by conventional North American locomotives. Consistent with the comments APTA and Alstom submitted, ETF industry representatives suggested applying the 20-mph initial velocity to Tier III trainsets in this section, and applying the 25-mph initial velocity to Tier I alternative trainsets in appendix G to this part. ETF labor representatives noted the original consensus product of the ETF and cautioned against re-drafting consensus language. After a healthy discussion and to remain technology neutral, FRA proposed to the ETF the concept of using the term ‘‘integrated trainset’’ for determining which initial velocity applies. If the design of the trainset was integrated from a structural and crashworthiness perspective, with all vehicles inclusive of the leading unit designed to work together in a collision scenario, then the 20-mph initial velocity would apply. For all other configurations not considered ‘‘integrated,’’ regardless of the equipment’s tier and what type of unit leads the trainset, the 25-mph initial velocity would apply. Such an approach would take into account instances when the lead unit of a Tier III trainset and its passenger coaches would be manufactured by different companies. Further, because properly testing the crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities of the passenger coaches must involve some known characteristics of the vehicle leading the trainset, this section would consider such a trainset a non-integrated trainset led by a surrogate for the lead unit, and reflect that the collision load paths of the lead unit and the coach cars are not structurally interdependent. Accordingly, in the final rule, FRA has not adopted the proposed references to cab cars, or MU or conventional locomotives. Rather, paragraph (a)(6) of this section requires the initiallymoving trainset to have an initial velocity of 20 mph if it is an integrated trainset, as that term is now defined under § 238.702, or an initial velocity of 25 mph when the lead vehicle is not part of the integrated design. By using the term ‘‘integrated trainset,’’ FRA intends to remain technology-neutral and not restrict the type of equipment that could potentially lead a Tier III trainset. As long as the entire trainset is designed and built as an integrated trainset, the 20-mph initial velocity applies. FRA also received comments from APTA concerning paragraph (b) of this section, which contains the PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements the individual vehicles in the initiallymoving trainset involved in the dynamic collision scenario must meet as described in paragraph (a). Specifically, FRA proposed in paragraph (b)(2) that if the option to use GM/RT2100 is exercised to demonstrate compliance with any of the requirements in §§ 238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of each vehicle during the dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g in any 100-millisecond (ms) time period. FRA explained that a plot of the 100-ms average longitudinal deceleration versus time, in which the curve never exceeds 5g, would suffice to demonstrate compliance with paragraph (b)(2). APTA, in its comment, noted that proposed paragraph differed slightly from the consensus agreement. However, APTA expressed its agreement with the proposal if FRA intends the rule to allow the use of a moving window of a 5g average deceleration within 100 ms. FRA makes clear that the differences between the consensus rule text and the proposed rule text were merely editorial in nature and in no way changed the substantive intent that the average longitudinal deceleration of the CG of each vehicle of the initially-moving trainset during the dynamic collision scenario not exceed 5g in any 100-ms time period. Additionally, FRA disagrees with APTA’s characterization of the intent of this section. The average deceleration in any 100-ms period was never intended to be comprised of the most favorable data points during the time period, e.g., selecting only those decelerations that are at or below 5g, to demonstrate compliance. It has always been FRA’s intent that a representative data set be used to calculate the average deceleration. However, because FRA recognizes the possibility that this intent may be overlooked, or otherwise not followed, FRA is including text in paragraph (b)(2) specifying that the maximum interval between the data points averaged in the 100-ms time period shall be no greater than 1 ms. This means that each deceleration experienced during each millisecond of the 100-ms period must now be used to calculate the average deceleration under paragraph (b)(2) of this section. FRA believes this provision will help assure that the average taken during the 100-ms time period is based on a sufficient data set, so that there is a high degree of confidence and accuracy supporting the calculated average deceleration. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 FRA has otherwise adopted this section as proposed in the NPRM, and the complete analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here. Section 238.707 Override Protection This section contains the requirements for analyzing the ability of a Tier III passenger trainset to resist vertical climbing or override at its collision interface locations during a dynamic collision scenario. This section examines the vertical displacement behavior of colliding equipment under an ideal impact scenario where an initially-moving Tier III trainset and an initially-standing train are aligned. This section also prescribes an impact scenario where the interface of the colliding equipment is translated both laterally and vertically by 3 inches to ensure that override is resisted during an impact when the two trains are not perfectly aligned. Evaluating the colliding equipment’s ability to resist override in an offset impact condition helps to demonstrate that the override features are robust. As proposed, Tier III passenger trainsets must comply with both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. FRA received comments from Alstom on this section on proposed paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(ii). Alstom stated that the direction of the vertical perturbation required in each paragraph was not defined (i.e., whether the perturbation is upwards or downwards). Alstom recommended that the rule specify which direction the initiallymoving trainset is to be perturbed, to remove any confusion on how the dynamic collision scenario under § 238.705(a) is applied to properly evaluate the equipment’s resistance to override. FRA agrees with Alstom’s comment, and for the reasons discussed below, paragraph (a)(1) in the final rule contains three sets of initial conditions for analyzing the ability of the evaluated trainset to resist vertical climbing or override during a dynamic collision scenario. Paragraph (a)(1) also states these conditions must be applied using the dynamic collision scenario in § 238.705(a). The criteria for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of initial conditions are provided in paragraph (a)(2), and remain unchanged from the NPRM. Because the same model may be used both to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of § 238.705 and the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the model must be validated with test data in such a way as to provide confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses. In this regard, VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 if the components that experience large deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in § 238.705 also experience large deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then the same test results may be used to validate the model. If the performance of the components that undergo large deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section is not validated with test data as part of the validation of the model used in § 238.705, then additional validation testing must be performed to validate the model being used to demonstrate performance under paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used in the collision simulation to demonstrate anti-climbing performance, and remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph still provides that all vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running heights with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and initiallystanding train aligned. Because the centerlines of the colliding vehicles are aligned with one another, a longitudinally half-symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as appropriate. FRA intends for this initial condition to represent an ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned with one another. As proposed, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) described the second condition to be used in the collision simulation as a 3inch lateral and 3-inch vertical offset of the interface of the colliding equipment, without defining the direction of the perturbance. It is here where Alstom’s comment was focused. FRA notes that implicit in the proposed regulatory text for this paragraph was an assumption that, to demonstrate compliance with this section, a railroad or manufacturer would choose the more unfavorable arrangement (upwards or downwards perturbance) with respect to override (the arrangement most likely to lead to override) to be evaluated. However, FRA recognizes that this assumption was not made clear. Therefore, in the final rule, FRA has provided more detail in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) and included new paragraph (a)(1)(iii). Although FRA is being more prescriptive with respect to the requirements of this section to remove ambiguity on its application, FRA still expects that when a scenario arises where there are multiple arrangements that can be evaluated, the most severe scenario (the scenario most likely to lead to override) will be PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59199 evaluated and the results used to determine whether compliance with the requirements of this section has been achieved. Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) specifies that the initially-moving trainset must be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches vertically upwards relative to the initiallystanding train. Further, paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires that the initiallymoving trainset must be perturbed 3inches laterally and 3-inches vertically downwards relative to the initiallystanding train. The lateral and vertical offsets still must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will demonstrate that the anticlimb features are of a robust design, capable of preventing climbing when the colliding vehicles are not perfectly aligned. Because these simulations require a lateral offset between the initially-standing train and initiallymoving trainset, a symmetric boundary condition may not be employed (i.e., the full width of each consist must be modeled). Paragraph (a)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of the term ‘‘trainset,’’ instead of ‘‘train,’’ to remain consistent with use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph explains the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to demonstrate a trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features for its colliding interface. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)–(iii) for demonstrating appropriate resistance to override between colliding equipment. Paragraph (b) contains the evaluation methodology for demonstrating the appropriate level of override protection for connected equipment in a Tier III trainset. This paragraph requires examination of the vertical displacement behavior of coupled equipment under an ideal impact scenario where the vehicles within the initially-moving trainset are aligned. It also prescribes an impact scenario where the first coupled interface of the initially-moving trainset is translated both laterally and vertically by 2 inches. Evaluating the connected equipment’s ability to resist override in an offset impact condition is necessary to demonstrate the override features are robust and can resist override during an impact where the coupled vehicles are not perfectly aligned. Paragraph (b)(1) explains the conditions for analyzing the ability of connected equipment to resist vertical climbing or override at the coupled interfaces during a dynamic collision E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59200 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations scenario, using the scenario described in § 238.705(a). Like paragraph (a) of this section, each set of conditions in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)–(iii) must be evaluated independently. Criteria for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of conditions are in paragraph (b)(2). As noted in the discussion of paragraph (a), because the same model may be used to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of § 238.705 and the requirements of this section, the model must be validated with test data in a way that provides confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses. The discussion of model validation in paragraph (a) applies equally to model validation for purposes of paragraph (b). Paragraph (b)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used for collision simulation to demonstrate override protection for connected equipment, and remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph provides that all vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running heights, with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the colliding vehicles will be aligned with one another, a longitudinally halfsymmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as appropriate. This initial condition is meant to represent an ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned with one another. As proposed, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) described the second condition to be used in the collision simulation as a 2inch lateral and 2-inch vertical offset of the first connected interface between vehicles in the initially-moving train. As discussed above, Alstom raised concern that the proposed paragraph did not define the direction of the vertical offset. Accordingly, FRA is employing the same approach here as under paragraph (a)(1)(ii) to clarify the direction of the vertical offset and is also including a new paragraph (b)(1)(iii). In the final rule, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) specifies that the first connected vehicle behind the lead unit of the initiallymoving trainset must be perturbed 2inches laterally and 2-inches vertically upwards, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface. Further, paragraph (b)(1)(iii) requires that the first connected vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset must be perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically downwards, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 The lateral and vertical offsets must still be applied simultaneously in the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design, capable of preventing climbing when the vehicles in the initially-moving trainset are not perfectly aligned. Because these simulations require a lateral offset between the vehicles of the initiallymoving consist, a symmetric boundary condition may not be used (i.e., the full width of each consist must be modeled). Paragraph (b)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of the term ‘‘trainset,’’ instead of ‘‘train,’’ to remain consistent with use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph sets out the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to demonstrate a Tier III trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features to protect the vehicles connected in the trainset from overriding each other. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)–(iii) to demonstrate appropriate resistance to override between connected equipment. Under appendix G to this part, a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate an appropriate level of override protection by complying with the requirements of this section instead of the requirements applicable to Tier I passenger train in § 238.205, Anticlimbing mechanism, and § 238.207, Link between coupling mechanism and car body, as proposed. In general, the requirements in this section were developed as an alternative to demonstrating anti-climbing capabilities in § 238.205 and the capability of the link between the coupling mechanism and carbody to resist the loads in current § 238.207. While compliance with both §§ 238.205 and 238.207 requires meeting a set of quasi-static, vertical load cases, the requirements in this section were developed as a dynamic performance standard. Section 238.709 Fluid Entry Inhibition This section contains the requirements for fluid entry inhibition for the skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset. FRA received one comment on this section from APTA which agreed with the language of this section, noting that compliance with this section can be demonstrated during a design review of the equipment. As this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88026, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Section 238.711 End Structure Integrity of Cab End This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of cab ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a minimum level of protection for the engineer and other cab occupants, equivalent to the collision post and corner post requirements for Tier I equipment in subpart C. FRA did not receive any comments on these requirements and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88027. Section 238.713 End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of the non-cab ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a minimum level of protection for occupants equivalent to that required for Tier I equipment in subpart C. These requirements help ensure the integrity of the components that make up any non-cab end of a passenger trainset unit. FRA did not receive any comments on these requirements and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88027. Section 238.715 Roof and Side Structure Integrity To demonstrate sufficient roof and side structure integrity, Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) must comply with the requirements in § 238.215, ‘‘Rollover strength,’’ and § 238.217, ‘‘Side structure.’’ These Tier I requirements in §§ 238.215 and 238.217 are thereby broadly applicable to both new trainset classifications in this final rule. FRA did not receive any comments on this section and FRA is adopting it as proposed. Accordingly, as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88029. Section 238.717 Truck-to-Carbody Attachment This section contains requirements to demonstrate the integrity of truck-tocarbody attachments on a Tier III trainset (or a Tier I trainset designed to E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) during a dynamic impact. In commenting on the NPRM, Alstom recommended FRA clarify that the performance metric in paragraph (c) of this section is the ultimate strength of the truck materials. Paragraph (c) provides an alternative to demonstrating compliance with the quasi-static load requirements applied on the mass of the truck at its CG in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. Instead, paragraph (c) requires demonstrating the truck remains attached after a dynamic impact under the nominal conditions in the dynamic collision scenario described in § 238.705(a). Because paragraph (b)(3) limits demonstrating compliance to a truck and carbody meeting deceleration requirements specified in paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii), respectively, paragraph (c) may alternatively be used to demonstrate truck-to-carbody attachment when the requirements in paragraph (b)(3) are exceeded. To comply with paragraph (c), it must be demonstrated that the truck undergoing evaluation has remained attached to the carbody after the trainset has been subjected to a dynamic collision scenario as described in § 238.705(a). FRA recognizes that the collision scenario in § 238.705(a) results in deformation of the carbody structure, and allowance for such deformation is consistent with an evaluation of the truck-to-carbody attachment that is based on ultimate strength, as FRA intended for paragraph (c). Accordingly, in response to Alstom’s comment, FRA makes clear that the required performance metric in paragraph (c) is based on ultimate strength. As a separate comment, Alstom requested that FRA make clear this section ‘‘supersedes’’ the requirements contained in § 229.141(a)(5) of this chapter, which applies to MU locomotives built new after April 1, 1956, that are operated in trains having a total empty weight of 600,000 pounds or more. Section 229.141(a)(5) of this chapter provides that the strength of the means of locking the truck to the body shall be at least the equivalent of an ultimate shear value of 250,000 pounds. However, FRA notes that the required truck attachment strength in § 238.717 is intended to be equivalent to an ultimate shear value of 250,000 pounds. Consequently, the requirements of § 238.717 are harmonious with the requirements of § 229.141(a)(5) of this chapter. Nonetheless, in response to Alstom’s comment, FRA makes clear that the requirements of § 229.141(a)(5) of this chapter are inapplicable to Tier VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 III and Tier I alternative trainsets subject to § 238.717. FRA did not receive any other comments on this section and FRA is adopting it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88029–88030. Glazing Section 238.721 Glazing This section contains the requirements for exterior glazing (i.e., side- and end-facing exterior windows and windshields) to be installed on Tier III trainsets. APTA and TCRR both commented on this section as proposed in the NPRM. The comments focused on three discrete areas: Conduct of a comprehensive analysis, ballistic impact resistance requirements, and certification of the glazing material. Having considered the comments received, this section of the final rule reflects several changes from the NPRM, as explained below. Otherwise, FRA has adopted the requirements as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is not repeating the analysis in the NPRM supporting and explaining those provisions remaining the same, see 81 FR 88006, 88030–88032. Comprehensive Analysis Both APTA and TCRR recommended deleting as unnecessary the requirement in proposed paragraph (a) of this section to conduct a comprehensive analysis identifying and addressing glazing safety issues associated with operating in a Tier III environment as part of the railroad’s Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment. APTA stated that specific requirements for Tier III glazing were adequately defined in the other paragraphs of this section, and were based on the operating environment for Tier I passenger equipment and the protected ROW required by FRA regulations under 49 CFR parts 213 and 236 for the dedicated high-speed portions. APTA also commented that compliance with the other paragraphs of this section will permit Tier III trainsets to be interoperable on the national rail network. Similarly, TCRR believed that compliance with the performance requirements contained in the other paragraphs proposed in this section should be the only regulatory requirements necessary to demonstrate suitability for Tier III trainset glazing and will assure interoperability throughout the national rail network. TCRR added that even if proposed paragraph (a) was intended to ensure PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59201 that the ROW is adequately protected against potential hazards to the glazing there is no need to specify such a requirement here as other provisions of FRA’s regulations adequately cover the topic, citing FRA’s requirement for a ROW barrier plan, under 49 CFR 213.361, and the HSR–125 plan, under 49 CFR 236.1007. In the final rule, FRA has not adopted the requirement proposed in paragraph (a) for railroads to conduct a comprehensive analysis of their systems to identify and address glazing safety issues their systems present for Tier III operations. Moreover, as explained further in the discussion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, neither this section nor any section in the final rule text refers to analyses required under a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. However, this section does require railroads to properly support and document glazing safety determinations, notably for the ballistic-resistance properties of the glazing material and for use of alternative requirements in a non-cab, side-facing window intended to be a breakable emergency window exit, for which specific FRA approval is required. FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval, as discussed under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above. FRA will of course also work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly implemented. Separately, because FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (a), the paragraph ordering in this final rule begins with proposed paragraph (b), which is designated paragraph (a). Subsequent paragraphs proposed in the NPRM are designated accordingly in conformance, with the exception of the certification requirements in paragraph (e) in this final rule, discussed below. Ballistic Penetration Resistance Requirements In its comments on this section, APTA disagreed with FRA’s proposal under paragraph (b)(5) of the NPRM that ballistic penetration resistance be sufficient to protect cab occupants from the risks and hazards identified by the railroad as part of its Tier III Safe Operation Plan, at a minimum meeting the protection requirements in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter. Instead, APTA suggested the regulation should require compliance with the ballistic impact protection requirement in appendix A to part 223, specifically in paragraphs (b)(10)(i) or (11)(i) of that E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59202 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations appendix, as appropriate. APTA stated that due to the interoperability requirements for Tier III equipment, the ballistic impact requirements must be standardized rather than vary for each railroad. APTA also stated that FRA has previously indicated the current 22 caliber bullet requirement in appendix A to part 223 has proven effective, and therefore APTA recommended retaining the current requirement for Tier III equipment. Further, in line with its comments on proposed paragraph (a), and noting that the existing requirement has shown through a long history to be adequate for conventional equipment, APTA suggested that no reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is necessary. In addition, APTA expressed concern that changing the ballistic requirement has implications not just for Tier III equipment but for everything that is currently operating in North America and needs to be evaluated in another forum that involves all affected stakeholders. In its comments, TCRR agreed with APTA and stated it did not see the merits of requiring each railroad to perform a risk assessment to form the basis for any performance requirements for glazing as suggested in proposed § 238.721(b)(5). Instead, TCRR recommended that the regulation include specific ballistic impact requirements that are applicable to glazing on all Tier III trainsets, to assure compatibility and interoperability of Tier III trainsets over the general railroad network. Additionally, TCRR stated that the current 22 caliber bullet requirement should apply to both endfacing and side-face exterior glazing in the cab, as well as in non-cab areas, to assure that both the passengers and crew in a Tier III trainset are afforded the same protection. FRA notes that ballistic protection for cab glazing was discussed in detail during the RSAC glazing task group meetings, as stated in the NPRM. In particular, during those meetings, labor representatives asserted that ballistic protection from a larger diameter projectile, differing from the size required for Type I glazing by part 223, would enhance the overall safety of the cab occupants. Much discussion was focused on this point, but a review of the available information on the impact characteristics of reasonable ballistic scenarios (projectile size and terminal velocity), and a review of the statistics related to glazing failure due to ballistic impact, proved inconclusive. This is one area where the task group could not agree on a consensus approach. Therefore, the decision on ballistic VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 requirements for cab glazing was referred to FRA. At this time, FRA does not have sufficient evidence to suggest a particular risk or hazard exists facing all potential Tier III systems to warrant a change from current ballistic requirements in part 223. However, even without such a risk or hazard facing all Tier III systems in common, the circumstances of a specific Tier III operation may warrant additional consideration and protection for that operation. To be consistent with the approach to Tier III safety in this rule, railroad safety elements subject to elements present within a specific Tier III operation need to be addressed in a manner appropriate to that operation, reflecting the level of service, operating environment, operational conditions, etc. Accordingly, while the ballistic penetration resistance requirement in paragraphs (b)(10)(i) and (11)(i) of appendix A to part 223 remains the minimum requirement in this final rule—namely, protection from a 22 caliber long rifle lead bullet of 40 grains in weight impacting at a minimum velocity of 960 feet per second, this final rule allows for the use of a ballistic penetration resistance standard that provides greater protection. Nor would use of a more stringent standard necessarily affect equipment interoperability any more than in any situation where a particular operation uses a standard more stringent than the minimum standard specified in the regulation. Consequently, even though FRA has not adopted the reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan in proposed paragraph (b)(5), a Tier III operation is in no way restricted from protecting against only a 22 caliber long-rifle bullet if circumstances known to the railroad warrant additional protection—whether for end-facing glazing in paragraph (a)(5) of this final rule or for side-face glazing in paragraph (b)(2) of this final rule (proposed paragraph (c)(2)). FRA has continued to examine the appropriateness of the ballistic impact requirement with the ETF, but no consensus within the ETF was reached on this topic. FRA has also engaged in additional research. At the behest of ETF industry members, FRA has subjected representative samples of forward- and side-facing glazing to 22 caliber long rifle and 9 mm ballistic impact tests. The use of a 9 mm bullet for ballistic impact testing reflects the alternative ballistic penetration resistance requirement in 49 CFR 238.421(c)(3)(i) for Tier II equipment ordered prior to May 12, 1999, which FRA believes provides an equivalent level of ballistic protection. However, PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 the results of the testing were not sufficient to confirm whether use of the different caliber bullets results in a different level of test severity or whether the tests are indeed equivalent. Glazing Certification Commenters APTA and TCRR also raised concern over the NPRM’s approach to the certification of glazing material in proposed § 238.721(b)(6). As a threshold matter, APTA requested that the rule make clear the glazing manufacturer is responsible for certification of each type of glazing material supplied. APTA then stated that the rule, in turn, require testing to be done either by an independent laboratory or the manufacturer with allowance for FRA to witness the testing. Similarly, TCRR believed that the proposal would create unnecessary confusion regarding glazing certification and instead recommended FRA continue with the current approach to glazing certification in part 223. TCRR stated that the current requirements under appendix A to part 223 have worked very well and provide the railroads and carbuilders assurance that all glazing materials they receive are produced from a lot that has been properly tested. TCRR cautioned that before taking a new approach to glazing certification, discussions are needed involving the glazing manufacturers and possible testing agencies to better understand both how any proposed changes would be addressed and the practical realities and consequences of the proposed changes. FRA recognizes that the proposed regulatory language created confusion regarding who is ultimately responsible for certifying that the glazing material is compliant with FRA’s requirements. As such, the final rule text makes clear that the glazing manufacturer is ultimately responsible for this certification. In the NPRM, FRA had intended to convey that the glazing manufacturer can certify the glazing material based on tests performed by an independent third party (e.g., a laboratory, facility, or underwriter), or tests performed by the glazing manufacturer itself. FRA did not intend to imply that another party was ultimately responsible for certifying the glazing materials. Further, for clarity, the glazing certification requirements are contained in their own paragraph (paragraph (e)) in this section of the final rule, rather than combined with other glazing requirements. These glazing certification requirements apply to all glazing material used on Tier III trainsets. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations Demonstrating Alternative Safety for Breakable, Emergency Window Exits Finally, consistent with APTA’s comments concerning the NPRM’s proposal for a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, APTA commented that proposed paragraph (d)(2)’s alternative requirements for non-cab, side-facing exterior window glazing should not reference a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. APTA stated that during the design review process information would be available that is necessary to demonstrate an equivalent level of glazing safety for a side-facing exterior window intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency window exit, and that its proposal for a new § 238.110 would specifically reference this design review requirement to be included in the pre-revenue qualification plan. As discussed above, this § 238.721 does require railroads to properly support and document glazing safety determinations. Specifically, paragraph (c)(2) of this section requires such support and documentation for use of alternative glazing requirements in a non-cab, side-facing exterior window intended to be a breakable emergency window exit. FRA approval is also required. Nonetheless, as noted above and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly implemented. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Brake System Section 238.731 Brake System This section introduces brake system requirements for Tier III passenger trainsets. As articulated in the NPRM, development of these requirements was identified as one of the goals for this first Tier III rulemaking to facilitate planned equipment acquisitions. These requirements represent a balance between maintaining compatibility with existing Tier I equipment and the adoption of service-proven techniques to protect against potential risks encountered with high-speed operations. A concerted effort was made to develop technology-neutral requirements, and the NPRM identified various requirements to be determined by a railroad and included in the railroad’s Tier III Safe Operation Plan or ITM Plan. In response to the comments received, FRA is making changes to this section from the NPRM’s proposal, as explained VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 below. Additionally, FRA is making a minor editorial change to reference an ITM ‘‘program’’ rather than ITM ‘‘plan.’’ Otherwise, FRA has adopted the requirements as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is not repeating the analysis in the NPRM supporting and explaining those provisions remaining the same, see 81 FR 88006, 88032–88034. In its comment on this section, APTA recommended that the determinations identified in the NPRM to be included in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan be left to the railroad to address at various stages of equipment design reviews. APTA offered in support of this position that certain determinations to be included in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan are already required under other FRA regulations. As discussed earlier, the requirements of this final rule do not reference a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, and this section contains no such references as proposed in the NPRM. However, this section does provide for FRA approval of various determinations made by the railroad, consistent with FRA’s closer oversight of high-speed train operations. Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires the railroad to define the worst-case adhesion conditions under which each Tier III trainset’s brake system must stop the passenger trainset from its maximum operating speed within the prevailing signal spacing, as approved by FRA. The paragraph is intended to ensure that the railroad formally establish the worst case-adhesion conditions for use in procuring individual trainsets. Similarly, paragraph (c)(2) requires the railroad to specify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a crewmember can initiate an irretrievable emergency brake application, as approved by FRA. FRA approval of railroad determinations is required in several provisions under paragraph (d). Paragraph (d)(1) requires the railroad to identify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a mechanism to initiate the passenger brake alarm is installed. Paragraph (d)(4) requires the railroad to define the timeframe in which engineers must acknowledge a passenger brake alarm after the trainsets have safely cleared the boarding platform, for the engineer to retain full control of the trainset, and to define the method used to confirm that the trainsets did in fact safely clear the boarding platform. In addition, paragraph (d)(6) requires the railroad to specify the procedures for engineers to retrieve full service brake application if the timeframe to acknowledge a passenger brake alarm has passed and a brake application has been automatically initiated. PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59203 FRA approval of railroad determinations is also required under paragraph (e), which addresses how trainsets without fully functional electric braking are to be safely operated, particularly to ensure thermalrelated brake system damage does not occur. Paragraph (e)(1) requires that the railroad specify the allowable stopping distance not to be exceeded in the event of a power loss or failure of the dynamic or regenerative brake. FRA expects the railroad to provide a means for automatically reducing the maximum allowable train speed, based on feedback from the on-board monitoring and diagnostic system specified in § 238.731(n), so the trainset can safely stop using friction braking alone within the allowable stopping distance. Additionally, paragraph (e)(2) requires the railroad to define the operating conditions under which the available friction braking effort alone can safely stop the trainset. For discussion of paragraph (e)(4), please see below. FRA approval of railroad determinations is required under paragraph (f)’s main reservoir system requirements. Paragraph (f)(1) requires that main reservoirs be designed and tested using a recognized industry standard specified by the railroad and approved by FRA. This paragraph also provides that the railroad shall define the working pressure and rated temperature for main reservoirs in accordance with the designated standard, if different from the pressure and temperature otherwise specified in this paragraph. Further, paragraph (f)(2) requires the railroad to identify a recognized industry standard governing the drilling of steel main reservoirs. FRA approval is required under paragraph (j)’s brake application/release requirements. Specifically, paragraph (j)(2) requires that the railroad establish the minimum brake cylinder pressure necessary to adjust from minimum service to full service brake application for proper train operation. FRA approval is required under paragraph (m)’s slide protection and alarm requirements. Paragraph (m)(3) requires the railroad to specify the operational restrictions that apply when the wheel slide protection system fails to function as intended within preestablished, allowable parameters. As noted above, the railroad determinations specified under paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(6), (e)(1)–(2), (f)(1)–(2), (j)(2), and (m)(3) do not reference a Tier III Safe Operation Plan but do require FRA approval. However, as discussed under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, FRA E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59204 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations approval oversight was a major tenet of the proposed Tier III Safe Operation Plan requirement, and those requirements identified for inclusion in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan were selected to allow FRA to have some specific approval oversight of the railroad’s determinations. Accordingly, those plan elements the NPRM identified in this section as needing specific FRA approval do require FRA approval in this final rule. Nonetheless, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly implemented. FRA notes that proposed paragraph (l), Leakage, did refer to the Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (l) of the final rule contains no such reference. Specifically, the Air Consumption Analysis required under this paragraph shall be developed as part of the railroad’s ITM program. Based on APTA’s comments, FRA is taking a somewhat different approach regarding the proposed reference in paragraph (n) to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (n) requires each Tier III trainset to be equipped with a brake system health monitoring and diagnostic system to automatically assesses the functionality of the brake system for the entire trainset, both before the trainset departs and while it is en route. As proposed, the railroad must document the details of the monitoring system and diagnostic system, and the means for communicating trainset brake system functionality to the engineer. In its comment, APTA recommended that rather than include this information in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, a railroad should include this information in its ITM program. FRA agrees with and is adopting APTA’s recommendation. It accomplishes the goals of this paragraph, and trainset monitoring and diagnostics relate to inspection, testing, and maintenance. It will also provide FRA approval oversight through the ITM program approval process. In other comments on this section, APTA recommended that FRA include in paragraph (e)(4) a requirement that railroads conduct additional analysis and testing to determine the maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of operative friction brakes. As proposed, paragraph (e)(4) requires railroads to determine through analysis and testing the maximum speed for safely operating and stopping their Tier III trainsets using the friction brake system alone without causing thermalrelated damage to the equipment or infrastructure. APTA recommended the additional analysis and testing to VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 adequately quantify the braking performance for movement of defective equipment. TCRR’s comments on the NPRM were in agreement with APTA’s on this paragraph. TCRR cautioned that the movement of defective equipment requirements must refer to paragraph (e) of this section and require railroads to conduct appropriate analysis and testing to determine the maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of operative friction brakes. FRA agrees with APTA’s and TCRR’s comments. Accordingly, FRA is adopting the recommendation in paragraph (e) to make clear further testing and analysis is required to determine the safe maximum operating speed for various percentages of friction brakes less than 100-percent operative. FRA expects the railroad to include these determination in its ITM program. FRA also received comments on paragraph (o) of this section from APTA and Alstom. As proposed, this paragraph requires Tier III equipment to be equipped with a means to secure unattended equipment against unintentional movement. Because the securement technique may be technology-specific to a particular trainset, FRA proposed that the procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment based on the grade conditions be included in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan, which in turn could be used to help demonstrate the effectiveness of the securement method(s). FRA further proposed to define the term ‘‘unattended equipment’’ to have the same meaning as in § 238.231(h)(4), which provides that unattended equipment is equipment left standing and unmanned in such a manner that a qualified person cannot readily control the brake system of the equipment. FRA intended the cross reference to § 238.231(h)(4) to be limited specifically to the definition of ‘‘unattended equipment,’’ for consistency and to remove any ambiguity as to the meaning of the term, because FRA has already defined the term in this part 238. In APTA’s comment on paragraph (o), APTA objected to the cross reference to § 238.231(h)(4). APTA raised concern that its inclusion in the regulatory text could sweep in the Tier I requirement that Tier III trainsets be equipped with a parking or handbrake. APTA stated that was not part of the consensus agreement on the proposed rule text presented to FRA in which wheel chocks could be used to secure unattended equipment under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, APTA did agree to FRA’s use of the modifier ‘‘unattended’’ in this paragraph to PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 describe the type of equipment to be secured, noting that technical specifications normally state that the equipment can be left for an indefinite time period, which corresponds to unattended. Further, consistent with its other comments, APTA stated that this paragraph’s reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary because the physical means for securing the trainset will be addressed during the design review and the procedures for securing the trainset will be defined in the railroad’s operating rules. In its comments on this paragraph, Alstom similarly objected to the addition of the cross reference to § 238.231(h)(4), stating it was not consistent with the consensus agreement on the proposed regulatory text to permit the use of wheel chocks to secure unattended equipment under certain conditions. FRA makes clear that the reference to § 238.231(h)(4) was not intended to mean that § 238.231(h)(4)’s requirements for parking or hand brakes apply to this § 238.731(o). As explained above, the reference was intended to capture only the definition of ‘‘unattended’’ and not sweep into this paragraph requirements concerning parking or hand brakes. However, to guard against ambiguity and for consistent application of the term, in this paragraph of the final rule FRA has incorporated § 238.231(h)(4)’s definition of ‘‘unattended.’’ Further, FRA agrees with APTA’s recommendation not to include the reference to the Tier III Safe Operation Plan, and it is not included in this paragraph. Yet, FRA believes it necessary to approve the procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment on the grade conditions identified, and this paragraph requires such approval. Inclusion in the railroad’s operating rules alone is not sufficient as FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part 217 of this chapter. Further, issues surrounding how equipment will be properly secured while unattended are operational in nature and thus capturing those issues in a design review is not sufficient. In the interim, FRA will of course work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the specific procedures and means of securing unattended equipment as required under this paragraph are properly addressed and documented. In this regard, and as FRA made clear in the NPRM, certain brake system requirements are imposed by Federal statute, 49 U.S.C. ch. 203. Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B) requires ‘‘efficient handbrakes.’’ Railroads must E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations ensure that those statutory requirements are addressed. Interior Fittings and Surfaces khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Section 238.733 Attachment Interior Fixture This section contains requirements for interior fixture attachment strength for Tier III trainsets. This section relates to strength requirements for seats and luggage racks in §§ 238.735 and 238.737, respectively, to help prevent and mitigate hazards associated with occupants impacting interior objects and surfaces during a collision. In its comments on this section and §§ 238.735 and 238.737, APTA recommended that FRA not reference the attachment strength requirements in § 238.233, Interior fittings and surface, for Tier I equipment. The NPRM proposed to allow compliance with those strength requirements, specifically, 8g longitudinal, 4g vertical, and 4g lateral, as an option instead of using Railway Group Standard GM/ RT2100 and 5g longitudinal, 3g vertical, and 3g lateral attachment strength requirements. As discussed in the ETF’s May 2017 meeting, APTA believes the 5g, 3g, and 3g attachment strength requirements are sufficient to serve as the minimum safety requirements and are consistent with the dynamic collision requirements in § 238.705(b)(2), which provides that, if GM/RT2100 is used, the average deceleration experienced by each vehicle in a Tier III trainset may not exceed 5g during any 100-ms period. APTA added that, in developing the NPRM, the ETF consensus for use of the strength requirements in § 238.233 was for Tier I alternative trainsets, as reflected in proposed paragraphs (i) though (k) of appendix G to this part. According to APTA, the ETF’s consensus was for Tier III trainsets to comply with the relevant strength requirements in Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, with the additional requirement to apply a 3g vertical load rather than a 1g vertical load. As noted above, APTA contends that the 5g, 3g, and 3g attachment strength requirements are more harmonious with the Tier III requirements because they are tied to a maximum crash pulse requirement, unlike the 8g, 4g, and 4g requirements in § 238.223. FRA is not adopting APTA’s recommendation. FRA always intended to provide the two options for compliance, as discussed in the NPRM. The first option, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, allows compliance with the requirements of § 238.233 and APTA VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1, ‘‘Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,’’ Authorized September 2005. The second option, in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, allows compliance with section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, provided: The test conditions of § 238.705(b)(2) are met; interior fixture attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g longitudinal, 3g vertical, and 3g lateral acceleration resistance; and use of the GM/RT standard is carried out in accordance with any conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (This last condition has been modified from the NPRM consistent with FRA’s discussion regarding proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above.) The acceleration-based performance standards in § 238.233 and APTA standard PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1, were established after years of industry practice designing interior fittings to withstand the forces due to accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g vertically, and 3g laterally, which FRA specifically found to be inadequate to protect against occupant injury (see 64 FR 25540, 25614).16 The accident performance of interior fixtures designed to comply with § 238.233 and the APTA standard support their continued use for interior attachment strength. However, FRA continues to recognize that some Tier III passenger equipment may not experience accelerations of 8g longitudinally, 4g vertically, or 4g laterally during the dynamic collision scenario in § 238.705, or at higher-speed collisions resulting in collapse of the occupied volume. FRA acknowledges that equipment that does not experience large decelerations during collisions does not need to be designed to these standards in § 238.233 and APTA standard PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1. Accordingly, FRA developed an alternative attachment strength option consistent with international design standards, in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. FRA views the alternative as providing an equivalent level of safety 16 When developing the requirements of the 1999 final rule, FRA concluded that due to the injuries caused by broken seats and other loose fixtures, which were designed to withstand the forces due to accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal direction, 3g in the vertical direction, and 3g in the lateral direction, as revealed in FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents, the design practice was inadequate. PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59205 to the now longstanding acceleration resistance requirements in § 238.233 and the APTA standard, with the qualification that no acceleration-based load higher than 5g is experienced as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. FRA finds no additional burden is imposed by providing two options to demonstrate compliance with this section, and therefore declines to adopt APTA’s suggestion to remove the first option. As noted above, paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides for use of the GM/RT standard in accordance with any conditions identified by the railroad and approved by FRA. According to APTA, in its comments on this NPRM, the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation plan in this paragraph was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in § 238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (a)(2) rather than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary. FRA seeks to ensure that compliance with paragraph (a)(2) provides an equivalent level of safety to the existing requirements in § 238.233 and the APTA standard, and that no acceleration-based load higher than 5g is experienced. Nonetheless, as noted above and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly implemented. Because FRA has otherwise adopted the substantive requirements of this section as proposed in the NPRM, FRA is not repeating the full analysis in the NPRM supporting and explaining the requirements of this section, see 81 FR 88006, 88034–88036. FRA does note it is incorporating by reference APTA PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1 (previously designated as SS–C&S– 006), ‘‘Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,’’ Authorized September 2005, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in paragraph (i) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59206 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Board Ltd., December 2010 in paragraph (a)(2) of this section and § 238.741(b)(2). APTA PR–CS–S–006–98 addresses fittings used in commuter and intercity railcar and locomotive cab interiors. It specifies the minimum strength and attachment strength for interior subsystems, including overhead luggage racks, stanchions and handholds, windscreen and partitions, food service equipment, and miscellaneous interior fittings. This standard also contains recommendations for design requirements and design practices for such interior sub-systems. APTA PR– CS–S–006–98 is available to all interested parties online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. Section 6.1.4 of GM/RT2100 contains requirements for securement of furniture, on-board equipment, and other trainset features to help mitigate against injuries to passengers and crew from secondary impacts within the occupied volume. GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_ Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. Section 238.735 Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Cab Crew) This section contains the seat strength requirements for Tier III trainsets and relates to the strength requirements for interior fixtures and luggage racks in §§ 238.733 and 238.737, respectively, as noted above. APTA and Alstom both commented on this section. Specifically, APTA commented on the proposed passenger seating requirements in paragraph (a) based on the same premise as its comment on § 238.733(a), as discussed above. APTA recommended that the option in proposed paragraph (a)(1) to comply with § 238.233 and APTA standard PR–CS–S–006–98 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested that the sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on section 6.2, ‘‘Seats for passengers, personnel, or train crew,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, under the same acceleration resistance conditions APTA recommended for § 238.733(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises applies equally for both sections, FRA is not repeating the full discussion here. For the reasons discussed under § 238.733(a), above, FRA is not adopting APTA’s recommendation and is therefore retaining both compliance options under paragraph (a). Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Operation Plan under paragraph (a)(2)(iii) was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in § 238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (a)(2) rather than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Please see § 238.733(a)(2)(iii), above, and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this requirement. FRA notes that Alstom, in commenting on this section in the NPRM, stated that paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are not fully equivalent in terms of scope of application. Although the requirements of the paragraph are different, FRA has always intended these requirements to provide an equivalent level of safety, given the different circumstances surrounding their application. FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of paragraph (a) are properly implemented. FRA notes it is incorporating by reference APTA PR–CS–S–016–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,’’ Authorized October 2010, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in paragraph (j) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.2, ‘‘Seats for passengers, personnel, or train crew,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. APTA PR–CS–S–016–99 addresses row-to-row passenger seating in commuter and intercity railcars. APTA PR–CS–S–016–99 is available to all interested parties online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. However, FRA makes clear the rule does not require compliance with section 6.0, ‘‘Seat durability testing,’’ of this APTA standard. Seat durability testing is beyond the scope of this regulation because the testing focuses on the optimal life of the seats—not their safety performance. Section 6.2 of GM/RT2100 contains design specifications and tolerances for passenger and crew seating. GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_ Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Paragraph (b) contains requirements for the crashworthiness of seats provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III trainset. Unlike passenger seating, FRA proposed in paragraph (b)(1) that cab seats must comply with the requirements in § 238.233(e), (f), and (g), and the performance, design, and test criteria of AAR–RP–5104, ‘‘Locomotive Cab Seats,’’ April 2008, which FRA proposed to incorporate by reference in paragraph (b)(2) and paragraph (k)(2) of appendix G to this part. Although not submitted as a comment, AAR made FRA aware that it is archiving AAR–RP–5104. FRA therefore requested assistance from the ETF during the May 2017 meeting, and a small work group was convened to address the problem. The group recommended back to the ETF to excerpt language from section 3 of AAR–RP–5104 that prescribes minimum loading requirements for the seat itself, and place that language into the final rule. When the recommendation was presented to the ETF, industry members were adamantly opposed, stating that the requirements in section 3 of AAR– RP–5104 were durability standards and not safety-related. In fact, APTA, in a comment submitted after the close of the comment period, recommended deleting the reference to AAR–RP–5104 and its proposed paragraph (b)(2) entirely, stating that proposed paragraph (b)(1) adequately defines the requirements for Tier III cab seating. Resultantly, FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (b)(2) and FRA is not including a requirement to comply with any portion of AAR–RP–5104. In turn, proposed paragraph (b)(1) is designated as (b) of this section. As proposed, paragraph (b) requires compliance with § 238.233(e), (f), and (g). However, with respect to the acceleration-based loading requirements specified in § 238.233(f), FRA makes clear in paragraph (b) that it expects for Tier III (and Tier I alternative) trainsets the cab seat to remain attached to the trainset structure when subjected to an 8g longitudinal acceleration-based load applied to the combined mass of the seat and a 95th-percentile male. FRA recognizes that this constitutes the more severe scenario to be tested. It is more severe than an 8g acceleration-based load applied solely to the mass of the cab seat. It is also more severe than testing under AAR–RP–5104, which provides for testing the seat with 250 pounds impacting the seatback at 3g. FRA concludes that if the cab seat can remain attached when subjected to an 8g acceleration-based load applied to the combined mass of the cab seat and E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 a 95th-percentile male, then the seat should remain attached under foreseeable collision scenarios. Section 238.737 Luggage Racks This section contains requirements to constrain the longitudinal and lateral motion of articles stowed in luggage racks, and relates to the strength requirements for interior fixtures and seats in §§ 238.733 and 238.735, respectively, as noted above. FRA received no comments on paragraph (a) and has adopted it as proposed. Please see the discussion of paragraph (a) in the NPRM (81 FR 88006, 88036). Nonetheless, APTA commented on the proposed luggage rack strength requirements in paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its comments on §§ 238.733(a) and 238.735(a), as discussed above. APTA recommended that the option in proposed paragraph (b)(1) to comply with § 238.233 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested that the sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on section 6.8, ‘‘Luggage stowage,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, specifically under the same acceleration resistance conditions APTA recommended for §§ 238.733(a)(2)(ii) and 238.735(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises applies equally here, FRA is not repeating the full discussion. For the reasons discussed under §§ 238.733(a) and 238.735(a), above, FRA is not adopting APTA’s recommendation and is therefore retaining both compliance options under paragraph (b). Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in § 238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (b)(2) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Please see §§ 238.733(a)(2)(iii) and 238.735(a)(2)(iii), above, and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this requirement. Further, FRA expects that in demonstrating compliance with this requirement, the railroad must address how the mass of VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 the luggage was considered when applied to the loading conditions defined in paragraph (b)(2)(ii). FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.8, ‘‘Luggage stowage,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section 6.8 contains requirements for luggage stowage, either on the floor or in overhead racks. As noted above, GM/ RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/ Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. Emergency Systems Section 238.741 Emergency Window Egress and Rescue Access This section establishes requirements for emergency egress and rescue access through windows or alternative openings in passenger cars as part of an emergency window egress and rescue access plan for Tier III trainsets. The ETF recognized that any regulation would need to allow multiple approaches to facilitate the adoption of service-proven, high-speed trainset technology. Specifically, the methods used to manufacture high-speed trainsets are often governed by consideration of the effects of aerodynamics and noise; together with the potential need to pressurize occupied compartments, these can affect the way window glazing is installed and mounted in some trainset designs. Therefore, the ETF recommended performance-oriented requirements to allow necessary flexibility where an appropriate safety case can be made. FRA did not receive any comments on the requirements of this section as described in the NPRM. However, FRA is clarifying in paragraph (b) the reference to a Tier III ITM program, rather than to a Tier III ITM plan, as proposed in the NPRM. Otherwise, FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this section of the final rule is virtually identical to the proposed version, the full analysis and discussion of this section provided in the NPRM is not repeated here (see 81 FR 88006, 88019–88020). Section 238.743 Emergency Lighting This section contains the emergency lighting requirements for Tier III trainsets. As proposed, paragraph (a) provides that the requirements are the same as the emergency lighting requirements in § 238.115, except for those specific to emergency lighting PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59207 back-up power systems in paragraph (b). Paragraph (b), in turn, permits compliance with alternative, crash loading resistance requirements, to demonstrate the capability of back-up power systems to function after the initial shock caused by a collision or derailment. APTA commented on the proposed back-up power requirements in paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its comments on §§ 238.733, 238. 735, and 238.737, above. APTA recommended that the option in proposed paragraph (b)(1) of this section to comply with the acceleration resistance requirements in § 238.115 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested that the sole option to demonstrate compliance be based on section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, under the same conditions APTA recommended for §§ 238.733(a)(2)(ii), 238.735(a)(2)(ii), and 238.737(b)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises generally applies equally for all sections, FRA is not repeating the full discussion here, and generally for the reasons discussed under these sections, above, FRA is not adopting APTA’s recommendation. This paragraph retains both compliance options. Further, FRA makes clear that § 238.115 is contained in subpart B of part 238, and the scope of subpart B applies to all passenger equipment, regardless of operating speed. Consequently, FRA could have included specific back-up power requirements for Tier III trainsets in subpart B’s § 238.115 but chose instead to place them here in subpart H for ease of reference. FRA notes § 238.743(b)(1) in the final rule references the acceleration-based loads in § 238.115(a)(4)(ii), which are 8g, longitudinally, and 4g, laterally and vertically. In the NPRM, FRA inadvertently referenced § 238.115(b)(4)(ii), which was clear error because there is no such paragraph in § 238.115. FRA has corrected the reference. Paragraph (b)(2) provides the second option for demonstrating the crashworthiness of emergency lighting back-up power systems. A railroad may use the loading requirements defined in section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of GM/ RT2100, under specified conditions. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that back-up power systems have an attachment strength sufficient to resist minimum loads of 5g longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. However, FRA’s E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59208 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations proposal was inadvertently overbroad. FRA intended for the back-up power supply to remain functional after being subjected to the initial shock of a collision or derailment, whether or not remaining attached in place. Consistent with its comments on similar proposed provisions, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in § 238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (b)(2) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Please see §§ 238.733(a)(2)(iii), 238.735(a)(2)(iii), and 238.737(b)(2)(iii), above, and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this requirement. FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, into paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section 6.1.4 contains requirements for the securement of furniture, equipment, and other features. As noted above, GM/ RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/ Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. Cab Equipment khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Section 238.751 Alerters This section contains requirements for alerters on Tier III passenger trainsets. In commenting on this section in the NPRM, APTA recommended removal of the proposed references to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, consistent with its comments on proposed subpart J. As discussed below, this section does not include references to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan but does ensure FRA oversight. Otherwise, FRA has adopted this section as proposed and has therefore not repeated the full analysis of this section in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88037–88038). As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (b) would have required the railroad to determine the appropriate time period within which the engineer must VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 acknowledge the alerter and include that determination in the railroad’s Tier III Safe Operation Plan for review and approval by FRA. In its comment, APTA stated that inclusion in the Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary because the basis for setting the alerter control timing would be addressed during the design review process and FRA could review the railroad’s alerter timing determination then. Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the periodicity of the alerter alarm, as well as the time period within which the engineer must react to that alarm, is necessary for safety. Nonetheless, as noted above and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this paragraph and this section are properly implemented. In this regard, FRA makes clear it intends alerter control timing to be set by the railroad taking into consideration maximum train speed and capabilities of the signal system. As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (d) would have required specifying in the railroad’s Tier III Safe Operation Plan the necessary actions of the engineer responding to a full-service brake application initiated after the engineer failed to properly acknowledge the alerter. APTA, in its comment, stated that this was also unnecessary as these required actions would be contained in the railroad’s operating rules and the ‘‘engineer’s training program.’’ Again, although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval is necessary, namely, of the actions specified for the engineer to recover the full-service brake application. Inclusion in the railroad’s operating rules is not sufficient as FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part 217 of this chapter. Additionally, these procedures are not intended to be specified in the locomotive engineer certification program required under part 240 of this chapter. Thus, simple inclusion in a training program does not provide the necessary review and approval mechanism FRA desires. Nonetheless, as FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing specific procedures and processes for obtaining such PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 approval, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure the requirements of this paragraph are properly implemented. Finally, as proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (e) would have required a railroad electing to use alternate technology to an alerter, to provide the function(s) of an alerter, to conduct a hazard analysis as part of its Tier III Safe Operation Plan. The intent behind the analysis was to demonstrate that the alternate alerter technology provided an equivalent level of safety. APTA, in its comment, stated that inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary because the demonstration of an equivalent level of safety would be performed during the design review process, with the results of the safety analysis being used to support the determination. Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the equivalency determination is necessary for safety, and FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this paragraph are properly implemented, as discussed above. In this regard, FRA has clarified that the required analysis is not limited to a ‘‘hazard analysis,’’ as proposed in the NPRM, but provides for a broader evaluation. Section 238.753 Sanders This section introduces requirements for sanders on Tier III trainsets. In their comments on the NPRM, APTA and TCRR objected to inclusion of this section in the final rule. According to APTA and TCRR, in the international market, sanders are not considered a safety critical component but rather only performance enhancing and not critical to the safe operation of the trainset. Both APTA and TCRR further stated that if a railroad were to determine that sanders were critical to the safe operation of the trainset, then the sanders would be defined and addressed in the railroad’s ITM program; under these circumstances, a trainset with defective sanders could move only under the regulatory provisions dealing with movement of defective equipment. Thus, APTA and TCRR believed that providing specific requirements for sanders in this section is unnecessary. FRA disagrees with this recommendation. As explained in the NPRM, this section does not require Tier III trainsets to be equipped with sanders; this section applies only if the railroad determines sanders are a required trainset component. Some railroads may determine that sanders E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations are necessary for the safe operation of Tier III trainsets, whereas other railroads may not. Nonetheless, FRA agrees that if the railroad deems the sanders safety critical, they would be so identified in the railroad’s ITM program. No reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is necessary. Accordingly, trainsets equipped with such sanders that are defective could move only in compliance with the requirements covering movement of defective equipment. Please also see the discussion of this proposed section in the NPRM (81 FR 88006, 88038). As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure the requirements of this section are properly implemented. Appendix A to Part 238—Schedule of Civil Penalties The final rule includes an amended schedule of civil penalties under appendix A to this part. Specifically, the schedule includes civil penalty amounts for violations of the requirements of subpart H of this part. Because the penalty schedule is a statement of policy, notice and comment was not required prior to its revision. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, FRA has amended the penalty schedule to reflect the addition of subpart H. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Appendix B to Part 238—Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs FRA is revising this appendix to clarify the application of the floor fire test in the table of ‘‘Test Procedures and Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs’’ in paragraph (c) to Tier III passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this clarification and has adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating the analysis provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039). Appendix F to Part 238—Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives FRA is revising this appendix so that it applies to Tier III passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this change and has adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating the analysis of this change provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039). VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Appendix G to Part 238—Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of a Tier I Passenger Trainset As proposed, FRA is adding appendix G to this part to provide alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets instead of the conventional requirements of §§ 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219 in subpart C of this part. The technical contents of appendix G remain materially unchanged from those developed for the original Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. FRA intends for these alternative requirements to be applied to a Tier I trainset as a whole. Accordingly, compliance must be demonstrated either through application of the conventional requirements in subpart C, or through application of the requirements in this appendix G, not a combination of both. They also apply in addition to the requirements of §§ 238.209(b), 238.215, 238.217, and 238.233, and APTA standards for occupant protection, as specified in this appendix. Although the appendix may refer to specific units of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in this appendix apply only to a Tier I trainset as a whole, as noted above. Further, use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance for Tier I passenger trainsets is subject to FRA review and approval under § 238.201. In general, where alternatives to the conventional Tier I requirements are given in this appendix G, those requirements are also identified in the Tier III requirements in subpart H— Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment. See the discussion in the section-by-section analysis for subpart H, which applies to Tier I trainsets seeking qualification under this appendix. As FRA did not receive any comments on this appendix, FRA is not repeating the full analysis of this appendix provided in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88039–88040. However, FRA does highlight that in paragraph (i) of this appendix, FRA is incorporating by reference APTA standard PR–CS–S–034–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,’’ Authorized June 2006, for interior fixtures. The standard is intended to address forces applied to the carbody and truck structures during collisions, derailments, and other PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59209 accident conditions. APTA PR–CS–S– 034–99 is available to all interested parties online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review. Further, in paragraph (j) of this appendix, FRA is incorporating by reference APTA standard PR–CS–S– 016–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,’’ Authorized October 2010, with the exception of Section 6 of the standard, which relates to the durability testing of seats. FRA considers the durability testing of seats to be beyond the scope of this final rule for the same reasons discussed under § 238.735, above. Appendix H to Part 238—Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input Data and Geometrical Depiction FRA is adding this appendix to part 238 to formally provide input data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a computer model of the rigid locomotive design in § 238.705(a)(4) for use in evaluating the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset (and a Tier I alternative passenger trainset under appendix G) in a dynamic collision scenario. Section 238.705(a) outlines the required conditions for performing a dynamic collision scenario involving an initially-moving trainset impacting an initially-standing train having the rigid locomotive leading its consist. As explained in § 238.705(a)(4), the initially-standing train is made up of a rigid locomotive and five identical passenger coaches having the following characteristics: The locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach weighs 95,000 pounds; the locomotive and each coach crush in response to applied force as specified in Table 1 to § 238.705; and the locomotive has a geometric design as depicted in Figure 1 to this appendix H. This appendix is intended to establish a consistent definition for locomotive geometry for use in conducting dynamic computer simulations. The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the geometry for approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive design. Because this input file is for a halfsymmetric model, a locomotive mass corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is provided for modeling purposes—half the 260,000 pounds of weight specified for the locomotive in § 238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to this appendix provides two views of the locomotive’s geometric depiction. The input data is contained in Appendix C to FRA’s Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, available at https:// www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/ L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59210 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures This final rule is an economically significant regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures. See 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impacts of this final rule. The RIA estimates the costs of this final rule that are likely to be incurred over a 30-year period. FRA estimated the costs of this final rule using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, respectively. For the 30-year period analyzed, the present value of the estimated high-range quantified net cost savings for this final rule is $837.8 million when discounted at 3 percent and $541.9 million when discounted at 7 percent. Annualized net cost savings total approximately $42.7 million when discounted at 3 percent and $43.7 million when discounted at 7 percent. This final rule addresses several limitations in the Code of Federal Regulations pertaining to passenger equipment. Prior to publication of this final rule, the PESS in 49 CFR part 238 did not comprehensively address safety requirements for passenger rail equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the regulatory framework established Tier I safety compliance through equipment requirements that were more design-based, and therefore limited the application of contemporary design techniques and innovative technology. This final rule amends FRA’s PESS and adds a new equipment tier (Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of high-speed rail at speeds up to 220 mph. The final rule also establishes alternative crashworthiness performance standards to qualify passenger rail equipment for Tier I operations (Tier I alternative). In addition, FRA is increasing the maximum allowable speed for Tier II operations from 150 mph to 160 mph, making it consistent with prior changes in 49 CFR parts 213 and 238 for Vehicle/Track Interaction (VTI) Safety Standards. There are several HSR projects in development, such as Amtrak’s nextgeneration Acela, Texas High-Speed Rail, and California’s high-speed rail project, which are all expected to benefit from implementation of the rule. Additionally, FRA believes that other HSR operations may be initiated due to the publication of this final rule. The costs, cost savings, and benefits associated with the Tier III requirements of this rule were developed looking at all possible operations in the United States. FRA researched HSR projects that were most viable, focusing on all publicly available business models for HSR projects. FRA developed an economic analysis that could be applied to any individual Tier III operation in the United States, including Amtrak’s next-generation Acela. The main costs savings result from minimizing the costs of right-of-way acquisition, especially in high population urban areas, such as New York, Washington, Miami, and other large metropolitan areas. The provisions of the final rule’s Tier III passenger equipment safety standards allow the service to use existing rightsof-way, permitting the use of track shared with other rail service (i.e., blended track). FRA estimates that between $227.7 million and $523.3 million (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $351.3 million and $808.8 million (when discounted at a 3-percent rate) in quantifiable costs will be borne by the industry over a future 30-year period in availing itself of the rule’s new regulatory framework. Note that industry will only incur these costs if it chooses to test to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I alternative, or decides to implement Tier III operations. The added alternative Tier I standards provide an option for railroads to use different types or designs of passenger equipment in Tier I service and will not impose any cost on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. The new Tier III requirements will not impose any cost on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations (existing passenger rolling stock is Tier I and II; there is no Tier III rolling stock in operation in the U.S.). TABLE 1—REGULATORY COST SUMMARY [$ in millions] Description 3% khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 High Range: 17 Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs .................................................................................................................. Tier III Infrastructure Costs ............................................................................................................................... 7% $59.6 749.2 $39.1 484.2 Total Costs ................................................................................................................................................ Annualized Costs ............................................................................................................................... Low Range: 18 Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs .................................................................................................................. Tier III Infrastructure Costs ............................................................................................................................... 808.8 41.3 523.3 42.2 51.6 299.7 34.1 193.7 Total Costs ................................................................................................................................................ 351.3 227.7 Annualized Costs ............................................................................................................................... 17.9 18.4 This final rule will result in significant cost savings for the industry. 17 High-range costs represent costs at a high funding level with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust for the upper bound confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more detailed description of the high-range costs, please refer to Section 3 of the RIA. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Estimated infrastructure-related cost savings comprise the most significant driver of cost savings compared to other 18 Low-range costs represent costs at a low funding level with a 10-percent multiplier to adjust for the lower bound confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more detailed description of the low-range costs, please refer to Section 3 of the RIA. PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 quantified cost savings (i.e., equipment design and engineering, manufacturing benefits, etc.). Infrastructure cost savings will be generated by the ability of railroad operators to take advantage of a blended operating environment— avoiding costly new construction, maintenance of dedicated track, and acquisition of new rights-of-way. This E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations cost savings is especially attractive to railroad operators that provide service in areas with high population density, where right-of-way acquisition and new railroad construction are significantly more expensive and complex. This rule will increase the probability that new services are introduced and reduce the need for new construction in densely populated areas. The U.S. passenger rail industry will experience cost savings from this regulatory action because it permits manufacturers to adapt existing designs of rolling stock to meet the new standards and will allow operators to take advantage of a wider variety of trainset designs. Further, the rule will allow Tier I and Tier III operations to use service-proven platforms with the latest technology available. These cost savings will be achieved by adapting technology that exists on the international market to meet FRA’s safety requirements and ensuring that all equipment suppliers comply with the same safety standards. Table 2 provides the estimated industry equipment and infrastructure cost savings and their discounted values 59211 at the 3- and 7-percent levels, respectively. High-range cost savings represent cost savings at a high funding level with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust for the confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. Lowrange cost savings represent cost savings at a low funding level with a 10-percent multiplier to adjust for the confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more detailed description of the low- and high-range cost savings, please refer to the RIA. TABLE 2—REGULATORY COST SAVINGS RANGE SUMMARY [$ in millions] Description 3% 7% High Range: Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost Savings ...................................................................................................... Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings .................................................................................................................. $315.4 1,331.3 $205.8 859.4 Total Cost Savings .................................................................................................................................... 1,646.7 1,065.2 Annualized Cost Savings ................................................................................................................... Low Range: Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost Savings ...................................................................................................... Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings .................................................................................................................. 84.0 85.8 257.5 532.5 168.8 343.7 Total Cost Savings .................................................................................................................................... 790.1 512.5 Annualized Cost Savings ................................................................................................................... 40.3 41.3 Table 3 below displays the net cost savings of this final rule, categorized by either Tier I alternative or Tier III costs and cost savings. Discounted net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8 million (low range) and $837.8 million (high range) at the 3-percent level, and between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9 million (high range) at the 7-percent level. Annualized net regulatory cost savings are between $22.4 million and $42.7 million when discounted at 3 percent and between $22.9 million and $43.7 million when discounted at 7 percent. TABLE 3—NET REGULATORY COST SAVINGS [$ in millions] khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Description 3% 7% High Range: Tier I Alternative Costs ..................................................................................................................................... Tier III Costs ..................................................................................................................................................... $59.6 749.2 $39.1 484.2 Total Costs ................................................................................................................................................ Cost Savings Tier I Alternative ......................................................................................................................... Cost Savings Tier III ......................................................................................................................................... 808.8 315.4 1,331.3 523.3 205.8 859.4 Total Cost Savings .................................................................................................................................... Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative .................................................................................................................. Net Cost Savings Tier III .................................................................................................................................. 1,646.7 255.8 582.1 1,065.2 166.7 375.2 Total Net Cost Savings ............................................................................................................................. 837.8 541.9 Annualized Net Cost Savings ............................................................................................................ Low Range: Tier I Alternative Costs ..................................................................................................................................... Tier III Costs ..................................................................................................................................................... 42.7 43.7 51.6 299.7 34.1 193.7 Total Costs ................................................................................................................................................ Cost Savings Tier I Alternative ......................................................................................................................... Cost Savings Tier III ......................................................................................................................................... 351.3 257.5 532.5 227.7 168.8 343.7 Total Cost Savings .................................................................................................................................... Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative .................................................................................................................. 790.1 205.9 512.5 134.7 VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59212 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations TABLE 3—NET REGULATORY COST SAVINGS—Continued [$ in millions] Description 7% Net Cost Savings Tier III .................................................................................................................................. 232.8 150.1 Total Net Cost Savings ............................................................................................................................. 438.8 284.8 Annualized Net Cost Savings ............................................................................................................ 22.4 22.9 This final rule is considered an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this final rule can be found in the RIA. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 3% B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272 The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis describing the impact of the regulatory action on small entities as part of the rulemaking. Small entities include small businesses, small organizations, and governmental jurisdictions. An agency must conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis unless it determines and certifies that the rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. FRA developed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13272, ‘‘Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking,’’ and DOT’s procedures and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act to ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities are properly considered. Prior to this final rule, the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in part 238 did not comprehensively address safety requirements for passenger rail equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the former regulatory framework generally set Tier I safety compliance through equipment design requirements, which limited the application of new technology. This final rule changes the passenger rail equipment safety regulatory framework by introducing a new tier of equipment safety standards (Tier III) and also establishes more performance-based crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the alternative to those specified for Tier I equipment. Additionally, the final rule increases the maximum allowable speed for Tier II equipment to make it consistent the corresponding speed range in FRA’s Track Safety Standards for the track over which the equipment VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 operates. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is presented to comply with Executive Order 13272 and with the Regulatory Flexibility Act as part of the rulemaking process required by law. FRA initiated the rulemaking using recommendations made by FRA’s RSAC. In general, the rulemaking amends 49 CFR part 238, to reflect new or modified safety requirements for Tier I and Tier III equipment, and to increase the authorized speed limit for Tier II equipment. 1. Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts The ‘‘universe’’ of the entities under consideration includes only those small entities that can reasonably be expected to be directly affected by the provisions of this final rule. For the rule, there is only one type of small entity that will be affected: Small passenger railroads. ‘‘Small entity’’ is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the same meaning as ‘‘small business concern’’ under section 3 of the Small Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of operation. Under 5 U.S.C. 601(5) ‘‘small entities’’ is defined as governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts with populations less than 50,000. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ‘‘size standards’’ for small entities. It provides that industry sectors relevant for the rulemaking must not exceed the limits listed below (and still classify as a ‘‘small entity’’): 19 • 1,500 employees for railroad rolling stock manufacturing. • 1,500 employees for line haul operating railroads. • 1,250 employees for motor and generator manufacturing. • 1,250 employees for switchgear and switchboard apparatus manufacturing. 19 U.S. Small Business Administration, ‘‘Table of Small Business Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification System Codes,’’ effective January 1, 2018. PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small entities in consultation with SBA, and in conjunction with public comment. Under the authority provided to it by SBA, FRA published a final policy, which formally establishes small entities as railroads that meet the line haulage revenue requirements of a Class III railroad.20 Currently, the revenue requirements are $20 million or less in annual operating revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. The $20 million limit (adjusted annually for inflation) is based on the Surface Transportation Board’s threshold of a Class III railroad, which is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment.21 FRA uses this definition for the rule. Railroads For purposes of this analysis, there are only two intercity passenger railroads, Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad. Neither is considered a small entity. Amtrak is a Class I railroad and the Alaska Railroad is a Class II railroad. The Alaska Railroad is owned by the State of Alaska, which has a population well in excess of 50,000. There are currently 30 commuter or other shorthaul passenger railroad operations in the U.S., most of which are part of larger transportation organizations that receive Federal funds and serve major metropolitan areas with populations greater than 50,000. However, one of these railroads does not fall in this category and is considered a small entity: The Hawkeye Express. The Hawkeye Express provides service to Iowa City, Iowa, and is owned by a Class III railroad, a small entity. FRA notes that it has not analyzed the Saratoga & North Creek Railway as a small entity under this final rule. Because of operational changes subsequent to the NPRM’s publication, FRA considers the Saratoga & North Creek Railway a tourist railroad, not subject to this rule. 20 See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003. further information on the calculation of the specific dollar limit, please see 49 CFR part 1201. 21 For E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations It is important to note that the small railroad being considered in this analysis uses passenger rolling stock that is different from the equipment covered by the rulemaking. Further, the Hawkeye Express would be able to find their current type of train equipment in the market if they decide to acquire new rolling stock over the next 30 years. This final rule does not increase costs for this small passenger railroad. FRA expects the cost to acquire passenger rail equipment will drop as a result of the rulemaking. There will be more variety in trainset models available for passenger operations and options in companies supplying equipment in the U.S. market. Additionally, the railroad may enjoy lower prices as the U.S. passenger rail market is enlarged as a result of the rulemaking, enhancing economies of scale and increasing predictability for equipment orders. Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing The passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment manufacturing sector in the United States has a fairly small number of firms with no more than 15 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and a few hundred component and subcomponent suppliers.22 However, for this flexibility analysis, FRA is taking a broader approach by assessing the effect of the regulation on the railroad rolling stock manufacturing sector as defined by the North American Classification System (NAICS), which includes the passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment manufacturing industry but goes beyond by also covering freight and maintenance-ofway vehicles. This approach includes firms that currently do not manufacture passenger rail equipment but can potentially enter the market. Based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, employment in these industries is as follows: • NAICS code 336510, Railroad rolling stock manufacturing, 159 firms in the industry, and 137 firms with less than 500 employees. • NAICS code 335312, Motor and generator manufacturing, 428 firms in the industry, and 384 firms with less than 500 employees. The main impact of the rule affecting these industries is the qualification costs for Tier I alternative and Tier III trainsets. FRA worked with the industry to develop new safety criteria to evaluate passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those historically used for procurements in the U.S. As noted in the RIA, companies supplying new trainsets covered by the rulemaking will be required to submit test and analysis results to demonstrate compliance with these new safety standards. However, in the case of rolling stock manufacturing, this cost will only be incurred by the OEM when submitting a qualification package, which would include details regarding the performance of the trainset model under the required tests and analyses. Therefore, small and very small firms supplying OEMs are not expected to be required to submit that information. Small firms could be expected to benefit from existing requirements for minimum domestic content as more trainsets are purchased by U.S. railroad operators. Small businesses have the opportunity to supply OEMs with domestic inputs and to partner with larger firms to allow small domestic producers to meet the needs of the market being created by this final rule. Consequently, FRA expects the rulemaking to have only a positive impact on these small entities as more of them are provided with the opportunity to enter the passenger railroad equipment manufacturing industry. Significant Economic Impact Criteria Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One percent of khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 CFR section 22 Lowe, M., Tokuoka, S., Dubay, K., and Gereffi, G., ‘‘U.S. Manufacture of Rail Vehicles for Intercity VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. FRA realizes that some railroads will have revenue lower than $4.7 million. However, FRA estimates that small railroads will not have any additional expenses over the next ten years to comply with the requirements in this rule. Based on this, FRA concludes that the expected burden of this rule will not have a significant impact on the competitive position of small entities, or on the small entity segment of the railroad industry as a whole. Substantial Number Criteria This final rule will likely affect any small railroad that is not exempt from its scope or application (see 49 CFR 238.3). Thus, as noted above, this final rule will impact a substantial number of small railroads. 2. Certification Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. In the NPRM, FRA requested comments on its certification made as a result of its Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis, see 81 FR 88006, 88044. FRA received no comments. FRA therefore stands with its previous Regulatory Flexibility Act certification. C. Paperwork Reduction Act The information collection requirements in this final rule are being submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections that contain the new, revised, and current information collection requirements and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows: Total annual responses Respondent universe 229.47—Emergency Brake Valve—Marking brake pipe valve as such ............................. 238.7—Waivers ................................................................................................................... 238.15—Movement of passenger equipment with power brake defect .............................. —Movement of passenger equipment—defective en route ......................................... —Conditional requirement—Notice .............................................................................. 238.17—Limitations on movement of passenger equipment—defects found at calendar day insp. & on movement of passenger equipment—develops defects en route. —Special requirements—movement of passenger equip. with safety appliance defect. —Crew member notifications ....................................................................................... 238.21—Petitions for special approval of alternative standards ......................................... 32 32 32 32 32 32 railroads railroads railroads railroads railroads railroads PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 4701 Average time per response ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ............... 32 markings ............... 5 waivers ................... 1,000 tags .................. 288 tags ..................... 144 notices ................ 200 tags ..................... 1 2 3 3 3 3 32 railroads ............... 76 tags ....................... 3 minutes 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 38 radio notifications 1 petition .................... 30 secs .... 16 hours .. Passenger Rail and Urban Transit: A Value Chain Sfmt 4700 59213 minute ... hours .... minutes minutes minutes minutes Total annual burden hours 1 10 50 14 7 10 4 .32 16 Analysis,’’ Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness, June 24, 2010. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59214 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time per response —Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan ....... —Comments on petitions ............................................................................................. 238.103—Fire Safety: —Procuring new pass. equipment—Fire Safety Analysis ........................................... —Transferring existing equipment—Revised Fire Safety Analysis ............................. 238.107—Inspection/testing/maintenance plans—RR review ............................................. 238.109—Employee/Contractor Tr.: —Training employees—Mech. insp ............................................................................. 32 railroads ............... Public/RR Industry .... 1 petition .................... 4 comments ............... 40 hours .. 1 hour ...... 40 4 2 new railroads ......... 32 railroads/APTA ..... 32 railroads ............... 1 analysis .................. 3 analyses ................. 32 reviews ................. 150 hours 20 hours .. 60 hours .. 150 60 1,920 7,500 employees/100 trainers. 32 railroads ............... 9 equipment manufacturers. 9 equipment manufacturers. 9 equipment manufacturers. 32 railroads ............... 2,500 empl./100 trainers. 2,500 records ............ 1 plan ......................... 1.33 hours 3,458 3 minutes 16 hours .. 125 16 1 plan ......................... 192 hours 192 1 plan ......................... 60 hours .. 60 1 report ...................... 60 hours .. 60 32 railroads ............... 1 plan ......................... 20 hours .. 20 6 passenger car builders. 32 railroads ............... 2 analyses ................. 4 hours .... 8 32 plan updates ......... 4 hours .... 128 32 railroads ............... 30 secs .... 84 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 9,994 radio notifications. 320 safety briefings ... 320 radio notifications 2 minutes 30 secs .... 11 3 32 railroads ............... 320 QP descriptions .. 5 minutes 27 32 railroads ............... 320 notices + 320 safety briefings. 56 —RR record of each door by-pass activation .............................................................. —RR record of unintended power door openings ....................................................... —RR record of by-pass activations found unsealed ................................................... 238.135—RR request to FRA for special consideration to operate passenger trains with exterior side doors or trap doors, or both, open between stations. —FRA request to RR for additional information concerning special consideration request. —RR Operating rule to override a door summary circuit or no motion system, or both, in the event of an en route exterior side door failure or malfunction on a passenger train. —RR copy of written operating rules to train crew members and control center personnel. —RR training of train crew members on requirements of this section ........................ 32 32 32 32 ............... ............... ............... ............... 320 records ............... 20 records ................. 20 records ................. 2 requests .................. 30 seconds + 10 min.. 2 minutes 2 hours .... 4 hours .... 25 hours .. 32 railroads ............... 1 additional document 12 hours .. 12 32 railroads ............... 10 operating rules ..... 42 hours .. 420 32 railroads ............... 10,000 op. rule copies 1 minute ... 167 32 railroads ............... 30 mins .... 1,692 —RR training of new employees ................................................................................. —RR operational/efficiency tests of train crew members & control center employees 238.201—New Requirements—Alternative Compliance: Tier I Passenger equipment— Test plans + supporting documentation demonstrating compliance. —Notice of tests sent to FRA 30 days prior to commencement of operations ........... 238.229—Safety Appliances: —Welded safety appliances: Lists ............................................................................... —Defective welded safety appliance—Tags ................................................................ —Notification to crewmembers about non-compliant equipment ................................ —Inspection plans —Inspection personnel—Training ................................................................................ —Remedial action: Defect/crack in weld—record ........................................................ 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 3,383 RR trained employees. 150 workers ............... 3,383 tests ................. 1 plan ......................... 30 mins .... 2 minutes 40 hours .. 75 113 40 32 railroads ............... 1 notice ...................... 30 mins .... 1 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 32 lists ....................... 4 tags ......................... 2 notices .................... 1 hour ...... 3 minutes 1 minute ... 32 .20 .0333 32 32 32 32 ............... ............... ............... ............... 1 plan ......................... 60 workers ................. 1 record ..................... 1 petition .................... 16 hours .. 4 hours .... 2.25 hours 4 hours .... 16 240 2 4 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 3,264 records ............ 100 records ............... 12 mins .... 6 minutes 653 10 32 railroads ............... 1 document ................ 4 hours .... 4 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 2,500 forms ............... 1 procedure ............... 21 mins .... 2 hours .... 875 2 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 1 document ................ 25 tags ....................... 32 notices .................. 2 hours .... 3 minutes 1 minute ... 2 1 1 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 50 tags ....................... 50 tags ....................... 4 documents .............. 3 minutes 3 minutes 2 hours .... 3 3 8 32 railroads ............... 100 notices ................ 3 minutes 5 —Recordkeeping—Employee/Contractor current qualifications .................................. 238.111—Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan: Passenger equipment that has previously been used in service in the U.S. —Passenger equipment that has not been previously used in revenue service in the U.S. —Subsequent equipment orders .................................................................................. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 —Tier II & Tier III Passenger Equipment: Report of test results to FRA (Revised Requirement). —Plan submitted to FRA for Tier II or Tier III equipment before being placed in service (Revised Requirement). 238.131—Exterior side door safety systems—new passenger cars/locomotives used in passenger service: Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis (FMECA). 238.133—Exterior side door safety systems—passenger cars/locomotives used in passenger service: Functional test plans. —Notification to designated RR authority by train crewmember of unsealed door bypass device. —Safety briefing by train crew when door by-pass device is activated ...................... —Notification to designated RR authority by train crewmember that door by-pass device has been activated. —On-site qualified person (QP) description to a qualified maintenance person (QMP) off-site that equipment is safe to move for repairs. —QP/QMP notification to crewmember in charge that door by-pass has been activated + safety briefing by train crew. —Petitions for special approval of alternative compliance—impractical equipment design. —Records of inspection/repair of welded safety appliance brackets/supports/training 238.230—Safety Appliances—New Equipment—Inspection record of welded equipment by qualified Employee. —Welded safety appliances: Documentation for equipment impractically designed to mechanically fasten safety appliance support. 238.231—Brake System—Inspection and repair of hand/parking brake: Records ............ —Procedures verifying hold of hand/parking brakes ................................................... 238.237—Automated monitoring: —Documentation for alerter/deadman control timing .................................................. —Defective alerter/deadman control: Tagging ............................................................. 238.303—Exterior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger equipment: Notice of previous inspection. —Dynamic brakes not in operating mode: Tag ........................................................... —Conventional locomotives equipped with inoperative dynamic brakes: Tagging ..... —MU passenger equipment found with inoperative/ineffective air compressors at exterior calendar day inspection: Documents. —Written notice to train crew about inoperative/ineffective air compressors .............. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 4701 railroads railroads railroads railroads railroads railroads railroads railroads Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Total annual burden hours 11 40 80 50 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time per response —Records of inoperative air compressors ................................................................... —Record of exterior calendar day mechanical inspection .......................................... 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 100 records ............... 1,959,620 records ..... 3 359,264 238.305—Interior calendar day mechanical inspection of passenger cars—Tagging of defective end/side doors. —Records of interior calendar day inspection ............................................................. 32 railroads ............... 540 tags ..................... 2 minutes 10 minutes +1 minute. 1 minute ... 32 railroads ............... 1,959,620 records ..... 359,264 32 railroads ............... 2 notices/notifications 5 minutes +1 minute. 5 hours .... 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 200 notices ................ 19,284 insp./records .. 7 3,857,443 32 railroads ............... 5 documents .............. 2 minutes 200 hours/ 2 minutes. 100 hours 32 railroads ............... 50 tags ....................... 3 minutes CFR section 238.307—Periodic mechanical inspection of passenger cars and unpowered vehicles— Alternative inspection intervals: Notifications. —Notice of seats/seat attachments broken or loose ................................................... —Records of each periodic mechanical inspection ..................................................... khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59215 Total annual burden hours 9 10 —Detailed documentation of reliability assessments as basis for alternative inspection interval. 238.311—Single car test: —Tagging to indicate need for single car test ............................................................. 238.313—Class I Brake Test: —Record for additional inspection for passenger equipment that does not comply with § 238.231(b)(1). 238.315—Class IA brake test: —Notice to train crew that test has been performed (verbal notice) ........................... —Communicating signal tested and operating as intended ........................................ 32 railroads ............... 15,600 insp./records .. 30 minutes 7,800 32 railroads ............... 32 railroads ............... 18,250 notices ........... 365,000 op. sufficiency tests. 5 seconds 15 seconds. 25 1,521 238.317—Class II brake test: —Communicating signal tested and operating as intended ........................................ 32 railroads ............... 15 seconds. 2 minutes 1,521 32 railroads ............... 365,000 op. sufficiency tests. 1,250 notes ................ 1 railroad ................... 1 railroad ................... 2 railroads ................. 10,000 alerts/alarms .. 21,900 notices ........... 1 analysis .................. 10 secs .... 20 secs .... 40 hours .. 28 122 40 2 railroads ................. 1 model validation/ analysis. 1 test/analysis ............ 40 hours .. 40 40 hours .. 40 1 compliance document/analysis. 1 data document/analysis. 60 markings ............... 1 document analysis 20 hours .. 20 60 hours .. 60 2 minutes 10 hours .. 2 10 2 minutes 20 hours .. 4 20 5 glass manuf ........... 5 glass manuf ........... 120 window markings 1 data document/analysis. 1, 200 glass markings 1 alternative standard 2 minutes 5 hours .... 40 5 2 railroads ................. 1 analysis/test ............ 480 hours 480 2 railroads ................. 240 stencils/markings 20 minutes 80 2 railroads ................. 2 railroads ................. 1 test/cert ................... 1 ITM plan ................. 6 hours .... 480 hours 6 480 2 railroads ................. 1 design ..................... 40 hours .. 40 2 railroads ................. 2 railroads ................. 1 procedure ............... 1 analysis/document .. 8 hours .... 20 hours .. 8 20 2 railroads ................. 1 analysis/document .. 40 hours .. 40 2 railroads ................. 1 analysis/document .. 20 hours .. 20 2 railroads ................. 1 plan ......................... 60 hours .. 60 2 railroads ................. 2 railroads ................. 1 analysis/test ............ 1 analysis/test ............ 60 hours .. 40 hours .. 60 40 238.321—Out-of-service credit—Passenger car: Out-of-use notation ................................ 238.445—Automated Monitoring: —Performance monitoring: Alerters/alarms ................................................................. —Monitoring system: Self-test feature: Notifications ................................................... 238.703—Quasi-static Load Requirements—Document/analysis for Tier III Trainsets showing compliance with this section (New Requirement). 238.705—Dynamic Collision Scenario—Demonstration of Occupied Volume Integrity for Tier III Trainsets—Model validation document (New Requirement). 238.707—Override Protection—Anti-climbing performance test/analysis for Tier III Trainsets (New Requirement). 238.709—Fluid Entry Inhibition—Information to demonstrate compliance with this section—Tier III Trainsets (New Requirement). 238.721—New Requirements—Tier III Trainsets—End-facing document/analysis for exterior windows of Tier III Trainsets. —Marking of End-facing exterior windows Tier III Trainsets ....................................... —Cab Glazing; Side-facing exterior windows in Tier III cab—document showing compliance with Type II glazing. —Marking of side-facing exterior windows in Tier III Trainsets ................................... —Non-Cab Glazing; Side-facing exterior windows—Tier III—compliance document for Type II glazing. —Marking of side-facing exterior windows—Tier III Trainsets—non-cab cars ............ —Alternative standard to FRA for side-facing exterior window intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency window exit (option to comply with an alternative standard). 238.731—New Requirements—Brake Systems—RR analysis and testing Tier III trainsets’ maximum safe operating speed. —Tier III trainsets’ passenger brake alarm—legible stenciling/marking of devices with words ‘‘Passenger Brake Alarm’’. —Main reservoir test/certification ................................................................................. —Inspection, testing and maintenance plan (ITM)—Periodic inspection for main reservoirs. —Brake actuator design with approved brake cylinder pressure as part of design review process. —Tier III equipment: Demonstrated securement procedure ........................................ 238.733—Tier III Interior fixture attachment standard—analysis for FRA approval (New Requirement). 238.735—Tier III seat crashworthiness standard (passenger & cab crew)—analysis for FRA approval (New Requirement). 238.737—Tier III luggage racks standard—analysis for FRA approval (New Requirement). 238.741—New Requirement—Emergency window egress/rescue plan to FRA for passenger cars in Tier III trainsets not in compliance with sections 238.113 or 238.114. 238.743—New Requirement—Emergency Lighting Std.—Tier III trainsets—analysis/test 238.751—New Requirements—Alerters—alternate technology- Tier III trainsets—analysis/test. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 4701 2 railroads ................. 2 railroads ................. 5 glass manufacturers. 5 glass manuf ........... 5 glass manuf ........... 5 glass manuf ........... 5 glass manuf ........... Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 500 3 42 59216 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions; searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the information collection submission sent to OMB, please contact FRA Information Collection Clearance Officers Mr. Robert Brogan at (202) 493–6292 or Ms. Kimberly Toone at (202) 493–6132, or via email at the following addresses: Robert.Brogan@dot.gov; Kimberly.Toone@dot.gov. Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the collection of information requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 725 17th St. NW, Washington, DC 20503, attn: FRA Desk Officer. Comments may also be sent via email to the Office of Management and Budget at the following address: oira_submissions@ omb.eop.gov. OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register. Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of this final rule. The OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate notice in the Federal Register. D. Federalism Implications Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism’’ (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications.’’ ‘‘Policies that have federalism implications’’ are defined in the Executive Order to include regulations that have ‘‘substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.’’ Under Executive Order 13132, the agency may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes substantial VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 direct compliance costs and that is not required by statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local governments, or the agency consults with State and local government officials early in the process of developing the regulation. Where a regulation has federalism implications and preempts State law, the agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the process of developing the regulation. This final rule has been analyzed under the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. This final rule will not have a substantial effect on the States or their political subdivisions, and it will not affect the relationships between the Federal government and the States or their political subdivisions, or the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. In addition, FRA has determined that this regulatory action will not impose substantial direct compliance costs on the States or their political subdivisions. Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not apply. However, this final rule could have preemptive effect by operation of law under certain provisions of the Federal railroad safety statutes, specifically the former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106, and the former Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LIA) at 45 U.S.C. 22–34, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20701–20703. Section 20106 provides that States may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject matter of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies under the ‘‘essentially local safety or security hazard’’ exception to section 20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as preempting the field concerning locomotive safety. See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). E. International Trade Impact Assessment The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign commerce and believes that its requirements are consistent with the Trade Agreements Act. The requirements are safety standards, which, as noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to trade. Moreover, FRA has sought, to the extent practicable, to state the requirements in terms of the performance desired, rather than in more narrow terms restricted to a particular design or system. F. Environmental Impact FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, related regulatory requirements, and its ‘‘Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts’’ (FRA’s Procedures) (64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999). FRA has determined that this final rule is categorically excluded from detailed environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA’s Procedures, which concerns the promulgation of railroad safety rules and policy statements that do not result in significantly increased emissions of air or water pollutants or noise or increased traffic congestion in any mode of transportation. See 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Categorical exclusions (CEs) are actions identified in an agency’s NEPA implementing procedures that do not normally have a significant impact on the environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 1508.4. In analyzing the applicability of a CE, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant a more detailed environmental review through the preparation of an EA or EIS. Id. In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA’s Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no extraordinary circumstances exist with respect to this regulation that might trigger the need for a more detailed environmental review. The purpose of this rulemaking is to amend FRA’s Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. This rulemaking adds safety standards to facilitate the safe implementation of high-speed rail at E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations speeds up to 220 mph (Tier III). The rule also establishes crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements in the alternative to those specified for passenger trainsets operated at speeds up to 125 mph (Tier I). In addition, the rule increases from 150 mph to 160 mph the maximum speed allowable for the tier of railroad passenger equipment currently operated at the Nation’s highest train speeds (Tier II). FRA does not anticipate any environmental impacts from the requirements and finds that there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this final rule. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice) Executive Order 12898, ‘‘Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,’’ and DOT Order 5610.2(a) (91 FR 27534, May 10, 2012) require DOT agencies to achieve environmental justice as part of their mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects, including interrelated social and economic effects, of their programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations. The DOT Order instructs DOT agencies to address compliance with Executive Order 12898 and requirements within the DOT Order in rulemaking activities, as appropriate. FRA has evaluated this rule under Executive Order 12898 and the DOT Order and has determined that it will not cause disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects on minority populations or low-income populations. H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation) FRA has evaluated this rule in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175, ‘‘Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,’’ dated November 6, 2000. This rule will not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, will not impose substantial direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments, and will not preempt tribal laws. Therefore, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175 do not apply, and a tribal summary impact statement is not required. I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Under section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 agency ‘‘shall, unless otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector (other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate requirements specifically set forth in law).’’ Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ‘‘before promulgating any general notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency shall prepare a written statement’’ detailing the effect on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. This final rule will not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of $100,000,000 or more (as adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year, and thus preparation of such a statement is not required. J. Energy Impact Executive Order 13211, ‘‘Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,’’ requires Federal agencies to prepare a Statement of Energy Effects for any ‘‘significant energy action.’’ See 66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001. FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13211 and determined that this regulatory action is not a ‘‘significant energy action’’ within the meaning of the Executive Order. Executive Order 13783, ‘‘Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,’’ requires Federal agencies to review regulations to determine whether they potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources. See 82 FR 16093, March 31, 2017. FRA has determined this regulatory action will not burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources. K. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51 As required by 1 CFR 51.5, FRA has summarized the standards it is incorporating by reference and shown the reasonable availability of those standards in the section-by-section analysis of §§ 238.733, 238.735, 238.737, 238.743, and Appendix G, paragraphs (i) and (j) of this rulemaking document. PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59217 List of Subjects 49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 236 Railroad safety. 49 CFR Part 238 Incorporation by reference, Passenger equipment, Railroad safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The Rule For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA amends parts 229, 231, 236, and 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows: PART 229—[AMENDED] 1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 103, 322(a), 20103, 20107, 20901–02, 21301, 21302, 21311; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89. Subpart A—General ■ 2. Revise § 229.3(c) to read as follows: § 229.3 Applicability. * * * * * (c) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of § 229.125 do not apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in § 238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph). * * * * * ■ 3. Section 229.5 is amended by revising the definition of ‘‘Tier II’’ to read as follows: § 229.5 Definitions. * * * * * Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph. * * * * * PART 231—[AMENDED] 4. The authority citation for part 231 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107, 20131, 20301–20303, 21301–21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89. ■ 5. Revise § 231.0(c) to read as follows: § 231.0 Applicability and penalties. * * * * * (c) Except for the provisions governing uncoupling devices, this part does not apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in § 238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph). * * * * * E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59218 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations PART 236—[AMENDED] 6. The authority citation for part 236 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20157, 20301–20303, 20306, 20701–20703, 21301–21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89. Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems § 236.1007 [Amended] 7. In § 236.1007, remove paragraph (d), and redesignate paragraph (e) as new paragraph (d). ■ PART 238—[AMENDED] 8. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302–20303, 20306, 20701–20702, 21301–21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89. Subpart A—General 9. Section 238.5 is amended by: a. Adding in alphabetical order a definition of ‘‘Associate Administrator’’; ■ b. Revising the definitions of ‘‘glazing, end-facing’’, ‘‘glazing, side-facing’’, and ‘‘Tier II’’; ■ c. Adding in alphabetical order a definition of ‘‘Tier III’’; ■ d. Revising the definition of ‘‘Train, Tier II passenger’’; and ■ e. Adding in alphabetical order definitions of ‘‘Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger’’, ‘‘Trainset, Tier III’’, and ‘‘Trainset unit’’. The additions and revisions read as follows: ■ ■ § 238.5 Definitions. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 * * * * * Associate Administrator means Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Associate Administrator for Safety. * * * * * Glazing, end-facing means any exterior glazing located where a line perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal angle of 50 degrees or less with the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material is installed, except for: The coupled ends of multiple-unit (MU) locomotives or other equipment semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist; and end doors of passenger cars at locations other than the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. Any location which, due to curvature of the glazing material, can meet the criteria for either an end-facing glazing location or a side- VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 facing glazing location shall be considered an end-facing glazing location. * * * * * Glazing, side-facing means any glazing located where a line perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal angle of more than 50 degrees with the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material is installed. Side-facing glazing also means glazing located at the coupled ends of MU locomotives or other equipment semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist and glazing located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. * * * * * Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph. Tier III means operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph and in an exclusive right-ofway without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. * * * * * Train, Tier II passenger means a shortdistance or long-distance intercity passenger train providing service at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph. * * * * * Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger means a trainset consisting of Tier I passenger equipment demonstrating alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance under the requirements of appendix G to this part. Trainset, Tier III means an intercity passenger train that provides service in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. Trainset unit means a trainset segment located between connecting arrangements (articulations). * * * * * ■ 10. In § 238.21 revise paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) to read as follows: § 238.21 Special approval procedure. * * * * * (c) * * * (2) The elements prescribed in §§ 238.201(b)(1), 238.229(j)(2), and 238.230(d); and * * * * * (d) * * * (2) Each petition for special approval of the pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan shall be submitted to the PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Associate Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. * * * * * Subpart B—Safety Planning and General Requirements 11. In § 238.111 revise paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and (c) to read as follows: ■ § 238.111 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan. * * * * * (b) * * * (2) Submit a copy of the plan to FRA at least 30 days before testing the equipment and include with that submission notification of the times and places of the pre-revenue service tests to permit FRA observation of such tests. For Tier II and Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall obtain FRA approval of the plan under the procedures specified in § 238.21. * * * * * (4) Document in writing the results of the tests. For Tier II and Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall report the results of the tests to the Associate Administrator at least 90 days prior to its intended operation of the equipment in revenue service. (5) Correct any safety deficiencies identified in the design of the equipment or in the ITM procedures uncovered during testing. If safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design changes, the railroad shall impose operational limitations on the revenue service operation of the equipment designed to ensure the equipment can operate safely. For Tier II and Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall comply with any operational limitations the Associate Administrator imposes on the revenue service operation of the equipment for cause stated following FRA review of the results of the test program. This section does not restrict a railroad from petitioning FRA for a waiver of a safety regulation under the procedures specified in part 211 of this chapter. * * * * * (7) For Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, obtain approval from the Associate Administrator before placing the equipment in revenue service. The Associate Administrator will grant such approval if the railroad demonstrates compliance with the applicable requirements of this part. (c) If a railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new technology to Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment that has been used in revenue service in E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations the United States and that affects a safety system on such equipment, the railroad shall follow the procedures in paragraph (b) of this section before placing the equipment in revenue service with the major upgrade or introduction of new technology. Subpart C—Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment 12. In § 238.201, redesignate the text after the heading of paragraph (b) as paragraph (b)(1), revise the first sentence of newly redesignated paragraph (b)(1), and add paragraph (b)(2) to read as follows: ■ § 238.201 Scope/alternative compliance. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 * * * * * (b) * * * (1) Passenger equipment of special design shall be deemed to comply with this subpart, other than § 238.203, for the service environment the petitioner proposes to operate the equipment in if the Associate Administrator determines under paragraph (c) of this section that the equipment provides at least an equivalent level of safety in such environment for the protection of its occupants from serious injury in the case of a derailment or collision. * * * (2)(i) Tier I passenger trainsets may comply with the alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to this part instead of the requirements in §§ 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219. (ii) To assess compliance with the alternative requirements, the railroad shall submit the following documents to the Associate Administrator, for review: (A) Test plans, and supporting documentation for all tests intended to demonstrate compliance with the alternative requirements and to validate any computer modeling and analysis used, including notice of such tests, 30 days before commencing the tests; and (B) A carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance report based on the analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to demonstrate compliance. (iii) The carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance report shall be deemed acceptable unless the Associate Administrator stays action by written notice to the railroad within 60 days after receipt of the report. (A) If the Associate Administrator stays action, the railroad shall correct any deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected the deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 (B) FRA may also impose written conditions necessary for safely operating the equipment, for cause stated. * * * * * ■ 13. Revise § 238.203(a)(1) to read as follows: § 238.203 Static end strength. (a)(1) Except as further specified in this paragraph (a), paragraph (d) of this section, and § 238.201(b)(2), on or after November 8, 1999, all passenger equipment shall resist a minimum static end load of 800,000 pounds applied on the line of draft without permanent deformation of the body structure. * * * * * ■ 14. Revise the first sentence of § 238.205(a) to read as follows: § 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, and § 238.201(b), all passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on or after September 8, 2000, and prior to March 9, 2010, shall have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds without failure. * * * * * * * * ■ 15. Revise § 238.207 to read as follows: § 238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and carbody. Except as specified in § 238.201(b), all passenger equipment placed in service for the first time on or after September 8, 2000, shall have a coupler carrier at each end designed to resist a vertical downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for any normal horizontal position of the coupler, without permanent deformation. Passenger equipment connected by articulated joints that complies with the requirements of § 238.205(a) also complies with the requirements of this section. ■ 16. Amend § 238.209 by adding paragraph (a) introductory text to read as follows: § 238.209 Forward end structure of locomotives, including cab cars and MU locomotives. (a) Except as specified in § 238.201(b)— * * * * * ■ 17. Revise § 238.211(a) introductory text to read as follows: § 238.211 Collision posts. (a) Except as further specified in this paragraph (a), paragraphs (b) through (d) PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59219 of this section, § 238.201(b), and § 238.209(b)— * * * * * ■ 18. Revise § 238.213(a)(1) to read as follows: § 238.213 Corner posts. (a)(1) Except as further specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, § 238.201(b), and § 238.209(b), each passenger car shall have at each end of the car, placed ahead of the occupied volume, two full-height corner posts, each capable of resisting together with its supporting car body structure: * * * * * ■ 19. Revise the first sentence of § 238.219 to read as follows: § 238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment. Except as provided in § 238.201(b), passenger equipment shall have a truckto-carbody attachment with an ultimate strength sufficient to resist without failure the following individually applied loads: 2g vertically on the mass of the truck; and 250,000 pounds in any horizontal direction on the truck, along with the resulting vertical reaction to this load. * * * Subpart E—Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment 20. Revise the first sentence of § 238.401 to read as follows: ■ § 238.401 Scope. This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph. * * * Subpart F—Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment 21. Revise § 238.501 to read as follows: ■ § 238.501 Scope. This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for railroad passenger equipment that operates at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph. ■ 22. Add subpart H to part 238 to read as follows: Subpart H—Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment Sec. 238.701 Scope. 238.702 Definitions. Trainset Structure 238.703 Quasi-static compression load requirements. 238.705 Dynamic collision scenario. 238.707 Override protection. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59220 238.709 238.711 238.713 end. 238.715 238.717 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations Fluid entry inhibition. End structure integrity of cab end. End structure integrity of non-cab Roof and side structure integrity. Truck-to-carbody attachment. Glazing 238.721 Glazing. Brake System 238.731 Brake system. Interior Fittings and Surfaces 238.733 Interior fixture attachment. 238.735 Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew). 238.737 Luggage racks. Emergency Systems 238.741 Emergency window egress and rescue access. 238.743 Emergency lighting. Cab Equipment 238.751 Alerters. 238.753 Sanders. Figure 1 to Subpart H of Part 238— Cylindrical Projectile for Use in § 238.721 End-Facing Cab-Glazing Testing Subpart H—Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment § 238.701 Scope. This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger equipment operating in a shared rightof-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. Passenger seating is permitted in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset if the trainset complies with the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements of this subpart, and the railroad has an approved rightof-way plan under § 213.361 of this chapter and an approved HSR–125 plan under § 236.1007(c) of this chapter. Demonstration of compliance with the requirements of this subpart is subject to FRA review and approval under § 238.111. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 § 238.702 Definitions. As used in this subpart— Cab means a compartment or space within a trainset that is designed to be occupied by an engineer and contain an operating console for exercising control over the trainset. Integrated trainset means a passenger train in which all units of the trainset are designed to operate together to achieve the trainset’s structural crashworthiness performance. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Trainset Structure § 238.703 Quasi-static compression load requirements. (a) General. To demonstrate resistance to loss of occupied volume, Tier III trainsets shall comply with both the quasi-static compression load requirements in paragraph (b) of this section and the dynamic collision requirements in § 238.705. (b) Quasi-static compression load requirements. (1) Each individual vehicle in a Tier III trainset shall resist a minimum quasi-static end load applied on the collision load path of: (i) 800,000 pounds without permanent deformation of the occupied volume; or (ii) 1,000,000 pounds without exceeding either of the following two conditions: (A) Local plastic strains no greater than 5 percent; and (B) Vehicle shortening no greater than 1 percent over any 15-foot length of the occupied volume; or (iii) 1,200,000 pounds without crippling the body structure. Crippling of the body structure is defined as reaching the maximum point on the load-versus-displacement characteristic. (2) To demonstrate compliance with this section, each type of vehicle shall be subjected to an end compression load (buff) test with an end load magnitude no less than 337,000 lbf (1500 kN). (3) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section shall be documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval. § 238.705 Dynamic collision scenario. (a) General. In addition to the requirements of § 238.703, occupied volume integrity (OVI) shall also be demonstrated for each individual vehicle in a Tier III trainset through an evaluation of a dynamic collision scenario in which a moving train impacts a standing train under the following conditions: (1) The initially-moving trainset is made up of the equipment undergoing evaluation at its AW0 ready-to-run weight; (2) If trainsets of varying consist lengths are intended for use in service, then the shortest and longest consist lengths shall be evaluated; (3) If the initially-moving trainset is intended for use in push-pull service, then, as applicable, each configuration of leading vehicle shall be evaluated separately; (4) The initially-standing train is led by a rigid locomotive and also made up of five identical passenger coaches having the following characteristics: PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 (i) The rigid locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach weighs 95,000 pounds; (ii) The rigid locomotive and each passenger coach crush in response to applied force as specified in Table 1 to this section; and (iii) The rigid locomotive shall be modeled using the data inputs listed in appendix H to this part so that it has a geometric design as depicted in Figure 1 to appendix H to this part; (5) The scenario shall be evaluated on tangent, level track; (6) The initially-moving trainset shall have an initial velocity of 20 mph if it is an integrated trainset, or an initial velocity of 25 mph if the lead vehicle of the trainset is not part of the integrated design; (7) The coupler knuckles on the colliding equipment shall be closed and centered; (8) The initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train consists are not braked; (9) The initially-standing train has only one degree-of-freedom (longitudinal displacement); and (10) The model used to demonstrate compliance with the dynamic collision requirements must be validated. Model validation shall be documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval. (b) Dynamic collision requirements. As a result of the impact described in paragraph (a) of this section— (1) One of the following two conditions must be met for the occupied volume of the initially-moving trainset: (i) There shall be no more than 10 inches of longitudinal permanent deformation; or (ii) Global vehicle shortening shall not exceed 1 percent over any 15-foot length of occupied volume. (2) If Railway Group Standard GM/ RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, is used to demonstrate compliance with any of the requirements in §§ 238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of each vehicle in the initially-moving trainset during the dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g during any 100-millisecond (ms) time period. The maximum interval between data points so averaged in the 100-ms time period shall be no greater than 1-ms. (3) Compliance with each of the following conditions shall also be demonstrated for the cab of the initiallymoving trainset after the impact: (i) For each seat provided for an employee in the cab, and any floor- E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations described in § 238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall be evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions: (i) All vehicles in the initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train consists are positioned at their nominal running heights; (ii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically upwards by 2 inches, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-vehicle interface in the initially-moving trainset; and, (iii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically downwards by 2 inches, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-vehicle interface in the initially-moving trainset. (2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this TABLE 1—FORCE-VERSUS-CRUSH RE- section, compliance with the following LATIONSHIPS FOR PASSENGER conditions shall be demonstrated after a COACH AND CONVENTIONAL LOCO- dynamic impact: MOTIVE (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of the Crush Force Vehicle connected equipment in the initially(in) (lbf) moving trainset shall not change by Passenger Coach .................. 0 0 more than 4 inches; and 3 80,000 6 2,500,000 (ii) The tread of any wheel of the Conventional Locomotive ...... 0 0 initially-moving trainset shall not rise 2.5 100,000 5 2,500,000 above the top of rail by more than 4 inches. mounted seat in the cab, a survival space shall be maintained where there is no intrusion for a minimum of 12 inches from each edge of the seat. Walls or other items originally within this defined space, not including the operating console, shall not further intrude more than 1.5 inches towards the seat under evaluation; (ii) There shall be a clear exit path for the occupants of the cab; (iii) The vertical height of the cab (floor to ceiling) shall not be reduced by more than 20 percent; and (iv) The operating console shall not have moved more than 2 inches closer to the engineer’s seat; if the engineer’s seat is part of a set of adjacent seats, the requirements of this paragraph (b)(3) apply to both seats. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 § 238.707 Override protection. § 238.709 (a) Colliding equipment. (1) Using the dynamic collision scenario described in § 238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall be evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions: (i) All vehicles in the initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train consists are positioned at their nominal running heights; (ii) The lead vehicle of the initiallymoving trainset shall be perturbed laterally and vertically upwards by 3 inches at the colliding interface; and (iii) The lead vehicle of the initiallymoving trainset shall be perturbed laterally and vertically downwards by 3 inches at the colliding interface. (2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall be demonstrated after a dynamic impact: (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of the colliding equipment in the initiallymoving trainset and initially-standing train consists shall not change by more than 4 inches; and (ii) The tread of any wheel of the first vehicle of the initially-moving trainset shall not rise above the top of the rail by more than 4 inches (b) Connected equipment override. (1) Using the dynamic collision scenario VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Fluid entry inhibition. (a) The skin covering the forwardfacing end of a Tier III trainset shall be— (1) Equivalent to a 1⁄2-inch steel plate with yield strength of 25,000 pounds per square inch. Material of higher yield strength may be used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at least an equivalent level of strength is maintained. The sum of the thicknesses of elements (e.g., skin and structural elements) from the structural leading edge of the trainset to a point, when projected onto a vertical plane, just forward of the engineer’s normal operating position, may also be used to satisfy this requirement; (2) Designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into the cab; and (3) Affixed to the collision posts or other main structural members of the forward end structure so as to add to the strength of the end structure. (b) Information used to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section shall at a minimum include a list and drawings of the structural elements considered in satisfying the thickness-strength requirement of this section, and calculations showing that the thickness-strength requirement is satisfied. PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 § 238.711 end. 59221 End structure integrity of cab The cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements of appendix F to this part to demonstrate the integrity of the end structure. For those units of Tier III trainsets without identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix F to this part apply to the end structure at each location specified, regardless of whether the structure is a post. § 238.713 cab end. End structure integrity of non- (a) General. Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section to demonstrate the integrity of the end structure for other than the cab ends. (b) Collision post requirements. (1) Each unit of a Tier III trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the unit either: (i) Two full-height collision posts, located at approximately the one-third points laterally. Each collision post shall have an ultimate longitudinal shear strength of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point even with the top of the underframe member to which it is attached. If reinforcement is used to provide the shear value, the reinforcement shall have full value for a distance of 18 inches up from the underframe connection and then taper to a point approximately 30 inches above the underframe connection; or (ii) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section is required to withstand. For analysis purposes, the required forces may be assumed to be evenly distributed at the locations where the equivalent structure attaches to the underframe. (2) Collision posts are not required for the non-cab ends of any unit with pushback couplers and interlocking anticlimbing mechanisms in a Tier III trainset, or the non-cab ends of a semipermanently coupled consist of trainset units, if the inter-car connection is capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post requirements in subpart C of this part. For demonstrating that the inter-car connection is capable of preventing such disengagement (and telescoping), the criteria in § 238.707(b) apply. (c) Corner post requirements. (1) Each passenger car in a Tier III trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the car, placed ahead of the occupied volume, two side structures capable of resisting a: E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59222 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations (i) 150,000-pound horizontal force applied at floor height without failure; (ii) 20,000-pound horizontal force applied at roof height without failure; and (iii) 30,000-pound horizontal force applied at a point 18 inches above the top of the floor without permanent deformation. (2) For purposes of this paragraph (c), the orientation of the applied horizontal forces shall range from longitudinal inward to transverse inward. (3) For each evaluation load, the load shall be applied to an area of the structure sufficient to not locally cripple or punch through the material. (4) The load area shall be chosen to be appropriate for the particular car design and shall not exceed 10 inches by 10 inches. § 238.715 integrity. Roof and side structure To demonstrate roof and side structure integrity, Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements in §§ 238.215 and 238.217. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 § 238.717 Truck-to-carbody attachment. To demonstrate the integrity of truckto-carbody attachments, each unit in a Tier III trainset shall: (a) Comply with the requirements in § 238.219; or (b) Have a truck-to-carbody attachment with strength sufficient to resist, without yielding, the following individually applied, quasi-static loads on the mass of the truck at its CG: (1) 3g vertically downward; (2) 1g laterally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to this load; and (3) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 5g longitudinally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to this load, provided that for the conditions in the dynamic collision scenario described in § 238.705(a): (i) The average longitudinal deceleration at the CG of the equipment during the impact does not exceed 5g; and (ii) The peak longitudinal deceleration of the truck during the impact does not exceed 10g. (c) As an alternative to demonstrating compliance with paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the truck shall be shown to remain attached after a dynamic impact under the conditions in the collision scenario described in § 238.705(a). (d) For purposes of paragraph (b) of this section, the mass of the truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, truckmounted brake system, suspension system components, and any other component attached to the truck by design. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 (e) Truck attachment shall be demonstrated using a validated model. Glazing § 238.721 Glazing. (a) Cab glazing; end-facing. (1) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab of a Tier III trainset shall comply with the requirements for Type I glazing in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section. (2) Instead of the large object impact test specified in appendix A to part 223, each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall demonstrate compliance with the following requirements of this paragraph (a): (i) The glazing article shall be impacted with a cylindrical projectile that complies with the following design specifications as depicted in Figure 1 to this subpart: (A) The projectile shall be constructed of aluminum alloy such as ISO 6362– 2:1990, grade 2017A, or its demonstrated equivalent; (B) The projectile end cap shall be made of steel; (C) The projectile assembly shall weigh 2.2 pounds (¥0, +0.044 pounds) or 1 kilogram (kg) (¥0, +0.020 kg) and shall have a hemispherical tip. Material may be removed from the interior of the aluminum portion to adjust the projectile mass according to the prescribed tolerance. The hemispherical tip shall have a milled surface with 0.04 inch (1 mm) grooves; and (D) The projectile shall have an overall diameter of 3.7 inches (94 mm) with a nominal internal diameter of 2.76 inches (70 mm). (ii) The test of the glazing article shall be deemed satisfactory if the test projectile does not penetrate the windscreen, the windscreen remains in its frame, and the witness plate is not marked by spall. (iii) A new projectile shall be used for each test. (iv) The glazing article to be tested shall be that which has the smallest area for each design type. For the test, the glazing article shall be fixed in a frame of the same construction as that mounted on the vehicle. (v) A minimum of four tests shall be conducted and all must be deemed satisfactory. Two tests shall be conducted with the complete glazing article at 32 °F ± 9 °F (0 °C ± 5 °C) and two tests shall be conducted with the complete glazing article at 68 °F ± 9 °F (20 °C ± 5 °C). For the tests to be valid they shall demonstrate that the core temperature of the complete glazing article during each test is within the required temperature range. PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 (vi) The test glazing article shall be mounted at the same angle relative to the projectile path as it will be to the direction of travel when mounted on the vehicle. (vii) The projectile’s impact velocity shall equal the maximum operating speed of the Tier III trainset plus 100 mph (160 km/h). The projectile velocity shall be measured within 13 feet (4 m) of the point of impact. (viii) The point of impact shall be at the geometrical center of the glazing article. (3) Representative samples for large object impact testing of large Tier III end-facing cab glazing articles may be used instead of the actual design size, provided that the following conditions are met: (i) Testing of glazing articles having dimensions greater than 39.4 by 27.6 inches (1,000 mm by 700 mm), excluding framing, may be performed using a flat sample having the same composition as the glazing article for which compliance is to be demonstrated. The glazing manufacturer shall provide documentation containing its technical justification that testing a flat sample is sufficient to verify compliance of the glazing article with the requirements of this paragraph (a). (ii) Flat sample testing is permitted only when no surface of the full-size glazing article contains curvature with a radius less than 98 inches (2,500 mm), and when a complete, finished glazing article is laid (convex side uppermost) on a flat horizontal surface, the distance (measured perpendicularly to the flat surface) between the flat surface and the inside face of the glazing article is not greater than 8 inches (200 mm). (4) End-facing glazing shall demonstrate sufficient resistance to spalling, as verified by the large impact projectile test under the following conditions: (i) An annealed aluminum witness plate of maximum thickness 0.006 inch (0.15 mm) and of dimension 19.7 by 19.7 inches (500 mm by 500 mm) is placed vertically behind the sample under test, at a horizontal distance of 500 mm from the point of impact in the direction of travel of the projectile or the distance between the point of impact of the projectile and the location of the engineer’s eyes in the engineer’s normal operating position, whichever is less. The center of the witness plate is aligned with the point of impact. (ii) Spalling performance shall be deemed satisfactory if the aluminum witness plate is not marked. (iii) For the purposes of this subpart, materials used specifically to protect the cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations shields) shall not be required to meet the flammability and smoke emission performance requirements of appendix B to this part. (5) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall, at a minimum, provide ballistic penetration resistance that meets the requirements of appendix A to part 223. (6) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall be permanently marked, before installation, in such a manner that the marking is clearly visible after the material has been installed. The marking shall include: (i) The words ‘‘FRA TYPE IHS’’ to indicate that the material has successfully passed the testing requirements specified in this paragraph (a); (ii) The name of the manufacturer; and (iii) The type or brand identification of the material. (b) Cab glazing; side-facing. Each side-facing exterior window in a cab of a Tier III trainset shall— (1) Comply with the requirements for Type II glazing contained in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, for largeobject impact; and (2) Maintain the minimum ballistics penetration resistance as required for end-facing glazing in paragraph (a)(5) of this section. (c) Non-cab glazing; side-facing. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, each side-facing exterior window in other than a cab shall comply with the requirements for Type II glazing contained in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter. (2) Instead of the requirements specified in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, a side-facing exterior window intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency window exit may comply with an alternative standard that provides an equivalent level of safety and is approved for use by FRA. (d) Glazing securement. Each exterior window shall remain in place when subjected to: (1) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two trains pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while traveling in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum authorized speed; and (2) The impact forces that the exterior window is required to resist as specified in this section. (e) Glazing certification. (1) Each manufacturer that provides glazing materials, intended by the manufacturer for use in achieving compliance with the requirements of this section, shall certify that each type of glazing material being supplied for this purpose has been VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 successfully tested. Tests performed on glazing materials for demonstration of compliance with this section, relied on by the glazing manufacturer in furtherance of certification, may be performed by either: (i) An independent third-party (laboratory, facility, underwriter); or (ii) The glazing manufacturer, by providing FRA the opportunity to witness all tests by written notice at least 30 days prior to testing. (2) Any glazing material certified to meet the requirements of this section shall be re-certified by the same means (as originally certified) if any changes are made to the glazing that may affect its mechanical properties or its mounting arrangement on the vehicle. (3) All certification/re-certification documentation shall be made available to FRA upon request. Brake System § 238.731 Brake system. (a) General. Each railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and testing the maximum safe operating speed for its Tier III trainsets that results in no thermal damage to equipment or infrastructure during normal operation of the brake system. (b) Minimum performance requirement for brake system. Each Tier III trainset’s brake system shall be capable of stopping the trainset from its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the track over which the trainset is operating under the worst-case adhesion conditions defined by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (c) Emergency brake system. A Tier III trainset shall be provided with an emergency brake application feature that produces an irretrievable stop. An emergency brake application shall be available at any time, and shall be initiated by either of the following: (1) An unintentional parting of the trainset; or (2) The train crew at locations within the trainset specified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (d) Passenger brake alarm. (1) A means to initiate a passenger brake alarm shall be provided at two locations in each unit of a Tier III trainset that is over 45 feet in length. When a unit of the trainset is 45 feet or less in length, a means to initiate a passenger brake alarm need only be provided at one location in the unit. These locations shall be identified by the railroad as approved by FRA. The words ‘‘Passenger Brake Alarm’’ shall be legibly stenciled or marked on each device or on an adjacent badge plate. PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59223 (2) All passenger brake alarms shall be installed so as to prevent accidental activation. (3) During departure from the boarding platform, activation of the passenger brake alarm shall result in an emergency brake application. (4) A passenger brake alarm activation that occurs after the trainset has safely cleared the boarding platform shall be acknowledged by the engineer within the time period specified by the railroad, as approved by FRA, for train operation to remain under the full control of the engineer. The method used to confirm that the trainset has safely cleared the boarding platform shall be defined by the railroad as approved by FRA. (5) If the engineer does not acknowledge the passenger brake alarm as specified in paragraph (d)(4) of this section, at a minimum, a retrievable full service brake application shall be automatically initiated until the trainset has stopped unless the engineer intervenes as described in paragraph (d)(6) of this section. (6) To retrieve the full service brake application described in paragraph (d)(5) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the passenger brake alarm and activate appropriate controls to issue a command for brake application as specified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (e) Degraded performance of blended brake system. The following requirements of this paragraph (e) apply to operation of Tier III trainsets with blended braking systems, to address degraded brake system performance: (1) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic or regenerative brake shall not result in exceeding the allowable stopping distance defined by the railroad as approved by FRA; (2) The available friction braking shall be adequate to stop the trainset safely under the operating conditions defined by the railroad, as approved by FRA; (3) The operational status of the trainset brake system shall be displayed for the engineer in the operating cab; and (4) The railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and testing the maximum speed for safely operating its Tier III trainsets using only the friction brake portion of the blended brake with no thermal damage to equipment or infrastructure. The analysis and testing shall also be used to determine the maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of operative friction brakes and shall be included in the railroad’s ITM program. (f) Main reservoir system. (1) The main reservoirs in a Tier III trainset E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 59224 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations shall be designed and tested to meet the requirements of a recognized standard specified by the railroad as approved by FRA, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Unfired Pressure Vessel Section VIII, Division I (ASME Code). The working pressure shall be 150 psig (10.3 bar) and the corresponding rated temperature shall be 150 °F (65 °C) unless otherwise defined by the railroad as approved by FRA. Reservoirs shall be certified based on their size and volume requirements. (2) Each welded steel main reservoir shall be drilled in accordance with the requirements of a recognized standard specified by the railroad as approved by FRA, such as paragraph UG–25(e) of Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. With the drain opening located at the low point of the reservoir, one row of holes shall be drilled lengthwise on the reservoir on a line intersecting the drain opening and sloped to the drain opening. (3) A breach of a welded steel main reservoir at any of the drilled holes described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section shall be cause for the reservoir to be condemned and withdrawn from service. Any type of welded repair to a steel main reservoir is prohibited. (g) Aluminum main reservoirs. (1) Aluminum main reservoirs used in a Tier III trainset shall conform to the requirements of § 229.51 of this chapter. (2) Any type of welded repair to an aluminum main reservoir is prohibited. (h) Main reservoir tests. Prior to initial installation, each main reservoir shall be subjected to a pneumatic or hydrostatic pressure test based on the maximum working pressure defined in paragraph (f) or (g) of this section, as appropriate, unless otherwise established by the railroad’s ITM program. Records of the test date, location, and pressure shall be maintained by the railroad for the life of the equipment. Periodic inspection requirements for main reservoirs shall be defined in the railroad’s ITM program. (i) Brake gauges. All mechanical gauges and all devices providing electronic indication of air pressure that are used by the engineer to aid in the control or braking of a Tier III trainset shall be located so they may be conveniently read from the engineer’s normal position during operation of the trainset. (j) Brake application/release. (1) Brake actuators shall be designed to provide brake pad and shoe clearance when the brakes are released. (2) The minimum brake cylinder pressure shall be established by the railroad, as approved by FRA, to VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 provide adequate adjustment from minimum service to full service for proper train operation. (k) Foundation brake gear. The railroad shall specify requirements in its ITM program for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the foundation brake gear. (l) Leakage. (1) If a Tier III trainset is equipped with a brake pipe, the leakage rates shall not exceed the limits defined in either paragraph (l)(2) of this section, or those defined in the Air Consumption Analysis included in the railroad ITM program, whichever is more restrictive. The method of inspection for main reservoir pipe leakage shall be prescribed in the railroad’s ITM program. (2) Brake pipe leakage may not exceed 5 p.s.i. per minute; and with a full service application at maximum brake pipe pressure and with communication to the brake cylinders closed, the brakes shall remain applied for at least 5 minutes. (m) Slide protection and alarm. (1) A Tier III trainset shall be equipped with an adhesion control system designed to automatically adjust the braking force on each wheel to prevent sliding during braking. (2) A wheel-slide alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall alert the engineer in the operating cab to wheelslide conditions on any axle of the trainset. (3) The railroad shall specify operating restrictions for trainsets with slide protection devices for when they fail to prevent wheel slide within safety parameters preset by the railroad. Both the operating restrictions and safety parameters shall be approved by FRA. (n) Monitoring and diagnostics. Each Tier III trainset shall be equipped with a monitoring and diagnostic system that is designed to automatically assess the functionality of the brake system for the entire trainset. Details of the system operation and the method of communication of brake system functionality prior to the departure of the trainset and while en route shall be described in detail in the railroad’s ITM program. (o) Train securement. Independent of the pneumatic brakes, Tier III equipment shall be equipped with a means of securing the equipment against unintentional movement when left standing and unmanned in such a manner that the brake system of the equipment cannot be readily controlled by a qualified person. The railroad shall develop the procedures used to secure the equipment and shall also demonstrate that those procedures effectively secure the equipment on all PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 grade conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (p) Rescue operation; brake system. A Tier III trainset’s brake system shall be designed to allow a rescue vehicle or trainset to control its brakes when the trainset is disabled. Interior Fittings and Surfaces § 238.733 Interior fixture attachment. (a) Tier III trainsets shall comply with the interior fixture attachment strength requirements referenced in either of the following paragraphs: (1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR– CS–S–006–98; or (2) Section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of GM/RT2100, provided that— (i) The conditions of § 238.705(b)(2) are met; (ii) Interior fixture attachment strength is sufficient to resist without failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical when applied to the mass of the fixture; and (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (b) The standards required in this section are incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC and is available from the sources indicated below. It is also available for inspection at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/ cfr/ibr-locations.html. (1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com. (i) APTA PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1, ‘‘Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,’’ Authorized September 28, 2005. (ii) [Reserved] (2) Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. (i) Railway Group Standard GM/ RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ December 2010. (ii) [Reserved] E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 § 238.735 Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew). (a) Passenger seating in Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements referenced in either of the following paragraphs: (1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR– CS–S–016–99 excluding Section 6, ‘‘Seat durability testing;’’ or (2) Section 6.2, ‘‘Seats for passengers, personnel, or train crew,’’ of GM/ RT2100, provided that— (i) The conditions of § 238.705(b)(2) are met; (ii) Seat attachment strength is sufficient to resist without failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g applied to the mass of the seat; and (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (b) Each seat provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, shall comply with § 238.233(e), (f), and (g). (c) The standards required in this section are incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC and are available from the sources indicated below. They are also available for inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html. (1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com. (i) APTA PR–CS–S–016–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,’’ Authorized October 3, 2010. (ii) [Reserved] (2) Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. (i) Railway Group Standard GM/ RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ December 2010. (ii) [Reserved] § 238.737 Luggage racks. (a) Overhead storage racks shall provide longitudinal and lateral restraint for stowed articles. These racks shall incorporate transverse dividers at a maximum spacing of 10 ft. (3 m) to VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 restrain the longitudinal movement of luggage. To restrain the lateral movement of luggage, these racks shall also slope downward in the outboard direction at a minimum ratio of 1:8 with respect to a horizontal plane. (b) Luggage racks shall comply with the requirements in either of the following paragraphs: (1) Section 238.233; or (2) Section 6.8, ‘‘Luggage stowage,’’ of GM/RT2100, provided that— (i) The conditions of § 238.705(b)(2) are met; (ii) Attachment strength is sufficient to resist without failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical; and (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. In particular, the railroad shall determine the maximum allowable weight of the luggage stowed for purposes of evaluating luggage rack attachment strength. (c) Railway Group Standard GM/ RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ December 2010 is incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC and is available from Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html. Emergency Systems § 238.741 Emergency window egress and rescue access. (a) Emergency window egress and rescue access plan. If a passenger car in a Tier III trainset is not designed to comply with the requirements in § 238.113 or § 238.114, the railroad shall submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress and rescue access plan during the design review stage. The plan must include, but is not limited to, the elements in this section. (b) Ease of operability. If an emergency window exit in a passenger car requires the use of a tool, other implement (e.g., hammer), or a mechanism to permit removal of the window panel from the inside of the car during an emergency situation, then the PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59225 plan must demonstrate the use of the device provides a level of safety equivalent to that required by § 238.113(b). In particular, the plan must address the location, design, and signage and instructions for the device. The railroad shall also include a provision in its Tier III ITM program to inspect for the presence of the device at least each day the car is in service. (c) Dimensions. If the dimensions of a window opening in a passenger car do not comply with the requirements in § 238.113 or § 238.114, then the plan must demonstrate that at least an equivalent level of safety is provided. (d) Alternative emergency evacuation openings. If a passenger car employs the use of emergency egress panels or additional door exits instead of emergency window exits or rescue access windows, then the plan must demonstrate that such alternative emergency evacuation openings provide a level of safety at least equivalent to that required by § 238.113 or § 238.114, or both as appropriate. The plan must address the location, design, and signage and instructions for the alternative emergency evacuation openings. § 238.743 Emergency lighting. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, Tier III trainsets shall comply with the emergency lighting requirements specified in § 238.115. (b) Emergency lighting back-up power systems shall, at a minimum, be capable of operating after experiencing the individually applied accelerations defined in either of the following paragraphs: (1) Section 238.115(a)(4)(ii); or (2) Section 6.1.4, ‘‘Security of furniture, equipment and features,’’ of GM/RT2100, provided that— (i) The conditions of § 238.705(b)(2) are met; (ii) The initial shock of a collision or derailment is based on a minimum load of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical; and (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (c) Railway Group Standard GM/ RT2100, Issue Four, ‘‘Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,’’ December 2010, is incorporated by reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC and is available from Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59226 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html. Cab Equipment § 238.751 Alerters. khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 (a) An alerter shall be provided in the operating cab of each Tier III trainset, unless in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section the trainset operates in a territory where an alternate technology providing equivalent safety is installed, such as redundant automatic train control or redundant automatic train stop system. (b) Upon initiation of the alerter, the engineer must acknowledge the alerter within the time period and according to the parameters specified by the railroad, VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 as approved by FRA, in order for train operations to remain under the full control of the engineer. (c) If the engineer does not acknowledge the alerter as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, at a minimum a retrievable full service brake application shall occur until the train has stopped, unless the crew intervenes as described in paragraph (d) of this section. (d) To retrieve the full service brake application described in paragraph (c) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the alerter and activate appropriate controls to issue a command for brake application as specified by the railroad and approved by FRA. (e) If an alternate technology to the alerter is used, the railroad shall conduct an analysis that confirms the ability of the technology to provide an equivalent level of safety. This analysis shall be approved by FRA. PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 § 238.753 Sanders. (a) A Tier III trainset shall be equipped with operative sanders, if required by the railroad and as approved by FRA. (b) Sanders required under this section shall comply with § 229.131(a), (b), and (d) of this chapter, except that instead of the requirements of §§ 229.9 and 229.23 of this chapter: (1) The requirements of § 238.17 shall apply to the tagging and movement of a Tier III trainset with defective sanders; and (2) The requirements of the railroad’s ITM program shall apply to the next periodic inspection of such a trainset. (c) In addition to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this section, the railroad’s ITM program shall specify the inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for Tier III trainsets equipped with sanders. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59227 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 23. Add and reserve subpart I to part 238 to read as follows: ■ Subpart I—Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment—[Reserved] order, the entry for new subpart H to read as follows: 24. Appendix A to part 238 is amended by adding, in alphabetical ■ APPENDIX A TO PART 238—SCHEDULE OF CIVIL PENALTIES 1 2 * * * Violation * * * Willful violation * SUBPART H—SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER III PASSENGER EQUIPMENT 238.703 238.705 238.707 Quasi-static compression load requirements .......................................................................................... Dynamic collision scenario ...................................................................................................................... Override protection .................................................................................................................................. VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 2,500 2,500 2,500 5,000 5,000 5,000 ER21NO18.128</GPH> khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 Section 59228 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations APPENDIX A TO PART 238—SCHEDULE OF CIVIL PENALTIES 1 2—Continued Section 238.709 238.711 238.713 238.715 238.717 238.721 238.731 238.733 238.735 238.737 238.741 238.751 238.753 Violation Fluid entry inhibition ................................................................................................................................ End structure integrity of cab end ........................................................................................................... End structure integrity of non-cab end .................................................................................................... Roof and side structure integrity ............................................................................................................. Truck-to-car-body attachment ................................................................................................................. Glazing .................................................................................................................................................... Brake system ........................................................................................................................................... Interior fixture attachment ....................................................................................................................... Seat crashworthiness .............................................................................................................................. Luggage racks ......................................................................................................................................... Emergency window egress and rescue access ...................................................................................... Alerters .................................................................................................................................................... Sanders ................................................................................................................................................... 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 1,000 Willful violation 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 2,000 1 A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation. Generally, when two or more violations of these regulations are discovered with respect to a single unit of passenger equipment that is placed or continued in service by a railroad, the appropriate penalties set forth above are aggregated up to a maximum of $27,904 per day. However, failure to perform, with respect to a particular unit of passenger equipment, any of the inspections and tests required under subparts D and F of this part will be treated as a violation separate and distinct from, and in addition to, any substantive violative conditions found on that unit of passenger equipment. Moreover, the Administrator reserves the right to assess a penalty of up to the statutory maximum amount for any violation where circumstances warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A. Failure to observe any condition for movement of defective equipment set forth in § 238.17 will deprive the railroad of the benefit of the movement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any responsible individuals liable for penalty under the particular regulatory section(s) concerning the substantive defect(s) present on the unit of passenger equipment at the time of movement. Failure to observe any condition for the movement of passenger equipment containing defective safety appliances, other than power brakes, set forth in § 238.17(e) will deprive the railroad of the movement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any responsible individuals liable for penalty under the particular regulatory section(s) contained in part 231 of this chapter or § 238.429 concerning the substantive defective condition. The penalties listed for failure to perform the exterior and interior mechanical inspections and tests required under § 238.303 and § 238.305 may be assessed for each unit of passenger equipment contained in a train that is not properly inspected. Whereas, the penalties listed for failure to perform the brake inspections and tests under § 238.313 through § 238.319 may be assessed for each train that is not properly inspected. 2 The penalty schedule uses section numbers from 49 CFR part 238. If more than one item is listed as a type of violation of a given section, each item is also designated by a ‘‘penalty code,’’ which is used to facilitate assessment of civil penalties, and which may or may not correspond to any subsection designation(s). For convenience, penalty citations will cite the CFR section and the penalty code, if any. FRA reserves the right, should litigation become necessary, to substitute in its complaint the CFR citation in place of the combined CFR and penalty code citation, should they differ. 25. Amend paragraph (c) of Appendix B to part 238 by adding two sentences to the end of note 16 of the table of ‘‘Test Procedures and Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs’’ to read as follows: ■ Appendix B to Part 238—Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs * * * * * khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 16 * * * For purposes of this Note, the floor assembly of a vehicle in a Tier III trainset may be tested together with undercar design features that separate the vehicle from the fire source, i.e., skirts and bottom covers, to protect against a fire source under and external to the vehicle. To assess the safety associated with testing the floor assembly in this manner, and to protect against a fire source under the floor assembly but internal to the vehicle, safety must also be demonstrated by conducting a fire hazard analysis that includes the considerations in Note 17. * * * * * 26. Amend the introductory text of appendix F to part 238 by adding a third paragraph to read as follows: ■ 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 * * * * * Although the requirements of this appendix are stated in terms applicable to Tier I passenger equipment, they are also applicable to Tier III passenger trainsets under § 238.711. Specifically, the cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements of this appendix to demonstrate the integrity of the end structure. * * * * * 27. Add appendix G to part 238 to read as follows: ■ (c) * * * VerDate Sep<11>2014 Appendix F to Part 238—Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives Jkt 247001 Appendix G to Part 238—Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of Tier I Passenger Trainsets General This appendix applies to Tier I alternative passenger trainsets, as described below. While the appendix may refer to specific units of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in this appendix apply only to a trainset as a whole. This appendix specifies alternatives to the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger equipment in §§ 238.203, Static end strength; 238.205, Anti-climbing PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 mechanism; 238.207, Link between coupling mechanism and car body; 238.209(a), Forward end structure of locomotives, including cab cars and MU locomotives; 238.211, Collision posts; 238.213, Corner posts; and 238.219, Truck-to-carbody attachment. To maintain their integrity, these requirements apply as a whole. They also apply in addition to the requirements of §§ 238.209(b); 238.215, Rollover strength; 238.217, Side structure; and 238.233, Interior fittings and surfaces; and they apply with APTA standards for occupant protection, as specified in this appendix. For ease of comparison with the Tier I requirements in subpart C of this part, this appendix is arranged in order by the Tier I section referenced. Use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance for Tier I passenger equipment is subject to FRA review and approval under § 238.201. Occupied Volume Integrity (a) Instead of the requirements of § 238.203, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their occupied volume integrity by complying with both the quasi-static compression load and dynamic collision requirements in §§ 238.703(b) and 238.705, respectively. Override Protection (b) Colliding equipment. Instead of the requirements of § 238.205, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations demonstrate their ability to resist vertical climbing and override at each colliding interface during a train-to-train collision by complying with the dynamic collision requirements in § 238.707(a). (c) Connected equipment. Instead of the requirements of §§ 238.205 and 238.207, when connected, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their ability to resist vertical climbing and override by complying with the dynamic collision requirements in § 238.707(b). Fluid Entry Inhibition (d) Instead of the requirements of § 238.209(a), each cab end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate its ability to inhibit fluid entry and provide other penetration resistance by complying with the requirements in § 238.709. End Structure Integrity of Cab End (e) Each cab end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the requirements of appendix F to this part to demonstrate cab end structure integrity. For those cab ends without identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix F to this part apply to the end structure at the specified locations, regardless of whether the structure at the specified locations is a post. End Structure Integrity of Non–Cab End (f) Instead of the applicable requirements of §§ 238.211 and 238.213, the units of a Tier I alternative trainset may demonstrate end structure integrity for other than a cab end by complying with the requirements in § 238.713(b) and (c). Roof and Side Structure Integrity (g) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the requirements of §§ 238.215 and 238.217 to demonstrate roof and side structure integrity. Truck Attachment khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 (h) Instead of the requirements of § 238.219, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their truck-to-carbody attachment integrity by complying with the requirements in § 238.717 (b) through (e). VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 Interior Fixture Attachment (i)(1) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the interior fixture requirements in § 238.233. Interior fixtures must also comply with APTA PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1, ‘‘Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,’’ Authorized September 28, 2005, and those portions of APTA PR–CS–S–034– 99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,’’ Authorized June 11, 2006, relating to interior fixtures. (2) The standards required in this paragraph (i) are incorporated by reference into this paragraph with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC and available from the American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com. It is also available for inspection at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. (i) APTA PR–CS–S–006–98, Rev. 1, ‘‘Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,’’ Authorized September 28, 2005. (ii) APTA PR–CS–S–034–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,’’ Authorized June 11, 2006. Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Crew) (j) Passenger seating. (1) Passenger seating in a Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the requirements for seats in § 238.233 and must also comply with APTA PR–CS–S–016–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,’’ Authorized October 3, 2010, with the exception of Section 6, ‘‘Seat durability testing.’’ (2) APTA PR–CS–S–016–99, Rev. 2, ‘‘Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,’’ Authorized October 3, 2010, is incorporated by reference into this paragraph (j) with the approval of the Director of the PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 59229 Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC and is available from the American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com. It is also available for inspection at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. (k) Crew seating. Each seat provided for an employee regularly assigned to occupy the cab of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, must comply with § 238.233(e), (f), and (g). 28. Add appendix H to part 238 to read as follows: ■ Appendix H to Part 238—Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input Data and Geometrical Depiction (a) As specified in § 238.705(a)(4), this appendix provides input data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a computer model of the rigid locomotive design for use in evaluating the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset in a dynamic collision scenario. (This appendix may also be applied to a Tier I alternative passenger trainset to evaluate its occupied volume integrity, in accordance with appendix G to this part). (b) The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the geometry for approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive design. Because this input file is for a halfsymmetric model, a locomotive mass corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is provided for modeling purposes—half the 260,000 pounds of weight specified for the locomotive in § 238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to this appendix provides two views of the locomotive’s geometric depiction. The input data is contained in Appendix C to FRA’s Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/ details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT. E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 59230 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 / Rules and Regulations Issued in Washington, DC. Ronald L. Batory, Administrator. [FR Doc. 2018–25020 Filed 11–20–18; 8:45 am] VerDate Sep<11>2014 20:49 Nov 20, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 9990 E:\FR\FM\21NOR3.SGM 21NOR3 ER21NO18.129</GPH> khammond on DSK30JT082PROD with RULES3 BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 225 (Wednesday, November 21, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 59182-59230]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-25020]

[[Page 59181]]

Vol. 83

Wednesday,

No. 225

November 21, 2018

Part III

Department of Transportation

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Federal Railroad Administration

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49 CFR Parts 229, 231, 236, et al.

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2018 /
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 59182]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, 236, and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, Notice No. 3]
RIN 2130-AC46

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule amends FRA's passenger equipment safety
standards using a performance-based approach to adopt new and modified
requirements governing the construction of conventional- and high-speed
passenger rail equipment. This final rule adds a new tier of passenger
equipment safety standards (Tier III) to facilitate the safe
implementation of nation-wide, interoperable high-speed passenger rail
service at speeds up to 220 mph. While Tier III trainsets must operate
in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds above
125 mph, these trainsets can share the right-of-way with freight trains
and other tiers of passenger equipment at speeds not exceeding 125 mph.
This final rule also establishes crashworthiness and occupant
protection performance requirements in the alternative to those
currently specified for Tier I passenger trainsets. Together, the Tier
III requirements and Tier I alternative crashworthiness and occupant
protection requirements remove regulatory barriers and enable use of
new technological designs, allowing a more open U.S. rail market.
Additionally, the final rule increases from 150 mph to 160 mph the
maximum speed for passenger equipment that complies with FRA's Tier II
requirements.

DATES: Effective date. This final rule is effective January 22, 2019.
Incorporation by reference. The incorporation by reference of
certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of
the Federal Register as of January 22, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Docket: For access to the docket to read background
documents or comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov at any
time or visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140 on the Ground
level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Devin Rouse, Staff Director, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office
of Railroad Safety, Passenger Rail Division, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6185); or Michael Hunter,
Attorney Adviser, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad
Administration, Office of Chief Counsel, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-0368).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Common Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads
APTA American Public Transportation Association
AW0 ready-to-run weight, empty
CEM crash energy management
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CG center of gravity
EN EuroNorm
ETF Engineering Task Force
FE finite element
FEA finite element analysis
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
g gravitational acceleration (32.2 feet/second/second)
HSR high-speed rail
in inch(es)
kip kilopound(s)
kN kilo-Newton(s)
kph kilometer(s) per hour
lbf pound(s)-force
mph mile(s) per hour
ms millisecond(s)
MU multiple-unit
OVI occupied volume integrity
PTC positive train control
RIA regulatory impact analysis
ROW right-of-way
RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
ITM inspection, testing, and maintenance
PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
PESS Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
U.S.C. United States Code
UIC International Union of Railways

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
A. Statutory Background
B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking
Mandate
III. Development of the Final Rule
IV. Discussion of Comments and Conclusions
A. General Comments
B. Proposed Subpart I and the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
C. Proposed Subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III
Passenger Equipment
D. Comments From the NTSB
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
D. Federalism Implications
E. International Trade Impact Assessment
F. Environmental Impact
G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)
I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
J. Energy Impact
K. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

I. Executive Summary

Having considered the public comments in response to FRA's December
6, 2016, proposed rule on standards for alternative compliance and
high-speed trainsets, see 81 FR 88006, FRA issues this final rule
amending the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 49 CFR part 238.
This final rule is the product of consensus reached by FRA's Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which accepted the task of reviewing
passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending specific
actions that could be useful to advance the safety of passenger
service, including the development of regulatory requirements for the
next generation of high-speed trainsets. The RSAC established the
Passenger Safety Working Group (``PSWG'' or ``Working Group'') to
handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to
consider. In September 2009, the Working Group in turn established the
Engineering Task Force (``ETF'' or ``Task Force'') for the purpose of
producing a set of technical criteria and procedures to evaluate
passenger rail equipment based on alternative designs. This work led to
the development of the report entitled ``Technical Criteria and
Procedures for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection
Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail Equipment for Use
in Tier I Service'' (``Technical Criteria and Procedures Report'' or
``Report'').\1\ The guidance in the Technical Criteria and Procedures
Report has assisted railroads and rolling stock manufacturers who have
petitioned FRA for waivers from strict compliance with FRA's Tier I
passenger equipment crashworthiness standards, and has been useful to
FRA in

[[Page 59183]]

evaluating such petitions. In addition to developing the criteria in
the Report, the ETF's task was expanded to develop formal
recommendations to the full RSAC for adopting these alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection criteria into FRA's regulations
and to establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of
high-speed trainsets, capable of operating at speeds of up to 220 mph,
classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The ETF reached consensus
on recommending the adoption of these alternative crashworthiness
criteria in 49 CFR part 238 for Tier I passenger equipment. The ETF
also reached consensus on criteria for Tier III passenger equipment,
specifically trainset structure, side-window glazing, brake systems,
interior fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems and cab
equipment, and cab glazing (with the exception of ballistic penetration
resistance). The ETF further reached consensus on the definition of
Tier III, including when Tier III equipment can operate on shared
infrastructure and when the equipment must operate in an exclusive
right-of-way. On June 14, 2013, the full RSAC voted to recommend the
consensus items to FRA's Administrator, as the basis for a formal
rulemaking. This final rule is based on these RSAC recommendations.
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\1\ U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-ORD-11/
22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of
Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at
https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
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This final rule establishes requirements in three main subject
areas: (1) Tier III trainset safety standards; (2) alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for
Tier I passenger equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for
Tier II passenger equipment. The following is a brief overview of the
rule organized by subject area and a summary of its economic impact.

Tier III Trainset Safety Standards

This final rule defines Tier III passenger train operations and
outlines the minimum safety standards for the use of such trainsets in
the United States, focusing on core structural and critical system
design criteria. FRA intends for this final rule to facilitate the safe
implementation of interoperable high-speed rail service, and enable the
use of common infrastructure and promote other efficiencies. The Tier
III operating environment is unique by design. Tier III passenger
trains are permitted to operate in a shared right-of-way (one shared
with freight trains and other tiers of passenger equipment) at speeds
up to 125 mph, but must operate in an exclusive right-of-way without
grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph, up to 220 mph. The
requirements provide for the sharing of rail infrastructure among
various types of rail equipment, especially in more urban areas, while
providing for dedicated passenger rail service at maximum speeds up to
220 mph.
This final rule also establishes requirements for Tier III trainset
structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and
surfaces, certain emergency systems (including window egress and rescue
access requirements), and certain cab equipment. To support operational
compatibility, the Tier III trainset crashworthiness and occupant
protection requirements are predominantly based on the alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for Tier I
passenger equipment and are intended to safely apply to operations at
speeds up to 220 mph in a dedicated environment as approved by FRA.
Specialized RSAC task groups developed the requirements for braking
systems and cab glazing by focusing on the development of performance-
based requirements that could be implemented in a technology-neutral
manner, wherever possible.
To develop their recommendations, the ETF and full RSAC considered
the latest trainset designs and technology available globally, and
adapted their recommendations in a manner consistent with the North
American operating environment. The intent of these requirements is to
ensure that safety and reliability are paramount, while incorporating
elements from the most advanced, service-proven technology available
throughout the world.

Alternative Crashworthiness Requirements for Tier I Passenger Trainsets

As noted above, FRA is codifying a set of technical evaluation
criteria the ETF developed as guidance for those seeking to demonstrate
that alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance
requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets provide a level of safety
equivalent to the existing requirements in part 238. FRA intends for
the alternative technical criteria to allow the industry greater
flexibility to use more contemporary design techniques and more fully
apply emerging technology, including crash energy management (CEM)
technology, without requiring a waiver of compliance for operating the
equipment. The technical criteria are based on established
international standards and significant research and testing conducted
by the industry and DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) over the past 25 years. Codifying the technical
criteria dovetails with alternative crashworthiness performance
requirements FRA earlier established in part 238 for the front-end
structures of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives (75 FR 1180),
thereby broadening application of such requirements to other main
structures.

Tier II Maximum Authorized Speed

On March 13, 2013, FRA issued a final rule (78 FR 16052) to amend
the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of
rail vehicles and the tracks they operate on at speeds up to 220 mph.
That final rule revised the track geometry and safety limits for
various track classes, extended the limits for the highest track speeds
from 200 to 220 mph (Class 9 track), and affirmed that the maximum
authorized speed for Class 8 track is 160 mph. This final rule
establishes the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II
passenger equipment consistent with the limits for Class 8 track.
However, it is important to note that existing Tier II operations FRA
has approved to operate at speeds up to 150 mph are still required to
provide sufficient testing and vehicle/track interaction performance
data required under 49 CFR 213.329 and 238.111, and obtain FRA approval
before any operations occur at the new maximum authorized speed of 160
mph.

Economic Analysis

This final rule expands and makes more flexible FRA's Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards. FRA believes this final rule will have a
net cost savings effect on the passenger rail industry and society as a
whole, along with safety benefits.
Specifically, the final rule will generate cost savings benefits by
enabling high-speed rail operators to avoid new right-of-way
acquisition and infrastructure construction for dedicated rail lines in
dense urban areas. This is possible because the final rule allows such
trains to travel on existing, non-dedicated rail lines, although at
slower speeds than permissible for travel on dedicated rail lines.
For traditional passenger rail operations, there are both
operational and safety benefits resulting from this final rule. Not
issuing the rule would increase costs associated with the acquisition
of new passenger trains and could delay new U.S. passenger rail
infrastructure projects. The final rule ensures existing and future
alternative trainset designs can operate in the U.S.

[[Page 59184]]

railroad environment on a widespread basis, beyond the constraints that
have been imposed by FRA regulations. This helps avert perpetuating a
patchwork of waivers in the U.S. passenger rail market that would, in
turn, perpetuate the current unattractiveness of the U.S. passenger
equipment market to manufacturers. The final rule allows U.S. trainsets
to use technological advances for safety compliance purposes in a way
that was previously restricted under the former regulations.
There will also be safety benefits associated with improvement of
the existing rail infrastructure to accommodate the operation of new
high-speed rail equipment in shared rights-of-way.\2\ Additionally, as
the requirements herein are largely performance-based standards and not
prescriptive requirements, equipment benefits will be generated by
passenger rail operators being able to adopt service-proven, safety-
equivalent technology and practices and apply future technological
advancements.
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\2\ For example, the shared rail infrastructure is presumed to
be better maintained to accommodate the new Tier III equipment, and
thus all rail traffic operating over that shared infrastructure will
benefit from track maintained to tighter tolerances for higher
speeds under FRA's track safety standards at 49 CFR part 213. Track
that was once maintained to Class 4 or 5 tolerances, may now be
maintained to Class 6 or 7 tolerances.
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Over a 30-year period, FRA estimates quantifiable cost savings
range from a present value of between $512.5 million to $1.1 billion
(when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $790.1 million to $1.6
billion (when discounted at a 3-percent rate).\3\ Annualized cost
savings of this rule are expected to be between $41.3 million and $85.8
million when discounted at a 7-percent rate and between $40.3 million
and $84.0 million when discounted at a 3-percent rate.
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\3\ Tier III costs and cost savings are uncertain because they
are based on assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed
rail operations and how those operations will be incorporated into
the U.S. rail network. It is possible that all costs, cost savings,
and benefits relating to Tier III systems, including equipment and
infrastructure, will be zero. This could occur if no high-speed rail
projects come to fruition over the forecasted horizon. Further, the
estimated infrastructure cost savings depend on the assumption of
not having to build dedicated HSR track for the whole system (i.e.,
they represent savings from being able to operate HSR using shared
infrastructure). Tier I cost savings from adopting performance-based
standards are challenging to quantify, as estimates are based on
projecting future changes. However, given that the new regulation's
performance standards provide an alternative to more design-based
standards, operators would voluntarily comply only if they found it
beneficial to do so. The estimated figures in the Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) are provided for expository purposes. For both Tier
III and Tier I, if the actions that trigger cost savings are not
taken, the costs would not be incurred, as the costs and cost
savings are two sides of the same actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Over the same 30-year period, FRA estimates the industry will incur
costs ranging between $227.7 to $523.3 million (when discounted at a 7-
percent rate) or between $351.3 to $808.8 million (when discounted at a
3-percent rate). Annualized costs of this rule are expected to be
between $18.4 million and $42.2 million when discounted at a 7-percent
rate and between $17.9 million and $41.3 million when discounted at a
3-percent rate. All quantified costs would be for testing and analysis
to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I alternative or Tier
III standards.
Over the 30-year period of the analysis, FRA estimates discounted
net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8 million (low range)
and $837.8 million (high range) discounted at 3 percent; net regulatory
cost savings will be between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9
million (high range), discounted at 7 percent. Annualized net
regulatory cost savings total between $22.4 million and $42.7 million
when discounted at a 3-percent rate and between $22.9 million and $43.7
million when discounted at a 7-percent rate.

Net Regulatory Cost Savings
[Quantified estimates using a 30-year period; $ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description Discounted 3% Discounted 7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs................................................................... $808.8 $523.3
Total Cost Savings............................................................ 1,646.7 1,065.2
Total Net Cost Savings........................................................ 837.8 541.9
Annualized Net Cost Savings................................................... 42.7 43.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs................................................................... 351.3 227.7
Total Cost Savings............................................................ 790.1 512.5
Total Net Cost Savings........................................................ 438.8 284.8
Annualized Net Cost Savings................................................... 22.4 22.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The rulemaking will provide an optional alternative, not a mandate,
for railroads to use a different type or design of passenger equipment
in Tier I service and will not impose any burden on existing rolling
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations.
Similarly, the rulemaking will provide a framework for railroads to
operate equipment in new Tier III service--it will not impose any
burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under
existing regulations.

Alternatives Considered

One of the main purposes of the final rule is to provide a set of
minimum Federal safety requirements for safe operation in the U.S. rail
environment of passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary
engineering standards outside of the U.S. Traditionally, U.S. railroad
safety regulations evolved as a consequence of specific accidents
scenarios, which have led to the identification of specific risks in
the operating environment.\4\ As FRA stated in its 1999 Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards (PESS) final rule, the railroad operating
environment in the United States generally requires passenger equipment
to operate commingled with very heavy and long freight trains, often
over track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy highway
equipment. See 64 FR 25540, 25541 (May 12, 1999). European passenger
operations, on the other hand,

[[Page 59185]]

are intermingled with freight equipment of lesser weight than in North
America. In many cases, highway-rail grade crossings also pose lesser
hazards to passenger trains in Europe due to lower highway vehicle
weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 62 FR 49728, 49729-49731 (Sep. 23, 1997) (discussing
differences between the European and U.S. rail operating
environments, and describing a range of passenger rail accidents
demonstrating the need for comprehensive, passenger equipment safety
standards).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are
adequately addressed for the operating environment, the final rule
places special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than
simply mitigating them. Importantly, this final rule allows the use of
additional types of rolling stock design, which will enable innovation
and provide railroads the flexibility to purchase equipment designed to
more performance-based and modern requirements. The rule also permits
carriers to move forward with a new tier of higher speed rail.
The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the safety
requirements for Tier III trainsets are based on European and Japanese
industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety
requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of
regulation, market accessibility, benefits and costs, and operational
efficiency and safety. FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of
those options based on the key attributes of the alternatives and the
effect of those attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory
purpose. FRA compared the technical requirements of other established
high-speed rail standards to illustrate the primary differences, not
make a direct comparison between comparable requirements or standards.
In Europe, passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant
protection design standards have been largely standardized by
EuroNorms.\5\ FRA concluded that there are no significant differences
between trains built to the design standards contained in EuroNorms and
trains built to meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection
requirements in the final rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset
prices will increase $310,250 (0.62 percent) per trainset to meet the
Tier III requirements in this final rule.
In Japan, railroad safety regulation is governed by the Railway
Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and is codified
in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.\6\ These technical
standards are primarily performance-based and railways have the
obligation to conform their operations, equipment, and infrastructure
to these standards. In the case of its high-speed rail system, the
Tokaido Shinkansen, the railway transports only passengers; the rail
line is entirely dedicated to high-speed rail with no conventional
trains operating and has full grade separation. These are the
significant differences underlying the design of Tokaido Shinkansen
trainsets operating in Japan when compared to passenger trainsets
currently operating in the U.S. The key to the Japanese high-speed rail
network's ongoing safety performance and reliability is the principle
of crash avoidance. Modifying this advanced Japanese high-speed
trainset to comply with the new Tier III requirements would result in
significant additional costs to be interoperable in the U.S. rail
system; FRA estimates $4.7 million per trainset. European trains
generally would not need carbody, truck, suspension, or brake
modifications to comply with the Tier III requirements. However, either
the analysis used to demonstrate compliance of the train safety
features or components would require modification, or minor design
modification(s) would likely be needed, or both.\7\ These differences
are illustrated in the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ EuroNorms title derived: ``Standard'' is ``norme'' in French
and ``norm'' in German. https://www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/default.aspx.
\6\ https://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf.
\7\ A discussion of the rationale supporting each of the
structural requirements under the ``Minor modifications required''
column in the ``Summary of potential changes for equipment designed
to European standards to comply with final rule in the U.S.'' table
is available under the section-by-section analysis contained in the
NPRM. See 81 FR 88006, 88027-88028, 88034-88038 (Dec. 6, 2016). As
discussed in the NPRM, each requirement was determined as necessary
to achieve an equivalent level of safety as provided by conventional
Tier I equipment under 49 CFR part 238, subpart C.

Summary of Potential Changes for Equipment Designed to European
Standards To Comply With Final Rule in the U.S.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engineering analysis difference Minor modifications required
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quasi static compression...... Structural integrity
of non-cab end.
Dynamic collision scenario.... Interior fixture
attachment.
Override protection........... Seat crashworthiness.
Fluid entry inhibition........ Luggage racks.
Roof and side structure Emergency window
integrity. egress & rescue access
windows.
Glazing....................... Emergency lighting.
Alerters.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The RIA that accompanies this final rule contains an analysis of
regulatory alternatives FRA considered. Specifically, the analysis
compares at a general level the costs and benefits of the Tier III
requirements to both European and Japanese standards for high-speed
trains. The analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million European
high-speed trainset could be modified to comply with the Tier III
requirements with only minor structural modifications and, as indicated
above, at little additional cost--about $310,000 per trainset.
Modifications are expected to ensure such trainsets safely operate in a
U.S. setting. Due to the lack of historical safety information for
operations at Tier III speeds in the U.S., FRA was unable to estimate
the incremental safety benefit that would be provided by the Tier III
requirements as compared to the European technical standards. However,
these new requirements are supported by the recommendation of the full
RSAC and FRA is confident about the cost-beneficial nature of the final
rule. Additionally, the analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50
million Tokaido Shinkansen Japanese high-speed trainset would need
significant structural modifications, including those to the carbody,
trucks, and suspension, to comply with the Tier III requirements, and,
as indicated above, would incur significant additional costs--about
$4.7 million per trainset.
FRA is unable to provide an estimate of the expected incremental
benefit of the Tier III requirements over the alternatives, but FRA
believes these additional costs are justified by the nature of the
risks within the U.S. rail operating environment and RSAC's
recommendations. Tier III trains in the U.S. will share track with
other rail operations, including heavy and long

[[Page 59186]]

freight trains, and operate on track with highway-rail grade crossings
and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other highway
vehicles.
FRA conducted a qualitative analysis comparing the final rule's
Tier I alternative requirements to two alternatives: Not taking any
regulatory action or adopting existing international design standards.
As discussed in the RIA, trainsets compliant with international design
standards (such as European or Japanese) would require extensive
modifications to meet Tier I requirements if FRA elected to take no
regulatory action. However, under the new Tier I alternative
requirements, FRA believes the costs associated with compliance will be
similar to those discussed for Tier III equipment.
A second alternative would be to codify EuroNorms as Federal
regulations, instead of the new Tier I alternative requirements. This
option opens the possibility for manufacturers to accrue savings from
fewer modifications; however, such an option would require
manufacturers to expend resources that favor a particular technology or
approach to equipment design. Additionally, codifying EuroNorms in lieu
of the final rule would potentially have required equipment designed to
a different standard to incur certain costs related to modifying the
equipment to bring it into compliance.
Consequently, regardless of the requirements codified,
manufacturers would likely have to modify trainsets to meet the
regulatory requirements specified. Importantly, trainsets meeting only
a European standard (or Japanese or other international standard) would
not be interoperable with existing U.S. passenger or freight equipment.
Therefore, this equipment could only operate on an exclusive right-of-
way, unable to take advantage of existing infrastructure.
FRA requested and received no public comment on the alternatives
presented and discussed. For further discussion, please also see the
RIA's ``Alternatives Considered'' section, in which FRA presents more
detailed discussion of the impact of the alternatives considered.
FRA did consider the alternative of standalone HSR systems (not
physically connected to the general railroad system) operating on an
exclusive right-of-way, which would use passenger equipment that
complies with European or other international standards but not
necessarily with FRA's new requirements. For the reasons discussed
below, FRA declined to pursue this alternative. A major tenet of this
final rule is to safely facilitate the implementation of nationwide,
interoperable HSR service. Standalone systems operating equipment not
compliant with FRA's passenger equipment safety standards would
significantly limit the interoperability of HSR service. When
developing these requirements, FRA did not envision a network of
standalone, non-interoperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide
network.
Additionally, it would be very costly for a standalone system to
attempt to connect with major metropolitan areas because those
standalone systems could not take advantage of a major regulatory
savings--operating over existing infrastructure. FRA determined that
two-thirds to four-fifths of the regulatory cost savings are due to
infrastructure cost avoidance for operations electing to use Tier I
alternative or Tier III equipment. In particular, interoperability will
allow HSR operators to reach into major metropolitan areas where
building new, exclusive rights-of-way may not be feasible due to land
density, environmental, and other considerations.
An advantage of the standalone alternative is that an individual
railroad system could optimize its operations to high levels of
performance without necessarily having to adhere to requirements
generally applicable to railroad systems in the U.S. However, for such
a project to attain that level of performance, it would have to
optimize the design of the entire system, not only the passenger
equipment. Basically, a standalone system would have to bring together
all the other aspects of railroad safety (such as operating practices,
signal and train control, and track) that must be applied to the
individual system. Given that such an approach covers more than
passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular right-of-
way intrusion protection and other safety requirements not adequately
addressed in FRA's regulations, FRA continues to believe that
addressing proposals for standalone HSR systems on a case-by-case basis
and comprehensively (such as through a rule of particular applicability
or other specific regulatory action(s)) is prudent because of the small
number of potential operations and the potential for significant
differences in their design. Entities considering such operations
voluntarily assume the higher costs of building new infrastructure,
knowing they cannot take advantage of the cost savings from sharing
existing infrastructure.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Statutory Background

In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary)
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one initiative of
this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin
developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-
year period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1994 (the Act), Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November
2, 1994). In the Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations and to issue
orders under it. See section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C.
20133).

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate

On May 4, 1998, under section 215 of the Act, FRA published the
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (PTEP). See 63 FR
24629. The PTEP contained minimum Federal safety standards for the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains,
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail
service. The rule also established specific requirements for passenger
train emergency systems and contained specific requirements for
participation in debrief and critique sessions following emergency
situations and full-scale simulations.
On May 12, 1999, FRA published the PESS final rule. See 64 FR
25540. The PESS established comprehensive safety standards for railroad
passenger equipment including requirements for carbody structure and
fire safety. FRA subsequently amended the PESS to address petitions
seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the
rule. In response to the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and
published three sets of amendments to the final rule. See 65 FR 41284,
Jul. 3, 2000; 67 FR 19970, Apr. 23, 2002; and 67 FR 42892, June 25,
2002.
Since then, FRA has engaged in a number of rulemakings to amend and
enhance its passenger safety requirements. On October 19, 2006, FRA

[[Page 59187]]

published a final rule addressing various requirements on the
inspection, testing, and operation of passenger equipment, and the
attachment of safety appliances. See 71 FR 61835. On February 1, 2008,
FRA published the Passenger Train Emergency Systems final rule
promoting passenger occupant safety by addressing emergency
communication, emergency egress, and rescue access requirements. See 73
FR 6370. FRA also established additional requirements for passenger
train emergency systems on November 29, 2013, see 78 FR 71785, revised
and clarified its PTEP regulations on March 31, 2014, see 79 FR 18128,
and established new standards to improve the integrity of passenger
train exterior side door safety systems on December 7, 2015, see 80 FR
76118.
On January 8, 2010, FRA published a final rule enhancing
requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars
and MU locomotives. See 75 FR 1180. FRA included energy-absorption
requirements in the 2010 rulemaking to address traditional cab car and
MU locomotive designs, with very strong underframes and relatively
weaker superstructures, because it is vitally important to provide
protection to crewmembers and passengers if the superstructure is
impacted. In that rulemaking, FRA applied mature technology and design
practice to extend requirements from linear-elastic to elastic-plastic
and provided descriptions of allowable deformations without complete
failure of the system. Although FRA believed at the time of the
rulemaking that the alternative performance requirements would
principally apply to shaped-nose equipment designs or CEM designs, or
both, FRA also intended for them to apply to any conventional equipment
design, as an alternative to the linear-elastic approach. In
particular, the alternative performance requirements allow innovative
designs that protect the occupied volume for its full height, even
without traditional full-height collision and corner post structures,
and the rule has been applied to such innovative end frame designs and
traditional end frame designs.

III. Development of the Final Rule

This final rule is primarily based on consensus recommendations
from the RSAC.\8\ See 81 FR 88006, 88013. Those recommendations were
developed over many years, and began in 2009 when FRA elected to
develop, in consultation with the RSAC, alternative criteria and
procedures to assess the crashworthiness and occupant protection
performance of rail passenger equipment applicable to a wide range of
equipment designs to be used in Tier I service. Accordingly, the ETF
\9\ was established in September 2009, charged with the mission of
producing a set of technical criteria and procedures for evaluating
petitions for waivers from (or, as appropriate under Sec. 238.201(b),
approval of alternative compliance with) one or more of the Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards. This work led to the development of the
Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, published in 2011. The
technical evaluation criteria and procedures in the Report provided a
means of establishing whether equipment of an alternative design would
result in at least equivalent performance to that of equipment designed
in accordance with the structural standards in 49 CFR part 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ The RSAC member groups are: American Association of Private
Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council;
American Petroleum Institute; American Public Transportation
Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of American Railroads (AAR); Association of State Rail
Safety Managers (ASRSM); Association of Tourist Railroads and
Railway Museums; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen
(BLET); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division
(BMWED); Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine
Institute; Federal Transit Administration (FTA);* Fertilizer
Institute; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International
Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers
(SMART), including the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association (SMWIA) and United Transportation Union (UTU);
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); Labor
Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);* League of Railway
Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women;* National Conference
of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and Maintenance
Association (NRCMA); National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);* Railway
Supply Institute (RSI); Safe Travel America (STA); Secretaria de
Comunicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);* Transport Canada;* Transport
Workers Union of America (TWU); Transportation Communications
International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and Transportation Security
Administration (TSA).* *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
\9\ The ETF member groups are: AAR; AAPRCO; AASHTO, including
California Department of Transportation, and Interfleet; APTA,
including Alstom, Ansaldo Breda, Bombardier, Central Japan Railway
Company (JRC), China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation
(CSR), Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD), East Japan
Railway Company, Faiveley Transport, GE Transportation, Japan
International Transport Institute, Japan's Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Kawasaki, Keolis, KPS N.A.,
LIRR, LTK Engineering Services, Marsh, Metro-North, Nippon Sharyo,
Parsons Brinckerhoff, PS Consulting, Safetran Systems, SEPTA, Sharma
& Associates, Siemens, Southern California Regional Rail Authority
(SCRRA), Stadler, STV, Talgo, Texas Central Railway, Veolia, Voith
Turbo, and Wabtec; Amtrak; ASLRRA; BLET; European Railway Agency
(ERA); NTSB; RSI, including Battelle Memorial Institute, and ENSCO;
SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; TCIU/BRC; and Transport Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

After the ETF developed the Report, the task of the ETF was
expanded to: (1) Develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC to
adopt the alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations;
and (2) establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation
of high-speed trainsets able to operate at speeds up to 220 mph,\10\
classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The work of the ETF and
full RSAC culminated with the publication of the NPRM on December 6,
2016. Please see the Technical Background and Overview section of the
NPRM, section III, for a more comprehensive discussion on the
development of these requirements at 81 FR 88006, 88013-88017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ FRA elected 220 mph as the maximum operating speed for Tier
III equipment to remain harmonious with FRA's track safety standards
(49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013 (discussing the
reasoning and research behind the 220-mph maximum track speed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The comment period was initially scheduled to close on February 6,
2017. However, in a December 12, 2016 letter, APTA requested a 30-day
extension of the NPRM's comment period. APTA stated it needed
additional time to thoroughly review the NPRM, and review and
consolidate comments on the NPRM from its members and affiliates. On
February 13, 2017, FRA published a notice in the Federal Register
reopening the comment period until March 21, 2017. See 82 FR 10449. A
description and summary of the comments received on the NPRM is
discussed below under section IV, Discussion of Comments and
Conclusions.
To further benefit from the input of the ETF, FRA convened a
meeting of the ETF on May 16-18, 2017, in Washington, DC.\11\ During
this meeting, FRA discussed proposed responses to the comments
received, which was helpful to FRA in crafting the fuller responses to
the comments contained in this final rule. Accordingly, FRA did not
believe it necessary to bring any issues back to the full RSAC for a
formal recommendation. The only issues for which there was no consensus
either did not have consensus agreement initially (cab glazing
ballistic requirements, which were deferred to FRA to develop) or were
generally non-

[[Page 59188]]

substantive in nature (the archival of AAR-RP-5104 for incorporation-
by-reference). Please see the fuller discussion of each of these topics
under the section-by-section analysis of the respective sections (Sec.
238.721, Glazing, and Sec. 238.735, Seat crashworthiness (passenger
and cab crew)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\11\ Minutes of this meeting is part of the docket in this
proceeding and is available for public inspection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please note that the RSAC did not expressly consider FRA's removal
of the requirement for a rule of particular applicability to conduct
operations at speeds above 150 mph, as specified in subpart I of part
236 of this chapter. See the discussion of changes to Sec. 236.1007 of
this chapter in the section-by-section analysis, below. The RSAC also
did not consider FRA's changes to Sec. Sec. 229.3, 229.5, and 231.0 of
this chapter. These changes, harmonizing references to the maximum
authorized operating speed for Tier II equipment, were not expressly
proposed in the NPRM as they were inadvertently omitted. See the
discussion of changes to Sec. Sec. 229.3, 229.5, and 231.0 of this
chapter in the section-by-section analysis, below. FRA nonetheless
believes the removal of language from part 236 and the harmonization of
parts 229 and 231 are consistent with the RSAC recommended approach in
this rulemaking.

IV. Discussion of Comments and Conclusions

As noted above, on February 13, 2017, FRA reopened the comment
period for the NPRM that closed on February 6, 2017, in response to a
request received from APTA. See 82 FR 10449 (Feb. 13, 2017). During the
entire comment period, FRA received comments from two individuals and
the following seven entities: Alstom Transportation, Inc. (Alstom);
APTA; East Japan Railway Company (JR East); Italcertifier, SPA; LTK
Engineering Services (LTK); Siemens; and Texas Central Railroad, LLC
(TCRR). The comments were all supportive of the rulemaking, and FRA
appreciates the commenters for the time and effort put into each of the
comments received. FRA will first discuss the comments that are
applicable to the rulemaking, generally. Responses to comments on
specific sections of the rule are discussed in the section-by-section
analysis, or in the Regulatory Impact and Notices portion of this final
rule, with the provisions and statements to which they specifically
relate. FRA makes clear that the order of the discussion is not meant
to imply that FRA is prioritizing one commenter over another.
As noted above, following the submission of these written comments,
FRA convened the Engineering Task Force to consider and discuss the
comments and to help achieve a fuller understanding of the comments
received and recommendations for this final rule. As a result, certain
of these comments have been superseded by changes made in the rule text
from the NPRM to this final rule, and they should not necessarily be
understood to reflect the positions of the commenters with respect to
the requirements of the final rule. Nevertheless, FRA is setting out
all the comments received and is responding to each of them, either
here, or in the pertinent section-by-section analysis or Regulatory
Impact Notice provision, so that FRA's positions are clearly
understood. In addressing these comments and developing this final
rule, FRA has relied on information contained in comments, RSAC meeting
minutes, memoranda, and other materials in the docket for this
rulemaking.

A. General Comments

APTA, in its comment, stated that it is very supportive of the
``Tier III approach.'' APTA further stated that the Tier III
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements permit Tier III
trainsets to operate in a shared right of way with conventional
passenger and freight rail equipment at speeds below 125 mph (Tier I
environment). This type of interoperability has the potential to have a
safe and cost-effective approach to implementing high-speed rail as it
permits the use of internationally service-proven high-speed rail
equipment and also the use of existing infrastructure for lower speed
operation. FRA appreciates APTA's support on FRA's approach to permit
Tier III equipment to be interoperable at speeds not exceeding 125 mph.
APTA further noted that FRA described very well an advantage of a
standalone system to be the system's potential to optimize its
operations to a high level of performance.
In both their comments, APTA and TCRR recommended that FRA adopt a
definition for ``Tier IV system.'' For the reasons discussed in the
section-by-section analysis for Sec. 238.5, below, FRA is not
including a definition for ``Tier IV system'' in this final rule.
However, APTA's and TCRR's comments on this topic went beyond the
definition of a Tier IV system and touched on FRA's discussion in the
NPRM of Alternatives Considered under the Executive Summary. 81 FR
88006, 88009.
Additionally, APTA, as part of its comment, noted that the
regulation references several APTA standards by a ``date certain'' for
incorporation by reference. APTA further noted that many of those
standards will be updated ``in the near future'' and recommended that
the latest versions of the standards be referenced. APTA also
recommended, more generally, that all existing references to APTA
standards within part 238 be updated in the final rule. FRA must
incorporate by reference updated technical standards according to 1 CFR
part 51. To the extent possible, FRA has included for incorporation by
reference the most up-to-date APTA standards that were under
consideration in this rulemaking. Under the section-by-section
analysis, FRA has indicated where it has revised references from the
initial versions of APTA standards to refer to the most recent editions
instead. With respect to updating references to APTA standards in part
238, generally, FRA will address this issue in another rulemaking
effort in which FRA reviews and updates, as necessary, all references
to relevant technical standards in part 238, because part 238
incorporates by reference technical standards from a number of
different industry consensus organizations.
Alstom commented on Sec. 238.15, Movement of passenger equipment
with power brake defects, asking FRA if a reference for Tier III
equipment will be added where there is currently a reference to Tier
II. Alstom also commented more generally whether Tier II requirements
will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and extended to apply to Tier
III equipment. Alstom comments on Sec. 238.15 are outside the intended
scope of this rulemaking. Due to the unique nature of Tier III
equipment and operations, FRA believes that more consideration and
analysis are necessary in developing appropriate regulatory
requirements addressing the specific safety concerns implicated.
Accordingly, FRA believes it appropriate to seek public comment on any
proposal on this topic as part of a future rulemaking. In the interim,
FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure proper
safeguards and procedures are in place to protect the movement of
defective Tier III equipment.
Italcertifier, SPA submitted a presentation to the docket in which
it outlined six comments. None of those six comments proposed any
changes to regulatory text or to FRA's approach to Tier I alternative
or Tier III requirements. Among its comments, Italcertifier stated that
collision risk is mitigated ``by the presence and efficiency of the
train protection systems'' and the crash-avoidance philosophy, and
added that trains in Europe must be equipped with an onboard train
control system that is integrated with the wayside signal

[[Page 59189]]

system. Italcertifier stated, though, that the proposed rule did not
account for PTC or such other technology. However, FRA notes that PTC
technology is not intended as a replacement for crashworthiness and
occupant protection requirements. PTC is a performance-based system
requirement that provides collision avoidance and overspeed protection
technology for certain accident scenarios that complement, but do not
replace, crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements.
Additionally, not all accidents are PTC-preventable.
Italcertifier also commented that in Italy ``level crossings''
(highway-rail grade crossings) are not permitted at speeds exceeding
200 km/h (approximately 124 mph) but there is a movement to eliminate
such crossings from track with speeds exceeding 160 km/h (approximately
100 mph). Although this has no impact on the regulatory text, FRA notes
that such an approach appears consistent with FRA's treatment of grade
crossings (permitted on Class 6 track, or at speeds up to 110 mph;
permitted subject to FRA approval on Class 7 track, or at speeds up to
125 mph; and prohibited on Class 8 track and above, or at speeds
exceeding 125 mph). See 49 CFR 213.347. Further, Italcertifier
commented that the European standards bodies (e.g., CEN or CENELEC)
create technology-neutral standards, which is consistent with FRA's
approach under this rule. Italcertifier also expressed its support for
creating an interoperable passenger rail network, stating that the
decision to have an interoperable high-speed rail system, and not a
standalone system except on a case-by-case basis, is completely in line
with the European position. Finally, Italcertifier commented that
qualifying equipment in Italy requires a series of tests to demonstrate
compliance with various European technical standards. This, too, is
consistent with FRA's approach.
JR East's comment focused on the economic impacts of the proposed
rule. In its comment, JR East articulated that when FRA calculates the
costs of modifying Japanese equipment to meet Tier III requirements,
FRA should consider not only the initial cost (which FRA estimated at
$4.7 million per trainset), but also ``the total cost including
operation cost, maintenance cost and the expenses for the suspension of
transportation due to accidents.'' FRA has addressed this comment in
section 2.1.1 of the regulatory impact analysis, which is included in
the docket, and in the economic analysis discussion contained in this
final rule. For purposes of the economic analysis, FRA chose to only
consider the initial cost of modifying Japanese equipment to meet Tier
III requirements. FRA considers that the operation, maintenance, and
other related expenses would be unique to each railroad potentially
operating the equipment, and therefore the differential cost would only
be the expense to modify the equipment.
LTK was very supportive of the rule and the effort put forth by all
involved in the ETF. LTK also expressed that the publication of the
proposed rule was timely in that industry ``requires clarity'' with
respect to applicable safety standards for Tier I alternative and Tier
III high-speed trainsets, noting both of which must be capable of
operating in mixed service with conventional passenger and freight
operations at speeds below 125 mph as a result of a number of ongoing
trainset procurements. LTK went on to say that the crashworthiness and
occupant protection requirements contained in the proposed rule will
facilitate the introduction of international passenger and high-speed
trainset designs with minor modifications to enable operation in the
North American rail environment. LTK also commented that it agrees with
the comments APTA submitted to the docket, stating that the recommended
edits in the APTA comments provide additional clarity and are
consistent with the basis for consensus reached within the ETF. LTK
further commented that APTA is currently in the process of reviewing
and renewing its Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards and that, as
FRA finalizes the rule, FRA should update the incorporation dates of
APTA standards to the most recent dates if the standards are updated
and approved through APTA prior to final rule publication. FRA makes
clear it supports incorporating updated APTA standards and has
incorporated by reference the most up-to-date APTA standards in this
final rule consistent with the requirements of 1 CFR part 51.
Siemens' comment was very supportive of the rule and of the ETF's
work on it. Siemens expressed the belief that the rule's defining of
the new equipment tier, Tier III, was timely and is needed to clarify
to the industry what types of trainset designs ``can get approved by
the FRA.'' Siemens noted this significantly reduces risk for the
industry and has its full support. Siemens also expressed its support
for the comments submitted by APTA to the docket. Siemens stated it
participated in the reviews leading to the submission of the APTA
comments and believed they improve the NPRM.
TCRR also voiced support of the rulemaking and of the industry-
developed comments submitted by APTA, noting they provide clarification
on various requirements proposed in the NPRM and are consistent with
the basis for consensus reached within the RSAC ETF. TCRR also
submitted substantive comments on specific sections that are addressed
in the section-by-section analysis, below.
In addition, FRA received comments on the rulemaking from
individuals. One individual stated that he ``strongly support[s]
modifying the regulations that make American trains much more expensive
and slower than train across much of the rest of the world.'' The
commenter urged, to the extent possible, that FRA align its regulations
with other major standards (especially European standards) to enable
railroads to buy ``off-the-shelf'' trainsets at much lower cost. The
commenter stated that this was an easy way to start to reduce
regulatory burdens and suggested that FRA's regulations be amended to
grant a categorical safe harbor for any trainset that complies with the
European safety requirements. FRA has long considered whether adopting
European safety requirements would be practical in advancing passenger
rail safety in the U.S., given the unique nature of the risks within
the U.S. rail operating environment in which passenger trains share
track with other rail operations, including heavy and long freight
trains, and frequently operate on track with highway-rail grade
crossings and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other
highway vehicles. 62 FR 49728, 49729-49731 (Sep. 23, 1997). In
addressing the safety concerns that are present in the U.S., FRA has
instead focused on developing regulations in this rulemaking that are
performance-based and technology-neutral to further open the U.S.
market to international experience and contemporary design techniques
and to harmonize the crashworthiness and occupant protection
requirements with those that are established internationally. Further,
if a car builder can show that its equipment meets or exceeds the
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements as established by
this rule without structural modification through proper modeling and
documentation, FRA would not exclude that equipment from operating in
the U.S. Specifically, FRA noted in the NPRM that it is important to
recognize that differences between the FRA requirements and
international technical standards do not mean that in all cases
structural modifications are

[[Page 59190]]

necessary. Equipment designed to international standards can meet these
requirements; the equipment manufacturer must only validate and provide
supporting documentation that it does. See 81 FR 88006, 88014. Further,
FRA notes that in response to its solicitation for comments on the
topic of alternative approaches to regulating Tier III equipment (i.e.,
fully adopting European standards), no international equipment
manufacturer (some of whom are members of the ETF) stated that it would
be better to simply adopt European crashworthiness standards or offered
any other regulatory alternative to the ETF's recommended approach.
Accordingly, this supports FRA's approach to addressing crashworthiness
and occupant protection requirements in this rule. Further, FRA notes
that the commenter's reference to a so-called ``off-the-shelf'' product
is misleading, as all common product platforms are modified to fit the
specific needs of the customer's specifications, which often reflects
varying regulatory standards for the country or service intended.
FRA received a comment from another individual who expressed
overall support for the proposed rule and wanted to accommodate NTSB
recommendations to the extent possible without excluding the adoption
of ``EuroNorm-like trains.'' FRA addresses NTSB's recommendations and
comments, below.

B. Proposed Subpart I and the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

FRA is not adopting the proposed ITM requirements under proposed
subpart I in the NPRM. FRA worked with the ETF to develop a more
comprehensive set of ITM requirements for Tier III equipment. Indeed,
in their comments on the NPRM, both APTA and TCRR cited the likelihood
that the requirements in the subpart as proposed would be subject to
change based on the ETF's then-ongoing discussion of ITM requirements,
and they recommended against including the requirements of proposed
subpart I in this final rule.
FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation so that ITM
processes and procedures for an operation's equipment are sufficient to
address all safety-critical features. FRA will be guided by the ITM
program elements the ETF developed, which may be codified in a future
rulemaking.

C. Proposed Subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III
Passenger Equipment

In the NPRM, FRA proposed to add and reserve a subpart J to contain
the requirements for a Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger
Equipment (or Tier III Safe Operation Plan). As noted below, APTA
commented that this subpart is unnecessary as the information requested
by FRA for inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan would be
available to FRA through other regulatory means. Specifically, APTA
prepared a matrix recommending changes to various proposed requirements
in the NPRM where it believed the desired information should be
provided, including the addition of a Sec. 238.110 (Pre-revenue
qualification plan) to review specific design review elements. FRA has
adopted APTA's recommendations, in whole or in part, in various
sections of this final rule (see the specific section-by-section
analysis, below), and has not adopted subpart J, as proposed. However,
FRA intended the Tier III Safe Operation Plan to be a mechanism
allowing flexibility for both the Tier III equipment manufacturer and
operator to address, and FRA to review and approve, certain aspects of
Tier III equipment or operations not prescriptively defined in the
regulation so they can be appropriately tailored. To do so, the Tier
III Safe Operation Plan would provide FRA a broad level of oversight
during the equipment design period to ensure that safety issues are
addressed. FRA therefore remains concerned that APTA's comments do not
offer an alternative that provides FRA the same approval oversight for
all Tier III equipment or operations matters initially identified for
the Tier III Safe Operation Plan. For instance, FRA does not approve
railroad operating rules, so referencing a railroad's operating rules
to address various matters is not a suitable alternative. Without a
Tier III Safe Operation Plan requirement in the rule, some other
mechanism for FRA review and approval is necessary.
As noted below, APTA has suggested the addition of a new Sec.
238.110 to handle this review and approval oversight function. However,
FRA believes that further work is necessary to develop this alternate
approach. The process for how FRA would provide approval is not fully
addressed in APTA's proposal, including when that approval must be
sought, and what, specifically, needs to be approved, including how
certain Tier III operational aspects would be reviewed and approved by
FRA. In the interim, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation
on a case-by-case basis to address safety-critical matters that would
otherwise have been identified for inclusion in the proposed Tier III
Safe Operation Plan.

D. Comments From the NTSB

The NTSB submitted a letter to the docket asking FRA to include in
the final rule provisions to address safety recommendations the NTSB
has issued. Specifically, the NTSB asked FRA to add language addressing
safety recommendations R-12-41, R-14-74, R-15-01, and R-15-02.
Recommendation R-12-41 arose from a grade crossing accident that
occurred in Miriam, NV, in 2011, where a tractor-trailer truck struck
the side of an Amtrak train that was passing through the crossing. The
NTSB recommended FRA ``[r]equire that passenger railcar doors be
designed to prevent fire and smoke from traveling between railcars.''
FRA notes that adding weight or tighter seals to the doors to prevent
fire and smoke from traveling between railcars could cause unintended
harm. Both sliding and swinging doors interact closely with the
surrounding car body structure, at the hinge, track, jamb, pocket, and/
or latch. Even minor distortion of that structure due to the forces of
collision or derailment, or simply a change in the orientation of the
door due to a car being significantly displaced from its upright
position, could cause the door to fail to operate as intended. Thus,
during an emergency, additional time and effort would be needed to
operate the doors, delaying egress and access through those doors.
Recommendation R-14-74 arose from the overspeed derailment of a
Metro-North commuter train in Spuyten Duyvil, NY, in 2013. The
derailment occurred in a 6-degree left-hand curve where the maximum
authorized speed was 30 mph. The train was traveling at 82 mph when it
derailed. As a result of the derailment, four people died and at least
61 persons were injured. Metro-North estimated about 115 passengers
were on the train at the time of the derailment. Contributing to the
severity of the accident was the loss of the window glazing that
resulted in the fatal ejection of four passengers from the train. The
NTSB recommended FRA ``[d]evelop a performance standard to ensure that
windows (e.g., glazing, gaskets, and any retention hardware) are
retained in the window opening structure during an accident and
incorporate the standard into [49 CFR 238.221 and 238.421] to require
that passenger railcars meet this standard.'' As discussed in its
responses to the

[[Page 59191]]

NTSB,\12\ FRA is taking steps to address this recommendation. However,
the Metro-North accident was the result of overspeed.\13\
Implementation of positive train control should eliminate such
overspeed occurrences in passenger service, thereby reducing the
likelihood of rollover accidents and fatalities due to ejection through
window openings similar to the events involved in the Metro-North
accident. At this time, though, FRA is not amending Sec. 238.221 or
Sec. 238.421, as the NTSB's recommendations are outside the intended
scope of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-14-074.
\13\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RAB1412.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Recommendations R-15-01 and R-15-02 arose from a train-to-train
collision between two Metro-North commuter trains in Bridgeport, CT, in
2013. An eastbound train was struck by a westbound train after the
eastbound had derailed. As a result of the collision, at least 65
persons were injured. Metro-North estimated about 250 passengers were
on each train at the time of the accident. In R-15-01, the NTSB
recommended FRA ``[r]evise [49 CFR 238.213] to require the existing
forward-end corner post strength requirements for the back-end corner
posts of passenger railcars.'' In R-15-02, the NTSB recommended FRA
``[r]evise [49 CFR part 238] to incorporate a certificate of
construction, similar to the one found at [49 CFR 179.5], and require
that the certificate be furnished prior to the in-service date of the
railcar.'' FRA recognizes the importance of structurally sound
passenger cars and believes it has achieved the intent of these
recommendations. After fully analyzing FRA's current safety data,
evaluating FRA's existing safety regulations, and reviewing the NTSB's
findings, FRA determined that its current regulations do address the
NTSB's underlying safety concerns.\14\ FRA continues to use RSAC to
identify and analyze potential safety issues and the need for further
rulemaking. At this time, RSAC (and by extension, FRA) is not
considering any changes to the strength requirements for passenger car
corner posts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-15-001 https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-15-002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

Part 229--Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 229.3 Applicability
FRA is revising Sec. 229.3(c) to conform the reference to Tier II
maximum authorized speed with this final rule's revision to the
definition of ``Tier II.'' FRA is simply changing the reference to
``150 mph'' to ``160 mph,'' reflecting the changes to the maximum
authorized speed of Tier II equipment under this rule. This was not
expressly discussed in the proposed rule; however, this is merely a
conforming technical revision and will not impose any additional
regulatory requirements or burdens on the regulated industry.
Section 229.5 Definitions
FRA is revising the definition of ``Tier II'' to conform the
maximum authorized operating speed of Tier II passenger equipment in
this section (150 mph) with the maximum authorized operating speed of
Tier II equipment as specified under Sec. 238.5 of this chapter (160
mph). As a result, the definition of ``Tier II'' under part 229 is
revised to mean operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding
160 mph. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule;
however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not
impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the
regulated industry.
Part 231--Railroad Safety Appliance Standards
Section 231.0 Applicability and Penalties
FRA is revising Sec. 231.0(c) to conform the reference to Tier II
maximum authorized speed with the revisions in this final rule. FRA is
simply changing the reference to ``150 mph'' to ``160 mph,'' reflecting
the changes to the maximum authorized speed of Tier II equipment under
this rule. This was not expressly discussed in the proposed rule;
however, this is merely a conforming technical revision and will not
impose any additional regulatory requirements or burdens on the
regulated industry.

Part 236--Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the
Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train
Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems
Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High-Speed Service
FRA is removing paragraph (d) of this section as it is no longer
relevant, and redesignating paragraph (e) as paragraph (d) of this
section. FRA described the reasons for removing paragraph (d) of this
section in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88017, and did not receive any
comments on or objections to the paragraph's removal. As this portion
of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the analysis
provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, and FRA is adopting
this change as proposed.

Part 238--Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 238.5 Definitions
In this section, FRA is revising the definitions of ``glazing, end-
facing'' and ``glazing, side-facing,'' and making technical revisions
to the definitions of ``Tier II'' and ``train, Tier II passenger'' to
reflect the change in the maximum authorized speed of Tier II passenger
equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA is also adding new definitions
for ``Associate Administrator,'' ``Tier III,'' ``trainset, Tier I
alternative passenger,'' ``trainset, Tier III,'' and ``trainset unit.''
For the reasons discussed below, FRA is placing the definition of
``cab'' in new Sec. 238.702, and not under this section as proposed in
the NPRM.
FRA did not receive any comments on or objections to FRA's proposed
revisions or additions to the definitions of ``glazing, end-facing,''
``glazing, side-facing,'' ``Tier II,'' ``train, Tier II passenger,''
``Associate Administrator,'' ``Tier III,'' ``trainset, Tier I
alternative passenger,'' and ``trainset, Tier III'' and those
definitions in this final rule are identical to the proposed versions.
81 FR 88006, 88018-88019. Accordingly, the analysis provided for these
definitions in the NPRM is not being repeated here, and FRA is adopting
these definitions as proposed.
FRA did receive comments, however, on the proposed new definitions
of ``cab'' and ``trainset unit.'' APTA submitted comments suggesting
revisions to the proposed definitions of ``cab'' and ``trainset unit,''
and to FRA's existing definition of ``trainset, passenger.''
Additionally, APTA, along

[[Page 59192]]

with Alstom, suggested adding a definition for ``conventional
locomotive.'' Further, APTA, along with TCRR, suggested adding a
definition for ``Tier IV system.'' However, as discussed more fully
under new Sec. 238.702, below, FRA is placing the definition of
``cab'' under subpart H to clarify the definition's application.
Accordingly, FRA's discussion of APTA's comment on the term ``cab'' is
in the section-by-section analysis of new Sec. 238.702, below.
In its comment, APTA suggested that FRA amend its existing
definition of ``trainset, passenger'' to provide a more robust
definition to clarify when the term is used in other sections of the
rule (e.g., Sec. 238.705, Dynamic collision scenario). APTA suggested
that the term ``trainset'' means: ``a passenger train where all units
within the trainset are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a single
consist. A Tier I alternative trainset may be equipped with a
conventional locomotive at either end that may not be semi-permanently
coupled to the adjacent unit of the trainset.'' APTA reasoned that the
specific requirements proposed by the ETF for a Tier III trainset are
based on the assumption that all units within the trainset are semi-
permanently coupled together, such that units of the trainset can only
be coupled or uncoupled at a maintenance facility or other location
where personnel can safely get under or between units. Additionally,
APTA commented that, because revenue operations can only be conducted
using a complete trainset, the collision scenario defined in Sec.
238.705 is based on the operation of a complete trainset, and mentioned
that the specific requirements pertaining to safety appliances for Tier
III trainsets are also based on the assumption that all units within a
trainset are semi-permanently coupled. Further, APTA proposed allowing
a passenger trainset, as it would define the term, to be equipped with
an automatic coupler in the middle of the trainset configuration so it
could be more easily disconnected in a maintenance facility, noting
that for such configurations, the requirements of Sec. 238.705(a)
would apply to the complete trainset as operated in revenue service. At
this time, FRA is not inclined to amend its current definitions of
``trainset, passenger'' or ``train, passenger,'' and is declining to
adopt APTA's proposed definition of ``trainset.'' The definition of
passenger trainset in Sec. 238.5 applies to all tiers of passenger
equipment under part 238. Specifying that trainsets, generally, are all
semi-permanently coupled together places too broad a restriction on the
method or manner for connecting individual trainset units. However, in
this final rule, new Sec. 238.705(a)(6) does include a reference to an
``integrated trainset'' as defined in new Sec. 238.702, to clarify
which initial velocity applies to a given trainset. Moreover, FRA
recognizes APTA's concern about allowing for an automatic coupler in
the middle of a semi-permanently coupled trainset, but believes no
change is needed. FRA makes clear that the rule does not preclude the
use of automatic coupler arrangements within the consist of a semi-
permanently coupled Tier III trainset to facilitate maintenance within
a shop facility, provided the coupler arrangements are not used for
switching or other operational purposes outside of the protected
maintenance environment envisioned by the rule. Of course, if a
coupling between Tier III vehicles is not intended to be semi-permanent
in nature, then other requirements apply, such as those governing
safety appliances.
APTA also recommended clarifying the definition of ``trainset
unit,'' which FRA proposed to mean a trainset segment located between
connecting arrangements (articulations). In the NPRM, FRA explained
this definition would clarify that the proposed requirements may apply
to individual vehicles within a trainset consist, but not necessarily
to the trainset as a whole. However, in its comment, APTA suggested
restating the definition to mean ``any car within a trainset that is
semi-permanently coupled to an adjacent car within the trainset.'' FRA
is adopting its proposed definition of ``trainset unit'' in the final
rule, not APTA's. APTA's suggested definition would be too narrow
because, to be considered a trainset unit, a vehicle would require
semi-permanent coupling to an adjacent unit. Yet, FRA intends the
definition to apply to all tiers of passenger equipment, and therefore
not require all configurations of trainsets to be semi-permanently
coupled. FRA believes the definition addresses the essential elements
constituting a trainset unit without being too specific.
In their comments, both APTA and Alstom requested FRA add a
definition of ``conventional locomotive.'' APTA recommended the rule
define ``conventional locomotive'' to mean ``a piece of on-track rail
equipment with one or more control stands designed to transport a Tier
I alternative compliant passenger trainset and which meets the
crashworthiness requirements defined in Sec. 229.205 [of this chapter]
and the design requirements contained in Sec. 229.206 [of this
chapter].'' APTA stated that inclusion of such a definition would
provide greater clarity with respect to application of the dynamic
collision scenarios under Sec. 238.705. As discussed below under Sec.
238.705, APTA raised concern that because a conventional locomotive
will not be used in Tier III service, requiring use of a conventional
locomotive for a collision scenario under Tier III requirements would
introduce confusion as to which is the correct collision scenario to
apply. Alstom, in its comment, indicated that such a definition of
``conventional locomotive'' would clarify it is Tier I equipment
governed by 49 CFR part 229 and that the front vehicle of a Tier III
Trainset could therefore not be a conventional locomotive. However, FRA
is not adding a definition of ``conventional locomotive'' to this Sec.
238.5 of the final rule. APTA's proposed definition would be too
narrowly limited to a locomotive used to move Tier I alternative
equipment under appendix G to this part. Instead, FRA believes it is
more appropriate to more fully explain under Sec. 238.705, below,
FRA's intent on how the two dynamic collision scenarios should be
applied. As noted above, FRA is adding the term ``integrated trainset''
to Sec. 238.705 to address any confusion about which initial velocity
applies to a given trainset.
As mentioned above in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, APTA and TCRR recommended that FRA include in the final
rule a definition of ``Tier IV system.'' According to both APTA and
TCRR, a ``Tier IV system would mean ``any passenger rail or ground
transportation system that operates on an exclusive right-of-way
without grade crossings and is governed by a technology-specific rule
of particular applicability, or other regulatory means.'' Although
amenable to undertaking the development of such a definition, FRA is
not accepting APTA's and TCRR's recommendations to include a definition
of a Tier IV system in this final rule. Adding such a broad-ranging
definition is beyond the intended scope of this rulemaking at this
final rule stage.
Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure
In commenting on this section in the NPRM, Alstom suggested that a
reference to Tier III equipment be added in paragraph (a) where there
is currently a reference to Tier II. Alstom noted that paragraph (a)
includes a cross-reference to Sec. 238.505, which governs approvals
for Tier II ITM programs. While FRA agrees that a change to this
paragraph will be warranted in the future, doing so

[[Page 59193]]

in this rulemaking is premature as there is no equivalent section to
reference for Tier III equipment. However, in the interim, FRA will
work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the specific
ITM program sufficiently addresses the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of all safety-critical features of a Tier III trainset.
FRA is revising paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section, as
proposed in the NPRM. FRA did not receive any comments on these
technical changes. As these paragraphs are identical to those FRA
proposed in the NPRM, please see the NPRM for an analysis of the
changes, 81 FR 88006, 88050, as it is not being repeated here.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
This section contains requirements for pre-revenue service testing
of passenger equipment. As proposed in the NPRM, FRA is amending
paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), (7), and (c) of this section to require
railroads to obtain FRA approval before using Tier III passenger
equipment that either has not been used in revenue service in the U.S.,
or has been used in revenue service in the U.S. and is scheduled for a
major upgrade or introduction of new technology that affects a safety
system on such equipment. The explicit inclusion of a Tier III
notification and approval process is consistent with FRA's approach to
the implementation of high-speed rail technology. It also provides a
formal mechanism for FRA to ensure all required elements of this part
are satisfactorily addressed and documented.
In commenting on the NPRM, APTA stated that FRA should separate out
from this section issues related to FRA approval of the design of Tier
III equipment. APTA therefore suggested that FRA add a new Sec.
238.110, titled ``Pre-revenue qualification plan,'' to require a plan
addressing all documents required by subpart H to be submitted for
review and approval for Tier III equipment.'' According to APTA, new
Sec. 238.110 would contain the requirements of Tier III equipment
design that FRA would need to review and approve before Tier III
equipment could operate in revenue service. As discussed above under
proposed subpart J and the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger
Equipment, the creation of this new section ties into APTA's comment
recommending excluding from this final rule the proposed references to
a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. (Please see the discussion above, under
proposed subpart J, for FRA's response concerning removal of the Tier
III Safe Operation Plan.)
FRA recognizes that Sec. 238.111 will need some further revision
as new Tier III equipment requirements are established. However, APTA's
request to adopt a new Sec. 238.110 exceeds the intended scope of this
current rulemaking proceeding.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Section 238.201 Scope/Alternative Compliance
This section sets out the scope of subpart C, which contains
specific requirements for Tier I passenger equipment, and also provides
compliance alternatives for the use of Tier I passenger equipment. In
its comments on the NPRM, APTA agreed with FRA's proposal to amend this
section to allow Tier I equipment to comply with alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to
this part, instead of certain requirements under subpart C (Sec. Sec.
238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219).
APTA also urged that efforts be undertaken to complete and reach
consensus on a separate guidance document for demonstrating the
crashworthiness of passenger rail equipment, to assist with the
implementation of this rule. FRA is working on generating such a
document, as FRA recognizes the importance of providing guidance on the
proper application of the alternative crashworthiness and occupant
protection requirements of appendix G to this part.
FRA did not receive any additional comments on the proposed
revisions to this section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88019-
88020, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as
this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version,
the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Sections 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209, 238.211, 238.213, and
238.219
These sections contain structural and equipment protection
requirements for Tier I passenger equipment. FRA did not receive any
comments on the proposed revisions to these sections as described in
the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88020, to reflect the addition of alternative
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. As these
sections of the final rule are identical to the proposed versions, FRA
is adopting them as proposed and the analysis provided in the NPRM for
each section is not being repeated here.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.401 Scope
As discussed in the NPRM, FRA is revising this section to increase
the maximum allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150
mph to 160 mph. This change is consistent with FRA's March 13, 2013,
final rule amending and clarifying the Track Safety Standards, which
affirmed that the maximum allowable speed on Class 8 track is 160 mph.
See 78 FR 16052. Further, this change makes the speed range for Tier II
passenger equipment consistent with that for Class 8 track in the Track
Safety Standards. As specified in Sec. 213.307 of this chapter, Class
8 track encompasses the speed range above 125 mph up to 160 mph--now
the same speed range for Tier II passenger equipment. Nonetheless, FRA
makes clear this change only increases the maximum operating speed to
160 mph. FRA approval to operate at 160 mph is still needed as this
part and other FRA safety regulations require.
In commenting on the NPRM, APTA expressed its support for this
change and harmonizing the Track Safety Standards and Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards. Separately, APTA stated that it might be
appropriate to reexamine Tier II requirements in the future because
they were developed prior to the congressional mandate to implement
PTC. APTA added that such a reexamination should take into
consideration the incident and accident data since the introduction of
Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets, along with the corresponding risks
associated with future operations and anticipated Northeast Corridor
upgrades.
FRA agrees with APTA that if it becomes necessary to reexamine Tier
II requirements, it would be appropriate, as always, to consider all
relevant safety data available. However, FRA makes clear that the
mandate to implement PTC should not be viewed as a replacement for
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements but as a
complementary safety measure. Indeed, around the time part 238 was
originally published, FRA issued an order of particular applicability
for use of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, a type of PTC
system, on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor to support safe train operations
at higher speeds. See 63 FR 39343 (Jul. 22, 1998)

[[Page 59194]]

and subsequent amendments thereto. Moreover, as discussed in the NPRM
and in this final rule under Sec. 238.705, not all accidents are PTC-
preventable, such as collisions with trespassing highway equipment at
grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or passenger
equipment) during manual operations at speeds 20 mph or below.
Accordingly, FRA does not intend to amend the Tier II occupant
protection and crashworthiness requirements simply because PTC is
installed on the equipment.
FRA did not receive any comments objecting to the revision to this
section as described in the NPRM. 81 FR 88006, 88020. As this portion
of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the complete
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier
II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.501 Scope
FRA is revising this section to increase the maximum allowable
speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA did
not receive any comments on the proposed revision to this section as
described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88021, and FRA is adopting it as
proposed. Please see the discussion of Sec. 238.401 for further
information on this speed change.
Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
This subpart contains specific requirements for Tier III passenger
equipment. Many of the requirements under this subpart consider Tier
III passenger equipment in terms of an integrated trainset, as that
term is now defined under Sec. 238.702, particularly for purposes of
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. This rule
presumes that Tier III trainsets will consist of semi-permanently
coupled, articulated, or otherwise ``fixed'' configurations, that are
not intended to operate normally as individual vehicles, or in mixed
consists (with equipment of another design or operational tier).
The requirements in this subpart are organized into subject areas
based on their general applicability: Trainset structure, window
glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, emergency
systems, and cab equipment. FRA intends that the requirements be
applied in a manner that is performance-based and technology-neutral,
where possible. FRA notes that it intends for certain sections of this
subpart to be applied as an integrated set of alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for
Tier I passenger equipment as delineated in appendix G to this part.
FRA considers this set of requirements to provide an equivalent level
of safety to its counterpart set of Tier I requirements in subpart C of
this part. As explained in greater detail in the discussion of appendix
G below, the rule clarifies which specific Tier III crashworthiness and
occupant protection performance requirement should be applied as an
alternative set of Tier I counterpart requirements. Specifically, FRA
makes clear that if alternative Tier I compliance is sought under
appendix G, then all the requirements in appendix G must be met so the
integrity of the alternative requirements is maintained.
Section 238.701 Scope
This section sets out the scope of new subpart H. Subpart H
contains specific requirements for railroad passenger equipment
operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph, and
in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. FRA did not receive any
comments on the exclusion of grade crossings or the 125-mph speed limit
when grade crossings are present within the right-of-way, or on whether
FRA should explicitly apply the 125-mph speed limit only to track
located at or near each grade crossing within an exclusive right-of-
way. As stated in the NPRM, FRA believes that in most cases new,
exclusive rights-of-way designed for Tier III operations will be
constructed without highway grade crossings, see 81 FR 88006, 88021.
However, in the situation where exclusive rights-of-way include highway
grade crossings, but may have long stretches of track without a grade
crossing, FRA would expect appropriate operational safeguards to be in
place to prevent trainsets from traversing highway grade crossings at
speeds exceeding 125 mph. In fact, FRA would expect those operations
that include grade crossings in their exclusive rights-of-way to also
comply with the requirements of Sec. 213.347 of this chapter.
Section 213.347(a) of this chapter prohibits any grade crossings on
Class 8 or 9 track. Whereas Class 8 track is track with an operational
speed range from above 125 mph not exceeding 160 mph, Class 9 track is
track with an operational speed range from above 160 mph not exceeding
220 mph. Further, Sec. 213.347(b) of this chapter requires a track
owner of Class 7 track (track with an operational speed range from
above 110 mph not exceeding 125 mph) to submit for FRA's approval a
complete description of the proposed warning/barrier system to address
the protection of highway traffic and high-speed trains if the track
will include highway grade crossings. Section 213.347(b) of this
chapter prohibits operations on Class 7 track unless such an FRA-
approved warning barrier system is in place and functioning as
intended.
Separately, FRA received comments on its proposal to allow
passenger seating in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset provided
safety issues associated with passengers occupying the leading unit are
addressed and mitigated through a comprehensive Tier III Safe Operation
Plan. (See the discussion of proposed subpart J and the Safe Operation
Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment, under Discussion of Comments and
Conclusions, section IV, above.) APTA stated that addressing safety
concerns in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is unnecessary because those
safety concerns are already addressed through other regulatory means.
APTA maintained that when Tier III equipment is operating at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph, the crashworthiness and occupant protection
requirements provide an equivalent level of safety to that of Tier I
equipment and sufficient protection is already afforded passengers
occupying leading units of Tier III trainsets. Additionally, APTA
suggested that when operating above 125 mph, the right-of-way barrier
plan required under Sec. 213.361 of this chapter and the HSR-125 plan
required under Sec. 236.1007 of this chapter address any additional
safety concerns for passengers occupying the leading units of Tier III
trainsets, as these two sections guard against unauthorized intrusions
into the right-of-way. Accordingly, APTA believed that conducting an
additional, comprehensive analysis for the Tier III Safe Operation Plan
would be redundant.
Alstom's comment on this section mirrored APTA's comment in
substance. Alstom also suggested that the safety considerations that
FRA initially sought to address in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan are
adequately addressed just as APTA outlined in its comment.
As explained under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section
IV, above, this section does not refer to a Tier III Safe Operation
Plan. This final rule does not require railroads to complete a
comprehensive safety analysis specifically addressing and mitigating
all safety conditions

[[Page 59195]]

associated with passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III
trainset. Instead, FRA's regulations continue to require, before
passengers can occupy the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, that
railroads seeking to do so namely have an approved right-of-way plan
that complies with the requirements of Sec. 213.361 of this chapter,
have an approved PTC Safety Plan that complies with Sec. 236.1007(c)
of this chapter, and, as appropriate, comply with Sec. 213.347 of this
chapter. These requirements should not place any additional regulatory
burden on a Tier III operation as these are all existing regulatory
requirements. However, FRA does make clear that prior to any train
operation in which passengers other than assigned crew members (i.e.,
engineers and conductors) occupy the lead unit of a Tier III trainset,
the above requirements must be met, regardless of whether operating in
revenue service (i.e., whether or not the passengers have paid a fare
to ride). Additionally, if a railroad does identify safety concerns
involving passengers occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset,
FRA expects the railroad to properly and adequately address the
concerns. Similarly, FRA reserves the right to ensure that the railroad
properly and adequately addresses safety concerns involving passengers
occupying the lead unit of a Tier III trainset, if FRA's inspection of
a Tier III railroad operation identifies such safety concerns.
Finally, as noted earlier, APTA suggested that FRA create a new
section, Sec. 238.110, to address compliance review and approval with
the requirements of this subpart H. See FRA's discussion of this
suggestion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV,
above.
Section 238.702 Definitions
FRA has added this new section to contain definitions applying
specifically to subpart H of this part. This section defines the terms
``cab,'' which was proposed in the NPRM under Sec. 238.5, and
``integrated trainset,'' which is a new term not expressly proposed in
the NPRM. FRA determined it will be clearer and more useful to place
definitions that are tailored to the application of subpart H in this
section, rather than in this part's general definitions section, Sec.
238.5.
In its comments on the proposed definition of ``cab,'' APTA
recommended FRA remove the proposed statement that the term ``cab''
includes a locomotive cab for the purposes of subpart H. According to
APTA, the Tier III trainsets subpart H addresses do not have locomotive
cabs. APTA also commented that any analysis for a Tier I alternatively
compliant trainset as governed by appendix G cannot include an analysis
of the cab of a conventional locomotive because the collision model
used for that analysis is insufficient. APTA suggested instead to
revise the proposed definition of ``cab'' to mean ``for the purposes of
subpart H of this part, a compartment or space in a trainset designed
to be occupied by the engineer and contain an operating console from
which the engineer exercises control over the trainset.'' When
discussed at the May 2017 ETF meeting, APTA expanded on its comment
saying that if the definition were to remain as proposed, there would
need to be a way to differentiate between when the term ``cab'' applies
to a Tier III trainset versus a conventional locomotive cab. APTA
stated this is crucial when applying the dynamic collision scenario
under Sec. 238.705 because (as discussed more comprehensively below) a
Tier III trainset cannot be led by a conventional North American
locomotive in its intended service.
FRA recognizes APTA's underlying concern with the proposed
definition of ``cab.'' FRA has therefore defined the term in this
section of the final rule to better clarify how the term is applied to
Tier III equipment, and by extension of appendix G to this part, Tier I
alternative equipment. Accordingly, the term ``cab'' means a
compartment or space within a trainset that is designed to be occupied
by an engineer and contain an operating console for exercising control
over the trainset. As the definition is contained in this new section,
which applies specifically to subpart H, there is no need to add
language to the definition expressly limiting its application.
In addition, as fully discussed below, FRA has included the term
``integrated trainset'' in Sec. 238.705 and is defining that term in
this Sec. 238.702. FRA believes that any confusion over which initial
velocity applies to a given trainset undergoing evaluation in the
dynamic collision scenario in Sec. 238.705 is reconciled with the new
term ``integrated trainset.'' The term ``integrated trainset'' is
defined as a passenger trainset in which all units of the trainset are
designed to operate as an integrated consist to achieve its structural
crashworthiness performance. FRA intends the term ``integrated
trainset'' to mean that each individual vehicle comprising the trainset
is interdependent structurally with each other, specifically with
respect to the collision load path and how the collision loads are
designed to be resolved.
Trainset Structure
Section 238.703 Quasi-Static Compression Load Requirements
This section contains the quasi-static compression load
requirements for Tier III equipment. This section also requires
compliance with Sec. 238.705 to demonstrate sufficient occupied volume
integrity (OVI). The purpose of applying both requirements is to ensure
the integrity of the occupied volume during a collision or other
accident. Integrity of the occupied volume is a fundamental requirement
of crashworthiness--the primary goal of which is preservation of space
to protect occupants during an accident. Additionally, a strong
occupied volume serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness
features such as CEM components. And although the language of this
section references only Tier III trainsets, the requirements of this
section may also be applied to Tier I trainsets through the application
of appendix G, in the alternative to the requirements of 49 CFR
238.203, Static end strength. Tier I passenger equipment designed to
alternative crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate
level of crashworthiness by complying with the quasi-static compression
load requirements proposed in Sec. 238.703(b).
FRA received one comment on this section. The commenter, Alstom,
stated that the methodology necessary to properly apply the collision
load along the collision load path was not included in the proposal,
and suggested FRA supply that methodology in some form of compliance
manual or document. FRA does agree with Alstom that providing guidance
on how to properly apply the requirements of this section would be
beneficial to the regulated community. However, to remain technology
neutral, FRA did not propose a specific methodology in the rule text.
FRA understands there may be different methodologies that are
equivalent, and thus putting one in the regulation over another could
unintentionally limit the technology employed. FRA intends to address
this issue in developing a guidance document, as discussed above.
FRA did not receive any other comments on the requirements in this
section as described in the NPRM, 81 FR 88006, 88021-88023, and FRA is
adopting this section as proposed. Because this portion of the final
rule is identical to the proposed version, the complete analysis
provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.

[[Page 59196]]

Section 238.705 Dynamic Collision Scenario
As discussed in the NPRM, this section contains the dynamic
collision scenario analysis requirements as the second part of the OVI
evaluation of a Tier III passenger trainset, in conjunction with Sec.
238.703. Because PTC technology does not protect against all possible
collision scenarios, such as collisions with trespassing highway
equipment at grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or
passenger equipment) during manual operations at 20 mph or below,
compliance with this requirement is necessary to preserve the occupied
volume, to protect all occupants on the trainset.
As mentioned in the discussion of Sec. 238.703, each vehicle in
the trainset needs to demonstrate it meets both the OVI requirements in
paragraph (b) of that section and the dynamic collision scenario
requirements in paragraph (b) of this section. Further, as provided in
Sec. 238.703, and as outlined in appendix G, a Tier I passenger
trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may comply
with this section instead of the requirements applicable to Tier I
passenger trainsets in Sec. 238.203.
In combination with the quasi-static compression load requirements
in Sec. 238.703, the purpose of this dynamic collision scenario
requirement is to ensure that survivable space for the passengers and
crew is preserved in up to moderately severe accident conditions (i.e.,
conditions comparable to a head-on collision at speeds of 20 to 25 mph,
depending on the type of equipment, into a stationary train). This
requirement also provides a baseline level of protection for scenarios
that may be more severe, but less predictable with respect to loading
conditions and historical accident data. Although the dynamic collision
scenario is conducted at the trainset level, the requirements described
in this section are evaluated at the level of the trainset's individual
vehicles so no vehicle in the trainset may exceed the parameters
outlined in paragraph (b) as a result of the dynamic collision
scenario.
Paragraph (a) outlines the required conditions under which a
dynamic collision scenario is performed. Generally, the collision
scenario requires a dynamic impact to be simulated between an
initially-moving trainset and an initially-standing train. The
initially-moving trainset is the trainset undergoing evaluation, either
Tier III equipment or, as provided in appendix G, Tier I equipment
designed to alternative crashworthiness standards. The initially-
standing train is a locomotive-led consist of five conventionally-
designed passenger cars. The conventionally-designed passenger cars
have a prescribed weight and force-versus-displacement
characteristic.\15\ The pass/fail criteria for the scenario determine
whether there is sufficient preservation of occupied volume for
passengers and crew in the trainset undergoing evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\ Appropriate weights and force-versus-displacement
characteristics for the conventionally-designed passenger cars can
be found in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FRA expects the collision scenario simulation to be executed for an
impact duration sufficient to capture the most severe portion of the
collision event. The actual amount of impact time required to simulate
the collision sufficiently will vary based upon the characteristics of
the trainset undergoing evaluation. Typically, the collision scenario
will be executed until all the equipment, including the initially-
standing train and initially-moving trainset, is moving in the same
direction at approximately the same velocity. If all the equipment is
moving together at approximately the same speed, no further vehicle-to-
vehicle impacts will occur, and the simulation will then have been
executed for a sufficient duration to capture the most severe
decelerations.
There are various types of analyses that may be used to evaluate
the collision scenario requirements. These analyses include fully-
detailed FE models, lumped-parameter analyses, or a hybrid approach
where a combination of detailed FE modeling and lumped-parameter
techniques are used within the same simulation. An FEA of the scenario
is generally a highly-detailed simulation of the actual trainset
geometry. The parts making up the trainset are meshed into a large
number of elements, with each element having its own mass, stiffness,
and connection properties to the adjacent elements. A lumped parameter
analysis represents each car or section of a car within a trainset
using a small number of masses and a small number of non-linear
springs. At its extreme, each vehicle consists of a single mass and a
single spring characteristic. A hybrid approach may utilize an FE mesh
to represent some structures (e.g., CEM structures that undergo large
deformations) and lumped-parameter representations of other structures
(e.g., vehicles far from the impacting interface that experience little
deformation). Any of the three types of analyses is capable of
developing the information needed to verify a trainset's ability to
meet the requirements of the collision scenario. Additionally, because
the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and initially-standing
train are aligned with one another during this scenario, a half-
symmetric model may be used to represent the colliding vehicles, as
appropriate.
FRA received comments from APTA recommending revisions to several
paragraphs of this section in the NPRM. In its comments on the NPRM,
APTA recommended that FRA replace the references made to ``train'' in
paragraphs (a)(1)-(3), (6), and (8), and replace them with the term
``trainset,'' to clarify the application of the collision scenario
under paragraph (a) of this section. APTA proposed that the term
trainset be defined to mean a passenger train where all units within
the trainset are semi-permanently coupled to operate as a single
consist. As stated under the discussion of Sec. 238.5, FRA has not
adopted APTA's proposal definition of ``trainset.'' However, FRA does
agree that reference to a trainset is more appropriate than to a
``train'' in this section. Accordingly, the above-referenced paragraphs
of paragraph (a) use the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' and
FRA intends the term ``trainset'' to mean either a Tier I alternative
or Tier III trainset, as those terms are defined in Sec. 238.5.
However, with reference to the initially-standing train, as FRA
envisions it being reflective of a conventional Tier I passenger train,
FRA is using the term ``train'' for clarity. Although not specifically
requested by APTA, paragraphs (a)(4) and (9) use the term ``trainset''
in conformance with these changes.
In commenting on the NPRM, APTA recommended that paragraph (a)(3)
be placed in appendix G to part 238, consistent with its other comments
that requirements for conventional locomotive led equipment are not
appropriate in subpart H because Tier III equipment will not utilize
conventional locomotive power. APTA also suggested that the text adopt
APTA's proposed definition of ``trainset'' instead of ``train,'' as
proposed. Paragraph (a)(3) of this section, as proposed in the NPRM,
stated that if the trainset is intended for use in push-pull service,
then both the locomotive-led and cab-car-led configurations would
require separate evaluation. This proposal was intended to ensure
sufficient OVI for all occupied spaces in the trainset regardless of
whether led by a cab car or a conventional locomotive.
FRA's discussion of the use of the term ``conventional locomotive''
in paragraph (a)(6) of this section applies

[[Page 59197]]

here, in response to APTA's concern, as discussed below. In the final
rule, this paragraph (a)(3) omits specific references to ``locomotive''
or ``cab car'' and requires that if the initially-moving trainset is
intended for use in push-pull service, then, as applicable, each
configuration of leading vehicle shall be evaluated separately. By
requiring that each lead vehicle be evaluated separately, FRA intends
to capture situations where the lead vehicles of a push-pull operation
could be two different styles of vehicle that could potentially have
different designs and structural characteristics, and thus have
different crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities. This
paragraph eliminates any reference to a specific technology and only
requires separate evaluation if the lead vehicles are different. FRA
recognizes that some push-pull operations do not necessarily require a
locomotive-like vehicle on one end with a cab car-like vehicle on the
other. But when the two vehicles are different, in design or structural
make-up, then the crashworthiness and occupant protection capabilities
of each vehicle must be evaluated.
In its comments on this section, Alstom also raised concern about
how to implement the force-versus-crush requirements in proposed
paragraph (a)(4)(ii) and Table 1 to this section. Proposed paragraph
(a)(4)(ii) stated that the rigid locomotive and each passenger coach in
the initially-standing train crush in response to applied force as
specified in Table 1, which in turn provided the non-linear, force-
versus-crush relationships for the passenger cars and locomotive
comprising the initially-standing train. In particular, Alstom found it
unclear whether the paragraph made it necessary to combine
characteristics at ``inter-trailers,'' and, if so, how to do so. Alstom
therefore suggested that the force-crush characteristics to be used at
each interface between vehicles be included in this paragraph instead
of Table 1.
FRA makes clear that the force-crush characteristics described in
Table 1 are intended for use as inputs to a lumped-parameter simulation
model of a train-to-train collision. The data in Table 1 describe the
resulting force when the equipment moves into a rigid fixed barrier. In
the initial position, when the crush is 0 inches, the passenger coach
is just touching the barrier and the force is also 0 lbf. The length of
the coach is reduced as the coach moves towards the barrier and
crushes. When the coach has crushed by 3 inches, the force has
increased linearly to 80,000 lbf. When the coach has crushed by 6
inches, the force again increases linearly to 250,000 lbf, from 80,000
lbf. For the rigid locomotive, the force is 0 lbf when the crush is 0
inches and the rigid locomotive is just touching the barrier. After 2.5
inches of crush, the force increases linearly to 100,000 lbf. When the
rigid locomotive has crushed by 5 inches, the force again increases
linearly to 2,500,000 lbf, from 100,000 lbf.
Depending on the details of the software used to implement the
lumped-parameter model, the data in Table 1 may need to be re-
formatted. Some software may allow the data to be input simply as it is
presented in Table 1. Other software may require coach-to-coach force
crush characteristics for input. For coach-to-coach crush, the crush
distances simply double for the corresponding force. Accordingly, 6
inches of crush between coaches are required to reach 80,000 lbf, and
12 inches of crush are required to reach 2,500,000 lbf. For rigid
locomotive-to-coach crush, some calculations are required. At 80,000
lbf between the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has
crushed by 2 inches, while the coach has crushed by 3 inches. The rigid
locomotive-to-coach crush is then 5 inches when there is 80,000 lbf
between the rigid locomotive and coach. At 100,000 lbf between the
rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 2.5
inches and the coach has crushed by 3.35 inches. The rigid locomotive-
to-coach crush is 5.85 inches at 100,000 lbf. At 2,500,000 lbf between
the rigid locomotive and coach, the rigid locomotive has crushed by 5
inches and the coach has crushed by 6 inches. The rigid locomotive-to-
coach crush is 11 inches at 2,500,000 lbf.
Calculations may be necessary to determine the force-crush
characteristic between the rigid locomotive described in Table 1 and
the new equipment under evaluation. The details of such calculations
will likely depend on the software modeling choices. One possibility,
of many, is to calculate the force-crush response of the new equipment
with a rigid fixed barrier, and use those results in combination with
the rigid locomotive data in Table 1. The force-crush characteristic
for the rigid locomotive to the new equipment may then be calculated in
a manner similar to the force crush characteristic for the rigid
locomotive to the coaches.
Most notably, APTA recommended revising paragraph (a)(6), which
specifically describes the initial velocities to be assigned to the
initially-moving trainset in the dynamic collision scenario. FRA makes
clear that, although the collision scenario in paragraph (a)(6)
references ``initial velocities'' for the scenario, FRA expects that
the actual velocity at the colliding interface be the same as the
initial velocity, as generally models do not account for loss of
velocity. However, if a model includes loss of velocity due to
friction, or other velocity-reducing forces, FRA would expect the
initial velocity to be increased so that the collision velocity remains
either 20 mph or 25 mph, depending on the equipment undergoing
evaluation. As proposed in the NPRM, if the initially-moving trainset
were led by a cab car or an MU locomotive, its initial velocity would
be 20 mph; if the initially-moving trainset were led by a conventional
locomotive, its initial velocity would be 25 mph. These speeds were
chosen based upon estimates of the upper limit of the ability of
conventionally-designed Tier I equipment to maintain its occupied
volume in a similar collision scenario.
APTA commented that, although it is probable for a Tier I
alternative trainset, it is not possible for a Tier III trainset to be
led by a conventional North American locomotive. APTA stated that a
Tier III trainset could never meet its performance capabilities with a
conventional locomotive on the leading and trailing ends, because the
end units must be low-profile, aerodynamic designs that are an integral
part of the trainset design. APTA therefore suggested that the portion
of the rule text involving an initially-moving consist led by a
conventional locomotive be placed in appendix G to this part and not
contained in this section.
Alstom also provided comments on paragraph (a)(6) of this section.
Specifically, Alstom sought clarification of the application of the 20-
mph and 25-mph initial velocities. Alstom did not believe having two
initial velocities makes sense and suggested there should instead be
only one initial velocity applicable to all equipment--an initial
velocity for all Tier III trainsets.
FRA carefully considered both APTA's and Alstom's comments on this
paragraph. FRA recognizes the importance of ensuring that the intent of
the section's application is clearly understood so that equipment
designed to the Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection
requirements, or the Tier I alternative requirements, properly
preserves the occupied volume in the event of a collision. As discussed
above, the collision scenario speeds were chosen based upon estimates
of the upper limit of the ability of conventionally-designed Tier I
equipment to maintain its occupied volume in a similar collision
scenario. FRA did not intend inclusion of two

[[Page 59198]]

collision scenario speeds to create ambiguity but rather to clarify and
refine the application of this paragraph depending on the type of
equipment used. Nonetheless, FRA recognizes that use of the term
``conventional locomotive'' for purposes of applying the dynamic
collision scenario requirements could cause confusion. FRA did not
intend for the reference to a ``conventional locomotive'' to
necessarily mean a conventional North American locomotive. Instead, FRA
intended the reference to refer more generally to the use of a rigid
locomotive, especially a surrogate model of a rigid locomotive when the
leading unit is unknown. This is why FRA included in the proposed rule
text a rigid locomotive model, as described and depicted in appendix H
to this part, Rigid locomotive design computer model input data and
geometrical depiction. Accordingly, FRA has holistically revised this
section from that proposed in the NPRM to remove the term
``conventional locomotive'' and replace it with the term ``rigid
locomotive,'' referencing the rigid locomotive model in appendix H.
FRA notes that it also considered drafting the regulatory text so
that the 20-mph initial velocity would apply to a trainset led by a
vehicle designed to be occupied by passengers, and the 25-mph initial
velocity would apply to a trainset led by equipment not designed to be
occupied by passengers. When this issue was discussed at the May 2017
ETF meeting, the ETF members rejected this approach. Simply referencing
a locomotive not designed to be occupied by passengers instead of a
conventional locomotive did not fully resolve the issue, because of
concern that a Tier III trainset may not be powered by a stand-alone
power unit but rather through an integrated system in which powered
axles are distributed throughout the trainset. Additionally, a question
arose whether a control cab in the lead unit of such an integrated and
powered trainset design made that lead unit an MU, further clouding
which initial velocity would apply. Moreover, to the extent passengers
do not occupy the lead unit in such a trainset, there would be a large
mass in front of passenger-occupied units that allows for more
absorption of energy not being transferred to the passenger-occupied
units, and the ETF raised concern that the lead unit in such a trainset
not be subjected to more stringent requirements.
In discussing how best to clarify the application of the
requirements of this paragraph, ETF industry representatives mentioned
that the requirements, when developed for the Technical Criteria and
Procedures Report, were intended to apply to integrated trainsets, not
trainsets led by conventional North American locomotives. Consistent
with the comments APTA and Alstom submitted, ETF industry
representatives suggested applying the 20-mph initial velocity to Tier
III trainsets in this section, and applying the 25-mph initial velocity
to Tier I alternative trainsets in appendix G to this part. ETF labor
representatives noted the original consensus product of the ETF and
cautioned against re-drafting consensus language. After a healthy
discussion and to remain technology neutral, FRA proposed to the ETF
the concept of using the term ``integrated trainset'' for determining
which initial velocity applies. If the design of the trainset was
integrated from a structural and crashworthiness perspective, with all
vehicles inclusive of the leading unit designed to work together in a
collision scenario, then the 20-mph initial velocity would apply. For
all other configurations not considered ``integrated,'' regardless of
the equipment's tier and what type of unit leads the trainset, the 25-
mph initial velocity would apply. Such an approach would take into
account instances when the lead unit of a Tier III trainset and its
passenger coaches would be manufactured by different companies.
Further, because properly testing the crashworthiness and occupant
protection capabilities of the passenger coaches must involve some
known characteristics of the vehicle leading the trainset, this section
would consider such a trainset a non-integrated trainset led by a
surrogate for the lead unit, and reflect that the collision load paths
of the lead unit and the coach cars are not structurally
interdependent.
Accordingly, in the final rule, FRA has not adopted the proposed
references to cab cars, or MU or conventional locomotives. Rather,
paragraph (a)(6) of this section requires the initially-moving trainset
to have an initial velocity of 20 mph if it is an integrated trainset,
as that term is now defined under Sec. 238.702, or an initial velocity
of 25 mph when the lead vehicle is not part of the integrated design.
By using the term ``integrated trainset,'' FRA intends to remain
technology-neutral and not restrict the type of equipment that could
potentially lead a Tier III trainset. As long as the entire trainset is
designed and built as an integrated trainset, the 20-mph initial
velocity applies.
FRA also received comments from APTA concerning paragraph (b) of
this section, which contains the crashworthiness and occupant
protection performance requirements the individual vehicles in the
initially-moving trainset involved in the dynamic collision scenario
must meet as described in paragraph (a). Specifically, FRA proposed in
paragraph (b)(2) that if the option to use GM/RT2100 is exercised to
demonstrate compliance with any of the requirements in Sec. Sec.
238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then the average longitudinal
deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of each vehicle during the
dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g in any 100-millisecond
(ms) time period. FRA explained that a plot of the 100-ms average
longitudinal deceleration versus time, in which the curve never exceeds
5g, would suffice to demonstrate compliance with paragraph (b)(2).
APTA, in its comment, noted that proposed paragraph differed slightly
from the consensus agreement. However, APTA expressed its agreement
with the proposal if FRA intends the rule to allow the use of a moving
window of a 5g average deceleration within 100 ms.
FRA makes clear that the differences between the consensus rule
text and the proposed rule text were merely editorial in nature and in
no way changed the substantive intent that the average longitudinal
deceleration of the CG of each vehicle of the initially-moving trainset
during the dynamic collision scenario not exceed 5g in any 100-ms time
period. Additionally, FRA disagrees with APTA's characterization of the
intent of this section. The average deceleration in any 100-ms period
was never intended to be comprised of the most favorable data points
during the time period, e.g., selecting only those decelerations that
are at or below 5g, to demonstrate compliance. It has always been FRA's
intent that a representative data set be used to calculate the average
deceleration. However, because FRA recognizes the possibility that this
intent may be overlooked, or otherwise not followed, FRA is including
text in paragraph (b)(2) specifying that the maximum interval between
the data points averaged in the 100-ms time period shall be no greater
than 1 ms. This means that each deceleration experienced during each
millisecond of the 100-ms period must now be used to calculate the
average deceleration under paragraph (b)(2) of this section. FRA
believes this provision will help assure that the average taken during
the 100-ms time period is based on a sufficient data set, so that there
is a high degree of confidence and accuracy supporting the calculated
average deceleration.

[[Page 59199]]

FRA has otherwise adopted this section as proposed in the NPRM, and
the complete analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here.
Section 238.707 Override Protection
This section contains the requirements for analyzing the ability of
a Tier III passenger trainset to resist vertical climbing or override
at its collision interface locations during a dynamic collision
scenario. This section examines the vertical displacement behavior of
colliding equipment under an ideal impact scenario where an initially-
moving Tier III trainset and an initially-standing train are aligned.
This section also prescribes an impact scenario where the interface of
the colliding equipment is translated both laterally and vertically by
3 inches to ensure that override is resisted during an impact when the
two trains are not perfectly aligned. Evaluating the colliding
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition
helps to demonstrate that the override features are robust. As
proposed, Tier III passenger trainsets must comply with both paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this section.
FRA received comments from Alstom on this section on proposed
paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) and (b)(1)(ii). Alstom stated that the direction
of the vertical perturbation required in each paragraph was not defined
(i.e., whether the perturbation is upwards or downwards). Alstom
recommended that the rule specify which direction the initially-moving
trainset is to be perturbed, to remove any confusion on how the dynamic
collision scenario under Sec. 238.705(a) is applied to properly
evaluate the equipment's resistance to override.
FRA agrees with Alstom's comment, and for the reasons discussed
below, paragraph (a)(1) in the final rule contains three sets of
initial conditions for analyzing the ability of the evaluated trainset
to resist vertical climbing or override during a dynamic collision
scenario. Paragraph (a)(1) also states these conditions must be applied
using the dynamic collision scenario in Sec. 238.705(a). The criteria
for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of initial
conditions are provided in paragraph (a)(2), and remain unchanged from
the NPRM. Because the same model may be used both to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 238.705 and the requirements
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the model must be validated
with test data in such a way as to provide confidence in the validity
of the results of the collision analyses. In this regard, if the
components that experience large deflection or permanent deformation in
the analysis described in Sec. 238.705 also experience large
deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then the same test results may be
used to validate the model. If the performance of the components that
undergo large deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2)
of this section is not validated with test data as part of the
validation of the model used in Sec. 238.705, then additional
validation testing must be performed to validate the model being used
to demonstrate performance under paragraph (a)(2).
Paragraph (a)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used in the
collision simulation to demonstrate anti-climbing performance, and
remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph still provides that all
vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the initially-
standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running
heights with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset and
initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the
colliding vehicles are aligned with one another, a longitudinally half-
symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as
appropriate. FRA intends for this initial condition to represent an
ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially
aligned with one another.
As proposed, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) described the second condition to
be used in the collision simulation as a 3-inch lateral and 3-inch
vertical offset of the interface of the colliding equipment, without
defining the direction of the perturbance. It is here where Alstom's
comment was focused. FRA notes that implicit in the proposed regulatory
text for this paragraph was an assumption that, to demonstrate
compliance with this section, a railroad or manufacturer would choose
the more unfavorable arrangement (upwards or downwards perturbance)
with respect to override (the arrangement most likely to lead to
override) to be evaluated. However, FRA recognizes that this assumption
was not made clear. Therefore, in the final rule, FRA has provided more
detail in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) and included new paragraph (a)(1)(iii).
Although FRA is being more prescriptive with respect to the
requirements of this section to remove ambiguity on its application,
FRA still expects that when a scenario arises where there are multiple
arrangements that can be evaluated, the most severe scenario (the
scenario most likely to lead to override) will be evaluated and the
results used to determine whether compliance with the requirements of
this section has been achieved.
Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)(ii) specifies that the initially-
moving trainset must be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches
vertically upwards relative to the initially-standing train. Further,
paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires that the initially-moving trainset must
be perturbed 3-inches laterally and 3-inches vertically downwards
relative to the initially-standing train. The lateral and vertical
offsets still must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation.
Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will demonstrate that
the anti-climb features are of a robust design, capable of preventing
climbing when the colliding vehicles are not perfectly aligned. Because
these simulations require a lateral offset between the initially-
standing train and initially-moving trainset, a symmetric boundary
condition may not be employed (i.e., the full width of each consist
must be modeled).
Paragraph (a)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of
the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' to remain consistent with
use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph
explains the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to
demonstrate a trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features for its
colliding interface. The criteria must be met for each set of initial
conditions in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)-(iii) for demonstrating appropriate
resistance to override between colliding equipment.
Paragraph (b) contains the evaluation methodology for demonstrating
the appropriate level of override protection for connected equipment in
a Tier III trainset. This paragraph requires examination of the
vertical displacement behavior of coupled equipment under an ideal
impact scenario where the vehicles within the initially-moving trainset
are aligned. It also prescribes an impact scenario where the first
coupled interface of the initially-moving trainset is translated both
laterally and vertically by 2 inches. Evaluating the connected
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition is
necessary to demonstrate the override features are robust and can
resist override during an impact where the coupled vehicles are not
perfectly aligned.
Paragraph (b)(1) explains the conditions for analyzing the ability
of connected equipment to resist vertical climbing or override at the
coupled interfaces during a dynamic collision

[[Page 59200]]

scenario, using the scenario described in Sec. 238.705(a). Like
paragraph (a) of this section, each set of conditions in paragraphs
(b)(1)(i)-(iii) must be evaluated independently. Criteria for
evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of conditions
are in paragraph (b)(2). As noted in the discussion of paragraph (a),
because the same model may be used to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of Sec. 238.705 and the requirements of this section, the
model must be validated with test data in a way that provides
confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses.
The discussion of model validation in paragraph (a) applies equally to
model validation for purposes of paragraph (b).
Paragraph (b)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used for
collision simulation to demonstrate override protection for connected
equipment, and remains unchanged from the NPRM. This paragraph provides
that all vehicles in both the initially-moving trainset and the
initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal
running heights, with the centerlines of the initially-moving trainset
and initially-standing train aligned. Because the centerlines of the
colliding vehicles will be aligned with one another, a longitudinally
half-symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario,
as appropriate. This initial condition is meant to represent an ideal
collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned
with one another.
As proposed, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) described the second condition to
be used in the collision simulation as a 2-inch lateral and 2-inch
vertical offset of the first connected interface between vehicles in
the initially-moving train. As discussed above, Alstom raised concern
that the proposed paragraph did not define the direction of the
vertical offset. Accordingly, FRA is employing the same approach here
as under paragraph (a)(1)(ii) to clarify the direction of the vertical
offset and is also including a new paragraph (b)(1)(iii).
In the final rule, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) specifies that the first
connected vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset
must be perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically upwards,
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface.
Further, paragraph (b)(1)(iii) requires that the first connected
vehicle behind the lead unit of the initially-moving trainset must be
perturbed 2-inches laterally and 2-inches vertically downwards,
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first connected interface. The
lateral and vertical offsets must still be applied simultaneously in
the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner
will demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design,
capable of preventing climbing when the vehicles in the initially-
moving trainset are not perfectly aligned. Because these simulations
require a lateral offset between the vehicles of the initially-moving
consist, a symmetric boundary condition may not be used (i.e., the full
width of each consist must be modeled).
Paragraph (b)(2) remains unchanged from the NPRM, except for use of
the term ``trainset,'' instead of ``train,'' to remain consistent with
use of the term in other sections of this final rule. This paragraph
sets out the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to
demonstrate a Tier III trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features
to protect the vehicles connected in the trainset from overriding each
other. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions
provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)-(iii) to demonstrate appropriate
resistance to override between connected equipment.
Under appendix G to this part, a Tier I alternative passenger
trainset may demonstrate an appropriate level of override protection by
complying with the requirements of this section instead of the
requirements applicable to Tier I passenger train in Sec. 238.205,
Anti-climbing mechanism, and Sec. 238.207, Link between coupling
mechanism and car body, as proposed. In general, the requirements in
this section were developed as an alternative to demonstrating anti-
climbing capabilities in Sec. 238.205 and the capability of the link
between the coupling mechanism and carbody to resist the loads in
current Sec. 238.207. While compliance with both Sec. Sec. 238.205
and 238.207 requires meeting a set of quasi-static, vertical load
cases, the requirements in this section were developed as a dynamic
performance standard.
Section 238.709 Fluid Entry Inhibition
This section contains the requirements for fluid entry inhibition
for the skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset.
FRA received one comment on this section from APTA which agreed with
the language of this section, noting that compliance with this section
can be demonstrated during a design review of the equipment. As this
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88026, and FRA is adopting this section as proposed.
Section 238.711 End Structure Integrity of Cab End
This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of cab
ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to
alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a
minimum level of protection for the engineer and other cab occupants,
equivalent to the collision post and corner post requirements for Tier
I equipment in subpart C. FRA did not receive any comments on these
requirements and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly,
as this portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version,
the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88027.
Section 238.713 End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End
This section contains requirements to ensure the structure of the
non-cab ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to
alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) provides a
minimum level of protection for occupants equivalent to that required
for Tier I equipment in subpart C. These requirements help ensure the
integrity of the components that make up any non-cab end of a passenger
trainset unit. FRA did not receive any comments on these requirements
and FRA is adopting this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88027.
Section 238.715 Roof and Side Structure Integrity
To demonstrate sufficient roof and side structure integrity, Tier
III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to alternative
crashworthiness standards under appendix G) must comply with the
requirements in Sec. 238.215, ``Rollover strength,'' and Sec.
238.217, ``Side structure.'' These Tier I requirements in Sec. Sec.
238.215 and 238.217 are thereby broadly applicable to both new trainset
classifications in this final rule. FRA did not receive any comments on
this section and FRA is adopting it as proposed. Accordingly, as this
portion of the final rule is identical to the proposed version, the
analysis provided in the NPRM is not being repeated here, see 81 FR
88006, 88029.
Section 238.717 Truck-to-Carbody Attachment
This section contains requirements to demonstrate the integrity of
truck-to-carbody attachments on a Tier III trainset (or a Tier I
trainset designed to

[[Page 59201]]

alternative crashworthiness standards under appendix G) during a
dynamic impact. In commenting on the NPRM, Alstom recommended FRA
clarify that the performance metric in paragraph (c) of this section is
the ultimate strength of the truck materials. Paragraph (c) provides an
alternative to demonstrating compliance with the quasi-static load
requirements applied on the mass of the truck at its CG in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section. Instead, paragraph (c) requires demonstrating
the truck remains attached after a dynamic impact under the nominal
conditions in the dynamic collision scenario described in Sec.
238.705(a). Because paragraph (b)(3) limits demonstrating compliance to
a truck and carbody meeting deceleration requirements specified in
paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii), respectively, paragraph (c) may
alternatively be used to demonstrate truck-to-carbody attachment when
the requirements in paragraph (b)(3) are exceeded. To comply with
paragraph (c), it must be demonstrated that the truck undergoing
evaluation has remained attached to the carbody after the trainset has
been subjected to a dynamic collision scenario as described in Sec.
238.705(a). FRA recognizes that the collision scenario in Sec.
238.705(a) results in deformation of the carbody structure, and
allowance for such deformation is consistent with an evaluation of the
truck-to-carbody attachment that is based on ultimate strength, as FRA
intended for paragraph (c). Accordingly, in response to Alstom's
comment, FRA makes clear that the required performance metric in
paragraph (c) is based on ultimate strength.
As a separate comment, Alstom requested that FRA make clear this
section ``supersedes'' the requirements contained in Sec.
229.141(a)(5) of this chapter, which applies to MU locomotives built
new after April 1, 1956, that are operated in trains having a total
empty weight of 600,000 pounds or more. Section 229.141(a)(5) of this
chapter provides that the strength of the means of locking the truck to
the body shall be at least the equivalent of an ultimate shear value of
250,000 pounds. However, FRA notes that the required truck attachment
strength in Sec. 238.717 is intended to be equivalent to an ultimate
shear value of 250,000 pounds. Consequently, the requirements of Sec.
238.717 are harmonious with the requirements of Sec. 229.141(a)(5) of
this chapter. Nonetheless, in response to Alstom's comment, FRA makes
clear that the requirements of Sec. 229.141(a)(5) of this chapter are
inapplicable to Tier III and Tier I alternative trainsets subject to
Sec. 238.717.
FRA did not receive any other comments on this section and FRA is
adopting it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical
to the proposed version, the analysis provided in the NPRM is not being
repeated here, see 81 FR 88006, 88029-88030.
Glazing
Section 238.721 Glazing
This section contains the requirements for exterior glazing (i.e.,
side- and end-facing exterior windows and windshields) to be installed
on Tier III trainsets. APTA and TCRR both commented on this section as
proposed in the NPRM. The comments focused on three discrete areas:
Conduct of a comprehensive analysis, ballistic impact resistance
requirements, and certification of the glazing material. Having
considered the comments received, this section of the final rule
reflects several changes from the NPRM, as explained below. Otherwise,
FRA has adopted the requirements as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is
not repeating the analysis in the NPRM supporting and explaining those
provisions remaining the same, see 81 FR 88006, 88030-88032.
Comprehensive Analysis
Both APTA and TCRR recommended deleting as unnecessary the
requirement in proposed paragraph (a) of this section to conduct a
comprehensive analysis identifying and addressing glazing safety issues
associated with operating in a Tier III environment as part of the
railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment. APTA
stated that specific requirements for Tier III glazing were adequately
defined in the other paragraphs of this section, and were based on the
operating environment for Tier I passenger equipment and the protected
ROW required by FRA regulations under 49 CFR parts 213 and 236 for the
dedicated high-speed portions. APTA also commented that compliance with
the other paragraphs of this section will permit Tier III trainsets to
be interoperable on the national rail network. Similarly, TCRR believed
that compliance with the performance requirements contained in the
other paragraphs proposed in this section should be the only regulatory
requirements necessary to demonstrate suitability for Tier III trainset
glazing and will assure interoperability throughout the national rail
network. TCRR added that even if proposed paragraph (a) was intended to
ensure that the ROW is adequately protected against potential hazards
to the glazing there is no need to specify such a requirement here as
other provisions of FRA's regulations adequately cover the topic,
citing FRA's requirement for a ROW barrier plan, under 49 CFR 213.361,
and the HSR-125 plan, under 49 CFR 236.1007.
In the final rule, FRA has not adopted the requirement proposed in
paragraph (a) for railroads to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
their systems to identify and address glazing safety issues their
systems present for Tier III operations. Moreover, as explained further
in the discussion under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section
IV, neither this section nor any section in the final rule text refers
to analyses required under a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. However,
this section does require railroads to properly support and document
glazing safety determinations, notably for the ballistic-resistance
properties of the glazing material and for use of alternative
requirements in a non-cab, side-facing window intended to be a
breakable emergency window exit, for which specific FRA approval is
required. FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards
developing procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval, as
discussed under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV,
above. FRA will of course also work with any proposed Tier III
operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly
implemented.
Separately, because FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (a), the
paragraph ordering in this final rule begins with proposed paragraph
(b), which is designated paragraph (a). Subsequent paragraphs proposed
in the NPRM are designated accordingly in conformance, with the
exception of the certification requirements in paragraph (e) in this
final rule, discussed below.
Ballistic Penetration Resistance Requirements
In its comments on this section, APTA disagreed with FRA's proposal
under paragraph (b)(5) of the NPRM that ballistic penetration
resistance be sufficient to protect cab occupants from the risks and
hazards identified by the railroad as part of its Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, at a minimum meeting the protection requirements in
appendix A to part 223 of this chapter. Instead, APTA suggested the
regulation should require compliance with the ballistic impact
protection requirement in appendix A to part 223, specifically in
paragraphs (b)(10)(i) or (11)(i) of that

[[Page 59202]]

appendix, as appropriate. APTA stated that due to the interoperability
requirements for Tier III equipment, the ballistic impact requirements
must be standardized rather than vary for each railroad. APTA also
stated that FRA has previously indicated the current 22 caliber bullet
requirement in appendix A to part 223 has proven effective, and
therefore APTA recommended retaining the current requirement for Tier
III equipment. Further, in line with its comments on proposed paragraph
(a), and noting that the existing requirement has shown through a long
history to be adequate for conventional equipment, APTA suggested that
no reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan is necessary. In
addition, APTA expressed concern that changing the ballistic
requirement has implications not just for Tier III equipment but for
everything that is currently operating in North America and needs to be
evaluated in another forum that involves all affected stakeholders.
In its comments, TCRR agreed with APTA and stated it did not see
the merits of requiring each railroad to perform a risk assessment to
form the basis for any performance requirements for glazing as
suggested in proposed Sec. 238.721(b)(5). Instead, TCRR recommended
that the regulation include specific ballistic impact requirements that
are applicable to glazing on all Tier III trainsets, to assure
compatibility and interoperability of Tier III trainsets over the
general railroad network. Additionally, TCRR stated that the current 22
caliber bullet requirement should apply to both end-facing and side-
face exterior glazing in the cab, as well as in non-cab areas, to
assure that both the passengers and crew in a Tier III trainset are
afforded the same protection.
FRA notes that ballistic protection for cab glazing was discussed
in detail during the RSAC glazing task group meetings, as stated in the
NPRM. In particular, during those meetings, labor representatives
asserted that ballistic protection from a larger diameter projectile,
differing from the size required for Type I glazing by part 223, would
enhance the overall safety of the cab occupants. Much discussion was
focused on this point, but a review of the available information on the
impact characteristics of reasonable ballistic scenarios (projectile
size and terminal velocity), and a review of the statistics related to
glazing failure due to ballistic impact, proved inconclusive. This is
one area where the task group could not agree on a consensus approach.
Therefore, the decision on ballistic requirements for cab glazing was
referred to FRA.
At this time, FRA does not have sufficient evidence to suggest a
particular risk or hazard exists facing all potential Tier III systems
to warrant a change from current ballistic requirements in part 223.
However, even without such a risk or hazard facing all Tier III systems
in common, the circumstances of a specific Tier III operation may
warrant additional consideration and protection for that operation. To
be consistent with the approach to Tier III safety in this rule,
railroad safety elements subject to elements present within a specific
Tier III operation need to be addressed in a manner appropriate to that
operation, reflecting the level of service, operating environment,
operational conditions, etc. Accordingly, while the ballistic
penetration resistance requirement in paragraphs (b)(10)(i) and (11)(i)
of appendix A to part 223 remains the minimum requirement in this final
rule--namely, protection from a 22 caliber long rifle lead bullet of 40
grains in weight impacting at a minimum velocity of 960 feet per
second, this final rule allows for the use of a ballistic penetration
resistance standard that provides greater protection. Nor would use of
a more stringent standard necessarily affect equipment interoperability
any more than in any situation where a particular operation uses a
standard more stringent than the minimum standard specified in the
regulation. Consequently, even though FRA has not adopted the reference
to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan in proposed paragraph (b)(5), a Tier
III operation is in no way restricted from protecting against only a 22
caliber long-rifle bullet if circumstances known to the railroad
warrant additional protection--whether for end-facing glazing in
paragraph (a)(5) of this final rule or for side-face glazing in
paragraph (b)(2) of this final rule (proposed paragraph (c)(2)).
FRA has continued to examine the appropriateness of the ballistic
impact requirement with the ETF, but no consensus within the ETF was
reached on this topic. FRA has also engaged in additional research. At
the behest of ETF industry members, FRA has subjected representative
samples of forward- and side-facing glazing to 22 caliber long rifle
and 9 mm ballistic impact tests. The use of a 9 mm bullet for ballistic
impact testing reflects the alternative ballistic penetration
resistance requirement in 49 CFR 238.421(c)(3)(i) for Tier II equipment
ordered prior to May 12, 1999, which FRA believes provides an
equivalent level of ballistic protection. However, the results of the
testing were not sufficient to confirm whether use of the different
caliber bullets results in a different level of test severity or
whether the tests are indeed equivalent.
Glazing Certification
Commenters APTA and TCRR also raised concern over the NPRM's
approach to the certification of glazing material in proposed Sec.
238.721(b)(6). As a threshold matter, APTA requested that the rule make
clear the glazing manufacturer is responsible for certification of each
type of glazing material supplied. APTA then stated that the rule, in
turn, require testing to be done either by an independent laboratory or
the manufacturer with allowance for FRA to witness the testing.
Similarly, TCRR believed that the proposal would create unnecessary
confusion regarding glazing certification and instead recommended FRA
continue with the current approach to glazing certification in part
223. TCRR stated that the current requirements under appendix A to part
223 have worked very well and provide the railroads and carbuilders
assurance that all glazing materials they receive are produced from a
lot that has been properly tested. TCRR cautioned that before taking a
new approach to glazing certification, discussions are needed involving
the glazing manufacturers and possible testing agencies to better
understand both how any proposed changes would be addressed and the
practical realities and consequences of the proposed changes.
FRA recognizes that the proposed regulatory language created
confusion regarding who is ultimately responsible for certifying that
the glazing material is compliant with FRA's requirements. As such, the
final rule text makes clear that the glazing manufacturer is ultimately
responsible for this certification. In the NPRM, FRA had intended to
convey that the glazing manufacturer can certify the glazing material
based on tests performed by an independent third party (e.g., a
laboratory, facility, or underwriter), or tests performed by the
glazing manufacturer itself. FRA did not intend to imply that another
party was ultimately responsible for certifying the glazing materials.
Further, for clarity, the glazing certification requirements are
contained in their own paragraph (paragraph (e)) in this section of the
final rule, rather than combined with other glazing requirements. These
glazing certification requirements apply to all glazing material used
on Tier III trainsets.

[[Page 59203]]

Demonstrating Alternative Safety for Breakable, Emergency Window Exits
Finally, consistent with APTA's comments concerning the NPRM's
proposal for a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, APTA commented that
proposed paragraph (d)(2)'s alternative requirements for non-cab, side-
facing exterior window glazing should not reference a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan. APTA stated that during the design review process
information would be available that is necessary to demonstrate an
equivalent level of glazing safety for a side-facing exterior window
intended to be breakable and serve as an emergency window exit, and
that its proposal for a new Sec. 238.110 would specifically reference
this design review requirement to be included in the pre-revenue
qualification plan.
As discussed above, this Sec. 238.721 does require railroads to
properly support and document glazing safety determinations.
Specifically, paragraph (c)(2) of this section requires such support
and documentation for use of alternative glazing requirements in a non-
cab, side-facing exterior window intended to be a breakable emergency
window exit. FRA approval is also required. Nonetheless, as noted above
and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of Comments
and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by the ETF,
is working towards developing procedures and processes to provide such
FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III
operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are properly
implemented.
Brake System
Section 238.731 Brake System
This section introduces brake system requirements for Tier III
passenger trainsets. As articulated in the NPRM, development of these
requirements was identified as one of the goals for this first Tier III
rulemaking to facilitate planned equipment acquisitions. These
requirements represent a balance between maintaining compatibility with
existing Tier I equipment and the adoption of service-proven techniques
to protect against potential risks encountered with high-speed
operations. A concerted effort was made to develop technology-neutral
requirements, and the NPRM identified various requirements to be
determined by a railroad and included in the railroad's Tier III Safe
Operation Plan or ITM Plan.
In response to the comments received, FRA is making changes to this
section from the NPRM's proposal, as explained below. Additionally, FRA
is making a minor editorial change to reference an ITM ``program''
rather than ITM ``plan.'' Otherwise, FRA has adopted the requirements
as proposed in the NPRM, and FRA is not repeating the analysis in the
NPRM supporting and explaining those provisions remaining the same, see
81 FR 88006, 88032-88034.
In its comment on this section, APTA recommended that the
determinations identified in the NPRM to be included in a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan be left to the railroad to address at various stages of
equipment design reviews. APTA offered in support of this position that
certain determinations to be included in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan
are already required under other FRA regulations. As discussed earlier,
the requirements of this final rule do not reference a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, and this section contains no such references as
proposed in the NPRM. However, this section does provide for FRA
approval of various determinations made by the railroad, consistent
with FRA's closer oversight of high-speed train operations.
Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires the railroad to define the
worst-case adhesion conditions under which each Tier III trainset's
brake system must stop the passenger trainset from its maximum
operating speed within the prevailing signal spacing, as approved by
FRA. The paragraph is intended to ensure that the railroad formally
establish the worst case-adhesion conditions for use in procuring
individual trainsets. Similarly, paragraph (c)(2) requires the railroad
to specify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a
crewmember can initiate an irretrievable emergency brake application,
as approved by FRA.
FRA approval of railroad determinations is required in several
provisions under paragraph (d). Paragraph (d)(1) requires the railroad
to identify the locations onboard its Tier III trainsets where a
mechanism to initiate the passenger brake alarm is installed. Paragraph
(d)(4) requires the railroad to define the timeframe in which engineers
must acknowledge a passenger brake alarm after the trainsets have
safely cleared the boarding platform, for the engineer to retain full
control of the trainset, and to define the method used to confirm that
the trainsets did in fact safely clear the boarding platform. In
addition, paragraph (d)(6) requires the railroad to specify the
procedures for engineers to retrieve full service brake application if
the timeframe to acknowledge a passenger brake alarm has passed and a
brake application has been automatically initiated.
FRA approval of railroad determinations is also required under
paragraph (e), which addresses how trainsets without fully functional
electric braking are to be safely operated, particularly to ensure
thermal-related brake system damage does not occur. Paragraph (e)(1)
requires that the railroad specify the allowable stopping distance not
to be exceeded in the event of a power loss or failure of the dynamic
or regenerative brake. FRA expects the railroad to provide a means for
automatically reducing the maximum allowable train speed, based on
feedback from the on-board monitoring and diagnostic system specified
in Sec. 238.731(n), so the trainset can safely stop using friction
braking alone within the allowable stopping distance. Additionally,
paragraph (e)(2) requires the railroad to define the operating
conditions under which the available friction braking effort alone can
safely stop the trainset. For discussion of paragraph (e)(4), please
see below.
FRA approval of railroad determinations is required under paragraph
(f)'s main reservoir system requirements. Paragraph (f)(1) requires
that main reservoirs be designed and tested using a recognized industry
standard specified by the railroad and approved by FRA. This paragraph
also provides that the railroad shall define the working pressure and
rated temperature for main reservoirs in accordance with the designated
standard, if different from the pressure and temperature otherwise
specified in this paragraph. Further, paragraph (f)(2) requires the
railroad to identify a recognized industry standard governing the
drilling of steel main reservoirs.
FRA approval is required under paragraph (j)'s brake application/
release requirements. Specifically, paragraph (j)(2) requires that the
railroad establish the minimum brake cylinder pressure necessary to
adjust from minimum service to full service brake application for
proper train operation.
FRA approval is required under paragraph (m)'s slide protection and
alarm requirements. Paragraph (m)(3) requires the railroad to specify
the operational restrictions that apply when the wheel slide protection
system fails to function as intended within pre-established, allowable
parameters.
As noted above, the railroad determinations specified under
paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(6), (e)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2),
(j)(2), and (m)(3) do not reference a Tier III Safe Operation Plan but
do require FRA approval. However, as discussed under Discussion of
Comments and Conclusions, section IV, above, FRA

[[Page 59204]]

approval oversight was a major tenet of the proposed Tier III Safe
Operation Plan requirement, and those requirements identified for
inclusion in the Tier III Safe Operation Plan were selected to allow
FRA to have some specific approval oversight of the railroad's
determinations. Accordingly, those plan elements the NPRM identified in
this section as needing specific FRA approval do require FRA approval
in this final rule. Nonetheless, FRA will work with any proposed Tier
III operation to ensure that the requirements of this section are
properly implemented.
FRA notes that proposed paragraph (l), Leakage, did refer to the
Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (l) of the final rule contains
no such reference. Specifically, the Air Consumption Analysis required
under this paragraph shall be developed as part of the railroad's ITM
program.
Based on APTA's comments, FRA is taking a somewhat different
approach regarding the proposed reference in paragraph (n) to a Tier
III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (n) requires each Tier III trainset
to be equipped with a brake system health monitoring and diagnostic
system to automatically assesses the functionality of the brake system
for the entire trainset, both before the trainset departs and while it
is en route. As proposed, the railroad must document the details of the
monitoring system and diagnostic system, and the means for
communicating trainset brake system functionality to the engineer. In
its comment, APTA recommended that rather than include this information
in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, a railroad should include this
information in its ITM program. FRA agrees with and is adopting APTA's
recommendation. It accomplishes the goals of this paragraph, and
trainset monitoring and diagnostics relate to inspection, testing, and
maintenance. It will also provide FRA approval oversight through the
ITM program approval process.
In other comments on this section, APTA recommended that FRA
include in paragraph (e)(4) a requirement that railroads conduct
additional analysis and testing to determine the maximum safe operating
speed for various percentages of operative friction brakes.
As proposed, paragraph (e)(4) requires railroads to determine
through analysis and testing the maximum speed for safely operating and
stopping their Tier III trainsets using the friction brake system alone
without causing thermal-related damage to the equipment or
infrastructure. APTA recommended the additional analysis and testing to
adequately quantify the braking performance for movement of defective
equipment. TCRR's comments on the NPRM were in agreement with APTA's on
this paragraph. TCRR cautioned that the movement of defective equipment
requirements must refer to paragraph (e) of this section and require
railroads to conduct appropriate analysis and testing to determine the
maximum safe operating speed for various percentages of operative
friction brakes. FRA agrees with APTA's and TCRR's comments.
Accordingly, FRA is adopting the recommendation in paragraph (e) to
make clear further testing and analysis is required to determine the
safe maximum operating speed for various percentages of friction brakes
less than 100-percent operative. FRA expects the railroad to include
these determination in its ITM program.
FRA also received comments on paragraph (o) of this section from
APTA and Alstom. As proposed, this paragraph requires Tier III
equipment to be equipped with a means to secure unattended equipment
against unintentional movement. Because the securement technique may be
technology-specific to a particular trainset, FRA proposed that the
procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment based
on the grade conditions be included in the Tier III Safe Operation
Plan, which in turn could be used to help demonstrate the effectiveness
of the securement method(s). FRA further proposed to define the term
``unattended equipment'' to have the same meaning as in Sec.
238.231(h)(4), which provides that unattended equipment is equipment
left standing and unmanned in such a manner that a qualified person
cannot readily control the brake system of the equipment. FRA intended
the cross reference to Sec. 238.231(h)(4) to be limited specifically
to the definition of ``unattended equipment,'' for consistency and to
remove any ambiguity as to the meaning of the term, because FRA has
already defined the term in this part 238.
In APTA's comment on paragraph (o), APTA objected to the cross
reference to Sec. 238.231(h)(4). APTA raised concern that its
inclusion in the regulatory text could sweep in the Tier I requirement
that Tier III trainsets be equipped with a parking or handbrake. APTA
stated that was not part of the consensus agreement on the proposed
rule text presented to FRA in which wheel chocks could be used to
secure unattended equipment under certain circumstances. Nonetheless,
APTA did agree to FRA's use of the modifier ``unattended'' in this
paragraph to describe the type of equipment to be secured, noting that
technical specifications normally state that the equipment can be left
for an indefinite time period, which corresponds to unattended.
Further, consistent with its other comments, APTA stated that this
paragraph's reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary
because the physical means for securing the trainset will be addressed
during the design review and the procedures for securing the trainset
will be defined in the railroad's operating rules. In its comments on
this paragraph, Alstom similarly objected to the addition of the cross
reference to Sec. 238.231(h)(4), stating it was not consistent with
the consensus agreement on the proposed regulatory text to permit the
use of wheel chocks to secure unattended equipment under certain
conditions.
FRA makes clear that the reference to Sec. 238.231(h)(4) was not
intended to mean that Sec. 238.231(h)(4)'s requirements for parking or
hand brakes apply to this Sec. 238.731(o). As explained above, the
reference was intended to capture only the definition of ``unattended''
and not sweep into this paragraph requirements concerning parking or
hand brakes. However, to guard against ambiguity and for consistent
application of the term, in this paragraph of the final rule FRA has
incorporated Sec. 238.231(h)(4)'s definition of ``unattended.''
Further, FRA agrees with APTA's recommendation not to include the
reference to the Tier III Safe Operation Plan, and it is not included
in this paragraph. Yet, FRA believes it necessary to approve the
procedures and means necessary for securing unattended equipment on the
grade conditions identified, and this paragraph requires such approval.
Inclusion in the railroad's operating rules alone is not sufficient as
FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part 217 of this
chapter. Further, issues surrounding how equipment will be properly
secured while unattended are operational in nature and thus capturing
those issues in a design review is not sufficient. In the interim, FRA
will of course work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that
the specific procedures and means of securing unattended equipment as
required under this paragraph are properly addressed and documented. In
this regard, and as FRA made clear in the NPRM, certain brake system
requirements are imposed by Federal statute, 49 U.S.C. ch. 203.
Specifically, 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B) requires ``efficient
handbrakes.'' Railroads must

[[Page 59205]]

ensure that those statutory requirements are addressed.
Interior Fittings and Surfaces
Section 238.733 Interior Fixture Attachment
This section contains requirements for interior fixture attachment
strength for Tier III trainsets. This section relates to strength
requirements for seats and luggage racks in Sec. Sec. 238.735 and
238.737, respectively, to help prevent and mitigate hazards associated
with occupants impacting interior objects and surfaces during a
collision.
In its comments on this section and Sec. Sec. 238.735 and 238.737,
APTA recommended that FRA not reference the attachment strength
requirements in Sec. 238.233, Interior fittings and surface, for Tier
I equipment. The NPRM proposed to allow compliance with those strength
requirements, specifically, 8g longitudinal, 4g vertical, and 4g
lateral, as an option instead of using Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100
and 5g longitudinal, 3g vertical, and 3g lateral attachment strength
requirements. As discussed in the ETF's May 2017 meeting, APTA believes
the 5g, 3g, and 3g attachment strength requirements are sufficient to
serve as the minimum safety requirements and are consistent with the
dynamic collision requirements in Sec. 238.705(b)(2), which provides
that, if GM/RT2100 is used, the average deceleration experienced by
each vehicle in a Tier III trainset may not exceed 5g during any 100-ms
period. APTA added that, in developing the NPRM, the ETF consensus for
use of the strength requirements in Sec. 238.233 was for Tier I
alternative trainsets, as reflected in proposed paragraphs (i) though
(k) of appendix G to this part. According to APTA, the ETF's consensus
was for Tier III trainsets to comply with the relevant strength
requirements in Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, with the
additional requirement to apply a 3g vertical load rather than a 1g
vertical load. As noted above, APTA contends that the 5g, 3g, and 3g
attachment strength requirements are more harmonious with the Tier III
requirements because they are tied to a maximum crash pulse
requirement, unlike the 8g, 4g, and 4g requirements in Sec. 238.223.
FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation. FRA always intended to
provide the two options for compliance, as discussed in the NPRM. The
first option, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, allows compliance
with the requirements of Sec. 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1,
``Standard for Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger
Railroad Equipment,'' Authorized September 2005. The second option, in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, allows compliance with section 6.1.4,
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group
Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle
Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010,
provided: The test conditions of Sec. 238.705(b)(2) are met; interior
fixture attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g longitudinal,
3g vertical, and 3g lateral acceleration resistance; and use of the GM/
RT standard is carried out in accordance with any conditions identified
by the railroad, as approved by FRA. (This last condition has been
modified from the NPRM consistent with FRA's discussion regarding
proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above.)
The acceleration-based performance standards in Sec. 238.233 and
APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, were established after years of
industry practice designing interior fittings to withstand the forces
due to accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g vertically, and 3g
laterally, which FRA specifically found to be inadequate to protect
against occupant injury (see 64 FR 25540, 25614).\16\ The accident
performance of interior fixtures designed to comply with Sec. 238.233
and the APTA standard support their continued use for interior
attachment strength. However, FRA continues to recognize that some Tier
III passenger equipment may not experience accelerations of 8g
longitudinally, 4g vertically, or 4g laterally during the dynamic
collision scenario in Sec. 238.705, or at higher-speed collisions
resulting in collapse of the occupied volume. FRA acknowledges that
equipment that does not experience large decelerations during
collisions does not need to be designed to these standards in Sec.
238.233 and APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1. Accordingly, FRA
developed an alternative attachment strength option consistent with
international design standards, in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
FRA views the alternative as providing an equivalent level of safety to
the now longstanding acceleration resistance requirements in Sec.
238.233 and the APTA standard, with the qualification that no
acceleration-based load higher than 5g is experienced as provided in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section. FRA finds no additional burden is
imposed by providing two options to demonstrate compliance with this
section, and therefore declines to adopt APTA's suggestion to remove
the first option.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ When developing the requirements of the 1999 final rule,
FRA concluded that due to the injuries caused by broken seats and
other loose fixtures, which were designed to withstand the forces
due to accelerations of 6g in the longitudinal direction, 3g in the
vertical direction, and 3g in the lateral direction, as revealed in
FRA and NTSB investigations of passenger train accidents, the design
practice was inadequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As noted above, paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides for use of the GM/RT
standard in accordance with any conditions identified by the railroad
and approved by FRA. According to APTA, in its comments on this NPRM,
the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation plan in this
paragraph was unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration
pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be met as provided in
Sec. 238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to
a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA
approval of the conditions involving the option to comply with
paragraph (a)(2) rather than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary. FRA seeks
to ensure that compliance with paragraph (a)(2) provides an equivalent
level of safety to the existing requirements in Sec. 238.233 and the
APTA standard, and that no acceleration-based load higher than 5g is
experienced. Nonetheless, as noted above and discussed under proposed
subpart J in the Discussion of Comments and Conclusions, section IV,
FRA, based on input provided by the ETF, is working towards developing
procedures and processes to provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA
will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the
requirements of this section are properly implemented. Because FRA has
otherwise adopted the substantive requirements of this section as
proposed in the NPRM, FRA is not repeating the full analysis in the
NPRM supporting and explaining the requirements of this section, see 81
FR 88006, 88034-88036.
FRA does note it is incorporating by reference APTA PR-CS-S-006-98,
Rev. 1 (previously designated as SS-C&S-006), ``Standard for Attachment
Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,''
Authorized September 2005, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in
paragraph (i) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.1.4, ``Security
of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail
Safety and Standards

[[Page 59206]]

Board Ltd., December 2010 in paragraph (a)(2) of this section and Sec.
238.741(b)(2).
APTA PR-CS-S-006-98 addresses fittings used in commuter and
intercity railcar and locomotive cab interiors. It specifies the
minimum strength and attachment strength for interior sub-systems,
including overhead luggage racks, stanchions and handholds, windscreen
and partitions, food service equipment, and miscellaneous interior
fittings. This standard also contains recommendations for design
requirements and design practices for such interior sub-systems. APTA
PR-CS-S-006-98 is available to all interested parties online at
www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for
review.
Section 6.1.4 of GM/RT2100 contains requirements for securement of
furniture, on-board equipment, and other trainset features to help
mitigate against injuries to passengers and crew from secondary impacts
within the occupied volume. GM/RT2100 is available to all interested
parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards.
Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review.
Section 238.735 Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Cab Crew)
This section contains the seat strength requirements for Tier III
trainsets and relates to the strength requirements for interior
fixtures and luggage racks in Sec. Sec. 238.733 and 238.737,
respectively, as noted above. APTA and Alstom both commented on this
section. Specifically, APTA commented on the proposed passenger seating
requirements in paragraph (a) based on the same premise as its comment
on Sec. 238.733(a), as discussed above. APTA recommended that the
option in proposed paragraph (a)(1) to comply with Sec. 238.233 and
APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested
that the sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on
section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, personnel, or train crew,'' of
Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail
Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December
2010, under the same acceleration resistance conditions APTA
recommended for Sec. 238.733(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA
raises applies equally for both sections, FRA is not repeating the full
discussion here. For the reasons discussed under Sec. 238.733(a),
above, FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation and is therefore
retaining both compliance options under paragraph (a).
Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a
Tier III Safe Operation Plan under paragraph (a)(2)(iii) was
unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier
III collision scenario must be met as provided in Sec. 238.705(b)(2).
Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the
conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (a)(2) rather
than paragraph (a)(1) is necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph
(a)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier
III Safe Operation Plan. Please see Sec. 238.733(a)(2)(iii), above,
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this
requirement. FRA notes that Alstom, in commenting on this section in
the NPRM, stated that paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are not fully
equivalent in terms of scope of application. Although the requirements
of the paragraph are different, FRA has always intended these
requirements to provide an equivalent level of safety, given the
different circumstances surrounding their application. FRA will work
with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of
paragraph (a) are properly implemented.
FRA notes it is incorporating by reference APTA PR-CS-S-016-99,
Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,''
Authorized October 2010, in paragraph (a)(1) of this section and in
paragraph (j) of appendix G to this part; and section 6.2, ``Seats for
passengers, personnel, or train crew,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail
Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (a)(2) of
this section.
APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 addresses row-to-row passenger seating in
commuter and intercity railcars. APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 is available to
all interested parties online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will
maintain a copy available for review. However, FRA makes clear the rule
does not require compliance with section 6.0, ``Seat durability
testing,'' of this APTA standard. Seat durability testing is beyond the
scope of this regulation because the testing focuses on the optimal
life of the seats--not their safety performance.
Section 6.2 of GM/RT2100 contains design specifications and
tolerances for passenger and crew seating. GM/RT2100 is available to
all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy
available for review.
Paragraph (b) contains requirements for the crashworthiness of
seats provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III trainset.
Unlike passenger seating, FRA proposed in paragraph (b)(1) that cab
seats must comply with the requirements in Sec. [thinsp]238.233(e),
(f), and (g), and the performance, design, and test criteria of AAR-RP-
5104, ``Locomotive Cab Seats,'' April 2008, which FRA proposed to
incorporate by reference in paragraph (b)(2) and paragraph (k)(2) of
appendix G to this part. Although not submitted as a comment, AAR made
FRA aware that it is archiving AAR-RP-5104. FRA therefore requested
assistance from the ETF during the May 2017 meeting, and a small work
group was convened to address the problem. The group recommended back
to the ETF to excerpt language from section 3 of AAR-RP-5104 that
prescribes minimum loading requirements for the seat itself, and place
that language into the final rule. When the recommendation was
presented to the ETF, industry members were adamantly opposed, stating
that the requirements in section 3 of AAR-RP-5104 were durability
standards and not safety-related. In fact, APTA, in a comment submitted
after the close of the comment period, recommended deleting the
reference to AAR-RP-5104 and its proposed paragraph (b)(2) entirely,
stating that proposed paragraph (b)(1) adequately defines the
requirements for Tier III cab seating.
Resultantly, FRA has not adopted proposed paragraph (b)(2) and FRA
is not including a requirement to comply with any portion of AAR-RP-
5104. In turn, proposed paragraph (b)(1) is designated as (b) of this
section. As proposed, paragraph (b) requires compliance with Sec.
238.233(e), (f), and (g). However, with respect to the acceleration-
based loading requirements specified in Sec. 238.233(f), FRA makes
clear in paragraph (b) that it expects for Tier III (and Tier I
alternative) trainsets the cab seat to remain attached to the trainset
structure when subjected to an 8g longitudinal acceleration-based load
applied to the combined mass of the seat and a 95th-percentile male.
FRA recognizes that this constitutes the more severe scenario to be
tested. It is more severe than an 8g acceleration-based load applied
solely to the mass of the cab seat. It is also more severe than testing
under AAR-RP-5104, which provides for testing the seat with 250 pounds
impacting the seatback at 3g. FRA concludes that if the cab seat can
remain attached when subjected to an 8g acceleration-based load applied
to the combined mass of the cab seat and

[[Page 59207]]

a 95th-percentile male, then the seat should remain attached under
foreseeable collision scenarios.
Section 238.737 Luggage Racks
This section contains requirements to constrain the longitudinal
and lateral motion of articles stowed in luggage racks, and relates to
the strength requirements for interior fixtures and seats in Sec. Sec.
238.733 and 238.735, respectively, as noted above.
FRA received no comments on paragraph (a) and has adopted it as
proposed. Please see the discussion of paragraph (a) in the NPRM (81 FR
88006, 88036). Nonetheless, APTA commented on the proposed luggage rack
strength requirements in paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its
comments on Sec. Sec. 238.733(a) and 238.735(a), as discussed above.
APTA recommended that the option in proposed paragraph (b)(1) to comply
with Sec. 238.233 not be included. Instead, APTA suggested that the
sole option to demonstrate compliance would be based on section 6.8,
``Luggage stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four,
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards
Board Ltd., December 2010, specifically under the same acceleration
resistance conditions APTA recommended for Sec. Sec. 238.733(a)(2)(ii)
and 238.735(a)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises applies
equally here, FRA is not repeating the full discussion. For the reasons
discussed under Sec. Sec. 238.733(a) and 238.735(a), above, FRA is not
adopting APTA's recommendation and is therefore retaining both
compliance options under paragraph (b).
Similarly, APTA also commented that the proposed reference to a
Tier III Safe Operation plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was
unnecessary because the criteria for the acceleration pulse in the Tier
III collision scenario must be met as provided in Sec. 238.705(b)(2).
Although FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the
conditions involving the option to comply with paragraph (b)(2) is
necessary for safety. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for
such FRA approval rather than refer to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan.
Please see Sec. Sec. 238.733(a)(2)(iii) and 238.735(a)(2)(iii), above,
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this
requirement. Further, FRA expects that in demonstrating compliance with
this requirement, the railroad must address how the mass of the luggage
was considered when applied to the loading conditions defined in
paragraph (b)(2)(ii).
FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.8, ``Luggage
stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four,
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards
Board Ltd., December 2010, in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section
6.8 contains requirements for luggage stowage, either on the floor or
in overhead racks. As noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all
interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy
available for review.
Emergency Systems
Section 238.741 Emergency Window Egress and Rescue Access
This section establishes requirements for emergency egress and
rescue access through windows or alternative openings in passenger cars
as part of an emergency window egress and rescue access plan for Tier
III trainsets. The ETF recognized that any regulation would need to
allow multiple approaches to facilitate the adoption of service-proven,
high-speed trainset technology. Specifically, the methods used to
manufacture high-speed trainsets are often governed by consideration of
the effects of aerodynamics and noise; together with the potential need
to pressurize occupied compartments, these can affect the way window
glazing is installed and mounted in some trainset designs. Therefore,
the ETF recommended performance-oriented requirements to allow
necessary flexibility where an appropriate safety case can be made.
FRA did not receive any comments on the requirements of this
section as described in the NPRM. However, FRA is clarifying in
paragraph (b) the reference to a Tier III ITM program, rather than to a
Tier III ITM plan, as proposed in the NPRM. Otherwise, FRA is adopting
this section as proposed. Accordingly, as this section of the final
rule is virtually identical to the proposed version, the full analysis
and discussion of this section provided in the NPRM is not repeated
here (see 81 FR 88006, 88019-88020).
Section 238.743 Emergency Lighting
This section contains the emergency lighting requirements for Tier
III trainsets. As proposed, paragraph (a) provides that the
requirements are the same as the emergency lighting requirements in
Sec. 238.115, except for those specific to emergency lighting back-up
power systems in paragraph (b). Paragraph (b), in turn, permits
compliance with alternative, crash loading resistance requirements, to
demonstrate the capability of back-up power systems to function after
the initial shock caused by a collision or derailment.
APTA commented on the proposed back-up power requirements in
paragraph (b) based on the same premise as its comments on Sec. Sec.
238.733, 238. 735, and 238.737, above. APTA recommended that the option
in proposed paragraph (b)(1) of this section to comply with the
acceleration resistance requirements in Sec. 238.115 not be included.
Instead, APTA suggested that the sole option to demonstrate compliance
be based on section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and
features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four,
``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards
Board Ltd., December 2010, under the same conditions APTA recommended
for Sec. Sec. 238.733(a)(2)(ii), 238.735(a)(2)(ii), and
238.737(b)(2)(ii). As the underlying issue APTA raises generally
applies equally for all sections, FRA is not repeating the full
discussion here, and generally for the reasons discussed under these
sections, above, FRA is not adopting APTA's recommendation. This
paragraph retains both compliance options. Further, FRA makes clear
that Sec. 238.115 is contained in subpart B of part 238, and the scope
of subpart B applies to all passenger equipment, regardless of
operating speed. Consequently, FRA could have included specific back-up
power requirements for Tier III trainsets in subpart B's Sec. 238.115
but chose instead to place them here in subpart H for ease of
reference.
FRA notes Sec. 238.743(b)(1) in the final rule references the
acceleration-based loads in Sec. 238.115(a)(4)(ii), which are 8g,
longitudinally, and 4g, laterally and vertically. In the NPRM, FRA
inadvertently referenced Sec. 238.115(b)(4)(ii), which was clear error
because there is no such paragraph in Sec. 238.115. FRA has corrected
the reference.
Paragraph (b)(2) provides the second option for demonstrating the
crashworthiness of emergency lighting back-up power systems. A railroad
may use the loading requirements defined in section 6.1.4, ``Security
of furniture, equipment and features,'' of GM/RT2100, under specified
conditions. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that back-up power systems have
an attachment strength sufficient to resist minimum loads of 5g
longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. However, FRA's

[[Page 59208]]

proposal was inadvertently overbroad. FRA intended for the back-up
power supply to remain functional after being subjected to the initial
shock of a collision or derailment, whether or not remaining attached
in place.
Consistent with its comments on similar proposed provisions, APTA
also commented that the proposed reference to a Tier III Safe Operation
plan under paragraph (b)(2)(iii) was unnecessary because the criteria
for the acceleration pulse in the Tier III collision scenario must be
met as provided in Sec. 238.705(b)(2). Although FRA agrees not to
include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan, FRA continues to
believe that FRA approval of the conditions involving the option to
comply with paragraph (b)(2) is necessary for safety. Accordingly,
paragraph (b)(2)(iii) provides for such FRA approval rather than refer
to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Please see Sec. Sec.
238.733(a)(2)(iii), 238.735(a)(2)(iii), and 238.737(b)(2)(iii), above,
and proposed subpart J, under Discussion of Comments and Conclusions,
section IV, above, for a fuller discussion of the comment and this
requirement.
FRA notes it is incorporating by reference section 6.1.4,
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of Railway Group
Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle
Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010, into
paragraph (b)(2) of this section. Section 6.1.4 contains requirements
for the securement of furniture, equipment, and other features. As
noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at
www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will
maintain a copy available for review.
Cab Equipment
Section 238.751 Alerters
This section contains requirements for alerters on Tier III
passenger trainsets. In commenting on this section in the NPRM, APTA
recommended removal of the proposed references to a Tier III Safe
Operation Plan, consistent with its comments on proposed subpart J. As
discussed below, this section does not include references to a Tier III
Safe Operation Plan but does ensure FRA oversight. Otherwise, FRA has
adopted this section as proposed and has therefore not repeated the
full analysis of this section in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88037-
88038).
As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (b) would have required the
railroad to determine the appropriate time period within which the
engineer must acknowledge the alerter and include that determination in
the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan for review and approval by
FRA. In its comment, APTA stated that inclusion in the Safe Operation
Plan was unnecessary because the basis for setting the alerter control
timing would be addressed during the design review process and FRA
could review the railroad's alerter timing determination then. Although
FRA agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation
Plan, FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the periodicity of
the alerter alarm, as well as the time period within which the engineer
must react to that alarm, is necessary for safety. Nonetheless, as
noted above and discussed under proposed subpart J in the Discussion of
Comments and Conclusions, section IV, FRA, based on input provided by
the ETF, is working towards developing procedures and processes to
provide such FRA approval. As always, FRA will work with any proposed
Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this paragraph
and this section are properly implemented. In this regard, FRA makes
clear it intends alerter control timing to be set by the railroad
taking into consideration maximum train speed and capabilities of the
signal system.
As proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (d) would have required
specifying in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan the necessary
actions of the engineer responding to a full-service brake application
initiated after the engineer failed to properly acknowledge the
alerter. APTA, in its comment, stated that this was also unnecessary as
these required actions would be contained in the railroad's operating
rules and the ``engineer's training program.'' Again, although FRA
agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan,
FRA continues to believe that FRA approval is necessary, namely, of the
actions specified for the engineer to recover the full-service brake
application. Inclusion in the railroad's operating rules is not
sufficient as FRA does not approve railroad operating rules under part
217 of this chapter. Additionally, these procedures are not intended to
be specified in the locomotive engineer certification program required
under part 240 of this chapter. Thus, simple inclusion in a training
program does not provide the necessary review and approval mechanism
FRA desires. Nonetheless, as FRA, based on input provided by the ETF,
is working towards developing specific procedures and processes for
obtaining such approval, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III
operation to ensure the requirements of this paragraph are properly
implemented.
Finally, as proposed in the NPRM, paragraph (e) would have required
a railroad electing to use alternate technology to an alerter, to
provide the function(s) of an alerter, to conduct a hazard analysis as
part of its Tier III Safe Operation Plan. The intent behind the
analysis was to demonstrate that the alternate alerter technology
provided an equivalent level of safety. APTA, in its comment, stated
that inclusion in a Tier III Safe Operation Plan was unnecessary
because the demonstration of an equivalent level of safety would be
performed during the design review process, with the results of the
safety analysis being used to support the determination. Although FRA
agrees not to include a reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan,
FRA continues to believe that FRA approval of the equivalency
determination is necessary for safety, and FRA will work with any
proposed Tier III operation to ensure that the requirements of this
paragraph are properly implemented, as discussed above. In this regard,
FRA has clarified that the required analysis is not limited to a
``hazard analysis,'' as proposed in the NPRM, but provides for a
broader evaluation.
Section 238.753 Sanders
This section introduces requirements for sanders on Tier III
trainsets. In their comments on the NPRM, APTA and TCRR objected to
inclusion of this section in the final rule. According to APTA and
TCRR, in the international market, sanders are not considered a safety
critical component but rather only performance enhancing and not
critical to the safe operation of the trainset. Both APTA and TCRR
further stated that if a railroad were to determine that sanders were
critical to the safe operation of the trainset, then the sanders would
be defined and addressed in the railroad's ITM program; under these
circumstances, a trainset with defective sanders could move only under
the regulatory provisions dealing with movement of defective equipment.
Thus, APTA and TCRR believed that providing specific requirements for
sanders in this section is unnecessary.
FRA disagrees with this recommendation. As explained in the NPRM,
this section does not require Tier III trainsets to be equipped with
sanders; this section applies only if the railroad determines sanders
are a required trainset component. Some railroads may determine that
sanders

[[Page 59209]]

are necessary for the safe operation of Tier III trainsets, whereas
other railroads may not. Nonetheless, FRA agrees that if the railroad
deems the sanders safety critical, they would be so identified in the
railroad's ITM program. No reference to a Tier III Safe Operation Plan
is necessary. Accordingly, trainsets equipped with such sanders that
are defective could move only in compliance with the requirements
covering movement of defective equipment. Please also see the
discussion of this proposed section in the NPRM (81 FR 88006, 88038).
As always, FRA will work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure
the requirements of this section are properly implemented.
Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties
The final rule includes an amended schedule of civil penalties
under appendix A to this part. Specifically, the schedule includes
civil penalty amounts for violations of the requirements of subpart H
of this part. Because the penalty schedule is a statement of policy,
notice and comment was not required prior to its revision. See 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, FRA has amended the penalty schedule to
reflect the addition of subpart H.
Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs
FRA is revising this appendix to clarify the application of the
floor fire test in the table of ``Test Procedures and Performance
Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of
Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs'' in paragraph (c)
to Tier III passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this
clarification and has adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the
final rule is identical to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating
the analysis provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039).
Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
FRA is revising this appendix so that it applies to Tier III
passenger equipment. FRA received no comments on this change and has
adopted it as proposed. As this portion of the final rule is identical
to the proposed version, FRA is not repeating the analysis of this
change provided in the NPRM (see 81 FR 88006, 88039).
Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of a Tier I
Passenger Trainset
As proposed, FRA is adding appendix G to this part to provide
alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance
requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets instead of the conventional
requirements of Sec. Sec. 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a),
238.211, 238.213, and 238.219 in subpart C of this part. The technical
contents of appendix G remain materially unchanged from those developed
for the original Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
FRA intends for these alternative requirements to be applied to a
Tier I trainset as a whole. Accordingly, compliance must be
demonstrated either through application of the conventional
requirements in subpart C, or through application of the requirements
in this appendix G, not a combination of both. They also apply in
addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec. 238.209(b), 238.215,
238.217, and 238.233, and APTA standards for occupant protection, as
specified in this appendix. Although the appendix may refer to specific
units of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in
this appendix apply only to a Tier I trainset as a whole, as noted
above. Further, use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance for Tier I
passenger trainsets is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.
238.201.
In general, where alternatives to the conventional Tier I
requirements are given in this appendix G, those requirements are also
identified in the Tier III requirements in subpart H--Specific
Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment. See the discussion in
the section-by-section analysis for subpart H, which applies to Tier I
trainsets seeking qualification under this appendix. As FRA did not
receive any comments on this appendix, FRA is not repeating the full
analysis of this appendix provided in the NPRM, see 81 FR 88006, 88039-
88040.
However, FRA does highlight that in paragraph (i) of this appendix,
FRA is incorporating by reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2,
``Standard for the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad
Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June 2006, for interior fixtures. The
standard is intended to address forces applied to the carbody and truck
structures during collisions, derailments, and other accident
conditions. APTA PR-CS-S-034-99 is available to all interested parties
online at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy
available for review.
Further, in paragraph (j) of this appendix, FRA is incorporating by
reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for
Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 2010, with
the exception of Section 6 of the standard, which relates to the
durability testing of seats. FRA considers the durability testing of
seats to be beyond the scope of this final rule for the same reasons
discussed under Sec. 238.735, above.
Appendix H to Part 238--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input
Data and Geometrical Depiction
FRA is adding this appendix to part 238 to formally provide input
data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a computer model
of the rigid locomotive design in Sec. 238.705(a)(4) for use in
evaluating the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset (and a
Tier I alternative passenger trainset under appendix G) in a dynamic
collision scenario. Section 238.705(a) outlines the required conditions
for performing a dynamic collision scenario involving an initially-
moving trainset impacting an initially-standing train having the rigid
locomotive leading its consist. As explained in Sec. 238.705(a)(4),
the initially-standing train is made up of a rigid locomotive and five
identical passenger coaches having the following characteristics: The
locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach weighs 95,000 pounds;
the locomotive and each coach crush in response to applied force as
specified in Table 1 to Sec. 238.705; and the locomotive has a
geometric design as depicted in Figure 1 to this appendix H.
This appendix is intended to establish a consistent definition for
locomotive geometry for use in conducting dynamic computer simulations.
The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the geometry for
approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive design. Because
this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a locomotive mass
corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is provided for modeling
purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight specified for the
locomotive in Sec. 238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to this appendix provides
two views of the locomotive's geometric depiction. The input data is
contained in Appendix C to FRA's Technical Criteria and Procedures
Report, available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.

[[Page 59210]]

VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771, and DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures

This final rule is an economically significant regulatory action
within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and
procedures. See 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979).
FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impacts of this final rule. The
RIA estimates the costs of this final rule that are likely to be
incurred over a 30-year period. FRA estimated the costs of this final
rule using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, respectively. For the 30-
year period analyzed, the present value of the estimated high-range
quantified net cost savings for this final rule is $837.8 million when
discounted at 3 percent and $541.9 million when discounted at 7
percent. Annualized net cost savings total approximately $42.7 million
when discounted at 3 percent and $43.7 million when discounted at 7
percent.
This final rule addresses several limitations in the Code of
Federal Regulations pertaining to passenger equipment. Prior to
publication of this final rule, the PESS in 49 CFR part 238 did not
comprehensively address safety requirements for passenger rail
equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the regulatory framework
established Tier I safety compliance through equipment requirements
that were more design-based, and therefore limited the application of
contemporary design techniques and innovative technology.
This final rule amends FRA's PESS and adds a new equipment tier
(Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of high-speed rail at
speeds up to 220 mph. The final rule also establishes alternative
crashworthiness performance standards to qualify passenger rail
equipment for Tier I operations (Tier I alternative). In addition, FRA
is increasing the maximum allowable speed for Tier II operations from
150 mph to 160 mph, making it consistent with prior changes in 49 CFR
parts 213 and 238 for Vehicle/Track Interaction (VTI) Safety Standards.
There are several HSR projects in development, such as Amtrak's
next-generation Acela, Texas High-Speed Rail, and California's high-
speed rail project, which are all expected to benefit from
implementation of the rule. Additionally, FRA believes that other HSR
operations may be initiated due to the publication of this final rule.
The costs, cost savings, and benefits associated with the Tier III
requirements of this rule were developed looking at all possible
operations in the United States. FRA researched HSR projects that were
most viable, focusing on all publicly available business models for HSR
projects. FRA developed an economic analysis that could be applied to
any individual Tier III operation in the United States, including
Amtrak's next-generation Acela. The main costs savings result from
minimizing the costs of right-of-way acquisition, especially in high
population urban areas, such as New York, Washington, Miami, and other
large metropolitan areas. The provisions of the final rule's Tier III
passenger equipment safety standards allow the service to use existing
rights-of-way, permitting the use of track shared with other rail
service (i.e., blended track).
FRA estimates that between $227.7 million and $523.3 million (when
discounted at a 7-percent rate) or between $351.3 million and $808.8
million (when discounted at a 3-percent rate) in quantifiable costs
will be borne by the industry over a future 30-year period in availing
itself of the rule's new regulatory framework. Note that industry will
only incur these costs if it chooses to test to demonstrate compliance
with either the Tier I alternative, or decides to implement Tier III
operations. The added alternative Tier I standards provide an option
for railroads to use different types or designs of passenger equipment
in Tier I service and will not impose any cost on existing rolling
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. The new
Tier III requirements will not impose any cost on existing rolling
stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations (existing
passenger rolling stock is Tier I and II; there is no Tier III rolling
stock in operation in the U.S.).

Table 1--Regulatory Cost Summary
[$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description 3% 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range: \17\
Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs.. $59.6 $39.1
Tier III Infrastructure Costs....... 749.2 484.2
-------------------------------
Total Costs..................... 808.8 523.3
Annualized Costs............ 41.3 42.2
Low Range: \18\
Tier I Alternative Equipment Costs.. 51.6 34.1
Tier III Infrastructure Costs....... 299.7 193.7
-------------------------------
Total Costs..................... 351.3 227.7
-------------------------------
Annualized Costs............ 17.9 18.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This final rule will result in significant cost savings for the
industry. Estimated infrastructure-related cost savings comprise the
most significant driver of cost savings compared to other quantified
cost savings (i.e., equipment design and engineering, manufacturing
benefits, etc.). Infrastructure cost savings will be generated by the
ability of railroad operators to take advantage of a blended operating
environment--avoiding costly new construction, maintenance of dedicated
track, and acquisition of new rights-of-way. This

[[Page 59211]]

cost savings is especially attractive to railroad operators that
provide service in areas with high population density, where right-of-
way acquisition and new railroad construction are significantly more
expensive and complex. This rule will increase the probability that new
services are introduced and reduce the need for new construction in
densely populated areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\17\ High-range costs represent costs at a high funding level
with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust for the upper bound
confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more
detailed description of the high-range costs, please refer to
Section 3 of the RIA.
\18\ Low-range costs represent costs at a low funding level with
a 10-percent multiplier to adjust for the lower bound confidence
level of an HSR system becoming operational. For a more detailed
description of the low-range costs, please refer to Section 3 of the
RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The U.S. passenger rail industry will experience cost savings from
this regulatory action because it permits manufacturers to adapt
existing designs of rolling stock to meet the new standards and will
allow operators to take advantage of a wider variety of trainset
designs. Further, the rule will allow Tier I and Tier III operations to
use service-proven platforms with the latest technology available.
These cost savings will be achieved by adapting technology that exists
on the international market to meet FRA's safety requirements and
ensuring that all equipment suppliers comply with the same safety
standards.
Table 2 provides the estimated industry equipment and
infrastructure cost savings and their discounted values at the 3- and
7-percent levels, respectively. High-range cost savings represent cost
savings at a high funding level with a 25-percent multiplier to adjust
for the confidence level of an HSR system becoming operational. Low-
range cost savings represent cost savings at a low funding level with a
10-percent multiplier to adjust for the confidence level of an HSR
system becoming operational. For a more detailed description of the
low- and high-range cost savings, please refer to the RIA.

Table 2--Regulatory Cost Savings Range Summary
[$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description 3% 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range:
Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost $315.4 $205.8
Savings............................
Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings 1,331.3 859.4
-------------------------------
Total Cost Savings.............. 1,646.7 1,065.2
-------------------------------
Annualized Cost Savings..... 84.0 85.8
Low Range:
Tier I Alternative Equipment Cost 257.5 168.8
Savings............................
Tier III Infrastructure Cost Savings 532.5 343.7
-------------------------------
Total Cost Savings.............. 790.1 512.5
-------------------------------
Annualized Cost Savings..... 40.3 41.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 3 below displays the net cost savings of this final rule,
categorized by either Tier I alternative or Tier III costs and cost
savings. Discounted net regulatory cost savings will be between $438.8
million (low range) and $837.8 million (high range) at the 3-percent
level, and between $284.8 million (low range) and $541.9 million (high
range) at the 7-percent level. Annualized net regulatory cost savings
are between $22.4 million and $42.7 million when discounted at 3
percent and between $22.9 million and $43.7 million when discounted at
7 percent.

Table 3--Net Regulatory Cost Savings
[$ in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description 3% 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Range:
Tier I Alternative Costs............ $59.6 $39.1
Tier III Costs...................... 749.2 484.2
-------------------------------
Total Costs..................... 808.8 523.3
Cost Savings Tier I Alternative..... 315.4 205.8
Cost Savings Tier III............... 1,331.3 859.4
-------------------------------
Total Cost Savings.............. 1,646.7 1,065.2
Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative. 255.8 166.7
Net Cost Savings Tier III........... 582.1 375.2
-------------------------------
Total Net Cost Savings.......... 837.8 541.9
-------------------------------
Annualized Net Cost Savings. 42.7 43.7
Low Range:
Tier I Alternative Costs............ 51.6 34.1
Tier III Costs...................... 299.7 193.7
-------------------------------
Total Costs..................... 351.3 227.7
Cost Savings Tier I Alternative..... 257.5 168.8
Cost Savings Tier III............... 532.5 343.7
-------------------------------
Total Cost Savings.............. 790.1 512.5
Net Cost Savings Tier I Alternative. 205.9 134.7

[[Page 59212]]

Net Cost Savings Tier III........... 232.8 150.1
-------------------------------
Total Net Cost Savings.......... 438.8 284.8
-------------------------------
Annualized Net Cost Savings. 22.4 22.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------

This final rule is considered an Executive Order 13771 deregulatory
action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this final rule can be
found in the RIA.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), as amended
by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA), generally requires an agency to prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis describing the impact of the regulatory action on
small entities as part of the rulemaking. Small entities include small
businesses, small organizations, and governmental jurisdictions. An
agency must conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis unless it
determines and certifies that the rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
FRA developed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13272,
``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking,'' and
DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities
are properly considered.
Prior to this final rule, the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
in part 238 did not comprehensively address safety requirements for
passenger rail equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Further, the former
regulatory framework generally set Tier I safety compliance through
equipment design requirements, which limited the application of new
technology. This final rule changes the passenger rail equipment safety
regulatory framework by introducing a new tier of equipment safety
standards (Tier III) and also establishes more performance-based
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the alternative
to those specified for Tier I equipment. Additionally, the final rule
increases the maximum allowable speed for Tier II equipment to make it
consistent the corresponding speed range in FRA's Track Safety
Standards for the track over which the equipment operates. This Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is presented to comply with Executive
Order 13272 and with the Regulatory Flexibility Act as part of the
rulemaking process required by law.
FRA initiated the rulemaking using recommendations made by FRA's
RSAC. In general, the rulemaking amends 49 CFR part 238, to reflect new
or modified safety requirements for Tier I and Tier III equipment, and
to increase the authorized speed limit for Tier II equipment.
1. Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts
The ``universe'' of the entities under consideration includes only
those small entities that can reasonably be expected to be directly
affected by the provisions of this final rule. For the rule, there is
only one type of small entity that will be affected: Small passenger
railroads. ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the
same meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of
operation. Under 5 U.S.C. 601(5) ``small entities'' is defined as
governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations less than 50,000.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ``size
standards'' for small entities. It provides that industry sectors
relevant for the rulemaking must not exceed the limits listed below
(and still classify as a ``small entity''): \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Table of Small
Business Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification
System Codes,'' effective January 1, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1,500 employees for railroad rolling stock manufacturing.
1,500 employees for line haul operating railroads.
1,250 employees for motor and generator manufacturing.
1,250 employees for switchgear and switchboard apparatus
manufacturing.
Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small
entities in consultation with SBA, and in conjunction with public
comment. Under the authority provided to it by SBA, FRA published a
final policy, which formally establishes small entities as railroads
that meet the line haulage revenue requirements of a Class III
railroad.\20\ Currently, the revenue requirements are $20 million or
less in annual operating revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. The
$20 million limit (adjusted annually for inflation) is based on the
Surface Transportation Board's threshold of a Class III railroad, which
is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment.\21\
FRA uses this definition for the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003.
\21\ For further information on the calculation of the specific
dollar limit, please see 49 CFR part 1201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railroads
For purposes of this analysis, there are only two intercity
passenger railroads, Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad. Neither is
considered a small entity. Amtrak is a Class I railroad and the Alaska
Railroad is a Class II railroad. The Alaska Railroad is owned by the
State of Alaska, which has a population well in excess of 50,000. There
are currently 30 commuter or other short-haul passenger railroad
operations in the U.S., most of which are part of larger transportation
organizations that receive Federal funds and serve major metropolitan
areas with populations greater than 50,000. However, one of these
railroads does not fall in this category and is considered a small
entity: The Hawkeye Express. The Hawkeye Express provides service to
Iowa City, Iowa, and is owned by a Class III railroad, a small entity.
FRA notes that it has not analyzed the Saratoga & North Creek Railway
as a small entity under this final rule. Because of operational changes
subsequent to the NPRM's publication, FRA considers the Saratoga &
North Creek Railway a tourist railroad, not subject to this rule.

[[Page 59213]]

It is important to note that the small railroad being considered in
this analysis uses passenger rolling stock that is different from the
equipment covered by the rulemaking. Further, the Hawkeye Express would
be able to find their current type of train equipment in the market if
they decide to acquire new rolling stock over the next 30 years. This
final rule does not increase costs for this small passenger railroad.
FRA expects the cost to acquire passenger rail equipment will drop as a
result of the rulemaking. There will be more variety in trainset models
available for passenger operations and options in companies supplying
equipment in the U.S. market. Additionally, the railroad may enjoy
lower prices as the U.S. passenger rail market is enlarged as a result
of the rulemaking, enhancing economies of scale and increasing
predictability for equipment orders.
Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
The passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment manufacturing
sector in the United States has a fairly small number of firms with no
more than 15 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and a few hundred
component and subcomponent suppliers.\22\ However, for this flexibility
analysis, FRA is taking a broader approach by assessing the effect of
the regulation on the railroad rolling stock manufacturing sector as
defined by the North American Classification System (NAICS), which
includes the passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment
manufacturing industry but goes beyond by also covering freight and
maintenance-of-way vehicles. This approach includes firms that
currently do not manufacture passenger rail equipment but can
potentially enter the market. Based on data from the U.S. Census
Bureau, employment in these industries is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\22\ Lowe, M., Tokuoka, S., Dubay, K., and Gereffi, G., ``U.S.
Manufacture of Rail Vehicles for Intercity Passenger Rail and Urban
Transit: A Value Chain Analysis,'' Center on Globalization,
Governance & Competitiveness, June 24, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NAICS code 336510, Railroad rolling stock manufacturing,
159 firms in the industry, and 137 firms with less than 500 employees.
NAICS code 335312, Motor and generator manufacturing, 428
firms in the industry, and 384 firms with less than 500 employees.
The main impact of the rule affecting these industries is the
qualification costs for Tier I alternative and Tier III trainsets. FRA
worked with the industry to develop new safety criteria to evaluate
passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those
historically used for procurements in the U.S. As noted in the RIA,
companies supplying new trainsets covered by the rulemaking will be
required to submit test and analysis results to demonstrate compliance
with these new safety standards. However, in the case of rolling stock
manufacturing, this cost will only be incurred by the OEM when
submitting a qualification package, which would include details
regarding the performance of the trainset model under the required
tests and analyses. Therefore, small and very small firms supplying
OEMs are not expected to be required to submit that information. Small
firms could be expected to benefit from existing requirements for
minimum domestic content as more trainsets are purchased by U.S.
railroad operators. Small businesses have the opportunity to supply
OEMs with domestic inputs and to partner with larger firms to allow
small domestic producers to meet the needs of the market being created
by this final rule. Consequently, FRA expects the rulemaking to have
only a positive impact on these small entities as more of them are
provided with the opportunity to enter the passenger railroad equipment
manufacturing industry.
Significant Economic Impact Criteria
Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. FRA
realizes that some railroads will have revenue lower than $4.7 million.
However, FRA estimates that small railroads will not have any
additional expenses over the next ten years to comply with the
requirements in this rule. Based on this, FRA concludes that the
expected burden of this rule will not have a significant impact on the
competitive position of small entities, or on the small entity segment
of the railroad industry as a whole.
Substantial Number Criteria
This final rule will likely affect any small railroad that is not
exempt from its scope or application (see 49 CFR 238.3). Thus, as noted
above, this final rule will impact a substantial number of small
railroads.
2. Certification
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the
Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration certifies that
this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. In the NPRM, FRA requested comments on its
certification made as a result of its Regulatory Flexibility Act
analysis, see 81 FR 88006, 88044. FRA received no comments. FRA
therefore stands with its previous Regulatory Flexibility Act
certification.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

The information collection requirements in this final rule are
being submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review
and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections that contain the new, revised, and
current information collection requirements and the estimated time to
fulfill each requirement are as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Total annual Average time per annual
CFR section Respondent universe responses response burden
hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.47--Emergency Brake Valve-- 32 railroads......... 32 markings.......... 1 minute......... 1
Marking brake pipe valve as such.
238.7--Waivers.................... 32 railroads......... 5 waivers............ 2 hours.......... 10
238.15--Movement of passenger 32 railroads......... 1,000 tags........... 3 minutes........ 50
equipment with power brake defect.
--Movement of passenger 32 railroads......... 288 tags............. 3 minutes........ 14
equipment--defective en route.
--Conditional requirement-- 32 railroads......... 144 notices.......... 3 minutes........ 7
Notice.
238.17--Limitations on movement of 32 railroads......... 200 tags............. 3 minutes........ 10
passenger equipment--defects
found at calendar day insp. & on
movement of passenger equipment--
develops defects en route.
--Special requirements-- 32 railroads......... 76 tags.............. 3 minutes........ 4
movement of passenger equip.
with safety appliance defect.
--Crew member notifications... 32 railroads......... 38 radio 30 secs.......... .32
notifications.
238.21--Petitions for special 32 railroads......... 1 petition........... 16 hours......... 16
approval of alternative standards.

[[Page 59214]]

--Petitions for special 32 railroads......... 1 petition........... 40 hours......... 40
approval of pre-revenue
service acceptance testing
plan.
--Comments on petitions....... Public/RR Industry... 4 comments........... 1 hour........... 4
238.103--Fire Safety:
--Procuring new pass. 2 new railroads...... 1 analysis........... 150 hours........ 150
equipment--Fire Safety
Analysis.
--Transferring existing 32 railroads/APTA.... 3 analyses........... 20 hours......... 60
equipment--Revised Fire
Safety Analysis.
238.107--Inspection/testing/ 32 railroads......... 32 reviews........... 60 hours......... 1,920
maintenance plans--RR review.
238.109--Employee/Contractor Tr.:
--Training employees--Mech. 7,500 employees/100 2,500 empl./100 1.33 hours....... 3,458
insp. trainers. trainers.
--Recordkeeping--Employee/ 32 railroads......... 2,500 records........ 3 minutes........ 125
Contractor current
qualifications.
238.111--Pre-revenue service 9 equipment 1 plan............... 16 hours......... 16
acceptance testing plan: manufacturers.
Passenger equipment that has
previously been used in service
in the U.S.
--Passenger equipment that has 9 equipment 1 plan............... 192 hours........ 192
not been previously used in manufacturers.
revenue service in the U.S.
--Subsequent equipment orders. 9 equipment 1 plan............... 60 hours......... 60
manufacturers.
--Tier II & Tier III Passenger 32 railroads......... 1 report............. 60 hours......... 60
Equipment: Report of test
results to FRA (Revised
Requirement).
--Plan submitted to FRA for 32 railroads......... 1 plan............... 20 hours......... 20
Tier II or Tier III equipment
before being placed in
service (Revised Requirement).
238.131--Exterior side door safety 6 passenger car 2 analyses........... 4 hours.......... 8
systems--new passenger cars/ builders.
locomotives used in passenger
service: Failure Modes, Effects,
Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
238.133--Exterior side door safety 32 railroads......... 32 plan updates...... 4 hours.......... 128
systems--passenger cars/
locomotives used in passenger
service: Functional test plans.
--Notification to designated 32 railroads......... 9,994 radio 30 secs.......... 84
RR authority by train notifications.
crewmember of unsealed door
by-pass device.
--Safety briefing by train 32 railroads......... 320 safety briefings. 2 minutes........ 11
crew when door by-pass device
is activated.
--Notification to designated 32 railroads......... 320 radio 30 secs.......... 3
RR authority by train notifications.
crewmember that door by-pass
device has been activated.
--On-site qualified person 32 railroads......... 320 QP descriptions.. 5 minutes........ 27
(QP) description to a
qualified maintenance person
(QMP) off-site that equipment
is safe to move for repairs.
--QP/QMP notification to 32 railroads......... 320 notices + 320 30 seconds + 10 56
crewmember in charge that safety briefings. min..
door by-pass has been
activated + safety briefing
by train crew.
--RR record of each door by- 32 railroads......... 320 records.......... 2 minutes........ 11
pass activation.
--RR record of unintended 32 railroads......... 20 records........... 2 hours.......... 40
power door openings.
--RR record of by-pass 32 railroads......... 20 records........... 4 hours.......... 80
activations found unsealed.
238.135--RR request to FRA for 32 railroads......... 2 requests........... 25 hours......... 50
special consideration to operate
passenger trains with exterior
side doors or trap doors, or
both, open between stations.
--FRA request to RR for 32 railroads......... 1 additional document 12 hours......... 12
additional information
concerning special
consideration request.
--RR Operating rule to 32 railroads......... 10 operating rules... 42 hours......... 420
override a door summary
circuit or no motion system,
or both, in the event of an
en route exterior side door
failure or malfunction on a
passenger train.
--RR copy of written operating 32 railroads......... 10,000 op. rule 1 minute......... 167
rules to train crew members copies.
and control center personnel.
--RR training of train crew 32 railroads......... 3,383 RR trained 30 mins.......... 1,692
members on requirements of employees.
this section.
--RR training of new employees 32 railroads......... 150 workers.......... 30 mins.......... 75
--RR operational/efficiency 32 railroads......... 3,383 tests.......... 2 minutes........ 113
tests of train crew members &
control center employees.
238.201--New Requirements-- 32 railroads......... 1 plan............... 40 hours......... 40
Alternative Compliance: Tier I
Passenger equipment--Test plans +
supporting documentation
demonstrating compliance.
--Notice of tests sent to FRA 32 railroads......... 1 notice............. 30 mins.......... 1
30 days prior to commencement
of operations.
238.229--Safety Appliances:
--Welded safety appliances: 32 railroads......... 32 lists............. 1 hour........... 32
Lists.
--Defective welded safety 32 railroads......... 4 tags............... 3 minutes........ .20
appliance--Tags.
--Notification to crewmembers 32 railroads......... 2 notices............ 1 minute......... .0333
about non-compliant equipment.
--Inspection plans
--Inspection personnel-- 32 railroads......... 1 plan............... 16 hours......... 16
Training.
--Remedial action: Defect/ 32 railroads......... 60 workers........... 4 hours.......... 240
crack in weld--record. 32 railroads......... 1 record............. 2.25 hours....... 2
--Petitions for special 32 railroads......... 1 petition........... 4 hours.......... 4
approval of alternative
compliance--impractical
equipment design.
--Records of inspection/repair 32 railroads......... 3,264 records........ 12 mins.......... 653
of welded safety appliance
brackets/supports/training.
238.230--Safety Appliances--New 32 railroads......... 100 records.......... 6 minutes........ 10
Equipment--Inspection record of
welded equipment by qualified
Employee.
--Welded safety appliances: 32 railroads......... 1 document........... 4 hours.......... 4
Documentation for equipment
impractically designed to
mechanically fasten safety
appliance support.
238.231--Brake System--Inspection 32 railroads......... 2,500 forms.......... 21 mins.......... 875
and repair of hand/parking brake:
Records.
--Procedures verifying hold of 32 railroads......... 1 procedure.......... 2 hours.......... 2
hand/parking brakes.
238.237--Automated monitoring:
--Documentation for alerter/ 32 railroads......... 1 document........... 2 hours.......... 2
deadman control timing.
--Defective alerter/deadman 32 railroads......... 25 tags.............. 3 minutes........ 1
control: Tagging.
238.303--Exterior calendar day 32 railroads......... 32 notices........... 1 minute......... 1
mechanical inspection of
passenger equipment: Notice of
previous inspection.
--Dynamic brakes not in 32 railroads......... 50 tags.............. 3 minutes........ 3
operating mode: Tag.
--Conventional locomotives 32 railroads......... 50 tags.............. 3 minutes........ 3
equipped with inoperative
dynamic brakes: Tagging.
--MU passenger equipment found 32 railroads......... 4 documents.......... 2 hours.......... 8
with inoperative/ineffective
air compressors at exterior
calendar day inspection:
Documents.
--Written notice to train crew 32 railroads......... 100 notices.......... 3 minutes........ 5
about inoperative/ineffective
air compressors.

[[Page 59215]]

--Records of inoperative air 32 railroads......... 100 records.......... 2 minutes........ 3
compressors.
--Record of exterior calendar 32 railroads......... 1,959,620 records.... 10 minutes + 1 359,264
day mechanical inspection. minute.
238.305--Interior calendar day 32 railroads......... 540 tags............. 1 minute......... 9
mechanical inspection of
passenger cars--Tagging of
defective end/side doors.
--Records of interior calendar 32 railroads......... 1,959,620 records.... 5 minutes + 1 359,264
day inspection. minute.
238.307--Periodic mechanical 32 railroads......... 2 notices/ 5 hours.......... 10
inspection of passenger cars and notifications.
unpowered vehicles--Alternative
inspection intervals:
Notifications.
--Notice of seats/seat 32 railroads......... 200 notices.......... 2 minutes........ 7
attachments broken or loose.
--Records of each periodic 32 railroads......... 19,284 insp./records. 200 hours/2 3,857,443
mechanical inspection. minutes.
--Detailed documentation of 32 railroads......... 5 documents.......... 100 hours........ 500
reliability assessments as
basis for alternative
inspection interval.
238.311--Single car test:
--Tagging to indicate need for 32 railroads......... 50 tags.............. 3 minutes........ 3
single car test.
238.313--Class I Brake Test:
--Record for additional 32 railroads......... 15,600 insp./records. 30 minutes....... 7,800
inspection for passenger
equipment that does not
comply with Sec.
238.231(b)(1).
238.315--Class IA brake test:
--Notice to train crew that 32 railroads......... 18,250 notices....... 5 seconds........ 25
test has been performed
(verbal notice).
--Communicating signal tested 32 railroads......... 365,000 op. 15 seconds....... 1,521
and operating as intended. sufficiency tests.
238.317--Class II brake test:
--Communicating signal tested 32 railroads......... 365,000 op. 15 seconds....... 1,521
and operating as intended. sufficiency tests.
238.321--Out-of-service credit-- 32 railroads......... 1,250 notes.......... 2 minutes........ 42
Passenger car: Out-of-use
notation.
238.445--Automated Monitoring:
--Performance monitoring: 1 railroad........... 10,000 alerts/alarms. 10 secs.......... 28
Alerters/alarms.
--Monitoring system: Self-test 1 railroad........... 21,900 notices....... 20 secs.......... 122
feature: Notifications.
238.703--Quasi-static Load 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis........... 40 hours......... 40
Requirements--Document/analysis
for Tier III Trainsets showing
compliance with this section (New
Requirement).
238.705--Dynamic Collision 2 railroads.......... 1 model validation/ 40 hours......... 40
Scenario--Demonstration of analysis.
Occupied Volume Integrity for
Tier III Trainsets--Model
validation document (New
Requirement).
238.707--Override Protection--Anti- 2 railroads.......... 1 test/analysis...... 40 hours......... 40
climbing performance test/
analysis for Tier III Trainsets
(New Requirement).
238.709--Fluid Entry Inhibition-- 2 railroads.......... 1 compliance document/ 20 hours......... 20
Information to demonstrate analysis.
compliance with this section--
Tier III Trainsets (New
Requirement).
238.721--New Requirements--Tier 5 glass manufacturers 1 data document/ 60 hours......... 60
III Trainsets--End-facing analysis.
document/analysis for exterior
windows of Tier III Trainsets.
--Marking of End-facing 5 glass manuf........ 60 markings.......... 2 minutes........ 2
exterior windows Tier III
Trainsets.
--Cab Glazing; Side-facing 5 glass manuf........ 1 document analysis.. 10 hours......... 10
exterior windows in Tier III
cab--document showing
compliance with Type II
glazing.
--Marking of side-facing 5 glass manuf........ 120 window markings.. 2 minutes........ 4
exterior windows in Tier III
Trainsets.
--Non-Cab Glazing; Side-facing 5 glass manuf........ 1 data document/ 20 hours......... 20
exterior windows--Tier III-- analysis.
compliance document for Type
II glazing.
--Marking of side-facing 5 glass manuf........ 1, 200 glass markings 2 minutes........ 40
exterior windows--Tier III
Trainsets--non-cab cars.
--Alternative standard to FRA 5 glass manuf........ 1 alternative 5 hours.......... 5
for side-facing exterior standard.
window intended to be
breakable and serve as an
emergency window exit (option
to comply with an alternative
standard).
238.731--New Requirements--Brake 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis/test...... 480 hours........ 480
Systems--RR analysis and testing
Tier III trainsets' maximum safe
operating speed.
--Tier III trainsets' 2 railroads.......... 240 stencils/markings 20 minutes....... 80
passenger brake alarm--
legible stenciling/marking of
devices with words
``Passenger Brake Alarm''.
--Main reservoir test/ 2 railroads.......... 1 test/cert.......... 6 hours.......... 6
certification.
--Inspection, testing and 2 railroads.......... 1 ITM plan........... 480 hours........ 480
maintenance plan (ITM)--
Periodic inspection for main
reservoirs.
--Brake actuator design with 2 railroads.......... 1 design............. 40 hours......... 40
approved brake cylinder
pressure as part of design
review process.
--Tier III equipment: 2 railroads.......... 1 procedure.......... 8 hours.......... 8
Demonstrated securement
procedure.
238.733--Tier III Interior fixture 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis/document.. 20 hours......... 20
attachment standard--analysis for
FRA approval (New Requirement).
238.735--Tier III seat 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis/document.. 40 hours......... 40
crashworthiness standard
(passenger & cab crew)--analysis
for FRA approval (New
Requirement).
238.737--Tier III luggage racks 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis/document.. 20 hours......... 20
standard--analysis for FRA
approval (New Requirement).
238.741--New Requirement-- 2 railroads.......... 1 plan............... 60 hours......... 60
Emergency window egress/rescue
plan to FRA for passenger cars in
Tier III trainsets not in
compliance with sections 238.113
or 238.114.
238.743--New Requirement-- 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis/test...... 60 hours......... 60
Emergency Lighting Std.--Tier III
trainsets--analysis/test.
238.751--New Requirements-- 2 railroads.......... 1 analysis/test...... 40 hours......... 40
Alerters--alternate technology-
Tier III trainsets--analysis/test.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 59216]]

All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the
information collection submission sent to OMB, please contact FRA
Information Collection Clearance Officers Mr. Robert Brogan at (202)
493-6292 or Ms. Kimberly Toone at (202) 493-6132, or via email at the
following addresses: [email protected]; [email protected].
Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the
collection of information requirements should direct them to the Office
of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
725 17th St. NW, Washington, DC 20503, attn: FRA Desk Officer. Comments
may also be sent via email to the Office of Management and Budget at
the following address: [email protected].
OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60
days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.
FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control
number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control numbers
for any new information collection requirements resulting from this
rulemaking action prior to the effective date of this final rule. The
OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate notice
in the Federal Register.

D. Federalism Implications

Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999),
requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the Executive Order
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency
may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by
statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local
governments, or the agency consults with State and local government
officials early in the process of developing the regulation. Where a
regulation has federalism implications and preempts State law, the
agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the process
of developing the regulation.
This final rule has been analyzed under the principles and criteria
contained in Executive Order 13132. This final rule will not have a
substantial effect on the States or their political subdivisions, and
it will not affect the relationships between the Federal government and
the States or their political subdivisions, or the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. In
addition, FRA has determined that this regulatory action will not
impose substantial direct compliance costs on the States or their
political subdivisions. Therefore, the consultation and funding
requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
However, this final rule could have preemptive effect by operation
of law under certain provisions of the Federal railroad safety
statutes, specifically the former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,
repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106, and the former Locomotive
Boiler Inspection Act (LIA) at 45 U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and re-
codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703. Section 20106 provides that States
may not adopt or continue in effect any law, regulation, or order
related to railroad safety or security that covers the subject matter
of a regulation prescribed or order issued by the Secretary of
Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) or the
Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security
matters), except when the State law, regulation, or order qualifies
under the ``essentially local safety or security hazard'' exception to
section 20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as preempting the field concerning locomotive safety. See
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 et
seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or
related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as
safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign
commerce and believes that its requirements are consistent with the
Trade Agreements Act. The requirements are safety standards, which, as
noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to trade. Moreover, FRA
has sought, to the extent practicable, to state the requirements in
terms of the performance desired, rather than in more narrow terms
restricted to a particular design or system.

F. Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other
environmental statutes, related regulatory requirements, and its
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures)
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999). FRA has determined that this final rule is
categorically excluded from detailed environmental review pursuant to
section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures, which concerns the promulgation
of railroad safety rules and policy statements that do not result in
significantly increased emissions of air or water pollutants or noise
or increased traffic congestion in any mode of transportation. See 64
FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Categorical exclusions (CEs) are actions
identified in an agency's NEPA implementing procedures that do not
normally have a significant impact on the environment and therefore do
not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental
impact statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 1508.4.
In analyzing the applicability of a CE, the agency must also
consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would
warrant a more detailed environmental review through the preparation of
an EA or EIS. Id. In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's
Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no extraordinary
circumstances exist with respect to this regulation that might trigger
the need for a more detailed environmental review. The purpose of this
rulemaking is to amend FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. This
rulemaking adds safety standards to facilitate the safe implementation
of high-speed rail at

[[Page 59217]]

speeds up to 220 mph (Tier III). The rule also establishes
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements in the
alternative to those specified for passenger trainsets operated at
speeds up to 125 mph (Tier I). In addition, the rule increases from 150
mph to 160 mph the maximum speed allowable for the tier of railroad
passenger equipment currently operated at the Nation's highest train
speeds (Tier II). FRA does not anticipate any environmental impacts
from the requirements and finds that there are no extraordinary
circumstances present in connection with this final rule.

G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)

Executive Order 12898, ``Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,'' and DOT
Order 5610.2(a) (91 FR 27534, May 10, 2012) require DOT agencies to
achieve environmental justice as part of their mission by identifying
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects, including interrelated social
and economic effects, of their programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations. The DOT Order
instructs DOT agencies to address compliance with Executive Order 12898
and requirements within the DOT Order in rulemaking activities, as
appropriate. FRA has evaluated this rule under Executive Order 12898
and the DOT Order and has determined that it will not cause
disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental
effects on minority populations or low-income populations.

H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)

FRA has evaluated this rule in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13175, ``Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,'' dated November 6, 2000.
This rule will not have a substantial direct effect on one or more
Indian tribes, will not impose substantial direct compliance costs on
Indian tribal governments, and will not preempt tribal laws. Therefore,
the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175 do
not apply, and a tribal summary impact statement is not required.

I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

Under section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless otherwise
prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions on
State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector (other
than to the extent that such regulations incorporate requirements
specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C.
1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general notice of
proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the promulgation of any
rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in expenditure
by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any final rule for
which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency
shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the effect on State,
local, and tribal governments and the private sector. This final rule
will not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of $100,000,000
or more (as adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year, and thus
preparation of such a statement is not required.

J. Energy Impact

Executive Order 13211, ``Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,'' requires
Federal agencies to prepare a Statement of Energy Effects for any
``significant energy action.'' See 66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001. FRA has
evaluated this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 13211 and
determined that this regulatory action is not a ``significant energy
action'' within the meaning of the Executive Order.
Executive Order 13783, ``Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth,'' requires Federal agencies to review regulations to determine
whether they potentially burden the development or use of domestically
produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural
gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources. See 82 FR 16093, March 31,
2017. FRA has determined this regulatory action will not burden the
development or use of domestically produced energy resources.

K. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

As required by 1 CFR 51.5, FRA has summarized the standards it is
incorporating by reference and shown the reasonable availability of
those standards in the section-by-section analysis of Sec. Sec.
238.733, 238.735, 238.737, 238.743, and Appendix G, paragraphs (i) and
(j) of this rulemaking document.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 236

Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 238

Incorporation by reference, Passenger equipment, Railroad safety,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Rule

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA amends parts 229,
231, 236, and 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 229--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 103, 322(a), 20103, 20107, 20901-02, 21301,
21302, 21311; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

Subpart A--General

0
2. Revise Sec. 229.3(c) to read as follows:

Sec. 229.3 Applicability.

* * * * *
(c) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 229.125 do not apply to Tier II
passenger equipment as defined in Sec. 238.5 of this chapter (i.e.,
passenger equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 160 mph).
* * * * *

0
3. Section 229.5 is amended by revising the definition of ``Tier II''
to read as follows:

Sec. 229.5 Definitions.

* * * * *
Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 160 mph.
* * * * *

PART 231--[AMENDED]

0
4. The authority citation for part 231 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20131, 20301-20303,
21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

0
5. Revise Sec. 231.0(c) to read as follows:

Sec. 231.0 Applicability and penalties.

* * * * *
(c) Except for the provisions governing uncoupling devices, this
part does not apply to Tier II passenger equipment as defined in Sec.
238.5 of this chapter (i.e., passenger equipment operating at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph).
* * * * *

[[Page 59218]]

PART 236--[AMENDED]

0
6. The authority citation for part 236 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20157,
20301-20303, 20306, 20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461,
note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems

Sec. 236.1007 [Amended]

0
7. In Sec. 236.1007, remove paragraph (d), and redesignate paragraph
(e) as new paragraph (d).

PART 238--[AMENDED]

0
8. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303,
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49
CFR 1.89.

Subpart A--General

0
9. Section 238.5 is amended by:
0
a. Adding in alphabetical order a definition of ``Associate
Administrator'';
0
b. Revising the definitions of ``glazing, end-facing'', ``glazing,
side-facing'', and ``Tier II'';
0
c. Adding in alphabetical order a definition of ``Tier III'';
0
d. Revising the definition of ``Train, Tier II passenger''; and
0
e. Adding in alphabetical order definitions of ``Trainset, Tier I
alternative passenger'', ``Trainset, Tier III'', and ``Trainset unit''.
The additions and revisions read as follows:

Sec. 238.5 Definitions.

* * * * *
Associate Administrator means Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety, Associate Administrator for Safety.
* * * * *
Glazing, end-facing means any exterior glazing located where a line
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal
angle of 50 degrees or less with the centerline of the vehicle in which
the glazing material is installed, except for: The coupled ends of
multiple-unit (MU) locomotives or other equipment semi-permanently
connected to each other in a train consist; and end doors of passenger
cars at locations other than the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive.
Any location which, due to curvature of the glazing material, can meet
the criteria for either an end-facing glazing location or a side-facing
glazing location shall be considered an end-facing glazing location.
* * * * *
Glazing, side-facing means any glazing located where a line
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal
angle of more than 50 degrees with the centerline of the vehicle in
which the glazing material is installed. Side-facing glazing also means
glazing located at the coupled ends of MU locomotives or other
equipment semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist
and glazing located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car
or MU locomotive.
* * * * *
Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not
exceeding 160 mph.
Tier III means operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade
crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.
* * * * *
Train, Tier II passenger means a short-distance or long-distance
intercity passenger train providing service at speeds exceeding 125 mph
but not exceeding 160 mph.
* * * * *
Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger means a trainset consisting
of Tier I passenger equipment demonstrating alternative crashworthiness
and occupant protection performance under the requirements of appendix
G to this part.
Trainset, Tier III means an intercity passenger train that provides
service in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph and in
an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding
125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.
Trainset unit means a trainset segment located between connecting
arrangements (articulations).
* * * * *

0
10. In Sec. 238.21 revise paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) to read as
follows:

Sec. 238.21 Special approval procedure.

* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) The elements prescribed in Sec. Sec. 238.201(b)(1),
238.229(j)(2), and 238.230(d); and
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Each petition for special approval of the pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan shall be submitted to the Associate
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE, Washington, DC 20590.
* * * * *

Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements

0
11. In Sec. 238.111 revise paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and
(c) to read as follows:

Sec. 238.111 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) Submit a copy of the plan to FRA at least 30 days before
testing the equipment and include with that submission notification of
the times and places of the pre-revenue service tests to permit FRA
observation of such tests. For Tier II and Tier III passenger
equipment, the railroad shall obtain FRA approval of the plan under the
procedures specified in Sec. 238.21.
* * * * *
(4) Document in writing the results of the tests. For Tier II and
Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall report the results of
the tests to the Associate Administrator at least 90 days prior to its
intended operation of the equipment in revenue service.
(5) Correct any safety deficiencies identified in the design of the
equipment or in the ITM procedures uncovered during testing. If safety
deficiencies cannot be corrected by design changes, the railroad shall
impose operational limitations on the revenue service operation of the
equipment designed to ensure the equipment can operate safely. For Tier
II and Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall comply with any
operational limitations the Associate Administrator imposes on the
revenue service operation of the equipment for cause stated following
FRA review of the results of the test program. This section does not
restrict a railroad from petitioning FRA for a waiver of a safety
regulation under the procedures specified in part 211 of this chapter.
* * * * *
(7) For Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, obtain approval
from the Associate Administrator before placing the equipment in
revenue service. The Associate Administrator will grant such approval
if the railroad demonstrates compliance with the applicable
requirements of this part.
(c) If a railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new
technology to Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment that has been
used in revenue service in

[[Page 59219]]

the United States and that affects a safety system on such equipment,
the railroad shall follow the procedures in paragraph (b) of this
section before placing the equipment in revenue service with the major
upgrade or introduction of new technology.

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

0
12. In Sec. 238.201, redesignate the text after the heading of
paragraph (b) as paragraph (b)(1), revise the first sentence of newly
redesignated paragraph (b)(1), and add paragraph (b)(2) to read as
follows:

Sec. 238.201 Scope/alternative compliance.

* * * * *
(b) * * * (1) Passenger equipment of special design shall be deemed
to comply with this subpart, other than Sec. 238.203, for the service
environment the petitioner proposes to operate the equipment in if the
Associate Administrator determines under paragraph (c) of this section
that the equipment provides at least an equivalent level of safety in
such environment for the protection of its occupants from serious
injury in the case of a derailment or collision. * * *
(2)(i) Tier I passenger trainsets may comply with the alternative
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to
this part instead of the requirements in Sec. Sec. 238.203, 238.205,
238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219.
(ii) To assess compliance with the alternative requirements, the
railroad shall submit the following documents to the Associate
Administrator, for review:
(A) Test plans, and supporting documentation for all tests intended
to demonstrate compliance with the alternative requirements and to
validate any computer modeling and analysis used, including notice of
such tests, 30 days before commencing the tests; and
(B) A carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance
report based on the analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to
demonstrate compliance.
(iii) The carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection
compliance report shall be deemed acceptable unless the Associate
Administrator stays action by written notice to the railroad within 60
days after receipt of the report.
(A) If the Associate Administrator stays action, the railroad shall
correct any deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected
the deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service.
(B) FRA may also impose written conditions necessary for safely
operating the equipment, for cause stated.
* * * * *

0
13. Revise Sec. 238.203(a)(1) to read as follows:

Sec. 238.203 Static end strength.

(a)(1) Except as further specified in this paragraph (a), paragraph
(d) of this section, and Sec. 238.201(b)(2), on or after November 8,
1999, all passenger equipment shall resist a minimum static end load of
800,000 pounds applied on the line of draft without permanent
deformation of the body structure.
* * * * *

0
14. Revise the first sentence of Sec. 238.205(a) to read as follows:

Sec. 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, and Sec.
238.201(b), all passenger equipment placed in service for the first
time on or after September 8, 2000, and prior to March 9, 2010, shall
have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing mechanism
capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000
pounds without failure. * * *
* * * * *

0
15. Revise Sec. 238.207 to read as follows:

Sec. 238.207 Link between coupling mechanism and carbody.

Except as specified in Sec. 238.201(b), all passenger equipment
placed in service for the first time on or after September 8, 2000,
shall have a coupler carrier at each end designed to resist a vertical
downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for any normal
horizontal position of the coupler, without permanent deformation.
Passenger equipment connected by articulated joints that complies with
the requirements of Sec. 238.205(a) also complies with the
requirements of this section.

0
16. Amend Sec. 238.209 by adding paragraph (a) introductory text to
read as follows:

Sec. 238.209 Forward end structure of locomotives, including cab cars
and MU locomotives.

(a) Except as specified in Sec. 238.201(b)--
* * * * *

0
17. Revise Sec. 238.211(a) introductory text to read as follows:

Sec. 238.211 Collision posts.

(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph (a), paragraphs
(b) through (d) of this section, Sec. 238.201(b), and Sec.
238.209(b)--
* * * * *

0
18. Revise Sec. 238.213(a)(1) to read as follows:

Sec. 238.213 Corner posts.

(a)(1) Except as further specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of
this section, Sec. 238.201(b), and Sec. 238.209(b), each passenger
car shall have at each end of the car, placed ahead of the occupied
volume, two full-height corner posts, each capable of resisting
together with its supporting car body structure:
* * * * *

0
19. Revise the first sentence of Sec. 238.219 to read as follows:

Sec. 238.219 Truck-to-car-body attachment.

Except as provided in Sec. 238.201(b), passenger equipment shall
have a truck-to-carbody attachment with an ultimate strength sufficient
to resist without failure the following individually applied loads: 2g
vertically on the mass of the truck; and 250,000 pounds in any
horizontal direction on the truck, along with the resulting vertical
reaction to this load. * * *

Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

0
20. Revise the first sentence of Sec. 238.401 to read as follows:

Sec. 238.401 Scope.

This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger
equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160
mph. * * *

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier II Passenger Equipment

0
21. Revise Sec. 238.501 to read as follows:

Sec. 238.501 Scope.

This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance
requirements for railroad passenger equipment that operates at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph.

0
22. Add subpart H to part 238 to read as follows:
Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
Sec.
238.701 Scope.
238.702 Definitions.

Trainset Structure

238.703 Quasi-static compression load requirements.
238.705 Dynamic collision scenario.
238.707 Override protection.

[[Page 59220]]

238.709 Fluid entry inhibition.
238.711 End structure integrity of cab end.
238.713 End structure integrity of non-cab end.
238.715 Roof and side structure integrity.
238.717 Truck-to-carbody attachment.

Glazing

238.721 Glazing.

Brake System

238.731 Brake system.

Interior Fittings and Surfaces

238.733 Interior fixture attachment.
238.735 Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew).
238.737 Luggage racks.

Emergency Systems

238.741 Emergency window egress and rescue access.
238.743 Emergency lighting.

Cab Equipment

238.751 Alerters.
238.753 Sanders.
Figure 1 to Subpart H of Part 238--Cylindrical Projectile for Use in
Sec. 238.721 End-Facing Cab-Glazing Testing

Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

Sec. 238.701 Scope.

This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger
equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding
125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at
speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. Passenger seating
is permitted in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset if the trainset
complies with the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements
of this subpart, and the railroad has an approved right-of-way plan
under Sec. 213.361 of this chapter and an approved HSR-125 plan under
Sec. 236.1007(c) of this chapter. Demonstration of compliance with the
requirements of this subpart is subject to FRA review and approval
under Sec. 238.111.

Sec. 238.702 Definitions.

As used in this subpart--
Cab means a compartment or space within a trainset that is designed
to be occupied by an engineer and contain an operating console for
exercising control over the trainset.
Integrated trainset means a passenger train in which all units of
the trainset are designed to operate together to achieve the trainset's
structural crashworthiness performance.

Trainset Structure

Sec. 238.703 Quasi-static compression load requirements.

(a) General. To demonstrate resistance to loss of occupied volume,
Tier III trainsets shall comply with both the quasi-static compression
load requirements in paragraph (b) of this section and the dynamic
collision requirements in Sec. 238.705.
(b) Quasi-static compression load requirements. (1) Each individual
vehicle in a Tier III trainset shall resist a minimum quasi-static end
load applied on the collision load path of:
(i) 800,000 pounds without permanent deformation of the occupied
volume; or
(ii) 1,000,000 pounds without exceeding either of the following two
conditions:
(A) Local plastic strains no greater than 5 percent; and
(B) Vehicle shortening no greater than 1 percent over any 15-foot
length of the occupied volume; or
(iii) 1,200,000 pounds without crippling the body structure.
Crippling of the body structure is defined as reaching the maximum
point on the load-versus-displacement characteristic.
(2) To demonstrate compliance with this section, each type of
vehicle shall be subjected to an end compression load (buff) test with
an end load magnitude no less than 337,000 lbf (1500 kN).
(3) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section shall be documented and submitted to FRA for review and
approval.

Sec. 238.705 Dynamic collision scenario.

(a) General. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 238.703,
occupied volume integrity (OVI) shall also be demonstrated for each
individual vehicle in a Tier III trainset through an evaluation of a
dynamic collision scenario in which a moving train impacts a standing
train under the following conditions:
(1) The initially-moving trainset is made up of the equipment
undergoing evaluation at its AW0 ready-to-run weight;
(2) If trainsets of varying consist lengths are intended for use in
service, then the shortest and longest consist lengths shall be
evaluated;
(3) If the initially-moving trainset is intended for use in push-
pull service, then, as applicable, each configuration of leading
vehicle shall be evaluated separately;
(4) The initially-standing train is led by a rigid locomotive and
also made up of five identical passenger coaches having the following
characteristics:
(i) The rigid locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach
weighs 95,000 pounds;
(ii) The rigid locomotive and each passenger coach crush in
response to applied force as specified in Table 1 to this section; and
(iii) The rigid locomotive shall be modeled using the data inputs
listed in appendix H to this part so that it has a geometric design as
depicted in Figure 1 to appendix H to this part;
(5) The scenario shall be evaluated on tangent, level track;
(6) The initially-moving trainset shall have an initial velocity of
20 mph if it is an integrated trainset, or an initial velocity of 25
mph if the lead vehicle of the trainset is not part of the integrated
design;
(7) The coupler knuckles on the colliding equipment shall be closed
and centered;
(8) The initially-moving trainset and initially-standing train
consists are not braked;
(9) The initially-standing train has only one degree-of-freedom
(longitudinal displacement); and
(10) The model used to demonstrate compliance with the dynamic
collision requirements must be validated. Model validation shall be
documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval.
(b) Dynamic collision requirements. As a result of the impact
described in paragraph (a) of this section--
(1) One of the following two conditions must be met for the
occupied volume of the initially-moving trainset:
(i) There shall be no more than 10 inches of longitudinal permanent
deformation; or
(ii) Global vehicle shortening shall not exceed 1 percent over any
15-foot length of occupied volume.
(2) If Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd.,
December 2010, is used to demonstrate compliance with any of the
requirements in Sec. Sec. 238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then
the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of
each vehicle in the initially-moving trainset during the dynamic
collision scenario shall not exceed 5g during any 100-millisecond (ms)
time period. The maximum interval between data points so averaged in
the 100-ms time period shall be no greater than 1-ms.
(3) Compliance with each of the following conditions shall also be
demonstrated for the cab of the initially-moving trainset after the
impact:
(i) For each seat provided for an employee in the cab, and any
floor-

[[Page 59221]]

mounted seat in the cab, a survival space shall be maintained where
there is no intrusion for a minimum of 12 inches from each edge of the
seat. Walls or other items originally within this defined space, not
including the operating console, shall not further intrude more than
1.5 inches towards the seat under evaluation;
(ii) There shall be a clear exit path for the occupants of the cab;
(iii) The vertical height of the cab (floor to ceiling) shall not
be reduced by more than 20 percent; and
(iv) The operating console shall not have moved more than 2 inches
closer to the engineer's seat; if the engineer's seat is part of a set
of adjacent seats, the requirements of this paragraph (b)(3) apply to
both seats.

Table 1--Force-Versus-Crush Relationships for Passenger Coach and
Conventional Locomotive
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crush Force
Vehicle (in) (lbf)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Coach.................................... 0 0
3 80,000
6 2,500,000
Conventional Locomotive............................ 0 0
2.5 100,000
5 2,500,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 238.707 Override protection.

(a) Colliding equipment. (1) Using the dynamic collision scenario
described in Sec. 238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall be
evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions:
(i) All vehicles in the initially-moving trainset and initially-
standing train consists are positioned at their nominal running
heights;
(ii) The lead vehicle of the initially-moving trainset shall be
perturbed laterally and vertically upwards by 3 inches at the colliding
interface; and
(iii) The lead vehicle of the initially-moving trainset shall be
perturbed laterally and vertically downwards by 3 inches at the
colliding interface.
(2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph
(a)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall
be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:
(i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of
the colliding equipment in the initially-moving trainset and initially-
standing train consists shall not change by more than 4 inches; and
(ii) The tread of any wheel of the first vehicle of the initially-
moving trainset shall not rise above the top of the rail by more than 4
inches
(b) Connected equipment override. (1) Using the dynamic collision
scenario described in Sec. 238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall
be evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions:
(i) All vehicles in the initially-moving trainset and initially-
standing train consists are positioned at their nominal running
heights;
(ii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically upwards by 2
inches, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-
vehicle interface in the initially-moving trainset; and,
(iii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically downwards
by 2 inches, relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-
vehicle interface in the initially-moving trainset.
(2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall
be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:
(i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of
the connected equipment in the initially-moving trainset shall not
change by more than 4 inches; and
(ii) The tread of any wheel of the initially-moving trainset shall
not rise above the top of rail by more than 4 inches.

Sec. 238.709 Fluid entry inhibition.

(a) The skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset
shall be--
(1) Equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with yield strength of
25,000 pounds per square inch. Material of higher yield strength may be
used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at
least an equivalent level of strength is maintained. The sum of the
thicknesses of elements (e.g., skin and structural elements) from the
structural leading edge of the trainset to a point, when projected onto
a vertical plane, just forward of the engineer's normal operating
position, may also be used to satisfy this requirement;
(2) Designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into the cab; and
(3) Affixed to the collision posts or other main structural members
of the forward end structure so as to add to the strength of the end
structure.
(b) Information used to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of this section shall at a minimum include a list and
drawings of the structural elements considered in satisfying the
thickness-strength requirement of this section, and calculations
showing that the thickness-strength requirement is satisfied.

Sec. 238.711 End structure integrity of cab end.

The cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the
requirements of appendix F to this part to demonstrate the integrity of
the end structure. For those units of Tier III trainsets without
identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix F
to this part apply to the end structure at each location specified,
regardless of whether the structure is a post.

Sec. 238.713 End structure integrity of non-cab end.

(a) General. Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section to demonstrate the integrity
of the end structure for other than the cab ends.
(b) Collision post requirements. (1) Each unit of a Tier III
trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the unit either:
(i) Two full-height collision posts, located at approximately the
one-third points laterally. Each collision post shall have an ultimate
longitudinal shear strength of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point
even with the top of the underframe member to which it is attached. If
reinforcement is used to provide the shear value, the reinforcement
shall have full value for a distance of 18 inches up from the
underframe connection and then taper to a point approximately 30 inches
above the underframe connection; or
(ii) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of
forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section
is required to withstand. For analysis purposes, the required forces
may be assumed to be evenly distributed at the locations where the
equivalent structure attaches to the underframe.
(2) Collision posts are not required for the non-cab ends of any
unit with push-back couplers and interlocking anti-climbing mechanisms
in a Tier III trainset, or the non-cab ends of a semi-permanently
coupled consist of trainset units, if the inter-car connection is
capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post
requirements in subpart C of this part. For demonstrating that the
inter-car connection is capable of preventing such disengagement (and
telescoping), the criteria in Sec. 238.707(b) apply.
(c) Corner post requirements. (1) Each passenger car in a Tier III
trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the car, placed ahead of the
occupied volume, two side structures capable of resisting a:

[[Page 59222]]

(i) 150,000-pound horizontal force applied at floor height without
failure;
(ii) 20,000-pound horizontal force applied at roof height without
failure; and
(iii) 30,000-pound horizontal force applied at a point 18 inches
above the top of the floor without permanent deformation.
(2) For purposes of this paragraph (c), the orientation of the
applied horizontal forces shall range from longitudinal inward to
transverse inward.
(3) For each evaluation load, the load shall be applied to an area
of the structure sufficient to not locally cripple or punch through the
material.
(4) The load area shall be chosen to be appropriate for the
particular car design and shall not exceed 10 inches by 10 inches.

Sec. 238.715 Roof and side structure integrity.

To demonstrate roof and side structure integrity, Tier III
trainsets shall comply with the requirements in Sec. Sec. 238.215 and
238.217.

Sec. 238.717 Truck-to-carbody attachment.

To demonstrate the integrity of truck-to-carbody attachments, each
unit in a Tier III trainset shall:
(a) Comply with the requirements in Sec. 238.219; or
(b) Have a truck-to-carbody attachment with strength sufficient to
resist, without yielding, the following individually applied, quasi-
static loads on the mass of the truck at its CG:
(1) 3g vertically downward;
(2) 1g laterally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to
this load; and
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 5g
longitudinally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to this
load, provided that for the conditions in the dynamic collision
scenario described in Sec. 238.705(a):
(i) The average longitudinal deceleration at the CG of the
equipment during the impact does not exceed 5g; and
(ii) The peak longitudinal deceleration of the truck during the
impact does not exceed 10g.
(c) As an alternative to demonstrating compliance with paragraph
(b)(3) of this section, the truck shall be shown to remain attached
after a dynamic impact under the conditions in the collision scenario
described in Sec. 238.705(a).
(d) For purposes of paragraph (b) of this section, the mass of the
truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, truck-mounted brake system,
suspension system components, and any other component attached to the
truck by design.
(e) Truck attachment shall be demonstrated using a validated model.

Glazing

Sec. 238.721 Glazing.

(a) Cab glazing; end-facing. (1) Each end-facing exterior window in
a cab of a Tier III trainset shall comply with the requirements for
Type I glazing in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, except as
provided in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section.
(2) Instead of the large object impact test specified in appendix A
to part 223, each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall demonstrate
compliance with the following requirements of this paragraph (a):
(i) The glazing article shall be impacted with a cylindrical
projectile that complies with the following design specifications as
depicted in Figure 1 to this subpart:
(A) The projectile shall be constructed of aluminum alloy such as
ISO 6362-2:1990, grade 2017A, or its demonstrated equivalent;
(B) The projectile end cap shall be made of steel;
(C) The projectile assembly shall weigh 2.2 pounds (-0, +0.044
pounds) or 1 kilogram (kg) (-0, +0.020 kg) and shall have a
hemispherical tip. Material may be removed from the interior of the
aluminum portion to adjust the projectile mass according to the
prescribed tolerance. The hemispherical tip shall have a milled surface
with 0.04 inch (1 mm) grooves; and
(D) The projectile shall have an overall diameter of 3.7 inches (94
mm) with a nominal internal diameter of 2.76 inches (70 mm).
(ii) The test of the glazing article shall be deemed satisfactory
if the test projectile does not penetrate the windscreen, the
windscreen remains in its frame, and the witness plate is not marked by
spall.
(iii) A new projectile shall be used for each test.
(iv) The glazing article to be tested shall be that which has the
smallest area for each design type. For the test, the glazing article
shall be fixed in a frame of the same construction as that mounted on
the vehicle.
(v) A minimum of four tests shall be conducted and all must be
deemed satisfactory. Two tests shall be conducted with the complete
glazing article at 32 [deg]F 9 [deg]F (0 [deg]C 5 [deg]C) and two tests shall be conducted with the complete
glazing article at 68 [deg]F 9 [deg]F (20 [deg]C 5 [deg]C). For the tests to be valid they shall demonstrate that
the core temperature of the complete glazing article during each test
is within the required temperature range.
(vi) The test glazing article shall be mounted at the same angle
relative to the projectile path as it will be to the direction of
travel when mounted on the vehicle.
(vii) The projectile's impact velocity shall equal the maximum
operating speed of the Tier III trainset plus 100 mph (160 km/h). The
projectile velocity shall be measured within 13 feet (4 m) of the point
of impact.
(viii) The point of impact shall be at the geometrical center of
the glazing article.
(3) Representative samples for large object impact testing of large
Tier III end-facing cab glazing articles may be used instead of the
actual design size, provided that the following conditions are met:
(i) Testing of glazing articles having dimensions greater than 39.4
by 27.6 inches (1,000 mm by 700 mm), excluding framing, may be
performed using a flat sample having the same composition as the
glazing article for which compliance is to be demonstrated. The glazing
manufacturer shall provide documentation containing its technical
justification that testing a flat sample is sufficient to verify
compliance of the glazing article with the requirements of this
paragraph (a).
(ii) Flat sample testing is permitted only when no surface of the
full-size glazing article contains curvature with a radius less than 98
inches (2,500 mm), and when a complete, finished glazing article is
laid (convex side uppermost) on a flat horizontal surface, the distance
(measured perpendicularly to the flat surface) between the flat surface
and the inside face of the glazing article is not greater than 8 inches
(200 mm).
(4) End-facing glazing shall demonstrate sufficient resistance to
spalling, as verified by the large impact projectile test under the
following conditions:
(i) An annealed aluminum witness plate of maximum thickness 0.006
inch (0.15 mm) and of dimension 19.7 by 19.7 inches (500 mm by 500 mm)
is placed vertically behind the sample under test, at a horizontal
distance of 500 mm from the point of impact in the direction of travel
of the projectile or the distance between the point of impact of the
projectile and the location of the engineer's eyes in the engineer's
normal operating position, whichever is less. The center of the witness
plate is aligned with the point of impact.
(ii) Spalling performance shall be deemed satisfactory if the
aluminum witness plate is not marked.
(iii) For the purposes of this subpart, materials used specifically
to protect the cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall

[[Page 59223]]

shields) shall not be required to meet the flammability and smoke
emission performance requirements of appendix B to this part.
(5) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall, at a minimum,
provide ballistic penetration resistance that meets the requirements of
appendix A to part 223.
(6) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall be permanently
marked, before installation, in such a manner that the marking is
clearly visible after the material has been installed. The marking
shall include:
(i) The words ``FRA TYPE IHS'' to indicate that the material has
successfully passed the testing requirements specified in this
paragraph (a);
(ii) The name of the manufacturer; and
(iii) The type or brand identification of the material.
(b) Cab glazing; side-facing. Each side-facing exterior window in a
cab of a Tier III trainset shall--
(1) Comply with the requirements for Type II glazing contained in
appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, for large-object impact; and
(2) Maintain the minimum ballistics penetration resistance as
required for end-facing glazing in paragraph (a)(5) of this section.
(c) Non-cab glazing; side-facing. (1) Except as provided in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section, each side-facing exterior window in
other than a cab shall comply with the requirements for Type II glazing
contained in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter.
(2) Instead of the requirements specified in paragraph (c)(1) of
this section, a side-facing exterior window intended to be breakable
and serve as an emergency window exit may comply with an alternative
standard that provides an equivalent level of safety and is approved
for use by FRA.
(d) Glazing securement. Each exterior window shall remain in place
when subjected to:
(1) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two
trains pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while
traveling in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum
authorized speed; and
(2) The impact forces that the exterior window is required to
resist as specified in this section.
(e) Glazing certification. (1) Each manufacturer that provides
glazing materials, intended by the manufacturer for use in achieving
compliance with the requirements of this section, shall certify that
each type of glazing material being supplied for this purpose has been
successfully tested. Tests performed on glazing materials for
demonstration of compliance with this section, relied on by the glazing
manufacturer in furtherance of certification, may be performed by
either:
(i) An independent third-party (laboratory, facility, underwriter);
or
(ii) The glazing manufacturer, by providing FRA the opportunity to
witness all tests by written notice at least 30 days prior to testing.
(2) Any glazing material certified to meet the requirements of this
section shall be re-certified by the same means (as originally
certified) if any changes are made to the glazing that may affect its
mechanical properties or its mounting arrangement on the vehicle.
(3) All certification/re-certification documentation shall be made
available to FRA upon request.

Brake System

Sec. 238.731 Brake system.

(a) General. Each railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and
testing the maximum safe operating speed for its Tier III trainsets
that results in no thermal damage to equipment or infrastructure during
normal operation of the brake system.
(b) Minimum performance requirement for brake system. Each Tier III
trainset's brake system shall be capable of stopping the trainset from
its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the
track over which the trainset is operating under the worst-case
adhesion conditions defined by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
(c) Emergency brake system. A Tier III trainset shall be provided
with an emergency brake application feature that produces an
irretrievable stop. An emergency brake application shall be available
at any time, and shall be initiated by either of the following:
(1) An unintentional parting of the trainset; or
(2) The train crew at locations within the trainset specified by
the railroad, as approved by FRA.
(d) Passenger brake alarm. (1) A means to initiate a passenger
brake alarm shall be provided at two locations in each unit of a Tier
III trainset that is over 45 feet in length. When a unit of the
trainset is 45 feet or less in length, a means to initiate a passenger
brake alarm need only be provided at one location in the unit. These
locations shall be identified by the railroad as approved by FRA. The
words ``Passenger Brake Alarm'' shall be legibly stenciled or marked on
each device or on an adjacent badge plate.
(2) All passenger brake alarms shall be installed so as to prevent
accidental activation.
(3) During departure from the boarding platform, activation of the
passenger brake alarm shall result in an emergency brake application.
(4) A passenger brake alarm activation that occurs after the
trainset has safely cleared the boarding platform shall be acknowledged
by the engineer within the time period specified by the railroad, as
approved by FRA, for train operation to remain under the full control
of the engineer. The method used to confirm that the trainset has
safely cleared the boarding platform shall be defined by the railroad
as approved by FRA.
(5) If the engineer does not acknowledge the passenger brake alarm
as specified in paragraph (d)(4) of this section, at a minimum, a
retrievable full service brake application shall be automatically
initiated until the trainset has stopped unless the engineer intervenes
as described in paragraph (d)(6) of this section.
(6) To retrieve the full service brake application described in
paragraph (d)(5) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the
passenger brake alarm and activate appropriate controls to issue a
command for brake application as specified by the railroad, as approved
by FRA.
(e) Degraded performance of blended brake system. The following
requirements of this paragraph (e) apply to operation of Tier III
trainsets with blended braking systems, to address degraded brake
system performance:
(1) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic or regenerative brake
shall not result in exceeding the allowable stopping distance defined
by the railroad as approved by FRA;
(2) The available friction braking shall be adequate to stop the
trainset safely under the operating conditions defined by the railroad,
as approved by FRA;
(3) The operational status of the trainset brake system shall be
displayed for the engineer in the operating cab; and
(4) The railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and testing the
maximum speed for safely operating its Tier III trainsets using only
the friction brake portion of the blended brake with no thermal damage
to equipment or infrastructure. The analysis and testing shall also be
used to determine the maximum safe operating speed for various
percentages of operative friction brakes and shall be included in the
railroad's ITM program.
(f) Main reservoir system. (1) The main reservoirs in a Tier III
trainset

[[Page 59224]]

shall be designed and tested to meet the requirements of a recognized
standard specified by the railroad as approved by FRA, such as the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code for Unfired Pressure Vessel Section VIII, Division I (ASME
Code). The working pressure shall be 150 psig (10.3 bar) and the
corresponding rated temperature shall be 150 [deg]F (65 [deg]C) unless
otherwise defined by the railroad as approved by FRA. Reservoirs shall
be certified based on their size and volume requirements.
(2) Each welded steel main reservoir shall be drilled in accordance
with the requirements of a recognized standard specified by the
railroad as approved by FRA, such as paragraph UG-25(e) of Section VIII
of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. With the drain opening
located at the low point of the reservoir, one row of holes shall be
drilled lengthwise on the reservoir on a line intersecting the drain
opening and sloped to the drain opening.
(3) A breach of a welded steel main reservoir at any of the drilled
holes described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section shall be cause for
the reservoir to be condemned and withdrawn from service. Any type of
welded repair to a steel main reservoir is prohibited.
(g) Aluminum main reservoirs. (1) Aluminum main reservoirs used in
a Tier III trainset shall conform to the requirements of Sec. 229.51
of this chapter.
(2) Any type of welded repair to an aluminum main reservoir is
prohibited.
(h) Main reservoir tests. Prior to initial installation, each main
reservoir shall be subjected to a pneumatic or hydrostatic pressure
test based on the maximum working pressure defined in paragraph (f) or
(g) of this section, as appropriate, unless otherwise established by
the railroad's ITM program. Records of the test date, location, and
pressure shall be maintained by the railroad for the life of the
equipment. Periodic inspection requirements for main reservoirs shall
be defined in the railroad's ITM program.
(i) Brake gauges. All mechanical gauges and all devices providing
electronic indication of air pressure that are used by the engineer to
aid in the control or braking of a Tier III trainset shall be located
so they may be conveniently read from the engineer's normal position
during operation of the trainset.
(j) Brake application/release. (1) Brake actuators shall be
designed to provide brake pad and shoe clearance when the brakes are
released.
(2) The minimum brake cylinder pressure shall be established by the
railroad, as approved by FRA, to provide adequate adjustment from
minimum service to full service for proper train operation.
(k) Foundation brake gear. The railroad shall specify requirements
in its ITM program for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the
foundation brake gear.
(l) Leakage. (1) If a Tier III trainset is equipped with a brake
pipe, the leakage rates shall not exceed the limits defined in either
paragraph (l)(2) of this section, or those defined in the Air
Consumption Analysis included in the railroad ITM program, whichever is
more restrictive. The method of inspection for main reservoir pipe
leakage shall be prescribed in the railroad's ITM program.
(2) Brake pipe leakage may not exceed 5 p.s.i. per minute; and with
a full service application at maximum brake pipe pressure and with
communication to the brake cylinders closed, the brakes shall remain
applied for at least 5 minutes.
(m) Slide protection and alarm. (1) A Tier III trainset shall be
equipped with an adhesion control system designed to automatically
adjust the braking force on each wheel to prevent sliding during
braking.
(2) A wheel-slide alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall
alert the engineer in the operating cab to wheel-slide conditions on
any axle of the trainset.
(3) The railroad shall specify operating restrictions for trainsets
with slide protection devices for when they fail to prevent wheel slide
within safety parameters preset by the railroad. Both the operating
restrictions and safety parameters shall be approved by FRA.
(n) Monitoring and diagnostics. Each Tier III trainset shall be
equipped with a monitoring and diagnostic system that is designed to
automatically assess the functionality of the brake system for the
entire trainset. Details of the system operation and the method of
communication of brake system functionality prior to the departure of
the trainset and while en route shall be described in detail in the
railroad's ITM program.
(o) Train securement. Independent of the pneumatic brakes, Tier III
equipment shall be equipped with a means of securing the equipment
against unintentional movement when left standing and unmanned in such
a manner that the brake system of the equipment cannot be readily
controlled by a qualified person. The railroad shall develop the
procedures used to secure the equipment and shall also demonstrate that
those procedures effectively secure the equipment on all grade
conditions identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
(p) Rescue operation; brake system. A Tier III trainset's brake
system shall be designed to allow a rescue vehicle or trainset to
control its brakes when the trainset is disabled.

Interior Fittings and Surfaces

Sec. 238.733 Interior fixture attachment.

(a) Tier III trainsets shall comply with the interior fixture
attachment strength requirements referenced in either of the following
paragraphs:
(1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98; or
(2) Section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and
features,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
(i) The conditions of Sec. 238.705(b)(2) are met;
(ii) Interior fixture attachment strength is sufficient to resist
without failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g
lateral, and 3g vertical when applied to the mass of the fixture; and
(iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
(b) The standards required in this section are incorporated by
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
and is available from the sources indicated below. It is also available
for inspection at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA,
call 202-741-6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
(1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW,
Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com.
(i) APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for Attachment Strength
of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,'' Authorized
September 28, 2005.
(ii) [Reserved]
(2) Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB,
Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY,
www.rgsonline.co.uk.
(i) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010.
(ii) [Reserved]

[[Page 59225]]

Sec. 238.735 Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew).

(a) Passenger seating in Tier III trainsets shall comply with the
requirements referenced in either of the following paragraphs:
(1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 excluding Section 6,
``Seat durability testing;'' or
(2) Section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, personnel, or train
crew,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
(i) The conditions of Sec. 238.705(b)(2) are met;
(ii) Seat attachment strength is sufficient to resist without
failure individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and
3g applied to the mass of the seat; and
(iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
(b) Each seat provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III
trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, shall comply with
Sec. 238.233(e), (f), and (g).
(c) The standards required in this section are incorporated by
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
and are available from the sources indicated below. They are also
available for inspection at NARA. For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
(1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW,
Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com.
(i) APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in
Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 3, 2010.
(ii) [Reserved]
(2) Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., Communications, RSSB,
Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY,
www.rgsonline.co.uk.
(i) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010.
(ii) [Reserved]

Sec. 238.737 Luggage racks.

(a) Overhead storage racks shall provide longitudinal and lateral
restraint for stowed articles. These racks shall incorporate transverse
dividers at a maximum spacing of 10 ft. (3 m) to restrain the
longitudinal movement of luggage. To restrain the lateral movement of
luggage, these racks shall also slope downward in the outboard
direction at a minimum ratio of 1:8 with respect to a horizontal plane.
(b) Luggage racks shall comply with the requirements in either of
the following paragraphs:
(1) Section 238.233; or
(2) Section 6.8, ``Luggage stowage,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
(i) The conditions of Sec. 238.705(b)(2) are met;
(ii) Attachment strength is sufficient to resist without failure
individually applied loads of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g
vertical; and
(iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA. In particular, the
railroad shall determine the maximum allowable weight of the luggage
stowed for purposes of evaluating luggage rack attachment strength.
(c) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010 is incorporated by
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
and is available from Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd.,
Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London,
England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for
inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

Emergency Systems

Sec. 238.741 Emergency window egress and rescue access.

(a) Emergency window egress and rescue access plan. If a passenger
car in a Tier III trainset is not designed to comply with the
requirements in Sec. 238.113 or Sec. 238.114, the railroad shall
submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress and rescue access
plan during the design review stage. The plan must include, but is not
limited to, the elements in this section.
(b) Ease of operability. If an emergency window exit in a passenger
car requires the use of a tool, other implement (e.g., hammer), or a
mechanism to permit removal of the window panel from the inside of the
car during an emergency situation, then the plan must demonstrate the
use of the device provides a level of safety equivalent to that
required by Sec. 238.113(b). In particular, the plan must address the
location, design, and signage and instructions for the device. The
railroad shall also include a provision in its Tier III ITM program to
inspect for the presence of the device at least each day the car is in
service.
(c) Dimensions. If the dimensions of a window opening in a
passenger car do not comply with the requirements in Sec. 238.113 or
Sec. 238.114, then the plan must demonstrate that at least an
equivalent level of safety is provided.
(d) Alternative emergency evacuation openings. If a passenger car
employs the use of emergency egress panels or additional door exits
instead of emergency window exits or rescue access windows, then the
plan must demonstrate that such alternative emergency evacuation
openings provide a level of safety at least equivalent to that required
by Sec. 238.113 or Sec. 238.114, or both as appropriate. The plan
must address the location, design, and signage and instructions for the
alternative emergency evacuation openings.

Sec. 238.743 Emergency lighting.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, Tier III
trainsets shall comply with the emergency lighting requirements
specified in Sec. 238.115.
(b) Emergency lighting back-up power systems shall, at a minimum,
be capable of operating after experiencing the individually applied
accelerations defined in either of the following paragraphs:
(1) Section 238.115(a)(4)(ii); or
(2) Section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and
features,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
(i) The conditions of Sec. 238.705(b)(2) are met;
(ii) The initial shock of a collision or derailment is based on a
minimum load of 5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical; and
(iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions
identified by the railroad, as approved by FRA.
(c) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' December 2010, is incorporated by
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
and is available from Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd.,
Communications,

[[Page 59226]]

RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY,
www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for inspection at NARA. For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-
6030 or go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

Cab Equipment

Sec. 238.751 Alerters.

(a) An alerter shall be provided in the operating cab of each Tier
III trainset, unless in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section
the trainset operates in a territory where an alternate technology
providing equivalent safety is installed, such as redundant automatic
train control or redundant automatic train stop system.
(b) Upon initiation of the alerter, the engineer must acknowledge
the alerter within the time period and according to the parameters
specified by the railroad, as approved by FRA, in order for train
operations to remain under the full control of the engineer.
(c) If the engineer does not acknowledge the alerter as specified
in paragraph (b) of this section, at a minimum a retrievable full
service brake application shall occur until the train has stopped,
unless the crew intervenes as described in paragraph (d) of this
section.
(d) To retrieve the full service brake application described in
paragraph (c) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the
alerter and activate appropriate controls to issue a command for brake
application as specified by the railroad and approved by FRA.
(e) If an alternate technology to the alerter is used, the railroad
shall conduct an analysis that confirms the ability of the technology
to provide an equivalent level of safety. This analysis shall be
approved by FRA.

Sec. 238.753 Sanders.

(a) A Tier III trainset shall be equipped with operative sanders,
if required by the railroad and as approved by FRA.
(b) Sanders required under this section shall comply with Sec.
229.131(a), (b), and (d) of this chapter, except that instead of the
requirements of Sec. Sec. 229.9 and 229.23 of this chapter:
(1) The requirements of Sec. 238.17 shall apply to the tagging and
movement of a Tier III trainset with defective sanders; and
(2) The requirements of the railroad's ITM program shall apply to
the next periodic inspection of such a trainset.
(c) In addition to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this
section, the railroad's ITM program shall specify the inspection,
testing, and maintenance requirements for Tier III trainsets equipped
with sanders.

[[Page 59227]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21NO18.128

0
23. Add and reserve subpart I to part 238 to read as follows:

Subpart I--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for
Tier III Passenger Equipment--[Reserved]

0
24. Appendix A to part 238 is amended by adding, in alphabetical
order, the entry for new subpart H to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties \1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Willful
Section Violation violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBPART H--SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR TIER III PASSENGER EQUIPMENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
238.703 Quasi-static compression load 2,500 5,000
requirements...........................
238.705 Dynamic collision scenario...... 2,500 5,000
238.707 Override protection............. 2,500 5,000

[[Page 59228]]

238.709 Fluid entry inhibition.......... 2,500 5,000
238.711 End structure integrity of cab 2,500 5,000
end....................................
238.713 End structure integrity of non- 2,500 5,000
cab end................................
238.715 Roof and side structure 2,500 5,000
integrity..............................
238.717 Truck-to-car-body attachment.... 2,500 5,000
238.721 Glazing......................... 2,500 5,000
238.731 Brake system.................... 2,500 5,000
238.733 Interior fixture attachment..... 2,500 5,000
238.735 Seat crashworthiness............ 2,500 5,000
238.737 Luggage racks................... 2,500 5,000
238.741 Emergency window egress and 2,500 5,000
rescue access..........................
238.751 Alerters........................ 2,500 5,000
238.753 Sanders......................... 1,000 2,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful
violation. Generally, when two or more violations of these regulations
are discovered with respect to a single unit of passenger equipment
that is placed or continued in service by a railroad, the appropriate
penalties set forth above are aggregated up to a maximum of $27,904
per day. However, failure to perform, with respect to a particular
unit of passenger equipment, any of the inspections and tests required
under subparts D and F of this part will be treated as a violation
separate and distinct from, and in addition to, any substantive
violative conditions found on that unit of passenger equipment.
Moreover, the Administrator reserves the right to assess a penalty of
up to the statutory maximum amount for any violation where
circumstances warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A.
Failure to observe any condition for movement of defective equipment set
forth in Sec. 238.17 will deprive the railroad of the benefit of the
movement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any
responsible individuals liable for penalty under the particular
regulatory section(s) concerning the substantive defect(s) present on
the unit of passenger equipment at the time of movement.
Failure to observe any condition for the movement of passenger equipment
containing defective safety appliances, other than power brakes, set
forth in Sec. 238.17(e) will deprive the railroad of the movement-
for-repair provision and make the railroad and any responsible
individuals liable for penalty under the particular regulatory
section(s) contained in part 231 of this chapter or Sec. 238.429
concerning the substantive defective condition.
The penalties listed for failure to perform the exterior and interior
mechanical inspections and tests required under Sec. 238.303 and
Sec. 238.305 may be assessed for each unit of passenger equipment
contained in a train that is not properly inspected. Whereas, the
penalties listed for failure to perform the brake inspections and
tests under Sec. 238.313 through Sec. 238.319 may be assessed for
each train that is not properly inspected.
\2\ The penalty schedule uses section numbers from 49 CFR part 238. If
more than one item is listed as a type of violation of a given
section, each item is also designated by a ``penalty code,'' which is
used to facilitate assessment of civil penalties, and which may or may
not correspond to any subsection designation(s). For convenience,
penalty citations will cite the CFR section and the penalty code, if
any. FRA reserves the right, should litigation become necessary, to
substitute in its complaint the CFR citation in place of the combined
CFR and penalty code citation, should they differ.

0
25. Amend paragraph (c) of Appendix B to part 238 by adding two
sentences to the end of note 16 of the table of ``Test Procedures and
Performance Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission
Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive
Cabs'' to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs

* * * * *
(c) * * *

\16\ * * * For purposes of this Note, the floor assembly of a
vehicle in a Tier III trainset may be tested together with undercar
design features that separate the vehicle from the fire source,
i.e., skirts and bottom covers, to protect against a fire source
under and external to the vehicle. To assess the safety associated
with testing the floor assembly in this manner, and to protect
against a fire source under the floor assembly but internal to the
vehicle, safety must also be demonstrated by conducting a fire
hazard analysis that includes the considerations in Note 17.
* * * * *

0
26. Amend the introductory text of appendix F to part 238 by adding a
third paragraph to read as follows:

Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

* * * * *
Although the requirements of this appendix are stated in terms
applicable to Tier I passenger equipment, they are also applicable
to Tier III passenger trainsets under Sec. 238.711. Specifically,
the cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the
requirements of this appendix to demonstrate the integrity of the
end structure.
* * * * *

0
27. Add appendix G to part 238 to read as follows:

Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of Tier I Passenger
Trainsets

General

This appendix applies to Tier I alternative passenger trainsets,
as described below. While the appendix may refer to specific units
of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in
this appendix apply only to a trainset as a whole.
This appendix specifies alternatives to the crashworthiness and
occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger
equipment in Sec. Sec. 238.203, Static end strength; 238.205, Anti-
climbing mechanism; 238.207, Link between coupling mechanism and car
body; 238.209(a), Forward end structure of locomotives, including
cab cars and MU locomotives; 238.211, Collision posts; 238.213,
Corner posts; and 238.219, Truck-to-carbody attachment. To maintain
their integrity, these requirements apply as a whole. They also
apply in addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec. 238.209(b);
238.215, Rollover strength; 238.217, Side structure; and 238.233,
Interior fittings and surfaces; and they apply with APTA standards
for occupant protection, as specified in this appendix.
For ease of comparison with the Tier I requirements in subpart C
of this part, this appendix is arranged in order by the Tier I
section referenced.
Use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative crashworthiness
and occupant protection performance for Tier I passenger equipment
is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec. 238.201.

Occupied Volume Integrity

(a) Instead of the requirements of Sec. 238.203, the units of a
Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their occupied
volume integrity by complying with both the quasi-static compression
load and dynamic collision requirements in Sec. Sec. 238.703(b) and
238.705, respectively.

Override Protection

(b) Colliding equipment. Instead of the requirements of Sec.
238.205, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may

[[Page 59229]]

demonstrate their ability to resist vertical climbing and override
at each colliding interface during a train-to-train collision by
complying with the dynamic collision requirements in Sec.
238.707(a).
(c) Connected equipment. Instead of the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 238.205 and 238.207, when connected, the units of a Tier
I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their ability to
resist vertical climbing and override by complying with the dynamic
collision requirements in Sec. 238.707(b).

Fluid Entry Inhibition

(d) Instead of the requirements of Sec. 238.209(a), each cab
end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate its
ability to inhibit fluid entry and provide other penetration
resistance by complying with the requirements in Sec. 238.709.

End Structure Integrity of Cab End

(e) Each cab end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset is
subject to the requirements of appendix F to this part to
demonstrate cab end structure integrity. For those cab ends without
identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix
F to this part apply to the end structure at the specified
locations, regardless of whether the structure at the specified
locations is a post.

End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End

(f) Instead of the applicable requirements of Sec. Sec. 238.211
and 238.213, the units of a Tier I alternative trainset may
demonstrate end structure integrity for other than a cab end by
complying with the requirements in Sec. 238.713(b) and (c).

Roof and Side Structure Integrity

(g) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the
requirements of Sec. Sec. 238.215 and 238.217 to demonstrate roof
and side structure integrity.

Truck Attachment

(h) Instead of the requirements of Sec. 238.219, the units of a
Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their truck-
to-carbody attachment integrity by complying with the requirements
in Sec. 238.717 (b) through (e).

Interior Fixture Attachment

(i)(1) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the
interior fixture requirements in Sec. 238.233. Interior fixtures
must also comply with APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for
Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad
Equipment,'' Authorized September 28, 2005, and those portions of
APTA PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for the Design and
Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June
11, 2006, relating to interior fixtures.
(2) The standards required in this paragraph (i) are
incorporated by reference into this paragraph with the approval of
the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC and available from the American Public
Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006,
www.aptastandards.com. It is also available for inspection at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or
go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
(i) APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for Attachment
Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,''
Authorized September 28, 2005.
(ii) APTA PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for the Design and
Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June
11, 2006.

Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Crew)

(j) Passenger seating. (1) Passenger seating in a Tier I
alternative passenger trainset is subject to the requirements for
seats in Sec. 238.233 and must also comply with APTA PR-CS-S-016-
99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,''
Authorized October 3, 2010, with the exception of Section 6, ``Seat
durability testing.''
(2) APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats
in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 3, 2010, is
incorporated by reference into this paragraph (j) with the approval
of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1
CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC and is available from the American Public
Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006,
www.aptastandards.com. It is also available for inspection at the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or
go to www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
(k) Crew seating. Each seat provided for an employee regularly
assigned to occupy the cab of a Tier I alternative passenger
trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, must comply with
Sec. 238.233(e), (f), and (g).

0
28. Add appendix H to part 238 to read as follows:

Appendix H to Part 238--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input
Data and Geometrical Depiction

(a) As specified in Sec. 238.705(a)(4), this appendix provides
input data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a
computer model of the rigid locomotive design for use in evaluating
the occupied volume integrity of a Tier III trainset in a dynamic
collision scenario. (This appendix may also be applied to a Tier I
alternative passenger trainset to evaluate its occupied volume
integrity, in accordance with appendix G to this part).
(b) The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the
geometry for approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive
design. Because this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a
locomotive mass corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is
provided for modeling purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight
specified for the locomotive in Sec. 238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to
this appendix provides two views of the locomotive's geometric
depiction. The input data is contained in Appendix C to FRA's
Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, available at https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.

[[Page 59230]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR21NO18.129

Issued in Washington, DC.
Ronald L. Batory,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-25020 Filed 11-20-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P

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